Beruflich Dokumente
Kultur Dokumente
RESOLUTION
FELICIANO, J.:
The Philippine Press Institute, Inc. ("PPI") is before this Court
assailing the constitutional validity of Resolution No. 2772
issued by respondent Commission on Elections ("Comelec")
and its corresponding Comelec directive dated 22 March
1995, through a Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition.
Petitioner PPI is a non-stock, non-profit organization of
newspaper and magazine publishers.
On 2 March 1995, Comelec promulgated Resolution No. 2772,
which reads in part:
xxx xxx xxx
Sec. 2. Comelec Space. The Commission
shall procure free print space of not less
than one half (1/2) page in at least one
newspaper of general circulation in every
province or city for use as "Comelec Space"
from March 6, 1995 in the case of
candidates for senator and from March 21,
1995 until May 12, 1995. In the absence of
said newspaper, "Comelec Space" shall be
obtained from any magazine or periodical of
said province or city.
Sec. 3. Uses of Comelec Space. "Comelec
Space" shall be allocated by the
Commission, free of charge, among all
candidates within the area in which the
newspaper, magazine or periodical is
circulated to enable the candidates to make
known their qualifications, their stand on
public issues and their platforms and
programs of government.
"Comelec Space" shall also be used by the
Commission for dissemination of vital
election information.
Sec. 4. Allocation of Comelec Space. (a)
"Comelec Space" shall also be available to
all candidates during the periods stated in
Section 2 hereof. Its allocation shall be
equal and impartial among all candidates
for the same office. All candidates
concerned shall be furnished a copy of the
allocation of "Comelec Space" for their
information, guidance and compliance.
(b) Any candidate desiring to avail himself
of "Comelec Space" from newspapers or
publications based in the Metropolitan
Manila Area shall submit an application
therefor, in writing, to the Committee on
Mass Media of the Commission. Any
candidate desiring to avail himself of
"Comelec Space" in newspapers or
publications based in the provinces shall
submit his application therefor, in writing, to
the Provincial Election Supervisor
concerned. Applications for availment of
"Comelec Space" maybe filed at any time
from the date of effectivity of this
Resolution.
(c) The Committee on Mass Media and the
Provincial Election Supervisors shall allocate
available "Comelec Space" among the
candidates concerned by lottery of which
said candidates shall be notified in advance,
in writing, to be present personally or by
representative to witness the lottery at the
date, time and place specified in the notice.
Any party objecting to the result of the
lottery may appeal to the Commission.
(d) The candidates concerned shall be
notified by the Committee on Mass Media or
the Provincial Election Supervisor, as the
sa Blg.
881,
otherwis
e known
as the
Omnibus
Election
Code, on
the
grant of
"Comele
c
space."
2.
Section
8 of Res.
No.
2772
shall not
be
construe
d to
mean as
constitut
ing prior
restraint
on the
part of
publishe
rs with
respect
to the
printing
or
publicati
on of
material
s in the
news,
opinion,
features
or other
sections
of their
respecti
ve
publicati
ons or
other
account
s or
commen
ts, it
being
clear
from the
last
sentenc
e of said
Section
8 that
the
Commis
sion
shall,
"unless
the facts
and
circumst
ances
clearly
indicate
otherwis
e...
respect
the
determi
nation
by the
publishe
r and/or
editors
of the
newspa
pers or
publicati
ons that
the
account
s or
views
publishe
d are
significa
nt,
newswo
rthy and
of public
interest.
"
This Resolution shall take effect upon
approval. (Emphasis in the original)
While, at this point, the Court could perhaps simply dismiss
the Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition as having become
moot and academic, we consider it not inappropriate to pass
upon the first constitutional issue raised in this case. Our hope
is to put this issue to rest and prevent its resurrection.
Section 2 of Resolution No. 2772 is not a model of clarity in
expression. Section 1 of Resolution No. 2772-A did not try to
redraft Section 2; accordingly, Section 2 of Resolution No.
