VOL, 150, JUNE 17, 1987

645
Diaz vs. Intermediate Appellate Court
No. L-66574. June 17, 1987.*
ANSELMA DIAZ, guardian of VICTOR, RODRIGO, ANSELMINA and MIGUEL, all
surnamed SANTERO, petitioners, and FELIXBERTA PACURSA, guardian of
FEDERICO SANTERO, et al., vs. INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT and FELISA
PAMUTI JARDIN,
_______________
* SECOND DIVISION.
646
646
SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Diaz vs. Intermediate Appellate Court
respondents.
Civil Law; Succession; Illegitimate child cannot inherit ab intestato from the
legitimate children and relatives of his father or mother nor shall such
children or relatives inherit in the same manner from the illegitimate child
Article 992 of the New Civil Code provides a barrier or iron curtain in that it
prohibits absolutely a succession ab intestato between the illegitimate child
and the legitimate children and relatives of the father or mother of said
legitimate child. They may have a natural tie of blood, but this is not
recognized by law for the purposes of Art. 992. Between the legitimate
family and the illegitimate family there is presumed to be an intervening
antagonism and incompatibility. The illegitimate child is disgracefully looked
down upon by the legitimate family; the family is in turn, hated by the
illegitimate child; the latter considers the privileged condition of the former,
and the resources of which it is thereby deprived; the former, in turn, sees in
the illegitimate child nothing but the product of sin, palpable evidence of a
blemish broken in life; the law does no more than recognize this truth, by
avoiding further grounds of resentment. Thus, petitioners herein cannot
represent their father Pablo Santero in the succession of the letter to the
intestate estate of his legitimate mother Simona Pamuti Vda. de Santero,
because of the barrier provided for under Art. 992 of the New Civil Code.
PETITION to review the decision of the Intermediate Appellate Court.
The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.
Ambrosio Padilla, Mempin & Reyes Law Offices for petitioners.
Pedro S. Sarino for respondent R.P. Jar din.
PARAS, J.:
Private respondent filed a Petition dated January 23, 1976 with the Court of
First Instance of Cavite in Sp. Proc. Case No. B-21, "In The Matter of the
Intestate Estate of the late Simona Pamuti Vda. de Santero," praying among

other things, that the corresponding letters of Administration be issued in her

favor and that she be appointed as special ad647
VOL. 150, JUNE 17, 1987
647
Diaz vs. Intermediate Appellate Court
ministratrix of the properties of the deceased Simona Pamuti Vda. de
Santero.
It is undisputed: 1) that Felisa Pamuti Jardin is a niece of Simona Pamuti Vda.
de Santero who together with Felisa's mother Juliana were the only legitimate
children of the spouses Felipe Pamuti and Petronila Asuncion; 2) that Juliana
married Simon Jardin and out of their union were born Felisa Pamuti and
another child who died during infancy; 3) that Simona Pamuti Vda. de
Santero is the widow of Pascual Santero and the mother of Pablo Santero; 4)
that Pablo Santero was the only legitimate son of his parents Pascual Santero
and Simona Pamuti Vda. de Santero; 5) that Pascual Santero died in 1970;
Pablo Santero in 1973 and Simona Santero in 1976; 6) that Pablo Santero, at
the time of his death was survived by his mother Simona Santero and his six
minor natural children to wit: four minor children with Anselma Diaz and two
minor children with Felixberta Pacursa.
Judge Jose Raval in his Orders dated December 1,19761 1 and December 9,
19762 declared Felisa Pamuti Jardin as the sole legitimate heir of Simona
Pamuti Vda. de Santero.
Before the trial court, there were 4 interrelated cases filed to wit:
"a) Sp. Proc. No. B-4is the Petition for the Letters of Administration of the
Intestate Estate of Pablo Santero;
"b) Sp. Proc. No. B-5is the Petition for the Letters of Administration of the
Intestate Estate of Pascual Santero;
"c) Sp. Proc. No. B-7is the Petition for Guardianship over the properties of
an Incompetent Person, Simona Pamuti Vda. de Santero;
"e) Sp. Proc. No. B-21is the Petition for Settlement of the Intestate Estate of
Simona Pamuti Vda. de Santero."
Felisa Jardin upon her Motion to Intervene in Sp. Proceedings Nos. B-4 and B5, was allowed to intervene in the intestate estates of Pablo Santero and
Pascual Santero by Order
_______________
1 RA pp. 30-35.
2 RA pp. 35-38.
648
648
SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Diaz vs. Intermediate Appellate Court
of the Court dated August 24, 1977.

