Cases For 1st Year

Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
A.M. No. 88-7-1861-RTC October 5, 1988
IN RE: DESIGNATION OF JUDGE RODOLFO U. MANZANO AS MEMBER OF THE
ILOCOS NORTE PROVINCIAL COMMITTEE ON JUSTICE.
PADILLA, J.:
On 4 July 1988, Judge Rodolfo U. Manzano, Executive Judge, RTC, Bangui, Ilocos Norte,
Branch 19, sent this Court a letter which reads:
Hon. Marcelo Fernan
Chief Justice of the Supreme Court
of the Philippines
Manila
Thru channels: Hon. Leo Medialdea
Court Administrator
Supreme Court of the Philippines
Sir:
By Executive Order RF6-04 issued on June 21, 1988 by the Honorable Provincial
Governor of Ilocos Norte, Hon. Rodolfo C. Farinas, I was designated as a member
of the Ilocos Norte Provincial Committee on Justice created pursuant to
Presidential Executive Order No. 856 of 12 December 1986, as amended by
Executive Order No. 326 of June 1, 1988. In consonance with Executive Order
RF6-04, the Honorable Provincial Governor of Ilocos Norte issued my
appointment as a member of the Committee. For your ready reference, I am
enclosing herewith machine copies of Executive Order RF6-04 and the
appointment.
Before I may accept the appointment and enter in the discharge of the powers and
duties of the position as member of the Ilocos (Norte) Provincial Committee on
Justice, may I have the honor to request for the issuance by the Honorable
Supreme Court of a Resolution, as follows:
(1) Authorizing me to accept the appointment and to as assume and
discharge the powers and duties attached to the said position;
(2) Considering my membership in the Committee as neither
violative of the Independence of the Judiciary nor a violation of
Section 12, Article VIII, or of the second paragraph of Section .7,
Article IX (B), both of the Constitution, and will not in any way
1 | Pa g e a t u e l , r a n d y v.
amount to an abandonment of my present position as Executive

Judge of Branch XIX, Regional Trial Court, First Judicial Region,
and as a member of the Judiciary; and
(3) Consider my membership in the said Committee as part of the
primary functions of an Executive Judge.
May I please be favored soon by your action on this request.
Very respectfully yours,
(Sgd) RODOLFO U. MANZANO
Judge
An examination of Executive Order No. 856, as amended, reveals that Provincial/City
Committees on Justice are created to insure the speedy disposition of cases of detainees,
particularly those involving the poor and indigent ones, thus alleviating jail congestion and
improving local jail conditions. Among the functions of the Committee are
3.3 Receive complaints against any apprehending officer, jail warden, final or
judge who may be found to have committed abuses in the discharge of his duties
and refer the same to proper authority for appropriate action;
3.5 Recommend revision of any law or regulation which is believed prejudicial to
the proper administration of criminal justice.
It is evident that such Provincial/City Committees on Justice perform administrative functions.
Administrative functions are those which involve the regulation and control over the conduct and
affairs of individuals for; their own welfare and the promulgation of rules and regulations to
better carry out the policy of the legislature or such as are devolved upon the administrative
agency by the organic law of its existence (Nasipit Integrated Arrastre and Stevedoring Services
Inc., vs. Tapucar, SP-07599-R, 29 September 1978, Blacks Law Dictionary).
Furthermore, under Executive Order No. 326 amending Executive Order No. 856, it is provided
that
Section 6. Supervision.The Provincial/City Committees on Justice shall be
under the supervision of the Secretary of justice Quarterly accomplishment
reports shall be submitted to the Office of the Secretary of Justice.
Under the Constitution, the members of the Supreme Court and other courts established by law
shag not be designated to any agency performing quasi- judicial or administrative functions
(Section 12, Art. VIII, Constitution).
Considering that membership of Judge Manzano in the Ilocos Norte Provincial Committee on
Justice, which discharges a administrative functions, will be in violation of the Constitution, the
Court is constrained to deny his request.
Former Chief Justice Enrique M. Fernando in his concurring opinion in the case of Garcia vs.
Macaraig (39 SCRA 106) ably sets forth:
2. While the doctrine of separation of powers is a relative theory not to be

enforced with pedantic rigor, the practical demands of government precluding its
doctrinaire application, it cannot justify a member of the judiciary being required
to assume a position or perform a duty non-judicial in character. That is implicit in
the principle. Otherwise there is a plain departure from its command. The essence
of the trust reposed in him is to decide. Only a higher court, as was emphasized by
Justice Barredo, can pass on his actuation. He is not a subordinate of an executive
or legislative official, however eminent. It is indispensable that there be no
exception to the rigidity of such a norm if he is, as expected, to be confined to the
task of adjudication. Fidelity to his sworn responsibility no less than the
maintenance of respect for the judiciary can be satisfied with nothing less.
This declaration does not mean that RTC Judges should adopt an attitude of monastic
insensibility or unbecoming indifference to Province/City Committee on Justice. As incumbent
RTC Judges, they form part of the structure of government. Their integrity and performance in
the adjudication of cases contribute to the solidity of such structure. As public officials, they are
trustees of an orderly society. Even as non-members of Provincial/City Committees on Justice,
RTC judges should render assistance to said Committees to help promote the laudable purposes
for which they exist, but only when such assistance may be reasonably incidental to the
fulfillment of their judicial duties.
ACCORDINGLY, the aforesaid request of Judge Rodolfo U. Manzano is DENIED.
SO ORDERED.
Cruz, Paras, Feliciano, Gancayco, Bidin, Sarmiento, Cortes, Medialdea and Regalado, JJ.,
concur.
Separate Opinions
GUTIERREZ, JR., J., dissenting:
The Constitution prohibits the designation of members of the judiciary to any agency performing
quasi-judicial or administrative functions (Section 12, Article VIII, Constitution.).
Insofar as the term "quasi-judicial" is concerned, it has a fairly clear meaning and Judges can
confidently refrain from participating in the work of any administrative agency which
adjudicates disputes and controversies involving the rights of parties within its jurisdiction. The
issue involved in this case is where to draw the line insofar as administrative functions are
concerned.
"Administrative functions" as used in Section 12 refers to the executive machinery of
government and the performance by that machinery of governmental acts. It refers to the
management actions, determinations, and orders of executive officials as they administer the
laws and try to make government effective. There is an element of positive action, of supervision
or control.
Applying the definition given in the opinion of the majority which reads:
Administrative functions are those which involve the regulation and control over
the conduct and affairs of individuals for their own welfare and the promulgation
of rules and regulations to better carry out the policy of the legislature or such as
are devolved upon the administrative agency by the organic law of its existence
(Nasipit Integrated Arrastre and Stevedoring Services Inc. v. Tapucar, S.P-07599R, 29 September 1978, Black's Law Dictionary. )
we can readily see that membership in the Provincial or City Committee on Justice would not
involve any regulation or control over the conduct and affairs of individuals. Neither will the
Committee on Justice promulgate rules and regulations nor exercise any quasi-legislative
functions. Its work is purely advisory. I do not see anything wrong in a member of the judiciary
joining any study group which concentrates on the administration of justice as long as the group
merely deliberates on problems involving the speedy disposition of cases particularly those
involving the poor and needy litigants or detainees, pools the expertise and experiences of the
members, and limits itself to recommendations which may be adopted or rejected by those who
have the power to legislate or administer the particular function involved in their
implementation.
We who are Judges cannot operate in a vacuum or in a tight little world of our own. The
administration of justice cannot be pigeonholed into neat compartments with Judges, Fiscals,
Police, Wardens, and various other officials concerned erecting water-tight barriers against one
another and limiting our interaction to timidly peeping over these unnecessary and impractical
barriers into one another's work, all the while blaming the Constitution for such a quixotic and
unreal interpretation. As intimated in the majority opinion, we should not be monastically
insensible or indifferent to projects or movements cogitating on possible solutions to our
common problems of justice and afterwards forwarding their findings to the people, public or
private, where these findings would do the most good.
The majority opinion suggests the giving of assistance by Judges to the work of the Committees
on Justice. Assistance is a vague term. Can Judges be designated as observers? Advisers?
Consultants? Is it the act of being "designated" which is proscribed by the Constitution or is it
participation in the prohibited functions? If judges cannot become members, why should they be
allowed or even encouraged to assist these Committees The line drawn by the majority is vague
and unrealistic.
The constitutional provision is intended to shield Judges from participating in activities which
may compromise their independence or hamper their work. Studying problems involving the
administration of justice and arriving at purely recommendatory solutions do not in any way
involve the encroachment of. the judiciary into executive or legislative functions or into matters
which are none of its concerns. Much less is it an encroachment of the other departments into
judicial affairs.
As the visible representation of the law and of justice in his community, the Judge should not shy
away from public activities which do not interfere with the prompt and proper performance of
his office, but which, in fact, enhance his effectiveness as a Judge. He cannot stop mingling in
civic intercourse or shut himself into solitary seclusion. The Committees on Justice will also be
immensely benefited by the presence of Judges in the study groups. The work of the Committees
is quite important. Let it not be said that the Judges the officials most concerned with justice
have hesitated to join in such a worthy undertaking because of a strained interpretation of their
functions.
It is well for this Court to be generally cautious, conservative or restrictive when it interprets
provisions of the Constitution or statutes vesting us with powers or delimit the exercise of our
jurisdiction and functions. However, we should not overdo it. The basic principles of
constitutional interpretation apply as well to the provisions which define or circumscribe our
powers and functions as they do to the provisions governing the other dependents of government.
The Court should not adopt a strained construction which impairs its own efficiency to meet the
responsibilities brought about by the changing times and conditions of society. The familiar
quotation is apt in this caseconstitutional provisions are interpreted by the spirit which vivifies
and not by the letter which killeth.
I, therefore, dissent from the majority opinion and vote to allow Judge Rodolfo U.
Fernan C.J., Narvasa and Grio-Aquino, JJ., join in Gutierrez dissent.
MELENCIO-HERRERA, J., dissenting:
I hesitate to give such a restrictive and impractical interpretation to Section 12, Article VIII of the
1987 Constitution, and thus join the dissent of Justice Gutierrez, Jr.
What I believe is contemplated by the Constitutional prohibition is designation, for example, to
such quasi-judicial bodies as the SEC, or administrative agencies like the BIR. Those are fulltime positions involving running the affairs of government, which will interfere with the
discharge of judicial functions or totally remove a Judge/Justice from the performance of his
regular functions.
The Committee on Justice cannot be likened to such an administrative agency of government. It
is a study group with recommendatory functions. In fact, membership by members of the Bench
in said committee is called for by reason of the primary functions of their position.
The matter of supervision by the Secretary of Justice provided for under E.O. No. 326 amending
E.O. No. 856, need not be a cause for concern. That supervision is confined to Committee work
and will by no means extend to the performance of judicial functions per se.
Manzano to become a member of the Ilocos Norte Provincial Committee on Justice.
Separate Opinions
GUTIERREZ, JR., J., dissenting:
The Constitution prohibits the designation of members of the judiciary to any agency performing
quasi-judicial or administrative functions (Section 12, Article VIII, Constitution.).
Insofar as the term "quasi-judicial" is concerned, it has a fairly clear meaning and Judges can
confidently refrain from participating in the work of any administrative agency which
adjudicates disputes and controversies involving the rights of parties within its jurisdiction. The
issue involved in this case is where to draw the line insofar as administrative functions are
concerned.
"Administrative functions" as used in Section 12 refers to the executive machinery of
government and the performance by that machinery of governmental acts. It refers to the
management actions, determinations, and orders of executive officials as they administer the
laws and try to make government effective. There is an element of positive action, of supervision
or control.
Applying the definition given in the opinion of the majority which reads:
Administrative functions are those which involve the regulation and control over
the conduct and affairs of individuals for their own welfare and the promulgation
of rules and regulations to better carry out the policy of the legislature or such as
are devolved upon the administrative agency by the organic law of its existence
(Nasipit Integrated Arrastre and Stevedoring Services Inc. v. Tapucar, S.P-07599R, 29 September 1978, Black's Law Dictionary. )
we can readily see that membership in the Provincial or City Committee on Justice would not
involve any regulation or control over the conduct and affairs of individuals. Neither will the
Committee on Justice promulgate rules and regulations nor exercise any quasi-legislative
functions. Its work is purely advisory. I do not see anything wrong in a member of the judiciary
joining any study group which concentrates on the administration of justice as long as the group
merely deliberates on problems involving the speedy disposition of cases particularly those
involving the poor and needy litigants or detainees, pools the expertise and experiences of the
members, and limits itself to recommendations which may be adopted or rejected by those who
have the power to legislate or administer the particular function involved in their
implementation.
We who are Judges cannot operate in a vacuum or in a tight little world of our own. The
administration of justice cannot be pigeonholed into neat compartments with Judges, Fiscals,
Police, Wardens, and various other officials concerned erecting water-tight barriers against one
another and limiting our interaction to timidly peeping over these unnecessary and impractical
barriers into one another's work, all the while blaming the Constitution for such a quixotic and
unreal interpretation. As intimated in the majority opinion, we should not be monastically
insensible or indifferent to projects or movements cogitating on possible solutions to our
common problems of justice and afterwards forwarding their findings to the people, public or
private, where these findings would do the most good.
The majority opinion suggests the giving of assistance by Judges to the work of the Committees
on Justice. Assistance is a vague term. Can Judges be designated as observers? Advisers?
Consultants? Is it the act of being "designated" which is proscribed by the Constitution or is it
participation in the prohibited functions? If judges cannot become members, why should they be
allowed or even encouraged to assist these Committees The line drawn by the majority is vague
and unrealistic.
The constitutional provision is intended to shield Judges from participating in activities which
may compromise their independence or hamper their work. Studying problems involving the
administration of justice and arriving at purely recommendatory solutions do not in any way
involve the encroachment of. the judiciary into executive or legislative functions or into matters
which are none of its concerns. Much less is it an encroachment of the other departments into
judicial affairs.
As the visible representation of the law and of justice in his community, the Judge should not shy
away from public activities which do not interfere with the prompt and proper performance of
his office, but which, in fact, enhance his effectiveness as a Judge. He cannot stop mingling in
civic intercourse or shut himself into solitary seclusion. The Committees on Justice will also be
immensely benefited by the presence of Judges in the study groups. The work of the Committees
is quite important. Let it not be said that the Judges the officials most concerned with justice
have hesitated to join in such a worthy undertaking because of a strained interpretation of their
functions.
It is well for this Court to be generally cautious, conservative or restrictive when it interprets
provisions of the Constitution or statutes vesting us with powers or delimit the exercise of our
jurisdiction and functions. However, we should not overdo it. The basic principles of
constitutional interpretation apply as well to the provisions which define or circumscribe our
powers and functions as they do to the provisions governing the other dependents of government.
The Court should not adopt a strained construction which impairs its own efficiency to meet the
responsibilities brought about by the changing times and conditions of society. The familiar
quotation is apt in this caseconstitutional provisions are interpreted by the spirit which vivifies
and not by the letter which killeth.
I, therefore, dissent from the majority opinion and vote to allow Judge Rodolfo U. Manzano to
become a member of the Ilocos Norte Provincial Committee on Justice.
Fernan C.J., Narvasa and Grio-Aquino, JJ., join in Gutierrez dissent.
I hesitate to give such a restrictive and impractical interpretation to Section 12, Article VIII of the
1987 Constitution, and thus join the dissent of Justice Gutierrez, Jr.
What I believe is contemplated by the Constitutional prohibition is designation, for example, to
such quasi-judicial bodies as the SEC, or administrative agencies like the BIR. Those are fulltime positions involving running the affairs of government, which will interfere with the
discharge of judicial functions or totally remove a Judge/Justice from the performance of his
regular functions.
The Committee on Justice cannot be likened to such an administrative agency of government. It
is a study group with recommendatory functions. In fact, membership by members of the Bench
in said committee is called for by reason of the primary functions of their position.
The matter of supervision by the Secretary of Justice provided for under E.O. No. 326 amending
E.O. No. 856, need not be a cause for concern. That supervision is confined to Committee work
and will by no means extend to the performance of judicial functions per se.
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-45081
July 15, 1936
JOSE A. ANGARA, petitioner,

vs.
THE ELECTORAL COMMISSION, PEDRO YNSUA, MIGUEL CASTILLO, and
DIONISIO C. MAYOR,respondents.
Godofredo Reyes for petitioner.

Office of the Solicitor General Hilado for respondent Electoral Commission.
Pedro Ynsua in his own behalf.
No appearance for other respondents.
LAUREL, J.:
This is an original action instituted in this court by the petitioner, Jose A. Angara, for the
issuance of a writ of prohibition to restrain and prohibit the Electoral Commission, one of the
respondents, from taking further cognizance of the protest filed by Pedro Ynsua, another
respondent, against the election of said petitioner as member of the National Assembly for the
first assembly district of the Province of Tayabas.
The facts of this case as they appear in the petition and as admitted by the respondents are as
follows:
(1) That in the elections of September 17, 1935, the petitioner, Jose A. Angara, and the
respondents, Pedro Ynsua, Miguel Castillo and Dionisio Mayor, were candidates voted
for the position of member of the National Assembly for the first district of the Province
of Tayabas;
(2) That on October 7, 1935, the provincial board of canvassers, proclaimed the petitioner
as member-elect of the National Assembly for the said district, for having received the
most number of votes;
(3) That on November 15, 1935, the petitioner took his oath of office;
(4) That on December 3, 1935, the National Assembly in session assembled, passed the
following resolution:
[No. 8]
RESOLUCION CONFIRMANDO LAS ACTAS DE AQUELLOS
DIPUTADOS CONTRA QUIENES NO SE HA PRESENTADO
PROTESTA.
Se resuelve: Que las actas de eleccion de los Diputados contra quienes no
se hubiere presentado debidamente una protesta antes de la adopcion de la
presente resolucion sean, como por la presente, son aprobadas y
confirmadas.
Adoptada, 3 de diciembre, 1935.
(5) That on December 8, 1935, the herein respondent Pedro Ynsua filed before the
Electoral Commission a "Motion of Protest" against the election of the herein petitioner,
Jose A. Angara, being the only protest filed after the passage of Resolutions No. 8
aforequoted, and praying, among other-things, that said respondent be declared elected
member of the National Assembly for the first district of Tayabas, or that the election of
said position be nullified;
(6) That on December 9, 1935, the Electoral Commission adopted a resolution, paragraph
6 of which provides:
6. La Comision no considerara ninguna protesta que no se haya presentado en o
antes de este dia.
(7) That on December 20, 1935, the herein petitioner, Jose A. Angara, one of the
respondents in the aforesaid protest, filed before the Electoral Commission a "Motion to
Dismiss the Protest", alleging (a) that Resolution No. 8 of Dismiss the Protest", alleging
(a) that Resolution No. 8 of the National Assembly was adopted in the legitimate exercise
of its constitutional prerogative to prescribe the period during which protests against the
election of its members should be presented; (b) that the aforesaid resolution has for its
object, and is the accepted formula for, the limitation of said period; and (c) that the
protest in question was filed out of the prescribed period;
(8) That on December 27, 1935, the herein respondent, Pedro Ynsua, filed an "Answer to
the Motion of Dismissal" alleging that there is no legal or constitutional provision barring
the presentation of a protest against the election of a member of the National Assembly
after confirmation;
(9) That on December 31, 1935, the herein petitioner, Jose A. Angara, filed a "Reply" to
the aforesaid "Answer to the Motion of Dismissal";
(10) That the case being submitted for decision, the Electoral Commission promulgated a
resolution on January 23, 1936, denying herein petitioner's "Motion to Dismiss the
Protest."
The application of the petitioner sets forth the following grounds for the issuance of the writ
prayed for:
(a) That the Constitution confers exclusive jurisdiction upon the electoral Commission
solely as regards the merits of contested elections to the National Assembly;
(b) That the Constitution excludes from said jurisdiction the power to regulate the
proceedings of said election contests, which power has been reserved to the Legislative
Department of the Government or the National Assembly;
(c) That like the Supreme Court and other courts created in pursuance of the Constitution,
whose exclusive jurisdiction relates solely to deciding the merits of controversies
submitted to them for decision and to matters involving their internal organization, the
Electoral Commission can regulate its proceedings only if the National Assembly has not
availed of its primary power to so regulate such proceedings;
(d) That Resolution No. 8 of the National Assembly is, therefore, valid and should be
respected and obeyed;
(e) That under paragraph 13 of section 1 of the ordinance appended to the Constitution
and paragraph 6 of article 7 of the Tydings-McDuffie Law (No. 127 of the 73rd Congress
of the United States) as well as under section 1 and 3 (should be sections 1 and 2) of
article VIII of the Constitution, this Supreme Court has jurisdiction to pass upon the
fundamental question herein raised because it involves an interpretation of the
Constitution of the Philippines.
On February 25, 1936, the Solicitor-General appeared and filed an answer in behalf of the
respondent Electoral Commission interposing the following special defenses:
(a) That the Electoral Commission has been created by the Constitution as an
instrumentality of the Legislative Department invested with the jurisdiction to decide "all
contests relating to the election, returns, and qualifications of the members of the
National Assembly"; that in adopting its resolution of December 9, 1935, fixing this date
as the last day for the presentation of protests against the election of any member of the
National Assembly, it acted within its jurisdiction and in the legitimate exercise of the
implied powers granted it by the Constitution to adopt the rules and regulations essential
to carry out the power and functions conferred upon the same by the fundamental law;
that in adopting its resolution of January 23, 1936, overruling the motion of the petitioner
to dismiss the election protest in question, and declaring itself with jurisdiction to take
cognizance of said protest, it acted in the legitimate exercise of its quasi-judicial
functions a an instrumentality of the Legislative Department of the Commonwealth
Government, and hence said act is beyond the judicial cognizance or control of the
Supreme Court;
(b) That the resolution of the National Assembly of December 3, 1935, confirming the
election of the members of the National Assembly against whom no protest had thus far
been filed, could not and did not deprive the electoral Commission of its jurisdiction to
take cognizance of election protests filed within the time that might be set by its own
rules:
(c) That the Electoral Commission is a body invested with quasi-judicial functions,
created by the Constitution as an instrumentality of the Legislative Department, and is not
an "inferior tribunal, or corporation, or board, or person" within the purview of section
226 and 516 of the Code of Civil Procedure, against which prohibition would lie.
The respondent Pedro Ynsua, in his turn, appeared and filed an answer in his own behalf on
March 2, 1936, setting forth the following as his special defense:
(a) That at the time of the approval of the rules of the Electoral Commission on
December 9, 1935, there was no existing law fixing the period within which protests
against the election of members of the National Assembly should be filed; that in fixing
December 9, 1935, as the last day for the filing of protests against the election of
members of the National Assembly, the Electoral Commission was exercising a power
impliedly conferred upon it by the Constitution, by reason of its quasi-judicial attributes;
(b) That said respondent presented his motion of protest before the Electoral Commission
on December 9, 1935, the last day fixed by paragraph 6 of the rules of the said Electoral
Commission;
(c) That therefore the Electoral Commission acquired jurisdiction over the protest filed by
said respondent and over the parties thereto, and the resolution of the Electoral
Commission of January 23, 1936, denying petitioner's motion to dismiss said protest was
an act within the jurisdiction of the said commission, and is not reviewable by means of a
writ of prohibition;
(d) That neither the law nor the Constitution requires confirmation by the National
Assembly of the election of its members, and that such confirmation does not operate to
limit the period within which protests should be filed as to deprive the Electoral
Commission of jurisdiction over protest filed subsequent thereto;
(e) That the Electoral Commission is an independent entity created by the Constitution,
endowed with quasi-judicial functions, whose decision are final and unappealable;
( f ) That the electoral Commission, as a constitutional creation, is not an inferior tribunal,
corporation, board or person, within the terms of sections 226 and 516 of the Code of
Civil Procedure; and that neither under the provisions of sections 1 and 2 of article II
(should be article VIII) of the Constitution and paragraph 13 of section 1 of the
Ordinance appended thereto could it be subject in the exercise of its quasi-judicial
functions to a writ of prohibition from the Supreme Court;
(g) That paragraph 6 of article 7 of the Tydings-McDuffie Law (No. 127 of the 73rd
Congress of the united States) has no application to the case at bar.
10 | P a g e a t u e l , r a n d y v .
The case was argued before us on March 13, 1936. Before it was submitted for decision, the
petitioner prayed for the issuance of a preliminary writ of injunction against the respondent
Electoral Commission which petition was denied "without passing upon the merits of the case"
by resolution of this court of March 21, 1936.
There was no appearance for the other respondents.
The issues to be decided in the case at bar may be reduced to the following two principal
propositions:
1. Has the Supreme Court jurisdiction over the Electoral Commission and the subject
matter of the controversy upon the foregoing related facts, and in the affirmative,
2. Has the said Electoral Commission acted without or in excess of its jurisdiction in
assuming to the cognizance of the protest filed the election of the herein petitioner
notwithstanding the previous confirmation of such election by resolution of the National
Assembly?
We could perhaps dispose of this case by passing directly upon the merits of the controversy.
However, the question of jurisdiction having been presented, we do not feel justified in evading
the issue. Being a case prim impressionis, it would hardly be consistent with our sense of duty
to overlook the broader aspect of the question and leave it undecided. Neither would we be doing
justice to the industry and vehemence of counsel were we not to pass upon the question of
jurisdiction squarely presented to our consideration.
The separation of powers is a fundamental principle in our system of government. It obtains not
through express provision but by actual division in our Constitution. Each department of the
government has exclusive cognizance of matters within its jurisdiction, and is supreme within its
own sphere. But it does not follow from the fact that the three powers are to be kept separate and
distinct that the Constitution intended them to be absolutely unrestrained and independent of
each other. The Constitution has provided for an elaborate system of checks and balances to
secure coordination in the workings of the various departments of the government. For example,
the Chief Executive under our Constitution is so far made a check on the legislative power that
this assent is required in the enactment of laws. This, however, is subject to the further check that
a bill may become a law notwithstanding the refusal of the President to approve it, by a vote of
two-thirds or three-fourths, as the case may be, of the National Assembly. The President has also
the right to convene the Assembly in special session whenever he chooses. On the other hand, the
National Assembly operates as a check on the Executive in the sense that its consent through its
Commission on Appointments is necessary in the appointments of certain officers; and the
concurrence of a majority of all its members is essential to the conclusion of treaties.
Furthermore, in its power to determine what courts other than the Supreme Court shall be
established, to define their jurisdiction and to appropriate funds for their support, the National
Assembly controls the judicial department to a certain extent. The Assembly also exercises the
judicial power of trying impeachments. And the judiciary in turn, with the Supreme Court as the
final arbiter, effectively checks the other departments in the exercise of its power to determine
the law, and hence to declare executive and legislative acts void if violative of the Constitution.
But in the main, the Constitution has blocked out with deft strokes and in bold lines, allotment of
power to the executive, the legislative and the judicial departments of the government. The
overlapping and interlacing of functions and duties between the several departments, however,
sometimes makes it hard to say just where the one leaves off and the other begins. In times of
social disquietude or political excitement, the great landmarks of the Constitution are apt to be
forgotten or marred, if not entirely obliterated. In cases of conflict, the judicial department is the
only constitutional organ which can be called upon to determine the proper allocation of powers
between the several departments and among the integral or constituent units thereof.
As any human production, our Constitution is of course lacking perfection and perfectibility, but
as much as it was within the power of our people, acting through their delegates to so provide,
that instrument which is the expression of their sovereignty however limited, has established a
republican government intended to operate and function as a harmonious whole, under a system
of checks and balances, and subject to specific limitations and restrictions provided in the said
instrument. The Constitution sets forth in no uncertain language the restrictions and limitations
upon governmental powers and agencies. If these restrictions and limitations are transcended it
would be inconceivable if the Constitution had not provided for a mechanism by which to direct
the course of government along constitutional channels, for then the distribution of powers
would be mere verbiage, the bill of rights mere expressions of sentiment, and the principles of
good government mere political apothegms. Certainly, the limitation and restrictions embodied
in our Constitution are real as they should be in any living constitution. In the United States
where no express constitutional grant is found in their constitution, the possession of this
moderating power of the courts, not to speak of its historical origin and development there, has
been set at rest by popular acquiescence for a period of more than one and a half centuries. In our
case, this moderating power is granted, if not expressly, by clear implication from section 2 of
article VIII of our constitution.
The Constitution is a definition of the powers of government. Who is to determine the nature,
scope and extent of such powers? The Constitution itself has provided for the instrumentality of
the judiciary as the rational way. And when the judiciary mediates to allocate constitutional
boundaries, it does not assert any superiority over the other departments; it does not in reality
nullify or invalidate an act of the legislature, but only asserts the solemn and sacred obligation
assigned to it by the Constitution to determine conflicting claims of authority under the
Constitution and to establish for the parties in an actual controversy the rights which that
instrument secures and guarantees to them. This is in truth all that is involved in what is termed
"judicial supremacy" which properly is the power of judicial review under the Constitution. Even
then, this power of judicial review is limited to actual cases and controversies to be exercised
after full opportunity of argument by the parties, and limited further to the constitutional question
raised or the very lis mota presented. Any attempt at abstraction could only lead to dialectics and
barren legal questions and to sterile conclusions unrelated to actualities. Narrowed as its function
is in this manner, the judiciary does not pass upon questions of wisdom, justice or expediency of
legislation. More than that, courts accord the presumption of constitutionality to legislative
enactments, not only because the legislature is presumed to abide by the Constitution but also
because the judiciary in the determination of actual cases and controversies must reflect the
wisdom and justice of the people as expressed through their representatives in the executive and
legislative departments of the governments of the government.
But much as we might postulate on the internal checks of power provided in our Constitution, it
ought not the less to be remembered that, in the language of James Madison, the system itself is
not "the chief palladium of constitutional liberty . . . the people who are authors of this blessing
must also be its guardians . . . their eyes must be ever ready to mark, their voice to pronounce . . .
aggression on the authority of their constitution." In the Last and ultimate analysis, then, must
the success of our government in the unfolding years to come be tested in the crucible of Filipino
minds and hearts than in consultation rooms and court chambers.
In the case at bar, the national Assembly has by resolution (No. 8) of December 3, 1935,
confirmed the election of the herein petitioner to the said body. On the other hand, the Electoral
Commission has by resolution adopted on December 9, 1935, fixed said date as the last day for
the filing of protests against the election, returns and qualifications of members of the National
Assembly, notwithstanding the previous confirmation made by the National Assembly as
aforesaid. If, as contended by the petitioner, the resolution of the National Assembly has the
effect of cutting off the power of the Electoral Commission to entertain protests against the
election, returns and qualifications of members of the National Assembly, submitted after
December 3, 1935, then the resolution of the Electoral Commission of December 9, 1935, is
mere surplusage and had no effect. But, if, as contended by the respondents, the Electoral
Commission has the sole power of regulating its proceedings to the exclusion of the National
Assembly, then the resolution of December 9, 1935, by which the Electoral Commission fixed
said date as the last day for filing protests against the election, returns and qualifications of
members of the National Assembly, should be upheld.
Here is then presented an actual controversy involving as it does a conflict of a grave
constitutional nature between the National Assembly on the one hand, and the Electoral
Commission on the other. From the very nature of the republican government established in our
country in the light of American experience and of our own, upon the judicial department is
thrown the solemn and inescapable obligation of interpreting the Constitution and defining
constitutional boundaries. The Electoral Commission, as we shall have occasion to refer
hereafter, is a constitutional organ, created for a specific purpose, namely to determine all
contests relating to the election, returns and qualifications of the members of the National
Assembly. Although the Electoral Commission may not be interfered with, when and while
acting within the limits of its authority, it does not follow that it is beyond the reach of the
constitutional mechanism adopted by the people and that it is not subject to constitutional
restrictions. The Electoral Commission is not a separate department of the government, and even
if it were, conflicting claims of authority under the fundamental law between department powers
and agencies of the government are necessarily determined by the judiciary in justifiable and
appropriate cases. Discarding the English type and other European types of constitutional
government, the framers of our constitution adopted the American type where the written
constitution is interpreted and given effect by the judicial department. In some countries which
have declined to follow the American example, provisions have been inserted in their
constitutions prohibiting the courts from exercising the power to interpret the fundamental law.
This is taken as a recognition of what otherwise would be the rule that in the absence of direct
prohibition courts are bound to assume what is logically their function. For instance, the
Constitution of Poland of 1921, expressly provides that courts shall have no power to examine
the validity of statutes (art. 81, chap. IV). The former Austrian Constitution contained a similar
declaration. In countries whose constitutions are silent in this respect, courts have assumed this
power. This is true in Norway, Greece, Australia and South Africa. Whereas, in Czechoslovakia
(arts. 2 and 3, Preliminary Law to constitutional Charter of the Czechoslovak Republic, February
29, 1920) and Spain (arts. 121-123, Title IX, Constitutional of the Republic of 1931) especial
constitutional courts are established to pass upon the validity of ordinary laws. In our case, the
nature of the present controversy shows the necessity of a final constitutional arbiter to determine
the conflict of authority between two agencies created by the Constitution. Were we to decline to
take cognizance of the controversy, who will determine the conflict? And if the conflict were left
undecided and undetermined, would not a void be thus created in our constitutional system
which may be in the long run prove destructive of the entire framework? To ask these questions
is to answer them. Natura vacuum abhorret, so must we avoid exhaustion in our constitutional
system. Upon principle, reason and authority, we are clearly of the opinion that upon the
admitted facts of the present case, this court has jurisdiction over the Electoral Commission and
the subject mater of the present controversy for the purpose of determining the character, scope
and extent of the constitutional grant to the Electoral Commission as "the sole judge of all
Assembly."
Having disposed of the question of jurisdiction, we shall now proceed to pass upon the second
proposition and determine whether the Electoral Commission has acted without or in excess of
its jurisdiction in adopting its resolution of December 9, 1935, and in assuming to take
cognizance of the protest filed against the election of the herein petitioner notwithstanding the
previous confirmation thereof by the National Assembly on December 3, 1935. As able counsel
for the petitioner has pointed out, the issue hinges on the interpretation of section 4 of Article VI
of the Constitution which provides:
"SEC. 4. There shall be an Electoral Commission composed of three Justice of the Supreme
Court designated by the Chief Justice, and of six Members chosen by the National Assembly,
three of whom shall be nominated by the party having the largest number of votes, and three by
the party having the second largest number of votes therein. The senior Justice in the
Commission shall be its Chairman. The Electoral Commission shall be the sole judge of all
Assembly." It is imperative, therefore, that we delve into the origin and history of this
constitutional provision and inquire into the intention of its framers and the people who adopted
it so that we may properly appreciate its full meaning, import and significance.
The original provision regarding this subject in the Act of Congress of July 1, 1902 (sec. 7, par.
5) laying down the rule that "the assembly shall be the judge of the elections, returns, and
qualifications of its members", was taken from clause 1 of section 5, Article I of the Constitution
of the United States providing that "Each House shall be the Judge of the Elections, Returns, and
Qualifications of its own Members, . . . ." The Act of Congress of August 29, 1916 (sec. 18, par.
1) modified this provision by the insertion of the word "sole" as follows: "That the Senate and
House of Representatives, respectively, shall be the sole judges of the elections, returns, and
qualifications of their elective members . . ." apparently in order to emphasize the exclusive the
Legislative over the particular case s therein specified. This court has had occasion to
characterize this grant of power to the Philippine Senate and House of Representatives,
respectively, as "full, clear and complete" (Veloso vs. Boards of Canvassers of Leyte and Samar
[1919], 39 Phil., 886, 888.)
The first step towards the creation of an independent tribunal for the purpose of deciding
contested elections to the legislature was taken by the sub-committee of five appointed by the
Committee on Constitutional Guarantees of the Constitutional Convention, which sub-committee
submitted a report on August 30, 1934, recommending the creation of a Tribunal of
Constitutional Security empowered to hear legislature but also against the election of executive
officers for whose election the vote of the whole nation is required, as well as to initiate
impeachment proceedings against specified executive and judicial officer. For the purpose of
hearing legislative protests, the tribunal was to be composed of three justices designated by the
Supreme Court and six members of the house of the legislature to which the contest corresponds,
three members to be designed by the majority party and three by the minority, to be presided
over by the Senior Justice unless the Chief Justice is also a member in which case the latter shall
preside. The foregoing proposal was submitted by the Committee on Constitutional Guarantees
to the Convention on September 15, 1934, with slight modifications consisting in the reduction
of the legislative representation to four members, that is, two senators to be designated one each
from the two major parties in the Senate and two representatives to be designated one each from
the two major parties in the House of Representatives, and in awarding representation to the
executive department in the persons of two representatives to be designated by the President.
Meanwhile, the Committee on Legislative Power was also preparing its report. As submitted to
the Convention on September 24, 1934 subsection 5, section 5, of the proposed Article on the
Legislative Department, reads as follows:
The elections, returns and qualifications of the members of either house and all cases
contesting the election of any of their members shall be judged by an Electoral
Commission, constituted, as to each House, by three members elected by the members of
the party having the largest number of votes therein, three elected by the members of the
party having the second largest number of votes, and as to its Chairman, one Justice of
the Supreme Court designated by the Chief Justice.
The idea of creating a Tribunal of Constitutional Security with comprehensive jurisdiction as
proposed by the Committee on Constitutional Guarantees which was probably inspired by the
Spanish plan (art. 121, Constitution of the Spanish Republic of 1931), was soon abandoned in
favor of the proposition of the Committee on Legislative Power to create a similar body with
reduced powers and with specific and limited jurisdiction, to be designated as a Electoral
Commission. The Sponsorship Committee modified the proposal of the Committee on
Legislative Power with respect to the composition of the Electoral Commission and made further
changes in phraseology to suit the project of adopting a unicameral instead of a bicameral
legislature. The draft as finally submitted to the Convention on October 26, 1934, reads as
follows:
(6) The elections, returns and qualifications of the Members of the National Assembly
and all cases contesting the election of any of its Members shall be judged by an Electoral
Commission, composed of three members elected by the party having the largest number
of votes in the National Assembly, three elected by the members of the party having the
second largest number of votes, and three justices of the Supreme Court designated by the
Chief Justice, the Commission to be presided over by one of said justices.
During the discussion of the amendment introduced by Delegates Labrador, Abordo, and others,
proposing to strike out the whole subsection of the foregoing draft and inserting in lieu thereof
the following: "The National Assembly shall be the soled and exclusive judge of the elections,
returns, and qualifications of the Members", the following illuminating remarks were made on
the floor of the Convention in its session of December 4, 1934, as to the scope of the said draft:
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Mr. VENTURA. Mr. President, we have a doubt here as to the scope of the meaning of
the first four lines, paragraph 6, page 11 of the draft, reading: "The elections, returns and
qualifications of the Members of the National Assembly and all cases contesting the
election of any of its Members shall be judged by an Electoral Commission, . . ." I should
like to ask from the gentleman from Capiz whether the election and qualification of the
member whose elections is not contested shall also be judged by the Electoral
Commission.
Mr. ROXAS. If there is no question about the election of the members, there is nothing to
be judged; that is why the word "judge" is used to indicate a controversy. If there is no
question about the election of a member, there is nothing to be submitted to the Electoral
Commission and there is nothing to be determined.
Mr. VENTURA. But does that carry the idea also that the Electoral Commission shall
confirm also the election of those whose election is not contested?
Mr. ROXAS. There is no need of confirmation. As the gentleman knows, the action of the
House of Representatives confirming the election of its members is just a matter of the
rules of the assembly. It is not constitutional. It is not necessary. After a man files his
credentials that he has been elected, that is sufficient, unless his election is contested.
Mr. VENTURA. But I do not believe that that is sufficient, as we have observed that for
purposes of the auditor, in the matter of election of a member to a legislative body,
because he will not authorize his pay.
Mr. ROXAS. Well, what is the case with regards to the municipal president who is
elected? What happens with regards to the councilors of a municipality? Does anybody
confirm their election? The municipal council does this: it makes a canvass and proclaims
in this case the municipal council proclaims who has been elected, and it ends there,
unless there is a contest. It is the same case; there is no need on the part of the Electoral
Commission unless there is a contest. The first clause refers to the case referred to by the
gentleman from Cavite where one person tries to be elected in place of another who was
declared elected. From example, in a case when the residence of the man who has been
elected is in question, or in case the citizenship of the man who has been elected is in
question.
However, if the assembly desires to annul the power of the commission, it may do so by
certain maneuvers upon its first meeting when the returns are submitted to the
assembly. The purpose is to give to the Electoral Commission all the powers exercised by
the assembly referring to the elections, returns and qualifications of the members. When
there is no contest, there is nothing to be judged.
Mr. VENTURA. Then it should be eliminated.
Mr. ROXAS. But that is a different matter, I think Mr. Delegate.
Mr. CINCO. Mr. President, I have a similar question as that propounded by the gentleman
from Ilocos Norte when I arose a while ago. However I want to ask more questions from
the delegate from Capiz. This paragraph 6 on page 11 of the draft cites cases contesting
the election as separate from the first part of the sections which refers to elections, returns
and qualifications.
Mr. ROXAS. That is merely for the sake of clarity. In fact the cases of contested elections
are already included in the phrase "the elections, returns and qualifications." This phrase
"and contested elections" was inserted merely for the sake of clarity.
Mr. CINCO. Under this paragraph, may not the Electoral Commission, at its own
instance, refuse to confirm the elections of the members."
Mr. ROXAS. I do not think so, unless there is a protest.
Mr. LABRADOR. Mr. President, will the gentleman yield?
THE PRESIDENT. The gentleman may yield, if he so desires.
Mr. ROXAS. Willingly.
Mr. LABRADOR. Does not the gentleman from Capiz believe that unless this power is
granted to the assembly, the assembly on its own motion does not have the right to
contest the election and qualification of its members?
Mr. ROXAS. I have no doubt but that the gentleman is right. If this draft is retained as it
is, even if two-thirds of the assembly believe that a member has not the qualifications
provided by law, they cannot remove him for that reason.
Mr. LABRADOR. So that the right to remove shall only be retained by the Electoral
Commission.
Mr. ROXAS. By the assembly for misconduct.
Mr. LABRADOR. I mean with respect to the qualifications of the members.
Mr. ROXAS. Yes, by the Electoral Commission.
Mr. LABRADOR. So that under this draft, no member of the assembly has the right to
question the eligibility of its members?
Mr. ROXAS. Before a member can question the eligibility, he must go to the Electoral
Commission and make the question before the Electoral Commission.
Mr. LABRADOR. So that the Electoral Commission shall decide whether the election is
contested or not contested.
Mr. ROXAS. Yes, sir: that is the purpose.
Mr. PELAYO. Mr. President, I would like to be informed if the Electoral Commission has
power and authority to pass upon the qualifications of the members of the National
Assembly even though that question has not been raised.
Mr. ROXAS. I have just said that they have no power, because they can only judge.
In the same session, the first clause of the aforesaid draft reading "The election, returns and
qualifications of the members of the National Assembly and" was eliminated by the Sponsorship
Committee in response to an amendment introduced by Delegates Francisco, Ventura, Vinzons,
Rafols, Lim, Mumar and others. In explaining the difference between the original draft and the
draft as amended, Delegate Roxas speaking for the Sponsorship Committee said:
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Sr. ROXAS. La diferencia, seor Presidente, consiste solamente en obviar la objecion

apuntada por varios Delegados al efecto de que la primera clausula del draft que dice:
"The elections, returns and qualifications of the members of the National Assembly"
parece que da a la Comision Electoral la facultad de determinar tambien la eleccion de
los miembros que no ha sido protestados y para obviar esa dificultad, creemos que la
enmienda tien razon en ese sentido, si enmendamos el draft, de tal modo que se lea como
sigue: "All cases contesting the election", de modo que los jueces de la Comision
Electoral se limitaran solamente a los casos en que haya habido protesta contra las actas."
Before the amendment of Delegate Labrador was voted upon the following interpellation
also took place:
El Sr. CONEJERO. Antes de votarse la enmienda, quisiera
El Sr. PRESIDENTE. Que dice el Comite?
El Sr. ROXAS. Con mucho gusto.
El Sr. CONEJERO. Tal como esta el draft, dando tres miembros a la mayoria, y otros tres
a la minoria y tres a la Corte Suprema, no cree Su Seoria que esto equivale
practicamente a dejar el asunto a los miembros del Tribunal Supremo?
El Sr. ROXAS. Si y no. Creemos que si el tribunal o la Commission esta constituido en
esa forma, tanto los miembros de la mayoria como los de la minoria asi como los
miembros de la Corte Suprema consideraran la cuestion sobre la base de sus meritos,
sabiendo que el partidismo no es suficiente para dar el triunfo.
El Sr. CONEJERO. Cree Su Seoria que en un caso como ese, podriamos hacer que
tanto los de la mayoria como los de la minoria prescindieran del partidismo?
El Sr. ROXAS. Creo que si, porque el partidismo no les daria el triunfo.
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The amendment introduced by Delegates Labrador, Abordo and others seeking to restore the
power to decide contests relating to the election, returns and qualifications of members of the
National Assembly to the National Assembly itself, was defeated by a vote of ninety-eight (98)
against fifty-six (56).
In the same session of December 4, 1934, Delegate Cruz (C.) sought to amend the draft by
reducing the representation of the minority party and the Supreme Court in the Electoral
Commission to two members each, so as to accord more representation to the majority party. The
Convention rejected this amendment by a vote of seventy-six (76) against forty-six (46), thus
maintaining the non-partisan character of the commission.
As approved on January 31, 1935, the draft was made to read as follows:
(6) All cases contesting the elections, returns and qualifications of the Members of the
National Assembly shall be judged by an Electoral Commission, composed of three
members elected by the party having the largest number of votes in the National
Assembly, three elected by the members of the party having the second largest number of
votes, and three justices of the Supreme Court designated by the Chief Justice, the
Commission to be presided over by one of said justices.
The Style Committee to which the draft was submitted revised it as follows:
SEC. 4. There shall be an Electoral Commission composed of three Justices of the
Supreme Court designated by the Chief Justice, and of six Members chosen by the
National Assembly, three of whom shall be nominated by the party having the largest
number of votes, and three by the party having the second largest number of votes
therein. The senior Justice in the Commission shall be its chairman. The Electoral
Commission shall be the sole judge of the election, returns, and qualifications of the
Members of the National Assembly.
When the foregoing draft was submitted for approval on February 8, 1935, the Style Committee,
through President Recto, to effectuate the original intention of the Convention, agreed to insert
the phrase "All contests relating to" between the phrase "judge of" and the words "the elections",
which was accordingly accepted by the Convention.
The transfer of the power of determining the election, returns and qualifications of the members
of the legislature long lodged in the legislative body, to an independent, impartial and nonpartisan tribunal, is by no means a mere experiment in the science of government.
Cushing, in his Law and Practice of Legislative Assemblies (ninth edition, chapter VI, pages 57,
58), gives a vivid account of the "scandalously notorious" canvassing of votes by political parties
in the disposition of contests by the House of Commons in the following passages which are
partly quoted by the petitioner in his printed memorandum of March 14, 1936:
153. From the time when the commons established their right to be the exclusive judges
of the elections, returns, and qualifications of their members, until the year 1770, two
modes of proceeding prevailed, in the determination of controverted elections, and rights
of membership. One of the standing committees appointed at the commencement of each
session, was denominated the committee of privileges and elections, whose functions was
to hear and investigate all questions of this description which might be referred to them,
and to report their proceedings, with their opinion thereupon, to the house, from time to
time. When an election petition was referred to this committee they heard the parties and
their witnesses and other evidence, and made a report of all the evidence, together with
their opinion thereupon, in the form of resolutions, which were considered and agreed or
disagreed to by the house. The other mode of proceeding was by a hearing at the bar of
the house itself. When this court was adopted, the case was heard and decided by the
house, in substantially the same manner as by a committee. The committee of privileges
and elections although a select committee. The committee of privileges and elections
although a select committee was usually what is called an open one; that is to say, in
order to constitute the committee, a quorum of the members named was required to be
present, but all the members of the house were at liberty to attend the committee and vote
if they pleased.
154. With the growth of political parties in parliament questions relating to the right of
membership gradually assumed a political character; so that for many years previous to
the year 1770, controverted elections had been tried and determined by the house of
commons, as mere party questions, upon which the strength of contending factions might
be tested. Thus, for Example, in 1741, Sir Robert Walpole, after repeated attacks upon his
government, resigned his office in consequence of an adverse vote upon the Chippenham
election. Mr. Hatsell remarks, of the trial of election cases, as conducted under this
system, that "Every principle of decency and justice were notoriously and openly
prostituted, from whence the younger part of the house were insensibly, but too
successfully, induced to adopt the same licentious conduct in more serious matters, and in
questions of higher importance to the public welfare." Mr. George Grenville, a
distinguished member of the house of commons, undertook to propose a remedy for the
evil, and, on the 7th of March, 1770, obtained the unanimous leave of the house to bring
in a bill, "to regulate the trial of controverted elections, or returns of members to serve in
parliament." In his speech to explain his plan, on the motion for leave, Mr. Grenville
alluded to the existing practice in the following terms: "Instead of trusting to the merits of
their respective causes, the principal dependence of both parties is their private interest
among us; and it is scandalously notorious that we are as earnestly canvassed to attend in
favor of the opposite sides, as if we were wholly self-elective, and not bound to act by the
principles of justice, but by the discretionary impulse of our own inclinations; nay, it is
well known, that in every contested election, many members of this house, who are
ultimately to judge in a kind of judicial capacity between the competitors, enlist
themselves as parties in the contention, and take upon themselves the partial management
of the very business, upon which they should determine with the strictest impartiality."
155. It was to put an end to the practices thus described, that Mr. Grenville brought in a
bill which met with the approbation of both houses, and received the royal assent on the
12th of April, 1770. This was the celebrated law since known by the name of the
Grenville Act; of which Mr. Hatsell declares, that it "was one of the nobles works, for the
honor of the house of commons, and the security of the constitution, that was ever
devised by any minister or statesman." It is probable, that the magnitude of the evil, or
the apparent success of the remedy, may have led many of the contemporaries of the
measure to the information of a judgement, which was not acquiesced in by some of the
leading statesmen of the day, and has not been entirely confirmed by subsequent
experience. The bill was objected to by Lord North, Mr. De Grey, afterwards chief justice
of the common pleas, Mr. Ellis, Mr. Dyson, who had been clerk of the house, and Mr.
Charles James Fox, chiefly on the ground, that the introduction of the new system was an
essential alteration of the constitution of parliament, and a total abrogation of one of the
most important rights and jurisdictions of the house of commons.
As early as 1868, the House of Commons in England solved the problem of insuring the nonpartisan settlement of the controverted elections of its members by abdicating its prerogative to
two judges of the King's Bench of the High Court of Justice selected from a rota in accordance
with rules of court made for the purpose. Having proved successful, the practice has become
imbedded in English jurisprudence (Parliamentary Elections Act, 1868 [31 & 32 Vict. c. 125] as
amended by Parliamentary Elections and Corrupt Practices Act. 1879 [42 & 43 Vict. c. 75], s. 2;
Corrupt and Illegal Practices Preventions Act, 1883 [46 & 47 Vict. c. 51;, s. 70; Expiring Laws
Continuance Act, 1911 [1 & 2 Geo. 5, c. 22]; Laws of England, vol. XII, p. 408, vol. XXI, p.
787). In the Dominion of Canada, election contests which were originally heard by the
Committee of the House of Commons, are since 1922 tried in the courts. Likewise, in the
Commonwealth of Australia, election contests which were originally determined by each house,
are since 1922 tried in the High Court. In Hungary, the organic law provides that all protests
against the election of members of the Upper House of the Diet are to be resolved by the
Supreme Administrative Court (Law 22 of 1916, chap. 2, art. 37, par. 6). The Constitution of
Poland of March 17, 1921 (art. 19) and the Constitution of the Free City of Danzig of May 13,
1922 (art. 10) vest the authority to decide contested elections to the Diet or National Assembly in
the Supreme Court. For the purpose of deciding legislative contests, the Constitution of the
German Reich of July 1, 1919 (art. 31), the Constitution of the Czechoslovak Republic of
February 29, 1920 (art. 19) and the Constitution of the Grecian Republic of June 2, 1927 (art.
43), all provide for an Electoral Commission.
The creation of an Electoral Commission whose membership is recruited both from the
legislature and the judiciary is by no means unknown in the United States. In the presidential
elections of 1876 there was a dispute as to the number of electoral votes received by each of the
two opposing candidates. As the Constitution made no adequate provision for such a
contingency, Congress passed a law on January 29, 1877 (United States Statutes at Large, vol.
19, chap. 37, pp. 227-229), creating a special Electoral Commission composed of five members
elected by the Senate, five members elected by the House of Representatives, and five justices of
the Supreme Court, the fifth justice to be selected by the four designated in the Act. The decision
of the commission was to be binding unless rejected by the two houses voting separately.
Although there is not much of a moral lesson to be derived from the experience of America in
this regard, judging from the observations of Justice Field, who was a member of that body on
the part of the Supreme Court (Countryman, the Supreme Court of the United States and its
Appellate Power under the Constitution [Albany, 1913] Relentless Partisanship of Electoral
Commission, p. 25 et seq.), the experiment has at least abiding historical interest.
The members of the Constitutional Convention who framed our fundamental law were in their
majority men mature in years and experience. To be sure, many of them were familiar with the
history and political development of other countries of the world. When , therefore, they deemed
it wise to create an Electoral Commission as a constitutional organ and invested it with the
exclusive function of passing upon and determining the election, returns and qualifications of the
members of the National Assembly, they must have done so not only in the light of their own
experience but also having in view the experience of other enlightened peoples of the world. The
creation of the Electoral Commission was designed to remedy certain evils of which the framers
of our Constitution were cognizant. Notwithstanding the vigorous opposition of some members
of the Convention to its creation, the plan, as hereinabove stated, was approved by that body by a
vote of 98 against 58. All that can be said now is that, upon the approval of the constitutional the
creation of the Electoral Commission is the expression of the wisdom and "ultimate justice of the
people". (Abraham Lincoln, First Inaugural Address, March 4, 1861.)
From the deliberations of our Constitutional Convention it is evident that the purpose was to
transfer in its totality all the powers previously exercised by the legislature in matters pertaining
to contested elections of its members, to an independent and impartial tribunal. It was not so
much the knowledge and appreciation of contemporary constitutional precedents, however, as
the long-felt need of determining legislative contests devoid of partisan considerations which
prompted the people, acting through their delegates to the Convention, to provide for this body
known as the Electoral Commission. With this end in view, a composite body in which both the
majority and minority parties are equally represented to off-set partisan influence in its
deliberations was created, and further endowed with judicial temper by including in its
membership three justices of the Supreme Court.
The Electoral Commission is a constitutional creation, invested with the necessary authority in
the performance and execution of the limited and specific function assigned to it by the
Constitution. Although it is not a power in our tripartite scheme of government, it is, to all intents
and purposes, when acting within the limits of its authority, an independent organ. It is, to be
sure, closer to the legislative department than to any other. The location of the provision (section
4) creating the Electoral Commission under Article VI entitled "Legislative Department" of our
Constitution is very indicative. Its compositions is also significant in that it is constituted by a
majority of members of the legislature. But it is a body separate from and independent of the
legislature.
The grant of power to the Electoral Commission to judge all contests relating to the election,
returns and qualifications of members of the National Assembly, is intended to be as complete
and unimpaired as if it had remained originally in the legislature. The express lodging of that
power in the Electoral Commission is an implied denial of the exercise of that power by the
National Assembly. And this is as effective a restriction upon the legislative power as an express
prohibition in the Constitution (Ex parte Lewis, 45 Tex. Crim. Rep., 1; State vs.Whisman, 36
S.D., 260; L.R.A., 1917B, 1). If we concede the power claimed in behalf of the National
Assembly that said body may regulate the proceedings of the Electoral Commission and cut off
the power of the commission to lay down the period within which protests should be filed, the
grant of power to the commission would be ineffective. The Electoral Commission in such case
would be invested with the power to determine contested cases involving the election, returns
and qualifications of the members of the National Assembly but subject at all times to the
regulative power of the National Assembly. Not only would the purpose of the framers of our
Constitution of totally transferring this authority from the legislative body be frustrated, but a
dual authority would be created with the resultant inevitable clash of powers from time to time. A
sad spectacle would then be presented of the Electoral Commission retaining the bare authority
of taking cognizance of cases referred to, but in reality without the necessary means to render
that authority effective whenever and whenever the National Assembly has chosen to act, a
situation worse than that intended to be remedied by the framers of our Constitution. The power
to regulate on the part of the National Assembly in procedural matters will inevitably lead to the
ultimate control by the Assembly of the entire proceedings of the Electoral Commission, and, by
indirection, to the entire abrogation of the constitutional grant. It is obvious that this result should
not be permitted.
We are not insensible to the impassioned argument or the learned counsel for the petitioner
regarding the importance and necessity of respecting the dignity and independence of the
national Assembly as a coordinate department of the government and of according validity to its
acts, to avoid what he characterized would be practically an unlimited power of the commission
in the admission of protests against members of the National Assembly. But as we have pointed
out hereinabove, the creation of the Electoral Commission carried with it ex necesitate rei the
power regulative in character to limit the time with which protests intrusted to its cognizance
should be filed. It is a settled rule of construction that where a general power is conferred or duty
enjoined, every particular power necessary for the exercise of the one or the performance of the
other is also conferred (Cooley, Constitutional Limitations, eight ed., vol. I, pp. 138, 139). In the
absence of any further constitutional provision relating to the procedure to be followed in filing
protests before the Electoral Commission, therefore, the incidental power to promulgate such
rules necessary for the proper exercise of its exclusive power to judge all contests relating to the
election, returns and qualifications of members of the National Assembly, must be deemed by
necessary implication to have been lodged also in the Electoral Commission.
It is, indeed, possible that, as suggested by counsel for the petitioner, the Electoral Commission
may abuse its regulative authority by admitting protests beyond any reasonable time, to the
disturbance of the tranquillity and peace of mind of the members of the National Assembly. But
the possibility of abuse is not argument against the concession of the power as there is no power
that is not susceptible of abuse. In the second place, if any mistake has been committed in the
creation of an Electoral Commission and in investing it with exclusive jurisdiction in all cases
relating to the election, returns, and qualifications of members of the National Assembly, the
remedy is political, not judicial, and must be sought through the ordinary processes of
democracy. All the possible abuses of the government are not intended to be corrected by the
judiciary. We believe, however, that the people in creating the Electoral Commission reposed as
much confidence in this body in the exclusive determination of the specified cases assigned to it,
as they have given to the Supreme Court in the proper cases entrusted to it for decision. All the
agencies of the government were designed by the Constitution to achieve specific purposes, and
each constitutional organ working within its own particular sphere of discretionary action must
be deemed to be animated with the same zeal and honesty in accomplishing the great ends for
which they were created by the sovereign will. That the actuations of these constitutional
agencies might leave much to be desired in given instances, is inherent in the perfection of
human institutions. In the third place, from the fact that the Electoral Commission may not be
interfered with in the exercise of its legitimate power, it does not follow that its acts, however
illegal or unconstitutional, may not be challenge in appropriate cases over which the courts may
exercise jurisdiction.
But independently of the legal and constitutional aspects of the present case, there are
considerations of equitable character that should not be overlooked in the appreciation of the
intrinsic merits of the controversy. The Commonwealth Government was inaugurated on

November 15, 1935, on which date the Constitution, except as to the provisions mentioned in
section 6 of Article XV thereof, went into effect. The new National Assembly convened on
November 25th of that year, and the resolution confirming the election of the petitioner, Jose A.
Angara was approved by that body on December 3, 1935. The protest by the herein respondent
Pedro Ynsua against the election of the petitioner was filed on December 9 of the same year. The
pleadings do not show when the Electoral Commission was formally organized but it does
appear that on December 9, 1935, the Electoral Commission met for the first time and approved
a resolution fixing said date as the last day for the filing of election protest. When, therefore, the
National Assembly passed its resolution of December 3, 1935, confirming the election of the
petitioner to the National Assembly, the Electoral Commission had not yet met; neither does it
appear that said body had actually been organized. As a mater of fact, according to certified
copies of official records on file in the archives division of the National Assembly attached to the
record of this case upon the petition of the petitioner, the three justices of the Supreme Court the
six members of the National Assembly constituting the Electoral Commission were respectively
designated only on December 4 and 6, 1935. If Resolution No. 8 of the National Assembly
confirming non-protested elections of members of the National Assembly had the effect of
limiting or tolling the time for the presentation of protests, the result would be that the National
Assembly on the hypothesis that it still retained the incidental power of regulation in such
cases had already barred the presentation of protests before the Electoral Commission had had
time to organize itself and deliberate on the mode and method to be followed in a matter
entrusted to its exclusive jurisdiction by the Constitution. This result was not and could not have
been contemplated, and should be avoided.
From another angle, Resolution No. 8 of the National Assembly confirming the election of
members against whom no protests had been filed at the time of its passage on December 3,
1935, can not be construed as a limitation upon the time for the initiation of election contests.
While there might have been good reason for the legislative practice of confirmation of the
election of members of the legislature at the time when the power to decide election contests was
still lodged in the legislature, confirmation alone by the legislature cannot be construed as
depriving the Electoral Commission of the authority incidental to its constitutional power to be
"the sole judge of all contest relating to the election, returns, and qualifications of the members
of the National Assembly", to fix the time for the filing of said election protests. Confirmation by
the National Assembly of the returns of its members against whose election no protests have
been filed is, to all legal purposes, unnecessary. As contended by the Electoral Commission in its
resolution of January 23, 1936, overruling the motion of the herein petitioner to dismiss the
protest filed by the respondent Pedro Ynsua, confirmation of the election of any member is not
required by the Constitution before he can discharge his duties as such member. As a matter of
fact, certification by the proper provincial board of canvassers is sufficient to entitle a memberelect to a seat in the national Assembly and to render him eligible to any office in said body (No.
1, par. 1, Rules of the National Assembly, adopted December 6, 1935).
Under the practice prevailing both in the English House of Commons and in the Congress of the
United States, confirmation is neither necessary in order to entitle a member-elect to take his
seat. The return of the proper election officers is sufficient, and the member-elect presenting such
return begins to enjoy the privileges of a member from the time that he takes his oath of office
(Laws of England, vol. 12, pp. 331. 332; vol. 21, pp. 694, 695; U. S. C. A., Title 2, secs. 21, 25,
26). Confirmation is in order only in cases of contested elections where the decision is adverse to
the claims of the protestant. In England, the judges' decision or report in controverted elections is
certified to the Speaker of the House of Commons, and the House, upon being informed of such
certificate or report by the Speaker, is required to enter the same upon the Journals, and to give
such directions for confirming or altering the return, or for the issue of a writ for a new election,
or for carrying into execution the determination as circumstances may require (31 & 32 Vict., c.
125, sec. 13). In the United States, it is believed, the order or decision of the particular house
itself is generally regarded as sufficient, without any actual alternation or amendment of the
return (Cushing, Law and Practice of Legislative Assemblies, 9th ed., sec. 166).
Under the practice prevailing when the Jones Law was still in force, each house of the Philippine
Legislature fixed the time when protests against the election of any of its members should be
filed. This was expressly authorized by section 18 of the Jones Law making each house the sole
judge of the election, return and qualifications of its members, as well as by a law (sec. 478, Act
No. 3387) empowering each house to respectively prescribe by resolution the time and manner
of filing contest in the election of member of said bodies. As a matter of formality, after the time
fixed by its rules for the filing of protests had already expired, each house passed a resolution
confirming or approving the returns of such members against whose election no protests had
been filed within the prescribed time. This was interpreted as cutting off the filing of further
protests against the election of those members not theretofore contested (Amistad vs. Claravall
[Isabela], Second Philippine Legislature, Record First Period, p. 89; Urguello vs. Rama [Third
District, Cebu], Sixth Philippine Legislature; Fetalvero vs. Festin [Romblon], Sixth Philippine
Legislature, Record First Period, pp. 637-640; Kintanar vs. Aldanese [Fourth District, Cebu],
Sixth Philippine Legislature, Record First Period, pp. 1121, 1122; Aguilar vs. Corpus
[Masbate], Eighth Philippine Legislature, Record First Period, vol. III, No. 56, pp. 892, 893).
The Constitution has repealed section 18 of the Jones Law. Act No. 3387, section 478, must be
deemed to have been impliedly abrogated also, for the reason that with the power to determine
all contest relating to the election, returns and qualifications of members of the National
Assembly, is inseparably linked the authority to prescribe regulations for the exercise of that
power. There was thus no law nor constitutional provisions which authorized the National
Assembly to fix, as it is alleged to have fixed on December 3, 1935, the time for the filing of
contests against the election of its members. And what the National Assembly could not do
directly, it could not do by indirection through the medium of confirmation.
Summarizing, we conclude:
(a) That the government established by the Constitution follows fundamentally the theory
of separation of power into the legislative, the executive and the judicial.
(b) That the system of checks and balances and the overlapping of functions and duties
often makes difficult the delimitation of the powers granted.
(c) That in cases of conflict between the several departments and among the agencies
thereof, the judiciary, with the Supreme Court as the final arbiter, is the only
constitutional mechanism devised finally to resolve the conflict and allocate
constitutional boundaries.
(d) That judicial supremacy is but the power of judicial review in actual and appropriate
cases and controversies, and is the power and duty to see that no one branch or agency of
the government transcends the Constitution, which is the source of all authority.
(e) That the Electoral Commission is an independent constitutional creation with specific
powers and functions to execute and perform, closer for purposes of classification to the
legislative than to any of the other two departments of the governments.
(f ) That the Electoral Commission is the sole judge of all contests relating to the election,
returns and qualifications of members of the National Assembly.
(g) That under the organic law prevailing before the present Constitution went into effect,
each house of the legislature was respectively the sole judge of the elections, returns, and
qualifications of their elective members.
(h) That the present Constitution has transferred all the powers previously exercised by
the legislature with respect to contests relating to the elections, returns and qualifications
of its members, to the Electoral Commission.
(i) That such transfer of power from the legislature to the Electoral Commission was full,
clear and complete, and carried with it ex necesitate rei the implied power inter alia to
prescribe the rules and regulations as to the time and manner of filing protests.
( j) That the avowed purpose in creating the Electoral Commission was to have an
independent constitutional organ pass upon all contests relating to the election, returns
and qualifications of members of the National Assembly, devoid of partisan influence or
consideration, which object would be frustrated if the National Assembly were to retain
the power to prescribe rules and regulations regarding the manner of conducting said
contests.
(k) That section 4 of article VI of the Constitution repealed not only section 18 of the
Jones Law making each house of the Philippine Legislature respectively the sole judge of
the elections, returns and qualifications of its elective members, but also section 478 of
Act No. 3387 empowering each house to prescribe by resolution the time and manner of
filing contests against the election of its members, the time and manner of notifying the
adverse party, and bond or bonds, to be required, if any, and to fix the costs and expenses
of contest.
(l) That confirmation by the National Assembly of the election is contested or not, is not
essential before such member-elect may discharge the duties and enjoy the privileges of a
member of the National Assembly.
(m) That confirmation by the National Assembly of the election of any member against
whom no protest had been filed prior to said confirmation, does not and cannot deprive
the Electoral Commission of its incidental power to prescribe the time within which
protests against the election of any member of the National Assembly should be filed.
We hold, therefore, that the Electoral Commission was acting within the legitimate exercise of its
constitutional prerogative in assuming to take cognizance of the protest filed by the respondent
Pedro Ynsua against the election of the herein petitioner Jose A. Angara, and that the resolution
of the National Assembly of December 3, 1935 can not in any manner toll the time for filing
protests against the elections, returns and qualifications of members of the National Assembly,
nor prevent the filing of a protest within such time as the rules of the Electoral Commission
might prescribe.
In view of the conclusion reached by us relative to the character of the Electoral Commission as
a constitutional creation and as to the scope and extent of its authority under the facts of the
present controversy, we deem it unnecessary to determine whether the Electoral Commission is
an inferior tribunal, corporation, board or person within the purview of sections 226 and 516 of
the Code of Civil Procedure.
The petition for a writ of prohibition against the Electoral Commission is hereby denied, with
costs against the petitioner. So ordered.
Avancea, C. J., Diaz, Concepcion, and Horrilleno, JJ., concur.
Separate Opinions
ABAD SANTOS, J., concurring:
I concur in the result and in most of the views so ably expressed in the preceding opinion. I am,
however, constrained to withhold my assent to certain conclusions therein advanced.
The power vested in the Electoral Commission by the Constitution of judging of all contests
relating to the election, returns, and qualifications of the members of the National Assembly, is
judicial in nature. (Thomas vs.Loney, 134 U.S., 372; 33 Law. ed., 949, 951.) On the other hand,
the power to regulate the time in which notice of a contested election may be given, is legislative
in character. (M'Elmoyle vs. Cohen, 13 Pet., 312; 10 Law. ed., 177; Missouri vs. Illinois, 200 U.
S. 496; 50 Law. ed., 572.)
It has been correctly stated that the government established by the Constitution follows
fundamentally the theory of the separation of powers into legislative, executive, and judicial.
Legislative power is vested in the National Assembly. (Article VI, sec. 1.) In the absence of any
clear constitutional provision to the contrary, the power to regulate the time in which notice of a
contested election may be given, must be deemed to be included in the grant of legislative power
to the National Assembly.
The Constitution of the United States contains a provision similar to the that found in Article VI,
section 4, of the Constitution of the Philippines. Article I, section 5, of the Constitution of the
United States provides that each house of the Congress shall be the judge of the elections,
returns, and qualifications of its own members. Notwithstanding this provision, the Congress has
assumed the power to regulate the time in which notice of a contested election may be given.
Thus section 201, Title 2, of the United States Code Annotated prescribes:
Whenever any person intends to contest an election of any Member of the House of
Representatives of the United States, he shall, within thirty days after the result of such
election shall have been determined by the officer or board of canvassers authorized by
law to determine the same, give notice, in writing, to the Member whose seat he designs
to contest, of his intention to contest the same, and, in such notice, shall specify
particularly the grounds upon which he relies in the contest. (R. S., par. 105.)
The Philippine Autonomy Act, otherwise known as the Jones Law, also contained a provision to
the effect that the Senate and House of Representatives, respectively, shall be the sole judges of
the elections, returns, and qualifications of their elective members. Notwithstanding this
provision, the Philippine Legislature passed the Election Law, section 478 of which reads as
follows:
The Senate and the House of Representatives shall by resolution respectively prescribe
the time and manner of filing contest in the election of members of said bodies, the time
and manner of notifying the adverse party, and bond or bonds, to be required, if any, and
shall fix the costs and expenses of contest which may be paid from their respective funds.
The purpose sought to be attained by the creation of the Electoral Commission was not to erect a
body that would be above the law, but to raise legislative elections contests from the category of
political to that of justiciable questions. The purpose was not to place the commission beyond the
reach of the law, but to insure the determination of such contests with the due process of law.
Section 478 of the Election Law was in force at the time of the adoption of the Constitution,
Article XV, section 2, of which provides that
All laws of the Philippine Islands shall continue in force until the inauguration of the
Commonwealth of the Philippines; thereafter, such laws shall remain operative, unless
inconsistent with this Constitution, until amended, altered, modified, or repealed by the
National Assembly, and all references in such laws to the Government or officials of the
Philippine Islands shall be construed, in so far as applicable, to refer to the Government
and corresponding officials under this Constitution.
The manifest purpose of this constitutional provision was to insure the orderly processes of
government, and to prevent any hiatus in its operations after the inauguration of the
Commonwealth of the Philippines. It was thus provided that all laws of the Philippine Islands
shall remain operative even after the inauguration of the Commonwealth of the Philippines,
unless inconsistent with the Constitution, and that all references in such laws to the government
or officials of the Philippine Islands shall be construed, in so far as applicable, to refer to the
government and corresponding officials under the Constitution. It would seem to be consistent
not only with the spirit but the letter of the Constitution to hold that section 478 of the Election
Law remains operative and should now be construed to refer to the Electoral Commission,
which, in so far as the power to judge election contests is concerned, corresponds to either the
Senate or the House of Representative under the former regime. It is important to observe in this
connection that said section 478 of the Election Law vested the power to regulate the time and
manner in which notice of a contested election may be given, not in the Philippine Legislature
but in the Senate and House of Representatives singly. In other words, the authority to prescribe
the time and manner of filing contests in the elections of members of the Philippine Legislature
was by statute lodged separately in the bodies clothed with power to decide such contests.
Construing section 478 of the Election Law to refer to the National Assembly, as required by
Article XV, section 2, of the Constitution, it seems reasonable to conclude that the authority to
prescribe the time and manner of filing contests in the election of members of the National
Assembly is vested in the Electoral Commission, which is now the body clothed with power to
decide such contests.
In the light of what has been said, the resolution of the National Assembly of December 3, 1935,
could not have the effect of barring the right of the respondent Pedro Ynsua to contest the
election of the petitioner. By the same token, the Electoral Commission was authorized by law to
adopt its resolution of December 9, 1935, which fixed the time with in which written contests
must be filed with the commission.
Having been filed within the time fixed by its resolutions, the Electoral Commission has
jurisdiction to hear and determine the contest filed by the respondent Pedro Ynsua against the
petitioner Jose A. Angara.
SUPREME COURT
Manila
FIRST DIVISION
G.R. No. L-38025 August 20, 1979
DANTE O. CASIBANG, petitioner,
vs.
HONORABLE NARCISO A. AQUINO, Judge of the Court of First Instance of
Pangasinan, Branch XIV, and REMEGIO P. YU, respondents.
Nicanor & Bautista and Agaton D. Yaranon for petitioner.
Bince, Sevilleja, Agsalud & Associates for respondents.
MAKASIAR, J.:
Respondent Remigio P. Yu was proclaimed on November 9, 1971 as the elected Mayor of
Rosales, Pangasinan in the 1971 local elections, by a plurality of 501 votes over his only rival,
herein petitioner, who seasonably filed on November 24, 1971 a protest against the election of
the former with the Court of First Instance of Pangasinan, on the grounds of (1) anomalies and
irregularities in the appreciation, counting and consideration of votes in specified electoral

precincts; (2) terrorism; (3) rampant vote buying; (4) open voting or balloting; and (5) excessive
campaign expenditures and other violations of the 1971 Election Code.
Respondent Yu filed on November 29, 1971 his answer and counter-protest which petitioner
answered on December 10, 1971. However, respondent Yu withdrew his counter-protest after
waiving the opening and revision of the ballot boxes specified therein.
Proceedings therein continued with respect to the election protest of petitioner before the Court
of First Instance of Pangasinan, Branch XIV, presided by respondent Judge, who initially took
cognizance of the same as it is unquestionably a justiciable controversy.
In the meantime or on September 21, 1972, the incumbent President of the Republic of the
Philippines issued Proclamation No. 1081, placing the entire country under Martial Law; and
two months thereafter, more or less, or specifically on November 29, 1972, the 1971
Constitutional Convention passed and approved a Constitution to supplant the 1935 Constitution;
and the same was thereafter overwhelmingly ratified by the sovereign people of the Republic of
the Philippines on January 17, 1973; and on March 31, 1973, this Court declared that "there is no
further judicial obstacle to the new Constitution being considered in force and effect" (Javellana
vs. Executive Secretary, 50 SCRA 30 [1973]).
Thereafter or on October 10, 1973, at which time petitioner had already completed presenting his
evidence and in fact had rested his case, respondent Yu moved to dismiss the election protest of
petitioner on the ground that the trial court had lost jurisdiction over the same in view of the
effectivity of the 1973 Constitution by reason of which principally) Section 9 of Article XVII
[Transitory Provisions] and Section 2 of Article XI a political question has intervened in the
case. Respondent Yu contended that "... the provisions in the 1935 Constitution relative to all
local governments have been superseded by the 1973 Constitution. Therefore, all local
government should adhere to our parliamentary form of government. This is clear in the New
Constitution under its Article XI." He further submitted that local elective officials (including
mayors) have no more four-year term of office. They are only in office at the pleasure of the
appointing power embodied in the New Constitution, and under Section 9 of Article XVII.
Petitioner vigorously opposed the motion to dismiss, and, relying mainly on Sections 7 and 8 of
Article XVII (Transitory Provisions) of the New Constitution and G.O. No. 3, contended that the
New Constitution did not divest the Court of First Instance of its jurisdiction to hear and decide
election protests pending before them at the time of its ratification and effectivity; that the
ratification of the New Constitution and its effectivity did not automatically abolish the office
and position of municipal mayor nor has it automatically cut short the tenure of the office, so as
to render the issue as to who is the lawfully elected candidate to said office or position moot and
academic; that election protests involve public interest such that the same must be heard until
terminated and may not be dismissed on mere speculation that the office involved may have been
abolished, modified or reorganized; and that the motion to dismiss was filed manifestly for delay.
Respondent Yu replied pointing out, among others, that petitioner failed to refute the issue of
political question; and reiterated his stand, expanding his arguments on the political question,
thus:
It is an undeniable fact that this case has its source from the 1971 elections for
municipal mayoralty. Unsatisfied with the counting of votes held by the Board of
Canvassers, the herein protestant filed this present case. And before the
termination of the same and pending trial, the Filipino people in the exercise of
their free will and sovereign capacity approved a NEW CONSTITUTION, thus a
NEW FORM OF GOVERNMENT-PARLIAMENTARY IN FORM was enforced.
We find this provision under Article XI of the New Constitution, which provides:
SEC. 2. The National Assembly shall enact a local government
code which may not thereafter be amended except by a majority
vote of all its members, defining a more responsive and
accountable local government structure with an effective system of
recall, allocating among the different local government units their
powers, responsibilities, and resources, and providing for the
qualifications, election and removal, term, salaries, powers,
functions, and duties of local officials, and all other matters
relating to the organization and operation of the local units.
However, any change in the existing form of local government
shall not take effect until ratified by a majority of the votes cast in
a plebiscite called for the purpose.
It is respectfully submitted that the contention of the protestant to the effect that
the New Constitution "shows that the office of the Municipal Mayor has not been
abolished ... ," is not ACCURATE. Otherwise, the provisions of Section 9 of
Article XVII, is meaningless.
All officials and employees in the existing Government of the
Republic shall continue in office until otherwise provided by law
or decreed by the incumbent President of the Philippines, ...
In the above-quoted provision is the protection of the officials and employees
working in our government, otherwise, by the force of the New Constitution they
are all out of the government offices. In fact, in the case above-cited (Javellana)
we are all performing our duties in accordance with the New Constitution.
Therefore, election cases of the 1935 Constitution being interwoven in the
political complexion of our new Constitution should be dismissed because only
those incumbent official and employees existing in the new government are
protected by the transitional provisions of the New Fundamental Law of the Land.
The protestant, we respectfully submit, is not covered by the provisions of Section
9 Article XVII of the Constitution. And in case he will win in this present case he
has no right to hold the position of mayor of the town of Rosales, Pangasinan,
because he was not then an official of the government at the time the New
Constitution was approved by the Filipino People. His right if proclaimed a
winner is derived from the 1935 Constitution which is changed by the Filipino
people.
On December 18, 1973, the trial court, presided by respondent Judge, sustained the political
question theory of respondent Yu and ordered the dismissal of the electoral protest. Thus:
There is no dispute that the Filipino people have accepted and submitted to a new
Constitution to replace the 1935 Constitution, and that we are now living under its
aegis and protection. ...
xxx xxx xxx
Under Section 9, Article XVII, of the new Constitution, above-quoted, only those
officials and employees of the existing Government of the Republic of the
Philippines like the protestee herein, are given protection and are authorized to
continue in office at the pleasure of the incumbent President of the Philippines,
while under Section 2 of Article XI of the new Constitution, also above-quoted,
the intention of completely revamp the whole local government structure,
providing for different qualifications, election and removal, term, salaries,
powers, functions, and duties, is very clear. These present questions of policy, the
necessity and expediency of which are outside the range of judicial review. With
respect to the fate of incumbent oficials and employees in the existing
Government of the Republic of the Philippines, as well as to the qualifications,
election and removal, term of office, salaries, and powers of all local officials
under the parliamentary form of government these have been entrusted or
delegated by the sovereign people or has reserved it to be settled by the incumbent
Chief Executive or by the National Assembly with full discretionary authority
therefor. As if to supplement these delegated powers, the people have also decreed
in a referendum the suspension of all elections. Thus, in the United States,
questions relating to what persons or organizations constituted the lawful
government of a state of the Union (Luther vs. Borden, 7 How. 1, 12, L. Ed 58),
and those relating to the political status of a state (Highland Farms Dairy vs.
Agnew, 57 S. et 549, 300 U.S. 608, 81 L.ed 835), have been held to be political
and for the judiciary to determine.
To the mind of the Court, therefore, the ratification and effectivity of the new
Constitution has tainted this case with a political complexion above and beyond
the power of judicial review. As fittingly commented by Mr. Justice Antonio in a
separate opinion in the Javellana, et al. cases, 69 0. G. No. 36, September 3, 1973,
p. 8008:
The essentially political nature of the question is at once manifest
by understanding that in the final analysis, what is assailed is not
merely the validity of Proclamation No. 1102 of the President,
which is merely declaratory of the fact of the approval or
ratification, but the legitimacy of the government. It is addressed
more to the frame-work and political character of this government
which now functions under the new Charter. It seeks to nullify a
Constitution that is already effective. In other words, where a
complete change in the fundamental law has been effected through
political action, the Court whose existence is affected by such a
change is, in the words of Mr. Meville Fuller Weston "precluded
from passing upon the fact of change by a logical difficulty which
is not to be surmounted as the change relates to the existence of a
prior point in the Court's "chain of title" to its authority and "does
not relate merely to a question of the horizontal distribution of
powers." It involves a matter which 'the sovereign has entrusted to

the so-called political departments or has reserved to be settled by
its own extra-governmental action." The present Government
functions under the new Constitution which has become effective
through political action. Judicial power presupposes an established
government and an effective constitution. If it decides at all as a
court, it necessarily affirms the existence and authority of the
Government under which it is exercising judicial power.
The Court is not unaware of provisions of the new Constitution, particularly
Sections 7 and 8, Article XVII (Transitory Provisions) decreeing that all existing
laws not inconsistent with the new Constitution shall remain operative until
amended, modified, or repealed by the National Assembly, and that all courts
existing at the time of the ratification of the said new Constitution shall continue
and exercise their jurisdiction until otherwise provided by law in accordance with
the new Constitution, and all cases pending in said courts shall be heard, tried and
determined under the laws then in force. Again, to the mind of the Court, these
refer to matters raised in the enforcement of existing laws or in the invocation of a
court's jurisdiction which have not been "entrusted to the so-called political
department or has reserved to be settled by its own extra governmental action.
Hence, this petition.
We reverse.
The thrust of the aforesaid political question theory of respondent Yu is that the 1973
Constitution, through Section 9 of Article XVII thereof, protected only those incumbents, like
him, at the time of its ratification and effectivity and are the only ones authorized to continue in
office and their term of office as extended now depends on the pleasure of, as the same has been
entrusted or committed to, the incumbent President of the Philippines or the Legislative
Department; and that Section 2 of Article XI thereof entrusted to the National Assembly the
revamp of the entire local government structure by the enactment of a local government code,
thus presenting a question of policy, the necessity and expediency of which are outside the range
of judicial review. In short, for the respondent Judge to still continue assuming jurisdiction over
the pending election protest of petitioner is for him to take cognizance of a question or policy "in
regard to which full discretionary authority has been delegated to the Legislative or Executive
branch of the government."
I
There is an imperative need to re-state pronouncements of this Court on the new Constitution
which are decisive in the resolution of the political question theory of respondent Yu.
WE ruled:
1. That Section 9 of Article XVII of the 1973 Constitution did not render moot and academic
pending election protest cases (Santos vs. Castaeda, 65 SCRA 114 [1975]; Euipilag vs. Araula,
60 SCRA 211 [1974]; Nunez vs. Averia, 57 SCRA 726 [1974]; Parades vs. Abad, L-36927,
Sunga vs. Mosueda, L-37715, Valley vs. Caro, L-38331, 56 SCRA 522, [1974]).
2. That "the constitutional grant of privilege to continue in office, made by the new Constitution
for the benefit of persons who were incumbent officials or employees of the Government when
the new Constitution took effect, cannot be fairly construed as indiscriminately encompassing
every person who at the time happened to be performing the duties of an elective office, albeit
under protest or contest" and that "subject to the constraints specifically mentioned in Section 9,
Article XVII of the Transitory Provisions, it neither was, nor could have been the intention of the
framers of our new fundamental law to disregard and shunt aside the statutory right of a
condidate for elective position who, within the time-frame prescribed in the Election Code of
1971, commenced proceedings beamed mainly at the proper determination in a judicial forum of
a proclaimed candidate-elect's right to the contested office."' (Santos vs. Castaeda, supra); and
We rationalized that "the Constitutional Convention could not have intended, as in fact it .did not
intend, to shielf or protect those who had been unduly elected. To hold that the right of the herein
private respondents to the respective offices which they are now holding, may no longer be
subject to question, would be tantamount to giving a stamp of approval to what could have been
an election victory characterized by fraud, threats, intimidation, vote buying, or other forms of
irregularities prohibited by the Election Code to preserve inviolate the sanctity of the ballot."
(Parades, Sunga and Valley cases, supra).
3. That "the right of the private respondents (protestees) to continue in office indefinitely arose
not only by virtue of Section 9 of Article XVII of the New Constitution but principally from their
having been proclaimed elected to their respective positions as a result of the November 8, 1971
elections. Therefore, if in fact and in law, they were not duly elected to their respective positions
and consequently, have no right to hold the same, perform their functions, enjoy their privileges
and emoluments, then certainly, they should not be allowed to enjoy the indefinite term of office
given to them by said constitutional provision" (Parades, Sunga and Valley cases, supra).
4. That "until a subsequent law or presidential decree provides otherwise, the right of respondent
(protestee) to continue as mayor rests on the legality of his election which has been protested by
herein petitioner. Should the court decide adversely against him the electoral protest, respondent
(protestee) would cease to be mayor even before a law or presidential decree terminates his
tenure of office pursuant to said Section 9 of Article XVII of the 1973 Constitution"
(Euipilag, supra).
5. That "there is a difference between the 'term' of office and the 'right' to hold an office. A 'term'
of office is the period during winch an elected officer or appointee is entitled to hold office,
perform its functions and enjoy its privileges and emoluments. A 'right' to hold a public office is
the just and legal claim to hold and enjoy the powers and responsibilities of the office. In other
words, the 'term' refers to the period, duration of length of time during which the occupant of an
office is .entitled to stay therein whether such period be definite or indefinite. Hence, although
Section 9, Article XVII of the New Constitution made the term of the petitioners indefinite, it did
not foreclose any challenge by the herein petitioners, in an election protest, of the 'right' of the
private respondents to continue holding their respective office. What has been directly affected
by said constitutional provision is the 'term' to the office, although the 'right' of the incumbent to
an office which he is legally holding is co-extensive with the 'term' thereof," and that "it is
erroneous to conclude that under Section 9, Article XVII of the New Constitution, the term of
office of the private respondents expired, and that they are now holding their respective offices
under a new term. We are of the opinion that they hold their respective offices still under the
term to which they have been elected, although the same is now indefinite" (Parades, Sunga and
Valley cases, supra).
6. That the New Constitution recognized the continuing jurisdiction of courts of first instance to
hear, try and decide election protests: "Section 7 of Article XVII of the New Constitution
provides that 'all existing laws not inconsistent with this Constitution shall remain operative until
amended, modified or repealed by the National Assembly. 'And there has been no amendment,
modification or repeal of Section 220 of the Election Code of 1971 which gave the herein
petitioners the right to file an election contest against those proclaimed elected," and "according
to Section 8, Article XVII of the New Constitution 'all courts existing at the time of the
ratification of this Constitution shall continue and exercise their jurisdiction until otherwise
provided by law in accordance with this Constitution, and all cases pending in said courts shall
be heard, tried and determined under the laws then in force.' Consequently, the Courts of First
Instance presided over by the respondent-Judges should continue and exercise their jurisdiction
to hear, try and decide the election protests filed by herein petitioners" (Santos, Euipilag, Nunez,
Parades, Sunga and Valley cases, supra).
While under the New Constitution the Commission on Elections is now the sole judge of all
contests relating to the elections, returns, and qualifications of members of the National
Assembly as well as elective provincial and city officials (par. 2 of Sec. 2, Article XII-C of the
1973 Constitution), such power does not extend to electoral contests concerning municipal
elective positions.
7. That General Order No. 3, issued by the President of the Philippines merely reiterated his
powers under Section 9 of Article XVII of the New Constitution. The President did not intend
thereby to modify the aforesaid constitutional provision (Euipilag, supra).
General Order No. 3, as amended by General Order No. 3-A, does not expressly include electoral
contests of municipal elective positions as among those removed from the jurisdiction of the
courts; for said General Order, after affirming the jurisdiction of the Judiciary to decide in
accordance with the existing laws on criminal and civil cases, simply removes from the
jurisdiction of the Civil Court certain crimes specified therein as well as the validity, legality or
constitutionality of any decree, order or acts issued by the President or his duly designated
representative or by public servants pursuant to his decrees and orders issued under Proclamation
No. 1081.
8. That General Order No. 3 may not be invoked by the courts to avoid exercise of their
jurisdiction because to do co "is nothing short of unwarranted abdication of judicial', authority,
which no judge duly imbued with the implications of the paramount principle of independence of
the judiciary should ever think of doing. It is unfortunate indeed that respondent Judge is
apparently unaware that it is a matter of highly significant historical fact that this Court has
always deemed General Order No. 3 including its amendment by General Order No. 3-A as
practically inoperative even in the light of Proclamation No. 1081 of September 21, 1972 and
Proclamation No. 1104 of January 17, 1973, placing the whole Philippines under martial law.
While the members of the Court are not agreed on whether or not particular instances of attack
against the validity of certain Presidential decrees raise political questions which the Judiciary
would not interfere with, there is unanimity among Us in the view that it is for the Court rather
than the Executive to determine whether or not We may take cognizance of any given case
involving the validity of acts of the Executive Department purportedly under the authority of the
martial law proclamations" (Lina vs. Purisima, 3 PHILAJUR 605, 610-611, 82 SCRA 344
[1978]).
II
1. In the light of the foregoing pronouncements, We hold that the electoral protest case herein
involved has remained a justiciable controversy. No political question has ever been interwoven
into this case. Nor is there any act of the incumbent President or the Legislative Department to be
indirectly reviewed or interfered with if the respondent Judge decides the election protest. The
term "political question" connotes what it means in ordinary parlance, namely, a question of
policy. It refers to those questions which under the Constitution, are to be decided by the people
in their sovereign capacity; or in regard to which full discretionary authority has been delegated
to the legislative or executive branch of the government. It is concerned with issues dependent
upon the wisdom, not legality, of a particular measure" (Taada vs. Cuenco, L-1052, Feb. 28,
1957). A broader definition was advanced by U.S. Supreme Court Justice Brennan in Baker vs.
Carr (369 U.S. 186 [1962]): "Prominent on the surface of any case held to involve a political
question is found a textually demonstrable constitutional commitment of the issue to a coordinate
political department; or a lack of judicially discoverable and manageable standards for resolving
it; or the impossibility of deciding without an initial policy determination of a kind clearly for
non-judicial discretion; or the impossibility of a court's undertaking independent resolution
without expressing lack of respect due coordinate branches of the government; or an unusual
need for unquestioning adherence to a political decision already made; or the potentiality of
embarrassment from multifarious pronouncements by various departments on one question" (p.
217). And Chief Justice Enrique M. Fernando, then an Associate Justice, of this Court fixed the
limits of the term, thus: "The term has been made applicable to controversies clearly non-judicial
and therefore beyond its jurisdiction or to an issue involved in a case appropriately subject to its
cognizance, as to which there has been a prior legislative or executive determination to which
deference must be paid (Cf. Vera vs. Avelino, 77 Phil. 192 [1946]; Lopez vs. Roxas, L-25716,
July 28, 1966, 17 SCRA 756; Gonzales vs. Commission on Elections, L-28196, Nov. 9, 1967, 21
SCRA 774). It 'has likewise been employed loosely to characterize a suit where the party
proceeded against is the President or Congress, or any branch thereof (Cf. Planas vs. Gil, 67 Phil.
62 [1937]; Vera vs. Avelino, 77 Phil. 192 [1946]). If to be delimited with accuracy; 'political
questions' should refer to such as would under the Constitution be decided by the people in their
sovereign capacity or in regard to which full discretionary authority is vested either in the
President or Congress. It is thus beyond the competence of the judiciary to pass upon. ..."
(Lansang vs. Garcia, 42 SCRA 448, 504-505 [1971]).
2. The only issue in the electoral protest case dismissed by respondent Judge on the ground of
political question is who between protestant herein petitioner and protestee herein
respondent Yu was the duly elected mayor of Rosales, Pangasinan, and legally entitled to
enjoy the rights, privileges and emoluments appurtenant thereto and to discharge the functions,
duties and obligations of the position. If the protestee's election is upheld by the respondent
Judge, then he continues in office; otherwise, it is the protestant, herein petitioner. That is the
only consequence of a resolution of the issue therein involved a purely justiciable question or
controversy as it implies a given right, legally demandable and enforceable, an act or ommission
violative of said right, and a remedy, granted or sanctioned by law, for said breach of right (Tan
vs. Republic, 107 Phil. 632-633 [1960]). Before and after the ratification and effectivity of the
New Constitution, the nature of the aforesaid issue as well as the consequences of its resolution
by the Court, remains the same as above-stated.
3. Any judgment to be made on that issue will not in any way collide or interfere with the
mandate of Section 9 of Article XVII of the New Constitution, as it will merely resolve who as
between protestant and protestee is the duly elected mayor of Rosales, Pangasinan; hence,
entitled to enjoy the extended term as mandated by said provision of the New Constitution. As
construed by this Court, the elective officials referred to in Section 9 of Article XVII are limited
to those duly elected as the right to said extended term was not personal to whosoever was
incumbent at the time of the ratification and effectivity of the New Constitution. Nor would such
judgment preempt, collide or interfere with the power or discretion entrusted by the New
Constitution to the incumbent President or the Legislative Department, with respect to the
extended term of the duly elected incumbents; because whoever between protestant and protestee
is declared the duly elected mayor will be subject always to whatever action the President or the
Legislative Department will take pursuant thereto.
4. Neither does Section 2 of Article XI stigmatize the issue in that electoral protest case with a
political color. For simply, that section allocated unto the National Assembly the power to enact a
local government code "which may not thereafter be amended except by a majority of all its
Members, defining a more responsive and accountable local government allocating among the
different local government units their powers, responsibilities, and resources, and providing for
their qualifications, election and removal, term, salaries, powers, functions and duties of local
officials, and all other matters relating to the organization and operation of the local units" but "...
any change in the existing form of local government shall not take effect until ratified by a
majority of the votes cast in a plebiscite called for the purpose." It is apparent at once that such
power committed by the New Constitution to the National Assembly will not be usurped or
preempted by whatever ruling or judgment the respondent Judge will render in the electoral
protest case. Whoever will prevail in that contest will enjoy the indefinite term of the disputed
office of mayor of Rosales, Pangasinan in the existing set-up of local government in this country;
subject always to whatever change or modification the National Assembly will introduce when it
will enact the local government code.
III
The construction made by respondent Judge of Sections 7 and 8 of Article XVII of the New
Constitution "... that these refer to matters raised in the enforcement of existing laws or in the
invocation of a court's jurisdiction which have not been 'entrusted to the so-called political
department or reserved to be settled by its own extra-governmental action,"' strained as it is,
cannot be sustained in view of the result herein reached on the issue of political question as well
as Our previous pronouncements as above restated on the same Sections 7 and 8 of the New
Constitution.
WHEREFORE, RESPONDENT COURT'S ORDER OF DISMISSAL IS HEREBY SET ASIDE
AND THE RESPONDENT COURT IS DIRECTED TO IMMEDIATELY PROCEED WITH
THE TRIAL AND DETERMINATION OF THE ELECTION PROTEST BEFORE IT ON THE
MERITS. THIS DECISION SHALL BE IMMEDIATELY EXECUTORY UPON
PROMULGATION HEREOF. NO COSTS.
Teehankee (Chairman), Fernandez, Guerrero, De Castro and Melencio-Herrera, JJ,, concur.

SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-10520
February 28, 1957
LORENZO M. TAADA and DIOSDADO MACAPAGAL, petitioners,

vs.
MARIANO JESUS CUENCO, FRANCISCO A. DELGADO, ALFREDO CRUZ,
CATALINA CAYETANO, MANUEL SERAPIO, PLACIDO REYES, and FERNANDO
HIPOLITO in his capacity as cashier and disbursing officer,respondents.
Taada, Teehankee and Macapagal for petitioners.
Office of the Solicitor General Ambrosio Padilla and Solicitor Troadio T. Quiazon, Jr. for
respondents.
CONCEPCION, J.:
Petitioner Lorenzo M. Taada is a member of the Senate of the Philippines, and President of the
Citizens Party, whereas petitioner Diosdado Macapagal, a member of the House of
Representatives of the Philippines, was one of the official candidates of the Liberal Party for the
Senate, at the General elections held in November, 1955, in which Pacita Madrigal Wins,
Lorenzo Sumulong, Quintin Paredes, Francisco Rodrigo, Pedro Sabido, Claro M. Recto,
Domocao Alonto and Decoroso Rosales, were proclaimed elected. Subsequently, the elections of
this Senators-elect-who eventually assumed their respective seats in the Senate-was contested by
petitioner Macapagal, together with Camilo Osias, Geronima Pecson, Macario Peralta, Enrique
Magalona, Pio Pedrosa and William Chiongbian-who had, also, run for the Senate, in said
election-in Senate Electoral Case No. 4, now pending before the Senate Electoral Tribunal. .
The Senate, in its session of February 22, 1956, upon nomination of Senator Cipriano Primicias,
on behalf of the Nacionalista Party, chose Senators Jose P. Laurel, Fernando Lopez and Cipriano
Primicias, as members of the Senate Electoral Tribunal. Upon nomination of petitioner Senator
Taada, on behalf of the Citizens Party, said petitioner was next chosen by the Senate as member
of said Tribunal. Then, upon nomination of Senator Primicias on behalf of the Committee on
Rules of the Senate, and over the objections of Senators Taada and Sumulong, the Senate
choose respondents Senators Mariano J. Cuenco and Francisco A. Delgado as members of the
same Electoral Tribunal. Subsequently, the Chairman of the latter appointed: (1) Alfredo Cruz
and Catalina Cayetano, as technical assistant and private secretary, respectively, to Senator
Cuenco, as supposed member of the Senate Electoral Tribunal, upon his recommendation of said
respondent; and (2) Manuel Serapio and Placido Reyes, as technical assistant and private
secretary, respectively to Senator Delgado, as supposed member of said Electoral Tribunal, and
upon his recommendation.
Soon, thereafter, Senator Lorenzo M. Taada and Congressman Diosdado Macapagal instituted
the case at bar against Senators Cuenco and Delgado, and said Alfredo Cruz, Catalina Cayetano,
Manuel Serapio and Placido Reyes, as well as Fernando Hipolito, in his capacity as Cashier and
Disbursing Officer of the Senate Electoral Tribunal. Petitioners allege that on February 22, 1956,
as well as at present, the Senate consists of 23 Senators who belong to the Nacionalista Party,
and one (1) Senator-namely, petitioner, Lorenzo M. Taada-belonging to the Citizens Party; that
the Committee on Rules for the Senate, in nominating Senators Cuenco and Delgado, and the
Senate, in choosing these respondents, as members of the Senate Electoral Tribunal, had "acted
absolutely without power or color of authority and in clear violation .. of Article VI, Section 11
of the Constitution"; that "in assuming membership in the Senate Electoral Tribunal, by taking
the corresponding oath of office therefor", said respondents had "acted absolutely without color
of appointment or authority and are unlawfully, and in violation of the Constitution, usurping,
intruding into and exercising the powers of members of the Senate Electoral Tribunal"; that,
consequently, the appointments of respondents, Cruz, Cayetano, Serapio and Reyes, as technical
assistants and private secretaries to Senators Cuenco and Delgado-who caused said appointments
to be made-as members of the Senate Electoral Tribunal, are unlawful and void; and that
Senators Cuenco and Delgado "are threatening and are about to take cognizance of Electoral
Case No. 4 of the Senate Electoral Tribunal, as alleged members thereof, in nullification of the
rights of petitioner Lorenzo M. Taada, both as a Senator belonging to the Citizens Party and as
representative of the Citizens Party in the Senate Electoral Tribunal, and in deprivation of the
constitutional rights of petitioner Diosdado Macapagal and his co-protestants to have their
election protest tried and decided-by an Electoral Tribunal composed of not more than three (3)
senators chosen by the Senate upon nomination of the party having the largest number of votes in
the Senate and not more than the (3) Senators upon nomination of the Party having the second
largest number of votes therein, together, three (3) Justice of the Supreme Court to be designated
by the Chief Justice, instead of by an Electoral Tribunal packed with five members belonging to
the Nacionalista Party, which is the rival party of the Liberal Party, to which the Petitioner
Diosdado Macapagal and his co-protestants in Electoral Case No. 4 belong, the said five (5)
Nacionalista Senators having been nominated and chosen in the manner alleged.. hereinabove.".
Petitioners pray that:.
"1. Upon petitioners' filing of bond in such amount as may be determined by this Honorable
Court, a writ of preliminary injunction be immediately issued directed to respondents Mariano J.
Cuenco, Francisco A. Delgado, Alfredo Cruz, Catalina Cayetano, Manuel Serapio and Placido
Reyes, restraining them from continuing to usurp, intrude into and/ or hold or exercise the said
public offices respectively being occupied by them in the Senate Electoral Tribunal, and to
respondent Fernando Hipolito restraining him from paying the salaries of respondent Alfredo
Cruz, Catalina Cayetano, Manuel Serapio and Placido Reyes, pending this action.
"2. After hearing, judgment be rendered ousting respondent Mariano J. Cuenco Francisco A.
Delgado, Alfredo Cruz, Catalina Cayetano, Manuel Serapio and Placido Reyes from the
aforementioned public offices in the Senate Electoral Tribunal and that they be altogether
excluded therefrom and making the Preliminary injunction permanent, with costs against the
respondents.".
Respondents have admitted the main allegations of fact in the petition, except insofar as it
questions the legality, and validity of the election of respondents Senators Cuenco and Delgado,
as members of the Senate Electoral Tribunal, and of the appointment of respondent Alfredo Cruz,
Catalina Cayetano, Manuel Serapio and Placido Reyes as technical assistants and private
secretaries to said respondents Senators. Respondents, likewise, allege, by way of special and
affirmative defenses, that: (a) this Court is without power, authority of jurisdiction to direct or
control the action of the Senate in choosing the members of the Electoral Tribunal; and (b) that
the petition states no cause of action, because "petitioner Taada has exhausted his right to
nominate after he nominated himself and refused to nominate two (2) more Senators", because
said petitioner is in estoppel, and because the present action is not the proper remedy. .
I. Respondents assail our jurisdiction to entertain the petition, upon the ground that the power to
choose six (6) Senators as members of the Senate Electoral Tribunal has been expressly
conferred by the Constitution upon the Senate, despite the fact that the draft submitted to the
constitutional convention gave to the respective political parties the right to elect their respective
representatives in the Electoral Commission provided for in the original Constitution of the
Philippines, and that the only remedy available to petitioners herein "is not in the judicial
forum", but "to bring the matter to the bar of public opinion.".
We cannot agree with the conclusion drawn by respondents from the foregoing facts. To begin
with, unlike the cases of Alejandrino vs. Quezon (46 Phil., 83) and Vera vs. Avelino (77 Phil.,
192)-relied upon by the respondents this is not an action against the Senate, and it does not seek
to compel the latter, either directly or indirectly, to allow the petitioners to perform their duties as
members of said House. Although the Constitution provides that the Senate shall choose six (6)
Senators to be members of the Senate Electoral Tribunal, the latter is part neither of Congress nor
of the Senate. (Angara vs. Electoral Commission, 63 Phil., 139, Suanes vs. Chief Accountant, 81
Phil., 818; 46 Off. Gaz., 462.).
Secondly, although the Senate has, under the Constitution, the exclusive power to choose the
Senators who shall form part of the Senate Electoral Tribunal, the fundamental law has
prescribed the manner in which the authority shall be exercised. As the author of a very
enlightening study on judicial self-limitation has aptly put it:.
"The courts are called upon to say, on the one hand, by whom certain powers shall be exercised,
and on the other hand, to determine whether the powers possessed have been validly exercised.
In performing the latter function, they do not encroach upon the powers of a coordinate branch of
the, government, since the determination of the validity of an act is not the same, thing as the
performance of the act. In the one case we are seeking to ascertain upon whom devolves the duty
of the particular service. In the other case we are merely seeking to determine whether the
Constitution has been violated by anything done or attented by either an executive official or the
legislative." (Judicial Self-Limitation by Finkelstein, pp. 221, 224, 244, Harvard Law Review,
Vol. 39; emphasis supplied,).
The case of Suanes vs. Chief Accountant (supra) cited by respondent refutes their own pretense.
This Court exercised its jurisdiction over said case and decided the same on the merits thereof,
despite the fact that it involved an inquiry into the powers of the Senate and its President over the
Senate Electoral Tribunal and the personnel thereof. .
Again, under the Constitution, "the legislative power" is vested exclusively in the Congress of
the Philippines. Yet, this does not detract from the power of the courts to pass upon the
constitutionality of acts of Congress 1 And, since judicial power includes the authority to inquire
into the legality of statutes enacted by the two Houses of Congress, and approved by the
Executive, there can be no reason why the validity of an act of one of said Houses, like that of
any other branch of the Government, may not be determined in the proper actions. Thus, in the
exercise of the so-called "judicial supremacy", this Court declared that a resolution of the defunct
National Assembly could not bar the exercise of the powers of the former Electoral Commission
under the original Constitution. 2 (Angara vs. Electoral Commission, supra), and annulled certain
acts of the Executive 3 as incompatible with the fundamental law.
In fact, whenever the conflicting claims of the parties to a litigation cannot properly be settled
without inquiring into the validity of an act of Congress or of either House thereof, the courts
have, not only jurisdiction to pass upon said issue, but, also, the duty to do so, which cannot be
evaded without violating the fundamental law and paving the way to its eventual destruction. 4.
Neither are the cases of Mabanag vs. Lopez Vito (78 Phil., 1) and Cabili vs. Francisco (88 Phil.,
654), likewise, invoked by respondents, in point. In the Mabanag case, it was held that the courts
could not review the finding of the Senate to the effect that the members thereof who had been
suspended by said House should not be considered in determining whether the votes cast therein,
in favor of a resolution proposing an amendment to the Constitution, sufficed to satisfy the
requirements of the latter, such question being a political one. The weight of this decision, as a
precedent, has been weakened, however, by our resolutions in Avelino vs. Cuenco (83 Phil., 17),
in which this Court proceeded to determine the number essential to constitute a quorum in the
Senate. Besides, the case at bar does not hinge on the number of votes needed for a particular act
of said body. The issue before us is whether the Senate-after acknowledging that the Citizens
Party is the party, having the second largest number of votes in the Senate, to which party the
Constitution gives the right to nominate three (3) Senators for the Senate electoral Tribunal-could
validly choose therefor two (2) Nacionalista Senators, upon nomination by the floor leader of the
Nacionalista Party in the Senate, Senator Primicias claiming to act on behalf of the Committee
on Rules for the Senate.
The issue in the Cabili case was whether we could review a resolution of the Senate reorganizing
its representation in the Commission on Appointments. This was decided in the negative, upon
the authority of Alejandrino vs. Quezon (supra) and Vera vs. Avelino (supra), the main purpose
of the petition being "to force upon the Senate the reinstatement of Senator Magalona in the
Commission on Appointments," one-half (1/2) of the members of which is to be elected by each
House on the basis of proportional representation of the political parties therein. Hence, the issue
depended mainly on the determination of the political alignment of the members of the Senate at
the time of said reorganization and of the necessity or advisability of effecting said
reorganization, which is a political question. We are not called upon, in the case at bar, to pass
upon an identical or similar question, it being conceded, impliedly, but clearly, that the Citizens
Party is the party with the second largest number of votes in the Senate. The issue, therefore, is
whether a right vested by the Constitution in the Citizens Party may validly be exercised, either
by the Nacionalista Party, or by the Committee on Rules for the Senate, over the objection of
said Citizens Party.
xxx
xxx
xxx
The only ground upon which respondents' objection to the jurisdiction of this Court and their
theory to the effect that the proper remedy for petitioners herein is, not the present action, but an
appeal to public opinion, could possibly be entertained is, therefore, whether the case at bar
raises merely a political question, not one justiciable in nature.
In this connection, respondents assert in their answer that "the remedy of petitioners is not in the
judicial forum, but, to use petitioner, Taada's own words, to bring the matter to the bar of public
opinion' (p. 81, Discussion on the Creation of the Senate Electoral Tribunal, February 21, 1956)."
This allegation may give the impression that said petitioner had declared, on the floor of the
Senate, that his only relief against the acts complained of in the petition is to take up the issue
before the people- which is not a fact. During the discussions in the Senate, in the course of the
organization of the Senate Electoral Tribunal, on February 21, 1956, Senator Taada was asked
what remedies he would suggest if he nominated two (2) Nacionialista Senators and the latter
declined the, nomination. Senator Taada replied:.
"There are two remedies that occur to my mind right now, Mr. Senator; one is the remedy open to
all of us that if we feel aggrieved and there is no recourse in the court of justice, we can appeal to
public opinion. Another remedy is an action in the Supreme Court. Of course, as Senator
Rodriguez, our President here, has said one day; "If you take this matter to the Supreme Court,
you will lose, because until now the Supreme Court has always ruled against any action that
would constitute interference in the business of anybody pertaining to the Senate. The theory of
separation of powers will be upheld by the Supreme Court." But that learned opinion of Senator
Rodriguez, our President, notwithstanding, I may take the case to the Supreme Court if my right
herein is not respected. I may lose, Mr. President, but who has not lost in the Supreme Court? I
may lose because of the theory of the separation of powers, but that does not mean, Mr.
President, that what has been done here is pursuant to the provision of the Constitution."
(Congressional Record, Vol. III, p. 339; emphasis supplied.).
This statement did not refer to the nomination, by Senator Primicias, and the election, by the
Senate, of Senators Cuenco and Delgado as members of said Tribunal. Indeed, said nomination
and election took place the day after the aforementioned statement of Senator Taada was made.
At any rate, the latter announced that he might "take the case to the Supreme Court if my right
here is not respected.".
As already adverted to, the objection to our jurisdiction hinges on the question whether the issue
before us is political or not. In this connection, Willoughby lucidly states:.
"Elsewhere in this treatise the well-known and well-established principle is considered that it is
not within the province of the courts to pass judgment upon the policy of legislative or executive
action. Where, therefore, discretionary powers are granted by the Constitution or by statute, the
manner in which those powers are exercised is not subject to judicial review. The courts,
therefore, concern themselves only with the question as to the existence and extent of these
discretionary powers.
"As distinguished from the judicial, the legislative and executive departments are spoken of as
the political departments of government because in very many cases their action is necessarily
dictated by considerations of public or political policy. These considerations of public or political
policy of course will not permit the legislature to violate constitutional provisions, or the
executive to exercise authority not granted him by the Constitution or by, statute, but, within
these limits, they do permit the departments, separately or together, to recognize that a certain set
of facts exists or that a given status exists, and these determinations, together with the
consequences that flow therefrom, may not be traversed in the courts." (Willoughby on the
Constitution of the United States, Vol. 3, p. 1326; emphasis supplied.).
To the same effect is the language used in Corpus Juris Secundum, from which we quote:.
"It is well-settled doctrine that political questions are not within the province of the judiciary,
except to the extent that power to deal with such questions has been conferred upon the courts by
express constitutional or statutory provisions.
"It is not easy, however, to define the phrase `political question', nor to determine what matters,
fall within its scope. It is frequently used to designate all questions that lie outside the scope of
the judicial questions, which under the constitution, are to be decided by the people in their
sovereign capacity, or in regard to which full discretionary authority has been delegated to the
legislative or executive branch of the government." (16 C.J.S., 413; see, also Geauga Lake
Improvement Ass'n. vs. Lozier, 182 N. E. 491, 125 Ohio St. 565; Sevilla vs, Elizalde, 112 F. 2d
29, 72 App. D. C., 108; emphasis supplied.).
Thus, it has been repeatedly held that the question whether certain amendments to the
Constitution are invalid for non-compliance with the procedure therein prescribed, is not a
political one and may be settled by the Courts. 5 .
In the case of In re McConaughy (119 N.W. 408), the nature of political question was considered
carefully. The Court said:.
"At the threshold of the case we are met with the assertion that the questions involved are
political, and not judicial. If this is correct, the court has no jurisdiction as the certificate of the
state canvassing board would then be final, regardless of the actual vote upon the amendment.
The question thus raised is a fundamental one; but it has been so often decided contrary to the
view contended for by the Attorney General that it would seem to be finally settled.
xxx
xxx
x x x.
" .. What is generally meant, when it is, said that a question is political, and not judicial, is that it
is a matter which, is to be exercised by the people in their primary political capacity, or that it has
been specifically delegated to some other department or particular officer of the government,
with discretionary power to act. See State vs. Cunningham, 81 Wis. 497, 51 L. R. A. 561; In Re
Gunn, 50 Kan. 155; 32 Pac. 470, 948, 19 L. R. A. 519; Green vs. Mills, 69 Fed. 852, 16, C. C. A.
516, 30 L. R. A. 90; Fletcher vs. Tuttle, 151 Ill. 41, 37 N. E. 683, 25 L. R. A. 143, 42 Am. St.
Rep. 220. Thus the Legislature may in its discretion determine whether it will pass a law or
submit a proposed constitutional amendment to the people. The courts have no judicial control
over such matters, not merely because they involve political question, but because they are
matters which the people have by the Constitution delegated to the Legislature. The Governor
may exercise the powers delegated to him, free from judicial control, so long as he observes the
laws and acts within the limits of the power conferred. His discretionary acts cannot be
controllable, not primarily because they are of a political nature, but because the Constitution and
laws have placed the particular matter under his control. But every officer under a constitutional
government must act according to law and subject him to the restraining and controlling power
of the people, acting through the courts, as well as through the executive or the Legislature. One
department is just as representative as the other, and the judiciary is the department which is
charged with the special duty of determining the limitations which the law places upon all
official action. The recognition of this principle, unknown except in Great Britain and America,
is necessary, to the end that the government may be one of laws and not men'-words which
Webster said were the greatest contained in any written constitutional document." (pp. 411, 417;
emphasis supplied.).
In short, the term "political question" connotes, in legal parlance, what it means in ordinary
parlance, namely, a question of policy. In other words, in the language of Corpus Juris Secundum
(supra), it refers to "those questions which, under the Constitution, are to be decided by the
people in their sovereign capacity, or in regard to which full discretionary authority has been
delegated to the Legislature or executive branch of the Government." It is concerned with issues
dependent upon the wisdom, not legality, of a particular measure.
Such is not the nature of the question for determination in the present case. Here, we are called
upon to decide whether the election of Senators Cuenco and Delgado, by the Senate, as members
of the Senate Electoral Tribunal, upon nomination by Senator Primicias-a member and
spokesman of the party having the largest number of votes in the Senate-on behalf of its
Committee on Rules, contravenes the constitutional mandate that said members of the Senate
Electoral Tribunal shall be chosen "upon nomination .. of the party having the second largest
number of votes" in the Senate, and hence, is null and void. This is not a political question. The
Senate is not clothed with "full discretionary authority" in the choice of members of the Senate
Electoral Tribunal. The exercise of its power thereon is subject to constitutional limitations
which are claimed to be mandatory in nature. It is clearly within the legitimate prove of the
judicial department to pass upon the validity the proceedings in connection therewith.
".. whether an election of public officers has been in accordance with law is for the judiciary.
Moreover, where the legislative department has by statute prescribed election procedure in a
given situation, the judiciary may determine whether a particular election has been in conformity
with such statute, and, particularly, whether such statute has been applied in a way to deny or
transgress on the constitutional or statutory rights .." (16 C.J.S., 439; emphasis supplied.).
It is, therefore, our opinion that we have, not only jurisdiction, but, also, the duty, to consider and
determine the principal issue raised by the parties herein.
II. Is the election of Senators Cuenco and Delgado, by the Senate, as members of the Electoral
Tribunal, valid and lawful?.
Section 11 of Article VI of the Constitution, reads:.
"The Senate and the House of Representatives shall each have an Electoral Tribunal which shall
be the sole judge of all contests relating to the election, returns, and qualifications of their
respective Members. Each Electoral Tribunal shall be composed of nine Members, three of
whom shall be Justices of the Supreme Court to be designated by the Chief Justice, and the
remaining six shall be Members of the Senate or of the House of Representatives, as the case
may be, who shall be chosen by each House, three upon nomination of the party having the
largest number of votes and three of the party having the second largest number of votes therein.
The Senior Justice in each Electoral Tribunal shall be its Chairman." (Emphasis supplied.).
It appears that on February 22, 1956, as well as at present, the Senate of the Philippines consists
of twenty three (23) members of the Nacionalista Party and one (1) member of the Citizens
Party, namely, Senator Taada, who is, also, the president of said party. In the session of the
Senate held on February 21, 1956, Senator Sabido moved that Senator Taada, "the President of
the Citizens Party, be given the privilege to nominate .. three (3) members" of the Senate
Electoral Tribunal (Congressional Record for the Senate, Vol. III, pp. 328-329), referring to those
who, according to the provision above-quoted, should be nominated by "the party having the
second largest number of votes" in the Senate. Senator Taada objected formally to this motion
upon the-ground: (a) that the right to nominate said members of the Senate Electoral Tribunal
belongs, not to the Nacionalista Party of which Senator Sabido and the other Senators are
members-but to the Citizens Party, as the one having the second largest number of votes in the
Senate, so that, being devoid of authority to nominate the aforementioned members of said
Tribunal, the Nacionalista Party cannot give it to the Citizens Party, which, already, has such
authority, pursuant to the Constitution; and (b) that Senator Sabido's motion would compel
Senator Taada to nominate three (3) Senators to said Tribunal, although as representative of the
minority party in the Senate he has "the right to nominate one, two or three to the Electoral
Tribunal," in his discretion. Senator Taada further stated that he reserved the right to determine
how many he would nominate, after hearing the reasons of Senator Sabido in support of his
motion. After some discussion, in which Senators Primicias, Cea, Lim, Sumulong, Zulueta, and
Rodrigo took part, the Senate adjourned until the next morning, February 22, 1956 (Do., do, pp.
329, 330, 332-333, 336, 338, 339, 343).
Then, said issues were debated upon more extensively, with Senator Sumulong, not only
seconding the opposition of Senator Taada, but, also, maintaining that "Senator Taada should
nominate only one" member of the Senate, namely, himself, he being the only Senator who
belongs to the minority party in said House (Do., do., pp. 360-364, 369). Thus, a new issue was
raised - whether or not one who does not belong to said party may be nominated by its
spokesman, Senator Taada - on which Senators Paredes, Pelaez, Rosales and Laurel, as well as
the other Senators already mentioned, expressed their views (Do., do., pp. 345, 349, 350, 354,
358, 364, 375). Although the deliberations of the Senate consumed the whole morning and
afternoon of February 22, 1956, a satisfactory solution of the question before the Senate
appeared to be remote. So, at 7:40 p.m., the meeting was suspended, on motion of Senator
Laurel, with a view to seeking a compromise formula (Do., do., pp. 377). When session was
resumed at 8:10 p.m., Senator Sabido withdrew his motion above referred to. Thereupon, Senator
Primicias, on behalf of the Nacionalista Party, nominated, and the Senate elected, Senators
Laurel, Lopez and Primicias, as members of the Senate Electoral Tribunal. Subsequently, Senator
Taada stated:.
"On behalf of the Citizens Party, the minority party in this Body, I nominate the only Citizens
Party member in this Body, and that is Senator Lorenzo M. Taada.".
Without an objection, this nomination was approved by the House. Then, Senator Primicias stood
up and said:.
"Now, Mr. President, in order to comply with the provision in the Constitution, the Committee on
Rules of the Senate-and I am now making this proposal not on behalf of the Nacionalista Party
but on behalf of the Committee on Rules of the Senate-I nominate two other members to
complete the membership of the Tribunal: Senators Delgado and Cuenco.".
What took place thereafter appears in the following quotations from the Congressional Record
for the Senate.
"SENATOR TAADA. Mr. President.
"EL PRESIDENTE INTERINO. Caballero de Quezon.
"SENATOR TAADA. I would like to record my opposition to the nominations of the last two
named gentlemen, Senators Delgado and Cuenco, not because I don't believe that they do not
deserve to be appointed to the tribunal but because of my sincere and firm conviction that these
additional nominations are not sanctioned by the Constitution. The Constitution only permits the
Nacionalista Party or the party having the largest number of votes to nominate three.
"SENATOR SUMULONG. Mr. President.
"EL PRESIDENTE INTERINO. Caballero de Rizal.
"SENATOR SUMULONG. For the reasons that I have stated a few moments ago when I took
the floor, I also wish to record my objection to the last nominations, to the nomination of two
additional NP's to the Electoral Tribunal.
"EL PRESIDENTE INTERINO. Esta dispuesto el Senado a votar? (Varios Senadores: Si.) Los
que esten conformes con la nominacion hecha por el Presidente del Comite de Reglamentos a
favor de los Senadores Delgado y Cuenco para ser miembros del Tribunal Electoral, digan, si.
(Varios Senadores: Si.) Los que no lo esten digan, no (Silencio.) Queda aprobada."
(Congressional Record for the Senate, Vol. III, p. 377; emphasis supplied.).
Petitioners maintain that said nomination and election of Senators Cuenco and Delgado-who
belong to the Nacionalista Party-as members of the Senate Electoral Tribunal, are null and void
and have been made without power or color of authority, for, after the nomination by said party,
and the election by the Senate, of Senators Laurel, Lopez and Primicias, as members of said
Tribunal, the other Senators, who shall be members thereof, must necessarily be nominated by
the party having the second largest number of votes in the Senate, and such party is, admittedly,
the Citizens Party, to which Senator Taada belongs and which he represents.
Respondents allege, however, that the constitutional mandate to the effect that "each Electoral
Tribunal shall be compose of nine (9) members," six (6) of whom "shall be members of the
Senate or of the House of Representatives, as the case may be", is mandatory; that when-after the
nomination of three (3) Senators by the majority party, and their election by the Senate, as
members of the Senate Electoral Tribunal-Senator Taada nominated himself only, on behalf of
the minority party, he thereby "waived his right to no two more Senators;" that, when Senator
Primicias nominated Senators Cuenco and Delgado, and these respondents were chosen by the
Senate, as members of the Senate Electoral Tribunal, Said Senator Primicias and the Senate
merely complied with the aforementioned provision of the fundamental law, relative to the
number of members of the Senate Electoral Tribunal; and, that, accordingly, Senators Cuenco
and Delgado are de jure members of said body, and the appointment of their co-respondents,
Alfredo Cruz, Catalina Cayetano, Manuel Serapio and Placido Reyes is valid and lawful.
At the outset, it will be recalled that the proceedings the organization of the Senate Electoral
Tribunal began with a motion of Senator Sabido to the effect that "the distinguished gentleman
from Quezon, the President of the Citizens Party, be given the privilege to nominate the three
Members" of said Tribunal. Senator Primicias inquired why the movant had used the word
"privilege". Senator Sabido explained that the present composition of the Senate had created a
condition or situation which was not anticipated by the framers of our Constitution; that although
Senator Taada formed part of the Nacionalista Party before the end of 1955, he subsequently
parted ways with" said party; and that Senator Taada "is the distinguished president of the
Citizens Party," which "approximates the situation desired by the framers of the Constitution"
(Congressional Record for the Senate Vol. III, pp. 329-330). Then Senator Lim intervened,
stating:.
"At present Senator Taada is considered as forming the only minority or the one that has the
second largest number of votes in the existing Senate, is not that right? And if this is so, he
should be given this as a matter of right, not as a matter of privilege. .. I don't believe that we
should be allowed to grant this authority to Senator Taada only as a privilege but we must grant
it as a matter of right." (Id., id., p. 32; emphasis supplied.).
Similarly, Senator Sumulong maintained that "Senator Taada, as Citizens Party Senator, has the
right and not a mere privilege to nominate," adding that:.
".. the question is whether we have a party here having the second largest number of votes, and it
is clear in my mind that there is such a party, and that is the Citizens Party to which the
gentleman from Quezon belongs. .. We have to bear in mind, .. that when Senator Taada was
included in the Nacionalista Party ticket in 1953, it was by virtue of a coalition or an alliance
between the Citizens Party and the Nacionalista Party at that time, and I maintain that when
Senator Taada as head of the Citizens Party entered into a coalition with the Nacionalista Party,
he did not thereby become a Nacionalista because that was a mere coalition, not a fusion. When
the Citizens Party entered into a mere coalition, that party did not lose its personality as a party
separate and distinct from the, Nacionalista Party. And we should also remember that the
certificate of candidacy filed by Senator Taada in the 1953 election was one to the effect that he
belonged to the Citizens Party .." (Id., id., p. 360; emphasis supplied.).
The debate was closed by Senator Laurel, who remarked, referring to Senator Taada:.
"..there is no doubt that he does not belong to the majority in the first place, and that, therefore,
he belongs to the minority. And whether we like it or not, that is the reality of the actual
situation-that he is not a Nacionalista now, that he is the head and the representative of the
Citizens Party. I think that on equitable ground and from the point of view of public opinion, his
situation .. approximates or approaches what is within the spirit of that Constitution. .. and from
the point of view of the spirit of the Constitution it would be a good thing if we grant the
opportunity to Senator Taada to help us in the organization of this Electoral Tribunal (Id., id., p.
376; emphasis supplied.).
The foregoing statements and the fact that, thereafter, Senator Sabido withdrew his motion to
grant Senator Taada the "privilege" to nominate, and said petitioner actually nominated himself
"on behalf of the Citizens Party, the minority party in this Body"-not only without any, objection
whatsoever, but, also, with the approval of the Senate-leave no room for doubt that the Senateleave no room for doubt that the Senate has regarded the Citizens Party, represented by Senator
Taada, as the party having the second largest number of votes in said House.
Referring, now, to the contention of respondents herein, their main argument in support of the
mandatory character of the constitutional provision relative to the number of members of the
Senate Electoral Tribunal is that the word "shall", therein used, is imperative in nature and that
this is borne out by an opinion of the Secretary of Justice dated February 1, 1939, pertinent parts
of which are quoted at the footnote. 6.
Regardless of the respect due its author, as a distinguished citizen and public official, said
opinion has little, if any, weight in the solution of the question before this Court, for the practical
construction of a Constitution is of little, if any, unless it has been uniform .." 6a Again, "as a
general rule, it is only in cases of substantial doubt and ambiguity that the doctrine of
contemporaneous or practical construction has any application". As a consequence, "where the
meaning of a constitutional provision is clear, a contemporaneous or practical executive
interpretation thereof is entitled to no weight, and will not be allowed to distort or in any way
change its natural meaning." The reason is that "the application of the doctrine of
contemporaneous construction is more restricted as applied to the interpretation of constitutional
provisions than when applied to statutory provisions", and that, "except as to matters committed
by the Constitution, itself to the discretion of some other department, contemporary or practical
construction is not necessarily binding upon the courts, even in a doubtful case." Hence, "if in the
judgment of the court, such construction is erroneous and its further application is not made
imperative by any paramount considerations of public policy, it may he rejected." (16 C. J. S.,
71-72; emphasis supplied.) 6b.
The aforemention opinion of the Secretary of Justice is not backed up by a, "uniform"
application of the view therein adopted, so essential to give thereto the weight accorded by the
rules on contemporaneous constructions. Moreover, said opinion tends to change the natural
meaning of section 11 of Article VI of the Constitution, which is clear. What is more, there is not
the slightest doubt in our mind that the purpose and spirit of said provisions do not warrant said
change and that the rejection of the latter is demanded by paramount considerations of public
policy. .
The flaw in the position taken in said opinion and by respondent herein is that, while, it relies
upon the compulsory nature of the word "shall", as regards the number of members of the
Electoral Tribunals, it ignores the fact that the same term is used with respect to the method
prescribed for their election, and that both form part of a single sentence and must be considered,
therefore, as integral portions of one and the same thought. Indeed, respondents have not even
tried to show and we cannot conceive-why "shall" must be deemed mandatory insofar as the
number of members of each Electoral Tribunal, and should be considered directory as regards the
procedure for their selection. More important still, the history of section 11 of Article VI of the
Constitution and the records of the Convention, refute respondents' pretense, and back up the
theory of petitioners herein.
Commenting on the frame of mind of the delegates to the Constitutional Convention, when they
faced the task of providing for the adjudication of contests relating to the election, returns and
qualifications of members of the Legislative Department, Dr. Jose M. Aruego, a member of said
Convention, says:.
"The experience of the Filipino people under the provisions of the organic laws which left to the
lawmaking body the determination of the elections, returns, and qualifications of its members
was not altogether satisfactory. There were many complaints against the lack of political justice
in this determination; for in a great number of cases, party interests controlled and dictated the
decisions. The undue delay in the dispatch of election contests for legislative seats, the
irregularities that characterized the proceedings in some of them, and the very apparent injection
of partisanship in the determination of a great number of the cases were decried by a great
number of the people as well as by the organs of public opinion.
"The faith of the people in the uprightness of the lawmaking body in the performance of this
function assigned to it in the organic laws was by no means great. In fact so blatant was the lack
of political justice in the decisions that there was, gradually built up a camp of thought in the
Philippines inclined to leave to the courts the determination of election contests, following the
practice in some countries, like England and Canada.
"Such were the conditions of things at the time of the meeting of the convention." (The Framing
of the Philippine Constitution by Aruego, Vol. 1, pp. 257-258; emphasis supplied.).
This view is shared by distinguished members of the Senate. Thus, in its session of February 22,
1956, Senator Sumulong declared:.
".. when you leave it to either House to decide election protests involving its own members, that
is virtually placing the majority party in a position to dictate the decision in those election cases,
because each House will be composed of a majority and a minority, and when you make each
House the judge of every election protest involving any member of that House, you place the
majority in a position to dominate and dictate the decision in the case and result was, there were
so many abuses, there were so main injustices: committed by the majority at the expense and to
the prejudice of the minority protestants. Statements have been made here that justice was done
even under the old system, like that case involving Senator Mabanag, when he almost became a
victim of the majority when he had an election case, and it was only through the intervention of
President Quezon that he was saved from becoming the victim of majority injustices.
"It is true that justice had sometimes prevailed under the old system, but the record will show
that those cases were few and they were the rare exceptions. The overwhelming majority of
election protests decided under the old system was that the majority being then in a position to
dictate the, decision in the election protest, was tempted to commit as it did commit many abuses
and injustices." (Congressional Record for the Senate, Vol. 111, p. 361; emphasis supplied.).
Senator Paredes, a veteran legislator and former Speaker of the House of Representatives, said:.
".. what was intended in the creation of the electoral tribunal was to create a sort of collegiate
court composed of nine members: Three of them belonging to the party having the largest
number of votes, and three from the party having the second largest number votes so that these
members may represent the party, and the members of said party who will sit before the electoral
tribunal as protestees. For when it comes to a party, Mr. President, there ground to believe that
decisions will be made along party lines." (Congressional Record for the Senate, Vol. III, p. 351;
Senator Laurel, who played an important role in the framing of our Constitution, expressed
himself as follows:.
"Now, with reference to the protests or contests, relating to the election, the returns and the
qualifications of the members of the legislative bodies, I heard it said here correctly that there
was a time when that was given to the corresponding chamber of the legislative department. So
the election, returns and qualifications of the members, of the Congress or legislative body was
entrusted to that body itself as the exclusive body to determine the election, returns and
qualifications of its members. There was some doubt also expressed as to whether that should
continue or not, and the greatest argument in favor of the retention of that provision was the fact
that was, among other things, the system obtaining in the United States under the Federal
Constitution of the United States, and there was no reason why that power or that right vested in
the legislative body should not be retained. But it was thought that would make the determination
of this contest, of this election protest, purely political as has been observed in the past."
(Congressional Record for the Senate, Vol. III, p. 376; emphasis supplied.).
It is interesting to note that not one of the members of the Senate contested the accuracy of the
views thus expressed.
Referring particularly to the philosophy underlying the constitutional provision quoted above,
Dr. Aruego states:.
"The defense of the Electoral Commission was based primarily upon the hope and belief that the
abolition of Party line because of the equal representation in this body of the majority and the
minority parties of the National Assembly and the intervention of some members of the Supreme
Court who, under the proposed constitutional provision, would also be members of the same,
would insure greater political justice in the determination of election contests for seats in the
National Assembly than there would be if the power had been lodged in the lawmaking body
itself. Delegate Francisco summarized the arguments for the creation of the Electoral
Commission in the following words:.
"I understand that from the time that this question is placed in the hands of members not only of
the majority party but also of the minority party, there is already a condition, a factor which
would make protests decided in a non-partisan manner. We know from experience that many
times in the many protests tried in the House or in the Senate, it was impossible to prevent the
factor of party from getting in. From the moment that it is required that not only the majority but
also the minority should intervene in these questions, we have already enough guarantee that
there would be no tyranny on the part of the majority.
`But there is another more detail which is the one which satisfies me most, and that is the
intervention of three justices. So that with this intervention of three justices if there would be any
question as to the justice applied by the majority or the minority, if there would be any
fundamental disagreement, or if there would be nothing but questions purely of party in which
the members of the majority as well as those of the minority should wish to take lightly a protest
because the protestant belongs to one of said parties, we have in this case, as a check upon the
two parties, the actuations of the three justices. In the last analysis, what is really applied in the
determination of electoral cases brought before the tribunals of justice or before the House of
Representatives or the Senate? Well, it is nothing more than the law and the doctrine of the
Supreme Court. If that is the case, there will be greater skill in the application of the laws and in
the application of doctrines to electoral matters having as we shall have three justices who will
act impartially in these electoral questions.
Ì wish to call the attention of my distinguished colleagues to the fact that in electoral protests it
is impossible to set aside party interests. Hence, the best guarantee, I repeat, for the
administration of justice to the parties, for the fact that the laws will not be applied rightfully or
incorrectly as well as for the fact that the doctrines of the Supreme Court will be applied
rightfully, the best guarantee which we shall have, I repeat, is the intervention of the three
justices. And with the formation of the Electoral Commission, I say again, the protestants as well
as the protestees could remain tranquil in the certainty that they will receive the justice that they
really deserve. If we eliminate from this precept the intervention of the party of the minority and
that of the three justices, then we shall be placing protests exclusively in the hands of the party in
power. And I understand, gentlemen, that in practice that has not given good results. Many have
criticized, many have complained against, the tyranny of the majority in electoral cases .. I repeat
that the best guarantee the fact that these questions will be judged not only by three members of
the majority but also by three members of the minority, with the additional guarantee of the
impartial judgment of three justices of the Supreme Court." (The Framing of the Philippine
Constitution by Aruego, Vol. I, pp. 261-263; emphasis supplied.).
The foregoing was corroborated by Senator Laurel. Speaking for this Court, in Angara vs.
Electoral Commission (63 Phil., 139), he asserted:.
"The members of the Constitutional Convention who framed our fundamental law were in their
majority-men mature in years and experience. To be sure, many of them were familiar with the
history and political development of other countries of the world. When, therefore they deemed it
wise to create an Electoral Commission as a constitutional organ and invested with the exclusive
function of passing upon and determining the election, returns and qualifications of the members
of the National Assembly, they must have done so not only in the light of their own experience
but also having in view the experience of other enlightened peoples of the world. The creation of
the Electoral Commission was designed to remedy certain evils of which the framers of our
Constitution were cognizant. Notwithstanding the vigorous opposition of some members of the
Convention to its creation, the plan, as hereinabove stated, was approved by that body by a vote
of 98 against 58. All that can be said now is that, upon the approval of the Constitution, the
creation of the Electoral Commission is the expression of the wisdom ùltimate justice of the
people'. (Abraham Lincoln, First Inaugural Address, March 4, 1861.).
"From the deliberations of our Constitutional Convention it is evident that the purpose was to
transfer in its totality all the powers previously exercised by the legislature in matters pertaining
to contested elections of its members, to an independent and impartial tribunal. It was not so
much the knowledge and appreciation of contemporary constitutional precedents, however, as
the long felt need of determining legislative contests devoid of partisan considerations which
prompted the people acting through their delegates to the Convention, to provide for this body
known as the Electoral Commission. With this end in view, a composite body in which both the
majority and minority parties are equally represented to off-set partisan influence in its
deliberations was created, and further endowed with judicial temper by including in its
membership three justices of the Supreme Court," (Pp. 174-175.) 7.
As a matter of fact, during the deliberations of the convention, Delegates Conejero and Roxas
said:.
"El Sr. CONEJERO. Antes de votarse la enmienda, quisiera pedir informacion del Subcomite de
Siete.
"El Sr. PRESIDENTE. Que dice el Comite?" El Sr. ROXAS. Con mucho gusto. "El Sr.
CONEJERO. Tal como esta el draft., dando tres miembrosala mayoria, y otros t?-es a la
minyoryia y atros a la Corte Suprerma, no cree su Senoria que este equivale pricticamente a dejar
el asunto a los miembros del Tribunal Supremo?.
"El Sr. ROXAS. Si y no. Creemos que si el tribunal a la Comision esta cotistuido en esa forma,
tanto los miembros de la mayoria como los de la minoria asi como los miembros de la Corte
Saprema consideration la cuestion sobre la base de sus meritos, sabiendo que el partidismo no es
suficiente para dar el triunbo.
"El Sr. CONEJERO. Cree Su Senoria que en un caso como ese, podriamos hacer que tanto los de
la mayoria como los de la minoria prescindieran del partidisrno?.
"El Sr. ROXAS. Creo que si, porque el partidismo no les daria el triunfo." (Angara vs. Electoral
Commission, supra, pp. 168-169; emphasis supplied.).
It is clear from the foregoing that the main objective of the framers of our Constitution in
providing for the establishment, first, of an Electoral Commission, 8 and then 9 of one Electoral
Tribunal for each House of Congress, was to insure the exercise of judicial impartiality in the
disposition of election contests affecting members of the lawmaking body. To achieve this
purpose, two devices were resorted to, namely: (a) the party having the largest number of votes,
and the party having the second largest number of votes, in the National Assembly or in each
House of Congress, were given the same number of representatives in the Electoral Commission
or Tribunal, so that they may realize that partisan considerations could not control the
adjudication of said cases, and thus be induced to act with greater impartiality; and (b) the
Supreme Court was given in said body the same number of representatives as each one of said
political parties, so that the influence of the former may be decisive and endow said Commission
or Tribunal with judicial temper.
This is obvious from the very language of the constitutional provision under consideration. In
fact, Senator Sabido-who had moved to grant to Senator Taada the privilege" to make the
nominations on behalf of party having the second largest number of votes in the Senate-agrees
with it. As Senator Sumulong inquired:.
"..I suppose Your Honor will agree with me that the framers of the Constitution precisely thought
of creating this Electoral Tribunal so as to prevent the majority from ever having a preponderant
majority in the Tribunal." (Congressional Record for the Senate, Vol. III, p. 330; emphasis
supplied.).
Senator Sabido replied:.
"That is so, .." (Id., p. 330.).
Upon further interpretation, Senator Sabido said:.
".. the purpose of the creation of the Electoral Tribunal and of its composition is to maintain a
balance between the two parties and make the members of the Supreme Court the controlling
power so to speak of the Electoral Tribunal or hold the balance of power. That is the ideal
situation." (Congressional Record for the Senate, Vol. III, p. 349; emphasis supplied.).
Senator Sumulong opined along the same line. His words were: .
"..The intention is that when the three from the majority and the three from the minority become
members of the Tribunal it is hoped that they will become aware of their judicial functions, not to
protect the protestants or the protegees. It is hoped that they will act as judges because to decide
election cases is a judicial function. But the framers of, the Constitution besides being learned
were men of experience. They knew that even Senators like us are not angels, that we are human
beings, that if we should be chosen to go to the Electoral Tribunal no one can say that we will
entirely be free from partisan influence to favor our party, so that in, case that hope that the three
from the majority and the three from the minority who will act as Judges should result in
disappointment, in case they do not act as judges but they go there and vote along party liner,
still there is the guarantee that they will offset each other and the result will be that the deciding
vote will reside in the hands of the three Justices who have no partisan motives to favor either the
protestees or the protestants. In other words, the whole idea is to prevent the majority from
controlling and dictating the decisions of the Tribunal and to make sure that the decisive vote
will be wielded by the Congressmen or Senators who are members the Tribunal but will be
wielded by the Justices who, by virtue of their judicial offices, will have no partisan motives to
serve, either protestants, or protestees. That is my understanding of the intention of the framers
of the Constitution when they decided to create the Electoral Tribunal.
xxx
xxx
x x x.
"My idea is that the intention of the framers of the constitution in creating the Electoral Tribunal
is to insure impartially and independence in its decision, and that is sought to be done by never
allowing the majority party to control the Tribunal, and secondly by seeing to it that the decisive
vote in the Tribunal will be left in the hands of persons who have no partisan interest or motive
to favor either protestant or protestee." (Congressional Record for the Senate, Vol. III, pp. 362363, 365-366; emphasis supplied.).
So important in the "balance of powers" between the two political parties in the Electoral
Tribunals, that several members of the Senate questioned the right of the party having the second
largest number of votes in the Senate and, hence, of Senator Taada, as representative of the
Citizens Party-to nominate for the Senate Electoral Tribunal any Senator not belonging to said
party. Senators Lim, Sabido, Cea and Paredes maintained that the spirit of the Constitution would
be violated if the nominees to the Electoral Tribunals did not belong to the parties respectively
making the nominations. 10.
It is not necessary, for the purpose of this decision, to determine whether the parties having the
largest, and the second largest, number of votes in each House may nominate, to the Electoral
Tribunals, those members of Congress who do not belong to the party nominating them. It is
patent, however, that the most vital feature of the Electoral Tribunals is the equal representation
of said parties therein, and the resulting equilibrium to be maintained by the Justices of the
Supreme Court as members of said Tribunals. In the words of the members of the present Senate,
said feature reflects the "intent" "purpose", and "spirit of the Constitution", pursuant to which the
Senate Electoral Tribunal should be organized (Congressional Record for the Senate, pp. 330,
337, 348-9, 350, 351, 355, 358, 362-3, 364, 370, 376).
Now then, it is well settled that "the purpose of all rules or maxims as to the construction or
interpretation of statutes is to discover the true intention of the law" (82 C. J. S., 526) and that.
"As a general rule of statutory construction, the spirit or intention of a statute prevails over the
letter thereof, and whatever is within the spirit of statute is within the statute although it is not
within the letter, while that which is within the letter, but not within the spirit of a statute, is not
within the statute; but, where the law is free and clear from ambiguity, the letter of it is not to be
disregarded on the pretext of pursuing its spirit." (82 C. J. S., 613.).
"There is no universal rule or absolute test by which directory provisions in a statute may in all
circumstances be distinguished from those which are mandatory. However, in the determination
of this question, as of every other question of statutory construction, the prime object is to
ascertain the legislative intent. The legislative intent must be obtained front all the surrounding
circumstances, and the determination does not depend on the form of the statute. Consideration
must be given to the entire statute, its nature, its object, and the consequences which would result
from construing it one way or the other, and the statute must be construed in connection with
other related statutes. Words of permissive character may be given a mandatory significance in
order to effect the legislative intent, and, when the terms of a statute are such that they cannot be
made effective to the extent of giving each and all of them some reasonable operation, without
construing the statute as mandatory, such construction should be given; .. On the other hand, the
language of a statute, however mandatory in form, may be deemed directory whenever
legislative purpose can best be carried out by such construction, and the legislative intent does
not require a mandatory construction; but the construction of mandatory words as directory
should not be lightly adopted and never where it would in fact make a new law instead of that
passed by the legislature. .. Whether a statute is mandatory or directory depends on whether the
thing directed to be done is of the essence of the thing required, or is a mere matter of form, and
what is a matter of essence can often be determined only by judicial construction. Accordingly,
when a particular provision of a statute relates to some immaterial matter, as to which
compliance with the statute is a matter of convenience rather than substance, or where the
directions of a statute are given merely with a view to the proper, orderly, and prompt conduct of
business, it is generally regarded as directory, unless followed by words of absolute prohibition;

and a statute is regarded as directory were no substantial rights depend on it, no injury can result
from ignoring it, and the purpose of the legislative can be accomplished in a manner other than
that prescribed, with substantially the same result. On the other hand, a provision relating to the
essence of the thing to be done, that is, to matters of substance, is mandatory, and when a fair
interpretation of a statute, which directs acts or proceedings to be done in a certain way shows
that the legislature intended a compliance with such provision to be essential to the validity of
the act or proceeding, or when same antecedent and pre-requisite conditions must exist prior to
the exercise of power, or must be performed before certain other powers can be exercise, the
statute must be regarded as mandatory. (Id., pp. 869-874.) (See also, Words and Phrases, Vol. 26,
pp. 463-467; emphasis supplied.).
What has been said above, relative to the conditions antecedent to, and concomitant with, the
adoption of section 11 of Article VI of the Constitution, reveals clearly that its framers intended
to prevent the majority party from controlling the Electoral Tribunals, and that the structure
thereof is founded upon the equilibrium between the majority and the minority parties therein,
with the Justices of the Supreme Court, who are members of said Tribunals, holding the resulting
balance of power. The procedure prescribed in said provision for the selection of members of the
Electoral Tribunals is vital to the role they are called upon to play. it constitutes the essence of
said Tribunals. Hence, compliance with said procedure is mandatory, and acts performed in
violation thereof are null and void. 11.
It is true that the application of the foregoing criterion would limit the membership of the Senate
Electoral Tribunal, in the case at bar, to seven (7), instead of nine (9), members; but, it is
conceded that the present composition of the Senate was not foreseen by the framers of our
Constitution (Congressional Record for the Senate, Vol. III, pp. 329, 342, 349, 354, 359, 375).
Furthermore, the spirit of the law prevails over its letter, and the solution herein adopted
maintains the spirit of the Constitution, for partisan considerations can not be decisive in a
tribunal consisting of three (3) Justices of the Supreme Court, three (3) members nominated by
the majority party and either one (1) or two (2) members nominated by the party having the
second largest number of votes in the House concerned.
Upon the other hand, what would be the result of respondents' contention if upheld? Owing to
the fact that the Citizens Party 12 has only one member in the Upper House, Senator Taada felt
he should nominate, for the Senate Electoral Tribunal, only said member of the Citizens Party.
The same is, thus, numerically handicapped, vis-a-vis the majority party, in said Tribunal.
Obviously, Senator Taada did not nominate other two Senators, because, otherwise, he would
worsen the already disadvantageous position, therein, of the Citizens Party. Indeed, by the
aforementioned nomination and election of Senators Cuenco and Delgado, if the same were
sanctioned, the Nacionalista Party would have five (5) members in the Senate Electoral Tribunal,
as against one (1) member of the Citizens Party and three members of the Supreme Court. With
the absolute majority thereby attained by the majority party in said Tribunal, the philosophy
underlying the same would be entirely upset. The equilibrium between the political parties
therein would be destroyed. What is worst, the decisive moderating role of the Justices of the
Supreme Court would be wiped out, and, in lieu thereof, the door would be thrown wide open for
the predominance of political considerations in the determination of election protests pending
before said Tribunal, which is precisely what the fathers of our Constitution earnestly strove to
forestall. 13.
This does not imply that the honesty, integrity or impartiality of Senators Cuenco and Delgado
are being questioned. As a matter of fact, when Senator Taada objected to their nomination, he
explicitly made of record that his opposition was based, not upon their character, but upon the
principle involved. When the election of members of Congress to the Electoral Tribunal is made
dependent upon the nomination of the political parties above referred to, the Constitution thereby
indicates its reliance upon the method of selection thus established, regardless of the individual
qualities of those chosen therefor. Considering the wealth of experience of the delegatesto the
Convention, as lawyers of great note, as veteran politicians and as leaders in other fields of
endeavor, they could not, and did not, ignore the fact that the Constitution must limit itself to
giving general patterns or norms of action. In connection, particularly, with the composition of
the Electoral Tribunals, they believed that, even the most well meaning individuals often find it
difficult to shake off the bias and prejudice created by political antagonisms and to resist the
demands of political exigencies, the pressure of which is bound to increase in proportion to the
degree of predominance of the party from which it comes. As above stated, this was confirmed
by distinguished members of the present Senate. (See pp. 25-28, 33, 34, supra.).
In connection with the argument of the former Secretary of Justice to the effect that when "there
is no minority party represented in the Assembly, the necessity for such a check by the minority
disappears", the following observations of the petitioners herein are worthy of notice:.
" Under the interpretation espoused by the respondents, the very frauds or terrorism committed
by a party would establish the legal basis for the final destruction of minority parties in the
Congress at least. Let us suppose, for example, that in the Senate, the 15 or 16 senators with
unexpired terms belong to the party A. In the senatorial elections to fill the remaining 8 seats, all
the 8 candidates of party A are proclaimed elected through alleged fraud and/or terrorism. (The
ouster of not less than 3 senators-elect in the elections held since liberation attests to the reality
of election frauds and terrorism in our country.) There being no senator or only one senator
belonging to the minority, who would sit in judgment on the election candidates of the minority
parties? According to the contention of the respondents, it would be a Senate Electoral Tribunal
made up of three Supreme Court Justices and 5 or 6 members of the same party A accused of
fraud and terrorism. Most respectfully, we pray this Honorable Court to reject an interpretation
that would make of a democratic constitution the very instrument by which a corrupt and ruthless
party could entrench itself in power the legislature and thus destroy democracy in the
Philippines.
xxx
xxx
x x x.
".. When there are no electoral protests filed by the Minority party, or when the only electoral
protests filed are by candidates of the majority against members-elect of the same majority party,
there might be no objection to the statement. But if electoral protests are filed by candidates of
the minority party, it is at this point that a need for a check on the majority party is greatest, and
contrary to the observation made in the above-quoted opinion, such a cheek is a function that
cannot be successfully exercised by the 3 Justices of the Supreme Court, for the obvious and
simple reason that they could easily be outvoted by the 6 members of the majority party in the
Tribunal.
xxx
xxx
x x x.
"In the case of the cited opinion of Secretary Abad Santos rendered in 1939, it, did not appear
that there were minority party candidates who were adversely affected by the ruling of the
Secretary of Justice and who could have brought a test case to court." (Emphasis supplied.).
The defenses of waiver and estoppel set up against petitioner Taada are untenable. Although "an
individual may waive constitutional provisions intended for his benefit", particularly those meant
for the protection of his property, and, sometimes, even those tending "to secure his personal
liberty", the power to waive does not exist when "public policy or public morals" are involved.
(11 Am. Jur. 765; I Cooley's Constitutional Limitations, pp. 368-371). The procedure outlined in
the Constitution for the organization, of the Electoral Tribunals was adopted in response to the
demands of the common weal, and it has been held that where a statute is founded on public
policy, those to whom it applies should not be permitted to waive its provisions" (82 C. J. S.,
874). Besides, there can be no waiver without an intent to such effect, which Senator Taada did
not have. Again, the alleged waiver or exhaustion of his rights does not justify the exercise
thereof by a person or party, other than that to which it is vested exclusively by the Constitution.
The rule estoppel is that "whenever a party has, by his declaration, act or omissions, intentionally
and deliberately led another to believe a particular thing true, and to act upon such belief, he
cannot, in a litigation arising out of such declaration, act or omission, be permitted to falsify it"
(Rule 69, sec. 68 [a], Rules of Court). In the case at bar, petitioner Senator Taada did not lead
the Senate to believe that Senator Primicias could nominate Senators Cuenco and Delgado. On
the contrary, said petitioner repeatedly asserted that his was the exclusive right to make the
nomination. He, likewise, specifically contested said nomination of Senators Cuenco and
Delgado. Again, the rule on estoppel applies to questions of fact, not of law, about the truth of
which the other party is ignorant (see Moran's Comments on the Rules of Court, Vol. 3, pp. 490,
495). Such is not the nature of the situation that confronted Senator Taada and the other
members of the Senate. Lastly, the case of Zandueta vs. De la Costa (66 Phil., 615), cited by
respondents, is not in point. Judge Zandueta assumed office by virtue of an appointment, the
legality of which he later on assailed. In the case at bar, the nomination and election of Senator
Taada as member of the Senate Electoral Tribunal was separate, distinct and independent from
the nomination and election of Senators Cuenco and Delgado.
In view of the foregoing, we hold that the Senate may not elect, as members of the Senate
Electoral Tribunal, those Senators who have not been nominated by the political parties specified
in the Constitution; that the party having the largest number of votes in the Senate may nominate
not more than three (3) members thereof to said Electoral Tribunal; that the party having the
second largest number of votes in the Senate has the exclusive right to nominate the other three
(3) Senators who shall sit as members in the Electoral Tribunal; that neither these three (3)
Senators, nor any of them, may be nominated by a person or party other than the one having the
second largest number of votes in the Senate or its representative therein; that the Committee on
Rules for the Senate has no standing to validly make such nomination and that the nomination of
Senators Cuenco and Delgado by Senator Primicias, and the election of said respondents by the
Senate, as members of said Tribunal, are null and void ab initio.
As regards respondents Alfredo Cruz, Catalina Cayetano, Manuel Serapio and Placido Reyes, we
are not prepared to hold, however, that their appointments were null and void. Although
recommended by Senators Cuenco and Delgado, who are not lawful members of the Senate
Electoral Tribunal, they were appointed by its Chairman, presumably, with the consent of the
majority of the de jure members of said body 14 or, pursuant to the Rules thereof. At any rate, as
held in Suanes vs. Chief Accountant (supra), the election of its personnel is an internal matter
falling within the jurisdiction and control of said body, and there is every reason to believe that it
will, hereafter take appropriate measures, in relation to the four (4) respondents abovementioned,
conformably with the spirit of the Constitution and of, the decision in the case at bar.
Wherefore, judgment is hereby rendered declaring that, respondents Senators Mariano Jesus
Cuenco and Francisco A. Delgado have not been duly elected as Members of the Senate
Electoral Tribunal, that they are not entitled to act as such and that they should be, as they are
hereby, enjoined from exercising the powers and duties of Members of said Electoral Tribunal
and from acting in such capacity in connection with Senate Electoral Case No. 4 thereof. With
the qualification stated above, the petition is dismissed, as regards respondents Alfredo Cruz,
Catalina Cayetano, Manuel Serapio and Placido Reyes. Without special pronouncement as to
costs. It is so ordered.
Bengzon, Padilla, Montemayor, Reyes, A., Bautista Angelo, Reyes, J.B.L., and Felix, JJ., concur.
Paras, C.J., dissenting:.

In 1939, Section (4) of Article VI of the Philippine Constitution provided that "There shall be an
Electoral Commission composed of three Justices of the Supreme Court designated by the Chief
Justice, and of six members chosen by the National Assembly, three of whom shall be nominated
by the party having the largest number of votes, and three by the party having the second largest
number of votes therein." As all the members of the National Assembly then belonged to the
Nacionalista Party and a belief arose that it was impossible to comply with the constitutional
requirement that three members of the Electoral Commission should be nominated by the party
having the second largest number of votes, the opinion of the Secretary of Justice was sought on
the proper interpretation of the constitutional provision involved. Secretary of Justice Jose A.
Santos accordingly rendered the following opinion:.
"Sir:.
"I have the honor to acknowledge the receipt of your letter of January 24, 1939, thru the office of
His Excellency, the President, in which you request my opinion as `to the proper interpretation of
the following provision of Section (4) of Article VI of the Philippine Constitution':.
`There shall be an Electoral Commission composed of three Justices of the Supreme Court
designated by the Chief Justice, and of six members chosen by the National Assembly, three of
whom shall be nominated by the party having the largest number of votes, and three by the party
having the second largest number of votes therein.'.
"You state that às all the members of the present National Assembly belong to the Nacionalista
Party, it is impossible to comply with the last part of the provision which requires that three
members shall be nominated by the party having the second largest number of votes in the
Assembly.'.
"The main features of the constitutional provision in question are: (1) that there shall be an
Electoral Commission composed of three Justices of the Supreme Court designated by the Chief
Justice, and of six members chosen by the National Assembly; and that (2) of the six members to
be chosen by the National Assembly, three shall be nominated by the party having the largest
number of votes and three by the party having the second largest number of votes.
"Examining the history of the constitutional provision, I find that in the first two drafts it was
provided that the Electoral Commission shall be composed of `three members elected by the
members of the party having the largest number of vote three elected by the members of the
party having the second largest number of votes, and three justices of the Supreme Court ..
(Aruego, The Framing of the Phil. Const., pp. 260-261). But as finally adopted by the
Convention, the Constitution explicitly states that there shall be `six members chosen by the
National Assembly, three of whom shall be nominated by the party having the largest number of
votes, an and three by the party having the second largest number of votes' (Aruego, The
Framing of the Phil. Const., pp. 271-272).
"From the foregoing changes in the phraseology of the provision, it is evident that the intention
of the framers of our Constitution was that there should invariably be six members from the
National Assembly. It was also intended to create a non-partisan body to decide any partisan
contest that may be brought before the Commission. The primary object was to avoid decision
based chiefly if not exclusively on partisan considerations.
"The procedure or manner of nomination cannot possibly affect the constitutional mandate that
the Assembly is entitled to six members in the Electoral Commission. When for lack of a
minority representation in the Assembly the power to nominate three minority members cannot
be exercised, it logically follows that the only party the Assembly may nominate three others,
otherwise the explicit mandate of the Constitution that there shall be six members from the
National Assembly would be nullified.
"In other words, fluctuations in the total membership of the Commission were not and could not
have been intended. We cannot say that the Commission should have nine members during one
legislative term and six members during the next. Constitutional provisions must always have a
consistent application. The membership of the Commission is intended to be fixed and not
variable and is not dependent upon the existence or non-existence of one or more parties in the
Assembly.
"À cardinal rule in dealing with Constitutions is that they should receive a consistent and
uniform interpretation, so they shall not be taken to mean one thing at one time and another thing
at another time, even though the circumstances may have so changed as to make a different rule
after desirable (11 Am. Jur. 659).
"It is undisputed of course that the primary purpose of the Convention in giving representation to
the minority party in the Electoral Commission was to safeguard the rights of the minority party
and to protect their interests, especially when the election of any member of the minority party is
protested. The basic philosophy behind the constitutional provision was to enable the minority
party to act as a check on the majority in the Electoral Commission, with the members of the
Supreme Court as the balancing factor. Inasmuch, however, as there is no minority party
represented in the Assembly, the necessity for such a check by the minority party disappears. It is
a function that is expected to be exercised by the three Justices of the Supreme Court.
"To summarize, considering the plain terms of the constitutional provision in question, the
changes that it has undergone since it was first introduced until finally adopted by the convertion,
as well as, the considerations that must have inspired the Constitutional Convention in adopting
it as it is, I have come to the conclusion that the Electoral Commission should be composed of
nine members, three from the Supreme Court and six chosen by the National Assembly to be
nominated by the party in power, there being no other party entitled to such nomination.".
Pursuant to the foregoing opinion of February 1, 1939, the Electoral Commission was formally
organized, with six members of the National Assembly all belonging to the same party and three
Justices of the Supreme Court. Constitutional amendments were introduced and duly adopted in
1940, and the Electoral Commission was replaced by an Electoral Tribunal for each house of
Congress. It is now provided that "Each Electoral Tribunal shall be composed of nine Members,
three of whom shall be Justices of the Supreme Court to be designated by the Chief Justice, and
the remaining six shall be Members of the Senate or of the House of Representatives, as the case
may be, who shall be chosen by each house, three upon nomination of the party having the
The senior Justice in each Electoral Tribunal shall be its Chairman." (Article VI, Section 11, of
the Constitution.).
If there was any doubt on the matter, the same was removed by the amendment of 1940 the
framers of which may be assumed to have been fully aware of the one-party composition of the
former National Assembly which gave rise to the abovequoted opinion of the Secretary of
Justice. When instead of wording the amendment in such a form as to nullify said opinion,
Section 11 of Article VI of the Constitution not only did not substantially depart from the original
constitutional provision but also positively and expressly ordains that "Each Electoral Tribunal
shall be composed of nine Members," the intent has become clear and mandatory that at all times
the Electoral Tribunal shall have nine Members regardless of whether or not two parties make up
each house of Congress.
It is very significant that while the party having the second largest number of votes is allowed to
nominate three Members of the Senate or of the House of Representatives, it is not required that
the nominees should belong to the same party. Considering further that the six Members are
chosen by each house, and not by the party or parties, the conclusion is inescapable that party
affiliation is neither controlling nor necessary.
Under the theory of the petitioners, even if there were sufficient Members belonging to the party
having the second largest of votes, the latter may nominate less than three or none at all; and the
Chief Justice may similarly designate less than three Justices. If not absurd, would frustrate the
purpose of having an ideal number in the composition of the Electoral Tribunal and guarding
against the possibility of deadlocks. It would not be accurate to argue that the Members of the
Electoral Tribunal other than the Justices of the Supreme Court would naturally vote along
purely partisan lines, checked or fiscalized only by the votes of the Justices; otherwise
membership in the Tribunal may well be limited to the Justices of the Supreme Court and so
others who are not Members of the Senate or of the House of Representatives. Upon the other
hand, he framers of the Constitution-not insensitive to some such argument-still had reposed
their faith and confidence in the independence, integrity and uprightness of the Members of each
House who are to sit in the Electoral Tribunals and thereby expected them, as does everybody, to
decide jointly with the Justices of the Supreme Court election contests exclusively upon their
merits.
In view of the failure or unwillingness of Senator Lorenzo M. Taada of the Citizens Party, the
party having the second largest number of votes in the Senate, to nominate two other Members of
the Electoral Tribunal, the Senate was justified, in obedience to the constitutional mandate, to
choose-as it did-said two Members.
I vote to dismiss the petition.
Endencia, J., concurs.
LABRADOR, J., dissenting:.
I dissent and herewith proceed to explain my reasons therefor.
The constitutional provision, in pursuance of which Senators Cuenco and Delgado were elected
by the Senate members of the Senate Electoral Tribunal is as follows:.
"The Senate and the House of Representatives shall each have an Electoral Tribunal which shall
be the sole judge of all contests relating to the election, returns, and qualifications of their
respective Members. Each Electoral Tribunal shall be composed of nine Members, three of
remaining six shall be Members of the Senate or of the House of Representatives, as the case
may be, who shall be chosen by each House, three upon nomination of the party having the
The Senior Justice in each Electoral Tribunal shall be its Chairman." (Section II, Article VI of the
Constitution.).
I hold that the above provision, just as any other constitutional provision, is mandatory in
character and that this character is true not only of the provision that nine members shall
compose the tribunal but also that which defines the manner in which the members shall be
chosen. Such a holding is in accord with well-settled rules of statutory construction.
"As a general proposition, there is greater likelihood that constitutional provisions will be given
mandatory effect than is true of any other class of organic law. Indeed, such a construction
accords with the generally acknowledged import of constitutional fiat; that its character is such
as to require absolute compliance in all cases without exception. And the very principles of our
institutions, involving as they do concepts of constitutional supremacy, are such as to form
reasonable grounds for a presumption that the framers of a constitution intended that just such
efficacy be given to it .." (Sec. 5807, Sutherland Statutory Construction, Vol. 3, p.84.).
The majority helds that as Senator Taada, the only member of the Senate who does not belong
to the Nacionalista Party, has refused to exercise the constitutional privilege afforded him to
nominate the two other members the Senate may not elect said two other members. And the
reason given for this ruling is the presumed intention of the constitutional provision to safeguard
the interests of the minority. This holding is subject to the following fundamental objections. In
the first Place, it renders nugatory the provision which fixes the membership of the Senate
Electoral Tribunal at nine, a provision which is admittedly a mandatory provision. In the second
place, it denies to the Senate the power that the constitutional provision expressly grants it, i. e.,
that of electing the members of the Electoral Tribunal so in effect this right or prerogative is
lodged, as a consequence of the refusal of the minority member to nominate, in the hands of said
member of the minority, contrary to the constitutional provision. In the third place, it would
make the supposedly procedural provision, the process of nomination lodged in the minority
party in the Senate, superior to and paramount over the power of election, which is in the whole
Senate itself. So by the ruling of the majority, a procedural provision overrides a substantive one
and renders nugatory the other more important mandatory provision that the Electoral Tribunal
shall be composed of nine members. In the fourth place, the majority decision has by
interpretation inserted a provision in the Constitution, which the Constitutional Convention alone
had the power to introduce, namely, a proviso to the effect that if the minority fails or refuses to
exercise its privilege to nominate all the three members, the membership of the Electoral
Tribunal shall thereby be correspondingly reduced. This arrogation of power by us is not justified
by any rule of law or reason.
I consider the opinion of the Senate that the refusal of Senator Taada to nominate the two other
members must be construed as a waiver of a mere privilege, more in consonance not only with
the constitutional provision as a whole, but with the dictates of reason. The above principle (of
waiver) furnishes the remedy by which two parts of the constitutional provision, that which fixes
membership at nine and that which outlines the procedure in which said membership of nine may
be elected, can be reconciled. Well known is the legal principle that provisions which in their
application may nullify each other should be reconciled to make them both effective, if the
reconciliation can be effected by the application of other legal principles. The reconciliation is
brought about in this case by the principle of waiver.
While I agree with the majority that it is the duty of this Court to step in, when a constitutional
mandate is ignored, to enforce said mandate even as against the other coordinate departments,
this is not the occasion for it to do so, for to say the least it does not clearly appear that the form
and manner in which the Senate exercised its expressly recognized power to elect its members to
the Senate Electoral Tribunal has been clearly violative of the constitutional mandate.
______________________________.
1 Casanovas vs. Hord, 8 Phil., 125; Omo vs. Insular Gov't., 11 Phil., 67; Weigall vs. Shuster, 11
Phil., 340; Barrameda vs. Moir, 25 Phil., 44; Hamilton vs. McGirr, 30 Phil., 563; Compania Gral.
de Tabacos vs. Board of Public Utility Commissioners, 34 Phil., 136; Central Capiz vs. Ramirez,
40 Phil., 883; Concepcion vs. Paredes, 42 Phil 599; McDaniel vs. Apacible, 42 Phil., 749; U. S.
vs. Ang Tan Ho, 43 Phil., 1; People vs. Pomar, 46 Phil., 440. Agcaoili vs. Saguitan, 48 Phil., 676;
Gov't. vs. Springer, 50 Phil., 259; Gov't. us. Agoncillo, 50 Phil., 348; Gov't. vs. El Hogar
Filipino, 50 Phil, 399; Manila Electric vs. Pasay Transp., 57 Phil., 600; Angara vs. Electoral
Commission, supra; People vs. Vera, 65 Phil., 56; Vargas vs. Rilloraza, 45 Off. Gaz., 3847;
Endencia vs. David, 49 Off. Gaz., A822; Rutter vs. Esteban, 49 Off. Gaz., 1807; Comm.
investment vs. Garcia, 49 Off. Gaz., 1801; Marbury vs. Madison, 1 Cranch 137; Ex Parte
Garland, 4 Wall. 333; Hepburn vs. Griswold, 8 Wall. 603; Knox vs. Lee, 12 Wall. 457; Civil
Rights Cases [U. S. vs. M. Stanley; U. S. vs. M. Ryan, U. S. vs. S. Nichols; U. S. vs. Singleton;
Robinson vs. and Charleston Railroad Co.], 109 U. S. 3 Pollock vs. Farmers' Loan and Trust Co.
157 U. S. 429, 158 U. S. 601; Fairbanks vs. U. S., 181 U. S. 286.
2 Which, insofar as pertinent to the issues in the case at bar, is substantially identical to each of
the Electoral Tribunals under the Constitution as amended.
3 Araneta vs. Dinglasan, Barredo vs. Commission on Elections, and Rodriguez vs. Teasurer of
the Philippines, 84 Phil., 368, 45 Off. Gaz., 4411, 4457; Nacionalista Party vs. Bautista, 85 Phil.,
101, 47 Off. Gaz., 2356; Lacson vs. Romero, 84 Phil., 740, 47 Off. Gaz., 1778; De los Santos vs.
Mallare, 87 Phil., 289, 48 Off. Gaz., 1787; Lacson vs. Roque, 92 Phil., 456, 49 Off. Gaz., 93;
Jover Ledesma vs. Borra, 93 Phil., 506, 49 Off. Gaz., 2765; Ramos vs. Avelino, 97 Phil., 844, 51
Off. Gaz., 5607.
"From the very nature of the American system of government with Constitutions prescribing the
jurisdiction and powers of each of the three branches of government, it has devolved on the
judiciary to determine whether the acts of the other two departments are in harmony with the
fundamental law. All the departments are of the government are unquestionably entitled and
compelled to judge of the Constitution for themselves; but, in doing so, they act under the
obligations imposed in the instrument, and in the order of time pointed out by it. When the,
judiciary has once spoken, if the acts of the other two departments are held to be unauthorized or
despotic, in violation of the Constitution or the vested rights of the citizen, they cease to be
operative or binding.
xxx
xxx
x x x.
"Since the Constitution is intended for the observance of the judiciary as well as the other
departments of government and the judges are sworn to support its provisions, the court are not
at liberty to overlook or disregard its commands. It is their duty in authorized proceedings to give
effect to the existing Constitution and to obey all constitutional provisions irrespective of their
opinion as to the wisdom of such provisions.
"In accordance with principles which are basic, the rule is fixed that the duty in a proper case to
declare a law unconstitutional cannot be declined and must be performed in accordance with the
deliberate judgment of the tribunal before which the validity of the enactment is directly drawn
into question. When it is clear that a statute transgresses the authority vested in the legislature by
the Constitution, it is the duty of the courts to declare the act unconstitutional cause they cannot
shrink from it without violating their oaths of office. This duty of the courts to maintain the
Constitution as the fundamental law of the state is imperative and unceasing; and, as Chief
Justice Marshal said, whenever a statute is in violation of the fundamental law, the courts must so
adjudge and thereby give effect to the Constitution. Any other course would lead to the
destruction of the Constitution. Since the question as to the constitutionality of a statute is a
judicial matter, the courts will not decline the exercise of jurisdiction upon the suggestion that
action might be taken by political agencies in disregard of the judgment of the judicial tribunals."
(11 Am. Jur., pp. 712-713, 713-715; emphasis supplied).
5 Rich vs. Board of Canvassers, 59 N. W. 183; State vs. McBride, 29 Am. Dec. 636; Collier vs.
Frierson, 24 Ala. 100; State vs. Swift, 69 Ind. 505; State vs. Timme, 11 N.W. 785; Prohibition
and Amendment Cases, 24 Kan. 700; Kadderly vs. Portland, 74 Pac. 710; Koehler vs. Hill, 14 N.
W. 738; State vs. Brockhart, 84 S. W. 1064; University vs. Melver, 72 N. C. 76; Westinghausen
vs. People, 6 N.W. 641; State vs. Powell, 27 South, 927; Bott vs. Wurtz, 43 Atl. 744; Rice vs.
Palmer, 96 S. W. 396; State vs. Tooker, 37 Pac. 840.
6 "The procedure or manner of nomination cannot possibly affect the, constitutional mandate that
the Assembly is entitled to six in the Electoral Commission. When for lack of a minority
representation in the Assembly the power to nominate three minority members cannot be
exercised, it logically follows that the only party in the Assembly may nominate three others,
otherwise the explicit mandate of the Constitution that there shall be six members from the
National Assembly would be nullified.
"In other words, fluctuations in the total membership of the Commission were not and could
have been intended; We cannot say that the Commission should have nine members during one
legislative term and six members during the next. Constitutional provisions must always have a
consistent application. The membership of the Commission is intended to be fixed and not
variable and is not dependent upon the existence or non-existence of one or more parties in the
Assembly.
À cardinal rule in dealing with Constitutions is that they should receive a consistent and uniform
interpretation, so they shall not be taken to mean one thing at one time and another thing at
another time, even though the circumstance may have so changed as to make a different rule
seem desirable (11 Am. Jur. 659).'.
"It is undisputed of course that the primary purpose of the Convention in giving representation to
the minority party in the Electoral Commission was to safeguard the rights of the minority party
and to protect their interests, especially when the election of any member of the minority party is
protected. The basic philosophy behind the constitutional provision was to enable the minority
party to act as a check on the majority of the Electoral Commission, with the members of the
Supreme Court as the balancing factor. Inasmuch, however, as there is no minority party
represented in the Assembly, the necessity for such a check by the minority party disappears. It is
a function that is expected to be exercised by the three Justices of the Supreme Court.
"To summarize, considering the plain terms of the constitutional provision in question, the
changes that it has undergone since it was first introduced until finally adopted by the
Convention, as well as the considerations that must have inspired the Constitutional Convention
in adopting it as it is, I have come to the conclusion that the Electoral Commission should be
composed of nine members, three from the Supreme Court and six chosen by the National
Assembly to be nominated by the party in power, there being no other party entitled to such
nomination." Annex A to the Answers pp. 2-3.
6a Since 1939, when said opinion was rendered, the question therein raised has not been taken up
or discussed, until the events leading to the case at bar (in February 1956).
6b "Thus, in Suanes vs. Chief Accountant (supra)-in which the respondents maintained that the
Electoral Commission formed part of the National Assembly, citing in support thereof the
principle of contemporaneous and practical construction-this Court deemed it unnecessary to
refute the same in order to adopt the opposite view.
7 Senator Laurel reiterated this view on the floor of the Senate, on February 22. 1956, in the
following language:.
"And hence this provision that we find in the Constitution, three to represent, in the manner
prescribed in the Constitution, the party that received the highest number of votes, meaning the
majority party which is the Nacionalista Party now, and three to represent the party receiving the
next highest number of votes therein, meaning the minority party, the party receiving the next
highest number of votes. But there was a great deal of opinion that it would be better if this
political organization, so far as the legislative department is concerned, could be tempered by a
sort of a judicial reflection which could be done by drafting three, as to each Electoral Tribunal,
from the Supreme Court. And that, I think, was the reason because a great majority of the
delegates to the constitutional convention accepted that principle. That is why we have nine
members in each electoral tribunal, in the House and in the Senate. And one reason that I
remember then and I am speaking from memory, Mr. President, was that it is likely that the three
members representing a party would naturally favor the protestants or protestees, and so on. So it
would be better that even on that hypothesis or on that supposition it would be better, in case
they annul each other because three votes in favor or three votes against, depending on the party
of the protestants or the protestees, that the Supreme Court decide the case because then it would
be a judicial decision in reality. Another reason is founded on the theory that the Justices of the
Supreme Court are supposed to be beyond influence, although that may not be true. But having
reached the highest judicial position of the land, these persons would likely act impartially."
(Congressional Record for the Senate Vol. III, p. 376.).
8 When the legislative power was vested in a unicameral body, known as the National Assembly.
9 Upon the substitution of the National Assembly by a bicameral Congress, consisting of the
Senate and the House of Representatives.
10 Senator Lim said:.
"But in the spirit, Your Honor can see very well that those three should belong to the party
having the second largest number of votes, precisely, as Your Honor said, to maintain
equilibrium because partisan considerations naturally enter into the mind and heart of a senator
belonging to a particular party. Although grammatically, I agree with Your Honor, Your Honor
can see that the spirit of the provision of the Constitution is clear that the three must come from
the party having the highest number of votes and the other three nominated must belong to the
party having the second highest number of votes. Your Honor can see the point. If we allow Your
Honor to back up your argument that equilibrium should be maintained, because partisan
considerations enter when one is with the majority party, and that no party should prevail, Your
Honor should also have to consider that the spirit of the Constitution is precisely to obviate that
to the extent that the only three can be nominated from the party having the largest number of
votes and three from the party having the second largest number of votes." (Congressional
Record of the Senate, Vol. Ill, p, 337; emphasis supplied.).
________________________________.
The statement of Senator Sabido was:.
".. the purpose of the creation of the Electoral Tribunal and of its composition is to maintain a
balance between the two parties and make the members of the Supreme Court the controlling
power so to speak of the Electoral Tribunal or hold the balance of power. That is the ideal
situation.".
xxx
xxx
x x x.
".. I said that the ideal composition in the contemplation of the framers of the Constitution is that
those participating in the electoral tribunal shall belong to the members of the party who are
before the electoral tribunal either as protestants or protestees, in order to insure impartiality in
the proceeding and justice in the decision that may be finally rendered." (Congressional Record
for the Senate, Vol. III, pp. 349, 352; emphasis supplied.).
____________________________________.
Senator Cea declared:.
".. the original purpose of the Constitution is to nominate only members of the two major parties
in the Senate in the Electoral Tribunal." (Congressional Record for the Senate, Vol. III, p. 350;
The words of Senator Paredes were:.
".. what was intended in the creation of the electoral tribunal was to create a sort of collegiate
court composed of nine members three of them belonging to the party having largest number of
votes, and three from, the party having the second largest number of votes so that these members
my represent the party, and the members of said party who will sit before the electoral tribunal as
protestees. For when it comes to a party, Mr. President, there is ground to believe that decisions
will be made along party lines." (Congressional Record for the Senate, Vol. III, p. 351; emphasis
supplied.).
11 The need of adopting this view is demanded, not only by the factors already adverted to, but,
also, by the fact that constitutional provisions, unlike statutory enactments, are presumed to be
mandatory, "unless the contrary is unmistakably manifest." The pertinent rule of statutory
construction is set forth in the American Jurisprudence as follows:.
"In the interpretation of Constitutions, questions frequently arise as to whether particular sections
are mandatory or directory. The courts usually hesitate to declare that a constitutional provision
is directory merely in view of the tendency of the legislature to disregard provisions which are
not said to be mandatory. Accordingly, it is the general rule to regard constitutional provisions as
mandatory, and not to leave any direction to the will of a legislature to obey or to disregard them.
This presumption as to mandatory quality is usually followed unless it is unmistakably manifest

that the provisions are intended to be merely directory. The analogous rules distinguishing
mandatory and directory statutes are of little value in this connection and are rarely applied in
passing upon the provisions of a Constitution.
"So strong is the inclination in favor of giving obligatory force to the terms of the organic law
that it has even been said that neither by the courts nor by any other department of the
government may any provision of the Constitution be regarded as merely directory, but that each
and everyone of its provisions should be treated as imperative and mandatory, without reference
to the rules and distinguishing between the directory and the mandatory statutes." (II Am. Jur.
686-687; emphasis supplied.).
12 Which admittedly, has the second largest number of votes in the Senate.
13 In Angara vs. Electoral Commission (supra, 169) Senator, then Justice, Laurel, speaking for
this Court, recalled that:.
"In the same session of December 4, 1934, Delegate Cruz (C.) sought to amend the draft by
reducing the representation of the minority party and the Supreme Court in the Electoral
Commission to two members each, so as to accord more representation to the majority party. The
Convention rejected this amendment by a vote of seventy-six (76) against forty-six (46), thus
maintaining the non-partisan character of the commission."(emphasis supplied.).
Needless to say, what the Constitutional Convention thus precluded from being done by direct
action or grant of authority in the Charter of our Republic should not receive judicial sanction,
when done by resolution of one House of Congress, a mere creature of said charter.
14 Namely, the other two (2) Justices of the Supreme Court and Senators Laurel, Lopez and
Primicias, or a total of six (6) members of the Tribunal.

SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-44640 October 12, 1976
PABLO C. SANIDAD and PABLITO V. SANIDAD, petitioner,
vs.
HONORABLE COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS and HONORABLE NATIONAL
TREASURER, respondents.
G.R. No. L-44684. October 12,1976
VICENTE M. GUZMAN, petitioner,
vs.
COMMISSION ELECTIONS, respondent.
G.R. No. L-44714. October 12,1976
RAUL M. GONZALES, RAUL T. GONZALES, JR., and ALFREDO
SALAPANTAN, petitioners,
vs.
HONORABLE COMMISSION ON SELECTIONS and HONORABLE NATIONAL
TREASURER, respondents.
MARTIN, J,:
The capital question raised in these prohibition suits with preliminary injunction relates to the
power of the incumbent President of the Philippines to propose amendments to the present
Constitution in the absence of the interim National Assembly which has not been convened.
On September 2, 1976, President Ferdinand E. Marcos issued Presidential Decree No. 991
calling for a national referendum on October 16, 1976 for the Citizens Assemblies ("barangays")
to resolve, among other things, the issues of martial law, the I . assembly, its replacement, the
powers of such replacement, the period of its existence, the length of the period for tile exercise
by the President of his present powers.1
Twenty days after or on September 22, 1976, the President issued another related decree,
Presidential Decree No. 1031, amending the previous Presidential Decree No. 991, by declaring
the provisions of presidential Decree No. 229 providing for the manner of voting and canvass of
votes in "barangays" (Citizens Assemblies) applicable to the national referendum-plebiscite of
October 16, 1976. Quite relevantly, Presidential Decree No. 1031 repealed Section 4, of
Presidential Decree No. 991, the full text of which (Section 4) is quoted in the footnote below. 2
On the same date of September 22, 1976, the President issued Presidential Decree No. 1033,
stating the questions to be submitted to the people in the referendum-plebiscite on October 16,
1976. The Decree recites in its "whereas" clauses that the people's continued opposition to the
convening of the National Assembly evinces their desire to have such body abolished and
replaced thru a constitutional amendment, providing for a legislative body, which will be
submitted directly to the people in the referendum-plebiscite of October 16.
The questions ask, to wit:
(1) Do you want martial law to be continued?
(2) Whether or not you want martial law to be continued, do you approve the following
amendments to the Constitution? For the purpose of the second question, the referendum shall
have the effect of a plebiscite within the contemplation of Section 2 of Article XVI of the
Constitution.
PROPOSED AMENDMENTS:
1. There shall be, in lieu of the interim National Assembly, an interim Batasang Pambansa.
Members of the interim Batasang Pambansa which shall not be more than 120, unless otherwise
provided by law, shall include the incumbent President of the Philippines, representatives elected
from the different regions of the nation, those who shall not be less than eighteen years of age
elected by their respective sectors, and those chosen by the incumbent President from the
members of the Cabinet. Regional representatives shall be apportioned among the regions in
accordance with the number of their respective inhabitants and on the basis of a uniform and
progressive ratio while the sectors shall be determined by law. The number of representatives
from each region or sector and the, manner of their election shall be prescribed and regulated by
law.
2. The interim Batasang Pambansa shall have the same powers and its members shall have the
same functions, responsibilities, rights, privileges, and disqualifications as the interim National
Assembly and the regular National Assembly and the members thereof. However, it shall not
exercise the power provided in Article VIII, Section 14(l) of the Constitution.
3. The incumbent President of the Philippines shall, within 30 days from the election and
selection of the members, convene the interim Batasang Pambansa and preside over its sessions
until the Speaker shall have been elected. The incumbent President of the Philippines shall be the
Prime Minister and he shall continue to exercise all his powers even after the interim Batasang
Pambansa is organized and ready to discharge its functions and likewise he shall continue to
exercise his powers and prerogatives under the nineteen hundred and thirty five. Constitution and
the powers vested in the President and the Prime Minister under this Constitution.
4. The President (Prime Minister) and his Cabinet shall exercise all the powers and functions,
and discharge the responsibilities of the regular President (Prime Minister) and his Cabinet, and
shall be subject only to such disqualifications as the President (Prime Minister) may prescribe.
The President (Prime Minister) if he so desires may appoint a Deputy Prime Minister or as many
Deputy Prime Ministers as he may deem necessary.
5. The incumbent President shall continue to exercise legislative powers until martial law shall
have been lifted.
6. Whenever in the judgment of the President (Prime Minister), there exists a grave emergency or
a threat or imminence thereof, or whenever the interim Batasang Pambansa or the regular
National Assembly fails or is unable to act adequately on any matter for any reason that in his
judgment requires immediate action, he may, in order to meet the exigency, issue the necessary
decrees, orders or letters of instructions, which shall form part of the law of the land.
7. The barangays and sanggunians shall continue as presently constituted but their functions,
powers, and composition may be altered by law.
Referenda conducted thru the barangays and under the Supervision of the Commission on
Elections may be called at any time the government deems it necessary to ascertain the will of
the people regarding any important matter whether of national or local interest.
8. All provisions of this Constitution not inconsistent with any of these amendments shall
continue in full force and effect.
9. These amendments shall take effect after the incumbent President shall have proclaimed that
they have been ratified by I majority of the votes cast in the referendum-plebiscite."
The Commission on Elections was vested with the exclusive supervision and control of the
October 1976 National Referendum-Plebiscite.
On September 27, 1976, PABLO C. SANIDAD and PABLITO V. SANIDAD, father and son,
commenced L-44640 for Prohibition with Preliminary Injunction seeking to enjoin the
Commission on Elections from holding and conducting the Referendum Plebiscite on October
16; to declare without force and effect Presidential Decree Nos. 991 and 1033, insofar as they
propose amendments to the Constitution, as well as Presidential Decree No. 1031, insofar as it
directs the Commission on Elections to supervise, control, hold, and conduct the ReferendumPlebiscite scheduled on October 16, 1976.
Petitioners contend that under the 1935 and 1973 Constitutions there is no grant to the incumbent
President to exercise the constituent power to propose amendments to the new Constitution. As a
consequence, the Referendum-Plebiscite on October 16 has no constitutional or legal basis.
On October 5, 1976, the Solicitor General filed the comment for respondent Commission on
Elections, The Solicitor General principally maintains that petitioners have no standing to sue;
the issue raised is political in nature, beyond judicial cognizance of this Court; at this state of the
transition period, only the incumbent President has the authority to exercise constituent power;
the referendum-plebiscite is a step towards normalization.
On September 30, 1976, another action for Prohibition with Preliminary Injunction, docketed as
L-44684, was instituted by VICENTE M. GUZMAN, a delegate to the 1971 Constitutional
Convention, asserting that the power to propose amendments to, or revision of the Constitution
during the transition period is expressly conferred on the interim National Assembly under
Section 16, Article XVII of the Constitution.3
Still another petition for Prohibition with Preliminary Injunction was filed on October 5, 1976 by
RAUL M. GONZALES, his son RAUL, JR., and ALFREDO SALAPANTAN, docketed as L44714, to restrain the implementation of Presidential Decrees relative to the forthcoming
Referendum-Plebiscite of October 16.
These last petitioners argue that even granting him legislative powers under Martial Law, the
incumbent President cannot act as a constituent assembly to propose amendments to the
Constitution; a referendum-plebiscite is untenable under the Constitutions of 1935 and 1973; the
submission of the proposed amendments in such a short period of time for deliberation renders
the plebiscite a nullity; to lift Martial Law, the President need not consult the people via
referendum; and allowing 15-.year olds to vote would amount to an amendment of the
Constitution, which confines the right of suffrage to those citizens of the Philippines 18 years of
age and above.
We find the petitions in the three entitled cases to be devoid of merit.
I
Justiciability of question raised.
1. As a preliminary resolution, We rule that the petitioners in L-44640 (Pablo C. Sanidad and
Pablito V. Sanidad) possess locus standi to challenge the constitutional premise of Presidential
Decree Nos. 991, 1031, and 1033. It is now an ancient rule that the valid source of a stature
Presidential Decrees are of such nature-may be contested by one who will sustain a direct
injuries as a in result of its enforcement. At the instance of taxpayers, laws providing for the
disbursement of public funds may be enjoined, upon the theory that the expenditure of public
funds by an officer of the State for the purpose of executing an unconstitutional act constitutes a
misapplication of such funds. 4 The breadth of Presidential Decree No. 991 carries all
appropriation of Five Million Pesos for the effective implementation of its purposes. 5
Presidential Decree No. 1031 appropriates the sum of Eight Million Pesos to carry out its
provisions. 6 The interest of the aforenamed petitioners as taxpayers in the lawful expenditure of
these amounts of public money sufficiently clothes them with that personality to litigate the
validity of the Decrees appropriating said funds. Moreover, as regards taxpayer's suits, this Court
enjoys that open discretion to entertain the same or not. 7 For the present case, We deem it sound
to exercise that discretion affirmatively so that the authority upon which the disputed Decrees are
predicated may be inquired into.
2. The Solicitor General would consider the question at bar as a pure political one, lying outside
the domain of judicial review. We disagree. The amending process both as to proposal and
ratification, raises a judicial question. 8 This is especially true in cases where the power of the
Presidency to initiate the of normally exercised by the legislature, is seriously doubted. Under the
terms of the 1973 Constitution, the power to propose amendments o the constitution resides in
the interim National Assembly in the period of transition (See. 15, Transitory provisions). After
that period, and the regular National Assembly in its active session, the power to propose
amendments becomes ipso facto the prerogative of the regular National Assembly (Sec. 1, pars. 1
and 2 of Art. XVI, 1973 constitution). The normal course has not been followed. Rather than
calling the National Assembly to constitute itself into a constituent assembly the incumbent
President undertook the proposal of amendments and submitted the proposed amendments thru
Presidential Decree 1033 to the people in a Referendum-Plebiscite on October 16. Unavoidably,
the regularity regularity of the procedure for amendments, written in lambent words in the very
Constitution sought to be amended, raises a contestable issue. The implementing Presidential
Decree Nos. 991, 1031, and 1033, which commonly purport to have the force and effect of
legislation are assailed as invalid, thus the issue of the validity of said Decrees is plainly a
justiciable one, within the competence of this Court to pass upon. Section 2 (2), Article X of the
new Constitution provides: "All cases involving the constitutionality of a treaty, executive
agreement, or law may shall be heard and decided by the Supreme Court en banc and no treaty,
executive agreement, or law may be declared unconstitutional without the concurrence of at least
ten Members. ..." The Supreme Court has the last word in the construction not only of treaties
and statutes, but also of the Constitution itself The amending, like all other powers organized in
the Constitution, is in form a delegated and hence a limited power, so that the Supreme Court is
vested with that authorities to determine whether that power has been discharged within its
limits.
Political questions are neatly associated with the wisdom, of the legality of a particular act.
Where the vortex of the controversy refers to the legality or validity of the contested act, that
matter is definitely justiciable or non-political. What is in the heels of the Court is not the
wisdom of the act of the incumbent President in proposing amendments to the Constitution, but
his constitutional authority to perform such act or to assume the power of a constituent assembly.
Whether the amending process confers on the President that power to propose amendments is
therefore a downright justiciable question. Should the contrary be found, the actuation of the
President would merely be a brutum fulmen. If the Constitution provides how it may be
amended, the judiciary as the interpreter of that Constitution, can declare whether the procedure
followed or the authority assumed was valid or not. 10
We cannot accept the view of the Solicitor General, in pursuing his theory of non-justiciability,
that the question of the President's authority to propose amendments and the regularity of the
procedure adopted for submission of the proposal to the people ultimately lie in the judgment of
the A clear Descartes fallacy of vicious circle. Is it not that the people themselves, by their
sovereign act, provided for the authority and procedure for the amending process when they
ratified the present Constitution in 1973? Whether, therefore, the constitutional provision has
been followed or not is the proper subject of inquiry, not by the people themselves of course who
exercise no power of judicial but by the Supreme Court in whom the people themselves vested
that power, a power which includes the competence to determine whether the constitutional
norms for amendments have been observed or not. And, this inquiry must be done a prior not a
posterior i.e., before the submission to and ratification by the people.
Indeed, the precedents evolved by the Court or, prior constitutional cases underline the
preference of the Court's majority to treat such issue of Presidential role in the amending process
as one of non-political impression. In the Plebiscite Cases, 11 the contention of the Solicitor
General that the issue on the legality of Presidential Decree No. 73 "submitting to the Pilipino
people (on January 15, 1973) for ratification or rejection the Constitution of the Republic of the
Philippines proposed by the 1971 Constitutional Convention and appropriating fund s therefore
"is a political one, was rejected and the Court unanimously considered the issue as justiciable in
nature. Subsequently in the Ratification Cases 12involving the issue of whether or not the validity
of Presidential Proclamation No. 1102. announcing the Ratification by the Filipino people of the
constitution proposed by the 1971 Constitutional Convention," partakes of the nature of a
political question, the affirmative stand of' the Solicitor General was dismissed, the Court ruled
that the question raised is justiciable. Chief Justice Concepcion, expressing the majority view,
said, Thus, in the aforementioned plebiscite cases, We rejected the theory of the respondents
therein that the question whether Presidential Decree No. 73 calling a plebiscite to be held on
January 15, 1973, for the ratification or rejection of the proposed new Constitution, was valid or
not, was not a proper subject of judicial inquiry because, they claimed, it partook of a political
nature, and We unanimously declared that the issue was a justiciable one. With Identical
unanimity. We overruled the respondent's contention in the 1971 habeas corpus cases,
questioning Our authority to determine the constitutional sufficiency of the factual bases of the
Presidential proclamation suspending the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus on August 21,
1971, despite the opposite view taken by this Court in Barcelon vs. Baker and Montenegro vs.
Castaneda, insofar as it adhered to the former case, which view We, accordingly, abandoned and
refused to apply. For the same reason, We did not apply and expressly modified, in Gonzales vs.
Commission on Elections, the political-question theory adopted in Mabanag vs. Lopez
Vito." 13 The return to Barcelon vs. Baker and Mabanag vs. Lopez Vito, urged by the Solicitor
General, was decisively refused by the Court. Chief Justice Concepcion continued: "The reasons
adduced in support thereof are, however, substantially the same as those given in support on the
political question theory advanced in said habeas corpus and plebiscite cases, which were
carefully considered by this Court and found by it to be legally unsound and constitutionally
untenable. As a consequence. Our decisions in the aforementioned habeas corpus cases partakes
of the nature and effect of a stare decisis which gained added weight by its virtual reiteration."
II
The amending process as laid out
in the new Constitution.
1. Article XVI of the 1973 Constitution on Amendments ordains:
SECTION 1. (1) Any amendment to, or revision of, this Constitution may be
proposed by the National Assembly upon a vote of three-fourths of all its
Members, or by a constitutional convention. (2) The National Assembly may, by a
vote of two-thirds of all its Members, call a constitutional convention or, by a
majority vote of all its Members, submit the question of calling such a convention
to the electorate in an election.
SECTION 2. Any amendment to, or revision of, this Constitution shall be valid
when ratified by a majority of the votes cast in a plebiscite which shall be held not
later than three months after the approval of such amendment or revision.
In the present period of transition, the interim National Assembly instituted in the Transitory
Provisions is conferred with that amending power. Section 15 of the Transitory Provisions reads:
SECTION 15. The interim National Assembly, upon special call by the interim
Prime Minister, may, by a majority vote of all its Members, propose amendments
to this Constitution. Such amendments shall take effect when ratified in
accordance with Article Sixteen hereof.
There are, therefore, two periods contemplated in the constitutional life of the nation, i.e., period
of normalcy and period of transition. In times of normally, the amending process may be initiated
by the proposals of the (1) regular National Assembly upon a vote of three-fourths of all its
members; or (2) by a Constitutional Convention called by a vote of two-thirds of all the
Members of the National Assembly. However the calling of a Constitutional Convention may be
submitted to the electorate in an election voted upon by a majority vote of all the members of the
National Assembly. In times of transition, amendments may be proposed by a majority vote of all
the Members of the National Assembly upon special call by the interim Prime Minister,.
2. This Court in Aquino v. COMELEC," had already settled that the incumbent President is
vested with that prerogative of discretion as to when he shall initially convene the interim
National Assembly. Speaking for the majority opinion in that case, Justice Makasiar said: "The
Constitutional Convention intended to leave to the President the determination of the time when
he shall initially convene the interim National Assembly, consistent with the prevailing
conditions of peace and order in the country." Concurring, Justice Fernandez, himself a member
of that Constitutional Convention, revealed: "(W)hen the Delegates to the Constitutional
Convention voted on the Transitory Provisions, they were aware of the fact that under the same,
the incumbent President was given the discretion as to when he could convene the interim
National Assembly; it was so stated plainly by the sponsor, Delegate Yaneza; as a matter of fact,
the proposal that it be convened 'immediately', made by Delegate Pimentel (V) was rejected. The
President's decision to defer the convening of the interim National Assembly soon found support
from the people themselves. In the plebiscite of January 10-15, 1973, at which the ratification of
the 1973 Constitution was submitted, the people voted against the convening of the interim
National Assembly. In the referendum of July 24, 1973, the Citizens Assemblies ("bagangays")
reiterated their sovereign will to withhold the convening of the interim National Assembly.
Again, in the referendum of February 27, 1975, the proposed question of whether the interim
National Assembly shall be initially convened was eliminated, because some of the members of
Congress and delegates of the Constitutional Convention, who were deemed automatically
members of the I interim National Assembly, were against its inclusion since in that referendum
of January, 1973, the people had already resolved against it.
3. In sensu strictiore, when the legislative arm of the state undertakes the proposals of
amendment to a Constitution, that body is not in the usual function of lawmaking. lt is not
legislating when engaged in the amending process.16 Rather, it is exercising a peculiar power
bestowed upon it by the fundamental charter itself. In the Philippines, that power is provided for
in Article XVI of the 1973 Constitution (for the regular National Assembly) or in Section 15 of
the Transitory Provisions (for the National Assembly). While ordinarily it is the business of the
legislating body to legislate for the nation by virtue of constitutional conferment amending of the
Constitution is not legislative in character. In political science a distinction is made between
constitutional content of an organic character and that of a legislative character'. The distinction,
however, is one of policy, not of law. 17Such being the case, approval of the President of any
proposed amendment is a misnomer 18 The prerogative of the President to approve or disapprove
applies only to the ordinary cases of legislation. The President has nothing to do with proposition
or adoption of amendments to the Constitution. 19
III
Concentration of Powers
in the President during
crisis government.
1. In general, the governmental powers in crisis government the Philippines is a crisis
government today are more or less concentrated in the President. 20 According to Rossiter, "(t)he
concentration of government power in a democracy faced by an emergency is a corrective to the
crisis inefficiencies inherent in the doctrine of the separation of powers. In most free states it has
generally been regarded as imperative that the total power of the government be parceled out
among three mutually independent branches executive, legislature, and judiciary. It is believed to
be destructive of constitutionalism if any one branch should exercise any two or more types of
power, and certainly a total disregard of the separation of powers is, as Madison wrote in the
Federalist, No. 47, 'the very definition of tyranny.' In normal times the separation of powers
forms a distinct obstruction to arbitrary governmental action. By this same token, in abnormal
times it may form an insurmountable barrier to a decisive emergency action in behalf of the state
and its independent existence. There are moments in the life of any government when all powers
must work together in unanimity of purpose and action, even if this means the temporary union
of executive, legislative, and judicial power in the hands of one man. The more complete the
separation of powers in a constitutional system, the more difficult and yet the more necessary
will be their fusion in time of crisis. This is evident in a comparison of the crisis potentialities of
the cabinet and presidential systems of government. In the former the all-important harmony of
legislature and executive is taken for granted; in the latter it is neither guaranteed nor to be to
confidently expected. As a result, cabinet is more easily established and more trustworthy than
presidential dictatorship. The power of the state in crisis must not only be concentrated and
expanded; it must also be freed from the normal system of constitutional and legal
limitations. 21 John Locke, on the other hand, claims for the executive in its own right a broad
discretion capable even of setting aside the ordinary laws in the meeting of special exigencies for
which the legislative power had not provided. 22 The rationale behind such broad emergency
powers of the Executive is the release of the government from "the paralysis of constitutional
restrains" so that the crisis may be ended and normal times restored.
2. The presidential exercise of legislative powers in time of martial law is now a conceded valid
at. That sun clear authority of the President is saddled on Section 3 (pars. 1 and 2) of the
Transitory Provisions, thus: 23
The incumbent President of the Philippines shall initially convene the interim
National Assembly and shall preside over its sessions until the interim Speaker
shall have been elected. He shall continue to exercise his powers and prerogatives
under the nineteen hundred and thirty-five Constitution and the powers vested in
the President and the Prime Minister under this Constitution until the calls upon
the interim National Assembly to elect the interim President and the interim Prime
Minister, who shall then exercise their respective powers vested by this
Constitution.
All proclamations, orders, decrees, instructions, and acts promulgated, issued, or
done by the incumbent President shall be part of the law of the land, and shall
remain valid, binding, and effective even after lifting of martial law or the
ratification of this Constitution, unless modified, revoked, or superseded by
subsequent proclamations, orders, decrees, instructions, or other acts of the
incumbent President, or unless expressly and explicitly modified or repealed by
the regular National Assembly.
"It is unthinkable," said Justice Fernandez, a 1971 Constitutional Convention delegate, "that the
Constitutional Convention, while giving to the President the discretion when to call the interim
National Assembly to session, and knowing that it may not be convened soon, would create a
vacuum in the exercise of legislative powers. Otherwise, with no one to exercise the lawmaking
powers, there would be paralyzation of the entire governmental machinery." 24 Paraphrasing
Rossiter, this is an extremely important factor in any constitutional dictatorship which extends
over a period of time. The separation of executive and legislature ordained in the Constitution
presents a distinct obstruction to efficient crisis government. The steady increase in executive
power is not too much a cause for as the steady increase in the magnitude and complexity of the
problems the President has been called upon by the Filipino people to solve in their behalf,
which involve rebellion, subversion, secession, recession, inflation, and economic crisis-a crisis
greater than war. In short, while conventional constitutional law just confines the President's
power as Commander-in-Chief to the direction of the operation of the national forces, yet the
facts of our political, social, and economic disturbances had convincingly shown that in meeting
the same, indefinite power should be attributed to tile President to take emergency measures 25
IV
Authority of the incumbent
President t to propose
amendments to the Constitution.
1. As earlier pointed out, the power to legislate is constitutionally consigned to the interim
National Assembly during the transition period. However, the initial convening of that Assembly
is a matter fully addressed to the judgment of the incumbent President. And, in the exercise of
that judgment, the President opted to defer convening of that body in utter recognition of the
people's preference. Likewise, in the period of transition, the power to propose amendments to
the Constitution lies in the interim National Assembly upon special call by the President (See. 15
of the Transitory Provisions). Again, harking to the dictates of the sovereign will, the President
decided not to call the interim National Assembly. Would it then be within the bounds of the
Constitution and of law for the President to assume that constituent power of the interim
Assembly vis-a-vis his assumption of that body's legislative functions? The answer is yes. If the
President has been legitimately discharging the legislative functions of the interim Assembly,
there is no reason why he cannot validly discharge the function of that Assembly to propose
amendments to the Constitution, which is but adjunct, although peculiar, to its gross legislative
power. This, of course, is not to say that the President has converted his office into a constituent
assembly of that nature normally constituted by the legislature. Rather, with the interim National
Assembly not convened and only the Presidency and the Supreme Court in operation, the urges
of absolute necessity render it imperative upon the President to act as agent for and in behalf of
the people to propose amendments to the Constitution. Parenthetically, by its very constitution,
the Supreme Court possesses no capacity to propose amendments without constitutional
infractions. For the President to shy away from that actuality and decline to undertake the
amending process would leave the governmental machineries at a stalemate or create in the
powers of the State a destructive vacuum, thereby impeding the objective of a crisis government
"to end the crisis and restore normal times." In these parlous times, that Presidential initiative to
reduce into concrete forms the constant voices of the people reigns supreme. After all,
constituent assemblies or constitutional conventions, like the President now, are mere agents of
the people .26
2. The President's action is not a unilateral move. As early as the referendums of January 1973
and February 1975, the people had already rejected the calling of the interim National Assembly.
The Lupong Tagapagpaganap of the Katipunan ng mga Sanggunian, the Pambansang Katipunan
ng mga Barangay, and the Pambansang Katipunan ng mga Barangay, representing 42,000
barangays, about the same number of Kabataang Barangay organizations, Sanggunians in 1,458
municipalities, 72 provinces, 3 sub-provinces, and 60 cities had informed the President that the
prevailing sentiment of the people is for the abolition of the interim National Assembly. Other
issues concerned the lifting of martial law and amendments to the Constitution .27 The national
organizations of Sangguniang Bayan presently proposed to settle the issues of martial law, the
interim Assembly, its replacement, the period of its existence, the length of the period for the
exercise by the President of its present powers in a referendum to be held on October 16 . 28 The
Batasang Bayan (legislative council) created under Presidential Decree 995 of September 10,
1976, composed of 19 cabinet members, 9 officials with cabinet rank, 91 members of the Lupong
Tagapagpaganap (executive committee) of the Katipunan ng mga Sangguniang Bayan voted in
session to submit directly to the people in a plebiscite on October 16, the previously quoted
proposed amendments to the Constitution, including the issue of martial law .29 Similarly, the
"barangays" and the "sanggunians" endorsed to the President the submission of the proposed
amendments to the people on October 16. All the foregoing led the President to initiate the
proposal of amendments to the Constitution and the subsequent issuance of Presidential Decree
No, 1033 on September 22, 1976 submitting the questions (proposed amendments) to the people
in the National Referendum-Plebiscite on October 16.
V
The People is Sovereign
1. Unlike in a federal state, the location of sovereignty in a unitary state is easily seen. In the
Philippines, a republican and unitary state, sovereignty "resides in the people and all government
authority emanates from them.30 In its fourth meaning, Savigny would treat people as "that
particular organized assembly of individuals in which, according to the Constitution, the highest
power exists." 31 This is the concept of popular sovereignty. It means that the constitutional
legislator, namely the people, is sovereign 32 In consequence, the people may thus write into the
Constitution their convictions on any subject they choose in the absence of express constitutional
prohibition. 33 This is because, as Holmes said, the Constitution "is an experiment, as all life is all
experiment." 34 "The necessities of orderly government," wrote Rottschaefer, "do not require that
one generation should be permitted to permanently fetter all future generations." A constitution is
based, therefore, upon a self-limiting decision of the people when they adopt it. 35
2. The October 16 referendum-plebiscite is a resounding call to the people to exercise their
sovereign power as constitutional legislator. The proposed amendments, as earlier discussed,
proceed not from the thinking of a single man. Rather, they are the collated thoughts of the
sovereign will reduced only into enabling forms by the authority who can presently exercise the
powers of the government. In equal vein, the submission of those proposed amendments and the
question of martial law in a referendum-plebiscite expresses but the option of the people
themselves implemented only by the authority of the President. Indeed, it may well be said that
the amending process is a sovereign act, although the authority to initiate the same and the
procedure to be followed reside somehow in a particular body.
VI
Referendum-Plebiscite not
rendered nugatory by the
participation of the 15-year olds.
1. October 16 is in parts a referendum and a plebiscite. The question - (1) Do you want martial
law to be continued? - is a referendum question, wherein the 15-year olds may participate. This
was prompted by the desire of the Government to reach the larger mas of the people so that their
true pulse may be felt to guide the President in pursuing his program for a New Order. For the
succeeding question on the proposed amendments, only those of voting age of 18 years may
participate. This is the plebiscite aspect, as contemplated in Section 2, Article XVI of the new
Constitution. 36 On this second question, it would only be the votes of those 18 years old and
above which will have valid bearing on the results. The fact that the voting populace are
simultaneously asked to answer the referendum question and the plebiscite question does not
infirm the referendum-plebiscite. There is nothing objectionable in consulting the people on a
given issue, which is of current one and submitting to them for ratification of proposed
constitutional amendments. The fear of commingled votes (15-year olds and 18-year olds above)
is readily dispelled by the provision of two ballot boxes for every barangay center, one
containing the ballots of voters fifteen years of age and under eighteen, and another containing
the ballots of voters eighteen years of age and above. 37 The ballots in the ballot box for voters
fifteen years of age and under eighteen shall be counted ahead of the ballots of voters eighteen
years and above contained in another ballot box. And, the results of the referendum-plebiscite
shall be separately prepared for the age groupings, i.e., ballots contained in each of the two
boxes. 38
2. It is apt to distinguish here between a "referendum" and a "plebiscite." A "referendum" is
merely consultative in character. It is simply a means of assessing public reaction to the given
issues submitted to the people foe their consideration, the calling of which is derived from or
within the totality of the executive power of the President. 39It is participated in by all citizens
from the age of fifteen, regardless of whether or not they are illiterates, feeble-minded, or exconvicts . 40 A "plebiscite," on the other hand, involves the constituent act of those "citizens of the
Philippines not otherwise disqualified by law, who are eighteen years of age or over, and who
shall have resided in the Philippines for at least one year and in the place wherein they propose to
vote for at least six months preceding the election Literacy, property or any other substantive
requirement is not imposed. It is generally associated with the amending process of the
Constitution, more particularly, the ratification aspect.
VII
1. There appeals to be no valid basis for the claim that the regime of martial law stultifies in main
the freedom to dissent. That speaks of a bygone fear. The martial law regime which, in the
observation of Justice Fernando, 41 is impressed with a mild character recorded no State
imposition for a muffled voice. To be sure, there are restraints of the individual liberty, but on
certain grounds no total suppression of that liberty is aimed at. The for the referendum-plebiscite
on October 16 recognizes all the embracing freedoms of expression and assembly The President
himself had announced that he would not countenance any suppression of dissenting views on
the issues, as he is not interested in winning a "yes" or "no" vote, but on the genuine sentiment of
the people on the issues at hand. 42 Thus, the dissenters soon found their way to the public
forums, voicing out loud and clear their adverse views on the proposed amendments and even (in
the valid ratification of the 1973 Constitution, which is already a settled matter. 43 Even
government employees have been held by the Civil Service Commission free to participate in
public discussion and even campaign for their stand on the referendum-plebiscite issues. 44
VIII
Time for deliberation
is not short.
1. The period from September 21 to October 16 or a period of 3 weeks is not too short for free
debates or discussions on the referendum-plebiscite issues. The questions are not new. They are
the issues of the day. The people have been living with them since the proclamation of martial
law four years ago. The referendums of 1973 and 1975 carried the same issue of martial law.
That notwithstanding, the contested brief period for discussion is not without counterparts in
previous plebiscites for constitutional amendments. Justice Makasiar, in the Referendum Case,
recalls: "Under the old Society, 15 days were allotted for the publication in three consecutive
issues of the Official Gazette of the women's suffrage amendment to the Constitution before the
scheduled plebiscite on April 30, 1937 (Com. Act No. 34). The constitutional amendment to
append as ordinance the complicated Tydings-Kocialskowski was published in only three
consecutive issues of the Official Gazette for 10 days prior to the scheduled plebiscite (Com. Act
492). For the 1940 Constitutional amendments providing for the bicameral Congress, the
reelection of the President and Vice President, and the creation of the Commission on Elections,
20 days of publication in three consecutive issues of the Official Gazette was fixed (Com Act No.
517). And the Parity Amendment, an involved constitutional amendment affecting the economy
as well as the independence of the Republic was publicized in three consecutive issues of the
Official Gazette for 20 days prior to the plebiscite (Rep. Act No. 73)." 45
2. It is worthy to note that Article XVI of the Constitution makes no provision as to the specific
date when the plebiscite shall be held, but simply states that it "shall be held not later than three
months after the approval of such amendment or revision." In Coleman v. Miller, 46 the United
States Supreme court held that this matter of submission involves "an appraisal of a great variety
of relevant conditions, political, social and economic," which "are essentially political and not
justiciable." The constituent body or in the instant cases, the President, may fix the time within
which the people may act. This is because proposal and ratification are not treated as unrelated
acts, but as succeeding steps in a single endeavor, the natural inference being that they are not to
be widely separated in time; second, it is only when there is deemed to be a necessity therefor
that amendments are to be proposed, the reasonable implication being that when proposed, they
are to be considered and disposed of presently, and third, ratification is but the expression of the
approbation of the people, hence, it must be done contemporaneously. 47 In the words of
Jameson, "(a)n alteration of the Constitution proposed today has relation to the sentiment and the
felt needs of today, and that, if not ratified early while that sentiment may fairly be supposed to
exist. it ought to be regarded as waived, and not again to be voted upon, unless a second time
proposed by proper body
IN RESUME
The three issues are
1. Is the question of the constitutionality of Presidential Decrees Nos. 991, 1031 and 1033
political or justiciable?
2. During the present stage of the transition period, and under, the environmental circumstances
now obtaining, does the President possess power to propose amendments to the Constitution as
well as set up the required machinery and prescribe the procedure for the ratification of his
proposals by the people?
3. Is the submission to the people of the proposed amendments within the time frame allowed
therefor a sufficient and proper submission?
Upon the first issue, Chief Justice Fred Ruiz Castro and Associate Justices Enrique M. Fernando,
Claudio Teehankee, Antonio P. Barredo, Cecilia Munoz Palma, Hermogenes Concepcion Jr. and
Ruperto G. Martin are of the view that the question posed is justiciable, while Associate Justices
Felix V. Makasiar, Felix Q. Antonio and Ramon C. Aquino hold the view that the question is
political.
Upon the second issue, Chief Justice Castro and Associate Justices Barredo, Makasiar, Antonio,
Aquino, Concepcion Jr. and Martin voted in the affirmative, while Associate Justices Teehankee
and Munoz Palma voted in the negative. Associate Justice Fernando, conformably to his
concurring and dissenting opinion in Aquino vs. Enrile (59 SCRA 183), specifically dissents
from the proposition that there is concentration of powers in the Executive during periods of
crisis, thus raising serious doubts as to the power of the President to propose amendments.
Upon the third issue, Chief Justice Castro and Associate Justices Barredo, Makasiar, Aquino,
Concepcion Jr. and Martin are of the view that there is a sufficient and proper submission of the
proposed amendments for ratification by the people. Associate Justices Barredo and Makasiar
expressed the hope, however that the period of time may be extended. Associate Justices
Fernando, Makasiar and Antonio are of the view that the question is political and therefore
beyond the competence and cognizance of this Court, Associate Justice Fernando adheres to his
concurrence in the opinion of Chief Justice Concepcion in Gonzales vs. COMELEC (21 SCRA
774).Associate Justices Teehankee and MUNOZ Palma hold that prescinding from the
President's lack of authority to exercise the constituent power to propose the amendments, etc.,
as above stated, there is no fair and proper submission with sufficient information and time to
assure intelligent consent or rejection under the standards set by this Court in the controlling
cases of Gonzales, supra, and Tolentino vs. COMELEC (41 SCRA 702).
Chief Justice Castro and Associate Justices Barredo, Makasiar, Antonio, Aquino, Concepcion Jr.
and Martin voted to dismiss the three petitions at bar. For reasons as expressed in his separate
opinion, Associate Justice Fernando concurs in the result. Associate Justices Teehankee and
Munoz Palma voted to grant the petitions.
ACCORDINGLY, the vote being 8 to 2 to dismiss, the said petitions are hereby dismissed. This
decision is immediately executory.
SO ORDERED.
Aquino, J, in the result.
Separate Opinions
CASTRO, C.J.:, concurring:
From the challenge as formulated in the three petitions at bar and the grounds advanced be the
Solicitor General in opposition thereto, as well as the arguments adduced by the counsels of the
parties at the hearing had on October 7 and 8, 1976, three vital issues readily project themselves
as the centers of controversy, namely:
(1) Is the question of the constitutionality of Presidential Decrees Nos. 991, 1031 and 1033
political or justiciable?
(2) During the present stage of the transition period, and under the environmental circumstances
now obtaining, does the President possess power to propose amendments to the Constitution as
well as set up the required machineries and prescribe the procedure for the ratification of his
proposals by the people?
(3) Is the submission to the people of the proposed amendments within the time frame allowed
therefor a sufficient and proper, submission"
I
First Issue
The threshold question is not at all one of first impression Specifically on the matter of proposals
to amend the Constitution, this Court, in Mabanag vs. Lopez Vito (78 Phil. 1), inceptively
announced the dictum thatProposal to amend the Constitution is a highly political function performed by the
Congress in its sovereign legislative capacity and committed to its charges by the
Constitution itself. The exercise of this power is even independent of any
intervention by the Chief Executive. If on grounds of expediency scrupulous
attention of the judiciary be needed to safeguard public interest, there is less
reason for judicial inquiry into the validity of a proposal than into that of a
ratification.
In time, however, the validity of the said pronouncement was eroded. In the assessment of the
Court itselfThe force of this precedent has been weakened, however, by Suanes vs. Chief Accountant of the
Senate (81 Phil. 818), Avelino vs. Cuenco (L-2581, March 4 and 14, 1949), Tanada vs. Cuenco
(L-10520, February 28, 1957), and Macias vs. Commission on Elections (L-18684, September
14, 1961).
xxx xxx xxx
In short, the issue whether or not a Resolution of Congress-acting as a constituent assemblyviolates the Constitution is essentially justiciable, not political, and, hence, subject to judicial
review, and, to the extent this view may be inconsistent with the stand taken in Mabanag vs.
Lopez Vito the latter should be deemed modified accordingly. The Members of the Court are
unanimous on this point." (Gonzales vs. Commission on Elections, et al, L-28196, November 9,
1967, 21 SCRA 774, 786-787).
The abandonment of the Mabanag vs. Lopez Vito doctrine appears to have been completed
when, in Javellana vs. Secretary, et al. (L-36142, March 3l, 1973, 50 SCRA 30), six members of
the Court concurred in the view that the question of whether the 1973 Constitution was ratified in
accordance with the provisions of Article XV (Amendments) of the 1935 Constitution is
inherently and essentially justiciable.
As elucidated therein, with extensive quotations from Tanada vs. Cuenco (103 Phil. 1051)... the term 'political question' connotes, in legal parlance, what it means in
ordinarily parlance, namely, a question of policy in matters concerning the
government of a State, as a body politic. In other words, in the language of
Corpus Juris Secundum (supra), it refers to 'those questions which, under the
Constitution, are to be decided by the people in their sovereign capacity, or in
regard to which full discretionary authority has been delegated to the Legislature
or executive branch of the government.' It is concerned with issues dependent
upon the wisdom, not legality, of a particular measure.'
Accordingly, when the grant of power is qualified, conditional or subject to limitations, the issue
on whether or not the prescribed qualifications or conditions have been met, or the limitations
respected, is justiciable or non-political, the crux of the problem being one of legality or validity
of the contested act, not its wisdom. Otherwise, said qualifications, conditions or limitations particularly those prescribed or imposed by the Constitution - would be set at naught." (Javellana
vs. Executive Secretary, supra).
So it is in the situation here presented. The basic issue is the constitutional validity of the
presidential acts of proposing amendments to the Constitution and of calling a referendumplebiscite for the ratification of the proposals made. Evidently, the question does not concern
itself with the wisdom of the exercise of the authority claimed or of the specific amendments
proposed. Instead the inquiry vel non is focused solely on the existence of the said power in the
President - a question purely of legality determinable thru interpretation and construction of the
letter and spirit of the Constitution by the Court as the final arbiter in the delineation of
constitutional boundaries and the allocation of constitutional powers.
For the Court to shun cognizance of the challenge herein presented, especially in these parlous
years, would be to abdicate its constitutional powers, shirk its constitutional responsibility, and
deny the people their ultimate recourse for judicial determination.
I have thus no hesitancy in concluding that the question here presented is well within the
periphery of judicial inquiry.
II
Second Issue
The main question stands on a different footing; it appears unprecedented both here and
elsewhere. Its solution, I believe, can be found and unraveled only by a critical assessment of the
existing legal order in the light of the prevailing political and factual milieu.
To be sure, there is an impressive array of consistent jurisprudence on the proposition that,
normally or under normal conditions, a Constitution may be amended only in accord with the
procedure set forth therein. Hence, if there be any such prescription for the amendatory process
as invariable there is because one of the essential parts of a Constitution is the so-called
"constitution of sovereignty" which comprises the provision or provisions on the modes in
accordance with which formal changes in the fundamental law may be effected the same would
ordinarily be the controlling criterion for the validity of the amendments sought.
Unfortunately, however, during the present transition period of our political development, no
express provision is extant in the Constitution regarding the agency or agent by whom and the
procedure by which amendments thereto may be proposed and ratified fact overlooked by those
who challenge the validity of the presidential acts in the premises. This is so because there are at
least two distinctly in the transition from the old system of government under the 1935
Constitution to the new one established by the 1973 Constitution.
The first stage comprises the period from the effectivity of the Constitution on January 17, 1973
to the time the National Assembly is convened by the incumbent President and the interim
President and the interim Prime Minister are chosen Article XVII, Sections 1 and 3[1]. The
existence of this stage as an obvious fact of the nation's political life was recognized by the Court
in Aquino vs. Commission on Elections, et al. (L-40004, January 31, 1975, 62 SCRA 275), when
it rejected the claim that, under the 1973 Constitution, the President was in duty bound to
convene the interim National Assembly soon after the Constitution took effect.
The second stage embraces the period from the date the interim National Assembly is convened
to the date the Government described in Articles VII to IX of the Constitution is inaugurated,
following the election of the members of the regular National Assembly (Article XVII, Section
1) and the election of the regular President and Prime Minister,. This is as it should be because it
is recognized that the President has been accorded the discretion to determine when he shall
initially convene the interim National Assembly, and his decision to defer the convocation
thereof has found overwhelming support by the sovereign people in two previous referenda,
therein giving reality to an interregnum between the effectivity of the Constitution and the initial
convocation of the interim National Assembly, which interregnum, as aforesaid, constitutes the
first stage in the transition period.
Against this factual backdrop, it is readily discernible that neither of the two sets of provisions
embodied in the Constitution on the amendatory process applied during the said first stage. Thus,
Section 15, Article XVII (Transitory Provisions) provides"Sec. 15. The interim National Assembly, upon special call by the interim Prime Minister, may,
by a majority vote of all its Members, propose amendments to this Constitution. Such
amendments shall take effect when ratified in accordance with Article Sixteen hereof."
Patently, the reference to the "interim National Assembly" and the "interim Prime Minister"
limits the application thereof to the second stage of the transition period, i.e.,., after the interim?
National Assembly shall have been convened and the interim Prime Minister shall have been
chosen.
Upon the other hand, the provisions of Article XVI (Amendments), to witSECTION 1. (1) Any amendment to, or revision of, this Constitution may be
proposed by the National Assembly upon a vote of three-fourths of all its
Members, or by a constitutional convention.
(2) The National Assembly may, by a vote of two-thirds of all its Members, call a
constitutional convention or, by a majority vote of all its Members, submit the
question of ceiling such a convention to the electorate in an election.
SEC. 2. Any amendment to, or revision of, this Constitution shall be valid when
ratified by a majority of the votes cast in a plebiscite which shall be held not later
than three months after the approval of such amendment or revision.
unequivocally contemplate amendments after the regular Government shall have become fully
operative, referring as they do to the National Assembly which will come into being only at that
time.
In the face of this constitutional hiatus, we are confronted with the dilemma whether
amendments to the Constitution may be effected during the aforesaid first stage and, if in the
affirmative, by whom and in what manner such amendments may be proposed and ratified.
Susceptibility to change is one of the hallmarks of an Ideal Constitution. Not being a mere
declaration of the traditions of a nation but more the embodiment of a people's hopes and
aspirations, its strictures are not unalterable. They are, instead, dynamic precepts intended to
keep in stride with and attuned to the living social organism they seek to fashion and govern. If it
is conceded that "the political or philosophical aphorism of one generation is doubted by the next
and entirely discarded by the third," then a Constitution must be able to adjust to the changing
needs and demands of society so that the latter may survive, progress and endure. On these
verities, there can be no debate.
During the first stage of the transition period in which the Government is at present - which is
understandably the most critical - the need for change may be most pressing and imperative, and
to disavow the existence of the right to amend the Constitution would be sheer political heresy.
Such view would deny the people a mechanism for effecting peaceful change, and belie the
organic conception of the Constitution by depriving it of its means of growth. Such a result
obviously could not have been intended by the framers of the fundamental law.
It seems, however, that the happenstance that the first period would come to pass before the
convocation of the interim National Assembly was not anticipated, hence, the omission of an
express mandate to govern the said situation in so far as amendments are concerned. But such
omission through inadvertence should not, because it cannot, negate the sovereign power of the
people to amend the fundamental charter that governs their lives and their future and perhaps
even the very survival of the nation.
Upon the other hand, it is clear from the afore-quoted provisions on the amendatory process that
the intent was, instead, to provide a simpler and more expeditious mode of amending the
Constitution during the transition period. For, while under Article XVI thereof, proposals for
amendment may be made directly by the regular National Assembly by a vote of at least threefourths of all its members, under Section 15 of Article XVII, a bare majority vote of all the
members of the National Assembly would suffice for the purpose. The relaxation and the
disparity in the vote requirement are revealing. The can only signify a recognition of the need to
facilitate the adoption of amendments during the second stage of the transition period so that the
interim National Assembly will be able, in a manner of speaking, to iron out the kinks in the new
Constitution, remove imperfections therein, and provide for changed or changing circumstances
before the establishment of the regular Government. In this contest, therefore, it is inutile
speculation to assume that the Constitution was intended to render impotent or ar the effectuation
of needful change at an even more critical period - the first stage. With greater reason, therefore,
must the right and power to amend the Constitution during the first stage of te transition period
be upheld, albeit within its express and implied constraints.
Neither can it be successfully argued, in the same context and in the present posture, that the
Constitution may be amended during the said first stage only by convening the interim National
Assembly. That is to say and require that he said stage must first be brought to an end before any
amendment may be proposed and ratified. Settled jurisprudence does not square with such a
proposition. As aptly noted in Aquino vs. Commission on Elections, et al., supra, the framers of
the Constitution set no deadline for the convening of the interim National Assembly because they
could not have foreseen how long the crises which impelled the proclamation and justify the
continued state of martial law would last. Indeed, the framers committed to the sound judgment
is not subject to judicial review, save possibly to determine whether arbitrariness has infected
such exercise; absent such a taint, the matter is solely in the keeping of the President. To thus
content that only by convening the interim National Assembly may the Constitution be amended
at this time would effectively override the judgement vested in the President, even in default of
any he has acted arbitrarily or gravely abuse his discretion. Furthermore, to sustain such a
contention would not only negate the mandate so resoundingly expressed by the people in two
national referenda against the immediate convening of the interim National Assembly, but as
well deride their overwhelming approval of the manner in which the President has exercised the
legislative power to issue proclamations, orders, decrees and instructions having the stature and
force of law.
Given the constitutional stalemate or impasse spawned by these supervening developments, the
logical query that compels itself for resolution is: By whom, then, may proposals for the
amendment of the Constitution be made and in what manner may said proposals be ratified by
the people?
It is conventional wisdom that, conceptually, the constituent power is not to be confuse with
legislative power in general because the prerogative to propose amendments to the Constitution
is not in any sense embraced within the ambit of ordinary law-making. Hence, there is much to
recommend the proposition that, in default of an express grant thereof, the legislature traditionally the delegated repository thereof - may not claim it under a general grant of
legislative authority. In the same vein, neither would it be altogether unassailable to say that
because by constitutional tradition and express allocation the constituent power under the
Constitution is locate in the law-making agency and at this stage of the transition period the lawmaking authority is firmly recognized as being lodged in the President, the said constituent
power should now logically be in the hands of te President who may thus exercise it in place of
the interim National Assembly. Instead,, as pointed out in Gonzales vs. Commission on
Elections, et al., supra, the power to amend the Constitution or to propose amendments thereto
... is part of the inherent powers of the people - as the repository of sovereignty in
a republican state, such as ours - t o make, and, hence, to amend their own
Fundamental Law.
As such, it is undoubtedly a power that only the sovereign people, either directly by themselves
or through their chosen delegate, can wield. Since it has been shown that the people,
inadvertently or otherwise, have not delegated that power to inadvertently or otherwise, have not
delegated that power to any instrumentality during the current stage of our hegira from crisis to
normalcy, it follows of necessity that the same remains with them for them to exercise in the
manner they see fit and through the agency they choose. And, even if it were conceded that - as it
is reputedly the rule in some jurisdictions - a delegation of the constituent authority amounts to a
complete divestiture from the people of the power delegated which they may not thereafter
unilaterally reclaim from the delegate, there would be no violence donde to such rule, assuming
it to be applicable here, inasmuch as that power, under the environmental circumstance adverted
to, has not been delegated to anyone in the first place. The constituent power during the first
stage of the transition period belongs to and remains with the people, and accordingly may be
exercised by them - how and when - at their pleasure.
At this juncture, a flashback to the recent and contemporary political ferment in the country
proves revelatory. The people, shocked and revolted by the "obvious immorality" of the
unabashed manner by which the delegates to the Constitutional Convention virtually legislated
themselves into office as ipso facto members of the interim National Assembly by the mere fiat
of voting for the transitory provisions of the Constitution. and the stark reality that the unwieldy
political monstrosity that the interim Assembly portended to be would have proven to be a
veritable drain on the meager financial resources of a nation struggling for survival, have
unequivocally put their foot down, as it were, on the convocation thereof. But this patently
salutary decision of the people proved to be double-edged. It likewise bound the political
machinery of the Government in a virtual straight-jacket and consigned the political evolution of
the nation into a state of suspended animation. Faced with the ensuing dilemma, the people
understandably agitated for a solution. Through consultations in the barangays and sanggunian
assemblies, the instrumentalities through which the people's voice is articulated in the unique
system of participatory democracy in the country today, the underpinnings for the hastening of
the return to constitutional normalcy quickly evolved into an overwhelming sentiment to amend
the Constitution in order to replace the discredited interim National Assembly with what the
people believe will be an appropriate agency to eventually take over the law-making power and
thus pave the way for the early lifting of martial rule. In pursuit of this sentiment, and to translate
its constraints into concrete action, the Pambansang Katipunan ng Barangay, the Pambansang
Katipunan ng mga Kabataang Barangay, the Lupong Tagapagpaganap of the Katipunan ng mga
Barangay, the Pambansang Katipunan ng mga Kabataang Barangay the Lupong Tagapagpaganap
of the Katipunan ng mga Sanggunian, and finally the Batasang Bayan, to a man and as one voice,
have come forward with definitive proposals for the amendment of the Constitution, and,
choosing the President the only political arm of the State at this time through which that decision
could be implemented and the end in view attained as their spokesman, proposed the
amendments under challenge in the cases at bar.
In the light of this milieu and its imperatives, one thing is inescapable: the proposals now
submitted to the people for their ratification in the forthcoming referendum-plebiscite are
factually not of the President; they are directly those of the people themselves speaking thru their
authorized instrumentalities. The President merely formalized the said proposals in Presidential
Decree No. 1033. It being conceded in all quarters that sovereignty resides in the people and it
having been demonstrated that their constituent power to amend the Constitution has not been
delegated by them to any instrumentality of the Government during the present stage of the
transition period of our political development, the conclusion is ineluctable that their exertion of
that residuary power cannot be vulnerable to any constitutional challenge as being ultra vires.
Accordingly, without venturing to rule on whether or not the President is vested with constituent
power as it does not appear necessary to do so in the premises the proposals here challenged,
being acts of the sovereign people no less, cannot be said to be afflicted with unconstitutionality.
A fortiori, the concomitant authority to call a plebiscite and to appropriate funds therefor is even
less vulnerable not only because the President, in exercising said authority has acted as a mere
alter ego of the people who made the proposals, but likewise because the said authority is
legislative in nature rather than constituent.
III
Third Issue
Little need be said of the claimed insufficiency and impropriety of the submission of the
proposed amendments for ratification from the standpoint of time. The thesis cannot be disputed
that a fair submission presupposes an adequate time lapse to enable the people to be sufficiently
enlightened on the merits or demerits of the amendments presented for their ratification or
rejection. However, circumstances there are which unmistakably demonstrated that the is met.
Even if the proposal appear to have been formalized only upon the promulgation of Presidential
Decree No. 1033 on September 22, 1976, they are actually the crystallization of sentiments that
for so long have preoccupied the minds of the people and their authorized representatives, from
the very lowest level of the political hierarchy. Hence, unlike proposals emanating from a
legislative body, the same cannot but be said to have been mulled over, pondered upon, debated,
discussed and sufficiently understood by the great masses of the nation long before they ripened
into formal proposals.
Besides. it is a fact of which judicial notice may well be taken that in the not so distant past when
the 1973 Constitution was submitted to the people for ratification, an all-out campaign, in which
all the delegates of the Constitutional Convention reportedly participated, was launched to
acquaint the people with the ramifications and working of the new system of government sought
to be inaugurated thereunder. It may thus well be assumed that the people in general have since
acquired, in the least, a working knowledge of the entirety of the Constitution. The changes now
proposed the most substantial of which being merely the replacement of the interim National
assembly with another legislative arm for the Government during the transition period until the
regular National Assembly shall have been constituted do not appear to be of such complexity as
to require considerable time to be brought home to the full understanding of the people. And, in
fact, the massive and wide-ranging informational and educational campaign to this end has been
and still is in full swing, with all the media the barangay, the civic and sectoral groups, and even
the religious all over the land in acting and often enthusiastic if not frenetic involvement.
Indeed, when the people cast their votes on October 16, a negative vote could very well mean an
understanding of the proposals which they reject; while an affirmative vote could equally be
indicative Of such understanding and/or an abiding credence in the fidelity with which the
President has kept the trust they have confided to him as President and administrator of martial
rule
IV
Conclusion
It is thus my considered view that no question viable for this court to pass judgment upon is
posed. Accordingly, I vote for the outright dismissal of the three petitions at bar.
FERNANDO, J., concurring and dissenting:
These three petitions, the latest in a series of cases starting from Planas v. Commission on
Elections continuing with the epochal resolution in Javellana v. Executive Secretary and
followed successively in three crucial decisions, Aquino v. Ponce Enrile Aquino v. Commission
on Elections, and Aquino v Military Commission, 5manifest to the same degree the delicate and
awesome character of the function of judicial review. While previous rulings supply guidance
and enlightenment, care is to be taken to avoid doctrinaire rigidity unmindful of altered
circumstances and the urgencies of the times. It is inappropriate to resolve the complex problems
of a critical period without full awareness of the consequences that flow from whatever decision
is reached. Jural norms must be read in the context of social facts, There is need therefore of
adjusting inherited principles to new needs. For law, much more so constitutional law, is
simultaneously a reflection of and a force in the society that it controls. No quality then can be
more desirable in constitutional adjudication than that intellectual and imaginative insight which
goes into the heart of the matter. The judiciary must survey things as they are in the light of what
they must become It must inquire into the specific problem posed not only in terms of the
teaching of the past but also of the emerging political and legal theory, especially so under a
leadership notable for its innovative approach to social problems and the vigor of its
implementation. This, on the one side. It must equally be borne in mind through that this Court
must be conscious of the risk inherent in its being considered as a mere subservient instrument of
government policy however admittedly salutary or desirable. There is still the need to
demonstrate that the conclusion reached by it in cases appropriate for its determination has
support in the law that must be applied. To my mind that was the norm followed, the conclusion
reached being that the three petitions be dismissed. I am in agreement. It is with regret however
that based on my reading of past decisions, both Philippine and American, and more specifically
my concurring opinion in Aquino v. Ponce Enrile, I must dissent from the proposition set forth in
the able and scholarly opinion of Justice Martin that there is concentration of power in the
President during a crisis government. Consequently, I cannot see my way clear to accepting the
view that the authority to propose amendments is not open to question. At the very least, serious
doubts could be entertained on the matter.
1. With due respect then, I have to dissociate myself from my brethren who would rule that
governmental powers in a crisis government, following Rossiter, "are more or less concentrated
in the President." Adherence to my concurring and dissenting opinion in Aquino v. Ponce Enrile
leaves me no choice.
It must be stated at the outset that with the sufficiency of doctrines supplied by our past decisions
to point the way to what I did consider the appropriate response to the basic issue raised in the
Aquino and the other habeas corpus petitions resolved jointly, it was only in the latter portion of
my opinion that reference was made to United States Supreme Court pronouncements on martial
law, at the most persuasive in character and rather few in number "due no doubt to the, absence
in the American Constitution of any provision concerning it." 7 It was understandable then that it
was only after the landmark Ex parte Milligan case, that commentators like Cooley in 1868 and
Watson in 1910 paid attention, minimal by that, to the subject." It was next set forth that in the
works on American constitutional law published in this century specially after the leading cases
of cases Sterling v. Constant in and Duncan v. Kahanamoku, "there was a fuller treatment of the
question of martial law While it is the formulation of Willoughby that for me is most acceptable,
my opinion did take note that another commentator, Burdick, came out earlier with a similar
appraisal. 10 Thus: "So called martial law, except in occupied territory of an enemy is merely the
calling in of the aid of military forces by the executive, who is charged with the enforcement of
the law, with or without special authorization by the legislature. Such declaration of martial law
does not suspend the civil law, though it may interfere with the exercise of one's ordinary rights.
The right to call out the military forces to maintain order and enforce the law is simply part of
the Police power, It is only justified when it reasonably appears necessary, and only justifies such
acts as reasonably appear necessarily to meet the exigency, including the arrest, or in extreme
cases the. killing of those who create the disorder or oppose the authorities. When the exigency is
over the members of the military forces are criminally and civilly habit for acts done beyond the
scope of reasonable necessity. When honestly and reasonably coping with a situation of
insurrection or riot a member of the military forces cannot be made liable for his acts, and
persons reasonably arrested under such circumstances will not, during the insurrection or riot, be
free by writ of habeas corpus." 11 When the opinion cited Willoughby's concept of martial law,
stress was laid on his being "Partial to the claims of liberty."12 This is evident in the explicit
statement from his work quoted by me: "There is, then, strictly speaking, no such thing in
American law as a declaration of martial law whereby military law is substituted for civil law.
So-called declarations of martial law are, indeed, often made but their legal effect goes no further
than to warn citizens that the military powers have been called upon by the executive to assist
him in the maintenance of law and order, and that, while the emergency lasts, they must, upon
pain of arrest and punishment not commit any acts which will in any way render more difficult
the restoration of order and the enforcement of law. Some of the authorities stating substantially
this doctrine are quoted in the footnote below Nor did I stop there. The words of Willis were
likewise cited: "Martial law proper, that is, military law in case of insurrection, riots, and
invasions, is not a substitute for the civil law, but is rather an aid to the execution of civil law.
Declarations of martial law go no further than to warn citizens that the executive has called upon
the military power to assist him in the maintenance of law and order. While martial law is in
force, no new powers are given to the executive and no civil rights of the individual, other than
the writ of habeas corpus, are suspended. The relations between the citizen and his stature
unchanged." 14
The conclusion reached by me as to the state of American federal law on the question of martial
law was expressed thus: 4'1 It is readily evident that even when Milligan supplied the only
authoritative doctrine, Burdick and Willoughby did not ignore the primacy of civil liberties.
Willis wrote after Sterling. It would indeed be surprising if his opinion were otherwise. After
Duncan, such an approach becomes even more strongly fortified. Schwartz, whose treatise is the
latest to be published, has this summary of what he considers the present state of American law:
'The Milligan and Duncan cases show plainly that martial law is the public law of necessity.
Necessities alone calls it forth, necessity justifies its exercise; and necessities measures the
extended degree to which it may be It is, the high Court has affirmed, an unbending rule of law
that the exercise of military power, where the rights of the citizen are concerned, may, never be
pushed beyond what the exigency requires. If martial law rule survive the necessities on which
alone it rests, for even a single minute it becomes a mere exercise of lawless violence.' Further:
Sterling v. Constantin is of basic importance. Before it, a number of decisions, including one the
highest Court, went or on the theory that the executive had a free hand in taking martial law
measures. Under them, it has been widely supposed that in proclamation was so far conclusive
that any action taken under it was immune from judicial scrutiny. Sterling v. Constantin
definitely discredits these earlier decisions and the doctrine of conclusiveness derived from them.
Under Sterling v. Constantin, where martial law measures impinge upon personal or property
rights-normally beyond the scope of military power, whose intervention is lawful only because
an abnormal Actuation has made it necessary the executive's ipse dixit is not of itself conclusive
of the necessity.'" 15
There was likewise an effort on my part to show what for me is the legal effect of martial law
being expressly provided for in the Constitution rather than being solely predicated on the
common law power based on the urgent need for it because of compelling circumstances incident
to the state of actual clash of arms: "It is not to be lost sight of that the basis for the declaration of
martial law in the Philippines is not mere necessity but an explicit constitutional provision. On
the other hand, Milligan, which furnished the foundation for Sterling and Duncan had its roots in
the English common law. There is pertinence therefore in ascertaining its significance under that
system. According to the noted English author, Dicey: 'Martial law,' in the proper sense of that
term, , in which - it means the suspension of ordinary law and the temporary government of a
country or parts of it be military tribunals, is unknown to the law of England. We have nothing
equivalent to what is called in France the "Declaration of the State of Siege," under which the
authority ordinarily vested in the civil power for the maintenance of order and police passes
entirely to the army (autorite militaire). This is an unmistakable proof of the permanent
supremacy of the law under our constitution. There was this qualification: 'Martial law is
sometimes employed as a name for the common law right of the Crown and its servants to repel
force by force in the case of invasion, insurrection, riot, or generally of any violent resistance to
the law. This right, or power, is essential to the very existence of orderly government, and is most
assuredly recognized in the most ample manner by the law of England. It is a power which has in
itself no special connection with the existence of an armed force. The Crown has the right to put
down breaches of the peace. Every subject, whether a civilian or a soldier, whether what is called
a servant of the government,' such for example as a policeman, or a person in no way connected
with the administration, not only has the right, but is, as a matter of legal duty, bound to assist in
putting down breaches of the peace. No doubt policemen or soldiers are the persons who, as
being specially employed in the maintenance of order, are most generally called upon to suppress
a riot, but it is clear that all loyal subjects are bound to take their part in the suppression of
riots." 16
Commitment to such an approach results in my inability to subscribe to the belief that martial
law in terms of what is provided both in the 1935 and the present Constitution, affords sufficient
justification for the concentration of powers in the Executive during periods of crisis. The better
view, considering the juristic theory on which our fundamental law rests is that expressed by
Justice Black in Duncan v. Kahanamoku: "Legislatures and courts are not merely cherished
American institutions; they are indispensable to our government. 17 If there has been no
observance of such a cardinal concept at the present, it is due to the fact that before the former
Congress could meet in regular session anew, the present Constitution was adopted, abolishing it
and providing for an interim National Assembly, which has not been convened. 18 So I did view
the matter.
2. Nor did I ignore Rossiter in my Aquino v. Ponce Enrile opinion. Reference was made to the
first chapter on his work on Constitutional Dictatorship where he spoke of martial rule as "a
device designed for use in the crisis of invasion or rebellion. It may be most precisely defined as
an extension of military government to the civilian population, the substitution of the will of a
military commander for the will of the people's elected government." 19Since, for me at least, the
Rossiter characterization of martial law has in it more of the common law connotation, less than
duly mindful of the jural effects of its inclusion in the Constitution itself as a legitimate device
for coping with emergency conditions in times of grave danger, but always subject to attendant
limitations in accordance with the fundamental postulate of a charter's supremacy, I felt justified
in concluding: "Happily for the Philippines, the declaration of martial law lends itself to the
interpretation that the Burdick, Willoughby, Willis, Schwartz formulations paying due regard to
the primacy of liberty possess relevance. lt cannot be said that the martial rule concept of
Rossiter, latitudinarian in scope, has been adopted, even on the assumption that it can be
reconciled with our Constitution. What is undeniable is that President Marcos has repeatedly
maintained that Proclamation No. 1081 was precisely based on the Constitution and that the
validity of acts taken there under could be passed upon by the Supreme court. For me that is
quite reassuring, persuaded as I am likewise that the week- of Rossiter is opposed to the
fundamental concept of our polity, which puts a premium on freedom."20
3. Candor and accuracy compel the admission that such a conclusion his to be qualified. For in
the opinion of the Court in the aforecited Aquino v. Commission on Elections, penned by Justice
Makasiar, the proposition was expressly affirmed "that as Commander-in-Chief and enforcer or
administrator of martial law, the incumbent President of the Philippines can reclamations, orders
and decrees during the period Martial Law essential to the security and preservation of the
Republic, to the defense of the political and social liberties of the people and to the institution of
reforms to prevent the resurgence of rebellion or insurrection or secession or the threat thereof as
well as to meet the impact of a worldwide recession, inflation or economic crisis which presently
threatens all nations including highly developed countries." 21 To that extent, Rossiter's view
mainly relied upon, now possesses Juristic significant in this jurisdiction. What, for me at least,
gives caused for concern is that with the opinion of the Court this intrusion of what I would
consider an alien element in the limited concept of martial law as set forth in the Constitution
would be allowed further incursion into the corpus of the law, with the invocation of the view
expressed in the last chapter of his work approving tile "concentration of governmental power in
a democracy [as] a corrective to the crisis inefficiencies inherent in the doctrine of the separation
of powers." 22 It is to the credit of the late Professor Rossiter as an objective scholar that in the
very same last chapter, just three pages later, he touched explicitly on the undesirable aspect of a
constitutional dictatorship. Thus: "Constitutional Dictatorship is a dangerous thing. A declaration
of martial law or the passage of an enabling act is a step which must always be feared and
sometimes bitterly resisted, for it is at once an admission of the incapacity of democratic
institutions to defend the order within which they function and a too conscious employment of
powers and methods long ago outlawed as destructive of constitutional government. Executive
legislation, state control of popular liberties, military courts, and arbitrary executive action were
governmental features attacked by the men who fought for freedom not because they were
inefficient or unsuccessful, but because they were dangerous and oppressive. The reinstitution of
any of these features is a perilous matter, a step to be taken only when the dangers to a free state
will be greater if the dictatorial institution is not adopted." 23
4. It is by virtue of such considerations that I find myself unable to share the view of those of my
brethren who would accord recognition to the Rossiter concept of concentration of governmental
power in the Executive during periods of crisis. This is not to lose sight of the undeniable fact
that in this country through the zeal, vigor, and energy lavished on projects conducive to the
general welfare, considerable progress has been achieved under martial rule. A fair summary
may be found in a recent address of the First Lady before the delegates to the 1976 international
Monetary Fund-World Bank Joint Annual Meeting: "The wonder is that so much has been done
in so brief a time. Since September 1972, when President Marcos established the crisis
government, peace and order have been restored in a country once avoided as one of the most
unsafe in the world. We have liberated millions of Filipino farmers from the bondage of tenancy,
in the most vigorous and extensive implementation of agrarian reform." 24 Further, she said: "A
dynamic economy has replaced a stagnant order, and its rewards are distributed among the many,
not hoarded by a few. Our foreign policy, once confined by fear and suspicion to a narrow alley
of self-imposed isolation, now travels the broad expressways of friendship and constructive
interaction with the whole world, these in a new spirit of confidence and self-reliance. And
finally, forced to work out our own salvation, the Filipino has re-discovered the well-springs of
his strength and resilience As Filipinos, we have found our true Identity. And having broken our
crisis of Identity, we are no longer apologetic and afraid. "25 The very Idea of a crisis, however,
signifies a transitory, certainly not a permanent, state of things. President Marcos accordingly has
not been hesitant in giving utterance to his conviction that full implementation of the modified
parliamentary system under the present Constitution should not be further delayed. The full
restoration of civilian rule can thus be expected. That is more in accord with the imperatives of a
constitutional order. It should not go unnoticed either that the President has referred to the
present regime as one of "constitutional authoritarianism." That has a less objectionable ring,
authority being more Identified with the Idea of law, as based on right, the very antithesis of
naked force, which to the popular mind is associated with dictatorship, even if referred to as
"constitutional."
For me likewise, that equally eminent scholar Corwin, also invoked in the opinion of the Court,
while no doubt a partisan of d strong Presidency, was not averse to constitutional restraints even
during periods of crisis. So I would interpret this excerpt from the fourth edition of his classic
treatise on the Presidency: "A regime of martial law may be compendiously, if not altogether
accurately, defined as one in which the ordinary law, as administered by the ordinary courts, is
superseded for the time being by the will of a military commander. It follows that, when martial
law is instituted under national authority, it rests ultimately on the will of the President of the
United States in his capacity as Commander-in-Chief. It should be added at once, nevertheless,
that the subject is one in which the record of actual practice fails often to support the niceties of
theory. Thus, the employment of the military arm in the enforcement of the civil law does not
invariably, or even usually, involve martial law in the strict sense, for, as was noted in the
preceding section, soldiers are often placed simply at the disposal and direction of the civil
authorities as a kind of supplementary police, or posse comitatus on the other hand be reason of
the discretion that the civil authorities themselves are apt to vest in the military in any emergency
requiring its assistance, the line between such an employment of the military and a regime of
martial law is frequently any but a hard and fast one. And partly because of these ambiguities the
conception itself of martial law today bifurcates into two conceptions, one of which shades off
into military government and the other into the situation just described, in which the civil
authority remains theoretically in control although dependent on military aid. Finally, there is the
situation that obtained throughout the North during the Civil War, when the privilege of the writ
of habeas corpus was suspended as to certain classes of suspects, although other characteristics
of martial law were generally absent." 26
It is by virtue of the above considerations that, with due respect to the opinion of my brethren, I
cannot yield assent to the Rossiter view of concentration of governmental powers in the
Executive during martial law.
5 There is necessity then, for me at least, that the specific question raised in all three petitions be
squarely faced. It is to the credit of the opinion of the Court that it did so. The basic issue posed
concerns the boundaries of the power of the President during this period of martial law, more
precisely whether it covers proposing amendments to the Constitution. There is the further
qualification if the stand of respondents be taken into account that the interim National Assembly
has not been convened and is not likely to be called into session in deference to the wishes of the
people as expressed in three previous referenda. It is the ruling of the majority that the answer be
in the affirmative, such authority being well within the area of presidential competence. Again I
find myself unable to join readily in that conviction. It does seem to me that the metes and
bounds of the executive domain, while still recognizable, do appear blurred. This is not to assert
that there is absolutely no basis for such a conclusion, sustained as it is by a liberal construction
of the principle that underlies Aquino v. Commission on Elections as to the validity of the
exercise of the legislative prerogative by the President as long as the interim National Assembly
is not For me, the stage of certitude has not been reached. I cannot simply ignore the vigorous
plea of petitioners that there is a constitutional deficiency consisting in the absence of any
constituent power on the part of the President, the express provision of the Constitution
conferring it on the by team National Assembly. 27 The learned advocacy reflected in the
pleadings as well as the oral discourse of Solicitor General Estelito P. Mendoza 21 failed to erase
the grave doubts in my mind that the Aquino doctrine as to the possession of legislative
competence by the President during this period of transition with the interim lawmaking body
not called into session be thus expanded. The majority of my brethren took that step. I am not
prepared to go that far. I will explain why.
The way for me, is beset with obstacles. In the first place, such an approach would lose sight of
the distinction between matters legislative and constituent. That is implicit in the treatise on the
1935 Constitution by Justices Malcolm and Laurel In their casebook published the same year,
one of the four decisions on the subject of constitutional amendments is Ellingham v. Dye 31
which categorically distinguished between constituent and legislative powers. Dean Sinco, a
well-known authority on the subject, was quite explicit. Thus: "If there had been no express
provision in the Constitution granting Congress the power to propose amendments, it would be
outside its authority to assume that power. Congress may not claim it under the general grant of
legislative power for such grant does not carry with it the right 'to erect the state, institute the
form of its government,' which is considered a function inherent in the people. Congressional
lawmaking authority is limited to the power of approving the laws 'of civil conduct relating to
the details and particulars of the government instituted,' the government established by the
people."12 If that distinction be preserved, then for me the aforecited Aquino decision does not
reach the heart of the matter. Nor is this all. In the main opinion of Justice Makasiar as well as
that of the then Justice, now Chief Justice, Castro, support for the ruling that the President cannot
be deemed as devoid of legislative power during this transition stage is supplied by implications
from explicit constitutional provisions. 13 That is not the case with the power to propose
amendments. It is solely the interim National Assembly that is mentioned. That is the barrier that
for me is well-nigh insurmountable. If I limit myself to entertaining doubts rather than
registering a dissent on this point, it is solely because of the consideration, possessed of weight
and significance, that there may be indeed in this far-from-quiescent and static period a need for
al. amendments. I do not feel confident therefore that a negative vote on my part would be
warranted. What would justify the step taken by the President, even if no complete acceptance be
accorded to the view that he was a mere conduit of the barangays on this matter, is that as noted
in both qualified concurrences by Justices Teehankee and Munoz Palma in Aquino, as far as the
legislative and appropriately powers are concerned, is the necessity that unless such authority be
recognized, there may be paralyzation of governmental activities, While not squarely applicable,
such an approach has, to my mind, a persuasive quality as far as the power to propose
amendments is concerned.
Thus I would confine myself to the expression of serious doubts on the question rather than a
dissent.
6. The constitutional issue posed as thus viewed leaves me free to concur in the result that the
petitions be dismissed. That is to accord respect to the principle that judicial review goes no
further than to checking clear infractions of the fundamental law, except in the field of human
rights where a much greater vigilance is required, That is to make of the Constitution a pathway
to rather than a barrier against a desirable objective. -As shown by my concurring and dissenting
opinion in Tolentino Commission on Elections '34 a pre-martial law decision, the fundamental
postulate that sovereignty resides in the people exerts a compelling force requiring the judiciary
to refrain as much as possible from denying the people the opportunity to make known their
wishes on matters of the utmost import for the life of the nation, Constitutional amendments fall
in that category. I am fortified in that conviction by the teaching of persuasive American
decisions There is reinforcement to such a conclusion from retired Chief Justice Concepcion's
concurring and dissenting opinion in Aytona v. Castillo,17 Which I consider applicable to the
present situation. These are his words: "It is well settled that the granting of writs of prohibition
and mandamus is ordinarily within the sound discretion of the courts, to be exercised on
equitable principles, and that said writs should be issued when the right to the relief is clear * *
by As he noted in his ponencia in the later case of Gonzales v. Hechanova,19 an action for
prohibition, while petitioner was sustained in his stand, no injunction was issued. This was
evident in the dispositive portion where judgment was rendered "declaring that respondent
Executive Secretary had and has no power to authorize the importation in question; that he
exceeded his jurisdiction in granting said authority; that said importation is not sanctioned by law
and is contrary to its provisions; and that, for lack of the requisite majority, the injunction prayed
for must be and is, accordingly, denied." 40 With the illumination thus supplied, it does not
necessarily follow that even a dissent on my part would necessarily compel that I vote for the
relief prayed for. Certainly this is not to belittle in any way the action taken by petitioners in
filing these suits. That, for me, is commendable. It attests to their belief in the rule of law. Even if
their contention as to lack of presidential power be accepted in their entirety, however, there is
still discretion that may be exercised on the matter, prohibition being an equitable remedy. There
are, for me, potent considerations that argue against acceding to the plea. With the prospect of the
interim National Assembly being convened being dim, if not non- existent, if only because of the
results in three previous referenda, there would be no constitutional agency other than the
Executive who could propose amendments, which, as noted. may urgently press for adoption. Of
even greater weight, to my mind, is the pronouncement by the President that the plebiscite is
intended not only to solve a constitutional anomaly with the country devoid of a legislative body
but also to provide. the machinery be which the termination of martial law could be hastened.
That is a consummation devoutly to be wished. That does militate strongly against the stand of
petitioners. The obstruction they would pose may be fraught with pernicious consequences. It
may not be amiss to refer anew to what I deem the cardinal character of the jural postulate
explicitly affirmed in both the 1935 and the present Constitutions that sovereignty resides in the
people. So I made clear in Tolentino v. Commission on Elections and thereafter in my dissent in
Javellana v. The Executive Secretary" and my concurrence in Aquino v. Commission on
Elections. 42 The destiny of the country lies in their keeping. The role of leadership is not to be
minimized. It is crucial it is of the essence. Nonetheless, it is their will, if given expression in a
manner sanctioned by law and with due care that there be no mistake in its appraisal, that should
be controlling. There is all the more reason then to encourage their participation in the power
process. That is to make the regime truly democratic. Constitutional orthodoxy requires,
however, that the fundamental law be followed. So I would interpret
Laski, 43 Corwin, 44 Lerner, 45, Bryn-Jones, 46 and McIver.47
7. There is reassurance in the thought that this Court has affirmed its commitment to the principle
that the amending process gives rise to a justiciable rather than a political question. So, it has
been since the leading case of Gonzales v. Commission on Election S. 48 It has since then been
followed in Tolentino v. Commission on Elections 49Planas v. Commission on Elections," and
lastly, in Javellana v. The Executive Secretary This Court did not heed the vigorous plea of the
Solicitor General to resurrect the political question doctrine announced in Mabanag v. Lopez
Vito. 52This is not to deny that the federal rule in the United States as set forth in the leading case
of Coleman v. Miller , 53 a 1939 decision, and relatively recent State court decisions, supply
ammunition to such a contention., 51 That may be the case in the United States, but certainly not
in this jurisdiction. Philippine constitutional tradition is to the contrary. It can trace its origin to
these words in the valedictory address before the 1934-35 Constitutional Convention by the
illustrious Claro M. Recto: "It is one of the paradoxes a democracy that the people of times place
more confidence in instrumentalities of the State other than those directly chosen by them for the
exercise of their sovereignty It can be said with truth, therefore, that there has invariably been a
judicial predisposition to activism rather than self-restraint. The thinking all these years has been
that it goes to the heart of constitutionalism. It may be said that this Court has shunned the role of
a mere interpreter; it did exercise at times creative power. It has to that extent participated in the
molding of policy, It has always recognized that in the large and undefined field of constitutional
law, adjudication partakes of the quality of statecraft. The assumption has been that just because
it cannot by itself guarantee the formation, much less the perpetuation of democratic values or,
realistically, it cannot prevail against the pressure of political forces if they are bent in other
directions. it does not follow that it should not contribute its thinking to the extent that it can. It
has been asked, it will continue to be asked, to decide momentous questions at each critical stage
of this nation's life.
There must be, however, this caveat. Judicial activism gives rise to difficulties in an era of
transformation and change. A society in flux calls for dynamism in "he law, which must be
responsive to the social forces at work. It cannot remain static. It must be sensitive to life. This
Court then must avoid the rigidity of legal Ideas. It must resist the temptation of allowing in the
wasteland of meaningless abstractions. It must face stubborn reality. It has to have a feel for the
complexities of the times. This is not to discount the risk that it may be swept too far and too fast
in the surge of novel concepts. The past too is entitled to a hearing; it cannot just be summarily
ignored. History still has its uses. It is not for this Court to renounce the virtue of systematic jural
consistency. It cannot simply yield to the sovereign sway of the accomplished fact. It must be
deaf to the dissonant dialectic of what appears to be a splintered society. It should strive to be a
factor for unity under a rule of law. There must be, on its part, awareness of the truth that a new
juridical age born before its appointed time may be the cause of unprecedented travail that may
not end at birth. It is by virtue of such considerations that I did strive for a confluence of
principle and practicality. I must confess that I did approach the matter with some misgivings and
certainly without any illusion of omniscience. I am comforted by the thought that immortality
does not inhere in judicial opinions. 8. 1 am thus led by my studies on the subject of
constitutional law and, much more so, by previous judicial opinions to concur in the dismissal of
the petitions. If I gave expression to byes not currently fashionable, it is solely due to deeplyingrained beliefs. Certainly, I am the first to recognize the worth of' the social and economic
reforms so needed by the troubled present that have been introduced and implemented. There is
no thought then of minimizing, much less of refusing to concede, the considerable progress that
has been made and the benefits that have been achieved under this Administration. Again, to
reiterate one of my cherished convictions, I certainly approve of the adherence to the
fundamental principle of popular sovereignty which, to be meaningful however, requires both
freedom in its manifestation and accuracy in ascertaining what it wills. Then, too, it is fitting and
proper that a distinction was made between two aspects of the coming poll, the referendum and
the plebiscite. It is only the latter that is impressed with authoritative force. So the Constitution
requires. Lastly, there should be, as I did mention in my concurrence in Aquino v. Commission
on Elections,56 full respect for free speech and press, free assembly and free association. There
should be no thought of branding the opposition as the enemy and the expression of its views as
anathema, Dissent, it is fortunate to note, has been encouraged. It has not been Identified with
disloyalty. That ought to be the case, and not solely due to presidential decrees. Constructive
criticism is to be welcomed not so much because of the right to be heard but because there may
be something worth hearing. That is to ensure a true ferment of Ideas, an interplay of
knowledgeable minds. There are though well- defined limits, One may not advocate disorder in
the name of protest, much less preach rebellion under the cloak of dissent.. What I mean to stress
is that except on a showing of clear and present danger, there must be respect for the traditional
liberties that make a society truly free.
TEEHANKEE, J., dissenting:
1. On the merits: I dissent from the majority's dismissal of the petitions for lack of merit and vote
to grant the petitions for the following reasons and considerations: 1. It is undisputed that neither
the 1935 Constitution nor the 1973 Constitution grants to the incumbent President the constituent
power to propose and approve amendments to the Constitution to be submitted to the people for
ratification in a plebiscite. The 1935 Constitution expressly vests the constituent power in
Congress, be a three-fourths vote of all its members, to propose amendments or call a
constitutional convention for the purpose The 1973 Constitution expressly vests the constituent
power in the regular National Assembly to propose amendments (by a three-fourths vote of all its
members) or "call a constitutional convention" (by a two-thirds vote of all its members) or
"submit the question of calling such convention to the electorate in an election" (by a majority
vote of all its members ) .2
The transitory provisions of the 1973 Constitution expressing vest the constituent power during
the period of transition in the interim National Assembly "upon special call be the Prime Minister
(the incumbent President 3)... by a majority ore of all its members (to) propose amendments."
Since the Constitution provides for the organization of the essential departments of government,
defines and delimits the powers of each and prescribes the manner of the exercise of such
powers, and the constituent power has not been granted to but has been withheld from the
President or Prime Minister, it follows that the President's questioned decrease proposing and
submitting constitutional amendments directly to the people (without the intervention of the
interim National Assembly in whom the power is expressly vested) are devoid of constitutional
and legal basis.
2. The doctrine in the leading case of Tolentino vs. Comelec is controlling in the case at bar In
therein declaring null and void the acts of the 1971 Constitutional Convention and of the
Comelec in calling a plebiscite with the general elections scheduled for November 8, 1971 for
the purpose of submitting for the people's ratification an advance amendment reducing the voting
age from 21 years to 18 years, and issuing writs of prohibition and injunction against the holding
of the plebiscite, this Court speaking through Mr. Justice Barredo ruled that --The Constitutional
provisions on amendments "dealing with the procedure or manner of amending the fundamental
law are binding upon the Convention and the other departments of the government, (land) are no
less binding upon the people
As long as an amendment is formulated and submitted under the aegis of the
present Charter, any proposal for such amendment which is not in conformity
with the letter, spirit and intent of the Charter for effecting amendments, cannot
receive the sanction of this Court ; 8
The real issue here cannot be whether or not the amending process delineated by the present
Constitution may be disregarded in favor of allowing the sovereign people to express their
decision on the proposed amendments, if only because it is evident that the very Idea of
departing from the fundamental law is anachronistic in the realm of constitutionalism and
repugnant to the essence of the rule of law,"; 9 and
-Accordingly barred the plebiscite as improper and premature, since "the provisional nature of
the proposed amendments and the manner of its submission to the people for ratification or
rejection" did not "conform with the mandate of the people themselves in such regard, as
expressed in the Constitution itself', 10 i.e. the mandatory requirements of the amending process
as set forth in the Article on Amendments.
3. Applying the above rulings of Tolentino to the case at bar, mutatis, mutandis, it is clear that
where the proposed amendments are violative of the Constitutional mandate on the amending
process not merely for being a "partial amendment" of a "temporary or provisional character" (as
in Tolentino) but more so for not being proposed and approved by the department vested by the
Constitution with the constituent power to do so, and hence transgressing the substantive
provision that it is only the interim National Assembly, upon special call of the interim Prime
Minister, bu a majority vote of all its members that may propose the amendments, the Court must
declare the amendments proposals null and void.
4. This is so because the Constitution is a "superior paramount law, unchangeable by ordinary
means" 11 but only by the particular mode and manner prescribed therein by the people. As
stressed by Cooley, "by the Constitution which they establish, (the people) not only tie up the
hands of their official agencies but their own hands as well; and neither the officers of the State,
nor the whole people as an aggregate body, are at liberty to take action in opposition to this
fundamental law." 12
The vesting of the constituent power to propose amendments in the legislative body (the regular
National Assembly) or the interim National Assembly during the transition period) or in a
constitutional convention called for the purpose is in accordance with universal practice. "From
the very necessity of the case" Cooley points out "amendments to an existing constitution, or
entire revisions of it, must be prepared and matured by some body of representatives chosen for
the purpose. It is obviously impossible for the whole people to meet, prepare, and discuss the
proposed alterations, and there seems to be no feasible mode by which an expression of their will
can be obtained, except by asking it upon the single point of assent or disapproval." This body of
representatives vested with the constituent - power "submits the result of their deliberations" and
"puts in proper form the questions of amendment upon which the people are to pass"-for
ratification or rejection. 13
5. The Court in Tolentino thus rejected the argument "that the end sought to be achieved is to be
desired" and in denying reconsideration in paraphrase of the late Claro M. Recto declared that
"let those who would put aside, invoking grounds at best controversial, any mandate of the
fundamental purportedly in order to attain some laudable objective bear in mind that someday
somehow others with purportedly more laudable objectives may take advantage of the precedent
and continue the destruction of the Constitution, making those who laid down the precedent of
justifying deviations from the requirements of the Constitution the victims of their own folly."
This same apprehension was echoed by now retired Justice Calixto O. Zaldivar in his dissenting
opinion in the Ratification cases 14 that "we will be opening the gates for a similar disregard to
the Constitution in the future. What I mean is that if this Court now declares that a new
Constitution is now in force because the members of the citizens assemblies had approved said
new Constitution, although that approval was not in accordance with the procedure and the
requirements prescribed in the 1935 Constitution, it can happen again in some future time that
some amendments to the Constitution may be adopted, even in a manner contrary to the existing
Constitution and the law, and then said proposed amendments is submitted to the people in any
manner and what will matter is that a basis is claimed that there was approval by the people.
There will not be stability in our constitutional system, and necessarily no stability in our
government."
6. It is not legally tenable for the majority, without overruling the controlling precedent of
Tolentino (and without mustering the required majority vote to so overrule) to accept the
proposed; amendments as valid notwithstanding their being "not in conformity with the letter,
spirit and intent of the provision of the Charter for effecting amendments" on the reasoning that
"If the President has been legitimately discharging the legislative functions of the interim
National Assembly, there is no reason why he cannot validly discharge the functions."15
In the earlier leading case of Gonzales vs. Comelec 16, this Court speaking through now retired
Chief Justice Roberto Concepcion, pointer out that "Indeed, the power to Congress" 17 or to the
National Assembly.18 Where it not for the express grant in the Transitory Provisions of the
constituent power to the interim National Assembly, the interim National Assembly could not
claim the power under the general grant of legislative power during the transition period.
The majority's ruling in the Referendum cases 19 that the Transitory Provision in section 3(2)
recognized the existence of the authority to legislate in favor of the incumbent President during
the period of martial law manifestly cannot be stretched to encompass the constituent power as
expressly vested in the interim National Assembly in derogation of the allotment of powers
defined in the Constitution.
Paraphrasing Cooley on the non-delegation of legislative power as one of the settled maxims of
constitutional law,20 the contituent power has been lodged by the sovereign power of the people
with the interim National Assembly during the transition period and there it must remain as the
sole constitutional agency until the Constitution itself is changed.
As was aptly stated by Justice Jose P. Laurel in the 1936 landmak case of Angara vs. Electoral
Commissioner 21, "(T)he Constitution sets forth in no uncertain language and restrictions and
limitations upon governmental powers and agencies. If these restrictions and limitations are
transcended it would be inconceivable if the Constitution had not provided for a mechanism by
which to direct the course of government along constitutional channels, for then the distribution
of powers sentiment, and the principles of good government mere political apothegms. Certainly,
the limitations and restrictions embodied in our Constitution are real as they should be in any
living Constitution".
7. Neither is the justification of "constitutional impasses" tenable. The sentiment of the people
against the convening of the interim National Assembly and to have no elections for "at least
seven (7) years" Concededly could not ament the Constitution insofar as the interim National
Assembly is concerned (since it admittendly came into existence "immediately" upon the
proclamation of ratification of the 1973 Constitution), much less remove the constituent power
from said interim National Assembly.
As stressed in the writer's separate opinion in the Referendum cases 22, "(W)hile it has been
advanced that the decision to defer the initial convocation of the interim National Assembly was
supported by the results of the referendum in January, 1973 when the people voted against the
convening of the interim National Assembly for at least seven years, such sentiment cannot be
given any legal force and effect in the light of the State's admission at the hearing that such
referendums are merely consultative and cannot amend the Constitution or Provisions which call
for the 'immediate existence' and 'initial convening of the interim National Assembly to 'give
priority to measures for the orderly transition from the presidential to the parliamentary system'
and the other urgent measures enumerated in section 5 thereof".
While the people reportedly expressed their mandate against the convening of the interim
National Assembly to dischange its legislative tasks during the period of transition under martial
law, they certainly had no opportunity and did not express themselves against convening the
interim National Assembly to discharge the constituent power to propose amendments likewise
vested in it by the people's mandate in the Constitution.
In point of fact, when the holding of the October 16, 1976 referendum was first announced, the
newspapers reported that among the seven questions proposed by the sanggunian and barangay
national executive committies for the referendum was the convening of the interim National
Assembly. 23
It was further reported that the proposals which were termed tentative "will be discussed and
studied by (the President), the members of the cabinet, and the security council" and that the
barangays felt, notwithstanding the previous referenda on the convening of the interim National
Assembly that "it is time to again ask the people's opinion of this matter " 24
8. If proposals for constitutional amendments are now deemed necessary to be discussed and
adopted for submittal to the people, strict adherence with the mandatory requirements of the
amending process as provided in the Constitution must be complied with. This means, under the
teaching of Tolentino that the proposed amendments must validly come from the constitutional
agency vested with the constituent power to do so, namely, the interim National Assembly, and
not from the executive power as vested in the Prime Minister (the incumbent President) with the
assistance of the Cabinet 25 from whom such power has been withheld.
It will not do to contend that these proposals represent the voice of the people for as was aptly
stated by Cooley "Me voice of the people, acting in their sovereign capacity, can be of legal force
only when expressed at the times and under the conditions which they themselves have
prescribed and pointed out by the Constitution. ... ."26
The same argument was put forward and rejected by this Court in Tolentino which rejected the
contention that the "Convention being a legislative body of the highest order (and directly
elected by the people to speak their voice) is sovereign, in as such, its acts impugned by
petitioner are beyond the control of Congress and the Courts" and ruled that the constitutional
article on the amending process" is nothing more than a part of the Constitution thus ordained by
the people. Hence, in continuing said section, We must read it as if the people said, "The
Constitution may be amended, but it is our will that the amendment must be proposed and
submitted to Us for ratification only in the manner herein provided'". 27
This Court therein stressed that "This must be so, because it is plain to Us that the framers of the
Constitution took care that the process of amending the same should not be undertaken with the
same ease and facility in changing an ordinary legislation. Constitution making is the most
valued power, second to none, of the people in a constitutional democracy such as the one our
founding fathers have chosen for this nation, and which we of the succeeding generations
generally cherish. And because the Constitution affects the lives, fortunes, future and every other
conceivable aspect of the lives of all the people within the country and those subject to its
sovereignity, ever constitution worthy of the people for which it is intended must not be prepared
in haste without adequate deliberation and study. It is obvious that correspondingly, any
amendment of the Constitution is of no less importance than the whole Constitution itself, and
perforce must be conceived and prepared with as much care and deliberation;" and that "written
constitutions are supposed to be designed so as to last for some time, if not for ages, or for, at
least, as long as they can be adopted to the needs and exigencies of the people, hence, they must
be insulated against precipitate and hasty actions motivated by more or less passing political
moods or fancies. Thus, as a rule, the original constitutions carry with them limitations and
conditions, more or less stringent, made so by the people themselves, in regard to the process of
their amendment." 28
9. The convening of the interim National Assembly to exercise the constituent power to proposed
amendments is the only way to fulfill the express mandate of the Constitution.
As Mr. Justice Fernando emphasized for this Court in Mutuc vs. Comelec 29 in the setting as in of
a Comelec resolution banning the use of political taped jingles by candidates for Constitutional
Convention delegates int he special 1970 elections, "the concept of the Constitution as the
fundamental law, setting forth the criterion for the validity of any public act whether proceeding
from the highest official or the lowest functionary, is a postulate of our system of government.
That is to amnifst fealty to the rule of law, with priority accorded to that which occupies the
topmost rung in the legal heirarchy. The three departments of government in the discharge of the
functions with which it is entrusted have no choice but to yield obedience to its commands.
Whatever limits it imposes must be observed. Congress in the enactment of statutes must ever be
on guart lest the restrictions on its authority, whether substantive or formal, be transcended. The
Presidency in the execution of the laws cannot ignore of disregard what it ordains. In its task of
applying the law to the facts as found in deciding cases, the judiciary is called upon the maintain
inviolate what is decreed by the fundamental law."
This is but to give meaning to the plan and clear mandate of section 15 of the Transitory
Provisions (which allows of no other interpretation) that during the stage of transition the interim
National Assembly alone exercises the constituent power to propose amendments, upon special
call therefor. This is reinforced by the fact that the cited section does not grant to the regular
National Assembly of calling a constitutional convention, thus expressing the will of the
Convention (and presumably of the people upon ratification) that if ever the need to propose
amendments arose during the limited period of transition, the interim National Assembly alone
would discharge the task and no constitutional convention could be call for the purpose.
As to the alleged costs involved in convening the interim National Assembly to propose
amendments, among them its own abolition, (P24 million annually in salaries alone for its 400
members at P600,000.00 per annum per member, assuming that its deliberations could last for
one year), suffice it to recall this Court's pronouncement in Tolentino (in reflecting a similar
argument on the costs of holding a plebiscite separately from the general elections for elective
officials) that "it is a matter of public knowledge that bigger amounts have been spent or thrown
to waste for many lesser objectives. ... Surely, the amount of seventeen million pesos or even
more is not too much a price to pay for fealty and loyalty to the Constitution ... " 30 and that
"while the financial costs of a separate plebiscite may be high, it can never be as much as the
dangers involved in disregarding clear mandate of the Constitution, no matter how laudable the
objective" and "no consideration of financial costs shall deter Us from adherence to the
requirements of the Constitution".11
10. The imposition of martial law (and "the problems of rebellion, subversion, secession,
recession, inflation and economic crisis a crisis greater than war") 32 cited by the majority
opinion as justifying the concentration of powers in the President, and the recognition now of his
exercising the constituent power to propose amendments to the Fundamental Law "as agent for
and in behalf of the people" 33 has no constitutional basis.
In the post-war Emergency Powers 33*, former Chief Justice Ricardo Paras reaffirmed for the
Court the principle that emergency in itself cannot and should not create power. In our
democracy the hope and survival of the nation lie in the wisdom and unselfish patriotism of all
officials and in their faithful 'Adherence to the Constitution".
The martial law clause of the 1973 Constitution found in Article IX, section 12 , as stressed by the
writer in his separate opinion in the Referendum Cases,14 "is a verbatim reproduction of Article
VII, section 10 (2) of the 1935 Constitution and provides for the imposition of martial law only
'in case of invasion, resurrection or rebellion, or imminent danger thereof, when the public safety
requires it and hence the use of the legislative power or more accurately 'military power' under
martial rule is limited to such necessary measures as will safeguard the Republic and suppress
the rebellion (or invasion)". 35
11. Article XVII, section 3 (2) of the 1973 Constitution which has been held by the majority in
the Referendum Cases to be the recognition or warrant for the exercise of legislative power by
the President during the period of martial law is but a transitory provision. Together with the
martial law clause, they constitute but two provisions which are not to be considered in isolation
from the Constitution but as mere integral parts thereof which must be harmonized consistently
with the entire Constitution.
As Cooley restated the rule: "effect is to be given, if possible, to the whole instrument, and to
every section and clause. If different portions seem to conflict, the courts must harmonize them,
if practicable, and must lean in favor of a construction which will render every word operative,
rather than one which may make some words Idle and nugatory.
This rule is applicable with special force to written constitutions, in which the
people will be presumed to have expressed themselves in careful and measured
terms, corresponding with the immense importance of the powers delegated,
leaving as little as possible to implication. It is scarcelly conceivable that a case
can arise where a court would bye justified in declaring any portion of a written
constitution nugatory because of ambiguity. One part may qualify another so as to
restrict its operation, or apply it otherwise than the natural construction would
require if it stood by itself; but one part is not to be allowed to defeat another, if
by any reasonable construction the two can be made to stand together. 36
The transcendental constituent power to propose and approve amendments to the Constitution as
well as set up the machinery and prescribe the procedure for the ratification of his proposals has
been withheld from the President (Prime Minister) as sole repository of the Executive Power,
presumably in view of the immense powers already vested in him by the Constitution but just as
importantly, because by the very nature of the constituent power, such amendments proposals
have to be prepared, deliberated and matured by a deliberative assembly of representatives such
as the interim National Assembly and hence may not be antithetically entrusted to one man.
Former Chief Justice Roberto Concepcion had observed before the elevation of the l971
Constitutional Convention that the records of past plebiscites show that the constitutional agency
vested with the exercise of the constituent power (Congress or the Constitutional Convention)
really determined the amendments to the Constitution since the proposals were invariably ratified
by the people 37 thus: "although the people have the reserved power to ratify or reject the action
taken by the Convention, such power is not, in view of the circumstances attending its exercise,
as effective as one might otherwise think: that, despite the requisite ratification by the people, the
actual contents of our fundamental law will really be determined by the Convention; that,
accordingly the people should exercise the greatest possible degree of circumspection in the
election of delegates thereto ... " 38
12. Martial law concededly does not abrogate the Constitution nor obliterate its constitutional
boundaries and allocation of powers among the Executive, Legislative and Judicial
Departments. 39
It has thus been aptly observed that "Martial law is an emergency regime, authorized by and
subject to the Constitution. Its basic premise is to preserve and to maintain the Republic against
the dangers that threaten it. Such premise imposes constraints and limitations. For the martial law
regime fulfills the constitutional purpose only if, by reason of martial law measures, the Republic
is preserved. If by reason of such measures the Republic is so transformed that it is changed in its
nature and becomes a State other than republican, then martial law is a failure; worse, martial
law would have become the enemy of the Republic rather than its defender and preserver."40
II. On the question of the Court's jurisdiction to pass upon the constitutionality of the questioned
presidential decrees: let it be underscored that the Court has long set at rest the question.
The trail was blazed for the Court since the benchmark case of Angara vs. Electoral Commission
when Justice Jose P. Laurel echoed U.S. Chief Justice Marshall's "climactic phrase" that "we
must never forget that it is a Constitution we are expounding" and declared the Court's "solemn
and sacred" constitutional obligation of judicial review and laid down the doctrine that the
Philippine Constitution as "a definition of the powers of government" placed upon the judiciary
the great burden of "determining the nature, scope and extent of such powers" and stressed that
"when the judiciary mediates to allocate constitutional boundaries, it does not assert any
superiority over the other departments . . . but only asserts the solemn and sacred obliteration
entrusted to it by the Constitution to determine conflicting claims of authority under the
Constitution and to establish for the parties in an actual controversy the rights which the
instrument secures and guarantees to them".
At the same time, the Court likewise adhered to the constitutional tenet that political questions,
i.e. questions which are intended by the Constitutional and relevant laws to be conclusively
determined by the "political", i.e. branches of government (namely, the Executive and the
Legislative) are outside the Court's jurisdiction. 41
Thus, in Gonzales, 42 (by a unanimous Court) and in Tolentino 43 (by the required constitutional
majority), the Court has since consistently ruled that when proposing and approving amendments
to the Constitution, the members of Congress. acting as a constituent assembly or the members
of the Constitutional Convention elected directly for the purpose by not have the final say on
whether or not their acts are within or beyond constitutional limits. Otherwise, they could brush
aside and set the same at naught, contrary to the basic tenet that outs is it government of lawsom
not of men, and to the rigid nature of our Constitution. Such rigidity is stressed by the fact that,
the Constitution expressly confers upon the Supreme Court, the power to declare a treaty
unconstitutional, despite the eminently political character of treaty-making power". 44
As amplified by former Chief Justice Concepcion in Javellana vs Executive Secretary 45 (by a
majority vote), "when the grant of power is qualified, conditional or subject to limitations. the
issue on whether or not the prescribed qualifications or conditions have been met, or the
limitations by expected, is justiciable or non-political, the crux of the problem being one of
legality or validity of the contested act, not its wisdom Otherwise, said qualifications, conditions
and limitations-particularly those prescribed or imposed by the Constitution would be set at
naught".
The fact that the proposed amendments are to be submitted to the people for ratification by no
means makes the question political and non- justiciable since as stressed even in Javellana the
issue of validity of the President's proclamation of ratification of the Constitution presented a
justiciable and non-political question
Stated otherwise, the question of whether the Legislative acting as a constituent assembly or the
Constitutional Convention called fol- the purpose, in proposing amendments to the people for
ratification followed the constitutional procedure and on the amending process is perforce a
justiciable question and does not raise a political question of police or wisdom of the proposed
amendments, which if Submitted, are reserved for the people's decision.
The substantive question presented in the case at bar of whether the President may legally
exercise the constituent power vested in the interim National Assembly (which has not been
granted to his office) and propose constitutional amendments is preeminently a justiciable issue.
Justice Laurel in Angara had duly enjoined that "in times of social disquietude or political
excitement, the great landmarks of the Constitution are apt to be forgotten or marred, if not
entirely obliterated. In cases of conflict, the judicial department is the only constitutional organ
which can be called upon to determine the proper allocation of powers between the several
departments and among the integral or constituent units thereof".
To follow the easy way out by disclaiming jurisdiction over the issue as a political question
would be judicial abdication.
III. On the question of whether there is a sufficient and proper submittal of the proposed
amendments to the people: Prescinding from the writer's view of the nullity of the questioned
decree of lack of authority on the President's part to excercise the constituent power, I hold that
the doctrine of fair and proper submission first enunciated by a simple majority of by Justices in
Gonzales and subsequently officially adopted by the required constitutional two-thirds majority
of the Court in is controlling in the case at bar.
1. There cannot be said to be fair and proper submission of the proposed amendments. As ruled
by this Court in Tolentino where "the proposed amendment in question is expressly saddled with
reservations which naturally impair, in great measures, its very essence as a proposed
constitutional amendment" and where "the way the proposal is worded, read together with the
reservations tacked to it by the Convention thru Section 3 of the questioned resolution, it is too
much of a speculation to assume what exactly the amendment would really amount lo in the end.
All in all, as already pointed out in our discussion of movants' first ground, if this kind of
amendment is allowed, the Philippines will appear before the world to be in the absurd position
of being the only country with a constitution containing a provision so ephemeral no one knows
until when it will bet actually in force", there can be no proper submission.
In Tolentino a solitary amendment reducing the voting age to 18 years was struck down by this
Court which ruled that "in order that a plebiscite for the ratification of an amendment to the
Constitution may be validly held, it must provide the voter not only sufficient time but ample
basis for an intelligent appraisal of the nature of the amendment per se as well as its relation to
the other parts of the Constitution with which it has to form a harmonious whole," and that there
was no proper Submission wherein the people are in the dark as to frame of reference they can
base their judgment on
2. The now Chief Justice and Mr. Justice Makasiar with two other members 46 graphically
pointed out in their joint separate opinion that the solitary question "would seem to be
uncomplicated and innocuous. But it is one of life's verities that things which appear to be simple
may turn out not to be so simple after all". 47
They further expressed "essential agreement" with Mr. Justice Conrado V. Sanchez' separate
opinion in Gonzales "on the minimum requirements that must be met in order that there can be a
proper submission to the people of a proposed constitutional amendment" which reads thus:
... we take the view that the words 'submitted to the people for their ratification', if
construed in the light of the nature of the Constitution a fundamental charter that
is legislation direct from the people, an expression of their sovereign will - is that
it can only be amended by the people expressing themselves according to the
procedure ordained by the Constitution. Therefore, amendments must be fairly
laid before the people for their blessing or spurning. The people are not to be mere
rubber stamps. They are not to vote blindly. They must be afforded ample
opportunity to mull over the original provisions, compare them with the proposed
amendments, and try to reach a conclusion as the dictates of their conscience
suggest, free from the incubus of extraneous or possibly insidious influences. We
believe the word submitted' can only mean that the government, within its
maximum capabilities, should strain every effort to inform every citizen of the
provisions to be amended, and the proposed amendments and the meaning, nature
and effects thereof. By this, we are not to be understood as saying that, if one
citizen or 100 citizens or 1,000 citizens cannot be reached, then there is no
submission within the meaning of the word as intended by the framers of the
Constitution. What the Constitution in effect directs is that the government, in
submitting an amendment for ratification, should put every instrumentality or
agency within its structural framework to enlighten the people, educate them with
respect to their act of ratification or rejection. For, as we have earlier stated, one
thing is submission and another is ratification. There must be fair submission,
intelligent. consent or rejection. If with all these safeguards the people still
approve the amendment no matter how prejudicial it is to them, then so be it. For
the people decree their own fate. 48
Justice Sanchez therein ended the passage with an apt citation that " ... " The great men who
builded the structure of our state in this respect had the mental vision of a good Constitution
voiced by Judge Cooley, who has said 'A good Constitution should be beyond the reach of
temporary excitement and. popular caprice or passion. It is needed for stability and steadiness; it
must yield to the thought of the people; not to the whim of the people, or the thought evolved in
excitement or hot blood, but the sober second thought, which alone, if the government is to be
safe, can be allowed efficiency. xxx xxx xxx Changes in government are to be feared unless the
benefit is certain. As Montaign says: All great mutations shake and disorder state. Good does not
necessarily succeed evil ;another evil may succeed and a worse'." 49
Justice Sanchez thus stated the rule that has been adopted by the Court in Tolentino that there is
no proper submission "if the people are not sufficiently affirmed of the amendments to be voted
upon, to conscientiously deliberate thereon, to express their will in a genuine manner. ... .." 50
3. From the complex and complicated proposed amendments set forth in the challenged decree
and the plethora of confused and confusing clarifications reported in the daily newspapers, it is
manifest that there is no proper submission of the proposed amendments. Nine (9) proposed
constitutional amendments were officially proposed and made known as per Presidential Decree
No. 1033 dated, September 22, 1976 for submittal at the "referendum-plebiscite" called for this
coming Saturday, October 16, 1976 wherein the 15-year and under 18-year- olds are enjoined to
vote notwithstanding their lack of qualification under Article VI of the Constitution. Former
Senator Arturo Tolentino, an acknowledged parliamentarian of the highest order, was reported by
the newspapers last October 3 to have observed that "there is no urgency in approving the
proposed amendments to the Constitution and suggested that the question regarding charter
changes be modified instead of asking the people to vote on hurriedly prepared amendments". He
further pointed out that "apart from lacking the parliamentary style in the body of the
Constitution, they do not indicate what particular provisions are being repealed or amended". 52
As of this writing, October 11, 1976, the paper today reported his seven-page analysis
questioning among others the proposed granting of dual legislative powers to both the President
and the Batasang Pambansa and remarking that "This dual legislative authority can give rise to
confusion and serious constitutional questions". 53
Aside from the inadequacy of the limited time given for the people's consideration of the
proposed amendments, there can be no proper submission because the proposed amendments are
not in proper form and violate the cardinal rule of amendments of written constitutions that the
specific provisions of the Constitution being repealed or amended as well as how the specific
provisions as amended would read, should be clearly stated in careful and measured terms. There
can be no proper submission because the vagueness and ambiguity of the proposals do not
sufficiently inform the people of the amendments for, conscientious deliberation and intelligent
consent or rejection.
4. While the press and the Solicitor General at the hearing have stated that the principal thrust of
the proposals is to substitute the interim National Assembly with an interim Batasang Pambansa,
a serious study thereof in detail would lead to the conclusion that the whole context of the 1973
Constitution proper would be affected and grave amendments and modifications thereof -would
apparently be made, among others, as follows:
Under Amendment No. 1, the qualification age of members of the interim Batasang Pambansa is
reduced to 18 years;
Under Amendment No. 2, the treaty-concurring power of the Legislature is withheld from the
interim Batasang Pambansa;
Under Amendment No 3, not withstanding the convening of the interim Batasang Pambansa
within 30 days from the election and selection of the members (for which there is no fixed date)
the incumbent President apparently becomes a regular President and Prime Minister (not ad
interim);
Under Amendment No. 4, the disqualifications imposed on members of the Cabinet in the
Constitution such as the prohibition against the holding of more than one office in the
government including government-owned or -controlled corporations would appear to be
eliminated, if not prescribed by the President;
Under Amendment No. 5, the President shall continue to exercise legislative powers until martial
law is lifted;
Under Amendment No. 6, there is a duality of legislative authority given the President and the
interim Batasang Pambansa as well as the regular National Assembly, as pointed out by Senator
Tolentino, with the President continuing to exercise legislative powers in case of "grave
emergency or a threat or imminence thereof" (without definition of terms) or when said
Assemblies "fail or are unable to act adequately on any matter for any reason that in his
judgment requires immediate action", thus radically affecting provisions of the Constitution
governing the said departments;
Under Amendment No. 7, the barangays and Sanggunians would apparently be
constitutionalized, although their functions, power and composition may be altered by law.
Referendums (which are not authorized in the present 1973 Constitution) would also be
constitutionalized, giving rise to the possibility fraught with grave consequences, as
acknowledged at the hearing, that amendments to the Constitution may thereafter be effected by
referendum, rather than by the rigid and strict amending process provided presently in Article
XVI of the Constitution;
Under Amendment No. 8, there is a general statement in general that the unspecified provisions
of the Constitution "not inconsistent with any of these amendments" shall continue in full force
and effect; and Under Amendment No. 9. the incumbent President is authorized to proclaim the
ratification of the amendments by the majority of votes cast. It has likewise been stressed by the
officials concerned that the proposed amendments come in a package and may not be voted upon
separately but on an "all or nothing" basis.
5. Whether the people can normally express their will in a genuine manner and with due
circumspection on the proposed amendments amidst the constraints of martial law is yet another
question. That a period of free debate and discussion has to be declared of itself shows the
limitations on free debate and discussion. The facilities for free debate and discussion over the
mass media, print and otherwise are wanting. The President himself is reported to have observed
the timidity of the media under martial law and to have directed the press to air the views of the
opposition. 54
Indeed, the voice of the studentry as reflected in the editorial of the Philippine Collegian issue of
September 23, 1976 comes as a welcome and refreshing model of conscientious deliberation, as
our youth analyzes the issues "which will affect generations yet to come" and urge the people to
mull over the pros and cons very carefully", as follows:
THE REFERENDUM ISSUES

