Foreign Diplomat Surveillance Aff

Inherency
NSA spying on diplomats now – tensions on the brink
Ball 13 [James Ball, an award-winning data journalist working on the Guardian's investigations team. He was a core journalist
on several of the newspaper's data-driven investigations, including the publication of the NSA files received from Edward Snowden,
the Reading the Riots project, its reporting on the WikiLeaks' Guantanamo Bay files, and the Guardian's extensive reporting relating
to the ICIJ's Offshore Leaks series, October 25, 2013, “NSA monitored calls of 35 world leaders after US official handed over
contacts”, http://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/oct/24/nsa-surveillance-world-leaders-calls] //dickies
The National Security Agency monitored the phone conversations of 35 world leaders after being

given the numbers by an official in another US government department , according to a classified
document provided by whistleblower Edward Snowden. The confidential memo reveals that the NSA encourages senior officials in
its "customer" departments, such as the White House, State and the Pentagon, to share their "Rolodexes" so the agency can add the
phone numbers of leading foreign politicians to their surveillance systems. The document notes that one unnamed US

official handed over 200 numbers, including those of the 35 world leaders, none of whom is named. These were
immediately "tasked" for monitoring by the NSA. The revelation is set to add to mounting
diplomatic tensions between the US and its allies, after the German chancellor Angela Merkel on
Wednesday accused the US of tapping her mobile phone . After Merkel's allegations became public, White House
press secretary Jay Carney issued a statement that said the US "is not monitoring and will not monitor" the German chancellor's
communications. But that failed to quell the row, as officials in Berlin quickly pointed out that the US did not deny monitoring the
phone in the past. Arriving in Brussels for an EU summit Merkel accused the US of a breach of trust. "We need

to have trust in our allies and partners, and this must now be established once again . I repeat that
spying among friends is not at all acceptable against anyone, and that goes for every citizen in Germany." The NSA
memo obtained by the Guardian suggests that such surveillance was not isolated, as the agency routinely monitors the
phone numbers of world leaders – and even asks for the assistance of other US officials to do so. The memo, dated
October 2006 and which was issued to staff in the agency's Signals Intelligence Directorate (SID), was titled "Customers Can Help
SID Obtain Targetable Phone Numbers". It begins by setting out an example of how US officials who mixed with world leaders and
politicians could help agency surveillance. "In one recent case," the memo notes, "a US official provided NSA with 200 phone
numbers to 35 world leaders … Despite the fact that the majority is probably available via open source, the PCs [intelligence
production centers] have noted 43 previously unknown phone numbers. These numbers plus several others have been tasked." The
document continues by saying the new phone numbers had helped the agency discover still more new contact details to add to their
monitoring: "These numbers have provided lead information to other numbers that have subsequently been tasked." But the memo
acknowledges that eavesdropping on the numbers had produced "little reportable intelligence". In the wake of the Merkel row , the

US is facing growing international criticism that any intelligence benefit from spying on friendly
governments is far outweighed by the potential diplomatic damage . The memo then asks analysts to think
about any customers they currently serve who might similarly be happy to turn over details of their contacts. "This success leads S2
[signals intelligence] to wonder if there are NSA liaisons whose supported customers may be willing to share their 'Rolodexes' or
phone lists with NSA as potential sources of intelligence," it states. "S2 welcomes such information!" The document suggests that
sometimes these offers come unsolicited, with US "customers" spontaneously offering the agency access to their overseas networks.
"From time to time, SID is offered access to the personal contact databases of US officials," it states. "Such 'Rolodexes' may contain
contact information for foreign political or military leaders, to include direct line, fax, residence and cellular numbers." The
Guardian approached the Obama administration for comment on the latest document. Officials declined to respond directly to the
new material, instead referring to comments delivered by Carney at Thursday's daily briefing. Carney told reporters: " The [NSA]

revelations have clearly caused tension in our relationships with some countries, and we are
dealing with that through diplomatic channels. "These are very important relations both
economically and for our security, and we will work to maintain the closest possible ties ." The
public accusation of spying on Merkel adds to mounting political tensions in Europe about the scope of US surveillance on the
governments of its allies, after a cascade of backlashes and apologetic phone calls with leaders across the continent over the course
of the week. Asked on Wednesday evening if the NSA had in the past tracked the German chancellor's communications, Caitlin
Hayden, the White House's National Security Council spokeswoman, said: "The United States is not monitoring and will not monitor
the communications of Chancellor Merkel. Beyond that, I'm not in a position to comment publicly on every specific alleged
intelligence activity." At the daily briefing on Thursday, Carney again refused to answer repeated questions about whether the US
had spied on Merkel's calls in the past.

Plan Text
Plan: The United States Federal Government should substantially curtail its
surveillance of foreign diplomats and of embassies inside the United States.

US-India Relations Advantage
The US uses surveillance against foreign diplomats and foreign embassies inside the United
States
BBC 13 [British Broadcast Corporation, “US National Security Agency 'spied on French diplomats'’,
http://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-24628947, October 22nd, 2013//Rahul]

The US National Security Agency has spied on French diplomats in Washington and at the UN,
according to the latest claims in Le Monde newspaper. NSA internal memos obtained by Le Monde detailed the use of
a sophisticated surveillance programme, known as Genie. US spies allegedly hacked foreign networks,
introducing the spyware into the software, routers and firewalls of millions of machines. It comes a day after claims the NSA tapped
millions of phones in France. The details in the latest Le Monde article are based on leaks from ex-intelligence analyst Edward
Snowden, through Glen Greenwald, the outgoing Guardian journalist, who is feeding the material from Brazil, says the BBC's
Christian Fraser in Paris. It comes on the day the US Secretary of State, John Kerry, is in London meeting foreign counterparts to
discuss Syria. 'Spy implants' The Le Monde report sets out details of Genie, an NSA surveillance programme in

which spyware implants were introduced remotely to overseas computers, including foreign embassies.
US allies on spying claims US agencies accused of spying on leaders of Brazil and Mexico; Brazil's
Dilma Rousseff cancels state visit, Mexico's Enrique Pena Nieto says US has promised an inquiry US allegedly runs bugging
operations on EU mission in Washington and other European embassies; France objects, Germany cancels surveillance agreement
with US and UK Le Monde claims NSA snooped on millions of phone calls in France; US ambassador in Paris summoned to explain
Who is Edward Snowden? Leaks timeline It claims bugs were introduced to the French Embassy in Washington (under a code name
"Wabash") and to the computers of the French delegation at the UN, codenamed "Blackfoot". The article suggests that in 2011, the

US allocated $652m (£402m) in funding for the programme, which was spent on "spy implants".
Tens of millions of computers were reported to have been hacked that year. A document dated
August 2010 suggests intelligence stolen from foreign embassy computers ensured the US knew
ahead of time the positions of other Security Council members, before a UN vote for a resolution
imposing new sanctions on Iran. The US was worried the French were drifting to the Brazilian side - who were opposed to
implementing sanctions - when in truth they were always aligned to the US position, says our correspondent. The intelligence agency
quotes Susan Rice, then-US ambassador to the UN, who praises the work done by the NSA: "It helped me know... the truth, and
reveal other [countries'] positions on sanctions, allowing us to keep one step ahead in the negotiations." On Monday, Le Monde
alleged that the NSA spied on 70.3 million phone calls in France between 10 December 2012 and 8 January 2013. At a breakfast
meeting with the US secretary of state on Tuesday, French Foreign Minister Laurent Fabius demanded a full

explanation. 'Genie' Surveillance Program The document in Le Monde outlines techniques used to spy on the
communications of the French diplomats "Highlands" was the name for the hacking of computers through cookies that were
implanted remotely "Vagrant" was a term used for capturing information from screens "PBX" was a bug which allegedly infiltrated
telephone conversations, eavesdropping on conversations in much the same way as one would listen into a conference call Referring
to a telephone call between the French and US presidents, Mr Fabius told reporters: "I said again to John Kerry what Francois
Hollande told Barack Obama, that this kind of spying conducted on a large scale by the Americans on its

allies is something that is unacceptable." Asked if France was considering reprisals against the US, government
spokeswoman Najat Vallaud-Belkacem replied: "It is up to Foreign Minister Fabius to decide what line we take but I don't think
there is any need for an escalation. "We have to have a respectful relationship between partners, between allies. Our confidence in
that has been hit but it is after all a very close, individual relationship that we have." Both French officials made their comments
before the latest revelations appeared in Le Monde. Mr Snowden, a former NSA worker, went public with revelations about US
spying operations in June. The information he leaked led to claims of systematic spying by the NSA and

CIA on a global scale. Targets included rivals like China and Russia, as well as allies like the EU
and Brazil. The NSA was also forced to admit it had captured email and phone data from millions of Americans. Mr Snowden is
currently in Russia, where he was granted a year-long visa after making an asylum application. The US wants him extradited to face
trial on criminal charges.

