FOR IMMEDIATE RELEASE

Harihar vs. US Bank et al. cites Fraud on the Court,

calling for Defendant default in $42B Lawsuit
Boston, MA, July 4, 2016 A Motion was filed yesterday in the US District Court (Boston, MA,
Docket No: 15-cv-11880, Harihar vs. US Bank et al) by the Plaintiff, Mohan A. Harihar, citing Fraud
on the Court against 14 Defendants.
That cheaters should not be allowed to prosper has long been central to the moral fabric of
our society and one of the underpinnings of our legal system.
In his Motion, Harihar states, The basic standards governing fraud on the court are reasonably
straightforward. As set forth in Cox v. Burke, 706 So. 2d 43, 47 (Fla. 5th DCA 1998):
The requisite fraud on the court occurs where it can be demonstrated, clearly and convincingly, that a
party has sentiently set in motion some unconscionable scheme calculated to interfere with the judicial
systems ability impartially to adjudicate a matter by improperly influencing the trier of fact or unfairly
hampering the presentation of the opposing partys claim or defense. Aoude v. Mobil Oil Corp., 892
F.2d 1115, 1118 (1st Cir. 1989) . . .
The same is true here as it pertains to clear title. All fourteen defendants were aware that clear title did
not exist with the Plaintiffs property and collectively participated in a scheme to defraud the Plaintiff
of his HOMESTEAD. The Court is well aware that this is not an isolated incident. The Plaintiff is able
to conservatively provide 4.2 million other examples of this scheme, as described by the DOJ and
Federal Bank Regulators.
A summary overview of the scheme begins with the RMBS Trust which, as detailed in the Plaintiffs
opposition, has no legal standing to the Plaintiffs property. Every action following is impacted and
therefore is moot/void: ranging from collecting monthly mortgage payments, to foreclosure, resale,
etc... As previously detailed, ALL Defendants have benefited from the alleged scheme against the
Plaintiff, either personally or financially; Litigation privilege should not apply when there is no legal
standing, nor should sovereign immunity. The Defendant Trust, Bank Defendants, attorney and law
firm Defendants, Defendant Real Estate Brokers and Defendant Homebuyers have benefitted
financially from the alleged scheme when they had no legal standing to do so; resulting in
severe detriment to the Plaintiff. The Plaintiff believes the Commonwealth has refused to
prosecute and correct erred judgments (at minimum) out of fear of setting a precedent for the
Nation. Regardless, their failure to hold parties accountable is unacceptable. The Plaintiff calls
for the Commonwealth to either waive its right to sovereign immunity, or for this Court to allow the
Plaintiff to appeal to Congress to abrogate the states sovereign immunity.
As a general proposition, substantive misconduct provides grounds for default with prejudice because
it more clearly and directly subverts the judicial process. The Plaintiff respectfully calls for this Court to
schedule the required evidentiary hearing to determine whether the conduct forming the basis for
Defendant default was willful or done in bad faith or was deliberate and in contumacious disregard of
the courts authority.
(Scroll down to view a copy of Harihars filed Motion, in its entirety.)

For Further Media Information Contact: Mohan A. Harihar

Email: mh.foreclosure1@gmail.com
Phone: 617.921.2526 (Mobile)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

DISTRICT OF MASSACHUSETTS
MOHAN A. HARIHAR
11880

Docket No: 2015-cv-

Plaintiff
v.
US BANK NA, et al.
Defendants
PLAINTIFF MOTION REQUESTING CLARIFICATION AND RECONSIDERATION,
PURSUANT TO FED. R. OF CIV. PROCEDURE, RULE 60 (b)(1,2, AND 3)
After reviewing this Courts order issued on June 23, 2016, the
Plaintiff, Mohan A. Harihar, respectfully files this Motion in
effort to further clarify his position, and to prevent
potential misunderstanding (by the Court, and/or the
Plaintiff). The Plaintiff does not wish to delay, or prolong
these proceedings any longer than necessary. However, it is
critically important to have ALL of the relevant facts
accurately presented before this court prior to forming an
opinion or judgment. Understanding that the Court is currently
reviewing eight motions to dismiss and their respective

oppositions, the Plaintiff fears that there may exist some

misunderstanding of the issues at hand.
I.

