STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION

STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION DEFINED

Statutory Construction the art or process of discovering and expounding
the meaning and intention of the authors of the law with respect to its
application to a given case, where that intention is rendered doubtful, among
others, by reason of the fact that the given case is not explicitly provided for in
the law.
Justice Martin defines statutory construction as the art of seeking the
intention of the legislature in enacting a statute and applying it to a given state
of facts.
A judicial function is required when a statute is invoked and different
interpretations are in contention.
Difference between judicial legislation and statutory construction:Where
legislature attempts to do several things one which is invalid, it may be
discarded if the remainder of the act is workable and in no way depends upon
the invalid portion, but if that portion is an integral part of the act, and its
excision changes the manifest intent of the act by broadening its scope to
include subject matter or territory which was not included therein as enacted,
such excision is judicial legislation and not statutory construction.

THE OBJECTIVE OF STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION

(LEGISLATIVE INTENT)
Legislative intent
In law, the legislative intent of the legislature in enacting legislation may sometimes be
considered by the judiciary when interpreting the law (see judicial interpretation). The judiciary
may attempt to assess legislative intent where legislation is ambiguous, or does not appear to
directly or adequately address a particular issue, or when there appears to have been a legislative
drafting error.
When a statute is clear and unambiguous, the courts have said, repeatedly, that the inquiry into
legislative intent ends at that point. It is only when a statute could be interpreted in more than
one fashion that legislative intent must be inferred from sources other than the actual text of the
statute.

Sources of legislative intent

Courts frequently look to the following sources in attempting to determine the goals and
purposes that the legislative body had in mind when it passed the law:
the text of the bill as proposed to the legislative body,
amendments to the bill that were proposed and accepted or rejected,
the record of hearings on the topic,
legislative records or journals,
speeches and floor debate made prior to the vote on the bill,
legislative subcommittee minutes, factual findings, and/or reports,
other relevant statutes which can be used to understand the definitions in the statute
on question,
other relevant statutes which indicate the limits of the statute in question,
legislative files of the executive branch, such as the governor or president,
case law prior to the statute or following it which demonstrates the problems the
legislature was attempting to address with the bill, or
constitutional determinations (i.e. "Would Congress still have passed certain sections
of a statute 'had it known' about the constitutional invalidity of the other portions of
the statute?").
legislative intent- the reason for passing the law
literal meaning or plain meaning rule. If the statute is clear, plain and free from ambiguity, it
must be given its literal meaning and applied without attempted interpretation.
you get the meaning of the law from the word per word written law. Literal meaning or plain rule
means INTERPRETATION of the LAW. ALL WORDS words in a statute should if possible, be
given effect.
Where a statute defines a word or phrase employed therein, the word or phrase should not, by
CONSTRUCTION, be given a different meaning. When the legislature defines a word used in a
statute, it does not usurp the courts function to interpret the laws but it merely LEGISLATES
what should form part of the law itself.
It is settled that in the absence of legislative intent to define words, words and phrases used in
statute should be given their plain, ordinary, and common usage meaning which is supported by
the maximgeneralia verba sunt generaliter intelligenda or what is generally spoken shall be
generally understood. It is also the same as GENERALI DICTUM GENERALITIR EST
INTERPRETANDUM a general statement is understood in a general sense.
WORDS MUST BE SUBSERVIENT TO THE INTENT and not intent to words.
Ubi lex non distinguit nec nos distinguere debemus. When the law does not distinguish, do not
distinguish.

dura lex sed lex or HOC QUIDEM PERQUAM DURUM EST, SED ITA LEX SCRIPTA EST.
The law maybe harsh but is still the law. It is exceedingly hard, but so the law is written.
doctrine of necessary implication this doctrine states that what is implied in a statute is as
much a part thereof as that which is expressed. Every statute is understand by implication
to contain all such provision as may be necessary to effectuate to its object and purpose, or
to make effective rights, powers, privileges or jurisdiction which it grants, including all such
collateral and subsidiary consequences as may be fairly and logically inferred from its terms. The
principle is expressed in the maxim EX NECESSITATE LEGIS or from the necessity of the law.

ejusdem generis. THE SAME KIND OR SPECIE. This is to give effect to both the particular
and general words, by treating the particular words as indicating the class and the general
words as indicating all that is embraced in said class, although not specifically named by the
particular words.
The rule of ejusdem generis is not of universal application; it should be used to carry out, not to
defeat the intent or purpose of the law; the rule must give way in favor of the legislative
intent;
limitations of ejusdem generis requisites:
1. Statue contains an enumeration of particular and specific words, followed by a general
word or phrase;
2. The particular and specific words constitute a class or are of the same kind;
3. The enumeration of the particular and specific words is not exhaustive or is not merely by
examples;
4. There is no indication of legislative intent to give general words or phrases a broader
meaning.
expressio unios est exclusio alterius.
the expression of 1 person, thing or consequence IMPLIES the EXCLUSION of
OTHERS or
What is expressed puts an end to that which is implied.

EXPRESSUM FACIT CESSARE TACITUM, where a Statute, by its terms, is expressly limited
to certain matters, it may not, by interpretation or CONSTRUCTION, be extended to other
matters.
These also follows that when a statute specifically lists downs the exceptions, what is not list
down as an exception is ACCEPTED express in the maxim EXCEPTIO FIRMAT REGULAM
IN CASIBUS NON EXCEPTIS,
the express exception, exemption or savings excludes others.

application of expressio unius rule. This auxiliary rule is used in CONSTRUCTION of

statutes granting
powers, creating rights and remedies, restricting common right,
and
imposing penalties and forfeitures, as well as those statutes which are strictly construed. It is
only a tool and not a mandatory rule used for ascertaining the legislative intent. The rule must
also yield to legislative intent.

negative- opposite doctrine, WHAT IS EXPRESSED PUTS AN END TO WHAT IS

IMPLIED is known as negative-opposite doctrine or argumentum a contrario.

doctrine of casus omissus (case of omission) pro omisso habendus est. A person, object or
thing omitted from an enumeration must be held to have been omitted intentionally. This rule is
not absolute if it can be shown that the legislature did not intend to exclude the person, thing or
object from the enumeration. If such legislative intent is clearly indicated, the COURT may
supply the omission if to do so will carry out the intent of the legislature and will not do violence
to its language.

doctrine of last antecedent or AD PROXIMUM ANTECEDENS FIAL RELATIO NISI

IMPEDIATUR SENTENTIA or relative words refer to the nearest antecedents, unless the
context otherwise requires. QUALIFYING WORDS restrict or modify only the words or
phrases to which they are immediately associated.
The last antecedent rule is a doctrine of interpretation of a statute, by which "Referential and
qualifying phrases, where no contrary intention appears, refer solely to the last antecedent." The
rule is typically bound by "common sense" and is flexible enough to avoid application that
"would involve an absurdity, do violence to the plain intent of the language, or if the context for
other reason requires a deviation from the rule." Evidence that a qualifying phrase is supposed
to apply to all antecedents instead of only to the immediately preceding one may be found
in the fact that it is separated from the antecedents by a comma."

reddendo singula singulis when two descriptions makes it impossible to reconcile, reconcile
it to have a singular meaning to settle the issue.
refers to each phrase or expression to its appropriate object, or let each be put in its proper place,
that is, the words should be taken DISTRIBUTIVELY to effect that each word is to be applied to
the subject to which it appears by context most appropriate related and to which it is most
applicable.
REDDENDO SINGULA SINGULIS, construction. By rendering each his own; for example,
when two descriptions of property are given together in one mass, both the next of kin and the

heir cannot take, unless in cases where a construction can be made reddendo singula singulis,
that the next of kin shall take the personal estate and the heir at law the real estate. 14 Ves. 490.
Vide 11 East,, 513, n.; Bac. Ab. Conditions, L.

Stare Decisis [Latin, Let the decision stand.] The policy of courts to abide by or adhere to
principles established by decisions in earlier cases. (stah-ray duh-see-sis) n. Latin for "to stand
by a decision," the doctrine that a trial court is bound by appellate court decisions (precedents)
on a legal question which is raised in the lower court. Reliance on such precedents is required of
trial courts until such time as an appellate court changes the rule, for the trial court cannot ignore
the precedent (even when the trial judge believes it is "bad law")

Res Judicata [Latin, A thing adjudged.] A rule that a final judgment on the merits by a court
having jurisdiction is conclusive between the parties to a suit as to all matters that were litigated
or that could have been litigated in that suit.
The party asserting res judicata, having introduced a final judgment on the merits, must then
show that the decision in the first lawsuit was conclusive as to the matters in the second suit. For
example, assume that the plaintiff in the first lawsuit asserted that she was injured in an auto
accident. She sues the driver of the other auto under a theory of Negligence. A jury returns a
verdict that finds that the defendant was not negligent. The injured driver then files a second
lawsuit alleging additional facts that would help her prove that the other driver was negligent. A
court would dismiss the second lawsuit under res judicata because the second lawsuit is based
on the same Cause of Action (negligence) and the same injury claim.
Obiter Dictum[Latin, By the way.] Words of an opinion entirely unnecessary for the decision of
the case. A remark made or opinion expressed by a judge in a decision upon a cause, "by the
way", that is, incidentally or collaterally, and not directly upon the question before the court or
upon a point not necessarily involved in the determination of the cause, or introduced by way of
illustration, or analogy or argument. Such are not binding as precedent.
AEQUITAS NUNQUAM CONTRAVENIT LEGIS . EQUITY never acts in contravention of
the law.
The reason of the Law is the Life of the Law or RATIO LEGIS ET ANIMA.

Interpretation and CONSTRUCTION of Statutes must be done to avoid evil and

injustice. EA EST ACCIPIENDA INTERPRETATIO QUAE VITIO CARET.

Interpretatio fienda est ut res magis valeat quam pereat, the interpretation that will give the
thing the EFFICACY is to be adopted. Law must receive sensible interpretation to promote the
ends for which they are enacted. They should be given practical CONSTRUCTION that will give
LIFE to them, IF IT CAN BE DONE without doing VIOLENCE to reason.

UT RES MAGIS VALEAT QUAM PEREAT, A STATUTE must be interpreted to give it

efficient operation and effect as a whole avoiding the nullification of provisions. IT is so that a
legal provision must not be so construed as to be a useless SURPLUSAGE. Accordingly, in case
of Doubt or obscurity, that construction should make the statute fully operative and effective. IT
IS PRESUMED THAT THE LEGISLATURE DID NOT DO A VAIN THING IN THE
ENACTMENT OF THE STATUTE.
In PARE MATERIA, of the same person or thing.

INTERPRETARE ET CONCORDARE LEGES LEGIBUS EST OPTIMUS

INTERPRETANDI MODUS, or every statute must be so CONSTRUED and harmonized with
other statutes as to form a uniform system of Jurisprudence. ALL laws are presumed to be
consistent with each other.

DISTINGUE TEMPORA ET CONCORDABIS JURA, distinguish times and you will

harmonize laws.
IN enacting a STATUTE, the legislature is presumed to have been aware, and taken into account,
PRIOR LAWS on the subject of legislation. Thus, conflict on same subject is not intended and if
such occur, Court must construe, through reconciliation to give effect to the statute. If it is
impossible to reconcile and harmonize, one statute has to give way to the other. The latest
statute shall prevail being the latest expression of the legislative WILL.
A GENERAL LAW and a SPECIAL LAW are in pare materia. The fact that one is general and
the other special creates a presumption that the special act is to be considered as remaining an
exception of the General Act. One as a General Law of the Land, the other as a LAW for a
Particular case. This shall apply all the time regardless of which law was enacted first.
CONTEMPORANEOUS CONSTRUCTIONS or CONTEMPORARY CONSTRUCTIONS are
made by the EXECUTIVE Departments.
First type of Contemporary Constructions are the interpretations of the Executive on Statutes,
for them to implement it, they must understand it and interpret it if the language of the law is
AMBIGUOUS. The executive makes RULES or IRRs for this statutes, or ADMINISTRATIVE
RULES and PROCEDURES. These IRRs or RULES issued by the executive to execute the
Statute are CONTEMPORARY Construction.
Second Type of Contemporary Constructions are the INTERPRETATIONS of the JUSTICE
Secretary in carrying out PENAL LAWS and all OTHER LAWS, under her are the
PROSECUTORS, FISCALS of the Philippine Republic. The issuances on how laws are to be
prosecuted are CONTEMPORARY CONSTRUCTION of the Justice Secretary.
The third type are the DECISIONS OF THE ADMINISTRATIVE BODIES handling disputes in
a QUASI-JUDICIAL MANNER. These decisions are based on their UNDERSTANDING of

Statutes passed by congress, laws that are enforced. These are CONTEMPORARY
INTERPRETATIONS and Constructions.
THESE CONTEMPORARY CONSTRUCTIONS STATUTES HAPPEN, WHEN THERE
ARENO ACTUAL CONTROVERSIES QUESTIONING THE VALIDITY OF STATUTES
IN THE SUPREME COURT, therefore, NO STARE DECISIS HAVE YET BEEN MADE. IF
THERE ARE JUDICIAL INTERPRETATIONS AND CONSTRUCTIONS, THEN
THE JUDICIAL CONSTRUCTIONS ARE governing and are THE ONES followed BY
THE EXECUTIVE DEPARTMENTS once promulgated by the Supreme Court.
CONGRESS, NOT BEING THE CONSTITUTIONALLY POWER TO INTERPRET AND
CONSTRUE THE LAWS THEY MAKE, MAY ALSO DO CONTEMPORARY
CONSTRUCTION IN FOLLOWING STATUTES THAT THEY THEMSELVES ARE BOUND
TO FOLLOW.
WITH THE GRANT OF POWERS, RIGHTS, PRIVILEGES IS ALSO THE RIGHT TO
INCIDENTAL POWERS OF THE POWERS, RIGHTS AND PRIVILEGES. THE
GREATER POWER IMPLIES INCIDENTAL LESSER POWER. This is so because the
greater includes the lesser as expressed in the maxim, in eo quod plus sit, simper inest et
minus. THERE SHALL BE NO CONSTRUCTION TO GIVE EFFECT TO A LAW THAT
SHALL MAKE IT MORE POWERFUL THAN WHAT WAS INTENDED BY THE LAW.
Every statute is understood by IMPLICATION, to contain such provisions as maybe necessary to
EFFECTUATE its object and purpose, or to make effective Rights, powers, privileges or
JURISDICTION which it grants, including all such COLLATERAL and subsidiary
consequences as may be fairly and LOGICALLY inferred from its TERMS, as expressed in the
maxim, Ex necessitate legis or from the NECESSITY of the LAW. Doctrine of Necessary
Implication.
WHAT CANNOT BE DONE DIRECTLY CANNOT BE DONE INDIRECTLY. QUANDO
ALIQUID PROHIBETUR EX DIRECTO, PROHIBETUR ET PER OBLIQUUM.
WHAT IS AUTOLIMITATION?
Doctrine of AutolimitationIt is the doctrine where the Philippines adhere to principles of
international law as a limitation to the exercise of its sovereignty.
Functus officio an officer or agency whose mandate has expired either because of the
arrival of an expiry date or because an agency has accomplished the purpose for which it
was created. Function is mere FORMALITY.
Sin perjuico judgments are judgment, w/o any stated facts in support of the conclusion.

A. Socorro Ramirez v CA and Ester Garcia

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
FIRST DIVISION

G.R. No. 93833 September 28, 1995

SOCORRO D. RAMIREZ, petitioner,
vs.
HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, and ESTER S. GARCIA, respondents.

KAPUNAN, J.:
A civil case damages was filed by petitioner Socorro D. Ramirez in the Regional Trial Court of
Quezon City alleging that the private respondent, Ester S. Garcia, in a confrontation in the latter's
office, allegedly vexed, insulted and humiliated her in a "hostile and furious mood" and in a manner
offensive to petitioner's dignity and personality," contrary to morals, good customs and public
policy." 1
In support of her claim, petitioner produced a verbatim transcript of the event and sought moral
damages, attorney's fees and other expenses of litigation in the amount of P610,000.00, in addition
to costs, interests and other reliefs awardable at the trial court's discretion. The transcript on which
the civil case was based was culled from a tape recording of the confrontation made by
petitioner. 2 The transcript reads as follows:
Plaintiff Soccoro D. Ramirez (Chuchi) Good Afternoon M'am.
Defendant Ester S. Garcia (ESG) Ano ba ang nangyari sa 'yo,
nakalimot ka na kung paano ka napunta rito, porke member ka na,
magsumbong ka kung ano ang gagawin ko sa 'yo.
CHUCHI Kasi, naka duty ako noon.
ESG Tapos iniwan no. (Sic)
CHUCHI Hindi m'am, pero ilan beses na nila akong binalikan,
sabing ganoon
ESG Ito and (sic) masasabi ko sa 'yo, ayaw kung (sic) mag explain
ka, kasi hanggang 10:00 p.m., kinabukasan hindi ka na pumasok.
Ngayon ako ang babalik sa 'yo, nag-aaply ka sa States, nag-aaply ka
sa review mo, kung kakailanganin ang certification mo, kalimutan mo
na kasi hindi ka sa akin makakahingi.
CHUCHI Hindi M'am. Kasi ang ano ko talaga noon i-cocontinue ko
up to 10:00 p.m.

ESG Bastos ka, nakalimutan mo na kung paano ka pumasok dito

sa hotel. Magsumbong ka sa Union kung gusto mo. Nakalimutan mo
na kung paano ka nakapasok dito "Do you think that on your own
makakapasok ka kung hindi ako. Panunumbyoyan na kita
(Sinusumbatan na kita).
CHUCHI Itutuloy ko na M'am sana ang duty ko.
ESG Kaso ilang beses na akong binabalikan doon ng mga no (sic)
ko.
ESG Nakalimutan mo na ba kung paano ka pumasok sa hotel,
kung on your own merit alam ko naman kung gaano ka "ka bobo" mo.
Marami ang nag-aaply alam kong hindi ka papasa.
CHUCHI Kumuha kami ng exam noon.
ESG Oo, pero hindi ka papasa.
CHUCHI Eh, bakit ako ang nakuha ni Dr. Tamayo
ESG Kukunin ka kasi ako.
CHUCHI Eh, di sana
ESG Huwag mong ipagmalaki na may utak ka kasi wala kang
utak. Akala mo ba makukuha ka dito kung hindi ako.
CHUCHI Mag-eexplain ako.
ESG Huwag na, hindi ako mag-papa-explain sa 'yo, makaalala ka
kung paano ka puma-rito. "Putang-ina" sasabi-sabihin mo kamaganak ng nanay at tatay mo ang mga magulang ko.
ESG Wala na akong pakialam, dahil nandito ka sa loob, nasa
labas ka puwede ka ng hindi pumasok, okey yan nasaloob ka umalis
ka doon.
CHUCHI Kasi M'am, binbalikan ako ng mga taga Union.
ESG Nandiyan na rin ako, pero huwag mong kalimutan na hindi ka
makakapasok kung hindi ako. Kung hindi mo kinikilala yan okey lang
sa akin, dahil tapos ka na.
CHUCHI Ina-ano ko m'am na utang na loob.
ESG Huwag na lang, hindi mo utang na loob, kasi kung baga sa
no, nilapastangan mo ako.
CHUCHI Paano kita nilapastanganan?

