Digested Cases- Torts and Damages

By: Nicolas D. Aranilla Jr.

out later that the fluid pipe on the rear right was cut that's
why the breaks did not function.

1. Layugan vs. IAC

Facts:

Plaintiff points to the negligence of the defendant driver

while Isidro points to the driver of parked truck as negligent,
and says that absent such proof of care, it would, under the
doctrine of res ipsa loquitur, evoke the presumption of
negligence on the part of the driver of the parked cargo truck
as well as his helper, the petitioner herein, who was fixing
the flat tire of the said truck.

(Petition for review on certiorari of IAC decision)

Plaintiff Pedro Layugan testified that while in Bagabag, Nueva
Vizcaya, he and a companion were repairing the tire of their
cargo truck which was parked along the right side of the
National Highway. Defendant's truck driven recklessly by
Daniel Serrano bumped the plaintiff, that as a result, plaintiff
was injured and hospitalized. Due to said injuries, his left leg
was amputated so he had to use crutches to walk.
Defendant Godofredo Isidro admitted his ownership of the
vehicle involved in the accident driven by Daniel Serrano.
Defendant said that the plaintiff was merely a bystander, not
a truck helper being a brother-in-law law of the driver of said
truck; that the truck allegedly being repaired was parked,
occupying almost half of the right lane towards Solano,
Nueva Vizcaya, right after the curve; that the proximate
cause of the incident was the failure of the driver of the
parked truck in installing the early warning device.
Daniel Serrano, defendant driver, said that he knew the
responsibilities of a driver; that before leaving, he checked
the truck. The truck owner used to instruct him to be careful
in driving. He bumped the truck being repaired by Pedro
Layugan, plaintiff, while the same was at a stop position.
From the evidence presented, it has been established clearly
that the injuries sustained by the plaintiff was caused by
defendant's driver, Daniel Serrano. Serrano also testified
that, When I was a few meters away, I saw the truck which
was loaded with round logs. I stepped on my foot brakes but
it did not function with my many attempts. I have (sic) found

Issues:
1. WON defendant driver Serrano was negligent?
2. WON the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur applies in this case?
Held:
1.

NO- (Procedural)

Findings of fact are entitled to great respect and will not

ordinarily be disturbed by this Court unless it falls down
under the exceptions provided by the Court to merit review
of the facts.
ReasoningThis is a question of fact. But this case is an exception since:
1) the finding are grounded entirely on speculation, surmise,
or conjecture; 2) the inference made is manifestly mistaken,
3) the judgment is based on misapprehension of facts; 4) CA
findings are contrary to those of the trial court; 5) the said
findings of fact are conclusions without citation of specific
evidence on which they are based; and 6) when the findings
of fact of the Court of Appeals are premised on the absence
of evidence and are contradicted on record. Hence, SC
entertained review of the factual question.

Res ipsa loquitor (the thing speaks for itself) Where the
thing which causes the injury is shown to be under the
management of the defendant, and the accident is such as in
the ordinary course of things does not happen if those who
have the management use proper care, it affords reasonable
evidence, in the absence of an explanation by the defendant,
that the accident arose from want of care. It is not rule of
substantive law but merely a mode of proof or a mere
procedural convenience. It can be involved when and only
when, under the circumstances involved, direct evidence is
absent and not readily available. It cannot be availed of when
the plaintiff has knowledge and testifies or presents evidence
as to the specific act of negligence which is the cause of
injury complained of or where there is direct evidence as to
the precise cause of the accident and all the facts and
circumstances attendant to the occurrence appear. The
absence of want of care of the driver has been established by
clear and convincing evidence. The doctrine does not
apply.
2. Ramos vs. CA
Facts:
Erlinda Ramos, a 47-year old robust woman, was normal
except for her experiencing occasional pain due to the
presence of stone in her gall bladder. She was advised to
undergo an operation for its removal. The results in the
examinations she underwent indicate that she was fit for the
operation. She and her husband Rogelio met Dr. Hosaka, one
of the defendants, who advised that she should undergo
cholecystectomy. Dr. Hosaka assured them that he will get a
good anesthesiologist.
At 7:30 a.m. on the day of the operation at Delos Santos
Medical Center, Herminda Cruz, Erlindas sister-in-law and the
dean of the College of Nursing in Capitol Medical Center, was
there to provide moral support. Dr. Perfecta Gutierrez was to

administer the anesthesia. Dr. Hosaka arrived only at 12:15

p. m. Herminda saw Dr. Gutierrez intubating the patient, and
heard the latter say Ang hirap ma-intubate nito, mali yata
ang pagkakapasok. O, lumalaki ang tiyan. Herminda saw
bluish discoloration of the nail beds of the patient. She heard
Dr. Hosaka issue an order for someone to call Dr. Calderon.
The doctor arrived and placed the patient in trendelenburg
position, wherein the head of the patient is positioned lower
than the feet, which indicates a decrease of blood supply in
the brain. Herminda knew and told Rogelio that something
wrong was happening. Dr. Calderon was able to intubate the
patient. Erlinda was taken to the ICU and became comatose.

