27: [A.C. No.

4697, November 25, 2014 ]

FLORENCIO A. SALADAGA, COMPLAINANT, VS. ATTY. ARTURO B. ASTORGA, RESPONDENT.
DECISION
LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, J.:
Membership in the legal profession is a high personal privilege burdened with conditions, [1] including continuing
fidelity to the law and constant possession of moral fitness. Lawyers, as guardians of the law, play a vital role in
the preservation of society, and a consequent obligation of lawyers is to maintain the highest standards of ethical
conduct.[2] Failure to live by the standards of the legal profession and to discharge the burden of the privilege
conferred on one as a member of the bar warrant the suspension or revocation of that privilege.
The Factual Antecedents
Complainant Florencio A. Saladaga and respondent Atty. Arturo B. Astorga entered into a Deed of Sale with Right
to Repurchase on December 2, 1981 where respondent sold (with right of repurchase) to complainant a parcel of
coconut land located at Barangay Bunga, Baybay, Leyte covered by Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. T-662 for
P15,000.00. Under the said deed, respondent represented that he has the perfect right to dispose as owner in fee
simple the subject property and that the said property is free from all liens and encumbrances. [3] The deed also
provided that respondent, as vendor a retro, had two years within which to repurchase the property, and if not
repurchased within the said period, the parties shall renew [the] instrument/agreement. [4]
Respondent failed to exercise his right of repurchase within the period provided in the deed, and no renewal of the
contract was made even after complainant sent respondent a final demand dated May 10, 1984 for the latter to
repurchase the property. Complainant remained in peaceful possession of the property until December 1989 when
he received letters from the Rural Bank of Albuera (Leyte), Inc. (RBAI) informing him that the property was
mortgaged by respondent to RBAI, that the bank had subsequently foreclosed on the property, and that
complainant should therefore vacate the property.[5]
Complainant was alarmed and made an investigation. He learned the following:
(1) TCT No. T-662 was already cancelled by TCT No. T-3211 in the name of Philippine National Bank (PNB) as early
as November 17, 1972 after foreclosure proceedings;
(2) TCT No. T-3211 was cancelled by TCT No. T-7235 in the names of respondent and his wife on January 4, 1982
pursuant to a deed of sale dated March 27, 1979 between PNB and respondent;
(3) Respondent mortgaged the subject property to RBAI on March 14, 1984, RBAI foreclosed on the property, and
subsequently obtained TCT No. TP-10635 on March 27, 1991. [6]
Complainant was subsequently dispossessed of the property by RBAI. [7]
Aggrieved, complainant instituted a criminal complaint for estafa against respondent with the Office of the
Provincial Prosecutor of Leyte, docketed as I.S. No. 95-144. The Provincial Prosecutor of Leyte approved the
Resolution[8] dated April 21, 1995 in I.S. No. 95-144 finding that [t]he facts of [the] case are sufficient to engender
a well-founded belief that Estafa x x x has been committed and that respondent herein is probably guilty
thereof.[9] Accordingly, an Information[10] dated January 8, 1996 was filed before the Municipal Trial Court (MTC) of
Baybay, Leyte, formally charging respondent with the crime of estafa under Article 316, paragraphs 1 and 2 of the
Revised Penal Code,[11] committed as follows:
On March 14, 1984, accused representing himself as the owner of a parcel of land known as Lot No. 7661 of the
Baybay Cadastre, mortgaged the same to the Rural Bank of Albuera, Albuera, Leyte, within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court, knowing fully well that the possessor and owner at that time was private complainant Florencio
Saladaga by virtue of a Pacto de Retro Sale which accused executed in favor of private complainant on
2nd December, 1981, without first redeeming/repurchasing the same. [P]rivate complainant knowing of accused[s]
unlawful act only on or about the last week of February, 1991 when the rural bank dispossessed him of the
property, the mortgage having been foreclosed, private complainant thereby suffered damages and was prejudiced
by accused[s] unlawful transaction and misrepresentation.
The aforementioned estafa case against respondent was docketed as Criminal Case No. 3112-A.
Complainant likewise instituted the instant administrative cases against respondent by filing before this Court an
Affidavit-Complaint[12] dated January 28, 1997 and Supplemental Complaint [13] dated February 27, 1997, which were
docketed as A.C. No. 4697 and A.C. No. 4728, respectively. In both complaints, complainant sought the disbarment
of respondent.
The administrative cases were referred to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) for investigation, report and
recommendation.[14]
In his Consolidated Answer[15] dated August 16, 2003 filed before the IBP, respondent denied that his agreement
with complainant was a pacto de retro sale. He claimed that it was an equitable mortgage and that, if only

complainant rendered an accounting of his benefits from the produce of the land, the total amount would have
exceeded P15,000.00.

Report and Recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner and Resolution of the IBP Board of
Governors
In a Report and Recommendation[16] dated April 29, 2005, the Investigating Commissioner of the IBPs Commission
on Bar Discipline found that respondent was in bad faith when he dealt with complainant and executed the Deed
of Sale with Right to Repurchase but later on claimed that the agreement was one of equitable mortgage.
Respondent was also guilty of deceit or fraud when he represented in the Deed of Sale with Right to Repurchase
dated December 2, 1981 that the property was covered by TCT No. T-662, even giving complainant the owners
copy of the said certificate of title, when the said TCT had already been cancelled on November 17, 1972 by TCT
No. T-3211 in the name of Philippine National Bank (PNB). Respondent made matters even worse, when he had
TCT No. T-3211 cancelled with the issuance of TCT No. T-7235 under his and his wifes name on January 4, 1982
without informing complainant. This was compounded by respondents subsequent mortgage of the property to
RBAI, which led to the acquisition of the property by RBAI and the dispossession thereof of complainant. Thus, the
Investigating Commissioner recommended that respondent be (1) suspended from the practice of law for one year,
with warning that a similar misdeed in the future shall be dealt with more severity, and (2) ordered to return the
sum of P15,000.00, the amount he received as consideration for the pacto de retro sale, with interest at the legal
rate.
Considering respondents commission of unlawful acts, especially crimes involving moral turpitude, acts of
dishonesty, grossly immoral conduct and deceit, the IBP Board of Governors adopted and approved the
Investigating Commissioners Report and Recommendation with modification as follows: respondent is (1)
suspended from the practice of law for two years, with warning that a similar misdeed in the future shall be dealt
with more severity, and (2) ordered to return the sum of P15,000.00 received in consideration of thepacto de
retro sale, with legal interest.[17]
The Courts Ruling
The Court agrees with the recommendation of the IBP Board of Governors to suspend respondent from the practice
of law for two years, but it refrains from ordering respondent to return the P15,000.00 consideration, plus interest.
Respondent does not deny executing the Deed of Sale with Right to Repurchase dated December 2, 1981 in favor
of complainant. However, respondent insists that the deed is not one of sale with pacto de retro, but one of
equitable mortgage. Thus, respondent argues that he still had the legal right to mortgage the subject property to
other persons. Respondent additionally asserts that complainant should render an accounting of the produce the
latter had collected from the said property, which would already exceed the P15,000.00 consideration stated in the
deed.
There is no merit in respondents defense.
Regardless of whether the written contract between respondent and complainant is actually one of sale withpacto
de retro or of equitable mortgage, respondents actuations in his transaction with complainant, as well as in the
present administrative cases, clearly show a disregard for the highest standards of legal proficiency, morality,
honesty, integrity, and fair dealing required from lawyers, for which respondent should be held administratively
liable.
When respondent was admitted to the legal profession, he took an oath where he undertook to obey the laws,
do no falsehood, and conduct [him]self as a lawyer according to the best of [his] knowledge and discretion. [18]
He gravely violated his oath.
The Investigating Commissioner correctly found, and the IBP Board of Governors rightly agreed, that respondent
caused the ambiguity or vagueness in the Deed of Sale with Right to Repurchase as he was the one who
prepared or drafted the said instrument. Respondent could have simply denominated the instrument as a deed of
mortgage and referred to himself and complainant as mortgagor and mortgagee, respectively, rather than as
vendor a retro and vendee a retro. If only respondent had been more circumspect and careful in the drafting
and preparation of the deed, then the controversy between him and complainant could have been avoided or, at
the very least, easily resolved. His imprecise and misleading wording of the said deed on its face betrayed lack of
legal competence on his part. He thereby fell short of his oath to conduct [him]self as a lawyer according to the
best of [his] knowledge and discretion.
More significantly, respondent transgressed the laws and the fundamental tenet of human relations as embodied in
Article 19 of the Civil Code:
Art. 19. Every person must, in the exercise of his rights and in the performance of his duties, act with justice, give
everyone his due, and observe honesty and good faith.
Respondent, as owner of the property, had the right to mortgage it to complainant but, as a lawyer, he should have
seen to it that his agreement with complainant is embodied in an instrument that clearly expresses the intent of

the contracting parties. A lawyer who drafts a contract must see to it that the agreement faithfully and clearly
reflects the intention of the contracting parties. Otherwise, the respective rights and obligations of the contracting
parties will be uncertain, which opens the door to legal disputes between the said parties. Indeed, the uncertainty
caused by respondents poor formulation of the Deed of Sale with Right to Repurchase was a significant factor in
the legal controversy between respondent and complainant. Such poor formulation reflects at the very least
negatively on the legal competence of respondent.
Under Section 63 of the Land Registration Act,[19] the law in effect at the time the PNB acquired the subject
property and obtained TCT No. T-3211 in its name in 1972, where a decree in favor of a purchaser who acquires
mortgaged property in foreclosure proceedings becomes final, such purchaser becomes entitled to the issuance of
a new certificate of title in his name and a memorandum thereof shall be indorsed upon the mortgagors original
certificate.[20] TCT No. T-662, which respondent gave complainant when they entered into the Deed of Sale with
Right to Repurchase dated December 2, 1981, does not bear such memorandum but only a memorandum on the
mortgage of the property to PNB in 1963 and the subsequent amendment of the mortgage.
Respondent dealt with complainant with bad faith, falsehood, and deceit when he entered into the Deed of Sale
with Right to Repurchase dated December 2, 1981 with the latter. He made it appear that the property was
covered by TCT No. T-662 under his name, even giving complainant the owners copy of the said certificate of title,
when the truth is that the said TCT had already been cancelled some nine years earlier by TCT No. T-3211 in the
name of PNB. He did not even care to correct the wrong statement in the deed when he was subsequently issued
a new copy of TCT No. T-7235 on January 4, 1982, [21] or barely a month after the execution of the said deed. All
told, respondent clearly committed an act of gross dishonesty and deceit against complainant.
Canon 1 and Rule 1.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility provide:
CANON 1 A lawyer shall uphold the constitution, obey the laws of the land and promote respect for law and legal
processes.
Rule 1.01 A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct.
Under Canon 1, a lawyer is not only mandated to personally obey the laws and the legal processes, he is moreover
expected to inspire respect and obedience thereto. On the other hand, Rule 1.01 states the norm of conduct that is
expected of all lawyers.[22]
Any act or omission that is contrary to, prohibited or unauthorized by, in defiance of, disobedient to, or disregards
the law is unlawful. Unlawful conduct does not necessarily imply the element of criminality although the
concept is broad enough to include such element. [23]
To be dishonest means the disposition to lie, cheat, deceive, defraud or betray; be untrustworthy; lacking in
integrity, honesty, probity, integrity in principle, fairness and straightforwardness. On the other hand, conduct that
is deceitful means as follows:
[Having] the proclivity for fraudulent and deceptive misrepresentation, artifice or device that is used upon another
who is ignorant of the true facts, to the prejudice and damage of the party imposed upon. In order to be deceitful,
the person must either have knowledge of the falsity or acted in reckless and conscious ignorance thereof,
especially if the parties are not on equal terms, and was done with the intent that the aggrieved party act thereon,
and the latter indeed acted in reliance of the false statement or deed in the manner contemplated to his injury. [24]
The actions of respondent in connection with the execution of the Deed of Sale with Right to Repurchase clearly
fall within the concept of unlawful, dishonest, and deceitful conduct. They violate Article 19 of the Civil Code. They
show a disregard for Section 63 of the Land Registration Act. They also reflect bad faith, dishonesty, and deceit on
respondents part. Thus, respondent deserves to be sanctioned.
Respondents breach of his oath, violation of the laws, lack of good faith, and dishonesty are compounded by his
gross disregard of this Courts directives, as well as the orders of the IBPs Investigating Commissioner (who was
acting as an agent of this Court pursuant to the Courts referral of these cases to the IBP for investigation, report
and recommendation), which caused delay in the resolution of these administrative cases.
In particular, the Court required respondent to comment on complainants Affidavit-Complaint in A.C. No. 4697 and
Supplemental Complaint in A.C. No. 4728 on March 12, 1997 and June 25, 1997, respectively. [25] While he
requested for several extensions of time within which to submit his comment, no such comment was submitted
prompting the Court to require him in a Resolution dated February 4, 1998 to (1) show cause why he should not be
disciplinarily dealt with or held in contempt for such failure, and (2) submit the consolidated comment. [26]
Respondent neither showed cause why he should not be disciplinarily dealt with or held in contempt for such
failure, nor submitted the consolidated comment.
When these cases were referred to the IBP and during the proceedings before the IBPs Investigating
Commissioner, respondent was again required several times to submit his consolidated answer. He only complied
on August 28, 2003, or more than six years after this Court originally required him to do so. The Investigating
Commissioner also directed the parties to submit their respective position papers. Despite having been given
several opportunities to submit the same, respondent did not file any position paper. [27]

Respondents disregard of the directives of this Court and of the Investigating Commissioner, which caused undue
delay in these administrative cases, contravenes the following provisions of the Code of Professional Responsibility:
CANON 11 A lawyer shall observe and maintain the respect due to the courts and to judicial officers and should
insist on similar conduct by others.
xxxx
CANON 12 A lawyer shall exert every effort and consider it his duty to assist in the speedy and efficient
administration of justice.
xxxx
Rule 12.03 A lawyer shall not, after obtaining extensions of time to file pleadings, memoranda or briefs, let the
period lapse without submitting the same or offering an explanation for his failure to do so.
Rule 12.04 A lawyer shall not unduly delay a case, impede the execution of a judgment or misuse court
processes.
Respondents infractions are aggravated by the fact that he has already been imposed a disciplinary sanction
before. In Nuez v. Atty. Astorga,[28] respondent was held liable for conduct unbecoming an attorney for which he
was fined P2,000.00.
Given the foregoing, the suspension of respondent from the practice of law for two years, as recommended by the
IBP Board of Governors, is proper.
The Court, however, will not adopt the recommendation of the IBP to order respondent to return the sum of
P15,000.00 he received from complainant under the Deed of Sale with Right to Repurchase. This is a civil liability
best determined and awarded in a civil case rather than the present administrative cases.
In Roa v. Moreno,[29] the Court pronounced that [i]n disciplinary proceedings against lawyers, the only issue is
whether the officer of the court is still fit to be allowed to continue as a member of the Bar. Our only concern is the
determination of respondents administrative liability. Our findings have no material bearing on other judicial
action which the parties may choose to file against each other. While the respondent lawyers wrongful actuations
may give rise at the same time to criminal, civil, and administrative liabilities, each must be determined in the
appropriate case; and every case must be resolved in accordance with the facts and the law applicable and the
quantum of proof required in each. Section 5,[30] in relation to Sections 1[31] and 2,[32]Rule 133 of the Rules of Court
states that in administrative cases, such as the ones at bar, only substantial evidence is required, not proof beyond
reasonable doubt as in criminal cases, or preponderance of evidence as in civil cases. Substantial evidence is that
amount of relevant evidence which a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to justify a conclusion. [33]
The Court notes that based on the same factual antecedents as the present administrative cases, complainant
instituted a criminal case for estafa against respondent, docketed as Criminal Case No. 3112-A, before the MTC.
When a criminal action is instituted, the civil action for the recovery of civil liability arising from the offense
charged shall be deemed instituted with the criminal action unless the offended party waives the civil action,
reserves the right to institute it separately or institutes the civil action prior to the criminal action. [34] Unless the
complainant waived the civil action, reserved the right to institute it separately, or instituted the civil action prior to
the criminal action, then his civil action for the recovery of civil liability arising from the estafa committed by
respondent is deemed instituted with Criminal Case No. 3112-A. The civil liability that complainant may recover in
Criminal Case No. 3112-A includes restitution; reparation of the damage caused him; and/or indemnification for
consequential damages,[35] which may already cover the P15,000.00 consideration complainant had paid for the
subject property.
WHEREFORE, respondent is hereby found GUILTY of the following: breach of the Lawyers Oath; unlawful,
dishonest, and deceitful conduct; and disrespect for the Court and causing undue delay of these cases, for which
he is SUSPENDED from the practice of law for a period of two (2) years, reckoned from receipt of this Decision,
with WARNING that a similar misconduct in the future shall be dealt with more severely.
Let a copy of this Decision be furnished the Office of the Bar Confidant and the Integrated Bar of the Philippines for
their information and guidance. The Court Administrator is directed to circulate this Decision to all courts in the
country.
SO ORDERED.

28: [A.C. No. 9860, September 11, 2013 ]

JOSEPHINE L. OROLA, MYRNA L. OROLA, MANUEL L. OROLA, MARY ANGELYN OROLA-BELARGA,
MARJORIE MELBA OROLA-CALIP, AND KAREN OROLA, COMPLAINANTS, VS. ATTY. JOSEPH ADOR RAMOS,
RESPONDENT.
RESOLUTION
PERLAS-BERNABE, J.:
For the Courts resolution is a disbarment complaint[1] filed against respondent Atty. Joseph Ador Ramos
(respondent) for his violation of Rule 15.03, Canon 15 (Rule 15.03) of the Code of Professional Responsibility (Code)
and Section 20(e), Rule 138 of the Rules of Court (Rules).
The Facts
Complainants Josephine, Myrna, Manuel, (all surnamed Orola), Mary Angelyn Orola-Belarga (Mary Angelyn), and
Marjorie Melba Orola-Calip (Marjorie) are the children of the late Trinidad Laserna-Orola (Trinidad), married to Emilio
Q. Orola (Emilio).[2]
Meanwhile, complainant Karen Orola (Karen) is the daughter of Maricar Alba-Orola (Maricar) and Antonio L. Orola
(Antonio), the deceased brother of the above-named complainants and the son of Emilio. [3]
In the settlement of Trinidads estate, pending before the Regional Trial Court of Roxas City, Branch 18 (RTC) and
docketed as Special Proceeding No. V-3639, the parties were represented by the following: (a) Atty. Roy M. Villa
(Atty. Villa) as counsel for and in behalf of Josephine, Myrna, Manuel, Mary Angelyn, and Marjorie (Heirs of Trinidad);
(b) Atty. Ely F. Azarraga, Jr. (Atty. Azarraga) as counsel for and in behalf of Maricar, Karen, and the other heirs [4] of
the late Antonio (Heirs of Antonio), with respondent as collaborating counsel; and (c) Atty. Aquiliana Brotarlo
as counsel for and in behalf of Emilio, the initially appointed administrator of Trinidads estate. In the course of the
proceedings, the Heirs of Trinidad and the Heirs of Antonio moved for the removal of Emilio as administrator and, in
his stead, sought the appointment of the latters son, Manuel Orola, which the RTC granted in an Order [5] dated
September 20, 2007 (RTC Order). Subsequently, or on October 10, 2007, respondent filed an Entry of Appearance
as collaborating counsel for Emilio in the same case and moved for the reconsideration of the RTC Order. [6]
Due to the respondents new engagement, complainants filed the instant disbarment complaint before the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP), claiming that he violated: (a) Rule 15.03 of the Code, as he undertook to
represent conflicting interests in the subject case; [7] and (b) Section 20(e), Rule 138 of the Rules, as he breached
the trust and confidence reposed upon him by his clients, the Heirs of Antonio. [8] Complainants further claimed that
while Maricar, the surviving spouse of Antonio and the mother of Karen, consented to the withdrawal of
respondents appearance, the same was obtained only on October 18, 2007, or after he had already entered his
appearance for Emilio on October 10, 2007.[9] In this accord, respondent failed to disclose such fact to all the
affected heirs and, as such, was not able to obtain their written consent as required under the Rules. [10]
For his part, respondent refuted the abovementioned charges, contending that he never appeared as counsel for
the Heirs of Trinidad or for the Heirs of Antonio. He pointed out that the records of the case readily show that the
Heirs of Trinidad were represented by Atty. Villa, while the Heirs of Antonio were exclusively represented by Atty.
Azarraga.[11] He averred that he only accommodated Maricar's request to temporarily appear on her behalf as their
counsel of record could not attend the scheduled June 16 and July 14, 2006 hearings and that his appearances
thereat were free of charge.[12] In fact, he obtained Maricars permission for him to withdraw from the case as no
further communications transpired after these two hearings. Likewise, he consulted Maricar before he undertook to
represent Emilio in the same case. [13] He added that he had no knowledge of the fact that the late Antonio had
other heirs and, in this vein, asserted that no information was disclosed to him by Maricar or their counsel of record
at any instance.[14] Finally, he clarified that his representation for Emilio in the subject case was more of a mediator,
rather than a litigator,[15] and that since no settlement was forged between the parties, he formally withdrew his
appearance on December 6, 2007.[16]In support of his assertions, respondent submitted the affidavits of
Maricar[17] and Atty. Azarraga[18] relative to his limited appearance and his consultation with Maricar prior to his
engagement as counsel for Emilio.
The Recommendation and Action of the IBP
In the Report and Recommendation[19] dated September 15, 2008 submitted by IBP Investigating Commissioner
Jose I. De La Rama, Jr. (Investigating Commissioner), respondent was found guilty of representing conflicting
interests only with respect to Karen as the records of the case show that he never acted as counsel for the other
complainants. The Investigating Commissioner observed that while respondent's withdrawal of appearance was
with the express conformity of Maricar, respondent nonetheless failed to obtain the consent of Karen, who was
already of age and one of the Heirs of Antonio, as mandated under Rule 15.03 of the Code. [20]
On the other hand, the Investigating Commissioner held that there was no violation of Section 20, Rule 138 of the
Rules as complainants themselves admitted that respondent did not acquire confidential information from his
former client nor did he use against the latter any knowledge obtained in the course of his previous
employment.[21] Considering that it was respondent's first offense, the Investigating Commissioner found the
imposition of disbarment too harsh a penalty and, instead, recommended that he be severely reprimanded for his
act with warning that a repetition of the same or similar acts would be dealt with more severely. [22]
The IBP Board of Governors adopted and approved with modification the aforementioned report in its Resolution

No. XVIII-2008-641[23] dated December 11, 2008 (Resolution No. XVIII-2008-641), finding the same to be fully
supported by the evidence on record and the applicable laws and rules but imposed against respondent the
penalty of six (6) months suspension from the practice of law.
Respondent's motion for reconsideration[24] was denied in IBP Resolution No. XX-2013-17[25] dated January 3, 2013.

