International Phenomenological Society

How to Rescue the Traditional Causal Theory of Perception

Author(s): Robert A. Oakes
Source: Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, Vol. 38, No. 3 (Mar., 1978), pp. 370-383
Published by: International Phenomenological Society
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HOW TO RESCUE THE TRADITIONAL

CAUSALTHEORY OF PERCEPTION
I
Rumor has it that the traditionalcausal theoryof perception
(hereafter'TCT') is moribund.Surely,a numberof prominentconare wont to regardit as such. Chisholm,
temporaryepistemologists
brieffootforexample,in his TheoryofKnowledge,'givesa relatively
note to Lovejoy'spresumablyjaded views,and D. W. Hamlyn,in his
confineshis philosophicallydisparaging
The Theoryof Knowledge,2
remarksabout the TCT to littlemore than a page. It is as if there
oxygenallottedto thetopicand
werea limitedquantityofintellectual
the supplyhas just runout. Not onlyis it the case thatlittle,if anything,is said in defenseof the TCT (H. P. Gricemightbe considered
as somewhatofan exceptionin thisregard,but it is clear thatGrice's
notto be regardedas constituting
revisionary
views3are sufficiently
anythinglike a defenseof the causal theoryin its traditionalform);
rather,one would be hard-pressedto locate anythinglike a serious
standsout as a notable
discussionof it thesedays. JeromeShaffer4
exceptionin thisregard,and I am gratefulto him insofaras the inspirationfor this essay is directlytraceableto his relativelyrecent
and provocativediscussionof the TCT.
However,it may well be that the paucityof presentdiscussion
maconcerningthe TCT constitutesa trendtowardsepistemological
(Englewood Cliffs,N.J.; 1966), p. 94.
(Garden City, N.Y., 1970), pp. 170-171.As pointed out by John Knox in speaking
of 'appearances' or 'sense-data,' many contemporaryphilosophers would claim that
'. . . to affirmthe existence of such items is to fall back into a neo-medievaldarkness fromwhich we have only lately emerged.' Knox then goes on, however,to provide
a veryprovocativedefenseof the existenceof 'such items.' Cf. 'Do Appearances Exist?,'
AmericanPhilosophical Quarterly,MonographNo. 4; Oxford,1970,p. 79.
3 Cf. 'The Causal Theory of Perception,'in The Philosophy of Perception,edited by
G. J. Warnock (London, 1967), pp. 85-112.Also, as pointed out by Hamlyn (loc. cit.),
not only is Grice's theoryclearly distinctfromthe 'traditional' causal theory,but 'it is
doubtfulwhetherthe Gricean version of the causal theoryis to be considered anything
like the traditionalone either' (my emphasis). This is in accord with Peter K. Machamer's claim that Grice 'eschews any claims for representation.''Recent Work on Perception,' AmericanPhilosophical Quarterly: January1970,p. 7.
4 Cf. Shaffer's Reality, Knowledge, and Value (New York, 1971), pp. 59-69. Subsequent referencesto Shafferare from this source and will be identifiedby page numbers in the body of the paper.
1
2

370

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turity.Maybewe had betterfollowthe lead of Austin,Prichard,and

theoryand get on with
manyotherseverecriticsof the'sense-datum'
ofperceptionsuchas Chisclutteredepistemology
a less ontologically
holm's 'adverbial theoryof appearances.However,if the TCT is to
is clearlyto buryit forthe
be buried,our philosophicalresponsibility
rightreasons.In thisregard,then,it seems to me thatmuchof considerablesignificanceremainsto be said about the TCT. However,
lest I be thoughtan intolerableepistemologicalreactionary(which
mightnot be all thatbad if what I have to say here is true),let me
quicklypoint out that my purpose hereinis the relativelycircumand putativescribedone of showingthatthestandard,time-honored,
ly fatal objectionto the TCT-maintainedby all foes of the theory
withconsiderableforceby Shaffersinceits inceptionand reiterated
to claimingthat
is mistaken.Now whilethisis surelynottantamount
theTCT is correct,it seems to me thatsomethingof no small significancewill have been achievedinsofaras the standardobjectionto
the TCT is shownto be withoutforce.Namely,we can therebybe
assured(I wouldthink)thatit is farfromclear thattheTCT is false.
unlessthereare othergroundsforrejectingit outright,
Consequently,
thereis preciouslittlereason forit not to be includedamongthose
theoriesof perceptionwhichare viable candidatesforbeingreasonably accurateaccountsof how we do in fact perceivethe 'external
world.'
II
Locke said:

