VILLANUEVA V.

CA
Marriage Certificate not an essential or formal requisite but the best
evidence of marriage
Petitioner: Villanueva
Respondent: Catalina Sanchez
FACTS:
Catalina Sanchez claims to be the widow of Robert Sanchez and avers that
her husband was the owner of a 275 sq. meter parcel of land which was registered
without her knowledge in the name of Villanueva on the strength of an alleged deed
of sale executed in favor by her late husband. She prayed for the deed of sale to be
annulled as it was found that the signature on the document was written by another
person upon involving the report of a handwriting expert from Philippine
Constabulary Criminal Investigation Service. She also prayed that registration of the
lot in the name of Villanueva be cancelled and the lot be reconveyed to her.
Villanueva questioned the personality of Catalina Ssanchez to file the
complaint and alleged that Roberto Sanchez was never married but had a commonlaw wife by whom he had 2 children. Villanueva also claimed that Roberto Sanchez
had deeded over the lot to them for the sum of P500 in partial settlement of a
judgment they had obtained against him. On Villanuevas motion, RTC required
examination of deed of sale by NBI to determine its forgery and later on rendered
judgment in favor of Villanueva rejecting the testimony of the handwriting experts
from Philippine Constabulary and NBI who both testified that the standard signature
of the late Roberto Sanchez and the one written on alleged deed of sale were
written by 2 different people and instead adhered to the claim of Villanueva that
the supposed differences between the signatures was because during the time
Roberto signed the deed he was under serious emotional stress and intensely
angry after he lost the case to them and that were really no fundamental
differences between the signatures compared. RTC decision also noted that Sanchez
did not take any step to annul the deed and allowed his action prescribe under Art.
1431 of Civil Code. As for contract of marriage submitted by Catalina, it was
rejected because the Torrens certificate issued to Roberto Sanchez over the subject
land described his civil status as single.
CA however reversed RTC decision hence, present petition.
ISSUE:
Whether or not CA erred in upholding the testimony of expert witnesses against
findings of fact of trial court, annulling the deed of sale, and generally not
sustaining the decision of the RTC
HELD:
No, SC sees no reason to disturb the judgment of CA as it is consonant with
the evidence of record and applicable law and jurisprudence.
SC notes that Catalina Sanchez has proven her status as the widow of
Roberto Sanchez by her submission of the marriage contract. Such evidence
rendered unnecessary the presumption that a man and woman deporting
themselves as husband and wife have entered into lawful contract of marriage and

also explains why Roberto could not have married the woman whom he supposedly
had 2 illegitimate children. SC notes it is strange for RTC for rejecting the
marriage certificate against the Transfer Certificate Title describing
Roberto as single. SC believes that RTC disregarded the elementary
principle that the best documentary evidence of marriage is the marriage
contract itself. Torrens Certificate title is the best evidence for ownership of land
but not of the civil status of owner. Thus, as the surviving spouse of Roberto
Sanchez, Catalina then can validly file the complaint for recovery of her late
husbands property without prejudice to successional rights of his heirs.
On the questioned signature, SC finds it significant that the examination by NBI was
requested by Villanueva but in the end it was Catalina who presented the NBI
handwriting as her own expert witness instead. To this SC states the obvious
explanation that Villanueva must have hoped to refute the findings of Philippine
Constabulary handwriting expert presented by Catalina with the NBI handwriting
expert but as it turned out, the findings of the 2 witnesses coincided instead. Both
experts stated the signature of the deed of sale was not written by Roberto
Sanchez. They did not conjure this conclusion out of thin air but supported it with
knowledgeable testimony extensively given on direct and cross-examination on
various characteristics and differences of signatures they had examined and
compared. Such findings by the experts were accepted by the SC.
De Loria v. Felix
Marriage Certificate is not an essential or formal requisite
Petitioners: Arsenia and Ricarda de Loria
Respondent: Felipe Felix
FACTS:
Long before and during the War of Pacific, Matea de la Cruz and Felipe Apelan
Felix lived together as husband and wife. They acquired properties but had no
children. In the early part of Liberation of Manila, Matea became seriously ill.
Knowing her critical condition, 2 young ladies of legal age dedicated to service of
God, Carmen Ordiales and Judith Vicarra visited and persuaded her to go to
confession. The priest conducting confession learned that Matea had been living
with Felix without the benefit of marriage and asked both parties to ratify their
union according to the rites of the Church which both agreed. Then the priest heard
the confession of bedridden Matea, gaver her Holy Communion, administered the
Sacrament of Extreme Unction (Anointing of the Sick) and then solemnized the
marriage between Mate and Felix in articulo mortise with Carmen Ordiales and
Judith Vicarra as sponsors and witnesses.
After a few months, Matea recovered from illness but not death. She died with the
same priest performing the burial ceremony.
Years after, Arsenio de Loria and Ricarda de Loria filed a complaint compelling Felix
to account and deliver the properties left by Matea. They are allegedly the
grandchildren of Adriana de La Cruz, the sister of Matea and claim to be the only
surviving forced heirs of Matea. Felix resisted the action setting his rights as

