Beruflich Dokumente
Kultur Dokumente
3d 492
NOTICE: Although citation of unpublished opinions remains unfavored,
unpublished opinions may now be cited if the opinion has persuasive value on a
material issue, and a copy is attached to the citing document or, if cited in oral
argument, copies are furnished to the Court and all parties. See General Order of
November 29, 1993, suspending 10th Cir. Rule 36.3 until December 31, 1995, or
further order.
We agree with, and thus affirm, the district court's granting of summary
judgment. We therefore conclude the remaining issues are moot. The parties
are well acquainted with the facts; thus, they will not be restated except when
necessary to elucidate our conclusions.
Making two separate arguments, Mr. Finley challenges the district court's
determination that he lacks standing to recover damages. Mr. Finley argues the
actual date of the 1989 Agreement was November 15, 1989. He claims the final
terms of the contract between ARCO and ARKLA were not resolved until
November and the parties agreed to make the contract effective retroactive to
February 1, 1989, to the detriment of himself and other third parties. If the
actual date of the agreement was November 15, Mr. Finley argues, as an owner
since March 1, he would have standing to sue.
Mr. Finley also maintains he has standing because his claims against ARCO
were not based simply on a price reduction resulting from the 1989 Agreement,
but also on ARCO's "marketing activities" during his ownership of the
minerals. Mr. Finley asserts ARCO's ongoing breach of an express and implied
lease obligation and its ongoing breach of fiduciary duty represent actual injury
for standing purposes. Mr. Finley claims the district court's determination that
ARCO does not owe a fiduciary duty to him is error under Oklahoma law. We
review the district court's granting of ARCO's Motion for Summary Judgment
de novo. Missouri Pacific R.R. v. Kansas Gas & Elec. Co., 862 F.2d 796, 798
(10th Cir1988).
The district court concluded Mr. Finley has no standing because he did not
acquire his interest until March 1, 1989, after the February 1, 1989 effective
date of the settlement agreement. He did not sustain any actual or threatened
injury because the price and royalty proportion for gas was set before Mr.
Finley acquired his interest in March 1989.
the letter because the letter obligated ARKLA to purchase gas commencing
February 1. The Letter Agreement announces: "This Letter of Intent
memorializes our agreement to certain Settlement Principles in resolution of the
above referenced lawsuits, and expresses our joint commitment to develop
documents incorporating such settlement Principles."
8
Although the 1989 Agreement was not completed until November 15, 1989, the
Settlement Principles reflected in the final document, including purchase price
and period of purchase obligation, remained unchanged. Additional terms were
collateral or immaterial matters which did not affect the formation of a contract.
Mr. Finley argues ARCO and ARKLA made their November 15, 1989
Agreement retroactive by backdating its effective date. He cites Debrecini v.
The Outlet Co., 784 F.2d 13 (1st Cir.1986), for the premise that the legal
fiction of retroactivity should not be applied to affect adversely the rights of
third persons. The premise is sound, but the rule does not apply to these facts.
10
11
In his response to ARCO's summary judgment motion, Mr. Finley argued for
the first time that his claim was based on ARCO's general "marketing
activities" and an ongoing breach of obligation, as well as on the 1989
Agreement. However, virtually every assertion in his complaint is tied to the
1989 Agreement. Mr. Finley alleges in his amended complaint:
13
The district court noted "[n]owhere in his complaint, response brief, or attached
affidavit does Finley attempt to present any evidentiary support for his
contention that his claims against ARCO are based on ARCO's marketing
activities' during his ownership of his minerals." As a result, the district court
concluded Mr. Finley's claims were "inextricably intertwined with, and wholly
dependent upon, the 1989 settlement agreement." Reviewing the complaint
documents, we see nothing to contradict the district court's finding.
14
Mr. Finley claims that by basing his complaint on "ARCO's structuring and
implementation of the Settlement Agreement," somehow the word
"implementation" encompasses the ongoing breach of his entitlement to proper
marketing efforts. He cites Indian Territory Illuminating Oil Co. v. Rosamond,
190 Okla. 46, 120 P.2d 349 (1941), as precedent for a lessee's right to sue for
breach of an implied covenant of a gas lease when the breach is ongoing and
unresolved.
15
16
Mr. Finley's lack of standing renders his remaining issues moot. We note
especially, however, although Mr. Finley challenges the district court's denial
of class certification, it is fundamental if he does not have standing to sue
ARCO based on his amended complaint he cannot represent an injured class.
"It is axiomatic that an uninjured plaintiff cannot bring suit on behalf of an
injured class." Milonas v. Williams, 691 F.2d 931, 937 (10th Cir.1982), cert.
denied, 460 U.S. 1069 (1983).
17
AFFIRMED.
This order and judgment is not binding precedent, except under the doctrines of
law of the case, res judicata, and collateral estoppel. The court generally
disfavors the citation of orders and judgments; nevertheless, an order and
judgment may be cited under the terms and conditions of 10th Cir. R. 36.3