The Issue Before the Court

The sole issue in this case is whether or not respondent is guilty of representing conflicting interests in violation of
Rule 15.03 of the Code.
The Courts Ruling
The Court concurs with the IBPs finding that respondent violated Rule 15.03 of the Code, but reduced the
recommended period of suspension to three (3) months.
Rule 15.03 of the Code reads:
CANON 15 A LAWYER SHALL OBSERVE CANDOR, FAIRNESS AND LOYALTY IN ALL HIS DEALINGS AND
TRANSACTIONS WITH HIS CLIENTS.
Rule 15.03 - A lawyer shall not represent conflicting interests except by written consent of all concerned given
after a full disclosure of the facts. (Emphasis supplied)
Under the afore-cited rule, it is explicit that a lawyer is prohibited from representing new clients whose interests
oppose those of a former client in any manner, whether or not they are parties in the same action or on totally
unrelated cases. The prohibition is founded on the principles of public policy and good taste. [26] It behooves lawyers
not only to keep inviolate the client's confidence, but also to avoid the appearance of treachery and double-dealing
for only then can litigants be encouraged to entrust their secrets to their lawyers, which is of paramount
importance in the administration of justice.[27] In Hornilla v. Salunat[28] (Hornilla), the Court explained the concept of
conflict of interest, to wit:
There is conflict of interest when a lawyer represents inconsistent interests of two or more opposing
parties. The test is whether or not in behalf of one client, it is the lawyer's duty to fight for an issue or claim, but
it is his duty to oppose it for the other client. In brief, if he argues for one client, this argument will be opposed by
him when he argues for the other client. This rule covers not only cases in which confidential communications
have been confided, but also those in which no confidence has been bestowed or will be used. Also, there is
conflict of interests if the acceptance of the new retainer will require the attorney to perform an act which will
injuriously affect his first client in any matter in which he represents him and also whether he will be called upon in
his new relation to use against his first client any knowledge acquired through their connection. Another test of the
inconsistency of interests is whether the acceptance of a new relation will prevent an attorney from the full
discharge of his duty of undivided fidelity and loyalty to his client or invite suspicion of unfaithfulness or double
dealing in the performance thereof.[29] (Emphasis supplied; citations omitted)
It must, however, be noted that a lawyers immutable duty to a former client does not cover transactions that
occurred beyond the lawyers employment with the client. The intent of the law is to impose upon the lawyer the
duty to protect the clients interests only on matters that he previously handled for the former client and not for
matters that arose after the lawyer-client relationship has terminated. [30]
Applying the above-stated principles, the Court agrees with the IBPs finding that respondent represented
conflicting interests and, perforce, must be held administratively liable therefor.
Records reveal that respondent was the collaborating counsel not only for Maricar as claimed by him, but for all the
Heirs of Antonio in Special Proceeding No. V-3639. In the course thereof, the Heirs of Trinidad and the Heirs of
Antonio succeeded in removing Emilio as administrator for having committed acts prejudicial to their interests.
Hence, when respondent proceeded to represent Emilio for the purpose of seeking his reinstatement as
administrator in the same case, he clearly worked against the very interest of the Heirs of Antonio particularly,
Karen in violation of the above-stated rule.
Respondent's justification that no confidential information was relayed to him cannot fully exculpate him for the
charges against him since the rule on conflict of interests, as enunciated in Hornilla, provides an absolute
prohibition from representation with respect to opposing parties in the same case. In other words, a lawyer cannot
change his representation from one party to the latters opponent in the same case. That respondents previous
appearances for and in behalf of the Heirs of Antonio was only a friendly accommodation cannot equally be given
any credence since the aforesaid rule holds even if the inconsistency is remote or merely probable or even if the
lawyer has acted in good faith and with no intention to represent conflicting interests. [31]
Neither can respondent's asseveration that his engagement by Emilio was more of a mediator than a litigator and
for the purpose of forging a settlement among the family members render the rule inoperative. In fact, even on
that assertion, his conduct is likewise improper since Rule 15.04, [32] Canon 15 of the Code similarly requires the
lawyer to obtain the written consent of all concerned before he may act as mediator, conciliator or arbitrator in
settling disputes. Irrefragably, respondent failed in this respect as the records show that respondent was remiss in
his duty to make a full disclosure of his impending engagement as Emilios counsel to all the Heirs of Antonio

particularly, Karen and equally secure their express written consent before consummating the same. Besides, it
must be pointed out that a lawyer who acts as such in settling a dispute cannot represent any of the parties to it.
[33]
Accordingly, for respondents violation of the aforestated rules, disciplinary sanction is warranted.
In this case, the penalty recommended by the Investigating Commissioner was increased from severe reprimand to
a suspension of six (6) months by the IBP Board of Governors in its Resolution No. XVIII-2008-641. However, the
Court observes that the said resolution is bereft of any explanation showing the bases of the IBP Board of
Governors modification; as such, it contravened Section 12(a), Rule 139-B of the Rules which specifically mandates
that [t]he decision of the Board upon such review shall be in writing and shall clearly and distinctly state the facts
and the reasons on which it is based.[34] Verily, the Court looks with disfavor the change in the recommended
penalty without any ample justification therefor. To this end, the Court is wont to remind the IBP Board of Governors
of the importance of the requirement to announce in plain terms its legal reasoning, since the requirement that its
decision in disciplinary proceedings must state the facts and the reasons on which the same is based is akin to
what is required of courts in promulgating their decisions. The reasons for handing down a penalty occupy no
lesser station than any other portion of the ratio.[35]
In the foregoing light, the Court finds the penalty of suspension from the practice of law for a period of three (3)
months to be more appropriate taking into consideration the following factors: first, respondent is a first time
offender; second, it is undisputed that respondent merely accommodated Maricars request out of gratis to
temporarily represent her only during the June 16 and July 14, 2006 hearings due to her lawyers
unavailability; third, it is likewise undisputed that respondent had no knowledge that the late Antonio had any
other heirs aside from Maricar whose consent he actually acquired (albeit shortly after his first appearance as
counsel for and in behalf of Emilio), hence, it can be said that he acted in good faith; and fourth, complainants
admit that respondent did not acquire confidential information from the Heirs of Antonio nor did he use against
them any knowledge obtained in the course of his previous employment, hence, the said heirs were not in any
manner prejudiced by his subsequent engagement with Emilio. Notably, in Ilusorio-Bildner v. Lokin, Jr.,[36] the Court
similarly imposed the penalty of suspension from the practice of law for a period of three months to the counsel
therein who represented parties whose interests are hostile to his other clients in another case.
WHEREFORE, respondent Atty. Joseph Ador Ramos is hereby held GUILTY of representing conflicting interests in
violation of Rule 15.03, Canon 15 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. Accordingly, he is
hereby SUSPENDED from the practice of law for a period of three (3) months, with WARNING that a repetition of
the same or similar acts in the future will be dealt with more severely.
SO ORDERED.

31:[ A.C. No. 10548, December 10, 2014 ]

CAROLINE CASTAEDA JIMENEZ, COMPLAINANT, VS. ATTY. EDGAR B. FRANCISCO, RESPONDENT.
DECISION
MENDOZA, J.:
This refers to the Resolutions of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines, Board of Governors (IBP-BOG), dated January
3, 2013[1] and March 22, 2014,[2] adopting and approving the findings of the Commission on Bar Discipline (CBD)
which found Atty. Edgar B. Francisco (Atty. Francisco) administratively liable for multiple violations of the Code of
Professional Responsibility (CPR) and recommended the penalty of suspension of one (1) year from the practice of
law.
On September 6, 2007, the CBD received a complaint, dated July 14, 2007, [3] filed by Caroline Castaeda Jimenez
(complainant) against Atty. Francisco for multiple violations of the CPR. On October 24, 2007, Atty. Francisco filed
his Answer.[4] On June 26, 2009, the mandatory conference was held and terminated. Only the counsel for Atty.
Francisco appeared. The notice of the said conference addressed to complainant was returned with the notation
unknown at the given address. No new address was provided by the complainant. Both parties were required to
submit their respective position papers. For this purpose, Atty. Francisco adopted his Answer.
The Antecedents
Mario Crespo, otherwise known as Mark Jimenez (Jimenez), filed a complaint for estafa against complainant, her
sister Rosemarie Flaminiano, Marcel Crespo, Geraldine Antonio, Brenda Heffron, Magdalena Cunanan, and Isabel
Gonzalez.[5] The said complaint was docketed as IS No. 074314 with the Office of the City Prosecutor of Makati City.
Jimenez alleged that he was the true and beneficial owner of the shares of stock in Clarion Realty and Development
Corporation (Clarion), which was incorporated specifically for the purpose of purchasing a residential house located
in Forbes Park, Makati City (Forbes property). The incorporators and original stockholders of Clarion were as
follows:
Thomas K.
Chua

- P500,000.00

Teresita C.
Alsua

- P500,000.00

Myla
Villanueva

- P249,998.00

Edgar B.
Francisco

- P1.00

Soledad
Gamat

- P1.00

Simultaneous with the drafting of Clarions Articles of Incorporation, the above-named stockholders, except for
Myla Villanueva (Myla), executed a deed of assignment of their respective shares in favor of complainant, who was
then Jimenezs common-law partner. Clarions total capitalization was only P5,000,000.00. Thus, in order to achieve
its purpose of purchasing the Forbes property, Clarion simulated a loan from the complainant in the amount of
P80,750,000.00. Thereafter, Clarion purchased the Forbes property in the amount of P117,000,000.00 from
Gerardo Contreras. To effect the sale, Myla handed a check in the said amount which was funded entirely by
Jimenez. The sale, however, was undervalued. In the deed of sale, it was made to appear that the Forbes property
was purchased for P78,000,000.00 only. Further, the money used as the purchase price was not reflected in the
books of Clarion.
On July 19, 2001, Thomas Chua and Teresita Alsua assigned their shares in Clarion to Jimenez by virtue of a deed of
trust. On the other hand, Mylas 249,997 shares were transferred to complainant based on a deed of assignment.
The remaining one (1) share was transferred to Ma. Carolina C. Crespo. These transactions appeared in Clarions
General Information Sheet (GIS) filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC). Resultantly, the
subscribed shares of Clarion were as follows:
Mark Jimenez

- P 500,000.00

Caroline
Jimenez

- P 749,997.00

Ma. Carolina
C. Crespo

- P 1.00

Edgar B.
Francisco

- P 1.00

Soledad
Gamat

- P 1.00

On November 5, 2002, Jimenez transferred all his shares to complainant by another deed of assignment, making
her the holder of Clarion shares amounting to P1,249,997.00.

According to Jimenezs complaint, while he was in prison in the United States in 2004, he learned from Atty.
Francisco that his son, Marcel Crespo (Marcel), approached the complainant and threatened her, claiming that the
United States Internal Revenue Service (IRS) was about to go after their properties. Marcel succeeded in
persuading complainant to transfer her nominal shares in Clarion to Geraldine Antonio, through another deed of
assignment. Again, this was reflected in Clarions GIS for the year 2004.
Thereafter, Jimenez was informed by Atty. Francisco that, through fraudulent means, complainant and her corespondents in the estafa case, put the Forbes property for sale sometime in August 2004. The said property was
eventually sold to Philmetro Southwest Enterprise Inc. (Philmetro) for the amount of P118,000,000.00 without
Jimenezs knowledge. This sale was again undervalued at P78,000.000.00 per the deed of sale. Atty. Francisco
relayed to Jimenez that he was the one who received the payment for the sale of the Forbes property and that he
handed all the proceeds thereof to Rosemarie Flaminiano in the presence of complainant.
Jimenezs complaint for estafa was based on complainants alleged participation in the fraudulent means in selling
the Forbes property which was acquired by Clarion with Jimenezs money. Complainant was duty-bound to remit all
the proceeds of the sale to Jimenez as the true and beneficial owner. Complainant and her co-respondents,
however, misappropriated and converted the funds for their personal use and benefit.
In support of Jimenezs complaint for estafa, Atty. Francisco executed an affidavit reiterating its factual averments.
[6]
A perusal of this affidavit likewise would show the following claims and admissions, among other things, of Atty.
Francisco:
1.

Sometime in August 2004, complainant called him, asking for assistance in the documentation of the sale
of the Forbes property owned by Clarion. Atty. Francisco asked her if she had secured permission from Mark
Jimenez and complainant answered in the affirmative.

2.

The Board of Directors of Clarion issued a resolution authorizing him to negotiate the sale of the property.

3.

For purposes of the sale, he opened an account with Security Bank, San Francisco Del Monte branch. When
the cash payment was deposited, he withdrew the amount and handed the same to Rosemarie Flaminiano in
the presence of complainant.

4.

All transfers of shares were caused without any consideration. The transfer taxes, however, were paid.

5.

When Mark Jimenez returned to the Philippines, he was able to confirm that the sale of the Forbes property
was without his knowledge and approval. The proceeds of the sale had already been farmed out to different
corporations established by complainant and her sister.

6.

The frequent changes in stockholdings were premeditated in order to steal the money of Mark Jimenez.
The Complaint

Complainant was shocked upon reading the allegations in the complaint for estafa filed by Jimenez against her. She
felt even more betrayed when she read the affidavit of Atty. Francisco, on whom she relied as her personal lawyer
and Clarions corporate counsel and secretary of Clarion. This prompted her to file a disciplinary case against Atty.
Francisco for representing conflicting interests. According to her, she usually conferred with Atty. Francisco
regarding the legal implications of Clarions transactions. More significantly, the principal documents relative to the
sale and transfer of Clarions property were all prepared and drafted by Atty. Francisco or the members of his law
office.[7] Atty. Francisco was the one who actively participated in the transactions involving the sale of the Forbes
property. Without admitting the truth of the allegations in his affidavit, complainant argued that its execution
clearly betrayed the trust and confidence she reposed on him as a lawyer. For this reason, complainant prayed for
the disbarment of Atty. Francisco.

The Respondents Position

In his Answer,[8] Atty. Francisco replied that Jimenez initially engaged his services in 1998 for the incorporation of
Clarion for the purpose of purchasing a residential house in Forbes Park, where he intended to live with his longtime partner, the complainant; that the original incorporators and stockholders of Clarion held their respective
shares in trust for Jimenez; that the subsequent changes in the ownership of Clarion shareholdings were also
pursuant to Jimenezs orders; and that as the corporate secretary and legal counsel of Clarion, he prepared all the
legal documentation to give effect to the said transfers and, ultimately, to the purchase of the Forbes property.
Atty. Francisco further stated that sometime in 2004, Jimenez was imprisoned in the United States for excessive
contributions to the Democratic Party; that during this time, Jimenezs son, Marcel, and the complainant, asked him
again to change the ownership of Clarion shares in order to avoid the attachment of Jimenezs properties in a tax
evasion case; that he acceded to the request on the belief that this was in accordance with Jimenezs wishes; and

that as a result, almost 100% of Clarions ownership was transferred in the name of Geraldine Antonio.
Atty. Francisco also claimed that, thereafter, complainant tasked him to talk to prospective buyers and to negotiate
the sale of the Forbes property until it was sold for P118,000,000.00; that Marcel and complainant led him to
believe that Jimenez had knowledge of the sale as they were in constant communication with him; that all these
representations, however, turned out to be false when Jimenez returned to the Philippines and discovered that the
proceeds of the sale were coursed through other corporations set up by complainant and her sister; that Jimenez
likewise learned of the successive sale of his other properties, including Meridian Telekoms Inc., by the members of
his family; and that this led to the filing of the estafa case against the complainant and the others. As a witness to
the fraud committed against Jimenez, Atty. Francisco executed the affidavit narrating the facts and circumstances
surrounding the said transactions.

Atty. Francisco mainly argued that he violated neither the rule on disclosures of privileged communication nor the
proscription against representing conflicting interests, on the ground that complainant was not his client. He was
the lawyer of Jimenez and the legal counsel of Clarion, but never of the complainant. He might have assisted her in
some matters, but these were all under the notion that Jimenez had given him authority to do so. Further, though
he acted as legal counsel for Clarion, no attorney-client relationship between him and complainant was formed, as
a corporation has a separate and distinct personality from its shareholders. While he admitted that the legal
documentation for the transfer of shares and the sale of the Forbes property were prepared by him and notarized
by the members of his law firm, he averred that these acts were performed in his capacity as the corporate
secretary and legal counsel of Clarion, and not as a lawyer of complainant. Therefore, he served no conflicting
interests because it was not a former client and a subsequent client who were the opposing parties in litigation.
He opined that assuming that complainant was indeed his client, the rule on privileged communication does not
apply to his case. Here, complainant failed to allege, much less prove, the requisites for the application of the
privilege. When Atty. Francisco denied being her lawyer, the complainant should have established, by clear and
convincing evidence, that a lawyer-client relationship indeed existed between them. Complainant failed to do this.
Arguing that the execution of his affidavit in the estafa case was but a truthful narration of facts by a witness, Atty.
Francisco cited Gonzaga v. Caete,[9] where the Court ruled that the fact that one of the witnesses for the
defendant had been formerly the lawyer for the defendant in this suit was no ground for rejecting his testimony. In
this case, he merely attested to the fraudulent acts of complainant, in the course of which, he defended and served
Jimenez as a client. This was likewise pursuant to the rule that unlawful and illegal motives and purposes were not
covered by the privilege. It was just unfortunate that he fell for the ploy of complainant.
The Findings of the Investigating Commissioner
In the Commissioners Report,[10] dated November 7, 2011, the Investigating Commissioner, Atty. Jose I. dela Rama,
Jr. (Investigating Commissioner), found Atty. Francisco guilty of violations of the CPR and recommended that he be
suspended for one (1) year from the practice of law.
Initially, the Investigating Commissioner noted that the subsequent affidavit of desistance executed by Jimenez in
the estafa case did not affect the investigation conducted by the CBD as it was not an ordinary court which
accepted compromises or withdrawals of cases. After weighing on the claims of the parties, the Investigating
Commissioner concluded that nothing in the records would show that a lawyer-client relationship existed between
Atty. Francisco and Jimenez.[11] The circumstances would show that Atty. Francisco was an original incorporator and
shareholder of Clarion. He was also the legal counsel and corporate secretary of the said corporation, the articles
of incorporation of which did not include Jimenez as an original incorporator. He became a stockholder only in
2001, when Jimenez acquired shares from Thomas Chua and Teresita Alsua. Jimenezs participation in Clarion
affairs again stopped when he assigned the entirety of his shares in favor of complainant.
Granting that Jimenez really owned 100% of Clarion as alluded to by Atty. Francisco, the report stated that it would
appear that the latter permitted misrepresentations as to Clarions ownership to be reported to the SEC through its
GIS. The Investigating Commissioner also pointed out Atty. Franciscos clear admission that the transfer of shares
within Clarion were without any consideration, ran counter to the deeds of assignment that he again admittedly
executed as corporate counsel. Worse, Atty. Francisco admitted to have simulated the loan and undervalued the
consideration of the effected sale of the Forbes property, which displayed his unlawful, dishonest, immoral, and
deceitful conduct in violation of Canon 1 of the CPR. Further, when he executed the affidavit containing allegations
against the interest of Clarion and complainant, the Investigating Commissioner held that Atty. Francisco violated
the rule on privileged communication and engaged in an act that constituted representation of conflicting interests
in violation of Canons 15 and 21 of the CPR.
In its January 3, 2013 Resolution,[12] the IBP-BOG adopted and approved, in toto, the findings and recommendation
of the CBD against Atty. Francisco.
The respondent received a copy of the said resolution on March 26, 2013 and moved for its reconsideration. [13]
Atty. Francisco appealed to the compassion of the IBP-BOG, reasoning out that the penalty of suspension of one (1)
year is too severe considering that in his more than three decades of practice, he had never been involved in any
act that would warrant the imposition of disciplinary action upon him. It was only in 2007, when his client, Jimenez,