widower of Matea. RTC rendered decision in favor of de Lorias but CA reversed and
dismissed it.
Hence, present petition.
ISSUES:
1. Whether or not the alleged marriage constituted, in the eyes of law, as a valid
and binding marriage considering there was no marriage contract signed by
the wedded couple, the witnesses and the priest
2. Whether or not the failure to sign the marriage certificate or
contract constitute a cause for nullity
HELD:
1. Yes, there was a valid marriage that took place and such marriage was
recognized as marriage in articulo mortis. SC adopts CAs ruling wherein it
took weight of Fr. Bautistas testimony that it was marriage in articulo mortis
because at that time, her condition was bad, she was bed-ridden, and
according to his observation, she might die any moment. Mateas condition
was so apprehensive that he decided in administering to her Sacrament of
Extreme Unction (Anointing the Sick) after hearing her confession.
2. No, failure to sign marriage contract does not constitute cause for
nullity.
In the first place, Marriage Law in Secs. 28, 29, and 30 (prevailing rule at
that time) enumerates the cause for annulment of marriage and
failure to sign marriage contract is not one of them.
In the second place, bearing in mind that the "essential requisites for
marriage are the legal capacity of the contracting parties and their consent"
(section 1), the latter being manifested by the declaration of "the parties" "in
the presence of the person solemnizing the marriage and of two witnesses of
legal age that they take each other as husband and wife" - which in this case
actually occurred. SC thinks the signing of marriage contract or certificate
was required by statute simply for purpose of evidencing the act. No
statutory provision or court ruling has been cited making it neither an
essential requisite nor a formal one.
In the third place, law imposing on priest the duty to furnish to parties
the copies of marriage certificate and punishing him for its omission
implies his obligation to see to it that such certificate is executed
accordingly. Hence, it would not be fair to visit upon the wedded
couple in the form of annulment, Father Bautistas omission which
apparently had been caused by prevailing disorder during Liberation
of Manila.
The law permits articulo mortis marriages, without marriage license; but
requiring priest to make affidavit and file it. Now then if marriage celebrated
without license is not voidable, marriage should not also be voidable for lack
of such affidavit. In line with policy to encourage legalization of union of men
and women who have lived publicly in a state of concubinage, it is proper
then to hold this marriage valid. Since marriage is valid, Felix as

widower has the better rights than the de Lorias who are the
grandchildren of Mateas sister Adriana.
Pugeda v. Trias
Requisites of Marriage: Failure of Registry not to bar the fact of marriage
Petitioner: Fabian Pugeda
Respondents: Trias children
FACTS:
Pugeda alleges that during the lifetime of his marriage with deceased Maria
Ferrer, they acquired thru conjugal partnership funds lots of the San Francisco de
Malabon Estate. Further alleged that Pugeda is the owner of of the said interest of
the lots and that upon the death of Maria Ferrer, Pugeda and Trias children became
co-owners of said properties and Trias children managed the properties in trust as
co-owners thereof. Pugeda prays that the properties, acquired as conjugal
properties by him and Maria be partitioned and thereof be given to him as his
share.
Trias children denied the claims of Pugeda to the properties and alleged that the
properties had been inherited by them from their deceased father (first-husband)
and deceased mother and had been in possession and full enjoyment thereof more
than 10 years, peacefully, uninterruptedly, quietly, and adversely under a claim of
ownership to the exclusion of others. Trias children also denied lack of knowledge
and belief the claim of Pugeda that he was married to Maria Ferrer and that the
marriage continued up to Marias death.
ISSUES:
1. Whether or not there existed a valid marriage between Pugeda and deceased
Maria Ferrer
2. Whether or not the subject lands may be considered as conjugal properties of
the first marriage or of the second, or of both
HELD:
1. Yes, there existed a valid marriage.
Pugeda and his witness Ricardo Ricafrente testified that on the eve of
Epiphany or Three Kings, Pugeda and Maria went to the office of Justice of
Peace who was Ricafrente to ask him to marry them, that accordingly
Ricafrente celebrated the desired marriage in the presence of 2 witnesses,
that after the usual ceremony Ricafrente asked the parties to sign 2 copies of
marriage contract, and after, witnesses had signed the same where he
delivered 1 copy to contracting parties and another to President of Sanitary
Division who at that time was keeper of the records of Civil Register.
The judge who heard the evidence, afer a review of testimonial and
documental evidence, arrived at the conclusion that Pugeda was in fact
married to Maria, this conclusion being borne out not only by chain of
circumstances but also by testimonies of witnesses to celebration of
marriage who appeared to be truthful as well as by the fact that
Pugeda and deceased Maria lived together as husband and wife for

