Tamargo vs CA

Tamargo vs CA
GR No. 85044, June 3, 1992
FACTS:
In October 1982, Adelberto Bundoc, minor, 10 years of age, shot Jennifer
Tamargo with an air rifle causing injuries that resulted in her death. The
petitioners, natural parents of Tamargo, filed a complaint for damages against
the natural parents of Adelberto with whom he was living the time of the tragic
incident.
In December 1981, the spouses Rapisura filed a petition to adopt Adelberto
Bundoc. Such petition was granted on November 1982 after the tragic
incident.
ISSUE: WON parental authority concerned may be given retroactive effect so as
to make adopting parents the indispensable parties in a damage case filed
against the adopted child where actual custody was lodged with the biological
parents.
HELD:
Parental liability is a natural or logical consequence of duties and responsibilities
of parents, their parental authority which includes instructing, controlling and
disciplining the child. In the case at bar, during the shooting incident, parental
authority over Adelberto was still lodged with the natural parents. It follows that
they are the indispensable parties to the suit for damages. Parents and
guardians are responsible for the damage caused by the child under their
parental authority in accordance with the civil code.
SC did not consider that retroactive effect may be given to the decree of
adoption so as to impose a liability upon the adopting parents accruing at the
time when they had no actual or physical custody over the adopted child.
Retroactivity may be essential if it permits accrual of some benefit or advantage
in favor of the adopted child. Under Article 35 of the Child and Youth Welfare
Code, parental authority is provisionally vested in the adopting parents during
the period of trial custody however in this case, trial custody period either had
not yet begin nor had been completed at the time of the shooting incident.
Hence, actual custody was then with the natural parents of Adelberto.
Petition for review was hereby granted.

Libi vs IAC
Libi vs. IAC
FACTS:
Julie Ann Gotiong and Wendell Libi were a sweetheart until the former broke up
with the latter after she found out the Wendell was irresponsible and sadistic.
Wendell wanted reconciliation but was not granted by Julie so it prompted him to
resort to threats. One day, there were found dead from a single gunshot wound
each coming from the same gun. The parents of Julie herein private
respondents filed a civil case against the parents of Wendell to recover
damages. Trial court dismissed the complaint for insufficiency of evidence but
was set aside by CA.
ISSUE: WON the parents should be held liable for such damages.
HELD:
The subsidiary liability of parents for damages caused by their minor children
imposed under Art 2180 of the Civil Code and Art. 101 of Revised Penal Code
covered obligations arising from both quasi-delicts and criminal offenses. The
court held that the civil liability of the parents for quasi-delict of their minor
children is primary and not subsidiary and that responsibility shall cease when
the persons can prove that they observe all the diligence of a good father of a
family to prevent damage. However, Wendells mother testified that her
husband owns a gun which he kept in a safety deposit box inside a drawer in
their bedroom. Each of the spouses had their own key. She likewise admitted
that during the incident, the gun was no longer in the safety deposit box.
Wendell could not have gotten hold of the gun unless the key was left
negligently lying around and that he has free access of the mothers bag where
the key was kept. The spouses failed to observe and exercise the required
diligence of a good father to prevent such damage.

Amadora vs CA
Amadora vs. CA
GR No. L47745, April 15, 1988
FACTS:
Alfredo Amadora, while in the auditorium of the school, was mortally hit by a
gun by Pablito Daffon resulting to the formers death. Daffon was convicted of
homicide through reckless imprudence. The victims parents, herein petitioners,
filed a civil action for damages against Colegio de San Jose-Recoletos, its
rectors, high school principal, dean of boys, the physics teacher together with
Daffon and 2 other students. Complaints against the students were dropped.
Respondent Court absolved the defendants completely and reversed CFI Cebus
decision for the following reasons: 1. Since the school was an academic
institution of learning and not a school of arts and trades 2. That students were
not in the custody of the school since the semester has already ended 3. There
was no clear identification of the fatal gun, and 4. In any event, defendants
exercised the necessary diligence through enforcement of the school regulations
in maintaining discipline. Petitioners on othe other hand claimed their son was
under school custody because he went to school to comply with a requirement
for graduation (submission of Physics reports).
ISSUE: WON Collegio de San Jose-Recoletos should be held liable.
HELD:
The time Alfredo was fatally shot, he was in the custody of the authorities of the
school notwithstanding classes had formally ended when the incident
happened. It was immaterial if he was in the school auditorium to finish his
physics requirement. What was important is that he was there for a legitimate
purpose. On the other hand, the rector, high school principal and the dean of
boys cannot be held liable because none of them was the teacher-in-charge as
defined in the provision. Each was exercising only a general authority over the
students and not direct control and influence exerted by the teacher placed incharge of particular classes.

