On the Gift A Discussion between Jacques Derrida and Jean-Luc Marion Moderated by Richard Kearney Introductory Remarks ‘Michael Scanlon. Villanova University is an Augustinian University, and { know the affection that Jacques Dertida has for Augustine. So, by way off trodacing this aftemoon’s roundtable, I want to say just a word on Augustine and the gif. One of Augustine's favorit word forthe Sprit, the Holy Spirt, the Spirit of God, the Spirit of Cris, is God's Gif, the donum De. Augustine Pats itvery nicely, “God gives us many gifts, but Deus ext qui Deum dat” (“God 's He Who gives God’). ‘The highest gift of God, the gift of God that we cal {ursalvaton, is nothing less than God. eave this to the profundity of Jacques Derrida. I thank al of you, participants and audience alike, for being here ‘Richard Keame. Itisa great honor to be here among you allan in par ticular between Jacques Derrida and Jean-Luc Marion. It somewhat stg ) flsen ebb aps lg dei Renta Z/ | problematic to me. The way Heidegger refers f the Gabe in the es gibt is S77 | stint fom intuitive Gegebeneit. When Huse says Gegebenhet and #27" p | when phenomenologiss in the broad sense say Gegebenhei, something is "given, they refer simply tothe pasivity of intuition. Something i there. We (have, we meet something. tis there, but its not a gif So, one of my fst | sion mule Are yeaubozedtgodecy fom ibe penance cal concept of Gegebenfei,giver-nes, tothe problem of the gift that we are ‘aboutto discus? Now, what wll make the discussion interesting and dificult at the same time, and [hope endless, has to do, not with this disagreement between us, but with a sort of chasms, Etat dang is a powerful book with a beautiful ile, Jean-Lue Marion has genius for tiles. Diew sans Ure was a tour de force asa title. Tam not sure that the English translation God without Being docs justice to what I find very interesting in the title, thats, not only Ged “without Being” but aso God “without being God.” Here we addtess the aueston ofthe name, of the name God. We will come upon this question again along our way. Donum de. Iwill come back to this question. I am terested in Christin theology, ofcourse although Tam totally incompetent But know that isthe pojtthate pcos Whalisin Coane? We acca dco aga ne we tated odothis “ast night. Whats the eaves, if ty to Maize it after having read this powerful book, within the tle, which is more easily translated into English, Being Given? Is that correct? Etant donné:I want to praise what is beautiful in 8 De Suney q. bo pak m sft 7 Mera — On the Gift this tie: Being as Being Given. 1 came here to praise Jeanne Marion's fg Batten her iinet gftand genom eng nay.) ‘We will come back to this. The ehiastus that I found inthis book would be this, schematically summarized: Jean-L.ue srmmarized in ave enan ea Jelasagithivrentomeed |S Foe la of on exchenge endidashored ava gif As son-es iedonee | 1 already than the donator, and cancels the onscious of giving, he himself thanks himself and again | ircle cancel the giftby e-inscribing it into a circle nomic io reconstitute my text here and insist on what looks like an impossibility: for the gift to appear as such while remaining a gift, to appear as such on the side }] Sua iil dc ad catbouacef clan etter and beimpecta: | gf? Vo frapite spn beabeagaricingptenSoldsacae eit | NCP way recon n esas that all these alleged objections or obstacles that lam sup ‘posed to have built agains the gi, farfrom blocking the way, o to speak, far from preventing us from having access to the gift or a phenomenology of the sift, in fact, are a sort of springboard for what you try to do as a phenomen- logit So, upto that point, we agree. Where we disagree, fwe do disagree isthat after ths stage, Jean-Lue saysthat I have problematized the giftin the horizon of economy,.of ontology and economy, in the circle of exchange, the way | larcel Mayst has done, and we Have to OMT this bovizon of cexchang and ecofoniy. Here, of cou Saree tay to} oppoyte Ted to precisely displace the probTenmticaf the gi, fo take it out efftle of economy, of exchange, but not to conclude, from the impossi- | fp bilty forthe giftoappearassuch and tobe determined as such, tits absolute Fair ile ee eeaiaee oe earn, ito appear as such. So the git does Hot exstax such, By existence we [| ¢- idee being present and MMuiively Went arsich, Soe gitdoes [FO 7 4 sok exst and appear as such; iti tmporble Tor We gifto exist and appear as | | such, But never concluded that there isn gif Lwentontosaythatfthere |} cng. ieagi. hough His Ipobiiy tat Be ee experenceof is impos Y ity, and it should appeat as impossible. The event called gift is totally hetero- geneous to theorlealsdentction, t phenomenological weniicaion ) 237 ‘Thats point ofGisagreement. The gifts totaly foreign to the horizon of cgénomy, ontology, Knowledge, constantive tatements;and Uicoreticaldeter- B mi judgment, But in doing so, [didnot intend to simply give up the © taskofaccounting for the gift, for what one ift, not only in economy bt ven in Christian dscouneftT THC fiyethowthecconomyat | ‘work, the economic axiomatic at work, arsomaChristian texts, So I ty to ¢ account for this ane to say that this soalled circle-thiseconomic circle, in. ne 9 pork Se GF kiuet Macon D Apfel ) Gabe> 1) Vee ose gepebent thee 4 Gir ayand ae.Richard Kearney ots to rutin order tobe pt in motion, mt corespond toa mye ‘ment, a motion, a desire—whatever the name-a thought ofthe gif, whi ‘ouldnot chased bysphoamenolga determin ye tae cal determination, bya scientific determination, by an economy. [would like this discussion not to be disagreement, and not to be too easily consensual, of course, but not to be polemical. I would like us to try to find some new opening. I would it what this question of the gift compels us tod, perhaps, is lewlgplacing, the famous distinction that Kant i enim for instance. The gift, I would claim, I wil copia wey ight of. We can : eed But there arclationtothegiftbevend the cirle, the econdne circle, and beyond the theoretical and phenonenclogt “cal determination Its this thinking, this exces, which interests mets hes j Seep cick noma yer canny iy ste exchange in Marcel Maur sense? Why are there return gis with