2772 persists in its original form. Thus, we must point out
that, as presently worded, and in particular as interpreted and
applied by the Comelec itself in its 22 March 1995 letterdirectives to newspaper publishers, Section 2 of Resolution
No. 2772 is clearly susceptible of the reading that petitioner
PPI has given it. That Resolution No. 2772 does not, in express
terms, threaten publishers who would disregard it or its
implementing letters with some criminal or other sanction,
does not by itself demonstrate that the Comelec's original
intention was simply to solicit or request voluntary donations
of print space from publishers. A written communication
officially directing a print media company to supply free print
space, dispatched by a government (here a constitutional)
agency and signed by a member of the Commission
presumably legally authorized to do so, is bound to produce a
coercive effect upon the company so addressed. That the
agency may not be legally authorized to impose, or cause the
imposition of, criminal or other sanctions for disregard of such
directions, only aggravates the constitutional difficulties
inhearing in the present situation. The enactment or addition
of such sanctions by the legislative authority itself would be
open to serious constitutional objection.
To compel print media companies to donate "Comelec-space"
of the dimensions specified in Section 2 of Resolution No.
2772 (not less than one-half page), amounts to "taking" of
private personal property for public use or purposes. Section 2
failed to specify the intended frequency of such compulsory
"donation:" only once during the period from 6 March 1995 (or
21 March 1995) until 12 May 1995? or everyday or once a
week? or as often as Comelec may direct during the same
period? The extent of the taking or deprivation is not
insubstantial; this is not a case of a de minimis temporary
limitation or restraint upon the use of private property. The
monetary value of the compulsory "donation," measured by
the advertising rates ordinarily charged by newspaper
publishers whether in cities or in non-urban areas, may be
very substantial indeed.
The taking of print space here sought to be effected may first
be appraised under the rubric of expropriation of private
personal property for public use. The threshold requisites for a
lawful taking of private property for public use need to be
examined here: one is the necessity for the taking; another is
the legal authority to effect the taking. The element of
necessity for the taking has not been shown by respondent
Comelec. It has not been suggested that the members of PPI
are unwilling to sell print space at their normal rates to
Comelec for election purposes. Indeed, the unwillingness or
reluctance of Comelec to buy print space lies at the heart of
the problem. 3 Similarly, it has not been suggested, let alone
demonstrated, that Comelec has been granted the power of
eminent domain either by the Constitution or by the
legislative authority. A reasonable relationship between that
power and the enforcement and administration of election
laws by Comelec must be shown; it is not casually to be
assumed.
That the taking is designed to subserve "public use" is not
contested by petitioner PPI. We note only that, under Section
3 of Resolution No. 2772, the free "Comelec space" sought by
the respondent Commission would be used not only for
informing the public about the identities, qualifications and
programs of government of candidates for elective office but
also for "dissemination of vital election information"
(including, presumably, circulars, regulations, notices,
directives, etc. issued by Comelec). It seems to the Court a
matter of judicial notice that government offices and agencies
(including the Supreme Court) simply purchase print space, in
the ordinary course of events, when their rules and
regulations, circulars, notices and so forth need officially to be
brought to the attention of the general public.
The taking of private property for public use is, of course,
authorized by the Constitution, but not without payment of
"just compensation" (Article III, Section 9). And apparently the
necessity of paying compensation for "Comelec space" is
precisely what is sought to be avoided by respondent
Commission, whether Section 2 of Resolution No. 2772 is read
as petitioner PPI reads it, as an assertion of authority to
require newspaper publishers to "donate" free print space for
MENDOZA, J.:
In Osmea v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 132231, decided March 31,
1998, 1 we upheld the validity of 11(b) of R.A. No. 6646
which prohibits the sale or donation of print space or air time
for political ads, except to the Commission on Elections under
90, of B.P. No. 881, the Omnibus Election Code, with respect
to print media, and 92, with respect to broadcast media. In
the present case, we consider the validity of 92 of B.P. Blg.
No. 881 against claims that the requirement that radio and
television time be given free takes property without due
process of law; that it violates the eminent domain clause of
the Constitution which provides for the payment of just
compensation; that it denies broadcast media the equal
protection of the laws; and that, in any event, it violates the
terms of the franchise of petitioner GMA Network, Inc.
