Critical Social Theory. An Introduction and Critique

London School of Economics
Critical Social Theory: An Introduction and Critique

Author(s): John P. Scott
Source: The British Journal of Sociology, Vol. 29, No. 1 (Mar., 1978), pp. 1-21
Published by: Wiley on behalf of The London School of Economics and Political Science
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British jtournal of Sociolog): Volume 29 J%umber I March I978
John P. Scott
Critical social theory: an introduction

and critique
ABSTRACT
This paper gives a systematic introduction to the major themes of

Jurgen Habermas' formulation of critical social theory. A discussion
of his views on knowledge, cognitive interests, and scientific method
is followed by an account of his social theory and his attempt to
combine Marxism with mainstream sociology. In criticism it is
argued that Habermas has not yet solved all the problems of a
'realist' approach to sociology and that his synthesis is incomplete.
It is argued that sociology can progress through a critical dialogue
with Habermas' work.
The aim of this paperl is to give an introduction to the thought of

Jurgen Habermas in such a way that those who are interested in understanding his ideas yet do not have the stamina to read all his available
work will possess a 'sketch map' of his version of critical sociology.
Hopefully, this will encourage readers to consult the original works.
Only on the basis of informed discussion can scientific advance be made.
The fate of complex writers is to be rejected rather than refuted that
is, they are disregarded because of their complexity and obscurity rather
than because of their lack of scientific rigour, validity, etc. The aim of
this paper, then, is to initiate fruitful discussion, to give a systematic
account of Habermas' ideas, and to suggest some important lines of
*
crltlclsm.
The work of Habermas has developed, along with that of his colleagues Wellmer and Schmidt,2 from the earlier work in critical theory
by Adorno, Horkheimer and other members of the Institute for Social
Research at Frankfurt.3 The work of the Frankfurt School relates to the
debates over 'scientific' and 'historicist' approaches to Marxism, and
over the 'Young' and the 'Old' Marx. The critical approach became
increasingly involved in philosophical debates in German sociology,
resulting in the now-famous confrontation between Adorno and
Popper.4 Habermas has continued this line of argument and has
attempted to develop a methodology for critical social theory through a
jrohn P. Scott
systematic reconstruction of the works of Hegel and Marx, and a

critique of 'positivist' and 'hermeneutic' interpretations of science.
I shall begin by considering Habermas' theory of knowledge and
then turn to his substantive social theory. Having discussed his fullest
and most systematic versions of epistemology and social theory, I shall
turn to his more recent considerations on methodology. Thereafter I
shall outline some criticisms.
HABERMAS ANALYSIS OF KNOWLEDGE
Habermas' theory of knowledge attempts to establish a connection

between methodological rules and 'knowledge-constitutive interests',
and to root these in a theory of social evolution. This is the basis of his
argument that epistemology today appears as social theory. Specifically,
he posits the notion of knowledge-constitutive interests as a link between
scientific methodology and social action. Critical social theory, which
embodies both a social philosophy and an empirical sociology, is the
standpoint from which these interests can be analysed. Knowledgeconstitutive interests, or cognitive interests, are transcendental: they are
fundamental orientations to knowledge and action which are rooted in
the underlying conditions of the evolution of the human species. Since
they are necessary conditions for particular types of knowledge,
Habermas sees his typologies of cognitive interests and types of knowledge as logically exhaustive. This analysis is based on a philosophical
anthropology which relates the diffierent types of knowledge to the
deep structure of human experience. Cognitive interests refer to the
link between the origin, application, and validity of knowledge, a link
which is brought about through the necessary embedding of knowledge
in experience and action.5
Habermas identifies three cognitive interests: the technical, the

practical, and the emancipatory. The technical interest refers to those
aspects of knowledge and action which are concerned with manipulating the environment and ensuring successful action; it involves gaining
and expanding control over natural objects and events. The practical
interest refers to those aspects of knowledge and action which are
concerned with attaining and extending understanding and consensus
in intersubjective relations so as to achieve community and mutuality.
At a more abstract level, the emancipatory interest involves liberating
men from historically contingent constraints through a process of 'selfreflection'. Whereas the technical and practical interests are 'primary
forms of cognitive world constitution', the emancipatory interest is a
derivative, 'meta-interest'.6 It is derivative in the sense that it is
linked with derivative types of action: exploitation and systematically
distorted communication; that is, it relates to situations where the
various sub-systems of a society are structured in ways which cannot
be rationally grounded.7 The technical and practical interests are aspects
Critical
social
theory
of the process of social evolution, where evolution is seen as the

emancipatory struggle of the human species.8 They must be comprehended as aspects of the meta-interest of emancipatory reason itself.
In his latest works, Habermas characterizes the cognitive interests as
deep structure 'rules' in the specific sense that Chomsky has given to
that term. Such rules are to be seen as invariant social universals, and
for this reason are transcendental to immediate experience. As aspects
of the deep structure of social evolution they make possible the surface
features of action and knowledge. Habermas argues that they are 'rules
according to which we constitute the world of experience',9 and since
they are not immediately given to consciousness they can only be discovered reflexively through a process of reconstruction. The epistemologist reflects on knowledge and action and so gives a rational
reconstruction of the underlying rules which are presumed to generate
that knowledge and action.
Habermas recognizes three types of knowledge based on the three
interests: analytical-empirical, historical-hermeneutic, and criticaldialectical. Analytical-empirical knowledge is that which is embodied
in the natural sciences. Theorizing consists of the construction of
deductive-nomological theories which 'fit' data derived from observation.l Analytical-empirical knowledge yields 'information' and is
structured into 'explanations' . Information is technically utilizable knowledge in the sense that its application can, in principle, expand human
powers of technical control and manipulation.ll Habermas makes two
major points about analytical-empirical knowledge: he criticizes the
'positivistic' interpretation of it, and he argues that it is too restrictive
for social phenomena. He argues that the dominant approach to the
philosophy of science has treated a distorted view of analytical-empirical
knowledge as the paradigm for all knowledge, and he terms this approach 'positivism' or 'scientism'. Habermas is critical of the 'positivistic
self-understanding' of analytical-empirical knowledge, which fails to
recognize its underlying technical interest.l2 But he argues that this
orthodoxy has come into question due to the works of Kuhn, Feyerabend, Lakatos, and Toulmin, and by works in the analytical philosophy
of language.l3 Additionally, he claims that Popper himself has been
consistently critical of elements of positivism, although he has never
taken these criticisms to their logical conclusion. Habermas' criticism
of the analytical-empirical approach in social science is that it is unduly
restrictive. Specifically, he criticizes its empiricism in favour of a
realist or essentialist position, according to which it is necessary that
theory grasps the real structure of the social totality.l4
The historical-hermeneutic knowledge of the cultural sciences works
through a 'cycle of interpretation' (the hermeneutic circle) in which
theorizing always depends upon a prior understanding of the object of
knowledge. It aims to relate ordinary utterances and social products to
the social life-world in which they are constituted. This is the method
jrohn P. Scott
of Verstehen.l 5 Historical-hermeneutic knowledge yields 'interpretations'