On October 16, the people may be asked to decide on two important national
issues - the creation of a new legislative body and the lifting of martial law.
On the first issue, it is almost sure that the interim National Assembly will not be
convened, primarily because of its membership. Majority of the members of the
defunct Congress, who are mandated by the Constitution to become members of
the interim National Assembly, have gained so widespread a notoriety that the
mere mention of Congress conjures the image of a den of thieves who are out to
fool the people most of the time. Among the three branches of government, it was
the most discredited. In fact, upon the declaration of martial law, some people
were heard to mutter that a 'regime that has finally put an end to such
congressional shenanigans could not be all that bad'.
A substitute legislative body is contemplated to help the President in
promulgating laws, and perhaps minimize the issuance of ill-drafted decrees
which necessitate constant amendments. But care should be taken that this new
legislative body would not become a mere rubber stamp akin to those of other
totalitarian countries. It should be given real powers, otherwise we will just have
another nebulous creation having the form but lacking the substance. Already the
President has expressed the desire that among the powers he would like to have
with regard to the proposed legislative body is that of abolishing it in case 'there is
a need to do so'. As to what would occasion such a need, only the President
himself can determine. This would afford the Chief Executive almost total power
over the legislature, for he could always offer the members thereof a carrot and a
stick.
On the matter of lifting martial law the people have expressed ambivalent
attitudes. Some of them, remembering the turmoil that prevailed before the
declaration of martial law, have expressed the fear that its lifting might precipitate
the revival of the abuses of the past, and provide an occasion for evil elements to
resurface with their usual tricks. Others say that it is about time martial law was
lifted since the peace and order situation has already stabilized and the economy
seems to have been parked up.
The regime of martial law has been with us for four years now. No doubt, martial
law has initially secured some reforms for the country The people were quite
willing to participate in the new experiment, thrilled by the novelty of it all. After
the euphoria, however, the people seem to have gone back to the old ways, with
the exception that some of our freedoms were taken away, and an authoritarian
regime established.
We must bear in mind that martial law was envisioned only to cope with an
existing national crisis, It was not meant to be availed of for a long period of time,
otherwise it would undermine our adherence to a democratic form of government.
In the words of the Constitution. martial law shall only be declared in times of
'rebellion, insurrection,. invasion, or imminent danger thereof, when the public
safety requires it'. Since we no longer suffer from internal disturbances of a
gargantuan scale, it is about time we seriously rethink the 'necessity' of prolonging
the martial law regime. If we justify the continuance of martial by economic or
other reasons other than the foregoing constitutional grounds, then our faith in the
Constitution might be questioned. Even without martial law,. the incumbent Chief
Executive still holds vast powers under the constitution. After all, the gains of the
New Society can be secured without sacrificing the freedom of our people. If the
converse is true, then we might have to conclude that the Filipinos deserve a
dictatorial form of government. The referendum results will show whether the
people themselves have adopted this sad conclusion.
The response of the people to the foregoing issues will affect generations yet to
come, so they should mull over the pros and cons very carefully."
6. This opinion by written in the same spirit as the President's exhortations on the first
anniversary of proclamation of the 1973 Constitution that we "let the Constitution remain firm
and stable" so that it may "guide the people", and that we "remain steadfast on the rule of law
and the Constitution" as he recalled his rejection of the "exercise (of) power that can be
Identified merely with a revolutionary government" that makes its own law, thus:
. . . Whoever he may be and whatever position he may happen to have, whether in
government or outside government, it is absolutely necessary now that we look
solemnly and perceptively into the Constitution and try to discover for ourselves
what our role is in the successful implementation of that Constitution. With this
thought, therefore, we can agree on one thing and that is: Let all of us age, let all
of us then pass away as a pace in the development of our country. but let the
Constitution remain firm and stable and let institutions grow in strength from day
to day, from achievement to achievement, and so long as that Constitution stands,
whoever may the man in power be, whatever may his purpose be, that
Constitution will guide the people and no man, however, powerful he may be, will
dare to destroy and wreck the foundation of such a Constitution.
These are the reasons why I personally, having proclaimed martial law, having
been often induced to exercise power that can be Identified merely with a
revolutionary government, have remained steadfast or the rule of law and the
Constitution. 54*
IV. A final word on the Court's resolution of October 5, 1976 which in reply to the Comelec
query allowed by a vote of 7 to 3, judges of all courts, after office hours, "to accept invitations to
act as resource speakers under Section 5 of Presidential Decree No. 991, as amended, as well as
to take sides in discussions and debates on the referendum-plebiscite questions under Section 7
of the same Decree." 55
The writer with Mr. Justice Makasiar and Madame Justice Munoz Palma had dissented from the
majority resolution, with all due respect, on the ground that the non-participation of judges in
such public discussions and debates on the referendum-plebiscite questions would preserve the
traditional non-involvement of the judiciary in public discussions of controversial issues. This is
essential for the maintenance and enhancement of the people's faith and confidence in the
judiciary. The questions of the validity of the scheduled referendum- plebiscite and of whether
there is proper submission of the proposed amendments were precisely subjudice by virtue of the
cases at bar.
The lifting of the traditional inhibition of judges from public discussion and debate might
blemish the image and independence of the judiciary. Aside from the fact that the fixing of a time
limit for the acceptance of their courtesy resignations to avoid an indefinite state of insecurity of
their tenure in office still spends litigants and their relatives and friends as well as a good sector
of the public would be hesitant to air views contrary to that of the.
Judge. Justices Makasiar and Munoz Palma who share these views have agreed that we make
them of record here, since we understand that the permission given in the resolution is
nevertheless addressed to the personal decision and conscience of each judge, and these views
may he of some guidance to them.
BARREDO, J.,: concurring:
While I am in full agreement with the majority of my brethren that the herein petitions should be
dismissed, as in fact I vote for their dismissal, I deem it imperative that I should state separately
the considerations that have impelled me to do so.
Perhaps, it is best that I should start by trying to disabuse the minds of those who have doubts as
to whether or not I should have taken part in the consideration and resolution of these cases.
Indeed, it would not be befitting my position in this Highest Tribunal of the land for me to leave
unmentioned the circumstances which have given cause, I presume, for others to feel
apprehensive that my participation in these proceedings might detract from that degree of faith in
the impartiality that the Court's judgment herein should ordinarily command. In a way, it can be
said, of course, that I am the one most responsible for such a rather problematical situation, and it
is precisely for this reason that I have decided to begin this opinion with a discussion of why I
have not inhibited myself, trusting most confidently that what I have to say will be taken in the
same spirit of good faith, sincerity and purity of purpose in which I am resolved to offer the
same.
Plain honesty dictates that I should make of record here the pertinent contents of the official
report of the Executive Committee of the Katipunan ng mga Sanggunian submitted to the
Katipunan itself about the proceedings held on August 14, 1976. It is stated in that public
document that:
THE ISSUE WITH REGARDS To THE CONVENING OF A LEGISLATIVE
body came out when the President express his desire to share his powers with
other people.
Aware of this, a five-man Committee members of the Philippine Constitution Association
(PHILCONSA) headed by Supreme Court Justice Antonio Barredo proposed on July 28, the
establishment of 'Sangguniang Pambansa' or 'Batasang Pambansa' which would help the
President in the performance of his legislative functions. The proposed new body will take the
place of the interim National Assembly which is considered not practical to convene at this time
considering the constitution of its membership.
Upon learning the proposal of Justice Barredo, the country's 42,000 barangay assemblies on
August 1 suggested that the people be consulted on a proposal to create a new legislative body to
replace the interim assembly provided for by the Constitution. The suggestion of the barangay
units was made through their national association, Pambansang Katipunan ng mga Barangay
headed by Mrs. Nora Z. Patines. She said that the people have shown in at least six instances
including in the two past referenda that they are against the convening of the interim National
Assembly. She also said that since the people had ruled out the calling of such assembly and that
they have once proposed that the President create instead the Sangguniang Pambansa or a
legislative advisory body, then the proposal to create a new legislative must necessarily be
referred to the people.
The federation of Kabataang Barangay, also numbering 42,000 units like their elder counterparts
in the Katipunan ng mga Barangay also asserted their own right to be heard on whatever plans
are afoot to convene a new legislative body.
On August 6, a meeting of the national directorate of PKB was held to discuss matters pertaining
to the stand of the PKB with regards to the convening of a new legislative body. The stand of the
PKB is to create a legislative advisory council in place of the old assembly. Two days after,
August 8, the Kabataang Barangay held a symposium and made a stand which is the creation of a
body with full legislative powers.
A nationwide clamor for the holding of meeting in their respective localities to discuss more
intellegently the proposal to create a new legislative body was made by various urban and rural
Sangguniang Bayans.
Numerous requests made by some members coming from 75 provincial and 61 city SB
assemblies, were forwarded to the Department of Local Government and Community
Development (DLGCD).
On August 7, Local Government Secretary, Jose A. Rono granted the request by convening the
91 member National Executive Committee of the Pambansang Katipunan ng mga Sanggunian on
August 14 which was held at Session Hall, Quezon City. Invited also to participate were 13
Regional Federation Presidents each coming from the PKB and the PKKB
Actually, the extent of my active participation in the events and deliberations that have
culminated in the holding of the proposed referendum- plebiscite on October 16, 1976, which
petitioners are here seeking to enjoin, has been more substantial and meaningful than the above
report imparts. Most importantly, aside from being probably the first person to publicly articulate
the need for the creation of an interim legislative body to take the place of. the interim National
Assembly provided for in the Transitory Provisions of the Constitution, as suggested in the above
report, I might say that I was the one most vehement and persistent in publicly advocating and
urging the authorities concerned to directly submit to the people in a plebiscite whatever
amendments of the Constitution might be considered necessary for the establishment of such
substitute interim legislature. In the aforementioned session of the Executive Committee of the
Katipunan, I discourse on the indispensability of a new interim legislative body as the initial step
towards the early lifting of martial law and on the fundamental considerations why in our present
situation a constitutional convention would be superfluous in amending the Constitution.
Moreover, it is a matter of public knowledge that in a speech I delivered at the Coral Ballroom of
the Hilton Hotel in the evening of August 17, 1976, I denounced in no uncertain terms the plan to
call a constitutional convention. I reiterated the same views on September 7, 1976 at the initial
conference called by the Comelec in the course of the information and educational campaign it
was enjoined to conduct on the subject. And looking back at the subsequent developments up to
September 22, 1976, when the Batasang Bayan approved and the President signed the now
impugned Presidential Decree No. 1033, it is but human for me to want to believe that to a
certain extent my strong criticisms and resolute stand against any other alternative procedure of
amending the Constitution for the purpose intended had borne fruit.
I must hasten to add at this point, however, that in a larger sense, the initiative for all I have done,
was not altogether mine alone. The truth of the matter is that throughout the four years of this
martial law government, it has always been my faith, as a result of casual and occasional
exchanges of thought with President Marcos, that when the appropriate time does come, the
President would somehow make it known that in his judgment, the situation has already so
improved as to permit the implementation, if gradual, of the constitutionally envisioned
evolution of our government from its present state to a parliamentary one. Naturally, this would
inevitably involve the establishment of a legislative body to replace the abortive interim National
Assembly. I have kept tract of all the public and private pronouncements of the President, and it
was the result of my reading thereof that furnished the immediate basis for my virtually
precipitating, in one way or another, the materialization of the forthcoming referendumplebiscite. In other words, in the final analysis, it was the President's own attitude on the matter
that made it opportune for me to articulate my own feelings and Ideas as to how the nation can
move meaningfully towards normalization and to publicly raise the issues that have been
ventilated by the parties in the instant cases.
I would not be human, if I did not consider myself privileged in having been afforded by Divine
Providence the opportunity to contribute a modest share in the formulation of the steps that
should lead ultimately to the lifting of martial law in our country. Indeed, I am certain every true
Filipino is anxiously looking forward to that eventuality. And if for having voiced the sentiments
of our people, where others would have preferred to be comfortably silent, and if for having
made public what every Filipino must have been feeling in his heart all these years, I should be
singled out as entertaining such preconceived opinions regarding the issues before the Court in
the cases at bar as to preclude me from taking part in their disposition, I can only say that I do
not believe there is any other Filipino in and out of the Court today who is not equally situated as
I am .
The matters that concern the Court in the instant petitions do not involve merely the individual
interests of any single person or group of persons. Besides, the stakes in these cases affect
everyone commonly, not individually. The current of history that has passed through the whole
country in the wake of martial law has swept all of us, sparing none, and the problem of national
survival and of restoring democratic institutions and Ideals is seeking solution in the minds of all
of us. That I have preferred to discuss publicly my own thoughts on the matter cannot mean that
my colleagues in the Court have been indifferent and apathetic about it, for they too are
Filipinos. Articulated or not, all of us must have our own preconceived Ideas and notions in
respect to the situation that confronts the country. To be sure, our votes and opinions in themajor political cases in the recent past should more or less indicate our respective basic positions
relevant to the issues now before Us. Certainly, contending counsels cannot be entirely in the
dark in this regard. I feel that it must have been precisely because of such awareness that despite
my known public participation in the discussion of the questions herein involved, none of the
parties have sought my inhibition or disqualification.
Actually, although it may be difficult for others to believe it, I have never allowed my
preconceptions and personal inclinations to affect the objectivity needed in the resolution of any
judicial question before the Court. I feel I have always been able to appreciate, fully consider and
duly weigh arguments and points raised by all counsels, even when they conflict with my
previous views. I am never beyond being convinced by good and substantial ratiocination.
Nothing has delighted me more than to discover that somebody else has thought of more weighty
arguments refuting my own, regardless of what or whose interests are at stake. I would not have
accepted my position in the Court had I felt I would not be able to be above my personal
prejudices. To my mind, it is not that a judge has preconceptions that counts, it is his capacity
and readiness to absorb contrary views that are indispensable for justice to prevail. That
suspicions of prejudgment may likely arise is unavoidable; but I have always maintained that
whatever improper factors might influence a judge will unavoidably always appear on the face of
the decision. In any event, is there better guarantee of justice when the preconceptions of a judge
are concealed?
Withal, in point of law, I belong to the school of thought that regards members of the Supreme
Court as not covered by the general rules relative to disqualification and inhibition of judges in
cases before them. If I have in practice actually refrained from participating in some cases, it has
not been because of any legal ground founded on said rules, but for purely personal reasons,
specially because, anyway, my vote would not have altered the results therein.
It is my considered opinion that unlike in the cases of judges in the lower courts, the Constitution
does not envisage compulsory disqualification or inhibition in any case by any member of the
Supreme Court. The Charter establishes a Supreme Court "composed of a Chief Justice and
fourteen Associate Justices", with the particular qualifications therein set forth and to be
appointed in the manner therein provided. Nowhere in the Constitution is there any indication
that the legislature may designate by law instances wherein any of the justices should not or may
not take part in the resolution of any case, much less who should take his place. Members of the
Supreme Court are definite constitutional officers; it is not within the power of the lawmaking
body to replace them even temporarily for any reason. To put it the other way, nobody who has
not been duly appointed as a member of the Supreme Court can sit in it at any time or for any
reason. The Judicial power is vested in the Supreme Court composed as the Constitution ordains
- that power cannot be exercised by a Supreme Court constituted otherwise. And so, when as in
the instant where, if any of the member of Court is to abstain from taking part, there would be no
quorum - and no court to render the decision - it is the includible duty of all the incumbent
justices to participate in the proceedings and to cast their votes, considering that for the reasons
stated above, the provisions of Section 9 of the Judiciary Act do not appear to conform with the
concept of the office of Justice of the Supreme Court contemplated in the Constitution.
The very nature of the office of Justice of the Supreme Court as the tribunal of last resort and
bulwark of the rights and liberties of all the people demands that only one of dependable and
trustworthy probity should occupy the same. Absolute integrity, mental and otherwise, must be
by everyone who is appointed thereto. The moral character of every member of the Court must
be assumed to be such that in no case whatsoever. regardless of the issues and the parties
involved, may it be feared that anyone's life, liberty or property, much less the national interests,
would ever be in jeopardy of being unjustly and improperly subjected to any kind of judicial
sanction. In sum, every Justice of the Supreme Court is expected to be capable of rising above
himself in every case and of having full control of his emotions and prejudices, such that with the
legal training and experience he must of necessity be adequately equipped with, it would be
indubitable that his judgment cannot be but objectively impartial, Indeed, even the appointing
power, to whom the Justices owe their positions, should never hope to be unduly favored by any
action of the Supreme Court. All appointments to the Court are based on these considerations,
hence the ordinary rules on inhibition and disqualification do not have to be applied to its
members.
With the preliminary matter of my individual circumstances out of the way, I shall now address
myself to the grave issues submitted for Our resolution.
-IIn regard to the first issue as to whether the questions posed in the petitions herein are political or
justiciable, suffice it for me to reiterate the fundamental position I took in the Martial Law
cases, 1 thus
As We enter the extremely delicate task of resolving the grave issues thus thrust
upon Us. We are immediately encountered by absolute verities to guide Us all the
way. The first and most important of them is that the Constitution (Unless
expressly stated otherwise, all references to the Constitution in this discussion are
to both the 1935 and 1973 charters, since, after all, the pertinent provisions are
practically Identical in both is the supreme law of the land. This means among
other things that all the powers of the government and of all its officials from the
President down to the lowest emanate from it. None of them may exercise any
power unless it can be traced thereto either textually or by natural and logical
implication. "The second is that it is settled that the Judiciary provisions of the
Constitution point to the Supreme Court as the ultimate arbiter of all conflicts as
to what the Constitution or any part thereof means. While the other Departments
may adopt their own construction thereof, when such construction is challenged
by the proper party in an appropriate case wherein a decision would be impossible
without determining the correct construction, the Supreme Court's word on the
matter controls.
xxx xxx xxx
xxx xxx xxx
The fifth is that in the same manner that the Executive power conferred upon the
Executive by the Constitution is complete, total and unlimited, so also, the
judicial power vested in the Supreme Court and the inferior courts, is the very
whole of that power, without any limitation or qualification.
xxx xxx xxx
xxx xxx xxx
From these incontrovertible postulates, it results, first of all, that the main
question before Us is not in reality one of jurisdiction, for there can be no
conceivable controversy, especially one involving a conflict as to the correct

construction of the Constitution, that is not contemplated to be within the judicial
authority of the courts to hear and decide. The judicial power of the courts being
unlimited and unqualified, it extends over all situations that call for the as
certainment and protection of the rights of any party allegedly violated, even
when the alleged violator is the highest official of the land or the government
itself. It is, therefore, evidence that the Court's jurisdiction to take cognizance of
and to decide the instant petitions on their merits is beyond challenge.
In this connection, however, it must be borne in mind that in the form of
government envisaged by the framers of the Constitution and adopted by our
people, the Court's indisputable and plenary authority to decide does not
necessarily impose upon it the duty to interpose its fiat as the only means of
settling the conflicting claims of the parties before it. It is ingrained in the
distribution of powers in the fundamental law that hand in hand with the vesting
of the judicial power upon the Court, the Constitution has coevally conferred
upon it the discretion to determine, in consideration of the constitutional
prerogatives granted to the other Departments, when to refrain from imposing
judicial solutions and instead defer to the judgment of the latter. It is in the very
nature of republican governments that certain matters are left in the residual
power of the people themselves to resolve, either directly at the polls or thru their
elected representatives in the political Departments of the government. And these
reserved matters are easily distinguishable by their very nature, when one
studiously considers the basic functions and responsibilities entrusted by the
charter to each of the great Departments of the government. To cite an obvious
example, the protection, defense and preservation of the state against internal or
external aggression threatening its very existence is far from being within the
ambit of judicial responsibility. The distinct role then of the Supreme Court of
being the final arbiter in the determination of constitutional controversies does not
have to be asserted in such contemplated situations, thereby to give way to the
ultimate prerogative of the people articulated thru suffrage or thru the acts of their
political representatives they have elected for the purpose.
Indeed, these fundamental considerations are the ones that lie at the base of what is known in
American constitutional law as the political question doctrine, which in that jurisdiction is
unquestionably deemed to be part and parcel of the rule of law, exactly like its apparently more
attractive or popular opposite, judicial activism, which is the fullest exertion of judicial power,
upon the theory that unless the courts intervene injustice might prevail. It has been invoked and
applied by this Court in varied forms and mode of projection in several momentous instances in
the past, (Barcelona vs. Baker, 5 Phil. 87; Severino vs. Governor-General, 16 Phil. 366; Abueva
vs. Wood, 45 Phil. 612; Alejandrino vs. Quezon, 46 Phil. 85; Vera vs. Avelino, 77 Phil. 192;
Mabanag vs. Lopez Vito, 78 Phil. 1; Cabin vs. Francisco, 88 Phil. 654; Montenegro vs.
Castaneda, 91 Phil. 882, Santos vs. Yatco, 55 O.G. 8641 [Minute Resolution of Nov. 6, 19591
Osmena vs. Pendatun, Oct. 28, 1960.) and it is the main support of the stand of the Solicitor
General on the issue of jurisdiction in the cases at bar. It is also referred to as the doctrine of
judicial self-restraint or abstention. But as the nomenclatures themselves imply, activism and
self- restraint are both subjective attitudes, not inherent imperatives. The choice of alternatives in
any particular eventuality is naturally dictated by what in the Court's considered opinion is what
the Constitution envisions should be by in order to accomplish the objectives of government and
of nationhood. And perhaps it may be added here to avoid confusion of concepts, that We are not
losing sight of the traditional approach based on the doctrine of separation of powers. In truth,
We perceive that even under such mode of rationalization, the existence of power is secondary,
respect for the acts of a co-ordinate, co-equal and independent Department being the general
rule, particularly when the issue is not encroachment of delimited areas of functions but alleged
abuse of a Department's own basic prerogatives. (59 SCRA, pp. 379-383.)
Applying the foregoing considerations to the cases at bar, I hold that the Court has jurisdiction to
pass on the merits of the various claims of petitioners. At the same time, however, I maintain that
the basic nature of the issues herein raised requires that the Court should exercise its
constitutionally endowed prerogative to refrain from exerting its judicial authority in the
premises.
Stripped of incidental aspects, the constitutional problem that confronts Us stems from the
absence of any clear and definite express provision in the Charter applicable to the factual milieu
herein involved. The primary issue is, to whom, under the circumstances, does the authority to
propose amendments to the Constitution property belong? To say, in the light of Section 15 of
Article XVII of the Charter, that that faculty lies in the interim National Assembly is to beg the
main question. Indeed, there could be no occasion for doubt or debate, if it could ' only be
assumed that the interim National Assembly envisaged in Sections 1 and 2 of the same Article
XVII may be convoked. But precisely, the fundamental issue We are called upon to decide is
whether or not it is still constitutionally possible to convene that body. And relative to that
question, the inquiry centers on whether or not the political developments since the ratification of
the Constitution indicate that the people have in effect enjoined the convening of the interim
National Assembly altogether. On this score, it is my assessment that the results of the referenda
of January 10-15, 1973, July 27-28, 1973 and February 27, 1975 clearly show that the great
majority of our people, for reasons plainly obvious to anyone who would consider the
composition of that Assembly, what with its more than 400 members automatically voted into it
by the Constitutional Convention together with its own members, are against its being convoked
at all.
Whether or not such a manifest determination of the sentiments of the people should be given
effect without a formal amendment of the Constitution is something that constitutional scholars
may endlessly debate on. What cannot be disputed, however, is that the government and the
nation have acquiesced to, it and have actually operated on the basis thereof. Proclamation 1103
which, on the predicate that the overwhelming majority of the people desire that the interim
Assembly be not convened, has ordained the suspension of its convocation, has not been assailed
either judicially or otherwise since the date of its promulgation on January 17, 1973.
In these premises, it is consequently the task of the Court to determine what, under these
circumstances, is the constitutional relevance of the interim National Assembly to any proposal
to amend the Constitution at this time. It is my considered opinion that in resolving that question,
the Court must have to grapple with the problem of what to do with the will of the people, which
although manifested in a manner not explicitly provided for in the Constitution, was nevertheless
official, and reliable, and what is more important clear and unmistakable, despite the known
existence of well-meaning, if insufficiently substantial dissent. Such being the situation, I hold
that it is not proper for the Court to interpose its judicial authority against the evident decision of
the people and should leave it to the political department of the government to devise the ways
and means of resolving the resulting problem of how to amend the Constitution, so long as in
choosing the same, the ultimate constituent power is left to be exercised by the people
themselves in a well- ordered plebiscite as required by the fundamental law.
-2Assuming We have to inquire into the merits of the issue relative to the constitutional authority
behind the projected amendment of the Charter in the manner provided in Presidential Decree
1033, I hold that in the peculiar situation in which the government is today, it is not incompatible
with the Constitution for the President to propose the subject amendments for ratification by the
people in a formal plebiscite under the supervision of the Commission on Elections. On the
contrary, in the absence of any express prohibition in the letter of the Charter, the Presidential
Decree in question is entirely consistent with the spirit and the principles underlying the
Constitution. The correctness of this conclusion should become even more patent, when one
considers the political developments that the people have brought about since the ratification of
the Constitution on January 17,1973.
I consider it apropos at this juncture to repeat my own words in a speech I delivered on the
occasion of the celebration of Law Day on September 18, 1975 before the members of the
Philippine Constitution Association and their guests:
To fully comprehend the constitutional situation in the Philippines today, one has
to bear in mind that, as I have mentioned earlier, the martial law proclaimed under
the 1935 Constitution overtook the drafting of the new charter by the
Constitutional Convention of 1971. It was inevitable, therefore, that the delegates
had to take into account not only the developments under it but, most of all, its
declared objectives and what the President, as its administrator, was doing to
achieve them. In this connection, it is worthy of mention that an attempt to
adjourn the convention was roundly voted down to signify the determination of
the delegates to finish earliest their work, thereby to accomplish the mission
entrusted to them by the people to introduce meaningful reforms in our
government and society. Indeed, the constituent labors gained rapid tempo, but in
the process, the delegates were to realize that the reforms they were formulating
could be best implemented if the martial law powers of the President were to be
allowed to subsist even after the ratification of the Constitution they were
approving. This denouement was unusual. Ordinarily, a constitution born out of a
crisis is supposed to provide all the needed cures and can, therefore, be
immediately in full force and effect after ratification. Not so, with our 1973
Constitution, Yes, according to the Supreme Court, 'there is no more judicial
obstacle to the new Constitution being considered in force and effect', but in truth,
it is not yet so in full. Let me explain.
To begin with, in analyzing the new Constitution, we must be careful to distinguish between the
body or main part thereof and its transitory provisions. It is imperative to do so because the
transitory provisions of our Constitution are extraordinary in the sense that obviously they have
been designed to provide not only for the transition of our government from the presidential form
under the past charter to a parliamentary one as envisaged in the new fundamental law, but also
to institutionalize, according to the President, the reforms introduced thru the exercise of his
martial law powers. Stated differently, the transitory provisions, as it has turned out, has in effect
established a transition government, not, I am sure, perceived by many. It is a government that is
neither presidential nor parliamentary. It is headed, of course, by President Marcos who not on
retains all his powers under the 1935 Constitution but enjoys as well those of the President and
the Prime Minister under the new Constitution. Most importantly, he can and does legislate
alone. But to be more accurate, I should say that he legislates alone in spite of the existence of
the interim National Assembly unequivocally ordained by the Constitution, for the simple reason
that he has suspended the convening of said assembly by issuing Proclamation No. 1103
purportedly 'in deference to the sovereign will of the Filipino people' expressed in the January
10-15, 1973 referendum.
Thus, we have here the unique case of a qualified ratification. The whole Constitution was
submitted for approval or disapproval of the people, and after the votes were counted and the
affirmative majority known, we were told that the resulting ratification was subject to the
condition that the interim National Assembly evidently established in the Constitution as the
distinctive and indispensable element of a parliamentary form of government should nevertheless
be not convened and that no elections should be held for about seven years, with the
consequence that we have now a parliamentary government without a parliament and a republic
without any regular election of its officials. And as you can see, this phenomenon came into
being not by virtue of the Constitution but of the direct mandate of the sovereign people
expressed in a referendum. In other words, in an unprecedented extra-constitutional way, we
have established, wittingly or unwittingly, a direct democracy through the Citizens Assemblies
created by Presidential Decree No. 86, which later on have been transformed into barangays, a
system of government proclaimed by the President as 'a real achievement in participatory
democracy.' What I am trying to say, my friends, is that as I perceive it, what is now known as
constitutional authoritarianism means, in the final analysis, that the fundamental source of
authority of our existing government may not be necessarily found within the four corners of the
Constitution but rather in the results of periodic referendums conducted by the Commission on
Elections in a manner well known to all of us This, as I see it, is perhaps what the President
means by saying that under the new Constitution he has extra-ordinary powers independently of
martial law - powers sanctioned directly by the people which may not even be read in the
language of the Constitution. in brief, when we talk of the rule of law nowadays, our frame of
reference should not necessarily be the Constitution but the outcome of referendums called from
time to time by the President. The sooner we imbibe this vital concept the more intelligent will
our perspective be in giving our support and loyalty to the existing government. What is more,
the clearer will it be that except for the fact that all the powers of government are being exercised
by the President, we - do not in reality have a dictatorship but an experimental type of direct
democracy."
In the foregoing disquisition, I purposely made no mention of the referendum of February 27,
1975. It is important to note, relative to the main issue now before Us, that it was originally
planned to ask the people in that referendum whether or not they would like the interim National
Assembly to convene, but the Comelec to whom the task of preparing the questions was assigned
was prevailed upon not to include any -such question anymore, precisely because it was the
prevalent view even among the delegates to the Convention as well as the members of the old
Congress concerned that that matter had already been finally resolved in the previous referenda
of January and July 1973 in the sense that. the Assembly should not be convened comparable to
res adjudicata.
It is my position that as a result of the political developments since January 17, 1973 the
transitory provisions envisioning the convening of the interim National Assembly have been
rendered legally inoperative. There is no doubt in my mind that for the President to convoke the
interim National Assembly as such would be to disregard the will of the people - something no
head of a democratic republican state like ours should do. And I find it simply logical that the
reasons that motivated the people to enjoin the convening of the Assembly - the unusually large
and unmanageable number of its members and the controversial morality of its automatic
composition consisting of all the incumbent elective national executive and legislative officials
under the Old Constitution who would agree to join it and the delegates themselves to the
Convention who had voted in favor of the Transitory Provisions - apply not only to the Assembly
as an ordinary legislature but perhaps more to its being a constituent body. And to be more
realistic, it is but natural to conclude that since the people are against politicians in the old order
having anything to do with the formulation of national policies, there must be more reasons for
them to frown on said politicians taking part in amendment of the fundamental law, specially
because the particular amendment herein involved calls for the abolition of the interim National
Assembly to which they belong and its substitution by the Batasang Pambansa.
It is argued that in law, the qualified or conditional ratification of a constitution is not
contemplated. I disagree. It is inconsistent with the plenary power of the people to give or
withhold their assent to a proposed Constitution to maintain that they can do so only wholly. I
cannot imagine any sound principle that can be invoked to support the theory that the proposing
authority can limit the power of ratification of the people. As long as there are reliable means by
which only partial approval can be manifested, no cogent reason exists why the sovereign people
may not do so. True it is that no proposed Constitution can be perfect and it may therefore be
taken with the good and the bad in it, but when there are feasible ways by which it can be
determined which portions of it, the people disapprove. it would be stretching technicality
beyond its purported office to render the final authority - the people impotent to act according to
what they deem best suitable to their interests.
In any event, I feel it would be of no consequence to debate at length regarding the legal
feasibility of qualified ratification. Proclamation 1103 categorically declares that:
WHEREAS, fourteen million nine hundred seventy six thousand five hundred
sixty-one (14,976.561) members of all the Barangays voted for the adoption of the
proposed Constitution, as against seven hundred forty-three thousand eight

hundred sixty-nine (743,869) who voted for its rejection; but a majority of those
who approved the new Constitution conditioned their votes on the demand that
the interim National Assembly provided in its Transitory Provisions should not be
convened.
and in consequence, the President has acted accordingly by not convening the Assembly. The
above factual premises of Proclamation 1103 is not disputed by petitioners. Actually, it is binding
on the Court, the same being a political act of a coordinate department of the government not
properly assailed as arbitrary or whimsical. At this point, it must be emphasized in relation to the
contention that a referendum is only consultative, that Proclamation 1103, taken together with
Proclamation 1102 which proclaimed the ratification of the Constitution, must be accorded the
same legal significance as the latter proclamation, as indeed it is part and parcel if the Act of
ratification of the Constitution, hence not only persuasive but mandatory. In the face of the
incontrovertible fact that the sovereign people have voted against the convening of the interim
National Assembly, and faced with the problem of amending the Constitution in order precisely
to implement the people's rejection of that Assembly, the problem of constitutional dimension
that confronts Us, is how can any such amendment be proposed for ratification by the people?
To start with, it may not be supposed that just because the office or body designed by the
constitutional convention to perform the constituent function of formulating proposed
amendments has been rendered inoperative by the people themselves, the people have thereby
foreclosed the possibility of amending the Constitution no matter how desirable or necessary this
might be. In this connection, I submit that by the very nature of the office of the Presidency in
the prevailing scheme of government we have - it being the only political department of the
government in existence - it is consistent with basic principles of constitutionalism to
acknowledge the President's authority to perform the constituent function, there being no other
entity or body lodged with the prerogative to exercise such function.
There is another consideration that leads to the same conclusion. It is conceded by petitioners
that with the non-convening of the interim Assembly, the legislative authority has perforce fallen
into the hands of the President, if only to avoid a complete paralysis of law-making and resulting
anarchy and chaos. It is likewise conceded that the provisions of Section 3 (2) of Article XVII
invest the President with legislative power for the duration of the transition period. From these
premises, it is safe to conclude that in effect the President has been substituted by the people
themselves in place of the interim Assembly. Such being the case, the President should be
deemed as having been granted also the cognate prerogative of proposing amendments to the
Constitution. In other words, the force of necessity and the cognate nature of the act justify that
the department exercising the legislative faculty be the one to likewise perform the constituent
function that was attached to the body rendered impotent by the people's mandate. Incidentally, I
reject most vehemently the proposition that the President may propose amendments to the
Constitution in the exercise of his martial law powers. Under any standards, such a suggestion
cannot be reconciled with the Ideal that a Constitution is the free act of the people.
It was suggested during the oral, argument that instead of extending his legislative powers by
proposing the amendment to create a new legislative body, the President should issue a decree
providing for the necessary apportionment of the seats in the Regular National Assembly and call
for an election of the members thereof and thus effect the immediate normalization of the
parliamentary government envisaged in the Constitution. While indeed procedurally feasible, the
suggestion overlooks the imperative need recognized by the constitutional convention as may be
inferred from the obvious purpose of the transitory provisions, for a period of preparation and
acquaintance by all concerned with the unfamiliar distinctive features and practices of the
parliamentary system. Accustomed as we are to the presidential system, the Convention has seen
to it that there should be an interim parliament under the present leadership, which will take the
corresponding measures to effectuate the efficient and smooth transition from the present system
to the new one. I do not believe this pattern set by the convention should be abandoned.
The alternative of calling a constitutional convention has also been mentioned. But, in the first
place, when it is considered that whereas, under Section 1 (1) and (2) of Article XVI, the regular
National Assembly may call a Constitutional Convention or submit such a call for approval of
the people, Section 15 of Article XVII, in reference to interim National Assembly, does not grant
said body the prerogative of calling a convention, one can readily appreciate that the spirit of the
Constitution does not countenance or favor the calling of a convention during the transition, if
only because such a procedure would be time consuming, cumbersome and expensive. And when
it is further noted that the requirement as to the number of votes needed for a proposal is only a
majority, whereas it is three-fourths in respect to regular Assembly, and, relating this point to the
provision of Section 2 of Article XVI to the effect that all ratification plebiscites must be held
"not later than three months after the approval" of the proposed amendment by the proposing
authority, the adoption of the most simple manner of amending the charter, as that provided for in
the assailed Presidential Decree 1033 suggests itself as the one most in accord with the intent of
the fundamental law.
There is nothing strange in adopting steps not directly based on the letter of the Constitution for
the purpose of amending or changing the same. To cite but one important precedent, as explained
by Mr. Justice Makasiar in his concurring opinion in Javellana 2, the present Constitution of the
United States was neither proposed nor ratified in the manner ordained by the original charter of
that country, the Articles of Confederation and Perpetual Union.
In brief. if the convening and operation of the interim National Assembly has been effectuated
through a referendum-plebiscite in January, 1973, and ratified expressly and impliedly in two
subsequent referenda, those of July, 1973 and February, 1975, why may not a duly held plebiscite
suffice for the purpose of creating a substitute for that Assembly? It should be borne in mind that
after all, as indicated in the whereas of the impugned Presidential Decree, actually, the proposed
amendments were initiated by the barangays and sanggunian members. In other words, in
submitting the amendments for ratification, the President is merely acting as the conduit thru
whom a substantial portion of the people, represented in the Katipunan ng Mga Sanggunian,
Barangay at Kabataang Barangay, seek the approval of the people as a whole of the amendments
in question. If all these mean that the sovereign people have arrogated unto themselves the
functions relative to the amendment to the Constitution, I would regard myself as totally devoid
of legal standing to question it, having in mind that the most fundamental tenet on which our
whole political structure rests is that "sovereignty resides in the people and all government
authority emanates from them."
In the light of the foregoing considerations, I hold that Presidential Decree No. 1033 does not
infringe the Constitution, if only because the specific provision it is supposed to infringe does not
exist in legal contemplation since it was coevally made inoperative when the people ratified the
Constitution on January 17, 1973. I am fully convinced that there is nothing in the procedure of
amendment contained in said decree that is inconsistent with the fundamental principles of
constitutionalism. On the contrary, I find that the Decree, in issue conforms admirably with the
underlying tenet of our government - the sovereignty and plenary power of the people.
On the issue of whether or not October 16, 1976 is too proximate to enable the people to
sufficiently comprehend the issues and intelligently vote in the referendum and plebiscite set by
Presidential Decree 1033, all I can say is that while perhaps my other colleagues are right in
holding that the period given to the people is adequate, I would leave it to the President to
consider whether or not it would be wiser to extend the same. Just to avoid adverse comments
later I wish the President orders a postponement. But whether such postponement is ordered or
not, date of the referendum- plebiscite anywhere from October 16, 1976 to any other later date,
would be of no vital import.
In conclusion, I vote to dismiss all the three petitions before Us.
MAKASIAR, J., concurring and dissenting:
Since the validity or effectivity of the proposed amendments is to be decided ultimately by the
people in their sovereign capacity, the question is political as the term is defined in Tanada, et al.
vs. Cuenco, et al. (103 Phil. 1051), which is a bar to any judicial inquiry, for the reasons stated in
Our opinion in Javellana, et al. vs. Executive Secretary, et al. (L-36142); Tan, et al. vs. Executive
Secretary, et al. (L,36164); Roxas, et al. vs Executive Secretary, et al. (L-36165); Monteclaro,
etc., et al. vs' Executive Secretary, et al. (@36236); and Ditag et al. vs. Executive Secretary, et al.
(L-W283, March 31, 1973, 50 SCRA 30, 204-283). The procedure for amendment is not
important Ratification by the people is all that is indispensable to validate an amendment. Once
ratified, the method of making the proposal and the period for submission become relevant.
The contrary view negates the very essence of a republican democracy - that the people are
sovereign - and renders meaningless the emphatic declaration in the very first provision of
Article II of the 1973 Constitution that the Philippines is a republican state, sovereignty resides
in the people and all government authority emanates from them. It is axiomatic that sovereignty
is illimitable The representatives cannot dictate to the sovereign people. They may guide them;
but they cannot supplant their judgment, Such an opposite view likewise distrusts the wisdom of
the people as much as it despises their intelligence. It evinces a presumptuous pretension to
intellectual superiority. There are thousands upon thousands among the citizenry, who are not in
the public service, who are more learned and better skilled than many of their elected
representatives.
Moreover, WE already ruled in Aquino, et al. vs- Comelec, et al. (L 40004, Jan. 31, 1975, 62
SCRA 275, 298-302) that the President as enforcer or administrator of martial rule during the
period of martial law can legislate; and that he has the discretion as to when the convene the
interim National Assembly depending on prevailing conditions of peace and order. In view of the
fact that the interim National Assembly has not been convoked in obedience to the desire of the
people clearly expressed in the 1973 referenda, the President therefore remains the lone lawmaking authority while martial law subsists. Consequently, he can also exercise the power of the
interim National Assembly to propose amendments to the New Constitution (Sec. 15,,Art. XVII
If, as conceded by petitioner Vicente Guzman (L-44684), former delegate to the 1971
Constitutional Convention which drafted the 1973 Constitution. the President, during the period
of martial law, can call a constitutional convention for the purpose, admittedly a constituent
power, it stands to reason that the President can likewise legally propose amendments to the
fundamental law.
ANTONIO, J., concurring:
I
At the threshold, it is necessary to clarify what is a "political question". It must be noted that this
device has been utilized by the judiciary "to avoid determining questions it is ill equipped to
determine or that could be settled in any event only with the effective support of the political
branches." 1 According to Weston, judges, whether "personal representatives of a truly sovereign
king, or taking their seats as the creatures of a largely popular sovereignty speaking through a
written constitution, derive their power by a delegation, which clearly or obscurely as the case
may be, deliminates and delimits their delegated jurisdiction.* * * Judicial questions * * * are
those which the sovereign has set to be decided in the courts. Political questions, similarly, are
those which the sovereign has entrusted to the so-called political departments of government or
has reserved to be settled by its own extra-government or has reserved to be settled by its own
extra-governmental action." 2 Reflecting a similar concept, this Court has defined a "political
question" as a "matter which is to be exercised by the people in their primary political capacity or
that has been specifically delegated to some other department or particular officer of the
government, with discretionary power to act." 3 In other words, it refers to those questions which,
under the Constitution, are to be decided by the people in their sovereign capacity, or in regard to
which full discretionary authority has been delegated to the legislative or executive branch of
government. 4
In determining whether an issue falls within the political question category, the absence of
satisfactory creterion for a judicial determination or the appropriateness of attributing finality to
the action of the political departments of government is a dominant consideration. This was
explained by Justice Brennan in Baker v. Carr, 5 thus :
Prominent on the surface of any case held to involve political question is found a
textually demonstrable constitutional lack of judicially discoverrable and
manageable standards for resolving it; or the impossibility of deciding without an
initial policy determination of a kind clearly for non-judicial discretion; or the
impossibility of a court's undertaking independent resolution without expressing
lack of the respect due coordinate branches of government; or an unusual need for
unquestioning adherence to a political decision already made; or the potentiality
of embarrassment from from multifarious pronouncements by various
departments on one question. . . .
To decide whether a matter has in a measure been committed by the Constitution to another
branch of government or retained be the people to be decided by them in their sovereign
capacity, or whether that branch exceeds whatever authority has been committed, is indeed a
delicate exercise in constitutional interpretation.
In Coleman v. Miller, 6 the United States Supreme Court held that the efficacy of the ratification
by state legislatures of a constitutional amendment is a political question. On the question of
whether the State Legislature could constitutionally relative an amendment, after the same had
been previously rejected by it, it was held that the ultimate authority over the question was in
Congress in the exercise of its control over the promulgation of the adoption of the amendment.
And in connection with the second question of whether the amendment has lost its, vitality
through the lapse of time, the Court held that the question was likewise political, involving "as it
does ... an appraisal of a great variety of relevant conditions, political, social and economic,
which can hardly be said to be within the appropriate range of evidence receivable in a court of
justice and as to which it would be an extravagant extension of juridical authority to assert
judicial notice as the basis of deciding a controversy with respect to the validity of an
amendment actually ratified. On the other hand, these conditions are appropriate for the
consideration of the political departments of the Government. The questions they involve are
essentially political and not justiciable." '
In their concurring opinions, Justices Black, Roberts, Frankfurter and Douglas stressed that:
The Constitution grants Congress exclusive power to control submission off
constitutional amendments. Final determination by Congress their ratification by
three-fourths of the States has taken place 'is conclusive upon the courts.' In the
exercise of that power, Congress, of course, is governed by the Constitution.
However, A whether submission, intervening procedure for Congressional
determination of ratification conforms to the commands of the Constitution, call
for decisions by apolitical department of questions of a t@ which this Court has
frequently designated 'political.' And decision of a 'political question' by the
political department' to which the Constitution has committed it 'conclusively
binds the judges, as well as all other officers, citizens and subjects of ...
government. Proclamation under authority of Congress that an amendment has
been ratified will carry with it a solemn assurance by the Congress that
ratification has taken place as the Constitution commands. Upon this assurance a
proclaimed amendment must be accepted as a part of the Constitution, learning to
the judiciary its traditional authority of interpretation. To the extent that the
Court's opinion in the present case even by implieding assumes a power to make
judicial interpretation of the exclusive constitutional authority of Congress over
submission and by ratification of amendments, we are unable to agree.
Relying on this doctrine enunciated in Coleman v. Miller supra this Court, in Mabanag v. Lopez
Vitol, 7 speaking through Mr. Justice Pedro Tuason, ruled that the process of constitutional
amendment, involving proposal and ratification, is a political question. In the Mabang case, the
petitioners sought to prevent the enforcement of a resolution of Congress proposing the "Parity
Amendment" to the Philippine Constitution on the ground that it had not been approved by the
three-fourths vote of all the members of each house as required be Article XV of the 1935
Constitution. It was claimed that three (3) Senators and eight (8) members of the House of
Representatives had been suspended and that their membership was not considered in the
determination of the three- fourths %- ore In dismissing the petition on the ground that the
question of the validity of the proposal was political, the Court stated:
"If ratification of an amendment is a political question, a proposal which leads to ratification has
to be a political question. The question to steps complement each other in a scheme intended to
achieve a single objective. It is to be noted that amendatory process as provided in Section I of
Article XV of the Philippine Constitution 'consists of (only) two distinct parts: proposal and
ratification.' There is no logic in attaching political character to one and withholding that
character from the other. Proposal to amend the Constitution is a highly political function
performed by the Congress in its sovereign legislative capacity and committed to its charge by
the Constitution itself. ..." (At pages 4-5, Italics supplied.)
It is true that in Gonzales v. Comelec, 8 this Court held that "the issue whether or not a
Resolution of Congress, acting as a constituent assembly - violates the Constitution is essentially
justiciable, not political, and hence, subject to judicial review." What was involved in Gonzales,
however, was not a proposed What was involved in Gonzales, however, was not a proposed
amendment to the Constitution but an act of Congress, 9 submitting proposed amendments to the
Constitution. Similarly, in Tolentino v. Commission an Elections, 10 what was involved was not
the validity of the proposal to lower the voting age but rather that of the resolution of the
Constitutional Convention submitting the proposal for ratification. The question was whether
piecemeal amendments to the Constitution could submitted to the people for approval or
rejection.
II
Here, the point has been stressed that the President is acting as agent for and in behalf of the
people in proposing the amendment. there can be no question that in the referendums of January,
1973 and in the subsequent referendums the people had clearly and categorically rejected the
calling of the interim National Assembly. As stated in the main opinion, the Lupang
Tagapagpaganap of the Katipunan ng mga Sanggunian, the Pambansang Katipunan ng mga
Barangay, representing 42,000 barangays, the Kabataang Barangay organizations and the various
sectoral groups had proposed the replacement of the interim National Assembly. These barangays
and the Sanggunian assemblies are effective instrumentalities through which the desires of the
people are articulated and expressed. The Batasang Bayan (Legislative Council), composed of
nineteen (19) cabinet members and nine (9) officials with cabinet rank, and ninety-one (91)
members of the Lupang Tagapagpaganap (Executive Committee) of the Katipunan ng mga
Sangguniang Bayani voted in their special session to submit directly to the people in a plebiscite
on October 16, 1976 the afore-mentioned constitutional amendments. Through the Pambansang
Katipunan by Barangay and the Pampurok ng Katipunan Sangguniang Bayan, the people have
expressed their desire not only to abolish the interim National Assembly, but to replace it with a
more representative body acceptable to them in order to effect the desirable constitutional
changes necessary to hasten the political evolution of the government towards the parliamentary
system, while at the same time ensuring that the gains of the New Society, which are vital to the
welfare of the people, shall be safeguarded. The proposed constitutional amendments, therefore,
represent a consensus of the people.
It would be futile to insist that the intemi National Assembly should have been convened to
propose those amendments pursuant to Section 15 of Article XVII of the Constitution. This
Court, in the case of Aquino v. Commission or Elections, 11 took judicial notice of the fact that in
the referendum of January, 1973, a majority of those who approved the new Constitution
conditioned their votes on the demand that the interim National Assembly provided in the
Transitory Provisions should not be and the President "in deference to the sovereign will of the
Filipino people" declared that the convening of said body shall be suspended. 12 As this Court
observed in the Aquino case:
His decision to defer the initial convocation of the byiitttit National Assembly was
supported by the sovereign people at the by referendum in January, 1973 when the
people voted to postpone the convening of the interim National Assembly until
after at least seven (7) years from the approval of the new Constitution. And the
reason why the same question was eliminated from the questions to be submitted
at the referendum on February 27, 1975, is that even some members of the
Congress and delegates of the Constitutional Convention, who are already byjso
ofitto members of the intetini National Assembly are against such inclusion;
because the issue was already bycciled in the January, 1973 referendum by the
sovereign people indicating thereby their disenchantment with any Assembly as
the former Congress failed to institutionalize the reforms they demanded and
wasted public funds through endless debates without relieving the suffering of the
general mass of citizenry (p. 302.) The action of the President in suspending the
convening of the interim National Assembly has met the overwhelming approval
of the people in subsequent referenda.
Since it was the action by the people that gave binding force and effect to the new Constitution,
then it must be accepted as a necessary consequence that their objection against the immediate
convening of the interim National Assembly must be respected as a positive mandate of the
sovereign.
In the Philippines, which is a unitary state, sovereignty "resides in the people and all government
authority emanates from them."13 The term "People" as sovereign is comprehensive in its
context. The people, as sovereign creator of all political reality, is not merely the enfranchised
citizens but the political unity of the people. 14 It connotes, therefore, a people which exists not
only in the urgent present but in the continuum of history. The assumption that the opinion of
The People as voters can be treated as the expression of the interests of the People as a historic
community was, to the distinguished American journalist and public philosopher, Walter
Lipunan, unwarranted.
Because of the discrepancy between The People as Voters and the People as the
corporate nation, the voters have no title to consider themselves the proprietors of
the commonwealth and to claim that their interests are Identical to the public
interest. A prevailing plurality of the voters are not The People. The claim that
they are is a bogus title invoked to justify the usurpation of the executive power
by representative assemblies and the intimidation of public men by demagogue
politicians. In fact demagoguery can be described as the sleight of hand by which
a faction of The People as voters are invested with the authority of The People.
That is why so many crimes are committed in the People's name 15
In Gonzales v. Comelec, supra, the Court clearly emphasized that the power to propose
amendments or to amend the Constitution is part of the inherent power of the people as the
repository of sovereignty in a republican state. While Congress may propose amendments to the
Constitution, it acts pursuant to authority granted to it by the people through the Constitution.
Both the power to propose and the authority to approve, therefore, inhere in the people as the
bearer of the Constitution making power.
Absent an interim National Assembly upon whom the people, through the Constitution, have
delegated the authority to exercise constituent powers, it follows from necessity that either the
people should exercise that power themselves or through any other instrumentality they may
choose. For Law, like Nature, abhors a vacuum (natural vacuum abhorret).
The question then is whether the President has authority to act for the people in submitting such
proposals for ratification at the plebiscite of October 16. The political character of the question
is, therefore, particularly manifest, considering that ultimately it is the people who will decide
whether the President has such authority. It certainly involves a matter which is to be exercised
by the people in their sovereign capacity, hence, it is essentially political, not judicial.
While it is true that the constituent power is not to be confuse with legislative power in general
because the prerogative to propose amendments is not embraced within the context of ordinary
lawmaking, it must be noted that the proposals to be submitted for ratification in the forthcoming
referendum are, in the final analysis, actually not of the President but directly of the people
themselves, speaking through their authorized instrumentalities.
As the Chief Justice aptly stated in his concurring opinion in this case:
... The President merely formalized the said proposals in Presidential Decree No.
1033. It being conceded in all quarters that sovereignty resides in the people and it
having been demonstrated that their constituent power to amend the Constitution
has not been delegated by them to any instrumentality of the Government during
the present stage of the transition period of our political development, the
conclusion is ineluctable that their exertion of that residuary power cannot be
vulnerable to any constitutional challenge as beingultravires. Accordingly, without
venturing to rule on whether or not the President is vested with constituent power
- as it does not appear necessary to do so in the premises - the proposals here
challenged, being acts of the sovereign people no less, cannot be said to be
afflicted with unconstitutionality. A fortiori, the concomitant authority to call a
plebiscite and to appropriate funds therefor is even less vulnerable not only
because the President, in exercising said authority, has acted as a mere ofiffet byf
of the people who made the proposals, but likewise because the said authority is
legislative in nature rather than constituent.
This is but a recognition that the People of the Philippines have the inherent, sole
and exclusive right of regulating their own government, and of altering or
abolishing their Constitution whenever it may be necessary to their safety or
happiness. There appears to be no justification, under the existing, circumstances,
for a Court to create by implication a limitation on - the sovereign power of the
people. As has been clearly explained in a previous case:
There is nothing in the nature of the submission which should cause the free
exercise of it to be obstructed, or that could render it dangerous to the stability of
the government; because the measure derives all its vital force from the action of
the people at the ballot box, and there can never be danger in submitting in an
established form to a free people, the proposition whether they will change their
fundamental law The means provided for the exercise of their Sovereign right of
changing their constitution should receive such a construction as not to trammel
the exercise of the right. Difficulties and embarrassments in its exercise are in
derogation of the right of free government, which is inherent in the people; and
the best security against tumult and revolution is the free and unobstructed
privilege to the people of the State to change their constitution in the mode
prescribed by the instrument.
III
The paramount consideration that impelled Us to arrive at the foregoing opinion is the necessity
of ensuring popular control over the constituent power. "If the people are to control the
constituent power - the power to make and change the fundamental law of the State," observed
Wheeler," "the process of Constitutional change must not be based too heavily upon existing
agencies of government." Indeed, the basic premise of republicanism is that the ordinary citizen,
the common man. can be trusted to determine his political destiny. Therefore, it is time that the
people should be accorded the fullest opportunity to decide the laws that shall provide for their
governance. For in the ultimate analysis, the success of the national endeavor shall depend on the
vision, discipline and I by ininess of the moqqqtai will of every Filipino.
IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING CONSIDERATIONS, We vote to dismiss the petitions.
Aquino, J., concur.
MUNOZ PALMA, J., dissenting:

I concur fully with the remarkably frank (so characteristic of him) dissenting opinion of my
distinguished colleague, Justice Claudio Teehankee. If I am writing this brief statement it is only
to unburden myself of some thoughts which trouble my mind and leave my conscience with no
rest nor peace.
Generally, one who dissents from a majority view of the Court takes a lonely and at times
precarious road, the burden byeing lightened only by the thought that in this grave task of
administering justice, when matters of conscience are at issue, one must be prepared to espouse
and embrace a rightful cause however unpopular it may be.
1. That sovereignty resides in the people and all government authority emanates from them is a
fundamental, basic principle of government which cannot be disputed, but when the people have
opted to govern themselves under the mantle of a written Constitution, each and every citizen,
from the highest to the lowliest, has the sacred duty to respect and obey the Character they have
so ordained.
By the Constitution which they establish, they not only tie up he hands of their
official agencies, but their own hands as well; and neither the officers of the state,
nor the whole people as an aggregate body, are at liberty to take action in
opposition to this fundamental law. (Cooley's Constitutional Limitations, 7th Ed.
p. 56, Italics Our).
The afore-quoted passage from the eminent jurist and author Judge Cooley although based on
declarations of law of more than a century ago, lays down a principle which to my mind is one of
the enduring cornerstones of the Rule of Law. it is a principle with which I have been familiar as
a student of law under the tutelage of revered Professors, Dr. Vicente G. Sinco and Justice Jose P.
Laurel, and which I pray will prevail at all times to ensure the existence of a free, stable, and
civilized society.
The Filipino people,. wanting to ensure to themselves a democratic republican form of
government, have promulgated a Constitution whereby the power to govern themselves has been
entrusted to and distributed among three branches of government; they have also mandated in
clear and unmistakable terms the method by which provisions in their fundamental Charter may
be amended or revised. Having done so, the people are bound by these constitutional limitations.
For while there is no surrender or abdication of the people's ultimate authority to amend, revise,
or adopt a new Constitution, sound reason demands that they keep themselves within the
procedural bounds of the existing fundamental law. The right of the people to amend or change
their Constitution if and when the need arises is not to be denied, but we assert that absent a
revolutionary state or condition in the country the change must be accomplished through the
ordinary, regular and legitimate processes provided for in the Constitution.'
I cannot subscribe therefore to the view taken by the Solicitor General that the people, being
sovereign, have the authority to amend the Constitution even in a manner different from and
contrary to that expressly provided for in that instrument, and that the amendatory process is
intended more as a limitation of a power rather than a grant of power to a particular agency and it
should not be construed as limiting the ultimate sovereign will of the people to decide on
amendments to the Constitution .2 Such a view will seriously undermine the very existence of a
constitutional government and will permit anarchy and/or mob rule to set afoot and prevail. Was
it the Greek philosopher Plato who warned that the rule of the mob is a prelude to the rule of the
tyrant?
I would use the following excerpt from Bernas, S.J. 'The 1973 Philippine Constitution, Notes and
Cases" as relevant to my point:
. . . the amendatory provisions are called a 'constitution of sovereighty' because
they define the constitutional meaning of 'sovereignty of the people.' Popular
sovereignty, as embodied in the Philippine Constitution, is not extreme popular
sovereignty. As one American writer put it:
A constitution like the American one serves as a basic check upon the popular will
at any given time. It is the distinctive function of such written document to
classify certain things as legal fundamentals; these fundamentals may not be
changed except by the slow and cumbersome process of amendment. The people
themselves have decided, in constitutional convention assembled, to limit
themselves ana future generations in the exercise of the sovereign power which
they would otherwise possess. And it is precisely such limitation that enables
those subject to governmental authority to appeal from the people drunk to the
people sober in time of excitement and hysteria. The Constitution, in the neat
phrase of the Iowa court, is the protector of the people against injury by the
.people. *
Truly, what need is there for providing in the Constitution a process by which the fundamental
law may be amended if, after all, the people by themselves can set the same at naught even in
times of peace when civil authority reigns supreme? To go along with the respondents' theory in
this regard is to render written Constitutions useless or mere "ropes of sand allowing for a
government of men instead of one of laws. For it cannot be discounted that a situation may arise
where the people are heralded to action at a point of a gun or by the fiery eloquence of a
demagogue, and where passion overpowers reason, and mass action overthrows legal processes.
History has recorded such instances, and I can think of no better example than that of Jesus
Christ of Judea who was followed and loved by the people while curing the sick, making the
lame walk and the blind see, but shortly was condemned by the same people turned into fanatic
rabble crying out "Crucify Him, Crucify Him" upon being incited into action by chief priests and
elders of Jerusalem. Yes, to quote once more from Judge Cooley:
A good Constitution should be beyond the reason of temporary excitement and
popular caprice or passion. It is needed for stability and steadiness; it must yield
to the thought of the people; not to the whim of the people, or the thought evolved
in excitement or hot blood, but the sober second thought, which alone, if the
government is to be sale can be allowed efficiency. .... Changes in government are
to be feared unless the benefit is certain." (quoted in Ellingham v. Dye, 99 N.E. 1,
15,) 3
Crawford v. Gilchrist 64 Fla. 41., 59., So. 963, Ann. Cas. 1914B, 916; State v. Hall, 159 N.W.,
281; Opinion of Marshall, J. in State ex. rel. Poster v. Marcus, 152 N.W., 419;
From Kochier v. Hill, Vol. 15, N.W., 609, we quote:
xxx xxx xxx
It has been said that changes in the constitution may be introduced in disregard of
its provisions; that if the majority of the people desire a change the majority must
be respected, no matter how the change may be effected; and that the change, if
revolution, is peaceful resolution. ...
We fear that the advocates of this new doctrine, in a zeal to accomplish an end
which the majority of the people desire, have looked at but one phase of the
question, and have not fully considered the terrible consequences which would
almost certainly follow a recognition of the doctrine for which they contend. It
may be that the incorporation of this amendment in the constitution, even if the
constitution has to be broken to accomplish it, would not of itself produce any
serious results. But if it should be done by sanctioning the doctrine contended for,
a precedent would be set which would plague the state for all future time. A
Banquo's ghost would arise at our incantation which would not down at our
bidding.
xxx xxx xxx
We ought to ponder long before we adopt a doctrine so fraught with danger to
republican institutions. ...
xxx xxx xxx
Appellants' counsel cite and rely upon section 2, art. 1, of the constitution of the staff This
section is a portion of the bill of rights, and is as follows: 'All political power is inherent in the
people. Government is instituted for the protection, security, and benefit of of the people; and
they have the right at all times to alter or reform the same, whenever the public good may
require.' Abstractly considered, there can bye no doubt of the correctness of the propositions
embraced in this suction. These principles are older than constitutions and older than
governments. The people did not derive the rights referred to by on the constitution. and, in their
nature, thee are such that the people cannot surrender them ... .
2. Presidential Decrees Nos. 991 and 1033 which call for a national referendum-plebiscite on
October 16, 1976 for the purpose, among other things, of amending certain provisions of the
1973 Constitution are null and void as they contravene the express provisions on the amending
process of the 1973 Constitution laid down in Article XVI, Section 1 (1) and Article XVII,
Section 15, more particularly the latter which applies during the present transition period. The
Opinion of Justice Teehankee discusses in detail this particular matter.
I would just wish to stress the point that although at present there is no by tterint National
Assembly which may propose amendments to the Constitution, the existence of a so-called
"vacuum" or "hiatus" does not justify a transgression of the constitutional provisions on the
manner of amending the fundamental law. We cannot cure one infirmity - the existence of a
"vacuum" caused by the non-convening of the interim National Assembly - with another
infirmity, that is, doing violence to the Charter.
All great mutations shake and disorder a state. Good does not necessarily succeed
evil; another evil may succeed and a worse. (Am. Law Rev. 1889, p. 311., quoted
in Ellingham v. Dye, supra, p. 15)
Respondents contend that the calling of the referendum-plebiscite for the purpose indicated is a
step necessary to restore the state of normalcy in the country. To my mind, the only possible
measure that will lead our country and people to a condition of normalcy is the lifting or ending
of the state of martial law. If I am constrained to make this statement it is because so much stress
was given during the hearings of these cases on this particular point, leaving one with the
impression that for petitioners to contest the holding of the October 16 referendum-plebiscite is
for them to assume a position of blocking or installing the lifting of martial law, which I believe
is unfair to the petitioners. Frankly, I cannot see the connection between the two. My esteemed
colleagues should pardon me therefore if I had ventured to state that the simple solution to the
simple solution to the present dilemma is the lifting of martial law and the implementation of the
constitutional provisions which will usher in the parliamentary form of government ordained in
the Constitution, which, as proclaimed in Proclamation 1102, the people themselves have
ratified.
If the people have indeed ratified the 1973 Constitution, then they are bound by their act and
cannot escape from the pretended unfavorable consequences thereof, the only y being to set in
motion the constitutional machinery by which the supposed desired amendments may properly
be adopted and submitted to the electorate for ratification. Constitutional processes are to be
observed strictly, if we have to maintain and preserve the system of government decreed under
the fundamental Charter. As said by Justice Enrique Fernando in Mutuc vs. Commission on
Elections
... The concept of the Constitution as the fundamental law, setting forth the
criterion for the validity of any public act whether proceeding from the highest
official or the lowest funcitonary, is a postulate of our system of government. That
is to manifest fealty to the rule of law, with priority accorded to that which
occupies the topmost rung in the legal hierarchy. ... (36 SCRA, 228, 234, italics
Ours)
A contrary view would lead to disastrous consequences for, in the words of Chief Justice Cox of
the Supreme Court of Indiana in Ellingham v. Dye, (supra, p. 7) liberty and popular sovereignty
are not meant to give rein to passion or thoughtless impulse but to allow the exercise of power by
the people for the general good by tistlercoitaitt restraints of law. 3 . The true question before Us
is is one of power. Does the incumbent President of the Philippines possess constituent powers?
Again, the negative answer is explained in detail in the dissenting opinion of Justice Teehankee.
Respondents would justify the incumbent President's exercise of constituent powers on theory
that he is vested with legislative powers as held by this Court in Benigno S. Aquino, Jr., et al. vs.
Commission on Elections, et al., L-40004, January 31, 1975. 1 wish to stress that although in my
separate opinion in said case I agreed that Section 3 (2) of the Transitory provisions grants to the
incumbent President legislative powers, I qualified my statement as follows:
.... As to, whether, or not, this unlimited legislative qqqjwwel of the President
continues by exist even after the ratification of the Constitution is a matter which I
am not ready to concede at the moment, and which at any rate I believe is not
essential in resolving this Petition for reasons to be given later. Nonetheless, I
hold the view that the President is empowered to issue proclamations, orders,
decrees, etc. to carry out and implement the objectives of the proclamation of
martial law be it under the 1935 or 1973 Constitution, and for the orderly and
efficient functioning of the government, its instrumentalities, and agencies. This
grant of legislative power is necessary to fill up a vacuum during the transition
period when the interim National Assembly is not yet convened and functioning,
for otherwise, there will be a disruption of official functions resulting in a collapse
of the government and of the existing social order. (62 SCRA, pp. 275,347)
I believe it is not disputed that legislative power is essentially different from constituent power;
one does not encompass the other unless so specified in the Charter, and the 1973 Constitution
contains provisions in this regard. This is well-explained in Justice Teehankee's Opinion. The
state of necessity brought about by the current political situation, invoked by the respondents,
provides no source of power to propose amendments to the existing Constitution. Must we "bend
the Constitution to suit the law of the hour or cure its defects "by inflicting upon it a wound
which nothing can heal commit one assault after the other "until all respect for the fundamental
law is lost and the powers of government are just what those in authority please to call
them?'" 5 Or can we now ignore what this Court, speaking through Justice Barredo, said in
Tolentino vs. Comelec:
... let those who would put aside, invoking grounds at best controversial, any
mandate of the fundamental law purportedly by order to attain some laudable
objective bear in mind that someday somehow others with purportedly more
laudable objectives may take advantages of the precedent in continue the
destruction of the Constitution, making those who laid down the precedent of
justifying deviations from the requirements of the Constitution the victims of their
own folly. 6
Respondents emphatically assert that the final word is the people's word and that ultimately it is
in the hands of the people where the final decision rests. (Comment, pp. 18, 19, 22) Granting in
gratia argument that it is so, let it be an expression of the will of the people a normal political
situation and not under the aegis of martial rule for as I have stated in Aquino vs. Comelec, et al.,
supra, a referendum (and now a plebiscite) held under a regime of martial law can be of no far
reaching significance because it is being accomplished under an atmosphere or climate of fear as
it entails a wide area of curtailment and infringement of individual rights, such as, human liberty,
property rights, rights of free expression and assembly, protection against unreasonable searches
and seizures, liberty of abode and of travel, and so on.
4. The other issues such as the sufficiency and proper submission of the proposed amendments
for ratification by the people are expounded in Justice Teehankee's Opinion. I wish to stress
indeed that it is incorrect to state that the thrust of the proposed amendments is the abolition of
the interim National Assembly and its substitution with an "interim Batasang Pambansa their in
by in Proposed amendment No. 6 will permit or allow the concentration of power in one man the Executive - Prime Minister or President or whatever you may call him - for it gives him
expressly (which the 1973 Constitution or the 1935 Constitution does not) legislative powers
even during the existence of the appropriate legislative body, dependent solely on the executive's
judgment on the existence of a grave emergency or a threat or imminence thereof **
I must be forgiven if, not concerned with the present, I am haunted however by what can happen
in the future, when we shall all be gone. Verily, this is a matter of grave concern which
necessitates full, mature, sober deliberation of the people but which they can do only in a climate
of freedom without the restraints of martial law. I close, remembering what Claro M. Recto,
President of the Constitutional Convention which drafted the 1935 Philippine Constitution, once
said: .
... Nor is it enough that our people possess a written constitution in order that their
government may be called constitutional. To be deserving of this name, and to
drive away all lanirer of anarchy as well as of dictatorship whether by one man or
a few, it is necessary that both the government authorities and the people
faithfully observe and obey the constitution, and that the citizens be duly
conversant not only with their rights but also with their duties... 7
Jose P. Laurel who served his people as Justice of the Supreme Court of this country gave this
reminder; the grave and perilous task of halting transgressions and vindicating cherished rights is
reposed mainly oil the Judiciary and therefore let the Courts be the vestal keepers of the purity
and sanctity of our Constitution.' On the basis of the foregoing, I vote to declare Presidential
Decrees Nos. 991 and 1033 unconstitutional and enjoin the implementation thereof.
CONCEPCION JR., J., concurring:
I vote for the dismissal of the petitions.
1. The issue is not political and therefore justiciable.
The term "political question", as this Court has previously defined, refers to those questions
which, under the constitution, are to be decided by the people in their sovereign capacity, or in
regard to which full discretionary authority has been delegated to the Legislature or executive
branch of the Government. It is concerned with the issues dependent upon the wisdom, not
legality, of a particular measure. 1
Here, the question raised is whether the President has authority to propose to the people
amendments to the Constitution which the petitioners claim is vested solely upon the National
Assembly, the constitutional convention called for the purpose, and the by the National
Assembly. This is not a political question since it involves the determination of conflicting
claims of authority under the constitution.
In Gonzales vs. Comelec, 2 this Court, resolving the issue of whether or not a Resolution of
Congress, acting as a constituent assembly, violates the Constitution, ruled that the question is
essentially justiciable, not political, and hence, subject to judicial review.
In Tolentino vs. Comelec 3 this Court finally dispelled all doubts as to its position regarding its
jurisdiction vis-a-vis the constitutionality of the acts of Congress, acting as a constituent
assembly, as well as those of a constitutional convention called for the purpose of proposing
amendments to the constitution. Insofar as observance of constitutional provisions on the
procedure for amending the constitution is concerned, the issue is cognizable by this Court under
its powers of judicial review.
2. As to the merits, a brief backdrop of the decision to hold the referendum-plebiscite will help
resolve the issue. It is to be noted that under the 1973 Constitution, an interim National Assembly
was organized to bring about an orderly transition from the presidential to the parliamentary
system of government.' The people, however, probably distrustful of the members who are old
time politicians and constitutional delegates who had voted themselves by to membership in the
interim National Assembly, voted against the convening of the said interim assembly for at least
seven years thus creating a political stalemate and a consequent delay' in the transformation of
the government into the parliamentary system. To resolve the impasse, the President, at the
instance of the barangays and sanggunian assemblies through their duly authorized
instrumentalities who recommended a study of the feasibility of abolishing and replacing the by
interim National Assembly with another interim body truly representative of the people in a
reformed society, issued Presidential Decree No. 991, on September 2, 1976, calling for a
national referendum on October -16, 1976 to ascertain the wishes of the people as to the ways
and means that may be available to attain the objective; providing for a period of educational and
information campaign on the issues; and establishing the mechanics and manner for holding
thereof. But the people, through their barangays, addressed resolutions to the Batasang Bayan,
expressing their desire to have the constitution amended, thus prompting the President to issue
Presidential Decree No. 1033, stating the questions to @ submitted to the people in the
referendum-plebiscite on October 16,1976.
As will be seen, the authority to amend the Constitution was removed from the interim National
Assembly and transferred to the seat of sovereignty itself. Since the Constitution emanates from
the people who are the repository of all political powers, their authority to amend the
Constitution through the means they have adopted, aside from those mentioned in the
Constitution, cannot be gainsaid. Not much reflection is also needed to show that the President
did not exercise his martial law legislative powers when he proposed the amendments to the
Constitution. He was merely acting as an instrument to carry out the will of the people. Neither
could he convene the interim National Assembly, as suggested by the petitioners, without doing
violence to the people's will expressed overwhelmingly when they decided against convening the
interim assembly for at least seven years.
3. The period granted to the people to consider the proposed amendments is reasonably long and
enough to afford intelligent discussion of the issues to be voted upon. PD 991 has required the
barangays to hold assemblies or meetings to discuss and debate on the referendum questions,
which in fact they have been doing. Considering that the proposed amendments came from the
representatives of the people themselves, the people must have already formed a decision by this
time on what stand to take on the proposed amendments come the day for the plebiscite. Besides,
the Constitution itself requires the holding of a plebiscite for the ratification of an amendment
not later than three (3) months after the approval of such amendment or revision but without
setting a definite period within which such plebiscite shall not be held. From this I can only
conclude that the framers of the Constitution desired that only a short period shall elapse from
the approval of such amendment or resolution to its ratification by the people.

SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. 86344 December 21, 1989
REP. RAUL A. DAZA, petitioner,

vs.
REP. LUIS C. SINGSON and HON. RAOUL V. VICTORINO IN THE LATTER'S
CAPACITY AS SECRETARY OF THE COMMISSION ON
APPOINTMENTS, respondent.
CRUZ, J.:
After the congressional elections of May 11, 1987, the House of Representatives proportionally
apportioned its twelve seats in the Commission on Appointments among the several political
parties represented in that chamber, including the Lakas ng Bansa, the PDP-Laban, the NPUnido, the Liberal Party, and the KBL, in accordance with Article VI, Section 18, of the
Constitution. Petitioner Raul A. Daza was among those chosen and was listed as a representative
of the Liberal Party. 1
On September 16, 1988, the Laban ng Demokratikong Pilipino was reorganized, resulting in a
political realignment in the House of Representatives. Twenty four members of the Liberal Party
formally resigned from that party and joined the LDP, thereby swelling its number to 159 and
correspondingly reducing their former party to only 17 members. 2
On the basis of this development, the House of Representatives revised its representation in the
Commission on Appointments by withdrawing the seat occupied by the petitioner and giving this
to the newly-formed LDP. On December 5, 1988, the chamber elected a new set of
representatives consisting of the original members except the petitioner and including therein
respondent Luis C. Singson as the additional member from the LDP. 3
The petitioner came to this Court on January 13, 1989, to challenge his removal from the
Commission on Appointments and the assumption of his seat by the respondent. Acting initially
on his petition for prohibition and injunction with preliminary injunction, we issued a temporary
restraining order that same day to prevent both the petitioner and the respondent from serving in
the Commission on Appointments. 4
Briefly stated, the contention of the petitioner is that he cannot be removed from the Commission
on Appointments because his election thereto is permanent under the doctrine announced in
Cunanan v. Tan. 5 His claim is that the reorganization of the House representation in the said
body is not based on a permanent political realignment because the LDP is not a duly registered
political party and has not yet attained political stability.
For his part, the respondent argues that the question raised by the petitioner is political in nature
and so beyond the jurisdiction of this Court. He also maintains that he has been improperly
impleaded, the real party respondent being the House of Representatives which changed its
representation in the Commission on Appointments and removed the petitioner. Finally, he
stresses that nowhere in the Constitution is it required that the political party be registered to be
entitled to proportional representation in the Commission on Appointments.
In addition to the pleadings filed by the parties, a Comment was submitted by the Solicitor
General as amicus curiae in compliance with an order from the Court.
At the core of this controversy is Article VI, Section 18, of the Constitution providing as follows:
Sec. 18. There shall be a Commission on Appointments consisting of the

President of the Senate, as ex officio Chairman, twelve Senators and twelve
Members of the House of Representatives, elected by each House on the basis of
proportional representation from the political parties and parties or organizations
registered under the party-list system represented therein. The Chairman of the
Commission shall not vote, except in case of a tie. The Commission shall act on
all appointments submitted to it within thirty session days of the Congress from
their submission. The Commission shall rule by a majority vote of all the
Members.
Ruling first on the jurisdictional issue, we hold that, contrary to the respondent's assertion, the
Court has the competence to act on the matter at bar. Our finding is that what is before us is not a
discretionary act of the House of Representatives that may not be reviewed by us because it is
political in nature. What is involved here is the legality, not the wisdom, of the act of that
chamber in removing the petitioner from the Commission on Appointments. That is not a
political question because, as Chief Justice Concepcion explained in Tanada v. Cuenco. 6
... the term "political question" connotes, in legal parlance, what it means in
ordinary parlance, namely, a question of policy. In other words, ... it refers "to
those questions which, under the Constitution, are to be decided by the people in
their sovereign capacity, or in regard to which full discretionary authority has
been delegated to the Legislature or executive branch of the Government." It is
concerned with issues dependent upon the wisdom, not legality, of a particular
measure.
In the aforementioned case, the Court was asked by the petitioners therein to annul the election
of two members of the Senate Electoral Tribunal of that chamber, on the ground that they had not
been validly nominated. The Senate then consisted of 23 members from the Nacionalista Party
and the petitioner as the lone member of the Citizens Party. Senator Lorenzo M. Tanada
nominated only himself as the minority representative in the Tribunal, whereupon the majority
elected Senators Mariano J. Cuenco. and Francisco Delgado, from its own ranks, to complete the
nine-man composition of the Tribunal as provided for in the 1935 Constitution. The petitioner
came to this Court, contending that under Article VI, Section 11, of that Charter, the six
legislative members of the Tribunal were to be chosen by the Senate, "three upon nomination of
the party having the largest number of votes and three of the party having the second largest
number of votes therein." As the majority party in the Senate, the Nacionalista Party could
nominate only three members and could not also fill the other two seats pertaining to the
minority.
By way of special and affirmative defenses, the respondents contended inter alia that the subject
of the petition was an internal matter that only the Senate could resolve. The Court rejected this
argument, holding that what was involved was not the wisdom of the Senate in choosing the
respondents but the legality of the choice in light of the requirement of the Constitution. The
petitioners were questioning the manner of filling the Tribunal, not the discretion of the Senate in
doing so. The Court held that this was a justiciable and not a political question, thus:
Such is not the nature of the question for determination in the present case. Here,
we are called upon to decide whether the election of Senators Cuenco and
Delgado by the Senate, as members of the Senate Electoral Tribunal, upon
nomination by Senator Primicias-member and spokesman of the party having the
largest number of votes in the Senate-behalf of its Committee on Rules,

contravenes the constitutional mandate that said members of the Senate Electoral
Tribunal shall be chosen "upon nomination ... of the party having the second
largest number of votes" in the Senate and hence, is null and void. The Senate is
not clothed with "full discretionary authority" in the choice of members of the
Senate Electoral Tribunal. The exercise of its power thereon is subject to
constitutional limitations which are claimed to be mandatory in nature. It is
clearly within the legitimate province of the judicial department to pass upon the
validity of the proceeding in connection therewith.
... whether an election of public officers has been in accordance with law is for the
judiciary. Moreover, where the legislative department has by statute prescribed
election procedure in a given situation, the judiciary may determine whether a
particular election has been in conformity with such statute, and particularly,
whether such statute has been applied in a way to deny or transgress on
constitutional or statutory rights ...' (1 6 C.J.S., 439; emphasis supplied)
It is, therefore, our opinion that we have, not only jurisdiction but also the duty, to
consider and determine the principal issue raised by the parties herein."
Although not specifically discussed, the same disposition was made in Cunanan v. Tan as it
likewise involved the manner or legality of the organization of the Commission on
Appointments, not the wisdom or discretion of the House in the choice of its representatives.
In the case now before us, the jurisdictional objection becomes even less tenable and decisive.
The reason is that, even if we were to assume that the issue presented before us was political in
nature, we would still not be precluded from resolving it under the expanded jurisdiction
conferred upon us that now covers, in proper cases, even the political question. Article VII,
Section 1, of the Constitution clearly provides:
Section 1. The judicial power shall be vested in one Supreme Court and in such
lower courts as may be established by law.
Judicial power includes the duty of the courts of justice to settle actual
controversies involving rights which are legally demandable and enforceable, and
to determine whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting
to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the
Government.
The respondent's contention that he has been improperly impleaded is even less persuasive.
While he may be technically correct in arguing that it is not he who caused the petitioner's
removal, we feel that this objection is also not an insuperable obstacle to the resolution of this
controversy. We may, for one thing, treat this proceeding as a petition for quo warranto as the
petitioner is actually questioning the respondent's right to sit as a member of the Commission on
Appointments. For another, we have held as early as in the Emergency Powers Cases 7 that where
serious constitutional questions are involved, "the transcendental importance to the public of
these cases demands that they be settled promptly and definitely brushing aside, if we must,
technicalities of procedure." The same policy has since then been consistently followed by the
Court, as in Gonzales v. Commission on Elections, 8 where we held through Chief Justice
Fernando:
In the course of the deliberations, a serious procedural objection was raised by

five members of the Court. It is their view that respondent Commission on
Elections not being sought to be restrained from performing any specific act, this
suit cannot be characterized as other than a mere request for an advisory opinion.
Such a view, from the remedial law standpoint, has much to recommend it.
Nonetheless, a majority would affirm the original stand that under the
circumstances, it could still rightfully be treated as a petition for prohibition.
The language of justice Laurel fits the case: "All await the decision of this Court
on the constitutional question. Considering, therefore, the importance which the
instant case has assumed and to prevent multiplicity of suits, strong reasons of
public policy demand that [its] constitutionality ... be now resolved.' It may
likewise be added that the exceptional character of the situation that confronts us,
the paramount public interest, and the undeniable necessity for ruling, the national
elections being barely six months away, reinforce our stand. It would appear
undeniable, therefore, that before us is an appropriate invocation of our
jurisdiction to prevent the enforcement of an alleged unconstitutional statute. We
are left with no choice then; we must act on the matter.
Coming now to the more crucial question, the Court notes that both the petitioner and the
respondent are invoking the case of Cunanan v. Tan to support their respective positions. It is
best, therefore, to make a quick review of that case for a proper disposition of this one.
In the election for the House of Representatives held in 1961, 72 seats were won by the
Nacionalista Party, 29 by the Liberal Party and 1 by an independent. Accordingly, the
representation of the chamber in the Commission on Appointments was apportioned to 8
members from the Nacionalista Party and 4 from the Liberal Party. Subsequently, 25 members of
the Nacionalista Party, professing discontent over the House leadership, made common cause
with the Liberal Party and formed what was called the Allied Majority to install a new Speaker
and reorganize the chamber. Included in this reorganization was the House representation in the
Commission on appointments where three of the Nacionalista congressmen originally chosen
were displaced by three of their party colleagues who had joined the Allied Majority.
Petitioner Carlos Cunanan's ad interim appointment as Deputy Administrator of the
Reforestration Administration was rejected by the Commission on Appointments as thus
reorganized and respondent Jorge Tan, Jr. was thereafter designated in his place. Cunanan then
came to this Court, contending that the rejection of his appointment was null and void because
the Commission itself was invalidly constituted.
The Court agreed. It noted that the Allied Majority was a merely temporary combination as the
Nacionalista defectors had not disaffiliated from their party and permanently joined the new
political group. Officially, they were still members of the Nacionalista Party. The reorganization
of the Commission on Appointments was invalid because it was not based on the proportional
representation of the political parties in the House of Representatives as required by the
Constitution. The Court held:
... In other words, a shifting of votes at a given time, even if du to arrangements of
a more or less temporary nature, like the one that has led to the formation of the
so-called "Allied Majority," does not suffice to authorize a reorganization of the
membership of the Commission for said House. Otherwise the Commission on
Appointments may have to be reorganized as often as votes shift from one side to
another in the House. The framers of our Constitution could not have intended to
thus place a constitutional organ, like the Commission on Appointments, at the
mercy of each House of Congress.
The petitioner vigorously argues that the LDP is not the permanent political party contemplated
in the Constitution because it has not been registered in accordance with Article IX-B, Section
2(5), in relation to the other provisions of the Constitution. He stresses that the so-called party
has not yet achieved stability and suggests it might be no different from several other political
groups that have died "a-bornin'," like the LINA, or have subsequently floundered, like the
UNIDO.
The respondent also cites Cunanan but from a different viewpoint. According to him, that case
expressly allows reorganization at any time to reflect changes in the political alignments in
Congress, provided only that such changes are permanent. The creation of the LDP constituting
the bulk of the former PDP-Laban and to which no less than 24 Liberal congressmen had
transferred was a permanent change. That change fully justified his designation to the
Commission on Appointments after the reduction of the LP representation therein. Thus, the
Court held:
Upon the other hand, the constitutional provision to the effect that "there shall be
a Commission on Appointments consisting of twelve (12) Senators and twelve
(12) members of the House of Representatives elected by each House,
respectively, on the basis of proportional REPRESENTATION OF THE
POLITICAL PARTIES THEREIN," necessarily connotes the authority of each
House of Congress to see to it that this requirement is duly complied with. As a
consequence, it may take appropriate measures, not only upon the initial
organization of the Commission, but also, subsequently thereto. If by reason of
successful election protests against members of a House, or of their expulsion
from the political party to which they belonged and/or of their affiliation with
another political party, the ratio in the representation of the political parties in the
House is materially changed, the House is clothed with authority to declare vacant
the necessary number of seats in the Commission on Appointments held by
members of said House belonging to the political party adversely affected by the
change and then fill said vacancies in conformity with the Constitution.
In the course of the spirited debate on this matter between the petitioner and the respondent (who
was supported by the Solicitor General) an important development has supervened to
considerably simplify the present controversy. The petitioner, to repeat, bases his argument
heavily on the non-registration of the LDP which, he claims has not provided the permanent
political realignment to justify the questioned reorganization. As he insists:
(c) Assuming that the so-called new coalesced majority is actually
the LDP itself, then the proposed reorganization is likewise illegal
and ineffectual, because the LDP, not being a duly registered
political party, is not entitled to the "rights and privileges granted
by law to political parties' (See. 160, BP No. 881), and therefore
cannot legally claim the right to be considered in determining the
required proportional representation of political parties in the
House of Representatives. 9
xxx xxx xxx

... the clear constitutional intent behind Section 18, Article VI, of the 1987
Constitution, is to give the right of representation in the Commission on
Appointment only to political parties who are duly registered with the Comelec. 10
On November 23, 1989, however, that argument boomeranged against the petitioner. On that
date, the Commission on Elections in an en banc resolution affirmed the resolution of its First
Division dated August 28, 1989, granting the petition of the LDP for registration as a political
party. 11 This has taken the wind out of the sails of the petitioner, so to speak, and he must now
limp to shore as best he can.
The petitioner's contention that, even if registered, the party must still pass the test of time to
prove its permanence is not acceptable. Under this theory, a registered party obtaining the
majority of the seats in the House of Representatives (or the Senate) would still not be entitled to
representation in the Commission on Appointments as long as it was organized only recently and
has not yet "aged." The Liberal Party itself would fall in such a category. That party was created
in December 1945 by a faction of the Nacionalista Party that seceded therefrom to support
Manuel A. Roxas's bid for the Presidency of the Philippines in the election held on April 23,
1946. 12 The Liberal Party won. At that time it was only four months old. Yet no question was
raised as to its right to be represented in the Commission on Appointments and in the Electoral
Tribunals by virtue of its status as the majority party in both chambers of the Congress.
The LDP has been in existence for more than one year now. It now has 157 members in the
House of Representatives and 6 members in the Senate. Its titular head is no less than the
President of the Philippines and its President is Senator Neptali A. Gonzales, who took over
recently from Speaker Ramon V. Mitra. It is true that there have been, and there still are, some
internal disagreements among its members, but these are to be expected in any political
organization, especially if it is democratic in structure. In fact even the monolithic Communist
Party in a number of socialist states has undergone similar dissension, and even upheavals. But it
surely cannot be considered still temporary because of such discord.
If the petitioner's argument were to be pursued, the 157 members of the LDP in the House of
Representatives would have to be denied representation in the Commission on Appointments
and, for that matter, also the Electoral Tribunal. By the same token, the KBL, which the
petitioner says is now "history only," should also be written off. The independents also cannot be
represented because they belong to no political party. That would virtually leave the Liberal
Party only with all of its seventeen members to claim all the twelve seats of the House of
Representatives in the Commission on Appointments and the six legislative seats in the House
Electoral Tribunal.
It is noteworthy that when with 41 members the Liberal Party was alloted two of the seats in the
Commission on Appointments, it did not express any objection. 13 Inconsistently, the petitioner is
now opposed to the withdrawal from it of one seat although its original number has been cut by
more than half.
As for the other condition suggested by the petitioner, to wit, that the party must survive in a
general congressional election, the LDP has doubtless also passed that test, if only vicariously. It
may even be said that as it now commands the biggest following in the House of
Representatives, the party has not only survived but in fact prevailed. At any rate, that test was
never laid down in Cunanan.
To summarize, then, we hold, in view of the foregoing considerations, that the issue presented to
us is justiciable rather political, involving as it does the legality and not the wisdom of the act
complained of, or the manner of filling the Commission on Appointments as prescribed by the
Constitution. Even if the question were political in nature, it would still come within our powers
of review under the expanded jurisdiction conferred upon us by Article VIII, Section 1, of the
Constitution, which includes the authority to determine whether grave abuse of discretion
amounting to excess or lack of jurisdiction has been committed by any branch or instrumentality
of the government. As for the alleged technical flaw in the designation of the party respondent,
assuming the existence of such a defect, the same may be brushed aside, conformably to existing
doctrine, so that the important constitutional issue raised may be addressed. Lastly, we resolve
that issue in favor of the authority of the House of Representatives to change its representation in
the Commission on Appointments to reflect at any time the changes that may transpire in the
political alignments of its membership. It is understood that such changes must be permanent and
do not include the temporary alliances or factional divisions not involving severance of political
loyalties or formal disaffiliation and permanent shifts of allegiance from one political party to
another.
The Court would have preferred not to intervene in this matter, leaving it to be settled by the
House of Representatives or the Commission on Appointments as the bodies directly involved.
But as our jurisdiction has been invoked and, more importantly, because a constitutional
stalemate had to be resolved, there was no alternative for us except to act, and to act decisively.
In doing so, of course, we are not imposing our will upon the said agencies, or substituting our
discretion for theirs, but merely discharging our sworn responsibility to interpret and apply the
Constitution. That is a duty we do not evade, lest we ourselves betray our oath.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED. The temporary restraining order dated January 13,
1989, is LIFTED. The Court holds that the respondent has been validly elected as a member of
the Commission on Appointments and is entitled to assume his seat in that body pursuant to
Article VI, Section 18, of the Constitution. No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.
Fernan, C.J., Narvasa, Melencio-Herrera, Gutierrez, Jr., Paras, Feliciano, Gancayco, Padilla,
Bidin, Cows, Grio-Aquino, Medialdea and Regalado, JJ., concur.
Sarmiento, J., took no part.

SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. 101273 July 3, 1992

CONGRESSMAN ENRIQUE T. GARCIA (Second District of Bataan), petitioner,
vs.
THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY, THE COMMISSIONER OF CUSTOMS, THE
NATIONAL ECONOMIC AND DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY, THE TARIFF
COMMISSION, THE SECRETARY OF FINANCE, and THE ENERGY REGULATORY
BOARD, respondents.
FELICIANO, J.:
On 27 November 1990, the President issued Executive Order No. 438 which imposed, in
addition to any other duties, taxes and charges imposed by law on all articles imported into the
Philippines, an additional duty of five percent (5%) ad valorem. This additional duty was
imposed across the board on all imported articles, including crude oil and other oil products
imported into the Philippines. This additional duty was subsequently increased from five percent
(5%) ad valorem to nine percent (9%) ad valorem by the promulgation of Executive Order No.
443, dated 3 January 1991.
On 24 July 1991, the Department of Finance requested the Tariff Commission to initiate the
process required by the Tariff and Customs Code for the imposition of a specific levy on crude
oil and other petroleum products, covered by HS Heading Nos. 27.09, 27.10 and 27.11 of Section
104 of the Tariff and Customs Code as amended. Accordingly, the Tariff Commission, following
the procedure set forth in Section 401 of the Tariff and Customs Code, scheduled a public
hearing to give interested parties an opportunity to be heard and to present evidence in support of
their respective positions.
Meantime, Executive Order No. 475 was issued by the President, on 15 August 1991 reducing
the rate of additional duty on all imported articles from nine percent (9%) to five percent
(5%) ad valorem, except in the cases of crude oil and other oil products which continued to be
subject to the additional duty of nine percent (9%) ad valorem.
Upon completion of the public hearings, the Tariff Commission submitted to the President a
"Report on Special Duty on Crude Oil and Oil Products" dated 16 August 1991, for consideration
and appropriate action. Seven (7) days later, the President issued Executive Order No. 478, dated
23 August 1991, which levied (in addition to the aforementioned additional duty of nine percent
(9%) ad valorem and all other existing ad valorem duties) a special duty of P0.95 per liter or
P151.05 per barrel of imported crude oil and P1.00 per liter of imported oil products.
In the present Petition for Certiorari, Prohibition and Mandamus, petitioner assails the validity
of Executive Orders Nos. 475 and 478. He argues that Executive Orders Nos. 475 and 478 are
violative of Section 24, Article VI of the 1987 Constitution which provides as follows:
Sec. 24: All appropriation, revenue or tariff bills, bills authorizing increase of the
public debt, bills of local application, and private bills shall originate exclusively
in the House of Representatives, but the Senate may propose or concur with
amendments.
He contends that since the Constitution vests the authority to enact revenue bills in
Congress, the President may not assume such power by issuing Executive Orders Nos.
475 and 478 which are in the nature of revenue-generating measures.
Petitioner further argues that Executive Orders No. 475 and 478 contravene Section 401 of the
Tariff and Customs Code, which Section authorizes the President, according to petitioner, to
increase, reduce or remove tariff duties or to impose additional duties only when necessary to
protect local industries or products but not for the purpose of raising additional revenue for the
government.
Thus, petitioner questions first the constitutionality and second the legality of Executive Orders
Nos. 475 and 478, and asks us to restrain the implementation of those Executive Orders. We will
examine these questions in that order.
Before doing so, however, the Court notes that the recent promulgation of Executive Order No.
507 did not render the instant Petition moot and academic. Executive Order No. 517 which is
dated 30 April 1992 provides as follows:
Sec. 1. Lifting of the Additional Duty. The additional duty in the nature of ad
valorem imposed on all imported articles prescribed by the provisions of
Executive Order No. 443, as amended, is hereby lifted; Provided, however, that
the selected articles covered by HS Heading Nos. 27.09 and 27.10 of Section 104
of the Tariff and Customs Code, as amended, subject of Annex "A" hereof, shall
continue to be subject to the additional duty of nine (9%) percent ad valorem.
Under the above quoted provision, crude oil and other oil products continue to be subject
to the additional duty of nine percent (9%) ad valorem under Executive Order No. 475
and to the special duty of P0.95 per liter of imported crude oil and P1.00 per liter of
imported oil products under Executive Order No. 478.
Turning first to the question of constitutionality, under Section 24, Article VI of the Constitution,
the enactment of appropriation, revenue and tariff bills, like all other bills is, of course, within
the province of the Legislative rather than the Executive Department. It does not follow,
however, that therefore Executive Orders Nos. 475 and 478, assuming they may be characterized
as revenue measures, are prohibited to the President, that they must be enacted instead by the
Congress of the Philippines. Section 28(2) of Article VI of the Constitution provides as follows:
(2) The Congress may, by law, authorize the President to fix within specified
limits, and subject to such limitations and restrictions as it may impose, tariff
rates, import and export quotas, tonage and wharfage dues, and other duties or
imposts within the framework of the national development program of the
Government. (Emphasis supplied)
There is thus explicit constitutional permission 1 to Congress to authorize the President "subject
to such limitations and restrictions is [Congress] may impose" to fix "within specific limits"
"tariff rates . . . and other duties or imposts . . ."
The relevant congressional statute is the Tariff and Customs Code of the Philippines, and
Sections 104 and 401, the pertinent provisions thereof. These are the provisions which the
President explicitly invoked in promulgating Executive Orders Nos. 475 and 478. Section 104 of
the Tariff and Customs Code provides in relevant part:
Sec. 104. All tariff sections, chapters, headings and subheadings and the rates of
import duty under Section 104 of Presidential Decree No. 34 and all subsequent
amendments issued under Executive Orders and Presidential Decrees are hereby
adopted and form part of this Code.
There shall be levied, collected, and paid upon all imported articles the rates of
duty indicated in the Section under this section except as otherwise specifically
provided for in this Code: Provided, that, the maximum rate shall not exceed one
hundred per cent ad valorem.
The rates of duty herein provided or subsequently fixed pursuant to Section Four
Hundred One of this Code shall be subject to periodic investigation by the Tariff
Commission and may be revised by the President upon recommendation of the

National Economic and Development Authority.
xxx xxx xxx
(Emphasis supplied)
Section 401 of the same Code needs to be quoted in full:
Sec. 401. Flexible Clause.
a. In the interest of national economy, general welfare and/or national security,
and subject to the limitations herein prescribed, the President, upon
recommendation of the National Economic and Development Authority
(hereinafter referred to as NEDA), is hereby empowered: (1) to increase, reduce
or remove existing protective rates of import duty (including any necessary
change in classification). The existing rates may be increased or decreased but in
no case shall the reduced rate of import duty be lower than the basic rate of ten
(10) per cent ad valorem, nor shall the increased rate of import duty be higher
than a maximum of one hundred (100) per cent ad valorem; (2) to establish
import quota or to ban imports of any commodity, as may be necessary; and (3) to
impose an additional duty on all imports not exceeding ten (10) per cent ad
valorem, whenever necessary; Provided, That upon periodic investigations by the
Tariff Commission and recommendation of the NEDA, the President may cause a
gradual reduction of protection levels granted in Section One hundred and four of
this Code, including those subsequently granted pursuant to this section.
b. Before any recommendation is submitted to the President by the NEDA
pursuant to the provisions of this section, except in the imposition of an additional
duty not exceeding ten (10) per cent ad valorem, the Commission shall conduct an
investigation in the course of which they shall hold public hearings wherein
interested parties shall be afforded reasonable opportunity to be present, produce
evidence and to be heard. The Commission shall also hear the views and
recommendations of any government office, agency or instrumentality concerned.
The Commission shall submit their findings and recommendations to the NEDA
within thirty (30) days after the termination of the public hearings.
c. The power of the President to increase or decrease rates of import duty within
the limits fixed in subsection "a" shall include the authority to modify the form of
duty. In modifying the form of duty, the corresponding ad valorem or specific
equivalents of the duty with respect to imports from the principal competing
foreign country for the most recent representative period shall be used as bases.
d. The Commissioner of Customs shall regularly furnish the Commission a copy
of all customs import entries as filed in the Bureau of Customs. The Commission
or its duly authorized representatives shall have access to, and the right to copy all
liquidated customs import entries and other documents appended thereto as finally
filed in the Commission on Audit.
e. The NEDA shall promulgate rules and regulations necessary to carry out the
provisions of this section.
f. Any Order issued by the President pursuant to the provisions of this section
shall take effect thirty (30) days after promulgation, except in the imposition of
additional duty not exceeding ten (10) per cent ad valorem which shall take effect
at the discretion of the President. (Emphasis supplied)
Petitioner, however, seeks to avoid the thrust of the delegated authorizations found in Sections
104 and 401 of the Tariff and Customs Code, by contending that the President is authorized to act
under the Tariff and Customs Code only "to protect local industries and products for the sake of
the national economy, general welfare and/or national security." 2 He goes on to claim that:
E.O. Nos. 478 and 475 having nothing to do whatsoever with the protection of
local industries and products for the sake of national economy, general welfare
and/or national security. On the contrary, they work in reverse, especially as to
crude oil, an essential product which we do not have to protect, since we produce
only minimal quantities and have to import the rest of what we need.
These Executive Orders are avowedly solely to enable the government to raise
government finances, contrary to Sections 24 and 28 (2) of Article VI of the
Constitution, as well as to Section 401 of the Tariff and Customs
Code. 3 (Emphasis in the original)
The Court is not persuaded. In the first place, there is nothing in the language of either Section
104 or of 401 of the Tariff and Customs Code that suggest such a sharp and absolute limitation of
authority. The entire contention of petitioner is anchored on just two (2) words, one found in
Section 401 (a)(1): "existing protective rates of import duty," and the second in the proviso found
at the end of Section 401 (a): "protection levels granted in Section 104 of this Code . . . . " We
believe that the words "protective" and ''protection" are simply not enough to support the very
broad and encompassing limitation which petitioner seeks to rest on those two (2) words.
In the second place, petitioner's singular theory collides with a very practical fact of which this
Court may take judicial notice that the Bureau of Customs which administers the Tariff and
Customs Code, is one of the two (2) principal traditional generators or producers of
governmental revenue, the other being the Bureau of Internal Revenue. (There is a third agency,
non-traditional in character, that generates lower but still comparable levels of revenue for the
government The Philippine Amusement and Games Corporation [PAGCOR].)
In the third place, customs duties which are assessed at the prescribed tariff rates are very much
like taxes which are frequently imposed for both revenue-raising and for regulatory
purposes. 4 Thus, it has been held that "customs duties" is "the name given to taxes on the
importationand exportation of commodities, the tariff or tax assessed upon merchandise imported
from, or exported to, a foreign country." 5 The levying of customs duties on imported goods may
have in some measure the effect of protecting local industries where such local industries
actually exist and are producing comparable goods. Simultaneously, however, the very same
customs duties inevitably have the effect of producing governmental revenues. Customs duties
like internal revenue taxes are rarely, if ever, designed to achieve one policy objective only. Most
commonly, customs duties, which constitute taxes in the sense of exactions the proceeds of
which become public funds 6 have either or both the generation of revenue and the regulation
of economic or social activity as their moving purposes and frequently, it is very difficult to say
which, in a particular instance, is the dominant or principal objective. In the instant case, since
the Philippines in fact produces ten (10) to fifteen percent (15%) of the crude oil consumed here,
the imposition of increased tariff rates and a special duty on imported crude oil and imported oil
products may be seen to have some "protective" impact upon indigenous oil production. For the
effective, price of imported crude oil and oil products is increased. At the same time, it cannot be
gainsaid that substantial revenues for the government are raised by the imposition of such
increased tariff rates or special duty.
In the fourth place, petitioner's concept which he urges us to build into our constitutional and
customs law, is a stiflingly narrow one. Section 401 of the Tariff and Customs Code establishes
general standards with which the exercise of the authority delegated by that provision to the
President must be consistent: that authority must be exercised in "the interest of national
economy, general welfare and/or national security." Petitioner, however, insists that the
"protection of local industries" is the only permissible objective that can be secured by the
exercise of that delegated authority, and that therefore "protection of local industries" is the sum
total or the alpha and the omega of "the national economy, general welfare and/or national
security." We find it extremely difficult to take seriously such a confined and closed view of the
legislative standards and policies summed up in Section 401. We believe, for instance, that the
protection of consumers, who after all constitute the very great bulk of our population, is at the
very least as important a dimension of "the national economy, general welfare and national
security" as the protection of local industries. And so customs duties may be reduced or even
removed precisely for the purpose of protecting consumers from the high prices and shoddy
quality and inefficient service that tariff-protected and subsidized local manufacturers may
otherwise impose upon the community.
It seems also important to note that tariff rates are commonly established and the corresponding
customs duties levied and collected upon articles and goods which are not found at all
and not produced in the Philippines. The Tariff and Customs Code is replete with such articles
and commodities: among the more interesting examples are ivory (Chapter 5, 5.10); castoreum or
musk taken from the beaver (Chapter 5, 5.14); Olives (Chapter 7, Notes); truffles or European
fungi growing under the soil on tree roots (Chapter 7, Notes); dates (Chapter 8,
8.01); figs (Chapter 8, 8.03); caviar (Chapter 16, 16.01); aircraft (Chapter 88, 88.0l); special
diagnostic instruments and apparatus for human medicine and surgery (Chapter 90, Notes); Xray
generators;
X-ray
tubes;
X-ray screens, etc. (Chapter 90, 90.20); etc. In such cases, customs duties may be seen to be
imposed either for revenue purposes purely or perhaps, in certain cases, to discourage any
importation of the items involved. In either case, it is clear that customs duties are levied and
imposed entirely apart from whether or not there are any competing local industries to protect.
Accordingly, we believe and so hold that Executive Orders Nos. 475 and 478 which may be
conceded to be substantially moved by the desire to generate additional public revenues, are not,
for that reason alone, either constitutionally flawed, or legally infirm under Section 401 of the
Tariff and Customs Code. Petitioner has not successfully overcome the presumptions of
constitutionality and legality to which those Executive Orders are entitled. 7
The conclusion we have reached above renders it unnecessary to deal with petitioner's additional
contention that, should Executive Orders Nos. 475 and 478 be declared unconstitutional and
illegal, there should be a roll back of prices of petroleum products equivalent to the "resulting
excess money not be needed to adequately maintain the Oil Price Stabilization Fund (OPSF)." 8
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Petition for Certiorari, Prohibition and Mandamus is
hereby DISMISSED for lack of merit. Costs against petitioner.
SO ORDERED.
Narvasa, C.J., Gutierrez, Jr., Cruz, Paras, Padilla, Bidin, Grio-Aquino, Medialdea, Regalado,
Davide, Jr., Romero, Nocon and Bellosilo, JJ., concur.

SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-2044
August 26, 1949
J. ANTONIO ARANETA, petitioner,

vs.
RAFAEL DINGLASAN, Judge of First Instance of Manila, and JOSE P. BENGZON,
Fiscal of City of Manila,respondents.
x---------------------------------------------------------x
G.R. No. L-2756
August 26, 1949
J. ANTONIO ARANETA and GREGORIO VILLAMOR, petitioners,

vs.
EUGENIO ANGELES, Fiscal of City of Manila, respondent.
x---------------------------------------------------------x
G.R. No. L-3054
August 26, 1949
EULOGIO RODRIGUEZ, Sr., por si y como Presidente del Partido

Nacionalista, recurrente,
vs.
EL TESORERO DE FILIPINAS, recurrido.
x---------------------------------------------------------x
G.R. No. L-3055
August 26, 1949
LEON MA. GURRERO, petitioner,

vs.
THE COMMISSIONER OF CUSTOMS and THE ADMINISTRATOR, SUGAR QUOTA
OFFICE, DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE AND INDUSTRY, respondents.
x---------------------------------------------------------x
G.R. No. L-3056
August 26, 1949
ANTONIO BARREDO, in his own behalf and on behalf of all taxpayers similarly
situated, petitioner,
vs.
THE COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, THE AUDITOR GENERAL and THE INSULAR

TREASURER OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondents.
L-2044
Paredes, Diaz and Poblador, Jesus G. Barrera, Vicente Hilado, and Araneta and Araneta for
petitioner.
Office of the Solicitor General Felix Bautista Angelo, Assistant Solicitor General Ruperto
Kapunan, Jr., Solicitor Martiniano P. Vico and Assistant City Fiscal Julio Villamor for
respondents.
Claro M. Recto and Padilla, Carlos and Fernando as amici curiae.
L-2756
Araneta and Araneta and Jesus G. Barrera for petitioners.
Assistant City Fiscal Luis B. Reyes for respondent.
Claro M. Recto as amici curiae.
L-3054
Claro M. Recto, Ramon Diokno, Jose O. Vera, Alejo Mabanag, Jose B. Laurel, Jr. and Antonio
Barredo for petitioner.
Office of the Solicitor General Felix Bautista Angelo for respondent.
Vicente de Vera, Chairman, Commission on Elections.
Alfonso Ponce Enrile, Alva J. Hill and Honorio Poblador, Jr. and Emiliano R. Navarro as amici
curiae.
Jesus G. Barrera, Enrique M. Fernando, Ramon Sunico, and Francisco A. Rodrigo also as amici
curiae.
L-3055
Claro M. Recto and Leon Ma. Guerrero for petitioner.
Office of the Solicitor General Felix Bautista Angelo for respondents.
V. G. Bunuan, Administrator, Sugar Quota Office.
Jesus G. Barrera, Felixberto M. Serrano, Enrique; Honorio Poblador, Jr. and Emiliano R.
Navarro as amici curiae.
L-3056
Claro M. Recto and Antonio Barredo for petitioner.
Office of the Solicitor General Felix Bautista Angelo for respondents.
Vicente de Vera, Chairman, Commission on Elections.
Alfonso Ponce Enrile, Alva J. Hill, Jesus G. Barrera, Enrique M. Fernando, Ramon Sunico and
Francisco A. Rodrigo; Honorio Poblador, Jr. and Emiliano R. Navarro as amici curiae.
TUASON, J.:
Three of these cases were consolidated for argument and the other two were argued separately on
other dates. Inasmuch as all of them present the same fundamental question which, in our view,
is decisive, they will be disposed of jointly. For the same reason we will pass up the objection to
the personality or sufficiency of interest of the petitioners in case G. R. No. L-3054 and case G.
R. No. L-3056 and the question whether prohibition lies in cases Nos. L-2044 and L-2756. No
practical benefit can be gained from a discussion of the procedural matters since the decision in
the cases wherein the petitioners' cause of action or the propriety of the procedure followed is not
in dispute, will be controlling authority on the others. Above all, the transcendental importance to
the public of these cases demands that they be settled promptly and definitely, brushing aside, if
we must, technicalities of procedure. (Avelino vs. Cuenco, G. R. No. L-2821.) The petitions
challenge the validity of executive orders of the President avowedly issued in virtue of
Commonwealth Act No. 671. Involved in cases Nos. L-2044 and L-2756 is Executive Order No.
62, which regulates rentals for houses and lots for residential buildings. The petitioner, J. Antonio
Araneta, is under prosecution in the Court of First Instance of Manila for violation of the
provisions of this Executive Order, and prays for the issuance of the writ of prohibition to the
judge and the city fiscal. Involved in case L-3055 is Executive Order No. 192, which aims to
control exports from the Philippines. In this case, Leon Ma. Guerrero seeks a writ
of mandamus to compel the Administrator of the Sugar Quota Office and the Commissioner of
Customs to permit the exportation of shoes by the petitioner. Both official refuse to issue the
required export license on the ground that the exportation of shoes from the Philippines is
forbidden by this Executive Order. Case No. L-3054 relates to Executive Order No. 225, which
appropriates funds for the operation of the Government of the Republic of the Philippines during
the period from July 1, 1949 to June 30, 1950, and for other purposes. The petitioner Eulogio
Rodriguez, Sr., as a tax-payer, an elector, and president of the Nacionalista Party, applies for a
writ of prohibition to restrain the Treasurer of the Philippines from disbursing this Executive
Order. Affected in case No. L-3056 is Executive Order No. 226, which appropriates P6,000,000
to defray the expenses in connection with, and incidental to, the hold lug of the national elections
to be held in November, 1949. The petitioner, Antonio Barredo, as a citizen, tax-payer and voter,
asks this Court to prevent "the respondents from disbursing, spending or otherwise disposing of
that amount or any part of it."
Notwithstanding allegations in the petitions assailing the constitutionally of Act No. 671, the
petitioners do not press the point in their oral argument and memorandum. They rest their case
chiefly on the proposition that the Emergency Powers Act (Commonwealth Act No. 671) has
ceased to have any force and effect. This is the basic question we have referred to, and it is to
this question that we will presently address ourselves and devote greater attention. For the
purpose of this decision, only, the constitutionality of Act No. 671 will be taken for granted, and
any dictum or statement herein which may appear contrary to that hypothesis should be
understood as having been made merely in furtherance of the main thesis.
Act No. 671 in full is as follows:
AN ACT DECLARING A STATE OF TOTAL EMERGENCY AS A RESULT OF WAR
INVOLVING THE PHILIPPINES AND AUTHORIZING THE PRESIDENT TO
PROMULGATE RULES AND REGULATIONS TO MEET SUCH EMERGENCY.
Be it enacted by the National Assembly of the Philippines:
SECTION 1. The existence of war between the United States and other countries of
Europe and Asia, which involves the Philippines, makes it necessary to invest the
President with extraordinary powers in order to meet the resulting emergency.
"SEC. 2. Pursuant to the provisions of Article VI, section 26, of the Constitution, the
President is hereby authorized, during the existence of the emergency, to promulgate such
rules and regulations as he may deem necessary to carry out the national policy declared
in section 1 hereof. Accordingly, he is, among other things, empowered (a) to transfer the
seat of the Government or any of its subdivisions, branches, departments, offices,
agencies or instrumentalities; (b) to reorganize the Government of the Commonwealth
including the determination of the order of precedence of the heads of the Executive
Department; (c) to create new subdivisions, branches, departments, agencies or
instrumentalities of government and to abolish any of those already existing; (d) to
continue in force laws and appropriations which would lapse or otherwise become
inoperative, and to modify or suspend the operation or application of those of an
administrative character; (e) to impose new taxes or to increase, reduce, suspend or
abolish those in existence; (f) to raise funds through the issuance of bonds or otherwise,
and to authorize the expenditure of the proceeds thereof; (g) to authorize the national,
provincial, city or municipal governments to incur in overdrafts for purposes that he may
approve; (h) to declare the suspension of the collection of credits or the payment of debts;
and (i) to exercise such other powers as he may deem to enable the Government to fulfill
its responsibities and to maintain and enforce the authority.
SEC. 3. The President of the Philippines shall as soon as practicable upon the convening
of the Congress of the Philippines report thereto all the rules and regulations promulgated
by him under the powers herein granted.
SEC. 4. This Act shall take effect upon its approval and the rules and regulations
promulgated hereunder shall be in force and effect until the Congress of the Philippines
shall otherwise provide.
Section 26 of Article VI of the Constitution provides:
In time of war or other national emergency, the Congress may by law authorize the
President, for a limited period and subject to such restrictions as it may prescribe, to
promulgate rules and regulations to carry out a declared national policy.
Commonwealth Act No. 671 does not in term fix the duration of its effectiveness. The intention
of the Act has to be sought for in its nature, the object to be accomplish, the purpose to be
subserved, and its relation to the Constitution. The consequences of the various constructions
offered will also be resorted to as additional aid to interpretation. We test a rule by its results.
Article VI of the Constitution provides that any law passed by virtue thereof should be "for a
limited period." "Limited" has been defined to mean "restricted; bounded; prescribed; confined
within positive bounds; restrictive in duration, extent or scope." (Encyclopedia Law Dictionary,
3rd ed., 669; Black's Law Dictionary, 3rd ed., 1120.) The words "limited period" as used in the
Constitution are beyond question intended to mean restrictive in duration. Emergency, in order to
justify the delegation of emergency powers, "must be temporary or it can not be said to be an
emergency." (First Trust Joint Stock Land Bank of Chicago vs. Adolph P. Arp, et al., 120 A. L.
R., 937, 938.).
It is to be presumed that Commonwealth Act No. 671 was approved with this limitation in view.
The opposite theory would make the law repugnant to the Constitution, and is contrary to the
principle that the legislature is deemed to have full knowledge of the constitutional scope of its
powers. The assertion that new legislation is needed to repeal the act would not be in harmony
with the Constitution either. If a new and different law were necessary to terminate the
delegation, the period for the delegation, it has been correctly pointed out, would be unlimited,
indefinite, negative and uncertain; "that which was intended to meet a temporary emergency may
become permanent law," (Peck vs. Fink, 2 Fed. [2d], 912); for Congress might not enact the
repeal, and even if it would, the repeal might not meet the approval of the President, and the
Congress might not be able to override the veto. Furthermore, this would create the anomaly that,
while Congress might delegate its powers by simple majority, it might not be able to recall them
except by a two-third vote. In other words, it would be easier for Congress to delegate its powers
than to take them back. This is not right and is not, and ought not to be, the law. Corwin,
President: Office and Powers, 1948 ed., p. 160, says:
It is generally agreed that the maxim that the legislature may not delegate its powers
signifies at the very least that the legislature may not abdicate its powers: Yet how, in
view of the scope that legislative delegations take nowadays, is the line between
delegation and abdication to be maintained? Only, I urge, by rendering the delegated
powers recoverable without the consent of the delegate; . . . .
Section 4 goes far to settle the legislative intention of this phase of Act No. 671. Section 4
stipulates that "the rules and regulations promulgated thereunder shall be in full force and effect
until the Congress of the Philippines shall otherwise provide." The silence of the law regarding
the repeal of the authority itself, in the face of the express provision for the repeal of the rules
and regulations issued in pursuance of it, a clear manifestation of the belief held by the National
Assembly that there was no necessity to provide for the former. It would be strange if having no
idea about the time the Emergency Powers Act was to be effective the National Assemble failed
to make a provision for this termination in the same way that it did for the termination of the
effects and incidents of the delegation. There would be no point in repealing or annulling the
rules and regulations promulgated under a law if the law itself was to remain in force, since, in
that case, the President could not only make new rules and regulations but he could restore the
ones already annulled by the legislature.
More anomalous than the exercise of legislative function by the Executive when Congress is in
the unobstructed exercise of its authority is the fact that there would be two legislative bodies
operating over the same field, legislating concurrently and simultaneously, mutually nullifying
each other's actions. Even if the emergency powers of the President, as suggested, be suspended
while Congress was in session and be revived after each adjournment, the anomaly would not be
limited. Congress by a two-third vote could repeal executive orders promulgated by the President
during congressional recess, and the President in turn could treat in the same manner, between
sessions of Congress, laws enacted by the latter. This is not a fantastic apprehension; in two
instances it materialized. In entire good faith, and inspired only by the best interests of the
country as they saw them, a former President promulgated an executive order regulating house
rentals after he had vetoed a bill on the subject enacted by Congress, and the present Chief
Executive issued an executive order on export control after Congress had refused to approve the
measure.
Quiet apart from these anomalies, there is good basis in the language of Act No. 671 for the
inference that the National Assembly restricted the life of the emergency powers of the President
to the time the Legislature was prevented from holding sessions due to enemy action or other
causes brought on by the war. Section 3 provides:
The President of the Philippines shall as soon as practicable upon the convening of the
Congress of the Philippines report thereto all the rules and regulations promulgated by
him under the powers herein granted.
The clear tenor of this provision is that there was to be only one meeting of Congress at which
the President was to give an account of his trusteeship. The section did not say each meeting,
which it could very well have said if that had been the intention. If the National Assembly did
not think that the report in section 3 was to be the first and last Congress Act No. 671 would
lapsed, what reason could there be for its failure to provide in appropriate and clear terms for the
filing of subsequent reports? Such reports, if the President was expected to continue making laws
in the forms of rules, regulations and executive orders, were as important, of as unimportant, as
the initial one.
As a contemporary construction, President Quezon's statement regarding the duration of Act No.
671 is enlightening and should carry much weight, considering his part in the passage and in the
carrying out of the law. Mr. Quezon, who called the National Assembly to a special session, who
recommended the enactment of the Emergency Powers Act, if indeed he was not its author, and
who was the very President to be entrusted with its execution, stated in his autobiography, "The
Good Fight," that Act No. 671 was only "for a certain period" and "would become invalid unless
reenacted." These phrases connote automatical extinction of the law upon the conclusion of a
certain period. Together they denote that a new legislation was necessary to keep alive (not to
repeal) the law after the expiration of that period. They signify that the same law, not a different
one, had to be repassed if the grant should be prolonged.
What then was the contemplated period? President Quezon in the same paragraph of his
autobiography furnished part of the answer. He said he issued the call for a special session of the
National Assembly "when it became evident that we were completely helpless against air attack,
and that it was most unlikely the Philippine Legislature would hold its next regular session which
was to open on January 1, 1942." (Emphasis ours.) It can easily be discerned in this statement
that the conferring of enormous powers upon the President was decided upon with specific view
to the inability of the National Assembly to meet. Indeed no other factor than this inability could
have motivated the delegation of powers so vast as to amount to an abdication by the National
Assembly of its authority. The enactment and continuation of a law so destructive of the
foundations of democratic institutions could not have been conceived under any circumstance
short of a complete disruption and dislocation of the normal processes of government. Anyway,
if we are to uphold the constitutionality of the act on the basis of its duration, we must start with
the premise that it fixed a definite, limited period. As we have indicated, the period that best
comports with constitutional requirements and limitations, with the general context of the law
and with what we believe to be the main if not the sole raison d'etre for its enactment, was a
period coextensive with the inability of Congress to function, a period ending with the
conventing of that body.
It is our considered opinion, and we so hold, that Commonwealth Act No. 671 became
inoperative when Congress met in regular session on May 25, 1946, and that Executive Orders
Nos. 62, 192, 225 and 226 were issued without authority of law. In setting the session of
Congress instead of the first special session preceded it as the point of expiration of the Act, we
think giving effect to the purpose and intention of the National Assembly. In a special session,
the Congress may "consider general legislation or only such as he (President) may designate."
(Section 9, Article VI of the Constitution.) In a regular session, the power Congress to legislate is
not circumscribed except by the limitations imposed by the organic law.
Having arrived at this conclusion, we are relieved of the necessity of deciding the question as to
which department of government is authorized to inquire whether the contingency on which the
law is predicated still exists. The right of one or another department to declare the emergency
terminated is not in issue. As a matter of fact, we have endeavored to find the will of the National
Assemblycall that will, an exercise of the police power or the war power and, once
ascertained, to apply it. Of course, the function of interpreting statutes in proper cases, as in this,
will not be denied the courts as their constitutional prerogative and duty. In so far as it is
insinuated that the Chief Executive has the exclusive authority to say that war not ended, and
may act on the strength of his opinion and findings in contravention of the law as the courts have
construed it, no legal principle can be found to support the proposition. There is no pretense that
the President has independent or inherent power to issue such executive orders as those under
review. we take it that the respondents, in sustaining the validity of these executive orders rely on
Act No. 600, Act No. 620, or Act No. 671 of the former Commonwealth and on no other source.
To put it differently, the President's authority in this connection is purely statutory, in no sense
political or directly derived from the Constitution.
Act No. 671, as we have stressed, ended ex proprio vigore with the opening of the regular
session of Congress on May 25, 1946. Acts Nos. 600 and 620 contain stronger if not conclusive
indication that they were self-liquidating. By express provision the rules and regulations to be
eventually made in pursuance of Acts Nos. 600 and 620, respectively approved on August 19,
1940 and June 6, 1941, were to be good only up to the corresponding dates of adjournment of the
following sessions of the Legislature, "unless sooner amended or repealed by the National
Assembly." The logical deduction to be drawn from this provision is that in the mind of the
lawmakers the idea was fixed that the Acts themselves would lapse not latter than the rules and
regulations. The design to provide for the automatic repeal of those rules and regulations
necessarily was predicated on the consciousness of a prior or at best simultaneous repeal of their
source. Were not this the case, there would arise the curious spectacle, already painted, and easily
foreseen, of the Legislature amending or repealing rules and regulations of the President while
the latter was empowered to keep or return them into force and to issue new ones independently
of the National Assembly. For the rest, the reasoning heretofore adduced against the asserted
indefinite continuance of the operation of Act No. 671 equally applies to Acts Nos. 600 and 620.
The other corollary of the opinion we have reached is that the question whether war, in law or in
fact, continues, is irrelevant. If we were to that actual hostilities between the original belligerents
are still raging, the elusion would not be altered. After the convening of Congress new legislation
had to be approved if the continuation of the emergency powers, or some of them, was desired.
In the light of the conditions surrounding the approval of the Emergency Power Act, we are of
the opinion that the "state of total emergency as a result of war" envisaged in the preamble
referred to the impending invasion and occupation of the Philippines by the enemy and the
consequent total disorganization of the Government, principally the impossibility for the
National Assembly to act. The state of affairs was one which called for immediate action and
with which the National Assembly would would not be able to cope. The war itself and its
attendant chaos and calamities could not have necessitated the delegation had the National
Assembly been in a position to operate.
After all the criticism that have been made against the efficiency of the system of the separation
of powers, the fact remains that the Constitution has set up this form of government, with all its
defects and shortcomings, in preference to the commingling of powers in one man or group of
men. The Filipino people by adopting parliamentary government have given notice that they
share the faith of other democracy-loving people in this system, with all its faults, as the ideal.
The point is, under this framework of government, legislation is preserved for Congress all the
time, not expecting periods of crisis no matter how serious. Never in the history of the United
States, the basic features of whose Constitution have been copied in ours, have the specific
functions of the legislative branch of enacting laws been surrendered to another department
unless we regard as legislating the carrying out of a legislative policy according to prescribed
standards; no, not even when that Republic was fighting a total war, or when it was engaged in a
life-and-death struggle to preserve the Union. The truth is that under our concept of
constitutional government, in times of extreme perils more than in normal circumstances "the
various branches, executive, legislative, and judicial," given the ability to act, are called upon "to
the duties and discharge the responsibilities committed to them respectively."
These observations, though beyond the issue as formulated in this decision, may, we trust, also
serve to answer the vehement plea that for the good of the Nation, the President should retain his
extraordinary powers as long asturmoil and other ills directly or indirectly traceable to the late
war harass the Philippines.
Upon the foregoing considerations, the petitions will be granted. In order to avoid any possible
disruption and interruption in the normal operation of the Government, we have deemed it best to
depart in these cases from the ordinary rule to the period for the effectivity of decisions, and to
decree, as it is hereby decreed, that this decision take effect fifteen days from the date of the
entry of final judgment provided in section 8 of Rule 53 of the Rules of Court in relation to
section 2 of Rule 35. No costs will be charged.
Ozaeta, J., concurs.
Separate Opinions
MORAN, C. J., concurring:
I agree with the opinion prepared by Mr. Justice Tuason, except on the points hereunder
discussed.
I believe, on the one hand, that the emergency power of the President had ceased not in May
1946, when Congress held its regular sessions, as Mr. Justice Tuason and Mr. Justice Feria
maintain, but on June 9, 1945, when Congress convened in a special session to consider general
legislation. The emergency contemplated in Commonwealth Act No. 671, is "total emergency"
which means the state of actual war involving the Philippines, with the impending invasion and
occupation of our country by the enemy and the consequent total disorganization and
paralyzation of the Government, principally, the impossibility for the National Assembly to act.
This was the only reason and justification for the total relinquishment of legislative power by
Congress in favor of the Chief Executive under Commonwealth Act No. 671. Such
relinquishment was total because the emergency was also total. Clearly, therefore, the inability of
Congress to act was the soul of the law, and the moment such inability ceased, the total
emergency also ceased and the law likewise ceased to validly exist. On June 9, 1945, the
Congress of the Philippines convened in a special session "to adopt such measures as may be
necessary to meet the existing emergency" and "for the purpose of considering general
legislation." I hold that from that date, June 9, 1945, Congress was able and ready to act on all
matters, and the emergency powers delegated to the President in Commonwealth Act No. 671,
naturally ceased to exist.
Upon the other hand, while I believe that the emergency powers had ceased in June 1945, I am
not prepared to hold that all executive orders issued thereafter under Commonwealth Act No.
671, are per se null and void. It must be borne in mind that these executive orders had been
issued in good faith and with the best of intentions of three successive Presidents, and some of
them may have already produced extensive effects in the life of the nation. We have, for instance,
Executive Order No. 73, issued on November 12, 1945, appropriating the sum of P6,750,000 for
public works; Executive Order No. 86, issued on January 7, 1946, amending a previous order
regarding the organization of the Supreme Court; Executive Order No. 89, issued on January 1,
1946, reorganizing the Courts of First Instance; Executive Order No. 184, issued on November
19, 1948, controlling rice and palay to combat hunger; and other executive orders appropriating
funds for other purposes. The consequences of a blanket nullification of these executive orders
will be unquestionably serious and harmful. And I hold that before nullifying them, other
important circumstances should be inquired into, as for instance, whether or not they have been
ratified by the Congress expressly or impliedly, whether their purposes have already been
accomplished entirely or partially, and in last instance, to what extent; acquiescence of
litigants; de facto officers; acts and contrast of parties acting in good faith; etc. It is my opinion
that each executive order must be viewed in the lights of its peculiar circumstances, and, if
necessary and possible, before nullifying it, precautionary measures should be taken to avoid
harm to public interest and innocent parties.
To illustrate the foregoing proposition of individual consideration of specific cases, shall go into
a brief discussion of the executive orders involved in the cases now before this Court. With
regard to Executive No. 225 on general appropriation, I hold that the court should not declare it
null and void till Congress may have an opportunity to provide a substitute measure for the
sustenance of government. This view is predicated upon the principle of absolute necessity. Till
Congress may pass a valid appropriation act our government cannot survive without the
executive order in question. It would be absurd for this court to declare the cessation of an
emergency, and by that same declaration permit, if not abet, the formation of another emergency
which would be inevitable if, by reason of lack of appropriation, government shall cease to
function. In such cases, when apparently the provisions of our laws and Constitution seem
inadequate, the courts must go deeper even than the very Magna Carta itself and find solution in
the basic principles of preservation of government and of national survival, which in the last
analysis, are the very reasons for the existence of a Constitution. In such extreme cases, as can
come from the present situation, it would be the height of judicial imprecision to preserve the
form of the constitution, and at the same time permit the disruption and cessation of the
government which that same constitution so intricately designed and firmly established. Thus, in
the remedy of an evil, we shall cause a far greater one.
It may be argued that the course of action I am taking is founded upon fear, fear that Congress
will again fail to act on the matter of appropriation, and it may be asserted that the members of
the Congress are presumed to be as patriotic as the members of this Court, if not more, and that,
therefore, we may rest assured that they will not fail to fulfill their duty. I admit this to be true,
and accordingly, I ask what is then the hurry and necessity for nullifying the executive order on
appropriation which we are sure will soon be substituted by a valid appropriation act? Why not
defer judgment and wait until the special session of Congress so that it may fulfill its duty as it
clearly sees it? I can find no reason against this suggestion except, perhaps, a desire to assert
judicial supremacy in a case where judicial statemanship is more necessary.
It is also true that the possibility that Congress will again fail to provide funds for the operation
of the government is a remote possibility. But there is no harm in providing for all the
possibilities, both near and remote. If that remote possibility never comes, well and good,
nothing is lost and the situation is saved. However, if the remote possibility does come, and it is
not impossible, and we had already nullified the executive order on appropriation, how will the
government function and survive? On the other hand, if we defer judgment upon the nullity of
such executive order, and that remote possibility does come, we still have the saving lifeline of
that executive order which may, perhaps, be tolerated to save the country from chaos, until a
more proper and adequate remedy can be secured.
With regard to the executive order appropriating funds for the conduct of the coming elections, I
uphold the same view as in the foregoing, namely, not in abdicating the power of this court to
pass upon the validity of an executive order, but to defer judgment upon such an order until the
legislature may provide a substitute measure. The reason for this is, likewise, absolute necessity.
Without such Executive Order we may have not elections in November. Elections are the very
essence of popular government for the establishment and preservation of which, our Constitution
has been consecrated. To permit the unwarranted abolition or even suspension of elections, will
surely result either in the denial of popular representation or in the perpetuation in power of those
already in office. Either result is revolting to our system of government. Briefly stated, I hold that
this court should neither ratify nor nullify this executive order, but should defer judgment in the
same manner and for the same reasons stated above in connection with the executive order on
appropriations. The Court, in these cases, is confronted not only with bare issues of law, but with
actual anomalous situations pregnant with possible dangers to the nation, and it is the duty of the
Court, as a dispenser of justice, to find a solution that is both legal and realistic.
With reference to Executive Order No. 62, which regulates rentals for houses, and Executive
Order No. 192, which aims to control exports from the Philippines, I agree that they must be held
null and void upon the reason stated by Mr. Justice Tuason and Mr. Justice Feria and also upon
those stated by Mr. Justice Montemayor and Mr. Justice Alex Reyes.
My vote, therefore, is that the petitions must be granted in Araneta vs. Dinglasan, G. R. No. L2044; Araneta vs. Angeles, G. R. No. L-2756 and Guerrero vs. Commissioner of Customs, G. R.
No. L-3055, and that judgment must be deferred in Rodriguez vs. El Tesorero de Filipinas, G. R.
No. L-3054 and Barredo vs. The Commission on Election, G. R. No. L-3056.
PARAS, J., concurring:

I concur in the opinion of Mr. Justice Tuason. I wish to add, however the following observations:
Even assuming, for the sake of argument, that the legislative intent is to make Commonwealth
Act No. 671, effective during the existence of the emergency contemplated therein and that it is
within the exclusive province of the political departments to determine whether said emergency
continues or has ceased to exist, I am of the conviction that, in view of the formal and
unmistakable declarations of both the Congress and the President, said Act No. 671, should be
held as having lost its force and effect.
It is important to remember that the kind of emergency expressly spoken of in the Act is a total
emergency resulting from war and that the Act was passed at a time (December 16, 1941) when
there was factually a state of war involving the Philippines.
In section 1 of Republic Act No. 342, approved on July 26, 1948, it was categorically declared
by the Congress that "since liberation conditions have gradually returned to normal, but not so
with regard to those who have suffered the ravages of war and who have not received any relief
for the loss and destruction resulting therefrom," and that "the emergency created by the last war
as regards these was sufferers being still existent, it is the declared policy of the state that as to
them the debt moratorium should be continued in force in a modified form." The President, in
turn, in his speech delivered on July 4, 1949, plainly proclaimed that "what emergencies it (the
Republic) faces today are incidental passing pains artificially created by seasonal partisanship,
very common among democracies but will disappear with the rains that follow the thunderclaps
not later than November 8 of this year."
We thus have a formal declaration on the part of the Congress that the emergency created by the
last war exists as regards only those debtors whose war damage claims have not been settled by
the United States Philippine War Damage Commission (section 2, Republic Act No. 342),
patently meaning that said emergency is, at most, a partial emergency. It is needless to point out
that only a small portion of the Philippine population are debtors and not all of those who are
debtors are war damage claimants.
We also have the solemn declaration on the part of the President that the emergencies faced by
the Republic are incidental emergencies artificially created by seasonal partisanship, clearly
meaning that such emergencies not only are not total but are not the result of war.
If the emergency is, as admitted by the Congress, not total and, as admitted by the President, not
the result of the war, Commonwealth Act No. 671 has lost its basis and cannot legally give rise to
the executive orders herein involved. Indeed, it is not pretended that said orders are intended to
meet any emergency growing out of the last war. Lack of a budget, an appropriation for the
elections, or an import control law, has been brought about by the inaction of the Congress
unaffected by the last war, and such emergency, if it may be called so, is not of the kind
contemplated in Commonwealth Act No. 671.
The government has for four years since liberation been normally functioning; election had been
regularly held; a national census had been taken; Congress had held regular and special session;
"people travel freely most everywhere and more quickly, by land, sea and air, to an extent that
was not hitherto enjoyed," and "business is more brisk than ever, goods are plentiful, our people
even in the remotest communities and barrios of the country are better dressed, their diet has
been immensely improved, and they look more healthy than they ever did" (President's fifth
monthly radio chat, March 15, 1949); and the sporadic depredations of the outlaws in isolated
areas of the country are but the last paroxysms of a dying movement (President's State-of-theNation Message, January 24, 1949), all these certainly negative the existence of any real
(much less total) emergency.
That the Congress had heretofore recognized the cessation of the emergency is conclusively
established by the fact that it had assumed the task of directly enacting, during its past sessions,
measures dealing with all the matters covered by the specific legislative powers conceded to the
President in Commonwealth Act No. 671. This is in line with the fundamental reason for the
approval of said Act, as may be gathered from the following statement of President Quezon:
"When it became evident that we were completely helpless against air attack and that it was most
unlikely the Philippine Legislature would hold its next regular session which was to open on
January 1, 1942, the National Assembly passed into history approving a resolution which
reaffirmed the abiding faith of the Filipino people in, and their loyalty to, the United States. The
assembly also enacted a law granting the President of the Philippines all the powers that under
the Philippine Constitution may be delegated to him in time of war." (The Good Fight, pp. 204205.) When President Quezon said "in time of war", he undoubtedly meant factual war, a
situation that existed at the time of the passage of Commonwealth Act No. 671.
Indeed, the dissenters admit that any delegated power directly exercised by the principal is
considered withdrawn from the agent. A cursory examination of Commonwealth Act No. 671
will show that the legislative function therein specified had been discharged by the Congress.
The following illustrates the powers delegated in the Act and the measures enacted by the
Congress itself covering each:
Section 2 of Commonwealth Act No. 671
(a) to transfer the seat of the Government or any of its subdivisions, branches, departments,
offices, agencies or instrumentalities:
Republic Act No. 333
An Act to establish the Capital of the Philippines and the permanent seat of the National
Government, to create a capital city planning commission, to appropriate funds for the
acquisition of private estates within the boundary limits of said city, and to authorize the
issuance of bonds of the National Government for the acquisition of private estates, for
the subdivision thereof, and for the construction of streets, bridges, waterworks, sewerage
and other municipal improvements in the capital City. (Approved, July 17, 1948.)
(b) to reorganize the Government of the Commonwealth including the determination of the order
of precedence of the heads of the Executive Departments:
Republic Act No. 51
Act authorizing the President of the Philippines to reorganize within one year the
different Executive departments, bureaus, offices, agencies and their instrumentalities of
the government, including the corporations owned or controlled by it. (Approved,
October 4, 1946.)
(c) to create new subdivisions, branches, departments, offices, agencies or instrumentalities of
government and to abolish any of those already existing:
Commonwealth Act No. 732
An Act to create the Department of Foreign Affairs and to authorize the President of the
Philippines to organize said department as well as the foreign service of the Republic of
the Philippines. (Approved, July 3, 1946.)
(d) to continue in force laws and appropriations which would lapse or otherwise become
inoperative, and to modify or suspend the operation or application of those of an administrative
character:
An Act appropriating the sum of five million pesos to enable the national housing
commission to resume its functions" (Approved, November 1, 1945.)
An Act to appropriate funds to continue the payment of Retirement gratuities or pensions
under existing laws. (Approved, November 1, 1945.)
(e) to impose new taxes or to increase, reduce, suspend, or abolish those in existence:
An Act to amend Section One of the Republic Act numbered eighty-one providing a new
time limit for the waiver of, and/or extension of the period, within which to perform,
accomplish or comply with, any term, condition, or stipulation required of locators,
holders, lessees, operators of mining claims or concessions, and of water rights and
timber concessions with the mining industry and the condonation of mining, specific and
real estate taxes, under certain terms and conditions. (Approved, June 1, 1948.)
Ley No. 321 de la Republica
Ley que eleva los derechos de transferencia de ganado mayor, enmendado al efecto el
articulo quinientos veintiochos del Codigo Administrativo Revisado. (Apobada, Junio 9,
1948.)
(f) to raise funds through the issuance of bonds or otherwise, and to authorize the expenditure of
proceeds thereof:
An Act establishing the Central Bank of the Philippines . . . . (Section 87 [e] No. 7.)
Approved, June 15, 1948.)
An Act appropriating such sums as may from time to time be released by the Central
Bank representing excess monetary reserves, and authorizing the President of the
Philippines to issue bonds, certificates or other evidences of indebtedness covering such
amounts. (Approved, June 15, 1948.)
Republic Act No. 85
An Act creating the Rehabilitation Finance Corporation. (Section 2 [f].) (Approved, Oct.
29, 1946.)
(g) to authorize the National, provincial, city or municipal government to incur in overdrafts for
the purposes that he may approve:
Various Appropriation Acts.
(h) to declare the suspension of the collection of credits or the payments of debts:
Republic Act No. 342, approved, July 26, 1948.
(i) to exercise such other powers as he may deem necessary to enable the Government to fulfill
its responsibilities and to maintain and enforce its authority.
The powers included in this subdivision (i) are of course covered by hundreds of other acts
approved by the Congress which, it cannot be denied, all tend to "enable the Government to
fulfill its responsibilities and to maintain and enforce its authority." Moreover, the withdrawal of
the greater and more important powers may be presumed to have carried the accessory and less
important powers.
There is no merit in the contention that Commonwealth Act No. 671 was enacted by virtue of the
war powers of the Congress. As the Act itself expressly states, its basis is section 26 of Article VI
of the Constitution which merely authorizes delegation of legislative powers to the President in
times of war or other national emergency. The phrase "in times of war or other national
emergency" is solely indicative or descriptive of the occasions during which the delegation may
be extended and does not classify the act of delegating legislative functions as a war power. It
must be borne in mind that said section 26 is peculiar to our Constitution, with the result that the
decisions of the Supreme Court of the United States cited on behalf of the respondents,
expounding the theory that the exercise by the President of his war powers granted by the
Congress cannot be interfered with by the courts, are not controlling. Particularly, the case
of Ludecke vs. Watkins, 92 L. ed., 1883, in which the opinion of the United States Supreme Court
was written by Mr. Justice Frankfurter, cannot apply, for the further reason that it merely
involved the power of deportation which, even in our jurisdiction, is recognized, it being the rule
here that the courts cannot control the right of the Chief Executive to determine the existence or
sufficiency of the facts justifying an order of deportation. Upon the other hand, the war power of
the President is separately covered by section 10, paragraph (2), of Article VII, and that of the
Congress by section 25.
Article VI, of the Constitution, which are not invoked for the passage of Commonwealth Act No.
671.
MONTEMAYOR, J., concurring and dissenting:.
The majority opinion holds that Executive Order No. 62 dated June 21, 1947; Executive Order
No. 192 dated December 24, 1948; and Executive Orders Nos. 225 and 226 both dated June 15,
1949 were issued without authority of law and therefore illegal and of no legal force and effect. I
concur only in the result. Ordinarily, such concurrence without comment or explanation would
be sufficient and satisfactory. However, in view of the radical difference between the reasons had
and given by the majority in arriving at the result and those entertained by me, and considering
the transcendental importance of these cases, not only because of the vast amounts of public
funds and the rights of citizens affected but also of the principles of law involved, and the fact
that not only the force and the effect of a law (Commonwealth Act No. 671) but also the legality
and the force and effect of numerous executive orders issued by several Presidents during a
period of about three years, affecting as they do not only citizens, their interest and their
properties but also the different departments and offices of the Government, I deem it my duty to
set forth my views and the reasons in support of the same.
There is a claim made about lack of personality of some of the parties-petitioners particularly, the
petitioners in G. R. Nos. L-3054 and L-3056. Much could be said for and against that claim, but I
am willing to brush aside all defenses and technicalities on this point in order to be able to
consider and decide the more important question of the legality of the executive orders involved
and whether or not Commonwealth Act No. 671 is still in force.
The aforementioned executive orders were issued on the straight of and by virtue of
Commonwealth Act No. 671. The majority holds that Commonwealth Act No. 671 ceased to
have any force and effect on May 25, 1946 when Congress first convened in regular session after
liberation. In This, I disagree for I believe and hold that Commonwealth Act No. 671 is still in
force and in effect. But despite this view, I am not of the opinion that the executive orders under
consideration were issued without authority.
Starting with Executive Order No. 62, we find that it deals with and regulates houses and lot
rentals. If the legislature had not already acted and legislated on this matter since the
promulgation of Commonwealth Act No. 671, this would be a proper field for Presidential
action. However, the legislature had already promulgated Commonwealth Act No. 689 and
Republic Act No. 66, regulating house rentals and, as late as the month of May, 1947, Congress
passed House Bill No. 978 further amending Commonwealth Act No. 689. In other words, in
thus acting, the Legislature had already shown its readiness and ability to legislate on this matter,
and had withdrawn it from the realm of presidential legislation or regulation under the powers
delegated by Commonwealth Act No. 671. Not only this, but in issuing rules and regulations in
the form of executive orders under his delegated powers, the Chief Executive merely acts as an
agent of the legislature, his principal which made the delegation. As such agent, he cannot go
against the policy and expressed desire of his principal.
There are radical differences between Commonwealth Act No. 689, Republic Act No. 66, and
House Bill No. 978 on one side and Executive Order No. 62 on the other. That was the reason
why President Roxas vetoed House Bill No. 978, believing in good faith that it would not solve
and remedy the problem of house rentals as explained by him in his communication to the House
of Representatives of June 21, 1947, setting forth his views on the bill. The President may not
and could not substitute his opinion however excellent or superior for that of the legislature on
matters of legislation when Congress has already acted and expressed its opinion and desire on
the matter.
With respect to Executive Order No. 192, it will be remembered that Congress passed
Commonwealth Act No. 728, approved on July 2, 1946, authorizing the President to regulate,
curtail, control, and prohibit the exportation of certain products, merchandise and materials.
Under said authority the President issued Executive Order No. 3 dated July 10, 1946, later
amending section 2 of said Executive Order by issuing Executive Order No. 23 dated November
1, 1946, regulating the exportation of certain products, materials and merchandise. The important
thing to consider is that section 4 of Commonwealth Act No. 728 provided that the authority it
granted to the President shall terminate on December 31, 1948, that is to say, that after said date
the Executive could no longer validly regulate exports under said law. The President, however,
overlooked or ignored said injunction and invoking his emergency powers under Commonwealth
Act No. 671, promulgated Executive Order No. 192 regulating exports, to take effect on January
1, 1949. What was said with regard to Executive Order No. 62 is applicable to the lack of
authority of the Executive to promulgate Executive Order No. 192, namely, that on this matter of
export control, the legislature had already withdrawn it from the jurisdiction of the Executive
under his emergency powers after the enactment of Commonwealth Act No. 728. Any
Presidential power or authority on the subject of export control was derived from said Act. Not
only this, but when in section 4 of Commonwealth Act No. 728 the legislature terminated the
authority given the President to regulate and control exports on December 31, 1948 and failed or
refused to renew said authority, the inference or conclusion and that after said date Congress
deemed any presidential regulation on exports unnecessary and inadvisable. Therefore, in
promulgating Executive Order No. 192 the Chief Executive acted not only without legislative
authority but also against the wishes and policy of Congress. This he may not validly do.
With respect to Executive Orders Nos. 225 and 226, the considerations made with regard to
Executive Orders Nos. 62 and 192 are equally applicable. By previously enacting necessary
legislation on the yearly Government appropriation and on the appropriation of funds for the
expenses incurred in national elections, Congress has shown its readiness and ability to cope
with the financial problems of the Government on this point. Republic Act No. 80, approved
October 22, 1946, appropriating funds for the operation of National Government from July 1,
1946 to June 30, 1947; Republic Act No. 156 appropriating funds for the fiscal year 1947-48 and
Republic Act No. 320, the appropriation law for the fiscal year 1948-49 show that Congress was
in a position and able to provide for the yearly expenditures of the Government. And Republic
Act No. 73 appropriating P1,000,000 to defray election expenses on March 11, 1947; Republic
Act No. 147 appropriating P1,000,000 to defray expenses for the election of provincial city and
municipal officials and eight senators held on November 11, 1947, and Republic Act No. 235
appropriating P100,000 for the special elections held on March 23, 1948, to fill vacancies in
Representative District No. 4 of Iloilo and No. 1 of Leyte, demonstrated the ability of the
Congress to appropriate money for election purposes. By so doing Congress had tacitly and
impliedly withdrawn this portion of the field where the President may under his emergency
power legislate or promulgate rules and regulations.
In this connection, it may be stated that in my opinion, the theory underlying the delegation of
emergency powers to the under Commonwealth Act No. 671 and the similar laws is that the
legislature because of the emergency resulting from the war, would be unable to meet in order to
legislate or although able to meet, because of the emergency, the ordinary process of legislation
would be too slow and inadequate and could not cope with the emergency. So, as a remedy, the
power and authority of legislation are vested temporarily in the hands of one man, the Chief
Executive. But as regards Executive Orders Nos. 225 and 226, the legislature has demonstrated
that not only it could meet but also it could legislate on this point of appropriations by approving
general appropriation laws for the different fiscal years since liberation as well as appropriations
for the necessary funds for the different national and provincial elections. Consequently, there no
longer was any necessity for Presidential legislation in this regard. Moreover, and this is not
unimportant, the failure of the Legislature to pass an appropriation law for the fiscal year 194950 and a law appropriating funds for the elections in November, 1949 was not due to any
emergency resulting from the war, contemplated by Commonwealth Act No. 671, but rather and
possibly due to lack of time and because of the rather abrupt and adjourning of the last session of
the Legislature last May.
As already stated, the majority holds that Act No. 671 ceased to have force and effect on May 25,
1946. The other view is that it is still in force. To me this is the main and the more important
issue involved in these cases. In fact the argument of the parties centered on this point. The
importance of this issue may readily be appreciated when it is realized that on its determination
is based, not only the validity or nullity (according to the theory of the majority opinion), of the
four Executive Orders now under consideration, but also of all the Executive Orders promulgated
under authority of Commonwealth Act No. 671 after May 25, 1946, up to the present time. Its
determination will also decide whether or not the President may still exercise his emergency
powers in the future on matters and subjects not heretofore withdrawn by the Legislature.
Because of my disagreement with the majority on this point, I deem it necessary to explain and
elaborate on my reasons for my disagreement.
For purposes of reference and to facilitate the same, I am reproducing Commonwealth Act No.
671 in full as well as section 26, Article VI of the Constitution on which said Act is based:
SECTION 1. The existence of war between the United States and other countries of
Europe and Asia, which involves the Philippines, makes it necessary to invest the
President with extraordinary powers in order to meet the resulting emergency.
SEC. 2. Pursuant to the provisions of Article VI, section 26, of the Constitution, the
President is hereby authorize, during the existence of the emergency, to promulgate such
rules and regulations as he may deem necessary to carry out the national policy declared
in section 1 hereof. Accordingly, he is, among other things, empowered (a) to transfer the
seat of the Government or any of its subdivisions, branches, departments, offices,
agencies or instrumentalities; (b) to reorganize the Government of the Commonwealth
including the determination of the order of precedence of the heads of the heads of
Executive Departments; (c) to create new subdivisions, branches, departments, offices,
agencies or instrumentalities of government and to abolish any of those already existing;
(d) to continue in force laws and appropriations which would lapse or otherwise become
inoperative, and to modify or suspend the operation or application of those of an
administrative character; (e) to impose new taxes to increase, reduce, suspend or abolish
those in existence; (f) to raise funds through the issuance of bonds or otherwise, and to
authorize the expenditure of the proceeds thereof; (g) to authorize the national,
provincial, city or municipal governments to incur in overdrafts for purposes that he may
approve; (h) to declare the suspension of the collection of credits or the payments of
debts; and (i) to exercise such other powers as he may deem necessary to enable the
Government to fulfill its responsibilities and to maintain and enforce the authority.
of the Congress of the Philippines report thereto all the rules and regulations promulgated
SEC. 4. This Act shall take effect upon its approval and the rules and regulations
President, for a limited period and subject to such restrictions as it may prescribe, to
promulgate rules and regulations to carry our a declared national policy. (Section 26,
Article VI, Constitution.)
I fully agree with the majority when in its opinion it says:

Commonwealth Act No. 671 does not in term fix the duration of its effectiveness. The
intention of the Act has to be sought for in its nature, the object to be accomplished, the
purpose to be sub-served, and its relation to the Constitution. (Page 5, majority opinion.)
The main thesis of the majority is that the only reason for the delegation of legislative powers to
the Chief Executive under the Constitution, such as was done under Commonwealth Act No. 671
was because due to the emergency resulting from the war, the Legislature could not meet to enact
legislation; that the moment of Legislature could convene there would no longer be any reason
for the exercise by the President of emergency powers delegated to him; that if, when the
Legislature could meet and actually is in session, the President is allowed to exercise his
delegated legislative powers, there would be the serious anomaly of two legislative bodies acting
at the same time, namely, the Legislature and the Executive, "mutually nullifying each other's
action" ; that the limited period fixed in Commonwealth Act No. 671 for its life and effectiveness
as required by the Constitution is the interval from the passage of said Act and the moment that
Congress could convene, not in special session where its power of legislation is limited by the
Chief Executive in his call for special session, but in regular session where it could be free to
enact general legislation; and that unless this automatic ending or cessation of Act No. 671 is so
held, there would be need of another Act or legislation by the Congress to repeal Act No. 671 in
which case, the Chief Executive may by his veto power effectively block any effort in this
direction.
I beg to differ with the foregoing thesis. I believe that, as I already had occasion to state though
incidentally, the real reason for the delegation of legislative powers to the Chief Executive is not
only because the Legislature is unable to meet due to a national emergency but also because
although it could and does actually meet, whether in regular or special session, it is not in a
position and able to cope with the problems brought about by and arising from the emergency,
problems which require urgent and immediate action. Certainly, one man can act more quickly
and expeditiously than about one hundred members of the Legislature, especially when they are
divided into legislative chambers. That is why in times of emergency, much as we in democratic
countries dislike the system or idea of dictatorship, we hear of food dictator, fuel dictator,
transportation dictator, civilian evacuation dictator, etc., where the functions which ordinarily
belong to a council or board or to a legislative body, are entrusted under certain limitations to one
single official or individual.
Supposing that during a national emergency and while the Legislature is in session, the
legislators woke up one morning to find that there was extreme scarcity of imported food, fuel,
building materials, equipment required in agriculture and industry, etc., because of a monopoly,
hoarding, injurious speculation, manipulation, private controls and profiteering, or that there
were wide-spread lockouts and strikes paralyzing transportation, commerce and industry, or
rampant espionage or sabotage endangering the very life and security of the nation. How much
time would it take the legislature to enact the necessary legislation in order to cope with the
situation and pass the necessary emergency measures?
We are familiar with the practice and routine of enacting laws. A bill is introduced in the
Legislature; it is referred to the corresponding committee, it is studied by said committee, which
in some cases holds public hearings; the committee discusses the bill and sometimes introduces
amendments; if the bill is not killed in the committee or shelved, it is submitted to the chamber
for study, discussion and possible amendment by all the members; it is finally voted and if
approved, it is sent to the other house where it undergoes the same process; and if it is finally
approved by both houses of Congress, it is submitted to the Chief Executive for his study and
approval or veto. All these may consume weeks or months as a result of which, ordinarily, many
bills finally approved by the Congress could be sent to the President for approval or veto only
after adjournment of the legislative session. And we should not overlook the fact that in some
cases for lack of time of due to disagreement among the legislators or between the two houses of
Congress, important pieces of legislations like the annual appropriation law for the fiscal year
1949-50, appropriation of funds for the election to be held in November, 1949, contained in
Executive Orders Nos. 225 and 226, involved in the present cases, and the proposed amendment
to the Election Code etc. have not been passed by Congress in its last session ending last May,
1949, which session lasted one hundred days. If we were to rely on the ordinary process of
legislation to meet a national emergency, by the time the necessary and needed law is passed, the
situation sought to be remedied, or the problem sought to be solved may have become disastrous
or ended in calamity or gone beyond legislation or any remedy. It would be too late. It would be
like locking the stable door after the horse had been stolen.
Now, for some retrospect. The Philippine National Assembly delegated its legislative powers
because of the existence of a state of national emergency as early as the year 1939. During its
second special session of that year, it promulgated the following laws:
(a) Commonwealth Act No. 494, authorizing the President of the Philippines to suspend
until the time of the adjournment of the next regular session of the National Assembly,
either wholly or partially and under such conditions as he may deem proper, the operation
of Commonwealth Act No. 444, commonly known as the Eight Hour Labor Law;
(b) Commonwealth Act No. 496, authorizing the President to take over, for use or
operation by the Government, any public service or enterprise and to pay just
compensation in the manner to be determined by him and to prescribe and promulgate
regulations he may deem essential to carry out the purposes of the Act;
(c) Commonwealth Act No. 498 declaring a state of national emergency due to a state of
war among several nations and as a measure to prevent scarcity, monopolization,
hoarding, injurious speculations, profiteering, etc. affecting the supply, distribution
movement of foods, clothing, fuel, building materials, agricultural equiptments etc.
authorized the President to purchase any of the articles or commodities available for
storage, for re-sale or distribution, to fix the maximum selling price of said articles or
commodities and to promulgated such rules and regulations as he may deem necessary;
and
(d) Commonwealth Act No. 500 authorizing the President in view of the existence of a
state of national emergency to reduce the expenditures of the executive departments of
the Government by the suspension or abandonment of service, activities, or operations of
no immediate importance.
At the time, September, 1939 the second world war was only in Europe, quite far from the
Philippines and had just begun. There was then no likelihood of the Philippines being involved in
the war until more than two years later, in December, 1941. The National Assembly was then
free to meet either in regular or special session to enact legislation to meet the emergency. In
fact, it met in regular session in January, 1941 lasting 100 days and in January, 1941 for another
regular session of 100 days, excluding the several special session held during those two years.
And yet the Assembly delegated legislative powers to the President under section 26, Article II of
the Constitution. This is clear proof that, contrary to the theory of the majority opinion, the
Legislature delegated legislative powers to the President even when it could meet and it actually
met several times.
After passing the Acts just mentioned delegating legislative powers to the President, the
Assembly in its fourthly special session on August 19, 1940 repeated and reiterated this practice
and policy by passing Commonwealth Act No. 600 delegating additional and more extensive
powers to the President in spite of the fact that the war was still far away in Europe and there was
no danger or prospect of involving the Philippines, and the Legislature was still free to meet as in
fact it met again in regular session in January, 1941. During its regular session begun that month
and year, instead of stopping or ending the legislative powers delegated to the President, because
according to the theory of the majority opinion, the Legislature was able to meet, the Assembly
allowed them to continue by passing Commonwealth Act No. 620 which merely amended
section 1 of Commonwealth Act No. 600. I repeat that all this, far from supporting the view of
the majority that the Legislature delegated legislative powers to the President only because it
could not meet, fairly and squarely refutes said view.
Now, let us consider the theory of the majority that it would be a great anomaly to have two
legislative bodies, the Legislature and the President to be acting at the same time, each nullifying
the acts of the other. I fail to see the suggested anomaly. In fact, under the view and interpretation
given by the majority of the delegation of contemplated the simultaneous functioning of the
Legislature and the President, both exercising legislative powers. And it is a fact that there were
several instances of the legislature and the President both validly and simultaneously exercising
legislative powers.
Under section 2 of Commonwealth Act No. 496 already referred to, approved on September 30,
1939, the power delegated to the President to prescribe rules and regulations he may deem
essential to carry out the purposes of the Act, namely, the taking over of and operation by the
Government of any public service or enterprise and to pay for the same, was to last until the date
of the adjournment of the next regular session of the National Assembly. This means that, during
the regular session of the Assembly which begun in January, 1940 and lasted 100 days, the
President could exercise the emergency powers delegated to him. Again, under Commonwealth
Acts Nos. 600 and 620 the President could and indeed he exercised his emergency powers during
the regular session of the Assembly which began in January, 1941, when President Quezon
issued at least nine Executive Orders numbered 321, 333, 335, 337, 339, 340, 342, 344 and 345.
The same thing obtains under Commonwealth Act 671. Since under the view of the majority the
emergency power of the President granted him in Commonwealth Act No. 671 ended only on
May 25, 1946, then the extensive legislative powers delegated to the President under that Act
could be exercised and in fact they were exercised during the five special session of Congress in
the year 1945, which lasted a total of 84 days. During those special session of 1945, President
Osmea issued several Executive Orders in the exercise of his emergency powers.
Is there further proof needed to show that the suggested and feared anomaly and impropriety of
the Legislature and the Executive both exercising legislative functions simultaneously, is more
fancied than real? The situation was contemplated and expressly intended by the Legislature
itself, evidently believing that said condition or state of affairs was neither anomalous nor
improper. There is to my mind really no incompatibility. At such a time and during the period of
their simultaneous functioning, the Legislature may perform its ordinary legislative duties taking
its time to study, consider, amend and pass bills, reserving to the President matters requiring and
demanding immediate action.
After all, it is for the Legislature to say whether it wants the President to exercise his emergency
powers at the same time that it is in session. It may validly and properly stipulate in its grant of
emergency powers that they be exercised when the Legislature is not in session. In fact, in one
instance, in Commonwealth Act No. 500, section 2, the Notional Assembly expressly provided
"that the authority herein given shall be exercised only when the National Assembly is not in
session." When in its other acts of delegation, like Commonwealth Act 671, the Legislature not
only fails to stipulate this condition, but on the contrary, contemplates Presidential exercise of
legislative powers simultaneously with the Legislature, it is to be presumed that the Legislature
intended it and saw nothing improper or anomalous in it, and it is not for the Court to pass upon
the supposed impropriety or anomaly.
As to the possibility of the Chief Executive validly and successfully nullifying the acts of the
Legislature, to me that is quite remote, if not impossible. As already stated at the beginning of
this opinion, the Chief Executive acting as an agent of the Legislative under his emergency
powers, may not go against the wishes and policies of his principal. He can only carry out its
wishes and policies, and where his acts and orders run counter to those of the Legislature, or
operate on a field already withdrawn because the Legislature had already acted therein, his acts
or Executive Orders must give way and will be declared void and of no effect, by the Courts, as
we are doing with the Executive Orders involved in these cases.
With respect to the claim of the majority opinion that unless the emergency powers were made to
end at the time the President made his report to Congress when it convened, it would be
necessary to enact new legislation to repeal the act of delegation, in which case the period for the
delegation would be unlimited, indefinite, and uncertain, contrary to the constitutional provision,
I may say that the President was authorized by Act 671 to exercise emergency powers "during
the existence of the emergency," and not a day longer. To me that is a limited period in
contemplation of the Constitution. There would be no need for a new law to repeal the Act of
delegation, for said Act is self-liquidating. The moment the emergency ceases, the law itself
automatically ceases to have force and effect, and the Presidential emergency powers also end
with it.
Under my view, had the invasion of the Philippines by the Japanese forces, which we feared and
expected in December, 1941 failed to materialize either because the invasion was repelled or
because the Japanese high command at the last moment decided to by-pass the Philippines and
divert his forces further south to invade, say Australia, or if the Pacific war had ended as we all
or most of us then expected it to end sooner within weeks or months after its commencement and
that the emergency resulting therefrom had also ceased soon thereafter, Commonwealth Act No.
671 would have automatically ceased to have force and effect right in the year 1942 without any
affirmative act or law of the Legislature. There would be no point or reason for the President to
continue exercising emergency powers when there no longer was any emergency. But under the
view of the majority, emergency or no emergency even if Congress could meet in special session
to enact general legislation, the country must continue to be ruled by the Presidential decree until
the next regular session of Congress which may not come till may months later. In my opinion
this is not logical. To me the real and only reason and test for the continuance of the exercise of
emergency powers is the continued existence of the emergency, not the inability of the Congress
to meet in regular session.
The majority, and the parties who initiated these proceedings in court fear that the President may
promulgate rules and regulations contrary in purpose and effect to legislation enacted by the
Legislature; that he may reenact his rules and regulations after being repealed by the legislature,
and that he may even veto a bill passed by Congress repealing the Act of delegation and ending
his emergency powers. It is a fear not well founded. It runs counter to the presumption that the
Chief Executive like any other public official would perform his functions and conduct himself
in every respect for the good and welfare of the people and in accordance with the Constitution.
It is fear based on the presumption that the Legislature and the Chief Executive are at
loggerheads, working at cross purposes and that the President though acting as a mere agent of
his principal, the legislature, would brazenly repudiate his principal and even challenge its
authority, and that the Chief Executive is so much in love with his emergency powers that he
would perpetuate them by going as far as vetoing an act of Congress ending said emergency
powers. Let it be said to the credit of and in justice to the different Chief Executives who have
wielded these emergency powers, President Quezon, Osmea, Roxas and the present incumbent
President Quirino, that no accusing finger has ever been pointed at them, accusing or even
insinuating that they have abused their emergency powers or exercised them for any purpose
other than the welfare of the country, or that they had maliciously acted contrary to the wishes of
the Legislatures. Even after liberation there has been no claim not even from the Legislatures
itself, to the knowledge of this Court, at least to that of the undersigned, that any Chief Executive
exercised his delegated powers, knowing that they had ended or had abused the same.
There is no charge or insinuation that any of the Executive Orders which we are now holding to
be invalid were issued from the ulterior motives or to further and favor the political interest of
the President issuing them. It is admitted in the majority opinion that Executive Order No. 62,
seeking to regulate house and lot rentals was issued in good faith by President Roxas. Executive
Order No. 192 was issued to regulate exports, President Quirino presumably believing that
exports at this time still needed regulation and control as was formerly provided by Congress in
its Act No. 728, and that the matter was still within the field of his emergency powers as was also
mistakenly believed by President Roxas in issuing Executive Order No. 52. As to Executive
Order No. 226, it merely appropriated funds to defray the expenses in connection with the
holding of the national elections in November, 1949, without which, said election could not be
held. With respect to Executive Order No. 225, it merely continues in force Republic Act 320
which appropriated funds for the last fiscal year inasmuch as Congress had failed to pass a
General Appropriation Act for the operation of the National Government for the period
beginning July 1, 1949 to June 30, 1950. There is no insinuation that any political motives or
purposes are involved in these Executive Orders.
I agree with the majority that since the Constitution provides that the delegation of legislative
powers by the Legislature should be done for a limited period, it is to be presumed that
Commonwealth Act No. 671 was approved with this limitation in view. I even agree to its
definition of the word "limited." But I submit that Commonwealth Act No. 671 itself, limited its
operation and effectiveness to and make it coextensive with the duration of the emergency
resulting from the war and that furthermore, that duration is a limited period within the meaning
and contemplation of the Constitution. Surely the emergency resulting from the war
contemplated by the National Assembly when it acted Act No. 671 is not permanent or
indefinite. It is of limited duration. It may be long or it may be short; but it cannot be for always.
It has an end. Presumably the members of the National Assembly thought that the emergency
would not last as long as it did. The belief entertained at the time by not a few, in fact by a great
portion of the people here not excluding the legislators, was that the war with Japan would be of
short duration, a question of months at the longest; that American reinforcements would come at
the beginning of the year 1942 and drive away the invading Japanese armies if they ever were
able to occupy the Philippines and that, consequently, the war as far as these islands were
concerned and the resulting emergency would soon pass away. The wisdom or lack of wisdom of
the National Assembly in limiting or rather making the life and effectiveness of Commonwealth
Act No. 671 coextensive with the resulting emergency, viewed in the light of what had actually
happened, cannot be passed upon this Court. So, as I see it, so long as the emergency resulting
from the War continues, Commonwealth Act No. 671 subsists and so long the Chief Executive
retains his emergency powers.
The majority believes that as already stated, Act No. 671 was in force only until Congress could
meet resume its legislatives functions. Naturally, this view is based on the theory that legislative
functions in times of emergency are delegated only because of the inability of the Legislative
Department to meet and exercise its functions. I believe I have successfully demonstrated the
flaw in this theory, not only by showing that the real reason underlying the delegation of
legislative powers is not inability of Legislature to meet but rather it inability to consider and
pass legislation in time to meet an emergency which requires as it does urgent and immediate
action and can be solved only by the exercise of legislative functions by one single responsible
individual, unhamppered by study and prolonged discussion by many members of the legislative
body, but also by the fact that although since 1939 when the second world war broke out in
Europe and for a period of more than two years thereafter, when the National Assembly could
still meet and in fact convened on several occasions and for hundreds of days in regular and
special session, nevertheless, it had been delegating legislative powers to the President.
The majority view finds no support in the law. Section 26, Article VI of the Constitution does not
impose this condition or requirement. The only important conditions imposed by the Constitution
are that there be a national emergency and delegation be for a limited period. The same thing is
true with Act No. 671 which makes the delegation. The only condition imposed by section 2 of
said Act is that the delegated powers be exercised during the emergency. Neither in the
Constitution nor in Commonwealth Act No. 671 is there any hint or insinuation, much less
express mention about the inability of the Legislature to meet. When every consideration for
clearness and for Executive and Judicial guidance loudly called for and demanded an
unequivocal and clear expression of Constitutional and legislative intent, both laws, the source
and basis of the emergency powers are conspicuously silent on this point. The only conclusion is
that neither the framers of the Constitution nor the members of the National Assembly had
thought of much less intended to impose this condition. To sustain the majority view would
require reading into the law what is not there. In further support of its view that emergency
powers may be exercised by the President only until the Legislature could meet, the majority
finds comfort in and cites section 3 of Act 671 which reads as follows:
of the Congress of the Philippines report thereto all the rules and regulation promulgated
I fail to see anything in said section that warrants a holding that upon filing his report with
Congress, about the rules and regulation promulgated by him under his emergency powers under
Commonwealth Act 671, his emergency powers automatically ceased. I could well imagine that
under an act of delegation of legislative powers where the President is authorized to perform one
single act such as the suspension of the eight-hour labor law under Commonwealth Act No. 494,
or the reduction of the expenditures of the executive departments of the National Government by
the suspension or abandonment of services, activities or operations of no immediate necessity
under Commonwealth Act No. 500, when the President has exercised his delegated authority and
made his report to the Assembly as required by said laws, the latter, as well as his delegated
authority thereunder automatically ceased, for the simple reason that nothing remains to be
performed or done. However, treating of the grant of extensive emergency powers as was done
under Commonwealth Acts Nos. 600, 620 and 671 where said laws contemplated many different
acts, rules and regulations of varied categories and objectives and to be performed not at one at
time or instance but at different times during the existence of the emergency, as the need or
occasion arose, there is no reason for the belief or the holding that upon submitting a partial
report, the whole law making the delegation including his powers under it automatically ended.
The legislature during the emergency might be able to convene and naturally, the President will
immediately make his report to it of the rules and regulations promulgated by him up to that
time; but if the emergency continued or even became more serious, would it be reasonable to
hold that his emergency powers ended right then and there? Would it not be more logical and
reasonable to believe that inasmuch as the grant and the exercise of his emergency powers were
motivated by and based upon the existence of the emergency and since the emergency continued
his work and responsibility were not ended and that his partial report could not possibly affect
the continuance of his emergency powers?
Section 3 of Commonwealth Act No. 671 provides for the filing of a report with Congress by the
President as soon as that body convened. According to the majority opinion on that date the
whole Act No. 671 ceased to have force and effect. Under that theory, as soon as the Congress
convened in June, 1945, and it is to be presumed that President Osmea, complying with his
duty, must have made his report of all the numerous Executive Orders he had issued so far,
perhaps including those issued by his predecessor President Quezon who because of his
premature death was unable to report his acts to Congress, the President automatically lost his
emergency powers. But the majority opinion qualifies this convening of the Congress, for it says
that it must be a regular session and not a special session, thereby extending the life of
Commonwealth act No. 671 one year longer, to May, 1946 when Congress held its first regular
session after liberation. I do not quite see the necessity or the reason for the distinction made
between the special and regular session, for at both sessions Congress could well receive the
report of the President. The reason given is that "in a special session Congress may consider
general legislation or only such subjects as he (President) may designate." But as a matter of fact,
the first two special sessions called by President Osmea in 1945, after liberation, each for a
period of thirty days were both to consider general legislation. So, actually there is no reason for
the distinction.
Furthermore, if it were the intention of the Legislature to fix the time at which Commonwealth
Act No. 671 would cease in its operation as of the date when the President could file his report
before Congress when it first convened not in special session but in regular session, it would
have expressly and unequivocally said so. In its other acts of delegation of powers when the
legislature wanted to have the report of the President at its regular session, it expressly and
explicitly said so. In section 3 of Commonwealth Act 494, in section 5 of Commonwealth Act
496, in section 6 of Commonwealth Act 498, in section 3 of Commonwealth Act 500 and in
section 4 of Commonwealth Act 600, the National Assembly provided that the President shall
report to the National Assembly within ten days after the opening of the next regular session of
the said Assembly of whatever acts have been taken by him under the authority of those Acts.
The Assembly left nothing for interpretation or speculation. In section 3 of Commonwealth Act
671, however, the same Assembly has not specified the kind of session before which the
President should make his report. It merely said that upon the convening of the Congress the
President shall report thereto all the rules and regulations promulgated by him. We should make
no distinction where the law makes or calls for none. Here again, to support the majority opinion
would require reading into the law, section 3 of Act 671, something that is not there.
In case like the present where there is room for doubt as to whether or not Commonwealth Act
No. 671 has ceased to operate, one view (of the majority) being that it automatically ceased to
have any force and effect on May 25, 1946, the other view being that the law operated as long as
the emergency resulting from the war existed, the opinion of and the obvious interpretation given
by the legislature which enacted the law and made the delegation of powers and the President to
whom the delegation was made and who exercised said powers, should have much if not decisive
weight. We must bear in mind that we are not passing upon the validity or constitutionality of a
law enacted by the Legislature, in which case, the Court may find the act invalid and
unconstitutional if it is in violation of the basic law, regardless of the opinion or interpretation
given by the Legislature that passed it or of the Executive Department which may be trying to
enforce it. We assume that Act No. 671 is valid and constitutional. Here, we are merely trying to
ascertain the intention of the National Assembly as to the life and period of effectiveness of
Commonwealth Act No. 671.
Do the study and analysis of other acts of the Legislature similar to Commonwealth Act 671,
favor the view of the majority? The answer in my opinion is clearly and decidedly in the
negative. The majority cites the Commonwealth Acts Nos. 600 and 620 to support the theory that
Commonwealth Act 671 automatically ceased to operate Congress met at its next regular session.
But the logical inference or conclusion to be drawn from these two acts is, in my opinion, just the
reverse. It is even fatal to the view of the majority as I shall attempt to show. Let us consider
Commonwealth Act 600 delegating extensive legislative powers to the President, approved on
August 19, 1940, which like Act 671 is silent as to any express provision regarding its life or
period of effectiveness, and as to how long the emergency powers granted the President by it will
last. Section 4 of said Commonwealth Act No. 600 like section 3 of Act 671 provides that "the
President shall within the first ten days from the date of the opening of the Assembly's next
regular session report to said Assembly whatever action he had taken under the authority therein
granted." Said section 4 of Act 600 is clearly and more specific than section 3 of Act 671 in that
it clearly specifies the next regular session whereas the latter refers merely to the convening of
Congress. But let us assume arguendo as contended by the majority that "the convening of the
Congress" mentioned in section 3 of Commonwealth Act 671, referred to regular session.
According to the majority opinion, under section 4 of the Commonwealth Act No. 600, as soon
as the President made the report of the National Assembly at its "next regular session" which was
to be and was actually held in January, 1941, Commonwealth Act 600 automatically ceased to
operate and the President automatically lost his delegated legislative powers. But this contrary to
the very view of the National Assembly which passed said Act 600. Commonwealth Act No. 620
of the National Assembly passed during that "next regular session" and approved on June 6, 1941
merely amended section 1 of Commonwealth Act 600, which enumerated the powers delegated
to the Chief Executive. It left the rest of the provisions and sections of Commonwealth Act 600
intact. So that, under section 4 (which was left intact) of Act 600, the President was still required
to report to National Assembly within the first 10 days from the date of the opening of its next
regular session which should have begun in January, 1942, despite the fact that he had already
made a report to the Legislature in January, 1941. Incidentally, this answer and refutes the
contention of the majority that the law of delegation of powers contemplated only one meeting of
the Congress at which the President was to report his acts of emergency, and that said report was
to be the first and the last.
Now, what inference may be drawn from this amending of section 1 only of Commonwealth Act
No. 600 by Commonwealth Act No. 620? The logical conclusion is that in promulgating
Commonwealth Act 620 on June 6, 1941, the National Assembly all along regarded
Commonwealth Act No. 600 which delegated legislative powers to the President as still in force
and effect despite the report filed with the Assembly by the President at the beginning of its
regular session in January, 1941. When the Legislature merely amends a section of a law, leaving
the rest of said law intact and unchanged, the logical inference and conclusion is that the
amended law was still in force because you cannot amend a law which is no longer in force. The
only thing that could be done with a law that has ceased to operate is to reenact it. But in passing
Commonwealth Act 620 in July, 1941, the Assembly did not reenacted Commonwealth Act No.
600. By merely amending one of its sections, the Assembly, as late as June 1941, considered said
Act 600 as still effective and in operation and consequently, the emergency powers of the
President continued and subsisted despite his previously having made a report of his actions in
January 1941. This squarely refutes the theory that as soon as the President filed his report on the
exercise of his emergency powers with the Legislature, the Act making the delegation ceased to
operate and the President lost his emergency powers.
As I have already stated in the course of this opinion, in connection with another phrase of this
case from January to June, 1941, President Quezon had issued at least eight Executive Orders in
the exercise of his emergency powers, by authority of Commonwealth Act 600. From this it is
evident that he did not share the majority view, because despite his having made his report to the
Assembly in January, 1941, and even before the enactment of Commonwealth Act No. 620, he
believed and considered Commonwealth Act No. 600 as still in force after that date and that he
still retained his emergency powers.
Then, let us see what was the attitude and conduct of the Chief Executive and of Congress after
May 25, 1946, when according to the majority opinion Commonwealth Act No. 671 ceased to
operate. After May 25, 1946, two Presidents, Roxas and Quirino had issued numerous Executive
Orders based upon and invoking Commonwealth Act No. 671. Like President Quezon, they also
evidently were of the opinion that despite the meeting of the Legislature in regular session the act
delegating legislative powers to them (in the case of Roxas and QuirinoCommonwealth Act
No. 671) was still in force, that they still retained their emergency powers and so proceeded to
exercise them in good faith.
Congress also, evidently, believed that Commonwealth Act No. 671 was still in force and effect
after said date, May 25, 1946. In spite of the several legislative sessions, regular and special
since then and up to and including the year 1949, Congress has not by law or resolution said
anything questioning or doubting the validity of said Executive Order on the score of having
been promulgated after Commonwealth Act No. 671 had supposedly ceased to operate. Not only
this, but at least in one instance, Congress had by a law promulgated by it, considered one of
those supposed illegal Executive Orders promulgated after May 25, 1946, to be valid. I refer to
Republic Act No. 224 approved on June 5, 1948, creating the National Airport Corporation
which considered and treated as valid Executive Order No. 100, dated October 21, 1947, by
providing in section 7 of said Republic Act No. 224 for the abolishment of the Office of the
Administrator of the Manila International Airport established under the provisions of said
Executive Order No. 100 and the transfer of the personnel and funds created under the same
Executive Order to the National Airport Corporation. This Executive Order No. 100 which
appropriated public funds and therefore, was of a legislative nature must have been issued under
Commonwealth Act No. 671. It cannot possibly be regarded as having been promulgated by
authority of Republic Act No. 51, for said Act approved on October 4, 1946, gave the President
only one year within which to reorganize the different executive departments, offices, agencies,
etc. and Executive Order No. 100 was promulgated on October 23, 1947, after the expiration of
the one year period. Furthermore, it is a matter of common knowledge that during the last session
of Congress which ended in May, 1949, there was talk if not a movement in the Congress to end
the emergency powers of the President. Nothing concrete in the form of legislation or resolution
was done, for if we are to accept newspaper reports and comment, the members of Congress or at
least a majority of them were willing and satisfied to have the Chief Executive continue in the
exercise of his emergency powers until the end of 1949. All this leads to no other conclusion but
that Congress believed all along that Commonwealth Act No. 671 is still in force and effect.
If Commonwealth Act No. 671 is still in force and effect the question arises: how long and for
what period will said Act continue to operate? As I have already stated, I believe that the
delegation of emergency powers was made coextensive with the emergency resulting from the
war, as long as that emergency continues and unless the Legislature provides otherwise, Act 671
will continue to operate and the President may continue exercising his emergency powers.
The last and logical question that one will naturally ask is: has the emergency resulting from the
war passed or does it still exist? This is a fair and decisive question inasmuch as the existence of
the emergency is, my opinion, the test and the only basis of the operation or cessation of Act 671.
The existence or non-existence of the emergency resulting from the war is a question of fact. It is
based on conditions obtaining among the people and in the country and perhaps even near and
around it. It is highly controversial question on which people may honestly differ. There are
those who in all good faith believe and claim that conditions have returned to normal; that the
people have now enough to eat, sometimes even more than they had before the war; that people
nowadays especially in the cities are better nourished and clothed and transported and better
compensated for their labor, and that the President himself in his speeches, chats and messages
had assured the public that normal times have returned, that the problem of peace and order had
been solved, that the finances of the Government and the national economy are sound, and that
there is an adequate food supply. It is therefore, claimed that there is no longer any emergency
resulting from the war.
On the other hand, it is asserted with equal vehemence in the opposite camp that conditions are
still far from normal; that the picture painted by the President in cheerful and reassuring colors is
based on over optimism and, as to be expected, calculated to show in bold relief the
achievements of the administration, and so should be considered with some allowance; that we
are now importing more rice than before the war for the reason that many rice farms are idle
because of the farmer's fear of or interference by dissidents; that the problem of peace and order
is far from solved as shown by the frequent hold-ups, kidnapping, loothing and killings and
organized banditry not only in Luzon but also in the Visayas and Mindanao; that whereas before
the war, the Constabulary force consisting of only about 6,000 officers and men could provide
complete protection to life and property and was adequate in all respects to enforce peace and
order, now this Constabulary enlarged to about 20,000 men, provided with modern weapons and
equipment and with the aid of thousands of civilians guards and of the Philippine Army and Air
Force cannot solve the peace and order problem; that the dissidents who are well organized,
armed and disciplined even attack and sack towns and sometimes openly defy and engage the
armed Government forces; that as long as more than 100,000 firearms are loose and in the hands
of irresponsible parties, not excluding the seemingly regular mysterious supply to them of
additional firearms and ammunitions, there can be no peace and order; and as to the barrio folks
in central Luzon and now, even in provinces bordering central Luzon whose parents and relatives
had been killed by dissidents, whose women folk had been outraged by the same elements,
whose homes had been looted and burned and whose very lives had been subjected to constant
terror and peril, compelling them to leave their homes and their farms and evacuate to and be
concentrated in the poblaciones to live there in utter discomfort and privation, it is said that it
would be difficult to convince these unfortunate people that normalcy has returned and that there
is no longer any emergency resulting from the war. To further support the claim of the existence
of an emergency, the menace of communism not only at home, particularly in central Luzon but
from abroad, especially China, is invoked. And it is asserted that all this is a result of the war.
I repeat that this question of the existence of an emergency is a controversial one, the decision on
which must be based on the ascertainment of facts, circumstances and conditions and the
situation obtaining in the country. This Court is not in a position to decide that controversy. It
does not have the facilities to obtain and acquire the necessary facts and data on which to base a
valid and just decision. Neither did it have the opportunity to receive the necessary evidence as
in a hearing or trial at which evidence, oral or documentary, is introduced. We cannot invoked
and resort to judicial notice because this refers to things of public knowledge, and not
controverted, whereas things, facts and conditions necessary for the determination of whether or
not there is still an emergency, are often not of public knowledge but require investigation,
accurate reporting and close contact with the people to be able to ascertain their living
conditions, their needs, their fears, etc.
To me, the department of the Government equipped and in a position to decide this question of
emergency are the Chief Executive and the Legislature. The first has at his command and beck
and call all the executive officials and departments. He has the Army, the Constabulary, Naval
Patrol, the Police of the cities and towns and the barrio lieutenants to inform him of the state of
peace and order and the security of the states. He has the Secretary of Education and all the
subordinates officers and the school officials under him to inform him as to whether or not there
is a school crisis or emergency as a result of the war. He has the Secretary of Agriculture and
Natural Resources and his men to advise him as to the agricultural needs and the food supply of
the country. He has the Secretary of Finance and all the officials under him to inform him of the
finances of the Government and the economy of the country as well as the officials to advise him
of the land shipping transportation situation. In other words, the President is in a position to
determine whether or not there is still an emergency as a result of the war.
As to Congress, it is equally in a position and in fact it is the first to called upon to decide as to
the existence or non-existence of an emergency. According to the Constitution, section 24,
Article VI, either House of Congress may call upon the head of any department of the
Government on any matter pertaining to his departure. The members of Congress come from all
parts and the far corners of the country. They are supposed to be in close contact with their
constituents and know at first hand their needs, the way they live, etc. Congress therefore should
know. Moreover, it is the legislature that must first determine as to whether or not there is a
national emergency as a condition precedent to the delegation of its legislative powers. Naturally,
it is the one that is called upon to say when that emergency ceases.
Now, one will ask, what does Congress think about the emergency? Does it believe that it still
exists? To me the answer is YES. What has been said about the acts, conduct and attitude of the
legislature as to its belief that Commonwealth Act No. 671 is still in force, are all applicable and
may be repeated to show that the Congress believes that the emergency resulting from the war
still exist. Under the theory that I maintain, Congress must be of the opinion that the emergency
still exists for the reason that as I have shown Congress believes that Commonwealth Act No.
671 is still in force and the life and the operation of said Act depends upon and is coextensive
with the existence of the emergency. To this may be added the attitude and the belief of the
President as to the continued existence of the emergency. It must be borne in mind that
Commonwealth Act No. 671 authorizes the President to exercise his emergency powers
only during the existence of the emergency. The inference is that before exercising his emergency
powers by promulgating an Executive Order he must first determine and decide that the state of
emergency still exists, for that is the condition precedent to the exercise of his delegated powers.
In other words, the two departments of the Government, the Legislative and the Executive
Departments, best qualified and called upon to determine whether or not the emergency resulting
from the war still exists have made manifest in their acts and attitude that they believe that such
emergency still exists. I may here state that on this question of emergency, I entertain no personal
opinion either way lacking as I do the means of deciding fairly and justly. Neither has the Court.
If the decision of the courts on question of fact involved in a controversy are given due respect
and weight and are binding, it is because such decisions are based on evidence adduced and
received after a hearing. No such hearing was held for the purpose and no evidence been
received. In other words, we have nothing in which to decide a question of fact which is the
existence or non-existence of emergency.
In view of the conclusion we have arrived at, finding these Executive Orders to be void and of no
effect, particularly Executive Orders Nos. 225 and 226 with the evident result that no funds are
appropriated for the operation of the Government for the fiscal year beginning July of this year
and for the expenses in the coming national election next November, one may inquire as to what
will happen or what is to be done. The answer or answers to this question lie with the Chief
Executive. Congress will not meet in regular session until next year. It is not for the court, not
even the undersigned to suggest the calling of a special legislative session to cope with the
perilous situation thus created, altho one may regard that as a logical remedy. But, should the
President call a special session and Congress for one reason or another fails to meet or though it
meets, for one reason or another it fails to pass an appropriation law, then a real crisis will have
ensued. I am confident that the Chief Executive, conscious of his responsibility as the Chief of
the nation would not just stand supine and idle and see the Government of the Republic of the
Philippines disintegrate and die. He would know what to do and he would do something
according to his sound discretion and in accordance with the law, statutory or otherwise and in
the discharge of his high executive powers, express or implied.
TORRES, J., concurring:
I concur in the foregoing opinion of Mr. Justice Montemayor on the existence of the emergency
powers. I reserve my opinion on the validity of Executive Orders Nos. 225 and 226.
REYES, J., concurring and dissenting:
The main issue in these cases is whether the emergency which on December 16, 1941 prompted
the approval of Commonwealth Act No. 671, delegating extraordinary powers to the President,
still existed at the time the Chief Executive exercised those powers by promulgating the
executive orders whose validity is now challenged.
On issue similar to the one just formulated there is a diversity of opinions. While some courts
would rather leave the determination of such issues to the political department of the
Government, others are for making the determination subject to judicial review. But the latest
ruling of the United States Supreme Court on the point accords with first view and declares that
"these are matters of political judgment for which judges have neither technical competence nor
official responsibility." (Ludecke vs. Watkins, 92 L. ed., 1883.)
In any event the existence or non-existence of an emergency is a question of facts which may not
always be determine without the evidence by mere reference to facts within the judicial notice. In
the present cases, there has been no trial for the reception of proof, and I am not aware that
enough facts have been shown to justify the conclusion that the emergency in question has
already ceased. On the other hand, since the exercise of the emergency powers by the President
presupposes a determination of the existence of the emergency, the President must be presumed
to have satisfied himself in some appropriate manner that the emergency existed when he issued
his executive orders. Under the theory of separation of powers and in accord with the latest
ruling of the United States Supreme Court, it is not for the judiciary to review the finding of the
Executive in this regard. Judicial review would in such case amount to control of executive
discretion and place the judicial branch above a co-equal department of the Government. Only in
case of a manifest abuse of the exercise of powers by a political branch of the Government is
judicial interference allowable in order to maintain the supremacy of the Constitution. But with
the cold war still going on though the shooting war has already ended; with the world still in
turmoil so much so that the American Secretary of the State has declared that "the world has
never before in peace time been as troubled or hazardous as it is right now;" with most of the
industries of the country still unrihabilitated, so that a large proportion of our food and other
necessaries have to be imported; with a great portion of the population still living in temporary
quarters; with most of the war damage claims still unpaid; and with peace and other conditions in
the country far from normal, it would be presumptuous for this Court, without proof of the actual
condition obtaining in all parts of the Archipelago, to declare that the President clearly abused his
discretion when he considered the emergency not ended at the time he promulgated the executive
orders now questioned.
The majority opinion has skirted the issue of whether or not the question of the existence or
continuance of the emergency is one for the political department of the Government to determine
by restricting "the life of the emergency powers of the President to the time the Legislature was
prevented from holding session due to enemy action or other causes brought on by the war." I
cannot subscribe to this narrow interpretation of Commonwealth Act No. 671, for in my opinion
it is contrary to both the plain language and manifest purpose of that enactment. The law invests
the President with extraordinary powers in order to meet the emergency resulting from the war
and it expressly says that the President is to exercise those powers "during the existence of the
emergency." The Act does not say that the President may exercise the powers only when the
Legislature is not session. Much less does it say that the emergency powers shall cease as soon as
the Legislature has convened in regular session. An emergency resulting from a global war
cannot end with the mere meeting of the Legislature. Neither may be legislated out of existence.
The Legislature, once it was convened, may, if it so desire, revoked the emergency powers of the
President, but it cannot by any form of legislative action put an immediate end to the emergency
itself. Well known is a fact that a deliverative body, such as the Legislature, because of the time
consumed in the study and discussion of a measure, may not always act with the promptness
which the situation requires so that in an emergency there is really need for the concentration of
power in one man. This may well be the reason why Act No. 671 in express terms authorizes the
President to exercise the emergency powers "during the existence of the emergency" and not
merely during the time that the Legislature could be in session. For one thing to make the life of
the emergency powers depend upon the inability of the Legislature to meet is the same as to
declare those emergency powers automatically ended the moment they were conferred, for at that
very moment of the Legislature that conferred them was in session.
The argument that, unless the emergency powers of the President were made to cease the
moment Congress convened in regular session, we should be having two legislatures which
could mutually annul each other, will not stand analysis. In supposing that the President, in the
exercise of the emergency powers could "repeal or modify a bill passed by the Legislature," the
argument overlooks the fact that the emergency powers delegated to the President under Article
VI, section 26 of the Constitution could only authorize him "to promulgate rules and regulations
to carry out a declared national policy." Only the Legislature (with the concurrence of the
President of course) may declare the President may not, under the Constitution, depart from it.
Moreover, unless the Presidential veto could be overriden, no bill approved by Congress could
become a law if the President did not want it. And if the President approves a bill and allows it to
become a law, surely he can have no reason for repealing it; while, on the other hand, there is no
point in his repealing that bill, because if there are enough votes to override his veto there must
also be enough votes to repeal his emergency powers.
The majority opinion has I think placed a rather forced construction upon section 3 of
Commonwealth Act No. 671, which provides that
The President of the Philippines shall as soon as practicable upon the convening of the
Congress of the Philippines report thereto all the rules and regulations promulgated by
him under the powers herein granted.
As may be seen, the above provision does not say that the President has to report only once, that
is, the first time Congress is convened, and never again. But the majority opinion wants to read
that thought into the law in order to bolster up the theory that the emergency powers of the
President would end as soon as Congress could convene in a regular session.
Invoking the rule of contemporary construction, the majority opinion makes reference to a
passage in President Quezon's book. "The Good Fight," to the effect that, according to the author,
Act No. 671, was only "for a certain period" and "would become valid unless re-enacted." But I
see nothing in the quoted phrases any suggestion that the emergency powers of the President
were to end the moment Congress was convened in regular session regardless of the continuance
of the emergency which gave birth to those powers. A more valid application of the rule of
contemporary construction may, I think, be made by citing the executive orders promulgated by
President Roxas by Commonwealth Act No. 671. Many of those executive orders were issued
after May 25, 1946 when Congress convened in regular session, an event which, according to the
majority opinion, automatically put an end to the emergency powers.
While we have adopted the republican form of government with its three co-equal departments,
each acting within its separate sphere, it would be well to remember that we have not accepted
the American theory of separation of powers to its full extent. For, profiting from the experience
of America when her Supreme Court, by the application many a New Deal measure which her
Congress had approved to meet a national crisis, our Constitutional Convention in 1935, despite
the warning of those who feared a dictatorship in his country, decided to depart from the strict
theory of separation of powers by embodying a provision in our Constitution, authorizing the
delegation of legislative powers to the President "in times of war or other national emergency." It
is my surmise that this provision was intended to guard not only against the inability to meet but
also against its usual tardiness and inaction. We have proof of this last in the last regular session
of Congress, when this body failed to pass measures of pressing necessity, especially the annual
appropriation law and the appropriation for the expenses of the coming elections.
It is said that the need for an appropriation law for the fiscal year 1949-1950 as well for the
coming elections is not an emergency resulting from the war. But I say that if the emergency
resulting from the war as contemplated in Commonwealth Act No. 671 still exists, as the
President believes it exists or he would not have issued the executive orders in question (and it is
not for the Court to change that belief in the absence of proof that the President was clearly
wrong) would it not be a dereliction of duty on his part to fall to provide, during the emergency,
for the continuance of the functions of government, which is only possible with an appropriation
law? What would be gained by issuing rules and regulations to meet the emergency if there is no
Government to enforce and carry them out? The mere calling of a special is no guaranty that an
appropriation law will be passed or that one will be passed before the thousands of officials and
employees who work for the Government have starved. It is, probably, because of these
considerations that the National Assembly, in approving Commonwealth Act No. 671,
specifically empowered the President, during the existence of the emergency, "to continue in
force laws and appropriations which would lapse or otherwise become inoperative." And that Act
has authorized the President during the existence of the same emergency "to exercise such other
powers as he may deem necessary to enable the government to fulfill its responsibilities and to
maintain in force this authority." Under this specific provision, the appropriation for the expenses
of the coming elections would, naturally, come, for, without doubt, it is a measure to enable the
Government "to fulfill its responsibilities."
Consistently with the views above express, I am of the opinion that Executive Order No. 225,
appropriating funds for the operation of the Government of the Republic for the fiscal year 194950, and Executive Order No. 226, appropriating funds for the expenses of the coming national
elections in November, 1949, are valid so that the petition in G.R. No. L-3054, Eulogio
Rodriguez, Sr. vs. Treasurer of the Philippines, and the petition in G.R. No. L-3056, Antonio
Barredo, etc., vs. Commissioner on Election, et al., in which the said two executive orders are
respectively challenged, should be denied.
But Executive Order No. 62 (regulating rents) and Executive Order No. 192 (controlling exports)
stand on a different footing. The validity of Executive Order No. 62 can no longer be maintained
because of the approval by the Legislature of Commonwealth Act No. 689 and Republic Act No.
66, which regulate the same subject matter and which, as an expression of the national policy,
can not be deviated from by the President in the exercise of the emergency powers delegated to
him by Commonwealth Act No. 671. The same is true with respect to Executive Order No. 192
(controlling exports) in view of the passage of Commonwealth Act No. 728, regulating the same
subject matter, especially because section 4 of said Act terminates the power of the President
thereunder on December 31, 1948, if not sooner. Consequently, since the validity of these
executive orders (Nos. 62 and 192) can no longer be upheld, the petitions in G.R. Nos. L-2044,
L-2756 and L-3055, which seek to prohibit their enforcement, should be granted.
PADILLA, J., concurring and dissenting:
I join in this opinion of Mr. Justice Reyes. I wish to add that I agree with Mr. Justice Bengzon
that petitioners in G. R. Nos. L-3054 and L-3056 have no personality to institute the proceedings.
BENGZON, J., dissenting:

The majority feels that it has to decide the question whether the President still has emergency
powers; but unable to determine in which of the above cases the issue may properly be decided,
it grouped them together. When the eye or the hand is unsure, it is best to shoot at five birds in a
group: firing at one after another may mean as many misses.
It does not matter that the first two cases had been submitted and voted before the submission of
the last three. Neither does it matter that, of these last, two should be thrown out in accordance
with our previous rulings. The target must be large.
These cases could be, and should be decided separately. If they are, they may be disposed of
without ruling on the general question whether the President still has emergency powers under
Commonwealth Act No. 7671. How? This way, which is my vote.
1. L-2044, Araneta vs. Dinglasan; L-2756, Araneta vs. Angeles. The President has presently no
power to regulate rents, because his power to do so is granted by Commonwealth Acts Nos. 600
and 620 which have lapsed. Under Commonwealth Act No. 671 he has no power to regulate
rents.
2. L-3056, Barredo vs. Commission, etc. Dismissed because petitioner has no personality to
sue. According to Custodio vs. President of the Senate et al., 42 Off. Gaz., 1243, a citizen and
taxpayer, as such, has no legal standing to institute proceedings for the annulment of a statute.
3. L-3054, Rodriguez vs. Treasurer. Dismissed, like the Barredo case. The private rights of
petitioner and of his partymen are affected only as taxpayers.
4. L-3055, Guerrero vs. Commissioner of Customs. Supposing that the President still has
emergency powers under Commonwealth Act No. 671, and that they include regulation of
exportation, inasmuch as the Congress has chosen to legislate on exports (Commonwealth Act
No. 728), it has thereby pro tanto withdrawn the power delegated to the President along that
field.
It is a sound rule, I believe, for the Court to determine only those questions which are
necessary to decide a case.
Although I am favorably impressed by the considerations set forth by Mr. Justice Montemayor
and Mr. Justice Reyes on the existence of emergency powers, I prefer to vote as herein indicated.
I reserve the right subsequently to elaborate on the above propositions.
For lack of the required number of votes, judgment was not obtained. However, after rehearing,
the required number of votes was had, by resolution of September 16, 1949, which follows.
RESOLUTION
September 16, 1949
MORAN, C. J.:
Petitioners filed motions asking (1) that Mr. Justice Padilla be qualified to act in these cases; (2)
that the vote cast by the late Mr. Justice Perpecto before his death be counted in their favor; and
(3) that the opinion of the Chief Justice be counted as a vote for the nullity of Executive Orders
Nos. 225 and 226.
I
As regards the motion to disqualify Mr. Justice Padilla, the Court is of the opinion that it must
not be considered, it having been presented after Mr. Justice Padilla had given his opinion on the
merits of these cases. As we have once said "a litigant . . . cannot be permitted to speculate upon
the action of the court and raise an objection of this sort after decision has been rendered."
(Government of the Philippine Islands vs. Heirs of Abella, 49 Phil., 374.)
Furthermore, the fact that Justice Padilla, while Secretary of Justice, had advised the President on
the question of emergency powers, does not disqualify him to act in these cases, for he cannot be
considered as having acted previously in these actions as counsel of any of the parties. The
President is not here a party.
All the members of this Court concur in the denial of the motion to disqualify Mr. Justice Padilla,
with the exception of Mr. Justice Ozaeta and Mr. Justice Feria who reserve their vote.
II
With respect to the motion to include the vote and opinion of the late Mr. Justice Perfecto in the
decision of these cases, it appears that Mr. Justice Perfecto died and ceased to be a member of
this Court on August 17, 1949, and our decision in these cases was released for publication on
August 26, 1949. Rule 53, section 1, in connection with Rule 58, section 1, of the Rules of Court,
is as follows:
SECTION 1. Judges: who may take part. All matters submitted to the court for its
consideration and adjudication will be deemed to be submitted for consideration and
adjudication by any and all of the justices who are members of the court at the time when
such matters are taken up for consideration and adjudication, whether such justices were
or not members of the court and whether they were or were not present at the date of
submission; . . . .
Under this provision, one who is not a member of the court at the time an adjudication is made
cannot take part in the adjudication. The word "adjudication" means decision. A case can be
adjudicated only by means of a decision. And a decision of this Court, to be of value and binding
force, must be in writing duly signed and promulgated (Article VIII, sections 11 and 12, of the
Constitution; Republic Act No. 296, section 21; Rule 53, section 7, of the Rules of Court).
Promulgated means the delivery of the decision to the Clerk of Court for filing and publication.
Accordingly, one who is no longer a member of this Court at the time a decision is signed and
promulgated, cannot validly take part in that decision. As above indicated, the true decision of
the Court is the decision signed by the Justices and duly promulgated. Before that decision is so
signed and promulgated, there is no decision of the Court to speak of. The vote cast by a member
of the Court after deliberation is always understood to be subject to confirmation at the time he
has to sign the decision that is to be promulgated. That vote is of no value if it is not thus
confirmed by the Justice casting it. The purpose of this practice is apparent. Members of this
Court, even after they have cast their vote, wish to preserve their freedom of action till the last
moment when they have to sign the decision, so that they may take full advantage of what they
may believe to be the best fruit of their most mature reflection and deliberation. In consonance
with this practice, before a decision is signed and promulgated, all opinions and conclusions
stated during and after the deliberation of the Court, remain in the breast of the Justices, binding
upon no one, not even upon the Justices themselves. Of course, they may serve for determining
what the opinion of the majority provisionally is and for designating a member to prepare the
decision binding unless and until duly signed and promulgated.
And this is practically what we have said in the contempt case against Abelardo
Subido,1 promulgated on September 28, 1948:
que un asunto o causa pendiente en esta Corte Suprema solo se considera decidido una
vez registrada, promulgada y publicada la sentencia en la escribania, y que hasta entonces
el resultado de la votacion se estima como una materia absolutamente reservada y
confidencial, perteneciente exclusivamente a las camaras interiores de la Corte.
In an earlier case we had occasion to state that the decisive point is the date of promulgation of
judgment. In that case a judge rendered his decision on January 14; qualified himself as
Secretary of Finance on January 16; and his decision was promulgated on January 17. We held
that the decision was void because at the time of its promulgation the judge who prepared it was
no longer a judge. (Lino Luna vs. Rodriquez, 37 Phil., 186.)
Another reason why the vote and opinion of the Mr. Justice Perfecto can not be considered in
these cases is that his successor, Mr. Justice Torres, has been allowed by this Court to take part in
the decision on the question of emergency powers because of lack of majority on that question.
And Mr. Justice Torres is not bound to follow any opinion previously held by Mr. Justice
Perfecto on that matter. There is no law or rule providing that a successor is a mere executor of
his predecessor's will. On the contrary, the successor must act according to his own opinion for
the simple reason that the responsibility for his action is his and of no one else. Of course, where
a valid and recorded act has been executed by the predecessor and only a ministerial duty
remains to be performed for its completion, the act must be completed accordingly. For instance,
where the predecessor had rendered a valid judgment duly filed and promulgated, the entry of
that judgment which is a ministerial duty, may be ordered by the successor as a matter of course.
But even in that case, if the successor is moved to reconsider the decision, and he still may do so
within the period provided by the rules, he is not bound to follow the opinion of his predecessor,
which he may set aside according to what he may believe to be for the best interests of justice.
We are of the opinion, therefore, that the motion to include the vote and opinion of the late
Justice Perfecto in the decision of these cases must be denied.
Mr. Justice Paras, Mr. Justice Bengzon, Mr. Justice Padilla, Mr. Justice Montemayor, Mr. Justice
Alex. Reyes, and Mr. Justice Torres concur in this denial. Mr. Justice Ozaeta, Mr. Justice Feria
and Mr. Justice Tuason dissent.
III
In connection with the motion to consider the opinion of the Chief Justice as a vote in favor of
petitioners, the writer has the following to say:
In my previous concurring opinion, I expressed the view that the emergency powers vested in
Commonwealth Act No. 671 had ceased in June 1945, but I voted for a deferment of judgment in
these two cases because of two circumstances then present, namely, (1) the need of sustaining the
two executive orders on appropriations as the life-line of government and (2) the fact that a
special session of Congress was to be held in a few days. I then asked, "Why not defer judgment
and wait until the special session of Congress so that it may fulfill its duty as it clearly sees it?"
It seemed then to me unwise and inexpedient to force the Government into imminent disruption
by allowing the nullity of the executive orders to follow its reglementary consequences when
Congress was soon to be convened for the very purpose of passing, among other urgent
measures, a valid appropriations act. Considering the facility with which Congress could remedy
the existing anomaly, I deemed it a slavish submission to a constitutional formula for this Court
to seize upon its power under the fundamental law to nullify the executive orders in question. A
deferment of judgment struck me then as wise. I reasoned that judicial statesmanship, not judicial
supremacy, was needed.
However, now that the holding of a special session of Congress for the purpose of remedying the
nullity of the executive orders in question appears remote and uncertain, I am compelled to, and
do hereby, give my unqualified concurrence in the decision penned by Mr. Justice Tuason
declaring that these two executive orders were issued without authority of law.
While in voting for a temporary deferment of the judgment I was moved by the belief that the
positive compliance with the Constitution by the other branches of the Government, which is our
prime concern in all these cases, would be effected, and indefinite deferment will produce the
opposite result because it would legitimize a prolonged or permanent evasion of our organic law.
Executive orders which are, in our opinion, repugnant to the Constitution, would be given
permanent life, opening the way to practices which may undermine our constitutional structure.
The harmful consequences which, as I envisioned in my concurring opinion, would come to pass
should the said executive orders be immediately declared null and void, are still real. They have
not disappeared by reason of the fact that a special session of the Congress is not now
forthcoming. However, the remedy now lies in the hands of the Chief Executive and of
Congress, for the Constitution vests in the former the power to call a special session should the
need for one arise, and in the latter, the power to pass a valid appropriation act.
That Congress may again fall to pass a valid appropriations act is a remote possibility, for under
the circumstances it fully realizes its great responsibility of saving the nation from breaking
down; and furthermore, the President in the exercise of his constitutional powers may, if he so
desires, compel Congress to remain in special session till it approves the legislative measures
most needed by the country.
Democracy is on trial in the Philippines, and surely it will emerge victorious as a permanent way
of life in this country, if each of the great branches of the Government, within its own allocated
spear, complies with its own constitutional duty, uncompromisingly and regardless of difficulties.
Our Republic is still young, and the vital principle underlying its organic structure should be
maintained firm and strong, hard as the best of steel, so as to insure its growth and development
along solid lines of a stable and vigorous democracy.
With my declaration that Executive Orders Nos. 225 and 226 are null and void, and with the vote
to the effect of Mr. Justice Ozaeta, Mr. Justice Paras, Mr. Justice Feria, Mr. Justice Tuason and
Mr. Justice Montemayor, there is a sufficient majority to pronounce a valid judgment on that
matter.
It is maintained by the Solicitor General and the amicus curiae that eight Justices are necessary
to pronounce a judgment on the nullity of the executive orders in question, under section 9 of
Republic Act No. 296 and Article VIII, section 10 of the Constitution. This theory is made to rest
on the ground that said executive orders must be considered as laws, they having been issued by
the Chief Executive in the exercise of the legislative powers delegated to him.
It is the opinion of the Court that the executive orders in question, even if issued within the
powers validly vested in the Chief Executive, are not laws, although they may have the force of
law, in exactly the same manner as the judgments of this Court, municipal ordinances and
ordinary executive orders cannot be considered as laws, even if they have the force of law.
Under Article VI, section 26, of the Constitution, the only power which, in times of war or other
national emergency, may be vested by Congress in the President, is the power "to promulgate
rules and regulations to carry out a declared national policy." Consequently, the executive orders
issued by the President in pursuance of the power delegated to him under that provision of the
Constitution, may be considered only as rules and regulations. There is nothing either in the
Constitution or in the Judiciary Act requiring the vote of eight Justices to nullify a rule or
regulation or an executive order issued by the President. It is very significant that in the previous
drafts of section 10, Article VII of the Constitution, "executive order" and "regulation" were
included among those that required for their nullification the vote of two thirds of all of the
members of the Court. But "executive order" and "regulations" were later deleted from the final
draft (Aruego, The Framing of the Philippine Constitution, Vol. I, pp. 495, 496), and thus a mere
majority of six members of this Court is enough to nullify them.
All the members of the Court concur in this view.
For all the foregoing, the Court denies the motion to disqualify Mr. Justice Padilla, and the
motion to include the vote of the late Mr. Justice Perfecto in the decision of these cases. And it is
the judgment of this Court to declare Executive Orders Nos. 225 and 226, null and void, with the
dissent of Mr. Justice Bengzon, Mr. Justice Padilla and Mr. Justice Reyes, upon the grounds
already stated in their respective opinions, and with Mr. Justice Torres abstaining.
But in order to avoid a possible disruption or interruption in a normal operation of the
Government, it is decreed, by the majority, of course, that this judgment take effect upon the
expiration of fifteen days from the date of its entry. No costs to be charged.
Ozaeta, Paras, Bengzon, Padilla, Tuason, Montemayor, Reyes and Torres, JJ., concur.
FERIA, J., concurring:

The respondent in the cases G. R. Nos. L-3054 and L-3056 contend that the petitioners in said
cases can not institute an action to invalidate the Executive Orders Nos. 225 and 226
promulgated by the President, because they have no interest in preventing the illegal
expenditures of moneys raised by taxation, and can not therefore question the validity of said
executive orders requiring expenditures of public money.
Although the Supreme Court, in the case of Custodio vs. President of the Senate, G. R. No. L117 (42 Off. Gaz., 1243) held in a minute resolution "That the constitutionality of a legislative
act is open to attack only by person whose rights are affected thereby, that one who invokes the
power of the court to declare an Act of Congress to be unconstitutional must be able to show not
only that the statute is invalid, but that he has sustained or is in immediate danger of sustaining
some direct injury as the result of its enforcement," that ruling was laid down without a careful
consideration and is contrary to the ruling laid down in the majority of jurisdictions in the United
States that "In the determination of the degree of interest essential to give the requisite standing
to attack the constitutionality of a statute, the general rule is that not only persons individually
affected, but also have taxpayers, have sufficient interest in preventing the illegal expenditures of
money raised by taxation and may therefore question the constitutionality of statutes requiring
expenditures of public moneys." (Am. Jur., Vol. 11, p. 761) All the members of this Court, except
two, in taking cognizance of those cases, rejected the respondents' contention, reversed the ruling
in said case and adopted the general rule above mentioned; and we believe the latter is better
than the one adopted in said case of Custodio, which was based on a doctrine adhered to only in
few jurisdiction in the United States; because if a taxpayer can not attack the validity of the
executive orders in question or a law requiring the expenditure of public moneys, one under our
laws could question the validity of such laws or executive orders.
After laying down the fundamental principles involved in the case at bar, we shall discuss and
show that Commonwealth Act No. 671 was no longer in force at the time the Executive Orders
under consideration were promulgated, because even the respondents in the cases G. R. Nos. L2044 and L-2756, in sustaining the validity of the Executive Order No. 62 rely not only on
Commonwealth Act No. 600 as amended by Commonwealth Act No. 620, but on
Commonwealth Act No. 671; and afterwards we shall refute the arguments in support of the
contrary proposition that said Commonwealth Act No. 671 is still in force and, therefore, the
President may exercise now the legislative powers therein delegated to him.
PRELIMINARY
The Constitution of the Philippines, drafted by the duly elected representatives of the Filipino
people, provides in its section 1, Article II, that "The Philippines is a republican states,
sovereignty resides in the people and all government authority emanates from them." The people
have delegated the government authority to three different and separate Departments:
Legislative, Executive, and Judicial. In section 1, Article VI, the legislative power to make laws
is conferred upon Congress; the executive power to faithfully executed the laws is vested by
sections 1 and 10 of Article VII, in the President; and the judicial power is vested by section 1,
Article VII, in one Supreme Court and in such inferior courts as may be established by law, the
Supreme Court having the supremacy to pass upon "the constitutionality or validity of any treaty,
law, ordinance, or executive order or regulations."
The distribution by the Constitution of the powers of government to the Legislative, Executive,
and Judicial Departments operates, by implication, as an inhibition against the exercise by one
department of the powers which belong to another, and imposes upon each of the three
departments the duty of exercising its own peculiar powers by itself, and prohibits the delegation
of any of those powers except in cases expressly permitted by the Constitution. The principle of
the separation of the powers of government is fundamental to the very existence of a
constitutional government as established in the Philippines patterned after that of the United
States of America. The division of governmental powers into legislative, executive, and judicial
represents the most important principle of government that guarantees the liberties of the people,
for it prevents a concentration of powers in the hands of one person or class of persons.
Under the doctrine of separation of the powers of government, the law-making functions is
assigned exclusively to the legislative, and the legislative branch cannot delegate the power to
make laws to any other authority. But it must be borne in mind that what cannot be delegated is
that which is purely legislative in nature, not administrative. There are powers so far legislative
that may properly be exercised by the legislature, but which may nevertheless be delegated
because they may be advantageously exercised in proper cases by persons belonging to the other
departments of the government, such as the authority to make rules and regulations of
administrative character to carry out an legislative purposes or to effect the operation and
enforcement of a law. As illustrations of the proper exercise of the power of Congress to delegate
the authority to promulgate rules and regulations with the necessary details to carry into effect a
law, are Act No. 3155 empowering the Governor General then, now the President, to suspend or
not, at his discretion, the prohibition of the importation of foreign cattle (Cruz vs. Youngberg, 56
Phil., 234; Act No. 3106 authorizing the Commissioner of the Public Service Commission to
regulate those engaged in various occupations or business affected with a public interest, and to
prescribe what the charges shall be for services rendered in the conduct of such business (Cebu
Autobus Co. vs.De Jesus, 56 Phil., 446); and the National Industrial Recovery Act enacted by the
Congress of the United States authorizing the President to promulgate administrative rules and
regulations to carry out the emergency measure enacted by Congress, though a part thereof was
declared unconstitutional for producing a delegation of legislative authority which is unconfined,
"and not canalized within banks to keep it from ever flowing."
Athough, in principle, the power of the Legislature to make laws or perform acts purely
legislative in nature may only be delegated by Congress to another authority or officers of either
the executive or judicial department when expressly permitted by the Constitution, no such
delegation is authorized by the State constitution or Federal Constitution of the Untied States. It
is a fact admitted by the attorneys and amici curiae for the petitioners and respondents in these
case that section 26, Article VI, our Constitution is unique and has no counterpart in said
constitutions, and for that reason not a single case involving a question similar to the one herein
involved has never been submitted to and passed upon by the courts of last resort in the United
States. The provision of our Constitution reads as follows:
SEC. 26. In times of war or other national emergency, the Congress may by law authorize
the President, for a limited period and subject to such restrictions as it may prescribe, to
It is important to observe that what the above-quoted constitutional provision empowers
Congress to delegate to the President, is not the power to promulgate rules and regulations of
administrative nature, for this may also be delegated at any time without necessity of an express
authority by the Constitution, but the power to promulgate rules and regulations purely
legislative in nature, leaving to the discretion of the President the determination of what rules or
regulations shall be or what acts are necessary to effectuate the so-called declared national
policy, for otherwise it would not have been necessary for the Constitution to authorize Congress
to make such delegation.
DEMONSTRATION
The Constitution permits Congress to authorize the President of the Philippines to promulgate
rules and regulations of legislative nature only (1) in times of war or (2) other national
emergency, such as rebellion, flood, earthquake, pestilence, economic depression, famine or any
other emergency different from war itself affecting the nation.
It is obvious that it is Congress and not a particular emergency and to authorize the President to
promulgate rules and regulations to cope with it. Therefore, if Congress declares that there exist a
war as a national emergency and empowers the President to promulgate rules and regulations to
tide over the emergency, the latter could not, because he believes that there is an economic
emergency or depression or any emergency other than war itself, exercise the legislative power
delegated to meet such economic or other emergency.
The Constitution requires also that the delegation be for a limited period or other authority so
delegated shall cease ipso facto at the expiration of the period, because to require an express
legislation to repel or terminate the delegated legislative authority of the President might be
subversive to the constitutional separation of powers in out democratic form of government, for
the President my prevent indefinitely the repeal of his delegated authority by the exercise of his
veto power, since the veto could be overridden only by two-thirds vote and it would be extremely
difficult to repeal it in subservient Congress dominated by the Chief Executive. Besides, to
provide that the delegated legislative powers shall continue to exist until repealed by the
Congress, would be delegation not for limited, but for an unlimited period or rather without any
limitation at all, because all acts enacted are always subjects to repeal by the Congress, without
necessity to providing so.
No question is raised as to the constitutionality of Commonwealth Act No. 671 under which
Executive Orders Nos. 62, 192, 225 and 226 were promulgated by the President of the
Philippines according to the contention of the respondents. The question involved is the validity
(not constitutionality) of said executive orders, that is, whether or not the President had authority
to promulgate them under Commonwealth Act No. 671; and therefore the concurrence of twothirds of all the members of this Court required by section 10, Article VIII of the Constitution to
declare a treaty or law unconstitutional is not required for adjudging the executive orders in
question invalid or not authorized by Commonwealth Act No. 671, which read as follows:
COMMONWEALTH ACT NO. 671

SECTION 1. The existence of war between the United States and other countries
of Europe and Asia, which involves the Philippines, makes it necessary to invest
the President with extraordinary powers in order to meet the resulting emergency.
SEC. 2. Pursuant to the provisions of Article VI, section 16, of the Constitution,
the President is hereby authorized, during the existence of the emergency, to
promulgate such rules and regulations as he may deem necessary to carry out the
national policy declared in section 1 hereof. Accordingly he is, among other
things, empowered (a) to transfer the seat of the Government or any of its
subdivisions, branches, departments, offices, agencies or instrumentalities; (b) to
reorganize the government of the Commonwealth including the determination of
the order of procedure of the heads of the Executive Departments; (c) to create
new subdivisions, branches, departments, offices, agencies or instrumentalities of
Government and to abolish any of those already existing; (d) to continue in force
laws and appropriations which would lapse or otherwise become inoperative, and
to modify or suspend the operation or application of those of an administrative
character; (e) to impose new taxes or to increase, reduce, suspend, or abolish
those in existence; (f) to raise funds through the issuance of bonds or otherwise,
and to authorize the expenditure of the proceeds thereof (g) to authorize the
National, provincial, city or municipal governments to incur in overdrafts for
purposes that he may approve; (h) to declare the suspension of the collection of
credits or the payment of debts; and (i) to exercise such other powers as he may
deem necessary to enable the Government to fulfill its responsibilities and to
maintain and enforce its authority.
SEC. 3. The President of the Philippines shall as soon as practicable upon the
convening of the Congress of the Philippines report thereto all the rules and
regulations promulgated by him under the powers herein granted.
SEC. 4. This Act shall take upon its approval, and the rules and regulations
promulgated hereunder shall be in force and effect until the Congress of the
Philippines shall otherwise provide.
Approved, December 16, 1941.
Taking into consideration the presumption that Congress was familiar with the well-known limits
of its powers under section 26, Article VI, of the Constitution and did not intend to exceed said
powers in enacting Commonwealth Act No. 671, the express provisions of Commonwealth Acts.
Nos. 494, 496, 498, 499, 500, 600 as amended by 620 and 671, and those of Commonwealth Act
No. 689 as amended by Republic Act No. 66 and Republic Acts Nos. 51 and 728, we are of the
opinion, and therefore so hold, that the actual war in the Philippine territory and not any other
national emergency is contemplated in Commonwealth Act No. 671, and that the period of time
during which the President was empowered by said Commonwealth Act No. 671 to promulgate
rules and regulations was limited to the existence of such war or invasion of the Philippines by
the enemy, which prevented the Congress to meet in a regular session. Such emergency having
ceased to exist upon the complete liberation of the Philippines from the enemy's occupation,
Commonwealth Act No. 671 had ceased to be in force and effect at the date of the adjournment
of the next regular session of the Congress in 1946, before the promulgation of said executive
orders, and hence they are null and void.
In view of the existence of a state of national emergency caused by the last world war among
several nations of the world, the second National Assembly during its second special session
passed the following acts: (a) Commonwealth Act No. 494 authorizing the President until the
adjournment of the next regular session of the National Assembly, to suspend the operation of
Commonwealth Act No. 444, commonly known as the "Eight-Hour Labor-Law," when in his
judgment the public interest so required, in order to prevent a dislocation of the productive forces
of the country; (b) Commonwealth Act No. 496 delegating to the President the power expressly
granted by section 6, Article XIII, of the Constitution to the State "until the date of adjournment
of the next regular session of the National Assembly, to take over solely for use or operation by
the Government during the existence of the emergency any public service or enterprise and to
operate the same," upon payment of just compensation; (c) Commonwealth Act No. 498,
authorizing the President, among others, to fix the maximum selling prices of foods, clothing,
fuel, fertilizers, chemicals, building materials, implements, machinery, and equipment required in
agriculture and industry, and other articles or commodities of prime necessity, and to promulgate
such rules and regulations as he may deem necessary in the public interest, which rules and
regulations shall have the force and effect of law until the date of the adjournment of the next
regular session of the National Assembly; (d) Commonwealth Act No. 499 providing that until
the date of the adjournment of the next regular session of the National Assembly, any sale,
mortgage, lease, charter, delivery, transfer of vessels owned in whole or in part by a citizen of the
Philippines or by a corporation organizes under the laws of the Philippines, to any person not a
citizen of the United States or of the Philippines, shall be null and void, without the approval of
the President of the Philippines; and Commonwealth Act No. 500 authorizing the President to
reduce the expenditure of the Executive Department of the National Government by the
suspension or abandonment of services, activities or operations of no immediate necessity, which
authority shall be exercised only when the National Assembly is not in session. All these
Commonwealth Acts took effect upon their approval on September 30, 1939, a short time after
the invasion of Poland by Germany.
During the fourth special session of the second National Assembly, Commonwealth Act No. 600,
which superseded the above-mentioned emergency power acts, was passed and took effect on its
approval on August 19, 1940. This Act No. 600 expressly declared that the existence of war in
many parts of the world had created a national emergency which made it necessary to invest the
President with extraordinary powers in order to safeguard the integrity of the Philippines and to
insure the tranquility of its inhabitants, by suppressing espionage, lawlessness, and all supervise
activities, by preventing or relieving unemployment, by insuring to the people adequate shelter
and clothing and sufficient food supply, etc. To carry out this policy the President was
"authorized to promulgate rules and regulations which shall have the force and effect of law until
the date of adjournment of the next regular session of the National Assembly," which rules and
regulations may embrace the objects therein enumerated. And the National Assembly in its
regular session commencing in January, 1941, in view of the fact that the delegated authority
granted to the President by Commonwealth Acts Nos. 494, 496, 498, 500, and 600 was to
terminate at the date of the adjournment of that regular session of the National Assembly, passed
Act No. 620 which took effect upon its approval on June 6, 1941, amending section 1 of
Commonwealth Act No. 600 by extending the delegated legislative authority of the President
until the date of the adjournment of the next regular session of the Congress of the Philippines,
instead of the National Assembly, the Constitution having been amended by substituting the
Congress of the Philippines for the National Assembly..
Although Commonwealth Act No. 600, as amended by Commonwealth Act No. 620, provides
that "the President is authorized to promulgate rules and regulations which shall have the force
and effect of law until the date of adjournment of the next regular session of the Congress of the
Philippines," it is evident that this limitation was intended to apply, not only to the effectivity of
the rules and regulations already promulgated, but specially to the authority granted to the
President to promulgated them, for the following reasons: First, because Commonwealth Act
Nos. 494, 496, 498, 499, and 500 had expressly limited the authority of the President to exercise
the delegated power while the Assembly was not in session until the date of the adjournment of
the next regular session of then National Assembly, and there was absolutely no reason
whatsoever why the National Assembly, in enacting Commonwealth Act No. 600 as amended,
which superseded said Act, would not impose the same limitation on the authority delegated in
Commonwealth Act No. 600 as amended in compliance with the requirement of the Constitution;
secondly, because it would have been useless to give the rules and regulations the effect and
force of law only until the date of the adjournment of the next regular session of the Congress, if
the President might, after said adjournment, continue exercising his delegated legislative powers
to promulgate again the same and other rules and regulations; and lastly, because to construe
Commonwealth Act No. 600, as amended by Act No. 620, otherwise would be to make the
delegation not for a limited but for an indefinite period of time, in violation of the express
provision of section 26, Article VI of the Constitution.
All the above-mentioned Acts Nos. 494, 496, 499, 500, and 600 before its amendment show that
it was the intention or policy of the National Assembly, in delegating legislative functions to the
President, to limit the exercise of the latter's authority to the interregnum while the National
Assembly or Congress of the Philippines was not in session until the date of the adjournment of
the next regular session thereof, which interregnum might have extended over a long period of
time had the war in Europe involved and made the Philippines a battle ground before the next
regular session of the Congress had convened. And the authority granted to the President of
Commonwealth Act No. 600, as amended, had to be extended over a long period of time during
the occupation because, before the meeting of the next regular session of the Congress, the
Philippines was involved in the war of the United States and invaded and occupied by the
Japanese forces. And the President was authorized to exercise his delegated powers until the date
of the adjournment of the next regular session of the Congress, for the reason that although
during the next regular session a bill may be passed, by the Congress, it would not become a law
until it was approved, expressly or impliedly, by the President during the period of twenty days
after it shall have been presented to him.
The reason of the limitation is that if Congress were in position to act it would not be necessary
for it to make such legislative delegation to the President, for Congress may in all cases act,
declare its will and, after fixing a primary standard or yardstick, authorize the President to fill up
the details by prescribing administrative rules and regulations to cope with the actual conditions
of any emergency; and it is inconceivable that there may arise an emergency of such a nature that
would require immediate action and can not wait, without irreparable or great injury to the public
interest, and action of the legislative in regular or special session called by the Chief Executive
for the purpose of meeting it. If in the United States they could withstand and have withstood all
kinds of emergency without resorting to the delegation by the legislative body of legislative
power to the Executive except those of administrative nature, because no such delegation is
permitted by the States and Federal constitution, as above stated, there is no reason why the same
can not be done in the Philippines. The frames of our Constitution and the national Assembly that
enacted Commonwealth Act No. 671 are presumed to be aware of the inconvenience and
chaotical consequences of having two legislative bodies acting at one and the same time.
It is true that Commonwealth Act No. 671 does not expressly say that the President is authorized
to promulgates rules and regulations until the date of the adjournment of the next regular session
of the National Assembly or Congress as the above-quoted Commonwealth Acts; but it is also
true that it clearly provides that "pursuant to the provisions of Article VI, section 26, of the
Constitution, the President is hereby authorized, during the existence of the emergency, to
promulgate such rules and regulations as he may deem necessary to carry out the national policy
declared"; and that the definite and specific emergency therein referred to is no other that the
"state of total emergency as a result of war involving the Philippines", declared in the title of said
Act No. 671, that was the reason for which the President was "authorize to promulgate rules and
regulations to meet resulting emergency." It is obvious that what Act No. 671 calls "total
emergency" was the invasion and occupation of the Philippines by the enemy or Japanese forces
which, at the time of the passage and approval of said Act, had already landed in Philippine soil
and was expected to paralyze the functioning of the Congress during the invasion and enemy
occupation of the Philippines.
The mere existence of the last world war in many parts of the world which had created a national
emergency made it necessary to invest the President with extraordinary powers was not called
total emergency by Commonwealth Act Nos. 600 and 620, because it had not yet actually
involved and engulfed the Philippines in the maelstrom of war. It does not stand to reason that
the authority given to the President to promulgate rules and regulations of legislative nature by
Commonwealth Acts Nos. 494, 496, 498, 499, 500, 600 and 620 was to terminate at the date of
the adjournment of the next regular session of the Congress of the Philippines in 1946, but those
granted to the President by Commonwealth Act No. 671 under the same war emergency should
continue to exist indefinitely even after the Congress of the Philippines had regularly convened,
acted, and adjourned in the year 1946 and subsequent years. Besides to give such construction to
Act No. 671 would make it violative of the express provision of section 26, Article VIII, of the
Constitution, under which said Commonwealth Act No. 671 was enacted, as expressly stated in
said Act, and which permits the Congress to authorize the President, only for a limited period
during a war emergency, to promulgate rules and regulations to carry into effect a declared
national policy.
By the special session of the first Congress of the Philippines commencing on the 9th day of
June, 1945, called by the President for the purpose of considering general legislation,
Commonwealth Act No. 671 did not cease to operate. As we have already said, the emergency
which prompted the second National Assembly to enact Commonwealth Act No. 671 delegating
legislative powers to the President, was the inability of Congress to convene in regular session in
January of every during the invasion of the Philippines by the Japanese Imperial forces. The
National Assembly could not have in mind any special session which might have been called by
the President immediately after liberation, because the calling of a special session as well as the
matters which may be submitted by the President to Congress for consideration is a contingent
event which depend upon the possibility of convening it and the discretion of the President to
call it, and the matters he will submit to it for consideration; because it is to be presumed, in
order to comply with the provision of section 26, Article VI of the Constitution, that it was the
intention of the National Assembly to fix a limited period, independent of the President's will,
during which he is authorized to exercise his delegated legislative power.
The object of section 3 of Act No. 671 in requiring the President to report "as soon as practicable
upon the convening of the Congress of the Philippines all rules and regulations promulgated by
him under the powers therein granted" is to inform the Congress of the contents of said rules and
regulations so that the latter may modify or repeal them if it sees fit to do so, inasmuch as,
according to section 4 of the same Act, "the rules and regulations promulgated hereunder shall be
in force and effect until the Congress shall otherwise provide." And although said section 3 does
not specify whether in regular or special session, it is evident that it refers to the next regular and
not to the special session of the Congress, because as a rule a special session is called to consider
only specific matters submitted by the President to Congress for consideration, and it would be
useless to submit such report to the Congress in special session if the latter can not either modify
or repeal such rules and regulations; and besides, it is to be presumed that it was the intention of
the National Assembly in enacting section 3 of Commonwealth Act No. 671 to require the
submission of a report to the next regular session of the Assembly or Congress, as provided in
section 4 Commonwealth Act No. 600, as amended by Commonwealth Act No. 620, which
required a similar report, for there was absolutely no plausible reason to provide otherwise.
Our conclusion is corroborated by the fact that section 3 of Act No. 671 only requires the
President to submit the report, "as soon as practicable upon the convening of the Congress" and
not to submit a report to the Congress every time it convenes, in order to inform the Congress
thereof so that the latter may modify or repeal any or all of them, for under section 4 of the same
Act "such rules and regulations shall continue in force and effect until the Congress shall
otherwise provide." It is obvious that the convening of the Congress referred to in said section 3
is the next regular session of the Congress after the passage of Act No. 671, and not any other
subsequent session; because, otherwise, it would not have required that it shall be submitted to
the Congress as soon as practicable and the purpose of the law already stated in requiring the
submission of the report would be defeated; and if it were the intention of said Commonwealth
Act No. 671 to authorize the President to continue promulgating rules and regulations after the
next regular session of the Congress, it would have required the President to submit to the
Congress each and every time it convenes a report of the rules and regulations promulgated after
his previous reports had been submitted.
Furthermore, our conclusion is confirmed by the legislative interpretation give to
Commonwealth Act No. 671 by the same Congress in enacting Commonwealth Act No. 728
which took effect on July 2, 1946, authorizing the President to regulate, control, curtail, and
prohibit the exploration of agricultural or industrial products, merchandise, articles, materials and
supplies without the permit of the President until December 31, 1948 as expressly provided in
section 4 thereof, because it would not have been necessary for the Congress to promulgate said
Act No. 728 if the President had authority to promulgate Executive Order No. 62 in question on
January 1, 1949, under Commonwealth Act No. 671 as contended by the respondents; and
Republic Act No. 51, approved on October 4, 1946, authorizing within one year the different
executive departments, business, offices, agencies and other instrumentalities of the government,
including corporations controlled by it, would not have been passed by the Congress if
Commonwealth Act No. 671 under consideration was then still in force, for section 2 (b) and (c)
of said Act No. 671 authorizes the President to reorganize the Government and to create new
subdivisions, branches, department offices, agencies or instrumentalities of government, and to
abolish any of those already existing.
REPUTATION
There is no force in the argument that the executive orders in question are not valid, not because
the promulgation of the acts above mentioned and of Commonwealth Act No. 689 as amended
by the Republic Act No. 66 on rentals, the appropriation acts or Republic Act Nos. 1, 156, and
320 for the years 1946-47, 1947-48 and 1948-49, and of the Republic Acts Nos. 73, 147, and 235
appropriating public finds to defray the expenses for the elections held in 1947 and 1948, shows
that the emergency powers granted by Commonwealth Act No. 671 had already ceased to exist,
but because Congress "has shown by their enactment its readiness and ability to legislate on
those matters, and had withdrawn it from the realm of presidential legislation or regulations
under the powers delegated by Commonwealth Act No. 671." If the Congress was ready and able
to legislate on those matters since 1946 and for that reason the executive orders herein involved
are null and void, there is no valid reason for not concluding that the emergency powers of the
President has ceased to exist it did not, legislate on all matters on which the President was
granted and delegated power to legislate by the Commonwealth Act No. 671. And if
Commonwealth Act No. 671 continues to be in force and effect in so far as it grants delegated
legislative powers to the President and declares the national policy to be carried out by the rules
and regulations the President is authorize to promulgate, the mere promulgation of the acts above
described can not be considered as an implied repeal or withdrawal of the authority of the
President to promulgates rules and regulations only on those matters, and the adoption of a
contrary policy by the Congress, because implied repeal is not favored in statutory construction,
and the national policy referred to in section 26, Article VIII of the Constitution is to be declared
by the Congress in delegating the legislative powers to the President, in order to establish the
standard to be carried out by him in exercising his delegated functions, and not in repealing said
powers.
As we have already said, section 26, Article VI of the Constitution expressly empowers
Congress, in times of war and other national emergency, to authorize the President to promulgate
rules and regulations to carry out a declared national policy, and therefore it is for the National
Assembly to determine the existence of a particular emergency declare the national policy, and
authorize the President to promulgate rules and regulations of legislative nature to carry out that
policy. As the Commonwealth Act No. 671 that the existence of war between the United States
and other countries of Europe and Asia which involves the Philippines is the emergency which
made it necessary for the National Assembly to invest the President with extraordinary powers to
promulgate rules and regulations to meet the resulting emergency from the actual existence of
that war which involved the Philippines, the President cannot, under said Act No. 671, determine
the existence of any other emergency, such as the state of cold war, the continued military
occupation of the enemy country, and the economic and political instability throughout the
world, cited by the respondents, and promulgate rules and regulations to meet the emergency;
because obviously it is not for the delegate but for the delegation to say when and under what
circumstances the former may act in behalf of the latter, and not vice-versa.
The theory of those who are of the opinion that the President may determine "whether the
emergency which on December 16, 1941, prompted the approval of Commonwealth Act No. 671
delegating extraordinary powers to the President, still existed at the time the Chief Executive
exercised those powers," is predicated upon the erroneous assumption that said Commonwealth
Act No. 671 contemplated any other emergency not expressly mentioned in said Commonwealth
Act. This assumption or premise is obviously wrong. Section 1 of said Act No. 671 expressly
states that "the existence of the war between the United States and other countries of Europe and
Asia which involves the Philippines makes it necessary to invest the President with extraordinary
power in order to meet the resulting emergency." That is the war emergency. Ant it is evident,
and therefore no evidence is requires to prove, that the existence of the war which involved the
Philippines had already ceased before the promulgation of the executive orders in question, or at
least, if the last war has not yet technically terminated in so far as the United States is concerned,
it did no longer involve the Republic of the Philippines since the inauguration of our Republic or
independence from the sovereignty of the United States.
It is untenable to contend that the words "resulting emergency from the existence of the war" as
used in section 1 of Commonwealth Act No. 671 should be construed to mean any emergency
resulting from or that is the effect of the last war, and not the war emergency itself, and that
therefore it is for the President to determine whether at the time of the promulgation of the
executive orders under consideration such emergency still existed, because such contention
would make Act No. 671 unconstitutional or violative of the provisions of section 26, Article VI
of the Constitution. This constitutional precept distinguishes war emergency from any other
national emergency, such as an economic depression and others which may be the effect of a
war, and empowers the Congress in times of war and other national emergency, to be determined
by Congress itself as we have already said and shown, to authorize the President, for a limited
period that may short or of the same duration but not longer than that of the emergency, to
promulgate rules and regulations to carry out the policy declared by the Congress in order to
meet the emergency. To construe Commonwealth Act No. 671 as contended would be to leave
the determination of the existence of the emergency to the discretion of the President, because
the effects of the war such as those enumerated by the respondents are not determined or stated
in said Act and could not have been foreseen by the Assembly in enacting said Act; and because
it would make the delegation of powers for an in definite period, since such an emergency may
or may not become depression, effect of the first world war, took place in the year 1929, or about
ten years after the cessation of hostilities in the year 1919; and by no stretch of imagination or
intellectual gymnastics may the failure of the Congress to appropriate funds for the operation of
the Government during the period from July 1, 1949 to June 30, 1950, and to defray the expenses
in connection with the holding of the national election on the second Tuesday of November,
1949, be considered as an emergency resulting from the last war.
In the enactment of emergency police measures, the questions as to whether an
emergency exists is primarily for the legislature to determine. Such determination,
although entitled to great respect, is not conclusive because the courts, in such cases,
posses the final authority to determine whether an emergency in fact exists. (American
Jurisprudence, Vol. XI, page 980.).
No case decided by the courts of last resort in the United States may be cited in support of the
proposition that it is for the President to determine whether there exist an emergency in order to
exercise his emergency powers, and "it is not for the judiciary to review the finding of the
Executive in this regard." There is none and there cannot be any. Because, as we have already
stated at the beginning of this opinion, and we are supported by the above quotation from
American Jurisprudence, the power to pass emergency police legislation in the United States
may be exercised only by the legislature in the exercise of the police power of the State, and it
can not be delegated to the Executive because there is no provision in the State and Federal
constitutions authorizing such delegation as we have in section 26, Article VI, of our
Constitution. As we have already said before, the only legislative power which may be delegated
to the Executive and other administrative bodies or officers in the United States is the power to
promulgate rules and regulations of administrative nature, which does not include the exercise of
the police power of the State.
The ruling laid down by the United States Supreme Court in the case of Ludecke vs. Watkins, 92
Law ed., 1883, quoted by the respondents and dissenters in support of the proposition that "only
in case of a manifest abuse of the exercise of powers by a political branch of the government is
judicial interference allowable in order to maintain the supremacy of the Constitution," has no
application to the present case; because the question involved in the present case is not a political
but a justiciable question, while the question in issue in said Ludecke case was the power of the
court to review "the determination of the President in the postwar period that an alien enemy
should be deported, even though active hostilities have ceased," and it was held that it was a
political question and, therefore, was not subject to judicial review.
CONCLUSION
In view of all the foregoing, we have to conclude and declare that the executive orders
promulgated by the President under Commonwealth Act 671 before the date of the adjournment
of the regular session of the Congress on the Philippines in 1946 are valid, because said
Commonwealth Act was then still in force; but the executive orders promulgated after the said
date are null and void, because Commonwealth Act No. 671 had already ceased to be in force in
so far as the delegation of powers was concerned. Therefore, are null and void the Executive
Order No. 192 promulgated on December 24, 1948, on the control of exports from the
Philippines; the Executive Order No. 225 dated June 15, 1949, appropriating funds for the
operation of the Government of the Republic of the Philippines during the period from July 1,
1949 to June 30, 1950; and the Executive Order No. 226 promulgated on June 15, 1949,
appropriating the sum of six million pesos to defray the expenses in connection with, and
incidental to, the holding of the national election to be held on the second Tuesday of November,
1949.
Republic
SUPREME
Manila
of
the
Philippines
COURT
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-6266
February 2, 1953
EULOGIO
RODRIGUEZ,
SR.,
vs.
VICENTE GELLA, ETC., ET AL., respondents.
ETC.,
ET
AL., petitioners,
Eulogio Rodriguez, Sr., Lorenzo M. Taada, Claro M. Recto, Jose P. Laurel, Jesus Barrera and
Leon
Ma.
Guerrero
for
petitioner.
Office of the Solicitor General Juan R. Liwag and Solicitor Martiniano P. Vivo for respondents.
PARAS, C.J.:
As a fitting foreword, it may be recalled that on a previous occasion, on August 26, 1949 to be
exact, this court had already passed upon the status of Commonwealth Act No. 671, approved on
December 16, 1941, "declaring a state of total emergency as a result of war involving the
Philippines and authorizing the President to promulgate rules and regulations to meet such
emergency." Five members held that the Act ceased to be operative in its totality, on May 25,
1946 (when the Congress convened in special session) according to Chief Justice Moran. Justice
Bengzon, Padilla, Montemayor, Reyes and Torres in effect concluded that the powers delegated
to the President had been withdrawn as to matters already legislated upon by the Congress or on
which the latter had demonstrated its readiness or ability to act. Executive Orders No. 62 (dated
June 21, 1947) regulating house and lot rentals, No. 192 (dated December 24, 1948) regulating
exports, Nos. 225 and 226 (dated June 15,1949) the first appropriation funds for the operation of
the Government from July 1, 1949 to June 30, 1950, and the second appropriating funds for
election expenses in November 1949, were therefore declared null and void for having been
issued after Act No. 671 had lapsed and/or after the Congress had enacted legislation on the same
subjects.1
More or less the same considerations that influenced our pronouncement of August 26, 1949 are
and should be controlling in the case now before us, wherein the petitioners seek to invalidate
Executive Orders Nos. 545 and 546 issued on November 10, 1952, the first appropriating the
sum of P37,850,500 for urgent and essential public works, and the second setting aside the sum
of P11,367,600 for relief in the provinces and cities visited by typhoons, floods, droughts,
earthquakes, volcanic action and other calamities.
Section 26 of Article VI of the Constitution provides that "in times of war or other national
emergency, the Congress may by law authorize the President, for a limited period and subject to
such restrictions as it may prescribe, to promulgate rules and regulations to carry out a declared
national policy." Accordingly the National Assembly passed Commonwealth Act No. 671,
declaring (in section 1) the national policy that "the existence of war between the United States
and other countries of Europe and Asia, which involves the Philippines makes it necessary to
invest the President with extraordinary powers in order to meet the resulting emergency," and (in
section 2) authorizing the President, "during the existence of the emergency, to promulgate such
rules and regulations as he may deem necessary to carry out the national policy declared in
section 1."
As the Act was expressly in pursuance of the constitutional provision, it has to be assumed that
the National Assembly intended it to be only for a limited period. If it be contended that the Act
has not yet been duly repealed, and such step is necessary to a cessation of the emergency
powers delegated to the President, the result would be obvious unconstitutionality, since it may
never be repealed by the Congress, or if the latter ever attempts to do so, the President may wield
his veto. This eventuality has in fact taken place when the President disapproved House Bill No.
727, repealing all Emergency Powers Acts. The situation will make the Congress and the
President or either as the principal authority to determine the indefinite duration of the delegation
of legislative powers, in palpable repugnance to the constitutional provision that any grant
thereunder must be for a limited period, necessarily to be fixed in the law itself and not
dependent upon the arbitrary or elastic will of either the Congress or the President.
Although House Bill No. 727, had been vetoed by the President and did not thereby become a
regular statute, it may at least be considered as a concurrent resolution of the Congress formally
declaring the termination of the emergency powers. To contend that the Bill needed presidential
acquiescence to produce effect, would lead to the anomalous, if not absurd, situation that, "while
Congress might delegate its power by a simple majority, it might not be able to recall them
except by two-third vote. In other words, it would be easier for Congress to delegate its powers
than to take them back. This is not right and is not, and ought not to be the law."2
Act No. 671 may be likened to an ordinary contract of agency, whereby the consent of the agent
is necessary only in the sense that he cannot be compelled to accept the trust, in the same way
that the principal cannot be forced to keep the relation in eternity or at the will of the agent.
Neither can it be suggested that the agency created under the Act is coupled with interest.
The logical view consistent with constitutionality is to hold that the powers lasted only during
the emergency resulting from the last world war which factually involved the Philippines when
Act No. 671 was passed on December 16, 1941. That emergency, which naturally terminated
upon the ending of the last world war, was contemplated by the members of the National
Assembly on the foresight that the actual state of war could prevent it from holding its next
regular session. This is confirmed by the following statement of President Quezon: "When it
became evident that we were completely helpless against air attack and that it was most unlikely
the Philippine Legislature would hold its next regular session which was to open on January 1,
1942, the National Assembly passed into history approving a resolution which reaffirmed the
abiding faith of the Filipino people in, and their loyalty to, the United States. The Assembly also
enacted a law granting the President of the Philippines all the powers that under the Philippine
Constitution may be delegated to him in time of war." 3 When President Quezon said "in time of
war", he an doubtedly meant such factual war as that then raging.
As early as July 26, 1948, the Congress categorically declared that "since liberation conditions
have gradually returned to normal, but not so with regard to those who have suffered the ravages
of war and who have not received any relief for the loss and destruction resulting therefrom," and
that "the emergency created by the last war as regards these war sufferers being still existent, it is
the declared policy of the state that as to them the debt moratorium should be continued in force
in a modified form."4 It is important to remember that Republic Act No. 342 in which this
declaration was made bore the approval of the President. Indeed, the latter in his speech
delivered on July 4, 1949, plainly proclaimed that "what emergencies it (the Republic) faces
today are incidental passing rains artificially created by seasonal partisanship, very common
among democracies but will disappear with the rains that follow the thunderclaps not later than
November 8 of this year," an admission, that such emergencies not only are not total but are
not the result of the last war as envisaged in Act No. 671.
If more is necessary to demonstrate the unmistakable stand of the legislative department on the
alleged existence of emergency, reference may be had to House Bill No. 727, hereinbefore
referred to, repealing all Emergency Powers Acts.
Moreover, section 26 of Article VI of the constitution, in virtue of which Act No. 671 was
passed, authorizes the delegation of powers by the Congress (1) in times of war or (2) other
national emergency. The emergency expressly spoken of in the title and in section 1 of the Act is
one "in time of war," as distinguished from "other national emergency" that may arise as an aftereffect of war or from natural causes such as widespread earthquakes, typhoons, floods, and the
like. Certainly the typhoons that hit some provinces and cities in 1952 not only did not result
from the last world war but were and could not have been contemplated by the legislators. At any
rate, the Congress is available for necessary special sessions, and it cannot let the people down
without somehow being answerable thereover.
As a matter of fact, the President, in returning to the Congress without his signature House Bill
No. 727, did not invoke any emergency resulting from the last world war, but only called
attention to an impending emergency that may be brought about by present complicated and
troubled world conditions, and to the fact that our own soldiers are fighting and dying in Korea
in defense of democracy and freedom and for the preservation of our Republic. The emergency
thus feared cannot, however, be attributed to the war mentioned in Act No. 671 and fought
between Germany and Japan on one side and the Allied Powers on the other; and indications are
that in the next world war, if any, the communist countries will be aligned against the
democracies. No departure can be made from the national policy declared in section 1 of Act No.
671. New powers may be granted as often as emergencies contemplated in the Constitution arise.
There is no point in the argument that the Philippines is still technically at war with Japan
pending the ratification of the peace treaty. In the first place, Act No. 671 referred to a factual
war. In the second place, the last world war was between the United States and Japan, the
Philippines being involved only because it was then under American sovereignty. In the third
place, the United States had already signed the peace treaty with Japan, and the Philippines has
become an independent country since July 4, 1946.
It is pointed out that the passage of House Bill No. 727 is inconsistent with the claim that the
emergency powers are non-existent. But, from the debates in the House, it is patent that the Bill
had to be approved merely to remove all doubts, especially because this Court had heretofore
failed, for lack of necessary majority, to declare Act No. 671 entirely inoperative.
Reliance is placed on the petition of about seventy Congressmen and Senators and on House
Resolution No. 99, urging the President to release and appropriate funds for essential and urgent
public works and for relief in the typhoon-stricken areas. It is enough to state, in reply, that the
said petition and resolution cannot prevail over the force and effect of House Bill No. 727
formally passed by two chambers of the Congress. If faith can be accorded to the resolution of
one house, there is more reason for accepting the solemn declarations of two houses.
Even under the theory of some members of this court that insofar as the Congress had shown its
readiness or ability to act on a given matter, the emergency powers delegated to the President had
been pro tanto withdrawn, Executive Orders Nos. 545 and 546 must be declared as having no
legal anchorage. We can take judicial notice of the fact that the Congress has since liberation
repeatedly been approving acts appropriating funds for the operation of the Government, public
works, and many others purposes, with the result that as to such legislative task the Congress
must be deemed to have long decided to assume the corresponding power itself and to withdraw
the same from the President. If the President had ceased to have powers with regards to general
appropriations, none can remain in respect of special appropriations; otherwise he may
accomplish indirectly what he cannot do directly. Besides, it is significant that Act No. 671
expressly limited the power of the President to that continuing "in force" appropriations which
would lapse or otherwise become inoperative, so that, even assuming that the Act is still
effective, it is doubtful whether the President can by executive orders make new appropriations.
The specific power "to continue in force laws and appropriations which would lapse or otherwise
become inoperative" is a limitation on the general power "to exercise such other powers as he
may deem necessary to enable the Government to fulfill its responsibilities and to maintain and
enforce its authority." Indeed, to hold that although the Congress has, for about seven years since
liberation, been normally functioning and legislating on every conceivable field, the President
still has any residuary powers under the Act, would necessarily lead to confusion and
overlapping, if not conflict.
Shelter may not be sought in the proposition that the President should be allowed to exercise
emergency powers for the sake of speed and expediency in the interest and for the welfare of the
people, because we have the Constitution, designed to establish a government under a regime of
justice, liberty and democracy. In line with such primordial objective, our Government is
democratic in form and based on the system of separation of powers. Unless and until changed or
amended, we shall have to abide by the letter and spirit of the Constitution and be prepared to
accept the consequences resulting from or inherent in disagreements between, inaction or even
refusal of the legislative and executive departments. Much as it is imperative in some cases to
have prompt official action, deadlocks in and slowness of democratic processes must be
preferred to concentration of powers in any one man or group of men for obvious reasons. The
framers of the Constitution, however, had the vision of and were careful in allowing delegation
of legislative powers to the President for a limited period "in times of war or other national
emergency." They had thus entrusted to the good judgment of the Congress the duty of coping
with any national emergency by a more efficient procedure; but it alone must decide because
emergency in itself cannot and should not create power. In our democracy the hope and survival
of the nation lie in the wisdom and unselfish patriotism of all officials and in their faithful
adherence to the Constitution.
Wherefore, Executive Orders Nos. 545 and 546 are hereby declared null and void, and the
respondents are ordered to desist from appropriating, releasing, allotting, and expending the
public funds set aside therein. So ordered, without costs.
Feria,
Pablo
Bengzon, J., concur in the result.
and
Tuason,
JJ., concur.
Separate Opinions
PADILLA, J., concurring:
"All appropriation, revenue or tariff bills . . . shall originate exclusively in the House of
Representatives, but the Senate may propose or concur with amendments."1 "No money shall be
paid out of the Treasury except in pursuance of an appropriation made by law." 2 The authority or
power to appropriate government funds to be spent for public purposes is lodged exclusively in
the Congress because it is purely and essentially a legislative function. The legislative power to
appropriate government funds for public purposes lodged exclusively in the Congress may,
however, be delegated to the President "in times of war or other national emergency," "for a
limited period and subject to such restrictions as it may prescribe," "to carry out a declared
national policy."3 This constitutional provision has no counterpart in the Constitution of the
United States of America and in those patterned after it. Under this provision of the Constitution
several emergency powers acts, notably Com. Acts Nos. 600 and 671, were passed. 4 Being a
deviation from the principle of separation of powers the delegation of legislative powers
authorized by the Constitution may validly be made only by adhering strictly to its spirit and
letter. Pursuant thereto the legislative authority or power to be granted or delegated to the
President by the Congress must be "in times of war or other national emergency" and "for a
limited period and subject to such restrictions as it may prescribe," and the Congress has to pass
a law for that purpose. The reason why the Constitution is silent on or does not provide for the
manner the delegation of legislative powers may be withdrawn, revoked or ended, is because if it
is for a limited period it lapses at the end of the period and because if the war or other national
emergency which prompted it ceases the delegation of legislative powers ceases also ipso facto.
A law which delegates such powers to the President for an indefinite period would be
unconstitutional because it is against the express provision of the Constitution. It would be an

abdication of legislative powers. If the law which delegates legislative powers does not fix or
provide for a period of time within or during which the President may exercise them and there is
dispute or doubt as to whether the national emergency which prompted the Congress to pass the
law delegating legislative powers to the President continues or has ceased, such dispute or doubt
may be determined in an appropriate case by the courts. Another way of terminating such
delegation is by the Congress itself which made the delegation. To withdraw, terminate or revoke
the delegation of legislative powers to the President a concurrent resolution would be
sufficient.5 The concurrence of the President is superfluous and unnecessary, for if it be required
then the law which delegated legislative powers to him would suffer from a fatal defect, vice, or
infirmity which would render such delegation unconstitutional for lack of time limitation
prescribed and ordained by the Constitution.
It is claimed that just as the delegation of legislative powers to the President is to be made by
means of a law which requires the concurrence of the President, so the withdrawal, termination
or revocation of the legislative powers delegated to him must also be with his concurrence and
approval. The reason for the requirements that a law be passed to make the delegation of
legislative powers valid and effective is the fact that whereas the Congress may deem it wise and
expedient to make the delegation, the President may hold a different view. In other words, he has
to concur and accept the powers delegated to him by the Congress. But when it comes to
withdrawal, termination or revocation of the legislative powers delegated to him his concurrence
or consent is not necessary. The absence of constitutional provision on how it should be done and
carried out is not due to an oversight or to an intention of the members of the Constitutional
Convention to require the concurrence of the President to make there vocation valid and
effective, because, as heretofore stated, if such concurrence be required to make the revocation
valid and effective, the law which delegated legislative powers to the President would or might
offend against the very provision of the Constitution which requires and ordains that such
delegation be for a limited period of time only, and because the refusal to concur in by a
President bent on or inclined to continue exercising legislative powers delegated to him would
result in a delegation of legislative powers, at least during his incumbency or tenure of office,
regardless of whether the reason or reasons for the grant of the authority to exercise such
legislative powers have ceased to exist.
It is contended, however, that in withdrawing, terminating or revoking the legislative powers
delegated to the President the Congress did so by passing a bill evincing its intention to have his
assent, which he refused to give, and for that reason the revocation of the legislative powers
delegated to him was ineffective for lack of such concurrence. To determine what the Congress
intended when it passed the bill repealing the Emergency Powers Acts the Senate approved it
unanimously form must give way to substance. If the contention that in passing the bill
repealing the Emergency Powers Acts the Congress intended to have the concurrence of the
President be upheld, such a construction would render the bill contradictory in itself, because in
the explanatory notes of H. No. 692 introduced by Congressman Roy and H. No. 727 by
Congressman Zosa, upon which the consolidated bill passed is based, it is declared "that war had
long ended," that "the need for the grant of such unusual powers to the President has
disappeared," and that for that reason the Congress repealed all Emergency Powers Acts. The
congress could not have meant or intended to subordinate its opinion or judgment that the war
had ended and that the national emergency had ceased to exist to that of the President, the
legislative and not the executive being the department of the Government exclusively clothed or
vested with the authority and power to make such a declaration. In passing the bill the Congress
committed a mistake in the matter of form but not of substance because the latter is there in the
explanatory note of the bill passed by both houses, to wit: "that war had long ended," that "the
need for the grant of such unusual powers to the President has disappeared," and that for that
reason it repealed all the Emergency Powers Acts. After the Congress had made that declaration
the President could no longer exercise the legislative powers delegated to him. It was a complete
and absolute revocation of the delegation of such powers. His veto of the bill could not and did
not have the effect of reviving or continuing the delegation of legislative powers which had been
revoked by the Congress, the only constitutional body empowered and authorized to make the
revocation.
For this reasons I am of the opinion that Executive Orders No. 545 and 546 which appropriate
government funds for public works and relief for the victims of typhoons in some provinces of
the Republic are of no validity and legal effect because the President no longer had the authority
to issue such executive orders under the Emergency Powers Act which had been withdrawn or
revoked by the Congress. The writ of prohibition prayed for should be granted.
BENGZON, J., concurring:

I have signed the majority opinion. But I also agree to the above views of Mr. Justice Padilla.
Labrador, J., concurs.
REYES, J., concurring:

It being repugnant to the spirit of the Constitution to let Commonwealth Act No. 671 degenerate
into a grant in perpetuity of legislative powers to the Executive, and taking House Bill No. 727,
approved by the Congress but vetoed by the President, as a for-the-record pronouncement on the
part of the legislative branch of the Government that the emergency which impelled it to
delegate, through the said Commonwealth Act, legislative powers to the President had already
ceased, so that there was no longer any need for the exercise of those delegated powers, and,
lastly, considering that said Act does not have to be repealed by another Act because, as an
emergency measure, it repeals itself with the cessation of the emergency, I concur in this opinion
of Mr. Justice Padilla.
JUGO, J., concurring:

In addition to the reasons set forth by Chief Justice Paras and Associate Justice Padilla, I would
like to make a few brief remarks:
Section 26 of Article VI of the Philippine Constitution provides as follows:
In times of war or other national emergency, the Congress may by law authorize the
President, for a limited period and subject to such restrictions as it may prescribed, to
Section 1 of Commonwealth Act No. 671, which is entitled "An Act Declaring a State of Total
Emergency as a Result of War Involving the Philippines and Authorizing the President to
Promulgate Rules and Regulations to Meet such Emergency," reads as follows:
The existence of war between the United States and other countries of Europe and Asia,
which involves the Philippines, makes it necessary to invest the President with
extraordinary powers in order to meet the resulting emergency.
Section 2 of said Commonwealth Act No. 671 invoking section 26, Article VI, of the
Constitution above-quoted, authorized the President during the existence of the emergency
caused by said war to promulgate rules and regulations, etc.
Executive Order No. 545, dated November 10, 1952, appropriating funds for urgent and essential
public works, states in its preamble, in justification of said order, that the Congress in its last
special session had failed to appraise funds for the immediate repairs and reconstruction of
certain public buildings and public works, damages by the recent typhoons, floods, and other
calamities.
Executive Order No. 564, dated November 10, 1952, also declared as its cause that the Congress
had failed in its last special session to provide funds for relief to the victims of the recent
typhoons, floods, draughts, earthquakes, etc.
It will be seen that the authority given by the Constitution to the Congress to delegate certain
legislative powers to the President was for a limited time. This was naturally so, because an
emergency cannot be of a long, unlimited or indefinite duration, for otherwise it would not be an
emergency.
Commonwealth Act No. 671 was passed on December 16, 1941. Executive Orders Nos. 545 and
546 were issued on November 10, 1952; that is, almost eleven years from the date
Commonwealth Act No. 671 was enacted. It is hard to conceive of an emergency which has
lasted almost eleven years.
The emergency contemplated by Commonwealth Act No. 671 was not same emergency invoked
in said executive orders, for, whereas Commonwealth Act No. 671 refers to the emergency
created by the existence of war between the United States and other countries of Europe
involving the Philippines, the executive order above-mentioned deal with the damages wrought
by the recent typhoons, earthquakes, volcanic eruptions, etc., and the failure of the Congress to
provide funds for the repair and reconstruction of damaged buildings and public works and the
relief of the victims. The recent typhoons, earthquakes, volcanic eruptions, etc. and the failure of
the Congress to provide for them have nothing to do with the war mentioned in said
Commonwealth Act No. 671 and are not the consequences of said war.
For the foregoing reasons, I concur in the majority opinion.
MONTEMAYOR, J., concurring and dissenting:

With the majority I agree that Executive Order Nos. 545 and 546, the first appropriating
P37,850,500 for urgent and essential public works, the second appropriating P11,367,600 for
relief are invalid, for the same reasons given by me in dissenting opinion in cases G.R. No. L2044,* L-2756,* and L-3054-56* commonly called the "Emergency Cases of 1949", namely, that
the legislature had already withdrawn from the realm of presidential legislation or regulation
under the emergency powers to delegate by Commonwealth Act No. 671, the power to
appropriate funds for the expenses of the Government and for other purposes.
To me, however, the more important point involved in the present case is not the validity of the
two executive orders but rather the question of whether or not Commonwealth Act No. 671 is
still has emergency powers under said Act. And the parties herein, not excluding the Chief
Executive and the Legislature, it is to be presumed, want this point definitely settled. So, I
proposed to devote the considerations in this modest dissenting opinion to this matter. The
majority opinion states that in the emergency cases of 1949, five members of this tribunal held
that Commonwealth Act 671 was still in force. Mr. Justice Padilla concurred in that opinion.
With the concurrence of Mr. Justice Torres in my concurring and dissenting opinion I also held
that Commonwealth Act. 671 was still in force. Mr. Justice Bengzon in his dissenting opinion in
those emergency cases said that although he was favorably impressed by the reasons set forth by
Mr. Justice Reyes and particular point the existence or non-existence of the emergency
powers of the President. So that even if we do not include Mr. Justice Bengzon, we can correctly
say that four justices voted in those emergency cases in favor of the existence of emergency
powers of the President.
In those emergency cases of 1949 I prepared a more or less extensive opinion in support of the
theory that Commonwealth Act No. 671 was still in force. I wish to embody said opinion in the
present opinion by reference, without prejudice to reproducing portions of the same.
I agree with the majority that Commonwealth Act 671 was to be in force only for a limited
period of time, otherwise be unconstitutional; and that limited period was co-extensive with the
existence of the emergency. But I emphatically disagree with the majority when it says:
That emergency, which naturally terminated upon the ending of the last world war, was
contemplated by the members of the National Assembly on the foresight that the actual
state of war would prevent it fromholding its next regular session.
As regards the majority's view that emergency Act 671 because due to war delegated by
Commonwealth Act 671 because due to emergency the National Assembly would be unable to
hold its regular session, I discussed and I hope I refused this theory in my dissenting opinion in
the 1949 emergency cases and I take the liberty of quoting a pertinent portion thereof:
I believe that, as I already had occasion to state though incidentally, the real reason for
the delegation of legislative powers to the Chief Executive is not only because the
Legislature is unable to meet due to a national emergency but also because although it
could and does actually meet, whether in regular or special session, it is not in a position
and able to cope with the problems brought about by and raising from the emergency,
problems which require urgent and immediate action. Certainly, one man can act more
quickly and expeditiously than about one hundred members of the Legislature, especially
when they are divided into Legislative chambers. That is why in times of emergency,
much as we in democratic countries dislike the system or idea of dictatorship, we hear of
food dictator, fuel dictator, transportations which ordinarily belong to a council or board
or to a legislative body, are entrusted under certain limitations to one single official or
individual.
Supposing that during a national emergency and while the legislature is in session, the
legislature woke up one morning to find that there was extreme scarcity of imported
foods, fuel, building materials, equipment required in agriculture and industry, etc.,
because of a monopoly, hoarding, injurious speculations, manipulations, private controls
and profiteering, or that there were widespread lockouts and strikes paralyzing
transportation, commerce and industry, or rampant espionage or sabotage endangering the
very life security of the necessary legislation in order to cope with the situation and pass
the necessary emergency measures?
We are all familiar with the practice and routine of enacting laws. A bill is introduced in
the Legislature; it is referred to the corresponding committee, it is studied by said
committee, which in some cases holds public hearings; the committee discusses the bill
and sometimes introduces amendments; if the bill is not killed in the committee or
shelved, it is submitted to the chamber for study, discussion, and possible amendment by
all the members; it is finally voted and if approved, it is sent to the other house where it
undergoes the same process; and if it is finally approved by both houses of Congress, it is
submitted to the Chief Executive for his study and approval or veto. All this may
consume weeks or months as a result of which, ordinarily, many bills finally approved by
Congress could be sent to the President for approval or veto only after adjournment of the
legislative session. And we should not overlook the fact that in some cases for lack of
time or due to disagreement among the legislators or between the two houses of
Congress, important pieces of legislations like the annual appropriation law for the fiscal
year 1949-50, appropriation founds for the elections to be held in November, 1949,
contained in Executive Orders Nos. 225 and 226, involved in the present cases, and the
proposed amendment to the Election Code etc., have not been passed by Congress in its
last session ending last May, 1949, which session lasted one hundred days. If we were to
rely on the ordinary process of legislation to meet a national emergency, by the time the
necessary and needed law is passed, the situation sought to be remedied, or the problem
sought to be solved may have become disastrous or ended in calamity or gone beyond
legislations or any remedy. It would be too late. It would be like locking the stable door
after the horse had been stolen.
Now, for some retrospect, The Philippine National Assembly delegated its legislative
powers because of the existence of a state of national emergency as early as the year
1939. During it second special session of that year, it promulgated the following laws:
(Commonwealth Acts Nos. 494, 496, 498 and 500).
At that time, September, 1939, the second world war was only in Europe, quite far from
the Philippines and had just begun. There was then no likelihood of the Philippines being
involved in the war. In fact, the Philippines did not get involved in the war until more
than two years, in December, 1941. The National Assembly was then free to meet either
in regular or special sessions to enact legislation to meet the emergency. In fact, it met in
regular session in January, 1940 lasting 100 days, excluding the several special sessions
held during those two years. And yet the Assembly delegated legislative powers to the
President under section 26, Article VI of the Constitution. This is clear proof that,
contrary to the theory of the majority opinion, the legislature delegated legislative powers
to the President even when it could meet and it actually met several times.
After passing the Acts just mentioned delegating legislative powers to the President, the
Assembly in its fourth special session on August 19, 1940 repeated and reiterated this
practice and policy by passing Commonwealth Act No. 600 delegating additional and
more extensive legislative powers to the President in spite of the fact that the war was
still far away in Europe and there was no danger or prospect of involving the Philippines,
and the legislature was still free to meet as in fact it met again in regular session in
January, 1941. During its regular session begun that month and year, instead of stopping
or ending the legislative powers delegated to the President, because according to the
theory of the majority opinion, the Legislature was able to meet, the Assembly allowed
them to continue by passing Commonwealth Act No. 620 which merely amended section
1 of Commonwealth Act No. 600. I repeat that all this, far from supporting the view of
the President only because it could not meet, fairly and squarely refutes said view.
As to the proposition in the majority opinion that the emergency terminated with the war. I am
afraid the majority confuses war with emergency. They are two different and separate things and
events. Even the Constitution (Article VI, section 26) which for purposes of reference is
reproduced below, considers war and emergency as separate and distinct:
SEC. 26. In times of war or other national emergency, the Congress may by law
authorize the President, for a limited period and subject to such restrictions as it may
prescribe, to promulgate rules and regulations to carry out a declared national policy.
There maybe a national emergency without war. And so, when on the occasion of a war, a
national emergency ensues and is recognized and declared by Congress, said emergency may
continue even if and when the war that started it is ended. War may and generally create an
emergency, but the emergency thus created does not necessarily end with the war. A war may last
only several weeks or months but with the use of the modern weapons of warfare it may cause
such devastation, desolation and national suffering and collapse not only economically but
socially and morally that the resulting emergency may last for years. A destructive flood,
tornado, tidal wave or volcanic eruption may last only minutes or hours but the destruction that it
leaves in its wake may take weeks, months or years to repair, and the emergency thereby created
may last that long.
To bolster its contention the majority cites President Quezon's book "The Good Fight" pp. 204205, wherein he speaks in time of war. I am afraid the citation proves nothing. He merely said
that the delegation was made intime of war. He did not say or mean that the powers thus
delegated were to be exercised only during the war. The main thing to be considered and which
calls for the exercise of the powers delegated is the emergency, not the war that merely started or
caused it. Commonwealth Act 671 itself in its section 2 says that the President will exercise his
emergency powers during the existence of the emergency. It does not say during the existence of
the war.
President Quezon is hardly the authority that the majority should quote to support its theory that
emergency powers are given to the Chief Executive just because due to the emergency, the
Legislature is unable to meet. It was President Quezon who was given emergency powers as
early as 1939 under Commonwealth Acts Nos. 494, 496, 498 and 500 when the war was still far
away in Europe and we were not yet involved and the National Assembly could still meet and
actually did meet several times in two years, 1940 and 1941, in regular and special sessions, and
during those two years when the National Assembly was holding its sessions, he was exercising
his emergency powers and enacting legislation by means of Executive Orders. Evidently, he did
not see any incompatibility in the grant and exercise of emergency powers with the ability of the
Legislature to meet and in actually holding session, this, all contrary to the majority's contention.
Hostilities incident to the last Pacific war have long ended since 1945; it does not however
necessarily mean that the emergency resulting from said war has ceased and that the disruption
of trade dislocation of the economy of the country, the destruction of public and private property,
the breakdown in honesty and morality and the collapse of peace and order, all resulting from
that war have disappeared, and that everything has returned to normalcy. In support of its theory
that the emergency has ceased the majority makes reference to Republic Act 342 wherein it is
stated that conditions have gradually returned to normal. But this same law clearly says that the
emergency created by the last war as regards war sufferers who have not received any relief for
the loss or destruction resulting from the war, still exists and so postpones payment of their debts
or monetary obligations contracted before the war, for a period of eight (8) years from and after
the settlement of their war damage claims by the United States-Philippine War Damage
Commission. In other words, the Congress of the Philippines believes that at least as regards war
sufferers, the emergency resulting from the last war still exists, and will exists not only up to the
time that their war damage claims are paid but for a period of eight years thereafter. This hardly
supports the majority's theory that everything is normal, and that there no longer is any
emergency because the war has long ended.
In connection with this question of whether or not there is still an emergency resulting from the
last war and whether or not things and conditions have returned to normal, I permit myself to
reproduce a portion of my dissenting opinion in the 1949 emergency cases:
The last logical question that one will naturally ask is: has the emergency resulting from
the war passed or does it still exists? This is a fair and decisive question inasmuch as the
existence of the emergency is, in my opinion, the test and the only basis of the operation
or cessation of Act 671. The existence or non-existence of the emergency resulting from
the war is question of fact. It is based on conditions obtaining among the people and in
the country and perhaps even near and around it. It is a highly controversial question on
which people may honestly differ. There are those who in all good faith believe and claim
that conditions have returned to normal; that the people have now enough to eat,
sometime even more than they had before the war; that people nowadays especially in the
cities are better nourished and clothed and transported and better compensated for their
labor, and that the President himself in his speeches, chats and messages had assured the
public that normal times have returned, that the problem of peace and order had been
solved, that the finances of the Government and the national economy are sound, and that
there is an adequate food supply. It is, therefore, claimed that there is no longer any
emergency resulting from the war.
On the other hand, it is asserted with equal vehemence in the opposite camp that
conditions are still far from normal; that the picture painted by the President in cheerful
and reassuring colors is based on over optimism and, as to be expected, calculated to
show in bold relief the achievements of the administration, and so should be considered
with some allowance; that we are now importing more rice than before the war for the
reason that many rice farms are idle because of the farmers fear of or interference by
dissidents; that the problem of peace and order is far from solved as shown by the
frequent hold-ups, kidnappings, lootings and killing and organized banditry not only in
Luzon but also in the Visayas and Mindanao; that whereas before the war, the
Constabulary force consisting of only about 6,000 officers and men could provide
complete protection to life and property was adequate in all respects to enforce peace and
order, now this Constabulary enlarged to about 20,000 men, provided with modern
weapons and equipment and with the aid of thousands of civilian guards and of the
Philippine Army and Air Force cannot solve the peace and order problem; that the
dissidents who are well-organized, armed and disciplined even attack and sack towns and
sometimes openly defy and engage the armed Government forces; that as long as more
than 100,000 firearms are loose and in the hands of irresponsible parties, not excluding
the seemingly regular mysterious supply to them of additional firearms and ammunitions,
there can be no peace and order; and as to the barrio folk in Central Luzon and now, even
in provinces bordering Central Luzon whose parents and relatives had been killed by
dissidents, whose women folk had been outraged by the same elements, whose homes
had been looted and burned and whose very lives had been subjected to constant terror
and peril, compelling them to leave their homes and their farms and evacuate to and be
concentrated in the poblaciones to live there in utter discomfort and privation, it is said
that it would be difficult to convince these unfortunate people that normalcy has returned
and that there is no longer emergency resulting from the war. To further support the claim
of the existence of an emergency, the menace of communism not only at home,
particularly in Central Luzon but from abroad, especially China, is invoked. And it is
asserted that all this is a result of the war.
To the above are those who claim and will add that since 1949 up to the present time, although
rehabilitation progressed substantially, there are still many people who have not achieved
rehabilitation. The economy of the country is still far from what it was before the war. It is being
bolstered temporarily by the millions of pesos being received by war veterans, their widows and
children in the form of pensions or insurance; by the millions being spent by the Mutual Security
Agent (MSA) in the Philippines to rehabilitate agriculture, industry, commerce, etc.; by the
millions being sent here by the United States in war materials, equipment, etc. in relation with
the United States military aid to the Philippines, and with the enforcement of the Import Control,
Exchange Control and other laws all of a temporary nature intended to temper and minimize the
financial and economic crisis which otherwise would overwhelm the country. The coastwise
trade is being maintained with ships originally built for and used during the war, converted
provisionally into inter-island freight and passenger boats; and land transportation specially in
the centers of population like Manila is operated in great measure with vehicles (used jeeps)
obtained from the Surplus Property Commission. Everything is on a provisional basis. What will
happen after these boats and motor vehicles wear out and become junk? Could they be readily
replaced by their owners or operators? Sunken boats will clutter the harbors of the country
particularly Manila Bay, constituting a menace to navigation. Squatters in great number are still a
problem, claiming that they have nowhere to go to live. Government and private buildings, and
churches are still ruins, tenanted by squatters. Intramuros, the Walled City, in the very City of
Manila is a living example of non-rehabilitation, with the hundreds and thousands of owners of
lots therein either financially unable to reconstruct or prohibited from rebuilding until the
Government has completed its plan about its reconstruction.
The War Damage Commission has paid war damage claims, it is true, but only a portion of the
amounts of the claims; and with prices as they are and the low purchasing power of the peso,
complete rehabilitation of war sufferers and substantial repair of the war damage is impossible.
The country is claiming reparations from Japan in the amount of eight (8) billion dollars. It is not
known if Japan can or will ever pay them and when. That is why the legislature in Republic Act
342 wisely postponed payment of debts and monetary obligations of sufferers, not up to the
payment of their war damage claims, but eight years thereafter, realizing perhaps that the
amounts paid for war damage claims are inadequate to achieve complete rehabilitation. So the
Legislature says that as to these war sufferers, the emergency still exists. And who has not
suffered damage during the last war?
We have not yet completely risen from the low level into which we had sunk during and
immediately after the war, in public and private morality, decency, honesty and personal integrity
as witnessed by the more or less rampant misappropriations and defalcations by public officials,
corruption and malfeasance, bribery, ten percentage, guerrilla recognition and veterans benefits
rackets, dynamite fishing, etc.
When the President makes his inspections, especially in the troubled area, he is escorted by
contingents of fully armed soldiers, sometimes with machine guns and tanks. High officials of
the Government using low plate numbers of their cars, use high plate numbers called "security
plate numbers" when travelling in the provinces to minimize the danger hold-ups and attacks by
dissidents who are said to be after the high government officials. People are advised not to travel
at night over certain provincial highways even national roads.
Peace and order still leaves much to be desired. In 1949 when the emergency cases were decided,
five justices held the opinion that there no longer was any emergency. But conditions of peace
and order actually worsened thereafter. There was an uprising or rebellion in Batangas by
Medrano and his men after November, 1949, and it is said that unable to cope with the uprising
and bring the rebels to justice the Government was compelled to offer them amnesty. Since 1949
the HUKS and the communists became stronger, in fact became so strong that they actually
threatened the existence of the Government which was forced to increase its army and wage
campaigns not only in the field but also in centers of population where it was able to arrest and
prosecute those whom it claims to be high officials of the POLITBURO. In Sulu, the
Government waged an intensive campaign against Kamlon and his men spending several million
pesos and losing quite a number of soldiers and officers, with no decisive result, and it was only
after Kamlon and his men had been promised executive clemency that they surrendered to the
authorities, stood trial, were convicted and promptly pardoned. Some of Kamlon's relatives with
their followers are said to be still in the mountains and forests and refuse to surrender unless
offered the same conditions. Not long ago several hundred Chinese said to be dangerous
communists were rounded up in several towns and cities in the Philippines. About two or three
weeks ago, according to the papers the army authorities said that up to that time they had through
confiscation, capture, surrender and purchase, been able to collect about 40,000 loose firearms
but that there still remained about 100,000 more to be accounted for. The other day the
Provincial Commander of Lanao said that he is faced with the problem of eliminating or
capturing ten outlaw bands in the province with about 700 followers, The hold-ups, massacres,
raids and ambushes in different provinces, even near Manila have not ceased. As long as over
100,000 loose firearms are still in the hands of lawless or irresponsible persons, there can be no
complete peace and order in the country. Before the war about 5,000 Constabulary soldiers and
officers with an appropriation of about three million pesos was able to maintain peace and order
throughout the country. The Armed Forces of the Philippines including the Constabulary of the
country in 1949 numbered 37,000. Realizing that this number was unable to maintain peace and
order it was increased substantially so that in 1952, it went up to 56,000 men and officers with an
appropriation of over P151,000,000, an amount by far larger than the appropriation for the
Department of Public Schools which gives instruction and education to school children and
students. With the help of thousands of temporary and special policemen, civilian guards and
commandos the army and the constabulary are still battling dissidents, communists and bandits.
Hundreds and thousands of families from Central Luzon, particularly Pampanga are still
marooned in Manila, Baguio and other centers of population, unable and afraid to return to their
homes, and a number of them more fearless and optimistic, who thought that peace and order in
Central Luzon had been restored, returned to their homes there but were kidnapped and liquidate.
Farmers harvesting rice in some barrios in Central Luzon have to be guarded by the armed forces
so as not to be molested by the dissidents. Only yesterday the papers carried the news that 14,000
soldiers and officers have started an intensive campaign in Central and Southern Luzon against
lawless elements. All this, many people still honestly believe.
Considering all this, one may well doubt that peace and order in the country has gone back to
normal, and that there is no longer any emergency. And this emergency clearly is the result of the
last war. The HUKS movement was born during that war and the hundreds of thousands of loose
firearms were also released and distributed indiscriminately during that war. Lawlessness and
banditry always follow a war, and it takes several years thereafter to restore peace and order. In
the face of all the foregoing which may regard as facts and realities, the majority without any
data in the form of evidence received at a hearing or trial, but based perhaps on judicial notice
and personal knowledge and observation holds that everything has gone back to normal and that
no longer is any emergency.
Personally, I cannot say that the emergency resulting from the last war still exists, but neither am
I prepared to say that it no longer exists. It is such a controversial question upon which people
may not and could honestly differ. There are authorities to the effect that the existence or nonexistence of an emergency calling for the exercise of emergency powers is a political question
which can be decided only by the political department, and that the courts are not called upon,
neither are they authorized to pass upon the question. This was one of the views maintained in
the concurring and dissenting opinion of Mr. Justice Alex. Reyes concurred in by Mr. Justice
Padilla in the 1949 emergency cases. But assuming for a moment that this court had the authority
to pass upon this point and to bind the executive and legislative department with is finding, I
believe that we have no data or evidence on which to base our finding. If the findings of courts
on questions of facts are given authority or binding effect it is because those findings are based
on facts established during the hearing by means of evidence adduced by both parties who given
the right to present, cross-examine and impeach witnesses, object to questions and object to the
admission of evidence in general. In the present case no such hearing or trial for the reception of
evidence was ever had. Consequently, in my opinion we are not warranted in finding that there
still exist or there no longer exists any emergency resulting from the last Pacific War.
It is the Legislature that granted or delegated the emergency powers or the Chief Executive to
whom the delegation was made that decide whether or not the emergency continues. There has
been lack of agreement between the two departments on this point since the last session of the
Legislature. While the President up to a few weeks ago has been exercising his emergency still
existed, because Commonwealth Act 671 provides that he may exercise those powers only
during the emergency, the Legislature has passed House Bill No. 727 in an attempt to withdraw
said emergency powers on the theory that the emergency has ceased. To end and definitely settle
this disagreement, we are called upon to render decision.
In my dissenting opinion in the 1949 emergency cases I held that the President still had the
emergency powers delegated to him under Commonwealth Act 671. Three justices of this court
held that same view as I did excluding one Justice who was favorably impressed with that view
though he preferred not to vote directly upon it. Today, tho it seems in the tribunal, I am the lone
dissenter on this proposition and so mine is reduced so to speak to the "voice in the wilderness,"
I still maintain the same view, and there is reason to believe that there are many others who
subscribe to the same opinion. The Legislature in passing during its last session House Bill No.
727 repealing the latest Commonwealth Acts including Commonwealth Act No. 671, delegating
emergency powers to the Chief Executive, must have believed and been satisfied that the
President still had those emergency powers otherwise, there would have been no need of going to
all the trouble and the tedious process of approving a bill withdrawing said powers from him.
There would have been no necessity for the Legislature to repeal a law which it believed to be no
longer operative. There is no reason or point in withdrawing something that is not there or that
no longer exists.
In previous sessions of the Legislature after Liberation there had been talk or move to enact
legislation withdrawing said emergency powers by presumably the atmosphere was not favorable
or the necessary votes to pass the corresponding measure was not available. It was in the last
session of the Legislature that a bill was finally approved by both House of Congress. The Chief
Executive, however, vetoed it and it was not repassed over his veto. In spite of this, did the
Legislature succeed in withdrawing his emergency powers? The majority through a process of
interpretation which to me, is strained and unwarranted, voted in the affirmative. I disagree. We
should not forget that in House Bill No. 727 the Legislature was not only expressing its wish and
desire to withdraw the emergency powers of the President. It wanted to repeal the law or laws
delegating said emergency powers. A law can be repealed only by another law. Consequently,
since House Bill No 727 did not become a law because of the veto of the President, it could not
repeal the law or laws which it sought to abrogate.
I agree with the majority and also with Mr. Justice Padilla that the emergency powers delegated
to the President could be withdrawn by means of a mere concurrent resolution. It is true that to
delegate emergency powers under section 26, Art. VI of the Constitution, a law is necessary. It is
because the Constitution expressly says so. Moreover, it is not only convenient but equally
necessary that a law should be passed for that purpose in whose approval the Chief Executive
takes part, because after all he is the one to whom the delegation is made and who would later
exercise the powers so delegated. If he believes that there is no emergency or that even if there
were, it is not of sufficient magnitude and seriousness as to call for the delegation and the
exercise of emergency powers, he may veto the bill of delegation and that would be the end of it.
It is far from likely that the bill would be repassed over his veto because it would be futile and
pointless to make delegation of powers to an unwilling delegate who later would decline and
refuse to exercise them. But if he approves the bill of delegation and it becomes a law then the
delegation is complete, successful and effective for the exercise of the powers by the President
would be assured. Not so with the withdrawal of the powers delegated. The Constitution does not
say or require a law for such withdrawal and it may be withdrawn at any time even when the
emergency which motivated said delegation still exists. In such a case, the Legislature is the sole
judge as to the necessity and advisability of the continuance or cessation of the exercise of
emergency powers by its delegate, the President.
But how did the Legislature go about his attempt to withdraw the President's emergency powers?
It had the choice of approving a mere concurrent resolution or passing a bill. Both houses of the
Legislature are graced with the presence of constitutional lawyers and legal luminaries for whom
I have great respect. They must have known that a concurrent resolution was sufficient for the
purpose. Atty. Recto, counsel for the petitioners and member of the Senate knew it and in his oral
argument before this Tribunal, he said that the Legislature merely made a mistake because it
could have just as well approved a concurrent resolution instead of passing a regular bill.
But to me, it is highly possible and not improbable that the Legislature knowing that it could
withdraw the President's emergency powers by means of a concurrent resolution or by means of
a law, deliberately and intentionally chose the latter for reasons of its own. The mistake
committed by the Legislature if any was that perhaps it believed that the Chief Executive would
not veto the bill; but veto it, he did and I am afraid the Legislature has to abide by the
consequences. The Legislature knew that in passing the bill and in submitting it to the Chief
Executive as required by the Constitution, it had to be approved by him either with his signature
or by letting it become a law without any action on his part. He may also veto it. This was a
hazard and a risk which the Legislature assumed and of which it must have been perfectly aware.
But they are willing to take the risk. Another possible reason why the Legislature chose to pass a
bill instead of a mere concurrent resolution was that it sought and wanted the intervention and
participation of the Chief Executive himself in the withdrawal of the emergency powers so that
he would also share in the credit and the responsibility for said withdrawal. If he approved the
bill there would be complete understanding between the two departments of the Government,
and no hard feelings. Another reason not entirely improbable is that the decision to withdraw the
emergency powers from the Chief Executive was a compromise arrangement between the two
parties in the Legislature. We must remember that our government is run on the basis of the party
system. The President at present happens to be the head of one of the two major parties in the
Legislature. His party is in the minority in the Senate by two or three votes but is in the majority
by quite a number of votes in the lower house. It is not conceivable that his party men in the two
houses consented and agreed to have the emergency powers withdrawn provided that the Chief
Executive consented to and approved of it. And so, they agreed to pass the bill for this purpose,
but that they would not agree to concurrent resolution where the Chief Executive would be
ignored and his emergency powers summarily withdrawn without consultation and without his
approval. This last view is in some measure supported and borne out by the attitude of the
Legislature when the House bill No. 727 was vetoed. The members of Congress knew that the
remedy was to override his veto if they wanted to. The Senate approved the bill unanimously and
judging from that unanimity, at least in the upper house the 2/3 votes necessary to override the
veto was available. But the fact is that the Legislature did not only fail to override the veto but it
did not even make any attempt whatsoever to repass it over the President's veto. Added to this, it
was a fact that, and this is by no means unimportant, in the month of September, 1952, that is,
about two months after the veto of the bill, about sixty-seven Congressman and two Senators
filed a petition addressed to the President in which they not only recognized the existence of his
emergency powers but even asked him to exercise the same for the purpose of releasing funds for
public works projects. Excluding the two Senators, the signers constituted more than the majority
of the membership of the lower house. In other words, after the veto of the bill and after a failure
whether intentionally or otherwise of the Legislative to override the veto, the majority of all the
members of the lower house believed that Congress failed to withdraw the President's emergency
powers and consequently, believed that he still had those powers, and was even requested to
exercise the same. And on November 8, 1952, the lower house of the Legislature passed
Resolution No. 99 strongly urging the President to exercise his emergency powers and authorize
the expenditure of funds for the relief to provinces visited by typhoons and floods and other
calamities and for other urgent essential public works projects. This official action of the Lower
House shows that one of the two Houses of Congress officially believes that the emergency
powers of the President had not been withdrawn. One view of this action or inaction of the
Legislature on the veto was that it could not get the 2/3 votes in both houses to override the veto
because some members who voted in favor of the House Bill No. 727, particularly members of
the party of the Chief Executive vetoing the bill and so either approved the stand taken by him or
acquiesced in it and took it in good grace and let the matter rest, at least for the time being.
In the foregoing considerations on this point are true or could have been true, then there would
absolutely be no reason or warrant for the majority's interpreting and considering House Bill No.
727 as a concurrent resolution sufficient to repeal the several laws mentioned in the bill and
withdraw the emergency powers of the President. In effect, the majority decided to think for the
Legislature and to do for the latter what it failed or perhaps did not want to do, namely, to
withdraw the emergency powers by means of a concurrent resolution. I repeat that both houses of
Congress with the legal talent and constitutional authorities, not only among its distinguished
members but also among its legal experts and assistants, did neither wish nor intend to approve a
mere concurrent resolution but deliberately and intentionally chose to pass a bill, House Bill
No. 727 with full realization of the possibilities and chances of its approval or rejection by the
Chief Executive to whom it was submitted. Under these circumstances, the action of the majority
is practically telling the Legislature what it should have one and in finally doing it for said
Legislature in order to most easily achieve its purpose or wish might be regarded by some as not
only unwarranted but officious and uncalled for.
In view of the foregoing reasons, I beg to disagree with the majority.

SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-45685
November 16, 1937
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS and HONGKONG & SHANGHAI

BANKING CORPORATION,petitioners,
vs.
JOSE O. VERA, Judge . of the Court of First Instance of Manila, and MARIANO CU
UNJIENG, respondents.
Office of the Solicitor General Tuason and City Fiscal Diaz for the Government.
De Witt, Perkins and Ponce Enrile for the Hongkong and Shanghai Banking Corporation.
Vicente J. Francisco, Feria and La O, Orense and Belmonte, and Gibbs and McDonough for
respondent Cu Unjieng.
No appearance for respondent Judge.
LAUREL, J.:
This is an original action instituted in this court on August 19, 1937, for the issuance of the writ
of certiorari and of prohibition to the Court of First Instance of Manila so that this court may
review the actuations of the aforesaid Court of First Instance in criminal case No. 42649 entitled
"The People of the Philippine Islands vs. Mariano Cu Unjieng, et al.", more particularly the
application of the defendant Mariano Cu Unjieng therein for probation under the provisions of
Act No. 4221, and thereafter prohibit the said Court of First Instance from taking any further
action or entertaining further the aforementioned application for probation, to the end that the
defendant Mariano Cu Unjieng may be forthwith committed to prison in accordance with the
final judgment of conviction rendered by this court in said case (G. R. No. 41200). 1
Petitioners herein, the People of the Philippine and the Hongkong and Shanghai Banking
Corporation, are respectively the plaintiff and the offended party, and the respondent herein
Mariano Cu Unjieng is one of the defendants, in the criminal case entitled "The People of the
Philippine Islands vs. Mariano Cu Unjieng, et al.", criminal case No. 42649 of the Court of First
Instance of Manila and G.R. No. 41200 of this court. Respondent herein, Hon. Jose O. Vera, is
the Judge ad interim of the seventh branch of the Court of First Instance of Manila, who heard
the application of the defendant Mariano Cu Unjieng for probation in the aforesaid criminal case.
The information in the aforesaid criminal case was filed with the Court of First Instance of
Manila on October 15, 1931, petitioner herein Hongkong and Shanghai Banking Corporation
intervening in the case as private prosecutor. After a protracted trial unparalleled in the annals of
Philippine jurisprudence both in the length of time spent by the court as well as in the volume in
the testimony and the bulk of the exhibits presented, the Court of First Instance of Manila, on
January 8, 1934, rendered a judgment of conviction sentencing the defendant Mariano Cu
Unjieng to indeterminate penalty ranging from four years and two months of prision correccional
to eight years of prision mayor, to pay the costs and with reservation of civil action to the
offended party, the Hongkong and Shanghai Banking Corporation. Upon appeal, the court, on
March 26, 1935, modified the sentence to an indeterminate penalty of from five years and six
months of prision correccional to seven years, six months and twenty-seven days of prision
mayor, but affirmed the judgment in all other respects. Mariano Cu Unjieng filed a motion for
reconsideration and four successive motions for new trial which were denied on December 17,
1935, and final judgment was accordingly entered on December 18, 1935. The defendant
thereupon sought to have the case elevated on certiorari to the Supreme Court of the United
States but the latter denied the petition forcertiorari in
November, 1936. This court, on
November 24, 1936, denied the petition subsequently filed by the defendant for leave to file
a second alternative motion for reconsideration or new trial and thereafter remanded the case to
the court of origin for execution of the judgment.
The instant proceedings have to do with the application for probation filed by the herein
respondent Mariano Cu Unjieng on
November 27, 1936, before the trial court, under the
provisions of Act No. 4221 of the defunct Philippine Legislature. Herein respondent Mariano Cu
Unjieng states in his petition, inter alia, that he is innocent of the crime of which he was
convicted, that he has no criminal record and that he would observe good conduct in the future.
The Court of First Instance of Manila, Judge Pedro Tuason presiding, referred the application for
probation of the Insular Probation Office which recommended denial of the same June 18, 1937.
Thereafter, the Court of First Instance of Manila, seventh branch, Judge Jose O. Vera presiding,
set the petition for hearing on April 5, 1937.
On April 2, 1937, the Fiscal of the City of Manila filed an opposition to the granting of probation
to the herein respondent Mariano Cu Unjieng. The private prosecution also filed an opposition on
April 5, 1937, alleging, among other things, that Act No. 4221, assuming that it has not been
repealed by section 2 of Article XV of the Constitution, is nevertheless violative of section 1,
subsection (1), Article III of the Constitution guaranteeing equal protection of the laws for the
reason that its applicability is not uniform throughout the Islands and because section 11 of the
said Act endows the provincial boards with the power to make said law effective or otherwise in
their respective or otherwise in their respective provinces. The private prosecution also filed a
supplementary opposition on April 19, 1937, elaborating on the alleged unconstitutionality on
Act No. 4221, as an undue delegation of legislative power to the provincial boards of several
provinces (sec. 1, Art. VI, Constitution). The City Fiscal concurred in the opposition of the
private prosecution except with respect to the questions raised concerning the constitutionality of
Act No. 4221.
On June 28, 1937, herein respondent Judge Jose O. Vera promulgated a resolution with a finding
that "las pruebas no han establecido de unamanera concluyente la culpabilidad del peticionario y
que todos los hechos probados no son inconsistentes o incongrentes con su inocencia" and
concludes that the herein respondent Mariano Cu Unjieng "es inocente por duda racional" of the
crime of which he stands convicted by this court in G.R. No. 41200, but denying the latter's
petition for probation for the reason that:
. . . Si este Juzgado concediera la poblacion solicitada por las circunstancias y la historia