18 years and that there is a strong presumption that they were

actually married. Citing Article 53 p. 27 of Civil Code (ruling law at that
time)
As to marriages contracted subsequently, no proof other than
a certificate of the record in civil register shall be admitted.
Testimony by one of the parties or by one of the witnesses to
marriage has been held to be admissible to prove fact of
marriage. The person who officiated marriage is also
competent to testify as eyewitness to fact of marriage.
As judgment, the evidence submitted shows conclusively that Pugeda was in
fact married to Maria that said marriage subsisted until the time of death of
Maria.
2. The lots in question were conjugal properties of Mariano Trias (first husband)
and Maria Ferrer and consequently decreed that thereof should be
adjudicated to Mariano Trias as his share and that it should be divided among
his 6 children at the rate of 1/6 each and the other half to Maria Ferrer as her
share in conjugal properties to be assigned to her children by both marriages
at the rate of 1/9 each and the balance of 1/9 to widower Fabian Pugeda in
usufruct. However, four documents were submitted to the case as evidence
showing that the total amount paid by Mariano Trias and Maria Ferrer on the
lots amount to only P8,911.84 while installments paid during the marriage of
spouses Fabian Pugeda and Maria Ferrer totaled P35,146.46 and that some of
the lots in question are paid only during the marriage of Pugeda and Maria.
Thus, judgment was rendered that 2 marriages should participate in the
ownership of lands, according to the actual contributions made by each
marriage in the installments in payment of lands.
A study of provisions of the Friar Lands Act discloses that the friar lands
purchased by government for sale to actual occupants. Also, as provided in
Sec.16 of such act:
"Sec. 16. In the event of the death of a holder of a certificate the
issuance of which is provided for in section twelve hereof, prior to
the execution of a deed by the Government to any purchaser, his
widow shall be entitled to receive a deed of the land stated in the
certificate upon showing that she has complied with the
requirements of law for the purchase of the same. In case a holder
of a certificate dies before the giving of the deed and does not
leave a widow, then the interest of the holder of the certificate shall
descend and deed shall issue to the persons who under the laws of
the Philippine Islands would have taken had the title been perfected
before the death of the holder of the certificate, upon proof of the
holders thus entitled of compliance with all the requirements of the
certificate. In case the holder of the certificate shall have sold his
interest in the land before having complied with all the conditions
thereof, the purchaser from the holder of the certificate shall be
entitled to all the rights of the holder of the certificate upon
presenting his assignment to the Chief of the Bureau of Public Lands
for registration."

