THE UNITED STATES v. WILLIAM FOWLER ET AL., G.R. No. 496.

December 31, 1902

Topic: Article 2
Principle: Courts of the Philippines have no jurisdiction to take cognizance of crimes
committed on the high seas on board of a transport or other vessel not registered or
licensed in the Philippines.
Facts:
The two defendants have been accused of the theft of sixteen bottles of champagne on
board the transport Lawton, then navigating the high seas, which said bottles of champagne
formed part of the cargo of the said vessel. They were brought before the Philippine court,
and alleged that the Court of First Instance was without jurisdiction to try the crime charged,
inasmuch as it appeared from the information that the crime was committed on the high
seas, and not in the city of Manila, or within the territory comprising the Bay of Manila, or
upon the seas within the 3-mile limit to which the jurisdiction of the court extends.
Issue: Whether or not the Court of First Instance of Manila has jurisdiction over the criminal
case theft committed on board while navigating on high seas on a vessel not registered in
the Philippines.
Ruling:
No. The Philippine court has jurisdiction over the crime of theft committed on high seas on
board a vessel not registered or licensed in the Philippines. The English Rule states that such
crimes are triable in our country when crimes are committed on board a foreign vessel
sailing from a foreign port and which enters the Philippine waters. In the case at bar, the
vessel Lawton was navigating the high seas at the commission of the crime. Given the
location of the vessel at the time, such act is not triable within our jurisdiction.
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS vs. NARCISO CABUNGCAL, G.R. No. L2845, August 1, 1928
Topic: Article 11, par 2 Defense of Relatives and Strangers
Principle: Victims conduct of rocking the boat gave rise to the belief on the plaintiff that the
boat would capsize if he did not separate the victim from the boat. Giving him a blow on the
head was the least that could reasonably have done. The appellant having acted in defense
of his wife and child and the other passengers in the boat and the means employed having
been reasonably necessary in this defense, while it was at the cost of the life of the
deceased, he is completely exempt from criminal liability. (kani lang para maka remember
tas situation. Super digest nani) haha
Facts:
Accused Cabungcal, his family and friends including the victim spent the day at said fishery
and in the afternoon returned in two boats. Victim Juan (deceased) rocked the boat which
started it to take water, and the accused, fearing the boat might capsize, asked the
deceased not to do it. As the deceased paid no attention to this warning and continued
rocking the boat, the appellant struck him on the forehead with an oar. The deceased fell
into the water and was submerged, but a little while after appeared on the surface having
grasped the side of the boat, saying that he was going to capzise it and started to move it
with this end in view, seeing which the women began to cry, whereupon the appellant struck
him on the neck with the same oar, which submerged the deceased again. With the
movement that the appellant made in giving him the second blow, the boat upset and then
the appellant proceeded to save his passengers. Cabungcal after having thus saved his
passengers, proceeded to search for the deceased but was unable to find him and his body
was recovered later.