The NSA spied on Indian diplomats in the US – it did and continues to hamper US-India
relations
IN 13 [International2 24 News, “US targeted Indian diplomats with sophisticated surveillance equipment”,
http://www.i24news.tv/en/news/international/130925-us-targeted-indian-diplomats-with-sophisticated-surveillance-equipment,
September 25th, 2013//Rahul]

The US National Security Agency targeted the Indian embassy in Washington and the Indian
UN office in New York with sophisticated surveillance equipment that might have resulted in hard disks being copied,

the
Indian offices were on a top-secret list of countries chosen for intensive spying. The NSA
"selected India's UN office and the embassy as (a) 'location target' for infiltrating their
computers and telephones with hi-tech bugs," the paper said, citing a secret internal document
from the spy agency. It said India's missions were marked for various snooping techniques including one codenamed "Lifesaver" which
a report said Wednesday. The Hindu newspaper, which has been collaborating with the Guardian newspaper reporter Glenn Greenwald, said

"facilitates imaging of the hard drive of computers." India and the US have put past difficulties behind them and become firm allies over the last decade,
with Prime Minister Manmohan Singh set to meet US President Barack Obama in Washington on Friday. The

revelations about US
spying activities, leaked through documents obtained by former NSA contractor Edward
Snowden, have already strained relations between Obama and his foreign allies , notably Brazilian

President Dilma Rousseff. The Hindu's report gives more detail on previous revelations published in the Guardian by Greenwald in July that 38
embassies and diplomatic missions were targeted by the NSA, including India's. New Delhi has previously defended widespread snooping on Internet
users and phone calls by US intelligence agencies, saying such scrutiny had helped prevent "terrorist attacks. "

But the foreign ministry
expressed concern about suspected spying on its diplomatic mission s in July and said it would raise the issue
with US authorities. The new revelations are likely to lead to calls from the opposition in India for the
government to take a firmer line with Washington.
Surveillance has severely worsened the hole between US-India relations, it trumps all other
issues
Moftha 14 [Lora Moftha, New York-based journalist. Global politics, with a focus on MidEast-NorthAfrica. Reporter, “U.S.

spying claims throw wrench into India diplomatic efforts”, http://blogs.blouinnews.com/blouinbeatworld/2014/07/02/u-s-spyingclaims-throw-wrench-into-india-diplomatic-efforts/, June 2nd, 2014//Rahul]

India's relationship with the US is going through yet another rough patch after the revelations
that the NSA sought and received permission from the top to put then Bharitiya Janata Party (BJP)
leader and now Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi under surveillance. The disclosures were made by
whistle-blower Edward Snowden through The Washington Post on June 30. This shows yet again that similar social systems and
values do not necessarily make the best buddies. It is the circumstances and the national interests that define

the relationship between nations. India and the US may be lauding their democratic institutions,
but when it comes to bilateral relations, there is a huge trust deficit and the gap , even though both have
tried to bridge it, remains wide.The weakening of the US-Pakistan détente, and the US "rebalancing to Asia" did raise some hopes of
cozier India-US relations, but the hurdles in the civil nuclear cooperation deal and many other foreign policy related issues have only
increased skepticism. There has been an India-US strategic dialogue in place since 2010, and various

US presidents have declared India as an "indispensable partner and a trusted friend. " However, the
strategic partnership has been overshadowed by various issues such as the spat over diplomatic immunity and privileges of Indian
diplomat Devyani Khobragade or the recent Modi case.Modi has been persona non grata in the US since 2005 for his role in the
2002 Gujarat anti-Muslim riots, albeit he has accepted US President Barack Obama's invitation for a summit in late September.

The BJP was one of only six political organizations around the world to be spied on by the NSA.

The surveillance issue also overshadowed US Republican Senator John McCain's visit to India as India summoned top US diplomats
and lodged its protest on July 2. India said that such intrusions were "highly objectionable" and "totally unacceptable" and that these
should not happen again. McCain was forced to cancel the news conference due to be held outside the Ministry of External Affairs
and other political engagements slated for that day. Besides John McCain, other parts of an all-out charm offensive that the US
believes will put the lingering negativity between India and the US at rest include the visits to India by US Deputy Secretary of State
William J. Burns, Defense Secretary Chuck Hagel and Secretary of State John Kerry in the coming weeks. These will be US

first official attempts at the highest level to make contacts with the Modi government, and mend
the relationship that has been overshadowed by various issues time and again . In the wake of the rise of
China and simmering tensions in the East China Sea and the South China Sea, the US has indicated that the Modi government will
recognize the need for a deeper strategic partnership with the US. It is perhaps in this connection that the US is

keen to transfer some of the key technologies to India, and Hagel himself has directed Frank
Kendall to lead the US-India Defense Trade and Technology Initiative with the new Indian
government. Issues such as civil nuclear cooperation deal, trade and investment, defense cooperation and cyber security would

be on the agenda of visitors. India and the US have set a target of $500 billion trade volume from the present $100 billion. These
visits are also seen as precursor to the Modi-Obama summit in September on the sidelines of the UN General Assembly meeting. A
flurry of visits demonstrate that both are keen to break the ice before the Modi-Obama summit in September. However, it has

to be seen how the new government in India calibrates its US policy and maintains "strategic
autonomy.
Probably need a card that goes reverse casual

Impact Module 1 – Afghan/Pakistan
Strong US-India relations key to Afghani stability – spills over to Pakistan and
regional extremism.
Shenai 9 [Neena Shenai, adjunct scholar at the American Enterprise Institute, November 18, 2009, “The Critical U.S-India
Relationship,” The American, http://www.american.com/archive/2009/november/the-critical-u-s-india-relationshipg]
Afghanistan. India

shares the desire of the United States for a stable, secure Afghanistan. Although India
has no military involvement in Afghanistan (due to Pakistani sensitivities), India’s current and future reconstruction
activities in Afghanistan are critical to successful U.S. efforts . In fact, closer U.S. cooperation
with

a democratic, U.S.-friendly

India —a blossoming regional and rising global power— is vital to stability

and the balance of power in the region. India has already committed more than US$1.3
billion in development assistance for infrastructure and civic projects in Afghanistan. The Indian government
also has longstanding ties with Afghanistan pre-dating the Taliban’s rule and enjoys close
relations with Afghan President Hamid Karzai, which could assist in rooting out corruption and
containing violent Islamic extremism. While Pakistan remains uneasy about India’s intentions in Afghanistan, India
has no interest in a destabilized Pakistan and instead seeks to contain Taliban and other
terrorist elements and prevent their incursions into Kashmir. By supporting the Karzai government’s efforts
to compartmentalize extremist elements in Afghanistan, India’s investment activities in concert with U.S.
counterinsurgency efforts could prevent the re-Talibanization of Afghanistan, reversion of
Afghanistan into a safe haven for terrorists, and a full-scale spillover of the conflict into
Pakistan’s bordering tribal areas and Kashmir. Accordingly, the United States should seek to allay Pakistan’s fears and more
publicly support India’s reconstruction efforts in Afghanistan. After all, India sees itself with, in the words of Prime Minister Singh,
“vital stakes in the peace, progress, and stability” of the region .

Causes loose nukes and Indian intervention
O’Hanlon 5 [Michael O’Hanlon, senior fellow with the Center for 21st Century Security and Intelligence and director of

research for the Foreign Policy program at the Brookings Institution, visiting lecturer at Princeton University, an adjunct professor
at Johns Hopkins University, and a member of the International Institute for Strategic Studies
PhD in public and international affairs from Princeton, Apr 27 2005, “Dealing with the Collapse of a Nuclear-Armed State: The
Cases of North Korea and Pakistan,” http://www.princeton.edu/~ppns/papers/ohanlon.pdf]

Were Pakistan to collapse, it is unclear what the United States and like-minded states would or should do. As with North Korea, it is highly
unlikely that “surgical strikes” to destroy the nuclear weapons could be conducted before
extremists could make a grab at them. The United States probably would not know their location
– at a minimum, scores of sites controlled by Special Forces or elite Army units would be presumed candidates – and no Pakistani government would likely help external forces
with targeting information. The chances of learning the locations would probably be greater than in the North Korean case, given the greater openness of Pakistani society and
its ties with the outside world; but U.S.-Pakistani military cooperation, cut off for a decade in the 1990s, is still quite modest, and the likelihood that Washington would be
provided such information or otherwise obtain it should be considered small.¶ If a surgical strike, series of surgical strikes, or commando-style raids were not possible, the only
option would be to try to restore order before the weapons could be taken by extremists and transferred to terrorists. The United States and other outside powers might, for

Given the embarrassment associated with
requesting such outside help, the Pakistani government might delay asking until quite late , thus
complicating an already challenging operation. If the international community could act fast enough, it might help defeat an insurrection.
example, respond to a request by the Pakistani government to help restore order.

Another option would be to protect Pakistan’s borders, therefore making it harder to sneak nuclear weapons out of the country, while only providing technical support to the
Pakistani armed forces as they tried to quell the insurrection. Given the enormous stakes, the United States would literally have to do anything it could to prevent nuclear

India would, of course, have a strong incentive to ensure the security of
Pakistan’s nuclear weapons. It also would have the advantage of proximity; it could undoubtedly mount a
large response within a week, but its role would be complicated to say the least. In the case of a dissolved Pakistani state, India likely would not hesitate
to intervene; however, in the more probable scenario in which Pakistan were fraying but not yet collapsed, India’s intervention could unify
Pakistan’s factions against the invader, even leading to the deliberate use of Pakistani weapons
against India. In such a scenario, with Pakistan’s territorial integrity and sovereignty on the line and its
weapons put into a “use or lose” state by the approach of the Indian Army, nuclear dangers have long
been considered to run very high.
weapons from getting into the wrong hands.¶

Extinction
Chaffin 11 [Greg Chaffin, Research Assistant at Foreign Policy in Focus, July 8, 2011, “Reorienting U.S. Security Strategy in
South Asia,” online: http://www.fpif.org/articles/reorienting_us_security_strategy_in_south_asia]

The greatest threat to regional security (although curiously not at the top of most lists of U.S. regional concerns) is the possibility that
increased India-Pakistan tension will erupt into all-out warthat could quickly escalate into a nuclear
exchange. Indeed, in just the past two decades, the two neighbors have come perilously close to war on several occasions. India and
Pakistan remain the most likely belligerents in the world to engage in nuclear war. Due to an Indian
preponderance of conventional forces, Pakistan would have a strong incentive to use its nuclear
arsenal very early on before a routing of its military installations and weaker conventional forces. In the event of conflict, Pakistan’s only
chance of survival would be the early use of its nuclear arsenal to inflict unacceptable damage to Indian military and (much more likely) civilian targets.