experienced a difficult crisis involving his children and common-law partner that he experienced a major upheaval
in his professional life. He apologized for his not being too circumspect in dealing with the relatives of Jimenez.
As to the charges against him, Atty. Francisco reiterated that his participation in the execution of the documents
pertaining to the sale of the Forbes property were all connected to his capacity as Clarions corporate secretary
and legal counsel, not to mention his ties with his client and friend, Jimenez. He admitted that he owed fidelity to
Clarion and Jimenez, but denied that this duty extended to the incorporators and shareholders of Clarion. Thus,
when complainant sought advice in her capacity as a shareholder in Clarion, no fiduciary duty arose on his part. In
his own words, Atty. Francisco insisted that Carol is not Clarion and vice versa. [14]
Attached to Atty. Franciscos motion for reconsideration was an affidavit executed by Jimenez, stating that he had
retained the legal services of Atty. Francisco since 1999. Espousing Atty. Franciscos defenses, Jimenez asserted
that Atty. Franciscos law firm was in charge of all the companies he owned in the Philippines. He directed Atty.
Francisco to execute all the documentation to show his ownership of these companies, including Clarion. These
documents were in the possession of complainant for safekeeping. When Jimenez ran for Congress in 2001, Atty.
Francisco personally assisted him in the filing of his certificate of candidacy and the proceedings before the
electoral tribunals. While he was in prison in the United States, it was Atty. Francisco who visited and told him that
his children, Myla and Marcel, were then facilitating the sale of one of his companies, Meridian Telekoms, Inc.,
without his knowledge. He asked Atty. Francisco to keep quiet about his childrens betrayal and to wait until he
could go home. When he filed the criminal cases against his children and complainant, the latter even filed a
frivolous kidnapping case against Atty. Francisco. According to Jimenez, the people who committed crimes against
him were now exhausting all possible means to keep Atty. Francisco silent and to prevent the latter from
performing his duties as a lawyer.
In its March 22, 2014 Resolution,[15] the IBP-BOG denied the respondents motion for reconsideration.
No petition for review was filed with the Court.
The Courts Ruling
Violations of Canons 1 and 10 of the CPR and the Lawyers Oath
Canon 1 and Rule 1.01 of the CPR provide:
CANON 1 A LAWYER SHALL UPHOLD THE CONSTITUTION, OBEY THE LAWS OF THE LAND AND PROMOTE RESPECT
FOR LAW AND LEGAL PROCESSES.
Rule 1.0 A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct.
Canon 1 clearly mandates the obedience of every lawyer to laws and legal processes. To the best of his ability, a
lawyer is expected to respect and abide by the law and, thus, avoid any act or omission that is contrary thereto. A
lawyers personal deference to the law not only speaks of his character but it also inspires respect and obedience
to the law, on the part of the public. Rule 1.0, on the other hand, states the norm of conduct to be observed by all
lawyers.
Any act or omission that is contrary to, or prohibited or unauthorized by, or in defiance of, disobedient to, or
disregards the law is unlawful. Unlawful conduct does not necessarily imply the element of criminality although
the concept is broad enough to include such element. [16] To be dishonest means the disposition to lie, cheat,
deceive, defraud or betray; be unworthy; lacking in integrity, honesty, probity, integrity in principle, fairness and
straightforwardness[17] while conduct that is deceitful means the proclivity for fraudulent and deceptive
misrepresentation, artifice or device that is used upon another who is ignorant of the true facts, to the prejudice
and damage of the party imposed upon.[18]
Membership in the legal profession is bestowed upon individuals who are not only learned in law, but also known to
possess good moral character. Lawyers should act and comport themselves with honesty and integrity in a manner
beyond reproach, in order to promote the publics faith in the legal profession. [19] To say that lawyers must at all
times uphold and respect the law is to state the obvious, but such statement can never be overemphasized.
Considering that, of all classes and professions, [lawyers are] most sacredly bound to uphold the law, it is
imperative that they live by the law.[20]
When Atty. Francisco was admitted to the Bar, he also took an oath to obey the laws, do no falsehood, and
conduct himself as a lawyer according to the best of his knowledge and discretion. [21]
In the facts obtaining in this case, Atty. Francisco clearly violated the canons and his sworn duty. He is guilty of
engaging in dishonest and deceitful conduct when he admitted to having allowed his corporate client, Clarion, to
actively misrepresent to the SEC, the significant matters regarding its corporate purpose and subsequently, its
corporate shareholdings. In the documents submitted to the SEC, such as the deeds of assignment and the GIS,
Atty. Francisco, in his professional capacity, feigned the validity of these transfers of shares, making it appear that
these were done for consideration when, in fact, the said transactions were fictitious, albeit upon the alleged
orders of Jimenez. The Investigating Commissioner was correct in pointing out that this ran counter to the deeds of
assignment which he executed as corporate counsel. In his long practice as corporate counsel, it is indeed safe to
assume that Atty. Francisco is knowledgeable in the law on contracts, corporation law and the rules enforced by the
SEC. As corporate secretary of Clarion, it was his duty and obligation to register valid transfers of stocks.
Nonetheless, he chose to advance the interests of his clientele with patent disregard of his duties as a lawyer.
Worse, Atty. Francisco admitted to have simulated the loan entered into by Clarion and to have undervalued the

consideration of the effected sale of the Forbes property. He permitted this fraudulent ruse to cheat the
government of taxes. Unquestionably, therefore, Atty. Francisco participated in a series of grave legal infractions
and was content to have granted the requests of the persons involved.
Despite assertions that these were in accordance to Jimenezs wishes, or pursuant to complainants
misrepresentations, the Court cannot turn a blind eye on Atty. Franciscos act of drafting, or at the very least,
permitting untruthful statements to be embodied in public documents. If the Court allows this highly irregular
practice for the specious reason that lawyers are constrained to obey their clients flawed scheming and
machinations, the Court would, in effect, sanction wrongdoing and falsity. This would undermine the role of lawyers
as officers of the court.
Time and again, the Court has reminded lawyers that their support for the cause of their clients should never be
attained at the expense of truth and justice. While a lawyer owes absolute fidelity to the cause of his client, full
devotion to his genuine interest, and warm zeal in the maintenance and defense of his rights, as well as the
exertion of his utmost learning and ability, he must do so only within the bounds of the law. It needs to be
emphasized that the lawyer's fidelity to his client must not be pursued at the expense of truth and justice, and
must be held within the bounds of reason and common sense. His responsibility to protect and advance the
interests of his client does not warrant a course of action propelled by ill motives and malicious intentions. [22]
In the same vein, Atty. Franciscos admissions show that he lacks candor regarding his dealings. Canon 10 of the
CPR provides that, [a] lawyer owes candor, fairness and good faith to the court. Corollary thereto, Rule 10.0 of
the CPR provides that a lawyer shall do no falsehood, nor consent to the doing of any in Court, nor shall he
mislead or allow the Court to be misled by an artifice. Lawyers are officers of the court, called upon to assist in the
administration of justice. They act as vanguards of our legal system, protecting and upholding truth and the rule of
law. They are expected to act with honesty in all their dealings, especially with the court. [23]
From the foregoing, Atty. Francisco clearly violated his duties as a lawyer embodied in the CPR, namely, to avoid
dishonest and deceitful conduct, (Rule 1.01, Canon 1) and to act with candor, fairness and good faith (Rule 10.01,
Canon 10). Also, Atty. Franciso desecrated his solemn oath not to do any falsehood nor consent to the doing of the
same.

Rule on Conflicting Interests and Disclosure of Privileged Communication

With respect to Atty. Franciscos alleged representation of conflicting interests and disclosure of privileged
communication, the Court deviates from the findings of the IBP-BOG.
Rule 15.03, Canon 15 of the CPR provides that, [a] lawyer shall not represent conflicting interests except by
written consent of all concerned given after a full disclosure of the facts. [24] The relationship between a lawyer
and his/her client should ideally be imbued with the highest level of trust and confidence. This is the standard of
confidentiality that must prevail to promote a full disclosure of the clients most confidential information to his/her
lawyer for an unhampered exchange of information between them. Needless to state, a client can only entrust
confidential information to his/her lawyer based on an expectation from the lawyer of utmost secrecy and
discretion; the lawyer, for his part, is duty-bound to observe candor, fairness and loyalty in all his dealings and
transactions with the client. Part of the lawyers duty in this regard is to avoid representing conflicting
interests[25] Thus, even if lucrative fees offered by prospective clients are at stake, a lawyer must decline
professional employment if the same would trigger a violation of the prohibition against conflict of interest.
In Quiambao v. Bamba,[26] the Court discussed the application of the rule on conflict of interest in this wise:
In broad terms, lawyers are deemed to represent conflicting interests when, in behalf of one client, it is their duty
to contend for that which duty to another client requires them to oppose. Developments in jurisprudence have
particularized various tests to determine whether a lawyers conduct lies within this proscription. One test is
whether a lawyer is duty-bound to fight for an issue or claim in behalf of one client and, at the same time, to
oppose that claim for the other client. Thus, if a lawyers argument for one client has to be opposed by that same
lawyer in arguing for the other client, there is a violation of the rule.
Another test of inconsistency of interests is whether the acceptance of a new relation would prevent the full
discharge of the lawyers duty of undivided fidelity and loyalty to the client or invite suspicion of unfaithfulness or
double-dealing in the performance of that duty. Still another test is whether the lawyer would be called upon in the
new relation to use against a former client any confidential information acquired through their connection or
previous employment.
The proscription against representation of conflicting interest applies to a situation where the opposing parties are
present clients in the same action or in an unrelated action. It is of no moment that the lawyer would not be called
upon to contend for one client that which the lawyer has to oppose for the other client, or that there would be no
occasion to use the confidential information acquired from one to the disadvantage of the other as the two actions
are wholly unrelated. It is enough that the opposing parties in one case, one of whom would lose the suit, are
present clients and the nature or conditions of the lawyers respective retainers with each of them would affect the
performance of the duty of undivided fidelity to both clients.
From the foregoing, it is obvious that the rule on conflict of interests presupposes a lawyer-client relationship. The
purpose of the rule is precisely to protect the fiduciary nature of the ties between an attorney and his client.
Conversely, a lawyer may not be precluded from accepting and representing other clients on the ground of conflict
of interests, if the lawyer-client relationship does not exist in favor of a party in the first place.

In determining whether or not Atty. Francisco violated the rule on conflict of interests, a scrutiny of the parties
submissions with the IBP reveals that the complainant failed to establish that she was a client of Atty. Francisco.
First, complainants claim of being Atty. Franciscos client remains unsubstantiated, considering its detailed
refutation. All that the complaint alleged was that Atty. Francisco was Clarions legal counsel and that complainant
sought advice and requested documentation of several transfers of shares and the sale of the Forbes property. This
was only successful in showing that Atty. Francisco, indeed, drafted the documents pertaining to the transaction
and that he was retained as legal counsel of Clarion. There was no detailed explanation as to how she supposedly
engaged the services of Atty. Francisco as her personal counsel and as to what and how she communicated with
the latter anent the dealings she had entered into. With the complaint lacking in this regard, the unrebutted
answer made by Atty. Francisco, accompanied with a detailed narrative of his engagement as counsel of Jimenez
and Clarion, would have to prevail.
Second, there is a stark disparity in the amount of narrative details presented by the parties. Atty. Franciscos claim
that he was the counsel of Clarion and Jimenez, and not of the complainant, was clearly established in a sworn
statement executed by Jimenez himself. Complainants evidence pales in comparison with her claims of being the
client of Atty. Francisco couched in general terms that lacked particularity of circumstances.
Third, noteworthy is the fact that complainant opted not to file a reply to Atty. Franciscos answer. This could have
given her opportunity to present evidence showing their professional relationship. She also failed to appear during
the mandatory conference with the IBP-CBD without even updating her residential address on record. Her
participation in the investigation of the case apparently ended at its filing.
In suspension or disbarment proceedings, lawyers enjoy the presumption of innocence, and the burden of proof
rests upon the complainant to clearly prove the allegations in the complaint by preponderant evidence.
Preponderance of evidence means that the evidence adduced by one side is, as a whole, superior to or has greater
weight than that of the other. It means evidence which is more convincing to the court as worthy of belief than that
which is offered in opposition thereto. Under Section 1 of Rule 133, in determining whether or not there is
preponderance of evidence, the court may consider the following: (a) all the facts and circumstances of the case;
(b) the witnesses manner of testifying, their intelligence, their means and opportunity of knowing the facts to
which they are testifying, the nature of the facts to which they testify, the probability or improbability of their
testimony; (c) the witnesses interest or want of interest, and also their personal credibility so far as the same may
ultimately appear in the trial; and (d) the number of witnesses, although it does not mean that preponderance is
necessarily with the greater number. [27]
Markedly, Atty. Francisco could have prevented his entanglement with this fiasco among the members of Jimenezs
family by taking an upfront and candid stance in dealing with Jimenezs children and complainant. He could have
been staunch in reminding the latter that his tasks were performed in his capacity as legal counsel for Clarion and
Jimenez. Be that as it may, Atty. Franciscos indiscretion does not detract the Court from finding that the totality of
evidence presented by the complainant miserably failed to discharge the burden of proving that Atty. Francisco was
her lawyer. At most, he served as the legal counsel of Clarion and, based on the affirmation presented, of Jimenez.
Suffice it to say, complainant failed to establish that Atty. Francisco committed a violation of the rule on conflict of
interests.
Consequently, the rule on lawyer-client privilege does not apply. In Mercado v. Vitriolo,[28] the Court elucidated on
the factors essential to establish the existence of the said privilege, viz:
In fine, the factors are as follows:
(1) There exists an attorney-client relationship, or a prospective attorney-client relationship, and it is
by reason of this relationship that the client made the communication.
Matters disclosed by a prospective client to a lawyer are protected by the rule on privileged communication even if
the prospective client does not thereafter retain the lawyer or the latter declines the employment. The reason for
this is to make the prospective client free to discuss whatever he wishes with the lawyer without fear that what he
tells the lawyer will be divulged or used against him, and for the lawyer to be equally free to obtain information
from the prospective client.
xxx
(2) The client made the communication in confidence.
The mere relation of attorney and client does not raise a presumption of confidentiality. The client
must intend the communication to be confidential.
A confidential communication refers to information transmitted by voluntary act of disclosure between attorney
and client in confidence and by means which, so far as the client is aware, discloses the information to no third
person other than one reasonably necessary for the transmission of the information or the accomplishment of the
purpose for which it was given.
Our jurisprudence on the matter rests on quiescent ground. Thus, a compromise agreement prepared by a lawyer
pursuant to the instruction of his client and delivered to the opposing party, an offer and counter-offer for
settlement, or a document given by a client to his counsel not in his professional capacity, are not privileged

communications, the element of confidentiality not being present.

(3) The legal advice must be sought from the attorney in his professional capacity.
The communication made by a client to his attorney must not be intended for mere information, but for the
purpose of seeking legal advice from his attorney as to his rights or obligations. The communication must have
been transmitted by a client to his attorney for the purpose of seeking legal advice.
If the client seeks an accounting service, or business or personal assistance, and not legal advice, the privilege
does not attach to a communication disclosed for such purpose.
[Emphases supplied]
Considering these factors in the case at bench, the Court holds that the evidence on record fails to demonstrate
the claims of complainant. As discussed, the complainant failed to establish the professional relationship between
her and Atty. Francisco. The records are further bereft of any indication that the advice regarding the sale of the
Forbes property was given to Atty. Francisco in confidence. Neither was there a demonstration of what she had
communicated to Atty. Francisco nor a recital of circumstances under which the confidential communication was
relayed. All that complaint alleged in her complainant was that she sought legal advice from respondent in various
occasions.[29] Considering that complainant failed to attend the hearings at the IBP, there was no testimony as to
the specific confidential information allegedly divulged by Atty. Francisco without her consent. It is, therefore,
difficult, if not impossible, to determine if there was any violation of the rule on privileged communication. As held
in Mercado, such confidential information is a crucial link in establishing a breach of the rule on privileged
communication between attorney and client. It is not enough to merely assert the attorney-client privilege. [30] It
cannot be gainsaid then that complainant, who has the burden of proving that the privilege applies, failed in this
regard.
The Penalty
A member of the Bar may be penalized, even disbarred or suspended from his office as an attorney, for violating of
the lawyers oath and/or for breaching the ethics of the legal profession as embodied in the CPR, [31] for the practice
of law is a profession, a form of public trust, the performance of which is entrusted to those who are qualified and
who possess good moral character.[32] The appropriate penalty on an errant lawyer depends on the exercise of
sound judicial discretion based on the surrounding facts. [33]
Under Section 27, Rule 138 of the Revised Rules of Court, a member of the Bar may be disbarred or suspended on
any of the following grounds: (1) deceit; (2) malpractice or other gross misconduct in office; (3) grossly immoral
conduct; (4) conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude; (5) violation of the lawyer's oath; (6) willful
disobedience of any lawful order of a superior court; and (7) willful appearance as an attorney for a party without
authority. A lawyer may be disbarred or suspended for misconduct, whether in his professional or private capacity,
which shows him to be wanting in moral character, honesty, probity and good demeanor, or unworthy to continue
as an officer of the court.
While the Court finds no violation of the rule on conflict of interests and disclosure of privileged communication,
the acts of Atty. Francisco, in actively and passively allowing Clarion to make untruthful representations to the SEC
and in other public documents, still constitute malpractice and gross misconduct in his office as attorney, for which
a suspension from the practice of law for six (6) months is warranted.
WHEREFORE, the Court finds Atty. Edgar B. Francisco GUILTY of violation of Canons 1 and 10 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility for which he is SUSPENDED from the practice of law for a period of six (6) months,
effective upon receipt of this Decision, with a STERN WARNING that a commission of the same or similar offense
in the future will result in the imposition of a more severe penalty.
Let a copy of this Decision be entered into the records of Atty. Edgar B. Francisco and furnished to the Office of the
Clerk of Court, the Office of the Bar Confidant, the Integrated Bar of the Philippines, and all courts in the
Philippines, for their information and guidance.
Atty. Francisco is DIRECTED to inform the Court of the date of his receipt of this Decision so that the Court can
determine the reckoning point when his suspension shall take effect.
SO ORDERED.

34: [ A.C. NO. 4947, February 14, 2005 ]

ROSA YAP-PARAS, PETITIONER, VS. ATTY. JUSTO PARAS, RESPONDENT.
RESOLUTION
GARCIA, J.:
Before us is this verified Petition[1] filed by Rosa Yap-Paras praying for the disbarment of her estranged husband
Atty. Justo Paras on alleged acts of deceit, malpractice, grave misconduct, grossly immoral conduct and violation of
his oath as a lawyer.
On 18 January 1989, respondent filed his comment [2] to the Petition.
In a Resolution dated 10 February 1999,[3] the Court referred the case to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP)
for investigation, report and recommendation.
The background facts are summarized in a Report and Recommendation dated 13 January 2004 [4] of Commissioner
Lydia A. Navarro of the IBP Commission on Bar Discipline, which Report reads in part, as follows:
Complainant alleged that on February 9, 1965 the children of Ledesma de Jesus Paras-Sumabong namely
Conegunda, Justo, Corazon, Carmen and Cataluna all surnamed Paras executed a Special Power of Attorney
prepared by the respondent to sell parcels of land located in Matobato, Bindoy, Negros Oriental giving authority to
their mother to sell the subject real properties previously registered in the name of the heirs of Vicente Paras
wherein respondent was one of the signatories therein.
Complainant alleged that on May 4, 1966 on the basis of said Special Power of Attorney, Ledesma J. ParasSumabang executed a Deed of Absolute Sale in favor of Aurora Dy-Yap over the subject real property located in
Matobato, Bindoy, Negros Oriental which was with the respondents full knowledge since he was residing at the
house of Soledad Dy-Yap at that time and from that time, the Yap family had been in possession of the subject real
property up to the present.
Complainant alleged that sometime in June 1998 her attention was called to the fact that a free patent title to the
aforesaid property was issued in respondents name and upon verification with the DENR, Bureau of Lands,
Dumaguete City, complainant was able to get copies of the documents for lot Nos. 660, 490 and 585 pertaining to
the Notice of Application for Free Patent dated April 2, 1985 signed by the respondent; over the aforesaid lots
previously sold by Ledesma de Jesus to Aurora D. Yap; Quitclaim/Renunciation of Property Rights and Interest Over
Real Property executed by Ledesma de Jesus dated May 28, 1985; Letter of Application dated April 2, 1985 signed
by respondent under oath before Apolonio Tan authorized officer to administer oath; Letter of Certification signed
by Apolonio Tan dated June 4, 1985 and Order of Approval dated August 19, 1985 signed by District Land Officer
Teopisto L. Gallozo with a Free Patent No. 328 in the name of respondent Justo J. Paras.
Complainant alleged that the aforementioned application was made by the respondent without her knowledge and
consent and those acts of deceit, machinations and falsification of documents were deliberately willfully, and
maliciously committed by the respondent in violation of Art. 172 in relation to Art. 171 of the RPC; in betrayal of his
oath as a lawyer and a transgression of the Canons of Professional Responsibility.
Complainant alleged that respondent surreptitiously obtained a free patent title over real properties which had
been previously sold by his own mother to Aurora D. Yap and now still under the control and possession of
complainants natural family, a fact respondent allegedly withheld from the Bureau of Lands which he had full
knowledge in successfully causing the release of a free patent in his name and unjustly and unlawfully deprived
the rightful owners of their legitimate title to the said property in betrayal of the court to pervert the administration
of justice in gross violation of his oath of office.
xxx

xxx

xxx

In his Comment, respondent alleged that complainant was obviously not the owner of the properties and
considering that the properties were applied for free patent titling during their marital union prior to its breakage,
complainant was likewise a communal owner thereof and as such was also complaining against herself.
Respondent alleged that later on, a great portion of the public lands classified as forested zone in Matobato were
declared and reclassified into public agricultural lands, then publicly surveyed and parcelized by lots identified in
the survey map based on actual or known occupants; then the Bureau of Lands allegedly made a public
announcement that the lands were available for private ownership thru Free Patent Application available only to
native settlers or natural born Filipinos.
Respondent alleged that none of the Yaps including complainant being native or natural born Filipinos muchless
Aurora D. Yap who in 1985 was said to be already an American citizen; complainant and her family; the Yaps
prevailed upon him to apply for free patent over said questioned properties for the reason that respondent had
already occupied the properties; introduced improvements thereon; acted as owner thereof; and could easily align
his right to the property which had been identified in the public survey as Heirs of Vicente Paras, otherwise the
questioned properties allegedly according to the Yaps will be applied for and awarded to other qualified natural
born Filipinos.
Respondent alleged that Free Patent Application was filed by him over the communal property of him and the

complainant as well as those purchased by him including the portion whose occupancy of a public land was
purchased by Aurora D. Yap from Ledesma Vda de Paras upon the prodding of the Yaps for all of them were not
qualified to apply for ownership of an agricultural public land via free patent; none of them being a natural born
Filipino or native settler and were disqualified from a gratuitous grant of public land from the government.
Respondent alleged that the whole idea of giving to him and the complainant the properties was hatched and
executed by the Yaps, most particularly Atty. Francisco D. Yap to circumvent the law and prevent the properties
from being given by the government to some other qualified persons. He allegedly applied for issuance of free
patent in good faith and thereafter took dominion and control of the properties in the concept of a legitimate owner
under authority of a gratuitous grant of the government.
Respondent alleged that complainant or any member of her family much less American citizen Aurora Dy Yap had
not made any prior demand for the return of the questioned properties; nor filed a complaint under the
Katarungang Pambarangay Law; nor filed an administrative remedy before the DENR for the cancellation and
reversion/transfer of the Free Patent and Title to them; nor brought any action in any civil court for either quieting
of title, or cancellation of free patent title or recovery of ownership or whatever.
Respondent alleged that even without such civil court determination on whether or not complainant or her family
were qualified to become grantee of a government gratuitous grant of public agricultural land, if the Honorable
Supreme Court will decide that complainant, her mother, brothers and sisters were within the ambit of the term
natural born citizen or native citizens under the 1946 Constitution and to them rightfully belong the ownership of
the questioned titled public agricultural lands; and that he can never be guilty of the Anti-Dummy Law consequent
to such cession, respondent alleged that he will gladly deliver and transfer title to them.
Respondent alleged that he sought and prayed for recovery of possession of all conjugal/communal properties
including the herein questioned properties for after he left the conjugal home in 1988 possession of all these
properties, real and personal were until now with the complainant and her biological family.
Respondent prayed for the outright dismissal of the petition for lack of merit.
Complainant subsequently filed a Reply[5] to respondents Comment, therein refuting respondents claims that he
was used as a dummy since complainant and her siblings had previously acquired Free Patents in their names.
Complainant further alleged that respondent is morally unfit to continue to be an officer of the court because of his
falsely declaring under oath that he had been occupying the subject real property since 1985 when in fact he did
not and was never in occupation/possession thereof.
On 27 August 1999, the IBP Commission on Bar Discipline issued an Order [6] noting the filing of the last pleading
and setting the instant case for hearing. Several hearings [7] were conducted wherein complainant presented all her
witnesses together with their respective affidavits and supporting documents [8], which were all subjected to crossexamination by the respondent. Likewise, respondent presented his Counter-Affidavit [9] and supporting documents.
Based on the foregoing, the Investigating Commissioner concluded her Report and made a recommendation, as
follows:
From the facts obtaining respondent committed deceit and falsehood in having applied for free patent over lands
owned by another over which he had no actual physical possession being aware of the fact that the same was
previously transferred in the name of Aurora Yap; an act which adversely reflected on his fitness to practice law in
violation of Rule 7.03, Canon 7 of the Code of Professional Responsibility.
It is immaterial as to who instituted the complaint for as long as there was a violation of the Code of Professional
Responsibility which partakes the nature of proper disciplinary action pursuant to Section 1, Rule 139-B of the
Disbarment and Discipline of Attorneys.
Wherefore in view of the foregoing, the Undersigned respectfully recommends for the suspension of Atty. Justo
Paras from the practice of his law profession for a period of three (3) months from receipt hereof.
It is also hereby recommended that the IBP Chapter wherein respondent Paras is a registered member be
furnished a copy of the Order and notified of the said suspension for proper enforcement.
Via Resolution No. XVI-2004-120 dated 27 February 2004,[10] the IBP Board of Governors adopted the Report of the
Investigating Commissioner but modified the latters recommended penalty by recommending that respondent be
suspended from the practice of law for six (6) months for violation of Rule 7.03, Canon 7 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility.
The case is now before us for confirmation.
We agree with the IBP Board of Governors that respondent should be sanctioned. We find, however, that the
recommended penalty is not commensurate to the gravity of the wrong perpetrated.
The Court has always reminded that a lawyer shall at all times uphold the integrity and dignity of the legal
profession[11] as the bar should always maintain a high standard of legal proficiency as well as of honesty and fair
dealing among its members. By and large, a lawyer can do honor to the legal profession by faithfully performing
his duties to society, to the bar, to the courts and to his clients. [12] To this end, nothing should be done by any
member of the legal fraternity which might tend to lessen in any degree the confidence and trust reposed by the
public in the fidelity, honesty and integrity of the legal profession. [13]