delay? ‘Where does this circle come from? I never said—that isa mrp) whid ns all the me in France-) IP Thisisvery well described in Robiuon Crusoe, wher he ids something ar the ced ce the beach stool, oP MERE, srpcthing Hike that Heiko ‘Hive isthat given or not Isthere any gveratallormere goodluck? And. “Z,, tothat question, there isnoplainansver Butthequetionhasfistioberased ) g Sd dis the important pant. tis within the horizon of such absences that_/ the ponible phenomenon ofthe gift may appear, it appears. So, ofcourse, | =a ply that there a ge But it ) implies that we may ekthat question, Isthere a giver? which alreadyopensus intothe horizon of givenness, We could eaily inTother examples = ering ght pot the most kn ny pon: WE candasribeagit ina ituaton where nothing nothing, given Becauseiwe | ae tear tao eS TF ifewheh ye give dem, properly and sticiapesking we pveqo tnt | <3, Trane th: When Sonchoy pe taniorencech oben sident | gyn tn as agate resent oft United Ses of Aeris he | feceWed anything? No, nothing, exept perp or a shee of paper, a hand- tdinke) or the veceet musaber ne romeainary eis | = Keamey. Could intervene for justa momenton this, because we've only | got about an hour ef. Youve given a umber of examples, and very useful ‘ones, President Clinton, Robinson Grusoe, the Scriptures. But I would like to | Suggest that in yout analysis ofthe phenomenclgy of the gift ax donation, there isa privileged example, a “highest” example, of te sarated phenom. ‘enon, and that szexelaton. > 4 J, Meio stall answer yo. ded hink at ti poible te _ SS des hesizonof the pheporténology ofgivenness, what wouldeall 1 ~ igure of revelation, which makes sense gp TST SHI, oT CiissPbur Aho any kind of revelation, ifthere are other tlaims to revelatn.—can acquire phenomenological statu and match other kinds of phenomena, In that precise sens, the distinction between the field of philosophy and the field of thology, th limits” between them in the mean- ings of Kant and Fiche coutd be bridged to some extent Let us goon, using Le Te TRE gTEaeS eas pha someting eh | Now this remains tra, net oni ia daly Tie, bot inthe moet important and | neaningfulexperiencesofhuman life Weknow that, tosome extent ifthe gift realy unique, makes a teal difference, cannot be repeated, then in such a ase the glftdos not appear as something that could shift fom one owe to Shother owner Each genuine gift happens withoutany objective counterpart. ‘When we give ourselves, our life, “when we give our word, not only ve ot a 9 PEW ga ioe ofthe rave comm such ay tates | ‘lenomenological rules appear. For instance, the gifror the given phenom? “Grom Rar entgy and Woes not need any Itwould sound absurd to ask chat ages dt ot eed 8 hreee PI —y isthe cause ofthe gif, precisely because givehnessimplies the unexpected, the nfl aie pure ge ef hoy And asthe pheno be |) pees the same git So we discover wth the gi and to let it dpa is || visibility according to its own logic, we have an experience of a kind of phe- y —— ed be described anymore as an object or asa being. Here isthe Teason why, ifTagsee wth Derida to go beyond economy, Idisagree with him on anather pints This description ofthe git can be made, butonly ina very paiticular way For we cannot make tila description, which brackets one orpethaps two ofthe socalled economical gif, if we have not previously, in foragmal ience, enacted by ourscles a gift without a receiver, oF giver, ora gift without anything given, And indeed EEL nota rel Someta Sena metic “the git by ourselves, in such a way that we Become able to describe i. Bu, J evertheless, Fihink that thi Sa aRior ee ee gift by {| Marcel Mauss. The gf, thats, the phenomenon as given, is also, L would say, {.addmenion ofthe experience ofthe world including the posit of revel — Rearitey. we could pick up on the last sentence, where Jean-Luc finally touches on the connection between the phenomenology ofthe gift and the revealed word. appreciate that one has to come a these things tangentially obliquely and piecemeal, but given the limits of time and given that this i not, strictly speaking, a phenomenology seminat on givenness but a conf ence on religion and post. ak, Jacques, that itis posible 7 Is it possible, to quote Ho havea rational thought ts mere ‘Metaphysics and Theoo ‘cannot forget withous Dera. But by asking me this question, you are recontextualizing and auton meg kar, not stat om the sentence at sentence oryourlast sentence. willy not to avid your question, but wou like to come back to something. sa akahiameicai Keeney give wp ve dai Be 34 want so fae Test gift which gives nothing is exactly something I thematized. Now, a to rrenomenology, [wil ry to answer the question. Since you agree thatthe gif, according tothe logic which i vitally at work in the name gift (I wll eome backto the name), des not imply neces the presence oa ese, the presence of a giver, o ofa given thing, then my question i ths: What would be the theme of such a phenomenology? What would phenomenological || ati dseibe if not the experience of the give, the experience ofthe || receive, the thing which is presently given, or the intention? As you know, || phenomenological analysis has as its main theme intentional experience Nowif,asone aysin English, you “economize on” the intentional experience {| ofeiving, what sf for phenomenology? Ifyou do nt have the eceer, the ees 7 donator, or the thing given, what remains forthe “as such’? Allow met quote something you have said at some point after having summarized my problem- tic. You say that what is leftist give up the economic horizon of exchange ‘order to interpret the gift part, starting from, the horizon of donation ‘sel What remains to be described, you sa, is donation, noanymore after what it rejects, but as sch, en tant que tlle. Then you ad, witha scruple that T would like you to comment upon—si une tlle en fant que tlle convient encore, if such an as such sil its. That is my question TT ology vel an ontlog sel agi 50 ifthe event ofthe git for me, excludes the presence ofthe a, such—of the giver, ofthe receiver, ofthe given thing ofthe present thing, and of the intention —then what is lft fr the “as such?” ‘That i my prob ames. Could interrupt For just a