It is evidentthe mind knows not things immediately,but only by the intervention of the ideas it has of them. Our knowledge,therefore,is real only so far
as there is a conformitybetween our ideas and the realityof things,5

of course,hangs a notorioustale. For Locke,it is clear

and thereby,
thatphysicalobjects cause us to have ideas, whichconstitute'representations'or (in a wordwhichhe seemed to prefer)'resemblances'
of (the 'primaryqualities'of) thoseobjects. ProfessorLovejoy,as a
sophiscriticalrealist,'has providedus witha ratherscientifically
dualofLocke's-and Descartes'- epistemological
ticatedrestatement
ism in his (Lovejoy's) remarkablebook The RevoltAgainstDualism.
of Lovejoy'spolemic
and intricacy
thesophistication
Notwithstanding
(about whichmorewillbe said a bitlateron), thecore of his position
remainsstridently
Lockean:
5 An Essay ConcerningHuman Understanding,Book IV, Chapter 4, Section 3.

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The revolt . . . against dualism ... has failed. The content of our actual experience does not consist wholly,and it is unprovable ... that any part of it
consists, of entities which, upon any plausible theory of the constitutionof
the physical world, can be supposed to be members of that world; it consists
of particularswhich arise throughthe functioningof percipientorganisms,are
present onlywithinthe privatefields of awareness of such organisms ... They
.6
are, in short,essentiallyof the nature of "ideas"

Consequently,

. . .we are broughtback to Locke's conclusion, despite the heroic effortsof

so many philosophers of our age to escape from it: "It is evident that the
mind knows not things immediately,but by the interventionof the ideas it
has of them."7

Now what, precisely,is unacceptable about this view? The standard and putativelyfatal objection to it is restated succintlyby Shaffer:
What is the objection, then, to the causal theory?The major objection seems
to be that there is no conceivable way in which we could show that material
objects, in the causal theory sense, exist . . . sense-data are all we are ever
aware of at first hand. If we have any informationabout material objects, it
must be by inference. . . But the trouble with this inferenceis that there is
no way of checkingit to ensure that it is correct . . . we can never get beyond
the sense-datato the objects themselves(pp. 60-61).

Also, we mightnote that in a fairlyrecent article endorsing Husserl's

view of perception over that of 'representationalists,'Guido King
registers his discontent with the TCT on the same time-honored
grounds:
In its theory of perception modern philosophy has been characterized by a
representationalistview according to which consciousness is comparable to a
closed box in which the mind contemplates its ideas. These ideas are considered to be the primaryobjects (i.e., the referents)of our knowledgeand perception, and it is thoughtthat the existence of all other objects has to be inferredby a causal inference.If there is an externalworld, then it is in principle
invisible,because it lies hidden behind the directlygiven ideas which are merely its images or symbols.8

While the criticsare legion,the criticismis essentiallyone. Consequently, let us refrain from the multiplication of critcs beyond necessity; rather,the point to be drivenis that the objection upon which
we are focussing,beginningwith the Scottish Common Sense polemic
of Thomas Reid, has been held by countless critics to spell the irredeemable demise of the TCT. Specifically,I believe this objection can
be spelled out concisely but comprehensivelyas follows: In the pro6 A. 0. Lovejoy's The Revolt Against Dualism, 2nd ed., (La Salle, Illinois; 1960),
pp. 328-329.Originallypublished in 1930.
7 Ibid., p. 329.
8 Guido Kung, 'Husserl on Pictures and Intentional Objects,' The Review of Metaphysics; June, 1973,p. 670.