India
would respond in kind, with escalation ensuing. Neither state possesses tactical nuclear weapons,
but both possess scores of city-sized bombs like those used on Hiroshima and Nagasaki. Furthermore, as more damage was
inflicted (or as the result of a decapitating strike), command and control elements would be disabled, leaving
individual commanders to respondin an environment increasingly clouded by the fog of war and
decreasing the likelihood that either government (what would be left of them) would be able to guarantee that their forces
would follow a negotiated settlement or phased reduction in hostilities. As a result any suchconflict
would likely continue to escalateuntil one side incurred an unacceptable or wholly debilitating level of injury or exhausted
its nuclear arsenal. A nuclear conflict in the subcontinentwould havedisastrous effects on the
world as a whole. In a January 2010 paper published in Scientific American, climatology professors Alan Robock and Owen Brian
Toon forecast the global repercussionsof a regional nuclear war. Their results are strikingly similar to those of
studies conducted in 1980 that conclude that a nuclear war between the United States and the Soviet Union
wouldresult in acatastrophic and prolonged nuclear winter,which could very well place the survival of the
human race in jeopardy. In their study, Robock and Toon use computer models to simulate the effect of a nuclear exchange between India
By raising the stakes to unacceptable levels, Pakistan would hope that India would step away from the brink. However, it is equally likely that

and Pakistan in which each were to use roughly half their existing arsenals (50 apiece). Since Indian and Pakistani nuclear devices are strategic rather
than tactical, the likely targets would be major population centers . Owing to the population densities of urban centers in both
nations, the number of direct casualties could climb as high as 20 million. The fallout of such an exchange would not merely be limited to the
immediate area. First, the detonation of a large number of nuclear devices would

propel as much as seven million
metric tons of ash, soot, smoke, and debris as high as the lower stratosphere . Owing to their small size (less
than a tenth of a micron) and a lack of precipitation at this altitude, ash particles would remain aloft for as long as a
decade, during which time the world would remain perpetually overcast. Furthermore, these particles would
soak up heat from the sun, generating intense heat in the upper atmosphere that would severely damage the earth’s ozone layer.
The inability of sunlight to penetrate through the smoke and dust would lead toglobal cooling by as much as 2.3
degrees Fahrenheit. This shift in global temperature would lead to more drought, worldwide food shortages, and
widespread political upheaval. Although the likelihood of this doomsday scenario remains relatively low, the consequences are dire
enough to warrant greater U.S. and international attention. Furthermore, due to the ongoing conflict over Kashmir and the deep animus
held between India and Pakistan, it might not take much to set them off. Indeed, following the successful U.S.

raid on bin Laden’s compound, several members of India’s security apparatus along with conservative politicians have argued that India should
emulate the SEAL Team Six raid and launch their own cross-border incursions to nab or kill anti-Indian terrorists, either preemptively or after the fact.
Such provocative action could very well lead to all-out

war between the two that couldquickly escalate.

Impact Module 2 – Prolif
US-India relations key to NPT legitimacy and the non-prolif efforts
Ayoob 2K [Mohammed Ayoob, Mohammed Ayoob is a Distinguished Professor of International Relations at Michigan State
University's James Madison College and the Department of Political Science. He is also Coordinator of the Muslim Studies Program
at Michigan State University, “India Matters”, The Washington Quarterly, Volume 23, Number 1, Winter 2000, pp. 27-39
(Article)//Rahul]
This is an area in which serious differences have existed and continue to persist in Indian-U.S. relations. However, as a result partly
of the Strobe Talbott-Jaswant Singh dialogue and partly of its new status as a declared nuclear weapons power, India has

moved closer to recognizing the validity of U.S. concerns about global nuclear proliferation. On its
part, following the Indian nuclear tests, the United States has demonstrated increasing appreciation of the
Indian security concerns that led New Delhi to go nuclear in May 1998. Washington also seems to have realized that these
concerns had to do more with China than with Pakistan and that they cannot be alleviated as long as the issue of Chinese nuclear
and missile capability that Indians find threatening is not seriously addressed. India’s self-imposed moratorium on

nuclear testing has further helped improve the atmosphere surrounding the Indian-U.S.
dialogue on nuclear proliferation. Recently the U.S. Senate refused to ratify the CTBT, and there is no immediate
prospect for the resurrection of its ratification. Therefore, the major source of friction between New Delhi and Washington in the
nonproliferation arena seems to have lost most of its relevance for the immediate future. In fact, the Indian position is now almost
identical to the U.S. policy of voluntary adherence to the CTBT enunciated by President Clinton in the wake of the Senate’s refusal to
ratify the treaty. l Mohammed Ayoob 34 THE WASHINGTON QUARTERLY ■ WINTER 2000 However, in the long run, an

understanding between the United States and India is essential for a credible nuclear
nonproliferation regime to survive the shocks from the South Asian tests of May 1998. India, having for all
practical purposes acquired the status of a nuclear weapons power, has clearly developed a
vested interest in limiting further horizontal proliferation and in augmenting its already tight
controls over the export of nuclearrelated material and technology to nonnuclear countries. Its
voluntary adherence to the main provisions of the CTBT as well as to the export control
provisions of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) signals this clearly. India shares these
objectives with the United States, and they provide a strong basis for future cooperation between the two countries in the nuclear
nonproliferation arena. Washington has also begun to realize that India, unlike some other nuclear aspirants such as North Korea, is
a responsible member of the international community with a large and relatively self-reliant technological infrastructure capable of
producing sophisticated nuclear warheads and delivery systems. This being the case, it is in the U.S. interest that

India be co-opted into the nonproliferation regime rather than treated as a pariah, because the
latter would undermine the residual credibility of the NPT regime. However, Washington is also concerned
that this co-optation be accomplished without unraveling the entire NPT structure. The principal objective of the
Indian-U.S. dialogue seems to be to square this circle while protecting the integrity, as far as possible,
of the initial positions adopted by both sides. This task is difficult but not altogether impossible. With patience, goodwill, and
diplomatic creativity, the two sides are more than likely to succeed in crafting a formula that both New Delhi and Washington can
live with until the world becomes used to India’s nuclear status. The attempt to find such a formula is, however,

by definition a joint venture and, therefore, likely to strengthen rather than damage Indian-U.S.
relations.
Prolif causes extinction
Kroenig 12 (Matthew, Assistant Professor of Government – Georgetown University and
Stanton Nuclear Security Fellow – Council on Foreign Relations, “The History of Proliferation
Optimism: Does It Have A Future?”, Prepared for the Nonproliferation Policy Education Center,
5-26, http://www.npolicy.org/article.php?aid=1182&tid=30)
Proliferation Optimism: Proliferation optimism was revived in the academy in Kenneth Waltz’s 1979 book, Theory of
International Politics.1[29] In this, and subsequent works, Waltz argued that the spread of nuclear weapons has beneficial effects on
international politics. He maintained that states, fearing a catastrophic nuclear war, will be deterred from going to war with other
nuclear-armed states. As more and more states acquire nuclear weapons, therefore, there are fewer states against which other states
will be willing to wage war. The spread of nuclear weapons, according to Waltz, leads to greater levels of international stability.

1

Looking to the empirical record, he argued that the introduction of nuclear weapons in 1945 coincided with an unprecedented period
of peace among the great powers. While the United States and the Soviet Union engaged in many proxy wars in peripheral
geographic regions during the Cold War, they never engaged in direct combat. And, despite regional scuffles involving nucleararmed states in the Middle East, South Asia, and East Asia, none of these conflicts resulted in a major theater war. This lid on the
intensity of conflict, according to Waltz, was the direct result of the stabilizing effect of nuclear weapons. Following in the path
blazed by the strategic thinkers reviewed above, Waltz argued that the requirements for deterrence are not high. He argued that,
contrary to the behavior of the Cold War superpowers, a state need not build a large arsenal with multiple survivable delivery
vehicles in order to deter its adversaries. Rather, he claimed that a few nuclear weapons are sufficient for deterrence. Indeed, he
even went further, asserting that any state will be deterred even if it merely suspects its opponent might have a few nuclear weapons
because the costs of getting it wrong are simply too high. Not even nuclear accident is a concern according to Waltz because leaders
in nuclear-armed states understand that if they ever lost control of nuclear weapons, resulting in an accidental nuclear exchange, the
nuclear retaliation they would suffer in response would be catastrophic. Nuclear-armed states, therefore, have strong incentives to
maintain control of their nuclear weapons. Not even new nuclear states, without experience in managing nuclear arsenals, would
ever allow nuclear weapons to be used or let them fall in the wrong hands. Following Waltz, many other scholars have advanced
arguments in the proliferation optimist school. For example, Bruce Bueno de Mesquite and William Riker explore the “merits of
selective nuclear proliferation.”2[30] John Mearsheimer made the case for a “Ukrainian nuclear deterrent,” following the collapse of
the Soviet Union.3[31] In the run up to the 2003 Gulf War, John Mearsheimer and Steven Walt argued that we should not
worry about a nuclear-armed Iraq because a nuclear-armed Iraq can be deterred. 4[32] And, in recent years, Barry Posen and many
other realists have argued that nuclear proliferation in Iran does not pose a threat, again arguing that a nuclear-armed Iran can be
deterred.5[33] What’s Wrong with Proliferation Optimism? The proliferation optimist position , while having a
distinguished pedigree, has several major problems. Many of these weaknesses have been chronicled in brilliant detail by
Scott Sagan and other contemporary proliferation pessimists. 6[34] Rather than repeat these substantial efforts, I will use this section
to offer some original critiques of the recent incarnations of proliferation optimism. First and foremost, proliferation

optimists do not appear to understand contemporary deterrence theory. I do not say this lightly in an effort to
marginalize or discredit my intellectual opponents. Rather, I make this claim with all due caution and with complete sincerity. A
careful review of the contemporary proliferation optimism literature does not reflect an understanding of, or engagement with, the
developments in academic deterrence theory in top scholarly journals such as the American Political Science Review and
International Organization over the past few decades. 7[35] While early optimists like Viner and Brodie can be excused for not
knowing better, the writings of contemporary proliferation optimists

ignore the past fifty years of academic
research on nuclear deterrence theory. In the 1940s, Viner, Brodie, and others argued that the advent of Mutually Assured
Destruction (MAD) rendered war among major powers obsolete, but nuclear deterrence theory soon
advanced beyond that simple understanding.8[36] After all, great power political competition does not end with
nuclear weapons. And nuclear-armed states still seek to threaten nuclear-armed adversaries. States cannot credibly threaten to
launch a suicidal nuclear war, but they still want to coerce their adversaries. This leads to a credibility problem: how can states
credibly threaten a nuclear-armed opponent? Since the 1960s academic nuclear deterrence theory has been devoted almost
exclusively to answering this question.9[37] And, unfortunately for proliferation optimists, the answers do not give us reasons to be