A study of the above quoted provisions clearly indicates that the conveyance
executed in favor of a buyer or purchaser, or the so-called certificate of sale,
is a conveyance of the ownership of the property, subject only to the
resolutory condition that the sale may be cancelled if the price agreed upon
is not paid for in full. In the case at bar the sale certificates were made in
favor of Mariano Trias, and upon his death they were assigned in accordance
with Sec. 16, to his widow. But the law provides that when the buyer does not
leave a widow, rights and interest of holder of certificate of sale are left to
buyers heirs in accordance with laws of succession.
It is true that the evidence shows that of the various parcels of land
now subject of the action none was paid for in full during the
marriage of Mariano Trias and Maria C. Ferrer, and that payments in
installments continued to be made even after the marriage of
Pugeda and Maria C. Ferrer. However, it is also true that even after
said marriage, certificates of sale were assigned to Maria Ferrer and
installments for lots after said marriage (with 1st husband) continued
in the name of Maria Ferrer, also all the amounts paid as
installments for lots were taken from the fruits of properties
conjugal partnership with Fabian Pugeda. However, there is also the
fact that during the intestate proceedings he failed to intervene to
claim that the friar lands or some of them belonged to himself and
his wife Maria shows a conviction that the said friar lands actually
belonged to Maria and 1st husband and that he had no interest
therein. His failure to intervene in the proceedings now bars him absolutely
from asserting the claim that he now pretends to have to said properties.
And even if succumbing to Pugedas claim that the lands in question
increased in productivity from 900 cavans to 2400 cavans thru the joint effort
of himself and Maria which in fact was proved, statute of limitations bars
Pugedas action to recover his share because Maria died. Pugeda was not
heard for 14 years until he instituted a claim over said lands
recently. His claim for improvements therefore, is also barred.
In view of our finding that the claim of the plaintiff to any share in the estate
of his wife Maria C. Ferrer is already barred by the statute of limitations, the
decree entered by Judge Lucero declaring that her properties be divided into
nine parts, one part belonging to each heir and one to plaintiff in usufruct, is
hereby modified, by eliminating the share in usufruct of the plaintiff therein
and increasing the share of each of her heirs to one-eighth.
*P.S.: Bottomline aning division of land is, naa untay share si Koya
Pugeda but since chaka man sha kay wala sha nagpakita during
intestate proceedings kay nag wife hunting sha and recently lang
sha nakialam about the lands, barred na sha from claiming his
rightful share kaya ang share sa properties among the children na
and wala na shay labot.

Delgado Vda De La Rosa v. Heirs of Damian

Marriage Certificate is neither an Essential Requisite nor Formal
Requisite: Absence of which, Presumption of Marriage
Petitioners: Heirs of Luis Delgado
Respondents: Heirs of Rustia
FACTS:
This case concerns the settlement of the intestate estates of
Guillermo Rustia and Josefa Delgado. The claimants to the estates of
Guillermo Rustia and Josefa Delgado may be divided into two groups: (1)
the alleged heirs of Josefa Delgado, consisting of her half- and full-blood
siblings, nephews and nieces, and grandnephews and grandnieces, and
(2) the alleged heirs of Guillermo Rustia, particularly, his sisters, 7 his
nephews and nieces,8 his illegitimate child,9 and the de facto adopted
child10 (ampun-ampunan) of the decedents.
It has been disputed whether a marriage really took place between Guillermo
and Rustia and according to Heirs of Luis Delgado, the 2 eventually lived
together as husband an wife but were never married asserting that no record
of contested marriage existed in civil registry. Moreover, a baptismal
certificate naming Josefa as one of the sponsors referred to her as Senorita
or unmarried woman.
Heirs of Rustia on the other hand, insist that absence of a marriage certificate
did not necessarily mean no marriage transpired. They allege that Guillermo
Rustia and Josefa Delgado were married and from then on lived together
as husband and wife until the death of Josefa. Spanning more than half a
century, heirs of Rustia alleged that they were known among relatives and
friends to have in fact been married and supporting their proposition they
presented:
-certificate of identity issued to Mrs. Guillermo Rustia by Carlos P. Romulo
-PH passport issued to Josefa Rustia
-Veterans application for pension or compensation for disability resulting from
service in active military or naval forces of US filed with Veterans
Administration of US of America by Dr. Guillermo Rustia wherein Dr. Rustia
himself swore to his marriage with Josefa Rustia
-Titles to real properties in the name of Guillermo Rustia indicating he was
married to Josefa Delgado
Thus Luisa Delgado, sister of Josefa, filed the original petition for letters of
administration of the intestate estates of spouses Josefa Delgado and
Guillermo Rustia with the RTC. This petition was opposed by the sister of
Guillermo Rustia, heirs of Guillermo Rustias late brother, and the ampunampunan Guillermina Rustia. Then Guillerma Rustia filed a motion to
intervene claiming she was the only surviving descendant in the direct line of
Guillermo Rustia which was granted. However, in the course of the
proceedings, Luisa Delgado died who was substituted for her sister Carlota
Delgado.
The RTC ruled that petitioner and her co-claimants are entitled to the estate