In Marcelo v. Javier[14], we held:

It bears stressing that membership in the bar is a privilege burdened with conditions. A lawyer has the privilege
and right to practice law during good behavior and can only be deprived of it for misconduct ascertained and
declared by judgment of the court after opportunity to be heard has been afforded him. Without invading any
constitutional privilege or right, an attorneys right to practice law may be resolved by a proceeding to suspend or
disbar him, based on conduct rendering him unfit to hold a license or to exercise the duties and responsibilities of
an attorney. It must be understood that the purpose of suspending or disbarring an attorney is to remove from the
profession a person whose misconduct has proved him unfit to be entrusted with the duties and responsibilities
belonging to the office of an attorney, and thus to protect the public and those charged with the administration of
justice, rather than to punish the attorney.
An attorney may be disbarred or suspended for any violation of his oath or of his duties as an attorney and
counsellor which include the statutory grounds enumerated in Section 27, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court. These
statutory grounds are so broad as to cover practically any misconduct of a lawyer in his professional or private
capacity. It is a settled rule that the enumeration of the statutory grounds for disciplinary action is not exclusive
and a lawyer may be disciplined on grounds other than those specifically provided in the law. Generally a lawyer
may be disbarred or suspended for any misconduct, whether in his professional or private capacity, which shows
him to be wanting in moral character, in honesty, probity and good demeanor or unworthy to continue as an officer
of the court, or an unfit or unsafe person to enjoy the privileges and to manage the business of others in the
capacity of an attorney, or for conduct which tends to bring reproach on the legal profession or to injure it in the
favorable opinion of the public.
Indeed, the practice of law is not a right but merely a privilege bestowed by the State upon those who show that
they possess, and continue to possess, the qualifications required by law for the conferment of such privilege.
[15]
One of those requirements is the observance of honesty and candor.
And in the recent case of Bergonia v. Merrera[16], we ruled:
Candor in all their dealings is the very essence of a practitioners honorable membership in the legal profession.
Lawyers are required to act with the highest standard of truthfulness, fair play and nobility in the conduct of
litigation and in their relations with their clients, the opposing parties, the other counsels and the courts. They are
bound by their oath to speak the truth and to conduct themselves according to the best of their knowledge and
discretion, and with fidelity to the courts and their clients. x x x
In the instant case, it is clear to the Court that respondent violated his lawyers oath as well as the Code of
Professional Responsibility which mandates upon each lawyer, as his duty to society and to the courts, the
obligation to obey the laws of the land and to do no falsehood nor consent to the doing of any in court. Respondent
has been deplorably lacking in the candor required of him as a member of the Bar and an officer of the court in his
acts of applying for the issuance of a free patent over the properties in issue despite his knowledge that the same
had already been sold by his mother to complainants sister. This fact, respondent even admitted in the comment
that he filed before this Court when he alleged that the said properties were public land under the Forestal Zone
when the mother of the respondent ceded to Aurora Yap some portions of entire occupancy of the Parases [17].
Moreover, respondent committed deceit and falsehood in his application for free patent over the said properties
when he manifested under oath that he had been in the actual possession and occupation of the said lands despite
the fact that these were continuously in the possession and occupation of complainants family, as evidenced no
less by respondents own statements in the pleadings filed before the IBP.
Anent his argument questioning the status of complainant and her family as natural born citizens, this Court
holds that the instant case is not the proper forum to address such issue. Furthermore, as correctly held by the
Investigating Commissioner, [i]t is immaterial as to who instituted the complaint for as long as there was a
violation of the Code of Professional Responsibility. Likewise, any other action which the parties may make against
each other has no material bearing in this case. For, it must be remembered that administrative cases against
lawyers belong to a class of their own. They are distinct from and may proceed independently of civil and criminal
cases.
In line herewith, this Court in In re Almacen,[18] held:
Accent should be laid on the fact that disciplinary proceedings like the present are sui generis. Neither purely civil
nor purely criminal, this proceeding is not and does not involve a trial of an action or a suit, but is rather an
investigation by the Court into the conduct of its officers. Not being intended to inflict punishment, it is in no sense
a criminal prosecution. Accordingly, there is neither a plaintiff nor a prosecutor therein. It may be initiated by the
Court motu proprio. Public interest is its primary objective, and the real question for determination is whether or
not the attorney is still a fit person to be allowed the privileges as such. Hence, in the exercise of its disciplinary
powers, the Court merely calls upon a member of the Bar to account for his actuations as an officer of the Court
with the end in view of preserving the purity of the legal profession and the proper and honest administration of
justice by purging the profession of members who by their misconduct have proved themselves no longer worthy
to be entrusted with the duties and responsibilities pertaining to the office of an attorney. xxx
The facts and evidence obtaining in the instant case indubitably reveal respondents failure to live up to his duties
as a lawyer in consonance with the strictures of the lawyers oath and the Code of Professional Responsibility,
thereby occasioning sanction from this Court.

At this juncture, we take note that on 18 October 2000, in our Decision in A.C. No. 5333 formerly A.C. No. CBD-371,
entitled Rosa Yap Paras v. Atty. Justo de Jesus Paras, respondent was previously meted with suspension from the
practice of law for six (6) months on the charge of falsifying his wifes signature in bank documents and other
related loan instruments, and for one (1) year from the practice of law on the charges of immorality and
abandonment of his own family.
Considering the serious nature of the instant offense and in light of respondents prior misdemeanors for which he
was penalized with a six (6) month and one (1) year suspension from the practice of law, his deplorable behavior in
the present case which grossly degrades the legal profession warrants the imposition of a much graver penalty.
WHEREFORE, finding respondent Atty. Justo J. Paras guilty of committing a falsehood in violation of his lawyers
oath and of the Code of Professional Responsibility, the Court Resolved to SUSPEND respondent from the practice
of law for a period of one (1) year, with a WARNING that commission of the same or similar offense in the future
will result in the imposition of a more severe penalty.
Let copies of this Resolution be furnished the IBP, as well as the Office of the Bar Confidant and the Court
Administrator who shall circulate it to all courts for their information and guidance and likewise be entered in the
record of respondent as attorney.
SO ORDERED.

35:[ADM. CASE NO. 9612, March 13, 2013 ]

JOHNNY M. PESTO, COMPLAINANT, VS. MARCELITO M. MILLO, RESPONDENT.
DECISION
BERSAMIN, J.:
An attorney who conceals his inefficiency and lack of diligence by giving wrong information to his client regarding
the matter subject of their professional relationship is guilty of conduct unbecoming an officer of the Court. He
thereby violates his Lawyers Oath to conduct himself as a lawyer according to the best of his knowledge and
discretion with all good fidelity as well to the courts as to his client. He also thereby violates Rule 18.03, Canon 18
of the Code of Professional Responsibility, by which he is called upon to serve his client with competence and
diligence.
Antecedents
In this administrative case, Johnny Pesto (Johnny), a Canadian national, charged Atty. Marcelito M. Millo with
conduct unbecoming an officer of the Court, misleading his client, bungling the transfer of title, and incompetence
and negligence in the performance of his duty as a lawyer.
Johnny averred that in May 1990, his wife Abella Pesto (Abella) retained the services of Atty. Millo to handle the
transfer of title over a parcel of land to her name, and the adoption of her niece, Arvi Jane Dizon; [1] that Johnny and
Abella gave to Atty. Millo the amounts of P14,000.00 for the transfer of title [2] and P10,000.00 for the adoption case;
[3]
that Atty. Millo thereafter repeatedly gave them false information and numerous excuses to explain his inability
to complete the transfer of title; that Atty. Millo likewise made them believe that the capital gains tax for the
property had been paid way back in 1991, but they found out upon their return to the country in February 1995
that he had not yet paid the tax; that when they confronted him, Atty. Millo insisted that he had already paid the
same, but he could not produce any receipt for the supposed payment; that Atty. Millo reluctantly returned to
Abella the amount of P14,000.00 only after he stormed out of Atty. Millos office in exasperation over his stalling
tactics; and that Atty. Millo then further promised in writing to assume the liability for the accrued penalties. [4]
Likewise, Johnny blamed Atty. Millo for letting the adoption case be considered closed by the Tarlac office of the
Department of Social Welfare and Development (Tarlac DSWD) due to two years of inaction. He stated that Atty.
Millo made him and his wife believe that an interview with the Tarlac DSWD had been scheduled on February 14,
1995, but when they arrived at the Tarlac DSWD they were dismayed to be told that no such interview had been
scheduled; that adding to their dismay, Atty. Millo could not be reached at all; that it was only upon reaching home
in Quezon City when he received word from Atty. Millo that a hearing had again been scheduled on February 23,
1995 at 10:00 a.m.; that when they went to the hearing, Atty. Millo could not be found; and that they learned after
an hour of waiting in the courthouse in Tarlac that Atty. Millo had requested the hearing to be moved to the
afternoon without their knowledge.[5]
Exasperated by Atty. Millos neglect and ineptitude, Johnny brought this administrative complaint in the Integrated
Bar of the Philippines (IBP) on March 14, 1995, praying for disciplinary action to be taken against Atty. Millo, and
seeking the refund of P15,643.75 representing the penalties for the non-payment of the capital gains tax, and of
the P10,000.00 given for the adoption case. Being a resident of Canada, he constituted one Tita Lomotan as his
attorney-in-fact to represent him during his and his wifes absence from the country.
On July 10, 1995, the IBP ordered Atty. Millo to file his answer. [6] Although an extension of the period to file was
granted at his instance,[7] he filed no answer in the end.[8] He did not also appear at the hearings despite due
notice.[9]
In the meantime, the IBP required Johnny through Lomotan to engage a counsel. The proceedings were held in
abeyance to await the appropriate motion from Johnnys counsel. [10]
The administrative matter did not move for several years. The long delay prompted Johnny to write to the President
of the IBP on October 28, 1998.[11] It was only on April 2, 2001, however, that the IBP Commission on Bar Discipline
(IBP-CBD) scheduled another hearing on June 29, 2001. [12] At that hearing, Atty. Millo appeared through a
representative, and presented a manifestation/motion, [13] whereby he claimed that Johnny had meanwhile died,
and that Abella would be withdrawing the complaint against him.
On October 11, 2001, the IBP-CBD, through Commissioner Victoria Gonzalez-De los Reyes, deemed the case
submitted for resolution.[14]
On October 4, 2010, Investigating Commissioner Victor C. Fernandez, to whom the case had been meanwhile
transferred, submitted a report and recommendation, whereby he found Atty. Millo liable for violating Canon 18 of
the Code of Professional Responsibility, and recommended his suspension from the practice of law for six months.
[15]

In Resolution No. XX-2011-235 adopted on November 19, 2011, [16] the IBP Board of Governors affirmed the findings
of Investigating Commissioner Fernandez, but lowered the suspension to two months; and ordered Atty. Millo to
return the amount of P16,000.00, to wit:

RESOLVED to ADOPT and APPROVE, as it is hereby unanimously ADOPTED and APPROVED, with modification, the
Report and Recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner in the above-entitled case, herein made part of
this Resolution as Annex A and finding the recommendation fully supported by the evidence on record and the
applicable laws and rules, and finding respondent guilty of the charges level(led) against him, Atty. Marcelito Millo
is hereby SUSPENDED from the practice of law for a period of two (2) months and is ordered to return the amount
of P16,000.00 to complainant.
On March 27, 2012, Atty. Millo moved for a reconsideration, stating that he had honestly believed that Abella had
already caused the withdrawal of the complaint prior to her own death; that he had already caused the preparation
of the documents necessary for the transfer of the certificate of title, and had also returned the P14,000.00 paid by
Johnny; that the adoption case had been finally granted by the trial court; that he had lost contact with Johnny and
Abella who resided in Canada; that Juan Daquis, Abellas brother, could have confirmed that the charge had arisen
from a simple misunderstanding, and that Abella would cause the withdrawal of the complaint, except that Daquis
had meanwhile died in November 2011.[17]
On June 9, 2012, the IBP Board of Governors denied Atty. Millos motion for reconsideration. [18]
Ruling
We affirm Resolution No. XX-2011-235, but modify the penalty.
Every attorney owes fidelity to the causes and concerns of his clients. He must be ever mindful of the trust and
confidence reposed in him by the clients. His duty to safeguard the clients interests commences from his
engagement as such, and lasts until his effective release by the clients. In that time, he is expected to take every
reasonable step and exercise ordinary care as his clients interests may require. [19]
Atty. Millos acceptance of the sums of money from Johnny and Abella to enable him to attend to the transfer of
title and to complete the adoption case initiated the lawyer-client relationship between them. From that moment
on, Atty. Millo assumed the duty to render competent and efficient professional service to them as his clients. Yet,
he failed to discharge his duty. He was inefficient and negligent in going about what the professional service he had
assumed required him to do. He concealed his inefficiency and neglect by giving false information to his clients
about having already paid the capital gains tax. In reality, he did not pay the capital gains tax, rendering the clients
liable for a substantial financial liability in the form of penalties.
Without doubt, Atty. Millo had the obligation to serve his clients with competence and diligence. Rule 18.03, Canon
18 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, expressly so demanded of him, to wit:
CANON 18 A LAWYER SHALL SERVE HIS CLIENT WITH COMPETENCE AND DILIGENCE.
xxxx
Rule 18.03 A lawyer shall not neglect a legal matter entrusted to him, and his negligence in connection therewith
shall render him liable.
A serious administrative complaint like this one should not be taken for granted or lightly by any respondent
attorney. Yet, Atty. Millo did not take the complaint of Johnny seriously enough, and even ignored it for a long period
of time. Despite being given several opportunities to do so, Atty. Millo did not file any written answer. He thereby
forfeited his right and chance to reasonably explain the circumstances behind the charges against him. Had the
complaint been untrue and unfair, it would have been quite easy for him to refute it quickly and seasonably.
Indeed, a refutation was the requisite response from any worthy and blameless respondent lawyer. His belated and
terse characterization of the charge by claiming that the charge had emanated from a mere misunderstanding
was not sufficient. He did not thereby refute the charge against him, which omission indicated that the complaint
had substance. It mattered little now that he had in the meantime returned the amount of P14,000.00 to the
clients, and that the application for adoption had been eventually granted by the trial court. Such events, being not
only post facto, but also inevitable from sheer passage of time, did not obliterate his liability based on the neglect
and ineptitude he had inflicted on his clients. The severe lesson that he must now learn is that he could not ignore
without consequences the liberal opportunity the Court and the IBP allowed him to justify his neglect and
ineptitude in serving his clients concerns. Towards him the Court now stays its hand of leniency, lest the Court be
unfairly seen as too willing to forego the exaction of responsibility upon a lawyer as neglectful and inept as he had
been towards his clients.
It even seems very likely that Atty. Millo purposely disregarded the opportunity to answer the charges granted to
him out of a desire to delay the investigation of the complaint until both Johnny and Abella, being residents in
Canada, would have already lost interest in prosecuting it, or, as happened here, would have already departed this
world and be no longer able to rebut whatever refutations he would ultimately make, whether true or not. But the
Court is not about to condone such selfish disregard. Let it be emphasized to him and to others similarly disposed
that an attorney who is made a respondent in a disbarment proceeding should submit an explanation, and should
meet the issue and overcome the evidence against him. [20] The obvious reason for the requirement is that an
attorney thus charged must thereby prove that he still maintained that degree of morality and integrity expected
of him at all times.
Atty. Millo made his situation even worse by consistently absenting himself from the scheduled hearings the IBP
had set for his benefit. His disregard of the IBPs orders requiring his attendance in the hearings was not only

irresponsible, but also constituted utter disrespect for the Judiciary and his fellow lawyers. Such conduct was
absolutely unbecoming of a lawyer, because lawyers are particularly called upon to obey Court orders and
processes and are expected to stand foremost in complying with orders from the duly constituted authorities.
[21]
Moreover, in Espiritu v. Ulep,[22] the Court saw the respondent attorneys odious practice of repeatedly and
apparently deliberately not appearing in the scheduled hearings as his means of wiggling out from the duty to
explain his side. A similar treatment of Atty. Millos disregard is justified. Indeed, he thereby manifested evasion, a
bad trait that no worthy member of the Legal profession should nurture in himself.
Surprisingly, Atty. Millo claimed that his belated response to the charge was due to the assurances of Abella that
she would be withdrawing the complaint. The Court disbelieves him, however, and treats his claim as nothing but a
belated attempt to save the day for himself. He ought to remember that the withdrawal of an administrative
charge for suspension or disbarment based on an attorneys professional misconduct or negligence will not furnish
a ground to dismiss the charge. Suspension or disbarment proceedings that are warranted will still proceed
regardless of the lack or loss of interest on the part of the complainant. The Court may even entirely ignore the
withdrawal of the complaint, and continue to investigate in order to finally determine whether the charge of
professional negligence or misconduct was borne out by the record. [23] This approach bespeaks the Courts
consistent view that the Legal Profession is not only a lofty and noble calling, but also a rare privilege reserved only
for the deserving.
Verily, disciplinary proceedings against attorneys are unlike civil suits where the complainants are the plaintiffs and
the respondent attorneys are the defendants. They neither involve private interests nor afford redress for private
grievances. They are undertaken and prosecuted solely for the public welfare, for the purpose of preserving the
courts of justice from the official ministration of persons unfit to practice law before them. Every attorney is called
to answer for every misconduct he commits as an officer of the Court. The complainant or any other person who
has brought the attorneys misconduct to the attention of the Court is in no sense a party, and has generally no
interest in the outcome except as all good citizens may have in the proper administration of justice. [24]
The IBP Board of Governors recommended suspension from the practice of law for two months as the penalty to be
imposed. The recommended penalty is not well taken. We modify the penalty, because Atty. Millo displayed no
remorse as to his misconduct, and could not be given a soft treatment. His professional misconduct warranted a
longer suspension from the practice of law because he had caused material prejudice to the clients interest. [25] He
should somehow be taught to be more ethical and professional in dealing with trusting clients like Johnny and
Abella, who were innocently too willing to repose their utmost trust in his abilities as a lawyer and in his
trustworthiness as a legal professional. He should remember that misconduct has no place in the heart and mind of
a lawyer who has taken the solemn oath to delay no man for money or malice, and to conduct himself as a lawyer
according to the best of his knowledge and discretion. Under the circumstances, suspension from the practice of
law for six months is the condign and commensurate penalty for him.
The Court notes that Atty. Millo already returned the P14,000.00 received for the transfer of title. Although he
ought also to refund the amount of P15,643.75 representing the penalty for the late payment of the capital gains
tax, the Court cannot order him to refund that amount because it is not a collection agency. [26] The Court may only
direct the repayment of attorneys fees received on the basis that a respondent attorney did not render efficient
service to the client. Consequently, Atty. Millo should refund the P10,000.00 given in connection with the adoption
case, plus interest of 6% per annum, reckoned from the finality of this decision.
WHEREFORE, the Court FINDS and HOLDS Atty. MARCELITO M. MILLO guilty of violating Canon 18, Rule 18.03
of the Code of Professional Responsibility and the Lawyers Oath; SUSPENDS him from the practice of law for a
period of six months effective from notice, with the STERN WARNING that any similar infraction in the future will
be dealt with more severely; ORDERS him to return to the heirs of Johnny and Abella Pesto within ten days from
notice the sum of P10,000.00, plus legal interest of 6% per annum reckoned from the finality of this decision until
full payment; and DIRECTS him to promptly submit to this Court written proof of his compliance within thirty days
from notice of this decision.
Let copies of this decision be furnished to the Office of the Bar Confidant, to be appended to Atty. Marcelito M.
Millos personal record as an attorney; to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines; and to the Office of the Court
Administrator for dissemination to all courts throughout the country for their information and guidance.
SO ORDERED.

