Abstract. In this paper we deal with the problem of extending the concept of nucleolus on fuzzy cooperative games. Has been invented a new definition of pre-nucleolus for fuzzy cooperative games. We prove that the newly defined pre-nucleolus on the set of classical cooperative games coincides with the previously existing one. It is proved that for separate classes of fuzzy games the pre-nucleolus exists and unique. The process of finding the pre-nucleolus illustrated on an example of a concrete type of fuzzy games.
Keywords: Fuzzy cooperative games; fuzzy coalition; fuzzy prenucleolus.
JEL Classification C71.
________________________________

© All Rights Reserved

Als PDF, TXT **herunterladen** oder online auf Scribd lesen

22 Aufrufe

Abstract. In this paper we deal with the problem of extending the concept of nucleolus on fuzzy cooperative games. Has been invented a new definition of pre-nucleolus for fuzzy cooperative games. We prove that the newly defined pre-nucleolus on the set of classical cooperative games coincides with the previously existing one. It is proved that for separate classes of fuzzy games the pre-nucleolus exists and unique. The process of finding the pre-nucleolus illustrated on an example of a concrete type of fuzzy games.
Keywords: Fuzzy cooperative games; fuzzy coalition; fuzzy prenucleolus.
JEL Classification C71.
________________________________

© All Rights Reserved

Als PDF, TXT **herunterladen** oder online auf Scribd lesen

- JEE(Main)2013-QPaper-Maths-with-Solution(Allen).pdf
- Chap03
- standards_progress_test_1.pdf
- CE_C471
- 13
- Functions of One Complex Variable 2 - J Conway
- 11 3 redox titration lab report
- Mathieu Dutour Sikiric- Perfect forms and perfect Delaunay polytopes
- TitrationCurves.6.pdf
- 2variableinequalities
- DTMC
- Quiz A(n)
- Free Must-Have Apps for Secondary Math
- Mathematics for Gate Objective Questions Part 12
- MIT exercises
- Extra Note From Bradley
- AM_F4_C1(S)
- 1254 oil
- SPM QUESTIONS3[2]
- Ee 2005 Gate Paper

Sie sind auf Seite 1von 18

ymaro221917@live.tcicollege.edu

Abstract. In this paper we deal with the problem of extending the concept of nucleolus on

fuzzy cooperative games. Has been invented a new definition of pre-nucleolus for fuzzy

cooperative games. We prove that the newly defined pre-nucleolus on the set of classical

cooperative games coincides with the previously existing one. It is proved that for separate

classes of fuzzy games the pre-nucleolus exists and unique. The process of finding the prenucleolus illustrated on an example of a concrete type of fuzzy games.

Keywords: Fuzzy cooperative games; fuzzy coalition; fuzzy prenucleolus.

JEL Classification C71.

________________________________

YEREMIA MAROUTIAN

Technical Carrier Institute

New York, New York 10001 USA

ymaro221917@live.tcicollege.edu

Abstract. In this paper we deal with the problem of extending the concept of nucleolus on

fuzzy cooperative games. Has been described a newly invented definition of pre-nucleolus for

fuzzy cooperative games. We prove that the newly defined pre-nucleolus on the set of classical

cooperative games coincides with the previously existing one. It is proved that for separate

classes of fuzzy games the pre-nucleolus exists and unique. The process of finding the prenucleolus illustrated on an example of a concrete type of fuzzy games.

Keywords: Fuzzy cooperative games; fuzzy coalition; fuzzy pre-nucleolus.

JEL Classification C71.

Introduction.

Let N= {1, 2 n} be the set of all players.

an n-dimensional

(

vector

for each

A cooperative fuzzy game with the

[ ] is the set of all fuzzy coalitions and is the

players set N is a pair (

, where

characteristic function of that game which maps a real number to each fuzzy coalition.

Cooperative fuzzy games reflect type of situations in which for players allowed to take part in

coalitions with different participation level that vary from non-cooperation to full cooperation.

The obtained reward in this type of games defines depending on the level of cooperation. The

participation levels at which each player is involved in cooperation gets described by fuzzy

coalitions.

Aubin (1981), when he first introduced the fuzzy cooperative games in game theory has been

explaining use of fuzzy coalitions by following way. Every player can choose his level of

participation in a coalition and not only whether to participate in it or not. As a justification for

that approach can be considered the individual players reluctance to invest all of available

resources in enterprise where that coalition involved.