In the absence of a teacher- in charge, dean of boys should probably be held

liable considering that he had earlier confiscated an unlicensed gun from a
student and later returned to him without taking disciplinary action or reporting
the matter to the higher authorities. Though it was clear negligence on his part,
no proof was shown to necessarily link this gun with the shooting incident.
Collegio San Jose-Recoletos cannot directly be held liable under the provision
because only the teacher of the head of school of arts and trade is made
responsible for the damage caused by the student. Hence, under the facts
disclosed, none of the respondents were held liable for the injury inflicted with
Alfredo resulting to his death.
Petition was denied.

I. MEANING OF VICARIOUS LIABILITY AND QUASI-DELICT

Vicarious Liability is a legal doctrine in tort law that imposes responsibility upon
one person for the failure of another or assigns liability for an injury to a person
who did not cause the injury but with whom the person has a special legal
relationship to exercise such care as a reasonably prudent person would use
under similar circumstances. It is also referred to as imputed negligence.
Legal relationships that can lead to imputed negligence include the relationship
between parent and child, husband and wife, owner of a vehicle and driver, and
employer and employee and the likes. Ordinarily the independent negligence of
one person is not imputable to another person.[1]
Sample Illustration
Eager to start your day, you run into the local diner to grab a cup of coffee and a
donut. When the waitress arrives to pour your coffee, you notice that she is a bit
wobbly on her feet. You also notice she is wearing a medical alert bracelet, but
dont pay much attention to it. She pours the steaming hot coffee in your cup,

on the table and even your lap. After letting out a loud yelp, it becomes painfully
obvious that you require medical attention to treat your first-degree burns. This
means you will be out of work, unable to wear pants and need costly follow-up
care.
The waitress was unable to perform her job due to what could have been a
medical condition. Someone must pay, but it is the employer that will bear the
brunt of this waitresss actions. You see, the doctrine of vicarious liability holds
that there can be a person responsible for the actions of another because of a
special relationship the parties maintain.[2]
Quasi-Delict
Whoever by act or omission causes damage to another, there being fault or
negligence, is obliged to pay for the damage done. Such fault or negligence, if
there is no pre-existing contractual relation between the parties, is called a
quasi-delict.[3]
Quasi-delicts give rise to a liability or an obligation to pay for the damage done,
and this obligation is demandable not only for ones own acts or omissions, but
also for those of persons for whom one is responsible.
A quasi-delict may be public or private; the neglect of the affairs of a
community, when it is our duty to attend to them, may be a crime; the neglect
of a private matter, under similar circumstances, may be the ground of a civil
action.[4]
II.LEGAL BASIS OF VICARIOUS LIABILITY
Article 2180 of the Civil Code enumerates those who are subject to this vicarious
liability, among them are teachers and heads of establishments of arts and
trades with respect to their pupils and students and apprentices so long as they remain
in their custody[5]. In order that one may not be made to satisfy this liability, one
needs to prove that the diligence of a good father of a family was observed to
prevent damage.
Meaning Of Custody As Used In Article 2180

The Supreme Court refined the definition of custody as used in Article 2180. In
Amadora v. CA it was held not to mean the student must be boarding with the
school authorities, but it does signify that the student should be within the
control and under the influence of the school authorities at the time of the
occurrence of the injury, whether the semester or school term has not yet begun
or has already ended. As long as the student is still subject to the disciplinary
authority of the school and cannot consider himself released altogether from
observance of its rules, he is in the custody of the school.
Also, as long as the student is in the school premises in pursuance of a
legitimate student objective, in the exercise of a legitimate student right, and
even in the enjoyment of a legitimate student privilege [like doing nothing but
relaxing in the campus in the company of his classmates] the responsibility of
the school authorities over the student continues.
III. Doctrine of in loco parentis
School heads and teachers are subject to this vicarious liability because they
stand, to a certain extent, as to their pupils or students, in loco parentis or as
substitute parents, as expressly provided under Article 218 of the Family Code.
Schools

exercise

their

educational

functional

principally

through

their

administrators and teachers, while parents exercise their parental authority by

sending their children to school to comply with their duty to educate them
according to their means, as provided in Article 220 of the Family Code, and
Article 72 of the Child and Youth Welfare Code, as amended.
Consequently, when parents send their minor child to school, they must
necessarily pass on or share their parental authority, their custody over the
child, and the responsibility to educate their child properly with the school, its
administrators and teachers temporarily, as the latter shall assume such during
all the time the child is under their supervision and instruction. This, in essence,
is the principle of substituted parental authority.[6]