TrowTent and Then we will go on? Could I ask Jean-Luc to comment on that “as such”? ‘Marion. The answer that ofcourse you cannot desribe the git without allthree elements ofthe giftatthe same moment. In that case nothing remains at all and there is neither an as such nor any possiblity even to question sivenness. What I have emphasized is something quite dfferent—that we can at least describe a phenomenon with two ofthe elements, not with the three. ‘Thusa gift could still achieve itelfwith agit a receiver, butwithoutany giver; or, in another solution, with a giver agit, bt no receiver; or, ina third figure, with a giver, a receiver but no thing which is given. And if we know al three terms, there sno question, So what raises my interests that we can always give "pat least one ofthem and perhaps two, and nevertheless keepa genuine and thorough phenomenon. Even in the ‘the interestof sucha ‘Something which canstillbe described although itdoes notamount toan objectand nota being either. Previously youasked me the question why Thave welded th Tan tell you that I have added the as such because I was thinking exactly of you and your terrible critics. But, itwas why I have added, “ifsuch an ‘as such’ stil its givenness” Derrida. Thank you. Itisa gift Marion. The final answer could be that as the “gift” remains equivocal, thats, has two different structures, so itis possible that there could be no “as such” in that case, and itis perhaps necessary. Because ina situation which is precisely a shift within the definition ofthe phenomenon, when something is given or received without any cause, in that case, the exigencies fora phenom- tenologieal sense ofthe as such, in Heidegger’ Sein und Zeit cannot be satis- fied anymore. So I think that there is no “as such” in our case But it is not so easy to each a place which you can describe as free of any “a such. Derrida. OF course. That is exactly my problem. I think what you de- seribe “Marion. There is no “as such” ina structure which is by definition open, not closed, which admits no cause, no repetition, and so on, which cannot appear but as an event. As the late Frangois Furet sid, en passant, where he roe " yostoned cont” Wah Coue ‘On the GiteRichard Kearney \e described the tating moment of thf World War | by this absolutely mag nificent statement, “lus un énement est ourd de comséquenees, moin ile posable dele penser. paride cause” | woulda that even ay srt of ‘pirical exetiever his any exchusive sufficient cause. [think that when we reach The fersitory, would say, of the given phenomenon, described nat according to the method of economy, but according the ese lack ofone ‘orpeshapstwoofthethtce terms a that moment wehavealiead gone within the horizon where the eventwthout cause, where something. appears insofar aitisgien,asitghves ital Derrida. The gueston swhetheryou can describe the event iselfassuch phenomenclgicaly You say itis not es to teach, ‘That is what Lam saving Teis not eas o think the gift and to dseribe the gif, But what you deseribe phenomenological, when, even ithere a giver without areeiver at the fame time and so on, what you are describing under the authority ofthe phenomenological ae such, precisely the proces ofthe destruction f the ait Marion. 1 do not recognize the “as such" 2 precisely in that horizon thatthe question ofthe cat othe “as suck to rght tobe made Derrida Then would you dissociate what you call phenomenology fom the authority ofthe as such? you do that it would e the fst hetesy in phenomenology. Phenomenology without sucht "Marion. Not ny fs ol Ts to Levinas some yeas ag that in at the last step fora eal phenomenology would be to give up the concept of horizon. Levinas answered me immediatly. "Without horizon there is no phenome enology And boldly assume he Was wrong Derida, 1 atm ako forthe suspension of the horizon, but, for that very reason by yng so, lm nota phenomenologt anymore: [am very te phenomenology, butwhen Lagreonthenecesityofsuspending the horizon, then ammo longera phenomenologistSothe problem remains you give up the as such, whale the ute that you can make ofthe word phenomenology? Thatisthe problem forme. [woud ie not to forget Richard's question about retlatigh. [want to speak not about what am dong but about what you are dingy hypothesis concerns the fac that you wo red the word Coge enhet with gif, with the meaning ogi and thishas todo with wll not call his theological or religous-the deepest ambition of yur thought For you, eventhing that given inthe phenomenological sense, gegebon don, Gegebereit, everyting tht ls given tous in perception, in memory, ina phenomenological pereption, i Ginaly a gi toa ite ercature, and iis nally agit of God, That isthe condition for you to redefine Gegebeneit as 3 Hi. This a lea, hypothesis anda question to you. The eg of Eant Gon, fal, to me i to reinterpret as 2 git everything that» phenome ologist—or anyone, ascentst-sip igen isa gen, afc, something that we meetin pereption, given to my inition. I pereive this tia given. T Os ciltnk Smog 9 tne velhins eynations : 4 Heseh F) sais Bs Meferal Gee h= = . On the Git Biot ode thi 1 i ot rete hi, which wht Kant wuld al Nan erro The is jer ioe notorat object trees receptively. Receptivty 3 Tnetpreted as precisely the situation ofthe created || Se ree hickeccnes ching ine words someting ee ee ok conden rice eatension that wef Gegebenheit and of the category of thegliTastone more thing. | would lke to come back at some porto ‘question of the event, and the reason why I am interested in the gift. He i irre We eed et fants inthe Western lexicon, WeStem culture, in Laas in. cations and so on. ees Gin ace tak acesel ss hemp (eo Se ane cee a eveLen ce erro oie ace ta aires naar oe He ee Tia Be sear ie ok ind he eet tenets yin Sine Te adores fo account for, to eRe The kegel armel meng pam ae ef pond feat cl Mor te getnlos a Sse we eu tlerglige he plac ofthe aking place, hich fer iui nett sey cee eadafe SatereT dehy ast taf iaethouendfow nrg step SE ee ia ace koa Ws wa tect Shih docsotgitehlacho wha aes place, there would not be this expo Uihay movement or desire for giving. for teething, for appropriating) Fae spsenaten Wat ay lin iti Ferran bitsy ak to pace of tay Ce a eapppisionct