How To RESCUE THE TRADITIONALCAUSAL

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373

to providean accountof how we arrive at 'percess of attempting

ceptualknowledge'ofphysicalobjects,theTCT has the (unfortunate)
ofmakingthoseverysameobjectsunexperienceable.That
implication
is, sinceperceptualexperience(accordingto the TCT) 'acquaints'us
onlywiththeeffectsofphysicalobjectsuponour sensoryapparatusneverwiththe'objectsthemselves'-itis clear thatsuch effects(i.e.,
the desensa) are the terminalobjects of perception.Consequently,
vastatingimplicationof the TCT (say its critics) is thatperceivers
withinthe
are in a situationof inescapableepistemicconfinement
matrixof theirsensa, i.e., theyare locked helplesslybehind (in a
I believe,withJonathonBennett)a 'veil of perphraseoriginating,
theTCT showsitselfto be a 'self-defeating'9ception.'Consequently,
thoughperhapsnotall of thecriticswouldwantthisto be construed
insofaras it
in the strictsense of 'formallyinconsistent'-doctrine
jarimpliesthatphysicalobjectshave thestatusof (in contemporary
gon) 'theoretical entities' (Shaffer,pp. 63-64),i.e., entitiesthe existenceand propertiesof whichmust be inferredratherthan experienced.
III
Shaffer'sdiscussion,however,goes on to take what I findto be
turn.That is, ratherthan a strictemphasisupon
a veryinteresting
the standardobjection,which,of course,criticizesthe TCT largely
character,Shaffer's
from'within'byfocussinguponits 'self-defeating'
criticismbecomesessentially'external'in natureinsofaras he concentrateshis attackupon whathe takes to be thefalsityof thepropositionthat physicalobjects are theoreticalentities.Consequently,
he claimsthatthe TCT failsbecause one of its verycentralimplicationsis clearlyfalse.Now to join withShafferherein concentrating
upon this 'external'criticismof the TCT does not, it should be
stressed,throwour projectat all offcoursesincewhateverforcethe
objectionhas is dependententirelyupon
standardor 'self-defeating'
or theoretical
the assumptionthatthe TCT makes unexperienceable
of the standard
entitiesout of physicalobjects.As such,thestrength
of thelatterassumpobjectionis clearlyparasiticalupon thestrength
tion.Hence, if the TCT can be explicated-in a mannerremaining
trueto both its spiritand letter-so as not to have the implication
9 John Hospers provides us with a very explicit and forceful statement of the
standard objection. Cf. An Introductionto Philosophical Analysis,2nd ed., (Englewood
Cliffs,N.J., 1967), pp. 501-505.

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entities,and,
or theoretical
thatphysicalobjectsare unexperienceable
thestanshownto havetheveryopposite implication,
morestrongly,
objectionwill therebyhave been overcome.
dard or 'self-defeating'
preFor,as we have seen,theTCT has been heldto be self-defeating
ciselybecause (say the critics)by the verynatureof its attemptto
accountforhow we arrive at 'perceptualknowledge'of physicalobor perceptualjects,it impliesthatsuchobjectsare unexperienceable
ly unknowable.Hence, insofaras it is shownthat the TCT has no
but actuallyhas the veryoppositeimplication,it
such implication,
(the TCT) is therebyrescuedfromthe standardand putativelyfatal
objection to it.

of Shaffer's
then,letus turnto a consideration
Withthisclarified,
discussion.Shafferasks the following:Is thereany good reason for
ratherthan
inferences'
believingthatphysicalobjectsare 'theoretical
regard
His answeris-wisely,I suggest-no.Why
objectsofexperience?
the onlyobjects of experientialawarenessas the effectsof physical
i.e., why should we not believe
objects upon our neurophysiology,
Now
thatwe haveperceptualexperienceof thoseobjectsthemselves?
letus agreewithShaffer(if onlyforpresentpurposes-anyarguing of
this pointhere would take us far afieldfromour centralconcern),
i.e., that they
that physicalobjects are not 'theoreticalinferences,'
are indeedexperiencedratherthanhavingto be inferred.Hence,let
us agreewithShafferthatthereis no reasonto regard
material objects as theoreticalentities. We would only be forced to do that if
we took material objects to be unobserved. But I have argued that there is no
reason to think that physical objects are unobserved; we observe them frequently (p. 68).