and is structured into processes of 'understanding'. Interpretations are
practically relevant knowledge, in the sense that they aid 'mutual
understanding in the conduct of life'.l6
Critical-dialectical knowledge is specific to social science and combines the other two forms of knowledge by recognizing their limitations
and the need to reconcile them in a higher synthesis. Examples of

critical sciences given by Habermas are psychoanalysis and Marxism,
although he claims that both Freud and Marx tended to interpret their
works positivistically. Critical social theory has both a philosophical

and a sociological component. Its philosophical component takes the
connection between knowledge and interests as it object, whilst the
sociological component examines the structures of the various forms of
society which have existed in human history. The two components are
linked, in as much as evolution is seen as a process of historical 'self-
formation'.l7 Critical theory aims to restore to men an awareness of

their position as active, yet historically limited subjects. In so far as it
discovers which forms of constraint on human freedom are necessary
and which are historically specific, it generates a critique of society: the
institutions of a society are compared with the objective possibilities

of human development, with the ideal of a rational society. In this way,
actors can achieve a historically conditioned autonomy and so engage
in rational social change. Therefore, critical social theory goes beyond
the nomological knowledge of the analytical-empirical approach in
order to discover when theoretical statements grasp 'invariant regulari-
ties of social action as such' and when they express 'ideologically
frozen relations of dependence'.l8 The result is a 'critically mediated

knowledge of laws'.l9 In achieving this it combines the understanding of
subjectively intended meanings with real causal mechanisms. Habermas
argues that 'By linking the method of Verstehen in this manner with the
objectivating procedures of causal-analytical science and by permitting
the realization of both through a mutually transcending critique, the
dialectical approach overcomes the separation of theory and history.'20
In so far as it embodies both information and interpretation, critical
knowledge is structured as an 'explanatory understanding'.
Habermas remarks-and this may surprise many of his critics-that

much sociology, recent German sociology in particular, comes very
close to his notion of critical social theory. He goes so far as to argue that
more attention should be paid to acquiring analytical-empirical know-
ledge of social regularities. Sociologists 'ought to devote all efforts to

acquiring more and better information of this kind'.2l German sociology
unlike economics and political science-has continued to place such
nomological information in the context of a historically oriented theory

of society which furthers the self-understanding of the acting subjects.
His reason for entering into 'the Positivist dispute' was that he wished
to criticize the positivistic interpretation of social science, and so
Critical social theory
prevent sociology from becoming just one more specialized technocratic

science. Critical social theory is not an ideal, it is an endangered reality.
Habermas aims not to reject previous approaches to sociology, but to
point out their limitations and to incorporate them in a broader
synthesis.
HABERMAS SOCIAL THEORY
The context for Habermas' social theory, and therefore for his analysis
of knowledge, is an essentially Hegelian notion of the evolution of the
human species as a process of formation, or education. Habermas argues
that this formation process operates through social 'media', i.e. basic
social mechanisms which underly different aspects of the process of
evolution. Habermas' thought on the social media has undergone a
number of modifications. It was not until he re-examined Hegel's early
philosophy that he succeeded in arriving at a coherent analysis of the
three social media of human evolution.22 His solution was to present
language, labour, and interaction as three social media, with 'domination' as a category referring to the specific historical distortions of
labour and interaction which arise in the course of social evolution.
In his analysis of Hegel's early philosophy of mind, Habermas shows
that, for Hegel, the evolutionary formation of self-consciousness
involved three fundamental aspects of 'Absolute spirit' which Habermas
identiSes as symbolic representation (or language), instrumental action,
and communicative action. Together, these define the two concrete
forms of 'Actual spirit': social labour (or work) and social interaction.23
In the concrete forms of human society, instrumental action appears
as social labour, and communicative action appears as social interaction. Whilst the abstract types of action are each separately constituted through language, the concrete types of social action are
dependent upon one another. Both the technical rules employed in
social labour and the norms of social interaction are formulated in
language, and the two types of action then enter into an interdependent
relationship with one another. On the one hand, the cooperation
necessary for social labour must be backed up by social norms; on the
other hand, mutual recognition in interaction depends upon the
recognition of rights of possession, and possession arises from the labour
process.24 Thus, the interdependence of social labour and social interaction in human evolution shows that emancipation must take account
of the interconnection between them. And it is on this basis that Habermas
justifies his argument that a critical social theory, oriented by an
emancipatory interest, involves the synthesis of the types of knowledge
generated through the technical and practical interests.
It is the types of action and social action which constitute the
scaffiolding of Habermas' work, and each must be discussed in more
detail.
jrohn P. Scott
s. Instrumental actions and the social labour process

Habermas sees instrumental action (tweckrationalitat) in terms of a
strict means-end relationship and strategic choice. The strategic element
involves analytical knowledge derived from formal calculations on the
basis of preference rules and decision rules; the means-end element
involves empirical knowledge derived from conditional predictions on
the basis of technical rules and observations. Instrumental action
involves the assessment of alternative choices in terms of the effective
control of external reality, although such actions may or may not
achieve the desired end. Contrary to what Habermas often implies,
this type of action is not defined in terms of the employment of accurate
analytical-empirical scientific knowledge. Rather, the action is defined
from the point of view ofthe actor in terms of Parsons' pattern variables.25
Instrumental action involves neutrality, specificity, universalism, and
performance. Habermas argues that the learning process involved in
instrumental action concerns the acquisition of problem-solving skills,
and that the failure of an action indicates the actor's incompetence.
The paradigm for instrumental action is the labour process, since it is
here that instrumental actions are most clearly and systematically
manifested. Labour is seen as the process which regulates the material
interchange, or metabolism, between man and nature: it is the process
of transforming the material basis through which the survival and
reproduction of the species is ensured.26
2. Communicative actions and social interaction

Communicative action is governed by consensual norms which define
reciprocal behavioural expectations. Such norms must be understood
and recognized as binding by the actors, and they are enforced through
the use of sanctions. It is this intersubjective understanding and
recognition which validates the norms. This type of action is not defined
as irrational, or even non-rational Habermas claims that it follows
'the rationality of language games'. Like instrumental action, it is
defined from the actor's point of view in terms ofthe pattern variablesthis time, affectivity, diffuseness, particularism, and quality.27 The
learning process involved in communicative action is the internalization
of motivations, and failure is indicative of deviance.28 The paradigm
for communicative action is the reciprocity and mutuality of social
interaction: the process through which the species constructs a consciousness of itself as a subject.
Each type of social action can be analysed in terms of the particular
social systems with which it is associated. Social interaction generates
an 'institutional framework' (or 'socio-cultural life-world') which is
particularly realized in systems such as familwr and kinship, although it
permeates the whole of society. The sub-system of instrumental actiorl
comprises the economy and the state apparatus, both of which are
Critical
social
theory
'embedded' in the institutional framework. As has already been argued,