Petitioner Telecommunications and Broadcast Attorneys of the
Philippines, Inc. is an organization of lawyers of radio and
television broadcasting companies. They are suing as citizens,
taxpayers, and registered voters. The other petitioner, GMA
Network, Inc., operates radio and television broadcasting
stations throughout the Philippines under a franchise granted
by Congress.
Petitioners challenge the validity of 92 on the ground (1) that
it takes property without due process of law and without just
compensation; (2) that it denies radio and television
broadcast companies the equal protection of the laws; and (3)
that it is in excess of the power given to the COMELEC to
supervise or regulate the operation of media of
communication or information during the period of election.
The Question of Standing
At the threshold of this suit is the question of standing of
petitioner Telecommunications and Broadcast Attorneys of the
Philippines, Inc. (TELEBAP). As already noted, its members
assert an interest as lawyers of radio and television
broadcasting companies and as citizens, taxpayers, and
registered voters.
In those cases 2 in which citizens were authorized to sue, this
Court upheld their standing in view of the "transcendental
importance" of the constitutional question raised which
justified the granting of relief. In contrast, in the case at bar,
as will presently be shown, petitioner's substantive claim is
without merit. To the extent, therefore, that a party's standing
is determined by the substantive merit of his case or
preliminary estimate thereof, petitioner TELEBAP must be held
to be without standing. Indeed, a citizen will be allowed to
raise a constitutional question only when he can show that he
has personally suffered some actual or threatened injury as a
result of the allegedly illegal conduct of the government; the
injury fairly is fairly traceable to the challenged action; and
the injury is likely to be redressed by a favorable action. 3
Members of petitioner have not shown that they have suffered
harm as a result of the operation of 92 of B.P. Blg. 881.
Nor do members of petitioner TELEBAP have an interest as
registered voters since this case does not concern their right
of suffrage. Their interest in 92 of B.P. Blg. 881 should be
precisely in upholding its validity.
Much less do they have an interest as taxpayers since this
case does not involve the exercise by Congress of its taxing or
spending power. 4 A party suing as a taxpayer must
specifically show that he has a sufficient interest in preventing
the illegal expenditure of money raised by taxation and that
he will sustain a direct injury as a result of the enforcement of
the questioned statute.
Nor indeed as a corporate entity does TELEBAP have standing
to assert the rights of radio and television broadcasting
Separate Opinions
broadcast media are equal in the sense that both derive their
revenues principally from paid ads. They should thus be
treated equally by the law in respect of such ads.
To sum up, the Bill of Rights of our Constitution expressly
guarantees the following rights:
1. No person, whether rich or poor, shall be deprived of
property without due process. 25
2. Such property shall not be taken by the government, even
for the use of the general public, without first paying just
compensation to the owner. 26
3. No one, regardless of social or financial status, shall be
denied equal protection of the law. 27
The majority, however, peremptorily brushes aside all these
sacred guarantees and prefers to rely on the nebulous legal
theory that broadcast stations are mere recipients of stategranted franchises which can be altered or withdrawn anytime
or otherwise burdened with post facto elephantine yokes. By
this short-circuited rationalization, the majority blithely
ignores the private entrepreneurs' billion-peso investments
and the broadcast professionals' grit and toil in transforming
these invisible franchises into merchandisable property; and
conveniently forgets the grim reality that the taking of
honestly earned media assets is unbridled, exorbitant and
arbitrary. Worse, the government, 28 against which these
constitutional rights to property were in the first place written,
prudently agrees to respect them and to pay adequate
compensation for their taking. But ironically, the majority
rejects the exemplary observance by the government of the
people's rights and insists on the confiscation of their private
property.
I have always believed that the Supreme Court is the ever
vigilant guardian of the constitutional rights of the citizens
and their ultimate protector against the tyrannies of their own
government. I am afraid that by this unfortunate Decision, the
majority, in this instance, has instead converted this
honorable and majestic Court into the people's unwitting
oppressor.
WHEREFORE, I vote to GRANT the petition and to declare
Section 92 of the Omnibus Election Code UNCONSTITUTIONAL
and VOID.