ESG Mabuti pa lumabas ka na. Hindi na ako makikipagusap sa

'yo. Lumabas ka na. Magsumbong ka. 3
As a result of petitioner's recording of the event and alleging that the said act of secretly taping the
confrontation was illegal, private respondent filed a criminal case before the Regional Trial Court of
Pasay City for violation of Republic Act 4200, entitled "An Act to prohibit and penalize wire tapping
and other related violations of private communication, and other purposes." An information charging
petitioner of violation of the said Act, dated October 6, 1988 is quoted herewith:
INFORMATION
The Undersigned Assistant City Fiscal Accusses Socorro D. Ramirez of Violation of
Republic Act No. 4200, committed as follows:
That on or about the 22nd day of February, 1988, in Pasay City Metro
Manila, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this honorable court,
the above-named accused, Socorro D. Ramirez not being authorized
by Ester S. Garcia to record the latter's conversation with said
accused, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously, with
the use of a tape recorder secretly record the said conversation and
thereafter communicate in writing the contents of the said recording
to other person.
Contrary to law.
Pasay City, Metro Manila, September 16, 1988.
MARIANO M. CUNETA
Asst. City Fiscal
Upon arraignment, in lieu of a plea, petitioner filed a Motion to Quash the Information on the ground
that the facts charged do not constitute an offense, particularly a violation of R.A. 4200. In an order
May 3, 1989, the trial court granted the Motion to Quash, agreeing with petitioner that 1) the facts
charged do not constitute an offense under R.A. 4200; and that 2) the violation punished by R.A.
4200 refers to a the taping of a communication by a person other than a participant to the
communication. 4
From the trial court's Order, the private respondent filed a Petition for Review on Certiorari with this
Court, which forthwith referred the case to the Court of Appeals in a Resolution (by the First Division)
of June 19, 1989.
On February 9, 1990, respondent Court of Appeals promulgated its assailed Decision declaring the
trial court's order of May 3, 1989 null and void, and holding that:
[T]he allegations sufficiently constitute an offense punishable under Section 1 of R.A.
4200. In thus quashing the information based on the ground that the facts alleged do
not constitute an offense, the respondent judge acted in grave abuse of discretion
correctible by certiorari. 5
Consequently, on February 21, 1990, petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration which respondent
Court of Appeals denied in its Resolution 6 dated June 19, 1990. Hence, the instant petition.

Petitioner vigorously argues, as her "main and principal issue" 7 that the applicable provision of
Republic Act 4200 does not apply to the taping of a private conversation by one of the parties to the
conversation. She contends that the provision merely refers to the unauthorized taping of a private
conversation by a party other than those involved in the communication. 8 In relation to this, petitioner
avers that the substance or content of the conversation must be alleged in the Information, otherwise the
facts charged would not constitute a violation of R.A. 4200. 9 Finally, petitioner agues that R.A. 4200
penalizes the taping of a "private communication," not a "private conversation" and that consequently, her
act of secretly taping her conversation with private respondent was not illegal under the said act. 10
We disagree.
First, legislative intent is determined principally from the language of a statute. Where the language
of a statute is clear and unambiguous, the law is applied according to its express terms, and
interpretation would be resorted to only where a literal interpretation would be either impossible 11 or
absurb or would lead to an injustice. 12
Section 1 of R.A. 4200 entitled, " An Act to Prohibit and Penalized Wire Tapping and Other Related
Violations of Private Communication and Other Purposes," provides:
Sec. 1. It shall be unlawfull for any person, not being authorized by all the parties to
any private communication or spoken word, to tap any wire or cable, or by using any
other device or arrangement, to secretly overhear, intercept, or record such
communication or spoken word by using a device commonly known as a dictaphone
or dictagraph or detectaphone or walkie-talkie or tape recorder, or however otherwise
described.
The aforestated provision clearly and unequivocally makes it illegal for any person, not authorized by
all the parties to any private communication to secretly record such communication by means of a
tape recorder. The law makes no distinction as to whether the party sought to be penalized by the
statute ought to be a party other than or different from those involved in the private communication.
The statute's intent to penalize all persons unauthorized to make such recording is underscored by
the use of the qualifier "any". Consequently, as respondent Court of Appeals correctly concluded,
"even a (person) privy to a communication who records his private conversation with another without
the knowledge of the latter (will) qualify as a violator" 13 under this provision of R.A. 4200.
A perusal of the Senate Congressional Records, moreover, supports the respondent court's
conclusion that in enacting R.A. 4200 our lawmakers indeed contemplated to make illegal,
unauthorized tape recording of private conversations or communications taken either by the parties
themselves or by third persons. Thus:
xxx xxx xxx
Senator Taada: That qualified only "overhear".
Senator Padilla: So that when it is intercepted or recorded, the element of secrecy
would not appear to be material. Now, suppose, Your Honor, the recording is not
made by all the parties but by some parties and involved not criminal cases that
would be mentioned under section 3 but would cover, for example civil cases or
special proceedings whereby a recording is made not necessarily by all the parties
but perhaps by some in an effort to show the intent of the parties because the
actuation of the parties prior, simultaneous even subsequent to the contract or the
act may be indicative of their intention. Suppose there is such a recording, would you

say, Your Honor, that the intention is to cover it within the purview of this bill or
outside?
Senator Taada: That is covered by the purview of this bill, Your Honor.
Senator Padilla: Even if the record should be used not in the prosecution of offense
but as evidence to be used in Civil Cases or special proceedings?
Senator Taada: That is right. This is a complete ban on tape recorded
conversations taken without the authorization of all the parties.
Senator Padilla: Now, would that be reasonable, your Honor?
Senator Taada: I believe it is reasonable because it is not sporting to record the
observation of one without his knowing it and then using it against him. It is not fair, it
is not sportsmanlike. If the purpose; Your honor, is to record the intention of the
parties. I believe that all the parties should know that the observations are being
recorded.
Senator Padilla: This might reduce the utility of recorders.
Senator Taada: Well no. For example, I was to say that in meetings of the board of
directors where a tape recording is taken, there is no objection to this if all the parties
know. It is but fair that the people whose remarks and observations are being made
should know that the observations are being recorded.
Senator Padilla: Now, I can understand.
Senator Taada: That is why when we take statements of persons, we say: "Please
be informed that whatever you say here may be used against you." That is fairness
and that is what we demand. Now, in spite of that warning, he makes damaging
statements against his own interest, well, he cannot complain any more. But if you
are going to take a recording of the observations and remarks of a person without
him knowing that it is being taped or recorded, without him knowing that what is
being recorded may be used against him, I think it is unfair.
xxx xxx xxx
(Congression Record, Vol. III, No. 31, p. 584, March 12, 1964)
Senator Diokno: Do you understand, Mr. Senator, that under Section 1 of the bill as
now worded, if a party secretly records a public speech, he would be penalized under
Section 1? Because the speech is public, but the recording is done secretly.
Senator Taada: Well, that particular aspect is not contemplated by the bill. It is the
communication between one person and another person not between a speaker
and a public.
xxx xxx xxx
(Congressional Record, Vol. III, No. 33, p. 626, March 12, 1964)

xxx xxx xxx

The unambiguity of the express words of the provision, taken together with the above-quoted
deliberations from the Congressional Record, therefore plainly supports the view held by the
respondent court that the provision seeks to penalize even those privy to the private
communications. Where the law makes no distinctions, one does not distinguish.
Second, the nature of the conversations is immaterial to a violation of the statute. The substance of
the same need not be specifically alleged in the information. What R.A. 4200 penalizes are the acts
of secretly overhearing, intercepting or recording private communications by means of the devices
enumerated therein. The mere allegation that an individual made a secret recording of a private
communication by means of a tape recorder would suffice to constitute an offense under Section 1 of
R.A. 4200. As the Solicitor General pointed out in his COMMENT before the respondent court:
"Nowhere (in the said law) is it required that before one can be regarded as a violator, the nature of
the conversation, as well as its communication to a third person should be professed." 14
Finally, petitioner's contention that the phrase "private communication" in Section 1 of R.A. 4200
does not include "private conversations" narrows the ordinary meaning of the word "communication"
to a point of absurdity. The word communicate comes from the latin word communicare, meaning "to
share or to impart." In its ordinary signification, communication connotes the act of sharing or
imparting signification, communication connotes the act of sharing or imparting, as in
a conversation, 15 or signifies the "process by which meanings or thoughts are shared between
individuals through a common system of symbols (as language signs or gestures)" 16 These definitions
are broad enough to include verbal or non-verbal, written or expressive communications of "meanings or
thoughts" which are likely to include the emotionally-charged exchange, on February 22, 1988, between
petitioner and private respondent, in the privacy of the latter's office. Any doubts about the legislative
body's meaning of the phrase "private communication" are, furthermore, put to rest by the fact that the
terms "conversation" and "communication" were interchangeably used by Senator Taada in his
Explanatory Note to the bill quoted below:
It has been said that innocent people have nothing to fear from
their conversations being overheard. But this statement ignores the usual nature
of conversations as well the undeniable fact that most, if not all, civilized people have
some aspects of their lives they do not wish to expose. Free conversationsare often
characterized by exaggerations, obscenity, agreeable falsehoods, and the
expression of anti-social desires of views not intended to be taken seriously. The
right to the privacy of communication, among others, has expressly been assured by
our Constitution. Needless to state here, the framers of our Constitution must have
recognized the nature of conversations between individuals and the significance of
man's spiritual nature, of his feelings and of his intellect. They must have known that
part of the pleasures and satisfactions of life are to be found in the unaudited, and
free exchange ofcommunication between individuals free from every unjustifiable
intrusion by whatever means. 17
In Gaanan vs. Intermediate Appellate Court, 18 a case which dealt with the issue of telephone
wiretapping, we held that the use of a telephone extension for the purpose of overhearing a private
conversation without authorization did not violate R.A. 4200 because a telephone extension devise was
neither among those "device(s) or arrangement(s)" enumerated therein, 19 following the principle that
"penal statutes must be construed strictly in favor of the accused." 20 The instant case turns on a different
note, because the applicable facts and circumstances pointing to a violation of R.A. 4200 suffer from no
ambiguity, and the statute itself explicitly mentions the unauthorized "recording" of private
communications with the use of tape-recorders as among the acts punishable.

WHEREFORE, because the law, as applied to the case at bench is clear and unambiguous and
leaves us with no discretion, the instant petition is hereby DENIED. The decision appealed from is
AFFIRMED. Costs against petitioner.
SO ORDERED.
Padilla, Davide, Jr. and Bellosillo JJ., concur.
Hermosisima, Jr., J., is on leave.
Footnotes
1 Docketed as Civil Case No. 88-403, Regional Trial Court, Makati, Branch
64.
2 Rollo, p. 48.
3 Rollo, pp. 47-48.
4 Rollo, p. 9.
5 Rollo, p. 37.
6 Rollo, p. 99, Annex "H".
7 Rollo, p. 13.
8 Id.
9 Rollo, p. 14.
10 Rollo, p. 14-15.
11 Pacific Oxygen and Acytelene Co. vs. Central Bank 37 SCRA 685 (1971).
12 Casela v. Court of Appeals, 35 SCRA 279 (1970).
13 Rollo, p. 33.
14 Rollo, p. 67.
15 WEBSTER'S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 460 (1976).
16 Id.
17 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD, Vol. III, No. 31, at 573 (March 10, 1964).
18 145 SCRA 112 (1986). See also, Salcedo-Ortanez v. CA 235 SCRA 111
(1994).

19 Id., at 120.
20 Id., at 121.

B. Gerbert R. Corpuz v Daisylyn Tirol Sto. Tomas and the

Solicitor General
Republic of the Philippines
Supreme Court
Manila

THIRD DIVISION
GERBERT R. CORPUZ,
Petitioner,

G.R. No. 186571

Present:

CARPIO MORALES, J., Chairperson,

BRION,
BERSAMIN,
*
ABAD, and
VILLARAMA, JR., JJ.

versus -

DAISYLYN TIROL STO.

TOMAS and The SOLICITOR
GENERAL,
Respondents. -- -

Promulgated:
August 11, 2010

x--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------x

DECISION
BRION, J.:
Before the Court is a direct appeal from the decision [1] of the Regional Trial
Court (RTC) of Laoag City, Branch 11, elevated via a petition for review
oncertiorari[2] under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court (present petition).

Petitioner Gerbert R. Corpuz was a former Filipino citizen who acquired

Canadian citizenship through naturalization on November 29, 2000.[3] On January
18, 2005, Gerbert married respondent Daisylyn T. Sto. Tomas, a Filipina,
in Pasig City.[4] Due to work and other professional commitments, Gerbert left
for Canada soon after the wedding. He returned to the Philippines sometime in
April 2005 to surprise Daisylyn, but was shocked to discover that his wife was
having an affair with another man. Hurt and disappointed, Gerbert returned
to Canada and filed a petition for divorce. The Superior Court of
Justice, Windsor, Ontario, Canada granted Gerberts petition for divorce
on December 8, 2005. The divorce decree took effect a month later, on January 8,
2006.[5]
Two years after the divorce, Gerbert has moved on and has found another
Filipina to love. Desirous of marrying his new Filipina fiance in the Philippines,
Gerbert went to the Pasig City Civil Registry Office and registered the Canadian
divorce decree on his and Daisylyns marriage certificate. Despite the registration
of the divorce decree, an official of the National Statistics Office (NSO) informed
Gerbert that the marriage between him and Daisylyn still subsists under Philippine
law; to be enforceable, the foreign divorce decree must first be judicially
recognized by a competent Philippine court, pursuant to NSO Circular No. 4, series
of 1982.[6]
Accordingly, Gerbert filed a petition for judicial recognition of foreign
divorce and/or declaration of marriage as dissolved (petition) with the
RTC.Although summoned, Daisylyn did not file any responsive pleading but
submitted instead a notarized letter/manifestation to the trial court. She offered no
opposition to Gerberts petition and, in fact, alleged her desire to file a similar case
herself but was prevented by financial and personal circumstances. She, thus,
requested that she be considered as a party-in-interest with a similar prayer to
Gerberts.
In its October 30, 2008 decision,[7] the RTC denied Gerberts petition. The
RTC concluded that Gerbert was not the proper party to institute the action for
judicial recognition of the foreign divorce decree as he is a naturalized Canadian
citizen. It ruled that only the Filipino spouse can avail of the remedy, under the

second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code, [8] in order for him or her to be
able to remarry under Philippine law.[9] Article 26 of the Family Code reads:
Art. 26. All marriages solemnized outside the Philippines, in accordance
with the laws in force in the country where they were solemnized, and valid there
as such, shall also be valid in this country, except those prohibited under Articles
35(1), (4), (5) and (6), 36, 37 and 38.
Where a marriage between a Filipino citizen and a foreigner is validly
celebrated and a divorce is thereafter validly obtained abroad by the alien
spouse capacitating him or her to remarry, the Filipino spouse shall likewise
have capacity to remarry under Philippine law.

This conclusion, the RTC stated, is consistent with the legislative intent behind the
enactment of the second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code, as determined
by the Court in Republic v. Orbecido III;[10] the provision was enacted to avoid the
absurd situation where the Filipino spouse remains married to the alien spouse
who, after obtaining a divorce, is no longer married to the Filipino spouse.[11]
THE PETITION
From the RTCs ruling,[12] Gerbert filed the present petition.[13]
Gerbert asserts that his petition before the RTC is essentially for declaratory
relief, similar to that filed in Orbecido; he, thus, similarly asks for a determination
of his rights under the second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code. Taking
into account the rationale behind the second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family
Code, he contends that the provision applies as well to the benefit of the alien
spouse. He claims that the RTC ruling unduly stretched the doctrine
in Orbecido by limiting the standing to file the petition only to the Filipino spouse
an interpretation he claims to be contrary to the essence of the second paragraph of
Article 26 of the Family Code. He considers himself as a proper party, vested with
sufficient legal interest, to institute the case, as there is a possibility that he might
be prosecuted for bigamy if he marries his Filipina fiance in the Philippines since
two marriage certificates, involving him, would be on file with the Civil Registry
Office. The Office of the Solicitor General and Daisylyn, in their respective
Comments,[14] both support Gerberts position.

Essentially, the petition raises the issue of whether the second paragraph of
Article 26 of the Family Code extends to aliens the right to petition a court of
this jurisdiction for the recognition of a foreign divorce decree.
THE COURTS RULING
The alien spouse can claim no right under
the second paragraph of Article 26 of the
Family Code as the substantive right it
establishes is in favor of the Filipino
spouse
The resolution of the issue requires a review of the legislative history and intent
behind the second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code.
The Family Code recognizes only two types of defective marriages void [15] and
voidable[16] marriages. In both cases, the basis for the judicial declaration of
absolute nullity or annulment of the marriage exists before or at the time of the
marriage. Divorce, on the other hand, contemplates the dissolution of the lawful
union for cause arising after the marriage.[17] Our family laws do not recognize
absolute divorce between Filipino citizens.[18]
Recognizing the reality that divorce is a possibility in marriages between a
Filipino and an alien, President Corazon C. Aquino, in the exercise of her
legislative powers under the Freedom Constitution, [19] enacted Executive Order No.
(EO) 227, amending Article 26 of the Family Code to its present wording, as
follows:
Art. 26. All marriages solemnized outside the Philippines, in accordance
with the laws in force in the country where they were solemnized, and valid there
as such, shall also be valid in this country, except those prohibited under Articles
35(1), (4), (5) and (6), 36, 37 and 38.
Where a marriage between a Filipino citizen and a foreigner is validly
celebrated and a divorce is thereafter validly obtained abroad by the alien
spouse capacitating him or her to remarry, the Filipino spouse shall likewise
have capacity to remarry under Philippine law.