labour and interaction are interdependent. However, Habermas
recognizes that the institutional framework has a certain 'priority' in
the constitution of society: 'Of course, only institutionalization can
guarantee that such [instrumental] action will in fact follow definite
technical rules and expected strategies with adequate probability.'29
Technical rules must be backed-up by the binding power of social
norms.
Political economy has as its object the social systems of instrumental
action and Habermas believes that Marx's critique of political economy
is the exemplar for critical social science in this area. From the standpoint of Habermas' Marxism, social labour is the universal element of
all social life through which man seeks to satisfy his basic needs. It
consists of the natural interchange between man and his environment.
This 'material' relation of man to nature is a condition of existence for
the individual, and is the dynamic of social evolution. Labour occurs
under definite historical forms, definite modes of production. It is in the
mode of production that the techniques of instrumental action (the
forces of production) are embedded in a particular aspect of the institutional framework (the relations of production). Marx's contribution to
critical social science was to show that in all known modes of production
labour was performed under conditions of an alienation from its true
nature as an expression of species-being. 'Exploitation' is any structure
of the relations of production which generates alienated labour. The
aim of the critique of political economy is to show that exploitation is a
historically specific form of domination which can be dispensed with in a
fully rational society.30
But Marx's critique of political economy was not a complete critical
social science. Whilst he criticized the form of domination found in
systems of instrumental action (exploitation), Marx did little to criticize
the form of domination found in systems of communicative action. He
examined the material and instrumental preconditions for a rational
society, but he did not discuss the forms of communication characteristic
of such a society. This is the task which Habermas sets for himself. His
aim is to construct an 'ideology-critique', a critique of systematically
distorted communication. Only in this way can Marx's critical social
science be completed. To this end Habermas has begun to construct a
theory of communication as such.
Habermas argues that the traditional hermeneutic understanding of
communication relies on the notion of 'communicative competence',
and that for this reason, the hermeneutic approach can be employed
only if actors are 'competent'. This leads him to the problem of defining
communicative competence. He criticizes Chomsky's model of language
for separating abstract 'competence' from actual 'performance'. Competence refers to an abstract system of rules based on an innate language
apparatus of linguistic universals; performance refers to the use of
,7ohn P. Scott
language in actual speech and is determined by peripheral psychological and sociological conditions which restrict the application of
linguistic competence.3l Chomsky's model requires that phonetics,
grammar, and semantics be rigidly separated from pragmatics. Habermas starts out by criticizing the application of this idea to semantics,
arguing that not all universal meanings need be regarded as innateeven though they are 'universal', they may nevertheless be culturally
determined. Universal meaning elements (for example, kinship terms)
may derive from features specific to culture, but which are common to all
cultures. Habermas attempts to show that communicative competence
depends upon both innate language capacity and certain socio-cultural
conditions. He argues that 'in order to participate in normal discourse,
the speaker must have in addition to his linguistic competencebasic qualifications of speech and of symbolic interaction (rolebehaviour) at his disposal, which we may call communicative competence'.32 Communicative competence is a set of abstract rules which
generate what Habermas terms an 'ideal speech community'. His
analysis relates to the intersubjective and institutional conditions which
make mutual understanding possible. People are not competent if
these conditions do not exist, and if people are not competent, their
communicative actions are systematically distorted. Traditional
hermeneutics needs to be modified so as to take account of this notion
of communicative competence. Where communication is organized on
the basis of social domination, rather than on the basis of a free community of speakers, hermeneutics gives way to 'ideology-critique'.
Habermas' next task is to give a more specific definition of systematically distorted communication. He argues that it can fairly easily
be recognized on the individual level, if, for example, there is a speech
disturbance due to a failure of the speaker to follow the normal conventions of his society. However, it can also exist where the normal
conventions themselves are at fault: 'Pseudo-communication produces
a system of reciprocal misunderstandings, which are not recognized as
such, due to the pretence of pseudo-consensus. Only a neutral observer
notices that the participants do not understand one another.'33 Habermas takes Freud's psychoanalysis as his starting point for an analysis
of this phenomenon and attempts to relate this to his notion of the ideal
speech community. This ideal rarely exists in actual social situations and
Habermas would argue that all known societies can be analysed as patterns of systematically distorted communication. It is worth quoting him
at length on the conditions which must be met for free communication:
An unlimited interchangeability of dialogue roles demands that no
side be privileged in the performance of these roles: pure intersubjectivity exists only when there is complete symmetry in the distribution of assertion and disputation, revelation and hiding, prescription
awnd following among the partners of communication As long as
these symmetries exist, communication will not be hindered by constraints arising from its own structure: (I) in the case of unrestricted
discussion (in which no prejudiced opinion can continually avoid

being made thematic and being criticized) it is possible to develop
strategies for reaching unconstrained consensus; (2) based on the
mutuality of unimpaired self-representation (which includes the
acknowledgment of the self-representation of the Other as well), it
is possible to achieve subtle nearness along with inviolable distance

among the partners and that means communication under conditions
of extreme individuation; (3) in the case of full complementation of
expectations (which excludes one-sided obliging norms), the claim
of universal understanding exists as well as the necessity of universalized norms. These three symmetries represent, by the way, a linguistic
conceptualization for that which we traditionally apprehend as the

ideas of truth, freedom, and justice.34
Where the intersubjective conditions of symbolic interaction (roleplaying) are not based on truth, freedom and justice, communicative
action is systematically distorted. Social interaction in real situations is
not primarily controlled by motives which coincide with the intentions
of the actor the greater the importance of those underlying needs

which cannot freely be converted into public communications, the
greater the degree of systematic distortion (i.e. the less 'competent' is the
actor). The degree of systematic distortion increases with the general

level of repressive domination in a society, the latter being dependent, in
turn, on the developmental stage of the productive forces and political
power.
My main aim in this paper is to outline the main features of

Habermas' approach to sociology, but some account must be given of
how he employs his particular orientation in studying actual processes

of change. In broad terms, the main problem of historical sociology, as
Habermas sees it, is the transition from traditional to rational society.
Capitalism is seen as the form of society which makes the first break
with traditionalism in the name of rationality. Habermas argues that
this process can be fulfilled only through the supersession of capitalism:
the full development of the principle of rationality is incompatible

with the capitalist form in which it was nurtured.35 The fully rational
society is the culmination of human evolution. To this end, Habermas
sees it as necessary to reconstruct the historical materialist account of the
stages of social development. A classification of stages must be based

upon the forms taken by both labour and interaction.36 Perhaps the
most important aspect of this scheme of social development is his
argument that it is important to distinguish 'liberal capitalism' from
'late capitalism'.
Each of the societal types which he identifies is defined by a parti-
cular 'organizational principle' which determines the patterns of
IO
jfohn
P.
Scott
exploitation and systematically distorted communication. In liberal

capitalism, the organizational principle was that of the market, which
gave rise to a class polarized society and to endemic economic crisis
tendencies. The system as a whole was legitimated in terms of the
apparent 'exchange of equivalents' which obscured the real exploitative
relations of the appropriation of surplus value. The development of
oligopoly and state intervention destroys this system and creates a
qualitatively new form of capitalist society in which many of the
original Marxian ideas no longer hold. In late capitalism, the economic
crisis tendencies can be resolved, but only at the expense of displacing
them to the political level. The state can regulate the crises of a market
economy, but only by creating persistent administrative and fiscal
crises for itself. At the same time, the end of the free market means the
end of its legitimating function. The advanced capitalist state faces a
legitimation crisis which can only be resolved through changes in the
structure of communicative actions. The principle of 'rationality' must
be extended from the sphere of instrumental action to that of communicative action: but the type of legitimation generated in an ideal
speech community would be incompatible with the exploitative
structure of capitalism. The capitalist system faces a dilemma: it tries
to continue without rational legitimation, or it brings into being a
system of legitimation which undermines it. At this point we reach the
frontiers of Habermas' work. This is the empirical and practical problem
to which all his work has been directed. His solutions to this problem are
only now emerging.37
KNOWLEDGE AND SOCIETY REVISITED: SOME RECENT