Important topic of research for fuzzy cooperative theory is the extension of existing in classical

theory decision concepts on fuzzy games. It is known, that not every concept of classical theory

has its natural counterpart for fuzzy games. At the same time some results in classical

cooperative games allow to be transformed on fuzzy games with of course significant

differences. In this work we aimed to establish an important in classical theory optimality

principle i. e. nucleolus on fuzzy games.

Together with the fuzzy theory of nucleolus we are also going to deal with classical

theory of the same concept. For that reason we need to reproduce here some preliminary

facts that concern to the classical theory of nucleolus. At the end of this paragraph we will

bring the definition of nucleolus for fuzzy cooperative games.

For classical cooperative games D. Schmeidler [1] has defined the nucleolus as an

imputation what is the best in the sense of some

relation.

Let G=<N, > is a classical cooperative game and

({ }

Y ( ) = {x

= (N)}

is the set of all imputations. The nucleolus of the game G consists of the following

imputations:

(

The relation

y for every y

}.

defined as below.

and a characteristic function v, the set (

nucleolus of Y if vectors from ( are minimal in the sense of relation :

(

y for every y

| |

is the

}.

Theorem (D. Schmeidler, 1969) For every nonempty, convex and compact set the

nucleolus exists and consists of only one vector.

Theorem (A. Sobolev, 1976) Let for a game G=<N, > defined a set of payoff vectors as

the following set of pre-imputations:

(

for every y

},

For outcomes from X ( ) the condition of individual rationality has been violated. That is

the reason because of what the set of payoff vectors X ( ) is different of the set Y ( ) of

imputations and is not compact as well. Despite of that the statement about existence and

uniqueness for pre-nucleolus continues to remain true.

Fuzz ooper ve g mes possess nf n e number of o

ons B

re son s

impossible to extend this concept on the set of fuzzy cooperative games by using the

approach that based on the idea of lexicographic order. From there arrives a need for a new

definition of pre-nucleolus on fuzzy games. To be valid the needed definition should be

equivalent to the existing one for classical games and at the same time to allow extending

that concept on fuzzy cooperative games.

[

and

Below we will prove that the newly defined pre-nucleolus coincides with already existing one.

Similar to classical games here too we will consider the set of all only collectively rational

payoff vectors, i. e. pre-imputations:

(

( }

by accepting that

.

For

(3.1)

the following way,

)/ (

[(e (

and sets

)]

(3.2)

for

={

where e(

point and set

(

:

/x = y , for every

(

}

and (

(3.3)

) is the distance between the

(

(

For sets { } rue e fo o ng

some

it is turning out that

set

or otherwise, by increasing

)=

|x

)=

).

|.

. If for

, then that entails the stabilization of corresponding

does not decrease any more. The set

obtained that

In this paragraph we will first describe the new definition of pre-nucleolus for classical

cooperative games. For that set of games will be proved that the pre-nucleolus defined both of

the ways coincide.

Let the pair

set of all players and

} is the

First we should pay attention that in case of classical cooperative games relations (3.1) - (3.3)

accept the following view:

(3.4)

X

= argmin

{

max

(

e(S, x)

(3.5)

(3.6)

Because the set 2 s f n e, so after finite number of steps the process of construction of sets

X T will be abrupt. The last set X will contain a unique vector what will coincide with prenucleolus in the sense of its initial definition. Takes place the following lemma:

Lemma 3.1. Let

and

{

if

(

Proof: For a given vector x

( }

(

according to definition we have that

(

Let denote by

Similarly,

( (

(

e(

rgm

( v

( )

(v(

e(

rgm

(

Let

( (

be an arbitrary coalition. If

(

= (

max ( (

= (

If it takes place the strong inequality then the lemmas statement proved.

takes place only equality. Also we will suppose that for

some

( )

( )

<m

where

(

(

. If

where

(

<

I.e.

y.

Let now

(

(

T too and

(

, then

( (

(

( (

<

is some coalition:

(

( (

( )

y. If for all k take place only equalities

then

what contradicts to the condition of lemma.

Let numbers

the vector ( (

B ={

( ))

for

and (

, if

for

}.

Lemma 3.2. If X

Proof. Let

(

According to definition of for every

But then

which means that

.