Issue: Whether or not accused is liable for the deceaseds death, where the former
Ruling:
No, Cabungcal is completely exempt from all criminal liability.
Article 11 par 3 requires:
1. Unlawful aggression.
2. Reasonable necessity of the means employed to prevent or repel it.
3. That the person defending be not induced by revenge, resentment, or other evil
motive. (or was driven by his Heroic motive)
The conduct of the deceased in rocking the boat until the point of it having taken water and
his insistence on this action, in spite of the appellant's warning, gave rise to the belief on the
part of the plaintiff that it would capsize if he did not separate the deceased from the boat in
such a manner as to give him no time to accomplish his purpose. It was necessary to disable
him momentarily. For this purpose the blow given him by the appellant on the forehead with
an oar was the least that could reasonably have been done. The appellant having acted in
defense of his wife and child and the other passengers in the boat and the means employed
having been reasonably necessary in this defense, while it was at the cost of the life of the
deceased, he is completely exempt from criminal liability.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. RALPH VELEZ DIAZ alias JIMBOY
Topic: Art 12, Par 1 Pedophilia
Principle: Pedophilia is not equivalent to insanity. It does not exempt accused from criminal
liability.
Facts:
Francis Bart 11 year old never returned home. His body was later discovered lifeless under
the Bulacao Bridge. Autopsy revealed injuries in the boys rectal area and was opined that a
blunt instrument like a male organ in full erection could have caused them. In Francis wake,
person acting suspiciously but unknown to the Fulache spouses went to the wake. There he
created a spectacle of himself by reciting poems for Francis Bart and singing the theme song
from the movie The Lion King, and giving emphasis to the word surrender. Bartolome
Fulache reported to the authorities the unusual behavior of their "uninvited guest." He was
identified later as herein accused Ralph Velez Diaz.
Diaz admitted to doing the act but raised the defense of insanity. The doctor eventually
diagnosed accused-appellant to be afflicted with pedophilia, a mental disorder not
synonymous with insanity. He explained that pedophilia is a sexual disorder wherein the
subject has strong, recurrent and uncontrollable sexual and physical fantasies about children
which he tries to fulfill, especially when there are no people around. He claimed, however,
that despite his affliction the subject could distinguish right from wrong. In fact, he
maintained that pedophilia could be committed without necessarily killing the victim
although injuries might be inflicted on the victim in an effort to repel any resistance.
Issue: WON pedophilia is equivalent to insanity and thus exempts accused from liability.
Ruling
No.
A defendant in a criminal case who interposes the defense of mental incapacity has the
burden of establishing that fact, i.e., he was insane at the very moment when the crime was
committed. He must prove it by clear and positive evidence. In the instant case, the defense
of insanity as an exempting circumstance was not established and did not overcome the
legal presumption that a person's acts are of his own free will and intelligence. The settled
rule is that the onus probandi rests upon him who invokes insanity as a defense, and the

defense failed to discharge this burden. Further, when accused-appellant was committed to
the National Center for Mental Health, he was not diagnosed as insane but was suffering
from pedophilia. Thus, there is no doubt in our mind that he was sane during his two-year
confinement in the center, pedophilia being dissimilar to insanity. Thus, the conviction of
accused-appellant no doubt is in order.
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS vs. DAYUG and BANNAISAN, G.R. No.
25782 September 30, 1926
Topic: Aggravating Circumstances (no mention of disregard of age here, so ako
lang g apil tanan aggravating circumstancs.
Principle: Pls check ruling
Facts:
The herein accused are relatives of Suguian and wanted to revenge the death of the family
of their relative. Later, the accused started out ahead of them and upon arriving at the
barrio of Pakik waited in ambush. At about noon Daupan and Panabang passed by them. The
accused followed them at a distance of about 80 yards, trying not to be seen. At Belen they
overtook them, Dayug attacking Panabang and bannaisan attacking Daupan, each using his
respective bolo. Dayug first wounded Panabang on the right shoulder and later in the back.
While Dayug was engaged with Panabang, Bannaisan pursued the Igorrote Daupan, inflicting
a wound in her abdomen, another in the right lumbar region, another across the left cheek
and another in the right buttock. The accused divided the money and the rings, Bannaisan
taking the P10 in silver and three rings and Dayug the rest.
There having been a concert of mind and unity of purpose, each of the accused carrying out
his part of the plan, each is liable for the death of the two victims. The crime committed by
them is double murder with the qualifying circumstance of evident premeditation, as shown
by the fact that they agreed to kill the two victims, started out ahead of them and waylaid
them in the road.
Issue: What are the aggravating circumstances involved in this case?
Ruling:
Aggravating circumstances must be conclusively proven.
Treachery? NO.
- the wounds on the back and shoulders of the victims alone are not sufficient to legally
establish the existence of the aggravating circumstance of treachery
Abuse of superior strength? NO.
- the fight was single-handed and there is no evidence in the record to slow that the
aggressors, individually and collectively, were greatly superior in strength to the offended
parties.
Disregard of sex? YES.
- must be taken into consideration inasmuch as his victim was a woman.
Cruelty? NO.
- There is cruelty when the culprit enjoys and delights in making his victim suffer slowly and
gradually, causing him unnecessary moral and physical pain in the consummation of the
criminal act which he intends to commit.
- mere fact of inflicting various successive wounds upon a person in order to cause his
death, no appreciable time intervening between the infliction of one wound and that of