DEVELOPMENTS AND SOME CRITICISMS
Habermas' latest developments in the area of the analysis of communication have required a reconstruction of his epistemology. I
propose to examine the main themes of his arguments and to take these
as a starting point for a critical commentary on his work. His recent
developments in epistemology have centred around a distinction
between everyday communication and discursive communication.
Everyday communication involves a body of common-sense knowledge
which is the taken-for-granted context for experience and action. Both
social labour and social interaction are rooted in this immediate actioncontext of common-sense knowledge. Habermas argues that this body
of knowledge generates 'action-related interpretations of experience'.38
Discursive communication, discourse, takes nothing for granted and is
'argumentative reasoning'. Discourse involves a phenomenological
reduction in which everyday belief is suspended so that a thorough
investigation of knowledge can take place. Only through such a discourse can a rational, true, consensus be achieved.39
I I
The common-sense knowledge which is relevant to instrumental

action involves sensory experience on the basis of observation. The
experiencing of things and events involves no shift in orientation when
we move from the level of perception itself to the level of statements
about perception: both involve the description of sensory experience.
Description enables us to proceed to a causal explanation. The commonsense knowledge which is relevant to communicative action involves
communicative experience on the basis of understanding. The experiencing of persons and utterances does involve a shift in orientation
between first- and second-order constructs:40 first-order meanings
derive from participation in interpersonal relationships, whilst secondorder meanings involve the objectivation of experience into a 'narration', which is the basis of a narrative interpretation. The theoretical
propositions which are formulated in discursive communication are
developments of second-order constructs, and it can be seen that
Habermas' discussion of analytical-empirical science and historicalhermeneutic science relates to the differential rooting of these two
sciences in everyday knowledge. The notion of cognitive interest
expresses the conceptual link between theoretical discourse and every<
day actlon orlentatlons:
Statements about the object domain of things and happenings (or

about deeper structures manifesting themselves in things and
happenings) can only be retranslated into orientations governing
purposively rational action (i.e. technologies and strategies). Likewise statements about the object domain of persons and utterances
(or the deeper structures of social systems) can only be retranslated
into orientations governing communicative action.4l
We may now return to the emancipatory interest. This, too, links

the levels of everyday and discursive knowledge. At the experiential
level is knowledge related to actions which are aimed at the removal of
unnecessary constraints ('self-reflection'); at the discursive level is
systematic knowledge aimed at the explanatory understanding of social
evolution ('rational reconstruction'). Critical social theory, which is
based on the emancipatory interest, expresses the relation between
self-reflection and rational reconstruction: that is, it comprehends the
interdependence between instrumental and communicative experiences
in terms of a theory of society in which analytical-empirical and historical-hermeneutic forms of knowledge are synthesized. Self-reflection
relates to individual experience and development. It analyses the
impact of ideology and domination on personal awareness, it makes
transparent the previously obscured levels of experience, and it aids in
the direct liberation of the individual from quasi-natural constraints.
It is attached to individual learning experiences and is illustrated in
the therapeutic context where the patient gradually comes to accept
the 'correct' interpretation of his experience. Rational reconstruction
John P. Scott
I2
1lncovers the deeply rooted regulatory mechanisms which every indivi-
dual requires in order to engage in any kind of cognitive activity. It

discloses the sets of 'rules' (such as those of logic and linguistics) which
can universally be mastered-thus, Habermas formulates the 'rules'
real
labour process.competence as Marx formulated the 'rules' of the
of communicative
The least developed part of Habermas' theory of knowledge is his
discussion of the connection between theory and practice. The main
point of his argument is that an assessment of the validity of social
theory is not sufficient: the 'therapeutic' application of theory to
practice is a process of enlightenment which involves the 'authentication' of tlle theory by social actors. In its connection with an emancipatory interest, critical social theory aims to show particular social
groups that the theory can give them self-knowledge and that it is an
acceptable reconstruction of their situation.42 The important question,
of course, is that of which social groups the critical theorist is to enter
into dialogue with in order to authenticate his theory. For Marx, there
was little doubt that it was the proletariat, but Habermas argues that in
late capitalism the capitalist class relations are no longer actualized in
real social groups. These relations are latent within the society, but on
the surface there is a plurality of actual social groupings in varying
relations of consensus, competition, and conflict. The traditional proletariat is no longer the appropriate subject for critical theory.43
Habermas' conclusion seems to be that the empirical discoveries based
on critical social science will themselves point to the groups which offer
the most possibility as agents of social change.
Habermas further argues that critical social theory itself cannot yield
strategic and tactical knowledge: no science can replace practical
processes of will-formation and decision-making. The achievement of
authenticated knowledge produces an enlightened social group within
which the conditions of an ideal speech community are approximated,
and this is the condition for the achievement of a rational consensus
over strategies and tactics. Critical social theory establishes the conditions under which appropriate strategies can arise, but it cannot prejudge the outcome of practical discourse. The success of a strategy
should result in progress towards a rational society. Each stage in this
progress broadens the social grouping within which enlightenment
exists, and the end result is the recreation of the classical 'public sphere'
on the level of society as a whole. Far from being merely the depoliticized sphere characteristic of late capitalism, a true public sphere is
one in which open, practical discourse leads to a meaningful public
opinion.44 The society aimed at by critical social theory is one in which
rationality is fully realized; a society in which the public as a whole
determines its own future in a rational and autonomous way. Critical
social theory aims at a society in which men make their own history in
a full consciousness of their capabilities and limitations.
I3
Clearly, the plausibility of Habermas' remarks on the problem of