Through the second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code, EO 227

effectively incorporated into the law this Courts holding in Van Dorn v. Romillo,

Jr.[20] andPilapil v. Ibay-Somera.[21] In both cases, the Court refused to acknowledge

the alien spouses assertion of marital rights after a foreign courts divorce decree
between the alien and the Filipino. The Court, thus, recognized that the foreign
divorce had already severed the marital bond between the spouses. The Court
reasoned in Van Dorn v. Romillo that:
To maintain x x x that, under our laws, [the Filipino spouse] has to be
considered still married to [the alien spouse] and still subject to a wife's
obligations x x x cannot be just. [The Filipino spouse] should not be obliged to
live together with, observe respect and fidelity, and render support to [the alien
spouse]. The latter should not continue to be one of her heirs with possible rights
to conjugal property. She should not be discriminated against in her own
country if the ends of justice are to be served.[22]

As the RTC correctly stated, the provision was included in the law to avoid
the absurd situation where the Filipino spouse remains married to the alien spouse
who, after obtaining a divorce, is no longer married to the Filipino spouse. [23] The
legislative intent is for the benefit of the Filipino spouse, by clarifying his or her
marital status, settling the doubts created by the divorce decree. Essentially, the
second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code provided the Filipino
spouse a substantive right to have his or her marriage to the alien spouse
considered as dissolved, capacitating him or her to remarry.[24] Without the
second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code, the judicial recognition of the
foreign decree of divorce, whether in a proceeding instituted precisely for that
purpose or as a related issue in another proceeding, would be of no significance to
the Filipino spouse since our laws do not recognize divorce as a mode of severing
the marital bond;[25]Article 17 of the Civil Code provides that the policy against
absolute divorces cannot be subverted by judgments promulgated in a foreign
country. The inclusion of the second paragraph in Article 26 of the Family Code
provides the direct exception to this rule and serves as basis for recognizing the
dissolution of the marriage between the Filipino spouse and his or her alien spouse.
Additionally, an action based on the second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family
Code is not limited to the recognition of the foreign divorce decree. If the court
finds that the decree capacitated the alien spouse to remarry, the courts can declare
that the Filipino spouse is likewise capacitated to contract another marriage. No
court in this jurisdiction, however, can make a similar declaration for the alien

spouse (other than that already established by the decree), whose status and legal
capacity are generally governed by his national law.[26]
Given the rationale and intent behind the enactment, and the purpose of the
second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code, the RTC was correct in
limiting the applicability of the provision for the benefit of the Filipino spouse. In
other words, only the Filipino spouse can invoke the second paragraph of Article
26 of the Family Code; the alien spouse can claim no right under this provision.
The foreign divorce decree is presumptive
evidence of a right that clothes the party
with legal interest to petition for its
recognition in this jurisdiction
We qualify our above conclusion i.e., that the second paragraph of Article 26
of the Family Code bestows no rights in favor of aliens with the complementary
statement that this conclusion is not sufficient basis to dismiss Gerberts petition
before the RTC. In other words, the unavailability of the second paragraph of
Article 26 of the Family Code to aliens does not necessarily strip Gerbert of legal
interest to petition the RTC for the recognition of his foreign divorce decree. The
foreign divorce decree itself, after its authenticity and conformity with the aliens
national law have been duly proven according to our rules of evidence, serves as a
presumptive evidence of right in favor of Gerbert, pursuant to Section 48, Rule 39
of the Rules of Court which provides for the effect of foreign judgments. This
Section states:
SEC. 48. Effect of foreign judgments or final orders.The effect of a
judgment or final order of a tribunal of a foreign country, having jurisdiction
to render the judgment or final order is as follows:
(a)

In case of a judgment or final order upon a specific thing, the

judgment or final order is conclusive upon the title of the thing;
and

(b)

In case of a judgment or final order against a person, the

judgment or final order is presumptive evidence of a right as
between the parties and their successors in interest by a
subsequent title.

In either case, the judgment or final order may be repelled by evidence of

a want of jurisdiction, want of notice to the party, collusion, fraud, or clear
mistake of law or fact.

To our mind, direct involvement or being the subject of the foreign judgment is
sufficient to clothe a party with the requisite interest to institute an action before
our courts for the recognition of the foreign judgment. In a divorce situation, we
have declared, no less, that the divorce obtained by an alien abroad may be
recognized in the Philippines, provided the divorce is valid according to his or her
national law.[27]
The starting point in any recognition of a foreign divorce judgment is the
acknowledgment that our courts do not take judicial notice of foreign judgments
and laws. Justice Herrera explained that, as a rule, no sovereign is bound to give
effect within its dominion to a judgment rendered by a tribunal of another country.
[28]
This means that the foreign judgment and its authenticity must be proven as
facts under our rules on evidence, together with the aliens applicable national law
to show the effect of the judgment on the alien himself or herself. [29] The
recognition may be made in an action instituted specifically for the purpose or in
another action where a party invokes the foreign decree as an integral aspect of his
claim or defense.
In Gerberts case, since both the foreign divorce decree and the national law
of the alien, recognizing his or her capacity to obtain a divorce, purport to be
official acts of a sovereign authority, Section 24, Rule 132 of the Rules of Court
comes into play. This Section requires proof, either by (1) official publications or
(2) copies attested by the officer having legal custody of the documents. If the
copies of official records are not kept in the Philippines, these must be (a)
accompanied by a certificate issued by the proper diplomatic or consular officer in
the Philippine foreign service stationed in the foreign country in which the record
is kept and (b) authenticated by the seal of his office.
The records show that Gerbert attached to his petition a copy of the divorce
decree, as well as the required certificates proving its authenticity,[30] but failed to
include a copy of the Canadian law on divorce.[31] Under this situation, we can, at

this point, simply dismiss the petition for insufficiency of supporting evidence,
unless we deem it more appropriate to remand the case to the RTC to determine
whether the divorce decree is consistent with the Canadian divorce law.
We deem it more appropriate to take this latter course of action, given the
Article 26 interests that will be served and the Filipina wifes (Daisylyns) obvious
conformity with the petition. A remand, at the same time, will allow other
interested parties to oppose the foreign judgment and overcome a petitioners
presumptive evidence of a right by proving want of jurisdiction, want of notice to a
party, collusion, fraud, or clear mistake of law or fact. Needless to state, every
precaution must be taken to ensure conformity with our laws before a recognition
is made, as the foreign judgment, once recognized, shall have the effect of res
judicata[32] between the parties, as provided in Section 48, Rule 39 of the Rules of
Court.[33]
In fact, more than the principle of comity that is served by the practice of
reciprocal recognition of foreign judgments between nations, the res judicata effect
of the foreign judgments of divorce serves as the deeper basis for extending
judicial recognition and for considering the alien spouse bound by its terms. This
same effect, as discussed above, will not obtain for the Filipino spouse were it not
for the substantive rule that the second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code
provides.
Considerations beyond the recognition of
the foreign divorce decree
As a matter of housekeeping concern, we note that the Pasig City Civil
Registry Office has already recorded the divorce decree on Gerbert and
Daisylyns marriage certificate based on the mere presentation of the decree.
[34]
We consider the recording to be legally improper; hence, the need to draw
attention of the bench and the bar to what had been done.
Article 407 of the Civil Code states that [a]cts, events and judicial decrees
concerning the civil status of persons shall be recorded in the civil register. The law
requires the entry in the civil registry of judicial decrees that produce legal
consequences touching upon a persons legal capacity and status, i.e., those
affecting all his personal qualities and relations, more or less permanent in nature,

not ordinarily terminable at his own will, such as his being legitimate or
illegitimate, or his being married or not.[35]
A judgment of divorce is a judicial decree, although a foreign one, affecting
a persons legal capacity and status that must be recorded. In fact, Act No. 3753 or
the Law on Registry of Civil Status specifically requires the registration of divorce
decrees in the civil registry:
Sec. 1. Civil Register. A civil register is established for recording the civil
status of persons, in which shall be entered:
(a)
(b)
(c)
(d)
(e)
(f)
(g)
(h)
(i)
(j)

births;
deaths;
marriages;
annulments of marriages;
divorces;
legitimations;
adoptions;
acknowledgment of natural children;
naturalization; and
changes of name.
xxxx

Sec. 4. Civil Register Books. The local registrars shall keep and preserve in
their offices the following books, in which they shall, respectively make the
proper entries concerning the civil status of persons:
(1) Birth and death register;
(2) Marriage register, in which shall be entered not only the marriages
solemnized but also divorces and dissolved marriages.
(3) Legitimation, acknowledgment, adoption, change of name and
naturalization register.

But while the law requires the entry of the divorce decree in the civil registry, the
law and the submission of the decree by themselves do not ipso facto authorize the
decrees registration. The law should be read in relation with the requirement of a
judicial recognition of the foreign judgment before it can be given res
judicata effect.In the context of the present case, no judicial order as yet exists
recognizing the foreign divorce decree. Thus, the Pasig City Civil Registry Office

acted totally out of turn and without authority of law when it annotated the
Canadian divorce decree on Gerbert and Daisylyns marriage certificate, on the
strength alone of the foreign decree presented by Gerbert.
Evidently, the Pasig City Civil Registry Office was aware of the requirement
of a court recognition, as it cited NSO Circular No. 4, series of 1982, [36] and
Department of Justice Opinion No. 181, series of 1982 [37] both of which required a
final order from a competent Philippine court before a foreign judgment, dissolving
a marriage, can be registered in the civil registry, but it, nonetheless, allowed the
registration of the decree. For being contrary to law, the registration of the foreign
divorce decree without the requisite judicial recognition is patently void and cannot
produce any legal effect.
Another point we wish to draw attention to is that the recognition that the
RTC may extend to the Canadian divorce decree does not, by itself, authorize
thecancellation of the entry in the civil registry. A petition for recognition of a
foreign judgment is not the proper proceeding, contemplated under the Rules of
Court, for the cancellation of entries in the civil registry.
Article 412 of the Civil Code declares that no entry in a civil register shall
be changed or corrected, without judicial order. The Rules of Court supplements
Article 412 of the Civil Code by specifically providing for a special remedial
proceeding by which entries in the civil registry may be judicially cancelled or
corrected.Rule 108 of the Rules of Court sets in detail the jurisdictional and
procedural requirements that must be complied with before a judgment,
authorizing the cancellation or correction, may be annotated in the civil registry. It
also requires, among others, that the verified petition must be filed with the RTC of
the province where the corresponding civil registry is located; [38] that the civil
registrar and all persons who have or claim any interest must be made parties to the
proceedings;[39] and that the time and place for hearing must be published in a
newspaper of general circulation.[40] As these basic jurisdictional requirements have
not been met in the present case, we cannot consider the petition Gerbert filed with
the RTC as one filed under Rule 108 of the Rules of Court.
We hasten to point out, however, that this ruling should not be construed as
requiring two separate proceedings for the registration of a foreign divorce decree

in the civil registry one for recognition of the foreign decree and another
specifically for cancellation of the entry under Rule 108 of the Rules of Court. The
recognition of the foreign divorce decree may be made in a Rule 108 proceeding
itself, as the object of special proceedings (such as that in Rule 108 of the Rules of
Court) is precisely to establish the status or right of a party or a particular
fact. Moreover, Rule 108 of the Rules of Court can serve as the appropriate
adversarial proceeding[41] by which the applicability of the foreign judgment can be
measured and tested in terms of jurisdictional infirmities, want of notice to the
party, collusion, fraud, or clear mistake of law or fact.
WHEREFORE, we GRANT the petition for review on certiorari,
and REVERSE the October
30,
2008 decision
of
the Regional Trial Court of Laoag City, Branch 11, as well as its February 17,
2009 order. We order the REMAND of the case to the trial court for further
proceedings in accordance with our ruling above. Let a copy of this Decision be
furnished the Civil Registrar General. No costs.
SO ORDERED.
ARTURO D. BRION
Associate Justice
WE CONCUR:
CONCHITA CARPIO MORALES
Associate Justice

LUCAS P. BERSAMIN
Associate Justice

ROBERTO A. ABAD
Associate Justice

MARTIN S. VILLARAMA, JR.

Associate Justice
ATTESTATION
I attest that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in
consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Courts
Division.

CONCHITA CARPIO MORALES

Associate Justice
Chairperson
CERTIFICATION
Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution, and the Division
Chairpersons Attestation, it is hereby certified that the conclusions in the above
Decision had been reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the
writer of the opinion of the Courts Division.

RENATO C. CORONA
Chief Justice

Designated additional Member of the Third Division, in view of the retirement of Chief Justice Reynato S. Puno,
per Special Order No. 843 dated May 17, 2010.
[1]
Dated October 30, 2008, penned by Judge Perla B. Querubin; rollo, pp. 24-31.
[2]
Id. at 3-20.
[3]
Id. at 27.
[4]
Marriage Certificate, id. at 37.
[5]
Certificate of Divorce, id. at 38.
[6]
Id. at 47-50; the pertinent portion of NSO Circular No. 4, series of 1982, states:

It would therefore be premature to register the decree of annulment in the Register of

Annulment of Marriages in Manila, unless and until final order of execution of such foreign
judgment is issued by competent Philippine court.
[7]
Supra note 1.
[8]
Executive Order No. 209, enacted on July 6, 1987.
[9]
Rollo, p. 31.
[10]
G.R. No. 154380, October 5, 2005, 472 SCRA 114.
[11]
Id. at 121.
[12]
Gerberts motion for reconsideration of the RTCs October 30, 2008 decision was denied in an order dated
February 17, 2009; rollo, p. 32.
[13]
Supra note 2.
[14]
Rollo, pp. 79-87 and 125-142, respectively.
[15]
The void marriages are those enumerated under Articles 35, 36, 37, 38, 40, 41, 44, and 53 in relation to Article 52
of the Family Code.
[16]
The voidable marriages are those enumerated under Article 45 of the Family Code.
[17]
Garcia v. Recio, G.R. No. 138322, October 2, 2001, 366 SCRA 437, 452.
[18]
Ibid. See A. Tolentino, Commentaries and Jurisprudence on the Civil Code of the Philippines, Volume One, with
the Family Code of the Philippines (2004 ed.), p. 262.
[19]
Proclamation No. 3, issued on March 25, 1996.
[20]
G.R. No. L-68470, October 8, 1985, 139 SCRA 139.
[21]
G.R. No. 80116, June 30, 1989, 174 SCRA 653.
[22]
Van Dorn v. Romillo, supra note 20 at 144.
[23]
Republic v. Orbecido, supra note 10 at 121.
[24]
The capacity of the Filipino spouse to remarry, however, depends on whether the foreign divorce decree
capacitated the alien spouse to do so.
[25]
See Article 17 in relation to Article 15 of the Civil Code:
Art. 15. Laws relating to family rights and duties, or to the status, condition and legal capacity
of persons are binding upon citizens of the Philippines, even though living abroad.
xxxx
Art. 17. x x x Prohibitive laws concerning persons, their acts or property, and those which
have for their object public order, public policy and good customs shall not be rendered ineffective
by laws or judgments promulgated, or by determinations or conventions agreed upon in a foreign
country.
[26]
Parenthetically, we add that an aliens legal capacity to contract is evidenced by a certificate issued by his or her
respective diplomatic and consular officials, which he or she must present to secure a marriage license (Article 21,
Family Code). The Filipino spouse who seeks to remarry, however, must still resort to a judicial action for a
declaration of authority to remarry.
[27]
Garcia v. Recio, supra note 17 at 447; citing Van Dorn v. Romillo, supra note 20.
[28]
Remedial Law, Volume II, Rules 23-56 (2007 ed.), p. 529.
[29]
Republic v. Orbecido III, supra note 10 at 123 and Garcia v. Recio, supra note 17 at 448; see also Bayot v. Court
of Appeals, G.R. No. 155635, November 7, 2008, 570 SCRA 472.
[30]
Rollo, pp. 38-41.
[31]
The foreign divorce decree only stated that the marriage between Gerbert and Daisylyn was dissolved by the
Canadian court. The full text of the courts judgment was not included.
[32]
Literally means a thing adjudged, Blacks Law Dictionary (5 th ed.), p. 1178; it establishes a rule that a final
judgment or decree on the merits by a court of competent jurisdiction is conclusive of the rights of the parties or
their privies in all later suits, on points and matters determined in the former. Supra note 28 at 462.
[33]
See Philsec Investment Corporation v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 103493, June 19, 1997, 274 SCRA 102, 110,
where the Court said:
While this Court has given the effect of res judicata to foreign judgments in several cases, it was
after the parties opposed to the judgment had been given ample opportunity to repel them on
grounds allowed under the law. It is not necessary for this purpose to initiate a separate action or
proceeding for enforcement of the foreign judgment. What is essential is that there is opportunity
to challenge the foreign judgment, in order for the court to properly determine its efficacy. This is

because in this jurisdiction, with respect to actions in personam, as distinguished from actions in
rem, a foreign judgment merely constitutes prima facie evidence of the justness of the claim of a
party and, as such, is subject to proof to the contrary.
[34]
On the face of the marriage certificate, the word DIVORCED was written in big, bold letters; rollo, p. 37.
[35]
Silverio v. Republic, G.R. No. 174689, October 22, 2007, 537 SCRA 373, 390, citing Beduya v. Republic, 120
Phil. 114 (1964).
[36]
Rollo, pp. 47-50.
[37]
Id. at 51.
[38]
Section 1, Rule 108, Rules of Court.
[39]
Section 3, Rule 108, Rules of Court.
[40]
Section 4, Rule 108, Rules of Court.
[41]
When the entry sought to be corrected is substantial (i.e., the civil status of a person), a Rule 108 proceeding is
deemed adversarial in nature. See Co v. Civil Register of Manila, G.R. No. 138496, February 23, 2004, 423 SCRA
420, 430.