Purisima, J., dissents.
ZALDIVAR, J.:p
Appeal from the decision of the Court of First Instance of
Pampanga in its Civil Case No. 1623, an expropriation
proceeding.
Plaintiff-appellant, the Republic of the Philippines, (hereinafter
referred to as the Republic) filed, on June 26, 1959, a
complaint for eminent domain against defendant-appellee,
Carmen M. Vda. de Castellvi, judicial administratrix of the
estate of the late Alfonso de Castellvi (hereinafter referred to
as Castellvi), over a parcel of land situated in the barrio of San
Jose, Floridablanca, Pampanga, described as follows:
A parcel of land, Lot No. 199-B Bureau of
Lands Plan Swo 23666. Bounded on the NE
by Maria Nieves Toledo-Gozun; on the SE by
national road; on the SW by AFP reservation,
and on the NW by AFP reservation.
Containing an area of 759,299 square
meters, more or less, and registered in the
name of Alfonso Castellvi under TCT No.
13631 of the Register of Pampanga ...;
The Republic assails the finding that the lands are residential,
contending that the plans of the appellees to convert the
lands into subdivision for residential purposes were only on
paper, there being no overt acts on the part of the appellees
which indicated that the subdivision project had been
commenced, so that any compensation to be awarded on the
basis of the plans would be speculative. The Republic's
contention is not well taken. We find evidence showing that
the lands in question had ceased to be devoted to the
production of agricultural crops, that they had become
adaptable for residential purposes, and that the appellees had
actually taken steps to convert their lands into residential
subdivisions even before the Republic filed the complaint for
eminent domain. In the case of City of Manila vs. Corrales (32
Phil. 82, 98) this Court laid down basic guidelines in
determining the value of the property expropriated for public
purposes. This Court said:
In determining the value of land
appropriated for public purposes, the same
consideration are to be regarded as in a
sale of property between private parties.
The inquiry, in such cases, must be what is
the property worth in the market, viewed
not merely with reference to the uses to
which it is at the time applied, but with
reference to the uses to which it is plainly
adapted, that is to say, What is it worth from
its availability for valuable uses?
So many and varied are the circumstances
to be taken into account in determining the
value of property condemned for public
purposes, that it is practically impossible to
formulate a rule to govern its appraisement
in all cases. Exceptional circumstances will
modify the most carefully guarded rule, but,
as a general thing, we should say that the
compensation of the owner is to be
estimated by reference to the use for which
the property is suitable, having regard to
the existing business or wants of the
community, or such as may be reasonably
expected in the immediate future. (Miss.
and Rum River Boom Co. vs. Patterson, 98
U.S., 403).
In expropriation proceedings, therefore, the owner of the land
has the right to its value for the use for which it would bring
the most in the market. 17 The owner may thus show every
advantage that his property possesses, present and
prospective, in order that the price it could be sold for in the
market may be satisfactorily determined. 18 The owner may
also show that the property is suitable for division into village
or town lots. 19
The trial court, therefore, correctly considered, among other
circumstances, the proposed subdivision plans of the lands
sought to be expropriated in finding that those lands are
residential lots. This finding of the lower court is supported not
only by the unanimous opinion of the commissioners, as
embodied in their report, but also by the Provincial Appraisal
Committee of the province of Pampanga composed of the
Provincial Treasurer, the Provincial Auditor and the District
Engineer. In the minutes of the meeting of the Provincial
Appraisal Committee, held on May 14, 1959 (Exh. 13Castellvi) We read in its Resolution No. 10 the following:
3. Since 1957 the land has been classified
as residential in view of its proximity to the
air base and due to the fact that it was not
being devoted to agriculture. In fact, there is
a plan to convert it into a subdivision for
residential purposes. The taxes due on the
property have been paid based on its
classification as residential land;
The evidence shows that Castellvi broached the idea of
subdividing her land into residential lots as early as July 11,
1956 in her letter to the Chief of Staff of the Armed Forces of
the Philippines. (Exh. 5-Castellvi) As a matter of fact, the
layout of the subdivision plan was tentatively approved by the
National Planning Commission on September 7, 1956. (Exh. 8Castellvi). The land of Castellvi had not been devoted to
agriculture since 1947 when it was leased to the Philippine
Army. In 1957 said land was classified as residential, and
taxes based on its classification as residential had been paid
since then (Exh. 13-Castellvi). The location of the Castellvi
land justifies its suitability for a residential subdivision. As
found by the trial court, "It is at the left side of the entrance of
the Basa Air Base and bounded on two sides by roads (Exh.