36: [ A.C. NO. 6128, December 19, 2006 ]

ROSEMARIE L. HSIEH, COMPLAINANT, VS ATTY. SALVADOR QUIMPO AND ATTY. NANCY QUIMPO,
RESPONDENTS
DECISION
CARPIO MORALES, J.:
The present complaint of Rosemarie Loria Hsieh [1] (complainant) against respondents-spouses Attorneys Salvador
and Nancy Quimpo, for gross misconduct, was referred to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) for
investigation, report and recommendation.
The following antecedents spawned the filing of the complaint.
Complainant, together with one Pilar Cabuslay, was arrested for drug trafficking and possession of marijuana
during a buy-bust operation conducted by police operatives within the vicinity of Isetann Department Store, Manila.
Her car, a Mitsubishi Eclipse which she boarded in going to the site of the operation, was impounded by the police
authorities. And she was detained at the Manila City Jail.
Complainant secured the services of respondents who represented her and Pilar during the inquest and preliminary
investigation of the case.
As complainant did not have sufficient funds to defray the expenses attendant to her defense, she, while on
detention at the Manila City Jail or on May 21, 1999, authorized respondents, who in the meantime were able to
secure the release of the car, to sell it by signing a Deed of Sale the complete particulars of which were left in
blank.
By complainant's claim, respondents informed her that the proceeds of the sale would defray "expenses in
dismissing her case and expediting and facilitating her release from the Manila City Jail;" [2] respondents, however,
ceased to appear on her behalf, forcing her to secure the services of another lawyer; and when she demanded the
return of her car, respondents refused, claiming that it would serve as payment for their legal services.
Complainant thus filed a complaint for replevin [3] against respondents. She soon discovered, however, that the car
was already registered in the name of respondents by virtue of the Deed of Sale. [4]
While complainant was able to regain possession of the car, the Traffic Management Group seized it from her and
charged her with carnapping and theft,[5] and respondents were eventually able to get hold of it.
Respondents, on the other hand, claim that they agreed to handle complainant's case for P20,000 as acceptance
fee, and P1,000,000 success fee, but as complainant did not have money, she convinced them to accept the Deed
of Sale covering her car as a form of assurance that she would settle any outstanding account.
Respondents claim further that on September 1999, as there was a big possibility that complainant would be
released on bail, she secured the services of another lawyer without her informing them, and to avoid a
"humiliating" situation, they withdrew as her counsel but demanded full settlement of her outstanding account;
and since complainant failed to settle her account, she and respondents mutually agreed on September 21, 1999
to "give effect" to the Deed of Sale which they caused to be notarized.
The IBP Investigator defined the issue in the present complaint to be whether respondents, as counsels for
complainant, violated the Canons of Professional Responsibility "when they acquired from the complainant the
[car]."
The IBP investigator found that there was a breach of trust on respondents' part, in light of, among other things,
the lack of justification of the charge of P600,000 for attorney's fees, and the fact that the order allowing
complainant to post bail was issued two months after the deed of sale was concluded and, therefore, the amount
could not have represented the success fee even if there was such an agreement for the payment thereof.
. . . [T]here is here a case of a breach of trust on the part of the respondents. It is submitted that
respondents took advantage of the fact that the Deed of Sale of Motor Vehicle was already signed in blank by the
complainant and which was in their possession coupled with the fact that complainant was still in jail. Their act of
"filling in" the details of the blank instrument by causing the name of Atty. Nancy Quimpo as well as the
purchase price of the sale at P600,000.00 to be indicated therein and Atty. Nancy Quimpo's signing the same in 21
September 1999 [see p. 3, Respondents' Reply to Complainant's Position Paper] was unethical if not improper,
and smacks of lack of delicadeza especially since the amount of P600,000.00 allegedly representing legal fees
or expenses incurred have not been clearly substantiated or justified by the respondents. It is further pointed out
that the complainant was allowed to post bail only on 09 November 1999 [see Order dated 09 November of
Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch 54; Annex F, Complainant's Reply to Respondent's Position Paper]. This
is roughly two (2) months after the questioned instrument was allegedly notarized. At this time [21 September
1999], respondents were thus not entitled to collect a success fee from the complainant even if there was an
agreement between the parties for the payment of such a fee. Ergo, saidP600,000.00 could not also be
considered a success fee payable to the respondents. Canon 16 of the Code of Professional Responsibility
provides that a lawyer shall hold in trust all moneys and properties of his client that may come into his
possession. Moreover, the respondents were duty-bound to observe faithfulness towards their client and

should have conducted themselves with utmost professionalism in discharging their fiduciary duty. [6] (Emphasis and
underscoring supplied)
By Report[7] dated July 22, 2005, the IBP thus recommended:
. . . that both respondents, Atty. Salvador Quimpo and Atty. Nancy Quimpo, be STRONGLY REPRIMANDED, and that
a repetition by respondents of this offense shall be dealt with more severely. However, it is further recommended
that the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch 90 and the Regional Trial Court of Kalookan, Branch 129, be
required to submit their decisions in the replevin case [Civil Case No. Q-00-41395]and the carnapping/theft
cases [Criminal Case Nos. C-67161 and C-67162], respectively, as soon as they are promulgated, to enable the
Honorable Supreme Court to determine whether there is a need to revise or adjust the herein recommended
penalty, assuming the same is approved.[8] (Underscoring supplied)
It appears from the computer-generated Deed of Sale that complainant's first name, the particulars of the car, and
the month and year (May 1999) of the signing of the document were the only data originally provided therein. It
can thus be reasonably concluded that the other important particulars, such as the vendee's name respondent
Atty. Nancy Quimpo, and the purchase price P600,000, were subsequently filled up.
If the Deed of Sale was originally intended to serve as security for the payment of complainant's outstanding
account with respondents, as claimed by the latter, why was not the name of the obligee for whom the security
was allegedly executed respondents not also printed out? And why did not respondents bother to advise
complainant of the eventual sale of the car and account the proceeds thereof? It is on this account that this Court
finds the above-quoted ratiocination of the IBP Investigator in holding respondents to have committed breach of
contract well-taken.
Although a lawyer's lien over a client's property in satisfaction of his lawful fees and disbursements is recognized
by this Court, the same cannot be exercised haphazardly.
This Court's pronouncement that a fiduciary relationship requires a high degree of fidelity and good faith and is
designed to remove all such temptation and to prevent everything of that kind from being done for the protection
of the client[9] bears reiterating.
It is thus this Court's duty to look into dealings between attorneys and their clients and guard the latter from any
undue consequences resulting from a situation in which they may stand unequal. [10]
As the breach of the trust reposed upon respondents constitutes a violation of the Canon 16 of the Canons of
Professional Responsibility which reads:
Canon 16 of the Code of Professional Responsibility provides:
CANON 16 A LAWYER SHALL HOLD IN TRUST ALL MONEYS AND PROPERTIES OF HIS CLIENT THAT MAY COME INTO
HIS POSSESSION,
this Court finds that the recommended penalty therefor is not commensurate. Instead, respondents' suspension for
three months from the practice of law would be reasonable.
On the IBP-CBD recommendation that the courts before the replevin and carnapping/theft cases involving the same
parties were lodged submit their decisions to enable this Court to determine whether there is a need to revise or
adjust the penalty, the same does not lie.
Administrative cases against lawyers belong to a class of their own. They are distinct from and may proceed
independently of civil and/or criminal cases. Hence, the disposition in the administrative case is not governed by
that in the civil and/or criminal cases and vice versa. [11]
WHEREFORE, respondents Atty. Salvador Quimpo and Atty. Nancy Quimpo are SUSPENDED from the practice of
law for a period of Three (3) Months from notice, with warning that a repetition of the same or similar acts will be
dealt with more severely.
Let copies of this Decision be furnished all courts in the country, the Integrated Bar of the Philippines, and the
Office of the Bar Confidant.
SO ORDERED

38:[ A.C. No. 10134, November 26, 2014 ]

PHILIPPINE ASSOCIATION OF COURT EMPLOYEES (PACE), REPRESENTED BY ITS PRESIDENT, ATTY.
VIRGINIA C. RAFAEL, COMPLAINANT, VS. ATTY. EDNA M. ALIBUTDAN-DIAZ, RESPONDENT.
DECISION
MENDOZA, J.:
This resolves the complaint for suspension or disbarment Hied by the Philippine Association of Court Employees
(PACE) through its president, Atty. Virginia C. Rafael (Atty. Rafael), on July 17, 2008 against Atty. Edna M. AlibutdanDiaz (Atty. Diaz), former National Treasurer of PACE, before the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP).[1]
PACE, the umbrella association of 1st and 2nd level court employees in the Judiciary held its 11 th National
Convention/Seminar in Davao City from October 6 to 8, 2005. As then National Treasurer of PACE, Atty. Diaz was
entrusted with all the money matters of PACE.
The complainant alleged that the liquidation for the 11th PACE national convention was submitted by Atty. Diaz only
on March 29, 2007, during the 12th PACE national convention in Iloilo City[2]; that during the 12thconvention, an
election of officers was conducted and Atty. Diaz ran for the position of National Treasurer, but she was not elected;
that on the last day of the convention or on March 31, 2007, the outgoing Board of Directors, including Atty. Diaz,
passed and approved Resolution No. 1-2007 appropriating the amount of P30,000.00 as term-end bonus for each
PACE official qualified thereto; that Atty. Diaz did not submit a liquidation report for the 12 th convention; that there
was no turn over of monies belonging to the association as a matter of procedure despite a letter of demand, dated
June 20, 2007 sent to Atty. Diaz;[3] and that the new set of PACE officers issued Board Resolution No. 00-07 directing
past president, Rosita D. Amizola; and past treasurer, Atty. Diaz, to explain why they failed to liquidate the finances
of PACE for the Davao and Iloilo conventions.[4]
In her defense, Atty. Diaz countered that she had filed the Statement of Liquidation for the 11 th national convention
in Davao in less than a week after the said convention; that it was duly audited by the national auditor, Letecia
Agbayani; that the net proceeds of that convention was "fully accounted, liquidated and entirely deposited to PACE
accounts;"[5] that she also filed the Statement of Liquidation for the 12th national convention on May 22, 2007; that
the report, together with the cash, checks and original receipts, were received by Rosita Amisola and witnessed by
former PACE officers;[6] that she denied running for re-election as PACE national treasurer during the Iloilo
convention as she had already filed her certificate of candidacy for Board Member of the First District of Ipil,
Zamboanga Sibugay;[7] that the approval of the P30,000.00 term-end bonus did not rest with her solely, rather, it
was approved by the previous board of directors; and that she never sponsored the bonus, as it was initiated by
Aliven Maderaza and seconded by Atty. Lourdes Garcia and Sarah Ampong.
On her part, Atty. Garcia averred that she was not privy to the disbursement of the said term-end bonus. [8]
Initially, the case was assigned to IBP Commissioner Elpidio G. Soriano. After an exchange of pleadings, the
mandatory conference was held. Afterwards, the protagonists were directed to submit their respective position
papers. Thereafter, the case was re-assigned to IBP Commissioner Victor C. Fernandez (Commissioner Fernandez).
[9]

The lone issue here is whether or not Atty. Diaz violated Chapter 1, Canon 1, Rule 1.01 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility (CPR), which reads:
"A lawyer should not engage in an unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct."
In his Report and Recommendation, dated June 28, 2010, Commissioner Fernandez recommended the dismissal of
the case against Atty. Diaz for lack of merit. Atty. Diaz offered documentary evidence to show that she was able to
submit the liquidation reports for the two aforementioned conventions of PACE. He also took note that Atty. Rafael
herself acknowledged the liquidation report made by Atty. Diaz with respect to the Davao City convention. [10] As to
the sufficiency and completeness of these reports, this would be better resolved through an audit rather than in
disbarment proceedings. Besides, Commissioner Fernandez did not consider the position of Atty. Diaz as national
treasurer of PACE to have any connection with her being as a lawyer. Thus, according to him, she should be
sanctioned in accordance with the by-laws of PACE instead of a disbarment case. [11]
As regards the accusation that Atty. Diaz ran for re-election in the PACE elections even though she was no longer
connected with the Judiciary and therefore disqualified, Commissioner Fernandez opined that the best evidence,
which was the "certificate of candidacy," was never offered, [12] and that Atty. Diaz, being a lawyer, knew that her
bid for re-election would be a useless exercise since she would not be able to assume office if she won. [13]
Finally, Commissioner Fernandez believed Atty. Diaz's assertion that she never sponsored the appropriation of the
P30,000.00 term-end bonus and that the approval of Resolution No. 1-2007 was a collegial action among the Board
of Directors. Again, Commissioner Fernandez was of the view that her participation in the passage of the
questioned board resolution was not connected to her being a lawyer. [14]
On November 19, 2011, the IBP Board of Governors (IBP-BOG) passed a resolution adopting and approvingthe
report and recommendation of Commissioner Fernandez, and dismissed the complaint against Atty. Diaz. [15]
On reconsideration, the IBP-BOG issued the Extended Resolution, [16] dated June 21, 2013, granting the
complainant's motion for reconsideration. It reversed and set aside its earlier resolution and suspended Atty. Diaz

from the practice of law for one (1) year.[17]

The IBP-BOG explained that the questions regarding (i) Atty. Diaz' liquidation of PACE funds; (ii) her running for reelection when she was no longer with the Judiciary; and (iii) her entitlement to the term-end bonus when she was
no longer working in the Judiciary, constituted a "triple - whammy" of questionable actions [18]committed by Atty.
Diaz in contravention of Rule 1.01 of the CPR.
The Court's Ruling
This Court agrees with the IBP-BOG and adopts its June 21, 2013 Extended Resolution.
Everyone should keep in mind that the practice of law is only a privilege. It is definitely not a right. In order to enjoy
this privilege, one must show that he possesses, and continues to possess, the qualifications required by law for
the conferment of such privilege.
One of those requirements is the observance of honesty and candor. Candor in all their dealings is the very
essence of a practitioner's honorable membership in the legal profession. Lawyers are required to act with the
highest standard of truthfulness, fair play and nobility in the conduct of litigation and in their relations with their
clients, the opposing parties, the other counsels and the courts. They are bound by their oath to speak the truth
and to conduct themselves according to the best of their knowledge and discretion, and with fidelity to the courts
and their clients.[19]
Time and again, the Court has held that the practice of law is granted only to those of good moral character. The
Bar maintains a high standard of honesty and fair dealing. Thus, lawyers must conduct themselves beyond
reproach at all times, whether they are dealing with their clients or the public at large, and a violation of the high
moral standards of the legal profession justifies the imposition of the appropriate penalty, including suspension and
disbarment.[20]
It bears stressing that Atty. Diaz is a servant of the law and belongs to that profession which society entrusts with
the administration of law and the dispensation of justice. For this, he or she is an exemplar for others to emulate
and should not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct. Necessarily, this Court has been
exacting in its demand for integrity and good moral character from members of the Bar. They are always expected
to uphold the integrity and dignity of the legal profession and to refrain from any act or omission which might
lessen the trust and confidence reposed by the public in the fidelity, honesty, and integrity of this noble profession.
[21]

Atty. Diaz' delay in the liquidation of the finances of PACE; her running for re-election, including her non-admission
that she ran for said election as shown not by her certificate of candidacy but by the affidavits of former PACE
officers; and her involvement in the approval or passage of the questioned term-end bonus of PACE officers,
including herself even though she was no longer working in the Judiciary, were definitely not the candor the Court
speaks of. There was much to be desired in Atty. Diaz' actions/ inactions.
WHEREFORE, Atty. Edna M. Alibutdan-Diaz is found GUILTY of violating Chapter 1, Canon 1, Rule 1.01 of the Code
of Professional Responsibility, and is hereby SUSPENDED from the practice of law for a period ofthree (3)
months.
This decision shall be immediately executory.
Let copies of this Decision be furnished the Court Administrator for its distribution to all courts of the land; the IBP;
and the Office of the Bar Confidant to be entered into respondent's personal records as a member of the Philippine
Bar.
SO ORDERED.
Carpio, (Chairperson), Del Castillo, Reyes,* and Leonen, JJ., concur

45:[ A.C. No. 7593, March 11, 2015 ]

ALVIN S. FELICIANO, COMPLAINANT, VS. ATTY. CARMELITA BAUTISTA-LOZADA, RESPONDENT.
DECISION
PERALTA, J.:
Before us is a Petition for Disbarment[1] dated August 2, 2007 filed by Alvin S. Feliciano (complainant) against
respondent Atty. Carmelita Bautista-Lozada (Atty. Lozada) for violation of Section 27,[2] Rule 138 of the Rules of
Court.
The facts of the case, as culled from the records, are as follows:
On December 13, 2005, the Court en banc promulgated a Resolution in A.C. No. 6656 entitled Bobie Rose V. Frias
vs. Atty. Carmencita Bautista Lozada[3] suspending Atty. Lozada for violation of Rules 15.03 and 16.04 of the Code
of Professional Responsibility, the dispositive portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, respondent Atty. Carmencita Bautista Lozada is hereby found guilty of violating Rules 15.03 and
16.04 of the Code of Professional Responsibility and of willfully disobeying a final and executory decision of the
Court of Appeals. She is hereby SUSPENDED from the practice of law for a period of two (2) years from notice,
with a STERN WARNING that a repetition of the same or similar acts will be dealt with more severely.
Let copies of this Resolution be furnished all courts of the land, the Integrated Bar of the Philippines, as well as the
Office of the Bar Confidant, for their information and guidance, and let it be entered in respondent's personal
records.
SO ORDERED.[4]
On May 4, 2006, the Court denied with finality Atty. Lozada's motion for reconsideration. [5]
However, on June 5, 2007, in an action for injunction with prayer for issuance of a temporary restraining order
and/or writ of preliminary injunction docketed as Civil Case no. 101-V-07 entitled Edilberto Lozada, et.al. vs. Alvin
S. Feliciano, et al., where complainant was one of the respondents, complainant lamented that Atty. Lozada
appeared as counsel for the plaintiff and her husband, Edilberto Lozada, and actively participated in the
proceedings of the case before Branch 75 of the Regional Trial Court of Valenzuela City. To prove his allegation,
complainant submitted certified true copies of the minutes of the hearings, dated June 12, 2007, July 3, 2007 and
July 6, 2007, wherein Atty. Lozada signed her name as one of the counsels, [6] as well as the transcript of
stenographic notes showing that Atty. Lozada conducted direct examination and cross-examination of the
witnesses during the trial proceedings.[7]
Complainant argued that the act of Atty. Lozada in appearing as counsel while still suspended from the practice of
law constitutes willfull disobedience to the resolutions of the Court which suspended her from the practice of law
for two (2) years.
On September 12, 2007, the Court resolved to require Atty. Lozada to comment on the complaint against him. [8]
In her Comment[9] dated November 19, 2007, Atty. Lozada explained that she was forced by circumstances and her
desire to defend the rights of her husband who is embroiled in a legal dispute. She claimed that she believed in
good faith that her appearance as wife of Edilberto Lozada is not within the prohibition to practice law, considering
that she is defending her husband and not a client. She insisted that her husband is a victim of grave injustice, and
his reputation and honor are at stake; thus, she has no choice but to give him legal assistance. [10]
On January 30, 2008, the Court referred the instant case to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines for investigation,
report and recommendation.[11]
In its Report and Recommendation[12] dated March 9, 2009, the Integrated Bar of the Philippines-Commission on Bar
Discipline (IBP-CBD) found Atty. Lozada guilty of violating Rule 1.01 & 1.02, Rule 18.01 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility and the terms of her suspension from the practice of law as imposed by the Court. Thus, the IBP-CBD
recommended the disbarment of Atty. Lozada.
On May 14, 2011, however, the IBP-Board of Governors resolved to adopt and approve with modification the report
and recommendation of the IBP-CBD such that it recommended instead that Atty. Lozada be suspended from the
practice of law for three (3) months.
RULING
We adopt the ruling of the IBP-Board of Governors with modification.
Indeed, this Court has the exclusive jurisdiction to regulate the practice of law. When this Court orders a lawyer
suspended from the practice of law, as in the instant case, the lawyer must desist from performing all functions
requiring the application of legal knowledge within the period of suspension. [13]
Suffice it to say that practice of law embraces "any activity, in or out of court, which requires the application of law,

legal procedure, knowledge, training and experience." It includes "[performing] acts which are characteristics of
the [legal] profession" or "[rendering any kind of] service [which] requires the use in any degree of legal knowledge
or skill.[14]
In the instant case, Atty. Lozada's guilt is undisputed. Based on the records, there is no doubt that Atty. Lozada's
actuations, that is, in appearing and signing as counsel for and in behalf of her husband, conducting or offering
stipulation/admission of facts, conducting direct and cross-examination, all constitute practice of law. Furthermore,
the findings of the IBP would disclose that such actuations of Atty. Lozada of actively engaging in the practice of
law in June-July 2007 were done within the period of her two (2)-year suspension considering that she was
suspended from the practice of law by this Court in May 4, 2006. It would then appear that, at the very least, Atty.
Lozada cannot practice law from 2006 to 2008. Thus, it is clear that when Atty. Lozada appeared for and in behalf
of her husband in Civil Case No. 101-V-07 and actively participated in the proceedings therein in June-July 2007, or
within the two (2)-year suspension, she, therefore, engaged in the unauthorized practice of law.
Atty. Lozada's defense of good faith fails to convince. She knew very well that at the time she represented her
husband, she is still serving her two (2)-year suspension order. Yet, she failed to inform the court about it. Neither
did she seek any clearance or clarification from the Court if she can represent her husband. While we understand
her devotion and desire to defend her husband whom she believed has suffered grave injustice, Atty. Lozada
should not forget that she is first and foremost, an officer of the court who is bound to obey the lawful order of the
Court.
Under Section 27, Rule 138 of the Revised Rules of Court, as amended, willful disobedience to any lawful order of a
superior court is a ground for disbarment or suspension from the practice of law:
SEC. 27. Disbarment or suspension of attorneys by Supreme Court; grounds therefor. - A member of the bar may
be disbarred or suspended from his office as attorney by the Supreme Court for any deceit, malpractice, or other
gross misconduct in such office, grossly immoral conduct, or by reason of his conviction of a crime involving moral
turpitude, or for any violation of the oath which he is required to take before admission to practice, or for a willful
disobedience of any lawful order of a superior court, or for corruptly or willfully appearing as an
attorney for a party to a case without authority to do so. The practice of soliciting cases at law for the
purpose of gain, either personally or through paid agents or brokers, constitutes malpractice. [15]
Atty. Lozada would have deserved a harsher penalty, but this Court recognizes the fact that it is part of the Filipino
culture that amid an adversity, families will always look out and extend a helping hand to a family member, more
so, in this case, to a spouse. Thus, considering that Atty. Lozada's actuation was prompted by her affection to her
husband and that in essence, she was not representing a client but rather a spouse, we deem it proper to mitigate
the severeness of her penalty.
Following the recent case of Victor C. Lingan v. Atty. Romeo Calubaquib and Jimmy P. Baliga,[16] citing Molina v. Atty.
Magat,[17] where this Court suspended further respondents from the practice of law for six (6) months for practicing
their profession despite this court's previous order of suspension, we, thus, impose the same penalty on Atty.
Lozada for representing her husband as counsel despite lack of authority to practice law.
Disbarment of lawyers is a proceeding that aims to purge the law profession of unworthy members of the bar. It is
intended to preserve the nobility and honor of the legal profession. While the Supreme Court has the plenary power
to discipline erring lawyers through this kind of proceedings, it does so in the most vigilant manner so as not to
frustrate its preservative principle. The Court, in the exercise of its sound judicial discretion, is inclined to impose a
less severe punishment if, through it, the end desire of reforming the errant lawyer is possible. [18]
WHEREFORE, premises considered, Atty. Carmelita S. Bautista-Lozada is found GUILTY of violating Section 27,
[19]
Rule 138 of the Rules of Court, and is hereby SUSPENDED for a period of six (6) months from the practice of
law, with a WARNING that a repetition of the same or similar offense will warrant a more severe penalty.
Let copies of this Decision be furnished all courts, the Office of the Bar Confidant and the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines for their information and guidance. The Office of the Bar Confidant is DIRECTED to append a copy of
this Decision to respondents record as member of the Bar.
Atty. Lozada is DIRECTED to inform the Court of the date of her receipt of this Decision, so that we can determine
the reckoning point when her suspension shall take effect.
This Decision is immediately executory.
SO ORDERED.