sop g wetie Gao aban pa teenseisaquetin of eno ‘Bae tea jueston ofthe Game, tic nourhGode gi anda aytion of what _happetts{ would sayin Frencli- drive, comes, aves, happy wil ‘what you said about the happening, the event, but at son ae although | agree with the fact that the event must be unique oe as well as that the fot be elation, against religion ‘ofthe space ofthe Bhar, omer, the newcomer must be unique, singular, and son, Lam not sure that Toul subseribe to what you sid about what sh peated. Lwould associate the singularity ofthe gift as an event wi the necesity frit or the promise for it to be repeated, When I give sfething to someone, in the Elassical semantic of the git—beit money, a Sword already promise to confirm ito peat it, even if do no repeat it ‘The repetition part ofthe singularity. Phat is what makes the event, the | structure dTthe event, eo dificult to deste, because its atthe same time ABvolutely singular and unique while cfrrying in ise the promise of tepei | fon, Ii in tis promise that al the faestions we are discussing ge Sriph- red fo, ore it simply a promise orRichard Kearney On the Gift Keamey. Would you not say, Jean-Luc, that you Jacques Derrida on the route to the khora? 2 “Marion. On the lst pat no seca. Not onthe pit ofthe event pe se, but the reaionhip tween the event and revelation, Jacques seems to go towards the Hheren {You seem to go towards revelation, . beatae Marion. Not necessarily. I disagree with his interpretation of wha supposed tsi about the relation of gitandgennese This is pont when wv realy disagree. As Derrida said, hei not interested inthe gilt sul bot in the profound structure of something which fom time etme may oe tnamed the gift and appears as possible. On the contrary. I say that ne hore go back from the ito gives, and there sich away reach Bk fo be brief, the event is unique and cannot be repeated, and for Dersida its unique, but has to be repeated. L agree. It has tobe repeated, of eouse eg instance give my word have to repestitand go on bet Leanna repeat toe identi act the repetition is never identi st reer to Kiethegur Heidegger or even Deleuze. As tothe question of whether what Lam doing, or wat Dera doing iswithin phenomenologyor been tds otce tome very important. Let me just quote here fants sentence of Hexlesey ‘We are not interested in phenomenology, bt inthe things phe aaa is interested in.” Whether Etat donne issill phenomenolagy we shlloce to, ear ltr: But now isnot very important. lain tat Lam tl ithe Phenomenology and I guessthatyou are moe inside the Feld of phenom ene ‘gy than you admit, But this wll bean issue, if any, for out suceesone hn httmey tis easier to get Unionists and Nationalists in Ue tot bout peace than itsto get yon two otal about Gd! We have les ha half 42 how le. want put a saight question to you bh. think that ee ines af he phromenolog of ens afte eben re be crucial and indispensable, and it isa great privilege for ust hear you addreg them. know that they are basic work for gettingon to higher things But | west tors you pile now owards those “higher things" and puns the lating {hp etweda gt ld res which you touched on Jeeta ute cone sion to our talkthe other night on negative theology. In the lat paseo g tht tall yom poke about (La dfernce between decansnachon ayo | view of negative theology and (2) “third way” that i opens up: One ofthe hase that you used was, “ifthe is nota intuitonafgraceorel revelation of some kind, if there is not an inttion of this exemplary hyperesental stated phenomenon, then there nodiferencebetwen nepal and deconstruction.” You seemed be holding out for some Hed of dist between the two postions. What i it and how do you defend te: Marion. Uthink thatthe difference between negative theology in my way ofthinkingand deconstruction, at east asitiscurrently accepted which wee necessarily th ew of Deda, ith I negative theology the ie ot hat we lack intuitions concerning God (ve are overwhelmed by them), bat part company with that we lack concepts fiting God. What we share in common, Derrida and mpl is that the concepts have to be eiicized even in theology, a they are deconstructed in deconstruction. Bu tis for opposite reasons, In theology and Tam not refering now to my work on givenness—we receive an amount af experiences through prayer, lity, ile inthe community, fraternity, et ‘Thedificultyies in that we have an utmost experience without the words, the sigifeations and the concepts able to uteri to expan it and to articulate One ofthe best examples, for instance, and [do eer here to theology, may te found inthe transfiguraion of Christ The disciples witnes the rans ation and they sy nothing but “Let us make thee tabernacle, For he [Peter Few not what tosay” (Mark 95-6). The gospel emphasizes tha they sy that tecause they have nothing more to sys that io concept matching their inition, Or let us ad the example ofthe disciples on the road to Enna Tstenng to Christ explaining, in what should have ben an oustanding lesson af exegesis al the Sexiptues refering to him, but making no mention of his tamesll te while remaining anonymous. After they have recognized Ci, they sy, we remember that “our hearts burfed] within us, wile he talked with us® (Luke 24°32), That sto say, the expetience was so intense tha they were overwhelmed and that no concept could grasp anything ofthat exper ence. ln philosophical language, thee was an exces of intuition over the concept or the signification, So, we have deconsticon Mat ses; that he tis fisdamental concepts of theology before Chrst—Son of God, Messi- ah, laiah, Elijah the prophet, and so onal these concepts which neverthe- tes remain meaningful for ws in theology now, were rejected as meaningles, not because they wet ttcized as such, but because they were devaluated by the exces of intuition, This is the very special situation in the socalled ne- ative theology. Ths is also the reason why tis not a god choice of words to deseribe it “negtive theology” as it seems nnich more an excesively po itv theology, Canepa negative and bythe nay, pat out of ply ony be caus they do not match the excess of inion. "This isthe season why in {eolog, in act, pluralism is implied in the very notion of revelation, there