13-Castellvi), paragraphs 1 and 2, Exh. 12-Castellvi), the
poblacion, (of Floridablanca) the municipal building, and the
Pampanga Sugar Mills are closed by. The barrio schoolhouse
and chapel are also near (T.S.N. November 23,1960, p. 68)." 20
The lower court did not altogether accept the findings of the
Commissioners based on the documentary evidence, but it
considered the documentary evidence as basis for comparison
in determining land values. The lower court arrived at the
conclusion that "the unanimous recommendation of the
commissioners of ten (P10.00) pesos per square meter for the
three lots of the defendants subject of this action is fair and
just". 27 In arriving at its conclusion, the lower court took into
consideration, among other circumstances, that the lands are
titled, that there is a rising trend of land values, and the
lowered purchasing power of the Philippine peso.
In the case of Manila Railroad Co. vs. Caligsihan, 40 Phil. 326,
328, this Court said:
A court of first instance or, on appeal, the
Supreme Court, may change or modify the
report of the commissioners by increasing or
reducing the amount of the award if the
facts of the case so justify. While great
weight is attached to the report of the
commissioners, yet a court may substitute
therefor its estimate of the value of the
property as gathered from the record in
certain cases, as, where the commissioners
have applied illegal principles to the
evidence submitted to them, or where they
have disregarded a clear preponderance of
evidence, or where the amount allowed is
either palpably inadequate or excessive. 28
The report of the commissioners of appraisal in condemnation
proceedings are not binding, but merely advisory in character,
as far as the court is concerned. 29 In our analysis of the report
of the commissioners, We find points that merit serious
consideration in the determination of the just compensation
that should be paid to Castellvi and Toledo-Gozun for their
lands. It should be noted that the commissioners had made
ocular inspections of the lands and had considered the nature
and similarities of said lands in relation to the lands in other
places in the province of Pampanga, like San Fernando and
Angeles City. We cannot disregard the observations of the
commissioners regarding the circumstances that make the
lands in question suited for residential purposes their
location near the Basa Air Base, just like the lands in Angeles
City that are near the Clark Air Base, and the facilities that
obtain because of their nearness to the big sugar central of
the Pampanga Sugar mills, and to the flourishing first class
town of Floridablanca. It is true that the lands in question are
not in the territory of San Fernando and Angeles City, but,
considering the facilities of modern communications, the town
of Floridablanca may be considered practically adjacent to
San Fernando and Angeles City. It is not out of place,
therefore, to compare the land values in Floridablanca to the
land values in San Fernando and Angeles City, and form an
idea of the value of the lands in Floridablanca with reference
to the land values in those two other communities.
The important factor in expropriation proceeding is that the
owner is awarded the just compensation for his property. We
have carefully studied the record, and the evidence, in this
case, and after considering the circumstances attending the
lands in question We have arrived at the conclusion that the
price of P10.00 per square meter, as recommended by the
commissioners and adopted by the lower court, is quite high.
It is Our considered view that the price of P5.00 per square
meter would be a fair valuation of the lands in question and
would constitute a just compensation to the owners thereof. In
arriving at this conclusion We have particularly taken into
consideration the resolution of the Provincial Committee on
Appraisal of the province of Pampanga informing, among
others, that in the year 1959 the land of Castellvi could be
sold for from P3.00 to P4.00 per square meter, while the land
of Toledo-Gozun could be sold for from P2.50 to P3.00 per
square meter. The Court has weighed all the circumstances
relating to this expropriations proceedings, and in fixing the
price of the lands that are being expropriated the Court
arrived at a happy medium between the price as
recommended by the commissioners and approved by the
court, and the price advocated by the Republic. This Court has
also taken judicial notice of the fact that the value of the
Philippine peso has considerably gone down since the year
1959. 30 Considering that the lands of Castellvi and ToledoGozun are adjoining each other, and are of the same nature,
the Court has deemed it proper to fix the same price for all
these lands.
