Beruflich Dokumente
Kultur Dokumente
3d 967
Pro se plaintiff Josephine Brown appeals the summary judgment order of the
district court dismissing his 42 U.S.C. Sec. 1983 civil rights action.1 We have
jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. Sec. 1291 and remand to the district court for
further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
I. BACKGROUND
2
Faulkner, 821 F.2d 408, 412 n. 5 (7th Cir.) (same), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 935,
108 S.Ct. 311, 98 L.Ed.2d 269 (1987); Jan Morris, Conundrum (1974)
(autobiographical narrative of the life of a transsexual).
3
Mr. Brown alleged in his complaint that the defendants have violated his
Eighth Amendment right to be free from cruel and unusual punishment and his
Fourteenth Amendment equal protection rights. Specifically, he alleged that
defendants have withheld medical care with deliberate indifference to his
serious medical needs by not providing him with the female hormone estrogen
and other medical treatment in contravention of the rule in Estelle v. Gamble,
429 U.S. 97, 104, 97 S.Ct. 285, 291, 50 L.Ed.2d 251 (1976).
After reviewing the complaint, a federal magistrate issued a show cause order
stating that he would dismiss the complaint if Mr. Brown did not explain how
the defendants personally participated in the alleged constitutional violations
and why Mr. Brown felt he was entitled to hormone treatment. Mr. Brown
responded that the named defendants were involved in his Sec. 1983 claim, that
he was entitled to hormone treatment and "therapy," and that he had an equal
protection right to hormone therapy. Rec. vol. I, doc. 5, at 2.
In his response to the magistrate's recommendation, Mr. Brown asserted that "
[t]here has been a total failure by the defendants to provide any kind of medical
attention to the plaintiff for his transsexual condition," and argued that the
magistrate had not addressed his equal protection argument. Rec. vol. I, doc.
14, at 3. The district court accepted the magistrate's recommendation regarding
the Eighth Amendment claim. The district court further noted that Mr. Brown
was not a member of a "protected class" and dismissed the equal protection
claim. On appeal, Mr. Brown argues that the district court erred in dismissing
both his Eighth Amendment and Equal Protection claims.
II. DISCUSSION
A. Summary Judgment Conversion
In this case, the magistrate relied upon matters outside of the complaint.
However, there is no indication in the record that the court notified Mr. Brown
of the conversion to a summary judgment proceeding or that he had the
opportunity to introduce evidence supporting his claims. We therefore will not
review the district court's grant of summary judgment.
B. Eighth Amendment
10
Mr. Brown argues that the defendants have provided inadequate medical care
under the Eighth Amendment. Deliberate indifference by prison officials to a
prisoner's serious medical need constitutes cruel and unusual punishment in
violation of the Eighth Amendment. Estelle, 429 U.S. at 104, 97 S.Ct. at 291.
11
This circuit was one of the first to consider whether transsexuals had an Eighth
Amendment right to estrogen. See Supre v. Ricketts, 792 F.2d 958, 962-63
(10th Cir.1986). We held in the context of that case, where the provision of
estrogen was medically controversial, that although prison officials must
provide treatment to address the medical needs of transsexual prisoners, the law
did not require prison officials to administer estrogen or provide any other
particular treatment. Id. at 963. Since Supre, most courts have reached the same
conclusion. Farmer, 990 F.2d at 321; White, 849 F.2d at 327-28; Meriwether,
821 F.2d at 414; Long v. Nix, 877 F.Supp. 1358, 1364 (S.D.Iowa 1995); see
also Connie Mayer, Survey of Case Law Establishing Constitutional Minima
The defendants' sole response to Mr. Brown's Eighth Amendment claim is that
Mr. Brown failed to raise the issue in the district court. In light of our obligation
to construe pro se pleadings liberally, see Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 92
S.Ct. 594, 30 L.Ed.2d 652 (1972), we cannot agree. In our view, Mr. Brown
claimed a medical need and therefore a general right to medical treatment for
gender dysphoria in his complaint. In addition, Mr. Brown clarified his
pleadings, specifically alleging that he has not been offered any treatment at all,
in his response to the magistrate's recommendation. Cf. Green v. Johnson, 977
F.2d 1383, 1388-91 (10th Cir.1992) (remanding case to district court for factual
development of issues raised in pro se supplemental brief).3
13
C. Equal Protection
14
Mr. Brown also asserts that he is being denied the equal protection of the laws
because some prisoners receive estrogen treatment.4 In this case, the district
court observed that transsexuals are not a protected class and dismissed Mr.
