CITY OF PHILADELPHIA

LAW DEPARTMENT
ONE PARKWAY BUILDING
1515 ARCH STREET
PHILADELPHIA, PA 19102
Sozi Pedro Tulante
City Solicitor
Russell T. Crotts
Assistant City Solicitor
(215) 683-5403 (Tel.)
(215) 683-5069 (fax)
russell.crotts@phila.gov

July 5, 2016
VIA ELECTRONIC MAIL
Mark Dent
30 S. 15th Street, 15th Floor
Philadelphia, PA 19102
mark@billypenn.com
Re:

Dent CP 2016-0550

Dear Mr. Dent:

Thank you for writing to the City of Philadelphia (the City) with your request for information
pursuant to the Pennsylvania Right-To-Know Law, 65 P.S. 67.101 et seq., (the Act or RTKL).
On April 21, 2016, the City received your request for [r]ecords of all out-of-state travel made
by city employees from 2004 to present day, with information featuring the destination of the travel,
the employee(s) involved and the purpose of the travel.
On April 28, 2016, the City informed you it would require up to an additional thirty (30) days
to respond to your request. You granted the City additional extensions until July 5, 2016. This
correspondence constitutes the Citys response to your request.
Your request is denied.
At the outset, your request for records of all out-of-state travel, concerning City employees
for a sixteen (16) year time period is not sufficiently specific to enable the City to determine
specifically what records are being requested. The Act requires, among other things, that a written
request identify or describe the records sought with sufficient specificity to enable the agency to
ascertain which records are being requested . . . . 65 P.S. 67.703.1 The requirement of specificity is
necessary to (1) ensure that a requestor provides enough information so that an agency can determine
whether to grant or deny the request[;] Nanayakkara v. Casella, 681 A.2d 857, 859-60 (Pa. Commw.
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This language is identical to sufficient specificity requirement in 2(c) of the prior Right-to-Know Law, 65 P.S. 66.1, et
seq. Accordingly, the case law interpreting this language in the context of the old Right-to-Know Law remains binding.
Dep't of Conservation & Natural Res. v. Office of Open Records, 1 A.3d 929, 940-41 (Pa. Commw. 2010) (interpreting
language in the new Act by relying on prior precedent holding that [t]he language in the two definitions is virtually
identical. Faced with a prior judicial interpretation . . . .by . . . the Pennsylvania Supreme Court of the
account/voucher/contract language in the RTKL, even though issued in the context of the Old Law, we are not at liberty
here to ascribe a different meaning to the same language.).

1996), and (2) to prevent agencies from suffering undue interference and obstruction of their daily
functions; . . . [which] would be unavoidable if agency officials always could be subjected to broad and
unlimited requests for documents and records. Mooney v. Temple Univ. of the Commonwealth Sys. Of
Higher Educ. Bd. Of Trustees, 292 A.2d 395, 397 n.8 (Pa. 1972) (requests for inspection [must] be
specific and particular seeking disclosure of named documents or records rather than broad and
unlimited requests for undefined bodies of documents or records); see also, e.g., Arduino v. Borough
of Dunmore, 720 A.2d 827, 831 (Pa. Commw. 1998) (holding that a request for all records related to
the disbursement of the funds for [certain] public projects lacked sufficient specificity), appeal
denied, 741 A.2d 195 (Pa. 1992); Hunt. v. Pa. Dept of Corr., 698 A.2d 147, 149 (Pa. Commw. 1997)
(holding that requests, including a request for all documents given by Department of Corrections to
inmate and by inmate to Department, lacked sufficient specificity).
Pennsylvania courts have compared such broad, sweeping requests to discovery-type requests
which, while potentially proper in the context of civil litigation, are improper under the Act. Berman
v. Pa. Convention Ctr. Auth., 901 A.2d 1085, 1089 (Pa. Commw. 2006) (holding that request for
[t]he most recent plans, construction, and design documents relating to the convention center
expansion was more in the nature of a discovery request than a proper request for public records);
Associated Builders and Contractors, Inc. v. Pa. Dept of Gen Servs., 747 A.2d 962, 965-66 (Pa.
Commw. 2000) (holding that requests akin to document requests under the civil discovery rules, i.e.,
any and all documents relating to [subject matter] lack sufficient specificity); accord Pa. State
Police v. Office of Open Records, 995 A.2d. 515, 517 (Pa. Commw. 2010) (The portion of the request
seeking any and all records, files or communications [concerning subject matter] is insufficiently
specific for the PSP to respond to the request.); Pa. Hous. Fin. Agency v. Ali, 43 A.3d 532 (Pa.
Commw. 2012) (finding request for all correspondence regarding a subject insufficiently specific).
Such broad requests have been, and will be, denied.
It would place an unreasonable burden on the City to go through all of its records for an
extended period of time without knowing, with sufficient specificity, what records would be
responsive. Cf. Mollick v. Twp. of Worcester, 32 A.3d 859, 871 (Pa. Commw. 2011) (holding that
requests seeking emails between certain agency officials and employees for the past one and five years
without sufficiently identifying the subject matter were insufficiently specific, and concluding that it
would place an unreasonable burden on an agency to examine all its emails for an extended time
period without knowing, with sufficient specificity, what Township business or activity the request is
related [to].).
As your request is insufficiently specific, the City is unable to assert all applicable grounds of
denial and reserves the right to do so if your request is construed as seeking specific records after a
review of such records. Subject to, and without waiving the foregoing objections, your request could
encompass various exempt records and it is specifically denied to the extent that you seek:

Personal identification information exempt from disclosure pursuant to 65 P.S.