Rogelio filed a civil case for damages. The trial court ruled in
his favor, finding Dr. Gutierrez, Dr. Hosaka, and the hospital,
guilty of negligence, but the Court of Appeals reversed the
decision. Hence, petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration,
which the Court of Appeals denied for having been filed
beyond the reglementary period. However, it was found that
the notice of the decision was never sent to the petitioners
counsel. Rather, it was sent to the petitioner, addressing him
as Atty. Rogelio Ramos, as if he was the legal counsel. The
petitioner filed the instant petition for certiorari. On the
procedural issue, the Supreme Court rules that since the
notice did not reach the petitioners then legal counsel, the
motion was filed on time.
Issue:
1. WON it should be dismissed for being filed later than
allowable 15 day period for the filing of the Motion for
Reconsideration?
2. WON the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur is applicable?
3. WON the Court of Appeals erred in finding that private
respondents were not negligent in the care of Erlinda during
the anesthesia phase of the operation?

Held:
1. NO- A careful review of the records reveals that the reason
behind the delay in filing the motion for reconsideration is
attributable to the fact that the decision of the Court of
Appeals was not sent to then counsel on record of
petitioners, the Coronel Law Office. In fact, a copy of the
decision of the appellate court was instead sent to and
received by petitioner Rogelio Ramos on 9 June1995 wherein
he was mistakenly addressed as Atty. Rogelio Ramos.
It is elementary that when a party is represented by counsel,
all notices should be sent to the partys lawyer at his given
address. With a few exceptions, notice to a litigant without
notice to his counsel on record is no notice at all. In the
present case, since a copy of the decision of the appellate
court was not sent to the counsel on record of petitioner,
there can be no sufficient notice to speak of. Hence, the
delay in the filing of the motion for reconsideration cannot be
taken against petitioner.
2. YES- We find the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur appropriate in
the case at bar. As will hereinafter be explained, the damage
sustained by Erlinda in her brain prior to a scheduled gall
bladder operation presents a case for the application of res
ipsa loquitur.
The liability of the physicians and the hospital in this case is
not predicated upon an alleged failure to secure the desired
results of an operation nor on an alleged lack of skill in the
diagnosis or treatment as in fact was no operation or
treatment ever performed on Erlinda. Thus, upon all these
initial determination a case is made out for the application of
the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur.
The accident arose from or was caused by the defendants
want of care. The doctrine of res ipsa loquitur is simply a
recognition of the postulate that, as a matter of common

knowledge and experience, the very nature of certain types

of occurrences may justify an inference of negligence on the
part of the person who controls the instrumentality causing
the injury in the absence of some explanation by the
defendant who is charged with negligence. It is grounded in
the superior logic of ordinary human experience and on the
basis of such experience or common knowledge, negligence
may be deduced from the mere occurrence of the accident
itself. Hence, res ipsa loquitur is applied in conjunction with
the doctrine of common knowledge.
3. YES. The CA committed a reversible error. Private
respondents were unable to disprove the presumption of
negligence on their part in the care of Erlinda and their
negligence was the proximate cause of her piteous condition.
Dra. Gutierrez failed to properly intubate the patient. In the
case at bar, respondent Dra. Gutierrez admitted that she saw
Erlinda for the first time on the day of the operation itself, on
17 June 1985. Before this date, no prior consultations with, or
pre-operative evaluation of Erlinda was done by her. Until the
day of the operation respondent Dra. Gutierrez was unaware
of the physiological make-up and needs of Erlinda. She was
likewise not properly informed of the possible difficulties she
would face during the administration of anesthesia to Erlinda.
Respondent Dra. Gutierrez act of seeing her patient for the
first time only an hour before the scheduled operative
procedure was, therefore, an act of exceptional negligence
and professional irresponsibility.
3. Batiquin vs. CA
Nature: Petition for review of the decision of the Court of
Appeals
Facts:

Mrs. Villegas submitted to Dr. Batiquin for prenatal care as

the latter's private patient sometime before September 21,
1988. In the morning of September 21,1988 Dr. Batiquin,
along with other physicians and nurses, performed a
caesarian operation on Mrs.Villegas and successfully
delivered the latters baby.
After leaving the hospital, Mrs. Villegas began to suffer
abdominal pains and complained of being feverish. She also
gradually lost her appetite, so she consulted Dr. Batiquin at
the latter's polyclinic who prescribed for her certain
medicines. However, the pains still kept recurring. She then
consulted Dr. Ma. Salud Kho. After examining her, Dr Kho
suggested that Mrs. Villegas submit to another surgery.
When Dr. Kho opened the abdomen of Mrs. Villegas she found
whitish yellow discharge inside, an ovarian cyst on each of
the left and right ovaries and a piece of rubber material on
the right side of the uterus, embedded on the ovarian cyst.
The piece of rubber appeared to be a part of a rubber glove.
This was the cause of all of the infection of the ovaries and
consequently of all the discomfort suffered by Mrs.Villegas.
Issue: WON Dr. Batiquin is liable?
Held:
Dr. Batiquin is therefore liable for negligently leaving behind
a piece of rubber in private respondent Villegas' abdomen
and for all the adverse effects thereof.
Dr. Kho was frank throughout her turn on the witness stand.
Furthermore, no motive to state any untruth was ever
imputed against Dr. Kho, leaving her trustworthiness
unimpaired. The trial court's following declaration shows that
while it was critical of the lack of care with which Dr. Kho
handled the piece of rubber, it was not prepared to doubt Dr.
Kho's credibility, thus only supporting out appraisal of Dr.
Kho's trustworthiness. Considering that we have assessed Dr.