Such,of course,places Shafferin someverygood company.Epistemologistsof perceptiontendto displayconsiderableagreementin reto be had about the existence
jectingtheview thatany information
and natureof physicalobjects mustbe inferredratherthan experiarticle,W. D. Joske
enced.Hence, in concludinga veryinteresting
urgesus to
rememberthe truisms that recognizingis a more primitiveactivitythan inferring, and that material objects are things which can be recognized.10

Shaffer's argument against the TCT, then, can be put succintly as

follows:
10 W.

D. Joske, 'Inferringand Perceiving,'The Philosophical Review, 1963,p. 445.

How To RESCUE THE TRADITIONAL CAUSAL

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THEORY OF PERCEPTION
The TCT implies that physical objects are theoreticalentities.
Physical objects are not theoreticalentities, but are objects of perceptual
experience.
Therefore,the TCT is false.

Now whatI hope to showis that,whileclearlyvalid in formand posa trueconclusion,the above argumentis not sound
siblycontaining
due to the falsityof the firstpremise.That is, I believe it can be
thatit is not an implicationof the TCT thatphysical
demonstrated
thatthe TCT has
objectsare theoreticalentities;and,morestrongly,
I hopeto show thatany
theveryoppositeimplication.Consequently,
or theoclaimto theeffectthatphysicalobjectsare unexperienceable
withtheTCT. However,if we are sucreticalentitiesis inconsistent
cessfulin showingthisto be the case, it followsclearly-as pointed
out above-that the standardobjectionto the TCT will therebyhave
been defeated.The strategyfor the discussionto follow,then,is to
defeatthe standardobjection to the TCT by showingthat Shaffer
(along withcountlessothercritics)is mistakenin maintainingthat
theTCT mustbe construedso as to have theimplicationthatphysical
or theoreticalentities.
objectsare unexperienceable
IV
We need now to considera veryimportantline of reasoningby
of thoughtin supportof theTCT
ProfessorLovejoy,whoseingenuity
by thecriticsof thatdoctrine.
continuesto be ignoredunconscionably
WhileLovejoy'sgeneralpositionregardingthe standardobjectionis
ambivalencein
due to an unfortunate
less thanentirelysatisfactory
his doctrine(more on this shortly),I hope to show that he has
chartedadmirablythedirectionwhichmustbe takenin orderto overcome that objection.Lovejoy'scentralargumentin responseto the
imaginative
chargemakesextraordinarily
standardor 'self-defeating'
cognition.'Consequently,
use of the phenomenonof 'intertemporal
one can onlywonderwhysucha vigorousand powerfuleffortto refatalobjectionto theTCT conand putatively
futethelong-standing
tinuesto be ignoredby the mostoutspokencriticsof that doctrine.
So far as I know,no criticof the TCT has even attemptedto come
to gripswithLovejoy'scentralargument"againstthe standardob11 Even Brand Blanshard, whose criticismof the TCT is perhaps the most thorough
to be found,had to omit any referenceto 'Professor Lovejoy's remarkable book . . .
owing to the mere accident of having been abroad at a point where his work was not
available' (The Nature of Thought,Volume 1, London; 1939,footnoteon p. 419).

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of perception;this,it seems to me, is

jection to his epistemology
nothingshortof an intellectualscandal.Whydo so manycriticsconcharacterof theTCT
tinueto speak of thehopelessly'self-defeating'
withouteventakingLovejoy'srejoinderto thatchargeintoaccount?
stateof affairs.
Let us attemptto rectifythisunfortunate
cognitionconstitutesthe
Accordingto Lovejoy,intertemporal
epistemicparadigmwhichfreesthe TCT (or 'the dualistictheoryof
or 'paradoxical'charperception')fromits putativelyself-defeating
it is clearthatpast eventscan onlybe remembered
acter.Specifically,
distinctfromthe events
by means of symbolsor imagesnumerically
be
recalled
can
onlyby means of
such
events
beingrecalled.That is,
form
of
thisbe in the
imagesor words.
representations-whether
If yesterday's experience is past, it cannot be "numerically identical" either
with the present event of my experiencingor with the content which is existent simultaneouslywith mypresentexperiencing.12

