MARCOS vs MARCOS

FACTS: Petitioner Brenda Marcos and Respondent Wilson Marcos were

married twice (One where it was solemnized by Judge Eriberto H. Espiritu at
the Municipal Court of Pasig and the other was solemnized by Rev. Eduardo
L. Eleazar) and had five children. After the downfall of President Marcos, the
respondent left the military service in1987. Consequently, due to the
respondents failure to engage in any gainful employment, they would often
quarrel and the respondent would hit and beat the petitioner. As a result, in
1992 they were already living separately. Thus, petitioner filed for annulment
of marriage assailing Article 36 of the Family Code. The court a quo found the
respondent to be psychologically incapacitated to perform his marital
obligations. However, the Court of Appeals reversed the decision of the
Regional Trial Court because psychological incapacity had not been
established by the totality of the evidence presented. Hence this case.
ISSUES:
1. W/N Court of Appeals could set aside the findings by the Regional
Trial Court of psychological incapacity of a respondent in a Petition
for declaration of nullity of marriage simply because the respondent
did not subject himself to psychological evaluation.
2. W/N the totality of evidence presented and the demeanor of all the
witnesses should be the basis of the determination of the merits of
the Petition.
RULING:
1.
Need for Personal Medical Examination. The guidelines
incorporate the three basic requirements earlier mandated by the
Court in Santos v. Court of Appeals that "psychological incapacity must
be characterized by (a) gravity (b) juridical antecedence, and (c)
incurability." The foregoing guidelines do not require that a physician
examine the person to be declared psychologically incapacitated. In
fact, the root cause may be "medically or clinically identified." What is
important is the presence of evidence that can adequately establish
the party's psychological condition. For indeed, if the totality of
evidence presented is enough to sustain a finding of psychological
incapacity, then actual medical examination of the person concerned
need not be resorted to.
2. Totality of Evidence Presented. The court ruled in the negative.
Although the Court is sufficiently convinced that respondent failed to
provide material support to the family and may have resorted to
physical abuse and abandonment, the totality of his acts does not lead
to a conclusion of psychological incapacity on his part. There is
absolutely no showing that his "defects" were already present at the
inception of the marriage or that they are incurable. Verily, the
behavior of respondent can be attributed to the fact that he had lost

his job and was not gainfully employed for a period of more than six
years. It was during this period that he became intermittently drunk,
failed to give material and moral support, and even left the family
home. Thus, his alleged psychological illness was traced only to said
period and not to the inception of the marriage. Equally important,
there is no evidence showing that his condition is incurable, especially
now that he is gainfully employed as a taxi driver.
Hence, this Court cannot declare the dissolution of the marriage for
failure of petitioner to show that the alleged psychological incapacity is
characterized by gravity, juridical antecedence and incurability; and for her
failure to observe the guidelines outlined in Molina.

REPUBLIC VS CUISON-MELGAR
FACTS: On March 27, 1965, Norma and Eulogio were married before the
Catholic Church in Dagupan City. Their union begot five children. On August
19, 1996, Norma filed for declaration of nullity of her marriage on the ground
of Eulogios psychological incapacity to comply with his essential marital
obligations.4 According to Norma, the manifestations of Eulogios
psychological incapacity are his immaturity, habitual alcoholism, unbearable
jealousy, maltreatment, constitutional laziness, and abandonment of his
family since December 27, 1985.
On Trial, the court ruled that the defendant has been persistent in his vices.
These are clear manifestation of his psychological incapacity to perform his
marital obligation to his wife. Defendant also became indifferent to the needs
of his own children who really longed for a father who is willing to make the
sacrifice in looking for a job so as to support them. Petitioner, represented by
the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), filed an appeal with the CA,
contending that the evidence presented are not sufficient to declare the
marriage void under Article 36 of the Family Code. On Appeal, it affirmed the
decision of the lower court. Hence, this petition.
ISSUE: WHETHER OR NOT THE ALLEGED PSYCHOLOGICAL INCAPACITY OF
RESPONDENT IS IN THE NATURE CONTEMPLATED BY ARTICLE 36 OF THE
FAMILY CODE.
RULING: No. The circumstances relied upon by Norma are grounds for legal
separation under Article 55 of the Family Code. As the Court ruled in Republic
of the Philippines v. Molina, it is not enough to prove that a spouse failed to
meet his responsibility and duty as a married person, it is essential that he
must be shown to be incapable of doing so due to some psychological, not
physical, illness. There was no proof of a natal or supervening disabling
factor in the person, an adverse integral element in the personality structure
that effectively incapacitates a person from accepting and complying with
the obligations essential to marriage. Further, no other evidence was
presented to show that Eulogio was not cognizant of the basic marital
obligations as outlined in Articles 68 to 72, 220, 221, and 225 of the Family
Code. It was not sufficiently proved that Eulogio was really incapable of
fulfilling his duties due to some incapacity of a psychological nature, and not
merely physical. All told, in order that the allegation of psychological
incapacity may not be considered a mere fabrication, evidence other than
Normas lone testimony should have been adduced. While an actual medical,