Kho to be acredible witness, her positive testimony prevails

over the negative testimony in favor of the petitioners.
As such, the rule of res ipsa loquitur comes to force.- This
doctrine is stated thus: "Where the thing which causes injury
is shown to be under the management of the defendant, and
the accident is such as in the ordinary course of things does
not happen if those who have the management use proper
care, it affords reasonable evidence, in the absence of an
explanation by the defendant, that the accident arose from
want of care."
In the instant case, all the requisites for recourse to the
doctrine are present. First, the entire proceedings of the
cesarean section were under the exclusive control of Dr.
Batiquin. In this light, the private respondents were bereft of
direct evidence as to the actual culprit or the exact cause of
the foreign object finding its way into private respondent
Villegas' body, which, needless to say, does not occur unless
through the intervention of negligence. Second, since aside
from the cesarean section, private respondent Villegas
underwent no other operation which could have caused the
offending piece of rubber to appear in her uterus, it stands to
reason that such could only have been a by-product of the
cesarean section performed by Batiquin. The petitioners, in
this regard, failed to overcome the presumption of
negligence arising from resort to the doctrine of res ipsa
loquitur.
Dr. Batiquin is therefore liable for negligently leaving behind
a piece of rubber in private respondent Villegas' abdomen
and for all the adverse effects thereof

4. DM Consunji vs. CA
Facts:

Nature: Appeal from CA affirming decision of RTC ordering

defendant D.M. Consunji, Inc. to pay damages to plaintif
Maria J. Juego
Around 1:30PM of November 2, 1990, Jose Juergo, a
construction worker of D.M. Consunji Inc. fell 14 floors from
the Renaissance Tower, Pasig City. He was immediately
rushed to Rizal Medical Center in Pasig City. The attending
physician, Dr. Errol de Yzo, pronounce Jose dead on arrival
(DOA) at around 2:15PM.
Jose Juergo, together with Jessie Jaluag and Delso Destajo,
performing their work as carpenter at the elevator core of the
14th floor of Tower D, Renaissance Tower Building were on
board a platform. Jose was crushed to death when the
platform fell due to removal or looseness of the pin, which
was merely inserted to the connecting points of the chain
block and platform but without a safety lock. Luckily, Jessie
and Delso jumped out of safety.
ISSUE:
1. Whether or not the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur is
applicable to prove petitioners negligence?
2. Whether Maria Juergo can still claim damages with D.M.
Consunji apart from the death benefits she claimed in the
State Insurance Fund.
Held:
1. Yes. As a rule of evidence, the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur is
peculiar to the law of negligence which recognizes that prima
facie negligence may be established without direct proof and
furnishes a substitute for specific proof of negligence. It is
based in part upon the theory that the defendant in charge of
the instrumentality which causes the injury either knows the
cause of the accident or has the best opportunity of

ascertaining it and that the plaintiff has no such knowledge,

and therefore is compelled to allege negligence in general
terms and to rely upon the proof of the happening of the
accident in order to establish negligence.
Res ipsa loquitur is a rule of necessity and it applies where
evidence is absent or no treadily available, provided the
following requisites are present:
(1) the accident was of a kind which does not ordinarily occur
unless someone is negligent;
(2) the instrumentality or agency which caused the injury
was under the exclusive control of the person charged with
negligence; and
(3) the injury suffered must not have been due to any
voluntary action or contribution on the part of theperson
injured.No worker is going to fall from the 14th floor of a
building to the basement while performing work in a
construction site unless someone is negligent.
2. The respondent is not precluded from recovering damages
under the civil code.
Maria Juergo was unaware of
petitioners negligence when she filed her claim for death
benefits from the State Insurance Fund. She filed the civil
complaint for damages after she received a copy of the
police investigation report and the Prosecutors Memorandum
dismissing the criminal complaint against petitioners
personnel.
Supreme Court remanded to the RTC of Pasig City to
determine whether the award decreed in its decision is more
than that of the Employees Compensation Commission (ECC).
Should the award decreed by the trial court be greater than
that awarded by the ECC, payments already made to private
respondent pursuant to the Labor Code shall be deducted
there from.
5. Manila Electric vs. Remonquillo

Facts:
Efren Magno went to repair a media agua of the house of his
brother-in-law. While making the repair, a galvanized iron
roofing which was holding came into contact with the electric
wire of the petitioner Manila Electric Co. strung parallel to the
edge of the media agua and 2 1/2 feet from it. He was
electrocuted and died as a result thereof. In an action for
damages brought by the heirs of Magno against manila
Electric Co. the CA awarded damages to the heirs of Magno
and that the company was at fault and guilty of negligence
because although the electric wire had been installed long
before the construction of the house the electric company did
not exercise due diligence.
Issue: WON Manila Electric Co., is gulity of negligence.
Held:

He could not have been entirely a stranger to electric wires

and the danger lurking in them.
To hold the defendant liable in damages for the death of
Magno, such supposed negligence of the company must have
been the proximate and principal cause of the accident.

6. Bernardo vs. Legaspi

Facts:
Due to a collision between the respective automobiles of
Bernardo and Legaspi, the Bernardo filed an action to recover
damages for injuries sustained by his car which he alleged
were by reason of Legaspi's negligence in causing said
collision. Legaspi, on the other hand, filed a cross-complaint
alleging it was Bernardo's fault. He also asks for damages.