Assistance to Retain Counsel It remains unclear as to

why the Court has yet to assist the Plaintiff with
requesting the appointment of legal counsel, pursuant to
28 U.S.C. 1915(e)(1). Doing so would certainly reduce
the risk of procedural missteps by the Plaintiff; and
would certainly level the playing field with litigating
the serious issues brought before this Court. The
Plaintiff understands that Section 1915(e) does not
authorize a court to appoint an attorney to represent an
indigent litigant, but instead merely to request one to
do so.

See Mallard v. U.S. Dist. Court for S. Dist. of

Iowa, 490 U.S. 296, 300-09 (1989). Additionally, when

sought by a Plaintiff in a civil matter who is unable to
afford counsel, courts may appropriately involve
themselves in the securing of counsel only in
extraordinary circumstances with severe potential
consequences (As is the case here, to both the Plaintiff,
and ultimately to the Nation as a whole). There should be
no question, that the issues brought before this Court are
extraordinary, and that the Court would be justified in
requesting an attorney to represent Mr. Harihar. The
Plaintiff respectfully reminds the Court, that indigence

is not the only issue here; The MANY qualified/experienced

law firms who have been contacted - either have a conflict
of interest; are not equipped to handle a case of its
magnitude; or are fearful of any negative consequences (to
their firm) should they decide to take on this case. The
Plaintiff makes clear that he is willing to enter into a
contingency agreement with a qualified/experienced (and
willing) firm, to ensure compensation for their services,
pending the outcome after trial.
Securing counsel will benefit ALL parties including the
Court, as it will undoubtedly assist with reducing
unintended procedural delays, while litigating the complex
issues that are before this Court. The Plaintiff
respectfully requests that the Court reconsider its
position here.
II.

Plaintiff should be allowed to amend, pursuant to Fed. R.

Civ. Proc. 60 (b)(1,2, and 3)

A. Per Fed. R. Civ. Proc. Rule 60(b)(1), the Court should

consider both surprise and/or excusable neglect in
granting the Plaintiff leave to amend his complaint. The
Plaintiff CLEARLY had the absolute expectation that there
would be alignment with Federal Prosecutors, in bringing
criminal charges alongside the clearly evidenced civil
allegations within this complaint. Their failure thus far

to do so comes as a complete surprise to this Plaintiff,

and further supports COLOR OF LAW allegations that appear
to extend beyond the Commonwealth of Massachusetts. It
additionally aligns with a scheme to DEFRAUD the Plaintiff
of his homestead. The Plaintiff would not have wasted his
time (or the Courts) seeking alignment in the first place
- If he had known that the Federal Government and the
Commonwealth of Massachusetts would ultimately refuse to
protect him from evidenced criminal misconduct. This
impacts the portions of the complaint which require the
alignment of Federal Prosecutors, and presents a matter of
justice if the Plaintiff is not allowed to amend. As
detailed in the filed opposition, an amended complaint is
necessary to draw comparison to Coursen vs. JP Morgan
Chase, Docket No: 8:12-cv-690-T-26EAJ, US District Court,
Middle District of Florida, Tampa Division.
B. Similarly, Per Fed. R. Civ. Proc. Rule 60(b)(1), the
Plaintiff should be allowed to amend, as he has been
surprised by the challenges faced in securing counsel. The
Plaintiff fully expected to encounter law firms who had a
conflict of interest, or those firms who would not
consider taking on as a contingency. He did not anticipate
a firms fear of negative repercussion, as a reason to
stay away from this case. It is not that the issues raised

are futile it is exactly the opposite. They are

considered too big.
C. Per Fed. R. Civ. Proc. Rule 60(b)(2), The Plaintiff has
uncovered newly discovered evidence that, with reasonable
diligence, could not have been discovered in time to
include in the original complaint, amended complaint, or
second amended complaint:
1. NEW CASE INFORMATION/EVIDENCE - The recent judgment
from the Northeast Housing Court dated 6/1/2016,
12H77SP002683 US Bank, NA vs. Milan, Steven L et al,
finding Summary Judgment in favor of the Defendant
homeowners, Karen and Steven Milan. The Plaintiff
will draw similar comparisons to the Milan case,
referencing fraudulent assignments, etc.
2. NEW CASE INFORMATION/EVIDENCE that has recently come
forth revealing that the Defendant Wells Fargo NA
has ADMITTED TO FRAUDULENT MISCONDUCT involving
thousands of mortgages, in a $1.2B settlement with
the United States Department of Justice (DOJ). The
case is the UNITED STATES OF AMERICA vs. WELLS FARGO
NA and KURT LOFRANO, Docket No: 1:12-cv-07527-JMF, US
District Court, Southern District of New York, dated
April 8, 2016. This ADMISSION TO MORTGAGE FRAUD by
the Defendant WELLS FARGO NA must be added in a