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optimistic. Thomas Schelling was the first to devise a rational means by which states can threaten nuclear-armed opponents. 10[38]
He argued that leaders cannot credibly threaten to intentionally launch a suicidal nuclear war, but they can make a “threat that
leaves something to chance.”11[39] They can engage in a process, the nuclear crisis, which increases the risk of nuclear war in an
attempt to force a less resolved adversary to back down. As states escalate a nuclear crisis there is an

increasing probability that the conflict will spiral out of control and result in an
inadvertent or accidental nuclear exchange . As long as the benefit of winning the crisis is greater than the
incremental increase in the risk of nuclear war, threats to escalate nuclear crises are inherently credible. In these games of nuclear
brinkmanship, the state that is willing to run the greatest risk of nuclear war before back down will win the crisis as long as it does
not end in catastrophe. It is for this reason that Thomas Schelling called great power politics in the nuclear era a “competition in risk
taking.”12[40] This does not mean that states eagerly bid up the risk of nuclear war. Rather, they face gut-wrenching decisions at
each stage of the crisis. They can quit the crisis to avoid nuclear war, but only by ceding an important geopolitical issue to an
opponent. Or they can the escalate the crisis in an attempt to prevail, but only at the risk of suffering a possible nuclear exchange.
Since 1945 there were have been many high stakes nuclear crises (by my count, there have been twenty) in which “rational” states
like the United States run a risk of nuclear war and inch very close to the brink of nuclear war. 13[41] By asking whether states can be
deterred or not, therefore, proliferation optimists are asking the wrong question. The right question to ask is: what risk of nuclear
war is a specific state willing to run against a particular opponent in a given crisis? Optimists are likely correct when they assert that
Iran will not intentionally commit national suicide by launching a bolt-from-the-blue nuclear attack on the United States or Israel.
This does not mean that Iran will never use nuclear weapons, however. Indeed, it is almost inconceivable to think that a nucleararmed Iran would not, at some point, find itself in a crisis with another nuclear-armed power and that it would not be willing to run
any risk of nuclear war in order to achieve its objectives. If a nuclear-armed Iran and the United States or Israel have a geopolitical
conflict in the future, over say the internal politics of Syria, an Israeli conflict with Iran’s client Hezbollah, the U.S. presence in the
Persian Gulf, passage through the Strait of Hormuz, or some other issue, do we believe that Iran would immediately capitulate? Or is
it possible that Iran would push back, possibly even brandishing nuclear weapons in an attempt to deter its adversaries? If the latter,
there is a real risk that proliferation to Iran could result in nuclear war. An optimist might counter that nuclear

weapons will never be used, even in a crisis situation, because states have such a strong incentive, namely
national survival, to ensure that nuclear weapons are not used. But, this objection ignores the fact that
leaders operate under competing pressures. Leaders in nuclear-armed states also have very
strong incentives to convince their adversaries that nuclear weapons could very well be used.
Historically we have seen that in crises, leaders purposely do things like put nuclear weapons on high alert and delegate
nuclear launch authority to low level commanders , purposely increasing the risk of
accidental nuclear war in an attempt to force less-resolved opponents to back down. Moreover, not even the optimists’
first principles about the irrelevance of nuclear posture stand up to scrutiny. Not all nuclear wars would be equally devastating. 14[42]
Any nuclear exchange would have devastating consequences no doubt, but, if a crisis were to spiral out of control and result in
nuclear war, any sane leader would rather be facing a country with five nuclear weapons than one with thirty-five thousand.
Similarly, any sane leader would be willing to run a greater risk of nuclear war against the former state than against the latter.
Indeed, systematic research has demonstrated that states are willing to run greater risks and, therefore, more likely to win nuclear
crises when they enjoy nuclear superiority over their opponent. 15[43] Proliferation optimists miss this point, however, because they
are still mired in 1940s deterrence theory. It is true that no rational leader would choose to launch a nuclear war, but, depending on
the context, she would almost certainly be willing to risk one. Nuclear deterrence theorists have proposed a second scenario under
which rational leaders could instigate a nuclear exchange: a limited nuclear war. 16[44] By launching a single nuclear weapon against

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a small city, for example, it was thought that a nuclear-armed state could signal its willingness to escalate the crisis, while leaving its
adversary with enough left to lose to deter the adversary from launching a full-scale nuclear response. In a future crisis between a
nuclear-armed China and the United States over Taiwan, for example, China could choose to launch a nuclear attack on Honolulu to
demonstrate its seriousness. In that situation, with the continental United States intact, would Washington choose to launch a fullscale nuclear war on China that could result in the destruction of many more American cities? Or would it back down? China might
decide to strike hoping that Washington will choose a humiliating retreat over a full-scale nuclear war. If launching a limited nuclear
war could be rational, it follows that the spread of nuclear weapons increases the risk of nuclear use. Again, by ignoring
contemporary developments in scholarly discourse and relying exclusively on understandings of nuclear deterrence theory that
became obsolete decades ago, optimists reveal the shortcomings of their analysis and fail to make a compelling case. The optimists
also error by confusing stability for the national interest. Even if the spread of nuclear weapons contributes to
greater levels of international stability (which discussions above and below suggest it might not) it does not necessarily
follow that the spread of nuclear weapons is in the U.S. interest. There might be other national goals that trump stability, such as
reducing to zero the risk of nuclear war in an important geopolitical region. Optimists might argue that South Asia is more stable

when India and Pakistan have nuclear weapons, but certainly the risk of nuclear war is higher than if there were no nuclear weapons on the subcontinent. In addition, it is wrong
to assume that stability is always in the national interest. Sometimes it is, but sometimes it is not. If stability is obtained because Washington is deterred from using force against
a nuclear-armed adversary in a situation where using force could have advanced national goals, stability harms, rather than advances, U.S. national interests. The final gaping
weakness in the proliferation optimist argument, however, is that it rests on a logical contradiction. This is particularly ironic, given that many optimists like to portray
themselves as hard-headed thinkers, following their premises to their logical conclusions. But, the contradiction at the heart of the optimist argument is glaring and simple to
understand: either the probability of nuclear war is zero, or it is nonzero, but it cannot be both. If the probability of nuclear war is zero, then nuclear weapons should have no
deterrent effect. States will not be deterred by a nuclear war that could never occur and states should be willing to intentionally launch large-scale wars against nuclear-armed
states. In this case, proliferation optimists cannot conclude that the spread of nuclear weapons is stabilizing. If, on the other hand, the probability of nuclear war is nonzero,
then there is a real danger that the spread of nuclear weapons increases the probability of a catastrophic nuclear war. If this is true, then proliferation optimists cannot be certain
that nuclear weapons will never be used. In sum, the spread of nuclear weapons can either raise the risk of nuclear war and in so doing, deter large-scale conventional conflict.
Or there is no danger that nuclear weapons will be used and the spread of nuclear weapons does not increase international instability. But, despite the claims of the proliferation
optimists, it is nonsensical to argue that nuclear weapons will never be used and to simultaneously claim that their spread contributes to international stability. Proliferation
Anti-obsessionists: Other scholars, who I label “anti-obsessionists” argue that the spread of nuclear weapons has neither been good nor bad for international politics, but rather
irrelevant. They argue that academics and policymakers concerned about nuclear proliferation spend too much time and energy obsessing over something, nuclear weapons,
that, at the end of the day, are not all that important. In Atomic Obsession, John Mueller argues that widespread fears about the threat of nuclear weapons are overblown.17[45]
He acknowledges that policymakers and experts have often worried that the spread of nuclear weapons could lead to nuclear war, nuclear terrorism and cascades of nuclear
proliferation, but he then sets about systematically dismantling each of these fears. Rather, he contends that nuclear weapons have had little effect on the conduct of
international diplomacy and that world history would have been roughly the same had nuclear weapons never been invented. Finally, Mueller concludes by arguing that the real
problem is not nuclear proliferation, but nuclear nonproliferation policy because states do harmful things in the name of nonproliferation, like take military action and deny
countries access to nuclear technology for peaceful purposes. Similarly, Ward Wilson argues that, despite the belief held by optimists and pessimists alike, nuclear weapons are
not useful tools of deterrence. 18[46] In his study of the end of World War II, for example, Wilson argues that it was not the U.S. use of nuclear weapons on Hiroshima and
Nagasaki that forced Japanese surrender, but a variety of other factors, including the Soviet Union’s decision to enter the war. If the actual use of nuclear weapons was not
enough to convince a country to capitulate to its opponent he argues, then there is little reason to think that the mere threat of nuclear use has been important to keeping the
peace over the past half century. Leaders of nuclear-armed states justify nuclear possession by touting their deterrent benefits, but if nuclear weapons have no deterrent value,
there is no reason, Ward claims, not to simply get rid of them. Finally, Anne Harrington de Santana argues that nuclear experts “fetishize” nuclear weapons. 19[47] Just like
capitalists, according to Karl Marx, bestow magical qualities on money, thus fetishizing it, she argues that leaders and national security experts do the same thing to nuclear
weapons. Nuclear deterrence as a critical component of national security strategy, according to Harrington de Santana, is not inherent in the technology of nuclear weapons
themselves, but is rather the result of how leaders in countries around the world think about them. In short, she argues, “Nuclear weapons are powerful because we treat them as
powerful.”20[48] But, she maintains, we could just as easily “defetish” them, treating them as unimportant and, therefore, rendering them obsolete. She concludes that “Perhaps
some day, the deactivated nuclear weapons on display in museums across the United States will be nothing more than a reminder of how powerful nuclear weapons used to
be.”21[49] The anti-obsessionists make some thought-provoking points and may help to reign in some of the most hyperbolic accounts of the effect of nuclear proliferation. They
remind us, for example, that our worst fears have not been realized, at least not yet. Yet, by taking the next step and arguing that nuclear weapons have been, and will continue to
be, irrelevant, they go too far. Their arguments call to mind the story about the man who jumps to his death from the top of a New York City skyscraper and, when asked how
things are going as he passes the 15th story window, replies, “so far so good.” The idea that world history would have been largely unchanged had nuclear weapons not been
invented is a provocative one, but it is also unfalsifiable. There is good reason to believe that world history would have been different, and in many ways better, had certain
countries not acquired nuclear weapons. Let’s take Pakistan as an example. Pakistan officially joined the ranks of the nuclear powers in May 1998 when it followed India in
conducting a series of nuclear tests. Since then, Pakistan has been a poster child for the possible negative consequences of nuclear proliferation. Pakistan’s nuclear weapons have
led to further nuclear proliferation as Pakistan, with the help of rogue scientist A.Q. Khan, transferred uranium enrichment technology to Iran, Libya, and North Korea.22[50]
Indeed, part of the reason that North Korea and Iran are so far along with their uranium enrichment programs is because they got help from Pakistan. Pakistan has also become
more aggressive since acquiring nuclear weapons, displaying an increased willingness to sponsor cross-border incursions into India with terrorists and irregular forces.23[51] In a
number of high-stakes nuclear crises between India and Pakistan, U.S. officials worried that the conflicts could escalate to a nuclear exchange and intervened diplomatically to