1=

exist numbers

, and

such that

(3. 7)

Proof. For

e relation (3.7) follows from definitions of sets

n

. Accept it

already has been proved that for some

n X

. According to lemma 2 supposed to take

place the inclusion T

f

be use B

en e s s

su

B

n B

We

nee o prove

now for some

Then will exist se

means, that

en

su

B

e o ns en e of se s

n

Let

n

n

ubse uen

. Which

Because (

according to lemma 3.1,

(

B so

e(S

e(S, x)

Further,

(

(

be use

result,

. As a

(

Or otherwise,

(

and

(

, so for every S

too. As far as T

, where m

(

Besides that, for every

S

B

, then

, e(S, x)

(

is remaining to proof that for arbitrary

(

Accept, that for some coalition S

B

(

For coalitions S

For S

And for S

(

(

(

(

(

(

Which means that the constructed above vector is more preferable than

(

(

(

z

on r

s o ef

s prenu eo us for e g me

Hence, for every

B

suppose o o rue e e u

(

.

But then the equality received would mean that

n

The last inclusion

Proof. (

for ever

From ere we will have that also (

according to

lemma 3.3. If

contains more than one point then it is obvious that T

Then based on

lemma 3.3 and lemma 3.2, B

and according to lemma 1 we will be able to construct the

next set

The constructed that way last set

will consist of only the pre-nucleolus

(

4.1. Let (

is a fuzzy cooperative game, where

is some finite set of fuzzy

coalitions. Below we will prove that in presence of some conditions this type of games possess a

unique pre-nucleolus.

Lemma 4.1 Let X is a convex polytope and is the solution for the next linear programming

problem:

x

.

Then exists a vector

where

vector

exists a vector x

su

s the solution of mentioned above linear programming problem. Consider now the

and also

10

minimization problem. So, exists a vector

su

for every x

is a fuzzy game, where is a finite set of fuzzy coalitions that

contains coalitions

(

for arbitrary

Then the game (

possesses

a unique pre-nucleolus.

Proof. We need to prove that after finite number of steps the process of construction of sets

X , will get abrupt and the last set

will consists of a unique point.

The set

for every

x

The number

(3. 8)

.

(

(

n

, then for

( (

).

from where

(

When accepts its minimal value we obtain the solution of our problem:

( )

T

for ever

11

[( (

argmin

for

The solution

for this problem is a convex politope and the set

strictly contains the set

T

. The same will take place on the following steps too. As far as the set is finite, so

the process of construction of sets

will get abrupt after finite number of steps.

Let now

follow that

theorem.

for arbitrary

T, from where

. That concludes the proof of our

In this paragraph we will prove a theorem about existence and uniqueness of nucleolus for

fuzzy cooperative games with piece-wise affine characteristic functions.

Theorem 4.. Let (T, v) is a fuzzy cooperative game with piece-wise affine characteristic

,

function v. That means, exists a collection of simplexes { } what covers

v( =u ( and

u ( is a linear function and

Then the game (

X = argmin

sup

={

)/ (

[(e (

/x = y , for every x, y

X }

(

x

X.

)]

12

( )

(

x

for that problem, where X is a convex politope. It is clear that

is the solution

also is solution for the problem (3.9). For that reason we will need to show

that the inequality v (

o s rue for

en

.

s n rb r r

Let

Because

(

where

. Then

( (

This means that really is a solution for the problem (3.9). So, we will have that X is the

following set:

{ (

that the product x is constant for every

now

re su

o

ons

if for some numbers

n

,

}.

and every

, what means

Let

n

. From there it will follow that

T, then for every

(

The latter one means that the set

is the intersection of the set of all coalitions

hyperplane and subsequently is a convex set, because of convexity of

Next we will rewrite the definition of

in a different form:

i

[(

e(

)/ (

)]

The set X defined that way is solution for the following maximization problem:

with some

13

for every

(3.10)

As it was in the beginning of the proof besides this problem we also will consider the

corresponding linear programming problem for peaks of simplexes { } that does not belong to

T

:

for every

{ }

(3.10)

The problem (3.10) has a solution because it is a linear programming problem and X

convex polytope. Let denote that solution by (

and

is a

{ }

the inequalities

(3.10) remain true. For

For

{ }

{ }

Let now

. Accept

and

,,

e

(

(

)+

(

(

(e

The last inequality in the chain above takes place because of convexity of metric (

by the

variable . As a result, we have proved that the solution (

for the problem (3.10) also is

solution for (3.10). From there according to lemma 4.1 exists

such that

and for

arbitrary x X takes place equality in (3.10). Then because

and

so

. As a result to that the dimension of T will increase by at least one. From there

because as we have proved above the sets T are convex, so after finite number of steps T

will coincide with T and the corresponding set X will contain only one point.