Brown's equal protection claim.
15
The Ninth Circuit has held that transsexuals are not a protected class. Holloway
v. Arthur Andersen & Co., 566 F.2d 659, 663 (9th Cir.1977). In Holloway, the
court reasoned that transsexuality did not meet the traditional indicia of a
suspect classification because transsexuals are not a discrete and insular
minority, and because the plaintiff did not establish that " 'transsexuality is an
immutable characteristic determined solely by the accident of birth' like race, or
national origin." Id. (quoting Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677, 686, 93
S.Ct. 1764, 1770, 36 L.Ed.2d 583 (1973)). A number of courts have adopted
the Holloway court's holding. See, e.g., Doe v. Alexander, 510 F.Supp. 900,
904 (D.Minn.1981); Russell J. Davis, Annotation, Refusal to Hire, or Dismissal
from Employment, on Account of Plaintiff's Sexual Lifestyle or Sexual
Preference as Violation of Federal Constitution or Federal Civil Rights Statutes,
42 A.L.R.Fed. 189, Sec. 5 (1979) (collecting transsexual prisoner cases).
16
18
A perplexing situation is presented when the rational basis standard meets the
standard applied to a dismissal under Fed R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6). The rational basis
standard requires the government to win if any set of facts reasonably may be
conceived to justify its classification; the Rule 12(b)(6) standard requires the
plaintiff to prevail if "relief could be granted under any set of facts that could be
proved consistent with the allegations." Hishon v. King & Spalding, 467 U.S.
69, 73, 104 S.Ct. 2229, 2232-33, 81 L.Ed.2d 59 (1984). The rational basis
standard, of course, cannot defeat the plaintiff's benefit of the broad Rule 12(b)
(6) standard. The latter standard is procedural, and simply allows the plaintiff
to progress beyond the pleadings and obtain discovery, while the rational basis
standard is the substantive burden that the plaintiff will ultimately have to meet
to prevail on an equal protection claim.
19
Id. at 459-60. The court then adopted a hybrid approach to reconcile the
standards, holding that a plaintiff pursuing an equal protection claim must
allege facts sufficient to overcome a presumption of government rationality.
20
While we therefore must take as true all of the complaint's allegations and
reasonable inferences that follow, we apply the resulting "facts" in light of the
deferential rational basis standard. To survive a motion to dismiss for failure to
state a claim, a plaintiff must allege facts sufficient to overcome the
presumption of rationality that applies to government classifications.
Id. at 460. Finally, the Wroblewski court reviewed possible government
21
22
23
We REVERSE and REMAND this matter to the district court for proceedings
consistent with this opinion regarding Mr. Brown's Eighth Amendment claim,
but AFFIRM the decision of the district court regarding Mr. Brown's equal
protection claim.
After examining the briefs and appellate record, this panel has determined
unanimously that oral argument would not materially assist the determination
of this appeal. See Fed.R.App.P. 34(a); 10th Cir.R. 34.1.9. The case therefore is
ordered submitted without oral argument
The documents that defendants attached to their motion to dismiss suggest that
Colorado provides hormones to prisoners with low hormone levels and that the
state will therefore give estrogen to postoperative transsexuals who suffer from
a hormone imbalance. However, as we have noted, we review Mr. Brown's
claim under the Rule 12 standard, referring only to his complaint