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prevent Armageddon on the subcontinent. The U.S. government also worries about the safety and security of Pakistan’s nuclear arsenal, fearing that Pakistan’s nukes could fall
into the hands of terrorists in the event of a state collapse or a break down in nuclear security. And we still have not witnessed the full range of consequences arising from
Pakistani nuclear proliferation. Islamabad has only possessed the bomb for a little over a decade, but they are likely to keep it for decades to come, meaning that we could still
have a nuclear war involving Pakistan. In short, Pakistan’s nuclear capability has already had deleterious effects on U.S. national security and these threats are only likely to
grow over time. In addition, the anti-obsessionists are incorrect to argue that the cure of U.S. nuclear nonproliferation policy is worse than the disease of proliferation. Many
observers would agree with Mueller that the U.S. invasion of Iraq in 2003 was a disaster, costing much in the way of blood and treasure and offering little strategic benefit. But
the Iraq War is hardly representative of U.S. nonproliferation policy. For the most part, nonproliferation policy operates in the mundane realm of legal frameworks,
negotiations, inspections, sanctions, and a variety of other tools. Even occasional preventive military strikes on nuclear facilities have been far less calamitous than the Iraq War.
Indeed, the Israeli strikes on nuclear reactors in Iraq and Syria in 1981 and 2007, respectively, produced no meaningful military retaliation and a muted international response.
Moreover, the idea that the Iraq War was primarily about nuclear nonproliferation is a contestable one, with Saddam Hussein’s history of aggression, the unsustainability of
maintaining the pre-war containment regime indefinitely, Saddam’s ties to terrorist groups, his past possession and use of chemical and biological weapons, and the window of
opportunity created by September 11th, all serving as possible prompts for U.S. military action in the Spring of 2003. The claim that nonproliferation policy is dangerous
because it denies developing countries access to nuclear energy also rests on shaky ground. If anything, the global nonproliferation regime has, on balance, increased access to
nuclear technology. Does anyone really believe that countries like Algeria, Congo, and Vietnam would have nuclear reactors today were it not for Atoms for Peace, Article IV of
the NPT, and other appendages of the nonproliferation regime that have provided developing states with nuclear technology in exchange for promises to forgo nuclear weapons
development? Moreover, the sensitive fuel-cycle technology denied by the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG) and other supply control regimes is not even necessary to the
development of a vibrant nuclear energy program as the many countries that have fuel-cycle services provided by foreign nuclear suppliers clearly demonstrate. Finally, the
notion that nuclear energy is somehow the key to lifting developing countries from third to first world status does not pass the laugh test. Given the large upfront investments,
the cost of back-end fuel management and storage, and the ever-present danger of environmental catastrophe exemplified most recently by the Fukushima disaster in Japan,
many argue that nuclear energy is not a cost-effective source of energy (if all the externalities are taken into account) for any country, not to mention those developing states
least able to manage these myriad challenges. Taken together, therefore, the argument that nuclear nonproliferation policy is more dangerous than the consequences of nuclear
proliferation, including possible nuclear war, is untenable. Indeed, it would certainly come as a surprise to the mild mannered diplomats and scientists who staff the
International Atomic Energy Agency, the global focal point of the nuclear nonproliferation regime, located in Vienna, Austria. The anti-obsessionsists, like the optimists, also
walk themselves into logical contradictions. In this case, their policy recommendations do not necessarily follow from their analyses. Ward argues that nuclear weapons are
irrelevant and, therefore, we should eliminate them.24[52] But, if nuclear weapons are really so irrelevant, why not just keep them lying around? They will not cause any
problems if they are as meaningless as anti-obsessionists claim and it is certainly more cost effective to do nothing than to negotiate complicated international treaties and
dismantle thousands of warheads, delivery vehicles, and their associated facilities. Finally, the idea that nuclear weapons are only important because we think they are powerful
is arresting, but false. There are properties inherent in nuclear weapons that can be used to create military effects that simply cannot, at least not yet, be replicated with
conventional munitions. If a military planner wants to quickly destroy a city on the other side of the planet, his only option today is a nuclear weapon mounted on an ICBM.

Therefore, if the collective “we” suddenly decided to “defetishize” nuclear weapons by treating them as
unimportant, it is implausible that some leader somewhere would not independently come to the idea that nuclear weapons
could advance his or her country’s national security and thereby re-fetishize them. In short, the optimists and anti-

obsessionists have brought an important perspective to the nonproliferation debate. Their arguments are provocative and they raise
the bar for those who wish to argue that the spread of nuclear weapons is indeed a problem. Nevertheless, their counterintuitive
arguments are not enough to wish away the enormous security challenges posed by the spread of the world’s most dangerous
weapons. These myriad threats will be considered in the next section. Why Nuclear Proliferation Is a Problem The spread

of nuclear weapons poses a number of severe threats to international peace and U.S. national security including:
nuclear war, nuclear terrorism , emboldened nuclear powers, constrained freedom of action,
weakened alliances , and further nuclear proliferation. This section explores each of these threats in turn.
Nuclear War. The greatest threat posed by the spread of nuclear weapons is nuclear war. The more states in possession of nuclear
weapons, the greater the probability that somewhere, someday, there is a catastrophic nuclear war. A nuclear exchange between the
two superpowers during the Cold War could have arguably resulted in human extinction and a nuclear exchange between states with
smaller nuclear arsenals, such as India and Pakistan, could still result in millions of deaths and casualties, billions of dollars of
economic devastation, environmental degradation, and a parade of other horrors. To date, nuclear weapons have only been used in
warfare once. In 1945, the United States used one nuclear weapon each on Hiroshima and Nagasaki, bringing World War II to a
close. Many analysts point to sixty-five-plus-year tradition of nuclear non-use as evidence that nuclear weapons are unusable, but it
would be naïve to think that nuclear weapons will never be used again. After all, analysts in the 1990s argued that worldwide
economic downturns like the great depression were a thing of the past, only to be surprised by the dot-com bubble bursting in the
later 1990s and the Great Recession of the late Naughts. 25[53] This author, for one, would be surprised if nuclear weapons are not
used in my lifetime. Before reaching a state of MAD, new nuclear states go through a transition period in which
they lack a secure-second strike capability. In this context, one or both states might believe that it has an incentive to
use nuclear weapons first. For example, if Iran acquires nuclear weapons neither Iran, nor its nuclear-armed rival, Israel, will have a
secure, second-strike capability. Even though it is believed to have a large arsenal, given its small size and lack of strategic depth,
Israel might not be confident that it could absorb a nuclear strike and respond with a devastating counterstrike. Similarly, Iran
might eventually be able to build a large and survivable nuclear arsenal, but, when it first crosses the nuclear threshold, Tehran will
have a small and vulnerable nuclear force. In these pre-MAD situations, there are at least three ways that nuclear war could occur.
First, the state with the nuclear advantage might believe it has a splendid first strike capability. In a crisis, Israel might, therefore,
decide to launch a preemptive nuclear strike to disarm Iran’s nuclear capabilities and eliminate the threat of nuclear war against
Israel. Indeed, this incentive might be further increased by Israel’s aggressive strategic culture that emphasizes preemptive action.
Second, the state with a small and vulnerable nuclear arsenal, in this case Iran, might feel use ‘em or

loose ‘em pressures. That is, if Tehran believes that Israel might launch a preemptive strike, Iran might decide to strike first
rather than risk having its entire nuclear arsenal destroyed. Third, as Thomas Schelling has argued, nuclear war could result due to
the reciprocal fear of surprise attack.26[54] If there are advantages to striking first, one state might start a