of the late Josefa Delgado and declared as the only legal heirs of the said
Josefa Delgado. Similarly, the intervenor Guillerma Rustia is hereby declared
as the sole and only surviving heir of the late Dr. Guillermo Rustia, and thus,
entitled to the entire estate of the said decedent, to the exclusion of the
oppositors and the other parties hereto. As the estates of both decedents
have not as yet been settled, a single administrator was appointed in the
petitioner Carlota Delgado Vda. de dela Rosa. LETTERS OF ADMINISTRATION
were issued to CARLOTA DELGADO VDA. DE DE LA ROSA upon her filing of the
requisite bond in the sum of P500,000.00.
Upon appeal in the CA said court reversed the decision. Hence, this recourse.
ISSUES:
1. Whether or not there was a valid marriage between Guillermo Rustia and
Josefa Delgado
2. Who are the legal heirs of decedents Guillermo Rustia and Josefa Delgado
3. Who should be issued letters of administration
HELD:
1. Yes, there was a valid marriage between Guillermo and Josefa. One of the
disputable presumptions provided in Rules of Court is that a man and a
woman deporting themselves as husband and wife have entered into lawful
contract of marriage. Semper praesumitur pro matrimonio. Always presume
marriage.
In elaboration, although a marriage contract is considered a primary
evidence of marriage, its absence is not always proof that no marriage
took place. Once the presumption of marriage arises, other evidence
may be presented in support. Evidence need not necessarily or directly
establish marriage but must at least be enough to strengthen the presumption of
marriage.
In this case, several circumstances gave rise to the presumption that a valid
marriage existed between Guillermo and Josefa. First, the certificate of identity
issued to Josefa as Mrs. Guillermo Rustia, the passport issued to her as Josefa
Rustia, declaration under oath of no less than Guillermo Rustia that he was
married to Josefa Delgado, and the titles to the properties in the name of
Guillermo Rustia married to Josefa Delgado more than adequately support the
presumption of marriage. These are public documents which are prima facie
evidence of facts stated therein.
Second, Elisa vda. De Anson whose testimony confirmed that Guillermo Rustia
had proposed marriage to Josefa Delgado and that eventually, they lived
together as husband and wife. This again strengthens presumption of marriage.

Third, baptismal certificate was only the conclusive proof of the baptism
administered by the priest who baptized the child. It is not a proof of veracity of
declarations and statements contained therein such as alleged single or
unmarried civil status of Josefa who had no hand in its preparation.
Thus, heirs of Delgado failed to rebut the presumption of marriage. Every
intendment of the law leans toward legitimizing matrimony. Persons
dwelling together apparently in marriage are presumed to be in fact
married.
2. Her brothers and sisters, or their children who were still alive at the time of
her death are entitled to partake of her intestate estate.

To determine who the lawful heirs of Josefa Delgado are, the questioned
status of the cohabitation of her mother Felisa Delgado with Ramon Osorio
must first be addressed. Evidences such as (1) continued use of Felisa
and Luis of the surname Delgado and (2) Luis Delgados and Caridad
Concepcions Partida de Casamiento identifying Luis as hijo natural de
Felisa Delgado. Considering these evidences, SC rules that these factors
sufficiently overcame the rebuttable presumption of marriage. Hence,
Felisa Delgado and Ramon Osorio were never married. Thus, all children
born to Felisa Delgado out of her relations with Ramon Osorio and Lucio
Ocampo were her natural children.
However, does being half-siblings entitle Luis and the other siblings to
inherit from Josefa?
SC submits that succession should be allowed, even when
illegitimate brothers and sisters are only of the half-blood. The
reason impelling the prohibition on reciprocal successions
between legitimate and illegitimate families does not apply to
the case under consideration. There is no such difference when all the
children are illegitimate children of the same parent, even if begotten with
different persons. They all stand on the same footing before the law, just
like legitimate children of half-blood relation. We submit, therefore, that
the rules regarding succession of legitimate brothers and sisters should be
applicable to them. Full blood illegitimate brothers and sisters should
receive double the portion of half-blood brothers and sisters; and if all are
either of the full blood or of the half-blood, they shall share equally.
Here, the above-named siblings of Josefa Delgado were related to her by
full-blood, except Luis Delgado, her half-brother. Nonetheless, since they
were all illegitimate, they may inherit from each other. Accordingly, all of
them are entitled to inherit from Josefa Delgado.
--The lawful heirs of Guillermo Rustia are the remaining claimants consisting of
his sisters, nieces and nephews.