another to show that he had wanted to prolong the suffering of his victim, is not sufficient for
taking this aggravating circumstance into consideration.
The only aggravating circumstances considered are:
Uninhabited place
Disregard of sex
- BUT all of which are offset by the special extenuating circumstance provided in article 11 of
the Penal Code, as amended by Act No. 2142, more especially in regard to the members of
the non-Christian Tribes, to whom, due to their custom and traditions, it is second nature to
revenge the death of a relative, which only instruction and education can eradicate. (I think
Lack of Education here is mitigating, being an Alternating Circumstance)
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. SALVADOR CRISOSTOMO and INOCENCIO
RAGSAC, G.R. No. L-38180 October 23, 1981
Topic: Aggravating Circ Evident Premeditation
Principle: 2 hours is not SUFFICIENT for the accused to reflect on his planned act.
Facts:
Accused and Victim are prisoners. Facts occurred inside the jail premises.
The accused Crisostomo gave (P 62.00) to the victim Maje to buy cigarettes and sugar.
When Crisostomo asked for the things he requested Waje to buy, the latter replied that the
money was lost. Waje then dared Crisostomo to fight it out with him. Infuriated by the
actuations and remarks of Waje, the accused Salvador Crisostomo and Inocencio Ragsac
planned to kill Waje. The two accused went out of their dormitory to carry out their plan.
Crisostomo followed the group of prisoners who were assigned to collect garbage inside the
prison compound while Ragsac proceeded to the general kitchen. When the accused saw the
deceased walking towards the Reception and Diagnostic Center, they followed him. Upon
hearing the victim, Crisostomo immediately stabbed Waje. The first trust did not prove fatal,
so Ragsac stabbed Waje and the two accused took turns in stabbing the victim.
Issue: Whether or not the two accused committed the killing in conspiracy and with evident
premeditation and treachery.
Ruling:
Conspiracy? Yes.
- The conspiracy between the two accused is shown by the admitted fact that they agreed to
kill Waje two hours before he was actually killed. It is shown by the concerted acts of the two
accused of leaving their dormitory XI-B-3 at 7:00 A.M. on the day of the killing, of meeting at
the prison kitchen, of waiting for Waje to appear, of approaching him and simultaneously
stabbing him.
Treachery? Yes.
- is shown by the admission of the accused Crisostomo that he approached Waje from
behind, turned him about, then stabbed him. The suddenness of the attack was consciously
adopted to facilitate the perpetration of the crime without risk to themselves.
Evident premeditation? NO.
- The two accused allegedly planned to kill Waje at 7:00 o'clock in the morning
and the killing took place at 9:00 A.M. The two accused did not have sufficient
time to reflect during the two hours that preceded the killing.
RAMON C. TAN vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES [G.R. No. 134298. August 26,
1999]

Topic: Anti-Fencing Law

Principle: Essential elements of the crime of fencing as follows:
1. A crime of robbery or theft has been committed;
2. The accused, who is not a principal or accomplice in the commission of the crime of
robbery or theft, buys, receives, possesses, keeps, acquires, conceals, sells or disposes, or
buys and sells, or in any manner deals in any article, item, object or anything of value, which
has been derived from the proceeds of the said crime;
3. The accused knows or should have known that the said article, item, object or anything of
value has been derived from the proceeds of the crime of robbery or theft; and
4. There is on the part of the accused, intent to gain for himself or for another.
The law on fencing does not require the accused to have participated in the criminal design
to commit, or to have been in any wise involved in the commission of, the crime of robbery
or theft.
Facts:
Rosita Lim is the proprietor of a business engaged in manufacturing propellers or spare parts
for boats. Manuelito Mendez was one of the employees working for her. Manuelito Mendez
left the employ of the company. Complainant Lim noticed that some of the welding rods,
propellers and boat spare parts, such as bronze and stainless propellers and brass screws
were missing. Complainant Rosita Lim informed Victor Sy, uncle of Manuelito Mendez, of the
loss. Subsequently, Manuelito Mendez was arrested in the Visayas and he admitted that he
and his companion Gaudencio Dayop stole them. Manuelito Mendez asked for complainants
forgiveness. He pointed to petitioner Ramon C. Tan as the one who bought the stolen items
and who paid the amount of P13,000.00, in cash to Mendez and Dayop, and they split the
amount with one another.
Lim later charged Tan with violation of Presidential Decree No. 1612 (Anti-Fencing Law)
which the latter denied.
Issue: whether or not the prosecution has successfully established the elements of fencing
as against petitioner.[2]
Ruling:
No.
Fencing, as defined in Section 2 of P.D. No. 1612 is the act of any person who, with intent to
gain for himself or for another, shall buy, receive, possess, keep, acquire, conceal, sell or
dispose of, or shall buy and sell, or in any manner deal in any article, item, object or
anything of value which he knows, or should be known to him, to have been derived from
the proceeds of the crime of robbery or theft.
Robbery is the taking of personal property belonging to another, with intent to gain, by
means of violence against or intimidation of any person, or using force upon things.The
crime of theft is committed if the taking is without violence against or intimidation of
persons nor force upon things
The law on fencing does not require the accused to have participated in the criminal design
to commit, or to have been in any wise involved in the commission of, the crime of robbery
or theft.
the crimes of robbery and theft, on the one hand, and fencing, on the other, are separate
and distinct offenses.[8] The State may thus choose to prosecute him either under the
Revised Penal Code or P. D. No. 1612.
Essential elements of the crime of fencing as follows:

1. A crime of robbery or theft has been committed;

2. The accused, who is not a principal or accomplice in the commission of the crime of
robbery or theft, buys, receives, possesses, keeps, acquires, conceals, sells or disposes, or
buys and sells, or in any manner deals in any article, item, object or anything of value, which
has been derived from the proceeds of the said crime;
3. The accused knows or should have known that the said article, item, object or anything of
value has been derived from the proceeds of the crime of robbery or theft; and
4. There is on the part of the accused, intent to gain for himself or for another.
In this case, Lim forgave Mendez and did not prosecute him. As complainant Rosita Lim
reported no loss, it cannot be held for certain that there was committed a crime of theft.
Thus, the first element of the crime of fencing is absent, that is, a crime of robbery or theft
has been committed. What is more, there was no showing at all that the accused knew or
should have known that the very stolen articles were the ones sold to him. One is deemed to
know a particular fact if he has the cognizance, consciousness or awareness thereof, or is
aware of the existence of something, or has the acquaintance with facts, or if he has
something within the minds grasp with certitude and clarity.
Moreno vs COMELEC
Topic: Probation
Principle: The grant of probation is a suspension of the imposition of sentence as well as the
accessory penalties of serving from public office. Hence during the period of probation, the
probationer is not even disqualified from running for a public office because the accessory
penalty is put on hold for the duration of the probation
Facts:
Norma L. Mejes (Mejes) filed a petition to disqualify Moreno from running for Punong
Barangay on the ground that the latter was convicted by final judgment of the crime of
Arbitrary Detention and was sentenced to suffer imprisonment of Four (4) Months and One
(1) Day to Two (2) Years and Four (4) Months by the Regional Trial Court.
Moreno filed an answer averring that the petition states no cause of action because he was
already granted probation.
He said that the final discharge of the probation shall operate to restore to him all civil rights
lost or suspended as a result of his conviction and to fully discharge his liability for any fine
imposed. The order of the trial court terminated his probation and restored to him all the
civil rights he lost as a result of his conviction, including the right to vote and be voted for in
the July 15, 2002 elections.
Issue: Under Section 40(a) of the Local Government Code, those sentenced by final
judgment for an offense punishable by more than one (1) year or more of imprisonment are
disqualified from running for any elective position within two (2) years after service of
sentence. Does this apply to an accused who was granted probation and thereafter
discharged?
Ruling:
No
a). The grant of probation is a suspension of the imposition of sentence as well as the
accessory penalties of serving from public office. Hence during the period of probation, the
probationer is not even disqualified from running for a public office because the accessory
penalty is put on hold for the duration of the probation

b). The period of probation cannot be equated with service of sentence as the probationer
does not serve the penalty but is merely required to comply with all the conditions
prescribed in the probation Order
c) Those who have not serve their sentence by reason of the grant of probation which should
not be equated with the service of sentence and should not likewise be disqualified from
running for a local office because the 2 year period of ineligibility under section 40(a) of the
Local Government Code does not even run
d) When the probationer is discharged, his case is deemed terminated; all civil rights lost or
suspended as a result of conviction were restored to him including the right to run for a
public office.