Petitioner Anselma Diaz, as guardian of her minor children, filed her

"Opposition and Motion to Exclude Felisa PamutiJardin dated March 13, 1980,
from further taking part or intervening in the settlement of the intestate
estate of Simona Pamuti Vda. de Santero, as well as in the intestate estate of
Pascual Santero and Pablo Santero.
Felixberta Pacursa guardian for her minor children, filed thru counsel, her
Manifestation of March 14, 1980 adopting the Opposition and Motion to
Exclude Felisa Pamuti, filed by Anselma Diaz.
On May 20, 1980, Judge Ildefonso M. Bleza issued an order excluding Felisa
Jardin "from further taking part or intervening in the settlement of the
intestate estate of Simona Pamuti Vda. de Santero, as well as in the intestate
estates of Pascual Santero and Pablo Santero and declared her to be, not an
heir of the deceased Simona Pamuti Vda. de Santero."3
After her Motion for Reconsideration was denied by the trial court in its order
dated November 1, 1980, Felisa P. Jardin filed her appeal to the Intermediate
Appellate Court in CAG.R. No. 69814-R. A decision4 was rendered by the
Intermediate Appellate Court on December 14, 1983 (reversing the decision
of the trial court) the dispositive portion of which reads
"WHEREFORE, finding the Order appealed from not consistent with the facts
and law applicable, the same is hereby set aside and another one entered
sustaining the Orders of December 1 and 9, 1976 declaring the petitioner as
the sole heir of Simona Pamuti Vda. de Santero and ordering oppositorsappellees not to interfere in the proceeding for the declaration of heirship in
the estate of Simona Pamuti Vda. de Santero."
"Costs against the oppositors-appellees."
The Motion for Reconsideration filed by oppositors_______________
3 R.A. p. 87.
4 Penned by Justice Marcelino R. Veloso and concurred in by Justices Porfirio
V. Sison, Abdulwahid A. Bidin and Desiderio P. Jurado.
649
VOL. 150, JUNE 17, 1987
649
Diaz vs. Intermediate Appellate Court
appellees (petitioners herein) was denied by the same respondent court in its
order dated February 17, 1984 hence, the present petition for Review with
the following:
ASSIGNMENT OF ERRORS
I. The Decision erred in ignoring the right to intestate succession of
petitioners grandchildren Santero as direct descending line (Art. 978) and/or
natural/"illegitimate children" (Art. 988) and prefering a niece, who is a
collateral relative (Art. 1003);