psychiatric or psychological examination is not a condition sine qua non to a

finding of psychological incapacity, an expert witness would have
strengthened Normas claim of Eulogios alleged psychological incapacity.
Normas omission to present one is fatal to her position. There can be no
conclusion of psychological incapacity where there is absolutely no showing
that the "defects" were already present at the inception of the marriage or
that they are incurable. In this case, the State did not actively participate in
the prosecution of the case at the trial level. The State should have been
given the opportunity to present controverting evidence before the judgment
was rendered. Truly, only the active participation of the Public Prosecutor or
the OSG will ensure that the interest of the State is represented and
protected in proceedings for annulment and declaration of nullity of
marriages by preventing collusion between the parties, or the fabrication or
suppression of evidence.

BARCELONA VS. COURT OF APPEALS AND BENGZON

FACTS: Respondent Tadeo and petitioner Diana were legally married union
begot five children. On 29 March 1995, private respondent Tadeo R. Bengzon
(respondent Tadeo) filed a Petition for Annulment of Marriage against
petitioner Diana M. Barcelona (petitioner Diana). The petition further
alleged that petitioner Diana was psychologically incapacitated at the time of
the celebration of their marriage to comply with the essential obligations of
marriage and such incapacity subsists up to the present time. The petition
alleged several non-complied marital obligations. During their marriage, they
had frequent quarrels due to their varied upbringing. Respondent, coming
from a rich family, was a disorganized housekeeper and was frequently out of
the house. She would go to her sisters house or would play tennis the whole
day. When the family had crisis due to several miscarriages suffered by
respondent and the sickness of a child, respondent withdrew to herself and
eventually refused to speak to her husband. On November 1977, the
respondent, who was five months pregnant with Cristina Maria and on the
pretext of re-evaluating her feelings with petitioner, requested the latter to
temporarily leave their conjugal dwelling. In his desire to keep peace in the
family and to safeguard the respondents pregnancy, the petitioner was
compelled to leave their conjugal dwelling. The respondent at the time of the
celebration of their marriage was psychologically incapacitated to comply
with the essential obligation of marriage and such incapacity subsisted up to
and until the present time. Such incapacity was conclusively found in the
psychological examination conducted on the relationship between the
petitioner and the respondent. Diana claims that petitioner falls short of the
guidelines stated in Molina case and there is no cause for action.
ISSUE: Whether or not petitioner stated a cause of action against Diana.
RULING: Diana contends that the 2nd petition of his husband is defective
because it fails to allege the root cause of the alleged psychological
incapacity. It is not defective since the new rules do not require the petition
to allege expert opinion on the psychological incapacity, it follows that there
is no need to allege in the petition the root cause of the psychological
incapacity. (only experts can determine the root cause and at times they
couldnt determine it). What the new Rules require the petition to allege are

physical manifestations indicative of psychological incapacity. Second

petition of Tadeo complies with this requirement.