46:[ A.C. No. 5581, January 14, 2014 ]

ROSE BUNAGAN-BANSIG, COMPLAINANT,VS. ATTY. ROGELIO JUAN A. CELERA, RESPONDENT.
DECISION

PER CURIAM:
Before us is a Petition for Disbarment[1] dated January 8, 2002 filed by complainant Rose BunaganBansig(Bansig) against respondent Atty. Rogelio Juan A. Celera (respondent) for Gross Immoral Conduct.
In her complaint, Bansig narrated that, on May 8, 1997, respondent and Gracemarie R. Bunagan (Bunagan),
entered into a contract of marriage, as evidenced by a certified xerox copy of the certificate of marriage issued by
the City Civil Registry of Manila.[2] Bansig is the sister of Gracemarie R. Bunagan, legal wife of respondent.
However, notwithstanding respondent's marriage with Bunagan, respondent contracted another marriage on
January 8, 1998 with a certain Ma. Cielo Paz Torres Alba (Alba), as evidenced by a certified xerox copy of the
certificate of marriage issued by the City Registration Officer of San Juan, Manila. [3]
Bansig stressed that the marriage between respondent and Bunagan was still valid and in full legal existence when
he contracted his second marriage with Alba, and that the first marriage had never been annulled or rendered void
by any lawful authority.
Bansig alleged that respondents act of contracting marriage with Alba, while his marriage is still subsisting,
constitutes grossly immoral and conduct unbecoming of a member of the Bar, which renders him unfit to continue
his membership in the Bar.
In a Resolution[4] dated February 18, 2002, the Court resolved to require respondent to file a comment on the
instant complaint.
Respondent failed to submit his comment on the complaint, despite receipt of the copy of the Court's Resolution,
as evidenced by Registry Return Receipt No. 30639. Thus, the Court, in a Resolution [5] dated March 17, 2003,
resolved to require respondent to show cause why he should not be disciplinarily dealt with or held in contempt for
failing to file his comment on the complaint against him. [6]
On December 10, 2002, Bansig filed an Omnibus Ex Parte Motion[7] praying that respondent's failure to file his
comment on the complaint be deemed as a waiver to file the same, and that the case be submitted for disposition.
On May 4, 2003, in a Motion, respondent claimed that while it appeared that an administrative case was filed
against him, he did not know the nature or cause thereof since other than Bansig's Omnibus Motion, he received no
other pleading or any processes of this Court. Respondent, however, countered that Bansig's Omnibus Motion was
merely a ploy to frighten him and his wife from pursuing the criminal complaints for falsification of public
documents they filed against Bansig and her husband. He also explained that he was able to obtain a copy of the
Court's Show Cause Order only when he visited his brother who is occupying their former residence at 59-B Aguho
St., Project 3, Quezon City. Respondent further averred that he also received a copy of Bansig's Omnibus Motion
when the same was sent to his law office address.
Respondent pointed out that having been the family's erstwhile counsel and her younger sister's husband, Bansig
knew his law office address, but she failed to send a copy of the complaint to him. Respondent suspected that
Bansig was trying to mislead him in order to prevent him from defending himself. He added that Bansig has an
unpaid obligation amounting to P2,000,000.00 to his wife which triggered a sibling rivalry. He further claimed that
he and his wife received death threats from unknown persons; thus, he transferred to at least two (2) new
residences, i.e., in Sampaloc, Manila and Angeles City. He then prayed that he be furnished a copy of the complaint
and be given time to file his answer to the complaint.
In a Resolution[8] dated July 7, 2003, the Court resolved to (a) require Bansig to furnish respondent with a copy of
the administrative complaint and to submit proof of such service; and (b) require respondent to file a comment on
the complaint against him.

In compliance, Bansig submitted an Affidavit of Mailing to show proof that a copy of the administrative complaint
was furnished to respondent at his given address which is No. 238 Mayflower St., Ninoy Aquino Subdivision,
Angeles City, as evidenced by Registry Receipt No. 2167. [9]
On March 17, 2004, considering that respondent failed anew to file his comment despite receipt of the complaint,
the Court resolved to require respondent to show cause why he should not be disciplinarily dealt with or held in
contempt for such failure.[10]

On June 3, 2004, respondent, in his Explanation, [11] reiterated that he has yet to receive a copy of the complaint. He
claimed that Bansig probably had not complied with the Court's Order, otherwise, he would have received the
same already. He requested anew that Bansig be directed to furnish him a copy of the complaint.
Again, on August 25, 2004, the Court granted respondent's prayer that he be furnished a copy of the complaint,
and required Bansig to furnish a copy of the complaint to respondent. [12]
On October 1, 2004, Bansig, in her Manifestation, [13] lamented the dilatory tactics allegedly undertaken by
respondent in what was supposedly a simple matter of receipt of complaint. Bansig asserted that the Court should
sanction respondent for his deliberate and willful act to frustrate the actions of the Court. She attached a copy of
the complaint and submitted an Affidavit of Mailing stating that again a copy of the complaint was mailed at
respondent's residential address in Angeles City as shown by Registry Receipt No. 3582.
On May 16, 2005, the Court anew issued a Show Cause Order to respondent as to why he should not be
disciplinarily dealt with or held in contempt for failure to comply with the Resolution dated July 7, 2003 despite
service of copy of the complaint by registered mail. [14]
On August 1, 2005, the Court noted the returned and unserved copy of the Show Cause Order dated May 16, 2005
sent to respondent at 238 Mayflower St., Ninoy Aquino Subd. under Registry Receipt No. 55621, with notation RTSMoved. It likewise required Bansig to submit the correct and present address of respondent. [15]
On September 12, 2005, Bansig manifested that respondent had consistently indicated in his correspondence with
the Court No. 238 Mayflower St., Ninoy Aquino Subdivision, Angeles City as his residential address. However, all
notices served upon him on said address were returned with a note moved by the mail server. Bansig averred
that in Civil Case No. 59353, pending before the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 1, Tuguegarao City, respondent
entered his appearance as counsel with mailing address to be at Unit 8, Halili Complex, 922 Aurora Blvd., Cubao,
Quezon City.[16]
On February 13, 2006, the Court resolved to resend a copy of the Show Cause Order dated May 16, 2005 to
respondent at his new address at Unit 8, Halili Complex, 922 Aurora Blvd., Cubao, Quezon City. [17]
On June 30, 2008, due to respondent's failure to comply with the Show Cause Order dated May 16, 2005, for failure
to file his comment on this administrative complaint as required in the Resolution dated July 7, 2003, the Court
resolved to: (a) IMPOSE upon Atty. Celera a FINE of P1,000.00 payable to the court, or a penalty of imprisonment of
five (5) days if said fine is not paid, and (b) REQUIRE Atty. Celera to COMPLY with the Resolution dated July 7, 2003
by filing the comment required thereon.[18]
In a Resolution[19] dated January 27, 2010, it appearing that respondent failed to comply with the Court's
Resolutions dated June 30, 2008 and July 7, 2003, the Court resolved to: (1) DISPENSE with the filing by respondent
of his comment on the complaint; (2) ORDER the arrest of Atty. Celera; and (3) DIRECT the Director of the National
Bureau of Investigation (NBI) to (a) ARREST and DETAIN Atty. Celera for non-compliance with the Resolution dated
June 30, 2008; and (b) SUBMIT a report of compliance with the Resolution. The Court likewise resolved to REFER
the complaint to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines for investigation, report and recommendation. [20]
However, the Return of Warrant[21] dated March 24, 2010, submitted by Atty. Frayn M. Banawa, Investigation Agent
II, Anti-Graft Division of the NBI, showed that respondent cannot be located because neither Halili Complex nor No.
922 Aurora Blvd., at Cubao, Quezon City cannot be located. During surveillance, it appeared that the given
address, i.e., No. 922 Aurora Blvd., Cubao, Quezon City was a vacant lot with debris of a demolished building.
Considering that the given address cannot be found or located and there were no leads to determine respondent's
whereabouts, the warrant of arrest cannot be enforced.
The Integrated Bar of the Philippines, meanwhile, in compliance with the Court's Resolution, reported that as per
their records, the address of respondent is at No. 41 Hoover St., Valley View Royale Subd., Taytay, Rizal.
Respondent likewise failed to appear before the mandatory conference and hearings set by the Integrated Bar of
the Philippines, Commission on Bar Discipline (IBP-CBD), despite several notices. Thus, in an Order dated August 4,
2010, Commissioner Rebecca Villanueva-Maala, of the IBP-CBD, declared respondent to be in default and the case
was submitted for report and recommendation. The Order of Default was received by respondent as evidenced by
a registry return receipt. However, respondent failed to take any action on the matter.
On January 3, 2011, the IBP-CBD, in its Report and Recommendation, recommended that respondent Atty. Celera
be suspended for a period of two (2) years from the practice of law.
RULING
A disbarment case is sui generis for it is neither purely civil nor purely criminal, but is rather an investigation by the
court into the conduct of its officers.[22] The issue to be determined is whether respondent is still fit to continue to
be an officer of the court in the dispensation of justice. Hence, an administrative proceeding for disbarment
continues despite the desistance of a complainant, or failure of the complainant to prosecute the same, or in this
case, the failure of respondent to answer the charges against him despite numerous notices.

In administrative proceedings, the complainant has the burden of proving, by substantial evidence, the allegations
in the complaint. Substantial evidence has been defined as such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might
accept as adequate to support a conclusion. For the Court to exercise its disciplinary powers, the case against the
respondent must be established by clear, convincing and satisfactory proof. Considering the serious consequence
of the disbarment or suspension of a member of the Bar, this Court has consistently held that clear preponderant
evidence is necessary to justify the imposition of the administrative penalty. [23]
In the instant case, there is a preponderance of evidence that respondent contracted a second marriage despite
the existence of his first marriage. The first marriage, as evidenced by the certified xerox copy of the Certificate of
Marriage issued on October 3, 2001 by the City Civil Registry of Manila, Gloria C. Pagdilao, states that respondent
Rogelio Juan A. Celera contracted marriage on May, 8, 1997 with Gracemarie R. Bunagan at the Church of Saint
Augustine, Intramuros, Manila; the second marriage, however, as evidenced by the certified xerox copy of the
Certificate of Marriage issued on October 4, 2001 by the City Civil Registry of San Juan, Manila, states that
respondent Rogelio Juan A. Celera contracted marriage on January 8, 1998 with Ma. Cielo Paz Torres Alba at the
Mary the Queen Church, Madison St., Greenhills, San Juan, Metro Manila.
Bansig submitted certified xerox copies of the marriage certificates to prove that respondent entered into a second
marriage while the latters first marriage was still subsisting. We note that the second marriage apparently took
place barely a year from his first marriage to Bunagan which is indicative that indeed the first marriage was still
subsisting at the time respondent contracted the second marriage with Alba.
The certified xerox copies of the marriage contracts, issued by a public officer in custody thereof, are admissible as
the best evidence of their contents, as provided for under Section 7 of Rule 130 of the Rules of Court, to wit:
Sec. 7. Evidence admissible when original document is a public record. When the original of a document is in the
custody of a public officer or is recorded in a public office, its contents may be proved by a certified copy issued by
the public officer in custody thereof.
Moreover, the certified xerox copies of the marriage certificates, other than being admissible in evidence, also
clearly indicate that respondent contracted the second marriage while the first marriage is subsisting. By itself, the
certified xerox copies of the marriage certificates would already have been sufficient to establish the existence of
two marriages entered into by respondent. The certified xerox copies should be accorded the full faith and
credence given to public documents. For purposes of this disbarment proceeding, these Marriage Certificates
bearing the name of respondent are competent and convincing evidence to prove that he committed bigamy,
which renders him unfit to continue as a member of the Bar. [24]
The Code of Professional Responsibility provides:
Rule 1.01- A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct.
Canon 7- A lawyer shall at all times uphold the integrity and dignity of the legal profession, and support the
activities of the Integrated Bar.
Rule 7.03- A lawyer shall not engage in conduct that adversely reflects on his fitness to practice law, nor should he,
whether in public or private life, behave in a scandalous manner to the discredit of the legal profession.
Respondent exhibited a deplorable lack of that degree of morality required of him as a member of the Bar. He
made a mockery of marriage, a sacred institution demanding respect and dignity. His act of contracting a second
marriage while his first marriage is subsisting constituted grossly immoral conduct and are grounds for disbarment
under Section 27, Rule 138 of the Revised Rules of Court. [25]
This case cannot be fully resolved, however, without addressing rather respondents defiant stance against the
Court as demonstrated by his repetitive disregard of its Resolution requiring him to file his comment on the
complaint. This case has dragged on since 2002. In the span of more than 10 years, the Court has issued
numerous directives for respondent's compliance, but respondent seemed to have preselected only those he will
take notice of and the rest he will just ignore. The Court has issued several resolutions directing respondent to
comment on the complaint against him, yet, to this day, he has not submitted any answer thereto. He claimed to
have not received a copy of the complaint, thus, his failure to comment on the complaint against him. Ironically,
however, whenever it is a show cause order, none of them have escaped respondent's attention. Even assuming
that indeed the copies of the complaint had not reached him, he cannot, however, feign ignorance that there is a
complaint against him that is pending before this Court which he could have easily obtained a copy had he wanted
to.
The Court has been very tolerant in dealing with respondent's nonchalant attitude towards this case;
accommodating respondent's endless requests, manifestations and prayers to be given a copy of the complaint.
The Court, as well as Bansig, as evidenced by numerous affidavits of service, have relentlessly tried to reach
respondent for more than a decade; sending copies of the Court's Resolutions and complaint to different locations both office and residential addresses of respondent. However, despite earnest efforts of the Court to reach

respondent, the latter, however conveniently offers a mere excuse of failure to receive the complaint. When said
excuse seemed no longer feasible, respondent just disappeared. In a manner of speaking, respondents acts were
deliberate, maneuvering the liberality of the Court in order to delay the disposition of the case and to evade the
consequences of his actions. Ultimately, what is apparent is respondents deplorable disregard of the judicial
process which this Court cannot countenance.
Clearly, respondent's acts constitute willful disobedience of the lawful orders of this Court, which under Section 27,
Rule 138 of the Rules of Court is in itself alone a sufficient cause for suspension or disbarment. Respondents
cavalier attitude in repeatedly ignoring the orders of the Supreme Court constitutes utter disrespect to the judicial
institution. Respondents conduct indicates a high degree of irresponsibility. We have repeatedly held that a Courts
Resolution is not to be construed as a mere request, nor should it be complied with partially, inadequately, or
selectively. Respondents obstinate refusal to comply with the Courts orders not only betrays a recalcitrant flaw
in his character; it also underscores his disrespect of the Courts lawful orders which is only too deserving of
reproof.[26]
Section 27, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court provides:
Sec. 27. Disbarment or suspension of attorneys by Supreme Court, grounds therefor. - A member of the bar may
be disbarred or suspended from his office as attorney by the Supreme Court for any deceit, malpractice, or other
gross misconduct in such office, grossly immoral conduct, or by reason of his conviction of a crime involving moral
turpitude or for any violation of the oath which he is required to take before admission to practice, or for a willful
disobedience of any lawful order of a superior court, or for corruptly or willfully appearing as an attorney for a party
to a case without authority to do so. The practice of soliciting cases for the purpose of gain, either personally or
through paid agents or brokers, constitutes malpractice.
Considering respondent's propensity to disregard not only the laws of the land but also the lawful orders of the
Court, it only shows him to be wanting in moral character, honesty, probity and good demeanor. He is, thus,
unworthy to continue as an officer of the court.
IN VIEW OF ALL THE FOREGOING, we find respondent ATTY. ROGELIO JUAN A. CELERA, guilty of grossly immoral
conduct and willful disobedience of lawful orders rendering him unworthy of continuing membership in the legal
profession. He is thus ordered DISBARRED from the practice of law and his name stricken off the Roll of Attorneys,
effective immediately.
Let copies of this Decision be furnished the Office of the Bar Confidant, which shall forthwith record it in the
personal file of respondent. All the Courts of the Philippines and the Integrated Bar of the Philippines shall
disseminate copies thereof to all its Chapters.SO ORDERED.

48: [ A.C. No. 6490 [Formerly CBD Case No. 03-1054], July 09, 2013 ]
LILIA TABANG AND CONCEPCION TABANG, COMPLAINANTS, VS. ATTY. GLENN C. GACOTT, RESPONDENT.
RESOLUTION
PER CURIAM:
This case involves a complaint for disbarment directly filed with the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) charging
respondent Atty. Glenn Gacott of engaging in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct in violation of Rule
1.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility (CPR). [1]
Complainants alleged that sometime in 1984 and 1985, complainant Lilia Tabang sought the advice of Judge
Eustaquio Gacott, respondent Atty. Glenn Gacotts father. Lilia Tabang intended to purchase a total of thirty (30)
hectares of agricultural land located in Barangay Bacungan, Puerto Princesa, Palawan, which consisted of several
parcels belonging to different owners. Judge Gacott noted that under the governments agrarian reform program,
Tabang was prohibited from acquiring vast tracts of agricultural land as she already owned other parcels. Thus,
Judge Gacott advised her to put the titles of the parcels under the names of fictitious persons. [2]
Eventually, Lilia Tabang was able to purchase seven parcels and obtained the corresponding Transfer Certificates of
Title (TCT) under the names of fictitious persons, as follows:
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.

TCT
TCT
TCT
TCT
TCT
TCT
TCT

No.
No.
No.
No.
No.
No.
No.

12475
12476
12790
12791
12792
12793
12794

Amelia Andes;
Wilfredo Ondoy;
Agnes Camilla;
Leonor Petronio;
Wilfredo Gomez;
Elizabeth Dungan; and
Andes Estoy.[3]

Later, complainants Lilia and Concepcion Tabang decided to sell the seven parcels as they were in need of funds
for their medication and other expenses. Claiming that he would help complainants by offering the parcels to
prospective buyers, respondent Glenn Gacott borrowed from Lilia Tabang the TCTs covering the parcels. [4]
About a year after respondent borrowed the titles and after he failed to negotiate any sale, complainants
confronted respondent. Respondent then told the complainants that he had lost all seven titles. [5]
On the pretext of offering a remedy to complainants, respondent advised them to file petitions in court for reissuance of titles. Pretending to be the authorized agent-representative of the fictitious owners of the seven
parcels, Lilia Tabang filed petitions for re-issuance of titles. [6]
In the course of the proceedings, the public prosecutor noticed similarities in the signatures of the supposed
owners that were affixed on the Special Powers of Attorney (SPA) purportedly executed in favor of Lilia Tabang. The
public prosecutor, acting on his observation, asked the court to have the supposed owners summoned. [7]
Seeking to avoid embarrassment, Lilia Tabang had the petitions voluntarily dismissed without prejudice to their
being re-filed.[8]
Subsequently, Lilia Tabang filed a new set of petitions. This time, she changed the fictitious owners signatures in
the hope of making them look more varied.[9]
Upon learning that Lilia Tabang had filed a new set of petitions, respondent executed several documents that
included revocations of SPAs and various affidavits of recovery purportedly signed by the parcels (fictitious)
owners. Respondent then caused the annotation of these documents on the TCTs of the seven parcels. [10]
Also, respondent caused the publication of notices where he represented himself as the owner of the parcels and
announced that these were for sale.[11] Later, respondent succeeded in selling the seven parcels. He received a
total of ?3,773,675.00 from the proceeds of the sales. [12]
Alleging that respondent committed gross misconduct, dishonesty, and deceit, complainants filed their complaint
directly with the Integrated Bar of the Philippines on February 3, 2003. The case was docketed as Commission on
Bar Discipline (CBD) Case No. 03-1054.
In his defense, respondent alleged that the owners of the seven parcels were not fictitious and that they had
voluntarily sold the seven parcels. He added that Lilia Tabang had been merely the broker for the seven parcels
and that she had unsuccessfully demanded a balato of twenty percent (20%) from the proceeds of the sale of the
seven parcels. He alleged that after she had been refused to be given a balato, Lilia Tabang had threatened to
defame him and seek his disbarment.[13]
In her Report and Recommendation dated March 4, 2004,[14] IBP Investigating Commissioner Lydia A. Navarro found
respondent guilty of gross misconduct for violating Rule 1.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. She
recommended that respondent be suspended from the practice of law for six (6) months.
In a Resolution dated April 16, 2004,[15] the IBP Board of Governors adopted the report of Commissioner Navarro.
However, the IBP Board of Governors increased the penalty to disbarment. Thereafter, the case was referred to the

Supreme Court pursuant to Rule 139-B of the Rules of Court.