As such, it is clear that

To claim knowledge of what is not temporallycoexistent with the knowing,

is not to have the intended object of knowledge in propria persona "before
the mind" . . . The 'how' of mediate knowing being thus made intelligible
primarilyby a scrutinyof intertemporalknowledge,of which the mediate character is certain, the . . . epistemological paradox . . . disappears. There is
nothing more paradoxical in the conception of knowledgeof physical objects
by means of sensa not identical with those objects than there is in the conception of a knowledge of past events by means of memory-imagesnot identical
with those events.13

hereis simplythis:
WhatLovejoyis pointingout veryforcefully
identicalto the surfacesof physicalobIf sensa are notnumerically
jects (and, as a proponentof theTCT,Lovejoybelievestheyare not),
it does not therebyfollowthatphysicalobjectsare unknowable-i.e.,
that sensa are the terminalobjects of cognition-anymore thanit
followsthat,in recallinga past eventby means of a representative
is therebythe terminalobject
imageor word,such a representation
Hence,it would seemclear thatthe TCT does
of memory-awareness.
not make theoreticalentitiesout of physicalobjects any more than
makestheoreticalentitiesout of past
normalmemory-representation
events.Such constitutesthe basic, and, I suggest,verysignificant
in Lovejoy'sresponseto thestandardobjectionto his
insightinherent
epistemological dualism. Now if Lovejoy has not totally foiled the

12 A. 0. Lovejoy, 'A Temporalistic Realism,' in Realism and the Background of

Phenomenology,ed. by Roderick Chisholm (New York, 1960), p. 252. Originallypublished in ContemporaryAmericanPhilosophy,Vol. II (1930).
13The Revolt AgainstDualism, pp. 390-391.(my italics on last sentence).

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standard objection by virtue of this argument,wherein has he failed

to do so? I suggest that while he has givenus an invaluable epistemological hint on how to proceed to overcome the standard objection,
his overall position relating to this point remains ultimatelyand unfortunatelyinconclusive.That is, does his argumententitleus to claim
that the TCT does not make theoretical entities out of physical objects? Much to our chagrin,we find that Lovejoy himselfis far from
clear on thispoint. Rememberhis statement(previously quoted) that,
insofar as 'the contentof our actual experience' is concerned,
it is unprovable and improbable that any part of it consists of entities which,
upon any plausible theoryof the constitutionof the physical world, can be
supposed to be membersof that world

In this passage, Lovejoy is clearly maintaining that physical objects

do not constituteany part of our 'actual experience.' In the light of
his vigorous argument against the standard objection, however, is
this not extraordinarilyenigmatic? Perhaps this difficultycan be
reconciled by the suggestion that, for Lovejoy, physical objects can
be knownby theireffectsupon us even thoughtheyare unexperienceable (i.e., theoretical) entities. But this does not seem to help since
any such 'knowledge'of physical objects would thenhave to be inferential; however,in addition to Lovejoy's persistentreluctance to suggest that knowledge of the existence and nature of physical objects
is any more 'inferred'than is knowledge of past events-i.e., to have
memory-awarenessof a past event is not to inferthat that event took
place-one could still ask (along with the critics) how such an 'inference' could ever be known to be warranted.
Hence, Lovejoy's position-as helpful as it is-suffers from an
ambivalence which ultimatelydeprives it of decisive force as a refutation of the standard objection to the TCT. For, surely,insofar as it
remains less than conclusive that the TCT does not make unexperienceable or theoreticalentitiesout of physical objects, the standard
objection to that doctrine will not have been properly laid to rest.
This notwithstanding,however, I want to maintain once again that
Lovejoy has renderedus an invaluable service by softeningthe terrain
which needs to be plowed in order to overcome the standard objection
to the TCT. Let us, then,proceed to explicate (or reconstruct)the TCT
in a manner which remains true to both the spirit and the letter of
that theoryand which overcomes conclusivelythe standard objection
by showingnot onlythat it is not an implicationof the TCT that physical objects are theoreticalentities,but that it is an implicationof the
TCT thatphysical objects are not theoreticalentities.