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nuclear war in the belief that war is inevitable and that it would be better to go first than to go
second. In a future Israeli-Iranian crisis, for example, Israel and Iran might both prefer to avoid a nuclear war, but decide to
strike first rather than suffer a devastating first attack from an opponent. Even in a world of MAD, there is a risk of nuclear war.
Rational deterrence theory assumes nuclear-armed states are governed by rational leaders that would not intentionally launch a
suicidal nuclear war. This assumption appears to have applied to past and current nuclear powers, but there is no guarantee that it
will continue to hold in the future. For example, Iran’s theocratic government, despite its inflammatory rhetoric, has followed a fairly
pragmatic foreign policy since 1979, but it contains leaders who genuinely hold millenarian religious worldviews who could one day
ascend to power and have their finger on the nuclear trigger. We cannot rule out the possibility that, as nuclear weapons continue to
spread, one leader will choose to launch a nuclear war, knowing full well that it could

result in self-destruction. One does not need to resort to irrationality, however, to imagine a nuclear war under MAD.
Nuclear weapons may deter leaders from intentionally launching full-scale wars, but they do not mean the end of international
politics. As was discussed above, nuclear-armed states still have conflicts of interest and leaders still seek to coerce nuclear-armed
adversaries. This leads to the credibility problem that is at the heart of modern deterrence theory: how can you threaten to launch a
suicidal nuclear war? Deterrence theorists have devised at least two answers to this question. First, as stated above, leaders can
choose to launch a limited nuclear war.27[55] This strategy might be especially attractive to states in a position of conventional
military inferiority that might have an incentive to escalate a crisis quickly. During the Cold War, the United States was willing to use
nuclear weapons first to stop a Soviet invasion of Western Europe given NATO’s conventional inferiority in continental Europe. As
Russia’s conventional military power has deteriorated since the end of the Cold War, Moscow has come to rely more heavily on
nuclear use in its strategic doctrine. Indeed, Russian strategy calls for the use of nuclear weapons early in a conflict (something that
most Western strategists would consider to be escalatory) as a way to de-escalate a crisis. Similarly, Pakistan’s military plans for
nuclear use in the event of an invasion from conventionally stronger India. And finally, Chinese generals openly talk about the
possibility of nuclear use against a U.S. superpower in a possible East Asia contingency. Second, as was also discussed above leaders
can make a “threat that leaves something to chance.”28[56] They can initiate a nuclear crisis. By playing these risky games

of nuclear brinkmanship, states can increases the risk of nuclear war in an attempt to force a less resolved
adversary to back down. Historical crises have not resulted in nuclear war, but many of them, including the 1962 Cuban Missile
Crisis, have come close. And scholars have documented historical incidents when accidents could have led to war. 29[57] When we
think about future nuclear crisis dyads, such as India and Pakistan and Iran and Israel, there are fewer sources of stability that
existed during the Cold War, meaning that there is a very real risk that a future Middle East crisis could result in a devastating
nuclear exchange.

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Impact Module 3 – Democracy
US-India relations key to democracy promotion
Ayoob 2K [Mohammed Ayoob, Mohammed Ayoob is a Distinguished Professor of International Relations at Michigan State
University's James Madison College and the Department of Political Science. He is also Coordinator of the Muslim Studies Program
at Michigan State University, “India Matters”, The Washington Quarterly, Volume 23, Number 1, Winter 2000, pp. 27-39
(Article)//Rahul]
Furthermore, the recent emphasis in U.S. rhetoric on creation of a "democratic community of states," itself based on a popularized
version of the "democratic peace" thesis, can be expected to aid in improving Indian-U.S. relations. The two states

crucial to legitimizing the idea of a global democratic community are obviously the world's
largest democracy (India) and the world's most powerful democracy (the United States), and
their partnership is essential for the idea to be taken serious ly. n3 If democracy and human rights are to
inform U.S. foreign policy making in any substantial fashion in the coming decade, Washington's relations with New
Delhi must inevitably move to a higher plane of understanding and cooperation.
Democracy key to solve great power war
Gat, 11 (National Security Prof-Tel Aviv University, “The Changing Character of War,” in The Changing Character of War, ed.
Strachan & Scheipers, P. 30-32)
Since 1945, the decline of major great power war has deepened further. Nuclear weapons have concentrated the
minds of all concerned wonderfully, but no less important have been the institutionalization of free trade and the closely related
process of rapid and sustained economic growth throughout the capitalist world. The communist bloc did not participate in the
system of free trade, but at least initially it too experienced substantial growth, and, unlike Germany and Japan, it was always
sufficiently large and rich in natural resources to maintain an autarky of sorts. With the Soviet collapse and with the integration of
the former communist powers into the global capitalist economy, the prospect of a major war within the developed world seems to
have become very remote indeed. This is one of the main sources for the feeling that war has been transformed: its geopolitical
centre of gravity has shifted radically. The modernized, economically developed parts of the world constitute a ‘zone of peace’. War

now seems to be confined to the less-developed parts of the globe, the world’s ‘zone of war’,
where countries that have so far failed to embrace modernization and its pacifying spin-off effects
continue to be engaged in wars among themselves, as well as with developed countries. While the trend is very real, one
wonders if the near disappearance of armed conflict within the developed world is likely to
remain as stark as it has been since the collapse of communism. The post-Cold War moment
may turn out to be a fleeting one. The probability of major wars within the developed world remains
low—because of the factors already mentioned: increasing wealth, economic openness and interdependence, and nuclear
deterrence. But the deep sense of change prevailing since 1989 has been based on the far more radical
notion that the triumph of capitalism also spelled the irresistible ultimate victory of democracy;
and that in an affluent and democratic world, major conflict no longer needs to be feared or seriously prepared for. This notion,
however, is fast eroding with the return of capitalist non-democratic great powers that have been
absent from the international system since 1945. Above all, there is the formerly communist and fast
industrializing authoritarian-capitalist China, whose massive growth represents the greatest change in the global
balance of power. Russia, too, is retreating from its postcommunist liberalism and assuming an
increasingly authoritarian character. Authoritarian capitalism may be more viable than
people tend to assume. 8 The communist great powers failed even though they were potentially larger than the
democracies, because their economic systems failed them. By contrast, the capitalist authoritarian/totalitarian
powers during the first half of the twentieth century, Germany and Japan , particularly the former, were
as efficient economically as, and if anything more successful militarily than, their democratic
counterparts. They were defeated in war mainly because they were too small and ultimately succumbed to the exceptional
continental size of the United States (in alliance with the communist Soviet Union during the Second World War). However, the
new non-democratic powers are both large and capitalist. China in particular is the largest player

in
the international system in terms of population and is showing spectacular economic growth that
within a generation or two is likely to make it a true non-democratic superpower. Although the return of capitalist nondemocratic great powers does not necessarily imply open conflict or war, it might indicate that the democratic
hegemony since the Soviet Union’s collapse could be short-lived and that a universal
‘democratic peace’ may still be far off. The new capitalist authoritarian powers are deeply integrated into the

world economy. They partake of the development-open-trade-capitalist cause of peace, but not of the liberal democratic cause. Thus,
it is crucially important that any protectionist turn in the system is avoided so as to prevent a grab for markets and raw materials
such as that which followed the disastrous slide into imperial protectionism and conflict during the first part of the twentieth
century. Of course, the openness of the world economy does not depend exclusively on the democracies. In time, China itself might
become more protectionist, as it grows wealthier, its labour costs rise, and its current competitive edge diminishes. With the possible
exception of the sore Taiwan problem, China is likely to be less restless and revisionist than the territorially confined Germany and
Japan were. Russia, which is still reeling from having lost an empire, may be more problematic. However, as China grows in

power, it is likely to become more assertive, flex its muscles, and behave like a superpower , even if
it does not become particularly aggressive. The democratic and non-democratic powers may coexist more or
less peacefully, albeit warily, side by side, armed because of mutual fear and suspicion, as a result of the so-called ‘security
dilemma’, and against worst-case scenarios. But there is also the prospect of more antagonistic relations,
accentuated ideological rivalry, potential and actual conflict, intensified arms races, and even
new cold wars, with spheres of influence and opposing coalitions. Although great power relations will probably vary from those that
prevailed during any of the great twentieth-century conflicts, as conditions are never quite the same, they may vary less than seemed
likely only a short while ago.

US-EU Relations Advantage
Empirical proof of surveillance of European embassies and diplomats in the USA
RT 13 (RT: A Russian state-funded television network which runs cable and satellite television
channels, as well as Internet content directed to audiences outside the Russian Federation,
“NSA spied on EU diplomats in Washington NY and Brussels – report,” 6/29/13,
http://rt.com/news/nsa-spy-eu-diplomats-429, RRR)
Not only European citizens, but also employees of the EU diplomatic missions in Washington and the UN
were under electronic surveillance from the NSA, Der Spiegel magazine reports citing a document obtained by
whistleblower Edward Snowden.¶ The German magazine claims to have taken a glance at parts of a “top secret” document, which
reveals that US National Security Agency has placed bugs in EU offices in Washington and at the New

York‘s United Nations headquarters in order to listen to conversations and phone calls . ¶ The
internal computer networks in the buildings were also under surveillance, which granted NSA
access to documents and emails of the European officials . ¶ The document, which categorically labels the
European Union as a “target”, was dated September 2010, Der Spiegel says. ¶ The magazine reports that the NSA also targeted
communications at the European Council headquarters at the Justus Lipsius building in Brussels, Belgium by calling a remote
maintenance unit.¶ According to Der Spiegel, more than five years ago EU security officers had noticed and traced several missed
calls to an area of the NATO facility in Brussels, which was used by NSA experts. ¶ The US previously acknowledged

that they were collecting data on European citizens under the PRISM program, but not on large
scale, only in cases of strong suspicion of individual or group being involved in terrorism,
cybercrime or nuclear proliferation. ¶ Former NSA contractor and CIA employee, Snowden, is believed to be currently
staying in the transit zone of Moscow’s Sheremetyevo airport where he arrived from Hong Kong on June 23. ¶ The 30-year-old, who
leaked details of top-secret American government mass surveillance programs to the media, is waiting for Ecuador to decide on
giving him political asylum as he’s being charged with espionage in the US.