THE REQUISITES FOR STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION

The solemn decisions of the judges upon a statute become part of the statute; and the security of
men's lives and property, require that they should be adhered to: for precedents serve to regulate
our conduct; and there is more danger to be apprehended from uncertainty, than from any
exposition; because, when the rule is settled, men know how to conform to it; but, when all is
uncertain, they are left in the dark, and constantly liable to error; for the same offence which, at
one time, was thought entitled to clergy, at another, may be deemed capital ; and thus the life or
death of the citizen will be made to depend, not upon a fixed rule, but upon the opinion of the
judge, who may happen to try him, than which a more miserable state of things cannot be
conceived.
1. Presumption of Correctness
a. "When testing the constitutional validity of statutes, courts shall presume the statute to be
valid." Consequently, the burden to show the constitutional defect is on the challenger. Every
act of the legislature is presumed to be constitutional, and the Constitution is to be given a liberal
construction so as to sustain the enactment in question, if practicable." "When the
constitutionality of an act is challenged, a heavy burden of proof is thrust upon the party making
the challenge. All laws are presumed to be constitutional and this presumption is one of the
strongest known to the law.
b. "Another rule of statutory construction requires the presumption that, in enacting statutes, the
CONGRESS has full knowledge of existing law and interpretations thereof. Although the repeal
of statutes by implication is not favored, if two statutes are in pari materia, then to the extent that
their provisions are irreconcilably inconsistent and repugnant, the latter enactment repeals or
amends the earlier enacted statute.
c. "The legislature is presumed to know the law when enacting legislation.
d. When amendments are enacted soon after controversies arise "as to the interpretation of the
original act, it is logical to regard the amendment as a legislative interpretation of the original

act,

formal

change-rebutting

the

presumption

of

substantial

change.

e. " We "assume that the legislature chose, with care, the words it used when it enacted the
relevant statute."

f. When current and prior versions of a statute are at issue, there is a presumption that
the CONGRESS, in amending a statute, intended to effect a substantive change in the law.
"Further, we assume that CONGRESS amendments to a statute are purposeful, rather than
unnecessary.
g.
"The Supreme Court repeatedly has affirmed that it is a presumption of
statutory construction that, where both general and specific
statutes appear to address a
matter, CONGRESS intends the specific statute to control the subject
h. "When a statute begins with the phrase "notwithstanding any other provision of law," it is
presumed that CONGRESS intended to override any potential conflicts with earlier legislation.
i. "The construction of statutes by agencies charged with administration of those statutes
is entitled to great weight. A decision of an agency specified to execute the law made by
CONGRESS carries great weight and is entitled to deference unless it is proven the agency
erred. The grant of regulatory authority extends only to duties or powers conferred by law. As
such, "regulations, promulgated pursuant to definitive statutory authority, have the force and
effect of law. Moreover, those regulations which "clearly and explicitly mirror" statutory
authority are likeliest to be sustained. Any regulation of the Department must be reasonably
grounded in an identifiable and definitive statutory foundation. "Generally, the court accords
substantial deference to an agency's interpretations of its own regulations. Provided the
interpretation "does not violate the Constitution, it must be given 'controlling weight unless it is
plainly erroneous or inconsistent with the regulation.
j. We will overturn COURTs decision only if it can be fairly characterized as "arbitrary or
capricious" and thus a "clear abuse of delegated discretion." On the other hand, an "agency does
not possess specialized competence over the interpretation of a statute merely because it
addresses topics within the agency's delegable authority. Pure statutory construction, a matter
within the "core competency of the judiciary, "This axiom stems from basic principles of
separation of powers. It is emphatically the province and duty of the JUDICIAL
DEPARTMENT to say what the law is. It necessarily follows that the a priori question whether
the statute delegates or withholds discretion is itself a question of statutory interpretation, one
implicating our duty of de novo review."
k. "The circuit court nonetheless deferred to the Technical Review Board's reasoning, correctly
noting that courts give "great deference" to an agency's interpretation of its own regulations. This
deference stems from Code 2.2-4027, which requires that reviewing courts "take due account"
of the "experience and specialized competence of the agency" promulgating the regulation. Even
so, "deference is not abdication, and it requires us to accept only those agency interpretations that

are reasonable in light of the principles of construction courts normally employ. No matter how
one calibrates judicial deference, the administrative power to interpret a regulation does not
include the power to rewrite it. When a regulation is "not ambiguous," judicial deference "to the
agency's position would be to permit the agency, under the guise of interpreting a regulation, to
create de facto a new regulation." Though agencies may be tempted to adjudicate their way
around unwanted regulations, such overreaching undermines the notice and public hearing
procedures of the rulemaking process - thereby putting in jeopardy the "enhanced political
accountability of agency policy decisions adopted through the rulemaking process" and the
democratic virtue of allowing "all potentially affected members of the public an opportunity to
participate in the process of determining the rules that affect them.
l. "However, whenever an "agency's statutory interpretation conflicts with the language of the
statute or when the interpretation has not been consistently and regularly applied, the usual
deference accorded to an agency's interpretation should be withheld.
m. When Congress enacts an imprecise statute that it commits to the implementation of an
executive agency, it has no control over that implementation (except, of course, through further,
more precise, legislation). The legislative and executive functions are not combined. But
when an agency promulgates an imprecise rule, it leaves to itself the implementation of that rule,
and thus the initial determination of the rule's meaning. And though the adoption of a rule is an
exercise of the executive rather than the legislative power, a properly adopted rule has fully the
effect of law. It seems contrary to fundamental principles of separation of powers to permit the
person who promulgates a law to interpret it as well.
Deferring to an agency's interpretation of a statute does not encourage Congress, out of a desire
to expand its power, to enact vague statutes; the vagueness effectively cedes power to the
Executive. By contrast, deferring to an agency's interpretation of its own rule encourages the
agency to enact vague rules which give it the power, in future adjudications, to do what it
pleases.

A. Director of Lands v CA
The Court of Appeals ruled that it was merely procedural and that the failure to
cause such publication did not deprive the trial court of its authority to grant the
application.But the Solicitor General disagreed and thus filed this petition to set aside
the
Decision promulgated
on
July
3,
1991
and
the
subsequent
Resolution promulgated on November 19, 1991 by Respondent Court of Appeals in
CA-G.R. CV No. 23719. The dispositive portion of the challenged Decision reads:
[1]

[2]

[3]

[4]

"WHEREFORE,premisesconsidered,thejudgmentofdismissalappealedfromis
herebysetaside,andanewoneenteredconfirmingtheregistrationandtitleof
applicant,TeodoroAbistado,Filipino,aresidentofBarangay7,Poblacion
Mamburao,OccidentalMindoro,nowdeceasedandsubstitutedbyMargarita,
Marissa,Maribel,ArnoldandMaryAnn,allsurnamedAbistado,representedbytheir

aunt,MissJosefaAbistado,Filipinos,residentsofPoblacionMamburao,Occidental
Mindoro,totheparceloflandcoveredunderMSI(IVA8)315Dlocatedin
PoblacionMamburao,OccidentalMindoro.
TheoppositionsfiledbytheRepublicofthePhilippinesandprivateoppositorare
herebydismissedforwantofevidence.
Uponthefinalityofthisdecisionandpaymentofthecorrespondingtaxesdueonthis
land,letanorderfortheissuanceofadecreebeissued."
The Facts
On December 8, 1986, Private Respondent Teodoro Abistado filed a petition for
original registration of his title over 648 square meters of land under Presidential Decree
(PD) No. 1529. The application was docketed as Land Registration Case (LRC) No. 86
and assigned to Branch 44 of the Regional Trial Court of Mamburao, Occidental
Mindoro. However, during the pendency of his petition, applicant died. Hence, his heirs
-- Margarita, Marissa, Maribel, Arnold and Mary Ann, all surnamed Abistado -represented by their aunt Josefa Abistado, who was appointed their guardian ad litem,
were substituted as applicants.
[5]

[6]

The land registration court in its decision dated June 13, 1989 dismissed the petition
for want of jurisdiction. However, it found that the applicants through their predecessorsin-interest had been in open, continuous, exclusive and peaceful possession of the
subject land since 1938.
In dismissing the petition, the trial court reasoned:

[7]

"xxx.However,theCourtnotedthatapplicantsfailedtocomplywiththeprovisions
ofSection23(1)ofPD1529,requiringtheApplicantstopublishthenoticeofInitial
Hearing(Exh.`E')inanewspaperofgeneralcirculationinthePhilippines.Exhibit`E'
wasonlypublishedintheOfficialGazette(Exhibits`F'and`G').Consequently,the
Courtisofthewellconsideredviewthatithasnotlegallyacquiredjurisdictionover
theinstantapplicationforwantofcompliancewiththemandatoryprovisionrequiring
publicationofthenoticeofinitialhearinginanewspaperofgeneralcirculation."
The trial court also cited Ministry of Justice Opinion No. 48, Series of 1982, which in
its pertinent portion provides:
[8]

ItbearsemphasisthatthepublicationrequirementunderSection23[ofPD1529]has
atwofoldpurpose;thefirst,whichismentionedintheprovisionoftheaforequoted
provisionreferstopublicationintheOfficialGazette,andisjurisdictional;whilethe

second,whichismentionedintheopeningclauseofthesameparagraph,refersto
publicationnotonlyintheOfficialGazettebutalsoinanewspaperofgeneral
circulation,andisprocedural.Neitheronenortheotherisdispensable.Astothefirst,
publicationintheOfficialGazetteisindispensablynecessarybecausewithoutit,the
courtwouldbepowerlesstoassumejurisdictionoveraparticularlandregistration
case.Astothesecond,publicationofthenoticeofinitialhearingalsoinanewspaper
ofgeneralcirculationisindispensablynecessaryasarequirementofproceduraldue
process;otherwise,anydecisionthatthecourtmaypromulgateinthecasewouldbe
legallyinfirm.
Unsatisfied, private respondents appealed to Respondent Court of Appeals which,
as earlier explained, set aside the decision of the trial court and ordered the registration
of the title in the name of Teodoro Abistado.
The subsequent motion for reconsideration was denied in the challenged CA
Resolution dated November 19, 1991.
The Director of Lands represented by the Solicitor General thus elevated this
recourse to us. This Court notes that the petitioners counsel anchored his petition on
Rule 65.This is an error. His remedy should be based on Rule 45 because he is
appealing a final disposition of the Court of Appeals. Hence, we shall treat his petition
as one for review under Rule 45, and not for certiorari under Rule 65.
[9]

The Issue
Petitioner alleges that Respondent Court of Appeals committed grave abuse of
discretion in holding
[10]

xxxthatpublicationofthepetitionforregistrationoftitleinLRCCaseNo.86need
notbepublishedinanewspaperofgeneralcirculation,andinnotdismissingLRC
CaseNo.86forwantofsuchpublication.
Petitioner points out that under Section 23 of PD 1529, the notice of initial hearing
shall be published both in the Official Gazette and in a newspaper of general
circulation.According to petitioner, publication in the Official Gazette is necessary to
confer jurisdiction upon the trial court, and xxx in xxx a newspaper of general circulation
to comply with the notice requirement of due process.
[11]

Private respondents, on the other hand, contend that failure to comply with the
requirement of publication in a newspaper of general circulation is a mere procedural
defect.They add that publication in the Official Gazette is sufficient to confer jurisdiction.
[12]

In reversing the decision of the trial court, Respondent Court of Appeals ruled:

[13]

xxxalthoughtherequirementofpublicationintheOfficialGazetteandina
newspaperofgeneralcirculationiscouchedinmandatoryterms,itcannotbegainsaid
thatthelawalsomandateswithequalforcethatpublicationintheOfficial
Gazetteshallbesufficienttoconferjurisdictionuponthecourt.
Further, Respondent Court found that the oppositors were afforded the opportunity
to explain matters fully and present their side. Thus, it justified its disposition in this
wise:
[14]

xxxWedonotseehowthelackofcompliancewiththerequiredprocedure
prejudicedtheminanyway.Moreover,theotherrequirementsof:publicationinthe
OfficialGazette,personalnoticebymailing,andpostingatthesiteandother
conspicuousplaces,werecompliedwithandthesearesufficienttonotifyanyparty
whoismindedtomakeanyobjectionoftheapplicationforregistration.
The Courts Ruling
We find for petitioner.
Newspaper Publication Mandatory
The pertinent part of Section 23 of Presidential Decree No. 1529 requiring
publication of the notice of initial hearing reads as follows:

Sec.23.Noticeofinitialhearing,publication,etc.Thecourtshall,withinfivedays
fromfilingoftheapplication,issueanordersettingthedateandhouroftheinitial
hearingwhichshallnotbeearlierthanfortyfivedaysnorlaterthanninetydaysfrom
thedateoftheorder.
Thepublicshallbegivennoticeofinitialhearingoftheapplicationforland
registrationbymeansof(1)publication;(2)mailing;and(3)posting.
1.Bypublication.

Uponreceiptoftheorderofthecourtsettingthetimeforinitialhearing,the
CommissionerofLandRegistrationshallcauseanoticeofinitialhearingtobe
publishedonceintheOfficialGazetteandonceinanewspaperofgeneralcirculation
inthePhilippines:Provided,however,thatthepublicationintheOfficialGazetteshall
besufficienttoconferjurisdictionuponthecourt.Saidnoticeshallbeaddressedtoall

personsappearingtohaveaninterestinthelandinvolvedincludingtheadjoining
ownerssofarasknown,and`toallwhomitmayconcern.'Saidnoticeshallalso
requireallpersonsconcernedtoappearincourtatacertaindateandtimetoshow
causewhytheprayerofsaidapplicationshallnotbegranted.
xxxxxxxxx
Admittedly, the above provision provides in clear and categorical terms that
publication in the Official Gazette suffices to confer jurisdiction upon the land registration
court.However, the question boils down to whether, absent any publication in a
newspaper of general circulation, the land registration court can validly confirm and
register the title of private respondents.
We answer this query in the negative. This answer is impelled by the demands of
statutory construction and the due process rationale behind the publication requirement.
The law used the term shall in prescribing the work to be done by the Commissioner
of Land Registration upon the latters receipt of the court order setting the time for initial
hearing. The said word denotes an imperative and thus indicates the mandatory
character of a statute. While concededly such literal mandate is not an absolute rule in
statutory construction, as its import ultimately depends upon its context in the entire
provision, we hold that in the present case the term must be understood in its normal
mandatory meaning. In Republic vs. Marasigan, the Court through Mr. Justice Hilario
G. Davide, Jr. held that Section 23 of PD 1529 requires notice of the initial hearing by
means of (1) publication, (2) mailing and (3) posting, all of which must be complied
with. If the intention of the law were otherwise, said section would not have stressed in
detail the requirements of mailing of notices to all persons named in the petition who,
per Section 15 of the Decree, include owners of adjoining properties, and occupants of
the land.Indeed, if mailing of notices is essential, then by parity of reasoning, publication
in a newspaper of general circulation is likewise imperative since the law included such
requirement in its detailed provision.
[15]

[16]

It should be noted further that land registration is a proceeding in rem. Being in

rem, such proceeding requires constructive seizure of the land as against all persons,
including the state, who have rights to or interests in the property. An in rem proceeding
is validated essentially through publication. This being so, the process must strictly be
complied with. Otherwise, persons who may be interested or whose rights may be
adversely affected would be barred from contesting an application which they had no
knowledge of. As has been ruled, a party as an owner seeking the inscription of realty in
the land registration court must prove by satisfactory and conclusive evidence not only
his ownership thereof but the identity of the same, for he is in the same situation as one
who institutes an action for recovery of realty. He must prove his title against the whole
world. This task, which rests upon the applicant, can best be achieved when all persons
concerned -- nay, the whole world -- who have rights to or interests in the subject
property are notified and effectively invited to come to court and show cause why the
application should not be granted. The elementary norms of due process require that
[17]

[18]

before the claimed property is taken from concerned parties and registered in the name
of the applicant, said parties must be given notice and opportunity to oppose.
It may be asked why publication in a newspaper of general circulation should be
deemed mandatory when the law already requires notice by publication in the Official
Gazette as well as by mailing and posting, all of which have already been complied with
in the case at hand. The reason is due process and the reality that the Official Gazette
is not as widely read and circulated as newspapers and is oftentimes delayed in its
circulation, such that the notices published therein may not reach the interested parties
on time, if at all. Additionally, such parties may not be owners of neighboring properties,
and may in fact not own any other real estate. In sum, the all-encompassing in
rem nature of land registration cases, the consequences of default orders issued
against the whole world and the objective of disseminating the notice in as wide a
manner as possible demand a mandatory construction of the requirements for
publication, mailing and posting.
Admittedly, there was failure to comply with the explicit publication requirement of
the law. Private respondents did not proffer any excuse; even if they had, it would not
have mattered because the statute itself allows no excuses. Ineludibly, this Court has no
authority to dispense with such mandatory requirement. The law is unambiguous and its
rationale clear. Time and again, this Court has declared that where the law speaks in
clear and categorical language, there is no room for interpretation, vacillation or
equivocation; there is room only for application. There is no alternative. Thus, the
application for land registration filed by private respondents must be dismissed without
prejudice to reapplication in the future, after all the legal requisites shall have been duly
complied with.
[19]

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED and the assailed Decision and Resolution
are REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The application of private respondent for land
registration is DISMISSED without prejudice. No costs.
SO ORDERED.
Davide, Jr., Melo, and Francisco, JJ., concur.
Narvasa, C.J., (Chairman), on leave.

[1]

Rollo, pp. 29-36.

[2]

Ibid., p. 37.

[3]

Seventh Division composed of Justice Celso L. Magsino, ponente, and Justices Serafin E. Camilon,
Chairman, and Artemon D. Luna, concurring.

[4]

Ibid., p. 35.

[5]

Known as the Property Registration Decree.

[6]

Presided by Judge Niovady M. Marin.

[7]

Rollo, p. 41.

[8]

Ibid., pp. 41-42.

[9]

The Solicitor General asked for and was granted an extension of 30 days within which to file a petition
for review on certiorari. It is thus strange why the OSG described its petition as one
for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court. In any event, the Court, in its Resolution dated
March 9, 1992 admitted the OSGs petition for review on certiorari, clearly ruling that the petition
was one for review, and not one forcertiorari.

[10]

Ibid., p. 21. This should really read reversible error since as already explained, the petition should be
treated as one for review under Rule 45.

[11]

Ibid., pp. 22-23.

[12]

Ibid., pp. 56-57.

[13]

Ibid., p. 34; Decision, p. 6.

[14]

Ibid.

[15]

Bersabal vs. Salvador, 84 SCRA 176, 179-180, July 21, 1978, citing Dizon vs. Encarnacion, 9 SCRA
714, 716-717, December 24, 1963.

[16]

198 SCRA 219, 227-228, June 6, 1991.

[17]

Grey Alba vs. De la Cruz, 17 Phil. 49, September 16, 1910.

[18]

Archbishop of Manila vs. Arnedo, 30 Phil. 593, March 31, 1915.

[19]

Cebu Portland Cement Company vs. Municipality of Naga, Cebu, 24 SCRA 708, 712, August 22, 1968
citing Lizarraga Hermanos vs. Yap Tico, 24 Phil. 504, 1913; People vs. Mapa, L-22301, August
30, 1967; Pacific Oxygen and Acetylene Co. vs. Central Bank, L-21881, March 1, 1968;
Dequito vs. Lopez, L-27757, March 28, 1968.