NO- It was the victim who was guilty of negligence

The death of Magno was primarily caused by his own
negligence and in some measure by the too close proximity
of the media agua to the electric wire of the company by
reason of the violation of the original permit given by the city
and the subsequent approval of said illegal construction of
the media agua.

The lower court found upon the evidence that both the
plaintiff and the defendant were negligent in handling their
automobiles and that said negligence was of such a
character and extent on the part of both as to prevent either
from recovering.

The company cannot be expected to be always on the

lookout for any illegal construction which reduces the
distance between its wires and said construction, and to
change the installation of its wires so as to preserve said
distance.

Held:

The violation of the permit for the construction was not the
direct cause of the accident. The real cause of the accident or
death was the reckless or negligent act of Magno himself. It is
to be presumed that due to his age and experience he was
qualified to do so. He had training and experience for the job.

Issue: WON the parties may recover damages

NO- Where two automobiles, going in opposite directions,

collide on turning a street corner, and it appears from the
evidence and is found by the trial court that the drivers
thereof were equally negligent and contributed equally to the
principal occurrence as determining causes thereof, neither
can recover of the other for damages suffered.

7. Bernal vs. House

Facts:
Fortunata Enverso with her daughter Purificacion Bernal went
to Tacloban, Leyte to attend the procession of Holy Friday.
After the procession, they, accompanied by two other
persons, passed along a public street named Gran Capitan.
The little girl was allowed to get a short distance in advance
of her mother and her friends.
While in front of the offices of the Tacloban Electric &Ice
Plant, Ltd., an automobile appeared on which frightened the
child. She turned to run, but fell into the street gutter. At that
time there was hot water in this gutter or ditch coming from
the Electric Ice Plant of J.V. House.
When the mother and her companions reached the child,
they found her face downward in the hot water. The girl was
taken to the provincial hospital. Despite his efforts, the child
died that same night.
It was certified that the cause of death was "Burns,3rd
Degree, whole Body", and that the contributory causes were
"Congestion of the Brain and visceras of the chest &
abdomen.
The defense was that the hot water was permitted to flow
down the side of the street Gran Captain with the knowledge
and consent of the authorities; that the cause of death was
other than the hot water; and that in the death the plaintiffs
contributed by their own fault and negligence.
Issue:
WON the action should be dismissed due to the contributory
negligence of the plaintiffs
Held:

NO- The death of the child was the result of fault and
negligence in permitting hot water to flow through the public
streets, there to endanger the lives of passers-by who were
unfortunately enough to fall into it- The mother and her child
had a perfect right to be on the principal street of Tacloban,
Leyte, on the evening when the religious procession was
held.- There was nothing abnormal in allowing the child to
run along a few paces in advance of the mother. No one
could foresee the coincidence of an automobile appearing
and of a frightened child running and falling into a ditch filled
with hot water.
The contributory negligence of the child and her mother, if
any, does not operate as a bar to recovery, but in its strictest
sense could only result in reduction of the damages.
Romualdez Dissent:
Even taking the finding that the defendant by its negligence
helped to bring about the accident which resulted in the
death of the child Purificacion Bernal, plaintiff, by negligence,
contributed to that most regrettable result.
8. PLDT vs. CA
Nature: Petition for certiorari to review the resolution of the
Court of Appeals.
Facts:
On July 30, 1968 Jeep of Esteban spouses ran over a mound
of earth and fell into an open trench, an excavation allegedly
undertaken by PLDT for the installation of its underground
conduit system. The complaint alleged that respondent
Antonio Esteban failed to notice the open trench which was
left uncovered because of the creeping darkness and the lack
of any warning light or signs.

Gloria Esteban allegedly sustained injuries on her arms, legs

and face, leaving a permanent scar on her cheek, while the
respondent husband suffered cut lips. In addition, the
windshield of the jeep was shattered.
PLDT, in its answer, denies liability on the contention that the
injuries sustained by respondent spouses were the result of
their own negligence and that the entity which should be
held responsible, if at all, is L.R. Barte and Company, an
independent
contractor
which
undertook
the
said
construction work
Issue:
WON the Esteban spouses can claim damages from PLDT
Held:
NO-A person claiming damages for the negligence of another
has the burden of proving the existence of such fault or
negligence causative thereof. The facts constitutive of
negligence must be affirmatively established by competent
evidence.
The accident was due to the lack of diligence of respondent
Antonio Esteban and was not imputable to negligent
omission on the part of petitioner PLDT. Jeep was running
along the inside lane of Lacson Street. If it had remained on
that inside lane, it would not have hit the accident mound.

