POWER OF EMINENT DOMAIN

Requisites of valid exercise of Eminent Domain [NP-TPJ]:

1.NECESSITY - there must be genuine necessity and must be of public character
when exercise by a legislature it is a political question
when exercise by a delegate it is a justiciable question (to determine the adequacy of the compensation; the necessity of
taking; and public use character
2.PROPERTY
GENERAL RULE - anything that can come under the dominion of man is subject to expropriation
XCPNS: money and choses in action (personal rights not reduced into possession such as the right to bring an action to
recover debt)
Private property already devoted to public use cannot be expropriated by a delegate acting under a general
grant of authority.
3.TAKING
requisites of a valid taking [EM-LPD]
a.[E] expropriator must enter a private property
2.[M] entry must be for more than a momentary period
3.[L] entry must be under the warrant of legal authority
4.[P] entry is for public use
5.[D] the owner is deprived of enjoying his property
TAKING UNDER EMINENT DOMAIN
TAKING IN POLICE POWER
the prejudice suffered by the individual property owner is
the individual suffers more than his aliquot part of the
shared in common with the rest of the community
damages
4. PUBLIC USE
whatever may be beneficially employed for the general welfare and it includes both direct or indirect benefit or advantage
to the public
5

JUST COMPENSATION
full and fair equivalent of the property taken; that sum of money which a person, desirous but not compelled to buy, and an
owner, willing but not compelled to sell, would agree on as a price to be given and received therefor
WHERE ONLY PART OF HE PROPERTY IS EXPROPRIATED : entitlement to consequential damages, if any+
consequential benefits must be deducted from the total compensation provided consequential benefits does not exceed
consequential damages
Payment of the correct amount + Payment within a reasonable time
FORM OF COMPENSATION :* money (However, in Assoc. of Small Landowners vs Sec. of Agrarian Reform,

payment is allowed to be made partly in bonds because it deals with a revolutionary kind of
expropriation)
TRANSFER OF TITLE- Payment of just compensation before title is transferred
RECKONING POINT OF MARKET VALUE OF PROPERTY :either as of the date of taking or filing of the complaint,
whichever comes first
ENTITLEMENT TO INTEREST:
General Rule: when there is delay, there must be interest by way of damages (Art. 2209, CC)
XCPN: when waived by not claiming the interest
PAYMENT OF TAXES: Taxes paid from the time of the taking until the transfer of the title, during which the owner did not
enjoy any beneficial use of the property, are reimbursable by the expropriator.
RIGHT OF LANDOWNER IN CASE OF NON-PAYMENT
General Rule: landowner is not entitled to recover possession of the property, but only to demand payment
XCPN: when the government failed to pay just compensation within 5 years from the finality of judgment in
expropriation proceedings, there is a right to recover property
CASES:
1. Amigable vs. Cuenca
Facts:
Victoria Amigable is the registered owner of Lot No. 639. Without prior expropriation or negotiated sale, the government used
a portion of said lot for the construction of the Mango and Gorordo Avenues. The Amigables lawyer wrote the President
requesting for payment of the portion of her lot which had been appropriated by the government. The claim was indorsed to
the Auditor General who disallowed it. Amigable then filed a complaint for the recovery of ownership and possession of said
lots.

The defendants on the other hand filed a joint answer denying the material allegations in the complaint arguing among others
that the action was premature since it was not filed first before the Office of the Auditor General and that the right of action for
the recovery of any amount, if any, had already prescribed.