linking theory and practice depends upon his more general epistemology
and social theory. In so far as the cognitive interests are the 'deep
structure rules' which connect everyday knowledge, discursive knowledge, and the theory of knowledge itself, it might seem that they are at
the core of critical social theory. In a sense this is true, for the interests
are the threads which hold his arguments together. But in another
sense the interests are of quite secondary importance. His argument is
that the logic of particular forms of knowledge implies a particular
relationship between that knowledge and social life. As Habermas'
recent discussion of the connection between common-sense and discourse shows, forms of knowledge have a differential rooting in everyday
experience. Scientific discourse reflects upon problems generated in
everyday life and subjects them to systematic examination. Since social
actions are structured in certain ways, corresponding distinctions
within the sphere of knowledge will also be possible. The concept of
'interest' merely makes this connection clear. For this reason, any
criticism of the nature of the interests or of their number, must depend
upon a prior criticism of Habermas' conceptions of knowledge and
society. As Habermas argues: epistemology must be seen as an aspect of
social theory; social theory explains human evolution; and the cognitive
interests relate to the media of evolution.45 My critical comments,
therefore, concentrate on his analyses of knowledge and society, since
these are the real core of critical social theory. In particular, I shall
investigate two central problems: first, his view of knowledge in general
and of sociological knowledge in particular; second, his attempted
synthesis of approaches to social theory.
I wish to argue that Habermas has an inadequate view of the methodology of the natural sciences, and that this creates problems for his
view of sociological knowledge. Habermas sees the natural sciences as
generating analytical-empirical knowledge and his sole criticism concerns its 'positivistic' interpretation. Whilst he makes reference to the
criticisms of positivism by Kuhn, Feyerabend and others, he fails to
recognize that these criticisms are linked with those of other writers
who reject the 'empiricism' of the orthodox philosophy of natural
science. Basing themselves on the work of Harre, a number of writers
have formulated a 'realist' interpretation of natural science which
corresponds in all essentials to Habermas' realist interpretation of
social science.46 The realist position holds that analytical-empirical
knowledge fails to distinguish between providing grounds for expecting
an event to occur (ratio cognoscendi) and giving a causal explanation of
why the event occurred (ratio essendi), and that observational facts are
'constructed' rather than 'given'. Thus, an attack is made against both
the 'analytical' and the 'empirical' components of analytical-empirical
knowledge. According to the realist, science attempts to uncover the
real causal mechanisms which generate events in the world, and so
B
I4
jeohn P. Scott
attempts to order this knowledge in terms of a conceptual scheme.

Scientific theory aims to represent the structure of real factors which
operate with causal force. Habermas recognizes the importance of
arguments such as these for the social sciences, but fails to undertake a
sufficiently radical examination of the natural sciences.47 His view of
natural science takes over the very nominalism which many people are
*
now reJectlng.
At the same time his view of the historical-hermeneutic knowledge of
the cultural sciences takes over a relativistic, and hence nominalist,

view of knowledge. But if Habermas wishes to argue that the interpretation of meaning is a crucial part of critical social theory, he cannot
reject the idea that structures of meaning are real. It is difficult to see
how Habermas could synthesize two nominalistic forms of knowledge
and obtain a body of knowledge concerning real structures. However, if
it is accepted that the natural sciences and the cultural sciences must be
interpreted in a realist way, then a realist social science is once more a
possibility. Whilst Habermas' derivation of a realist sociology may be
at fault, it may still be that his project is feasible. If these qualifications
are accepted, it is possible to assess his views on the critical-dialectical
knowledge of the social sciences.
Habermas' view of sociological knowledge implies that the sociologist
constructs theoretical models which represent the real social structuring
of action which results from the operation of both natural, material

forces and cultural ideas. The basic problem of this argument concerns
the reality status of these models: is Habermas taking a materialist or an
idealist position? If he were to adopt a materialist view of theoretical
models he would have to argue that social structures, such as the mode
of production, had a material existence in the social world. But, it was
precisely to avoid this kind of materialism that Habermas, and the

earlier members of the Frankfurt School, attempted to draw on the
arguments of German idealism.48 However, the idealist position itself

can be no more acceptable than the materialist. If social structure is an
ideal entity which is not the arbitrary construction of an individual

theorist then it must be immanent in social action, though not present
in a material sense. Habermas tries to avoid the dilemma of materialism
versus idealism by basing his argument on structural linguistics. Just
as the linguist gives a rational reconstruction of the rules of grammar
which are inherent in speech, though they may not necessarily be
consciously apprehended by the speaker, so the critical social theorist
attempts a reconstruction of the rules of social grammar which are
inherent in social action. I have already shown that Habermas aims to

reconstruct the 'rules' of communicative competence and of the labour
process.49 Whilst this argument certainly clarifies the nature of the
problemn it by no means constitutes a solution. It is still necessary to
know the reality of the 'grammar' or 'rules' identified. They cannot
have a nominalist status as simple constructions by the theorist, since
I5
they are held to be real structures. But neither can they be seen as
necessary principles of the human mind, since Habermas has already
rejected this possibility and it would in any case preclude the discovery
of particular grammars relating to the specific stages of human history
which Habermas recognizes.50 Habermas has failed to solve the
problem of sociological realism.
Habermas is not alone in this failure. The problem is at the very

frontiers of knowledge and is being investigated by numerous writers.5l
Whilst we must hope for and expect a solution in the near future, it
must be recognized that there is no obvious solution at present. Habermas' problem is the problem of all realist positions and it is to be
expected that any attempt to resolve this problem will reflect upon the
issues which Habermas has opened.
The synthesis of substantive approaches to social theory which

Habermas has attempted to produce is perhaps the most striking
feature of his work, and is one of his most important contributions to the
contemporary sociological scene. Habermas' attempt at an integrated
social science has drawn on many approaches to sociology which are
generally seen as incommensurable. He considers the issues raised in
the systems theories of Parsons and Luhmann, the 'phenomenological'
works of Schutz and the ethnomethodologists,52 the hermeneutics of
Gadamer,53 and the philosophy and sociology of language.54 All this
work is discussed in the context of the debates bequeathed to sociology
by the classical works of Marx and Weber. It is this integrated and
coherent view of sociology, if nothing else, which should force us to
consider Habermas' work.55 In view of this fact it is essential to examine
the success of his synthesis of divergent sociological tendencies. Such a
huge task can only be introduced here, and I propose to examine two
interrelated problems: whether Habermas has reconciled the 'material'
focus of Marx's original theory with the cultural, symbolic focus which
he has taken over from phenomenology and systems theory,56 and
whether he has brought together the levels of social action and social
system, or, more broadly, atomism and holism.57 These problems can
best be discussed through a consideration of Habermas' concept of the
'institutional framework'. Habermas argues that the economy is
embedded in an institutional framework of social norms, through which
cultural values and meanings are structured and which 'guarantees'
that instrumental actions will follow technical rules. This will be
recognized as a version of Durkheim's classical argument about the
'non-contractual' element in contract. However, Habermas gives no
analysis of this institutional framework; it is used as an unproblematic
category. Whereas Marx took the three volumes of Catital to give a
detailed, but unfinished, analysis of what Habermas calls the 'subsystem of instrumental action', Habermas gives no comparable investigation of the institutional mechanisms of communicative action. His
discussion of communication and interaction is pitched at the level of
I6
jtohn P. Scott
individual action processes and he does not consider the structural

