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ABSTRACT. The article deals with the problem of the disciplinary identification of the
philosophy of music education. It explores alternative approaches to the philosophy of
music education and its relation to musical pedagogy. On the basis of this analysis an
account of the philosophy of music education as a philosophical discipline is suggested
and its specific function identified.
KEY WORDS: analytical approach, disciplinary identification, musical pedagogy, philosophy of music education, second-order reflection, substantial approach
INTRODUCTION
The second half of the 20th century was marked in music education by a
tendency to supply philosophical foundations to this area of studies and
teaching. In their efforts to enhance the role of music in the schools and to
secure its place in the curriculum on the one hand, and to provide theoretical grounding for music teaching on the other hand, music educators
turned to a philosophical investigation of the nature and essence of music
education, its underlying premises, principles and concepts. This process
took different forms in various countries. In North America it resulted in
the emergence of a special sphere of study called philosophy of music
education which assumed the task of providing a philosophical aesthetic
basis for music education. There is much evidence that within the last
few years it has been institutionalized and recognized as a scholarly and
curriculum discipline. The following facts speak for this: Since 1990,
international symposia in the philosophy of music education have been
held on a regular basis, and in 1993 the Philosophy of Music Education
Review was launched while the Special Research Interest Group as a part
of Music Educators National Conference (MENC) was established. Many
colleges and universities are currently offering courses in philosophy of
music education.
Despite these achievements, the disciplinary status of philosophy of
music education remains vague and its position insecure. It lacks a clear
statement of its subject, purpose, agenda, boundaries and relationship
Studies in Philosophy and Education 21: 229252, 2002.
2002 Kluwer Academic Publishers. Printed in the Netherlands.
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limited to that which were accessible but I assume that they are sufficiently representative
to provide a basis for generalized conclusions.
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both of them are inadequate because of the manifold content of every given
philosophical position and disagreement between the philosophers themselves. F. McMurray, for example, realizing that philosophical theories are
far from being homogeneous, warned music educators against falling into
discussions of background disciplines, including philosophy, while still
advising them to concentrate upon building a unified perspective about
whys and hows of music education (McMurray, 1958, p. 36). Needless to
say, he voted for a pragmatic one. The pragmatisms version he presented
in his article purported to give a picture of the typically pragmatic ideas
as they were formulated mainly by Peirce. Drawing on the pragmatists
conceptions of learning as growth and of the function of knowledge as
a guidance for action, he formulated the universal aim of music education, which stressed the importance of passing on to new generations
the more refined portions of our musical culture. One of the tasks of
the music teacher he saw in removing popular prejudices and negative
biases against serious music (ibid., pp. 4243). These prescriptions were
corollaries of McMurrays conviction that only subtle portions of musical
culture, accessible through special training, need to be learned at school.
This part of McMurrays definition of the aims of music education stands in sharp contrast to the views of Richard Shusterman. In
his work Pragmatist Aesthetics: Living Beauty, Rethinking Art, Richard
Shusterman defended the legitimacy and aesthetic dignity of popular
culture (Shusterman, 1992). Taking off from Deweys thesis of continuity
between aesthetic experience and ordinary experience and his repudiation of the opposition of high versus popular art, Shusterman argues
that popular art has those formal qualities thought to distinguish high
art as aesthetic: unity and complexity, intertextuality and open-textured
polysemy, experimentation and foregrounded attention to medium, and he
gives rap music as example (ibid., p. 200). Although educational aspects
play only a peripheral role in Shustermans inquiry, it follows from his
discussion that popular art is worthy of teaching and must be included in
education, at least on an equal footing with high art because it requires
as well adequate training to appreciate it. The failure to appreciate artistic
values, philosophical depth and the socio-political appeal of this kind of
music is exactly due to the lack of proper training, since the traditional
system of aesthetic education was always concentrated upon preserving
and transmitting the classical heritage while totally neglecting popular art.