third amended complaint. Additional case references

will include (but not be limited to): Corvello v.
Wells Fargo Bank NA et al, 9th U.S. Circuit Court of
Appeals, No. 11-16234; Wigod v. Wells Fargo Bank,
N.A., United States Court of Appeals, Seventh Circuit
No. 11-1423.
D. Per Fed. R. Civ. Proc. Rule 60(b)(3) - fraud (whether
previously called intrinsic or extrinsic),
misrepresentation, or misconduct by an opposing party.
That cheaters should not be allowed to prosper has long
been central to the moral fabric of our society and one of
the underpinnings of our legal system.1
The basic standards governing fraud on the court are
reasonably straightforward. As set forth in Cox v. Burke,
706 So. 2d 43, 47 (Fla. 5th DCA 1998):

The requisite fraud on the court occurs where it can be

demonstrated, clearly and convincingly, that a party has
sentiently set in motion some unconscionable scheme
calculated to interfere with the judicial systems ability
impartially to adjudicate a matter by improperly
influencing the trier of fact or unfairly hampering the

Florida Bar Journal, February, 2004 Volume LXXVIII, No. 2,

p.16
1

presentation of the opposing partys claim or defense.

Aoude v. Mobil Oil Corp., 892 F.2d 1115, 1118 (1st Cir.
1989) . . .

Fraud on the court as described in Cox typically refers to

substantive, not procedural, misconduct. The same is true
here as it pertains to clear title. All fourteen
defendants were aware that clear title did not exist with
the Plaintiffs property and collectively participated in
a scheme to defraud the Plaintiff of his HOMESTEAD. The
Court is well aware that this is not an isolated incident.
The Plaintiff is able to conservatively provide 4.2
million other examples of this scheme, as described by the
DOJ and Federal Bank Regulators.
A summary overview of the scheme begins with the RMBS
Trust which, as detailed in the Plaintiffs opposition,
has no legal standing to the Plaintiffs property. Every
action following is impacted and therefore is moot/void:
ranging from collecting monthly mortgage payments, to
foreclosure, resale, etc... As previously detailed, ALL
Defendants have benefited from the alleged scheme against
the Plaintiff, either personally or financially;
Litigation privilege should not apply when there is no
legal standing, nor should sovereign immunity. The

Defendant Trust, Bank Defendants, attorney and law firm

Defendants, Defendant Real Estate Brokers and Defendant
Homebuyers have benefitted financially from the alleged
scheme when they had no legal standing to do so;
resulting in severe detriment to the Plaintiff. The
Plaintiff believes the Commonwealth has refused to
prosecute and correct erred judgments (at minimum) out of
fear of setting a precedent for the Nation. Regardless,
their failure to hold parties accountable is unacceptable.
The Plaintiff calls for the Commonwealth to either waive
its right to sovereign immunity, or for this Court to
allow the Plaintiff to appeal to Congress to abrogate the
states sovereign immunity.

As a general proposition, substantive misconduct provides

grounds for default with prejudice because it more clearly
and directly subverts the judicial process. The Plaintiff
respectfully calls for this Court to schedule the required
evidentiary hearing to determine whether the conduct
forming the basis for Defendant default was willful or
done in bad faith or was deliberate and in contumacious
disregard of the courts authority.
III. Core issues of the complaint remain unchanged The
Plaintiff clarifies that, should the Court grant leave to

amend, the core issues remain unchanged: 1. Plaintiff

damages resulting from an illegal foreclosure, and 2.
Plaintiff damages to his Intellectual Property rights.
IV.

Revised CAUSES OF ACTION based on the reasons stated

within, amending the causes of action is a matter of
justice. The causes of action stated in the second amended
complaint would be stricken, and replaced with the
following:
A. Deceptive Trade Practices Laws in Massachusetts (Count
I) As with Coursen vs. JP Morgan, here the Plaintiff
similarly alleges Deceptive Trade Practices under the
Uniform Deceptive Trade Practices Act M.G.L. 93A 21
against the Bank Defendants and the Defendant
Citigroup Global Realty Corp; Plaintiff is allowed to
Bring Suit (per Ch. 93A 9); Remedies Available
Injunction, double or treble damages, attorney's fees
and costs (Ch. 93A 11). These Deceptive Trade Practice
allegations are exemplified (in part) in the recorded
conversations between the Plaintiff and the Mortgage
servicer (Defendant Wells Fargo NA) during the 22month loan modification attempt(s).