features of communication systems. Whilst the latter is central to
Parsons' sociology,58 Habermas does not follow him into this area. All
that Habermas provides are various scattered remarks.
At a number of points in his writings Habermas suggests, although he
does not explicitly develop the idea, that role theory can be re-interpreted in the light of his model of distorted communication.59 Modern
sociological analysis and he is presumably referring to the debate over
Dahrendorf's classic paper60-sees symbolic interaction in terms of role
behaviour, but the concept of role is not seen as being historically
specific. It is necessary to approach role theory in the same way that
Marx approached the theory of the market both 'role' and 'market'
are historically specific forms of action which are not applicable to all
stages of social development.6l Sociology tends to reify 'social role' and
so loses the historical, dynamic dimension. In order to relate this to his
communication theory, Habermas would have to argue that roles are
associated with particular vocabularies of motive, that actors are
constrained to express themselves in terms of these vocabularies, and
that they may internalize them and accept them as their own. In such a
situation any consensus will be 'false' owing to the absence of the
conditions of the ideal speech community: communication is structured
through the dominance of one class over another. However, Habermas
has, so far, spent little time in attempting to build such a bridge with
orthodox sociology. Habermas must continue to develop such themes.
He must recognize that the institutional framework is a structure of
objective relations between social positions, a structure which is constructed on the basis of cultural meanings and which provides the
context within which individual actions take place. Instead of concentrating on individual actions themselves he must investigate the ways
in which they produce and reproduce an objective social structure and
the ways in which this structure, in its turn, produces and reproduces
individual actions.62 Habermas fails to integrate the 'action' and
'system' levels and thereby fails to integrate Marxian political economy
with a theory of the institutional framework. In order to achieve such a
synthesis Habermas must not merely examine these problems at the
general theoretical level, he must also investigate the structure of particular social institutions and the mechanisms through which they
operate.63 This would require that he extend his analysis of 'systematically distorted communication' and 'communicative competence'
to a full analysis of the normative structures of the institutional framework.
CONCLUSION
I have argued that Habermas, lik-e many other writers, is grappling

with the very difficult epistemological problems of a 'realist' social
I7
Crztical social theory
science. To the extent that the problems of this position have been
clarified, Habermas has made an important contribution to their
solution. Equally, his attempted synthesis of social theories points

towards some fruitful developments in substantive sociological theorizing, altllough it cannot yet be regarded as a completed synthesis
Habermas' work cannot be accepted as it stands, since it involves
many serious flaws and omissions. However, his vision of an integrated
social science and of its contribution to the achievement of a rational
society require that we consider his work seriously and attempt to
correct it and develop it. Sociology can progress through critically
assessing the work of a writer such as Habermas. The aim of this paper
has been to introduce his ideas and to suggest some areas in which our
critical attention should be concentrated. Habermas is a difficult
writer to understand, but this should not result in his work being
ignored.
jrohn P. Scott, B.SC.(SOC.), PH.D.

Lecturer in Sociolog)s
University of Leicester
Notes
I. A much earlier draft of sections of
5. Habermas,'KnowledgeandHuman
this paper was delivered to David
Interests'. For a general discussion of the
Martin's Graduate Seminar on Socio-
cognitive interests see N. Lobkowicz,
logical Theory at the London School of
'Interest and Objectivity', and F. Dall-
Economics in I972. The present paper
mayr, 'Critical Theory Criticized', both
incorporates a more detailed discussion
in Philosophy of the Social Sciences, vol. ,
of Habermas' later works. I am grateful
no. 3 (I972)
to my colleagues in the Tuesday Evening
6. C. Lenhardt, 'The Rise and Fall of
Seminar at Leicester University, and
Transcendental Anthropology', Philosophy
particularly to Christopher Dandeker,
of the Social Sciences, vol. 2, no. 3 (I972),
for comments on a previous draft. The
p. 239s
works of Habermas are cited according

to their title; full details of publication
are given in the appended bibliography.
. For Habermas' work see bibliography. A. Wellmer, Critical Theory of
7. Habermas, 'A Postscript to Knowledge and Human Interests'.
8. T. Schroyer, 'The Politics of

Epistemology', International ffournal of
Sociolog)t, vol. 2, no. I (Winter I97I-2).
Society, New York, Herder and Herder,
Schroyer writes that the technical and
I97I; A, Schmidt, fhe Concept of Nature
practical interests are 'moments in the
in Marx, London, New Left Books, I 97 I .
dialectic of social evolution', but little is
3. For an account of the history of the
gained from this formulation. See also
Institute and the ideas of its leading
T. Schroyer, Ehe Critique of Domination,
thinkers see M. Jay, The Dialectical
New York, George Braziller, I973.
Imagination, London, Heinemann, I 972;
9. Cited in Lenhardt, op. cit., p. 242.
P. Slater, Origins and Development of the

Frankfurt School, London, Routledge &
See also Habermas 'A Postscript to
Kegan Paul, I977.
Knowledge and Human Interests'.
IO. Habermas has in mincI the so-
4. T. AcIorno et al., The Positivist Dis-
called 'covering law' paradigm of ex-
pute in German Sociology, London, Heine-
planation associated with writers such as
mann, I976.
Popper, Hempel, and Nagel.
Xohn P. Scott
Philosophy of Mind' eontains the final
I I. A useful discussion of this can be

found in B. Fay, Social Theory and
Political Practice, London, George Allen
version.
& Unwin, I 975, pp 29-47
aceuraey of Habermas' interpretation of
I2. Habermas, 'A Positivistically Bi-
23. I am not eoncerned here with the

Hegel. I merely wish to present his own
sected Rationalism'.
views of the nature of the soeial media.
I 3. T. S. Kuhn, rhe Structure of

Scientifiic Revolutions, Chicago University
Press, I962; I. Lakatos and A. Musgrave
and property in A. \V. Gouldner, 7Che
(eds), Criticism and the Growth of Knowledge, Cambridge University Press, I 970;
S. Toulmin, The Uses of Argument,
Cambridge University Press, I 964; J.
Searle, Speech Acts, Cambridge University Press, I 969.
I 4. Habermas, 'Analytical Theory of
Science and Dialectics'. It is interesting
to note that Albert sees Habermas'

argument as a 'blatant' example of
'social-scientific essentialism': see H.
Albert, 'The Myth of Total Reason', in
Adorno, et al., op. cit., p. I 69 n. Keat and
Urry see it as an argument for realism,
although they criticise him, as does
Lobkowicz, for failing to extend this
realism to the natural sciences. R. Keat

and J. Urry, Social Theory as Science,
London, Routledge & Regan Paul, I975;
Lobkowicz, op. cit.
24. Compare the analysis of morality
Coming Crisis of Western Sociology, London,

. _ elnemann, I 97 I n pp. 304- I 3 .
25. This eontrast between defining the
rationality of action from the point of
viess of the actor and defining it in terms
of valid scientifie knowledge has frequently arisen in modern sociological
thought. The main issues are covered in:
B. Wilson (ed.), Rationality, Oxford, Basil
Blackwell, I970; J. D. Y. Peel, 'Under.
standing Alien Belief Systems', British

Xournal of Sociolog)t, vol. 20, no. I (I969).
26. Habermas, 'Technology and Science as "Ideology" ', p. 93 for a general
discussion of the two types of action.
27. Ibid., p. 9I. For a very interesting

comparison of decision rules and social
norms, see A. Heath, Rational Choice and
Social Exchange, Cambridge University
Press, I976.
tradition of hermeneutics and of the

method of Verstehe can be found in W.
28. Habermas' sociology of motivation

is relatively undeveloped, but an approach which would seem to correspond
to his argument is Mills' notion of
Outhwaite, Understanding Social Life,

London, George Allen & Unrin, I975.
'Situated Actions and Vocabularies of
I5. A useful general account of the
I 6. Habermas, 'Knowledge and

Human Interests', p. 3 I I . Habermas
relates this tradition to the works of
Dilthey, Husserl, and Schutz. Botil
analytical-empirical knowledge and
historical-hermeneutic knowledge are
'vocabularies of motive': C. \V. Mills,

Motive', American Sociological Review, vol.
5, no. 6 ( I 940); H. Gerth and C. W.
Mills, Character and Social Structure,
London, Routledge & Kegan Paul, I954,
Chapter V, 'The Sociology of Motivation'.
aspects of what Max Horkheimer termed
29. Habermas, op. cit., p. 94.
'traditional theory'.
30. This seetion is based on: Haber-
I7. The German term is 'Bildung'.
mas, 'Teehnology and Seienee as "Ideo-
I8. Habermas, op. cit., p. 3I0.