Card needed on solvency on this advantage
A robust US-EU relationship solves multiple extinction scenarios- Central Asian
stability, Terrorism, and China’s power growth.
Stivachtis 6 (Dr. Yannis Stivachtis: Director, International Studies Program Virginia
Polytechnic Institute & State University, “THE IMPERATIVE FOR TRANSATLANTIC
COOPERATION,” Research Institute for European and American Studies, 10/22/2006,
http://rieas.gr/research-areas/2014-07-30-08-58-27/transatlantic-studies/78-the-imperativefor-transatlantic-cooperation, Accessed: 7/14/15, RRR)
There are two reasons for concern regarding the transatlantic rift. First, if European leaders
conclude that Europe must become counterweight to the U.S., rather than a partner, it will be
difficult to engage in the kind of open search for a common ground than an elective partnership
requires. Second, there is a risk that public opinion in both the U.S. and Europe will make it
difficult even for leaders who want to forge a new relationship to make the necessary
accommodations. If both sides would actively work to heal the breach, a new opportunity could be created. A vibrant
transatlantic partnership remains a real possibility, but only if both sides make the necessary political commitment. There are
strong reasons to believe that the security challenges facing the U.S. and Europe are more shared
than divergent. The most dramatic case is terrorism. Closely related is the common interest in halting the spread of
weapons of mass destruction and the nuclearization of Iran and North Korea. This commonality of threats is clearly perceived by
publics on both sides of the Atlantic. Actually, Americans and Europeans see eye to eye on more issues than one would expect from
reading newspapers and magazines. But while elites on both sides of the Atlantic bemoan a largely illusory gap over the use of
military force, biotechnology, and global warming, surveys of American and European public opinion highlight sharp differences
over global leadership, defense spending, and the Middle East that threaten the future of the last century’s most successful alliance.
There are other important, shared interests as well. The transformation of Russia into a stable cooperative member of the
international community is a priority both for the U.S. and Europe. They also have an interest in promoting a stable regime in

Ukraine. It

is necessary for the U.S. and EU to form a united front to meet these challenges
because first, there is a risk that dangerous materials related to WMD will fall into the wrong
hands; and second, the spread of conflict along those countries’ periphery could destabilize
neighboring countries and provide safe havens for terrorists and other international criminal
organizations. Likewise, in the Caucasus and Central Asia both sides share a stake in promoting
political and economic transformation and integrating these states into larger communities such as the OSCE. This
would also minimize the risk of instability spreading and prevent those countries of becoming
havens for international terrorists and criminals. Similarly, there is a common interest in integrating the Balkans
politically and economically. Dealing with Iran, Iraq, Lebanon, and the Israeli-Palestinian conflict as well as other political issues in
the Middle East are also of a great concern for both sides although the U.S. plays a dominant role in the region. Finally, US-

European cooperation will be more effective in dealing with the rising power of China through
engagement but also containment. The post Iraq War realities have shown that it is no longer simply a question of
adapting transatlantic institutions to new realities. The changing structure of relations between the U.S. and Europe implies that a
new basis for the relationship must be found if transatlantic cooperation and partnership is to continue. The future course of
relations will be determined above all by U.S. policy towards Europe and the Atlantic Alliance.

Solvency
The US must show a commitment to the Vienna Convention and the Convention on
Internationally Protected Persons- Recent UN meeting proves
UN General Assembly 14 (UN General Assembly: The main deliberative, policymaking and
representative organ of the UN, “Compliance with Vienna Conventions Critical in Protection of
Diplomatic, Consular Missions, Personnel, Legal Committee Hears as Debate Begins,” 10/21/14,
http://www.un.org/press/en/2014/gal3484.doc.htm, Accessed: 7/14/15, RRR)
STEPHEN TOWNLEY (United States), tracing the history of diplomatic protections to ancient
times, pointed out that States had also always had the duty to protect diplomats from harmful
acts by non-State actors. Such attacks had increased in numbers, and more often involved nonState armed groups. There had been 200 such attacks against his country’s diplomatic facilities
and personnel in the last ten years, resulting in the deaths of 40 personnel. Nor was the United
States alone in that regard. The Convention on Internationally Protected Persons, adopted by
the General Assembly in 1973, which had 176 United Nations States parties, required the
punishment of violent attacks against foreign Government officials and the prevention of the
commission of such crimes. As the facts and circumstances of attacks on diplomatic and
consular personnel were changing, so must preventive measures. Among such measures, he
stressed the need for collaboration with local authorities.

2AC

2AC – US Surveys India
NSA continues surveillance of the Indian Embassy killing India’s sovereignty and
decision making process
Burke 13 (Jason; south Asia correspondent for the guardian; September 25th 2013
http://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/sep/25/nsa-surveillance-indian-embassy-un-mission//RItt)

The US National Security Agency may have accessed computers within the Indian embassy in
Washington and mission at the United Nations in New York as part of a huge clandestine effort
to mine electronic data held by its south Asian ally. Documents released by the US whistleblower
Edward Snowden also reveal the extent and aggressive nature of other NSA datamining
exercises targeting India as recently as March of this year. The latest revelations – published in
the Hindu newspaper – came as Manmohan Singh, the Indian prime minister, flew to Europe
on his way to the US, where he will meet President Barack Obama. The NSA operation targeting
India used two datamining tools, Boundless Informant and Prism, a system allowing the agency
easy access to the personal information of non-US nationals from the databases of some of the
world's biggest tech companies, including Apple, Google, Microsoft and Yahoo. In June, the
Guardian acquired and published top-secret documents about Boundless Informant describing
how in March 2013 the NSA, alongside its effort to capture data within the US, also collected
97bn pieces of intelligence from computer networks worldwide. The largest amount of
intelligence was gathered from Iran, with more than 14bn reports in that period, followed by
13.5bn from Pakistan. Jordan, one of America's closest Arab allies, came third with 12.7bn,
Egypt fourth with 7.6bn and India fifth with 6.3bn. Though relations between India and the US
were strained for many decades, they have improved considerably in recent years. President
George Bush saw India as a potential counterweight to China and backed a controversial civil
nuclear agreement with Delhi. Obama received a rapturous welcome when he visited in 2010,
though concrete results of the warmer relationship have been less obviou s. According to one
document obtained by the Hindu, the US agency used the Prism programme to gather
information on India's domestic politics and the country's strategic and commercial interests ,
specifically categories designated as nuclear, space and politics. A further NSA document
obtained by the Hindu suggests the agency selected the office of India's mission at the UN in
New York and the country's Washington embassy as "location targets " where records of Internet
traffic, emails, telephone and office conversations – and even official documents stored digitally
– could potentially be accessed after programs had been clandestinely inserted into computers.
In March 2013, the NSA collected 6.3bn pieces of information from internet networks in India
and 6.2bn pieces of information from the country's telephone networks during the same period,
the Hindu said. After the Guardian reported in June that Pm program allowed the NSA "to
obtain targeted communications without having to request them from the service providers and
without having to obtain individual court orders", both US and Indian officials claimed no
content was being taken from the country's networks and that the programs were intended to
aid "counter-terrorism". Syed Akbaruddin, an external affairs ministry spokesperson, said on
Wednesday there was no further comment following the latest revelations. Siddharth
Varadajaran, editor of the Hindu, said the Indian government's "remarkably tepid and even
apologetic response to the initial set of disclosures" made the story a "priority for Indians". A
home ministry official told the newspaper the government had been "rattled" to discover the
extent of the the programme's interest in India. "It's not just violation of our sovereignty,
it's a complete intrusion into our decision-making process," the official said.

2AC – Surveillance Kills India DMaking Scenario
Strong decision making process is key to effective foreign policy
Pant 9 (Harsh V. A Rising India's Search for a Foreign Policy; n International Relations in the Defence
Studies Department, http://ry2ue4ek7d.scholar.serialssolutions.com/?
sid=google&auinit=HV&aulast=Pant&atitle=A+rising+India
%27s+search+for+a+foreign+policy&id=doi:10.1016/j.orbis.2009.01.007&title=Orbis+
(Philadelphia)&volume=53&issue=2&date=2009&spage=250&issn=0030-4387//Ritt)

A state's destiny is not only shaped by external circumstances such as its geography, national
character, and resource endowments but also by the goals and choices that statesmen set and
make. A successful statesman works to “bridge the gap between a people's experience and his
vision, between a nation's tradition and its future.”12 As India reaches a turning point in its
relations with the rest of the world, Indian policymakers will have to make some crucial foreign
policy decisions, the most important of which includes how best to exploit the extant structure
of the international system to their nation's advantage. But a fundamental quandary has long
dogged India in the realm of foreign affairs and has become even more acute with India's ascent
in the international order. Sunil Khilnani has identified this quandary as India's lack of an
“instinct for power.” Power lies at the heart of international politics. Power permits one state to
exert influence over another, thereby shaping political outcomes. The success or failure of a
state's foreign policy is largely a function of how power is wielded. The exercise of power can be
shocking and at times corrupting but power is absolutely necessary to maintain one's place in
the international arena. Yet because India continues to be ambivalent about power, it has failed
to develop a strategic agenda commensurate with its growing economic and military
capabilities. As Morgenthau observed, “The prestige of a nation is its reputation for power. That
reputation, the reflection of the reality of power in the mind of the observers, can be as
important as the reality of power itself. What others think about us is as important as what we
actually are.”13 India faces a unique conundrum: its political elites desperately want global
recognition as a major power and all the prestige and authority associated with it. Yet, they
continue to be reticent about the acquisition and use of power in foreign affairs. Most recently,
this ambivalence was expressed by the Indian Minister of Commerce, Kamal Nath, [name]
during a speech in which he stated that “this word power often makes me uncomfortable.”14
Though he was talking about India's economic rise and the challenges it continues to face as it
strives for sustained economic growth, his discomfort with the notion of India as a rising power
was indicative of a larger reality in Indian polity. This ambivalence about the use of power in
international relations where “any prestige or authority eventually rely upon traditional
measures of power, whether military or economic”15 is curious. For the Indian political elites
have rarely shied away from maximizing power in domestic politics, thereby corroding the
institutional fabric of liberal democracy in the country. In what is defined as a “mini state
syndrome,” those states which lack the material capabilities to make a difference to the
outcomes at the international level, often denounce the concept of power in foreign
policymaking.16 India had long been such a state, viewing itself as an object of the foreign
policies of powerful nations. Consequently, the Indian political and strategic elite developed a
suspicion of power politics with the word “power” itself acquiring a pejorative connotation
regarding foreign policy. The relationship between power and foreign policy was never fully
understood, leading to a progressive loss in India's ability to wield power effectively in the
international realm. Today when India wants to shape the international system, it is more
important than ever that its foreign policy is “anchored on a planned augmentation of the power
of the nation as a whole.”17 Even the pious declarations of world peace, disarmament and global
development, that India propounds on the world stage, will be taken seriously only if they come
from a state that the international community perceives as having the will and the ability to
convert its rhetoric into reality. In other words, even the rhetoric of powerful nations matters.