The other significant point is Shustermans emphasis upon the experiential, dynamical dimension of art as opposed to a static one embodied
in the concept of a work of art. This is again incompatible with
McMurrays requirement to confine the experience of music in the music
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between this kind of the aim and that proposed by Reimer himself when he
speaks of music education as a means of self-understanding and of enrichment of the quality of peoples lives through enriching their experiences of
feelings. The referentialist nature of these aims is already predisposed by
the very principle of analogy because setting forth the analogy with other
dimensions of being, whatever their nature, we inevitably step outside
the realm of the intra-musical or pure musical. A logical consummation
of Pythagoreans (and later Platos) conception was the further analogy
between the human and world souls that pointed to the ultimate end of all
educational efforts. The principle of analogy perfectly fitted the ancient
idea of art as the immanent part of the sounded cosmos and, at the same
time, tightly embedded in the life of the polis. But if the analogy is to be
used to reach an opposite goal, namely to discover the unique nature and
value of music itself, nothing is left to us but to produce weighty evidence
that the feeling(fulness) is exactly this unique and most representative
property of music. These proofs we do not have. All we learned about
the relation of sound to feeling is that we do not have a complete answer
to this question and we may never have it (Reimer, 1989, pp. 130131).
As it has been noted, Reimer criticized the formalists, on the other
hand, for having broken contact with the socio-cultural context in which
the aesthetic experience occurs and having focused on the formal musical
properties. This is exactly what one should have in mind while conceiving
of music education as primarily music education, that is, education for
the essentially aesthetic or musical qualities and values of music as an art
and declaring the development, to the fullest extent possible, of every
students aesthetic sensitivity to the art of music to be its major goal as
Reimer does (ibid., pp. 122, 153).
Obviously Reimer believes that the above definition overcomes the
sterility and narrowness of the formalist approach in that it resolves
the continuity between aesthetics and the entire realm of human experience while retaining formalisms positive contribution its claim for the
intrinsicality of arts nature and value. However, it is my contention that
Reimers definition falls short of doing this. The examination of the relations between his formalist and referentialist definitions can help to
support my suggestion.
One might anticipate an objection on Reimers part that it is incorrect
to contrast the definitions in question the way I do, i.e. to treat them
as commensurable. The arguments I can think of would be that I am
confusing a philosophical explanation of aims in music education with a
curriculum definition which have different functions per definitionem.
I would agree that the educational aims could and should be formulated
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Reimer deals with this level (alongside the third one) in the second part
of his book designed to present his philosophy in action. In light of the
philosophy offered in this book, Reimer writes, the overall goal or aim of
the general music curriculum is to develop, to the fullest extent possible,
every students capacity to experience and create intrinsically expressive
qualities of sounds. Another term for this capacity, which every student
has to some degree, is aesthetic sensitivity. Another term for intrinsically
expressive qualities of sound is music. So the goal or aim of general music
can also be stated as the development, to the fullest extent possible, of
every students aesthetic sensitivity to the art of music (ibid., 153).
Reimer argues, reasonably enough, that as a philosophy requires a
curriculum to give it flesh and bones, the goal suggested by the philosophy
requires explicit objectives to give it specificity (ibid., 167). Thus, he
introduces the term objective as a name for the third level of specificity
which provides an operational description how the curriculum goal
is to be achieved. These learning objectives include seven basic modes
of interaction with music: perceiving, creating, conceptualising, reacting,
analysing, valuing, evaluating.
To recapitulate, Reimer identifies three levels of specificity of aims in
music education: philosophical (function) and two empirical one more
general (curriculum goal) and the other operational (specific objectives). They are thought to stand to each other as the terminal goal (first
level) to enabling (second and third levels) goals which, taken together,
form a hierarchical structure: the education of feeling can be achieved
through the development of aesthetic sensitivity and the latter presupposes
the development of a number of behaviors, or operational skills. There
is no doubt that the major function of music education (level one) is
supposed by the author to guide the curriculum goal (level two) which
in its turn guides the specific objections (level three).