The trial court ruled in favor of the defendants and the complaint was dismissed. The case was then elevated to the CA which
subsequently certified the case to the SC, there being no question of fact involved.
Issue:
WON the petitioner is entitled to a just compensation for the poritoin of her lot expropriated by the government despite the fact
that it wa snot filed first before the Office of the Auditor General
Held:
Yes, because where there is taking in the constitutional sense, the property owner need not file a claim for just compensation
with the Office of the Auditor General; he may go directly to court to demand payment. Considering further that no annotation
in favor of the government appears at the back of her certificate of title and that she has not executed any deed of
conveyance of any portion of her lot to the government, Amigable remains to be the owner of the whole lot. As registered
owner, she could bring an action to recover possession of the portion of land in question at any time because possession is
one of the attributes of ownership. However, since restoration of possession of said portion by the government is neither
convenient nor feasible at this time because it is now and has been used for road purposes, the only relief available is for the
government to make due compensation.
2. Manosca vs. Court of Appeals
Facts:
Petitioners inherited a piece of land. This land was then declared by the National Historical Instituted as a national historical
landmark because it was the site of the birth of Felix Manila, the found of INC. The government then filed an action to
appropriate the land to set up a marker. Petitioners then moved for the dismissal of the complaint alleging that the intended
appropriated was not for a public purpose.
Issue:
WON the taking or exercise of eminent domain may be granted.
Held:
Yes. The practical reality that greater benefit may be derived by Iglesia ni Cristo members than most others could well be true,
but such remains to be merely incidental and secondary in nature and does not necessarily diminish the essence and
character of public use for the very the purpose in setting up the marker is essentially to recognize the distinctive contribution
of the late Felix Manalo to the culture of the Philippines, rather than to commemorate his founding and leadership of
the Iglesia ni Cristo.
3. Philippine Columbian Associaton vs. Panis

Facts:
Philippine Columbian Association, petitioner herein, is an owner of a parcel of land. Private respondents are the actual occupants
of the said parcel of land. Petitioner instituted ejectment proceedings against herein private respondents before the metropolitan
Trial Court of Manila in which a decision was rendered in their favor.

Private respondents upon the other hand filed with the RTC, a petition against the MTC and petitioner herein to enjoin their
ejectment from and the demolition of their houses on the premises in question.

The City of Manila filed also a complaint against petitioner before the RTC for the expropriation of lot subject of the ejectment.
Petitioner, in turn, filed a motion to dismiss the complaint, alleging, among others that the City of Manila had no power to
expropriate private land that the expropriation is not for public use and welfare for it is only intended for a few individuals, etc.

The RTC then issued an order declaring that the expropriation proceeding was properly instituted in accordance with law.
Petitioner filed before the CA a petition assailing the order. The CA. however, rendered a Decision denying their petition, hence
the case was elevated to the SC.

Issues:
1. WON the City of Manila has the power to expropriate private lands?
2. Whether or not the expropriation is for public use / meets the public use requirement?

Held:

1. The Revised Charter of the City of Manila, R.A. No. 409, expressly authorizes the City of Manila to "condemn private property
for public use" (Sec. 3) and "to acquire private land . . . and subdivide the same into home lots for sale on easy terms to city
residents" (Sec. 100). Thus, it has the power to acquire private lands in the city and subdivide these lands into home lots for
sale to bona fide tenants or occupants thereof, and to laborers and low-salaried employees of the city.
2. Yes. Through the years, the public use requirement in eminent domain has evolved into a flexible concept, influenced by
changing conditions. Public use now includes the broader notion of indirect public benefit or advantage, including in
particular, urban land reform and housing. Though it may be true that only a few could actually benefit from the expropriation
of the property, it does not diminish its public use character. It is simply not possible to provide all at once land and shelter for
all who need them.
4. Province of Camsur vs. CA
Facts:
The SP of the Province of Camsur passed Reso No. 129 authorizing the provincial governor to purchase and expropriate
property contiguous to the provincial capitol in order to establish a pilot farm for non-food and non-traditional crops and housing
project for provincial government unit. Pursuant to the resolution, the Province of Camsur filed two separate cases for
expropriation. Private respondents moved to dismiss the complaints on the ground of inadequacy of the price offered The
Province of Camarines Sur claimed that it has the authority to initiate the expropriation proceedings under Sections 4 and 7 of
Local Government Code (B.P. Blg. 337) and that the expropriations are for a public purpose.
The CA then asked the Solicitor General in which he stated that under Section 9 of the Local Government Code (B.P. Blg. 337),
there was no need for the approval by the Office of the President of the exercise by the Sangguniang Panlalawigan of the right of
eminent domain. However, the Solicitor General expressed the view that the Province of Camarines Sur must first secure the
approval of the Department of Agrarian Reform of the plan to expropriate the lands of petitioners for use as a housing project.
Issue:
Whether or not the expropriation of agricultural lands by local government units is subject, to the prior approval of the Secretary of
the Agrarian Reform
Held:
No. Section 9 of B.P. Blg. 337 does not intimate in the least that local government, units must first secure the approval of the
Department of Land Reform for the conversion of lands from agricultural to non-agricultural use, before they can institute the
necessary expropriation proceedings.
To sustain the Court of Appeals would mean that the local government units can no longer expropriate agricultural lands needed
for the construction of roads, bridges, schools, hospitals, etc, without first applying for conversion of the use of the lands with the

