Beruflich Dokumente
Kultur Dokumente
Junhai Ma
Tianjin University
College of Management and Economics
92 Wei Jin Road, 300072 Tianjin
Tianjin University of Finance and Economics
School of Business
25 Zhu Jiang Road, 300222 Tianjin
China
mjhtju@yahoo.com.cn
Abstract: On the basis of domestic and foreign workers study, this paper considers the dynamic model of a duopoly
price game in insurance market. In the duopoly model, we theoretically analyze the existence and stability of the
Nash equilibrium point of the dynamic system, when one player or both players make a delayed decision, then
stability conditions are obtained. The numerical simulation results further confirmed the accuracy of the theory.
We observe that consideration of the delayed decision cannot change the equilibrium point of the system, but
the time to the situation of stabilize will be changed because of the influence of the delayed variable and other
parameters. If we increase the value of delayed parameter, the system will take longer time to be stable. If we
change the speed of price adjustment and the weight of price of different periods, the time to the situation of
stabilize will be changed.
KeyWords: insurance market,duopoly,dynamic game,delayed decision
1 Introduction
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point.
Song Yongli [10] studies a competitive
Lotka-Volterra system with two delays, then analyzes
the stability of the equilibrium point and the existence
of Hopf bifurcations. Zhang Jinzhu [11] considers a
two-species Lotka-Volterra competition system with
dependent delays. Gao Qin [12] uses the theory of
ecology to analyze the competition and cooperation
between two container terminal companies. She
improves the Lotka-Volterra model to constitute
nonlinear models and investigates the stability and
Hopf bifurcation of no-delay and delay models.
Woo-Sik Son [13] investigates the dynamical model
of a financial system, analyzes the local stability of
the system with delays and the effect of delayed
feedbacks on the financial model. Sanling Yuan [14]
analyzes a predator-prey system with same feedback
delays, Rui Xu [15] analyzes a predator-prey system
with stage structure for the predator. Both of them
investigate the stability of the equilibrium and the
existence of Hopf bifurcation of the model. Rui Xu
[16] also investigates a delayed predator-prey model
with prey dispersal and analyzes the local stability of
all nonnegative equilibria. Junhai Ma [17] studies a
dynamic triopoly game model characterized by firms
with different expectations. Junhai Ma [18] has
considered a three-species symbiosis Lotka-Volterra
model with discrete delays and investigated the local
stability of positive equilibrium.
Most of investigations are on the discrete
dynamical system and a few researches apply it to
the insurance market. Here the study is based on the
insurance market and a dynamic model of a duopoly
game is constituted, to investigate situations that one
player considers delayed decisions and both players
make delayed decisions. According to the analysis of
numerical simulations, the parameters effects on the
stability of this system are obtained.
Ci (qi ) = ci qi , i = 1, 2
(4)
1 (p1 ,p2 )
p1
2 (p1 ,p2 )
p2
= a 2b1 p1 + d1 p2 + b1 c1
= a 2b2 p2 + d2 p1 + b2 c2
(5)
i (p1 , p2 )
, i = 1, 2
pi
(6)
(7)
p1 (t) = v1 p1 (a 2b1 p1 + d1 p2 + b1 c1 )
p2 (t) = v2 p2 (a 2b2 p2 + d2 p1 + b2 c2 )
(8)
(1)
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q1 = a b1 p1 + d1 p2
q2 = a b2 p2 + d2 p1
(3)
Model
(2)
pi (t) = vi pi
i (pd1 , p2 )
, i = 1, 2
pi
where
600
(9)
( + 2b1 wv1 p1
+2b (1 w)v p e )
1
1 1
(d2 wv2 p2
d2 (1 w)v2 p2 e )
p1 (t) =
3 Equilibrium
stability
points
and
d1 v1 p1
=0
+ 2b2 v2 p2
(14)
Compute the determinant (14), we will have
(10)
2 + l1 + l2 + (l3 + l4 )e = 0
(15)
where
l1 = 2b1 wv1 p1 + 2b2 v2 p2 ,
local
l2 = v1 v2 p1 p2 w(4b1 b2 d1 d2 ),
l3 = 2b1 (1 w)v1 p1 ,
l4 = v1 v2 p1 p2 (1 w)(4b1 b2 d1 d2 ).
2 c2
E1 (0, 0), E2 (0, a+b
2b2 ),
1 c1
E3 ( a+b
2b1 , 0), E4 (p1 , p2 ).