B. Olivia S. Pascual and Hermes Pascual v. Esperanza C

Pascual Bautista, et. Al
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
SECOND DIVISION

G.R. No. 84240 March 25, 1992

OLIVIA S. PASCUAL and HERMES S. PASCUAL, petitioners,
vs.
ESPERANZA C. PASCUAL-BAUTISTA, MANUEL C. PASCUAL, JOSE C. PASCUAL, SUSANA C.
PASCUAL-BAUTISTA, ERLINDA C. PASCUAL, WENCESLAO C. PASCUAL, JR., INTESTATE
ESTATE OF ELEUTERIO T. PASCUAL, AVELINO PASCUAL, ISOCELES PASCUAL, LEIDA
PASCUAL-MARTINES, VIRGINIA PASCUAL-NER, NONA PASCUAL-FERNANDO, OCTAVIO
PASCUAL, GERANAIA PASCUAL-DUBERT, and THE HONORABLE PRESIDING JUDGE
MANUEL S. PADOLINA of Br. 162, RTC, Pasig, Metro Manila, respondents.

PARAS, J.:
This is a petition for review on certiorari which seeks to reverse and set aside: (a) the decision of the
Court of Appeals 1 dated April 29, 1988 in CA-G.R. SP. No. 14010 entitled "Olivia S. Pascual and Hermes
S. Pascual v. Esperanza C. Pascual-Bautista, Manuel C. Pascual, Jose Pascual, Susana C. PascualBautista, Erlinda C. Pascual, Wenceslao C. Pascual, Jr., et al." which dismissed the petition and in effect
affirmed the decision of the trial court and (b) the resolution dated July 14, 1988 denying petitioners'
motion for reconsideration.
The undisputed facts of the case are as follows:
Petitioners Olivia and Hermes both surnamed Pascual are the acknowledged natural children of the
late Eligio Pascual, the latter being the full blood brother of the decedent Don Andres Pascual (Rollo,
petition, p. 17).
Don Andres Pascual died intestate on October 12, 1973 without any issue, legitimate, acknowledged
natural, adopted or spurious children and was survived by the following:
(a) Adela Soldevilla de Pascual, surviving spouses;
(b) Children of Wenceslao Pascual, Sr., a brother of the full blood of the deceased, to
wit:
Esperanza C. Pascual-Bautista
Manuel C. Pascual
Jose C. Pascual
Susana C. Pascual-Bautista
Erlinda C. Pascual
Wenceslao C. Pascual, Jr.
(c) Children of Pedro-Bautista, brother of the half blood of the deceased, to wit:
Avelino Pascual
Isoceles Pascual
Loida Pascual-Martinez
Virginia Pascual-Ner
Nona Pascual-Fernando
Octavio Pascual
Geranaia Pascual-Dubert;
(d) Acknowledged natural children of Eligio Pascual, brother of the full blood of the
deceased, to wit:
Olivia S. Pascual
Hermes S. Pascual
(e) Intestate of Eleuterio T. Pascual, a brother of the half blood of the deceased and
represented by the following:
Dominga M. Pascual
Mamerta P. Fugoso

Abraham S. Sarmiento, III

Regina Sarmiento-Macaibay
Eleuterio P. Sarmiento
Domiga P. San Diego
Nelia P. Marquez
Silvestre M. Pascual
Eleuterio M. Pascual
(Rollo, pp. 46-47)
Adela Soldevilla de Pascual, the surviving spouse of the late Don Andres Pascual, filed with the
Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 162 (CFI of Rizal, Br. XXIII), a Special Proceeding, Case No.
7554, for administration of the intestate estate of her late husband (Rollo, p. 47).
On December 18, 1973, Adela soldevilla de Pascual filed a Supplemental Petition to the Petition for
letters of Administration, where she expressly stated that Olivia Pascual and Hermes Pascual, are
among the heirs of Don Andres Pascual (Rollo, pp. 99-101).
On February 27, 1974, again Adela Soldevilla de Pascual executed an affidavit, to the effect that of
her own knowledge, Eligio Pascual is the younger full blood brother of her late husband Don Andres
Pascual, to belie the statement made by the oppositors, that they were are not among the known
heirs of the deceased Don Andres Pascual (Rollo, p. 102).
On October 16, 1985, all the above-mentioned heirs entered into a COMPROMISE AGREEMENT,
over the vehement objections of the herein petitioners Olivia S. Pascual and Hermes S. Pascual,
although paragraph V of such compromise agreement provides, to wit:
This Compromise Agreement shall be without prejudice to the continuation of the
above-entitled proceedings until the final determination thereof by the court, or by
another compromise agreement, as regards the claims of Olivia Pascual and Hermes
Pascual as legal heirs of the deceased, Don Andres Pascual. (Rollo, p. 108)
The said Compromise Agreement had been entered into despite the Manifestation/Motion of the
petitioners Olivia Pascual and Hermes Pascual, manifesting their hereditary rights in the intestate
estate of Don Andres Pascual, their uncle (Rollo, pp. 111-112).
On September 30, 1987, petitioners filed their Motion to Reiterate Hereditary Rights (Rollo, pp. 113114) and the Memorandum in Support of Motion to reiterate Hereditary Rights (Rollo, pp. 116-130).
On December 18, 1987, the Regional Trial Court, presided over by Judge Manuel S. Padolina issued
an order, the dispositive portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, this Court resolves as it is hereby resolved to
Deny this motion reiterating the hereditary rights of Olivia and Hermes Pascual
(Rollo, p. 136).
On January 13, 1988, petitioners filed their motion for reconsideration (Rollo, pp. 515-526). and such
motion was denied.
Petitioner appealed their case to the Court of Appeals docketed as CA-G.R. No. 14010 (Rollo, p.
15.).

On Aril 29, 1988, the respondent Court of Appeals rendered its decision the decision the dispositive
part of which reads:
WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED. Costs against the petitioners.
SO ORDERED. (Rollo, p. 38)
Petitioners filed their motion for reconsideration of said decision and on July 14, 1988, the Court of
Appeals issued its resolution denying the motion for reconsideration (Rollo, p. 42).
Hence, this petition for review on certiorari.
After all the requirements had been filed, the case was given due course.
The main issue to be resolved in the case at bar is whether or not Article 992 of the Civil Code of the
Philippines, can be interpreted to exclude recognized natural children from the inheritance of the
deceased.
Petitioners contend that they do not fall squarely within the purview of Article 992 of the Civil Code of
the Philippines, can be interpreted to exclude recognized and of the doctrine laid down in Diaz v.
IAC (150 SCRA 645 [1987]) because being acknowledged natural children, their illegitimacy is not
due to the subsistence of a prior marriage when such children were under conception (Rollo, p. 418).
Otherwise stated they say the term "illegitimate" children as provided in Article 992 must be strictly
construed to refer only to spurious children (Rollo, p. 419).
On the other hand, private respondents maintain that herein petitioners are within the prohibition of
Article 992 of the Civil Code and the doctrine laid down in Diaz v. IAC is applicable to them.
The petition is devoid of merit.
Pertinent thereto, Article 992 of the civil Code, provides:
An illegitimate child has no right to inherit ab intestato from the legitimate children
and relatives of his father or mother; nor shall such children or relatives inherit in the
same manner from the illegitimate child.
The issue in the case at bar, had already been laid to rest in Diaz v. IAC, supra, where this Court
ruled that:
Article 992 of the Civil Code provides a barrier or iron curtain in that it prohibits
absolutely a successionab intestato between the illegitimate child and the legitimate
children and relatives of the father or mother of said legitimate child. They may have
a natural tie of blood, but this is not recognized by law for the purposes of Article 992.
Between the legitimate family and illegitimate family there is presumed to be an
intervening antagonism and incompatibility. The illegitimate child is disgracefully
looked down upon by the legitimate family; the family is in turn hated by the
illegitimate child; the latter considers the privileged condition of the former, and the
resources of which it is thereby deprived; the former, in turn, sees in the illegitimate
child nothing but the product of sin, palpable evidence of a blemish broken in life; the

law does no more than recognize this truth, by avoiding further grounds of
resentment.
Eligio Pascual is a legitimate child but petitioners are his illegitimate children.
Applying the above doctrine to the case at bar, respondent IAC did not err in holding that petitioners
herein cannot represent their father Eligio Pascual in the succession of the latter to the intestate
estate of the decedent Andres Pascual, full blood brother of their father.
In their memorandum, petitioners insisted that Article 992 in the light of Articles 902 and 989 of the
Civil Code allows them (Olivia and Hermes) to represent Eligio Pascual in the intestate estate of Don
Andres Pascual.
On motion for reconsideration of the decision in Diaz v. IAC, this Court further elucidated the
successional rights of illegitimate children, which squarely answers the questions raised by the
petitioner on this point.
The Court held:
Article 902, 989, and 990 clearly speaks of successional rights of illegitimate
children, which rights are transmitted to their descendants upon their death. The
descendants (of these illegitimate children) who may inherit by virtue of the right of
representation may be legitimate or illegitimate. In whatever manner, one should not
overlook the fact that the persons to be represented are themselves illegitimate. The
three named provisions are very clear on this matter. The right of representation is
not available to illegitimate descendants of legitimate children in the inheritance of a
legitimate grandparent. It may be argued, as done by petitioners, that the illegitimate
descendant of a legitimate child is entitled to represent by virtue of the provisions of
Article 982, which provides that "the grandchildren and other descendants shall
inherit by right of representation." Such a conclusion is erroneous. It would allow
intestate succession by an illegitimate child to the legitimate parent of his father or
mother, a situation which would set at naught the provisions of Article 992. Article 982
is inapplicable to the instant case because Article 992 prohibits absolutely a
succession ab intestato between the illegitimate child and the legitimate children and
relatives of the father or mother. It may not be amiss to state Article 982 is the
general rule and Article 992 the exception.
The rules laid down in Article 982 that "grandchildren and other descendants shall
inherit by right of representation" and in Article 902 that the rights of illegitimate
children . . . are transmitted upon their death to their descendants, whether legitimate
or illegitimate are subject to the limitation prescribed by Article 992 to the end that an
illegitimate child has no right to inherit ab intestato from the legitimate children and
relatives of his father or mother. (Amicus Curiae's Opinion by former Justice Minister
Ricardo C. Puno, p. 12). Diaz v. Intermediate Appellate Court, 182 SCRA 427; pp.
431-432; [1990]).
Verily, the interpretation of the law desired by the petitioner may be more humane but it is also an
elementary rule in statutory construction that when the words and phrases of the statute are clear
and unequivocal, their meaning must be determined from the language employed and the statute
must be taken to mean exactly what is says. (Baranda v. Gustilo, 165 SCRA 758-759 [1988]). The
courts may not speculate as to the probable intent of the legislature apart from the words (Aparri v.
CA, 127 SCRA 233 [1984]). When the law is clear, it is not susceptible of interpretation. It must be

applied regardless of who may be affected, even if the law may be harsh or onerous. (Nepomuceno,
et al. v. FC, 110 Phil. 42). And even granting that exceptions may be conceded, the same as a
general rule, should be strictly but reasonably construed; they extend only so far as their language
fairly warrants, and all doubts should be resolved in favor of the general provisions rather than the
exception. Thus, where a general rule is established by statute, the court will not curtail the former
nor add to the latter by implication (Samson v. C.A., 145 SCRA 654 [1986]).
Clearly the term "illegitimate" refers to both natural and spurious.
Finally under Article 176 of the Family Code, all illegitimate children are generally placed under one
category, which undoubtedly settles the issue as to whether or not acknowledged natural children
should be treated differently, in the negative.
It may be said that the law may be harsh but that is the law (DURA LEX SED LEX).
PREMISES CONSIDERED, the petition is DISMISSED for lack of merit and the assailed decision of
the respondent Court of Appeals dated April 29, 1988 is AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
Melencio-Herrera, Padilla, Regalado and Nocon, JJ., concur.

C. Abello, et.al v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue,

et.al.
FIRST DIVISION

[G.R. No. 120721. February 23, 2005]

MANUEL G. ABELLO, JOSE C. CONCEPCION, TEODORO D. REGALA,

AVELINO V. CRUZ, petitioners, vs. COMMISSIONER OF
INTERNAL REVENUE and COURT OF APPEALS, respondents.
DECISION
AZCUNA, J.:

This is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Civil
Procedure, assailing the decision of the Court of Appeals in CA G.R. SP No. 27134,
entitled Comissioner of Internal Revenue v. Manuel G. Abello, Jose C. Concepcion,
Teodoro D. Regala, Avelino V. Cruz and Court of Tax Appeals, which reversed and set
aside the decision of the Court of Tax Appeals (CTA), ordering the Commissioner of

Internal Revenue (Commissioner) to withdraw his letters dated April 21, 1988 and
August 4, 1988 assessing donors taxes and to desist from collecting donors taxes from
petitioners.
During the 1987 national elections, petitioners, who are partners in the Angara,
Abello, Concepcion, Regala and Cruz (ACCRA) law firm, contributed P882,661.31 each
to the campaign funds of Senator Edgardo Angara, then running for the Senate. In
letters dated April 21, 1988, the Bureau of Internal Revenue (BIR) assessed each of the
petitionersP263,032.66 for their contributions. On August 2, 1988, petitioners
questioned the assessment through a letter to the BIR. They claimed that political or
electoral contributions are not considered gifts under the National Internal Revenue
Code (NIRC), and that, therefore, they are not liable for donors tax. The claim for
exemption was denied by the Commissioner.
[1]

On September 12, 1988, petitioners filed a petition for review with the CTA, which
was decided on October 7, 1991 in favor of the petitioners. As aforestated, the CTA
ordered the Commissioner to desist from collecting donors taxes from the petitioners.
[2]

On appeal, the Court of Appeals reversed and set aside the CTA decision on April
20, 1994. The appellate Court ordered the petitioners to pay donors tax amounting
toP263,032.66 each, reasoning as follows:
[3]

TheNationalInternalRevenueCode,asamended,provides:
Sec.91.ImpositionofTax.(a)Thereshallbelevied,assessed,collected,andpaid
uponthetransferbyanyperson,resident,ornonresident,ofthepropertybygift,a
tax,computedasprovidedinSection92.(b)Thetaxshallapplywhetherthetransfer
isintrustorotherwise,whetherthegiftisdirectorindirect,andwhethertheproperty
isrealorpersonal,tangibleorintangible.
Pursuanttotheabovequotedprovisionsoflaw,thetransferofpropertybygift,
whetherthetransferisintrustorotherwise,whetherthegiftisdirectorindirect,and
whetherthepropertyisrealorpersonal,tangibleorintangible,issubjecttodonorsor
gifttax.
Agiftisgenerallydefinedasavoluntarytransferofpropertybyonetoanother
withoutanyconsiderationorcompensationtherefor(28C.J.620;Santosvs.Robledo,
28Phil.250).
Intheinstantcase,thecontributionsarevoluntarytransfersofpropertyintheformof
moneyfromprivaterespondentstoSen.Angara,withoutconsiderationstherefor.
Hence,theysquarelyfallunderthedefinitionofdonationorgift.
AscorrectlypointedoutbytheSolicitorGeneral:

ThefactthatthecontributionsweregiventobeusedascampaignfundsofSen.
Angaradoesnotaffectthecharacterofthefundtransfersasdonationorgift.There
wastherebynoretentionofcontroloverthedispositionofthecontributions.There
wassimplyanindicationofthepurposeforwhichtheyweretobeused.Foraslongas
thecontributionswereusedforthepurposeforwhichtheywereintended,Sen.
Angarahadcompleteandabsolutepowertodisposeofthecontributions.Hewasfully
entitledtotheeconomicbenefitsofthecontributions.
Section91oftheTaxCodeisveryclear.Adonorsorgifttaxisimposedonthe
transferofpropertybygift.
TheBureauofInternalRevenueissuedRulingNo.344onJuly20,1988,whichreads:
PoliticalContributions.Forinternalrevenuepurposes,politicalcontributionsinthe
Philippinesareconsideredtaxablegiftratherthantaxableincome.Thisisso,because
apoliticalcontributionisindubitablynotintendedbythegiverorcontributorasa
returnofvalueormadebecauseofanyintenttorepayanotherwhatishisdue,but
bestowedonlybecauseofmotivesofphilanthropyorcharity.Hispurposeistogive
andtobolsterthemorals,thewinningchanceofthecandidateand/orhisparty,and
nottoemployorbuy.Ontheotherhand,therecipientdoneedoesnotregardhimself
asexchanginghisservicesorhisproductforthemoneycontributed.Butmore
importantlyhereceivesfinancialadvantagesgratuitously.
WhentheU.S.gifttaxlawwasadoptedinthePhilippines(beforeMay7,1974),the
taxabilityofpoliticalcontributionswas,admittedly,anunsettledissue;hence,it
cannotbepresumedthatthePhilippineCongressthenhadintendedtoconsideror
treatpoliticalcontributionsasnontaxablegiftswhenitadoptedthesaidgifttaxlaw.
Moreover,wellsettledistherulethatthePhilippinesneednotnecessarilyadoptthe
presentruleorconstructionintheUnitedStatesonthematter.Generally,statutesof
differentstatesrelatingtothesameclassofpersonsorthingsorhavingthesame
purposesarenotconsideredtobeinparimateriabecauseitcannotbejustifiably
presumedthatthelegislaturehadtheminmindwhenenactingtheprovisionbeing
construed.(5206,Sutherland,StatutoryConstruction,p.546.)Accordingly,inthe
absenceofanexpressexemptingprovisionoflaw,politicalcontributionsinthe
Philippinesaresubjecttothedonorsgifttax.(citedinNationalInternalRevenueCode
AnnotatedbyHectorS.deLeon,1991ed.,p.290).
InthelightoftheaboveBIRRuling,itisclearthatthepoliticalcontributionsofthe
privaterespondentstoSen.EdgardoAngaraaretaxablegifts.Thevaguenessofthe

lawastowhatcomprisethegiftsubjecttotaxwasmadeconcretebytheabovequoted
BIRruling.Hence,thereisnodoubtthatpoliticalcontributionsaretaxablegifts.
[4]

Petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration, which the Court of Appeals denied in
its resolution of June 16, 1995.
[5]