Department of Agrarian Reform, because all of these projects would naturally involve a change in the land use. In effect, it would
then be the Department of Agrarian Reform to scrutinize whether the expropriation is for a public purpose or public use.
As for the payment of just compensation, the rules for determining just compensation are those laid down in Rule 67 of the Rules
of Court, which allow private respondents to submit evidence on what they consider shall be the just compensation for their
property.
5. National Power Corporation vs Judge Jocson
Facts:
The petitioner filed 7 eminent domain cases in the acquisition of right of way/easement over 7 parcels of land in relation to the
necessity of building towers and transmission line for the common good. Initially, the values of lands concerned were based on
tax declarations which the petitioner paid. Land owners concerned asserted that the amounts were low and that their lands value
is more than what is being offered. The following day respondent Judge Jocson increased provisional values of sugar land
without hearing and directed petitioner to deposit the differential amounts to which the petitioner also complied with. Jocson then
ordered NPC to pay in full the amounts to the landowners 5 days after the 2nd order was complied with. He also refused to issue
a writ of possession until full payment. Petitioners allege that respondent Judge acted in excess of jurisdiction, in violation of laws
and indereliction of the duty to afford respondents due process when he issued said orders.
They assert that orders were not valid and the payment required for the lands specified therein were excessive and
unconscionable amounts. Additionally they state that his refusal to issue a writ of possession until full payment, even when they
had already deposited the provisional values, was a violation of the Rules of Court and of PD 42.
Issue:
Whether respondent judge Jocson committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction when he issued the said
orders.
Held:
The court ruled that PD No. 42 provides that upon filing in court complaints on eminent domain proceeding and after due notice to
the defendants, plaintiff will have the right to take possession of the real property upon deposit of the amount of the assessed
value of the land. The respondent judge failed to observe this procedure by his failure to issue the writ of possession to the
petitioner. Furthermore, the respondent judge erred in increasing the provisional value of properties without holding any hearing
for both parties. The instant petition was granted by the court setting aside the temporary restraining order and directing
respondent judge to cease and desist from enforcing his orders.
There are 2 stages in the action of expropriation:

1. Determination of the authority of the plaintiff to exercise the power of eminent domain and the propriety of its exercise in the
context of the facts involved in the suit; and
2. Eminent domain action is concerned with the determination by the Court of the "just compensation for the property sought to
be taken." This is done by the Court with the assistance of not more than three (3) commissioners whose findings are deemed to
be final.
6. Republic of the Philippines vs. PLDT
Facts:
Sometime in 1933, the defendant PLDT entered into an agreement with RCA Communications Inc., an American corporation,
whereby telephone messages coming from the US and received by RCAs domestic station, could automatically be transferred to
the lines of PLDT, and vice versa. The plaintiff through the Bureau of Telecommunications, after having set up its own
Government Telephone System, by utilizing its own appropriation and equipment and by renting trunk lines of the PLDT, entered
into an agreement with RCA for a joint overseas telephone service.
Alleging that plaintiff is in competition with them, PLDT notified the former and receiving no reply, disconnected the trunk lines
being rented by the same; thus, prompting the plaintiff to file a case before the CFI praying for judgment commanding PLDT to
execute a contract with the Bureau for the use of the facilities of PLDTs telephone system, and for a writ of preliminary injunction
against the defendant to restrain the severance of the existing trunk lines and restore those severed.
Issue:
WON interconnection between PLDT and the government telephone system can be a valid object of expropriation?
Held:
Yes. While the Republic may not compel the PLDT to celebrate a contract with it, the Republic may, in the exercise of the
sovereign power of eminent domain, require the telephone company to permit interconnection of the government telephone
system and that of the PLDT, as the needs of the government service may require, subject to the payment of just compensation
to be determined by the court.
7. Manotok vs NHA
Facts:
Petitioners are the owners of two large estates known as the Tambunting Estate and Sunog-Apog, both of which were declared
expropriated in two decrees issued by President Marcos. The petitioners contend that the decrees violate their constitutional right
to due process and equal protection since by their mere passage, their properties were automatically expropriated and they were
immediately deprive of the ownership and possession thereof without being given the chance to oppose such expropriation. The