social que se han expuesto en el cuerpo de esta resolucion, que hacen al peticionario
acreedor de la misma, una parte de la opinion publica, atizada por los recelos y las
suspicacias, podria levantarse indignada contra un sistema de probacion que permite
atisbar en los procedimientos ordinarios de una causa criminal perturbando la quietud y la
eficacia de las decisiones ya recaidas al traer a la superficie conclusiones enteramente
differentes, en menoscabo del interes publico que demanda el respeto de las leyes y del
veredicto judicial.
On July 3, 1937, counsel for the herein respondent Mariano Cu Unjieng filed an exception to the
resolution denying probation and a notice of intention to file a motion for reconsideration. An
alternative motion for reconsideration or new trial was filed by counsel on July 13, 1937. This
was supplemented by an additional motion for reconsideration submitted on July 14, 1937. The
aforesaid motions were set for hearing on July 31, 1937, but said hearing was postponed at the
petition of counsel for the respondent Mariano Cu Unjieng because a motion for leave to
intervene in the case as amici curiae signed by thirty-three (thirty-four) attorneys had just been
filed with the trial court. Attorney Eulalio Chaves whose signature appears in the aforesaid
motion subsequently filed a petition for leave to withdraw his appearance as amicus curiae on
the ground that the motion for leave to intervene as amici curiae was circulated at a banquet
given by counsel for Mariano Cu Unjieng on the evening of July 30, 1937, and that he signed the
same "without mature deliberation and purely as a matter of courtesy to the person who invited
me (him)."
On August 6, 1937, the Fiscal of the City of Manila filed a motion with the trial court for the
issuance of an order of execution of the judgment of this court in said case and forthwith to
commit the herein respondent Mariano Cu Unjieng to jail in obedience to said judgment.
On August 7, 1937, the private prosecution filed its opposition to the motion for leave to
intervene as amici curiaeaforementioned, asking that a date be set for a hearing of the same and
that, at all events, said motion should be denied with respect to certain attorneys signing the same
who were members of the legal staff of the several counsel for Mariano Cu Unjieng. On August
10, 1937, herein respondent Judge Jose O. Vera issued an order requiring all parties including the
movants for intervention as amici curiae to appear before the court on August 14, 1937. On the
last-mentioned date, the Fiscal of the City of Manila moved for the hearing of his motion for
execution of judgment in preference to the motion for leave to intervene as amici curiae but,
upon objection of counsel for Mariano Cu Unjieng, he moved for the postponement of the
hearing of both motions. The respondent judge thereupon set the hearing of the motion for
execution on August 21, 1937, but proceeded to consider the motion for leave to intervene
as amici curiae as in order. Evidence as to the circumstances under which said motion for leave
to intervene as amici curiae was signed and submitted to court was to have been heard on August
19, 1937. But at this juncture, herein petitioners came to this court on extraordinary legal process
to put an end to what they alleged was an interminable proceeding in the Court of First Instance
of Manila which fostered "the campaign of the defendant Mariano Cu Unjieng for delay in the
execution of the sentence imposed by this Honorable Court on him, exposing the courts to
criticism and ridicule because of the apparent inability of the judicial machinery to make
effective a final judgment of this court imposed on the defendant Mariano Cu Unjieng."
The scheduled hearing before the trial court was accordingly suspended upon the issuance of a
temporary restraining order by this court on August 21, 1937.
To support their petition for the issuance of the extraordinary writs of certiorari and prohibition,
herein petitioners allege that the respondent judge has acted without jurisdiction or in excess of
his jurisdiction:
I. Because said respondent judge lacks the power to place respondent Mariano Cu Unjieng under
probation for the following reason:
(1) Under section 11 of Act No. 4221, the said of the Philippine Legislature is made to
apply only to the provinces of the Philippines; it nowhere states that it is to be made
applicable to chartered cities like the City of Manila.
(2) While section 37 of the Administrative Code contains a proviso to the effect that in
the absence of a special provision, the term "province" may be construed to include the
City of Manila for the purpose of giving effect to laws of general application, it is also
true that Act No. 4221 is not a law of general application because it is made to apply only
to those provinces in which the respective provincial boards shall have provided for the
salary of a probation officer.
(3) Even if the City of Manila were considered to be a province, still, Act No. 4221 would
not be applicable to it because it has provided for the salary of a probation officer as
required by section 11 thereof; it being immaterial that there is an Insular Probation
Officer willing to act for the City of Manila, said Probation Officer provided for in
section 10 of Act No. 4221 being different and distinct from the Probation Officer
provided for in section 11 of the same Act.
II. Because even if the respondent judge originally had jurisdiction to entertain the application
for probation of the respondent Mariano Cu Unjieng, he nevertheless acted without jurisdiction
or in excess thereof in continuing to entertain the motion for reconsideration and by failing to
commit Mariano Cu Unjieng to prison after he had promulgated his resolution of June 28, 1937,
denying Mariano Cu Unjieng's application for probation, for the reason that:
(1) His jurisdiction and power in probation proceedings is limited by Act No. 4221 to the
granting or denying of applications for probation.
(2) After he had issued the order denying Mariano Cu Unjieng's petition for probation on
June 28, 1937, it became final and executory at the moment of its rendition.
(3) No right on appeal exists in such cases.
(4) The respondent judge lacks the power to grant a rehearing of said order or to modify
or change the same.
III. Because the respondent judge made a finding that Mariano Cu Unjieng is innocent of the
crime for which he was convicted by final judgment of this court, which finding is not only
presumptuous but without foundation in fact and in law, and is furthermore in contempt of this
court and a violation of the respondent's oath of office as ad interim judge of first instance.
IV. Because the respondent judge has violated and continues to violate his duty, which became
imperative when he issued his order of June 28, 1937, denying the application for probation, to
commit his co-respondent to jail.
Petitioners also avers that they have no other plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary
course of law.
In a supplementary petition filed on September 9, 1937, the petitioner Hongkong and Shanghai
Banking Corporation further contends that Act No. 4221 of the Philippine Legislature providing
for a system of probation for persons eighteen years of age or over who are convicted of crime, is
unconstitutional because it is violative of section 1, subsection (1), Article III, of the Constitution
of the Philippines guaranteeing equal protection of the laws because it confers upon the
provincial board of its province the absolute discretion to make said law operative or otherwise
in their respective provinces, because it constitutes an unlawful and improper delegation to the
provincial boards of the several provinces of the legislative power lodged by the Jones Law
(section 8) in the Philippine Legislature and by the Constitution (section 1, Art. VI) in the
National Assembly; and for the further reason that it gives the provincial boards, in contravention
of the Constitution (section 2, Art. VIII) and the Jones Law (section 28), the authority to enlarge
the powers of the Court of First Instance of different provinces without uniformity. In another
supplementary petition dated September 14, 1937, the Fiscal of the City of Manila, in behalf of
one of the petitioners, the People of the Philippine Islands, concurs for the first time with the
issues raised by other petitioner regarding the constitutionality of Act No. 4221, and on the oral
argument held on October 6, 1937, further elaborated on the theory that probation is a form of
reprieve and therefore Act. No. 4221 is an encroachment on the exclusive power of the Chief
Executive to grant pardons and reprieves. On October 7, 1937, the City Fiscal filed two
memorandums in which he contended that Act No. 4221 not only encroaches upon the pardoning
power to the executive, but also constitute an unwarranted delegation of legislative power and a
denial of the equal protection of the laws. On October 9, 1937, two memorandums, signed jointly
by the City Fiscal and the Solicitor-General, acting in behalf of the People of the Philippine
Islands, and by counsel for the petitioner, the Hongkong and Shanghai Banking Corporation, one
sustaining the power of the state to impugn the validity of its own laws and the other contending
that Act No. 4221 constitutes an unwarranted delegation of legislative power, were presented.
Another joint memorandum was filed by the same persons on the same day, October 9, 1937,
alleging that Act No. 4221 is unconstitutional because it denies the equal protection of the laws
and constitutes an unlawful delegation of legislative power and, further, that the whole Act is
void: that the Commonwealth is not estopped from questioning the validity of its laws; that the
private prosecution may intervene in probation proceedings and may attack the probation law as
unconstitutional; and that this court may pass upon the constitutional question in prohibition
proceedings.
Respondents in their answer dated August 31, 1937, as well as in their oral argument and
memorandums, challenge each and every one of the foregoing proposition raised by the
petitioners.
As special defenses, respondents allege:
(1) That the present petition does not state facts sufficient in law to warrant the issuance
of the writ of certiorari or of prohibition.
(2) That the aforesaid petition is premature because the remedy sought by the petitioners
is the very same remedy prayed for by them before the trial court and was still pending
resolution before the trial court when the present petition was filed with this court.
(3) That the petitioners having themselves raised the question as to the execution of
judgment before the trial court, said trial court has acquired exclusive jurisdiction to
resolve the same under the theory that its resolution denying probation is unappealable.
(4) That upon the hypothesis that this court has concurrent jurisdiction with the Court of
First Instance to decide the question as to whether or not the execution will lie, this court
nevertheless cannot exercise said jurisdiction while the Court of First Instance has
assumed jurisdiction over the same upon motion of herein petitioners themselves.
(5) That upon the procedure followed by the herein petitioners in seeking to deprive the
trial court of its jurisdiction over the case and elevate the proceedings to this court, should
not be tolerated because it impairs the authority and dignity of the trial court which court
while sitting in the probation cases is "a court of limited jurisdiction but of great dignity."
(6) That under the supposition that this court has jurisdiction to resolve the question
submitted to and pending resolution by the trial court, the present action would not lie
because the resolution of the trial court denying probation is appealable; for although the
Probation Law does not specifically provide that an applicant for probation may appeal
from a resolution of the Court of First Instance denying probation, still it is a general rule
in this jurisdiction that a final order, resolution or decision of an inferior court is
appealable to the superior court.
(7) That the resolution of the trial court denying probation of herein respondent Mariano
Cu Unjieng being appealable, the same had not become final and executory for the reason
that the said respondent had filed an alternative motion for reconsideration and new trial
within the requisite period of fifteen days, which motion the trial court was able to
resolve in view of the restraining order improvidently and erroneously issued by this
court.lawphi1.net
(8) That the Fiscal of the City of Manila had by implication admitted that the resolution
of the trial court denying probation is not final and unappealable when he presented his
answer to the motion for reconsideration and agreed to the postponement of the hearing
of the said motion.
(9) That under the supposition that the order of the trial court denying probation is not
appealable, it is incumbent upon the accused to file an action for the issuance of the writ
ofcertiorari with mandamus, it appearing that the trial court, although it believed that the
accused was entitled to probation, nevertheless denied probation for fear of criticism
because the accused is a rich man; and that, before a petition for certiorari grounded on
an irregular exercise of jurisdiction by the trial court could lie, it is incumbent upon the
petitioner to file a motion for reconsideration specifying the error committed so that the
trial court could have an opportunity to correct or cure the same.
(10) That on hypothesis that the resolution of this court is not appealable, the trial court
retains its jurisdiction within a reasonable time to correct or modify it in accordance with
law and justice; that this power to alter or modify an order or resolution is inherent in the
courts and may be exercise either motu proprio or upon petition of the proper party, the
petition in the latter case taking the form of a motion for reconsideration.
(11) That on the hypothesis that the resolution of the trial court is appealable as
respondent allege, said court cannot order execution of the same while it is on appeal, for
then the appeal would not be availing because the doors of probation will be closed from
the moment the accused commences to serve his sentence (Act No. 4221, sec. 1; U.S. vs.
Cook, 19 Fed. [2d], 827).
In their memorandums filed on October 23, 1937, counsel for the respondents maintain that Act
No. 4221 is constitutional because, contrary to the allegations of the petitioners, it does not
constitute an undue delegation of legislative power, does not infringe the equal protection clause
of the Constitution, and does not encroach upon the pardoning power of the Executive. In an
additional memorandum filed on the same date, counsel for the respondents reiterate the view
that section 11 of Act No. 4221 is free from constitutional objections and contend, in addition,
that the private prosecution may not intervene in probation proceedings, much less question the
validity of Act No. 4221; that both the City Fiscal and the Solicitor-General are estopped from
questioning the validity of the Act; that the validity of Act cannot be attacked for the first time
before this court; that probation in unavailable; and that, in any event, section 11 of the Act No.
4221 is separable from the rest of the Act. The last memorandum for the respondent Mariano Cu
Unjieng was denied for having been filed out of time but was admitted by resolution of this court
and filed anew on
November 5, 1937. This memorandum elaborates on some of the
points raised by the respondents and refutes those brought up by the petitioners.
In the scrutiny of the pleadings and examination of the various aspects of the present case, we
noted that the court below, in passing upon the merits of the application of the respondent
Mariano Cu Unjieng and in denying said application assumed the task not only of considering
the merits of the application, but of passing upon the culpability of the applicant, notwithstanding
the final pronouncement of guilt by this court. (G.R. No. 41200.) Probation implies guilt be final
judgment. While a probation case may look into the circumstances attending the commission of
the offense, this does not authorize it to reverse the findings and conclusive of this court, either
directly or indirectly, especially wherefrom its own admission reliance was merely had on the
printed briefs, averments, and pleadings of the parties. As already observed by this court
in Shioji vs. Harvey ([1922], 43 Phil., 333, 337), and reiterated in subsequent cases, "if each and
every Court of First Instance could enjoy the privilege of overruling decisions of the Supreme
Court, there would be no end to litigation, and judicial chaos would result." A becoming modesty
of inferior courts demands conscious realization of the position that they occupy in the
interrelation and operation of the intergrated judicial system of the nation.
After threshing carefully the multifarious issues raised by both counsel for the petitioners and the
respondents, this court prefers to cut the Gordian knot and take up at once the two fundamental
questions presented, namely, (1) whether or not the constitutionality of Act No. 4221 has been
properly raised in these proceedings; and (2) in the affirmative, whether or not said Act is
constitutional. Considerations of these issues will involve a discussion of certain incidental
questions raised by the parties.
To arrive at a correct conclusion on the first question, resort to certain guiding principles is
necessary. It is a well-settled rule that the constitutionality of an act of the legislature will not be
determined by the courts unless that question is properly raised and presented inappropriate cases
and is necessary to a determination of the case; i.e., the issue of constitutionality must be the
very lis mota presented. (McGirr vs. Hamilton and Abreu [1915], 30 Phil., 563, 568; 6 R. C. L.,
pp. 76, 77; 12 C. J., pp. 780-782, 783.)
The question of the constitutionality of an act of the legislature is frequently raised in ordinary
actions. Nevertheless, resort may be made to extraordinary legal remedies, particularly where the
remedies in the ordinary course of law even if available, are not plain, speedy and adequate.
Thus, in Cu Unjieng vs. Patstone([1922]), 42 Phil., 818), this court held that the question of the
constitutionality of a statute may be raised by the petitioner in mandamus proceedings (see, also,
12 C. J., p. 783); and in Government of the Philippine Islands vs. Springer ([1927], 50 Phil., 259
[affirmed in Springer vs. Government of the Philippine Islands (1928), 277 U. S., 189; 72 Law.
ed., 845]), this court declared an act of the legislature unconstitutional in an action of quo
warrantobrought in the name of the Government of the Philippines. It has also been held that the
constitutionality of a statute may be questioned in habeas corpus proceedings (12 C. J., p. 783;
Bailey on Habeas Corpus, Vol. I, pp. 97, 117), although there are authorities to the contrary; on
an application for injunction to restrain action under the challenged statute (mandatory, see Cruz
vs. Youngberg [1931], 56 Phil., 234); and even on an application for preliminary injunction
where the determination of the constitutional question is necessary to a decision of the case. (12
C. J., p. 783.) The same may be said as regards prohibition and certiorari.(Yu Cong Eng vs.
Trinidad [1925], 47 Phil., 385; [1926], 271 U. S., 500; 70 Law. ed., 1059; Bell vs. First Judicial
District Court [1905], 28 Nev., 280; 81 Pac., 875; 113 A. S. R., 854; 6 Ann. Cas., 982; 1 L. R. A.
[N. S], 843, and cases cited). The case ofYu Cong Eng vs. Trinidad, supra, decided by this court
twelve years ago was, like the present one, an original action for certiorari and prohibition. The
constitutionality of Act No. 2972, popularly known as the Chinese Bookkeeping Law, was there
challenged by the petitioners, and the constitutional issue was not met squarely by the respondent
in a demurrer. A point was raised "relating to the propriety of the constitutional question being
decided in original proceedings in prohibition." This court decided to take up the constitutional
question and, with two justices dissenting, held that Act No. 2972 was constitutional. The case
was elevated on writ of certiorari to the Supreme Court of the United States which reversed the
judgment of this court and held that the Act was invalid. (271 U. S., 500; 70 Law. ed., 1059.) On
the question of jurisdiction, however, the Federal Supreme Court, though its Chief Justice, said:
By the Code of Civil Procedure of the Philippine Islands, section 516, the Philippine
supreme court is granted concurrent jurisdiction in prohibition with courts of first
instance over inferior tribunals or persons, and original jurisdiction over courts of first
instance, when such courts are exercising functions without or in excess of their
jurisdiction. It has been held by that court that the question of the validity of the criminal
statute must usually be raised by a defendant in the trial court and be carried regularly in
review to the Supreme Court. (Cadwallader-Gibson Lumber Co. vs. Del Rosario, 26
Phil., 192). But in this case where a new act seriously affected numerous persons and
extensive property rights, and was likely to cause a multiplicity of actions, the Supreme
Court exercised its discretion to bring the issue to the act's validity promptly before it and
decide in the interest of the orderly administration of justice. The court relied by analogy
upon the cases of Ex parte Young (209 U. S., 123;52 Law ed., 714; 13 L. R. A. [N. S.]
932; 28 Sup. Ct. Rep., 441; 14 Ann. Ca., 764; Traux vs. Raich, 239 U. S., 33; 60 Law. ed.,
131; L. R. A. 1916D, 545; 36 Sup. Ct. Rep., 7; Ann. Cas., 1917B, 283; and Wilson vs.
New, 243 U. S., 332; 61 Law. ed., 755; L. R. A. 1917E, 938; 37 Sup. Ct. Rep., 298; Ann.
Cas. 1918A, 1024). Although objection to the jurisdiction was raise by demurrer to the
petition, this is now disclaimed on behalf of the respondents, and both parties ask a
decision on the merits. In view of the broad powers in prohibition granted to that court
under the Island Code, we acquiesce in the desire of the parties.
The writ of prohibition is an extraordinary judicial writ issuing out of a court of superior
jurisdiction and directed to an inferior court, for the purpose of preventing the inferior tribunal
from usurping a jurisdiction with which it is not legally vested. (High, Extraordinary Legal
Remedies, p. 705.) The general rule, although there is a conflict in the cases, is that the merit of
prohibition will not lie whether the inferior court has jurisdiction independent of the statute the
constitutionality of which is questioned, because in such cases the interior court having
jurisdiction may itself determine the constitutionality of the statute, and its decision may be
subject to review, and consequently the complainant in such cases ordinarily has adequate
remedy by appeal without resort to the writ of prohibition. But where the inferior court or
tribunal derives its jurisdiction exclusively from an unconstitutional statute, it may be prevented
by the writ of prohibition from enforcing that statute. (50 C. J., 670; Ex parte Round tree [1874,
51 Ala., 42; In re Macfarland, 30 App. [D. C.], 365; Curtis vs. Cornish [1912], 109 Me., 384; 84
A., 799; Pennington vs. Woolfolk [1880], 79 Ky., 13; State vs. Godfrey [1903], 54 W. Va., 54; 46
S. E., 185; Arnold vs. Shields [1837], 5 Dana, 19; 30 Am. Dec., 669.)
Courts of First Instance sitting in probation proceedings derived their jurisdiction solely from Act
No. 4221 which prescribes in detailed manner the procedure for granting probation to accused
persons after their conviction has become final and before they have served their sentence. It is
true that at common law the authority of the courts to suspend temporarily the execution of the
sentence is recognized and, according to a number of state courts, including those of
Massachusetts, Michigan, New York, and Ohio, the power is inherent in the courts
(Commonwealth vs. Dowdican's Bail [1874], 115 Mass., 133; People vs. Stickel [1909], 156
Mich., 557; 121 N. W., 497; People ex rel. Forsyth vs. Court of Session [1894], 141 N. Y., 288;
Weber vs. State [1898], 58 Ohio St., 616). But, in the leading case of Ex parte United States
([1916], 242 U. S., 27; 61 Law. ed., 129; L. R. A., 1917E, 1178; 37 Sup. Ct. Rep., 72; Ann. Cas.
1917B, 355), the Supreme Court of the United States expressed the opinion that under the
common law the power of the court was limited to temporary suspension, and brushed aside the
contention as to inherent judicial power saying, through Chief Justice White:
Indisputably under our constitutional system the right to try offenses against the criminal
laws and upon conviction to impose the punishment provided by law is judicial, and it is
equally to be conceded that, in exerting the powers vested in them on such subject, courts
inherently possess ample right to exercise reasonable, that is, judicial, discretion to enable
them to wisely exert their authority. But these concessions afford no ground for the
contention as to power here made, since it must rest upon the proposition that the power
to enforce begets inherently a discretion to permanently refuse to do so. And the effect of
the proposition urged upon the distribution of powers made by the Constitution will
become apparent when it is observed that indisputable also is it that the authority to
define and fix the punishment for crime is legislative and includes the right in advance to
bring within judicial discretion, for the purpose of executing the statute, elements of
consideration which would be otherwise beyond the scope of judicial authority, and that
the right to relieve from the punishment, fixed by law and ascertained according to the
methods by it provided belongs to the executive department.
Justice Carson, in his illuminating concurring opinion in the case of Director of Prisons vs.
Judge of First Instance of Cavite (29 Phil., 265), decided by this court in 1915, also reached the
conclusion that the power to suspend the execution of sentences pronounced in criminal cases is
not inherent in the judicial function. "All are agreed", he said, "that in the absence of statutory
authority, it does not lie within the power of the courts to grant such suspensions." (at p. 278.)
Both petitioner and respondents are correct, therefore, when they argue that a Court of First
Instance sitting in probation proceedings is a court of limited jurisdiction. Its jurisdiction in such
proceedings is conferred exclusively by Act No. 4221 of the Philippine Legislature.
It is, of course, true that the constitutionality of a statute will not be considered on application for
prohibition where the question has not been properly brought to the attention of the court by
objection of some kind (Hill vs. Tarver [1901], 130 Ala., 592; 30 S., 499; State ex rel. Kelly vs.
Kirby [1914], 260 Mo., 120; 168 S. W., 746). In the case at bar, it is unquestionable that the
constitutional issue has been squarely presented not only before this court by the petitioners but
also before the trial court by the private prosecution. The respondent, Hon. Jose O Vera,
however, acting as judge of the court below, declined to pass upon the question on the ground
that the private prosecutor, not being a party whose rights are affected by the statute, may not
raise said question. The respondent judge cited Cooley on Constitutional Limitations (Vol. I, p.
339; 12 C. J., sec. 177, pp. 760 and 762), and McGlue vs. Essex County ([1916], 225 Mass., 59;
113 N. E., 742, 743), as authority for the proposition that a court will not consider any attack
made on the constitutionality of a statute by one who has no interest in defeating it because his
rights are not affected by its operation. The respondent judge further stated that it may not motu
proprio take up the constitutional question and, agreeing with Cooley that "the power to declare
a legislative enactment void is one which the judge, conscious of the fallibility of the human
judgment, will shrink from exercising in any case where he can conscientiously and with due
regard to duty and official oath decline the responsibility" (Constitutional Limitations, 8th ed.,
Vol. I, p. 332), proceeded on the assumption that Act No. 4221 is constitutional. While therefore,
the court a quo admits that the constitutional question was raised before it, it refused to consider
the question solely because it was not raised by a proper party. Respondents herein reiterates this
view. The argument is advanced that the private prosecution has no personality to appear in the
hearing of the application for probation of defendant Mariano Cu Unjieng in criminal case No.
42648 of the Court of First Instance of Manila, and hence the issue of constitutionality was not
properly raised in the lower court. Although, as a general rule, only those who are parties to a
suit may question the constitutionality of a statute involved in a judicial decision, it has been held
that since the decree pronounced by a court without jurisdiction is void, where the jurisdiction of
the court depends on the validity of the statute in question, the issue of the constitutionality will
be considered on its being brought to the attention of the court by persons interested in the effect
to be given the statute.(12 C. J., sec. 184, p. 766.) And, even if we were to concede that the issue
was not properly raised in the court below by the proper party, it does not follow that the issue
may not be here raised in an original action of certiorari and prohibitions. It is true that, as a
general rule, the question of constitutionality must be raised at the earliest opportunity, so that if
not raised by the pleadings, ordinarily it may not be raised at the trial, and if not raised in the trial
court, it will not considered on appeal. (12 C. J., p. 786. See, also,Cadwallader-Gibson Lumber
Co. vs. Del Rosario, 26 Phil., 192, 193-195.) But we must state that the general rule admits of
exceptions. Courts, in the exercise of sounds discretion, may determine the time when a question
affecting the constitutionality of a statute should be presented. (In re Woolsey [1884], 95 N. Y.,
135, 144.) Thus, in criminal cases, although there is a very sharp conflict of authorities, it is said
that the question may be raised for the first time at any stage of the proceedings, either in the trial
court or on appeal. (12 C. J., p. 786.) Even in civil cases, it has been held that it is the duty of a
court to pass on the constitutional question, though raised for the first time on appeal, if it
appears that a determination of the question is necessary to a decision of the case. (McCabe's
Adm'x vs. Maysville & B. S. R. Co., [1910], 136 ky., 674; 124 S. W., 892; Lohmeyer vs. St.
Louis Cordage Co. [1908], 214 Mo., 685; 113 S. W. 1108; Carmody vs. St. Louis Transit Co.,
[1905], 188 Mo., 572; 87 S. W., 913.) And it has been held that a constitutional question will be
considered by an appellate court at any time, where it involves the jurisdiction of the court below
(State vs. Burke [1911], 175 Ala., 561; 57 S., 870.) As to the power of this court to consider the
constitutional question raised for the first time before this court in these proceedings, we turn
again and point with emphasis to the case of Yu Cong Eng vs. Trinidad, supra. And on the
hypotheses that the Hongkong & Shanghai Banking Corporation, represented by the private
prosecution, is not the proper party to raise the constitutional question here a point we do not
now have to decide we are of the opinion that the People of the Philippines, represented by
the Solicitor-General and the Fiscal of the City of Manila, is such a proper party in the present
proceedings. The unchallenged rule is that the person who impugns the validity of a statute must
have a personal and substantial interest in the case such that he has sustained, or will sustained,
direct injury as a result of its enforcement. It goes without saying that if Act No. 4221 really
violates the constitution, the People of the Philippines, in whose name the present action is
brought, has a substantial interest in having it set aside. Of grater import than the damage caused
by the illegal expenditure of public funds is the mortal wound inflicted upon the fundamental law
by the enforcement of an invalid statute. Hence, the well-settled rule that the state can challenge
the validity of its own laws. In Government of the Philippine Islands vs. Springer ([1927]), 50
Phil., 259 (affirmed in Springer vs. Government of the Philippine Islands [1928], 277 U.S., 189;
72 Law. ed., 845), this court declared an act of the legislature unconstitutional in an action
instituted in behalf of the Government of the Philippines. In Attorney General vs. Perkins
([1889], 73 Mich., 303, 311, 312; 41 N. W. 426, 428, 429), the State of Michigan, through its
Attorney General, instituted quo warranto proceedings to test the right of the respondents to
renew a mining corporation, alleging that the statute under which the respondents base their right
was unconstitutional because it impaired the obligation of contracts. The capacity of the chief
law officer of the state to question the constitutionality of the statute was though, as a general
rule, only those who are parties to a suit may question the constitutionality of a statute involved
in a judicial decision, it has been held that since the decree pronounced by a court without
jurisdiction in void, where the jurisdiction of the court depends on the validity of the statute in
question, the issue of constitutionality will be considered on its being brought to the attention of
the court by persons interested in the effect to begin the statute. (12 C.J., sec. 184, p. 766.) And,
even if we were to concede that the issue was not properly raised in the court below by the
proper party, it does not follow that the issue may not be here raised in an original action of
certiorari and prohibition. It is true that, as a general rule, the question of constitutionality must
be raised at the earliest opportunity, so that if not raised by the pleadings, ordinarily it may not be
raised a the trial, and if not raised in the trial court, it will not be considered on appeal. (12 C.J.,
p. 786. See, also, Cadwallader-Gibson Lumber Co. vs. Del Rosario, 26 Phil., 192, 193-195.) But
we must state that the general rule admits of exceptions. Courts, in the exercise of sound
discretion, may determine the time when a question affecting the constitutionality of a statute
should be presented. (In re Woolsey [19884], 95 N.Y., 135, 144.) Thus, in criminal cases,
although there is a very sharp conflict of authorities, it is said that the question may be raised for
the first time at any state of the proceedings, either in the trial court or on appeal. (12 C.J., p.
786.) Even in civil cases, it has been held that it is the duty of a court to pass on the
constitutional question, though raised for first time on appeal, if it appears that a determination of
the question is necessary to a decision of the case. (McCabe's Adm'x vs. Maysville & B. S. R.
Co. [1910], 136 Ky., 674; 124 S. W., 892; Lohmeyer vs. St. Louis, Cordage Co. [1908], 214 Mo.
685; 113 S. W., 1108; Carmody vs. St. Louis Transit Co. [1905], 188 Mo., 572; 87 S. W., 913.)
And it has been held that a constitutional question will be considered by an appellate court at any
time, where it involves the jurisdiction of the court below (State vs. Burke [1911], 175 Ala., 561;
57 S., 870.) As to the power of this court to consider the constitutional question raised for the
first time before this court in these proceedings, we turn again and point with emphasis to the
case of Yu Cong Eng. vs. Trinidad, supra. And on the hypothesis that the Hongkong & Shanghai
Banking Corporation, represented by the private prosecution, is not the proper party to raise the
constitutional question here a point we do not now have to decide we are of the opinion
that the People of the Philippines, represented by the Solicitor-General and the Fiscal of the City
of Manila, is such a proper party in the present proceedings. The unchallenged rule is that the
person who impugns the validity of a statute must have a personal and substantial interest in the
case such that he has sustained, or will sustain, direct injury as a result of its enforcement. It goes
without saying that if Act No. 4221 really violates the Constitution, the People of the Philippines,
in whose name the present action is brought, has a substantial interest in having it set aside. Of
greater import than the damage caused by the illegal expenditure of public funds is the mortal
wound inflicted upon the fundamental law by the enforcement of an invalid statute. Hence, the
well-settled rule that the state can challenge the validity of its own laws. In Government of the
Philippine Islands vs. Springer ([1927]), 50 Phil., 259 (affirmed in Springer vs. Government of
the Philippine Islands [1928], 277 U.S., 189; 72 Law. ed., 845), this court declared an act of the
legislature unconstitutional in an action instituted in behalf of the Government of the Philippines.
In Attorney General vs. Perkings([1889], 73 Mich., 303, 311, 312; 41 N.W., 426, 428, 429), the
State of Michigan, through its Attorney General, instituted quo warranto proceedings to test the
right of the respondents to renew a mining corporation, alleging that the statute under which the
respondents base their right was unconstitutional because it impaired the obligation of contracts.
The capacity of the chief law officer of the state to question the constitutionality of the statute
was itself questioned. Said the Supreme Court of Michigan, through Champlin, J.:
. . . The idea seems to be that the people are estopped from questioning the validity of a
law enacted by their representatives; that to an accusation by the people of Michigan of
usurpation their government, a statute enacted by the people of Michigan is an adequate
answer. The last proposition is true, but, if the statute relied on in justification is
unconstitutional, it is statute only in form, and lacks the force of law, and is of no more
saving effect to justify action under it than if it had never been enacted. The constitution
is the supreme law, and to its behests the courts, the legislature, and the people must
bow . . . The legislature and the respondents are not the only parties in interest upon such
constitutional questions. As was remarked by Mr. Justice Story, in speaking of an
acquiescence by a party affected by an unconstitutional act of the legislature: "The people
have a deep and vested interest in maintaining all the constitutional limitations upon the
exercise of legislative powers." (Allen vs. Mckeen, 1 Sum., 314.)
In State vs. Doane ([1916], 98 Kan., 435; 158 Pac., 38, 40), an original action (mandamus) was
brought by the Attorney-General of Kansas to test the constitutionality of a statute of the state. In
disposing of the question whether or not the state may bring the action, the Supreme Court of
Kansas said:
. . . the state is a proper party indeed, the proper party to bring this action. The state
is always interested where the integrity of its Constitution or statutes is involved.
"It has an interest in seeing that the will of the Legislature is not
disregarded, and need not, as an individual plaintiff must, show grounds of
fearing more specific injury. (State vs. Kansas City 60 Kan., 518 [57 Pac.,
118])." (State vs. Lawrence, 80 Kan., 707; 103 Pac., 839.)
Where the constitutionality of a statute is in doubt the state's law officer, its AttorneyGeneral, or county attorney, may exercise his bet judgment as to what sort of action he
will bring to have the matter determined, either by quo warranto to challenge its validity
(State vs. Johnson, 61 Kan., 803; 60 Pac., 1068; 49 L.R.A., 662), by mandamus to
compel obedience to its terms (State vs. Dolley, 82 Kan., 533; 108 Pac., 846), or by
injunction to restrain proceedings under its questionable provisions (State ex rel. vs. City
of Neodesha, 3 Kan. App., 319; 45 Pac., 122).
Other courts have reached the same conclusion (See State vs. St. Louis S. W. Ry. Co. [1917], 197
S. W., 1006; State vs. S.H. Kress & Co. [1934], 155 S., 823; State vs. Walmsley [1935], 181 La.,
597; 160 S., 91; State vs. Board of County Comr's [1934], 39 Pac. [2d], 286; First Const. Co. of
Brooklyn vs. State [1917], 211 N.Y., 295; 116 N.E., 1020; Bush vs. State {1918], 187 Ind., 339;
119 N.E., 417; State vs. Watkins [1933], 176 La., 837; 147 S., 8, 10, 11). In the case last cited,
the Supreme Court of Luisiana said:
It is contended by counsel for Herbert Watkins that a district attorney, being charged with
the duty of enforcing the laws, has no right to plead that a law is unconstitutional. In
support of the argument three decisions are cited, viz.: State ex rel. Hall, District
Attorney, vs. Judge of Tenth Judicial District (33 La. Ann., 1222); State ex rel. Nicholls,
Governor vs. Shakespeare, Mayor of New Orleans (41 Ann., 156; 6 So., 592); and
State ex rel., Banking Co., etc. vs. Heard, Auditor (47 La. Ann., 1679; 18 So., 746; 47 L.
R. A., 512). These decisions do not forbid a district attorney to plead that a statute is
unconstitutional if he finds if in conflict with one which it is his duty to enforce. In
State ex rel. Hall, District Attorney, vs. Judge, etc., the ruling was the judge should not,
merely because he believed a certain statute to be unconstitutional forbid the district
attorney to file a bill of information charging a person with a violation of the statute. In
other words, a judge should not judicially declare a statute unconstitutional until the
question of constitutionality is tendered for decision, and unless it must be decided in
order to determine the right of a party litigant. Stateex rel. Nicholls, Governor, etc., is
authority for the proposition merely that an officer on whom a statute imposes the duty of
enforcing its provisions cannot avoid the duty upon the ground that he considers the
statute unconstitutional, and hence in enforcing the statute he is immune from
responsibility if the statute be unconstitutional. State ex rel. Banking Co., etc., is authority
for the proposition merely that executive officers, e.g., the state auditor and state
treasurer, should not decline to perform ministerial duties imposed upon them by a
statute, on the ground that they believe the statute is unconstitutional.
It is the duty of a district attorney to enforce the criminal laws of the state, and, above all,
to support the Constitution of the state. If, in the performance of his duty he finds two
statutes in conflict with each other, or one which repeals another, and if, in his judgment,
one of the two statutes is unconstitutional, it is his duty to enforce the other; and, in order
to do so, he is compelled to submit to the court, by way of a plea, that one of the statutes
is unconstitutional. If it were not so, the power of the Legislature would be free from
constitutional limitations in the enactment of criminal laws.
The respondents do not seem to doubt seriously the correctness of the general proposition that
the state may impugn the validity of its laws. They have not cited any authority running clearly
in the opposite direction. In fact, they appear to have proceeded on the assumption that the rule
as stated is sound but that it has no application in the present case, nor may it be invoked by the
City Fiscal in behalf of the People of the Philippines, one of the petitioners herein, the principal
reasons being that the validity before this court, that the City Fiscal is estopped from attacking
the validity of the Act and, not authorized challenge the validity of the Act in its application
outside said city. (Additional memorandum of respondents, October 23, 1937, pp. 8,. 10, 17 and
23.)
The mere fact that the Probation Act has been repeatedly relied upon the past and all that time
has not been attacked as unconstitutional by the Fiscal of Manila but, on the contrary, has been
impliedly regarded by him as constitutional, is no reason for considering the People of the
Philippines estopped from nor assailing its validity. For courts will pass upon a constitutional
questions only when presented before it in bona fide cases for determination, and the fact that the
question has not been raised before is not a valid reason for refusing to allow it to be raised later.
The fiscal and all others are justified in relying upon the statute and treating it as valid until it is
held void by the courts in proper cases.
It remains to consider whether the determination of the constitutionality of Act No. 4221 is
necessary to the resolution of the instant case. For, ". . . while the court will meet the question
with firmness, where its decision is indispensable, it is the part of wisdom, and just respect for
the legislature, renders it proper, to waive it, if the case in which it arises, can be decided on
other points." (Ex parte Randolph [1833], 20 F. Cas. No. 11, 558; 2 Brock., 447. Vide, also
Hoover vs. wood [1857], 9 Ind., 286, 287.) It has been held that the determination of a
constitutional question is necessary whenever it is essential to the decision of the case (12 C. J.,
p. 782, citing Long Sault Dev. Co. vs. Kennedy [1913], 158 App. Div., 398; 143 N. Y. Supp., 454
[aff. 212 N.Y., 1: 105 N. E., 849; Ann. Cas. 1915D, 56; and app dism 242 U.S., 272]; Hesse vs.
Ledesma, 7 Porto Rico Fed., 520; Cowan vs. Doddridge, 22 Gratt [63 Va.], 458; Union Line Co.,
vs. Wisconsin R. Commn., 146 Wis., 523; 129 N. W., 605), as where the right of a party is
founded solely on a statute the validity of which is attacked. (12 C.J., p. 782, citing Central Glass
Co. vs. Niagrara F. Ins. Co., 131 La., 513; 59 S., 972; Cheney vs. Beverly, 188 Mass., 81; 74
N.E., 306). There is no doubt that the respondent Cu Unjieng draws his privilege to probation
solely from Act No. 4221 now being assailed.
Apart from the foregoing considerations, that court will also take cognizance of the fact that the
Probation Act is a new addition to our statute books and its validity has never before been passed
upon by the courts; that may persons accused and convicted of crime in the City of Manila have
applied for probation; that some of them are already on probation; that more people will likely
take advantage of the Probation Act in the future; and that the respondent Mariano Cu Unjieng
has been at large for a period of about four years since his first conviction. All wait the decision
of this court on the constitutional question. Considering, therefore, the importance which the
instant case has assumed and to prevent multiplicity of suits, strong reasons of public policy
demand that the constitutionality of Act No. 4221 be now resolved. (Yu Cong Eng vs. Trinidad
[1925], 47 Phil., 385; [1926], 271 U.S., 500; 70 Law. ed., 1059. See 6 R.C.L., pp. 77, 78; People
vs. Kennedy [1913], 207 N.Y., 533; 101 N.E., 442, 444; Ann. Cas. 1914C, 616; Borginis vs. Falk
Co. [1911], 147 Wis., 327; 133 N.W., 209, 211; 37 L.R.A. [N.S.] 489; Dimayuga and Fajardo vs.
Fernandez [1922], 43 Phil., 304.) In Yu Cong Eng vs. Trinidad, supra, an analogous situation
confronted us. We said: "Inasmuch as the property and personal rights of nearly twelve thousand
merchants are affected by these proceedings, and inasmuch as Act No. 2972 is a new law not yet
interpreted by the courts, in the interest of the public welfare and for the advancement of public
policy, we have determined to overrule the defense of want of jurisdiction in order that we may
decide the main issue. We have here an extraordinary situation which calls for a relaxation of the
general rule." Our ruling on this point was sustained by the Supreme Court of the United States.
A more binding authority in support of the view we have taken can not be found.
We have reached the conclusion that the question of the constitutionality of Act No. 4221 has
been properly raised. Now for the main inquiry: Is the Act unconstitutional?
Under a doctrine peculiarly American, it is the office and duty of the judiciary to enforce the
Constitution. This court, by clear implication from the provisions of section 2, subsection 1, and
section 10, of Article VIII of the Constitution, may declare an act of the national legislature
invalid because in conflict with the fundamental lay. It will not shirk from its sworn duty to
enforce the Constitution. And, in clear cases, it will not hesitate to give effect to the supreme law
by setting aside a statute in conflict therewith. This is of the essence of judicial duty.
This court is not unmindful of the fundamental criteria in cases of this nature that all reasonable
doubts should be resolved in favor of the constitutionality of a statute. An act of the legislature
approved by the executive, is presumed to be within constitutional limitations. The responsibility
of upholding the Constitution rests not on the courts alone but on the legislature as well. "The
question of the validity of every statute is first determined by the legislative department of the
government itself." (U.S. vs. Ten Yu [1912], 24 Phil., 1, 10; Case vs. Board of Health and Heiser
[1913], 24 Phil., 250, 276; U.S. vs. Joson [1913], 26 Phil., 1.) And a statute finally comes before
the courts sustained by the sanction of the executive. The members of the Legislature and the
Chief Executive have taken an oath to support the Constitution and it must be presumed that they
have been true to this oath and that in enacting and sanctioning a particular law they did not
intend to violate the Constitution. The courts cannot but cautiously exercise its power to overturn
the solemn declarations of two of the three grand departments of the governments. (6 R.C.L., p.
101.) Then, there is that peculiar political philosophy which bids the judiciary to reflect the
wisdom of the people as expressed through an elective Legislature and an elective Chief
Executive. It follows, therefore, that the courts will not set aside a law as violative of the
Constitution except in a clear case. This is a proposition too plain to require a citation of
authorities.
One of the counsel for respondents, in the course of his impassioned argument, called attention to
the fact that the President of the Philippines had already expressed his opinion against the
constitutionality of the Probation Act, adverting that as to the Executive the resolution of this
question was a foregone conclusion. Counsel, however, reiterated his confidence in the integrity
and independence of this court. We take notice of the fact that the President in his message dated
September 1, 1937, recommended to the National Assembly the immediate repeal of the
Probation Act (No. 4221); that this message resulted in the approval of Bill No. 2417 of the
Nationality Assembly repealing the probation Act, subject to certain conditions therein
mentioned; but that said bill was vetoed by the President on September 13, 1937, much against
his wish, "to have stricken out from the statute books of the Commonwealth a law . . . unfair and
very likely unconstitutional." It is sufficient to observe in this connection that, in vetoing the bill
referred to, the President exercised his constitutional prerogative. He may express the reasons
which he may deem proper for taking such a step, but his reasons are not binding upon us in the
determination of actual controversies submitted for our determination. Whether or not the
Executive should express or in any manner insinuate his opinion on a matter encompassed within
his broad constitutional power of veto but which happens to be at the same time pending
determination in this court is a question of propriety for him exclusively to decide or determine.
Whatever opinion is expressed by him under these circumstances, however, cannot sway our
judgment on way or another and prevent us from taking what in our opinion is the proper course
of action to take in a given case. It if is ever necessary for us to make any vehement affirmance
during this formative period of our political history, it is that we are independent of the Executive
no less than of the Legislative department of our government independent in the performance
of our functions, undeterred by any consideration, free from politics, indifferent to popularity,
and unafraid of criticism in the accomplishment of our sworn duty as we see it and as we
understand it.
The constitutionality of Act No. 4221 is challenged on three principal grounds: (1) That said Act
encroaches upon the pardoning power of the Executive; (2) that its constitutes an undue
delegation of legislative power and (3) that it denies the equal protection of the laws.
1. Section 21 of the Act of Congress of August 29, 1916, commonly known as the Jones Law, in
force at the time of the approval of Act No. 4221, otherwise known as the Probation Act, vests in
the Governor-General of the Philippines "the exclusive power to grant pardons and reprieves and
remit fines and forfeitures". This power is now vested in the President of the Philippines. (Art.
VII, sec. 11, subsec. 6.) The provisions of the Jones Law and the Constitution differ in some
respects. The adjective "exclusive" found in the Jones Law has been omitted from the
Constitution. Under the Jones Law, as at common law, pardon could be granted any time after the
commission of the offense, either before or after conviction (Vide Constitution of the United
States, Art. II, sec. 2;In re Lontok [1922], 43 Phil., 293). The Governor-General of the
Philippines was thus empowered, like the President of the United States, to pardon a person
before the facts of the case were fully brought to light. The framers of our Constitution thought
this undesirable and, following most of the state constitutions, provided that the pardoning power
can only be exercised "after conviction". So, too, under the new Constitution, the pardoning
power does not extend to "cases of impeachment". This is also the rule generally followed in the
United States (Vide Constitution of the United States, Art. II, sec. 2). The rule in England is
different. There, a royal pardon can not be pleaded in bar of an impeachment; "but," says
Blackstone, "after the impeachment has been solemnly heard and determined, it is not
understood that the king's royal grace is further restrained or abridged." (Vide, Ex parte Wells
[1856], 18 How., 307; 15 Law. ed., 421; Com. vs. Lockwood [1872], 109 Mass., 323; 12 Am.
Rep., 699; Sterling vs. Drake [1876], 29 Ohio St., 457; 23 am. Rep., 762.) The reason for the
distinction is obvious. In England, Judgment on impeachment is not confined to mere "removal
from office and disqualification to hold and enjoy any office of honor, trust, or profit under the
Government" (Art. IX, sec. 4, Constitution of the Philippines) but extends to the whole
punishment attached by law to the offense committed. The House of Lords, on a conviction may,
by its sentence, inflict capital punishment, perpetual banishment, perpetual banishment, fine or
imprisonment, depending upon the gravity of the offense committed, together with removal from
office and incapacity to hold office. (Com. vs. Lockwood, supra.) Our Constitution also makes
specific mention of "commutation" and of the power of the executive to impose, in the pardons
he may grant, such conditions, restrictions and limitations as he may deem proper. Amnesty may
be granted by the President under the Constitution but only with the concurrence of the National
Assembly. We need not dwell at length on the significance of these fundamental changes. It is
sufficient for our purposes to state that the pardoning power has remained essentially the same.
The question is: Has the pardoning power of the Chief Executive under the Jones Law been
impaired by the Probation Act?
As already stated, the Jones Law vests the pardoning power exclusively in the Chief Executive.
The exercise of the power may not, therefore, be vested in anyone else.
". . . The benign prerogative of mercy reposed in the executive cannot be taken away nor fettered
by any legislative restrictions, nor can like power be given by the legislature to any other officer
or authority. The coordinate departments of government have nothing to do with the pardoning
power, since no person properly belonging to one of the departments can exercise any powers
appertaining to either of the others except in cases expressly provided for by the constitution."
(20 R.C.L., pp., , and cases cited.) " . . . where the pardoning power is conferred on the executive
without express or implied limitations, the grant is exclusive, and the legislature can neither
exercise such power itself nor delegate it elsewhere, nor interfere with or control the proper
exercise thereof, . . ." (12 C.J., pp. 838, 839, and cases cited.) If Act No. 4221, then, confers any
pardoning power upon the courts it is for that reason unconstitutional and void. But does it?
In the famous Killitts decision involving an embezzlement case, the Supreme Court of the United
States ruled in 1916 that an order indefinitely suspending sentenced was void. (Ex parte United
States [1916], 242 U.S., 27; 61 Law. ed., 129; L.R.A. 1917E, 1178; 37 Sup. Ct. Rep., 72; Ann.
Cas. 1917B, 355.) Chief Justice White, after an exhaustive review of the authorities, expressed
the opinion of the court that under the common law the power of the court was limited to
temporary suspension and that the right to suspend sentenced absolutely and permanently was
vested in the executive branch of the government and not in the judiciary. But, the right of
Congress to establish probation by statute was conceded. Said the court through its Chief Justice:
". . . and so far as the future is concerned, that is, the causing of the imposition of penalties as
fixed to be subject, by probation legislation or such other means as the legislative mind may
devise, to such judicial discretion as may be adequate to enable courts to meet by the exercise of
an enlarged but wise discretion the infinite variations which may be presented to them for
judgment, recourse must be had Congress whose legislative power on the subject is in the very
nature of things adequately complete." (Quoted in Riggs vs. United States [1926], 14 F. [2d], 5,
6.) This decision led the National Probation Association and others to agitate for the enactment
by Congress of a federal probation law. Such action was finally taken on March 4, 1925 (chap.
521, 43 Stat. L. 159, U.S.C. title 18, sec. 724). This was followed by an appropriation to defray
the salaries and expenses of a certain number of probation officers chosen by civil service.
(Johnson, Probation for Juveniles and Adults, p. 14.)
In United States vs. Murray ([1925], 275 U.S., 347; 48 Sup. Ct. Rep., 146; 72 Law. ed., 309), the
Supreme Court of the United States, through Chief Justice Taft, held that when a person
sentenced to imprisonment by a district court has begun to serve his sentence, that court has no
power under the Probation Act of March 4, 1925 to grant him probation even though the term at
which sentence was imposed had not yet expired. In this case of Murray, the constitutionality of
the probation Act was not considered but was assumed. The court traced the history of the Act
and quoted from the report of the Committee on the Judiciary of the United States House of
Representatives (Report No. 1377, 68th Congress, 2 Session) the following statement:
Prior to the so-called Killitts case, rendered in December, 1916, the district courts
exercised a form of probation either, by suspending sentence or by placing the defendants
under state probation officers or volunteers. In this case, however (Ex parte United States,
242 U.S., 27; 61 L. Ed., 129; L.R.A., 1917E, 1178; 37 Sup. Ct. Rep., 72 Ann. Cas.
1917B, 355), the Supreme Court denied the right of the district courts to suspend
sentenced. In the same opinion the court pointed out the necessity for action by Congress
if the courts were to exercise probation powers in the future . . .
Since this decision was rendered, two attempts have been made to enact probation
legislation. In 1917, a bill was favorably reported by the Judiciary Committee and passed
the House. In 1920, the judiciary Committee again favorably reported a probation bill to
the House, but it was never reached for definite action.
If this bill is enacted into law, it will bring the policy of the Federal government with
reference to its treatment of those convicted of violations of its criminal laws in harmony
with that of the states of the Union. At the present time every state has a probation law,
and in all but twelve states the law applies both to adult and juvenile offenders. (see, also,
Johnson, Probation for Juveniles and Adults [1928], Chap. I.)
The constitutionality of the federal probation law has been sustained by inferior federal courts. In
Riggs vs. United States supra, the Circuit Court of Appeals of the Fourth Circuit said:
Since the passage of the Probation Act of March 4, 1925, the questions under
consideration have been reviewed by the Circuit Court of Appeals of the Ninth Circuit (7
F. [2d], 590), and the constitutionality of the act fully sustained, and the same held in no
manner to encroach upon the pardoning power of the President. This case will be found
to contain an able and comprehensive review of the law applicable here. It arose under
the act we have to consider, and to it and the authorities cited therein special reference is
made (Nix vs. James, 7 F. [2d], 590, 594), as is also to a decision of the Circuit Court of
Appeals of the Seventh Circuit (Kriebel vs. U.S., 10 F. [2d], 762), likewise construing the
Probation Act.
We have seen that in 1916 the Supreme Court of the United States; in plain and unequivocal
language, pointed to Congress as possessing the requisite power to enact probation laws, that a
federal probation law as actually enacted in 1925, and that the constitutionality of the Act has
been assumed by the Supreme Court of the United States in 1928 and consistently sustained by
the inferior federal courts in a number of earlier cases.
We are fully convinced that the Philippine Legislature, like the Congress of the United States,
may legally enact a probation law under its broad power to fix the punishment of any and all
penal offenses. This conclusion is supported by other authorities. In Ex parte Bates ([1915], 20
N. M., 542; L.R.A. 1916A, 1285; 151 Pac., 698, the court said: "It is clearly within the province
of the Legislature to denominate and define all classes of crime, and to prescribe for each a
minimum and maximum punishment." And in State vs. Abbott ([1910], 87 S.C., 466; 33 L.R.A.
[N. S.], 112; 70 S. E., 6; Ann. Cas. 1912B, 1189), the court said: "The legislative power to set
punishment for crime is very broad, and in the exercise of this power the general assembly may
confer on trial judges, if it sees fit, the largest discretion as to the sentence to be imposed, as to
the beginning and end of the punishment and whether it should be certain or indeterminate or
conditional." (Quoted in State vs. Teal [1918], 108 S. C., 455; 95 S. E., 69.) Indeed, the
Philippine Legislature has defined all crimes and fixed the penalties for their violation.
Invariably, the legislature has demonstrated the desire to vest in the courts particularly the
trial courts large discretion in imposing the penalties which the law prescribes in particular
cases. It is believed that justice can best be served by vesting this power in the courts, they being
in a position to best determine the penalties which an individual convict, peculiarly
circumstanced, should suffer. Thus, while courts are not allowed to refrain from imposing a
sentence merely because, taking into consideration the degree of malice and the injury caused by
the offense, the penalty provided by law is clearly excessive, the courts being allowed in such
case to submit to the Chief Executive, through the Department of Justice, such statement as it
may deem proper (see art. 5, Revised Penal Code), in cases where both mitigating and
aggravating circumstances are attendant in the commission of a crime and the law provides for a
penalty composed of two indivisible penalties, the courts may allow such circumstances to offset
one another in consideration of their number and importance, and to apply the penalty according
to the result of such compensation. (Art. 63, rule 4, Revised Penal Code; U.S. vs. Reguera and
Asuategui [1921], 41 Phil., 506.) Again, article 64, paragraph 7, of the Revised Penal Code
empowers the courts to determine, within the limits of each periods, in case the penalty
prescribed by law contains three periods, the extent of the evil produced by the crime. In the
imposition of fines, the courts are allowed to fix any amount within the limits established by law,
considering not only the mitigating and aggravating circumstances, but more particularly the
wealth or means of the culprit. (Art. 66, Revised Penal Code.) Article 68, paragraph 1, of the
same Code provides that "a discretionary penalty shall be imposed" upon a person under fifteen
but over nine years of age, who has not acted without discernment, but always lower by two
degrees at least than that prescribed by law for the crime which he has committed. Article 69 of
the same Code provides that in case of "incomplete self-defense", i.e., when the crime committed
is not wholly excusable by reason of the lack of some of the conditions required to justify the
same or to exempt from criminal liability in the several cases mentioned in article 11 and 12 of
the Code, "the courts shall impose the penalty in the period which may be deemed proper, in
view of the number and nature of the conditions of exemption present or lacking." And, in case
the commission of what are known as "impossible" crimes, "the court, having in mind the social
danger and the degree of criminality shown by the offender," shall impose upon him either
arresto mayor or a fine ranging from 200 to 500 pesos. (Art. 59, Revised Penal Code.)
Under our Revised Penal Code, also, one-half of the period of preventive imprisonment is
deducted form the entire term of imprisonment, except in certain cases expressly mentioned (art.
29); the death penalty is not imposed when the guilty person is more than seventy years of age,
or where upon appeal or revision of the case by the Supreme Court, all the members thereof are
not unanimous in their voting as to the propriety of the imposition of the death penalty (art.
47, see also, sec. 133, Revised Administrative Code, as amended by Commonwealth Act No. 3);
the death sentence is not to be inflicted upon a woman within the three years next following the
date of the sentence or while she is pregnant, or upon any person over seventy years of age (art.
83); and when a convict shall become insane or an imbecile after final sentence has been
pronounced, or while he is serving his sentenced, the execution of said sentence shall be
suspended with regard to the personal penalty during the period of such insanity or imbecility
(art. 79).
But the desire of the legislature to relax what might result in the undue harshness of the penal
laws is more clearly demonstrated in various other enactments, including the probation Act.
There is the Indeterminate Sentence Law enacted in 1933 as Act No. 4103 and subsequently
amended by Act No. 4225, establishing a system of parole (secs. 5 to 100 and granting the courts
large discretion in imposing the penalties of the law. Section 1 of the law as amended provides;
"hereafter, in imposing a prison sentence for an offenses punished by the Revised Penal Code, or
its amendments, the court shall sentence the accused to an indeterminate sentence the maximum
term of which shall be that which, in view of the attending circumstances, could be properly
imposed under the rules of the said Code, and to a minimum which shall be within the range of
the penalty next lower to that prescribed by the Code for the offense; and if the offense is
punished by any other law, the court shall sentence the accused to an indeterminate sentence, the
maximum term of which shall not exceed the maximum fixed by said law and the minimum shall
not be less than the minimum term prescribed by the same." Certain classes of convicts are, by
section 2 of the law, excluded from the operation thereof. The Legislature has also enacted the
Juvenile Delinquency Law (Act No. 3203) which was subsequently amended by Act No. 3559.
Section 7 of the original Act and section 1 of the amendatory Act have become article 80 of the
Revised Penal Code, amended by Act No. 4117 of the Philippine Legislature and recently
reamended by Commonwealth Act No. 99 of the National Assembly. In this Act is again
manifested the intention of the legislature to "humanize" the penal laws. It allows, in effect, the
modification in particular cases of the penalties prescribed by law by permitting the suspension
of the execution of the judgment in the discretion of the trial court, after due hearing and after
investigation of the particular circumstances of the offenses, the criminal record, if any, of the
convict, and his social history. The Legislature has in reality decreed that in certain cases no
punishment at all shall be suffered by the convict as long as the conditions of probation are
faithfully observed. It this be so, then, it cannot be said that the Probation Act comes in conflict
with the power of the Chief Executive to grant pardons and reprieves, because, to use the
language of the Supreme Court of New Mexico, "the element of punishment or the penalty for
the commission of a wrong, while to be declared by the courts as a judicial function under and
within the limits of law as announced by legislative acts, concerns solely the procedure and
conduct of criminal causes, with which the executive can have nothing to do." (Ex
parte Bates, supra.) In Williams vs. State ([1926], 162 Ga., 327; 133 S.E., 843), the court upheld
the constitutionality of the Georgia probation statute against the contention that it attempted to
delegate to the courts the pardoning power lodged by the constitution in the governor alone is
vested with the power to pardon after final sentence has been imposed by the courts, the power
of the courts to imposed any penalty which may be from time to time prescribed by law and in
such manner as may be defined cannot be questioned."
We realize, of course, the conflict which the American cases disclose. Some cases hold it
unlawful for the legislature to vest in the courts the power to suspend the operation of a
sentenced, by probation or otherwise, as to do so would encroach upon the pardoning power of
the executive. (In re Webb [1895], 89 Wis., 354; 27 L.R.A., 356; 46 Am. St. Rep., 846; 62 N.W.,
177; 9 Am. Crim., Rep., 702; State ex rel. Summerfield vs. Moran [1919], 43 Nev., 150; 182
Pac., 927; Ex parte Clendenning [1908], 22 Okla., 108; 1 Okla. Crim. Rep., 227; 19 L.R.A.
[N.S.], 1041; 132 Am. St. Rep., 628; 97 Pac., 650; People vs. Barrett [1903], 202 Ill, 287; 67
N.E., 23; 63 L.R.A., 82; 95 Am. St. Rep., 230; Snodgrass vs. State [1912], 67 Tex. Crim. Rep.,
615; 41 L. R. A. [N. S.], 1144; 150 S. W., 162;Ex parte Shelor [1910], 33 Nev., 361;111 Pac.,
291; Neal vs. State [1898], 104 Ga., 509; 42 L. R. A., 190; 69 Am. St. Rep., 175; 30 S. E. 858;
State ex rel. Payne vs. Anderson [1921], 43 S. D., 630; 181 N. W., 839; People vs. Brown, 54
Mich., 15; 19 N. W., 571; States vs. Dalton [1903], 109 Tenn., 544; 72 S. W., 456.)
Other cases, however, hold contra. (Nix vs. James [1925; C. C. A., 9th], 7 F. [2d], 590; Archer
vs. Snook [1926; D. C.], 10 F. [2d], 567; Riggs. vs. United States [1926; C. C. A. 4th], 14]) [2d],
5; Murphy vs. States [1926], 171 Ark., 620; 286 S. W., 871; 48 A. L. R., 1189; Re Giannini
[1912], 18 Cal. App., 166; 122 Pac., 831; Re Nachnaber [1928], 89 Cal. App., 530; 265 Pac.,
392; Ex parte De Voe [1931], 114 Cal. App., 730; 300 Pac., 874; People vs. Patrick [1897], 118
Cal., 332; 50 Pac., 425; Martin vs. People [1917], 69 Colo., 60; 168 Pac., 1171; Belden vs. Hugo
[1914], 88 Conn., 50; 91 A., 369, 370, 371; Williams vs. State [1926], 162 Ga., 327; 133 S. E.,
843; People vs. Heise [1913], 257 Ill., 443; 100 N. E., 1000; Parker vs. State [1893], 135 Ind.,
534; 35 N. E., 179; 23 L. R. A., 859; St. Hillarie, Petitioner [1906], 101 Me., 522; 64 Atl., 882;
People vs. Stickle [1909], 156 Mich., 557; 121 N. W., 497; State vs. Fjolander [1914], 125
Minn., 529; State ex rel. Bottomnly vs. District Court [1925], 73 Mont., 541; 237 Pac., 525; State
vs. Everitt [1913], 164 N. C., 399; 79 S. E., 274; 47 L. R. A. [N. S.], 848; State ex rel. Buckley
vs. Drew [1909], 75 N. H., 402; 74 Atl., 875; State vs. Osborne [1911], 79 N. J. Eq., 430; 82 Atl.
424; Ex parteBates [1915], 20 N. M., 542; L. R. A., 1916 A. 1285; 151 Pac., 698; People vs. ex
rel. Forsyth vs. Court of Session [1894], 141 N. Y., 288; 23 L. R. A., 856; 36 N. E., 386; 15 Am.
Crim. Rep., 675; People ex rel. Sullivan vs. Flynn [1907], 55 Misc., 639; 106 N. Y. Supp., 928;
People vs. Goodrich [1914], 149 N. Y. Supp., 406; Moore vs. Thorn [1935], 245 App. Div., 180;
281 N. Y. Supp., 49; Re Hart [1914], 29 N. D., 38; L. R. A., 1915C, 1169; 149 N. W., 568; Ex
parte Eaton [1925], 29 Okla., Crim. Rep., 275; 233 P., 781; State vs. Teal [1918], 108 S. C., 455;
95 S. E., 69; State vs. Abbot [1910], 87 S. C., 466; 33 L.R.A., [N. S.], 112; 70 S. E., 6; Ann. Cas.,
1912B, 1189; Fults vs. States [1854],34 Tenn., 232; Woods vs. State [1814], 130 Tenn., 100; 169
S. W., 558; Baker vs. State [1814], 130 Tenn., 100; 169 S. W., 558; Baker vs. State [1913],70
Tex., Crim. Rep., 618; 158 S. W., 998; Cook vs. State [1914], 73 Tex. Crim. Rep., 548; 165 S.
W., 573; King vs. State [1914], 72 Tex. Crim. Rep., 394; 162 S. W., 890; Clare vs. State [1932],
122 Tex. Crim. Rep., 394; 162 S. W., 890; Clare vs. State [1932], 122 Tex. Crim. Rep., 211; 54 S.
W. [2d], 127; Re Hall [1927], 100 Vt., 197; 136 A., 24; Richardson vs. Com. [1921], 131 Va.,
802; 109 S.E., 460; State vs. Mallahan [1911], 65 Wash., 287; 118 Pac., 42; State ex rel.
Tingstand vs. Starwich [1922], 119 Wash., 561; 206 Pac., 29; 26 A. L. R., 393; 396.) We elect to
follow this long catena of authorities holding that the courts may be legally authorized by the
legislature to suspend sentence by the establishment of a system of probation however
characterized. State ex rel. Tingstand vs. Starwich ([1922], 119 Wash., 561; 206 Pac., 29; 26 A.
L. R., 393), deserved particular mention. In that case, a statute enacted in 1921 which provided
for the suspension of the execution of a sentence until otherwise ordered by the court, and
required that the convicted person be placed under the charge of a parole or peace officer during
the term of such suspension, on such terms as the court may determine, was held constitutional
and as not giving the court a power in violation of the constitutional provision vesting the
pardoning power in the chief executive of the state. (Vide, also, Re Giannini [1912], 18 Cal App.,
166; 122 Pac., 831.)
Probation and pardon are not coterminous; nor are they the same. They are actually district and
different from each other, both in origin and in nature. In People ex rel. Forsyth vs. Court of
Sessions ([1894], 141 N. Y., 288, 294; 36 N. E., 386, 388; 23 L. R. A., 856; 15 Am. Crim. Rep.,
675), the Court of Appeals of New York said:
. . . The power to suspend sentence and the power to grant reprieves and pardons, as
understood when the constitution was adopted, are totally distinct and different in their
nature. The former was always a part of the judicial power; the latter was always a part of
the executive power. The suspension of the sentence simply postpones the judgment of
the court temporarily or indefinitely, but the conviction and liability following it, and the
civil disabilities, remain and become operative when judgment is rendered. A pardon
reaches both the punishment prescribed for the offense and the guilt of the offender. It
releases the punishment, and blots out of existence the guilt, so that in the eye of the law,
the offender is as innocent as if he had never committed the offense. It removes the
penalties and disabilities, and restores him to all his civil rights. It makes him, as it were,
a new man, and gives him a new credit and capacity. (Ex parteGarland, 71 U. S., 4 Wall.,
333; 18 Law. ed., 366; U. S. vs. Klein, 80 U. S., 13 Wall., 128; 20 Law. ed., 519; Knote
vs. U. S., 95 U. S., 149; 24 Law. ed., 442.)
The framers of the federal and the state constitutions were perfectly familiar with the
principles governing the power to grant pardons, and it was conferred by these
instruments upon the executive with full knowledge of the law upon the subject, and the
words of the constitution were used to express the authority formerly exercised by the
English crown, or by its representatives in the colonies. (Ex parte Wells, 59 U. S., 18
How., 307; 15 Law. ed., 421.) As this power was understood, it did not comprehend any
part of the judicial functions to suspend sentence, and it was never intended that the
authority to grant reprieves and pardons should abrogate, or in any degree restrict, the
exercise of that power in regard to its own judgments, that criminal courts has so long
maintained. The two powers, so distinct and different in their nature and character, were
still left separate and distinct, the one to be exercised by the executive, and the other by
the judicial department. We therefore conclude that a statute which, in terms, authorizes
courts of criminal jurisdiction to suspend sentence in certain cases after conviction, a
power inherent in such courts at common law, which was understood when the
constitution was adopted to be an ordinary judicial function, and which, ever since its
adoption, has been exercised of legislative power under the constitution. It does not
encroach, in any just sense, upon the powers of the executive, as they have been
understood and practiced from the earliest times. (Quoted with approval in Directors of
Prisons vs. Judge of First Instance of Cavite [1915], 29 Phil., 265, Carson, J., concurring,
at pp. 294, 295.)
In probation, the probationer is in no true sense, as in pardon, a free man. He is not finally and
completely exonerated. He is not exempt from the entire punishment which the law inflicts.
Under the Probation Act, the probationer's case is not terminated by the mere fact that he is
placed on probation. Section 4 of the Act provides that the probation may be definitely
terminated and the probationer finally discharged from supervision only after the period of
probation shall have been terminated and the probation officer shall have submitted a report, and
the court shall have found that the probationer has complied with the conditions of probation.
The probationer, then, during the period of probation, remains in legal custody subject to the
control of the probation officer and of the court; and, he may be rearrested upon the nonfulfillment of the conditions of probation and, when rearrested, may be committed to prison to
serve the sentence originally imposed upon him. (Secs. 2, 3, 5 and 6, Act No. 4221.)
The probation described in the act is not pardon. It is not complete liberty, and may be far
from it. It is really a new mode of punishment, to be applied by the judge in a proper
case, in substitution of the imprisonment and find prescribed by the criminal laws. For
this reason its application is as purely a judicial act as any other sentence carrying out the
law deemed applicable to the offense. The executive act of pardon, on the contrary, is
against the criminal law, which binds and directs the judges, or rather is outside of and
above it. There is thus no conflict with the pardoning power, and no possible
unconstitutionality of the Probation Act for this cause. (Archer vs. Snook [1926], 10 F.
[2d], 567, 569.)
Probation should also be distinguished from reprieve and from commutation of the sentence.
Snodgrass vs. State ([1912], 67 Tex. Crim. Rep., 615;41 L. R. A. [N. S.], 1144; 150 S. W., 162),
is relied upon most strongly by the petitioners as authority in support of their contention that the
power to grant pardons and reprieves, having been vested exclusively upon the Chief Executive
by the Jones Law, may not be conferred by the legislature upon the courts by means of probation
law authorizing the indefinite judicial suspension of sentence. We have examined that case and
found that although the Court of Criminal Appeals of Texas held that the probation statute of the
state in terms conferred on the district courts the power to grant pardons to persons convicted of
crime, it also distinguished between suspensions sentence on the one hand, and reprieve and
commutation of sentence on the other. Said the court, through Harper, J.:
That the power to suspend the sentence does not conflict with the power of the Governor
to grant reprieves is settled by the decisions of the various courts; it being held that the
distinction between a "reprieve" and a suspension of sentence is that a reprieve postpones
the execution of the sentence to a day certain, whereas a suspension is for an indefinite
time. (Carnal vs. People, 1 Parker, Cr. R., 262; In re Buchanan, 146 N. Y., 264; 40 N. E.,
883), and cases cited in 7 Words & Phrases, pp. 6115, 6116. This law cannot be hold in
conflict with the power confiding in the Governor to grant commutations of punishment,
for a commutations is not but to change the punishment assessed to a less punishment.
In State ex rel. Bottomnly vs. District Court ([1925], 73 Mont., 541; 237 Pac., 525), the Supreme
Court of Montana had under consideration the validity of the adult probation law of the state
enacted in 1913, now found in sections 12078-12086, Revised Codes of 1921. The court held the
law valid as not impinging upon the pardoning power of the executive. In a unanimous decision
penned by Justice Holloway, the court said:
. . . . the term "pardon", "commutation", and "respite" each had a well understood
meaning at the time our Constitution was adopted, and no one of them was intended to
comprehend the suspension of the execution of the judgment as that phrase is employed
in sections 12078-12086. A "pardon" is an act of grace, proceeding from the power
intrusted with the execution of the laws which exempts the individual on whom it is
bestowed from the punishment the law inflicts for a crime he has committed (United
States vs. Wilson, 7 Pet., 150; 8 Law. ed., 640); It is a remission of guilt (State vs. Lewis,
111 La., 693; 35 So., 816), a forgiveness of the offense (Cook vs. Middlesex County, 26
N. J. Law, 326; Ex parte Powell, 73 Ala., 517; 49 Am. Rep., 71). "Commutation" is a
remission of a part of the punishment; a substitution of a less penalty for the one
originally imposed (Lee vs. Murphy, 22 Grat. [Va.] 789; 12 Am. Rep., 563; Rich vs.
Chamberlain, 107 Mich., 381; 65 N. W., 235). A "reprieve" or "respite" is the withholding
of the sentence for an interval of time (4 Blackstone's Commentaries, 394), a
postponement of execution (Carnal vs. People, 1 Parker, Cr. R. [N. Y.], 272), a temporary
suspension of execution (Butler vs. State, 97 Ind., 373).
Few adjudicated cases are to be found in which the validity of a statute similar to our
section 12078 has been determined; but the same objections have been urged against
parole statutes which vest the power to parole in persons other than those to whom the
power of pardon is granted, and these statutes have been upheld quite uniformly, as a
reference to the numerous cases cited in the notes to Woods vs. State (130 Tenn., 100;
169 S. W.,558, reported in L. R. A., 1915F, 531), will disclose. (See, also, 20 R. C. L.,
524.)
We conclude that the Probation Act does not conflict with the pardoning power of the Executive.
The pardoning power, in respect to those serving their probationary sentences, remains as full
and complete as if the Probation Law had never been enacted. The President may yet pardon the
probationer and thus place it beyond the power of the court to order his rearrest and
imprisonment.
(Riggs
vs.
United
States
[1926],
14 F. [2d], 5, 7.)
2. But while the Probation Law does not encroach upon the pardoning power of the executive
and is not for that reason void, does section 11 thereof constitute, as contended, an undue
delegation of legislative power?
Under the constitutional system, the powers of government are distributed among three
coordinate and substantially independent organs: the legislative, the executive and the judicial.
Each of these departments of the government derives its authority from the Constitution which,
in turn, is the highest expression of popular will. Each has exclusive cognizance of the matters
within its jurisdiction, and is supreme within its own sphere.
The power to make laws the legislative power is vested in a bicameral Legislature by the
Jones Law (sec. 12) and in a unicamiral National Assembly by the Constitution (Act. VI, sec. 1,
Constitution of the Philippines). The Philippine Legislature or the National Assembly may not
escape its duties and responsibilities by delegating that power to any other body or authority. Any
attempt to abdicate the power is unconstitutional and void, on the principle that potestas delegata
non delegare potest. This principle is said to have originated with the glossators, was introduced
into English law through a misreading of Bracton, there developed as a principle of agency, was
established by Lord Coke in the English public law in decisions forbidding the delegation of
judicial power, and found its way into America as an enlightened principle of free government. It
has since become an accepted corollary of the principle of separation of powers. (5 Encyc. of the
Social Sciences, p. 66.) The classic statement of the rule is that of Locke, namely: "The
legislative neither must nor can transfer the power of making laws to anybody else, or place it
anywhere but where the people have." (Locke on Civil Government, sec. 142.) Judge Cooley
enunciates the doctrine in the following oft-quoted language: "One of the settled maxims in
constitutional law is, that the power conferred upon the legislature to make laws cannot be
delegated by that department to any other body or authority. Where the sovereign power of the
state has located the authority, there it must remain; and by the constitutional agency alone the
laws must be made until the Constitution itself is charged. The power to whose judgment,
wisdom, and patriotism this high prerogative has been intrusted cannot relieve itself of the
responsibilities by choosing other agencies upon which the power shall be devolved, nor can it
substitute the judgment, wisdom, and patriotism of any other body for those to which alone the
people have seen fit to confide this sovereign trust." (Cooley on Constitutional Limitations, 8th
ed., Vol. I, p. 224. Quoted with approval in U. S. vs. Barrias [1908], 11 Phil., 327.) This court
posits the doctrine "on the ethical principle that such a delegated power constitutes not only a
right but a duty to be performed by the delegate by the instrumentality of his own judgment
acting immediately upon the matter of legislation and not through the intervening mind of
another. (U. S. vs. Barrias, supra, at p. 330.)
The rule, however, which forbids the delegation of legislative power is not absolute and
inflexible. It admits of exceptions. An exceptions sanctioned by immemorial practice permits the
central legislative body to delegate legislative powers to local authorities. (Rubi vs. Provincial
Board of Mindoro [1919], 39 Phil., 660; U. S. vs. Salaveria [1918], 39 Phil., 102; Stoutenburgh
vs. Hennick [1889], 129 U. S., 141; 32 Law. ed., 637; 9 Sup. Ct. Rep., 256; State vs. Noyes
[1855], 30 N. H., 279.) "It is a cardinal principle of our system of government, that local affairs
shall be managed by local authorities, and general affairs by the central authorities; and hence
while the rule is also fundamental that the power to make laws cannot be delegated, the creation
of the municipalities exercising local self government has never been held to trench upon that
rule. Such legislation is not regarded as a transfer of general legislative power, but rather as the
grant of the authority to prescribed local regulations, according to immemorial practice, subject
of course to the interposition of the superior in cases of necessity." (Stoutenburgh vs.
Hennick, supra.) On quite the same principle, Congress is powered to delegate legislative power
to such agencies in the territories of the United States as it may select. A territory stands in the
same relation to Congress as a municipality or city to the state government. (United States vs.
Heinszen [1907], 206 U. S., 370; 27 Sup. Ct. Rep., 742; 51 L. ed., 1098; 11 Ann. Cas., 688; Dorr
vs. United States [1904], 195 U.S., 138; 24 Sup. Ct. Rep., 808; 49 Law. ed., 128; 1 Ann. Cas.,
697.) Courts have also sustained the delegation of legislative power to the people at large. Some
authorities maintain that this may not be done (12 C. J., pp. 841, 842; 6 R. C. L., p. 164, citing
People vs. Kennedy [1913], 207 N. Y., 533; 101 N. E., 442; Ann. Cas., 1914C, 616). However,
the question of whether or not a state has ceased to be republican in form because of its adoption
of the initiative and referendum has been held not to be a judicial but a political question (Pacific
States Tel. & Tel. Co. vs. Oregon [1912], 223 U. S., 118; 56 Law. ed., 377; 32 Sup. Cet. Rep.,
224), and as the constitutionality of such laws has been looked upon with favor by certain
progressive courts, the sting of the decisions of the more conservative courts has been pretty well
drawn. (Opinions of the Justices [1894], 160 Mass., 586; 36 N. E., 488; 23 L. R. A., 113; Kiernan
vs. Portland [1910], 57 Ore., 454; 111 Pac., 379; 1132 Pac., 402; 37 L. R. A. [N. S.], 332; Pacific
States Tel. & Tel. Co. vs. Oregon, supra.) Doubtless, also, legislative power may be delegated by
the Constitution itself. Section 14, paragraph 2, of article VI of the Constitution of the
Philippines provides that "The National Assembly may by law authorize the President, subject to
such limitations and restrictions as it may impose, to fix within specified limits, tariff rates,
import or export quotas, and tonnage and wharfage dues." And section 16 of the same article of
the Constitution provides that "In times of war or other national emergency, the National
Assembly may by law authorize the President, for a limited period and subject to such
restrictions as it may prescribed, to promulgate rules and regulations to carry out a declared
national policy." It is beyond the scope of this decision to determine whether or not, in the
absence of the foregoing constitutional provisions, the President could be authorized to exercise
the powers thereby vested in him. Upon the other hand, whatever doubt may have existed has
been removed by the Constitution itself.
The case before us does not fall under any of the exceptions hereinabove mentioned.
The challenged section of Act No. 4221 in section 11 which reads as follows:
This Act shall apply only in those provinces in which the respective provincial boards
have provided for the salary of a probation officer at rates not lower than those now
provided for provincial fiscals. Said probation officer shall be appointed by the Secretary
of Justice and shall be subject to the direction of the Probation Office. (Emphasis ours.)
In testing whether a statute constitute an undue delegation of legislative power or not, it is usual
to inquire whether the statute was complete in all its terms and provisions when it left the hands
of the legislature so that nothing was left to the judgment of any other appointee or delegate of
the legislature. (6 R. C. L., p. 165.) In the United States vs. Ang Tang Ho ([1922], 43 Phil., 1),
this court adhered to the foregoing rule when it held an act of the legislature void in so far as it
undertook to authorize the Governor-General, in his discretion, to issue a proclamation fixing the
price of rice and to make the sale of it in violation of the proclamation a crime. (See and cf.
Compaia General de Tabacos vs. Board of Public Utility Commissioners [1916], 34 Phil., 136.)
The general rule, however, is limited by another rule that to a certain extent matters of detail may
be left to be filled in by rules and regulations to be adopted or promulgated by executive officers
and administrative boards. (6 R. C. L., pp. 177-179.)
For the purpose of Probation Act, the provincial boards may be regarded as administrative bodies
endowed with power to determine when the Act should take effect in their respective provinces.
They are the agents or delegates of the legislature in this respect. The rules governing delegation
of legislative power to administrative and executive officers are applicable or are at least
indicative of the rule which should be here adopted. An examination of a variety of cases on
delegation of power to administrative bodies will show that the ratio decidendiis at variance but,
it can be broadly asserted that the rationale revolves around the presence or absence of a standard
or rule of action or the sufficiency thereof in the statute, to aid the delegate in exercising
the granted discretion. In some cases, it is held that the standard is sufficient; in others that is
insufficient; and in still others that it is entirely lacking. As a rule, an act of the legislature is
incomplete and hence invalid if it does not lay down any rule or definite standard by which the
administrative officer or board may be guided in the exercise of the discretionary powers
delegated to it. (See Schecter vs. United States [1925], 295 U. S., 495; 79 L. ed., 1570; 55 Sup.
Ct. Rep., 837; 97 A.L.R., 947; People ex rel. Rice vs. Wilson Oil Co. [1936], 364 Ill., 406; 4 N.
E. [2d], 847; 107 A.L.R., 1500 and cases cited. See also R. C. L., title "Constitutional Law", sec
174.) In the case at bar, what rules are to guide the provincial boards in the exercise of their
discretionary power to determine whether or not the Probation Act shall apply in their respective
provinces? What standards are fixed by the Act? We do not find any and none has been pointed
to us by the respondents. The probation Act does not, by the force of any of its provisions, fix
and impose upon the provincial boards any standard or guide in the exercise of their
discretionary power. What is granted, if we may use the language of Justice Cardozo in the
recent case of Schecter, supra, is a "roving commission" which enables the provincial boards to
exercise arbitrary discretion. By section 11 if the Act, the legislature does not seemingly on its
own authority extend the benefits of the Probation Act to the provinces but in reality leaves the
entire matter for the various provincial boards to determine. In other words, the provincial boards
of the various provinces are to determine for themselves, whether the Probation Law shall apply
to their provinces or not at all. The applicability and application of the Probation Act are entirely
placed in the hands of the provincial boards. If the provincial board does not wish to have the Act
applied in its province, all that it has to do is to decline to appropriate the needed amount for the
salary of a probation officer. The plain language of the Act is not susceptible of any other
interpretation. This, to our minds, is a virtual surrender of legislative power to the provincial
boards.
"The true distinction", says Judge Ranney, "is between the delegation of power to make the law,
which necessarily involves a discretion as to what it shall be, and conferring an authority or
discretion as to its execution, to be exercised under and in pursuance of the law. The first cannot
be done; to the latter no valid objection can be made." (Cincinnati, W. & Z. R. Co. vs. Clinton
County Comrs. [1852]; 1 Ohio St., 77, 88. See also, Sutherland on Statutory Construction, sec
68.) To the same effect are the decision of this court in Municipality of Cardona vs. Municipality
of Binangonan ([1917], 36 Phil., 547); Rubi vs. Provincial Board of Mindoro ([1919],39 Phil.,
660) andCruz vs. Youngberg ([1931], 56 Phil., 234). In the first of these cases, this court
sustained the validity of the law conferring upon the Governor-General authority to adjust
provincial and municipal boundaries. In the second case, this court held it lawful for the
legislature to direct non-Christian inhabitants to take up their habitation on unoccupied lands to
be selected by the provincial governor and approved by the provincial board. In the third case, it
was held proper for the legislature to vest in the Governor-General authority to suspend or not, at
his discretion, the prohibition of the importation of the foreign cattle, such prohibition to be
raised "if the conditions of the country make this advisable or if deceased among foreign cattle
has ceased to be a menace to the agriculture and livestock of the lands."
It should be observed that in the case at bar we are not concerned with the simple transference of
details of execution or the promulgation by executive or administrative officials of rules and
regulations to carry into effect the provisions of a law. If we were, recurrence to our own
decisions would be sufficient. (U. S. vs. Barrias [1908], 11 Phil., 327; U.S. vs. Molina [1914], 29
Phil., 119; Alegre vs. Collector of Customs [1929], 53 Phil., 394; Cebu Autobus Co. vs. De Jesus
[1931], 56 Phil., 446; U. S. vs. Gomez [1915], 31 Phil., 218; Rubi vs. Provincial Board of
Mindoro [1919], 39 Phil., 660.)
It is connected, however, that a legislative act may be made to the effect as law after it leaves the
hands of the legislature. It is true that laws may be made effective on certain contingencies, as by
proclamation of the executive or the adoption by the people of a particular community (6 R. C.
L., 116, 170-172; Cooley, Constitutional Limitations, 8th ed., Vol. I, p. 227). In Wayman vs.
Southard ([1825], 10 Wheat. 1; 6 Law. ed., 253), the Supreme Court of the United State ruled
that the legislature may delegate a power not legislative which it may itself rightfully exercise.
(Vide, also, Dowling vs. Lancashire Ins. Co. [1896], 92 Wis., 63; 65 N. W., 738; 31 L. R. A.,
112.) The power to ascertain facts is such a power which may be delegated. There is nothing
essentially legislative in ascertaining the existence of facts or conditions as the basis of the taking
into effect of a law. That is a mental process common to all branches of the government.
(Dowling vs. Lancashire Ins. Co., supra; In re Village of North Milwaukee [1896], 93 Wis., 616;
97 N.W., 1033; 33 L.R.A., 938; Nash vs. Fries [1906], 129 Wis., 120; 108 N.W., 210; Field vs.
Clark [1892], 143 U.S., 649; 12 Sup. Ct., 495; 36 Law. ed., 294.) Notwithstanding the apparent
tendency, however, to relax the rule prohibiting delegation of legislative authority on account of
the complexity arising from social and economic forces at work in this modern industrial age
(Pfiffner, Public Administration [1936] ch. XX; Laski, "The Mother of Parliaments", foreign
Affairs, July, 1931, Vol. IX, No. 4, pp. 569-579; Beard, "Squirt-Gun Politics", in Harper's
Monthly Magazine, July, 1930, Vol. CLXI, pp. 147, 152), the orthodox pronouncement of Judge
Cooley in his work on Constitutional Limitations finds restatement in Prof. Willoughby's treatise
on the Constitution of the United States in the following language speaking of declaration of
legislative power to administrative agencies: "The principle which permits the legislature to
provide that the administrative agent may determine when the circumstances are such as require
the application of a law is defended upon the ground that at the time this authority is granted, the
rule of public policy, which is the essence of the legislative act, is determined by the legislature.
In other words, the legislature, as it its duty to do, determines that, under given circumstances,
certain executive or administrative action is to be taken, and that, under other circumstances,
different of no action at all is to be taken. What is thus left to the administrative official is not the
legislative determination of what public policy demands, but simply the ascertainment of what
the facts of the case require to be done according to the terms of the law by which he is
governed." (Willoughby on the Constitution of the United States, 2nd ed., Vol. II, p. 1637.) In
Miller vs. Mayer, etc., of New York [1883], 109 U.S., 3 Sup. Ct. Rep., 228; 27 Law. ed., 971,
974), it was said: "The efficiency of an Act as a declaration of legislative will must, of course,
come from Congress, but the ascertainment of the contingency upon which the Act shall take
effect may be left to such agencies as it may designate." (See, also, 12 C.J., p. 864; State vs.
Parker [1854], 26 Vt., 357; Blanding vs. Burr [1859], 13 Cal., 343, 258.) The legislature, then
may provide that a contingencies leaving to some other person or body the power to determine
when the specified contingencies has arisen. But, in the case at bar, the legislature has not made
the operation of the Prohibition Act contingent upon specified facts or conditions to be
ascertained by the provincial board. It leaves, as we have already said, the entire operation or
non-operation of the law upon the provincial board. the discretion vested is arbitrary because it is
absolute and unlimited. A provincial board need not investigate conditions or find any fact, or
await the happening of any specified contingency. It is bound by no rule, limited by no
principle of expendiency announced by the legislature. It may take into consideration certain
facts or conditions; and, again, it may not. It may have any purpose or no purpose at all. It need
not give any reason whatsoever for refusing or failing to appropriate any funds for the salary of a
probation officer. This is a matter which rest entirely at its pleasure. The fact that at some future
time we cannot say when the provincial boards may appropriate funds for the salaries of
probation officers and thus put the law into operation in the various provinces will not save the
statute. The time of its taking into effect, we reiterate, would yet be based solely upon the will of
the provincial boards and not upon the happening of a certain specified contingency, or upon the
ascertainment of certain facts or conditions by a person or body other than legislature itself.
The various provincial boards are, in practical effect, endowed with the power of suspending the
operation of the Probation Law in their respective provinces. In some jurisdiction, constitutions
provided that laws may be suspended only by the legislature or by its authority. Thus, section 28,
article I of the Constitution of Texas provides that "No power of suspending laws in this state
shall be exercised except by the legislature"; and section 26, article I of the Constitution of
Indiana provides "That the operation of the laws shall never be suspended, except by authority of
the General Assembly." Yet, even provisions of this sort do not confer absolute power of
suspension upon the legislature. While it may be undoubted that the legislature may suspend a
law, or the execution or operation of a law, a law may not be suspended as to certain individuals
only, leaving the law to be enjoyed by others. The suspension must be general, and cannot be
made for individual cases or for particular localities. In Holden vs. James ([1814], 11 Mass., 396;
6 Am. Dec., 174, 177, 178), it was said:
By the twentieth article of the declaration of rights in the constitution of this

commonwealth, it is declared that the power of suspending the laws, or the execution of
the laws, ought never to be exercised but by the legislature, or by authority derived from
it, to be exercised in such particular cases only as the legislature shall expressly provide
for. Many of the articles in that declaration of rights were adopted from the Magna Charta
of England, and from the bill of rights passed in the reign of William and Mary. The bill
of rights contains an enumeration of the oppressive acts of James II, tending to subvert
and extirpate the protestant religion, and the laws and liberties of the kingdom; and the
first of them is the assuming and exercising a power of dispensing with and suspending
the laws, and the execution of the laws without consent of parliament. The first article in
the claim or declaration of rights contained in the statute is, that the exercise of such
power, by legal authority without consent of parliament, is illegal. In the tenth section of
the same statute it is further declared and enacted, that "No dispensation by non
obstante of or to any statute, or part thereof, should be allowed; but the same should be
held void and of no effect, except a dispensation be allowed of in such statute." There is
an implied reservation of authority in the parliament to exercise the power here
mentioned; because, according to the theory of the English Constitution, "that absolute
despotic power, which must in all governments reside somewhere," is intrusted to the
parliament: 1 Bl. Com., 160.
The principles of our government are widely different in this particular. Here the
sovereign and absolute power resides in the people; and the legislature can only exercise
what is delegated to them according to the constitution. It is obvious that the exercise of
the power in question would be equally oppressive to the subject, and subversive of his
right to protection, "according to standing laws," whether exercised by one man or by a
number of men. It cannot be supposed that the people when adopting this general
principle from the English bill of rights and inserting it in our constitution, intended to
bestow by implication on the general court one of the most odious and oppressive
prerogatives of the ancient kings of England. It is manifestly contrary to the first
principles of civil liberty and natural justice, and to the spirit of our constitution and laws,
that any one citizen should enjoy privileges and advantages which are denied to all others
under like circumstances; or that ant one should be subject to losses, damages, suits, or
actions from which all others under like circumstances are exempted.
To illustrate the principle: A section of a statute relative to dogs made the owner of any dog liable
to the owner of domestic animals wounded by it for the damages without proving a knowledge of
it vicious disposition. By a provision of the act, power was given to the board of supervisors to
determine whether or not during the current year their county should be governed by the
provisions of the act of which that section constituted a part. It was held that the legislature could
not confer that power. The court observed that it could no more confer such a power than to
authorize the board of supervisors of a county to abolish in such county the days of grace on
commercial paper, or to suspend the statute of limitations. (Slinger vs. Henneman [1875], 38
Wis., 504.) A similar statute in Missouri was held void for the same reason in State vs. Field
([1853, 17 Mo., 529;59 Am. Dec., 275.) In that case a general statute formulating a road system
contained a provision that "if the county court of any county should be of opinion that the
provisions of the act should not be enforced, they might, in their discretion, suspend the
operation of the same for any specified length of time, and thereupon the act should become
inoperative in such county for the period specified in such order; and thereupon order the roads
to be opened and kept in good repair, under the laws theretofore in force." Said the court: ". . .
this act, by its own provisions, repeals the inconsistent provisions of a former act, and yet it is
left to the county court to say which act shall be enforce in their county. The act does not submit
the question to the county court as an original question, to be decided by that tribunal, whether
the act shall commence its operation within the county; but it became by its own terms a law in
every county not excepted by name in the act. It did not, then, require the county court to do any
act in order to give it effect. But being the law in the county, and having by its provisions
superseded and abrogated the inconsistent provisions of previous laws, the county court is . . .
empowered, to suspend this act and revive the repealed provisions of the former act. When the
question is before the county court for that tribunal to determine which law shall be in force, it is
urge before us that the power then to be exercised by the court is strictly legislative power, which
under our constitution, cannot be delegated to that tribunal or to any other body of men in the
state. In the present case, the question is not presented in the abstract; for the county court of
Saline county, after the act had been for several months in force in that county, did by order
suspend its operation; and during that suspension the offense was committed which is the subject
of the present indictment . . . ." (See Mitchell vs. State [1901], 134 Ala., 392; 32 S., 687.)
True, the legislature may enact laws for a particular locality different from those applicable to
other localities and, while recognizing the force of the principle hereinabove expressed, courts in
may jurisdiction have sustained the constitutionality of the submission of option laws to the vote
of the people. (6 R.C.L., p. 171.) But option laws thus sustained treat of subjects purely local in
character which should receive different treatment in different localities placed under different
circumstances. "They relate to subjects which, like the retailing of intoxicating drinks, or the
running at large of cattle in the highways, may be differently regarded in different localities, and
they are sustained on what seems to us the impregnable ground, that the subject, though not
embraced within the ordinary powers of municipalities to make by-laws and ordinances, is
nevertheless within the class of public regulations, in respect to which it is proper that the local
judgment should control." (Cooley on Constitutional Limitations, 5th ed., p. 148.) So that, while
we do not deny the right of local self-government and the propriety of leaving matters of purely
local concern in the hands of local authorities or for the people of small communities to pass
upon, we believe that in matters of general of general legislation like that which treats of
criminals in general, and as regards the general subject of probation, discretion may not be
vested in a manner so unqualified and absolute as provided in Act No. 4221. True, the statute
does not expressly state that the provincial boards may suspend the operation of the Probation
Act in particular provinces but, considering that, in being vested with the authority to appropriate
or not the necessary funds for the salaries of probation officers, they thereby are given absolute
discretion to determine whether or not the law should take effect or operate in their respective
provinces, the provincial boards are in reality empowered by the legislature to suspend the
operation of the Probation Act in particular provinces, the Act to be held in abeyance until the
provincial boards should decide otherwise by appropriating the necessary funds. The validity of a
law is not tested by what has been done but by what may be done under its provisions. (Walter E.
Olsen & Co. vs. Aldanese and Trinidad [1922], 43 Phil., 259; 12 C. J., p. 786.)
It in conceded that a great deal of latitude should be granted to the legislature not only in the
expression of what may be termed legislative policy but in the elaboration and execution thereof.
"Without this power, legislation would become oppressive and yet imbecile." (People vs.
Reynolds, 5 Gilman, 1.) It has been said that popular government lives because of the
inexhaustible reservoir of power behind it. It is unquestionable that the mass of powers of
government is vested in the representatives of the people and that these representatives are no
further restrained under our system than by the express language of the instrument imposing the
restraint, or by particular provisions which by clear intendment, have that effect. (Angara vs.
Electoral Commission [1936], 35 Off. Ga., 23; Schneckenburger vs. Moran [1936], 35 Off. Gaz.,
1317.) But, it should be borne in mind that a constitution is both a grant and a limitation of
power and one of these time-honored limitations is that, subject to certain exceptions, legislative
power shall not be delegated.
We conclude that section 11 of Act No. 4221 constitutes an improper and unlawful delegation of
legislative authority to the provincial boards and is, for this reason, unconstitutional and void.
3. It is also contended that the Probation Act violates the provisions of our Bill of Rights which
prohibits the denial to any person of the equal protection of the laws (Act. III, sec. 1 subsec. 1.
Constitution of the Philippines.)
This basic individual right sheltered by the Constitution is a restraint on all the tree grand
departments of our government and on the subordinate instrumentalities and subdivision thereof,
and on many constitutional power, like the police power, taxation and eminent domain. The
equal protection of laws, sententiously observes the Supreme Court of the United States, "is a
pledge of the protection of equal laws." (Yick Wo vs. Hopkins [1886], 118 U. S., 356; 30 Law.
ed., 220; 6 Sup. Ct. Rep., 10464; Perley vs. North Carolina, 249 U. S., 510; 39 Sup. Ct. Rep.,
357; 63 Law. ed., 735.) Of course, what may be regarded as a denial of the equal protection of
the laws in a question not always easily determined. No rule that will cover every case can be
formulated. (Connolly vs. Union Sewer Pipe Co. [1902], 184, U. S., 540; 22 Sup. Ct., Rep., 431;
46 Law. ed., 679.) Class legislation discriminating against some and favoring others in
prohibited. But classification on a reasonable basis, and nor made arbitrarily or capriciously, is
permitted. (Finely vs. California [1911], 222 U. S., 28; 56 Law. ed., 75; 32 Sup. Ct. Rep., 13;
Gulf. C. & S. F. Ry Co. vs. Ellis [1897], 165 U. S., 150; 41 Law. ed., 666; 17 Sup. Ct. Rep., 255;
Smith, Bell & Co. vs. Natividad [1919], 40 Phil., 136.) The classification, however, to be
reasonable must be based on substantial distinctions which make real differences; it must be
germane to the purposes of the law; it must not be limited to existing conditions only, and must
apply equally to each member of the class. (Borgnis vs. Falk. Co. [1911], 147 Wis., 327, 353;
133 N. W., 209; 3 N. C. C. A., 649; 37 L. R. A. [N. S.], 489; State vs. Cooley, 56 Minn., 540;
530-552; 58 N. W., 150; Lindsley vs. Natural Carbonic Gas Co.[1911], 220 U. S., 61, 79, 55
Law. ed., 369, 377; 31 Sup. Ct. Rep., 337; Ann. Cas., 1912C, 160; Lake Shore & M. S. R. Co. vs.
Clough [1917], 242 U.S., 375; 37 Sup. Ct. Rep., 144; 61 Law. ed., 374; Southern Ry. Co. vs.
Greene [1910], 216 U. S., 400; 30 Sup. Ct. Rep., 287; 54 Law. ed., 536; 17 Ann. Cas., 1247;
Truax vs. Corrigan [1921], 257 U. S., 312; 12 C. J., pp. 1148, 1149.)
In the case at bar, however, the resultant inequality may be said to flow from the unwarranted
delegation of legislative power, although perhaps this is not necessarily the result in every case.
Adopting the example given by one of the counsel for the petitioners in the course of his oral
argument, one province may appropriate the necessary fund to defray the salary of a probation
officer, while another province may refuse or fail to do so. In such a case, the Probation Act
would be in operation in the former province but not in the latter. This means that a person
otherwise coming within the purview of the law would be liable to enjoy the benefits of
probation in one province while another person similarly situated in another province would be
denied those same benefits. This is obnoxious discrimination. Contrariwise, it is also possible for
all the provincial boards to appropriate the necessary funds for the salaries of the probation
officers in their respective provinces, in which case no inequality would result for the obvious
reason that probation would be in operation in each and every province by the affirmative action
of appropriation by all the provincial boards. On that hypothesis, every person coming within the
purview of the Probation Act would be entitled to avail of the benefits of the Act. Neither will
there be any resulting inequality if no province, through its provincial board, should appropriate
any amount for the salary of the probation officer which is the situation now and, also, if
we accept the contention that, for the purpose of the Probation Act, the City of Manila should be
considered as a province and that the municipal board of said city has not made any
appropriation for the salary of the probation officer. These different situations suggested show,
indeed, that while inequality may result in the application of the law and in the conferment of the
benefits therein provided, inequality is not in all cases the necessary result. But whatever may be
the case, it is clear that in section 11 of the Probation Act creates a situation in which
discrimination and inequality are permitted or allowed. There are, to be sure, abundant
authorities requiring actual denial of the equal protection of the law before court should assume
the task of setting aside a law vulnerable on that score, but premises and circumstances
considered, we are of the opinion that section 11 of Act No. 4221 permits of the denial of the
equal protection of the law and is on that account bad. We see no difference between a law which
permits of such denial. A law may appear to be fair on its face and impartial in appearance, yet, if
it permits of unjust and illegal discrimination, it is within the constitutional prohibitions. (By
analogy, Chy Lung vs. Freeman [1876], 292 U. S., 275; 23 Law. ed., 550; Henderson vs. Mayor
[1876], 92 U. S., 259; 23 Law. ed., 543; Ex parte Virginia [1880], 100 U. S., 339; 25 Law. ed.,
676; Neal vs. Delaware [1881], 103 U. S., 370; 26 Law. ed., 567; Soon Hing vs. Crowley [1885],
113 U. S., 703; 28 Law. ed., 1145, Yick Wo vs. Hopkins [1886],118 U. S., 356; 30 Law. ed., 220;
Williams vs. Mississippi [1897], 170 U. S., 218; 18 Sup. Ct. Rep., 583; 42 Law. ed., 1012; Bailey
vs. Alabama [1911], 219 U. S., 219; 31 Sup. Ct. Rep. 145; 55 Law. ed., Sunday Lake Iron Co. vs.
Wakefield [1918], 247 U. S., 450; 38 Sup. Ct. Rep., 495; 62 Law. ed., 1154.) In other words,
statutes may be adjudged unconstitutional because of their effect in operation (General Oil Co.
vs. Clain [1907], 209 U. S., 211; 28 Sup. Ct. Rep., 475; 52 Law. ed., 754; State vs. Clement Nat.
Bank [1911], 84 Vt., 167; 78 Atl., 944; Ann. Cas., 1912D, 22). If the law has the effect of
denying the equal protection of the law it is unconstitutional. (6 R. C. L. p. 372; Civil Rights
Cases, 109 U. S., 3; 3 Sup. Ct. Rep., 18; 27 Law. ed., 835; Yick Wo vs. Hopkins, supra; State vs.
Montgomery, 94 Me., 192; 47 Atl., 165; 80 A. S. R., 386; State vs. Dering, 84 Wis., 585; 54 N.
W., 1104; 36 A. S. R., 948; 19 L. R. A., 858.) Under section 11 of the Probation Act, not only
may said Act be in force in one or several provinces and not be in force in other provinces, but
one province may appropriate for the salary of the probation officer of a given year and have
probation during that year and thereafter decline to make further appropriation, and have no
probation is subsequent years. While this situation goes rather to the abuse of discretion which
delegation implies, it is here indicated to show that the Probation Act sanctions a situation which
is intolerable in a government of laws, and to prove how easy it is, under the Act, to make the
guaranty of the equality clause but "a rope of sand". (Brewer, J. Gulf C. & S. F. Ry. Co. vs. Ellis
[1897], 165 U. S., 150 154; 41 Law. ed., 666; 17 Sup. Ct. Rep., 255.)lawph!1.net
Great reliance is placed by counsel for the respondents on the case of Ocampo vs. United States
([1914], 234 U. S., 91; 58 Law. ed., 1231). In that case, the Supreme Court of the United States
affirmed the decision of this court (18 Phil., 1) by declining to uphold the contention that there
was a denial of the equal protection of the laws because, as held in Missouri vs. Lewis (Bowman
vs. Lewis) decided in 1880 (101 U. S., 220; 25 Law. ed., 991), the guaranty of the equality clause
does not require territorial uniformity. It should be observed, however, that this case concerns the
right to preliminary investigations in criminal cases originally granted by General Orders No. 58.
No question of legislative authority was involved and the alleged denial of the equal protection
of the laws was the result of the subsequent enactment of Act No. 612, amending the charter of
the City of Manila (Act No. 813) and providing in section 2 thereof that "in cases triable only in
the court of first instance of the City of Manila, the defendant . . . shall not be entitled as of right
to a preliminary examination in any case where the prosecuting attorney, after a due investigation
of the facts . . . shall have presented an information against him in proper form . . . ." Upon the
other hand, an analysis of the arguments and the decision indicates that the investigation by the
prosecuting attorney although not in the form had in the provinces was considered a
reasonable substitute for the City of Manila, considering the peculiar conditions of the city as
found and taken into account by the legislature itself.
Reliance is also placed on the case of Missouri vs. Lewis, supra. That case has reference to a
situation where the constitution of Missouri permits appeals to the Supreme Court of the state
from final judgments of any circuit court, except those in certain counties for which counties the
constitution establishes a separate court of appeals called St. Louis Court of Appeals. The
provision complained of, then, is found in the constitution itself and it is the constitution that
makes the apportionment of territorial jurisdiction.
We are of the opinion that section 11 of the Probation Act is unconstitutional and void because it
is also repugnant to equal-protection clause of our Constitution.
Section 11 of the Probation Act being unconstitutional and void for the reasons already stated,
the next inquiry is whether or not the entire Act should be avoided.
In seeking the legislative intent, the presumption is against any mutilation of a statute,
and the courts will resort to elimination only where an unconstitutional provision is
interjected into a statute otherwise valid, and is so independent and separable that its
removal will leave the constitutional features and purposes of the act substantially
unaffected by the process. (Riccio vs. Hoboken, 69 N. J. Law., 649, 662; 63 L. R. A., 485;
55 Atl., 1109, quoted in Williams vs. Standard Oil Co. [1929], 278 U.S., 235, 240; 73
Law. ed., 287, 309; 49 Sup. Ct. Rep., 115; 60 A. L. R., 596.) In Barrameda vs.
Moir ([1913], 25 Phil., 44, 47), this court stated the well-established rule concerning
partial invalidity of statutes in the following language:
. . . where part of the a statute is void, as repugnant to the Organic Law, while another
part is valid, the valid portion, if separable from the valid, may stand and be enforced.
But in order to do this, the valid portion must be in so far independent of the invalid
portion that it is fair to presume that the Legislative would have enacted it by itself if they
had supposed that they could not constitutionally enact the other. (Mutual Loan Co. vs.
Martell, 200 Mass., 482; 86 N. E., 916; 128 A. S. R., 446; Supervisors of Holmes Co. vs.
Black Creek Drainage District, 99 Miss., 739; 55 Sou., 963.) Enough must remain to
make a complete, intelligible, and valid statute, which carries out the legislative intent.
(Pearson vs. Bass. 132 Ga., 117; 63 S. E., 798.) The void provisions must be eliminated
without causing results affecting the main purpose of the Act, in a manner contrary to the
intention of the Legislature. (State vs. A. C. L. R., Co., 56 Fla., 617, 642; 47 Sou., 969;
Harper vs. Galloway, 58 Fla., 255; 51 Sou., 226; 26 L. R. A., N. S., 794; Connolly vs.
Union Sewer Pipe Co., 184 U. S., 540, 565; People vs. Strassheim, 240 Ill., 279, 300; 88
N. E., 821; 22 L. R. A., N. S., 1135; State vs. Cognevich, 124 La., 414; 50 Sou., 439.)
The language used in the invalid part of a statute can have no legal force or efficacy for
any purpose whatever, and what remains must express the legislative will, independently
of the void part, since the court has no power to legislate. (State vs. Junkin, 85 Neb., 1;
122 N. W., 473; 23 L. R. A., N. S., 839; Vide, also,. U. S., vs. Rodriguez [1918], 38 Phil.,
759; Pollock vs. Farmers' Loan and Trust Co. [1895], 158 U. S., 601, 635; 39 Law. ed.,
1108, 1125; 15 Sup. Ct. Rep., 912; 6 R.C.L., 121.)
It is contended that even if section 11, which makes the Probation Act applicable only in those
provinces in which the respective provincial boards provided for the salaries of probation officers
were inoperative on constitutional grounds, the remainder of the Act would still be valid and may
be enforced. We should be inclined to accept the suggestions but for the fact that said section is,
in our opinion, is inseparably linked with the other portions of the Act that with the elimination
of the section what would be left is the bare idealism of the system, devoid of any practical
benefit to a large number of people who may be deserving of the intended beneficial result of
that system. The clear policy of the law, as may be gleaned from a careful examination of the
whole context, is to make the application of the system dependent entirely upon the affirmative
action of the different provincial boards through appropriation of the salaries for probation
officers at rates not lower than those provided for provincial fiscals. Without such action on the
part of the various boards, no probation officers would be appointed by the Secretary of Justice
to act in the provinces. The Philippines is divided or subdivided into provinces and it needs no
argument to show that if not one of the provinces and this is the actual situation now
appropriate the necessary fund for the salary of a probation officer, probation under Act No. 4221
would be illusory. There can be no probation without a probation officer. Neither can there be a
probation officer without the probation system.
Section 2 of the Acts provides that the probation officer shall supervise and visit the probationer.
Every probation officer is given, as to the person placed in probation under his care, the powers
of the police officer. It is the duty of the probation officer to see that the conditions which are
imposed by the court upon the probationer under his care are complied with. Among those
conditions, the following are enumerated in section 3 of the Act:
That the probationer (a) shall indulge in no injurious or vicious habits;
(b) Shall avoid places or persons of disreputable or harmful character;
(c) Shall report to the probation officer as directed by the court or probation officers;
(d) Shall permit the probation officer to visit him at reasonable times at his place of abode
or elsewhere;
(e) Shall truthfully answer any reasonable inquiries on the part of the probation officer
concerning his conduct or condition; "(f) Shall endeavor to be employed regularly; "(g)
Shall remain or reside within a specified place or locality;
(f) Shall make reparation or restitution to the aggrieved parties for actual damages or
losses caused by his offense;
(g) Shall comply with such orders as the court may from time to time make; and
(h) Shall refrain from violating any law, statute, ordinance, or any by-law or regulation,
promulgated in accordance with law.
The court is required to notify the probation officer in writing of the period and terms of
probation. Under section 4, it is only after the period of probation, the submission of a report of
the probation officer and appropriate finding of the court that the probationer has complied with
the conditions of probation that probation may be definitely terminated and the probationer
finally discharged from supervision. Under section 5, if the court finds that there is noncompliance with said conditions, as reported by the probation officer, it may issue a warrant for
the arrest of the probationer and said probationer may be committed with or without bail. Upon
arraignment and after an opportunity to be heard, the court may revoke, continue or modify the
probation, and if revoked, the court shall order the execution of the sentence originally imposed.
Section 6 prescribes the duties of probation officers: "It shall be the duty of every probation
officer to furnish to all persons placed on probation under his supervision a statement of the
period and conditions of their probation, and to instruct them concerning the same; to keep
informed concerning their conduct and condition; to aid and encourage them by friendly advice
and admonition, and by such other measures, not inconsistent with the conditions imposed by
court as may seem most suitable, to bring about improvement in their conduct and condition; to
report in writing to the court having jurisdiction over said probationers at least once every two
months concerning their conduct and condition; to keep records of their work; make such report
as are necessary for the information of the Secretary of Justice and as the latter may require; and
to perform such other duties as are consistent with the functions of the probation officer and as
the court or judge may direct. The probation officers provided for in this Act may act as parole
officers for any penal or reformatory institution for adults when so requested by the authorities
thereof, and, when designated by the Secretary of Justice shall act as parole officer of persons
released on parole under Act Number Forty-one Hundred and Three, without additional
compensation."
It is argued, however, that even without section 11 probation officers maybe appointed in the
provinces under section 10 of Act which provides as follows:
There is hereby created in the Department of Justice and subject to its supervision and
control, a Probation Office under the direction of a Chief Probation Officer to be
appointed by the Governor-General with the advise and consent of the Senate who shall
receive a salary of four eight hundred pesos per annum. To carry out this Act there is
hereby appropriated out of any funds in the Insular Treasury not otherwise appropriated,
the sum of fifty thousand pesos to be disbursed by the Secretary of Justice, who is hereby
authorized to appoint probation officers and the administrative personnel of the probation
officer under civil service regulations from among those who possess the qualifications,
training and experience prescribed by the Bureau of Civil Service, and shall fix the
compensation of such probation officers and administrative personnel until such positions
shall have been included in the Appropriation Act.
But the probation officers and the administrative personnel referred to in the foregoing section
are clearly not those probation officers required to be appointed for the provinces under section
11. It may be said, reddendo singula singulis, that the probation officers referred to in section 10
above-quoted are to act as such, not in the various provinces, but in the central office known as
the Probation Office established in the Department of Justice, under the supervision of the Chief
Probation Officer. When the law provides that "the probation officer" shall investigate and make
reports to the court (secs. 1 and 4); that "the probation officer" shall supervise and visit the
probationer (sec. 2; sec. 6, par. d); that the probationer shall report to the "probationer officer"
(sec. 3, par. c.), shall allow "the probationer officer" to visit him (sec. 3, par. d), shall truthfully
answer any reasonable inquiries on the part of "the probation officer" concerning his conduct or
condition (sec. 3, par. 4); that the court shall notify "the probation officer" in writing of the
period and terms of probation (sec. 3, last par.), it means the probation officer who is in charge of
a particular probationer in a particular province. It never could have been intention of the
legislature, for instance, to require the probationer in Batanes, to report to a probationer officer in
the City of Manila, or to require a probation officer in Manila to visit the probationer in the said
province of Batanes, to place him under his care, to supervise his conduct, to instruct him
concerning the conditions of his probation or to perform such other functions as are assigned to
him by law.
That under section 10 the Secretary of Justice may appoint as many probation officers as there
are provinces or groups of provinces is, of course possible. But this would be arguing on what
the law may be or should be and not on what the law is. Between is and ought there is a far cry.
The wisdom and propriety of legislation is not for us to pass upon. We may think a law better
otherwise than it is. But much as has been said regarding progressive interpretation and judicial
legislation we decline to amend the law. We are not permitted to read into the law matters and
provisions which are not there. Not for any purpose not even to save a statute from the doom
of invalidity.
Upon the other hand, the clear intention and policy of the law is not to make the Insular
Government defray the salaries of probation officers in the provinces but to make the provinces
defray them should they desire to have the Probation Act apply thereto. The sum of P50,000,
appropriated "to carry out the purposes of this Act", is to be applied, among other things, for the
salaries of probation officers in the central office at Manila. These probation officers are to
receive such compensations as the Secretary of Justice may fix "until such positions shall have
been included in the Appropriation Act". It was the intention of the legislature to empower the
Secretary of Justice to fix the salaries of the probation officers in the provinces or later on to
include said salaries in an appropriation act. Considering, further, that the sum of P50,000
appropriated in section 10 is to cover, among other things, the salaries of the administrative
personnel of the Probation Office, what would be left of the amount can hardly be said to be
sufficient to pay even nominal salaries to probation officers in the provinces. We take judicial
notice of the fact that there are 48 provinces in the Philippines and we do not think it is seriously
contended that, with the fifty thousand pesos appropriated for the central office, there can be in
each province, as intended, a probation officer with a salary not lower than that of a provincial
fiscal. If this a correct, the contention that without section 11 of Act No. 4221 said act is
complete is an impracticable thing under the remainder of the Act, unless it is conceded that in
our case there can be a system of probation in the provinces without probation officers.
Probation as a development of a modern penology is a commendable system. Probation laws
have been enacted, here and in other countries, to permit what modern criminologist call the
"individualization of the punishment", the adjustment of the penalty to the character of the
criminal and the circumstances of his particular case. It provides a period of grace in order to aid
in the rehabilitation of a penitent offender. It is believed that, in any cases, convicts may be
reformed and their development into hardened criminals aborted. It, therefore, takes advantage of
an opportunity for reformation and avoids imprisonment so long as the convicts gives promise of
reform. (United States vs. Murray [1925], 275 U. S., 347 357, 358; 72 Law. ed., 309; 312, 313;
48 Sup. Ct. Rep., 146; Kaplan vs. Hecht, 24 F. [2d], 664, 665.) The Welfare of society is its chief
end and aim. The benefit to the individual convict is merely incidental. But while we believe that
probation is commendable as a system and its implantation into the Philippines should be
welcomed, we are forced by our inescapable duty to set the law aside because of the repugnancy
to our fundamental law.
In arriving at this conclusion, we have endeavored to consider the different aspects presented by
able counsel for both parties, as well in their memorandums as in their oral argument. We have
examined the cases brought to our attention, and others we have been able to reach in the short
time at our command for the study and deliberation of this case. In the examination of the cases
and in then analysis of the legal principles involved we have inclined to adopt the line of action
which in our opinion, is supported better reasoned authorities and is more conducive to the
general welfare. (Smith, Bell & Co. vs. Natividad [1919], 40 Phil., 136.) Realizing the conflict of
authorities, we have declined to be bound by certain adjudicated cases brought to our attention,
except where the point or principle is settled directly or by clear implication by the more
authoritative pronouncements of the Supreme Court of the United States. This line of approach is
justified because:
(a) The constitutional relations between the Federal and the State governments of the
United States and the dual character of the American Government is a situation which
does not obtain in the Philippines;
(b) The situation of s state of the American Union of the District of Columbia with
reference to the Federal Government of the United States is not the situation of the
province with respect to the Insular Government (Art. I, sec. 8 cl. 17 and 10th
Amendment, Constitution of the United States; Sims vs. Rives, 84 Fed. [2d], 871),
(c) The distinct federal and the state judicial organizations of the United States do not
embrace the integrated judicial system of the Philippines (Schneckenburger vs. Moran
[1936], 35 Off. Gaz., p. 1317);
(d) "General propositions do not decide concrete cases" (Justice Holmes in Lochner vs.
New York [1904], 198 U. S., 45, 76; 49 Law. ed., 937, 949) and, "to keep pace with . . .
new developments of times and circumstances" (Chief Justice Waite in Pensacola Tel. Co.
vs. Western Union Tel. Co. [1899], 96 U. S., 1, 9; 24 Law. ed., 708; Yale Law Journal,
Vol. XXIX, No. 2, Dec. 1919, 141, 142), fundamental principles should be interpreted
having in view existing local conditions and environment.
Act No. 4221 is hereby declared unconstitutional and void and the writ of prohibition is,
accordingly, granted. Without any pronouncement regarding costs. So ordered.