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V

To begin with,thereis a ratherclear sense in whichseeingis

extensional. Paradigm cases for making this extensionalityclear are

whereintheordinary
ontologicalor numericalidentity
thoseinvolving
iftheatomictheory
example,
For
concerned.
are
objectsofperception
arrangeare
systematic
just
objects
physical
i.e.,
if
true,
is
of matter
mentsof microscopicparticles,it followsthatto see a physicalobject
of atoms.That is, experiis therebyto see a systematicarrangement
ences of physicalobjects would thenbe numericallyidenticalwith
as a consequenceof physicalobexperiencesof atom-arrangements
jects being numerically(or ontologically)identicalwith atom-arNotice,however,that-if theatomictheoryis true-perrangements.
ceiversdo nothave to believethattheyare seeingatom-arrangements
when theysee physicalobjects,nor is it even necessaryfor atom-,
to be seen thatthe atomictheoryhave a place in the
arrangements
perceiver'sconceptualscheme.That is, not only does one not need
in the
to believethat thereare such thingsas atom-arrangements
worldin orderto see them,but one does not evenhave to knowwhat
If the
meansin orderto see atom-arrangements.
atom-arrangement'
atomic theoryis true,then perceivers have been seeing atom-arrangements for centuries without realizing that they have, i.e., have been
seeing them in an extensional or nonepistemic14sense of 'seeing.'

Hence,wherewe havea relationofnumerical(or ontological)identity

we have a veryclear paradigmof the
betweenobjectsofperception,
extensionalityof seeing.
Exactly what, however does all of this have to do with the question of whetheror not the TCT implies that physical objects are theoretical entities? While it seems perfectlyclear that, e.g.,
If the lamp before me is numericallyidentical with a certain arrangement
of atoms, then anyone who sees that lamp sees a certain arrangementof atoms

is a necessary truth,the TCT, of course, insists upon a numerical or

ontological distinctionbetween sensa and (as Lovejoy would say)
'objects-to-be-known'or 'cognoscenda.' As such, it is clear that the
relation between sensa and physical objects (for the proponentof the
TCT) is notthe same as the relation between atom-arrangementsand
physical objects (presupposing, of course, the truth of the atomic
theory). Further,coupled with their insistence that sensa are onto14Cf. Fred I. Dretske, Seeing and Knowing (Chicago, 1969), Chapter II for a very
interestingexplorationof the concept of nonepistemicseeing.

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379

logicallydistinctfromthe surfaces of physical objects, proponents of

the TCT claim that no informationabout physical objects can be had
independentlyof the experience of sensa. Hence, argue Shaffer and
countless other critics,the TCT makes theoreticalentitiesout of physical objects, i.e., entitiesthe existenceand propertiesof which must
be inferredratherthan experienced.However, since no such inference
could ever be known to be warranted,the TCT implies that no information at all can be had about the existence and nature of physical
objects. (Hence, the critic's position might be characterized most
accurately as charging that the TCT is self-defeatingnot simply because it implies that physical objects are perceptually unknowable,
but, more strongly,that theyare unknowable simpliciter.)
To begin with, the TCT is certainlyparadigmatic of theories of
perception which discriminatebetween 'direct' and 'indirect' perception. Now whatevermightbe the problems inherentin any such view,
it is clear that the conventionsof language allow us to speak of 'direct perception' without being guiltyof redundancy,and, thereby,to
speak of 'indirect perception' without being guilty of conceptual
disorder. To speak of physical objects as being 'indirectlyperceived'
most assuredly does not involve any violation of 'meaning postulates.'
However,the criticmightregard this (justifiably) as not at all threatening to the force of the standard objection. That is, he could well
counter that,while our language does indeed allow for the prima facie
coherence of the concept of indirectperception,that concept as construed by the TCT clearlyimplies that physical objects are theoretical
entities.But why believe that this is so?
First of all, and as discussed above, it is clear that it is logically
impossible for someone to see some object or event without also seeing-eat the same time-anything to which that object or event is numericallyor ontologicallyidentical. That, however,is simply to point
out that for any A and any B, if A and B are numerically identical,
that is logicallysufficientfor the truthof 'Anyonewho sees A sees B.'
Hence,
If our refrigeratoris the most expensive item in our kitchen,then anyone who
sees our refrigeratorsees the most expensive item in our kitchen

is a necessary truth.This, however,does not entail that it is logically

impossible foran experienceof A to constitutean experienceof B if A
and B are not numericallyor ontologicallyidentical. That is,
If A and B are not numericallyor ontologicallyidentical, no experience of A
constitutesan experienceof B