9. Genobian vs. CA
Nature: Petition for review of the CAs decision affirming the
conviction of the petitioner of the crime of homicide thru
reckless imprudence.
Facts:

On Dec 31, 1959, at about 7:30 PM, a rig driven by

Genobiagon bumped an old woman who was crossing the
street. The appellant's rig was following another at a distance
of two meters. The old woman started to cross when the first
rig was approaching her, but as appellant's vehicle was going
so fast not only because of the steep down grade of the road,
but also because he was trying to overtake the rig ahead of
him, the appellant's rig bumped the old woman, who fell at
the middle of the road. The appellant continued to drive on,
but a by-stander Mangyao saw the incident and shouted at
the appellant to stop. He ran after appellant when the latter
refused to stop. Overtaking the appellant, Mangyao asked
him why he bumped the old woman and his answer was, 'it
was the old woman that bumped him.
The appellant went back to the place where the old woman
was struck by his rig. The old woman was unconscious. She
was then loaded in a jeep and brought to the hospital where
she died 3 hours later. Genobiagon was convicted of
homicide thru reckless imprudence. CA affirmed.
Genobiagon claims CA erred in not finding that the reckless
negligence of the victim was the proximate cause of the
accident which led to her death
Issue: WON contributory negligence can be used as defense
by Genobiagon?
Held:
NO- The alleged contributory negligence of the victim, if any,
does not exonerate the accused. The defense of contributory
negligence does not apply in criminal cases committed
through reckless imprudence, since one cannot allege the
negligence of another to evade the effects of his own
negligence.

The appealed decision is affirmed with modification as to the

civil liability of the petitioner which is hereby increased to
P30,000.

10.

Rakes vs. Atlantic

Nature: Action for damages

FACTS
The plaintiff, Rakes, one of a group of 8 African-American
laborers in the employment of defendant, Atlantic, was at
work transporting iron rails from the harbor in Manila.
The men were hauling the rails on 2hand cars, some behind
or at it sides and some pulling the cars in the front by a rope.
At one point, the track sagged, the tie broke, the car canted
and the rails slid off and caught the plaintiff who was walking
by the cars side, breaking his leg, which was later
amputated at the knee.
The plaintiffs witness alleged that a noticeable depression in
the track had appeared after a typhoon. This was reported to
the foreman, Mckenna, but it had not been proven that
Atlantic inspected the track or had any proper system of
inspection. Also, there were no side guards on the cars to
keep the rails from slipping off.
However, the companys officers and 3 of the workers
testified that there was a general prohibition frequently made
known to all against walking by the side of cars. As Rakes
was walking along the cars side when the accident occurred,
he was found to have contributed in some degree to the
injury inflicted, although not as the primary cause.
Atlantic contends that the remedy for injury through
negligence lies only in a criminal action against the official

directly responsible and that the employer beheld only

subsidiarily liable.
Issue:
WON there was contributory negligence on the part of
petitioner?
Held:
YES- Petitioner had walked along the side of the car despite a
prohibition to do so by the foreman. The negligence of the
injured person contributing to his injury but not being one of
the determining causes of the principal accident, does not
operate as a bar to recovery, but only in reduction of his
damages. Each party is chargeable with damages in
proportion to his fault. Trial court assessed that damages to
plaintiff amount to PhP5,000. SC deducted PhP2,500, the
amount fairly attributable to his own negligence
Dissent: Willard and Carson:
The negligence of the defendant alone was insufficient to
cause the accident. It also required the negligence of the
plaintiff. Because of this, plaintiff should not be
afforded relief.

11.

Philippine Bank of Commerce vs. CA

Nature: Petition for review challenging the CA decision

affirming the RTC decision in a civil case
Facts:
The case stems from a complaint filed by Rommels
Marketing Corporation (RMC) to recover from the former
Philippine Bank of Commerce (PBC) the sum of P304,979.74
representing various deposits it had made in its current
account with the bank but which were not credited.

Rommels Marketing Corporation (RMC) maintained two

separate current accounts with PBC in connection with its
business of selling appliances. The RMC General Manager
Lipana entrusted to his secretary, Irene Yabut, RMC funds
amounting to P300,000+ for the purpose of depositing the
same to RMCs account with PBC. However, it turned out that
Yabut deposited the amounts in her husbands account
instead of RMC. Lipana never checked his monthly statement
of accounts regularly furnished by PBC so that Yabuts modus
operandi went on for the span of more than one year.
ISSUE:
What is the proximate cause of the loss Lipanas negligence
in not checking his monthly statements or the banks
negligence through its teller in validating the deposit slips?
Held:
The bank teller was negligent in validating, officially
stamping and signing all the deposit slips prepared and
presented by Yabut, despite the glaring fact that the
duplicate copy was not completely accomplished contrary to
the self-imposed procedure of the bank with respect to the
proper validation of deposit slips, original or duplicate.
The bank tellers negligence, as well as the negligence of the
bank in the selection and supervision of its bank teller, is the
proximate cause of the loss suffered by the private
respondent, not the latters entrusting cash to a dishonest
employee.
Even if Yabut had the fraudulent intention to misappropriate
the funds, she would not have been able to deposit those
funds in her husbands current account, and then make
plaintiff believe that it was in the latters accounts wherein
she had deposited them, had it not been for the bank tellers
aforesaid gross and reckless negligence.

Doctrine of Last Clear Chance where both parties are

negligent, but the negligent act of one is appreciably later in
time than that of the other, or when it is impossible to
determine whose fault or negligence should be attributed to
the incident, the one who had the last clear opportunity to
avoid the impending harm and failed to do so is chargeable
with the consequences thereof. It means that the antecedent
negligence of a person does not preclude the recovery of
damages for the supervening negligence of, or bar a defense
against liability sought by another, if the latter, who had the
last fair chance, could have avoided the impending harm by
exercise of due diligence. (Phil. Bank of Commerce v. CA,
supra)

12.