In the case of Guillerma Rustia as an illegitimate child of Guillermo, she may

be entitled to successional rights only upon proof of an admission or
recognition of paternity. She, however, claimed the status of an
acknowledged illegitimate child only after the death of Guillermo Rustia at
which time it was already the new Civil Code that was in effect. Under the
new Civil Code, the strict edict that illegitimate children absolutely had no
hereditary rights was relaxed and now granted successional rights to
illegitimate children but only on condition that they were first recognized or
acknowledged by the parent. Under the new law, recognition may be
compulsory or voluntary.
Compulsory recognition is in any of the following cases:
-cases of rape, abduction, seduction, when the period of offense coincides
more or less with that of conception
-when the child is in continuous possession of status of a child of the
alleged father (or mother) by the direct acts of the latter or of his family
-when the child was conceived during the time when the mother
cohabited with the supposed father
-when the child has in his favor any evidence or proof that the defendant
is his father.
On the other hand, voluntary recognition may be made in the record of birth,
a will, a statement before a court of record in any authentic writing.
Guillerma sought recognition on 2 grounds: Compulsory recognition through
open and continuous possession of status of an illegitimate child and
voluntary recognition through authentic writing. However, her possession
of status of being an illegitimate child from her birth until the death
of her putative father does not constitute acknowledgment but a
mere ground which she could have compelled acknowledgment
through courts. Furthermore, any action for compulsory acknowledgment
has a dual limitation: lifetime of the child and lifetime of parent. On the death
of either, action for compulsory recognition can no longer be filed. In this
case, intervenor Guillermas right to claim compulsory
acknowledgment prescribed upon death of Guillermo Rustia. The
claim of voluntary recognition must likewise fail. An authentic writing
for purposes of voluntary recognition is understood as genuine or indubitable
writing of parent which includes a public instrument or a private writing
admitted by father to be his. In this case, Guillerma submits her report
card in UST and the obituary which Guillermo allegedly have made
where her name appears as one of the children. These evidences
however, do not qualify authentic writings in Civil Code. The report
card holds no weight since Guillermo had no participation in its preparation
similarly, the obituary published in Sunday Times was also not an authentic
writing contemplated by law. Guillermas failure to present the original signed
manuscript or signature on the report card was fatal to her claim.
The same misfortune befalls the ampun-ampunan Guillermina who
was never adopted in accordance with the law. Although a petition
for her adoption was filed by Guillermo, it never came to fruition and
was dismissed upon Guillermos death. SC affirms the ruling of both
trial court and Court of Appeals holding her a legal stranger to

deceased spouses and therefore not entitled to inherit from them ab

intestate.

Premises considered, we rule that two of the claimants to the estate of

Guillermo Rustia, namely, intervenor Guillerma Rustia and the ampunampunan Guillermina Rustia Rustia, are not lawful heirs of the decedent.
Under Article 1002 of the new Civil Code, if there are no descendants,
ascendants, illegitimate children, or surviving spouse, the collateral
relatives shall succeed to the entire estate of the deceased. Therefore, the
lawful heirs of Guillermo Rustia are the remaining claimants, consisting of
his sisters,69 nieces and nephews.
3. Carlota Delgado (sister of original petitioner Luisa Delgado) and a nominee of
the nephews and nieces of Guillermo Rustia.
Rule 78, Section 6 of the Rules of Court prescribes an order of preference in
the appointment of an administrator:
Section 6. When and to whom letters of administration granted.- If no
executor is named in the will, or the executor or executors are incompetent,
refuse the trust, or fail to give a bond, or a person dies intestate,
administration shall be granted:
(a) To the surviving husband or wife, as the case may be, or next of
kin, or both, in the discretion of the court, or to such person as such
surviving husband or wife, or next of kin, requests to have
appointed, if competent and willing to serve;
(b) If such surviving husband or wife, as the case may be, or next of kin, or
the person selected by them, be incompetent or unwilling, or if the husband
or widow or next of kin, neglects for thirty (30) days after the death of the
person to apply for administration or to request that the administration be
granted to some other person, it may be granted to one or more of the
principal creditors, if competent and willing to serve;
(c) If there is no such creditor competent and willing to serve, it may be
granted to such other person as the court may select.
In the appointment of an administrator, the principal consideration is the
interest in the estate of the one to be appointed. The order of preference
does not rule out the appointment of co-administrators, specially in cases
where justice and equity demand that opposing parties or factions be
represented in the management of the estates, a situation which obtains
here.
It is in this light that we see fit to appoint joint administrators, in
the persons of Carlota Delgado vda. de de la Rosa and a nominee of
the nephews and nieces of Guillermo Rustia. They are the next of kin
of the deceased spouses Josefa Delgado and Guillermo Rustia,
respectively.
Republic of the Philippines v. CA
Absence of Marriage License renders marriage void ab initio
Petitioners: Republic of PH