II. The Decision erred in denying the right of representation of the natural
grandchildren Santero to represent their father Pablo Santero in the
succession to the intestate estate of their grandmother Simona Pamuti Vda.
de Santero (Art. 982);
III. The Decision erred in mist aking the intestate estate of the grandmother
Simona Pamuti Vda. de Santero as the estate of "legitimate child or relative"
of Pablo Santero, her son and father of the petitioners' grandchildren
Santero;
IV. The Decision erred in ruling that petitioner-appellant Felisa P. Jardin who is
a niece and therefore a collateral relative of Simona Pamuti Vda. de Santero
excludes the natural children of her son Pablo Santero, who are her direct
descendants and/or grand children;
V. The Decision erred in applying Art. 992, when Arts. 988, 989 and 990 are
the applicable provisions of law on intestate succession; and
VI. The Decision erred in considering the orders of December 1 and
December 9, 1976 which are provisional and interlocutory as final and
executory.
The real issue in this case may be briefly stated as followswho are the legal
heirs of Simona Pamuti Vda. de Santeroher niece Felisa Pamuti Jardin or her
grandchildren (the natural children of Pablo Santero)?
The dispute at bar refers only to the intestate estate of Simona Pamuti Vda.
de Santero and the issue here is whether oppositors-appellees (petitioners
herein) as illegitimate children of Pablo Santero could inherit from Simona
Pamuti Vda. de Santero, by right of representation of their father Pablo
Santero who is a legitimate child of Simona Pamuti Vda. de Santero.
650
650
SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Diaz vs. Intermediate Appellate Court
Now then what is the appropriate law on the matter? Petitioners contend in
their pleadings that Art. 990 of the New Civil Code is the applicable law on
the case. They contend that said provision of the New Civil Code modifies the
rule in Article 941 (Old Civil Code) and recognizes the right of representation
(Art. 970) to descendants, whether legitimate or illegitimate and that Art.
941, Spanish Civil Code denied illegitimate children the right to represent
their deceased parents and inherit from their deceased grandparents, but
that Rule was expressly changed and/or amended by Art. 990 New Civil Code
which expressly grants the illegitimate children the right to represent their
deceased father (Pablo Santero) in the estate of their grandmother (Simona
Pamuti)"5
Petitioners' contention holds no water. Since the heridatary conflict refers
solely to the intestate estate of Simona Pamuti Vda. de Santero, who is the
legitimate mother of Pablo Santero, the applicable law is the provision of Art.
992 of the Civil Code which reads as follows:

ART. 992. An illegitimate child has no right to inherit ab intestato from the
legitimate children and relatives of his father or mother; nor shall such
children or relatives inherit in the same manner from the illegitimate child.
(943a)
Pablo Santero is a legitimate child, he is not an illegitimate child. On the
other hand, the oppositors (petitioners herein) are the illegitimate children of
Pablo Santero.
Article 992 of the New Civil Code provides a barrier or iron curtain in that it
prohibits absolutely a succession ab intestato between the illegitimate child
and the legitimate children and relatives of the father or mother of said
legitimate child. They may have a natural tie of blood, but this is not
recognized by law for the purposes of Art. 992. Between the legitimate
family and the illegitimate family there is presumed to be an intervening
antagonism and incompatibility. The illegitimate child is disgracefully looked
down upon by the legitimate family; the family is in turn, hated by the
illegitimate child; the latter considers the privileged condition of the former,
and the resources
_______________
5 Motion for Reconsideration, p. 78-79, Rollo.
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VOL. 150, JUNE 17, 1987
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Diaz vs. Intermediate Appellate Court
of which it is thereby deprived; the former, in turn, sees in the illegitimate
child nothing but the product of sin, palpable evidence of a blemish broken in
life; the law does no more than recognize this truth, by avoiding further
grounds of resentment.6
Thus, petitioners herein cannot represent their father Pablo Santero in the
succession of the letter to the intestate estate of his legitimate mother
Simona Pamuti Vda. de Santero, because of the barrier provided for under
Art. 992 of the New Civil Code.
In answer to the erroneous contention of petitioners that Article 941 of the
Spanish Civil Code is changed by Article 990 of the New Civil Code, We are
reproducing herewith the Reflections of the Illustrious Hon. Justice Jose B.L.
Reyes which also finds full support from other civilists, to wit:
"In the Spanish Civil Code of 1889 the right of representation was admitted
only within the legitimate family; so much so that Article 943 of that Code
prescribed that an illegitimate child can not inherit ab intestato from the
legitimate children and relatives of his father and mother. The Civil Code of
the Philippines apparently adhered to this principle since it reproduced
Article 943 of the Spanish Code in its own Art. 992, but with fine
inconsistency, in subsequent articles (990, 995 and 998) our Code allows the
hereditary portion of the illegitimate child to pass to his own descendants,
whether legitimate or illegitimate. So that while Art. 992 prevents the