isa rel revelation, no concept could achieve to say and to make intelligible ints own way the exces of intuition, Pluralism is implied a the inner core of revelation, There are four gospels and ai innit nnmberofspiritualities wit the sre experience ofthe Church, T conclude that deconstruction and the so-called negative theology have something very mich in common, thats the fact that no concept sabe to give us the presence of what iat tke, and that presence not only i impossible but eanmot be claimed, If thexe.cauld @) beany revelation, I would say that no heart, no mind, and no word would be do as Hatreer- Fhe pesener any reel remains impossible in our world. That is the reason why Christ has to again—because now we could not réccive im yet, nor have enough room for him Jobo 1:10-11). So let us sum it up: Deconstruction and mystical theology—I definitly | I regret BeseeyGee ony lt pee G gS be) Richard Kearney prefer to speak of mystical theology rather than of negative theology—share the same convictioi that we have no concept, therefore that we never reach such a thing asthe presence of meaning, of signification, of science. But in tnystical theology, this fails always by an exeess. Ido not want to claim that [ina stn we phone SpPEAF aT Riven, that is, withouPany Venus orgies When they appear to usas given, ofcourse, we have to ecelve » them, but this does mot imply that we should claim God asthe cause of what we rgeeiré: Nofice that philosophy and phenomenology we have already theexperience that subjectvneg not the actor, but the receiver, so tat sch an original pasivity of subjectivity isa way, think radical way,todeconstruct thetranscendental ambition ofthe eg. So, I suggest that my proposal remains merch; philosophical and without any theological presupposition or bias here ‘On the coniray, any Theologica bias and seonid thought would ruin n project and itis perhaps that some do their best to put by force such bias into tny work [think the dificult for phenomenology now isto become more fair tosome phenomena which cannot be described either as objector as being Weal try to make sense out of those phenomena—the gif, the Bora, the athe, the Resh and others that we cannot describe either as an objeet or as thes @ choc So, my hypothesis as 2 phenomenolgi i that we should ott to ong them. bat age them in any sense of accepts given and that is all. ea Kearney Jaques. do you think that brings Jear-Late Marion elsertoyour position or htet away? Dera. Itisificaltformeto understand howto describe something not asanobjectesh something oes hana abject and to lain thot eae sti doing phenomenology, What as intetstd in with this prablem of the gif mong eer things was precisely to check the limit and possbiliy of phe amenology 1s dieu rie to understand how an exces inttion can be dscribed phenomenological deconstruction ldo net wanttowsethis isord and to speak 25 if were speaking deconsticion is inferested in the intuition, ofphenomenaiy offllnes, af more than fllnes, The ences the Suck inhich Lem intrested, notanexcessofintition, When you sy fovinstance protesting agitst ny pio hypothesis about the reason hy you interpret everything, every Cegbenhet a it Marion Frey ats Geshenhet Derida. You sid the itmanentsraetureof phenom heit "There ate to hypotheses. Either you equate Geseber then thats my hypothesis serthing ica gia git fom C tver_Oryou dioeiate or mark gap between a Gegeenei and agit then you cat taser your point on Gegebeneitf the probly af ai But you say the immanent stmcture of phenomenality is Cegebenheit, and iE Gers meting sot then even Tomenon isagit, Even you do not determine the giver as God, itis a gift. Fatonotsurethat iss econlable or congruent with shat Tw det name of phenomenology ye then = On the: use what I understand as phenomenology, the principle of allprncpes which you hae recaed here plies aly inion that the fullness of the intuition, the presence of “between Muition and intention, there isa ers, there sa symbolie structure. Butthe principle ofal principles is intuition. Hyon agree, a8 think you agree about the impossibility ofequating the gifttoa present, then you cannot define hing When there 3 gap i | { ‘sey phenomenanascgi That b what puzzles me Twanted to make another point referring to your book. At some point you refer to something sa, in translation, “Let uso tothe limit” Lam smiling at fame ofthe typos in yout book, in which my book Dorner edemps is trans- formed amber of tise into Perser fetes." That is interesting Allow me toquotemiysel “Lets goto thelinit The tut ofthe gift... suficesto annul the gift. The uth ofthe gift isequivalentto the non gitor the nontruth ofthe git” (Given Time, 27), "That is what Tsay, then you comment, in a long footnote: fins cae J be gRichard Kearney Formally, one conld distinguish two meanings in this forma.) Hoe" has conjunctive value, one obtains “no git" = “nontrth” then, by cancel ingthe double negation, “git = truth b) lor” has disjunctive value, one wil have “non trath” of “non git” hence, “iter gift or uth.” Thus the Formula sable tobe understood either san equivalence between gift and truth, oa their mutual exclusion. one had to choose, Jacques Derrida ‘would probably hold for the second interpretation; and we would do the Same, while the Bist remains conceivable, But the strange thing is ese tere, that, in both cscs, the git keeps a privileged relation tothe truth (tant donne, 117 0.1) 7 wouthit fat cho, told beso single When say, “the truth ofthe git is equivalent othe noni or the non-ruth ofthe Bf” Lam efeting to 2 tational concept of truth that fs, an ontological- phenomenological concept of truth, as revelation or unveiling oradequation From that point of view, ould say that there is no truth ofthe gif but do ot give up tet in general. Tam looking for anther posible experien tio hugh the even the git wth ll hese cvs of possibility “What rain inferested in —and | often repeat thatthe deconstrction I ty to practice is imposible, isthe imposible—is precisely this experience of the impossible. Thisis not simply an imposible experience. The experience ofthe imposible, What happen in the experience of the imposible, which would not be simply anon experience, That is what I try