Respondent: Angelina Castro

FACTS:
Angelina M. Castro and Edwin F. Cardenas were married in a civil ceremony
performed by Judge Pablo M. Malvar. The marriage was celebrated without the
knowledge of Castros parents. It is important to note that it was Cardenas who
personally attended processing of the documents required for celebration of
marriage, including the procurement of marriage license. In fact, their marriage
contract itself states that marriage license no. 3196182 was issued in the name of
contracting parties.
The couple did not immediately live together as husband and wife since the
marriage was unknown to Castro's parents. Thus, it was when Castro discovered she
was pregnant, that the couple decided to live together. However, their cohabitation
lasted only for four (4) months. Thereafter, the couple parted ways. Castro gave
birth. The baby was adopted by Castro's brother, with the consent of Cardenas.
Baby is now in US. Desiring to follow her daughter, Castro wanted to put in order
her marital status before leaving for States. She thus consulted a lawyer regarding
the possible annulment of her marriage. Through her lawyers efforts, they
discovered that there was no marriage license issued to Cardenas prior to
celebration of their marriage. As proof, Angelina Castro offered in evidence a
certification from the Civil Register of Pasig, Metro Manila signed by the Senior Civil
Registry Officer.
Castro filed a petition in RTC and testified that she did not go to the civil registrar of
Pasig in order to apply for the license. Neither did she sign any application therefor
nor further elaborated, she affixed her signature only on the marriage contract. RTC
however, denied the petition holding that the certification was inadequate to
establish alleged non-issuance of marriage license prior to celebration of marriage.
Unsatisfied with the decision, Castro appealed to respondent appellate court. She
insisted that the certification from the local civil registrar sufficiently established the
absence of a marriage license. CA reversed the decision of the trial court and
declared marriage between parties null and void and directed Civil Registrar of Pasig
to cancel subject marriage contract.
Hence, petition for review on certiorari by the Republic of Philippines insisting that
the uncorroborated testimony of Castro is insufficient to overthrow the legal
presumption regarding validity of marriage. Republic of PH also points that in
declaring marriage between parties as null and void, appellate Court disregarded
the presumption that solemnizing officer Judge Malvar regularly performed his
duties when he attested in the marriage contract that marriage license no. 3196182
was duly presented to him before solemnization of marriage.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the documentary and testimonial evidence presented by Castro is
sufficient to establish that no marriage license was issued by the Civil Registrar of
Pasig prior to celebration of marriage of Castro to Cardenas
HELD:
Yes, the documentary and testimonial evidence is sufficient.