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is not a necessary truth. Indeed, there is precious little reason for

believing it to be a truthat all. For ordinary experience provides us
with paradigms which show it to be false.
Consider the case of looking at ourselves througha nondistortive
mirror. Now it would certainlybe correct to claim that one of the
thingswhich we see in any case is an image (specifically,of course a
mirror-image)of ourselves. But is it not also correct to claim that we
see (veridically) ourselves when looking into a (nondistortive) mirror? If we do not see ourselves in such a case, then how would we
know what we often do come to know about our appearance as a
consequence of looking into a mirror,i.e., that we have a smudge on
our forehead,that our hair is not combed neatly, etc.? Could it seriously be suggested that we infer these things about ourselves when
looking into the mirror? Is it not clear that we come to know these
things about ourselves when looking into the mirrorbecause we see
ourselves (i.e., the surface of our bodies or what is visible about us)
when doing so? Assuredly,it would be false to suggest that we do not
have a veridical experience of ourselves when looking into a (once
again, nondistortive) mirror.But consider: nothing could be clearer
than that an image of somethingis numericallynonidentical to that
of which it is an image. Clearly,
An image of somethingis not numericallyidentical to that of which it is an
image

is a necessary truth if ever there was one. Here, then, we have a

paradigm case of the following:A and B are numericallynonidentical
but an experience of A is numerically identical with-i.e., just constitutes-an experienceof B. To experience my mirror-imagein a nondistortivemirrorjust is to experience myself.Let us put it this way:
The experienceof our mirror-imagein a nondistortivemirroraffords
us a veridical experience of ourselves. We do not inferthat our hair
is not combed from looking into the mirror; we experience our uncombed hair. Hence, it would be quite proper to claim that, because
when looking into the mirrorwe cannot experience ourselves except
by experiencingan image of ourselves, we therebyhave an 'indirect
perception' of ourselves. Thus, we have here a paradigm of 'indirect
perception' which does not allow for the pernicious conclusions
drawn fromthat phrase by the critic of the TCT. This is not necessarily to suggest that,for the proponentof the TCT, the relation between
sensa and physical objects (or events) is analogous in every respect
to the relation between mirror-imagesand what those images reflect

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(though it seems clear that proponents of the TCT would regard the
two cases as analogous in some very central respects). Rather, the
point to be driven is that we can cite paradigms-drawn from ordinary experience-in which an experience of A constitutesan experience
of B notwithstandingthat A and B are numericallydistinct.
Consequently,seeing can be (and, I suggest,oftenis) 'extensional'
in the absence of there being a numerical identitybetween the relevant objects of perception. While A being numericallyidentical to B
is logically sufficientfor its being the case that anyone who sees A
sees B, we have now seen that it is not logically necessary that A be
numericallyidentical to B in order for it to be true that anyone who
sees A sees B. An experience of A can constitute-or be numerically
identical with-an experience of B even if A and B happen to be numerically nonide- -ical. It is this, I submit,which breaks the back of
the standard objection to the TCT insofar as it establishes that the
TCT can legitimatelybe construed so as not to imply that physical
objects have the status of unexperienceable or theoretical entities.
Rather, Shaffer's criticism (and that of countless others) is seen to
be groundless once it is shown that A need not be numericallyidentical withB in order for an experienceof A to be numericallyidentical
with (or constitute) an experienceof B.
More strongly,however,it can now be seen that in addition to the
TCT not having the implication that physical objects are theoretical
entities,it has the very opposite implication.That is, not only is the
TCT compatible with its being the case that physical objects are objects of perceptual experience, but it is incompatible with its not
being the case that theyare: in short,the TCT can now be shown to
imply that physical objects are not theoretical entities but are objects of perceptual experience. Specifically,I suggest that the TCT
can best be understood in termsof the claim that to experience sensa
which 'reveal,' 'represent,'or 'resemble' the features of the surfaces
of physical objects which give rise to such sensa is therebyto experienCe veridically the relevant features of those physical objects. And,
since sensa must be experienced in order for physical objects to be
experienced (while the reverse does not hold), it becomes quite proper to claim-as does the proponent of the TCT-that, as a consequence of such 'epistemic priority'of sensa to physical objects, the
latter are the objects of 'indirectperception.' Hence, the TCT can be
construed,in a manner which remains true to both its spirit and its
letter,to implythat physical objects are objects of perceptual experi-'