The recorded

conversations between mortgage servicer and the

Plaintiff will reveal (at minimum) that: 1. The
servicer stated a 90-day default was a requirement to

10

qualify for a loan modification under HAMP, 2.) The

Plaintiff DID IN FACT QUALIFY for a loan modification
under HAMP guidelines, as many as six (6) times over a
22-month period, but was denied due to a calculation
error that could not, or would not be corrected. Court
must find that Plaintiffs allegations present a
question of fact as to whether the Bank Defendants
activities violated Deceptive Trade Practice Laws, and
he must be allowed the opportunity to establish those
facts through the course of discovery.
B. FDCPA and MCDCA (Count II) - 15 U.S.C. 1692(a)(6)
defines the term debt collector to include any person
who uses an instrumentality of interstate commerce or
the mails in any business the principal purpose of
which is the enforcement of security interests.
Plaintiff alleges
that Bank Defendants knew that they did not possess the
legal right to collect monies from the Plaintiff.
Furthermore, under 15 U.S.C. 1692f, [a] debt
collector may not use unfair or unconscionable means to
collect or attempt to collect any debt. Subparagraph
(6) of that section specifically prohibits taking or
threatening to take any non-judicial action to effect
dispossession or disablement of property ... if there

11

is no present right to possession of the property

claimed as collateral through an enforceable security
interest. As previously discussed, Plaintiff alleges
that Bank Defendants implemented deceptive practices in
furtherance of a conspiracy to unlawfully divest
Plaintiff of his homestead. Consequently, this Court
must find that Plaintiffs allegations present a
question of fact as to whether the Bank Defendants
activities violated the FDCPA, and he must be allowed
the opportunity to establish those facts through the
course of discovery.
Questions of fact preclude dismissal of Plaintiffs
claim under the Massachusetts Act at MD COML 14-201204, as well, because he plainly alleges that Bank
Defendants and Citigroup Global Realty Corp., knew they
did not have the legal right to collect the alleged
debt and created manufactured evidence, sham pleadings
and deceptive conduct to do so. Massachusetts Statutes
provides that no person shall attempt to collect a
debt which is not
owed or is the result of a manufactured default.
Plaintiff will show that Bank Defendants asserted a
legal right that did not exist, with actual knowledge
that the right did not exist. For these reasons,

12

Plaintiffs allegations in support of his MCDCA claim

should be considered sufficient to overcome a Rule
12(b)(6) dismissal.
C. Civil Conspiracy and Abuse of Process (Counts III and
IV)- In a third amended complaint, the Plaintiff will
add a civil conspiracy claim that proves: (a) the
existence of an agreement between two or more parties;
(b) to do an unlawful act or to do a lawful act by
unlawful means; (c) the doing of some overt act in
pursuance of the conspiracy; and (d) damage to
Plaintiff as a result of the acts done under the
conspiracy. Olson v. Johnson, 961 So. 2d 356, 359 (Fla.
Dist. Ct. App. 2007). A cause of action for abuse of
process requires a showing of willful or intentional
misuse of process for some wrongful or unlawful object,
or ulterior purpose not intended by law. Peckins v.
Kaye, 443 So. 2d 1025, 1026 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1983)
(citing Cline v. Flagler Sales Corp., 207 So. 2d
709(Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1968)). Plaintiff should be
able to overcome dismissal of his common law claims for
civil conspiracy and abuse of process at this stage of
the proceedings through his factual allegations that
Defendants (at minimum, Bank Defendants) acted
unlawfully, and in agreement, with the intent to