Juntilla vs. Funtanar

Facts:
Petitioner Roberto Juntilla was sitting at the front seat of a
jeepney (driven by one Berfol Camoro, registered under the
franchise of Clemente Fontanar, but actually owned by
Fernando Banzon) when its right rear tire exploded causing it
to turn turtle. Plaintiff was thrown out of the vehicle and lost
consciousness upon landing on the ground.
When he came back to his senses, he found that he had a
lacerated wound on his right palm, injuries on his left arm,
right thigh and on his back and also found this Omega wrist
watch was lost.
He went to Danao city and upon arrival there he entered the
City Hospital to attend to his injuries and asked his father-inlaw to go to site of the accident to look for his watch but the
watch was nowhere to be found.
Petitioner then filed a civil case for breach of contract with
damages before the City Court of Cebu against Fontanar,

Banzon, and Camoro, who filed their answer, alleging that

the accident was beyond their control taking into account
that the tire that exploded was newly bought and slightly
used at the time it blew up.
City Court rendered judgment in favor of petitioner. The
respondents then appealed to the CFI of Cebu, which
reversed the judgment upon a finding that the accident in
question was due to a fortuitous event.
Petitioners MFR was denied, hence this appeal.
Issue:
Whether or not the accident was due to fortuitous event?
Held:
NO- A caso fortuito (fortuitous event) presents the following
essential characteristics:
1. The cause of the unforeseen must be independent of the
human will.
2. It must be impossible to foresee the even which
constitutes the caso fortuito, or if it can be foreseen, it must
be impossible to avoid.
3. The occurrence must be such as to render it impossible for
the debtor to fulfill his obligation in a normal manner
4. The obligor (debtor) must be free from any participation in
the aggravation of the injury resulting to the creditor
In the case at bar, the cause of the unforeseen and
unexpected occurrence was not independent of the human
will. The accident was caused either through the negligence
of the driver or because of mechanical defects in the tire.
Common carriers should teach their drivers not to overload
their vehicles not to exceed safe and legal speed limits and

to know the correct measures to take when a tire blows up

thus insuring the safety of passengers at all times.

13.

Hernandez vs. COA

Facts:
Teodoro M. Hernandez was the officer-in-charge and special
disbursing officer of the Ternate Beach Project of the
Philippine Tourism Authority in Cavite. He went to the main
office in Manila to encash 2 checks covering the wages of the
employees and the operating expenses of the Project. He
estimated that the money would be available by 10am and
that he would be back in Ternate by about 2pm of the same
day. However, the processing of the checks was completed
only at 3pm.
The petitioner decided nevertheless to encash them because
the Project employees would be waiting for their pay the
following day. And so, he collected the cash value of the
checks.
The petitioner had two choices: (1) return to Cavite that
same afternoon and arrive there in the early evening; or (2)
take the money with him to his house in Marilao, Bulacan,
spend the night there, and leave for Ternate the following
morning. He opted for the second, thinking it the safer one.
He took a passenger jeep bound for his house in Bulacan. It
was while the vehicle was along EDSA that two persons with
knives boarded and forcibly took the money he was carrying.
Hernandez, after the initial shock, immediately followed in
desperate pursuit. He caught up with Virgilio Alvarez and
overcame him after a scuffle. Alvarez was subsequently
charged with robbery and pleaded guilty. But the hold-upper
who escaped is still at large and the stolen money he took
with him has not been recovered.

The petitioner, invoking the foregoing facts, filed a request

for relief from money accountability under Section 638 of the
Revised Administrative Code.
Issue:
WON petitioners acts are so tainted with negligence or
recklessness as to justify the denial of the petitioner's
request for relief from accountability for the stolen money?
Held:
NO- This was undoubtedly a fortuitous event covered by the
said provisions, something that could not have been
reasonably foreseen although it could have happened, and
did. For most of us, all we can rely on is a reasoned
conjecture of what might happen, based on common sense
and our own experiences, or our intuition, if you will, and
without any mystic ability to peer into the future. It is true
that the petitioner miscalculated, but the Court feels he
should not be blamed for that. The decision he made seemed
logical at that time and was one that could be expected of a
reasonable and prudent person.
Disposition
The petitioner is entitled to be relieved from accountability
for the money forcibly taken from him. ACCORDINGLY, the
petition is GRANTED.
14.

Gotesco Investment vs. Chatto

Nature: Petition for review.

Facts:
In the afternoon of June 4, 1982 Gloria E. Chatto, and her 15year old daughter, Lina Delza E. Chatto went to see the

movie "Mother Dear" at Superama I theater, owned by

defendant Gotesco Investment Corporation.
They bought balcony tickets but even then were unable to
find seats considering the number of people patronizing the
movie. Hardly ten (10) minutes after entering the theater,
had the ceiling of its balcony collapsed.
The theater was plunged into darkness and pandemonium
ensued. Shocked and hurt, plaintiffs managed to crawl under
the fallen ceiling. As soon as they were able to get out to the
street they walked the nearby FEU Hospital where they were
confined and treated for one (1) day.
The next day, they transferred to the UST hospital. Plaintiff
Gloria Chatto was treated in said hospital from June 5 to June
19 and plaintiff Lina Delza Chatto from June 5 to 11.
Defendant tried to avoid liability by alleging that the collapse
of the ceiling of its theater was done due to force majeure. It
maintained that its theater did not suffer from any structural
or construction defect.
Issue:
WON the collapse was due to force majeure?
Held:
NO- Petitioner's claim that the collapse of the ceiling of the
theater's balcony was due toforce majeure is not even
founded on facts because its own witness, Mr. Jesus Lim Ong,
admitted that "he could not give any reason why the ceiling
collapsed." Having interposed it as a defense, it had the
burden to prove that the collapse was indeed caused by force
majeure. It is settled that the owner or proprietor of a place
of public amusement impliedly warrants that the premises,
appliances and amusement devices are safe for the purpose
for which they are designed, the doctrine being subject to no