toda. What does the word “posible” mean? Atsome point, hen sid tha the conditions of possibly ate conditions of impossibility, you replied that this isnot enough and you criticized my use ofthe word “coniion* But Iam interested in precisely in thinkingotherwiseahout the conceptof condition and the concept of possi ityor impossibility. {will refer here to what Richaad Kearney his said about possibilty” in theology, where Mglckhytaoes nat simply mean posible or real as opposed to imposible. Bul in German, in A Letter on Humanism Heidegser uses mogau-as desire What [ani iaferested iris the experience of p-theds ie iIBSATE That is, the impossible as the condition of desi, @ the bes word. Lean this quest in which we wan give, : even hen we realize, when we agree, ifwe agree, thatthe gift that giving, SA fing titi pocseoreprpitin and eldest Never 7 | les nedoaagacup ihe eat pn the gre ny awe poe [ donotaise up Dien al preheat ven fe now itisimposibleand Xe gf, sata pence: fs wed te est Toy dw 4° polis of hospitality rom the dream of unconditional hospitality, not only {wl hat be impessible bat it wll have perverse consequences. So despite this perversion, despite this impossibility, we goon dtearing or thinking of pure Fositaity of pe gif, having given up the idea ofthe sic, of subjet- giver and. subjecteceiver, and of thing given, object given, We continue to desite, to dream, through the impossible. ‘The possible forme is naka tive concept Tha s why I would like, in order not simply to give up the be hae oY eee idea of tut, to measure it orto proportion it to this problematic of the impossible. Pow lt us go back to the problem of relation, since Richard Keamey wants usto speak about cliion Richard Kearney Enfn! Jacques Deride. What realy donot know, an confess do ot kos iswhether what am analyzingortyingt think prior tomy own culture, one tom culture, asso the adcotChisa, Cree heritage of te gift Ian intrested nthe hors, Fam tying to reach a structure which isnot the kore ts inerpreted by Pato, but by myself against Plato. 1 do not know if this Structure is eally prior to what connor in ofevaled religion oF exén oT plifoophy, or whether is Hough pifosophy or the revealed re- Tigis Tie telgions ofthe book, or any other experience of teveation tht retospctively we thnk what ty to think. [nmst cones, [cannot maketh Choice between these two hypolfieses. Translated into Heidegger's score, sohich addressing the same difcalty, hiss the ditnction between Ofen barung and Offeburkit,evelaton and ravealabiity. Heeger si, this is is position, that there wat be no revelation or Ofenbarung without the prior siuctre of Offenborki, without the possibility of revelation and the pensilty of manifestation That i Heidegger’ position, Ian nt sure, Pe fap itis through Offenbaug that Offenbarkeit becomes hinkable, histo cally That shy Tam constant ell stating That spat of what ean Teall this here? let us say mv eos, Since its itpossbe for met choose between these two hypotheses my lst hypothesis thatthe question is not well posed that we should piace the question, notto have an answer, bet think otheraize the posibility of these two possiblities. Keamey, This ill be our last question because the time is short. I would like to pick up on what Jacques said ealierand puta question to you, Jean-Lare On the whole issue of thinking religion, Jacques invoked the Kantian distin: tion between thinking and knowing in relation tothe gift and by implication to the desite of God, which we spoke of two days ago, which opens on to the impossible.” He implied that even ifwe eannot know these things, because we reach a limit, we still should think ther. Arguably, that is what his thought about the messianic is and what he has just said about revelation. Even though itis an apocalypse without apocalypse, a messianicity without messianism, a religion without religion, without vision, without truth, without revelation, it isstill a mode of thinking. Now what | would like to ask you, finaly, Jean-Luc is this: Surely you go some way along the same path, you share that same crus. In the conclusion to your negative theology paper the other night, you talked about an encounter with revelation which fills us with incomprehensibility ‘which infuses us with tertor and stupor. There seems to be there, too, an encounter with what we might al the “monstzas,” the utterly other, that Bills us with fear and trembling, the mysterium fascinans, What, for you, is the religious thinking that is appropriate to that particular limit? You speak, as On the GiftRichard Keamey | ‘mentioned earlier, about “a rationalthought of God forget without losing isd epee vyatene! ener 5 ilosophycannat ity oraven ie poatbilty What would yx ay, ‘conclusion, that might help us get more of fix onthe religious nature of sich thinking? Marion. As Jacques Derrida jus said the question now iso thinkimpos sibility the impossible as uch, That was exacly my pointin tant donné aed [shalt tomaketriht here One nay sum ip maser pilsopy by saying its, and paps stl transcendental eterpese by which someting istaken for ranted pio which sthe Leo, subject mn onder, starting from it tocsablishthelimtsof the possble-afany nd of possiblity othink :mounttofoeseingthe posible andtoconsetebjctothintchizon athe posible. There asis well own, that some effective experiences anol be reconstructed within the mits the posible Iva tanseendental pinpt, the seston of eveltion is alvay fooked on aa questo of Ipossbil, ot atleast pata impessbilty, thin the lis of reason home accordingo the ea books by Kant aod Fite which nuit the “Limits of any possible revelation” As pointed out Heidegger, and alo Hegel make distinction between Offenbarn evelation) a what sp posed to Be understand revealed within he revelation, within Offenbar Feit ntheend, only within the linus ofthe concep does itbecome possible forthe impose to come to thought thik that what we can glimpse here and aint may sil be eae phenomenology adtpless complete reverse ofthe former station, Thats omy. we tow adit that we dave ate perience ofthe imposible The dfitono such an impesbecan no more Ise within metaphysis In metaphysics, the impasse simply eoadis thepossble which sslcady Lown ad has, serves, tobe