13

defraud him through the use of sham documents and

fabricated evidence, and that their actions caused him
damages.
D. For Damages and Declaratory relief under 18 U.S.C.
1961, 18 U.S.C. 1962, and 18 U.S.C. 1964(Count V)
E. Prospective injunctive relief against the Commonwealth
under 1983, see Stone v. Caswell, 963 F. Supp. 2d 32,
37 (D. Mass. 2013), (Count VI)
F. ADDITION OF CIVIL RICO CLAIMS (18 U.S.C. 1962), Count
VII) - Since Federal Prosecutors have yet to align with
the Plaintiffs complaint, a third amended complaint is
necessary to add CIVIL RICO Claims under 18 U.S.C.
1962 alleging facts that, at least for the purposes of
a Rule 12 (b)(6) dismissal, are adequate to support
each of the statutory elements for the predicate acts
that allegedly divested him of his homestead. See
Republic of Panama v. BCCI Holdings (Luxembourg) S.A.,
119F.3d 935, 949 (11th Cir. 1997) (holding that in order
to survive a motion to dismiss, a Plaintiff must allege
facts sufficient to support each of the statutory
elements for at least two of the pleaded predicate
acts) (citing Central Distribs. Of Beer, Inc. v. Conn,
5 f.3d 181, 183-184 (6th Cir. 1993)). Plaintiff alleges
that Bank Defendants, Harmon Law Offices PC, and Nelson

14

Mullins LLP unlawfully employed the United States Mail,

Massachusetts State Courts, and perjured and fabricated
evidence to divest him of his homestead. He alleges
that Defendants were the principals of or participated
in the operation or management of the enterprise itself
and that the pattern of racketeering included at least
two acts, transmission through the use of the mail of
fake assignments of Mortgage and fictitious corporate
signatures. Furthermore, Plaintiffs civil RICO claim
is not time-barred inasmuch as Plaintiff asserts that
he was prevented from discovering that he was the
victim of fraud by Defendants concealment of the
alleged fraud.
Plaintiff has alleged that Bank Defendants, Harmon Law
Offices PC and Nelson Mullins LLP, fabricated documents
in furtherance of a conspiracy to unlawfully divest him
of HIS homestead. Consequently, this Court MUST find
that the Plaintiffs allegations present a question of
FACT as to whether the Defendants activities violated
Massachusetts and Federal Law, and he MUST be allowed
the opportunity to establish those facts through
discovery.
G. SECOND CIVIL RICO CLAIM (18 U.S.C. 1962) (COUNT VIII)
In a third amended complaint, the Plaintiff will add

15

a second CIVIL RICO violation CLAIM, and expand upon

the facts of improper relationships between Defendants
Nelson Mullins LLP, the US Attorneys Office, the MA
Office of the Attorney General, the Boston BAR
Association, and Attorney Jeffrey S. Patterson. The
relationships in question references the West LegalEd
Center course entitled, After the Bubble Bursts
Mortgage and Foreclosure issues in Criminal and Civil
Litigation. Here, the United States, the Commonwealth
of Massachusetts, and former counsel to Bank Defendants
(Nelson Mullins and Jeffrey Patterson), have together
colluded, contributed to and/or taught a class on how
to defend lender clients against illegal foreclosure.
These improper relationships CLEARLY exemplifies
COLLUSION and (at minimum) shows cause to allege why
criminal complaints filed by the Plaintiff have not
been brought as charges before the Court(s). The
Plaintiff must be allowed the opportunity to establish
these facts through discovery.
H. HAMP and False Claims Violations (COUNT IX) A third
amended complaint is necessary to add HAMP and False
Claims violations by the Defendant mortgage servicer,
Wells Fargo NA. The 9th U.S. Circuit Court of Appeals
said Wells Fargo was required under the federal Home

16

Affordable Modification Program to offer loan

modifications to borrowers who demonstrated their
eligibility during a trial period (The case is Corvello
v. Wells Fargo Bank NA et al, 9th U.S. Circuit Court of
Appeals, No. 11-16234). The Plaintiff has consistently
stated that the Bank Defendants refused to modify the
Plaintiffs mortgage over a 22-month effort (ALL
conversations recorded), even though the Plaintiff
clearly met the requirements set forth by HAMP (and
other) loan modification programs. The Plaintiff must
be allowed the opportunity to establish the facts
through discovery.
I. Tampering allegations, per 18 U.S. Code 1519) (COUNT
X) In a third amended complaint, the Plaintiff will
add one Count (each Defendant) of Tampering
allegations, per 18 U.S. Code 1519 against DEFENDANTS
FIALKOW, PATTERSON, and HALEY. The tampering allegation
of a Middlesex Superior Court file has been well
documented with Massachusetts State Courts and has been
completely ignored by the Commonwealth. The Plaintiff
is not aware of any other parties (other than Court
employees) to have accessed the referenced file, or who
would have reason to alter/displace its contents. Court
must find that Plaintiffs allegations present a