Petitioners thereupon filed the instant petition on July 26, 1995. Raised are the
following issues:
1. DID THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERR WHEN IT FAILED TO
CONSIDER IN ITS DECISION THE PURPOSE BEHIND THE ENACTMENT OF
OUR GIFT TAX LAW?
2. DID THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERR IN NOT CONSIDERING THE
INTENTION OF THE GIVERS IN DETERMINING WHETHER OR NOT THE
PETITIONERS POLITICAL CONTRIBUTIONS WERE GIFTS SUBJECT TO
DONORS TAX?
3. DID THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERR WHEN IT FAILED TO
CONSIDER THE DEFINITION OF AN ELECTORAL CONTRIBUTION UNDER
THE OMNIBUS ELECTION CODE IN DETERMINING WHETHER OR NOT
POLITICAL CONTRIBUTIONS ARE TAXABLE?
4. DID THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERR IN NOT CONSIDERING THE
ADMINISTRATIVE PRACTICE OF CLOSE TO HALF A CENTURY OF NOT
SUBJECTING POLITICAL CONTRIBUTIONS TO DONORS TAX?
5. DID THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERR IN NOT CONSIDERING THE
AMERICAN JURISPRUDENCE RELIED UPON BY THE COURT OF TAX
APPEALS AND BY THE PETITIONERS TO THE EFFECT THAT POLITICAL
CONTRIBUTIONS ARE NOT TAXABLE GIFTS?
6. DID THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERR IN NOT APPLYING AMERICAN
JURISPRUDENCE ON THE GROUND THAT THIS WAS NOT KNOWN AT THE
TIME THE PHILIPPINES GIFT TAX LAW WAS ADOPTED IN 1939?
7. DID THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERR IN RESOLVING THE CASE
MAINLY ON THE BASIS OF A RULING ISSUED BY THE RESPONDENT ONLY
AFTER THE ASSESSMENTS HAD ALREADY BEEN MADE?
8. DID THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERR WHEN IT DID NOT
CONSTRUE THE GIFT TAX LAW LIBERALLY IN FAVOR OF THE TAXPAYER
AND STRICLTY AGAINST THE GOVERNMENT IN ACCORDANCE WITH
APPLICABLE PRINCIPLES OF STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION?[6]

First, Fifth and Sixth Issues

Section 91 of the National Internal Revenue Code (NIRC) reads:

(A)Thereshallbelevied,assessed,collectedandpaiduponthetransferby
anyperson,residentornonresident,ofthepropertybygift,atax,
computedasprovidedinSection92
(B)Thetaxshallapplywhetherthetransferisintrustorotherwise,whether
thegiftisdirectorindirect,andwhetherthepropertyisrealorpersonal,
tangibleorintangible.
The NIRC does not define transfer of property by gift. However, Article 18 of the
Civil Code, states:

InmatterswhicharegovernedbytheCodeofCommerceandspeciallaws,their
deficiencyshallbesuppliedbytheprovisionsofthisCode.
Thus, reference may be made to the definition of a donation in the Civil Code. Article
725 of said Code defines donation as:

...anactofliberalitywherebyapersondisposesgratuitouslyofathingorrightin
favorofanother,whoacceptsit.
Donation has the following elements: (a) the reduction of the patrimony of the donor; (b)
the increase in the patrimony of the donee; and, (c) the intent to do an act of liberality
oranimus donandi.
[7]

The present case falls squarely within the definition of a donation. Petitioners, the
late Manuel G. Abello , Jose C. Concepcion, Teodoro D. Regala and Avelino V. Cruz,
each gave P882,661.31 to the campaign funds of Senator Edgardo Angara, without any
material consideration. All three elements of a donation are present. The patrimony of
the four petitioners were reduced by P882,661.31 each. Senator Edgardo Angaras
patrimony correspondingly increased by P3,530,645.24 . There was intent to do an act
of liberality oranimus donandi was present since each of the petitioners gave their
contributions without any consideration.
[8]

[9]

Taken together with the Civil Code definition of donation, Section 91 of the NIRC is
clear and unambiguous, thereby leaving no room for construction. In Rizal Commercial
Banking Corporation v. Intermediate Appellate Court the Court enunciated:
[10]

ItbearsstressingthatthefirstandfundamentaldutyoftheCourtistoapplythelaw.
Whenthelawisclearandfreefromanydoubtorambiguity,thereisnoroomfor
constructionorinterpretation.Ashasbeenourconsistentruling,wherethelawspeaks
inclearandcategoricallanguage,thereisnooccasionforinterpretation;thereisonly
roomforapplication(CebuPortlandCementCo.v.MunicipalityofNaga,24SCRA
708[1968])

Wherethelawisclearandunambiguous,itmustbetakentomeanexactlywhatit
saysandthecourthasnochoicebuttoseetoitthatitsmandateisobeyed(Chartered
BankEmployeesAssociationv.Ople,138SCRA273[1985];LuzonSuretyCo.,Inc.
v.DeGarcia,30SCRA111[1969];Quijanov.DevelopmentBankofthe
Philippines,35SCRA270[1970]).
Onlywhenthelawisambiguousorofdoubtfulmeaningmaythecourtinterpretor
construeitstrueintent.Ambiguityisaconditionofadmittingtwoormoremeanings,
ofbeingunderstoodinmorethanoneway,orofreferringtotwoormorethingsatthe
sametime.Astatuteisambiguousifitisadmissibleoftwoormorepossible
meanings,inwhichcase,theCourtiscalledupontoexerciseoneofitsjudicial
functions,whichistointerpretthelawaccordingtoitstrueintent.
Second Issue
Since animus donandi or the intention to do an act of liberality is an essential
element of a donation, petitioners argue that it is important to look into the intention of
the giver to determine if a political contribution is a gift. Petitioners argument is not
tenable. First of all, donative intent is a creature of the mind. It cannot be perceived
except by the material and tangible acts which manifest its presence. This being the
case, donative intent is presumed present when one gives a part of ones patrimony to
another without consideration. Second, donative intent is not negated when the person
donating has other intentions, motives or purposes which do not contradict donative
intent. This Court is not convinced that since the purpose of the contribution was to help
elect a candidate, there was no donative intent. Petitioners contribution of money
without any material consideration evinces animus donandi. The fact that their purpose
for donating was to aid in the election of the donee does not negate the presence of
donative intent.
Third Issue
Petitioners maintain that the definition of an electoral contribution under the
Omnibus Election Code is essential to appreciate how a political contribution differs
from a taxable gift. Section 94(a) of the said Code defines electoral contribution as
follows:
[11]

Theterm"contribution"includesagift,donation,subscription,loan,advanceor
depositofmoneyoranythingofvalue,oracontract,promiseoragreementto
contribute,whetherornotlegallyenforceable,madeforthepurposeofinfluencingthe
resultsoftheelectionsbutshallnotincludeservicesrenderedwithoutcompensation

byindividualsvolunteeringaportionoralloftheirtimeinbehalfofacandidateor
politicalparty.Itshallalsoincludetheuseoffacilitiesvoluntarilydonatedbyother
persons,themoneyvalueofwhichcanbeassessedbasedontheratesprevailinginthe
area.
Since the purpose of an electoral contribution is to influence the results of the
election, petitioners again claim that donative intent is not present. Petitioners attempt to
place the barrier of mutual exclusivity between donative intent and the purpose of
political contributions. This Court reiterates that donative intent is not negated by the
presence of other intentions, motives or purposes which do not contradict donative
intent.
Petitioners would distinguish a gift from a political donation by saying that the
consideration for a gift is the liberality of the donor, while the consideration for a political
contribution is the desire of the giver to influence the result of an election by supporting
candidates who, in the perception of the giver, would influence the shaping of
government policies that would promote the general welfare and economic well-being of
the electorate, including the giver himself.
Petitioners attempt is strained. The fact that petitioners will somehow in the future
benefit from the election of the candidate to whom they contribute, in no way amounts to
a valuable material consideration so as to remove political contributions from the
purview of a donation. Senator Angara was under no obligation to benefit the
petitioners. The proper performance of his duties as a legislator is his obligation as an
elected public servant of the Filipino people and not a consideration for the political
contributions he received. In fact, as a public servant, he may even be called to enact
laws that are contrary to the interests of his benefactors, for the benefit of the greater
good.
In fine, the purpose for which the sums of money were given, which was to fund the
campaign of Senator Angara in his bid for a senatorial seat, cannot be considered as a
material consideration so as to negate a donation.
Fourth Issue
Petitioners raise the fact that since 1939 when the first Tax Code was enacted, up to
1988 the BIR never attempted to subject political contributions to donors tax. They
argue that:

...Itisafamiliarprincipleoflawthatprolongedpracticebythegovernmentagency
chargedwiththeexecutionofastatute,acquiescedinandrelieduponbyall
concernedoveranappreciableperiodoftime,isanauthoritativeinterpretation
thereof,entitledtogreatweightandthehighestrespect....
[12]

This Court holds that the BIR is not precluded from making a new interpretation of
the law, especially when the old interpretation was flawed. It is a well-entrenched rule
that

...erroneousapplicationandenforcementofthelawbypublicofficersdonotblock
subsequentcorrectapplicationofthestatute(PLDTv.CollectorofInternalRevenue,
90Phil.676),andthattheGovernmentisneverestoppedbymistakeorerroronthe
partofitsagents(Pinedav.CourtofFirstInstanceofTayabas,52Phil.803,807;
BenguetConsolidatedMiningCo.v.Pineda,98Phil.711,724).
[13]

Seventh Issue
Petitioners question the fact that the Court of Appeals decision is based on a BIR
ruling, namely BIR Ruling No. 88-344, which was issued after the petitioners were
assessed for donors tax. This Court does not need to delve into this issue. It is
immaterial whether or not the Court of Appeals based its decision on the BIR ruling
because it is not pivotal in deciding this case. As discussed above, Section 91 (now
Section 98) of the NIRC as supplemented by the definition of a donation found in Article
725 of the Civil Code, is clear and unambiguous, and needs no further elucidation.
Eighth Issue
Petitioners next contend that tax laws are construed liberally in favor of the taxpayer
and strictly against the government. This rule of construction, however, does not benefit
petitioners because, as stated, there is here no room for construction since the law is
clear and unambiguous.
Finally, this Court takes note of the fact that subsequent to the donations involved in
this case, Congress approved Republic Act No. 7166 on November 25, 1991, providing
in Section 13 thereof that political/electoral contributions, duly reported to the
Commission on Elections, are not subject to the payment of any gift tax. This all the
more shows that the political contributions herein made are subject to the payment of
gift taxes, since the same were made prior to the exempting legislation, and Republic
Act No. 7166 provides no retroactive effect on this point.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED and the assailed Decision and Resolution of
the Court of Appeals are AFFIRMED.
No costs.
SO ORDERED.
Davide, Jr., C.J., (Chairman), Quisumbing, and Carpio, JJ., concur.
Ynares-Santiago, J., no part.

[1]

Rollo, p. 38.

[2]

Ibid.

[3]

Penned by Justice Consuelo Ynares-Santiago, now Associate Justice of this Court, and concurred in by
Associate Justices Oscar M. Herrera and Delilah Vidallon-Magtolis, of the Eleventh Division of the
Court of Appeals.

[4]

Rollo, pp. 39-41 (Emphasis in the original).

[5]

Rollo, p. 44.

[6]

Rollo, pp. 167-168.

[7]

Republic of the Philippines v. Guzman, 326 SCRA 90 (2000); Tayoto v. Heirs of Cabalo Kusop, 184
SCRA 355 (1990).

[8]

See Manifestation, dated 25 November 2003, by counsel for petitioners informing the Court of the death
of petitioner Abello; Rollo, p. 192-A.

[9]

P882,661.31 x 4 = P3,530,645.24.

[10]

320 SCRA 279, 289 (1999).

[11]

Rollo, p. 174.

[12]

Rollo, p. 178.

[13]

Republic v. Phil. Long Distance Co., 26 SCRA 620, 631 (1969).

D.PP v. Mario Mapa y Mapulong

Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-22301

August 30, 1967

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,

vs.
MARIO MAPA Y MAPULONG, defendant-appellant.
Francisco P. Cabigao for defendant-appellant.
Office of the Solicitor General Arturo A. Alafriz, Assistant Solicitor General F. R. Rosete and Solicitor
O. C. Hernandez for plaintiff-appellee.
FERNANDO, J.:
The sole question in this appeal from a judgment of conviction by the lower court is whether or not
the appointment to and holding of the position of a secret agent to the provincial governor would

constitute a sufficient defense to a prosecution for the crime of illegal possession of firearm and
ammunition. We hold that it does not.
The accused in this case was indicted for the above offense in an information dated August 14, 1962
reading as follows: "The undersized accuses MARIO MAPA Y MAPULONG of a violation of Section
878 in connection with Section 2692 of the Revised Administrative Code, as amended by
Commonwealth Act No. 56 and as further amended by Republic Act No. 4, committed as follows:
That on or about the 13th day of August, 1962, in the City of Manila, Philippines, the said accused
did then and there willfully and unlawfully have in his possession and under his custody and control
one home-made revolver (Paltik), Cal. 22, without serial number, with six (6) rounds of ammunition,
without first having secured the necessary license or permit therefor from the corresponding
authorities. Contrary to law."
When the case was called for hearing on September 3, 1963, the lower court at the outset asked the
counsel for the accused: "May counsel stipulate that the accused was found in possession of the
gun involved in this case, that he has neither a permit or license to possess the same and that we
can submit the same on a question of law whether or not an agent of the governor can hold a firearm
without a permit issued by the Philippine Constabulary." After counsel sought from the fiscal an
assurance that he would not question the authenticity of his exhibits, the understanding being that
only a question of law would be submitted for decision, he explicitly specified such question to be
"whether or not a secret agent is not required to get a license for his firearm."
Upon the lower court stating that the fiscal should examine the document so that he could pass on
their authenticity, the fiscal asked the following question: "Does the accused admit that this pistol cal.
22 revolver with six rounds of ammunition mentioned in the information was found in his possession
on August 13, 1962, in the City of Manila without first having secured the necessary license or permit
thereof from the corresponding authority?" The accused, now the appellant, answered categorically:
"Yes, Your Honor." Upon which, the lower court made a statement: "The accused admits, Yes, and
his counsel Atty. Cabigao also affirms that the accused admits."
Forthwith, the fiscal announced that he was "willing to submit the same for decision." Counsel for the
accused on his part presented four (4) exhibits consisting of his appointment "as secret agent of the
Hon. Feliciano Leviste," then Governor of Batangas, dated June 2, 1962; 1 another document likewise
issued by Gov. Leviste also addressed to the accused directing him to proceed to Manila, Pasay and
Quezon City on a confidential mission;2 the oath of office of the accused as such secret agent, 3 a
certificate dated March 11, 1963, to the effect that the accused "is a secret agent" of Gov.
Leviste.4 Counsel for the accused then stated that with the presentation of the above exhibits he was
"willing to submit the case on the question of whether or not a secret agent duly appointed and
qualified as such of the provincial governor is exempt from the requirement of having a license of
firearm." The exhibits were admitted and the parties were given time to file their respective
memoranda.
1wph1.t

Thereafter on November 27, 1963, the lower court rendered a decision convicting the accused "of
the crime of illegal possession of firearms and sentenced to an indeterminate penalty of from one
year and one day to two years and to pay the costs. The firearm and ammunition confiscated from
him are forfeited in favor of the Government."
The only question being one of law, the appeal was taken to this Court. The decision must be
affirmed.
The law is explicit that except as thereafter specifically allowed, "it shall be unlawful for any person to
. . . possess any firearm, detached parts of firearms or ammunition therefor, or any instrument or

implement used or intended to be used in the manufacture of firearms, parts of firearms, or

ammunition."5 The next section provides that "firearms and ammunition regularly and lawfully issued
to officers, soldiers, sailors, or marines [of the Armed Forces of the Philippines], the Philippine
Constabulary, guards in the employment of the Bureau of Prisons, municipal police, provincial
governors, lieutenant governors, provincial treasurers, municipal treasurers, municipal mayors, and
guards of provincial prisoners and jails," are not covered "when such firearms are in possession of
such officials and public servants for use in the performance of their official duties." 6
The law cannot be any clearer. No provision is made for a secret agent. As such he is not exempt.
Our task is equally clear. The first and fundamental duty of courts is to apply the law. "Construction
and interpretation come only after it has been demonstrated that application is impossible or
inadequate without them."7 The conviction of the accused must stand. It cannot be set aside.
Accused however would rely on People v. Macarandang,8 where a secret agent was acquitted on
appeal on the assumption that the appointment "of the accused as a secret agent to assist in the
maintenance of peace and order campaigns and detection of crimes, sufficiently put him within the
category of a "peace officer" equivalent even to a member of the municipal police expressly covered
by section 879." Such reliance is misplaced. It is not within the power of this Court to set aside the
clear and explicit mandate of a statutory provision. To the extent therefore that this decision conflicts
with what was held in People v. Macarandang, it no longer speaks with authority.
Wherefore, the judgment appealed from is affirmed.
Concepcion, C.J., Reyes, J.B.L., Dizon, Makalintal, Bengzon, J.P., Zaldivar, Sanchez, Castro and
Angeles, JJ., concur.
Footnotes
1

Exhibit 1.

Exhibit 2.

Exhibit 3.

Exhibit 4.

Sec. 878 as amended by Republic Act No. 4, Revised Administrative Code.

Sec. 879, Revised Administrative Code.

Lizarraga Hermanos v. Yap Tico, (1913) 24 Phil. 504, 513.

L-12088, December 23, 1959.