It is important to note that at the time the subject marriage was solemnized on June
24, 1970, the law governing marital relations was the New Civil Code. The law
provides that no marriage shall be solemnized without a marriage license first
issued by a local civil registrar. Being one of the essential requisites to a valid
marriage, absence of marriage license renders marriage void ab initio.
The presentation of certification in court is anchored upon Section 29,
Rule 132 of the Rules of Court which states:
A written statement signed by an officer having custody of an official
record or by his deputy, that after diligent search, no record or entry
of a specified tenor is found to exist in the records of his office,
accompanied by a certificate as above provided, is admissible as
evidence that the records of his contain no such record or entry."
The abovementioned rule authorized custodian of documents to certify that despite
diligent search, a particular document does not exist in his office or that a particular
entry of a specified tenor was not to be found in a register. As custodians of public
documents, civil registrars are public officers charged with the duty of maintaining a
register book where they are required to enter all applications for marriage licenses,
including the names of applicants, the date of marriage license it was issued and
such other relevant data.
The certification of "due search and inability to find" issued by the civil
registrar of Pasig enjoys probative value, he being the officer charged
under the law to keep a record of all data relative to the issuance of a
marriage license. Unaccompanied by any circumstance of suspicion and
pursuant to Section 29, Rule 132 of the Rules of Court, a certificate of
"due search and inability to find" sufficiently proved that his office did not
issue marriage license no. 3196182 to the contracting parties.
Surely, the fact that only private respondent Castro testified during the trial cannot
be held against her. Her husband, Edwin F. Cardenas, was duly served with notice of
the proceedings and a copy of the petition. Despite receipt thereof, he chose to
ignore the same. For failure to answer, he was properly declared in default. Private
respondent cannot be faulted for her husband's lack of interest to participate in the
proceedings. There was absolutely no evidence on record to show that there was
collusion between Castro and her husband Cardenas.
It is noteworthy to mention that the finding of the appellate court that the marriage
between the contracting parties is null and void for lack of a marriage license does
not discount the fact that indeed, a spurious marriage license, purporting to be
issued by the civil registrar of Pasig, may have been presented by Cardenas to the
solemnizing officer.

Martinez v. Tan
No absence of essential or formal requisites; valid marriage
Petitioner: Rosalia Martinez
Respondent: Angel Tan

FACTS:
Rosalia and Angel were allegedly married before the Justice of Peace in
Ormoc, Leyte and evidenced through an expediente de matrimonio civil which was
written in Spanish consisting of a petition that indeed Rosalia and Angel, signing on
the document, directing the Justice of Peace that they have mutually agreed to
enter into a contract of marriage and asked the Justice of Peace to solemnize the
marriage. Following the document signed by the Justice of Peace and by Zacarias
Esmero and Pacita Ballori, the witnesses to the marriage, that they were actually
present in the office of the Justice on the day Rosalia and Angel civilly married.
Another document, which is the certificate of marriage, presents that it was signed
by the justice of peace and the witnesses attesting that Rosalia and Angel were
legally married in the presence of a solemnizing officer and with two witnesses.
However, Rosalia claims that what took place before the Justice of Peace despite
admitting that there were witnesses did not constitute a legal marriage. She
testified that she was never married to Angel. She admits that she signed the
document in question but says that she signed it in her own home, without reading
it, and at the request of Angel, who told her that it was a paper authorizing him to
ask the consent of her parents to marriage. She further avers that she was only
visiting the town of Palompon where his married brother was for about two weeks.
The wife of her brother testified as well that Rosalia never left the house except in
her company. She admitted however that she went to school every morning and
that on one occasion she went to church unaccompanied.
ISSUE: Whether or not Rosalia and Angel were married before Justice of the Peace in
the town of Palompon, Leyte
HELD:
Yes, they were legally married before the Justice of the Peace.
Under the circumstances, there was a sufficient compliance to General
Order 68 (No particular form for ceremony of marriage is required, but
the parties must declare, in the presence of person solemnizing the
marriage, that they take each other as husband and wife) showing
indeed that between Rosalia and Angel, there existed a valid marriage. The
evidences in support are:
First, the document itself, which Rosalia admits she signed. Second, evidence of
Angel, testifying that he and Rosalia appeared before Justice of the Peace at the
time named, together with witnesses Zacarias Esmero and Pacita Ballori, and that
they all signed the document. Third, evidence of Jose Santiago, the bailiff of the
court of justice of the peace testifying that Rosalia and Angel, as well as Zacarias
and Pacita , and the Justice of Peace were all present in the office of justice of Peace
at the time mentioned.
Such evidences were very well corroborated by Pacita Balloris testimony saying
that Rosalia requested her about 5oclock in the afternoon to accompany her to a
Chinese store names Veles, that they asked Rosalias mother permission to look at
dress patterns which Rosalias mother gave her consent, but instead of going to the
store they went directly to office of the Justice of Peace where ceremony took place.

Moreover, eight letters solidifies the belief that there indeed existed a valid
marriage between Rosalia and Angel. These letters are the correspondence between
Angel and Rosalia substantially providing that Rosalia was asking Angel to to ask for
her hand officially from her parents.