goverenment however contends that the power of eminent domain is inherent and when the legislative or the President exercises
this power, the necessity and the fixing of just compensation become political in nature and the court must respect the decision.
Issue:
WON the NHA in the exercise of power of eminent domain violates the right to just compensation and to due process?
Held:
The challenged decrees are unfair in the procedures adopted and the powers given to the NHA. The Tambunting subdivision is
summarily proclaimed a blighted area and directly expropriated by decree without the slightest semblance of a hearing or any
proceeding whatsoever. The expropriation is instant and automatic to take effect immediately upon the signing of the decree. No
deposit before the taking is required. There is not provision for any interest to be paid upon unpaid installments. Not only are the
owners given absolutely no opportunity to contest the expropriation, or question the amount of payments fixed by the decree, but
the decision of the NHA are expressly declared beyond judicial review. PD 1669 and 1670 are declared unconstitutional.
8. Export Processing Zone Authority vs. Dulay
Facts:
The San Antonio Development Corporation was the owner of a piece of land in Lapu-Lapu City which the EPZA expropriated in
1979. The commissioners appointed by the trial court recommended that the San Antonio Development Corp. be paid P15.00 per
square meter. EPZA filed a petition for certiorari, arguing that under PD 1533 the compensation should be the fair and current
market value declared by the owner or the market value determined by the assessor, whichever is lower. The trial court denied
the petition.
Issue:
WON PD 1533 is the only basis in determining the market value of a land expropriated.
Held:
The method of ascertaining just compensation under PD 1533 constitutes impermissible encroachment on judicial prerogatives.
Although the court technically would still have the power to determine the just compensation for the property, following the
decree, its task would be relegated to simply stating the lower value of the property as declared either by the owner or the
assessor. Just compensation means the value of the property at the time of the taking. It means a fair and full equivalent for the
loss sustained. All the facts as to the condition of the property and its surroundings, its improvements and capabilities should be
considered. In this case, the tax declarations used as basis for the just compensation were made long before the declaration of
martial law when the land was much cheaper. To peg the value of the lots on the basis of those documents which are outdated
would be arbitrary and confiscatory.
9. Estate of Salud Jimenez vs PEZA
Facts:

Private respondent PEZA initiated proceedings on lot 1406 registered in the name of Salud Jimenez. More than ten years later,
the trial court upheld PEZAs right to expropriate, among other, the lot of the petitioner. Petitioner sought reconsideration alleging
that the lot would only be transfeered to a private corporation, and hence would not be utilized for a public purpose. The trial
court reconsider the otder and rleadt lot 1406 Lot A form expropriation while the expropriation of Lot 1406 B was maintained.
PEZA appealed the order to the CA.
Later on, the petitioner and PEZA entered into a compromise agreement. Said agreement became immediately final and
executor. The CA remanded the case to the trial court for the approval of the said compromised agreement. The trial court
approved the same.
However, PEZA failed to transfer the title of the lot. Petitioner thereafter filed a motion to partially annul the order. The trial court
then annulled the compromise agreement and ordered the turnover of the Lot 1406B to petitioner. The CA upheld the rescission
of the compromise agreement. However, set aside the order of the trial court regarding the turnover of the lot and ordered the trial
judge to proceed with the hearings of the expropriation proceedings regarding the determination of just compensation.
Issue:
Issue:
WON the subject of rescission renders the expropriation order over lot 1406-B null and void.
Held:

involve
two
(2)
phases.
The
first
phase
of
the
expropriation
right
of
plaintiff
(where
to
public
purpose
to
which
they
are
to
be
devoted
are
dismissal.
would
be
a
Either
final
one
order
since
it
case.
concerns
The
second
phase
determination
be
(3)
ascertained
commissioners.
by
three
It
fixing
the
amount
to
be
paid
to
the
defendant.
nothing
this
order
more
finally
to
disposes
be
done,
both
orders
the
remedy
therefrom
is
an
appeal.
phase
when
was
July
terminated
11,
expropriation
became
final
subsequently
and
the
parties
regarding
the
mode
of
payment
of
respondent
by
the
terms
failed
of
the
to
abide
petitioner
filed
an
action
partially
rescind
the
court
order
the
could
rescission
only
validly
of
anent
the
payment
of
just
subject
of
the
compromise.
clear
It
is
crystal
that
the
parties
limited
compensation
matter
of
just
to
petitioner.
is
with
not
the
closely
issue
intertwined
of
to
pay
by
respondent
will
also
nullify
the
right
of
No
statement
this
effect
was
mentioned
in
the
agreement
only
to
clarify
payment.
"original
demand"
Hence,
the
referred
to
compensation.
PEZA
failed
to
When
fulfill
its
434,
petitioner
can
again
demand
for
the
return
Lot
1406-B
of
the
expropriated
1406-B.
The court held that the rescission will not change the outcome since the compromise agreement was only about the mode of
payment and not about the right and purpose to expropriate the subject lot. Only the agreed form of compensation was
rescinded. Respondent has the legal authority to expropriate the subject lot because the same was for a valid public purpose.
10. Republic vs. CA and Heirs of Luis Santos
Facts:
Petitioner instituted expropriation proceedings before the RTC on a contiguous land situated along, Malolos, Bulacan, to be
utilized for the continued broadcast operation and use of radio transmitter facilities. The court ordered the plaintiff to pay the
respondent the just compensation at P6 per sqm with legal rate of interest from Sept 19, 1969 to 1979 until fully paid. Five years
thereafter, Pres. Estrada issued Proclamation transferring 20 hectares of the expropriated proeprt to the BSI and 5 hectares for
propagation of the Philippine Carabao. The remaining portions was retained to PIC. However, on 1994 the Santos was remained
unpaid. The RTC ordered the plaint to return the expropriated land to the original owner.
Issue:
WON the respondents are entitle for the return of the expropriated lots?

Held:
The respondents are not entitled to recover possession of their expropriated lots which are still devoted to the public use for
which they were expropriated. They are only entitled to demand the fair and market value of the same at P6 plus legal rate of
interest. The court held that the property has assumed a public character upon its expropriation and it is within the right of the
state to alter and decide the use of that property for public use.
market value of the land condemned, computed at the rate of six pesos (P6.00) per square meter, with legal rate of interest from
September 19, 1969, until fully paid.
11. Mactan Cebu International Airport Authority vs. Lozada, Jr.
Facts:
Respondent Bernardo L. Lozada, Sr. acquired Certificate of Title (TCT) No. 9045 pending the expropriation proceedings and filed
a complaint upon completion of the expropriation proceedings where said lot was acquired by the State for expansion and
improvement of Lahug Airport. The court ruled in favor of the Republic and ordered the latter to pay Lozada the fair market value
of the lot. Lozada and the affected landowners appealed. Pending appeal, a compromised agreement was entered into by the
government and respondents whereby the owners of the lots affected by expropriation proceedings would either not appeal or
withdraw their respective appeals in consideration of a commitment that the expropriated lots would be resold to the latter if the
improvement and expansion of the Lahug Airport would not be pursued. Hence, Lozada and company did not pursue appeal.
From the date of the institution of the expropriation proceedings up to the present, the old airport was abandoned and was
converted into a park.
Issue:
Whether or not the respondents are entitled to repurchase Lot No. 88 since the public purpose of the said expropriation
(expansion of the airport) was never actually initiated or realized?
Held:
It is well settled that the taking of private property by the Governments power of eminent domain is subject to two mandatory
requirements: (1) that it is for a particular public purpose; and (2) that just compensation be paid to the property owner. That the
taking of private property, consequent to the Governments exercise of its power of eminent domain, is always subject to the
condition that the property be devoted to the specific public purpose for which it was taken. If this particular purpose or intent is
not initiated or not at all pursued, and is peremptorily abandoned, then the former owners, if they so desire, may seek the
reversion of the property, subject to the return of the amount of just compensation received.
1. Respondents are ORDERED to return to petitioners the just compensation they received for the expropriation of, plus legal
interest, in the case of default, to be computed from the time petitioners comply with their obligation to reconvey Lot No. 88 to
them; 2. Respondents are ORDERED to pay petitioners the necessary expenses the latter incurred in maintaining Lot No. 88,
plus the monetary value of their services to the extent that respondents were benefited thereby; 3. Petitioners are ENTITLED to

keep whatever fruits and income they may have obtained from Lot No. 88; and 4. Respondents are also ENTITLED to keep
whatever interests the amounts they received as just compensation may have earned in the meantime, as well as the
appreciation in value of Lot No. 88, which is a natural consequence of nature and time