I
9.
Ibid.
logy" '; idem., 'Beyond Philosophy and
Seienee: Marxism as Critique'; idem.,
20. Habermas, 'Analytical Theory of

Science and Dialectics', p. I40.
Knowledge and Human Interests, Part I.
2 I . Habermas, 'A Postivistically Bisected Rationalism', p. 22I.
Communieative Competenee'; idem.,
22. Habermas, 'Knowledge and

Human Interests' contains his first
formulation; idem., 'Technology and

Science as "Ideology" ' contains his
second discussion; idem., 'Labour and
Interaction: Remarks on Hegel's Jena
3 I . Habermas, 'Towards A Theory of

'Vorbereitende Bemerkungen zu einer
Theorie der kommunikativen Kompetenz'. Restrictions on the application of
hermeneutics are diseussed in Habermas,
'Der Universalitatanspruch der Hermeneutik'. For a general overview see T. A.
A1eCarthy, 'A Theory of Communicative

Competence', Philosophy of the Social
Sciences, vol. 3, no. 2 (I973).
32. Habermas, 'Towards A Theory of
Communicative Competence', p. I38.
33. Habermas, 'On Systematically
Distorted Communication', p. I I 7. An
example of the kind of sociology to which
this might lead is C. Mueller, 'Notes on

Repressive Communication', in P.
Dreitzel (ed.), Recent Sociology, Number 2,
London, Collier-Macmillan, I 970. See
also C. Mueller, The Politics of Communication, Oxford University Press, I973.
Communicative Competence', p. I44.
35. Habermas, 'Tecllnology and Science as "Ideology" ', idem., Legitimation
Crisis, Part III.
36. Habermas, Legitimation Crisis, pp.

I 7-3 I; idem., 'Towards A Reconstruction
of Historical Materialism'; idem., gur
Rekonstnxktion des Historischen AIaterialismus, Part III.
37. The major sources on this are:

Habermas, Legitimation Crisis; idem., gur
Rekonstraktion des Historischen AIaterialismus, Part IV. Empirical studies on
advanced capitalism influenced by
Habermas are beginning to emerge. The
work of Claus Offe is particularly important. See in particular: C. OSe,
'Political Authority and Class Structure'
(I969), in P. Connerton (ed.), Critical
Sociology, Harmondsworth, Penguin,
I976; C. OSe, Leistungsprinzip und industrielle Arbeit (The Achievement Principle
and Industrial Work) ( I 970), translated
as Industry and Inequality, London, Edward
Arnold, I976.
38. Habermas, 'A Postscript to Knowledge and Human Interests', p. I68.

39. Compare the notion of a 'Third
World' of 'objective knowledge' in K. R.
Popper, Objectiue Knowledge, Oxford

University Press, I972.
40. Habermas refers to A. V. Cicourel,
Method and Measurement in Sociology,
Glencoe, Free Press, I964.
4I. Habermas, op. cit., p. I75.
42. Habermas, 'Some Difficulties in
the Attempt to Link Theory and Praxis',
p. 32 ffW. Bauman discusses this but unfor-
tunately conflates the practical and

emancipatory interests: Z. Bauman,
Towards a Critical Sociology, London,
I9
Routledge & Kegan Paul, I976, Chapter

3. A useful discussion is contained in
R. J. Bernstein, The Restructuring of Social
and Political Theory, Oxford, Basil Blackwell, I 976, pp. 2 I 3-I 9.
43. Habermas, Legitimation Crisis, pp.

37-4I; idem., 'Technology and Science
as Ideology , pp . I 0 7-I O .
44. The nature of the public sphere
was the subject of Habermas' first book,
Strakturwandel der Offientlichkeit, and his
work since then can be seen as an exploration of precisely how a rational public
sphere is to be attained.
45. Habermas, Knowledge and Human

Interests.
46. R. Harre, An Introduction to the

Logic of the Sciences, London, Macmillan,
I 960; idem., The Principles of Scientific
Thinking, London, Macmillan, I 970;
R. Bhaskar, A Realist Theory of Science,
Leeds Books, I 975; Keat and Urry,
Social Theory as Science, op. cit.
47. I(eat and Urry, op. cit., p. 227;
Habermas, gur Logik der Sozialwissenschaften.
48. G. Lichtheim, From AIarx to Hegel,

London, Orbach and Chambers, I97I.
It is for the same reason that another
Marxist heretic, Louis Althusser, has
drawn on the rationalist and structuralist
arguments of French philosophy.
49. Habermas, 'A Postscript to Knowledge and Human Interests'.
Communicative Competence'; idem.,
Legitimation Crisis, Chapter 3.
5I. The contortions of the Althusser
school can be seen in this light: L.
Althusser, For Marx, London, Allen Lane,
I 969; idem. and E. Balibar, Reading
Capital, London, New Left Books, I 970;
B. Hindess and P. Hirst, Pre-Capitalist
Modes of Production, London, Routledge &
Kegan Paul, I 975; B. Hindess and P.
Hirst, Mode of Production and Social
Formation, London, Macmillan, I977.
52. Habermas, gur LogSk der Sozialwissenschaften; idem., 'Theorie der Gesellschaft oder Sozialtecilnologie'.
53. Habermas, 'Der Universitalitatanspruch der Hermeneutik'; idem., gur
Logik der Sozialwissenschaften.
Communicative Competence'.
jtohn P. Scott
20
55. The claim that Habermas is
merely an eclectic is argued in G. Ther-
& Kegan Paul, I968. See also, H. Popitz,

'The Concept of Role as an Element of
born, 'Habermas: A New Eclectic', New
Sociological Theory' (I967), in J. A.
Left Review, no. 67 (I97I).
Jackson (ed.), Role, Cambridge Univer-
56. Still the most relevant discussion

of this is D. Lockwood, 'Some Remarks
on "The Social System" ', British ournal
of Sociolog):, vol. 7, no. 2 (I956).
57. D. Lockwood, 'Social Integration
sity Press, I972.
and System Integration', in G. K.