3. The third issue raised by the Republic
relates to the payment of interest. The
Republic maintains that the lower court
erred when it ordered the Republic to pay
Castellvi interest at the rate of 6% per
annum on the total amount adjudged as the
value of the land of Castellvi, from July 1,
1956 to July 10, 1959. We find merit in this
assignment of error.
xxx
xxx
"And in the case of J.M. Tuason & Co., Inc. v. Land Tenure
Administration, 31 SCRA 413, the Court, speaking thru now
Chief Justice Fernando, reiterated the 'well-settled (rule) that
just compensation means the equivalent for the value of the
property at the time of its taking. Anything beyond that is
more and anything short of that is less, than just
compensation. It means a fair and full equivalent for the loss
sustained, which is the measure of the indemnity, not
whatever gain would accrue to the expropriating entity."
Garcia v. Court ofappeals (102 SCRA 597, 608),
xxx
xxx
xxx
xxx
xxx
CORTES, J.:
On December 5, 1977 the National Housing Authority (NIIA)
filed a complaint for expropriation of parcels of land covering
approximately twenty five (25) hectares, (in Antipolo, Rizal)
including the lots of petitioners Lorenzo Sumulong and Emilia
Vidanes-Balaoing with an area of 6,667 square meters and
3,333 square meters respectively. The land sought to be
expropriated were valued by the NHA at one peso (P1.00) per
square meter adopting the market value fixed by the
provincial assessor in accordance with presidential decrees
prescribing the valuation of property in expropriation
proceedings.
Together with the complaint was a motion for immediate
possession of the properties. The NHA deposited the amount
of P158,980.00 with the Philippine National Bank, representing
the "total market value" of the subject twenty five hectares of
land, pursuant to Presidential Decree No. 1224 which defines
"the policy on the expropriation of private property for
socialized housing upon payment of just compensation."
On January 17, 1978, respondent Judge issued the following
Order:
Plaintiff having deposited with the Philippine
National Bank, Heart Center Extension
Office, Diliman, Quezon City, Metro Manila,
the amount of P158,980.00 representing the
total market value of the subject parcels of
land, let a writ of possession be issued.
SO ORDERED.
(SGD) BU
GUERRER
Judge
Petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration on the ground
that they had been deprived of the possession of their
property without due process of law. This was however,
denied.
Hence, this petition challenging the orders of respondent
Judge and assailing the constitutionality of Pres. Decree No.
1224, as amended. Petitioners argue that:
1) Respondent Judge acted without or in
excess of his jurisdiction or with grave
abuse of discretion by issuing the Order of
January 17, 1978 without notice and without
hearing and in issuing the Order dated June
28, 1978 denying the motion for
reconsideration.
2) Pres. Decree l224, as amended, is
unconstitutional for being violative of the
due process clause, specifically:
a) The Decree would allow
the taking of property
regardless of size and no
matter how small the area
to be expropriated;
b) "Socialized housing" for
the purpose of
condemnation proceeding,
as defined in said Decree,
is not really for a public
purpose;
c) The Decree violates
procedural due process as
it allows immediate taking
of possession, control and
disposition of property
without giving the owner
his day in court;
The provision of P.D. 1669 which allows NHA, at its sole option,
to put portions of the expropriated area to commercial use in
order to defray the development costs of its housing projects
cannot stand constitutional scrutiny. The Government, for
instance, cannot expropriate the flourishing Makati
commercial area in order to earn money that would finance
housing projects all over the country. The leading case of
Guido v. Rural Progress Administration (84 Phil. 847) may
have been modified in some ways by the provisions of the
new Constitution on agrarian and urban land reform and on
housing. The principle of non-appropriation of private property
for private purposes, however, remains. The legislature,
according to the Guido case, may not take the property of one
citizen and transfer it to another, even for a full
compensation, when the public interest is not thereby
promoted. The Government still has to prove that
expropriation of commercial properties in order to lease them
out also for commercial purposes would be "public use" under
the Constitution.