E. PP v. Patricio Amigo

THIRD DIVISION

[G.R. No. 116719. January 18, 1996]

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,

AMIGO alias BEBOT, accused-appellant.

vs. PATRICIO

DECISION
MELO, J.:
Initially, Patricio Amigo was charged with frustrated murder in an
Information reading as follows:
TheundersignedaccusestheabovenamedaccusedofthecrimeofFRUSTRATED
MURDER,underArt.248,inrelationtoArt.5oftheRevisedPenalCode,committed
asfollows:
ThatonoraboutDecember29,1989,intheCityofDavao,Philippines,andwithinthe
jurisdictionofthisHonorableCourt,theabovementionedaccused,armedwitha
knife,withtreacheryandevidentpremeditationandwithintenttokillwilfully,
unlawfullyandfeloniouslyattacked,assaultedandstabwithsaidweapononeBenito
NgSuy,therebyinflictinginjuriesuponthelatter,thefollowinginjuries,towit:
MULTIPLESTABWOUNDSLEFTARM,LEFTCHEST,ABDOMENANDLEFT
THIGHWITHPENETRATIONTOLEFTPLEURALCAVITY,DIAPHRAGM
STOMACH,DUODENUM,PANCREASANDMIDTRANVERSECOLON.
thus performing all the acts of execution which should have produced the
crime of murder as a consequence but nevertheless, did not produce it by
reason of causes independent of his will, that is, because of the timely and
able medical assistance immediately rendered to the said Benito Ng Suy.
(p.1, Rollo.)
to which he pleaded not guilty.
Subsequently, due to the death of the victim, an amended Information was
filed charging now the crime of murder, to wit:

ThatonoraboutDecember29,1989,intheCityofDavao,Philippines,andwithinthe
jurisdictionofthisHonorableCourt,theabovementionedaccused,armedwitha
knife,withtreacheryandevidentpremeditationandwithintenttokillwilfully,
unlawfullyandfeloniouslyattacked,assaultedandstabbedwithsaidweaponone
BenitoNgSay,therebyinflictinguponthelattermultiplewoundswhichcausedhis
deathandtheconsequentlossanddamagetotheheirsofthevictim.
(p.3,Rollo.)
After trial on the merits, the court a quo rendered a decision, disposing:
WHEREFORE,findingtheaccusedPatricioAmigoguiltybeyondreasonabledoubt
ofthecrimeofMURDERpunishableunderArt.248oftheRevisedPenalCode,with
nomodifyingcircumstancepresent,theaccusedisherebysentencedtothepenalty
ofreclusionperpetua,whichisthemediumperiodofthepenaltyofreclusion
temporalinitsmaximumtodeathandtopaythecost;toindemnifytheoffendedparty
theamountofP93,214.70asactualdamagesandP50,000.00ascompensatory
damagesandP50,000.00asmoraldamages.
(p.32,Rollo.)
Reversal thereof is now sought, with accused-appellant arguing that error
was committed by the trial court in imposing or meting out the penalty
of reclusion perpetua against him despite the fact that Sec. 19 (1), Article III of
the 1987 Constitution was already in effect when the offense was committed.
The facts of the case, as briefly summarized in the brief submitted by the
Office of the Solicitor General and as borne out by the evidence, are as
follows:
OnDecember29,1989,ataround1:00P.M.,afterhavingspenthalfdayattheirstore,
locatedatNo.166A,RamonMagsaysayAvenue,DavaoCity,BenitoNgSuywas
drivingtheirgrayFordFierabackhome,situatedatthebackofCarAsia,Bajada,
DavaoCity.Withhimduringthattimewerehisdaughters,JocelynNgSuyanda
youngeronetogetherwithhistwoyearoldson,whowereallseatedatthefrontseat
besidehimwhileafiveyearoldboywasalsoseatedatthebackofthesaidvehicle.
(TSN,April29,1991,pp.35;TSN,March31,1992)
On their way home and while traversing the National Highway of Bajada,
Davao City, an orange Toyota Tamaraw driven by one Virgilio Abogada,
suddenly made a left turn in front of the Regional Hospital, Bajada, Davao

City, without noticing the Ford Fiera coming from the opposite direction. This
Tamaraw was heading for Sterlyn Kitchenette, which was situated at the
corner of the said hospital. (TSN, April 29, 1991, p. 4; TSN, March 31, 1992,
pp. 3 and 13)
With Virgilio was Patricio Amigo alias Bebot, a vulcanizer at Linglings
vulcanizing shop owned and operated by a certain Galadua. He was also
seated at the right front seat beside Virgilio.
Due to the unexpected veer made by Virgilio, an accidental head on
collision occurred between the Fiera and the Tamaraw, causing a slight
damage to the right bumper of the latter. (TSN, March 31, 1992, p. 4)
Right after the collision, Benito immediately alighted from the drivers seat
and confronted Virgilio Abogada who also went down from his vehicle. (TSN,
April 29, 1991, p. 5)
Benito, who was a big man with a loud voice told Virgilio, You were not
looking, to which Virgilio retorted, I did not see you. (TSN, April 29, 1991, p.16)
While the two drivers where having this verbal confrontation, Patricio who
was merely a passenger of Virgilio also alighted from the front seat of the
Tamaraw and instantaneously approached Benito and advised the latter to
leave since it was merely a small and minor accident. (TSN, April 29, 1991,
pp. 16-18)
A bit irritated with the actuation exhibit by Patricio, Benito rebuked the
former and told him not to interfere, since he had nothing to do with the
accident. (Ibid., p. 7)
Irked by the comment made by Benito, Patricio sarcastically asked; You
are Chinese, is it you? With a ready answer Benito said; Yes, I am a Chinese
and why? Patricio in turn replied; So, you are a Chinese, wait for a while, then
left. (Ibid., pp. 7 and 19)
Immediately thereafter, Benito ordered Jocelyn to call a policeman, but
after a lapse of about one minute, Patricio returned and arrogantly
approached Benito, asking the latter once again, You are a Chinese, is it not?
To this Benito calmly responded in the affirmative.
(Ibid., pp. 7, 19-20)
Upon hearing the response, Patricio mumbled Ah, so you are a Chinese,
and suddenly took a five inch knife from his waist and simultaneously stabbed
Benito hitting him twice on the chest. (ibid., p. 20)

After being hit, Benito wounded and sensing that his life was in peril, tried
to evade his assailant by pushing Patricio away and run around the Tamaraw
but Patricio wielding the same knife and not content with the injuries he had
already inflicted, still chased Benito and upon overtaking the latter embraced
him and thrusted his knife on the victim several times, the last of which hit
Benito on the left side of his body. (Ibid., pp. 8, 10, 22)
It was at this juncture that Jocelyn who was still inside the Ford Fiera,
pleading for mercy to spare her father tried to get out of the vehicle but it was
very unfortunate that she could not open its door. (Ibid., p. 10)
Knowing that Patricio was really determined to kill her father by refusing to
heed her pleas, Joselyn shouted for help, since there were already several
people around witnessing that fatal incident, but to her consternation nobody
lifted a single finger to help them. (Ibid., pp. 6, 10, 18, 21-22) Only after her
father lay seated on the floor of their Ford Fiera after being hit on the left side
of his body that she was able to open the door of the said vehicle. (Ibid., p. 12)
After this precise moment, her younger sister, upon seeing their father
bathing with his own blood, embraced him, causing Patricio to cease from his
ferocious assault and noticing the presence of several people, he
fled. (Ibid., p. 22)
Thereafter, an enraged Jocelyn chased him, but since the assailant ran
faster than her, she was not able to overtake him, thus, she instead decided to
go back to where her father was and carried him inside the Tamaraw who
bumped them and consequently brought him to San Pedro Hospital where he
was attended to at the Emergency Room.(Ibid., p. 13)
While at the Emergency Room, Benito who was on a very critical
condition, due to multiple (13) stabbed wounds, was operated by Dr. Rolando
Chiu. After the operation, he was subsequently brought to the ICU and stayed
there for three (3) weeks. (July 12, 1991, pp. 3 and 4)
In a last ditch effort to save his life, having only 10 to 20 percent survival,
Benito was airlifted to Manila and was directly confined at the Chinese
General Hospital. After three (3) weeks of confinement, Benito expired.
CAUSE OF DEATH - SEPSIS (an overwhelming infection). This means that
the infection has already circulated in the blood all over the body. (Ibid., pp.67)
(pp. 59-65, Rollo.)
Accused-appellant contends that under the 1987 Constitution and prior to
the promulgation of Republic Act No. 7659, the death penalty had been

abolished and hence, the penalty that should have been imposed for the
crime of murder committed by accused-appellant without the attendance of
any modifying circumstances, should be reclusion temporal in its medium
period or 17 years, 4 months and 1 day, to 20 years of reclusion temporal.
Reasons out accused-appellant:
. . . Since the death penalty (or capital punishment) is not imposable when
the stabbing and killing happened, the computation of the penalty should be
regarded fromreclusion perpetua down and not from death penalty. Indeed,
the appropriate penalty is deducible from reclusion perpetua down to reclusion
temporal in its medium period. Hence, there being no modifying
circumstances present (p. 5 Decision, ibid.), the correct penalty should be in
the medium period (Art. 64, par. 1, Revised Penal Code) which is 17 years, 4
months and 1 day to 20 years of reclusion temporal.
(p. 10, Appellants Brief, ff. p. 50, Rollo.)
The question raised by accused-appellant was settled by this Court
in People vs. Muoz (170 SCRA 107 [1989]) thusly:
In People vs. Gavarra, Justice Pedro L. Yap declared for the Court that in
view of the abolition of the death penalty under Section 19, Article III of the
1987 Constitution, the penalty that may be imposed for murder is reclusion
temporal in its maximum period to reclusion perpetua, thereby eliminating
death as the original maximum period. Later, without categorically saying so,
the Court, through Justice Ameurfina A. Melencio-Herrera in
People vs. Masangkay and through Justice Andres R. Narvasa in
People vs. Atencio, divided the modified penalty into three new periods, the
limits of which were specified by Justice Edgardo L. Paras in People vs. Intino,
as follows: the lower half of reclusion temporal maximum as the minimum; the
upper half of reclusion temporal maximum as the medium; and reclusion
perpetua as the maximum.
The Court has reconsidered the above cases and, after extended
discussion, come to the conclusion that the doctrine announced therein does
not reflect the intention of the framers as embodied in Article III, Section 19(1)
of the Constitution. This conclusion is not unanimous, to be sure. Indeed,
there is much to be said of the opposite view, which was in fact shared by
many of those now voting for its reversal. The majority of the Court, however,
is of the belief that the original interpretation should be restored as the more
acceptable reading of the constitutional provision in question.
The advocates of the Masangkay ruling argue that the Constitution
abolished the death penalty and thereby limited the penalty for murder to the

remaining periods, to wit, the minimum and the medium. These should now be
divided into three new periods in keeping with the three-grade scheme
intended by the legislature. Those who disagree feel that Article III, Section
19(1) merely prohibits the imposition of the death penalty and has not, by
reducing it to reclusion perpetua, also correspondingly reduced the remaining
penalties. These should be maintained intact.
A reading of Section 19(1) of Article III will readily show that there is really
nothing therein which expressly declares the abolition of the death penalty.
The provision merely says that the death penalty shall not be imposed unless
for compelling reasons involving heinous crimes the Congress hereafter
provides for it and, if already imposed, shall be reduced to reclusion
perpetua. The language, while rather awkward, is still plain enough. And it is a
settled rule of legal hermeneutics that if the language under consideration is
plain, it is neither necessary nor permissible to resort to extrinsic aids, like the
records of the constitutional convention, for its interpretation.
xxx xxx xxx
The question as we see it is not whether the framers intended to abolish
the death penalty or merely to prevent its imposition. Whatever the intention
was, what we should determine is whether or not they also meant to require a
corresponding modification in the other periods as a result of the prohibition
against the death penalty.
It is definite that such a requirement, if there really was one, is not at all
expressed in Article III, Section 19(1) of the Constitution or indicated therein
by at least clear and unmistakable implication. It would have been so easy,
assuming such intention, to state it categorically and plainly, leaving no doubts
as to its meaning. One searches in vain for such a statement, express or even
implied. The writer of this opinion makes the personal observation that this
might be still another instance where the framers meant one thing and said
another or - strangely, considering their loquacity elsewhere - did not say
enough.
The original ruling as applied in the Gavarra, Masangkay, Atencio and
Intino cases represented the unanimous thinking of the Court as it was then
constituted. All but two members at that time still sit on the Court today. If we
have seen fit to take a second look at the doctrine on which we were all
agreed before, it is not because of a change in the composition of this body. It
is virtually the same Court that is changing its mind after reflecting on the
question again in the light of new perspectives. And well it might, and tan, for
the tenets it lays down are not immutable. The decisions of this Court are not
petrified rules grown rigid once pronounced but vital, growing things subject to

change as all life is. While we are told that the trodden path is best, this
should not prevent us from opening a fresh trial or exploring the other side or
testing a new idea in a spirit of continuing inquiry.
Accordingly, with the hope that as judges, (we) will be equal to (our) tasks,
whatever that means, we hereby reverse the current doctrine providing for
three new periods for the penalty for murder as reduced by the Constitution.
Instead, we return to our original interpretation and hold that Article III, Section
19(1) does not change the periods of the penalty prescribed by Article 248 of
the Revised Penal Code except only insofar as it prohibits the imposition of
the death penalty and reduces it to reclusion perpetua. The range of the
medium and minimum penalties remains unchanged.
The Court realizes that this interpretation may lead to certain inequities
that would not have arisen under Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code
before its modification. Thus, a person originally subject to the death penalty
and another who committed the murder without the attendance of any
modifying circumstance will now be both punishable with the same medium
period although the former is concededly more guilty than the latter. True
enough. But that is the will not of this Court but of the Constitution. That is a
question of wisdom, not construction. Of some relevance perhaps is the
parable in the Bible of the workman who was paid the stipulated daily wage of
one penny although he had worked longer than others hired later in the day
also paid the same amount. When he complained because he felt unjustly
treated by the householder, the latter replied: Friend, I do you no wrong. Did
you not agree with me for a penny?
The problem in any event is addressed not to this Court but to the
Congress. Penalties are prescribed by statute and are essentially and
exclusively legislative. As judges, we can only interpret and apply them and
have no authority to modify them or revise their range as determined
exclusively by the legislature. We should not encroach on this prerogative of
the lawmaking body.
Coming back to the case at bar, we find that there being no generic
aggravating or mitigating circumstance attending the commission of the
offenses, the applicable sentence is the medium period of the penalty
prescribed by Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code which, conformably to
the new doctrine here adopted and announced, is still reclusion perpetua. This
is the penalty we imposed on all the accused-appellants for each of the three
murders they have committed in conspiracy with the others. The award of civil
indemnity for the heirs of each of the victims is affirmed but the amount
thereof is hereby increased to P30,000.00 in line with the present policy.

(at pp. 120-125.)

The above ruling was reiterated in People vs. Parojinog (203 SCRA 673
[1991]) and in People vs. De la Cruz (216 SCRA 476 [1992]).
Finally, accused-appellant claims that the penalty of reclusion perpetua is
too cruel and harsh a penalty and pleads for sympathy. Courts are not the
forum to plead for sympathy. The duty of courts is to apply the law,
disregarding their feeling of sympathy or pity for an accused. DURA LEX SED
LEX. The remedy is elsewhere - clemency from the executive or an
amendment of the law by the legislative, but surely, at this point, this Court
can but apply the law.
WHEREFORE, the appealed decision is hereby AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
Narvasa, C.J. (Chairman), Davide, Jr., Francisco, and Panganiban,
JJ., concur.

STATUTES IN GENERAL
A. The power to make laws
Article VI, Section 1, 1987 Constitution
B. The passage of law
Article VI, Sections 26-32, 1987 Constitution
C. Constitutional test

Three (3) very important constitutional requirements in the enactment of statute:

1. Every bill passed by Congress shall embrace only one subject which shall be expressed in the
title thereof. The purposes of these constitutional requirements are:

To prevent hodge-podge or log-rolling legislation;

To prevent surprise or fraud upon the legislature; and

To fairly apprise the people, through such publications of legislative proceedings as is usually
made, of the subjects of legislation that are being considered, in order that they may have

opportunity of being heard thereon by petition or otherwise, if they shall so desire.

2.

No bill passed by either House shall become law unless it has passed three readings on separate
days, and printed copies thereof in its final form have been distributed to each member three
days before its passage.

3.

Every bill passed by the Congress shall, before it becomes a law, be presented to the President.
The executive approval and veto power of the President is the third important constitutional
requirement in the mechanical passage of a bill.
PARTS OF STATUTE

a.

Title the heading on the preliminary part, furnishing the name by which the act is individually
known. It is usually prefixed to the statute in the brief summary of its contents.

b.

Preamble part of statute explaining the reasons for its enactment and the objects sought to be
accomplished. Usually, it starts with whereas.

c.

Enacting clause part of statute which declares its enactment and serves to identify it as an act
of legislation proceeding from the proper legislative authority. Be enacted is the usual formula
used to start this clause.

d.

Body the main and operative part of the statute containing its substantive and even procedural
provisions. Provisos and exceptions may also be found.

e.

Repealing Clause - announces the prior statutes or specific provisions which have been
abrogated by reason of the enactment of the new law.

f.

Saving Clause restriction in a repealing act, which is intended to save rights, pending
proceedings, penalties, etc. from the annihilation which would result from an unrestricted repeal.

g.

Separability Clause provides that in the event that one or more provisions or unconstitutional,
the remaining provisions shall still be in force.

h.

Effectivity Clause announces the effective date of the law.

KINDS OF STATUTES

1. General Law affects the community at large. That which affects all people of the state or all
of a particular class.
2. Special Law designed for a particular purpose, or limited in range or confined to a
prescribed field of action on operation.
3.

Local Law relates or operates over a particular locality instead of over the whole territory of
the state.

4.

Public Law a general classification of law, consisting generally of constitutional,

administrative, criminal, and international law, concerned with the organization of the state, the
relations between the state and the people who compose it, the responsibilities of public officers
of the state, to each other, and to private persons, and the relations of state to one another. Public
law may be general, local or special law.

5.

Private Law defines, regulates, enforces and administers relationships among individuals,
associations and corporations.

6.

Remedial Statute providing means or method whereby causes of action may be affectuated,
wrongs redressed and relief obtained.

7.

Curative Statute a form of retrospective legislation which reaches back into the past to
operate upon past events, acts or transactions in order to correct errors and irregularities and to
render valid and effective many attempted acts which would otherwise be ineffective for the
purpose intended.

8.

Penal Statute defines criminal offenses specify corresponding fines and punishments.

9.

Prospective Law applicable only to cases which shall arise after its enactment.
10. Retrospective Law looks backward or contemplates the past; one which is made to affect
acts or facts occurring, or rights occurring, before it came into force.
11. Affirmative Statute directs the doing of an act, or declares what shall be done in contrast
to a negative statute which is one that prohibits the things from being done, or declares what
shall not be done.
12. Mandatory Statutes generic term describing statutes which require and not merely permit

a course of action.

One Title- One Subject Rule: Article VI, Section

26 (1), 1987 Constitution
Three Readings and No Amendment Rule:
Article VI, Section26 (2), 1987 Constitution
Executive Approval and Veto Power: Article VI,
Section 27 (2), 1987 Constitution
D.Parts of a statute
E. Kinds of statutes
F. Void for vagueness doctrine
CONCEPT OF VAGUE STATUTES
Statues or act may be said to be vague when it lacks comprehensible standards those men of
common intelligence must necessarily guess at its meaning and differ as to its application.Statute
is repugnant to the Constitution in two (2) respects:
1. It violates due process for failure to accord persons fair notice of conduct to avoid; and
2. It leaves law enforcers unbridled discretions.
The Supreme Court held that the vagueness doctrine merely requires a reasonable degree of
certainty for the statute to be upheld--- not absolute precision or mathematical exactitude.
Flexibility, rather than meticulous specificity, is permissible as long as the metes and bounds of
the statute are clearly delineated

Coates v. City of Cincinnati

U.S. Supreme Court
Coates v. City of Cincinnati, 402 U.S. 611 (1971)
Coates v. City of Cincinnati
No. 117

Argued January 11, 1971

Decided June 1, 1971
402 U.S. 611
APPEAL FROM THE SUPREME COURT OF OHIO
Syllabus
Cincinnati, Ohio, ordinance making it a criminal offense for
"three or more persons to assemble . . . on any of the sidewalls . . . and there
conduct themselves in a manner annoying to persons passing by . . . ," which
has not been narrowed by any construction of the Ohio Supreme
Court, held violative on its face of the due process standard of vagueness
and the constitutional right of free assembly and association. Pp. 402 U. S.
614-616.
21 Ohio St.2d 66, 255 N.E.2d 247, reversed.
STEWART, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which DOUGLAS, HARLAN,
BRENNAN, and MARSHALL, JJ., joined. BLACK, J., filed a separate
opinion, post, p. 402 U. S. 616. WHITE, J., filed a dissenting opinion, in which
BURGER, C.J., and BLACKMUN, J., joined, post, p. 402 U. S. 617.
MR. JUSTICE STEWART delivered the opinion of the Court.
A Cincinnati, Ohio, ordinance makes it a criminal offense for
"three or more persons to assemble . . . on any of the sidewalks . . . and
there conduct themselves in a manner annoying to persons passing by. . . .
[Footnote 1] "
Page 402 U. S. 612
The issue before us is whether this ordinance is unconstitutional on its face.