allel not Bathe imposible now isn longer what cannot be thougl but hose fact hastobethonght Sothe questions, how sit pst ema ational and Fe ay nt dstngah between 4Sromatelbility anda weak htellighi ity, We may also say that we should faeg’@haTT call the excess of ition or, more exactly, the eXcess of the given, which achieves a kind of impossibility More generally e hve task ours hts ha wey that something nay ee imple that contrat he priv conditions cf experience} Ind neverthcles eould happen as anycvenigubich takes place within ont perience? To think we have to dea, is all he concepts accord ing to which the effective experience is supposed to appear from tne to time impostble and atonal That she it step. We have to decor a ereize aus concepts, even in philsopy,pestops nore hn ver plows Bhs Al that poi tcl theology and philosophy agree with deconstac- fon. Weall ere at lest once led toesrbe el station in whieh we were Shivonted with exces hat ws both impossible and neverteles elect ‘To achieve this we hove to take serious the fact that we cannot have a expetenceoftheimpomiblein the ame ay that we havean experience ofthe Ime Nt posible To havean experience ofthe imp ‘To havean experience (of imposibility prima facie, which I cal the “counter-xperience” of be- Enrlerentfestnishnent or Bewundening Ps connterexpercce aso do with the ft that we ean see, but cannot designate aan objector a being an event that we cannot comprehend but nevertheless we have to see, This counterexperience is, in fact, the corect and consistent kind of experience appropriate to every decisive evidence in our life death, inh, love, pave illness, jy, pleagure, and so on, We se dhem but we Know on inability to ee them ina clear manner, and nevertheles, these impossibleand unintelligible evidences pla the most important role forus. So, we cannot, a the moment reach a conceptual definition of those evidences, of those phenomena, then wwe have to take the counterexperience seriously, which exemplifies our not being able to reduce them to objectivity, which result think, i from time to time the only one we ean hope to achieve. Sich counterexpen ‘explamnsitvery wel, the possible, in this moment of philosophy, that is, after the endoFmetaphysc is meciel the experience ofthe imposible, then the Sift HTE MATT Hic aipo leas ssh wi bee experience ot UG coriterexperionseWETHRE setiously te fact tha oar experienee, The Tinorettariitceaiemnd unquestionable, de facto, nevertheleseannot bean experience ofobjctvation, To know without knowing in the mode of objee- ‘walion its incomprehensibilitercomprehendere incomprehensible as Agus tie sid, But ths comprehension a incomprehensible na Totfing Infact Wwe already have hihindaFeause-experiencehert we deal with a histor ig the slfatechoxul he Res, nd the experience of the gt. Al those are experiences ofthe imposible which I call paadoxesand we cannot make sense of them in ar objective way. Neve theless, we have those experiences. The incomprehensible the excess th imposible, are part and parcel of ou experience, We have to leatn how t "Fcoricept of experience which should not an wil not be univocal again. ‘Keamey. Thank you, Jean-Luc, A final word fron Jacques Dera Derrida jst one more word about phenomenology, because this s the point When Kevin eer tthe excess of he infinitely other, he sys that the ather, the fae, precisely does not appear as such. Hess many times that he «ants to find within phenomenology the injunction to go beyond phenon ‘enology. There are many places where fe says that we have to go phenomeno- logically beyond phenomenology. That's what Lam tying to do,also. remain and I want fo temain a fationatist, a pheniomenologist Marion. You are! Derrida, Arman ofthe Enlightenment, andsoonandsoforth, I woul like to.remain phenomenological in what I say against phenomenology. Finally ‘what leads me inthis matter about the nomphenomenaliy ofthe git is alo the now phenomenslity ofthe “the” as sic, which i something I learned fiom Husserls Cartesian Meditations, Hussel says that inthe case ofthe ater trent Jas On the Gift { nce oftheDyer Bury ts om Richard Kearney 1 ego we cannot have pure intuition, an originary perception of the other: we have to go through appresetaton. That isa limit of phenomenclogy that [sre sat slg Tate ew aos {One last word. When referred a moment ago to Offenbarkeit and Offen darung, Las sincere but atthe same te Lam also perplexed, Lam ako per pleed without 2 guide inthis tespect. The discourse of Offenbarung and Of Jenbarket in Heidegger or anywhere clei thiscontex, implies the istriiy of Dasein, of man and God, the historicity of revelation, listo jn the Christiano European sense My problem shat when LstertCthord) refer to some event, the posibilty of taking place, yh is not histotcal, to something non-historical that resists historiity-fa other words, there might bye something that i excluded by this proleatic, however complex it may be, of revelation, of Ofenbarung and Offenarkeit whether in Heidegger ot out of Heidenger. That is why Trefey what I cll the “desert in theldes Theteisa biblical eset theres inthe dese is this place which “yelore,”becatse that chroplogc fesists historcization, which is, L wif] not say but which ren ins irreducile to his: hives itis obscure, but becaus¢ it has nothing to do with the gif, with revelation oF sath aglsg we ate Yeung here Thats what peo hen ke Fe ioe dias Aerogenty to philosophy Page judeo Christan history of elation, exen othe concep of hisory, which isa Christian concept, isnot simply at war with what iteesists isalso, if maya This teruble work a condition af possbiiy which makes Disibreby resting it Itisalsoa place of nomi Byresistingi Wisthe place of nonslesie. The khora doe docs po give gnthing,Itis what makes taking place or an event possible, But the lve doesnot happen. does nate, doesn dese Ith api ad 1 absolutely iif Why do inst on ths, on ths perpletne Wh for Tnstanice, in Sau Tiiom, dN try to articulate this with the problem of negative theology and phenomenologyXJf you read this small essa, you will se that ‘hat I call My, Be sbsoltely Guise ple to what we cal revelation, revealability ‘Etirope, and so forth, Lthink the reference a threshold to the