P.D. No. 1670 suffers from a similar infirmity. There is no
showing how the President arrived at the conclusion that the
Sunog-Apog area is a blighted community. The many pictures
submitted as exhibits by the petitioners show a welldeveloped area subdivided into residential lots with either
middle-income or upper class homes. There are no squatters.
The provisions of the decree on the relocation of qualified
squatter families and on the re-blocking and re-alignment of
existing structures to allow the introduction of basic facilities
and services have no basis in fact The area is well-developed
with roads, drainage and sewer facilities, water connection to
the Metropolitan Waterworks and Sewerage System electric
connections to Manila Electric Company, and telephone
connections to the Philippine Long Distance Telephone
Company. There are many squatter colonies in Metro Manila in
need of upgrading. The Government should have attended to
them first. There is no showing for a need to demolish the
existing valuable improvements in order to upgrade SunogApog.
After a careful examination of the questioned decrees, we find
P.D. Nos. 1669 and 1670 to be violative of the petitioners'
right to due process of law and, therefore, they must fail the
test of constitutionality.
The decrees, do not by themselves, provide for any form of
hearing or procedure by which the petitioners can question
the propriety of the expropriation of their properties or the
reasonableness of the just compensation. Having failed to
provide for a hearing, the Government should have filed an
expropriation case under Rule 67 of the Revised Rules of Court
but it did not do so. Obviously, it did not deem it necessary
because of the enactment of the questioned decrees which
rendered, by their very passage, any questions with regard to
the expropriation of the properties, moot and academic. In
effect, the properties, under the decrees were "automatically
expropriated." This became more evident when the NHA wrote
the Register of Deeds and requested her to cancel the
certificate of titles of the petitioners, furnishing said Register
of Deeds only with copies of the decrees to support its
request.
This is hardly the due process of law which the state is
expected to observe when it exercises the power of eminent
domain.
Separate Opinions
Separate Opinions
TEEHANKEE, C.J., concurring:
The judgment of the Court invalidates Presidential Decrees
numbered 1669 and 1670 which unilaterally proclaimed the
Tambunting Estate and the Estero de Sunog-Apog area as
expropriated without further recourse, for being violative of
the due process and eminent domain provisions of the
Constitution in the particulars stated in the opinion ably
penned by Mr. Justice Gutierrez.
This is in line with my concurring and dissenting opinion in the
six-to-five decision in J.M. Tuason & Co., Inc. v. Land Tenure
Administration 1 wherein the Congress through Republic Act
No. 2616 "authorized the expropriation of the Tatalon Estate"
comprising about 109 hectares in Quezon City for subdivision
into small lots and conveyed at cost to individuals.
I concurred with the tenuous majority's ruling there setting
aside the lower court's ruling granting therein petitioner
appellee's petition to prohibit respondents-appellees from
instituting proceedings for expropriation of the "Tatalon
Estate" as specifically authorized by R.A. 2616, with the result
that the expropriation proceedings could then be properly
filed but subject to such proper and valid objections and
defenses to the action as petitioner-owner may raise.
I dissented, however, from the majority ruling, insofar as it
held that the constitutional power of Congress for the
expropriation of lands is well-nigh all embracing and
forecloses the courts from inquiring into the necessity for the
taking of the property. I noted that "this is the first case where
Congress has singled out a particular property for
condemnation under the constitutional power conferred upon
it. Does this square with the due process and equal protection
clauses of the Constitution? Is the explanatory note of the bill
later enacted as Republic Act 2616, without any evidence as
to a hearing with the affected parties having been given the
opportunity to be heard, and citing merely the population
increase of Quezon City and the land-for-the-landless program
sufficient compliance with these basic constitutional
guarantees? Rather, does not the need for a more serious
scrutiny as to the power of Congress to single out a particular
piece of property for expropriation, acknowledged in the main
opinion, call for judicial scrutiny, with all the acts in, as to the