illegitimate issue of a legitimate child from representing him in the intestate

succession of the grandparent, the illegitimates of an illegitimate child can
now do so. This difference being indefensible and unwarranted, in the future
revision of the Civil Code we shall have to make a choice and decide either
that the illegitimate issue enjoys in all cases the right of representation, in
which case Art. 992 must be suppressed; or contrariwise maintain said
article and modify Articles 995 and 998. The first solution would be more in
accord with an enlightened attitude vis-a-vis illegitimate children.
(Reflections on the Reform of Hereditary Succession, JOURNAL of the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines, First Quater, 1976, Volume 4, Number 1,
pp. 4041).
_______________
6 F. Manresa 110 cited in Grey v. Fabie 40 O.G. (First S) No. 3, p. 196).
652
652
SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Diaz vs. Intermediate Appellate Court
It is therefore clear from Article 992 of the New Civil Code that the phrase
"legitimate children and relatives of his father or mother" includes Simona
Pamuti Vda. de Santero as the word "relative" includes all the kindred of the
person spoken of.7 The record shows that from the commencement of this
case the only parties who claimed to be the legitimate heirs of the late
Simona Pamuti Vda. de Santero are Felisa Pamuti Jardin and the six minor
natural or illegitimate children of Pablo Santero. Since petitioners herein are
barred by the provisions of Article 992, the respondent Intermediate
Appellate Court did not commit any error in holding Felisa Pamuti-Jardin to be
the sole legitimate heir to the intestate estate of the late Simona Pamuti
Vda. de Santero.
Lastly, petitioners claim that the respondent Intermediate Appellate Court
erred in ruling that the Orders of the Court a quo dated December 1, 1976
and December 9, 1976 are final and executory. Such contention is without
merit. The Hon. Judge Jose Raval in his order dated December 1, 1976 held
that the oppositors (petitioners herein) are not entitled to intervene and
hence not allowed to intervene in the proceedings. for the declaration of the
heirship in the intestate estate of Simona Pamuti Vda. de Santero.
Subsequently, Judge Jose Raval issued an order, dated December 9, 1976,
which declared Felisa Pamuti-Jardin to be the sole legitimate heir of Simona
Pamuti. The said Orders were never made the subjects of either a motion for
reconsideration or a perfected appeal. Hence, said orders which long became
final and executory are already removed from the power of jurisdiction of the
lower court to decide anew. The only power retained by the lower court, after
a judgment has become final and executory is to order its execution. The
respondent Court did not err therefore in ruling that the Order of the Court a
quo dated May 30, 1980 excluding Felisa Pamuti Jardin as intestate heir of

the deceased Simona Pamuti Vda. de Santero "is clearly a total reversal of an
Order which has become final and executory, hence null and void.''
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7 Comment, p. 139 Rollo citing, p. 2862, Bouvier's Law Dictionary vol. II,
Third Revision, Eight Edition.
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People vs. Crisologo
WHEREFORE, this petition is hereby DISMISSED, and the assailed decision is
hereby AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
Fernan (Chairman), Gutierrez, Jr., and Corts, JJ., concur.
Padilla, J., took no part; principal counsel of petitioners is related to me.
Bidin, J., no part, see footnotes 4.
Petition dismissed. Decision affirmed.
Notes.In the settlement proceedings of the estate of the deceased spouse,
the entire conjugal partnership property of the marriage and not just the
one-half portion belonging to the deceased is under administration. (Picardal
vs. Lladas, 21 SCRA 1485.)
The practice in the distribution of the estates of deceased persons pursuant
to the provision of Section 1 of Rule 91 of the Rules of Court, is to assign the
whole of the estate left for distribution among the heirs in definite
proportion, an aliquot part pertaining in such of heirs. (Blas vs. Muoz-Palma,
4 SCRA 900.)
o0o
Copyright 2016 Central Book Supply, Inc. All rights reserved. Diaz vs.
Intermediate Appellate Court, 150 SCRA 645, No. L-66574 June 17, 1987