67.708(b)(6) including (but not limited to) cell phone numbers, personal telephone
numbers, personal email addresses, and federal tax identification numbers, social security
numbers, bank account numbers, credit card numbers. Personal telephone numbers and
email addresses are exempt from disclosure if they are unique to a particular individual or
which may be used to identify or isolate an individual from the general population,
including government-issued telephone numbers and email addresses. Off. of Lt. Gov. v.
Mohn, 67 A.3d 123, 133 (Pa. Commw. 2013) (exempting agency-issued email addresses as
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personal identifying information); Off. of the Gov. v. Raffle, 65 A.3d 1105, 1111 (Pa.
Commw. 2013) (exempting government-issued personal cellular telephone numbers as
personal identifying information).

Confidential tax information or other financial documents prohibited and/or exempt from
disclosure. 26 U.S.C. 6103, 7213 (establishing the confidentiality of federal tax return
information); 53 Pa. C.S.A. 8921 (prohibiting and penalizing the release of any
confidential tax information gathered by a city of the first class); Revenue Department
Regulations 307 (designating [a]ny information gained by the Commissioner of Revenue
or any other official or agent of the City as a result of any returns, investigations, hearings,
or verifications required or authorized under the Code as confidential); the Phila. Code
19-506(2) (designating [a]ny information obtained by the [Revenue] Department in the
conduct of any examination or investigation as confidential).

The home addresses of individuals. Under 65 P.S. 67.708(b)(1)(ii)of the Act, a request for
a record that would be reasonably likely to result in a substantial and demonstrable risk of
physical harm to or the personal security of an individual may be denied. See also 65 P.S.
67.708 (b)(6)(i)(A); 65 Pa.C.S. 67.708(c); 65 Pa.C.S. 67.101 (defining personal
financial information to include other information relating to an individuals personal
finances); cf. Dep't of Conservation & Natural Res. v. Office of Open Records, 1 A.3d 929,
931-942 (Pa. Commw. 2010).
Furthermore, the Supreme Court and several Circuit Courts have identified that a privacy
interest in ones home address exists. In Paul P. v. Verniero, the Third Circuit held that
home addresses are entitled to some privacy protection, whether or not so required by a
statute. 170 F.3d 396, 404 (3d Cir. 1999). The Paul P. court concluded that because
[t]here is some nontrivial [privacy] interest in ones home address by persons who do not
wish it disclosed, we must engage in the balancing inquiry repeatedly held appropriate in
privacy cases. Id. (emphasis in original). In the context of the Federal Freedom of
Information Act, the D.C. Circuit explained, If one does not want one's residence to be
known, the importance of its being unknown seems to go to the core of privacy. Federal
Labor Relations Authority v. U.S. Department of Defense, 977 F.2d 545, 549 (11th Cir.
1992). Though disclosure of a home address, without any further disclosure of personal
information, may constitute only a de minimis invasion of privacy, the invasion of privacy
becomes significant when the personal information is linked to the resident of that address.
U.S. Department of State v. Ray, 502 U.S. 164, 176 (1991); see NARFE v. Horner, 879 F.2d
873, 876 (D.C. Cir. 1989) (The privacy interest becomes more significant ... when names
and addresses are combined with [ ] financial information.).
The U.S. Supreme Court recognized that the purpose of an open records act is not fostered
by disclosure of information about private citizens that is accumulated in various
governmental files but that reveals little or nothing about an agency's own conduct. U.S.
Department of Justice v. Reporters Committee for Freedom of the Press, 489 U.S. 749,
772 (1989). Likewise, the City believes that its employees privacy interest in their home
addresses outweighs any public interest in the disclosure of those addresses, particularly
because the publics knowledge of those home addresses hardly furthers the objective of
the RTKL[:] . . . []to empower citizens by affording them access to information concerning
the activities of their government. Levy v. Senate of Pa., 65 A.3d 361, 381 (Pa. 2013)
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(quoting SWB Yankees LLC v. Wintermantel, 45 A.3d 1029, 1042 (Pa. 2012)). The public
does not glean information concerning the activities of the City through the disclosure of
the locations where the Citys public servants eat, sleep, and raise their children. See Pa.
State Ed. Assoc. v. Cmwlth. of Pa., 981 A.2d 383, 386 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 2009) (recognizing
that it is . . . generally accepted that a person has a privacy interest in his or her home
address . . . [and that] the disclosure of . . . home addresses[] reveals little, if anything,
about the workings of government.).

Records the disclosure of which would be reasonably likely to result in a substantial and
demonstrable risk of physical harm to or the personal security of an individual pursuant to
65 P.S. 67.708(b)(1)(ii).

Should you wish to contest any part of this decision you may file an appeal with the Office of
Open Records as provided for in 65 P.S. 67.1101. You have 15 business days from the mailing date
of this response to challenge the Citys response. Please direct any appeal to the Office of Open
Records, Commonwealth Keystone Building, 400 North Street, 4th Floor, Harrisburg, PA 17120-0225
and copy the undersigned Open Records Officer.
Please be advised that this correspondence will serve to close this record with our office as
permitted by law.
Respectfully,

Russell T. Crotts
Assistant City Solicitor
CC:

Beth Wetzel, ORO, Finance