I admit that the relationship between the curriculum goal and
specific objections is plausible enough and raises no questions. But I am
going to take issue with the logical links between the philosophical and
empirical levels of specificity. To begin with, Reimer offers no explanation for using the term function in his philosophical definition of music
educational aims. Most probably he was simply looking for a synonym for
goal to avoid repetition and it does not mean anything else than aim or
goal. Whatever the case, the term is telling in that it betrays the real status
of this definition: it underlines its instrumental character while pointing to
the special purpose of music education. Let me explain. In Reimers own
view, philosophy of music education has the responsibility of elucidating
the values of music for human life and establishing that these values are
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first, unique and, second, that they are fundamental to any notion of the
good life (ibid., 89). If he had followed this very sound recommendation, he would have focused upon the investigating of musics impact on
peoples emotional development and provided strong arguments in support
of his claim that music can have positive effect on human subjectivity. But
he went beyond this task and gave a remarkably normative-prescriptive
definition at the level of the philosophy instead of showing the direction
in which one ought to be aiming. As a result, Reimers philosophical
definition fell short of accomplishing its proper function.
But Reimer faces a more serious problem which is less easily to
overcome. As it should be clear from the foregoing, he emphasized the
intimate connection between philosophical and curriculum goals of music
education. Unfortunately, he has not satisfactorily demonstrated that the
premises in which this connection is grounding, are correct. Reimers argument in outline is as follows: music education is education of feeling and
it can be achieved through the development of the aesthetic sensitivity to
the intrinsic qualities of musical sounds because these qualities present the
logical form of feeling. The connection between the philosophical and
empirical goals of music education is thus based on the assumption that
intrinsic qualities of a musical work incorporate, or embody the qualities
of human experience, so that when one shares the expressive qualities
contained in a works artistic content, one is also sharing in the qualities
of which all human experience is made (ibid., 51). Reimer devotes most
of his book to supporting this statement but he does not shed light on the
question of how aesthetic qualities can incorporate referential meanings
while retaining their intrinsicality. His remark that references are always
transformed and transcended by the internal artistic form (ibid., 27), is
not illuminating, since the author does not explain the mechanism of such
a transformation. But granted it is correct that the extra-aesthetic meanings
dissolve in the purely aesthetic qualities, how is it then possible that they
can really affect a human organism?
The lack of logical links between the philosophical and curriculum
goals of music education made the latter independent of all philosophical
underpinnings and turned it alongside the curriculum in general into a
formalistic par excellence.2 His position turned out to be in effect not a
kind of symbiosis or third quality but could be proper called enhanced
2 Cf. Michael Mark (1982, pp. 1819): Where earlier writers had sought to link the
two philosophies (educational philosophy and philosophy of music E. P.) in order to
indicate how aesthetic development led to societal fulfillment, the philosophy of aesthetic
education (of B. Reimer, Ch. Leonhard, A. Britton E. P.) concentrated only on aesthetics,
breaking the link with societal needs.
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the two strategies are not mutually exclusive, but rather complementary.
The evidence is plain enough. The substantive theories are certainly not
devoid of analysis. If we look at Reimer, we will find him doing justice
to the analytic skills of a music teacher and recognizing the prevalent
confusion about and the need for clarifying concepts like, for example,
expression, creativity, aesthetic/artistic value. Another example
demonstrating the appreciation of the inquirial explorative component of
music education philosophy on the part of the substantivists could be
Broudys differentiation between philosophy of music education as a
reasoned justification of a set of beliefs (which he undoubtedly favours)
and a mere assertion of these beliefs.3
Bowman himself seems to be aware of the limitations of the analytic
approach in its strictly positivistic form. The most unfortunate limitations
of the analytical approach as a source of music education philosophy
stem from its (1) excessive emphasis on linguistic and logical techniques
that may cause hypercriticism and a loss of general perspective, and
(b) its being free (though not totally) of evaluative and normative judgments, positive doctrine, sociocultural, historical, etc. considerations. In
this respect a remarkable feature of Bowmans position is that he leaves
the door open for some portions of normative or evaluative judgments and
stresses the need to explore music in a broader, more inclusive context
(Bowman, 1992, pp. 1011). He also demonstrates tolerance towards a
potentially startling array of philosophies of music education which
might emerge from the multidimensional inquiry of the phenomena of
music education and music educational practice (ibid., 9). This however
does not turn Bowmans analytical approach into its opposite, since
he makes it most clear that philosophy of music education must be a
permanent quest for clarity and consistency in thought and action.