14

In the paragraph below we will find the pre-nucleolus for fuzzy game -from one

parameterized class. We will consider game G = < [0, 1]

with the following characteristic

function ( :

(

= min { ,

}, for

] and

To solve our problem we will start by dividing the square T = [0, 1] on eight triangle subsets

and figure out values of v ( on each one of them. Let denote these subsets by (i =1 8) and

start to describe them.

(1)

={

for

(2)

={

for

(3)

={

={

For

from there

(

.

(

we obtain that

and

. From what it follows that

(5)

={

(6)

v(

={

Analogically to

Further, because

.

,

in this case too

;

So, for

15

,

(7)

={

. i. e.

={

On

(8)

(

. So,

min max

e( , x), where

(

e(

max e(

= max (

e(

Below we will by turn figure out magnitudes of the following inner maximums:

max

e(

= max

+ x(

max

e(

= max

+ x(

max

e(

= max

+ x(

max

e(

= max

+ x(

max

e(

= max

+ x(

max

e(

= max

+ x(

max

e(

= max

+ x(

16

max

e(

= max

+ x(

{

by subsets , we can

Now, when we already have found all of the values for max e (

switch on calculation of the value for preliminary expression:

min max

e( , x) = min {min

min { min

argmin

max e (

max e( , x)} =

} =1.

=[1,-1].

Taking in account that, we together with the definition of the set T will have that T = { }.

Let denote

e = min max

e ( , x) =1.

To find sets X

F ( , x) =

(

{|

| |

|}

F ( , x), where

F ( , x) we again will calculate by the subsets

as we did it with the max e ( , x).

(

max

} F(

={

= max (

= max

F(

={

= max (

= max

= max

}=

max

}=

max

F(

= max (

}=

17

(

max

F(

= max (

={

= max

}=

max

F(

= max (

= max

+(

}=

f

={

mposs b e f

max

F(

= max (

= max

}=

f

={

mpopss b e

max

F(

= max (

= max

= max

}=

f

={

max

F(

= max (

}=

={

By the end we will need to calculate the following magnitude, what will give us the set X

min (

F(

max

F(

= min { min

max

F(

, min

max

}=

=min { min

max[

, x - , - x - , 2x - , ,

min

max [- -2x, -

,

]}=

,-

] }= min { min

], min

[

max[

max [- , +2x,

],

18

=max {

,-

}=-

X

argmin

] max

F(

=0.

(

results.

REFERENCES

[1] SCHMEIDLER D. 1969 The nucleolus of a characteristic function game. SIAM J. OF MATH. 1,

vol. 17, pp. 1163-1170.

[2] SOBOLEV A. 1976.Characterization of the optimality principles in cooperative games by

functional equations. Math Methods in Social Sciences. - Vilnius, pp. 94-151. (In Russian)

[3] AUBIN JP (1981). Cooperative fuzzy games. Math Oper.es 6: 1-13

- JEE(Main)2013-QPaper-Maths-with-Solution(Allen).pdfHochgeladen vonbondi7
- Chap03Hochgeladen vonJamaliah Daud
- standards_progress_test_1.pdfHochgeladen vonLorenzo Mckenzie
- CE_C471Hochgeladen vonVikash Prasad
- 13Hochgeladen vonSeanGoonShengTang
- Functions of One Complex Variable 2 - J ConwayHochgeladen vonPaul Joseph Druce
- 11 3 redox titration lab reportHochgeladen vonapi-346839668
- Mathieu Dutour Sikiric- Perfect forms and perfect Delaunay polytopesHochgeladen vonFlaoeram
- TitrationCurves.6.pdfHochgeladen vonCarina JL
- 2variableinequalitiesHochgeladen vonapi-227793309
- DTMCHochgeladen vonVadthyavath Ramu
- Quiz A(n)Hochgeladen vonHoàng Minh Măng
- Free Must-Have Apps for Secondary MathHochgeladen voncurtisgay81
- MIT exercisesHochgeladen vonSorin Miu
- Extra Note From BradleyHochgeladen vonShahzan Cincan
- Mathematics for Gate Objective Questions Part 12Hochgeladen vonsansure
- AM_F4_C1(S)Hochgeladen vonLim Wai Wai Smktp
- 1254 oilHochgeladen vonAnonymous GdWMlV46bU
- SPM QUESTIONS3[2]Hochgeladen voncasbenx
- Ee 2005 Gate PaperHochgeladen vonmass1984
- Dudas BulleHochgeladen vonAlberto Lozano Rivas
- ES 84 ProjectHochgeladen vonKian Dave Bucol
- Coded InequalitiesHochgeladen vonnbpr
- Business_Statistics_A_First_Course_4th_Edition_Chapter1.pdfHochgeladen vonAvinashRai
- june-2016-cape-pure-mathematics-u1-p2.pdfHochgeladen vonMackenzie Kangoo
- 6-18 Stations Equations QrHochgeladen vonMajid Khan
- MathHochgeladen vonMohamed EL Qarouaoui
- 3 WHEN IS A COSTHochgeladen vonanisa
- Practical Matlab Basics for Engineers 2008Hochgeladen vonBenja
- Quantitative Aptitude for Competitive Examinations - Abhijit Gu- By EasyEngineering.netHochgeladen vonPranshu Tripathi