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ence (albeit 'indirect'). As such, our explication of the TCT results in

that doctrine being incompatible with the view that physical objects
are theoretical entities, i.e., entities the existence and properties of
which can only be inferredrather than experienced. Hence, on our
explication of the TCT, it is required that physical objects comprisealong with the sensa to which they give rise-the contentof our 'actual experience.' I can findno reason why any proponent of the TCT
ought not insist upon this being the case. This, then,hopefully'completes' what we have seen to be Lovejoy's imaginative but ultimately
inconclusive response to the standard objection. Consequently,insofar as it is clear that the standard or'self-defeating'objection to the
TCT derives whatever force it may have from the charge that that
doctrine makes theoretical entities out of physical objects-i.e., is
entirelyparasitical upon the force of the latter charge-it has thereby
been shown to be groundless. That is, since it is not the case that the
TCT must be construed so as to imply that physical objects are
theoretical entities,but, as we have seen, can legitimatelybe explicated so as to have the very opposite implication,it seems clear that
the standard objection to the TCT has thereby been defeated.

VI
Once this is seen to be the case, however,a criticismnot unrelated
to the standard objection-though, unfortunately,it is conflated with
the latter far too often-is also seen to be without force. This criticism usually takes the form of something like the following: Given
the TCT, how can one ever know that a putative experience of some
physical object (or state of affairs) is in fact a veridical experienceof
that object (or state of affairs)? In short, how can we discriminate
veridical experiences from nonveridical experiences if the experience
of sensa is epistemicallynecessary for the experience of physical objects? Does not the view that physical objects are 'indirectlyperceived' lead straightto skepticism? However, now that we have seen
the standard objection to the TCT to be without force-i.e., now that
we have seen that the TCT does not imply that the existence and properties of physical objects can only be 'theoreticallyinferred'rather
than experienced,but that it is actually to be construed as having the
veryopposite implication-it can be seen that such questions present
no special problem for the TCT. Clearly, all theories of perception
must come to termswith the question of how to discriminatebetween
the veridical and the nonveridical,and, presumably,must respond to

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it in rathersimilar ways: What tests do we have for the veridicalityof

perception? Most of us drive cars, and, fortunately,survive to drive
again and again-surely not an insignificantindication that a reasonably respectable portion of our perceptual experience is veridical (or,
to put it another way, that a fairlygood number of our perceptual
judgments are true). In making telephone calls, most of us find that
we usually dial the correctphone number. These are just a couple of
ways by which we can gain a modicum of assurance concerningthe
reliabilityof our perceptual experience. Finally, of course, 'intersubjective corroboration'must be acknowledged as an important(though
admittedlynot conclusive) test for the veridicalityof perceptual experience. Hence, it seems to me that James Cornman is absolutely
correctwhen he suggests,in an eminentlysensible (no pun intended)
article,
that neither direct perception of somethingnor indirect perception of it entails any claims about knowledgeor lack of knowledgeabout it. Direct perception of only sensa does not entail skepticism,in some way lead to it, or make
it more plausible.15

If this is correct (as I believe it is), the question of whether or not

physical objects are 'indirectlyperceived' by means of sensa is a purely'factual' one and therebycarries far less epistemic freightthan has
normallybeen supposed. That is, questions concerningwhat we must
be skeptical about (and, as well, what we can be certain about) cannot be resolved on the basis of considerations about what is or is not
'directly'or 'indirectly'perceived. In any case, it seems quite clear
that the TCT has no special problem in responding to the question
of how one can know of any putative experience that it is in fact veridical. While that is an extraordinarilyimportantquestion, it is surely
time to recognizeit as one which is logically independentof the question of whetheror not the TCT is an at all credible theoryof perception.
ROBERT A. OAKES.
UNIVERSITY OF MISSOURI-ROLLA.

15James W. Cornman, 'On Direct Perception,' The Review of Metaphysics, September,1972,p. 55.