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In Russia, on the other hand, one has reasons to anticipate inimical reception of the idea of philosophy of music education, taking into
account the commonly held view of philosophy of education, namely
that American scholars were forced to establish a philosophy of (music)
education because they do not have a special science of education, (music)
pedagogy (pedagogika) as we do in Russia. The most simple answer
to such a claim would be to remind one that in the USA there also is
a discipline education/music education which fulfills the function of
pedagogy/music pedagogy in other countries. But this does not resolve the
major problem of the relations between philosophy of music education and
music pedagogy. A clarification of the distinct nature and specific tasks of
both disciplines is inescapable if we wish to reveal and state convincingly
the raison dtre of the philosophy of music education.
DEMARCATING PHILOSOPHY OF MUSIC EDUCATION
FROM MUSICAL PEDAGOGY
My point here is that to conceive of the philosophy of music education as
another name for music pedagogy or as part of the latter is to misrepresent it. Let us consider how philosophy of music education and musical
pedagogy can be demarcated from one another in terms of subject matter
and questions they are concerned with. Musical pedagogy in its widest
sense is understood as all reflection, of whatever kind and at all levels,
about music education. It deals immediately and exclusively with the
process of music education in its ideal and real dimensions and directs
its critical and reflective attention to the music educational phenomena
and facts. Even in its most abstract form (wissenschaftliche Musikpdagogik) musical pedagogy remains a practical science which arises out of
the practice and refers back to it. As a normative-prescriptive discipline it
aims at the improvement and reforming of this practice.
Quite contrarily, philosophy of music education is philosophical in
its nature. So is the knowledge it produces philosophical knowledge
about music education. Its primary function consists in the investigation
and conceptualization of the foundational principles and tendencies of
music education. Philosophy of music education does not seek solutions
for concrete educational situations and problems but provides insights
into the nature and manifold constellations of music, man and society
in culture and in the universe from a perspective of music education a
job neither of the related disciplines performs. In brief, it concerns itself
with an analysis of the fundamental nature of music education. In order
to avoid misunderstandings it seems necessary to point out that this is not
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and concerns. In other words, this means that the most significant identity
condition of philosophy of music education is its unique function whereas
in terms of the other traditional parameters it can not be clearly demarcated
from related disciplines.
On the basis of what has been said above (at least) two options for
the future development of the philosophy of music education could be
anticipated: it can keep existing as a free interdisciplinary discourse or
it may evolve into a more strictly organized philosophical discipline.
SUMMARY
In this paper I have undertaken to clarify two aspects of the philosophy
of music educations nature and value. First, I have designated the main
tendencies in approaching this phenomenon, demonstrating their weaknesses and strengths (part 1). Secondly, I have given my arguments against
the conception of philosophy of music education as a part of or another
name for music pedagogy which puts in question its very necessity (part 2).
As a result I offer a definition of philosophy of music education as a field
of knowledge or, more strictly a philosophical discipline, which performs
the job of clarifying basic concepts and categories and of thinking together
and relating the fundamental premises and principles of music education,
i.e., its modus of existence is characterized by permanent interconnection
of analysis and theory-building. I hope to have shown that philosophy of
music education has a specific mission which can be carried out neither by
philosophy nor by musical pedagogy, since the former has no educational
focus and the latter doesnt possess an adequate apparatus to solve the
specific tasks of exploring the foundational premises of music education
its constituents and the phenomenon itself considered as a part of the
world.
ACKNOWLEDGMENT
In preparing this article the author was supported by the scholarship of the
Alexander von Humboldt Foundation.
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