definition of aw polities arm not saying this against historical desert. But Wat eal T: leet” On thé Gite place of resistanse—pethaps reaitance isnot the best word—but this non- Something within something thf nonetevelation within revelation this no Fistory within history, this non-desire within desite, this impossibility. would = e like to tatislte the experience ofthis imposibility nto what we could ethics opt and This ea hypothesis, nota Hope, what Tama SGT Gn be retanalated after the factinto Jewish discourse or Christian discourse oF Muslim discourse, i they can integrate the tele things Pin suggesting now. Just to underline, itis not a yar machine that Lar locating Ihee bt another ype, sather place for questions, Fag, the question ofthe place Melee 7 ‘Keamey. | would lik to saya few words of thanks. One of the nice things shout the gift isthatit gives yon the opportunity to expressgratitude forthe, even ifyou betray the gift in doing so Derrida. No one knows who is thanking whom for what Keamey. Lam going'to puta few names oni, nonetheles. vould ike to thank Jacques Derrida and Jea-Late Marion for giving us thee thoughts onthe phenomenology of the gift and all of you for earning here. would alsa ike to thank Mike Seanlon and Jack Caputo for coming up with the idea ofthis, conference and, even at this eleventh hour, would like to invite Jack Caputo to offer us some concluding thoughts on this conference John D. Caputo. This has been a marvelous moment for wsall and we are all very grateful to Richard Kearney for leading this exciting conversation so genully and so deftly. I woud like to make theee brief points have the sense that Marion and Derrida are answering the question of the gifteifferently because they have diffcent problems. unk that Marion's problematic of the gift is very Heideggerian and that he wants to move the {question ofthe gift ntof the economy of causality outafthe horizon of onto | theologic, and o take up the “gifting of gift” the emerging ofa giftas what has been released from onto-theological and causal constrains, sothat it becomes exces. [do ot think that thisisexatly Derrida’s concern, My sense is thatthe / {question of the gift for Derrida has todo primarily withthe economy of credit snd debs, and that Derrida wants the recipient not to contract a debt and the giver not to acquire acclaim for such generosity {think that in Etant donne Marion removes the gift fron the sphere of causality but my question is whether i is removed from debt Do we not come into a universal indebted ness to God the giver, even though the gift has been released from a causal «conomy? Economy fox Mation means eausalif: Eeonony for Dertda means creditand debt: worry whether we donot up in debt in Maton. But sit forgiving the highest moment of the gf? Should anyone end up in debt from aug? Should we bei debt to God forthe gilt of creation? HFereation ia git, then it snot a debt but something we affirm and celebrate The second thing I would say is that I now appreciate Marion's postion better [took Marion to be eriticiging Derrida more than he now says he i ctiticizing him, When Dersida says that the gift i impossible, I thoughtRichard Keamey Marion took hins to be saying tat it is simply impossible and that for Derrida the gift remains forever stuck within economy, and that Marion was going to show how this very impossibility is what makes it possible—which is of course Dertida’s position in the first place, But Marion said today that he did not mean Derrida when he made this eriicism, although I did not know who else he coud have meant, So now it seems to me that they are both saying very much the same thing on this question ofthe impossible and thatthe round: table today has very much clarified this point. The last point concerns the saturated phenomenon. I find this analysis very beautiful, but if, as Marion say, the saturated phenomenon falls into confusion or bedazzlement, [do not know how to distinguish the confusion of bedazzlement or of excess from the confusion of defect. How do we know that wwe have been visited by asupereminent excess and not just simply invaded by hora? How do'we know thatthe source of the confusion is God, not kona? ‘Marion. [shall answer you atthe next conference. Caputo, jacques Derrida, Richard Kearney, Jear-Line Marion, thank you all so meh NorEs 1. Jean-Lue Mation, Reduction and Givenness:bnvetigations of Huser, Heide ger and Phenomenology, tans, Thrnas Caron (Evanston, tl: Northwestem Univer- Sty Press, 1998). tant donne i eutrently beng translated by Jef Kosky 2 Raimund Huser, The Idea of Phenomenalogy, tans. Wiliam P. Alston and George Nakhnikian (The Hague: Martins Nihof, 1964), 59 "Francois Puret, Le post dune illision (Paris Calman-Léy, 1995). 49. 4 Jeanine Maron, Etant donnd; Esai dune phénoménologie de la donation Pars: Preses universitaire de France, 1997), 14, a1-2, L161, 117 n2, \bovtind Ven By bmeulies « Loose Canons Augustine and Derrida on Their Selves Robert Dodaro Wisfiting and just that too, exeuse myself in advance of daring to speak bout a man and his work which I can never completely understand, but for whom confess an enormous respect, if for no other reason than because of he tourage with which he now dares to expose the most private parts of himself find for such a serious putpose.! So I confess the inadequate preparation of my reading, of my thoughts and of my words inthis moment; and in grateful recognition of your patience with my abuse of your generosity, [ask that you place no importance on what say, but that you allow my words to suggest to you what one Augustinian has received from another.) Jacques Derrida’s Circumfession will now change the way we shal read “Augustine's Confessions, and, thus, the way we shall tead Augustine. ‘To make this claim is no mere eaptatio benevolentiae, though iti also and obviously that, too. For Professor Derrida has shown us that we need not fear Augustine aaswe othensise might have done, as do those who read in him the arrogance ‘Of the “hammer of heretics." who consider his certainty about himself, a- sured through confession, as the canon, the eane, with which he beats down the unwarranted certainty of his adversaries—those too proud to acknowledge