17

question of fact as to whether these Defendants

tampered with the Superior Court file, and he must be
allowed the opportunity to establish those facts
through the course of discovery and further
investigation (if necessary). As managing partner of
the Boston Office, Peter Haley is on record in an email
communication to the Plaintiff, stating that both he
and the firm fully support ALL actions taken by
Attorney Fialkow in representing the client(s).
J. Wrongful Foreclosure and Eviction Practices (Count XI)
The Plaintiff will seek civil damages and injunctive
relief (and any additional relief deemed appropriate by
the Court) against Bank Defendants, Harmon Law Offices
PC and Nelson Mullins LLP for wrongful foreclosure and
eviction practices against the Plaintiff. Defendant
Harmon Law offices PC has already been under
investigation (for over three years) by the MA Attorney
General for these same allegations. The Plaintiff has
already brought to the Courts attention, that Harmon
is identified with DISBARRED FORECLOSURE KINGPIN
DAVID STERN (FL). Harmon Law Offices PC is identified
with over 50,000 illegal foreclosures in the
Commonwealth alone.

18

Here, the Plaintiff alleges that these Defendants knew

that they had no legal standing to foreclose or
displace the Plaintiff, but decided to act illegally
and unethically for the purpose (at least) of financial
gain.
V.

Damages to Plaintiffs Intellectual Property Rights (Count

XII) - Referencing the Testimony of the Honorable Grant D.
Aldonas before the Committee on Foreign Affairs, U.S.
House of Representatives July 19, 2012.2 The Topic(s)
addressed in the Justices testimony include: Unfair
Trading Practices Against the United States: Intellectual
Property Rights Infringement, Property Expropriation, and
Other Barriers. While the Plaintiffs complaint does not
raise claims involving trade, it does bring allegations of
unfair practices that undermine intellectual property
rights; which, if left unaddressed and uncorrected,
ultimately prohibits a successfully implemented FCS Model
from delivering substantial economic growth to the United
States, estimated in the trillions of dollars.
For example, in order for the FCS economic framework to be
implemented as intended, an already identified illegal
foreclosure would have to be recognized by a Court, and

Testimony of the Honorable Grant D. Aldonas before the

Committee on Foreign Affairs, U.S. House of Representatives
July 19, 2012.
2

19

may require corrective action if prior decisions failed to

do so. This case is a prime example of that. In fact, by
seeking corrective action here with his illegal
foreclosure, the Plaintiff will demonstrate by personal
example how the model will work to better the economy, and
ALL parties, including Bank Defendants.

ANY party, whos actions prevent an illegal foreclosure

from being recognized, will have contributed to damages
against this economic model, and is therefore, liable. The
Plaintiff alleges that every defendant listed in complaint
bears a portion of responsibility for these damages. A
third amended complaint will be necessary - the Court must
find that Plaintiffs allegations present a question of
fact, enough to overcome a 12(b) dismissal, and he must be
allowed the opportunity to establish those facts through
the course of discovery.

The implementation of the Plaintiffs Intellectual

Property is critical to restoring US economic growth,
fostering a more dynamic US economy, and delivering a more
broadly shared prosperity, particularly to those who have
been damaged by the US Foreclosure Crisis, and who live at
the bottom of the economic pyramid.

20

But, the more profound strategic reason for confronting

these practices is that our failure to do so will result
in a far less dynamic U.S. economy, which will weaken the
moral solvency of the example we set as a free society.
- Honorable Grant D. Aldonas
VI.

Adding as a Defendant, Citigroup Global Realty Corp. who

is recognized as the parent company to the RMBS Trust,
Defendant CMLTI 2006 AR-1. A third amended complaint
will draw similar comparison to the case example provided
in Coursen vs. JP Morgan Chase. Plaintiff alleges that
Citigroup Global Realty Corp., collectively with CMLTI
2006 AR-1, and the Bank Defendants, are responsible for
employing the individuals whose illegal acts proximately
caused him to suffer the loss of HIS homestead, and
additional damages resulting from an illegal foreclosure.

Wherefore, for the reasons stated within, the Plaintiff

respectfully requests that this Court: 1. Schedule the required
evidentiary hearing to determine whether the conduct forming
the basis for Defendant default was willful or done in bad
faith or was deliberate and in contumacious disregard of the
courts authority; 2. Reconsider the Plaintiffs request to
assist with counsel; and 3. Reconsider the Plaintiffs request
to amend.

21

Respectfully submitted,

Mohan A. Harihar

22