Zollschan and W. Hirsch (eds), Explora-
62. The most sophisticated discussion

of these is P. Bourdieu, Esquisse d'une
thetorie de la pratique ( I972), translated
as Outline of a fAeory of Practice, Cambridge University Press, I977.
63. It is interesting to note that
Althusser has attempted such an analysis
tions in Social Change, London, Routledge

& Kegan Paul, I964; P. S. Cohen,
Modern Social fheory, London, Heinemann, I968.
58. In particular see T. Parsons, rhe

Social System, Glencoe, Free Press, I95I.
Communicative Competence'. Also,
6 I . For a similar argument from a

different point of view see T. Shanin,
'Units of Sociological Analysis', Sociology,

vol.6,no.3(Ig72).
of the family, the school, and the church
as components of the 'ideological apparatus'. Althusser, however, commits the
idem., 'Between Philosophy and Science:
opposite error to Habermas and focuses
Marxism as Critique'.
on 'structures' to the complete exclusion
60. R. Dahrendorf, 'Homo Sociologicus' ( I958); idem., 'Sociology and
of 'actors'. See L. Althusser, 'Ideology
Hllman Nature' (I963); both in Essays

in the Theory of Society, London, Routledge
and Ideological State Apparatus', in

Lenin and Philosophy, London, New Left
Books, I97I.
Bibliography of Major Works by Habermas 2I

This bibliography lists all the works cited in footnotes, together with other important
books and articles. The date given is that of the original publication, but publication
details are given for the most accessible English editions where appropriate. There
are two major collections of articles which have been published in English: foward
A Rational Society, London, Heinemann, I970; fheory and Practice, London, Heinemann, I973. In the following bibliography, articles which appear in these collections
are followed by the abbreviations fRS and fP.
Strakturwandel der bffientlichkeit (Structural Change in the Public Sphere), I962,
Neuwid, Luchterhand.
'Between Philosophy and Science: Marxism as Critique', I963, fP.
'Dogmatism, Reason and Decision', I963, fP.
'The Classical Doctrine of Politics in Relation to Social Philosophy', I963, fP.

'Natural Law and Revolution', I963, fP.
'Hegel's Critique of the French Revolution', I963, fP.

'Analytical Theory of Science and Dialectics', I963, in T. Adorno etal., fhePositivist
Dispute in German Sociology, London, Heinemann, I976.
'A Positivistically Bisected Rationalism', I963, in T. Adorno et al., op. cit.
'The Scientization of Politics and Public Opinion', I964, f2S.

'Knowledge and Human Interests', I965, reprinted as Appendix to Knowledge and
Human Interests.
'Technology and Science as "Ideology" ', I965, 2S.

'Technical Progress and the Social Life World', I966, f2S.
'On Hegel's Political Writings', I966, fP.
'Labour and Interaction: Remarks on Hegel's Jena Philosophy of Mind', I967, fP.
gur Logik der Sozialwissenschaften (On the Logic of the Social Sciences), I967, Revised
edition, Frankfurt, Surhkamp, I970.
'Der Universitalitatanspruch der Hermeneutik' (The Universality Claims of Hermeneutics), I967, in K. O. Apel (ed.), Hermeneutik und Ideologiekritik, Frankfurt,
Suhrkamp, I97I.
Knowledge and Human Interests, I968, London, Heinemann, I97I.

'The University in a Democracy', I969, fRS.
'Student Protest in the Federal Republic of Germany', I969, fRS.

'The Movement in Germany: A Critical Analysis', I969, f2S.
'On Systematically Distorted Communication', I970, in H. P. Dreitzel, Recent
Sociology, No. 2, London, Collier-Macmillan, I970.

'Towards A Theory of Communicative Competence', I970, in H. P. Dreitzel, op. cit.
'Vorbereitende Bemerkungen zu einer Theorie der Kommunikativen Kompetenz'
(Preparatory Remarks for a Theory of Communicative Competence), I97I, in
J. Habermas and N. Luhmann, fheorie der Gesellschaft oder Sozialtechnologie.?,
Frankfurt, Suhrkamp, I97I.
'Theorie der Gesellschaft oder Sozialtechnologie?' (Theory of Society or Social

Technology), I97I, in J. Habermas and N. Luhmann, op. cit.
fowards a Communication fheory of Society, I97I, Unpublished lecture notes.
'Some Difficulties in the Attempt to Link Theory and Praxis', I97I, fP.
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Critical Social Theory. An Introduction and Critique

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London School of Economics

Critical Social Theory: An Introduction and Critique

British jtournal of Sociolog): Volume 29 J%umber I March I978

Critical social theory: an introduction

This paper gives a systematic introduction to the major themes of

The aim of this paperl is to give an introduction to the thought of

systematic reconstruction of the works of Hegel and Marx, and a

Habermas' theory of knowledge attempts to establish a connection

Habermas identifies three cognitive interests: the technical, the

of the process of social evolution, where evolution is seen as the

of Verstehen.l 5 Historical-hermeneutic knowledge yields 'interpretations'

practically relevant knowledge, in the sense that they aid 'mutual

understanding in the conduct of life'.l6

and the need to reconcile them in a higher synthesis. Examples of

works positivistically. Critical social theory has both a philosophical

formation'.l7 Critical theory aims to restore to men an awareness of

institutions of a society are compared with the objective possibilities

actors can achieve a historically conditioned autonomy and so engage

in rational social change. Therefore, critical social theory goes beyond

the nomological knowledge of the analytical-empirical approach in

order to discover when theoretical statements grasp 'invariant regulari-

ties of social action as such' and when they express 'ideologically

frozen relations of dependence'.l8 The result is a 'critically mediated

Habermas remarks-and this may surprise many of his critics-that

ledge of social regularities. Sociologists 'ought to devote all efforts to

unlike economics and political science-has continued to place such

nomological information in the context of a historically oriented theory

to criticize the positivistic interpretation of social science, and so

Critical social theory

prevent sociology from becoming just one more specialized technocratic

s. Instrumental actions and the social labour process

2. Communicative actions and social interaction

'embedded' in the institutional framework. As has already been argued,

Critical social theory

discussion (in which no prejudiced opinion can continually avoid

is possible to achieve subtle nearness along with inviolable distance

expectations (which excludes one-sided obliging norms), the claim

conceptualization for that which we traditionally apprehend as the

of the actor the greater the importance of those underlying needs

actor). The degree of systematic distortion increases with the general

My main aim in this paper is to outline the main features of

how he employs his particular orientation in studying actual processes

the full development of the principle of rationality is incompatible

stages of social development. A classification of stages must be based

Each of the societal types which he identifies is defined by a parti-

cular 'organizational principle' which determines the patterns of

exploitation and systematically distorted communication. In liberal

KNOWLEDGE AND SOCIETY REVISITED: SOME RECENT

Critical social theory

The common-sense knowledge which is relevant to instrumental

day actlon orlentatlons:

Statements about the object domain of things and happenings (or

We may now return to the emancipatory interest. This, too, links

1lncovers the deeply rooted regulatory mechanisms which every indivi-

dual requires in order to engage in any kind of cognitive activity. It

the most possibility as agents of social change.

Critical social theory

Clearly, the plausibility of Habermas' remarks on the problem of

attempts to order this knowledge in terms of a conceptual scheme.

operate with causal force. Habermas recognizes the importance of

At the same time his view of the historical-hermeneutic knowledge of

the cultural sciences takes over a relativistic, and hence nominalist,

of action which results from the operation of both natural, material