other exception or qualification than that he does not

contract against unknown defects not discoverable by
ordinary or reasonable means.
This implied warranty has given rise to the rule that where a
patron of a theater or other place of public amusement is
injured, and the thing that caused the injury is wholly and
exclusively under the control and management of the
defendant, and the accident is such as in the ordinary course
of events would not have happened if proper care had been
exercised, its occurrence raises a presumption or permits of
an inference of negligence on the part of the defendant.

15.

Servando vs. Phil Steam

Appellees' claims for the value of said goods were rejected by

the appellant on the bases of the foregoing facts; the lower
court rendered a decision, ordering Philippine Steam to pay
for damages. The court a quo held that the delivery of the
shipment in question to the warehouse of the Bureau of
Customs is not the delivery contemplated by Article 1736;
and since the burning of the warehouse occurred before
actual or constructive delivery of the goods to the appellees,
the loss is chargeable against the appellant.
Philippine Steam on the other hand relies on the following:
Clause 14. Carrier shall not be responsible for loss or damage
to shipments billed 'owner's risk' unless such loss or damage
is due to negligence of carrier. Nor shall carrier be
responsible for loss or damage caused by force majeure,
dangers or accidents of the sea or other waters; war; public
enemies; fire .

Facts:

Issue:

On November 6, 1963, appellees Clara Uy Bico and Amparo

Servando loaded on board the appellant's vessel for carriage
from Manila to Pulupandan, Negros Occidental several
cargoes (cavans of rice, colored papers, toys etc) as
evidenced by the corresponding bills of lading issued by the
appellant.

WON the above stipulation validly limits the liability of the

ship owner in this case?

Upon arrival of the vessel at Pulupandan, in the morning of

November18, 1963, the cargoes were discharged, complete
and in good order, unto the warehouse of the Bureau of
Customs.
At about 2:00 in the afternoon of the same day, said
warehouse was razed by a fire of unknown origin, destroying
appellees' cargoes. Before the fire, however, appellee Uy
Bico was able to take delivery of 907 cavans of rice.

Held:
YES- The parties may stipulate anything in the contract for so
long as the stipulation is not contrary to law, morals, public
policy. The stipulation which merely iterates the principle of
caso fortuito is for all intents and purposes valid.
We sustain the validity of the above stipulation; there is
nothing therein that is contrary to law, morals or public
policy. Appellees would contend that the above stipulation
does not bind them because it was printed in fine letters on
the back-of the bills of lading; and that they did not sign the
same.

This argument overlooks the pronouncement of this Court in

Ong Yiu vs. Court of Appeals, promulgated June 29, 1979,
where the Court held that while it may be true that petitioner
had not signed the plane ticket , he is nevertheless bound by
the provisions thereof. 'Such provisions have been held to be
a part of the contract of carriage, and valid and binding upon
the passenger regardless of the latter's lack of knowledge or
assent to the regulation'.
Thus, where fortuitous event or force majeure is the
immediate and proximate cause of the loss, the obligor is
exempt from liability for non-performance.
Separate Opinion: Aquino ( Concur)
I concur. Under article 1738 of the Civil Code "the
extraordinary liability of the common carrier continues to be
operative even during the time the goods are stored in the
warehouse of the carrier at the place of destination, until the
consignee has been advised of the arrival of the goods and
has had reasonable opportunity thereafter to remove them or
otherwise dispose of them".
From the time the goods in question were deposited in the
Bureau of Customs' warehouse in the morning of their arrival
up to two o' clock in the afternoon of the same day, when the
warehouse was burned, Amparo C. Servando and Clara Uy
Bico, the consignees, had reasonable opportunity to remove
the goods. Clara had removed more than one-half of the rice
consigned to her.
Moreover, the shipping company had no more control and
responsibility over the goods after they were deposited in the
customs warehouse by the arresters and stevedoring
operator.

No amount of extraordinary diligence on the part of the

carrier could have prevented the loss of the goods by fire
which was of accidental origin.

16.
National Power vs. CA
DAVIDE JR; May 21, 1993
Nature: Petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45
of the Revised Rules of Court
Facts:
When the water level in the Angat dam went beyond the
allowable limit at the height of typhoon Kading, NPC opened
three of the dams spillways to release the e x c e s s
water in the dam. This however caused the
inundation of the banks of the Angat River which caused
persons and animals to drown and properties to be
washed away.
The flooding was purportedly caused by the negligent
release by the defendants of water through the spillways of
the Angst Dam (Hydroelectric Plant).
Plaintiffs claim that NPC operated and maintained a multipurpose hydroelectric plant in the Angat River- despite the
defendants' knowledge of the impending entry of typhoon
"Kading," they failed to exercise due diligence in monitoring
the water level at the dam- when the said water level went
beyond the maximum allowable limit at the height of the
typhoon, the defendants suddenly, negligently and recklessly
opened three (3) of the dam's spillways, thereby releasing a
large amount of water which inundated the banks of the
Angat River causing the death of members of the household
of the plaintiffs, together with their animals
Respondents comments that NPC exercised due care,
diligence and prudence in the operation and maintenance of
the hydroelectric plant. NPC exercised the diligence of a
good father in the selection of its employees written
notices were sent to the diff erent municipalities of
Bulacan warning the residents therein about the impending