A teachers liability arises from the failure to provide due diligence in the
performance of the responsibilities that come with the substituted parental
authority.[7] A teacher must not only be charged with teaching but also
vigilance over their students or pupils. Without the parents to look after their
children when in school, it is the teacher who takes over in the supervision. It is
thus fitting that the basis of a teachers liability is the principle of in loco
parentis which, according to Blacks Dictionary, means in the place of a
parent.[8]
The law holds the teachers and heads of the school staff liable unless they
relieve themselves of such liability pursuant to the last paragraph of Article
2180 by proving that they observed all the diligence to prevent damage.[9]
The law also applies to all kinds of educational institutions, academic or
vocational.[10] When an academic institution accepts students for enrollment,
there is established a contract between them, resulting in bilateral obligations
which both parties are bound to comply with. The contract between school and
student is one imbued with public interest but a contract nonetheless.[11]
For its part, the school undertakes to provide the student with an education that
would presumably suffice to equip him with the necessary tools and skills to
pursue higher education or a profession. On the other hand, the student
covenants to abide by the schools academic requirements and observe its rules
and regulations.[12]
In all such cases, it had been stressed that the law (Article 2180) plainly
provides that the damage should have been caused or inflicted by pupils or
students of the educational institution sought to be held liable for the acts of its
pupils or students while in its custody.[13]
IV. The Palisoc Doctrine:
The case of Spouses Palisoc v. Brillantes, et al.,[14] raised into a doctrine the
idea that teachers are responsible for the acts of their students, not only minors
but those emancipated as well.
Dominador Palisoc, deceased son of petitioners spouses Palisoc, and the
defendant Virgilio Daffon (who was not a minor) were classmates at the Manila
Technical Institute. There was a fight during recess time, and Daffon caused the

death of Dominador Palisoc. The trial court found Daffon responsible for
Dominadors death, and sentenced him to pay damages. However, the owner
(Antonio Brillantes) and the president (Teodosio Valenton) of Manila Technical
Institute (MTI) and the teacher in charge of the students at that time (Santiago
Quibulue) were absolved. The spouses appealed.
In this particular case the action was instituted directly against the school
officials, and the Supreme Court had the occasion to decide directly on the
question of the liability of teachers and heads of schools under Article 2180,
Civil Code for damages caused by their pupils and students against fellow
students on the school premises. The Supreme Court held that defendants
Valenton (President of MTI) and Quibulue (teacher in charge) were liable.
According to the High Tribunal, the death resulting from the fight of the students
could have been avoided if Valenton and Quibulue had complied with their duty
of providing adequate supervision over the activities of the students in the
school premises to protect their students from harm, whether at the hands of
fellow students or other parties.
The construction of the phrase so long as (the students) remain in their
custody previously it was understood to mean that the student actually
boarded in the school,[15] now it was understood to mean the protective and
supervisory custody that the school and its heads and teachers exercise over
the pupils and students for as long as they are at attendance in the school,
including recess time. In other words it is not necessary that the student actually
boarded in the school; as long as they are at attendance in school, the school
authorities will be liable.
The school head and the teacher-in-charge were found liable, even if Daffon was
already of age at the time of the commission of the offense. There was intent
that the liability be not restricted to the case of persons under age. Furthermore,
teachers and heads of scholarly establishments are not grouped with parents

and guardians but ranged with owners and managers of enterprises, employers
and the state, as to whom no reason is discernible to imply that they should
answer only for minors. The responsibility of the teachers and school heads are
more plenary than that of the parents.[16]
According to Justice Reyes in his concurring opinion:
While in the case of parents and guardians, their authority and supervision
over the children and wards end by law upon the latter reaching majority age,
the authority and custodial supervision over pupils exist regardless of the age of
the latter.
A student over twenty-one, by enrolling and attending a school, places himself
under the custodial supervision and disciplinary authority of the school
authorities, which is the basis of the latters correlative responsibility for his
torts, committed while under such authority. Of course, the teachers control is
not as plenary as when the student is a minor; but that circumstance can only
affect the decree of the responsibility but cannot negate the existence thereof.
It is only a factor to be appreciated in determining whether or not the defendant
has exercised due diligence in endeavoring to prevent the injury, as prescribed
in the last paragraph of Article 2180.
V. LIABILITIES OF ACADEMIC AND TECHNICAL SCHOOLS
The Palisoc doctrine applies to all schools, whether academic or non-academic.
[17] This was settled in the Amadora case.[18] The Supreme Court did not see
any substantial distinction between an academic school and a non-academic
school with respect to torts committed by their students. For them, the same
vigilance of the teacher with respect to the safety of his students should be
expected, whether it the school is academic or technical.
In academic schools, the liability attaches to the teacher, while in a technical
school, the liability attaches to the head[19]
According to the Supreme Court:

The reason for the disparity can be traced to the fact that historically the head
of the school of arts and trades exercised a closer tutelage over his pupils than
the head of the academic school. The old schools of arts and trades were
engaged in the training of artisans apprenticed to their master who personally
and directly instructed them on the technique and secrets of their craft.
The head of the school of arts and trades was such a master and so was
personally involved in the task of teaching his students, who usually even
boarded with him and so came under his constant control, supervision and
influence.
By contrast, the head of the academic school was not as involved with his
students and exercised only administrative duties over the teachers who were
the persons directly dealing with the students. The head of the academic school
then has only a vicarious relationship with the students.
Consequently, while he could not be directly faulted for the acts of the students,
the head of the school of arts and trades, because of his closer ties with them,
could be so blamed.
The Court conceded however that the distinction no longer obtains at present
because of the expansion of technological schools, the increase in their
enrolment, and the decrease of the direct and personal contact of vocational
school heads with their students.
We no longer have masters and apprentices toiling in schools of arts and trades.
Students in technological colleges and universities are no different from students in liberal
arts or professional schools. Apprentices now work in regular shops and factories and th eir
relationship to the employer is covered by laws governing the employment
relationship and not by laws governing the teacher student relationship.[20]
VI. LIABILITY OF THE SCHOOL ON ACTS OF A STRANGER AND
ACTIVITIES OUTSIDE OF THE SCHOOL
In the PSBA case[21] although the person injured was a student of PSBA, the
person that caused the injury was not a student of PSBA. Art. 2180 on quasidelict would naturally not apply as it requires that the damage should be caused

by a student of the educational institution. However, the Court held that

although 2180 does not apply, the schools liability can arise from a breach in
contract as when an educational institution accepts students for enrolment,
there exists a contract which is one imbued with public interest. This contract
produces bilateral obligations, and one of the schools obligations is to provide
their students with an atmosphere that is conducive in furthering their primary
purpose which is to impart knowledge.
A similar ruling was adopted in the case of Regino v. Pangasinan Colleges of
Scienceand Technology[22] where it upheld the school-student relationship as
contractual in nature. In the case of Soliman although the Court held that the
school was not liable for the acts of the school security guard whose employer
was a security agency, the court still upheld the school-student contractual
relationship.[23]
May a teacher escape liability for outings and activities held outside the school
but authorized by the school? Art 218 of the Family Code states that authority
and responsibility shall apply to all authorized activities whether inside or
outside the premises of the school, entity or institution.[24] In the case of St.
Marys Academy[25], the Court held that special parental authority and
responsibility applies to all authorized activities, whether inside or outside the
school premises.
VII. DEFENSE AGAINST LIABILITY
To avoid responsibility and liability, the teacher must prove that due diligence
was observed. As to the kind of due diligence, the last paragraph of Art 2180 is
clear The persons must prove that they have observed all the diligence of a
good father of a family to prevent damage. This can only be done at a trial on
the merits of the case.
The case of Amadora and St Francis,[26] the accused parties have proven that
they have exercised the diligence required of them by law under the
circumstances to guard against the harm they had foreseen.
The court held:

The school can show that it exercised proper measure in selecting the head or
its teachers and the appropriate supervision over them in the custody and
instruction of pupils pursuant to its rules and regulations for the maintenance
among them. In fact, these measures are affected through the assistance of an
adequate security force to help the teacher physically enforce the rules upon
the students. It bolster the claim of the school that it has taken adequate steps
to prevent any injury that may be committed by the students.
VIII. WAIVERS
Can a teacher or school escape responsibility by asking parents to file a waiver
during field trips and outings? This issue is closely related to liabilities outside
school and Art 218 is clear that authority and responsibility shall apply to all
authorized activities whether inside or outside the premises of the school, entity
or institution. In the case of St. Francis, the Court still held some teachers
responsible despite the fact that the parent permitted the child to go to the
picnic.
IX. ILLUSTRATIVE CASES
School of the Holy Spirit vs Corazon P. Taguiam[27]
Respondent Corazon P. Taguiam was the Class Adviser of the petitioner, School
of the Holy Spirit of Quezon City. On March 10, 2000, the class president, wrote
a letter to the grade school principal requesting permission to hold a year-end
celebration at the school grounds. The principal authorized the activity and
allowed the pupils to use the swimming pool. In this connection, respondent
distributed the parents/guardians permit forms to the pupils.
Respondent admitted that Chiara Mae Federicos permit form was unsigned.
Nevertheless, she concluded that Chiara Mae was allowed by her mother to join
the activity since her mother personally brought her to the school with her
packed lunch and swimsuit.