- Notes on Copyright Infringements and FraudsHochgeladen vonYEREMIA MAROUTIAN
- To Presidents of Colleges. on Copyright Infringements and FraudsHochgeladen vonYEREMIA MAROUTIAN
- To Math Departments. on Copyright Infringements and FraudsHochgeladen vonYEREMIA MAROUTIAN
- To Economics Departments. on Copyright Infringements and Frauds.Hochgeladen vonYEREMIA MAROUTIAN
- On the Shapley Prevalue for Fuzzy Cooperative Games(Last Version)Hochgeladen vonYEREMIA MAROUTIAN

- Businessing SampleHochgeladen vonKurogane Gane
- X7R Flex TermHochgeladen vondovesnest_in
- Obesity and PregnancyHochgeladen vonBudiarto Baskoro
- Guidelines for ValidationHochgeladen vonSilvia Bacchini
- Effects of Exercise Training on Fat Loss and Lean Mass Gain in Mexican American and Korean Premenopausal WomenHochgeladen vonRizki Perdana
- CEOs Cpmpensation PPTHochgeladen vonjputhran
- Hudson v. AFGE (17-1867)Hochgeladen vonFedSmith Inc.
- The Browning and Yellowing of Whiteness - Issue 138Hochgeladen vonPovi-TamuBryant
- katloweresumeweebHochgeladen vonapi-259658470
- Euler's Identity - WikipediaHochgeladen vonZarabotta
- Assignment CriminalHochgeladen vonMush Esa
- Excavating the Bible - Yitzhak MeitlisHochgeladen vonappiah ernest
- Thesis 1asddddddddddddddddddddddddddddddddddddddddddddddddddddddddddddddddddddddddddddddddddddddddddddddddddddddddddddddddddddddddddddddHochgeladen vonKarl Renz Callejas
- Klasifikasi ABC pada PersediaanHochgeladen vonImanuel Rio
- A Study of Job Satisfaction, Organisational Commitment and Its Effect on Work Performance in Contractual Employees - A Case Study of Bihar Vikas Mission, Bihar, IndiaHochgeladen vonEditor IJLTEMAS
- A Vocabulary of Attitudes to Identify ToneHochgeladen vonchaostheorist
- prof. dr. Szilágyi József - The Deficit of Humidity and the Associated Risks in the Reghin Subcarpathians.docHochgeladen vonSzilagyi Jozsef
- PPG12P12Hochgeladen vonMuhammad Ahmad Warraich
- Oil Migration in ChocolateHochgeladen vonKenesei György
- Bu Ett Ner Ascorbate ChemistryHochgeladen vonAnonymous vcjB3yRi
- Work Less Accomplish MoreHochgeladen vonThomas
- Gillette caseHochgeladen vonamankanojia1992
- ewaveHochgeladen vonapi-19771937
- RES 562 RANK Principal Education / res562rank.comHochgeladen vontoshibamusic11
- Public Guidance Live Donor Kidney Transplant ServicesHochgeladen vonAnonymous UpWci5
- Promissory Estoppel- Requirements and Limitations of the DoctrineHochgeladen voncorter177
- boehmecatHochgeladen vonDeyve Redyson
- UM Letter 11.17.17Hochgeladen vonSusan Svrluga
- PMP EXAM 5Hochgeladen vonibnumoqla
- ESET NOD32 Antivirus 4.2.64.12 Nt32 User GuideHochgeladen vonlara_croft6008

## Viel mehr als nur Dokumente.

Entdecken, was Scribd alles zu bieten hat, inklusive Bücher und Hörbücher von großen Verlagen.

Jederzeit kündbar.