India’s strong process and framework for reform are key to China’s alliance
Pant 9 (Harsh V. A Rising India's Search for a Foreign Policy; n International Relations in the Defence
Studies Department, http://ry2ue4ek7d.scholar.serialssolutions.com/?
sid=google&auinit=HV&aulast=Pant&atitle=A+rising+India
%27s+search+for+a+foreign+policy&id=doi:10.1016/j.orbis.2009.01.007&title=Orbis+
(Philadelphia)&volume=53&issue=2&date=2009&spage=250&issn=0030-4387//Ritt)

While the party did set up the NSC in the late 1990s, defining its role in policy formulation, it
nonetheless failed to institutionalize the NSC or to provide it the capabilities necessary to play
its assigned role. As in the past, important national security decisions were addressed in an ad
hoc manner without utilizing the Cabinet Committee on Security, the Strategic Policy Group
(comprised of key secretaries, service chiefs, and heads of intelligence agencies), and officials of
the National Security Advisory Board. Moreover, as has been rightly pointed out, the very
structure of the NSC makes long-term planning impossible, thereby negating the very purpose
of its existence. Its effectiveness remains hostage to the weight of the National Security Advisor
(NSA) in national politics.37 The NSA has become the most powerful authority on national
security, eclipsing the NSC as an institution. While the Congress-led United Progressive Alliance
came to power in 2004 promising that it would make the NSC a professional and effective
institution (and blaming the NDA for making only cosmetic changes in the institutional
arrangements), to date it has failed to make it work. The NSC still does not anticipate national
security threats, coordinate the management of national security, or engender long-term
planning by generating new and bold ideas. An effective foreign policy institutional framework
would not only identify the challenges but would develop a coherent strategy to deal with it,
organize the bureaucracy and persuade the public. The NSC, by itself, is not a panacea–
particularly in light of its inability in the United States to successfully mediate in the
bureaucratic wars and effectively coordinate policy. But the lack of an effective NSC in India is
merely a symptom of the continuing inability and unwillingness of India's policymakers, across
political ideologies, to provide a strategic vision and establish India's foreign policy priorities.
There is clearly an appreciation in Indian policymaking circles of India's rising capabilities. This
appreciation is reflected in a gradual expansion of Indian foreign policy activity in recent years,
in India's attempt to reshape its defense forces, and its desire to seek greater global influence.
But all this is happening in an intellectual vacuum with the result that micro issues dominate the
foreign policy discourse. Since foreign policy issues do not tend to win votes, there is little
incentive for political parties to devote serious attention to them. The result then is ad hoc
responses to various crises as they emerge. The recent debates on the U.S.-India nuclear deal, on
India's role in the Middle East, on the nation's engagements with Russia and China in the socalled “Strategic Triangle,” and on its policy towards its immediate neighbours are all important
but ultimately of little value. In sum, they fail to clarify the singular issue facing India today:
What should be the trajectory of Indian foreign policy as India emerges as a rising power on the
way to a possible great power status? Answering this question requires a significant debate—
instead of the many minor ones that have characterized Indian security discourse over the last
few years. However much Indians like to be argumentative, a major power's foreign policy
cannot be effective in the absence of a guiding framework of underlying principles that is a
function of both the nation's geopolitical requirements and its values.
Indian diplomatic relations in the South China Sea can be used to deter Chinese expansion
Baruah 6/14 (Darshna M; Asia's Nightmare: Could India and China Clash over the South China Sea?; a
junior fellow at the New Delhi-based think tank the Observer Research
Foundation.http://www.nationalinterest.org/blog/the-buzz/asias-nightmare-could-india-china-clashover-the-south-china-13333//Ritt)

Such caution is evident in New Delhi’s approach to increasing its security profile in the Asia–
Pacific and Indian Ocean region. Soon after making some noise on the SCS affair, India softened

its demeanor. New Delhi refrained from commenting on the dispute when the US flew a
surveillance aircraft over China’s artificial island s and the international community joined
Washington in condemning Chinese actions in the region. In the background, India has
experienced some fresh troubles along its border with China and watched with concern as China
has ventured into the Indian Ocean. In fact, Beijing recently warned India about cooperating
with Vietnam on oil and gas exploration projects in the SCS, all the while China defends its own
economic corridor with Pakistan. One of the crucial developments that could affect the future
maritime security architecture in the Indian Ocean region was the docking of Chinese
submarines in Pakistan following the docking in Sri Lanka late last year. China has also warned
India about its reference to the Indian Ocean as its backyard . Chinese presence in the Indian
Ocean is no longer a possibility, it is a reality. For India the challenge is in managing this
development while securing its strategic interests in the region. The Indian Ocean has always
been an area of primary interest for New Delhi and an increasing Chinese presence is bound to
challenge the existing security order in the Indian Ocean region. India and China have always
had troubles along their land boundaries but their strategic interests are now converging into
the maritime domain as well. There will be serious ramifications for maritime security in the
Indian Ocean if relations between the two rising Asian powers can’t be managed. The message
from China is loud and clear. It wants to be a great power and will therefore take to the seas to
establish its presence in the Asia–Pacific and beyond. India’s been relatively quiet as China has
done so and made a strategic miscalculation by not sending its defence minister to the ShangriLa Dialogue 2015—it’s crucial to show up and shape the discourse at any opportunity. The
dialogue is a critical platform to voice concerns about regional security challenges. The Indian
Defense Minister’s presence and his interactions with the other key players in the region would
have been instrumental in putting across the message that India’s willing to take on its
responsibilities and is preparing to play its part.
SCS conflict escalates to nuclear to war
Glaser 14 – John Glaser is has been published at The Washington Times, Al Jazeera, The
American Conservative Magazine, and The Daily Caller, among other outlets. (John, 2014,
“Abandon Hegemony in Asia-Pacific, Or Risk Catastrophic War”,
http://antiwar.com/blog/2014/01/17/abandon-hegemony-in-asia-pacific-or-risk-catastrophicwar/)
Denny Roy, a Senior Fellow at the East-West Center, writes at The Diplomat that the crux of the tensions between the U.S. and
China is a contest for power in the Asia-Pacific region. The squabbling over competing sovereignty claims of

this or that island chain in the East and South China Seas, he writes, is peripheral to the real
battle for regional hegemony. A Chinese sphere of influence here would require the eviction of
American strategic leadership, including U.S. military bases and alliances in Japan and South Korea, U.S. “regional
policeman” duties, and most of the security cooperation between America and friends in the region that now occurs.
Washington is not ready to give up this role, seeing a strong presence in the western Pacific rim and the ability to
shape regional affairs as crucial to American security. A

basic problem, then, is that Beijing wants a sphere of
influence, while Washington is not willing to accede it. I’m reminded of the stark choice put forth in Noam
Chomsky’s 2003 book Hegemony or Survival. Relying on official documents, Chomsky warned that it is dangerous that “the declared
intention of the most powerful state in history [is] to maintain its hegemony through the threat or use of military force, the
dimension of power in which it reigns supreme.” In the official rhetoric of the National Security Strategy, “Our forces will be strong
enough to dissuade potential adversaries from pursuing a military build-up in hopes of surpassing, or equaling, the power of the
United States. One well-known international affairs specialist, John Ikenberry, describes the declaration as a “grand strategy [that]
begins with a fundamental commitment to maintaining a unipolar world in which the United States has no peer competitor,” a
condition that is to be “permanent [so] that no state or coalition could ever challenge [the U.S.] as global leader, protector, and
enforcer.” Ikenberry went on to say this quest for permanent hegemony threatens to “leave the world more dangerous and divided –
and the United States less secure.” America’s current defense posture in Asia – to back all of China’s neighboring rivals in an attempt
to curb China’s regional ambitions – is at once an attempt to implement this hegemonic grand strategy and a threat to peace. “My
biggest fear is that a small mishap is going to blow up into something much bigger ,” says Elizabeth C.

Economy of the Council on Foreign Relations. “ If there is a use of force between Japan

and China ,” warns her colleague Sheila A. Smith, “ this could be all-out conflict between these two
Asian giants. And as a treaty ally of Japan, it will automatically involve the United
States.” As I’ve written, maintaining global hegemony does ordinary Americans little good. Such an
exclusive hold on power in the sphere of international relations is greatly beneficial to political elites and the wealthy entities to
which they are closely tied, but not much for the general population. Given this, the question of whether we prefer

maintaining hegemony to “all-out conflict” in the Asia-Pacific is pertinent . We can either continue
to risk catastrophic conflict between two of the world’s most powerful states , or, as Roy
puts it, “accede” to China’s regional ambitions which, after all, mirror America’s own regional ambitions when it was a
rising power.