2 l2 = l4 cos( ) + l3 sin( )
l1 = l3 cos( ) l4 sin( )
(16)
where
{
p1 =
p2 =
(11)
u 1 (t) =
where
l12 2l2 l32 =
2
4(b1 v1 p1 ) (2w 1)+4(b2 v2 p2 )2 +2v1 v2 d1 d2 p1 p2 w,
l22 l42 = (v1 v2 p1 p2 )2 (4b1 b2 d1 d2 )2 (2w 1)
v1 (u1 (t) +
2b1 (1 w)u1 (t ) + d1 u2 (t)]
(12)
u 2 (t) =
+ d2 wv2 p2 u1 (t)
+d2 (1 w)v2 p2 u1 (t )
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(18)
2b1 (1 w)v1 p1 u1 (t )
+d1 v1 p1 u2 (t)
2b2 v2 p2 u2 (t)
(17)
0 =
(13)
(19)
1
0
(l l l ) 2 l l
arccos[ 4 l12 32 +l02 2 4 ]
3 0
4
2j
0 ,
j = 0, 1, 2,
(20)
(2+l1 )e
(l3 +l4 )
l3
(l3 +l4 )
p 1 (t) =
1 )e
Re[ (2+l
(l3 +l4 ) ]| =j
3
Re[ (l3 l+l
]| =j
4)
=
0 cos(0 )+l1 sin(0 ))
]+
Re[ l1 cos(0 )20 sin(l0 )+i(2
2 +il
Re[ l
l3
]
2
3 0 +il4 0
3 0
4 0
02
2
A [20
2
0
p1 (t) =
v1 p1 [a 2b1 p1 (t )
+d1 p2 (t ) + b1 c1 ]
p2 (t) = v2 p2 [a 2b2 p2 (t )
+d2 p1 (t ) + b2 c2 ]
02
>0
u 1 (t) =
(21)
(25)
u 1 (t) =
2b1 v1 p1 u1 (t )
+d1 v1 p1 u2 (t )
u 2 (t) = 2b2 v2 p2 u2 (t )
+d2 v2 p2 u1 (t )
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(24)
(26)
d2 v2 p2 e
d1 v1 p1 e
+ 2b2 v2 p2 e
= 0 (27)
602
d1 d2 )v1 v2 p1 p2 e( + ) = 0
4 Numerical simulations
4.1 One player makes delayed decision
(28)
where
m1 = 2(b1 v1 p1 + b2 v2 p2 )
m2 = (4b1 b2 d1 d2 )v1 v2 p1 p2
When = 0, the equation (28) becomes
2 + m1 + m2 = 0
(29)
2 + m1 cos( )i + m1 sin( ) +
m2 cos(2 ) m2 sin(2 )i = 0
10
t
15
20
2 + m1 cos( ) + m2 cos(2 ) = 0
m1 cos( ) m2 sin(2 ) = 0
(30)
Then we have
{
(m2 2 ) cos( ) = 0
(m2 + 2 ) sin( ) = m1
(31)
5
m m21 4m2
1,2 = 1
2
1,j =
1,2 ( 2
2,j =
arccos[
4m2 m21
2 m2 ]
20
2j
3 ,
j = 0, 1, 2,
The model in 3.2 is complex, here we only
compute the values of the delayed parameter, we will
deeply investigate this theory in the future.
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m2 ,
10
t
+ 2j), j = 0, 1, 2,
If m2 2 = 0, we have 3 =
1
3
603
p1
p2
p1
p2
100
200
300
400
500
p1
p2
100
200
300
400
500
100
200
300
400
500
p1
p2
p1
p2
100
200
300
400
500
100
300
400
500
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p1
p2
100
200
300
400
500
604
p1
p2
100
200
300
400
500
p1
p2
200
300
400
500
p1
p2
p1
p2
100
200
300
400
500
p1
p2
50
100
t
150
200
100
200
300
400
500
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p1
p2
50
100
t
150
p1
p2
200
50
100
t
150
p1
p2
50
100
t
150
p1
p2
200
50
100
t
150
100
t
150
p1
p2
200
50
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p1
p2
50
200
100
t
150
200
606
p1
p2
50
100
t
150
200
Conclusion
References:
[1] Han Shufeng and Ding Jiaxing, Analysis of price
game in Chinas insurance market, Technology
and Economic. 16, 2006, pp. 3738.
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