In a Resolution dated September 29, 2004,[16] the Supreme Court remanded the case to the IBP. The Court noted
that majority of the pieces of evidence presented by complainants were mere photocopies and affidavits and that
the persons who supposedly executed such documents were neither presented nor subpoenaed. Thus, there could
not have been adequate basis for sustaining the imposition of a penalty as grave as disbarment.
The case was then assigned to Investigating Commissioner Dennis B. Funa. Hearings were conducted on March 22,
2005; October 7, 2005; July 18, 2006; August 29, 2006; November 7, 2006; February 23, 2007; and July 25, 2007.
[17]

The complainants presented several witnesses. One was Dieter Heinze, President of the Swiss American Lending
Corporation.[18] Heinze testified that in April 2001, a friend introduced him to respondent who, in turn, introduced
himself as the owner of seven (7) parcels in Puerto Princesa City, Palawan. They agreed on the purchase of a lot
priced at P900,000.00. His company, however, paid only P668,000.00. Heinze noted that his company withheld
payment upon his realization that Lilia Tabang had caused the annotation of an adverse claim and upon
respondents failure to produce Leonor Petronio, the alleged lot owner.
Another of complainants witnesses was Atty. Agerico Paras. [19] He testified that Heinze introduced him to
respondent who, in turn, introduced himself as the owner of seven (7) parcels in Puerto Princesa City, Palawan.
They agreed on the purchase of a lot priced at P2,300,000.00. He paid for the said parcel in two (2) installments.
Upon learning that Lilia Tabang had caused the annotation of an adverse claim, he wrote to respondent asking him
to either work on the cancellation of the claim or to reimburse him. He added that respondent was unable to
produce Amelia Andes, the ostensible owner of the parcel he had purchased.
Teodoro Gallinero, another buyer of one of the seven parcels, also testified for complainants. [20] He testified that in
February 2001, he was introduced to respondent who claimed that several parcels with a total area of thirty (30)
hectares were owned by his mother. Gallinero agreed to purchase a parcel for the price of P2,000,000.00 which he
paid in cash and in kind (L-300 van).
Complainant Lilia Tabang also testified on the matters stated in the Complaint. [21]
On July 25, 2007, Commissioner Funa required the complainants to submit their Position Paper. Respondent filed his
Motion for Reconsideration and the Inhibition of Commissioner Funa who, respondent claimed, deprived him of the
chance to cross-examine complainants witnesses, and was bent on prejudicing [22] him.
Commissioner Funa then inhibited himself. Following this, the case was reassigned to Investigating Commissioner
Rico A. Limpingco.
In the meantime, with the Supreme Court En Bancs approval of the IBP-CBDs Rules of Procedure, it was deemed
proper for an Investigating Commissioner to submit his/her Report and Recommendation based on matters
discussed during the mandatory conferences, on the parties Position Papers (and supporting documents), and on
the results of clarificatory questioning (if such questioning was found to be necessary). As such, respondents
Motion for Reconsideration was denied, and he was required to file his Position Paper. [23]
On July 30, 2009, respondent filed his Position Paper. [24] Subsequently, the case was deemed submitted for
Commissioner Limpingcos Report and Recommendation.
In his Position Paper, respondent noted that he filed criminal complaints against Lilia Tabang on account of
Tabangs statement that she had fabricated the identities of the owners of the seven (7) parcels. He claimed that
since 1996, he had relied on the Torrens Titles of the seven (7) owners who were introduced to him by Lilia Tabang.
He asserted that Lilia Tabang could not have been the owner of the seven (7) parcels since the SPAs executed by
the parcels owners clearly made her a mere agent and him a sub-agent. He also assailed the authenticity of the
public announcements (where he supposedly offered the seven [7] parcels for sale) and Memorandum of
Agreement. He surmised that the signatures on such documents appearing above the name Glenn C. Gacott had
been mere forgeries and crude duplications of his own signature.
In his Report and Recommendation dated August 23, 2010, [25] Commissioner Limpingco found respondent liable for
gross violation of Rule 1.01 of the CPR. He likewise noted that respondent was absent in most of the hearings
without justifiable reason, in violation of Rule 12.04 of the CPR. [26] He recommended that respondent be disbarred
and his name, stricken from the Roll of Attorneys.
On October 8, 2010, the IBP Board of Governors issued a Resolution [27] adopting the Report of Investigating
Commissioner Limpingco.
On June 26, 2011, the IBP Board of Governors denied respondents Motion for Reconsideration. [28]
Respondent then filed his Notice of Appeal with the IBP on August 8, 2011.
On August 17, 2011, respondent filed before the Supreme Court his Urgent Motion for Extension of Time (to file
Petition for Review/Appeal). On September 20, 2011, the Court granted respondents Motion and gave him an
extension of thirty (30) days to file his Appeal. The Supreme Court warned respondent that no further extension
will be given. Despite this, respondent filed two (2) more Motions for Extension the first on September 29, 2011

and the second on November 3, 2011 both of which were denied by the Court.
Despite the Courts denials of his Motions for Extension, respondent filed on December 14, 2011 a Motion to Admit
Petition for Review/Appeal (with attached Petition/Appeal). This Motion was denied by the Court on April 17, 2012.
For resolution is the issue of whether or not respondent engaged in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful
conduct violating Rule 1.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, thus warranting his disbarment.
After a careful examination of the records, the Court concurs with and adopts the findings and recommendation of
Commissioner Limpingco and the IBP Board of Governors. It is clear that respondent committed gross misconduct,
dishonesty, and deceit in violation of Rule 1.01 of the CPR when he executed the revocations of SPAs and affidavits
of recovery and in arrogating for himself the ownership of the seven (7) subject parcels.
While it may be true that complainant Lilia Tabang herself engaged in illicit activities, the complainants own
complicity does not negate, or even mitigate, the repugnancy of respondents offense. Quite the contrary, his
offense is made even graver. He is a lawyer who is held to the highest standards of morality, honesty, integrity,
and fair dealing. Perverting what is expected of him, he deliberately and cunningly took advantage of his
knowledge and skill of the law to prejudice and torment other individuals. Not only did he countenance illicit action,
he instigated it. Not only did he acquiesce to injustice, he orchestrated it. Thus, We impose upon respondent the
supreme penalty of disbarment.
Under Rule 138, Section 27 of the Rules of Court (Rules), a lawyer may be disbarred for any of the following
grounds:
a.
deceit;
b.
malpractice;
c.
gross misconduct in office;
d.
grossly immoral conduct;
e.
conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude;
f.
violation of the lawyer's oath;
g.
willful disobedience of any lawful order of a superior court; and
h.
willfully appearing as an attorney for a party without authority to do so.
It is established in Jurisprudence that disbarment is proper when lawyers commit gross misconduct, dishonesty,
and deceit in usurping the property rights of other persons. By way of examples:
a.

In Brennisen v. Contawi:[29] Respondent Atty. Ramon U. Contawi was disbarred for having used a spurious
SPA to mortgage and sell property entrusted to him for administration.

b.

In Sabayle v. Tandayag:[30] One of the respondents, Atty. Carmelito B. Gabor, was disbarred for having
acknowledged a Deed of Sale in the absence of the purported vendors and for taking advantage of his position
as Assistant Clerk of Court by purchasing one-half (1/2) of the land covered by said Deed of Sale knowing that
the deed was fictitious.

c.

In Daroy v. Legaspi:[31] The Court disbarred respondent Atty. Ramon Legaspi for having converted to his
personal use the funds that he received for his clients.

Nevertheless, recourse to disbarment must be done with utmost caution. As this Court noted in Moran v. Moron:[32]
Disbarment should never be imposed unless it is evidently clear that the lawyer, by his serious misconduct, should
no longer remain a member of the bar. Disbarment is the most severe form of disciplinary sanction, and, as such,
the power to disbar must always be exercised with great caution, only for the most imperative reasons and in clear
cases of misconduct affecting the standing and moral character of the lawyer as an officer of the court and
member of the bar. Accordingly, disbarment should not be decreed where any punishment less severe such as a
reprimand, suspension, or fine would accomplish the end desired. [33]
Moreover, considering the gravity of disbarment, it has been established that clearly preponderant evidence is
necessary to justify its imposition.[34]
As explained in Aba v. De Guzman,[35] [p]reponderance of evidence means that the evidence adduced by one side
is, as a whole, superior to or has greater weight than that of the other. It means evidence which is more convincing
to the court as worthy of belief than that which is offered in opposition thereto. [36]
Per Rule 133, Section 1 of the Rules, a court may consider the following in determining preponderance of evidence:
a.

All the facts and circumstances of the case;

b.

The witnesses manner of testifying, their intelligence, their means and opportunity of knowing the facts to
which they are testifying, the nature of the facts to which they testify, the probability or improbability of their
testimony;

c.

The witnesses interest or want of interest and also their personal credibility so far as the same may
ultimately appear in the trial; and

d.

The number of witnesses, although it does not mean that preponderance is necessarily with the greater
number.

In this case, complainants have shown by a preponderance of evidence that respondent committed gross
misconduct, dishonesty, and deceit in violation of Rule 1.01 of the CPR.
Specifically, complainants have shown not only through Lilia Tabangs testimony but more so through the
testimonies of Dieter Heinze, Atty. Agerico Paras, and Teodoro Gallinero that:
a.

respondent misrepresented himself as the owner of or having the right to dispose of the subject parcels;

b.

respondent actively sought to sell or otherwise dispose of the subject parcels;

c.

respondent perfected the sales and received the proceeds of the sales whether in cash or in kind of the
subject parcels;

d.

such sales were without the consent or authorization of complainants; and

e.

respondent never remitted the proceeds of the sales to complainants.

More importantly, complainants witnesses showed that when respondent had been confronted with Lilia Tabangs
adverse claims and asked to substantiate the identities of the supposed owners of the subject parcels, he had
failed to produce such persons or even show an iota of proof of their existence. In this regard, the testimonies of
Dieter Heinze, Atty. Agerico Paras, and Teodoro Gallinero are particularly significant in so far as they have been
made despite the fact that their interest as buyers is contrary to that of complainants interest as adverse
claimants.
In contrast, respondent failed to present evidence to rebut complainant's allegations.
Respondents defense centered on his insistence that the owners of the seven parcels were not fictitious and that
they had voluntarily sold the seven parcels. Respondent also evaded the allegations against him by flinging
counter-allegations. For instance, he alleged that Lilia Tabang had unsuccessfully demanded a balato from the
proceeds of the sale of the subject parcels and that after she had been refused, she threatened to defame
respondent and seek his disbarment. In support of this allegation, he pointed out that he had filed criminal
complaints against Lilia Tabang. He also surmised that the signatures on the subject documents appearing above
the name Glenn C. Gacott were mere forgeries and crude duplications of his signature.
Per Rule 131, Section 1 of the Rules of Court,[37] the burden of proof is vested upon the party who alleges the truth
of his claim or defense or any fact in issue. Thus, in Leave Division, Office of Administrative Services, Office of the
Court Administrator v. Gutierrez[38] where a party resorts to bare denials and allegations and fails to submit
evidence in support of his defense, the determination that he committed the violation is sustained.
It was incumbent upon respondent to prove his allegation that the supposed owners of the seven parcels are real
persons. Quite the contrary, he failed to produce the slightest proof of their identities and existence, much less
produce their actual persons. As to his allegations regarding Lilia Tabangs supposed extortion and threat and the
forgery or crude duplication of his signature, they remain just that allegations. Respondent failed to aver facts
and circumstances which support these claims.
At best, respondent merely draws conclusions from the documents which form the very basis of complainants own
allegations and which are actually being assailed by complainants as inaccurate, unreliable, and fraudulent.
Respondent makes much of how Lilia Tabang could not have been the owner of the seven (7) parcels since her
name does not appear on the parcels TCTs[39] and how he merely respected the title and ownership of the
ostensible owners.[40] Similarly, he makes much of how Lilia Tabang was named as a mere agent in the SPAs.
[41]
However, respondent loses sight of the fact that it is precisely the accuracy of what the TCTs and SPAs indicate
and the deception they engender that are the crux of the present controversy. In urging this Court to sustain him,
respondent would have us rely on the very documents assailed as fraudulent.
Apart from these, all that respondent can come up with are generic, sweeping, and self-serving allegations of (1)
how he could not have obtained the TCTs from Tabang as it is a standing policy of his law office not to accept
Torrens title [sic] unless it is related to a court case [42] and because [he] does not borrow any Torrens title from
anybody and for whatever purpose;[43] (2) how complainants could not have confronted him to demand the return
of the TCTs and how he could not have told them that he lost the TCTs because [a]s a lawyer, [he] always respects
and recognizes the right of an owner to keep in his custody or possession any of his properties of value; [44] and (3)
how he could not have met and talked with Lilia Tabang for the engagement of his services only to refuse Lilia
Tabang because legal practice constituted his livelihood, and there was no reason for him to refuse an occasion to
earn income.[45]
Rather than responding squarely to complainants allegations, respondent merely embarks on conjectures and
ascribes motives to complainants. He accuses Lilia Tabang of demanding a balato of twenty percent (20%) from
the proceeds of the sale of the seven parcels, and of threatening to defame him and to seek his disbarment after
she had been refused. This evasive posturing notwithstanding, what is clear is that respondent failed to adduce
even the slightest proof to substantiate these claims. From all indications, Lilia Tabang had sufficient basis to file

the present Complaint and seek sanctions against respondent.

Given the glaring disparity between the evidence adduced by complainants and the sheer lack of evidence
adduced by respondent, this Court is led to no other reasonable conclusion than that respondent committed the
acts of which he is accused and that he acted in a manner that is unlawful, dishonest, immoral, and deceitful in
violation of Rule 1.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility.
This Court has repeatedly emphasized that the practice of law is imbued with public interest and that a lawyer
owes substantial duties not only to his client, but also to his brethren in the profession, to the courts, and to the
nation, and takes part in one of the most important functions of the State the administration of justice as an
officer of the court.[46] Accordingly, [l]awyers are bound to maintain not only a high standard of legal proficiency,
but also of morality, honesty, integrity and fair dealing. [47]
Respondent has fallen dismally and disturbingly short of the high standard of morality, honesty, integrity, and fair
dealing required of him. Quite the contrary, he employed his knowledge and skill of the law as well as took
advantage of the credulity of petitioners to secure undue gains for himself and to inflict serious damage on others.
He did so over the course of several years in a sustained and unrelenting fashion and outdid his previous
wrongdoing with even greater, more detestable offenses. He has hardly shown any remorse. From how he has
conducted himself in these proceedings, he is all but averse to rectifying his ways and assuaging complainants
plight. Respondent even foisted upon the IBP and this Court his duplicity by repeatedly absenting himself from the
IBPs hearings without justifiable reasons. He also vexed this Court to admit his Appeal despite his own failure to
comply with the much extended period given to him, thus inviting the Court to be a party in delaying complainants
cause. For all his perversity, respondent deserves none of this Courts clemency.
WHEREFORE, respondent ATTY. GLENN C. GACOTT, having clearly violated the Canons of Professional
Responsibility through his unlawful, dishonest, and deceitful conduct, is DISBARRED and his name
orderedSTRICKEN from the Roll of Attorneys.
Let copies of this Decision be served on the Office of the Bar Confidant, the Integrated Bar of the Philippines, and
all courts in the country for their information and guidance. Let a copy of this Decision be attached to respondent's
personal record as attorney.
SO ORDERED.

49:[ A.C. No. 6732, October 22, 2013 ]

ATTY. OSCAR L. EMBIDO, REGIONAL DIRECTOR, NATIONAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION, WESTERN
VISAYAS, REGIONAL OFFICE (NBI-WEVRO), FOR SAN PEDRO, ILOILO CITY, COMPLAINANT, VS. ATTY.
SALVADOR N. PE, JR., ASSISTANT PROVINCIAL PROSECUTOR, SAN JOSE, ANTIQUE, RESPONDENT.
DECISION
BERSAMIN, J.:
A lawyer who forges a court decision and represents it as that of a court of law is guilty of the gravest misconduct
and deserves the supreme penalty of disbarment.
The Case
Before this Court is the complaint for disbarment against Assistant Provincial Prosecutor Atty. Salvador N. Pe, Jr.
(respondent) of San Jose, Antique for his having allegedly falsified an inexistent decision of Branch 64 of the
Regional Trial Court stationed in Bugasong, Antique (RTC) instituted by the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI),
Western Visayas Regional Office, represented by Regional Director Atty. Oscar L. Embido.
Antecedent
On July 7, 2004, Atty. Ronel F. Sustituya, Clerk of Court of the RTC, received a written communication from Mr.
Ballam Delaney Hunt, a Solicitor in the United Kingdom (UK). The letter requested a copy of the decision dated
February 12, 1997 rendered by Judge Rafael O. Penuela in Special Proceedings Case No. 084 entitledIn the Matter
of the Declaration of Presumptive Death of Rey Laserna, whose petitioner was one Shirley Quioyo.[1]
On September 9, 2004, the RTC received another letter from Mr. Hunt, reiterating the request for a copy of the
decision in Special Proceedings Case No. 084 entitled In the Matter of the Declaration of Presumptive Death of Rey
Laserna.[2]
Judge Penuela instructed the civil docket clerk to retrieve the records of Special Proceedings Case No. 084
entitled In the Matter of the Declaration of Presumptive Death of Rey Laserna. It was then discovered that the RTC
had no record of Special Proceedings No. 084 wherein Shirley Quioyo was the petitioner. Instead, the court files
revealed that Judge Penuela had decided Special Proceedings No. 084 entitled In the Matter of the Declaration of
Presumptive Death of Rolando Austria, whose petitioner was one Serena Catin Austria.
Informed that the requested decision and case records did not exist, [3] Mr. Hunt sent a letter dated October 12,
2004 attaching a machine copy of the purported decision in Special Proceedings No. 084 entitled In the Matter of
the Declaration of Presumptive Death of Rey Laserna that had been presented by Shirley Quioyo in court
proceedings in the UK.[4]
After comparing the two documents and ascertaining that the document attached to the October 12, 2004 letter
was a falsified court document, Judge Penuela wrote Mr. Hunt to apprise him of the situation. [5]
The discovery of the falsified decision prompted the Clerk of Court to communicate on the situation in writing to
the NBI, triggering the investigation of the falsification. [6]
In the meanwhile, Dy Quioyo, a brother of Shirley Quioyo, executed an affidavit on March 4, 2005, [7] wherein he
stated that it was the respondent who had facilitated the issuance of the falsified decision in Special Proceedings
No. 084 entitled In the Matter of the Declaration of Presumptive Death of Rey Laserna for a fee of P60,000.00. The
allegations against the respondent were substantially corroborated by Mary Rose Quioyo, a sister of Shirley Quioyo,
in an affidavit dated March 20, 2005.[8]
The NBI invited the respondent to explain his side, [9] but he invoked his constitutional right to remain silent. The
NBI also issued subpoenas to Shirley Quioyo and Dy Quioyo but only the latter appeared and gave his sworn
statement.
After conducting its investigation, the NBI forwarded to the Office of the Ombudsman for Visayas the records of the
investigation, with a recommendation that the respondent be prosecuted for falsification of public document under
Article 171, 1 and 2, of the Revised Penal Code, and for violation of Section 3(a) of Republic Act 3019 (The AntiGraft and Corrupt Practices Act).[10] The NBI likewise recommended to the Office of the Court Administrator that
disbarment proceedings be commenced against the respondent. [11] Then Court Administrator Presbitero J. Velasco,
Jr. (now a Member of the Court) officially endorsed the recommendation to the Office of the Bar Confidant. [12]
Upon being required by the Court, the respondent submitted his counter-affidavit, [13] whereby he denied any
participation in the falsification. He insisted that Dy Quioyo had sought his opinion on Shirleys petition for the
annulment of her marriage; that he had given advice on the pertinent laws involved and the different grounds for
the annulment of marriage; that in June 2004, Dy Quioyo had gone back to him to present a copy of what appeared
to be a court decision;[14] that Dy Quioyo had then admitted to him that he had caused the falsification of the
decision; that he had advised Dy Quioyo that the falsified decision would not hold up in an investigation; that Dy
Quioyo, an overseas Filipino worker (OFW), had previously resorted to people on Recto Avenue in Manila to solve
his documentation problems as an OFW; and that he had also learned from Atty. Angeles Orquia, Jr. that one Mrs.