Before the activity started, respondent warned the pupils who did not
know how to swim to avoid the deeper area. However, while the pupils were
swimming, two of them sneaked out. Respondent went after them to verify
where they were going.
Unfortunately, while respondent was away, Chiara Mae drowned.
respondent

returned,

the

maintenance

man

cardiopulmonary resuscitation on Chiara Mae.

was

already

When

administering

She was still alive when

respondent rushed her to the General Malvar Hospital where she was
pronounced dead on arrival.
Petitioners dismissed respondent on the ground of gross negligence resulting to
loss of trust and confidence. Meanwhile, Chiara Maes parents filed a P7 Million
damage suit against petitioners and respondent, among others. They also filed
against respondent a criminal complaint for reckless imprudence resulting in
homicide.
The Court held that As a teacher who stands in loco parentis to her pupils,
respondent should have made sure that the children were protected from all
harm while in her company. Respondent should have known that leaving the
pupils in the swimming pool area all by themselves may result in an accident. A
simple reminder not to go to the deepest part of the poolwas insufficient to
cast away all the serious dangers that the situation presented to the children,
especially when respondent knew that Chiara Mae cannot swim. Dismally,
respondent created an unsafe situation which exposed the lives of all the pupils
concerned to real danger. This is a clear violation not only of the trust and
confidence reposed on her by the parents of the pupils but also of the school.

X. CONCLUSION

The essence of the principle of substituted parental authority is that when

parents send their minor child to school, they must necessarily pass on or share
their parental authority, their custody over the child, and the responsibility to
educate their child properly with the school, its administrators and teachers
temporarily, as the latter shall assume such during all the time the child is under
their supervision and instruction.
A teacher, who stands in loco parentis to her pupils, should make sure that the
children were protected from all harm while in her company. An academic
institution accepts students for enrollment, there is established a contract
between them, resulting in bilateral obligations which both parties are bound to
comply with. The contract between school and student is one imbued with
public interest but a contract nonetheless.
The law holds the teachers and heads of the school staff liable unless they
relieve themselves of such liability pursuant to the last paragraph of Article
2180 by proving that they observed all the diligence to prevent damage.
[1] US Tort Law Dictionary
[2] Taught by Kat Kadian-Baumeyer
[3] Article 2176, Civil Code of the Philippines
[4] Bowy. Mod. C. L. c. 43, p. 265
[5] Paragraph 7 of Article 2180 of the Civil Code
[6] Sangco, Philippine Law on Torts and Damages, 502 (1994).
[7] Sangco, Philippine Law on Torts and Damages, 502 (1994)
[8] A. Tolentino, Commentaries and Jurisprudence on the Civil Code of the
Philippines, 618(1992)
[9] Rollo, p. 75
[10] PSBA vs CA G.R. No. 84698 February 4, 1992
[11] In Non vs. Dames II, G.R. No. 89317, 20 May 1990, 185 SCRA 535,
[12] PSBA vs CA G.R. No. 84698 February 4, 1992

[13] Amadora vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. L-47745, 15 April 1988, 160 SCRA
315
[14] G.R. No. L-29025, October 4, 1971
[15] as enunciated in Exconde and Merc
[16] Justice Reyes in his concurring opinion in Palisoc case G.R. No. L-29025,
October 4, 1971
[17] Amadora case, G.R. No. L-47745, April 15, 1988
[18] G.R. No. L-47745, April 15, 1988
[19] Supreme Court in Amadora Case
[20] J. Guttierrez, in her concurring opinion
[21] Philippine School of Business Administration v. Court of Appeals,
G.R. No.84698, February4, 1992,205 SCRA 729
[22] Regino v. Pangasinan Colleges of Scienceand Technology, G.R. No. 156109,
November18, 2004, 443 SCRA 56
[23] Soliman, Jr v. Tuazon, G.R. No. 66207, May 18, 1992, 209 SCRA 4717
[24] Family Code
[25] St. Marys Academy v. Carpitanos, G.R. No.143363, February 6, 2002, 376
SCRA 473
[26] St. Francis High School v. Court of Appeals,supra.
[27] G.R. No. 165565 July 14, 2008
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Torts, vicarious liability, VICARIOUS LIABILITY OF TEACHERS AND EDUCATIONAL

INSTITUTIONScustody, Doctrine of in loco parentis, palisoc doctrine, quasi delict, school
liabilities, vicarious liability