The appellants were convicted of violating the ordinance, and the convictions
were ultimately affirmed by a closely divided vote in the Supreme Court of
Ohio, upholding the constitutional validity of the ordinance. 21 Ohio St.2d 66,
255 N.E.2d 247. An appeal from that judgment was brought here under 28
U.S.C. 1257(2), [Footnote 2] and we noted probable jurisdiction, 398 U.S.
902. The record brought before the reviewing courts tells us no more than
that the appellant Coates was a student involved in a demonstration and the
other appellants were pickets involved in a labor dispute. For, throughout this
litigation, it has been the appellants' position that the ordinance on its face
violates the First and Fourteenth Amendments of the Constitution. Cf. Times
Film Corp. v. Chicago, 365 U. S. 43.
In rejecting this claim and affirming, the convictions the Ohio Supreme Court
did not give the ordinance any construction at variance with the apparent
plain import of its language. The court simply stated:
"The ordinance prohibits, inter alia, 'conduct . . . annoying to persons passing
by.' The word 'annoying' is a widely used and well understood word; it is not
necessary to guess its meaning. 'Annoying' is the present participle of the
transitive verb 'annoy,' which means to trouble, to vex, to impede, to
incommode, to provoke, to harass or to irritate. "
Page 402 U. S. 613
"We conclude, as did the Supreme Court of the United States in Cameron v.
Johnson, 390 U. S. 611, 390 U. S. 616, in which the issue of the vagueness of
a statute was presented, that the ordinance"
"clearly and precisely delineates its reach in words of common
understanding. It is a 'precise and narrowly drawn regulatory statute
[ordinance] evincing a legislative judgment that certain specific conduct
be . . . proscribed.'"
21 Ohio St.2d at 69, 255 N.E.2d at 249.
Beyond this, the only construction put upon the ordinance by the state court
was its unexplained conclusion that "the standard of conduct which it

specifies is not dependent upon each complainant's sensitivity." Ibid. But the
court did not indicate upon whose sensitivity a violation does depend -- the
sensitivity of the judge or jury, the sensitivity of the arresting officer, or the
sensitivity of a hypothetical reasonable man. [Footnote 3]

Page 402 U. S. 614

We are thus relegated, at best, to the words of the ordinance itself. If three or
more people meet together on a sidewalk or street corner, they must
conduct themselves so as not to annoy any police officer or other person
who should happen to pass by. In our opinion, this ordinance is
unconstitutionally vague because it subjects the exercise of the right of
assembly to an unascertainable standard, and unconstitutionally broad
because it authorizes the punishment of constitutionally protected conduct.
Conduct that annoys some people does not annoy others. Thus, the
ordinance is vague not in the sense that it requires a person to conform his
conduct to an imprecise but comprehensible normative standard, but rather
in the sense that no standard of conduct is specified at all. As a result, "men
of common intelligence must necessarily guess at its meaning." Connally v.
General Construction Co., 269 U. S. 385, 269 U. S. 391.
It is said that the ordinance is broad enough to encompass many types of
conduct clearly within the city's constitutional power to prohibit. And so,
indeed, it is. The city is free to prevent people from blocking sidewalks,
obstructing traffic, littering streets, committing assaults, or engaging in
countless other forms of antisocial conduct. It can do so through the
enactment and enforcement of ordinances directed with reasonable
specificity toward the conduct to be prohibited. Gregory v. Chicago, 394 U. S.
111, 394 U. S. 118, 394 U. S. 124-125 (BLACK, J., concurring). It cannot
constitutionally do so through the enactment and enforcement of an
ordinance whose violation may entirely depend upon whether or not a
policeman is annoyed. [Footnote 4]
Page 402 U. S. 615

But the vice of the ordinance lies not alone in its violation of the due process
standard of vagueness. The ordinance also violates the constitutional right of
free assembly and association. Our decisions establish that mere public
intolerance or animosity cannot be the basis for abridgment of these
constitutional freedoms. See Street v. New York, 394 U. S. 576, 394 U. S.
592; Cox v. Louisiana, 379 U. S. 536, 379 U. S. 551-553; Edwards v. South
Carolina, 372 U. S. 229, 372 U. S. 238; Terminiello v. Chicago, 337 U. S.
1; Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U. S. 296, 310 U. S. 311; Schneider v.
State, 308 U. S. 147, 308 U. S. 161. The First and Fourteenth Amendments do
not permit a State to make criminal the exercise of the right of assembly
simply because its exercise may be "annoying" to some people. If this were
not the rule, the right of the people to gather in public places for social or
political purposes would be continually subject to summary suspension
through the good faith enforcement of a prohibition against annoying
conduct.. [Footnote 5]
Page 402 U. S. 616
And such a prohibition, in addition, contains an obvious invitation to
discriminatory enforcement against those whose association together is
"annoying" because their ideas, their lifestyle, or their physical appearance is
resented by the majority of their fellow citizens. [Footnote 6]
The ordinance before us makes a crime out of what under the Constitution
cannot be a crime. It is aimed directly at activity protected by the
Constitution. We need not lament that we do not have before us the details
of the conduct found to be annoying. It is the ordinance on its face that sets
the standard of conduct and warns against transgression. The details of the
offense could no more serve to validate this ordinance than could the details
of an offense charged under an ordinance suspending unconditionally the
right of assembly and free speech.
The judgment is reversed.
[Footnote 1]

"It shall be unlawful for three or more persons to assemble, except at a

public meeting of citizens, on any of the sidewalks, street corners, vacant
lots or mouths of alleys, and there conduct themselves in a manner annoying
to persons passing by, or occupants of adjacent buildings. Whoever violates
any of the provisions of this section shall be fined not exceeding fifty dollars
($50.00), or be imprisoned not less than one (1) nor more than thirty (30)
days or both."
Section 901-L6, Code of Ordinances of the City of Cincinnati (1956).
[Footnote 2]
"Final judgments or decrees rendered by the highest court of a State in which
a decision could be had, may be reviewed by the Supreme Court as follows: "
"* * * *"
"(2) By appeal, where is drawn in question the validity of a statute of any
state on the ground of its being repugnant to the Constitution, treaties or
laws of the United States, and the decision is in favor of its validity."
[Footnote 3]
Cf. Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U. S. 568, where this Court upheld a
statute that punished "offensive, derisive or annoying" words. The state
courts had construed the statute as applying only to such words "as have a
direct tendency to cause acts of violence by the persons to whom,
individually, the remark is addressed." The state court also said:
"The word 'offensive' is not to be defined in terms of what a particular
addressee thinks. . . . The test is what men of common intelligence would
understand would be words likely to cause an average addressee to fight. . . .
The English language has a number of words and expressions which, by
general consent, are 'fighting words' when said without a disarming
smile. . . . Such words, as ordinary men know, are likely to cause a fight. So
are threatening, profane or obscene revilings. Derisive and annoying words
can be taken as coming within the purview of the statute as heretofore

interpreted only when they have this characteristic of plainly tending to

excite the addressee to a breach of he peace."
This Court was "unable to say that the limited scope of the statute as thus
construed contravenes the Constitutional right of free expression." 315 U.S.
at 315 U. S. 573.
[Footnote 4]
In striking down a very similar ordinance of Cleveland, Ohio, as
constitutionally invalid, the Court of Appeals for Cuyahoga County said:
"As it is written, the disorderly assembly ordinance could be used to
incriminate nearly any group or individual. With little effort, one can imagine
many . . . assemblages which, at various times, might annoy some persons
in the city of Cleveland. Anyone could become an unwitting participant in a
disorderly assembly, and suffer the penalty consequences. It has been left to
the police and the courts to decide when and to what extent ordinance
Section 13.1124 is applicable. Neither the police nor a citizen can hope to
conduct himself in a lawful manner if an ordinance which is designed to
regulate conduct does not lay down ascertainable rules and guidelines to
govern its enforcement. This ordinance represents an unconstitutional
exercise of the police power of the city of Cleveland, and is therefore void."
Cleveland v. Anderson, 13 Ohio App.2d 83, 90, 234 N.E.2d 304, 309-310.
[Footnote 5]
In striking down a very similar ordinance of Toledo, Ohio, as constitutionally
invalid, the Municipal Court of that city said:
"Under the provisions of Sections 17-10 and 17-11, arrests and prosecutions,
as in the present instance, would have been effective as against Edmund
Pendleton, Peyton Randolph, Richard Henry Lee, George Wythe, Patrick
Henry, Thomas Jefferson, George Washington and others for loitering and
congregating in front of Raleigh Tavern on Duke of Gloucester Street in

Williamsburg, Virginia, at any time during the summer of 1774 to the great
annoyance of Governor Dunsmore and his colonial constables."
City of Toledo v. Sims, 14 Ohio Op.2d 66, 69, 169 N.E.2d 516, 520.
[Footnote 6]
The alleged discriminatory enforcement of this ordinance figured prominently
in the background of the serious civil disturbances that took place in
Cincinnati in June, 1967. See Report of the National Advisory Commission on
Civil Disorders 26-27 (1968).
MR. JUSTICE BLACK.
First. I agree with the majority that this case is properly before us on appeal
from the Supreme Court of Ohio.
Second. This Court has long held that laws so vague that a person of
common understanding cannot know what is forbidden are unconstitutional
on their face. Lanzetta v. New Jersey, 306 U. S. 451 (1939), United States v.
Cohen Grocery Co., 255 U. S. 81(1921). Likewise, laws which broadly forbid
conduct or activities which are protected by the Federal Constitution, such
as, for instance, the discussion of political matters, are void on their
face. Thornhill v. Alabama, 310 U. S. 88
Page 402 U. S. 617
(1940). On the other hand, laws which plainly forbid conduct which is
constitutionally within the power of the State to forbid but also restrict
constitutionally protected conduct may be void either on their face or merely
as applied in certain instances. As my Brother WHITE states in his opinion
(with which I substantially agree), this is one of those numerous cases where
the law could be held unconstitutional because it prohibits both conduct
which the Constitution safeguards and conduct which the State may
constitutionally punish. Thus, the First Amendment, which forbids the State
to abridge freedom of speech, would invalidate this city ordinance if it were
used to punish the making of a political speech, even if that speech were to

annoy other persons. In contrast, however, the ordinance could properly be

applied to prohibit the gathering of persons in the mouths of alleys to annoy
passersby by throwing rocks or by some other conduct not at all connected
with speech. It is a matter of no little difficulty to determine when a law can
be held void on its face and when such summary action is inappropriate. This
difficulty has been aggravated in this case, because the record fails to show
in what conduct these defendants had engaged to annoy other people. In my
view, a record showing the facts surrounding the conviction is essential to
adjudicate the important constitutional issues in this case. I would therefore
vacate the judgment and remand the case with instructions that the trial
court give both parties an opportunity to supplement the record so that we
may determine whether the conduct actually punished is the kind of conduct
which it is within the power of the State to punish.
MR. JUSTICE WHITE, with whom THE CHIEF JUSTICE and MR. JUSTICE
BLACKMUN join, dissenting.
The claim in this case, in part, is that the Cincinnati ordinance is so vague
that it may not constitutionally
Page 402 U. S. 618
be applied to any conduct. But the ordinance prohibits persons from
assembling with others and "conduct[ing] themselves in a manner annoying
to persons passing by. . . ." Cincinnati Code of Ordinances 901-L6. Any man
of average comprehension should know that some kinds of conduct, such as
assault or blocking passage on the street, will annoy others and are clearly
covered by the "annoying conduct" standard of the ordinance. It would be
frivolous to say that these and many other kinds of conduct are not within
the foreseeable reach of the law.
It is possible that a whole range of other acts, defined with unconstitutional
imprecision, is forbidden by the ordinance. But, as a general rule, when a
criminal charge is based on conduct constitutionally subject to proscription
and clearly forbidden by a statute, it is no defense that the law would be
unconstitutionally vague if applied to other behavior. Such a statute is not
vague on its face. It may be vague as applied in some circumstances, but

ruling on such a challenge obviously requires knowledge of the conduct with

which a defendant is charged.
In Williams v. United States, 341 U. S. 97 (1951), a police officer was charged
under federal statutes with extracting confessions by force and thus, under
color of law, depriving the prisoner there involved of rights, privileges, and
immunities secured or protected by the Constitution and laws of the United
States, contrary to 18 U.S.C. 242. The defendant there urged that the
standard -- rights, privileges, and immunities secured by the Constitution -was impermissibly vague and, more particularly, that the Court was often so
closely divided on illegal confession issues that no defendant could be
expected to know when he was violating the law. The Court's response was
that, while application of the statute
Page 402 U. S. 619
to less obvious methods of coercion might raise doubts about the adequacy
of the standard of guilt, in the case before it, it was
"plain as a pikestaff that the present confessions would not be allowed in
evidence whatever the school of thought concerning the scope and meaning
of the Due Process Clause."
Id. at 341 U. S. 101. The claim of facial vagueness was thus rejected.
So too in United States v. National Dairy Corp., 372 U. S. 29 (1963), where we
considered a statute forbidding sales of goods at "unreasonably" low prices
to injure or eliminate a competitor, 15 U.S.C. 13a, we thought the statute
gave a seller adequate notice that sales below cost were illegal. The statute
was therefore not facially vague, although it might be difficult to tell whether
certain other kinds of conduct fell within this language. We said:
"In determining the sufficiency of the notice a statute must of necessity be
examined in the light of the conduct with which a defendant is charged."
Id. at 372 U. S. 33. See also United States v. Harriss, 347 U. S. 612 (1954).
This approach is consistent with the host of cases holding that

"one to whom application of a statute is constitutional will not be heard to

attack the statute on the ground that impliedly it might also be taken as
applying to other persons or other situations in which its application might be
unconstitutional."
United States v. Raines, 362 U. S. 17, 362 U. S. 21 (1960), and cases there
cited.
Our cases, however, including National Dairy, recognize a different approach
where the statute at issue purports to regulate or proscribe rights of speech
or press protected by the First Amendment. See United States v. Robel, 389
U. S. 258 (1967); Keyishian v. Board of Regents, 385 U. S. 589 (1967); Kunz
v. New York, 340 U. S. 290 (1951). Although a statute may be neither vague,
overbroad, nor otherwise invalid as applied to the conduct charged against a
particular defendant, he is
Page 402 U. S. 620
permitted to raise its vagueness or unconstitutional overbreadth as applied
to others. And if the law is found deficient in one of these respects, it may
not be applied to him either, until and unless a satisfactory limiting
construction is placed on the statute. Dombrowski v. Pfister, 380 U. S.
479, 380 U. S. 491-492 (1965). The statute, in effect, is stricken down on its
face. This result is deemed justified since the otherwise continued existence
of the statute in unnarrowed form would tend to suppress constitutionally
protected rights.See United States v. National Dairy Corp., supra, at 372 U. S.
36.
Even accepting the overbreadth doctrine with respect to statutes clearly
reaching speech, the Cincinnati ordinance does not purport to bar or regulate
speech as such. It prohibits persons from assembling and "conduct[ing]"
themselves in a manner annoying to other persons. Even if the assembled
defendants in this case were demonstrating and picketing, we have long
recognized that picketing is not solely a communicative endeavor, and has
aspects which the State is entitled to regulate even though there is
incidental impact on speech. In Cox v. Louisiana, 379 U. S. 559 (1965), the
Court held valid on its face a statute forbidding picketing and parading near

a courthouse. This was deemed a valid regulation of conduct, rather than

pure speech. The conduct reached by the statute was "subject to regulation
even though [it was] intertwined with expression and association." Id. at 379
U. S. 563. The Court then went on to consider the statute as applied to the
facts of record.
In the case before us, I would deal with the Cincinnati ordinance as we would
with the ordinary criminal statute. The ordinance clearly reaches certain
conduct, but may be illegally vague with respect to other conduct. The
statute is not infirm on its face, and, since we have no information from this
record as to what conduct was
Page 402 U. S. 621
charged against these defendants, we are in no position to judge the statute
as applied. That the ordinance may confer wide discretion in a wide range of
circumstances is irrelevant when we may be dealing with conduct at its core.
I would therefore affirm the judgment of the Ohio Supreme Court.

G.Kinds of Repeal: Express and Implied

Express repeal is the abrogation or annulling of a previously existing law by the enactment of
a subsequent statute which declares that the former law shall be revoked and abrogated.
Implied repeal when a later statute contains provisions so contrary to irreconcilable with those
of the earlier law that only one of the two statutes can stand in force.
The repeal of a penal law deprives the court of jurisdiction to punish persons charged with a
violation of the old penal law prior to its repeal.
Only a law can repeal a law.
The intention to repeal must be clear and manifest, otherwise, at least, as a general rule, the later
act is to be construed as a continuation of, and not a substitute for, the first act.
Two (2) categories of repeal by implication:

Where provision in the two acts on the same subject matter are in an irreconcilable conflict;

If the later act covers the whole subject of the earlier one and is clearly intended as a substitute
to be a complete and perfect system in itself.

H.Statutes vis--vis Ordinances

Statute it is the written will of the legislature, expressed according to the form necessary to
construe it a law of the state, and rendered authentic by certain prescribed forms and solemnities.
Ordinance an act passed by the local legislative body in the exercise of its law-making
authority.
TEST OF VALID ORDINANCE
1. Must not contravene the Constitution or any statute; 2. Must not be unfair or oppressive;3.
Must not be partial or discriminatory;4. Must not prohibit but may regulate trade;
5. Must be general and consistent with public policy; and 6. Must not be unreasonable.
REASON WHY AN ORDINANCE SHOULD NOT CONTRAVENE A STATUTE
Local councils exercise only delegated legislative powers conferred on them by Congress as the
national law making body.
The delegate cannot be superior to the principal.