release of a large volume of water with the onset of typhoon

"Kading" and advising them to take the necessary
Precautions.
The water released during the typhoon was needed to
prevent the collapse of the dam and avoid greater damage to
people and property- in spite of the precautions undertaken
and the diligence exercised, they could still not contain or
control the flood that resulted.
The damages incurred by the private respondents were
caused by a fortuitous event or force majeure and are in the
nature and character of damnum absqueinjuria.
Issue:
WON NPC was guilty of negligence?
Held:
YES- The court declared that the proximate cause of the loss
and damage sustained by the plaintiffs therein was the
negligence of the petitioners. The petitioners were guilty of
"patent gross and evident lack of foresight, imprudence and
negligence in the management and operation of Angat Dam,"
and that "the extent of the opening of the spillways, and the
magnitude of the water released, are all but products of
defendants-appellees
heedlessness,
slovenliness,
and
carelessness." and that the 24 October 1978 'early warning
notice" supposedly sent to the affected municipalities, the
same notice involved in the case at bar, was insufficient.
17.

Southeastern College vs. CA

Nature: Petition for review seeking to set aside the Decision

promulgated on July 31, 1996, and Resolution dated
September 12, 1996 of the Court of Appeals in Juanitade
Jesus vda. de Dimaano, et al. vs Southeastern College, Inc.,
which reduced the moral damages awarded below from
P1,000,000.00 to P200,000.00. The Resolution under attack
denied petitioners motion for reconsideration.

Facts:
Private respondents are owners of a house at 326College
Road, Pasay City, while petitioner owns a four-storey school
building along the same College Road. On October 11, 1989,
at about 6:30 in the morning, a powerful typhoon Saling hit
Metro Manila. Buffeted by very strong winds, the roof of
petitioners building was partly ripped off and blown away,
landing on and destroying portions of the roofing of private
respondents house. After the typhoon had passed an ocular
inspection of the destroyed buildings was conducted by a
team of engineers headed by the city building official, Engr.
Jesus L. Reyna.
It then recommended that to avoid any further loss and
damage to lives, limbs and property of persons living in the
vicinity, the fourth floor of subject school building be
declared as a structural hazard.- In their Complaint
Private respondents alleged that the damage to their house
rendered the same uninhabitable, forcing them to stay
temporarily in others houses. And so they sought to recover
from
petitioner
P117,116.00,
as
actual
damages,
P1,000,000.00,
as
moral
damages,P300,000.00,
as
exemplary damages and P100,000.00,for and as attorneys
fees; plus costs.
In its Answer, petitioner averred that subject school building
had withstood several devastating typhoons and other
calamities in the past, without its roofing or any portion
thereof giving way; that it has not been remiss in its
responsibility to see to it that said school building, which
houses school children, faculty members, and employees, is
in tip-top condition; and furthermore, typhoon Saling was
an act of God and therefore beyond human control such
that petitioner cannot be answerable for the damages
wrought thereby, absent any negligence on its part.- The Trial

Court and the Court of Appeals gave credence to the ocular

inspection made by the city engineer. Thus, this appeal.
Issue:
WON the damage on the roof of the building of private
respondents resulting from the impact of the falling portions
of the school buildings roof ripped off by the strong winds of
typhoon Saling, was, within legal contemplation, due to
fortuitous event?

Held:
YES- Petitioner cannot be held liable for the damages
suffered by the private respondents. This conclusion finds
support in Article 1174 of the Civil Code, which provides:
Art 1174. Except in cases expressly specified by the law, or
when it is otherwise declared by stipulation, or when the
nature of the obligation requires the assumption of risk, no
person shall be responsible for those events which could not
be foreseen, or which, though foreseen, were inevitable.
The antecedent of fortuitous event or caso fortuito is found in
the Partidas which defines it as an event which takes place
by accident and could not have been foreseen.

Escriche elaborates it as an unexpected event or act of God

which could neither be foreseen nor resisted. Civilist
Arturo M. Tolentino adds that fortuitous events may be
produced by two general causes:
(1) by nature, such as
epidemics, fires, etc. and

earthquakes,

storms,

floods,

(2)by the act of man, such as an armed invasion, attack by

bandits, governmental prohibitions, robbery, etc.
In order that a fortuitous event may exempt a person from
liability, it is necessary that he be free from any previous
negligence or misconduct by reason of which the loss may
have been occasioned.. An act of God cannot be invoked for
the protection of a person who has been guilty of gross
negligence in not trying to forestall its possible adverse
consequences. When a persons negligence concurs with an
act of God in producing damage or injury to another, such
person is not exempt from liability by showing that the
immediate or proximate cause of the damage or injury was a
fortuitous event. When the effect is found to be partly the
result of the participation of man whether it be from active
intervention, or neglect, or failure to act the whole
occurrence is hereby humanized, and removed from the rules
applicable to acts of God.