Florencia Jalipa, a resident of Igbalangao, Bugasong, Antique, had executed a sworn statement before Police
Investigator Herminio Dayrit with the assistance of Atty. Orquia, Jr. to the effect that her late husband, Manuel
Jalipa, had been responsible for making the falsified document at the instance of Dy Quioyo. [15]
Thereafter, the Court issued its resolution [16] treating the respondents counter-affidavit as his comment, and
referred the case to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) for investigation, report and recommendation.
The IBPs Report and Recommendation
In a report and recommendation dated June 14, 2006,[17] Atty. Lolita A. Quisumbing, the IBP Investigating
Commissioner, found the respondent guilty of serious misconduct and violations of the Attorneys Oath andCode of
Professional Responsibility, and recommended his suspension from the practice of law for one year. She concluded
that the respondent had forged the purported decision of Judge Penuela by making it appear that Special
Proceedings No. 084 concerned a petition for declaration of presumptive death of Rey Laserna, with Shirley Quioyo
as the petitioner, when in truth and in fact the proceedings related to the petition for declaration of presumptive
death of Rolando Austria, with Serena Catin Austria as the petitioner; [18] and that the respondent had received
P60,000.00 from Dy Quioyo for the falsified decision. She rationalized her conclusions thusly:
Respondents denials are not worthy of merit. Respondent contends that it was one Manuel Jalipa (deceased) who
facilitated the issuance and as proof thereof, he presented the sworn statement of the widow of Florencia Jalipa
(sic). Such a contention is hard to believe. In the first place, if the decision was obtained in Recto, Manila, why was
it an almost verbatim reproduction of the authentic decision on file in Judge Penuelas branch except for the names
and dates? Respondent failed to explain this. Secondly, respondent did not attend the NBI investigation and merely
invoked his right to remain silent. If his side of the story were true, he should have made this known in the
investigation. His story therefore appears to have been a mere afterthought. Finally, there is no plausible reason
why Dy Quioyo and his sister, Mary Rose Quioyo would falsely implicate him in this incident. [19]
In its Resolution No. XVII-2007-063 dated February 1, 2007, [20] the IBP Board of Governors adopted and approved,
with modification, the report and recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner by suspending the
respondent from the practice of law for six years.
On December 11, 2008, the IBP Board of Governors passed Resolution No. XVIII-2008-709 [21] denying the
respondents motion for reconsideration and affirming Resolution No. XVII-2007-063. The IBP Board of Governors
then forwarded the case to the Court in accordance with Section 12(b), Rule 139-B [22] of the Rules of Court.
On January 11, 2011, the Court resolved: (1) to treat the respondents comment/opposition as his appeal by
petition for review; (2) to consider the complainants reply as his comment on the petition for review; (3) to require
the respondent to file a reply to the complainants comment within 10 days from notice; and (4) to direct the IBP to
transmit the original records of the case within 15 days from notice.
Ruling
We affirm the findings of the IBP Board of Governors. Indeed, the respondent was guilty of grave misconduct for
falsifying a court decision in consideration of a sum of money.
The respondents main defense consisted in blanket denial of the imputation. He insisted that he had had no hand
in the falsification, and claimed that the falsification had been the handiwork of Dy Quioyo. He implied that Dy
Quioyo had resorted to the shady characters in Recto Avenue in Manila to resolve the problems he had
encountered as an OFW, hinting that Dy Quioyo had a history of employing unscrupulous means to achieve his
ends.
However, the respondents denial and his implication against Dy Quioyo in the illicit generation of the falsified
decision are not persuasive. Dy Quioyos categorical declaration on the respondents personal responsibility for the
falsified decision, which by nature was positive evidence, was not overcome by the respondents blanket denial,
which by nature was negative evidence.[23] Also, the imputation of wrongdoing against Dy Quioyo lacked credible
specifics and did not command credence. It is worthy to note, too, that the respondent filed his counter-affidavit
only after the Court, through the en banc resolution of May 10, 2005, had required him to comment. [24] The
belatedness of his response exposed his blanket denial as nothing more than an afterthought.
The respondent relied on the sworn statement supposedly executed by Mrs. Jalipa that declared that her deceased
husband had been instrumental in the falsification of the forged decision. But such reliance was outrightly
worthless, for the sworn statement of the wife was rendered unreliable due to its patently hearsay character. In
addition, the unworthiness of the sworn statement as proof of authorship of the falsification by the husband is
immediately exposed and betrayed by the falsified decision being an almost verbatim reproduction of the
authentic decision penned by Judge Penuela in the real Special Proceedings Case No. 084.
In light of the established circumstances, the respondent was guilty of grave misconduct for having authored the
falsification of the decision in a non-existent court proceeding. Canon 7 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility demands that all lawyers should uphold at all times the dignity and integrity of the Legal Profession.
Rule 7.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility states that a lawyer shall not engage in conduct that
adversely reflects on his fitness to practice law, nor shall he whether in public or private life, behave in a
scandalous manner to the discredit of the legal profession. Lawyers are further required by Rule 1.01 of the Code

of Professional Responsibility not to engage in any unlawful, dishonest and immoral or deceitful conduct.
Gross immorality, conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude, or fraudulent transactions can justify a lawyers
disbarment or suspension from the practice of law. [25] Specifically, the deliberate falsification of the court decision
by the respondent was an act that reflected a high degree of moral turpitude on his part. Worse, the act made a
mockery of the administration of justice in this country, given the purpose of the falsification, which was to mislead
a foreign tribunal on the personal status of a person. He thereby became unworthy of continuing as a member of
the Bar.
It then becomes timely to remind all members of the Philippine Bar that they should do nothing that may in any
way or degree lessen the confidence of the public in their professional fidelity and integrity. [26] The Court will not
hesitate to wield its heavy hand of discipline on those among them who wittingly and willingly fail to meet the
enduring demands of their Attorneys Oath for them to:
x x x support [the] Constitution and obey the laws as well as the legal orders of the duly constituted authorities
therein; xxx do no falsehood, nor consent to the doing of any in court; x x x not wittingly or willingly promote or
sue on groundless, false or unlawful suit, nor give aid nor consent to the same; x x x delay no man for money or
malice, and x x x conduct [themselves as lawyers] according to the best of [their] knowledge and discretion with all
good fidelity as well to the courts as to [their] clients x x x.
No lawyer should ever lose sight of the verity that the practice of the legal profession is always a privilege that the
Court extends only to the deserving, and that the Court may withdraw or deny the privilege to him who fails to
observe and respect the Lawyers Oath and the canons of ethical conduct in his professional and private capacities.
He may be disbarred or suspended from the practice of law not only for acts and omissions of malpractice and for
dishonesty in his professional dealings, but also for gross misconduct not directly connected with his professional
duties that reveal his unfitness for the office and his unworthiness of the principles that the privilege to practice
law confers upon him.[27] Verily, no lawyer is immune from the disciplinary authority of the Court whose duty and
obligation are to investigate and punish lawyer misconduct committed either in a professional or private capacity.
[28]
The test is whether the conduct shows the lawyer to be wanting in moral character, honesty, probity, and good
demeanor, and whether the conduct renders the lawyer unworthy to continue as an officer of the Court. [29]
WHEREFORE, the Court FINDS AND PRONOUNCES ASST. PROVINCIAL PROSECUTOR SALVADOR N. PE,
JR. guilty of violating Rule 1.01 of Canon 1, and Rule 7.03 of Canon 7 of the Code of Professional Responsibility,
and DISBARS him effective upon receipt of this decision.
The Court DIRECTS the Bar Confidant to remove the name of ASST. PROVINCIAL PROSECUTOR SALVADOR N.
PE, JR. from the Roll of Attorneys.
This decision is without prejudice to any pending or contemplated proceedings to be initiated against ASST.
PROVINCIAL PROSECUTOR SALVADOR N. PE, JR.
Let copies of this decision be furnished to the Office of the Bar Confidant, the Office of the Court Administrator for
dissemination to all courts of the country, and to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines.
SO ORDERED.

50: [ A.C. No. 9608, November 27, 2012 ]

MARIA VICTORIA B. VENTURA, COMPLAINANT, VS. ATTY. DANILO S. SAMSON, RESPONDENT.
DECISION
PER CURIAM:
The Court has often reminded members of the bar to live up to the standards and norms of the legal profession by
upholding the ideals and principles embodied in the Code of Professional Responsibility. Lawyers are bound to
maintain not only a high standard of legal proficiency, but also of morality, honesty, integrity and fair dealing.
Lawyers are at all times subject to the watchful public eye and community approbation. Needless to state, those
whose conduct both public and private fail this scrutiny have to be disciplined and, after appropriate
proceedings, accordingly penalized.[1]
Complainant Maria Victoria B. Ventura filed on July 29, 2004 a Complaint [2] for Disbarment or Suspension before the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) Commission on Bar Discipline against respondent Atty. Danilo S. Samson for
grossly immoral conduct.
In her complaint, complainant alleged that
2. The herein Complainant MARIA VICTORIA B. VENTURA executed a Sworn Statement dated 19 April 2002 and
a Supplemental-Complaint dated 10 May 2002 stating therein that the crime of RAPE was committed against her
person sometime in December, 2001 and on 19 March 2002 when she was merely thirteen (13) years of age by
herein Respondent ATTY. DANILO S. SAMSON, then thirty eight (38) years old, married to Teresita B. Samson,
Filipino and resident of Barangay 5, San Francisco, Agusan Del Sur, Philippines.
3. In his Counter-Affidavit, herein Respondent ATTY. DANILO S. SAMSON admitted that sexual intercourse indeed
transpired between the herein Complainant MARIA VICTORIA B. VENTURA and himself.
4. After the conduct of preliminary investigation, the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor of Agusan Del Sur,
Philippines issued a RESOLUTION dated 10 June 2002 dismissing the charge of RAPE and finding the existence of
probable cause for the crime of QUALIFIED SEDUCTION and issued the corresponding INFORMATION for QUALIFIED
SEDUCTION on 04 July 2002.
5. Thereafter, the herein Complainant filed a MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION dated 26 August 2002 which was
denied in the RESOLUTION dated 02 October 2002 of the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor of Agusan Del Sur.
6. The aforesaid RESOLUTION dated 02 October 2002 was elevated to [the Department of Justice], by way of a
PETITION FOR REVIEW, and is pending resolution by the Department of Justice.
xxxx
8. The act/s committed by the herein Respondent Atty. Danilo S. Samson against the herein ComplainantMARIA
VICTORIA B. VENTURA as hereinbefore stated clearly constitute grossly immoral conduct under Section
27 of Rule 138 of the Rules of Court of the Philippines which provides for a penalty of DISBARMENT or
SUSPENSION of an Attorney by the SUPREME COURT.
Complainant narrated in her Sworn Statement[3] that sometime in December 2001, at around midnight, she was
sleeping in the maids room at respondents house when respondent entered and went on top of her. Respondent
kissed her lips, sucked her breast, and succeeded in having sexual intercourse with her. She felt pain and found
blood stain in her panty. She stated that another incident happened on March 19, 2002 at respondents poultry
farm in Alegria, San Francisco, Agusan del Sur. Respondent asked her to go with him to the farm. He brought her
to an old shanty where he sexually abused her. Thereafter, respondent gave her five hundred pesos and warned
her not to tell anyone what had happened or he would kill her and her mother.
In her Supplemental-Complaint,[4] complainant averred that respondent allowed her to sleep in his house after her
mother agreed to let her stay there while she studied at the Agusan National High School. She further stated that
on the night she was sexually abused, she was awakened when respondent went on top of her. She struggled to
free herself and shouted, but respondent covered her mouth and nobody could hear as nobody was in the house.
Complainant also claimed that on March 19, 2002, between 5:00 p.m. to 6:00 pm, respondent forced her to ride a
multi-cab. When they arrived at his poultry farm in Alegria, respondent dragged her to a dilapidated shack. She
resisted his advances but her efforts proved futile.
Respondent alleged in his Answer[5] that
2. Respondent admits the allegations in paragraph 2 of the complaint to the effect that Maria Victoria Ventura filed
a complaint against him for Rape at the Provincial Prosecutors Office with qualification that the said complaint for
Rape was dismissed. Respondent, however, has no knowledge or information as to the truth of the allegation that
she was 13 years.
xxxx

5. Respondent vehemently denies the truth of the allegations in paragraph 8 of the complaint to the effect that
the acts of respondent in having sex with complainant constitute grossly immoral conduct. The truth is that [the]
act of respondent in having sex with complainant was done [with] mutual agreement after respondent gave money
to complainant. Respondent respectfully submit[s] that his act of having sex with complainant once does not
constitute gross[ly] immoral conduct. There is no human law that punishes a person who [has] sex with a
woman with mutual agreement and complainant [accepts] compensation therefore. Having sex with complainant
once with just compensation does not amount to immoral conduct.
xxxx
6. The complaint is instigated by Corazon Ventura who was an employee at the Law Office of respondent herein.
The said Corazon Ventura entertained hatred and [had a grudge] against the herein respondent who terminated
her services due to misunderstanding.
7. The filing of the Criminal Case against respondent as well as this Administrative Case is a well orchestrated and
planned act of Corazon Ventura as vengeance against respondent as a result of her separation from the
employment in the Law Office of the respondent. This claim is supported by the Affidavit of Natividad Ruluna, the
former Office Clerk at the Law Office of respondent.
8. To show that Corazon Ventura desires to get back [at] respondent, she demanded from respondent to settle
with her and demanded the payment of the amount [of] P2,000,000.00[;] otherwise she will file a case against him
in Court for Rape and for disbarment. Respondent did not come across with Corazon Ventura, the latter made good
her threats and filed the criminal case for Rape. [sic] When the case [for] rape did not prosper because the
Prosecutor dropped the Rape Case, Corazon Ventura [sent word] to respondent that she is amenable for the
amount of P400,000.00. In effect, Corazon Ventura wanted to extort from respondent so that she [can] get even
with him and his wife for separating her from the employment;
9. Complainant is a woman of loose moral character. This is supported by the Affidavit of Patronio Punayan, Jr.
which is hereto attached as Annex 3. And Corazon Ventura can afford to utilize Maria Victoria Ventura as her
instrument in putting down the respondent herein because Maria Victoria Ventura is not her biological daughter
and she knows before hand that her ward has a questionable reputation. The fact [that] Corazon Ventura is not the
biological mother of Maria Victoria Ventura is shown by the pre-trial order in Criminal Case No. 5414.
xxxx
Respondent has not violated any grounds mentioned in this rule. Respondent respectfully submits that his having
sex with complainant with just compensation once does not amount to immoral conduct. For who among men will
not yield to temptation when a woman shall invite him for sex?
Attached to respondents Answer is his Counter-Affidavit[6] which he submitted to the Provincial Prosecutor. He
alleged therein that complainant usually stayed late at night with her male friends when her mother was out of the
house. He claimed that he heard rumors that complainant had sexual affairs with different boys. Respondent
narrated that on March 19, 2002, he saw complainant with some of her classmates near their rented house.
Complainant told him that they wanted to go out to swim but they did not have money. When she asked if he
could spare some amount, he gave her money. He told her in jest that he wanted to see her that afternoon and go
to a place where they could be alone, and he was surprised when she agreed. He just thought that for
complainant, sex is a common thing despite her age. At around 5:00 p.m., he fetched complainant at her house.
She casually walked towards the car and boarded it. He told her that they will not check in a lodging house
because people might recognize him. Upon reaching his poultry farm, respondent met his farm worker and asked
him if he could use the latters hut. The farm worker agreed and they went straight to the hut.
Inside the farm workers hut, complainant did not hesitate in entering the room. Respondent did not notice any
involuntariness on her part as she undressed herself. He asserted that they had sexual intercourse based on their
mutual understanding. Thereafter, the complainant dressed up and walked back to the multi-cab where she waited
for him. He told her not to tell anyone about what had happened, to which she replied natural buang kay motugan meaning, shes not crazy as to tell anyone. He alleged that she accepted the money he gave because she
needed to buy some things but her mother did not give her any allowance. Respondent insisted that what
happened between them was the first and the last incident. He claimed that he was able to confirm that
complainant is no longer a virgin.
It likewise appears that the Investigating Prosecutors found that probable cause exists for respondent to stand trial
for qualified seduction.[7] The charge of rape, however, was dismissed for insufficiency of evidence. An Information
was filed with the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Agusan del Sur, Branch 6, but complainant who was not satisfied
with the dismissal of the rape charge, filed a motion for reconsideration. When said motion was denied,
complainant filed a petition for review with the Department of Justice (DOJ). However, the DOJ sustained the
findings of the prosecutor.
Then, on December 14, 2006, complainant and her mother appeared before the public prosecutor and executed
their respective Affidavits of Desistance.[8] Complainant stated that what happened between respondent and her in
March 2002 was based on mutual understanding. Thus, she was withdrawing the complaint she filed against
respondent before the RTC as well as the one she filed before the IBP Commission on Bar Discipline. Accordingly,
the criminal case against respondent was dismissed. [9]

In its Report and Recommendation[10] dated October 10, 2007, the IBP Commission on Bar Discipline recommended
that respondent be suspended for a period of one year from the practice of law for immorality with the warning
that repetition of the same or similar act will merit a more severe penalty.
On November 10, 2007, the Board of Governors of the IBP issued Resolution No. XVIII-2007-237, to wit:
RESOLVED to ADOPT and APPROVE, as it is hereby unanimously ADOPTED and APPROVED with modification, the
Report and Recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner of the above-entitled case, herein made part of
this Resolution as Annex A; and, finding the recommendation fully supported by the evidence on record and the
applicable laws and rules, and considering that respondent is found guilty of immorality, the victim is a minor,
respondent and his wife was victims guardians and for being a married man, Atty. Danilo S. Samson is
hereby SUSPENDED from the practice of law for five (5) years with Stern Warning that repetition of the same or
similar act in the future will be dealt with more severely. [11]
Complainant now moves to reconsider the IBP Resolution. She argues that the penalty imposed by the IBP is not
commensurate to the gravity and depravity of the offense. She contends that respondent committed grossly
immoral conduct by forcing himself to have sexual intercourse with a young and innocent lass of 13 years of age.
He also took advantage of his moral ascendancy over complainant considering that she was then staying at
respondents residence. Moreover, there was a betrayal of the marital vow of fidelity considering that respondent
was a married man. She insists that this detestable behavior renders respondent unfit and undeserving of the
honor and privilege which his license confers upon him. Thus, complainant prays that the penalty of disbarment be
imposed.[12]
Meanwhile, respondent also filed a Motion for Reconsideration [13] of the IBP Resolution. He asserts that
complainant has not presented any proof of her minority. Likewise, during the sexual encounter, complainant was
not under their custody. He contends that complainants mother even testified that her daughter stayed at
respondents house only until February 2002. He further stresses that because of his admission and remorse, and
since this is the first time he has been found administratively liable, he is entitled to a reduction of the penalty to
one year suspension from the practice of law.
The pertinent provisions in the Code of Professional Responsibility provide:
CANON 1 - A LAWYER SHALL UPHOLD THE CONSTITUTION, OBEY THE LAWS OF THE LAND AND PROMOTE RESPECT
FOR LAW AND LEGAL PROCESSES.
Rule 1.01. - A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct.
xxxx
CANON 7 - A LAWYER SHALL AT ALL TIMES UPHOLD THE INTEGRITY AND DIGNITY OF THE LEGAL PROFESSION AND
SUPPORT THE ACTIVITIES OF THE INTEGRATED BAR.
xxxx
Rule 7.03. - A lawyer shall not engage in conduct that adversely reflects on his fitness to practice law, nor shall he,
whether in public or private life, behave in a scandalous manner to the discredit of the legal profession.
As we explained in Zaguirre v. Castillo,[14] the possession of good moral character is both a condition precedent and
a continuing requirement to warrant admission to the bar and to retain membership in the legal profession. It is
the bounden duty of members of the bar to observe the highest degree of morality in order to safeguard the
integrity of the Bar.[15] Consequently, any errant behavior on the part of a lawyer, be it in the lawyers public or
private activities, which tends to show said lawyer deficient in moral character, honesty, probity or good
demeanor, is sufficient to warrant suspension or disbarment.
Immoral conduct involves acts that are willful, flagrant, or shameless, and that show a moral indifference to the
opinion of the upright and respectable members of the community. [16] Immoral conduct is gross when it is so
corrupt as to constitute a criminal act, or so unprincipled as to be reprehensible to a high degree, or when
committed under such scandalous or revolting circumstances as to shock the communitys sense of decency. [17]
From the undisputed facts gathered from the evidence and the admissions of respondent himself, we find that
respondents act of engaging in sex with a young lass, the daughter of his former employee, constitutes gross
immoral conduct that warrants sanction. Respondent not only admitted he had sexual intercourse with
complainant but also showed no remorse whatsoever when he asserted that he did nothing wrong because she
allegedly agreed and he even gave her money. Indeed, his act of having carnal knowledge of a woman other than
his wife manifests his disrespect for the laws on the sanctity of marriage and his own marital vow of fidelity.
Moreover, the fact that he procured the act by enticing a very young woman with money showed his utmost moral
depravity and low regard for the dignity of the human person and the ethics of his profession.
In Cordova v. Cordova,[18] we held that the moral delinquency that affects the fitness of a member of the bar to
continue as such includes conduct that outrages the generally accepted moral standards of the community,
conduct for instance, which makes a mockery of the inviolable social institution of marriage.
Respondent has violated the trust and confidence reposed on him by complainant, then a 13-year-old minor, [19] who

for a time was under respondents care. Whether the sexual encounter between the respondent and complainant
was or was not with the latters consent is of no moment. Respondent clearly committed a disgraceful, grossly
immoral and highly reprehensible act. Such conduct is a transgression of the standards of morality required of the
legal profession and should be disciplined accordingly.
Section 27, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court expressly states that a member of the bar may be disbarred or
suspended from his office as attorney by the Supreme Court for, among others, any deceit, grossly immoral
conduct, or violation of the oath that he is required to take before admission to the practice of law. It bears to
stress that membership in the Bar is a privilege burdened with conditions. As a privilege bestowed by law through
the Supreme Court, membership in the Bar can be withdrawn where circumstances concretely show the lawyers
lack of the essential qualifications required of lawyers. [20]
Likewise, it was held in Maligsa v. Cabanting[21] that a lawyer may be disbarred for any misconduct, whether in his
professional or private capacity, which shows him to be wanting in moral character, in honesty, probity and good
demeanor or unworthy to continue as an officer of the court. Similarly, in Dumadag v. Lumaya,[22] the Court
pronounced:
The practice of law is a privilege burdened with conditions. Adherence to the rigid standards of mental fitness,
maintenance of the highest degree of morality and faithful compliance with the rules of the legal profession are the
conditions required for remaining a member of good standing of the bar and for enjoying the privilege to practice
law.
The fact that complainant filed an Affidavit of Desistance during the pendency of this case is of no moment.
Complainants Affidavit of Desistance cannot have the effect of abating the instant proceedings in view of the
public service character of the practice of law and the nature of disbarment proceedings as a public interest
concern. A case of suspension or disbarment is sui generis and not meant to grant relief to a complainant as in a
civil case, but is intended to cleanse the ranks of the legal profession of its undesirable members in order to
protect the public and the courts. A disbarment case is not an investigation into the acts of respondent but on his
conduct as an officer of the court and his fitness to continue as a member of the Bar. [23]
Illicit sexual relations have been previously punished with disbarment, indefinite or definite suspension, depending
on the circumstances.[24] In this case, respondents gross misbehavior and unrepentant demeanor clearly shows a
serious flaw in his character, his moral indifference to sexual exploitation of a minor, and his outright defiance of
established norms. All these could not but put the legal profession in disrepute and place the integrity of the
administration of justice in peril, hence the need for strict but appropriate disciplinary action. [25]
The Court is mindful of the dictum that the power to disbar must be exercised with great caution, and only in a
clear case of misconduct that seriously affects the standing and character of the lawyer as an officer of the Court
and as a member of the bar. Thus, where a lesser penalty, such as temporary suspension, could accomplish the
end desired, disbarment should never be decreed.[26] However, in the present case, the seriousness of the offense
compels the Court to wield its power to disbar as it appears to be the most appropriate penalty. [27]
WHEREFORE, respondent Atty. Danilo S. Samson is hereby DISBARRED for Gross Immoral Conduct, Violation of
his oath of office, and Violation of Canon 1, Rule 1.01 and Canon 7, Rule 7.03 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility.
Let a copy of this Decision, which is immediately executory, be made part of the records of respondent in the Office
of the Bar Confidant, Supreme Court of the Philippines. And let copies of the Decision be furnished the Integrated
Bar of the Philippines and circulated to all courts.
This Decision takes effect immediately.
SO ORDERED.