SUPREME COURT
Manila
FIRST DIVISION
G.R. No. 76633 October 18, 1988
EASTERN SHIPPING LINES, INC., petitioner,
vs.
PHILIPPINE OVERSEAS EMPLOYMENT ADMINISTRATION (POEA), MINISTER
OF LABOR AND EMPLOYMENT, HEARING OFFICER ABDUL BASAR and
KATHLEEN D. SACO, respondents.
Jimenea, Dala & Zaragoza Law Office for petitioner.
The Solicitor General for public respondent.
Dizon Law Office for respondent Kathleen D. Saco.
CRUZ, J.:
The private respondent in this case was awarded the sum of P192,000.00 by the Philippine
Overseas Employment Administration (POEA) for the death of her husband. The decision is
challenged by the petitioner on the principal ground that the POEA had no jurisdiction over the
case as the husband was not an overseas worker.
Vitaliano Saco was Chief Officer of the M/V Eastern Polaris when he was killed in an accident in
Tokyo, Japan, March 15, 1985. His widow sued for damages under Executive Order No. 797 and
Memorandum Circular No. 2 of the POEA. The petitioner, as owner of the vessel, argued that the
complaint was cognizable not by the POEA but by the Social Security System and should have
been filed against the State Insurance Fund. The POEA nevertheless assumed jurisdiction and
after considering the position papers of the parties ruled in favor of the complainant. The award
consisted of P180,000.00 as death benefits and P12,000.00 for burial expenses.
The petitioner immediately came to this Court, prompting the Solicitor General to move for
dismissal on the ground of non-exhaustion of administrative remedies.
Ordinarily, the decisions of the POEA should first be appealed to the National Labor Relations
Commission, on the theory inter alia that the agency should be given an opportunity to correct
the errors, if any, of its subordinates. This case comes under one of the exceptions, however, as
the questions the petitioner is raising are essentially questions of law. 1 Moreover, the private
respondent himself has not objected to the petitioner's direct resort to this Court, observing that
the usual procedure would delay the disposition of the case to her prejudice.
The Philippine Overseas Employment Administration was created under Executive Order No.
797, promulgated on May 1, 1982, to promote and monitor the overseas employment of Filipinos
and to protect their rights. It replaced the National Seamen Board created earlier under Article 20
of the Labor Code in 1974. Under Section 4(a) of the said executive order, the POEA is vested
with "original and exclusive jurisdiction over all cases, including money claims, involving
employee-employer relations arising out of or by virtue of any law or contract involving Filipino
contract workers, including seamen." These cases, according to the 1985 Rules and Regulations
on Overseas Employment issued by the POEA, include "claims for death, disability and other
benefits" arising out of such employment. 2
The petitioner does not contend that Saco was not its employee or that the claim of his widow is
not compensable. What it does urge is that he was not an overseas worker but a 'domestic
employee and consequently his widow's claim should have been filed with Social Security
System, subject to appeal to the Employees Compensation Commission.
We see no reason to disturb the factual finding of the POEA that Vitaliano Saco was an overseas
employee of the petitioner at the time he met with the fatal accident in Japan in 1985.
Under the 1985 Rules and Regulations on Overseas Employment, overseas employment is
defined as "employment of a worker outside the Philippines, including employment on board
vessels plying international waters, covered by a valid contract. 3 A contract worker is described
as "any person working or who has worked overseas under a valid employment contract and
shall include seamen" 4 or "any person working overseas or who has been employed by another
which may be a local employer, foreign employer, principal or partner under a valid employment
contract and shall include seamen." 5 These definitions clearly apply to Vitaliano Saco for it is
not disputed that he died while under a contract of employment with the petitioner and alongside
the petitioner's vessel, the M/V Eastern Polaris, while berthed in a foreign country. 6
It is worth observing that the petitioner performed at least two acts which constitute implied or
tacit recognition of the nature of Saco's employment at the time of his death in 1985. The first is
its submission of its shipping articles to the POEA for processing, formalization and approval in
the exercise of its regulatory power over overseas employment under Executive Order NO.
797. 7 The second is its payment 8 of the contributions mandated by law and regulations to the
Welfare Fund for Overseas Workers, which was created by P.D. No. 1694 "for the purpose of
providing social and welfare services to Filipino overseas workers."
Significantly, the office administering this fund, in the receipt it prepared for the private
respondent's signature, described the subject of the burial benefits as "overseas contract worker
Vitaliano Saco." 9 While this receipt is certainly not controlling, it does indicate, in the light of
the petitioner's own previous acts, that the petitioner and the Fund to which it had made
contributions considered Saco to be an overseas employee.
The petitioner argues that the deceased employee should be likened to the employees of the
Philippine Air Lines who, although working abroad in its international flights, are not considered
overseas workers. If this be so, the petitioner should not have found it necessary to submit its
shipping articles to the POEA for processing, formalization and approval or to contribute to the
Welfare Fund which is available only to overseas workers. Moreover, the analogy is hardly
appropriate as the employees of the PAL cannot under the definitions given be considered
seamen nor are their appointments coursed through the POEA.
The award of P180,000.00 for death benefits and P12,000.00 for burial expenses was made by
the POEA pursuant to its Memorandum Circular No. 2, which became effective on February 1,
1984. This circular prescribed a standard contract to be adopted by both foreign and domestic
shipping companies in the hiring of Filipino seamen for overseas employment. A similar contract
had earlier been required by the National Seamen Board and had been sustained in a number of
cases by this Court. 10 The petitioner claims that it had never entered into such a contract with the
deceased Saco, but that is hardly a serious argument. In the first place, it should have done so as
required by the circular, which specifically declared that "all parties to the employment of any
Filipino seamen on board any ocean-going vessel are advised to adopt and use this employment
contract effective 01 February 1984 and to desist from using any other format of employment
contract effective that date." In the second place, even if it had not done so, the provisions of the
said circular are nevertheless deemed written into the contract with Saco as a postulate of the
police power of the State. 11
But the petitioner questions the validity of Memorandum Circular No. 2 itself as violative of the
principle of non-delegation of legislative power. It contends that no authority had been given the
POEA to promulgate the said regulation; and even with such authorization, the regulation
represents an exercise of legislative discretion which, under the principle, is not subject to
delegation.
The authority to issue the said regulation is clearly provided in Section 4(a) of Executive Order
No. 797, reading as follows:
... The governing Board of the Administration (POEA), as hereunder provided
shall promulgate the necessary rules and regulations to govern the exercise of the
adjudicatory functions of the Administration (POEA).
Similar authorization had been granted the National Seamen Board, which, as earlier observed,
had itself prescribed a standard shipping contract substantially the same as the format adopted by
the POEA.
The second challenge is more serious as it is true that legislative discretion as to the substantive
contents of the law cannot be delegated. What can be delegated is the discretion to
determine how the law may be enforced, notwhat the law shall be. The ascertainment of the latter
subject is a prerogative of the legislature. This prerogative cannot be abdicated or surrendered by
the legislature to the delegate. Thus, in Ynot v. Intermediate Apellate Court 12 which annulled
Executive Order No. 626, this Court held:
We also mark, on top of all this, the questionable manner of the disposition of the
confiscated property as prescribed in the questioned executive order. It is there
authorized that the seized property shall be distributed to charitable institutions
and other similar institutions as the Chairman of the National Meat Inspection
Commission may see fit, in the case of carabaos.' (Italics supplied.) The phrase
"may see fit" is an extremely generous and dangerous condition, if condition it is.
It is laden with perilous opportunities for partiality and abuse, and even
corruption. One searches in vain for the usual standard and the reasonable
guidelines, or better still, the limitations that the officers must observe when they
make their distribution. There is none. Their options are apparently boundless.
Who shall be the fortunate beneficiaries of their generosity and by what criteria
shall they be chosen? Only the officers named can supply the answer, they and
they alone may choose the grantee as they see fit, and in their own exclusive
discretion. Definitely, there is here a 'roving commission a wide and sweeping
authority that is not canalized within banks that keep it from overflowing,' in short
a clearly profligate and therefore invalid delegation of legislative powers.
There are two accepted tests to determine whether or not there is a valid delegation of legislative
power, viz, the completeness test and the sufficient standard test. Under the first test, the law
must be complete in all its terms and conditions when it leaves the legislature such that when it
reaches the delegate the only thing he will have to do is enforce it. 13 Under the sufficient
standard test, there must be adequate guidelines or stations in the law to map out the boundaries
of the delegate's authority and prevent the delegation from running riot. 14
Both tests are intended to prevent a total transference of legislative authority to the delegate, who
is not allowed to step into the shoes of the legislature and exercise a power essentially legislative.
The principle of non-delegation of powers is applicable to all the three major powers of the
Government but is especially important in the case of the legislative power because of the many
instances when its delegation is permitted. The occasions are rare when executive or judicial
powers have to be delegated by the authorities to which they legally certain. In the case of the
legislative power, however, such occasions have become more and more frequent, if not
necessary. This had led to the observation that the delegation of legislative power has become the
rule and its non-delegation the exception.
The reason is the increasing complexity of the task of government and the growing inability of
the legislature to cope directly with the myriad problems demanding its attention. The growth of
society has ramified its activities and created peculiar and sophisticated problems that the
legislature cannot be expected reasonably to comprehend. Specialization even in legislation has
become necessary. To many of the problems attendant upon present-day undertakings, the
legislature may not have the competence to provide the required direct and efficacious, not to
say, specific solutions. These solutions may, however, be expected from its delegates, who are
supposed to be experts in the particular fields assigned to them.
The reasons given above for the delegation of legislative powers in general are particularly
applicable to administrative bodies. With the proliferation of specialized activities and their
attendant peculiar problems, the national legislature has found it more and more necessary to
entrust to administrative agencies the authority to issue rules to carry out the general provisions
of the statute. This is called the "power of subordinate legislation."
With this power, administrative bodies may implement the broad policies laid down in a statute
by "filling in' the details which the Congress may not have the opportunity or competence to
provide. This is effected by their promulgation of what are known as supplementary regulations,
such as the implementing rules issued by the Department of Labor on the new Labor Code.
These regulations have the force and effect of law.
Memorandum Circular No. 2 is one such administrative regulation. The model contract
prescribed thereby has been applied in a significant number of the cases without challenge by the
employer. The power of the POEA (and before it the National Seamen Board) in requiring the
model contract is not unlimited as there is a sufficient standard guiding the delegate in the
exercise of the said authority. That standard is discoverable in the executive order itself which, in
creating the Philippine Overseas Employment Administration, mandated it to protect the rights of
overseas Filipino workers to "fair and equitable employment practices."
Parenthetically, it is recalled that this Court has accepted as sufficient standards "Public interest"
in People v. Rosenthal 15 "justice and equity" in Antamok Gold Fields v. CIR 16 "public
convenience and welfare" in Calalang v. Williams 17 and "simplicity, economy and efficiency"
in Cervantes v. Auditor General, 18 to mention only a few cases. In the United States, the "sense
and experience of men" was accepted in Mutual Film Corp. v. Industrial Commission, 19 and
"national security" in Hirabayashi v. United States. 20
It is not denied that the private respondent has been receiving a monthly death benefit pension of
P514.42 since March 1985 and that she was also paid a P1,000.00 funeral benefit by the Social
Security System. In addition, as already observed, she also received a P5,000.00 burial gratuity
from the Welfare Fund for Overseas Workers. These payments will not preclude allowance of the
private respondent's claim against the petitioner because it is specifically reserved in the standard
contract of employment for Filipino seamen under Memorandum Circular No. 2, Series of 1984,
that
Section C. Compensation and Benefits.
1. In case of death of the seamen during the term of his Contract, the employer
shall pay his beneficiaries the amount of:
a. P220,000.00 for master and chief engineers
b. P180,000.00 for other officers, including radio operators and
master electrician
c. P 130,000.00 for ratings.
2. It is understood and agreed that the benefits mentioned above shall be separate
and distinct from, and will be in addition to whatever benefits which the seaman
is entitled to under Philippine laws. ...
3. ...
c. If the remains of the seaman is buried in the Philippines, the
owners shall pay the beneficiaries of the seaman an amount not
exceeding P18,000.00 for burial expenses.
The underscored portion is merely a reiteration of Memorandum Circular No. 22, issued by the
National Seamen Board on July 12,1976, providing an follows:
Income Benefits under this Rule Shall be Considered Additional Benefits.
All compensation benefits under Title II, Book Four of the Labor Code of the
Philippines (Employees Compensation and State Insurance Fund) shall be
granted, in addition to whatever benefits, gratuities or allowances that the seaman
or his beneficiaries may be entitled to under the employment contract approved by
the NSB. If applicable, all benefits under the Social Security Law and the
Philippine Medicare Law shall be enjoyed by the seaman or his beneficiaries in
accordance with such laws.
The above provisions are manifestations of the concern of the State for the working class,
consistently with the social justice policy and the specific provisions in the Constitution for the
protection of the working class and the promotion of its interest.
One last challenge of the petitioner must be dealt with to close t case. Its argument that it has
been denied due process because the same POEA that issued Memorandum Circular No. 2 has
also sustained and applied it is an uninformed criticism of administrative law itself.
Administrative agencies are vested with two basic powers, the quasi-legislative and the quasijudicial. The first enables them to promulgate implementing rules and regulations, and the
second enables them to interpret and apply such regulations. Examples abound: the Bureau of
Internal Revenue adjudicates on its own revenue regulations, the Central Bank on its own
circulars, the Securities and Exchange Commission on its own rules, as so too do the Philippine
Patent Office and the Videogram Regulatory Board and the Civil Aeronautics Administration and
the Department of Natural Resources and so on ad infinitumon their respective administrative
regulations. Such an arrangement has been accepted as a fact of life of modern governments and
cannot be considered violative of due process as long as the cardinal rights laid down by Justice
Laurel in the landmark case of Ang Tibay v. Court of Industrial Relations 21 are observed.
Whatever doubts may still remain regarding the rights of the parties in this case are resolved in
favor of the private respondent, in line with the express mandate of the Labor Code and the
principle that those with less in life should have more in law.
When the conflicting interests of labor and capital are weighed on the scales of social justice, the
heavier influence of the latter must be counter-balanced by the sympathy and compassion the law
must accord the underprivileged worker. This is only fair if he is to be given the opportunity and
the right to assert and defend his cause not as a subordinate but as a peer of management, with
which he can negotiate on even plane. Labor is not a mere employee of capital but its active and
equal partner.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED, with costs against the petitioner. The temporary
restraining order dated December 10, 1986 is hereby LIFTED. It is so ordered.
Narvasa, Gancayco, Grio-Aquino and Medialdea, JJ., concur.

SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. 17122
February 27, 1922
THE UNITED STATES, plaintiff-appellee,

vs.
ANG TANG HO, defendant-appellant.
Williams & Ferrier for appellant.
Acting Attorney-General Tuason for appellee.
JOHNS, J.:
At its special session of 1919, the Philippine Legislature passed Act No. 2868, entitled "An Act
penalizing the monopoly and holding of, and speculation in, palay, rice, and corn under
extraordinary circumstances, regulating the distribution and sale thereof, and authorizing the
Governor-General, with the consent of the Council of State, to issue the necessary rules and
regulations therefor, and making an appropriation for this purpose," the material provisions of
which are as follows:
Section 1. The Governor-General is hereby authorized, whenever, for any cause,
conditions arise resulting in an extraordinary rise in the price of palay, rice or corn, to
issue and promulgate, with the consent of the Council of State, temporary rules and
emergency measures for carrying out the purpose of this Act, to wit:
(a) To prevent the monopoly and hoarding of, and speculation in, palay, rice or corn.
(b) To establish and maintain a government control of the distribution or sale of the
commodities referred to or have such distribution or sale made by the Government itself.
(c) To fix, from time to time the quantities of palay rice, or corn that a company or
individual may acquire, and the maximum sale price that the industrial or merchant may
demand.
(d) . . .
SEC. 2. It shall be unlawful to destroy, limit, prevent or in any other manner obstruct the
production or milling of palay, rice or corn for the purpose of raising the prices thereof; to
corner or hoard said products as defined in section three of this Act; . . .
Section 3 defines what shall constitute a monopoly or hoarding of palay, rice or corn within the
meaning of this Act, but does not specify the price of rice or define any basic for fixing the price.
SEC. 4. The violations of any of the provisions of this Act or of the regulations, orders
and decrees promulgated in accordance therewith shall be punished by a fine of not more
than five thousands pesos, or by imprisonment for not more than two years, or both, in
the discretion of the court: Provided, That in the case of companies or corporations the
manager or administrator shall be criminally liable.
SEC. 7. At any time that the Governor-General, with the consent of the Council of State,
shall consider that the public interest requires the application of the provisions of this Act,
he shall so declare by proclamation, and any provisions of other laws inconsistent
herewith shall from then on be temporarily suspended.
Upon the cessation of the reasons for which such proclamation was issued, the GovernorGeneral, with the consent of the Council of State, shall declare the application of this Act
to have likewise terminated, and all laws temporarily suspended by virtue of the same
shall again take effect, but such termination shall not prevent the prosecution of any
proceedings or cause begun prior to such termination, nor the filing of any proceedings
for an offense committed during the period covered by the Governor-General's
proclamation.
August 1, 1919, the Governor-General issued a proclamation fixing the price at which rice
should be sold.
August 8, 1919, a complaint was filed against the defendant, Ang Tang Ho, charging him with
the sale of rice at an excessive price as follows:
The undersigned accuses Ang Tang Ho of a violation of Executive Order No. 53 of the
Governor-General of the Philippines, dated the 1st of August, 1919, in relation with the
provisions of sections 1, 2 and 4 of Act No. 2868, committed as follows:
That on or about the 6th day of August, 1919, in the city of Manila, Philippine Islands,
the said Ang Tang Ho, voluntarily, illegally and criminally sold to Pedro Trinidad, one
ganta of rice at the price of eighty centavos (P.80), which is a price greater than that fixed
by Executive Order No. 53 of the Governor-General of the Philippines, dated the 1st of
August, 1919, under the authority of section 1 of Act No. 2868. Contrary to law.
Upon this charge, he was tried, found guilty and sentenced to five months' imprisonment and to
pay a fine of P500, from which he appealed to this court, claiming that the lower court erred in
finding Executive Order No. 53 of 1919, to be of any force and effect, in finding the accused
guilty of the offense charged, and in imposing the sentence.
The official records show that the Act was to take effect on its approval; that it was approved
July 30, 1919; that the Governor-General issued his proclamation on the 1st of August, 1919; and
that the law was first published on the 13th of August, 1919; and that the proclamation itself was
first published on the 20th of August, 1919.
The question here involves an analysis and construction of Act No. 2868, in so far as it
authorizes the Governor-General to fix the price at which rice should be sold. It will be noted
that section 1 authorizes the Governor-General, with the consent of the Council of State, for any
cause resulting in an extraordinary rise in the price of palay, rice or corn, to issue and promulgate
temporary rules and emergency measures for carrying out the purposes of the Act. By its very
terms, the promulgation of temporary rules and emergency measures is left to the discretion of
the Governor-General. The Legislature does not undertake to specify or define under what
conditions or for what reasons the Governor-General shall issue the proclamation, but says that it
may be issued "for any cause," and leaves the question as to what is "any cause" to the discretion
of the Governor-General. The Act also says: "For any cause, conditions arise resulting in an
extraordinary rise in the price of palay, rice or corn." The Legislature does not specify or define
what is "an extraordinary rise." That is also left to the discretion of the Governor-General. The
Act also says that the Governor-General, "with the consent of the Council of State," is authorized
to issue and promulgate "temporary rules and emergency measures for carrying out the purposes
of this Act." It does not specify or define what is a temporary rule or an emergency measure, or
how long such temporary rules or emergency measures shall remain in force and effect, or when
they shall take effect. That is to say, the Legislature itself has not in any manner specified or
defined any basis for the order, but has left it to the sole judgement and discretion of the
Governor-General to say what is or what is not "a cause," and what is or what is not "an
extraordinary rise in the price of rice," and as to what is a temporary rule or an emergency
measure for the carrying out the purposes of the Act. Under this state of facts, if the law is valid
and the Governor-General issues a proclamation fixing the minimum price at which rice should
be sold, any dealer who, with or without notice, sells rice at a higher price, is a criminal. There
may not have been any cause, and the price may not have been extraordinary, and there may not
have been an emergency, but, if the Governor-General found the existence of such facts and
issued a proclamation, and rice is sold at any higher price, the seller commits a crime.
By the organic law of the Philippine Islands and the Constitution of the United States all powers
are vested in the Legislative, Executive and Judiciary. It is the duty of the Legislature to make
the law; of the Executive to execute the law; and of the Judiciary to construe the law. The
Legislature has no authority to execute or construe the law, the Executive has no authority to
make or construe the law, and the Judiciary has no power to make or execute the law. Subject to
the Constitution only, the power of each branch is supreme within its own jurisdiction, and it is
for the Judiciary only to say when any Act of the Legislature is or is not constitutional.
Assuming, without deciding, that the Legislature itself has the power to fix the price at which
rice is to be sold, can it delegate that power to another, and, if so, was that power legally
delegated by Act No. 2868? In other words, does the Act delegate legislative power to the
Governor-General? By the Organic Law, all Legislative power is vested in the Legislature, and
the power conferred upon the Legislature to make laws cannot be delegated to the GovernorGeneral, or any one else. The Legislature cannot delegate the legislative power to enact any law.
If Act no 2868 is a law unto itself and within itself, and it does nothing more than to authorize
the Governor-General to make rules and regulations to carry the law into effect, then the
Legislature itself created the law. There is no delegation of power and it is valid. On the other
hand, if the Act within itself does not define crime, and is not a law, and some legislative act
remains to be done to make it a law or a crime, the doing of which is vested in the GovernorGeneral, then the Act is a delegation of legislative power, is unconstitutional and void.
The Supreme Court of the United States in what is known as the Granger Cases (94 U.S., 183187; 24 L. ed., 94), first laid down the rule:
Railroad companies are engaged in a public employment affecting the public interest and,
under the decision in Munn vs. Ill., ante, 77, are subject to legislative control as to their
rates of fare and freight unless protected by their charters.
The Illinois statute of Mar. 23, 1874, to establish reasonable maximum rates of charges
for the transportation of freights and passengers on the different railroads of the State is
not void as being repugnant to the Constitution of the United States or to that of the State.
It was there for the first time held in substance that a railroad was a public utility, and that, being
a public utility, the State had power to establish reasonable maximum freight and passenger rates.
This was followed by the State of Minnesota in enacting a similar law, providing for, and
empowering, a railroad commission to hear and determine what was a just and reasonable rate.
The constitutionality of this law was attacked and upheld by the Supreme Court of Minnesota in
a learned and exhaustive opinion by Justice Mitchell, in the case of State vs. Chicago, Milwaukee
& St. Paul ry. Co. (38 Minn., 281), in which the court held:
Regulations of railway tariffs Conclusiveness of commission's tariffs. Under Laws
1887, c. 10, sec. 8, the determination of the railroad and warehouse commission as to
what are equal and reasonable fares and rates for the transportation of persons and
property by a railway company is conclusive, and, in proceedings by mandamus to
compel compliance with the tariff of rates recommended and published by them, no issue
can be raised or inquiry had on that question.
Same constitution Delegation of power to commission. The authority thus given

to the commission to determine, in the exercise of their discretion and judgement, what
are equal and reasonable rates, is not a delegation of legislative power.
It will be noted that the law creating the railroad commission expressly provides
That all charges by any common carrier for the transportation of passengers and property
shall be equal and reasonable.
With that as a basis for the law, power is then given to the railroad commission to investigate all
the facts, to hear and determine what is a just and reasonable rate. Even then that law does not
make the violation of the order of the commission a crime. The only remedy is a civil
proceeding. It was there held
That the legislative itself has the power to regulate railroad charges is now too well
settled to require either argument or citation of authority.
The difference between the power to say what the law shall be, and the power to adopt
rules and regulations, or to investigate and determine the facts, in order to carry into
effect a law already passed, is apparent. The true distinction is between the delegation of
power to make the law, which necessarily involves a discretion as to what it shall be, and
the conferring an authority or discretion to be exercised under and in pursuance of the
law.
The legislature enacts that all freights rates and passenger fares should be just and
reasonable. It had the undoubted power to fix these rates at whatever it deemed equal and
reasonable.
They have not delegated to the commission any authority or discretion as to what the law
shall be, which would not be allowable, but have merely conferred upon it an
authority and discretion, to be exercised in the execution of the law, and under and in
pursuance of it, which is entirely permissible. The legislature itself has passed upon the
expediency of the law, and what is shall be. The commission is intrusted with no
authority or discretion upon these questions. It can neither make nor unmake a single
provision of law. It is merely charged with the administration of the law, and with no
other power.
The delegation of legislative power was before the Supreme Court of Wisconsin in
Dowling vs. Lancoshire Ins. Co. (92 Wis., 63). The opinion says:
"The true distinction is between the delegation of power to make the law, which
necessarily involves a discretion as to what it shall be, and conferring authority or
discretion as to its execution, to be exercised under and in pursuance of the law. The first
cannot be done; to the latter no valid objection can be made."
The act, in our judgment, wholly fails to provide definitely and clearly what the standard policy
should contain, so that it could be put in use as a uniform policy required to take the place of all
others, without the determination of the insurance commissioner in respect to maters involving
the exercise of a legislative discretion that could not be delegated, and without which the act
could not possibly be put in use as an act in confirmity to which all fire insurance policies were
required to be issued.
The result of all the cases on this subject is that a law must be complete, in all its terms and
provisions, when it leaves the legislative branch of the government, and nothing must be left to
the judgement of the electors or other appointee or delegate of the legislature, so that, in form
and substance, it is a law in all its details in presenti, but which may be left to take effect in
futuro, if necessary, upon the ascertainment of any prescribed fact or event.
The delegation of legislative power was before the Supreme Court in United States vs. Grimaud
(220 U.S., 506; 55 L. ed., 563), where it was held that the rules and regulations of the Secretary
of Agriculture as to a trespass on government land in a forest reserve were valid constitutional.
The Act there provided that the Secretary of Agriculture ". . . may make such rules and
regulations and establish such service as will insure the object of such reservations; namely, to
regulate their occupancy and use, and to preserve the forests thereon from destruction;and any
violation of the provisions of this act or such rules and regulations shall be punished, . . ."
The brief of the United States Solicitor-General says:
In refusing permits to use a forest reservation for stock grazing, except upon stated terms
or in stated ways, the Secretary of Agriculture merely assert and enforces the proprietary
right of the United States over land which it owns. The regulation of the Secretary,
therefore, is not an exercise of legislative, or even of administrative, power; but is an
ordinary and legitimate refusal of the landowner's authorized agent to allow person
having no right in the land to use it as they will. The right of proprietary control is
altogether different from governmental authority.
The opinion says:
From the beginning of the government, various acts have been passed conferring upon
executive officers power to make rules and regulations, not for the government of their
departments, but for administering the laws which did govern. None of these statutes
could confer legislative power. But when Congress had legislated power. But when
Congress had legislated and indicated its will, it could give to those who were to act
under such general provisions "power to fill up the details" by the establishment of
administrative rules and regulations, the violation of which could be punished by fine or
imprisonment fixed by Congress, or by penalties fixed by Congress, or measured by the
injury done.
That "Congress cannot delegate legislative power is a principle universally recognized as
vital to the integrity and maintenance of the system of government ordained by the
Constitution."
If, after the passage of the act and the promulgation of the rule, the defendants drove and
grazed their sheep upon the reserve, in violation of the regulations, they were making an
unlawful use of the government's property. In doing so they thereby made themselves
liable to the penalty imposed by Congress.
The subjects as to which the Secretary can regulate are defined. The lands are set apart as a forest
reserve. He is required to make provisions to protect them from depredations and from harmful
uses. He is authorized 'to regulate the occupancy and use and to preserve the forests from
destruction.' A violation of reasonable rules regulating the use and occupancy of the property is
made a crime, not by the Secretary, but by Congress."
The above are leading cases in the United States on the question of delegating legislative power.
It will be noted that in the "Granger Cases," it was held that a railroad company was a public
corporation, and that a railroad was a public utility, and that, for such reasons, the legislature had
the power to fix and determine just and reasonable rates for freight and passengers.
The Minnesota case held that, so long as the rates were just and reasonable, the legislature could
delegate the power to ascertain the facts and determine from the facts what were just and
reasonable rates,. and that in vesting the commission with such power was not a delegation of
legislative power.
The Wisconsin case was a civil action founded upon a "Wisconsin standard policy of fire
insurance," and the court held that "the act, . . . wholly fails to provide definitely and clearly what
the standard policy should contain, so that it could be put in use as a uniform policy required to
take the place of all others, without the determination of the insurance commissioner in respect to
matters involving the exercise of a legislative discretion that could not be delegated."
The case of the United States Supreme Court, supra dealt with rules and regulations which were
promulgated by the Secretary of Agriculture for Government land in the forest reserve.
These decisions hold that the legislative only can enact a law, and that it cannot delegate it
legislative authority.
The line of cleavage between what is and what is not a delegation of legislative power is pointed
out and clearly defined. As the Supreme Court of Wisconsin says:
That no part of the legislative power can be delegated by the legislature to any other
department of the government, executive or judicial, is a fundamental principle in
constitutional law, essential to the integrity and maintenance of the system of government
established by the constitution.
Where an act is clothed with all the forms of law, and is complete in and of itself, it may
be provided that it shall become operative only upon some certain act or event, or, in like
manner, that its operation shall be suspended.
The legislature cannot delegate its power to make a law, but it can make a law to delegate
a power to determine some fact or state of things upon which the law makes, or intends to
make, its own action to depend.
The Village of Little Chute enacted an ordinance which provides:
All saloons in said village shall be closed at 11 o'clock P.M. each day and remain closed
until 5 o'clock on the following morning, unless by special permission of the president.
Construing it in 136 Wis., 526; 128 A. S. R., 1100,1 the Supreme Court of that State says:
We regard the ordinance as void for two reasons; First, because it attempts to confer
arbitrary power upon an executive officer, and allows him, in executing the ordinance, to
make unjust and groundless discriminations among persons similarly situated; second,
because the power to regulate saloons is a law-making power vested in the village board,
which cannot be delegated. A legislative body cannot delegate to a mere administrative
officer power to make a law, but it can make a law with provisions that it shall go into
effect or be suspended in its operations upon the ascertainment of a fact or state of facts
by an administrative officer or board. In the present case the ordinance by its terms gives
power to the president to decide arbitrary, and in the exercise of his own discretion, when
a saloon shall close. This is an attempt to vest legislative discretion in him, and cannot be
sustained.
The legal principle involved there is squarely in point here.
It must be conceded that, after the passage of act No. 2868, and before any rules and regulations
were promulgated by the Governor-General, a dealer in rice could sell it at any price, even at a
peso per "ganta," and that he would not commit a crime, because there would be no law fixing
the price of rice, and the sale of it at any price would not be a crime. That is to say, in the absence
of a proclamation, it was not a crime to sell rice at any price. Hence, it must follow that, if the
defendant committed a crime, it was because the Governor-General issued the proclamation.
There was no act of the Legislature making it a crime to sell rice at any price, and without the
proclamation, the sale of it at any price was to a crime.
The Executive order2 provides:
(5) The maximum selling price of palay, rice or corn is hereby fixed, for the time being as
follows:
In Manila
Palay at P6.75 per sack of 57 kilos, or 29 centavos per ganta.
Rice at P15 per sack of 57 kilos, or 63 centavos per ganta.
Corn at P8 per sack of 57 kilos, or 34 centavos per ganta.
In the provinces producing palay, rice and corn, the maximum price shall be the Manila
price less the cost of transportation from the source of supply and necessary handling
expenses to the place of sale, to be determined by the provincial treasurers or their
deputies.
In provinces, obtaining their supplies from Manila or other producing provinces, the
maximum price shall be the authorized price at the place of supply or the Manila price as
the case may be, plus the transportation cost, from the place of supply and the necessary
handling expenses, to the place of sale, to be determined by the provincial treasurers or
their deputies.
(6) Provincial treasurers and their deputies are hereby directed to communicate with, and
execute all instructions emanating from the Director of Commerce and Industry, for the
most effective and proper enforcement of the above regulations in their respective
localities.
The law says that the Governor-General may fix "the maximum sale price that the industrial or
merchant may demand." The law is a general law and not a local or special law.
The proclamation undertakes to fix one price for rice in Manila and other and different prices in
other and different provinces in the Philippine Islands, and delegates the power to determine the
other and different prices to provincial treasurers and their deputies. Here, then, you would have
a delegation of legislative power to the Governor-General, and a delegation by him of that power
to provincial treasurers and their deputies, who "are hereby directed to communicate with, and
execute all instructions emanating from the Director of Commerce and Industry, for the most
effective and proper enforcement of the above regulations in their respective localities." The
issuance of the proclamation by the Governor-General was the exercise of the delegation of a
delegated power, and was even a sub delegation of that power.
Assuming that it is valid, Act No. 2868 is a general law and does not authorize the GovernorGeneral to fix one price of rice in Manila and another price in Iloilo. It only purports to authorize
him to fix the price of rice in the Philippine Islands under a law, which is General and uniform,
and not local or special. Under the terms of the law, the price of rice fixed in the proclamation
must be the same all over the Islands. There cannot be one price at Manila and another at Iloilo.
Again, it is a mater of common knowledge, and of which this court will take judicial notice, that
there are many kinds of rice with different and corresponding market values, and that there is a
wide range in the price, which varies with the grade and quality. Act No. 2868 makes no
distinction in price for the grade or quality of the rice, and the proclamation, upon which the
defendant was tried and convicted, fixes the selling price of rice in Manila "at P15 per sack of
57 kilos, or 63 centavos per ganta," and is uniform as to all grades of rice, and says nothing
about grade or quality. Again, it will be noted that the law is confined to palay, rice and corn.
They are products of the Philippine Islands. Hemp, tobacco, coconut, chickens, eggs, and many
other things are also products. Any law which single out palay, rice or corn from the numerous
other products of the Islands is not general or uniform, but is a local or special law. If such a law
is valid, then by the same principle, the Governor-General could be authorized by proclamation
to fix the price of meat, eggs, chickens, coconut, hemp, and tobacco, or any other product of the
Islands. In the very nature of things, all of that class of laws should be general and uniform.
Otherwise, there would be an unjust discrimination of property rights, which, under the law, must
be equal and inform. Act No. 2868 is nothing more than a floating law, which, in the discretion
and by a proclamation of the Governor-General, makes it a floating crime to sell rice at a price in
excess of the proclamation, without regard to grade or quality.
When Act No. 2868 is analyzed, it is the violation of the proclamation of the Governor-General
which constitutes the crime. Without that proclamation, it was no crime to sell rice at any price.
In other words, the Legislature left it to the sole discretion of the Governor-General to say what
was and what was not "any cause" for enforcing the act, and what was and what was not "an
extraordinary rise in the price of palay, rice or corn," and under certain undefined conditions to
fix the price at which rice should be sold, without regard to grade or quality, also to say whether
a proclamation should be issued, if so, when, and whether or not the law should be enforced,
how long it should be enforced, and when the law should be suspended. The Legislature did not
specify or define what was "any cause," or what was "an extraordinary rise in the price of rice,
palay or corn," Neither did it specify or define the conditions upon which the proclamation
should be issued. In the absence of the proclamation no crime was committed. The alleged sale
was made a crime, if at all, because the Governor-General issued the proclamation. The act or
proclamation does not say anything about the different grades or qualities of rice, and the
defendant is charged with the sale "of one ganta of rice at the price of eighty centavos (P0.80)
which is a price greater than that fixed by Executive order No. 53."
We are clearly of the opinion and hold that Act No. 2868, in so far as it undertakes to authorized
the Governor-General in his discretion to issue a proclamation, fixing the price of rice, and to
make the sale of rice in violation of the price of rice, and to make the sale of rice in violation of
the proclamation a crime, is unconstitutional and void.
It may be urged that there was an extraordinary rise in the price of rice and profiteering, which
worked a severe hardship on the poorer classes, and that an emergency existed, but the question
here presented is the constitutionality of a particular portion of a statute, and none of such
matters is an argument for, or against, its constitutionality.
The Constitution is something solid, permanent an substantial. Its stability protects the life,
liberty and property rights of the rich and the poor alike, and that protection ought not to change
with the wind or any emergency condition. The fundamental question involved in this case is the
right of the people of the Philippine Islands to be and live under a republican form of
government. We make the broad statement that no state or nation, living under republican form
of government, under the terms and conditions specified in Act No. 2868, has ever enacted a law
delegating the power to any one, to fix the price at which rice should be sold. That power can
never be delegated under a republican form of government.
In the fixing of the price at which the defendant should sell his rice, the law was not dealing with
government property. It was dealing with private property and private rights, which are sacred
under the Constitution. If this law should be sustained, upon the same principle and for the same
reason, the Legislature could authorize the Governor-General to fix the price of every product or
commodity in the Philippine Islands, and empower him to make it a crime to sell any product at
any other or different price.
It may be said that this was a war measure, and that for such reason the provision of the
Constitution should be suspended. But the Stubborn fact remains that at all times the judicial
power was in full force and effect, and that while that power was in force and effect, such a
provision of the Constitution could not be, and was not, suspended even in times of war. It may
be claimed that during the war, the United States Government undertook to, and did, fix the price
at which wheat and flour should be bought and sold, and that is true. There, the United States had
declared war, and at the time was at war with other nations, and it was a war measure, but it is
also true that in doing so, and as a part of the same act, the United States commandeered all the
wheat and flour, and took possession of it, either actual or constructive, and the government itself
became the owner of the wheat and flour, and fixed the price to be paid for it. That is not this
case. Here the rice sold was the personal and private property of the defendant, who sold it to one
of his customers. The government had not bought and did not claim to own the rice, or have any
interest in it, and at the time of the alleged sale, it was the personal, private property of the
defendant. It may be that the law was passed in the interest of the public, but the members of this
court have taken on solemn oath to uphold and defend the Constitution, and it ought not to be
construed to meet the changing winds or emergency conditions. Again, we say that no state or
nation under a republican form of government ever enacted a law authorizing any executive,
under the conditions states, to fix the price at which a price person would sell his own rice, and
make the broad statement that no decision of any court, on principle or by analogy, will ever be
found which sustains the constitutionality of the particular portion of Act No. 2868 here in
question. By the terms of the Organic Act, subject only to constitutional limitations, the power to
legislate and enact laws is vested exclusively in the Legislative, which is elected by a direct vote
of the people of the Philippine Islands. As to the question here involved, the authority of the
Governor-General to fix the maximum price at which palay, rice and corn may be sold in the
manner power in violation of the organic law.
This opinion is confined to the particular question here involved, which is the right of the
Governor-General, upon the terms and conditions stated in the Act, to fix the price of rice and
make it a crime to sell it at a higher price, and which holds that portions of the Act
unconstitutional. It does not decide or undertake to construe the constitutionality of any of the
remaining portions of the Act.
The judgment of the lower court is reversed, and the defendant discharged. So ordered.
Araullo, C.J., Johnson, Street and Ostrand, JJ., concur.
Romualdez, J., concurs in the result.
Separate Opinions
MALCOLM, J., concurring:
I concur in the result for reasons which reach both the facts and the law. In the first place, as to
the facts, one cannot be convicted ex post facto of a violation of a law and of an executive
order issued pursuant to the law, when the alleged violation thereof occurred on August 6, 1919,
while the Act of the Legislature in question was not published until August 13, 1919, and the
order was not published until August 20, 1919. In the second place, as to the law, one cannot
be convicted of a violation of a law or of an order issued pursuant to the law when both the law
and the order fail to set up an ascertainable standard of guilt. (U.S. vs. Cohen Grocery Company
[1921], 255 U.S., 81, holding section 4 of the Federal Food Control Act of August 10, 1917, as
amended, invalid.)
In order that there may not be any misunderstanding of our position, I would respectfully invite
attention to the decision of the United States Supreme Court in German Alliance Ins.
Co. vs. Lewis ([1914, 233 U.S., 389), concerning the legislative regulation of the prices charged
by business affected with a public interest, and to another decision of the United States Supreme
Court, that of Marshall Field & Co. vs. Clark ([1892], 143 U.S., 649), which adopts as its own
the principles laid down in the case of Locke's Appeal ([1873], 72 Pa. St., 491), namely; "The
Legislature cannot delegate its power to make a law; but it can make a law to delegate a power to
determine some fact or state of things upon which the law makes, or intends to make, its own
action depend. To deny this would be to stop the wheels of government. There are many things
upon which wise and useful legislation must depend which cannot be known to the law-making
power, and must, therefore, be a subject of inquiry and determination outside of the halls of
legislation.

SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. 74457 March 20, 1987
RESTITUTO YNOT, petitioner,
vs.
INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT, THE STATION COMMANDER,
INTEGRATED NATIONAL POLICE, BAROTAC NUEVO, ILOILO and THE
REGIONAL DIRECTOR, BUREAU OF ANIMAL INDUSTRY, REGION IV, ILOILO
CITY, respondents.
Ramon A. Gonzales for petitioner.
CRUZ, J.:
The essence of due process is distilled in the immortal cry of Themistocles to Alcibiades "Strike
but hear me first!" It is this cry that the petitioner in effect repeats here as he challenges the
constitutionality of Executive Order No. 626-A.
The said executive order reads in full as follows:
WHEREAS, the President has given orders prohibiting the interprovincial
movement of carabaos and the slaughtering of carabaos not complying with the
requirements of Executive Order No. 626 particularly with respect to age;
WHEREAS, it has been observed that despite such orders the violators still
manage to circumvent the prohibition against inter-provincial movement of
carabaos by transporting carabeef instead; and
WHEREAS, in order to achieve the purposes and objectives of Executive Order
No. 626 and the prohibition against interprovincial movement of carabaos, it is
necessary to strengthen the said Executive Order and provide for the disposition
of the carabaos and carabeef subject of the violation;
NOW, THEREFORE, I, FERDINAND E. MARCOS, President of the
Philippines, by virtue of the powers vested in me by the Constitution, do hereby
promulgate the following:
SECTION 1. Executive Order No. 626 is hereby amended such that henceforth,
no carabao regardless of age, sex, physical condition or purpose and no carabeef
shall be transported from one province to another. The carabao or carabeef
transported in violation of this Executive Order as amended shall be subject to
confiscation and forfeiture by the government, to be distributed to charitable
institutions and other similar institutions as the Chairman of the National Meat
Inspection Commission may ay see fit, in the case of carabeef, and to deserving
farmers through dispersal as the Director of Animal Industry may see fit, in the
case of carabaos.
SECTION 2. This Executive Order shall take effect immediately.
Done in the City of Manila, this 25th day of October, in the year of Our Lord,
nineteen hundred and eighty.
(SGD.) FERDINAND
E. MARCOS
Preside
nt
Republic
of
Philippines
the
The petitioner had transported six carabaos in a pump boat from Masbate to Iloilo on January 13,
1984, when they were confiscated by the police station commander of Barotac Nuevo, Iloilo, for
violation of the above measure. 1 The petitioner sued for recovery, and the Regional Trial Court
of Iloilo City issued a writ of replevin upon his filing of a supersedeas bond of P12,000.00. After
considering the merits of the case, the court sustained the confiscation of the carabaos and, since
they could no longer be produced, ordered the confiscation of the bond. The court also declined
to rule on the constitutionality of the executive order, as raise by the petitioner, for lack of
authority and also for its presumed validity. 2
The petitioner appealed the decision to the Intermediate Appellate Court,* 3 which upheld the
trial court, ** and he has now come before us in this petition for review on certiorari.
The thrust of his petition is that the executive order is unconstitutional insofar as it authorizes
outright confiscation of the carabao or carabeef being transported across provincial boundaries.
His claim is that the penalty is invalid because it is imposed without according the owner a right
to be heard before a competent and impartial court as guaranteed by due process. He complains
that the measure should not have been presumed, and so sustained, as constitutional. There is
also a challenge to the improper exercise of the legislative power by the former President under
Amendment No. 6 of the 1973 Constitution. 4
While also involving the same executive order, the case of Pesigan v. Angeles 5 is not applicable
here. The question raised there was the necessity of the previous publication of the measure in
the Official Gazette before it could be considered enforceable. We imposed the requirement then
on the basis of due process of law. In doing so, however, this Court did not, as contended by the
Solicitor General, impliedly affirm the constitutionality of Executive Order No. 626-A. That is
an entirely different matter.
This Court has declared that while lower courts should observe a becoming modesty in
examining constitutional questions, they are nonetheless not prevented from resolving the same
whenever warranted, subject only to review by the highest tribunal. 6 We have jurisdiction under
the Constitution to "review, revise, reverse, modify or affirm on appeal or certiorari, as the law
or rules of court may provide," final judgments and orders of lower courts in, among others, all
cases involving the constitutionality of certain measures. 7 This simply means that the resolution
of such cases may be made in the first instance by these lower courts.
And while it is true that laws are presumed to be constitutional, that presumption is not by any
means conclusive and in fact may be rebutted. Indeed, if there be a clear showing of their
invalidity, and of the need to declare them so, then "will be the time to make the hammer fall,
and heavily," 8 to recall Justice Laurel's trenchant warning. Stated otherwise, courts should not
follow the path of least resistance by simply presuming the constitutionality of a law when it is
questioned. On the contrary, they should probe the issue more deeply, to relieve the abscess,
paraphrasing another distinguished jurist, 9 and so heal the wound or excise the affliction.
Judicial power authorizes this; and when the exercise is demanded, there should be no shirking
of the task for fear of retaliation, or loss of favor, or popular censure, or any other similar
inhibition unworthy of the bench, especially this Court.
The challenged measure is denominated an executive order but it is really presidential decree,
promulgating a new rule instead of merely implementing an existing law. It was issued by
President Marcos not for the purpose of taking care that the laws were faithfully executed but in
the exercise of his legislative authority under Amendment No. 6. It was provided thereunder that
whenever in his judgment there existed a grave emergency or a threat or imminence thereof or
whenever the legislature failed or was unable to act adequately on any matter that in his
judgment required immediate action, he could, in order to meet the exigency, issue decrees,
orders or letters of instruction that were to have the force and effect of law. As there is no
showing of any exigency to justify the exercise of that extraordinary power then, the petitioner
has reason, indeed, to question the validity of the executive order. Nevertheless, since the
determination of the grounds was supposed to have been made by the President "in his judgment,
" a phrase that will lead to protracted discussion not really necessary at this time, we reserve
resolution of this matter until a more appropriate occasion. For the nonce, we confine ourselves
to the more fundamental question of due process.
It is part of the art of constitution-making that the provisions of the charter be cast in precise and
unmistakable language to avoid controversies that might arise on their correct interpretation.
That is the Ideal. In the case of the due process clause, however, this rule was deliberately not
followed and the wording was purposely kept ambiguous. In fact, a proposal to delineate it more
clearly was submitted in the Constitutional Convention of 1934, but it was rejected by Delegate
Jose P. Laurel, Chairman of the Committee on the Bill of Rights, who forcefully argued against
it. He was sustained by the body. 10
The due process clause was kept intentionally vague so it would remain also conveniently
resilient. This was felt necessary because due process is not, like some provisions of the
fundamental law, an "iron rule" laying down an implacable and immutable command for all
seasons and all persons. Flexibility must be the best virtue of the guaranty. The very elasticity of
the due process clause was meant to make it adapt easily to every situation, enlarging or
constricting its protection as the changing times and circumstances may require.
Aware of this, the courts have also hesitated to adopt their own specific description of due
process lest they confine themselves in a legal straitjacket that will deprive them of the elbow
room they may need to vary the meaning of the clause whenever indicated. Instead, they have
preferred to leave the import of the protection open-ended, as it were, to be "gradually
ascertained by the process of inclusion and exclusion in the course of the decision of cases as
they arise." 11 Thus, Justice Felix Frankfurter of the U.S. Supreme Court, for example, would go
no farther than to define due process and in so doing sums it all up as nothing more and
nothing less than "the embodiment of the sporting Idea of fair play." 12
When the barons of England extracted from their sovereign liege the reluctant promise that that
Crown would thenceforth not proceed against the life liberty or property of any of its subjects
except by the lawful judgment of his peers or the law of the land, they thereby won for
themselves and their progeny that splendid guaranty of fairness that is now the hallmark of the
free society. The solemn vow that King John made at Runnymede in 1215 has since then
resounded through the ages, as a ringing reminder to all rulers, benevolent or base, that every
person, when confronted by the stern visage of the law, is entitled to have his say in a fair and
open hearing of his cause.
The closed mind has no place in the open society. It is part of the sporting Idea of fair play to
hear "the other side" before an opinion is formed or a decision is made by those who sit in
judgment. Obviously, one side is only one-half of the question; the other half must also be
considered if an impartial verdict is to be reached based on an informed appreciation of the
issues in contention. It is indispensable that the two sides complement each other, as unto the
bow the arrow, in leading to the correct ruling after examination of the problem not from one or
the other perspective only but in its totality. A judgment based on less that this full appraisal, on
the pretext that a hearing is unnecessary or useless, is tainted with the vice of bias or intolerance
or ignorance, or worst of all, in repressive regimes, the insolence of power.
The minimum requirements of due process are notice and hearing 13 which, generally speaking,
may not be dispensed with because they are intended as a safeguard against official arbitrariness.
It is a gratifying commentary on our judicial system that the jurisprudence of this country is rich
with applications of this guaranty as proof of our fealty to the rule of law and the ancient
rudiments of fair play. We have consistently declared that every person, faced by the awesome
power of the State, is entitled to "the law of the land," which Daniel Webster described almost
two hundred years ago in the famous Dartmouth College Case, 14 as "the law which hears before
it condemns, which proceeds upon inquiry and renders judgment only after trial." It has to be so
if the rights of every person are to be secured beyond the reach of officials who, out of mistaken
zeal or plain arrogance, would degrade the due process clause into a worn and empty catchword.
This is not to say that notice and hearing are imperative in every case for, to be sure, there are a
number of admitted exceptions. The conclusive presumption, for example, bars the admission of
contrary evidence as long as such presumption is based on human experience or there is a
rational connection between the fact proved and the fact ultimately presumed
therefrom. 15 There are instances when the need for expeditions action will justify omission of
these requisites, as in the summary abatement of a nuisance per se, like a mad dog on the loose,
which may be killed on sight because of the immediate danger it poses to the safety and lives of
the people. Pornographic materials, contaminated meat and narcotic drugs are inherently
pernicious and may be summarily destroyed. The passport of a person sought for a criminal
offense may be cancelled without hearing, to compel his return to the country he has
fled. 16Filthy restaurants may be summarily padlocked in the interest of the public health and
bawdy houses to protect the public morals. 17 In such instances, previous judicial hearing may
be omitted without violation of due process in view of the nature of the property involved or the
urgency of the need to protect the general welfare from a clear and present danger.
The protection of the general welfare is the particular function of the police power which both
restraints and is restrained by due process. The police power is simply defined as the power
inherent in the State to regulate liberty and property for the promotion of the general
welfare. 18 By reason of its function, it extends to all the great public needs and is described as
the most pervasive, the least limitable and the most demanding of the three inherent powers of
the State, far outpacing taxation and eminent domain. The individual, as a member of society, is
hemmed in by the police power, which affects him even before he is born and follows him still
after he is dead from the womb to beyond the tomb in practically everything he does or
owns. Its reach is virtually limitless. It is a ubiquitous and often unwelcome intrusion. Even so,
as long as the activity or the property has some relevance to the public welfare, its regulation
under the police power is not only proper but necessary. And the justification is found in the
venerable Latin maxims, Salus populi est suprema lex and Sic utere tuo ut alienum non
laedas, which call for the subordination of individual interests to the benefit of the greater
number.
It is this power that is now invoked by the government to justify Executive Order No. 626-A,
amending the basic rule in Executive Order No. 626, prohibiting the slaughter of carabaos except
under certain conditions. The original measure was issued for the reason, as expressed in one of
its Whereases, that "present conditions demand that the carabaos and the buffaloes be conserved
for the benefit of the small farmers who rely on them for energy needs." We affirm at the outset
the need for such a measure. In the face of the worsening energy crisis and the increased
dependence of our farms on these traditional beasts of burden, the government would have been
remiss, indeed, if it had not taken steps to protect and preserve them.
A similar prohibition was challenged in United States v. Toribio, 19 where a law regulating the
registration, branding and slaughter of large cattle was claimed to be a deprivation of property
without due process of law. The defendant had been convicted thereunder for having slaughtered
his own carabao without the required permit, and he appealed to the Supreme Court. The
conviction was affirmed. The law was sustained as a valid police measure to prevent the
indiscriminate killing of carabaos, which were then badly needed by farmers. An epidemic had
stricken many of these animals and the reduction of their number had resulted in an acute decline
in agricultural output, which in turn had caused an incipient famine. Furthermore, because of the
scarcity of the animals and the consequent increase in their price, cattle-rustling had spread
alarmingly, necessitating more effective measures for the registration and branding of these
animals. The Court held that the questioned statute was a valid exercise of the police power and
declared in part as follows:
To justify the State in thus interposing its authority in behalf of the public, it must
appear, first, that the interests of the public generally, as distinguished from those
of a particular class, require such interference; and second, that the means are
reasonably necessary for the accomplishment of the purpose, and not unduly
oppressive upon individuals. ...
From what has been said, we think it is clear that the enactment of the provisions
of the statute under consideration was required by "the interests of the public
generally, as distinguished from those of a particular class" and that the
prohibition of the slaughter of carabaos for human consumption, so long as these
animals are fit for agricultural work or draft purposes was a "reasonably
necessary" limitation on private ownership, to protect the community from the
loss of the services of such animals by their slaughter by improvident owners,
tempted either by greed of momentary gain, or by a desire to enjoy the luxury of
animal food, even when by so doing the productive power of the community may
be measurably and dangerously affected.
In the light of the tests mentioned above, we hold with the Toribio Case that the carabao, as the
poor man's tractor, so to speak, has a direct relevance to the public welfare and so is a lawful
subject of Executive Order No. 626. The method chosen in the basic measure is also reasonably
necessary for the purpose sought to be achieved and not unduly oppressive upon individuals,
again following the above-cited doctrine. There is no doubt that by banning the slaughter of these
animals except where they are at least seven years old if male and eleven years old if female
upon issuance of the necessary permit, the executive order will be conserving those still fit for
farm work or breeding and preventing their improvident depletion.
But while conceding that the amendatory measure has the same lawful subject as the original
executive order, we cannot say with equal certainty that it complies with the second
requirement, viz., that there be a lawful method. We note that to strengthen the original measure,
Executive Order No. 626-A imposes an absolute ban not on theslaughter of the carabaos but on
their movement, providing that "no carabao regardless of age, sex, physical condition or purpose
(sic) and no carabeef shall be transported from one province to another." The object of the
prohibition escapes us. The reasonable connection between the means employed and the purpose
sought to be achieved by the questioned measure is missing
We do not see how the prohibition of the inter-provincial transport of carabaos can prevent their
indiscriminate slaughter, considering that they can be killed anywhere, with no less difficulty in
one province than in another. Obviously, retaining the carabaos in one province will not prevent
their slaughter there, any more than moving them to another province will make it easier to kill
them there. As for the carabeef, the prohibition is made to apply to it as otherwise, so says
executive order, it could be easily circumvented by simply killing the animal. Perhaps so.
However, if the movement of the live animals for the purpose of preventing their slaughter
cannot be prohibited, it should follow that there is no reason either to prohibit their transfer as,
not to be flippant dead meat.
Even if a reasonable relation between the means and the end were to be assumed, we would still
have to reckon with the sanction that the measure applies for violation of the prohibition. The
penalty is outright confiscation of the carabao or carabeef being transported, to be meted out by
the executive authorities, usually the police only. In the Toribio Case, the statute was sustained
because the penalty prescribed was fine and imprisonment, to be imposed by the court after trial
and conviction of the accused. Under the challenged measure, significantly, no such trial is
prescribed, and the property being transported is immediately impounded by the police and
declared, by the measure itself, as forfeited to the government.
In the instant case, the carabaos were arbitrarily confiscated by the police station commander,
were returned to the petitioner only after he had filed a complaint for recovery and given
a supersedeas bond of P12,000.00, which was ordered confiscated upon his failure to produce
the carabaos when ordered by the trial court. The executive order defined the prohibition,
convicted the petitioner and immediately imposed punishment, which was carried out forthright.
The measure struck at once and pounced upon the petitioner without giving him a chance to be
heard, thus denying him the centuries-old guaranty of elementary fair play.
It has already been remarked that there are occasions when notice and hearing may be validly
dispensed with notwithstanding the usual requirement for these minimum guarantees of due
process. It is also conceded that summary action may be validly taken in administrative
proceedings as procedural due process is not necessarily judicial only. 20 In the exceptional cases
accepted, however. there is a justification for the omission of the right to a previous hearing, to
wit, the immediacy of the problem sought to be corrected and the urgency of the need to correct
it.
In the case before us, there was no such pressure of time or action calling for the petitioner's
peremptory treatment. The properties involved were not even inimical per se as to require their
instant destruction. There certainly was no reason why the offense prohibited by the executive
order should not have been proved first in a court of justice, with the accused being accorded all
the rights safeguarded to him under the Constitution. Considering that, as we held in Pesigan v.
Angeles, 21 Executive Order No. 626-A is penal in nature, the violation thereof should have been
pronounced not by the police only but by a court of justice, which alone would have had the
authority to impose the prescribed penalty, and only after trial and conviction of the accused.
We also mark, on top of all this, the questionable manner of the disposition of the confiscated
property as prescribed in the questioned executive order. It is there authorized that the seized
property shall "be distributed to charitable institutions and other similar institutions as the
Chairman of the National Meat Inspection Commissionmay see fit, in the case of carabeef, and to
deserving farmers through dispersal as the Director of Animal Industrymay see fit, in the case of
carabaos." (Emphasis supplied.) The phrase "may see fit" is an extremely generous and
dangerous condition, if condition it is. It is laden with perilous opportunities for partiality and
abuse, and even corruption. One searches in vain for the usual standard and the reasonable
guidelines, or better still, the limitations that the said officers must observe when they make their
distribution. There is none. Their options are apparently boundless. Who shall be the fortunate
beneficiaries of their generosity and by what criteria shall they be chosen? Only the officers
named can supply the answer, they and they alone may choose the grantee as they see fit, and in
their own exclusive discretion. Definitely, there is here a "roving commission," a wide and
sweeping authority that is not "canalized within banks that keep it from overflowing," in short, a
clearly profligate and therefore invalid delegation of legislative powers.
To sum up then, we find that the challenged measure is an invalid exercise of the police power
because the method employed to conserve the carabaos is not reasonably necessary to the
purpose of the law and, worse, is unduly oppressive. Due process is violated because the owner
of the property confiscated is denied the right to be heard in his defense and is immediately
condemned and punished. The conferment on the administrative authorities of the power to
adjudge the guilt of the supposed offender is a clear encroachment on judicial functions and
militates against the doctrine of separation of powers. There is, finally, also an invalid delegation
of legislative powers to the officers mentioned therein who are granted unlimited discretion in
the distribution of the properties arbitrarily taken. For these reasons, we hereby declare
Executive Order No. 626-A unconstitutional.
We agree with the respondent court, however, that the police station commander who confiscated
the petitioner's carabaos is not liable in damages for enforcing the executive order in accordance
with its mandate. The law was at that time presumptively valid, and it was his obligation, as a
member of the police, to enforce it. It would have been impertinent of him, being a mere
subordinate of the President, to declare the executive order unconstitutional and, on his own
responsibility alone, refuse to execute it. Even the trial court, in fact, and the Court of Appeals
itself did not feel they had the competence, for all their superior authority, to question the order
we now annul.
The Court notes that if the petitioner had not seen fit to assert and protect his rights as he saw
them, this case would never have reached us and the taking of his property under the challenged
measure would have become afait accompli despite its invalidity. We commend him for his spirit.
Without the present challenge, the matter would have ended in that pump boat in Masbate and
another violation of the Constitution, for all its obviousness, would have been perpetrated,
allowed without protest, and soon forgotten in the limbo of relinquished rights.
The strength of democracy lies not in the rights it guarantees but in the courage of the people to
invoke them whenever they are ignored or violated. Rights are but weapons on the wall if, like
expensive tapestry, all they do is embellish and impress. Rights, as weapons, must be a promise
of protection. They become truly meaningful, and fulfill the role assigned to them in the free
society, if they are kept bright and sharp with use by those who are not afraid to assert them.
WHEREFORE, Executive Order No. 626-A is hereby declared unconstitutional. Except as
affirmed above, the decision of the Court of Appeals is reversed. The supersedeas bond is
cancelled and the amount thereof is ordered restored to the petitioner. No costs.
SO ORDERED.
Teehankee, C.J., Yap, Fernan, Narvasa, Gutierrez, Jr., Paras, Gancayco, Padilla Bidin
Sarmiento and Cortes, JJ., concur.
Melencio-Herrera and Feliciano, JJ., are on leave.

SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. 78164
July 31, 1987
TERESITA TABLARIN, MA, LUZ CIRIACO, MA NIMFA B. ROVIRA, EVANGELINA

S. LABAO, in their behalf and in behalf of applicants for admission into the Medical
Colleges during the school year 1987-88 and future years who have not taken or
successfully hurdled tile National Medical Admission Test (NMAT).petitioners,
vs.
THE HONORABLE JUDGE ANGELINA S. GUTIERREZ, Presiding Judge of Branch
XXXVII of the Regional Trial Court of the National Capital Judicial Region with seat at
Manila, THE HONORABLE SECRETARY LOURDES QUISUMBING, in her capacity as
Chairman of the BOARD OF MEDICAL EDUCATION, and THE CENTER FOR
EDUCATIONAL MEASUREMENT (CEM), respondents.
FELICIANO, J.:
The petitioners sought admission into colleges or schools of medicine for the school year 19871988. However, the petitioners either did not take or did not successfully take the National
Medical Admission Test (NMAT) required by the Board of Medical Education, one of the public
respondents, and administered by the private respondent, the Center for Educational
Measurement (CEM).
On 5 March 1987, the petitioners filed with the Regional Trial Court, National Capital Judicial
Region, a Petition for Declaratory Judgment and Prohibition with a prayer for Temporary
Restraining Order and Preliminary Injunction. The petitioners sought to enjoin the Secretary of
Education, Culture and Sports, the Board of Medical Education and the Center for Educational
Measurement from enforcing Section 5 (a) and (f) of Republic Act No. 2382, as amended, and
MECS Order No. 52, series of 1985, dated 23 August 1985 and from requiring the taking and
passing of the NMAT as a condition for securing certificates of eligibility for admission, from
proceeding with accepting applications for taking the NMAT and from administering the NMAT
as scheduled on 26 April 1987 and in the future. After hearing on the petition for issuance of
preliminary injunction, the trial court denied said petition on 20 April 1987. The NMAT was
conducted and administered as previously scheduled.
Petitioners accordingly filed this Special Civil Action for certiorari with this Court to set aside
the Order of the respondent judge denying the petition for issuance of a writ of preliminary
injunction.
Republic Act 2382, as amended by Republic Acts Nos. 4224 and 5946, known as the "Medical
Act of 1959" defines its basic objectives in the following manner:
Section 1. Objectives. This Act provides for and shall govern (a) the standardization
and regulation of medical education (b) the examination for registration of physicians;
and (c) the supervision, control and regulation of the practice of medicine in the
Philippines. (Underscoring supplied)
The statute, among other things, created a Board of Medical Education which is composed of (a)
the Secretary of Education, Culture and Sports or his duly authorized representative, as
Chairman; (b) the Secretary of Health or his duly authorized representative; (c) the Director of
Higher Education or his duly authorized representative; (d) the Chairman of the Medical Board
or his duly authorized representative; (e) a representative of the Philippine Medical Association;
(f) the Dean of the College of Medicine, University of the Philippines; (g) a representative of the
Council of Deans of Philippine Medical Schools; and (h) a representative of the Association of
Philippine Medical Colleges, as members. The functions of the Board of Medical Education
specified in Section 5 of the statute include the following:
(a) To determine and prescribe equirements for admission into a recognized college of
medicine;
(b) To determine and prescribe requirements for minimum physical facilities of colleges
of medicine, to wit: buildings, including hospitals, equipment and supplies, apparatus,
instruments, appliances, laboratories, bed capacity for instruction purposes, operating and
delivery rooms, facilities for outpatient services, and others, used for didactic and
practical instruction in accordance with modern trends;
(c) To determine and prescribe the minimum number and minimum qualifications of
teaching personnel, including student-teachers ratio;
(d) To determine and prescribe the minimum required curriculum leading to the degree of
Doctor of Medicine;
(e) To authorize the implementation of experimental medical curriculum in a medical
school that has exceptional faculty and instrumental facilities. Such an experimental
curriculum may prescribe admission and graduation requirements other than those
prescribed in this Act; Provided, That only exceptional students shall be enrolled in the
experimental curriculum;
(f) To accept applications for certification for admission to a medical school and keep a
register of those issued said certificate; and to collect from said applicants the amount of
twenty-five pesos each which shall accrue to the operating fund of the Board of Medical
Education;
(g) To select, determine and approve hospitals or some departments of the hospitals for
training which comply with the minimum specific physical facilities as provided in
subparagraph (b) hereof; and
(h) To promulgate and prescribe and enforce the necessary rules and regulations for the
proper implementation of the foregoing functions. (Emphasis supplied)
Section 7 prescribes certain minimum requirements for applicants to medical schools:
Admission requirements. The medical college may admit any student who has not been
convicted by any court of competent jurisdiction of any offense involving moral turpitude
and who presents (a) a record of completion of a bachelor's degree in science or arts;
(b) a certificate of eligibility for entrance to a medical school from the Board of Medical
Education; (c) a certificate of good moral character issued by two former professors in
the college of liberal arts; and (d) birth certificate. Nothing in this act shall be construed
to inhibit any college of medicine from establishing, in addition to the preceding, other
entrance requirements that may be deemed admissible.
xxx
xxx
x x x (Emphasis supplied)
MECS Order No. 52, s. 1985, issued by the then Minister of Education, Culture and Sports and
dated 23 August 1985, established a uniform admission test called the National Medical
Admission Test (NMAT) as an additional requirement for issuance of a certificate of eligibility
for admission into medical schools of the Philippines, beginning with the school year 1986-1987.
This Order goes on to state that:
2. The NMAT, an aptitude test, is considered as an instrument toward upgrading the

selection of applicants for admission into the medical schools and its calculated to
improve the quality of medical education in the country. The cutoff score for the
successful applicants, based on the scores on the NMAT, shall be determined every year
by the Board of Medical Education after consultation with the Association of Philippine
Medical Colleges. The NMAT rating of each applicant, together with the other admission
requirements as presently called for under existing rules, shall serve as a basis for the
issuance of the prescribed certificate of elegibility for admission into the medical
colleges.
3. Subject to the prior approval of the Board of Medical Education, each medical college
may give other tests for applicants who have been issued a corresponding certificate of
eligibility for admission that will yield information on other aspects of the applicant's
personality to complement the information derived from the NMAT.
xxx
xxx
xxx
8. No applicant shall be issued the requisite Certificate of Eligibility for Admission

(CEA), or admitted for enrollment as first year student in any medical college, beginning
the school year, 1986-87, without the required NMAT qualification as called for under
this Order. (Underscoring supplied)
Pursuant to MECS Order No. 52, s. 1985, the private respondent Center conducted NMATs for
entrance to medical colleges during the school year 1986-1987. In December 1986 and in April
1987, respondent Center conducted the NMATs for admission to medical colleges during the
school year 1987.1988.1avvphi1
Petitioners raise the question of whether or not a writ of preliminary injunction may be issued to
enjoin the enforcement of Section 5 (a) and (f) of Republic Act No. 2382, as amended, and
MECS Order No. 52, s. 1985, pending resolution of the issue of constitutionality of the assailed
statute and administrative order. We regard this issue as entirely peripheral in nature. It scarcely
needs documentation that a court would issue a writ of preliminary injunction only when the
petitioner assailing a statute or administrative order has made out a case of unconstitutionality
strong enough to overcome, in the mind of the judge, the presumption of constitutionality, aside
from showing a clear legal right to the remedy sought. The fundamental issue is of course the
constitutionality of the statute or order assailed.
1. The petitioners invoke a number of provisions of the 1987 Constitution which are, in their
assertion, violated by the continued implementation of Section 5 (a) and (f) of Republic Act
2381, as amended, and MECS Order No. 52, s. 1985. The provisions invoked read as follows:
(a) Article 11, Section 11: "The state values the dignity of every human person and
guarantees full respect of human rights. "
(b) ArticleII, Section l3: "The State recognizes the vital role of the youth in nation
building and shall promote and protect their physical, moral, spiritual, intellectual and
social well being. It shall inculcate in the youth patriotism and nationalism, and
encourage their involvement in public and civic affairs."
(c) Article II, Section 17: "The State shall give priority to education, science and
technology, arts, culture and sports to foster patriotism and nationalism, accelerate social
progress and to promote total human liberation and development. "
(d) Article XIV, Section l: "The State shall protect and promote the right of all citizens to
quality education at all levels and take appropriate steps to make such education
accessible to all. "
(e) Article XIV, Section 5 (3): "Every citizen has a right to select a profession or course of
study, subject to fair, reasonable and equitable admission and academic requirements."
Article II of the 1987 Constitution sets forth in its second half certain "State policies" which the
government is enjoined to pursue and promote. The petitioners here have not seriously
undertaken to demonstrate to what extent or in what manner the statute and the administrative
order they assail collide with the State policies embodied in Sections 11, 13 and 17. They have
not, in other words, discharged the burden of proof which lies upon them. This burden is heavy
enough where the constitutional provision invoked is relatively specific, rather than abstract, in
character and cast in behavioral or operational terms. That burden of proof becomes of necessity
heavier where the constitutional provision invoked is cast, as the second portion of Article II is
cast, in language descriptive of basic policies, or more precisely, of basic objectives of State
policy and therefore highly generalized in tenor. The petitioners have not made their case, even
a prima facie case, and we are not compelled to speculate and to imagine how the legislation and
regulation impugned as unconstitutional could possibly offend the constitutional provisions
pointed to by the petitioners.
Turning to Article XIV, Section 1, of the 1987 Constitution, we note that once more petitioners
have failed to demonstrate that the statute and regulation they assail in fact clash with that
provision. On the contrary we may note-in anticipation of discussion infra that the statute and
the regulation which petitioners attack are in fact designed to promote "quality education" at the
level of professional schools. When one reads Section 1 in relation to Section 5 (3) of Article
XIV as one must one cannot but note that the latter phrase of Section 1 is not to be read with
absolute literalness. The State is not really enjoined to take appropriate steps to make quality
education " accessible to all who might for any number of reasons wish to enroll in a
professional school but rather merely to make such education accessible to all who qualify under
"fair, reasonable and equitable admission and academic requirements. "
2. In the trial court, petitioners had made the argument that Section 5 (a) and (f) of Republic Act
No. 2382, as amended, offend against the constitutional principle which forbids the undue
delegation of legislative power, by failing to establish the necessary standard to be followed by
the delegate, the Board of Medical Education. The general principle of non-delegation of
legislative power, which both flows from the reinforces the more fundamental rule of the
separation and allocation of powers among the three great departments of government, 1must be
applied with circumspection in respect of statutes which like the Medical Act of 1959, deal with
subjects as obviously complex and technical as medical education and the practice of medicine in
our present day world. Mr. Justice Laurel stressed this point 47 years ago in Pangasinan
Transportation Co., Inc. vs. The Public Service Commission:2
One thing, however, is apparent in the development of the principle of separation of
powers and that is that the maxim of delegatus non potest delegare or delegate potestas
non potest delegare, adopted this practice (Delegibus et Consuetudiniis Anglia edited by
G.E. Woodbine, Yale University Press, 1922, Vol. 2, p. 167) but which is also recognized
in principle in the Roman Law (d. 17.18.3) has been made to adapt itself to the
complexities of modern government, giving rise to the adoption, within certain limits of
the principle of "subordinate legislation," not only in the United States and England but
in practically all modern governments. (People vs. Rosenthal and Osmena [68 Phil. 318,
1939]. Accordingly, with the growing complexity of modern life, the multiplication of the
subjects of governmental regulation and the increased difficulty of administering the
laws, there is a constantly growing tendency toward the delegation of greater power by
the legislature, and toward the approval of the practice by the courts." 3
The standards set for subordinate legislation in the exercise of rule making authority by an
administrative agency like the Board of Medical Education are necessarily broad and highly
abstract. As explained by then Mr. Justice Fernando in Edu v. Ericta4
The standard may be either expressed or implied. If the former, the non-delegation
objection is easily met.The standard though does not have to be spelled out specifically.
It could be implied from the policy and purpose of the act considered as a whole. In the
Reflector Law, clearly the legislative objective is public safety. What is sought to be
attained as in Calalang v. Williams is "safe transit upon the roads. 5
We believe and so hold that the necessary standards are set forth in Section 1 of the 1959
Medical Act: "the standardization and regulation of medical education" and in Section 5 (a) and 7
of the same Act, the body of the statute itself, and that these considered together are sufficient
compliance with the requirements of the non-delegation principle.
3. The petitioners also urge that the NMAT prescribed in MECS Order No. 52, s. 1985, is an
"unfair, unreasonable and inequitable requirement," which results in a denial of due process.
Again, petitioners have failed to specify just what factors or features of the NMAT render it
"unfair" and "unreasonable" or "inequitable." They appear to suggest that passing the NMAT is
an unnecessary requirement when added on top of the admission requirements set out in Section
7 of the Medical Act of 1959, and other admission requirements established by internal
regulations of the various medical schools, public or private. Petitioners arguments thus appear to
relate to utility and wisdom or desirability of the NMAT requirement. But constitutionality is
essentially a question of power or authority: this Court has neither commission or competence to
pass upon questions of the desirability or wisdom or utility of legislation or administrative
regulation. Those questions must be address to the political departments of the government not to
the courts.
There is another reason why the petitioners' arguments must fail: the legislative and
administrative provisions impugned by them constitute, to the mind of the Court, a valid exercise
of the police power of the state. The police power, it is commonplace learning, is the pervasive
and non-waivable power and authority of the sovereign to secure and promote an the important
interests and needs in a word, the public order of the general community.6 An important
component of that public order is the health and physical safety and well being of the population,
the securing of which no one can deny is a legitimate objective of governmental effort and
regulation.7
Perhaps the only issue that needs some consideration is whether there is some reasonable relation
between the prescribing of passing the NMAT as a condition for admission to medical school on
the one hand, and the securing of the health and safety of the general community, on the other
hand. This question is perhaps most usefully approached by recalling that the regulation of the
practice of medicine in all its branches has long been recognized as a reasonable method of
protecting the health and safety of the public.8 That the power to regulate and control the practice
of medicine includes the power to regulate admission to the ranks of those authorized to practice
medicine, is also well recognized. thus, legislation and administrative regulations requiring those
who wish to practice medicine first to take and pass medical board examinations have long ago
been recognized as valid exercises of governmental power.9 Similarly, the establishment of
minimum medical educational requirements i.e., the completion of prescribed courses in a
recognized medical school for admission to the medical profession, has also been sustained as
a legitimate exercise of the regulatory authority of the state. 10What we have before us in the
instant case is closely related: the regulation of access to medical schools. MECS Order No. 52,
s. 1985, as noted earlier, articulates the rationale of regulation of this type: the improvement of
the professional and technical quality of the graduates of medical schools, by upgrading the
quality of those admitted to the student body of the medical schools. That upgrading is sought by
selectivity in the process of admission, selectivity consisting, among other things, of limiting
admission to those who exhibit in the required degree the aptitude for medical studies and
eventually for medical practice. The need to maintain, and the difficulties of maintaining, high
standards in our professional schools in general, and medical schools in particular, in the current
stage of our social and economic development, are widely known.
We believe that the government is entitled to prescribe an admission test like the NMAT as a
means for achieving its stated objective of "upgrading the selection of applicants into [our]
medical schools" and of "improv[ing] the quality of medical education in the country." Given the
widespread use today of such admission tests in, for instance, medical schools in the United
States of America (the Medical College Admission Test [MCAT] 11 and quite probably in other
countries with far more developed educational resources than our own, and taking into account
the failure or inability of the petitioners to even attempt to prove otherwise, we are entitled to
hold that the NMAT is reasonably related to the securing of the ultimate end of legislation and
regulation in this area. That end, it is useful to recall, is the protection of the public from the
potentially deadly effects of incompetence and ignorance in those who would undertake to treat
our bodies and minds for disease or trauma.
4. Petitioners have contended, finally, that MECS Order No. 52, s. 1985, is in conflict with the
equal protection clause of the Constitution. More specifically, petitioners assert that that portion
of the MECS Order which provides that
the cutoff score for the successful applicants, based on the scores on the NMAT, shall be
determined every-year by the Board of Medical 11 Education after consultation with the
Association of Philippine Medical Colleges. (Emphasis supplied)
infringes the requirements of equal protection. They assert, in other words, that students seeking
admission during a given school year, e.g., 1987-1988, when subjected to a different cutoff score
than that established for an, e.g., earlier school year, are discriminated against and that this
renders the MECS Order "arbitrary and capricious." The force of this argument is more apparent
than real. Different cutoff scores for different school years may be dictated by differing
conditions obtaining during those years. Thus, the appropriate cutoff score for a given year may
be a function of such factors as the number of students who have reached the cutoff score
established the preceding year; the number of places available in medical schools during the
current year; the average score attained during the current year; the level of difficulty of the test
given during the current year, and so forth. To establish a permanent and immutable cutoff score
regardless of changes in circumstances from year to year, may wen result in an unreasonable
rigidity. The above language in MECS Order No. 52, far from being arbitrary or capricious,
leaves the Board of Medical Education with the measure of flexibility needed to meet
circumstances as they change.
We conclude that prescribing the NMAT and requiring certain minimum scores therein as a
condition for admission to medical schools in the Philippines, do not constitute an
unconstitutional imposition.
WHEREFORE, the Petition for certiorari is DISMISSED and the Order of the respondent trial
court denying the petition for a writ of preliminary injunction is AFFIRMED. Costs against
petitioners.
SO ORDERED.
Teehankee, C.J., Yap, Fernan, Narvasa, Melencio-Herrera, Gutierrez, Jr., Cruz, Paras,
Gancayco, Padilla, Bidin, Sarmiento and Cortes, JJ., concur.

SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-23825
December 24, 1965
EMMANUEL PELAEZ, petitioner,

vs.
THE AUDITOR GENERAL, respondent.
Zulueta, Gonzales, Paculdo and Associates for petitioner.
Office of the Solicitor General for respondent.
CONCEPCION, J.:
During the period from September 4 to October 29, 1964 the President of the Philippines,
purporting to act pursuant to Section 68 of the Revised Administrative Code, issued Executive
Orders Nos. 93 to 121, 124 and 126 to 129; creating thirty-three (33) municipalities enumerated
in the margin.1 Soon after the date last mentioned, or on November 10, 1964 petitioner
Emmanuel Pelaez, as Vice President of the Philippines and as taxpayer, instituted the present
special civil action, for a writ of prohibition with preliminary injunction, against the Auditor
General, to restrain him, as well as his representatives and agents, from passing in audit any
expenditure of public funds in implementation of said executive orders and/or any disbursement
by said municipalities.
Petitioner alleges that said executive orders are null and void, upon the ground that said Section
68 has been impliedly repealed by Republic Act No. 2370 and constitutes an undue delegation of
legislative power. Respondent maintains the contrary view and avers that the present action is
premature and that not all proper parties referring to the officials of the new political
subdivisions in question have been impleaded. Subsequently, the mayors of several
municipalities adversely affected by the aforementioned executive orders because the latter
have taken away from the former the barrios composing the new political subdivisions
intervened in the case. Moreover, Attorneys Enrique M. Fernando and Emma QuisumbingFernando were allowed to and did appear as amici curiae.
The third paragraph of Section 3 of Republic Act No. 2370, reads:
Barrios shall not be created or their boundaries altered nor their names changed except
under the provisions of this Act or by Act of Congress.
Pursuant to the first two (2) paragraphs of the same Section 3:
All barrios existing at the time of the passage of this Act shall come under the provisions
hereof.
Upon petition of a majority of the voters in the areas affected, a new barrio may be
created or the name of an existing one may be changed by the provincial board of the
province, upon recommendation of the council of the municipality or municipalities in
which the proposed barrio is stipulated. The recommendation of the municipal council
shall be embodied in a resolution approved by at least two-thirds of the entire
membership of the said council: Provided, however, That no new barrio may be created if
its population is less than five hundred persons.
Hence, since January 1, 1960, when Republic Act No. 2370 became effective, barrios may "not
be created or their boundaries altered nor their names changed" except by Act of Congress or of
the corresponding provincial board "upon petition of a majority of the voters in the areas
affected" and the "recommendation of the council of the municipality or municipalities in which
the proposed barrio is situated." Petitioner argues, accordingly: "If the President, under this new
law, cannot even create a barrio, can he create a municipality which is composed of
several barrios, since barrios are units of municipalities?"
Respondent answers in the affirmative, upon the theory that a new municipality can be created
without creating new barrios, such as, by placing old barrios under the jurisdiction of the new
municipality. This theory overlooks, however, the main import of the petitioner's argument,
which is that the statutory denial of the presidential authority to create a new barrio implies a
negation of the bigger power to create municipalities, each of which consists of several barrios.
The cogency and force of this argument is too obvious to be denied or even questioned. Founded
upon logic and experience, it cannot be offset except by a clear manifestation of the intent of
Congress to the contrary, and no such manifestation, subsequent to the passage of Republic Act
No. 2379, has been brought to our attention.
Moreover, section 68 of the Revised Administrative Code, upon which the disputed executive
orders are based, provides:
The (Governor-General) President of the Philippines may by executive order define the
boundary, or boundaries, of any province, subprovince, municipality, [township]
municipal district, or other political subdivision, and increase or diminish the territory
comprised therein, may divide any province into one or more subprovinces, separate any
political division other than a province, into such portions as may be required, merge any
of such subdivisions or portions with another, name any new subdivision so created, and
may change the seat of government within any subdivision to such place therein as the
public welfare may require: Provided, That the authorization of the (Philippine
Legislature) Congress of the Philippines shall first be obtained whenever the boundary of
any province or subprovince is to be defined or any province is to be divided into one or
more subprovinces. When action by the (Governor-General) President of the Philippines
in accordance herewith makes necessary a change of the territory under the jurisdiction of
any administrative officer or any judicial officer, the (Governor-General) President of the
Philippines, with the recommendation and advice of the head of the Department having
executive control of such officer, shall redistrict the territory of the several officers
affected and assign such officers to the new districts so formed.
Upon the changing of the limits of political divisions in pursuance of the foregoing
authority, an equitable distribution of the funds and obligations of the divisions thereby
affected shall be made in such manner as may be recommended by the (Insular Auditor)
Auditor General and approved by the (Governor-General) President of the Philippines.
Respondent alleges that the power of the President to create municipalities under this section
does not amount to an undue delegation of legislative power, relying upon Municipality of
Cardona vs. Municipality of Binagonan (36 Phil. 547), which, he claims, has settled it. Such
claim is untenable, for said case involved, not the creation of a new municipality, but a
mere transfer of territory from an already existing municipality (Cardona) to another
municipality (Binagonan), likewise, existing at the time of and prior to said transfer (See Gov't
of the P.I. ex rel. Municipality of Cardona vs. Municipality, of Binagonan [34 Phil. 518, 5195201) in consequence of the fixing and definition, pursuant to Act No. 1748, of the common
boundaries of two municipalities.
It is obvious, however, that, whereas the power to fix such common boundary, in order to avoid
or settle conflicts of jurisdiction between adjoining municipalities, may partake of
an administrative nature involving, as it does, the adoption of means and ways to carry into
effect the law creating said municipalities the authority to create municipal corporations is
essentially legislative in nature. In the language of other courts, it is "strictly a legislative
function" (State ex rel. Higgins vs. Aicklen, 119 S. 425, January 2, 1959) or "solely
and exclusively the exercise oflegislative power" (Udall vs. Severn, May 29, 1938, 79 P. 2d 347349). As the Supreme Court of Washington has put it (Territory ex rel. Kelly vs. Stewart,
February 13, 1890, 23 Pac. 405, 409), "municipal corporations are purely the creatures of
statutes."
Although1a Congress may delegate to another branch of the Government the power to fill in the
details in the execution, enforcement or administration of a law, it is essential, to forestall a
violation of the principle of separation of powers, that said law: (a) be complete in itself it
must set forth therein the policy to be executed, carried out or implemented by the delegate 2
and (b) fix a standard the limits of which are sufficiently determinate or determinable to
which the delegate must conform in the performance of his functions. 2aIndeed, without a
statutory declaration of policy, the delegate would in effect, make or formulate such policy,
which is the essence of every law; and, without the aforementioned standard, there would be no
means to determine, with reasonable certainty, whether the delegate has acted within or beyond
the scope of his authority.2b Hence, he could thereby arrogate upon himself the power, not only to
make the law, but, also and this is worse to unmake it, by adopting measures inconsistent
with the end sought to be attained by the Act of Congress, thus nullifying the principle of
separation of powers and the system of checks and balances, and, consequently, undermining the
very foundation of our Republican system.
Section 68 of the Revised Administrative Code does not meet these well settled requirements for
a valid delegation of the power to fix the details in the enforcement of a law. It does not
enunciate any policy to be carried out or implemented by the President. Neither does it give a
standard sufficiently precise to avoid the evil effects above referred to. In this connection, we do
not overlook the fact that, under the last clause of the first sentence of Section 68, the President:
... may change the seat of the government within any subdivision to such place therein as
the public welfare may require.
It is apparent, however, from the language of this clause, that the phrase "as the public welfare
may require" qualified, not the clauses preceding the one just quoted, but only the place to which
the seat of the government may be transferred. This fact becomes more apparent when we
consider that said Section 68 was originally Section 1 of Act No. 1748, 3 which provided that,
"whenever in the judgment of the Governor-General the public welfare requires, he may, by
executive order," effect the changes enumerated therein (as in said section 68), including the
change of the seat of the government "to such place ... as the public interest requires." The
opening statement of said Section 1 of Act No. 1748 which was not included in Section 68 of
the Revised Administrative Code governed the time at which, or the conditions under which,
the powers therein conferred could be exercised; whereas the last part of the first sentence of said
section referred exclusively to the place to which the seat of the government was to be
transferred.
At any rate, the conclusion would be the same, insofar as the case at bar is concerned, even if we
assumed that the phrase "as the public welfare may require," in said Section 68, qualifies all
other clauses thereof. It is true that in Calalang vs. Williams (70 Phil. 726) and People vs.
Rosenthal (68 Phil. 328), this Court had upheld "public welfare" and "public interest,"
respectively, as sufficient standards for a valid delegation of the authority to execute the law. But,
the doctrine laid down in these cases as all judicial pronouncements must be construed in
relation to the specific facts and issues involved therein, outside of which they do not constitute
precedents and have no binding effect.4 The law construed in the Calalang case conferred upon
the Director of Public Works, with the approval of the Secretary of Public Works and
Communications, the power to issue rules and regulations topromote safe transit upon national
roads and streets. Upon the other hand, the Rosenthal case referred to the authority of the Insular
Treasurer, under Act No. 2581, to issue and cancel certificates or permits for the
sale ofspeculative securities. Both cases involved grants to administrative officers of powers
related to the exercise of their administrative functions, calling for the determination of questions
of fact.
Such is not the nature of the powers dealt with in section 68. As above indicated, the creation of
municipalities, is not an administrative function, but one which is essentially and eminently
legislative in character. The question of whether or not "public interest" demands the exercise of
such power is not one of fact. it is "purely a legislativequestion "(Carolina-Virginia Coastal
Highway vs. Coastal Turnpike Authority, 74 S.E. 2d. 310-313, 315-318), or apolitical question
(Udall vs. Severn, 79 P. 2d. 347-349). As the Supreme Court of Wisconsin has aptly
characterized it, "the question as to whether incorporation is for the best interest of the
community in any case is emphatically a question of public policy and statecraft" (In re Village
of North Milwaukee, 67 N.W. 1033, 1035-1037).
For this reason, courts of justice have annulled, as constituting undue delegation of legislative
powers, state laws granting the judicial department, the power to determine whether certain
territories should be annexed to a particular municipality (Udall vs. Severn, supra, 258-359); or
vesting in a Commission the right to determine the plan and frame of government of proposed
villages and what functions shall be exercised by the same, although the powers and functions of
the village are specifically limited by statute (In re Municipal Charters, 86 Atl. 307-308); or
conferring upon courts the authority to declare a given town or village incorporated, and
designate its metes and bounds, upon petition of a majority of the taxable inhabitants thereof,
setting forth the area desired to be included in such village (Territory ex rel Kelly vs. Stewart, 23
Pac. 405-409); or authorizing the territory of a town, containing a given area and population, to
be incorporated as a town, on certain steps being taken by the inhabitants thereof and on certain
determination by a court and subsequent vote of the inhabitants in favor thereof, insofar as the
court is allowed to determine whether the lands embraced in the petition "ought justly" to be
included in the village, and whether the interest of the inhabitants will be promoted by such
incorporation, and to enlarge and diminish the boundaries of the proposed village "as justice may
require" (In re Villages of North Milwaukee, 67 N.W. 1035-1037); or creating a Municipal Board
of Control which shall determine whether or not the laying out, construction or operation of a toll
road is in the "public interest" and whether the requirements of the law had been complied with,
in which case the board shall enter an order creating a municipal corporation and fixing the name
of the same (Carolina-Virginia Coastal Highway vs. Coastal Turnpike Authority, 74 S.E. 2d.
310).
Insofar as the validity of a delegation of power by Congress to the President is concerned, the
case of Schechter Poultry Corporation vs. U.S. (79 L. Ed. 1570) is quite relevant to the one at
bar. The Schechter case involved the constitutionality of Section 3 of the National Industrial
Recovery Act authorizing the President of the United States to approve "codes of fair
competition" submitted to him by one or more trade or industrial associations or corporations
which "impose no inequitable restrictions on admission to membership therein and are truly
representative," provided that such codes are not designed "to promote monopolies or to
eliminate or oppress small enterprises and will not operate to discriminate against them, and will
tend to effectuate the policy" of said Act. The Federal Supreme Court held:
To summarize and conclude upon this point: Sec. 3 of the Recovery Act is without
precedent. It supplies no standards for any trade, industry or activity. It does not
undertake to prescribe rules of conduct to be applied to particular states of fact
determined by appropriate administrative procedure. Instead of prescribing rules of
conduct, it authorizes the making of codes to prescribe them. For that legislative
undertaking, Sec. 3 sets up no standards, aside from the statement of the general aims of
rehabilitation, correction and expansion described in Sec. 1. In view of the scope of that
broad declaration, and of the nature of the few restrictions that are imposed, the discretion
of the President in approving or prescribing codes, and thus enacting laws for the
government of trade and industry throughout the country, is virtually unfettered. We think
that the code making authority thus conferred is an unconstitutional delegation of
legislative power.
If the term "unfair competition" is so broad as to vest in the President a discretion that is
"virtually unfettered." and, consequently, tantamount to a delegation of legislative power, it is
obvious that "public welfare," which has even a broader connotation, leads to the same result. In
fact, if the validity of the delegation of powers made in Section 68 were upheld, there would no
longer be any legal impediment to a statutory grant of authority to the President to do anything
which, in his opinion, may be required by public welfare or public interest. Such grant of
authority would be a virtual abdication of the powers of Congress in favor of the Executive, and
would bring about a total collapse of the democratic system established by our Constitution,
which it is the special duty and privilege of this Court to uphold.
It may not be amiss to note that the executive orders in question were issued after the legislative
bills for the creation of the municipalities involved in this case had failed to pass Congress. A
better proof of the fact that the issuance of said executive orders entails the exercise of purely
legislative functions can hardly be given.
Again, Section 10 (1) of Article VII of our fundamental law ordains:
The President shall have control of all the executive departments, bureaus, or offices,
exercise general supervision over all local governments as may be provided by law, and
take care that the laws be faithfully executed.
The power of control under this provision implies the right of the President to interfere in the
exercise of such discretion as may be vested by law in the officers of the executive departments,
bureaus, or offices of the national government, as well as to act in lieu of such officers. This
power is denied by the Constitution to the Executive, insofar as local governments are
concerned. With respect to the latter, the fundamental law permits him to wield no more
authority than that of checking whether said local governments or the officers thereof perform
their duties as provided by statutory enactments. Hence, the President cannot interfere with local
governments, so long as the same or its officers act Within the scope of their authority. He may
not enact an ordinance which the municipal council has failed or refused to pass, even if it had
thereby violated a duty imposed thereto by law, although he may see to it that the corresponding
provincial officials take appropriate disciplinary action therefor. Neither may he vote, set aside or
annul an ordinance passed by said council within the scope of its jurisdiction, no matter how
patently unwise it may be. He may not even suspend an elective official of a regular municipality
or take any disciplinary action against him, except on appeal from a decision of the
corresponding provincial board.5
Upon the other hand if the President could create a municipality, he could, in effect, remove any
of its officials, by creating a new municipality and including therein the barrio in which the
official concerned resides, for his office would thereby become vacant. 6 Thus, by merely
brandishing the power to create a new municipality (if he had it), without actually creating it, he
could compel local officials to submit to his dictation, thereby, in effect, exercising over them the
power of control denied to him by the Constitution.
Then, also, the power of control of the President over executive departments, bureaus or offices
implies no morethan the authority to assume directly the functions thereof or to interfere in the
exercise of discretion by its officials. Manifestly, such control does not include the authority
either to abolish an executive department or bureau, or to create a new one. As a consequence,
the alleged power of the President to create municipal corporations would necessarily connote
the exercise by him of an authority even greater than that of control which he has over the
executive departments, bureaus or offices. In other words, Section 68 of the Revised
Administrative Code does not merely fail to comply with the constitutional mandate above
quoted. Instead of giving the President less power over local governments than that vested in him
over the executive departments, bureaus or offices, it reverses the process and does the exact
opposite, by conferring upon him more power over municipal corporations than that which he
has over said executive departments, bureaus or offices.
In short, even if it did entail an undue delegation of legislative powers, as it certainly does, said
Section 68, as part of the Revised Administrative Code, approved on March 10, 1917, must be
deemed repealed by the subsequent adoption of the Constitution, in 1935, which is utterly
incompatible and inconsistent with said statutory enactment.7
There are only two (2) other points left for consideration, namely, respondent's claim (a) that "not
all the proper parties" referring to the officers of the newly created municipalities "have
been impleaded in this case," and (b) that "the present petition is premature."
As regards the first point, suffice it to say that the records do not show, and the parties do not
claim, that the officers of any of said municipalities have been appointed or elected and assumed
office. At any rate, the Solicitor General, who has appeared on behalf of respondent Auditor
General, is the officer authorized by law "to act and represent the Government of the Philippines,
its offices and agents, in any official investigation, proceeding or matter requiring the services of
a lawyer" (Section 1661, Revised Administrative Code), and, in connection with the creation of
the aforementioned municipalities, which involves a political, not proprietary, function, said
local officials, if any, are mere agents or representatives of the national government. Their
interest in the case at bar has, accordingly, been, in effect, duly represented.8
With respect to the second point, respondent alleges that he has not as yet acted on any of the
executive order & in question and has not intimated how he would act in connection therewith. It
is, however, a matter of common, public knowledge, subject to judicial cognizance, that the
President has, for many years, issued executive orders creating municipal corporations and that
the same have been organized and in actual operation, thus indicating, without peradventure of
doubt, that the expenditures incidental thereto have been sanctioned, approved or passed in audit
by the General Auditing Office and its officials. There is no reason to believe, therefore, that
respondent would adopt a different policy as regards the new municipalities involved in this case,
in the absence of an allegation to such effect, and none has been made by him.
WHEREFORE, the Executive Orders in question are hereby declared null and void ab initio and
the respondent permanently restrained from passing in audit any expenditure of public funds in
implementation of said Executive Orders or any disbursement by the municipalities above
referred to. It is so ordered.
Bengzon, C.J., Bautista Angelo, Reyes, J.B.L., Barrera and Dizon, JJ., concur.
Zaldivar, J., took no part.
Separate Opinions
BENGZON, J.P., J., concurring and dissenting:
A sign of progress in a developing nation is the rise of new municipalities. Fostering their rapid
growth has long been the aim pursued by all three branches of our Government.
So it was that the Governor-General during the time of the Jones Law was given authority by the
Legislature (Act No. 1748) to act upon certain details with respect to said local governments,
such as fixing of boundaries, subdivisions and mergers. And the Supreme Court, within the
framework of the Jones Law, ruled in 1917 that the execution or implementation of such details,
did not entail abdication of legislative power (Government vs. Municipality of Binagonan, 34
Phil. 518; Municipality of Cardona vs. Municipality of Binagonan, 36 Phil. 547). Subsequently,
Act No. 1748's aforesaid statutory authorization was embodied in Section 68 of the Revised
Administrative Code. And Chief Executives since then up to the present continued to avail of
said provision, time and again invoking it to issue executive orders providing for the creation of
municipalities.
From September 4, 1964 to October 29, 1964 the President of the Philippines issued executive
orders to create thirty-three municipalities pursuant to Section 68 of the Revised Administrative
Code. Public funds thereby stood to be disbursed in implementation of said executive orders.
Suing as private citizen and taxpayer, Vice President Emmanuel Pelaez filed in this Court a
petition for prohibition with preliminary injunction against the Auditor General. It seeks to
restrain the respondent or any person acting in his behalf, from passing in audit any expenditure
of public funds in implementation of the executive orders aforementioned.
Petitioner contends that the President has no power to create a municipality by executive order. It
is argued that Section 68 of the Revised Administrative Code of 1917, so far as it purports to
grant any such power, is invalid or, at the least, already repealed, in light of the Philippine
Constitution and Republic Act 2370 (The Barrio Charter).
Section 68 is again reproduced hereunder for convenience:
SEC. 68. General authority of [Governor-General) President of the Philippines to fix
boundaries and make new subdivisions. The [Governor-General] President of the
Philippines may by executive order define the boundary, or boundaries, of any province,
subprovince, municipality, [township] municipal district, or other political subdivision,
and increase or diminish the territory comprised therein, may divide any province into
one or more subprovinces, separate any political division other than a province, into such
portions as may be required, merge any of such subdivisions or portions with another,
name any new subdivision so created, and may change the seat of government within any
subdivision to such place therein as the public welfare may require: Provided, That the
authorization of the [Philippine Legislature] Congress of the Philippines shall first be
obtained whenever the boundary of any province or subprovince is to be defined or any
province is to be divided into one or more subprovinces. When action by the [GovernorGeneral] President of the Philippines in accordance herewith makes necessary a change
of the territory under the jurisdiction of any administrative officer or any judicial officer,
the [Governor-General] President of the Philippines, with the recommendation and advice
of the head of the Department having executive control of such officer, shall redistrict the
territory of the several officers to the new districts so formed.
Upon the changing of the limits of political divisions in pursuance of the foregoing
authority, an equitable distribution of the funds and obligations of the divisions thereby
affected shall be made in such manner as may be recommended by the [Insular Auditor]
Auditor General and approved by the [Governor-General] President of the Philippines.
From such working I believe that power to create a municipality is included: to "separate any
political division other than a province, into such portions as may be required, merge any such
subdivisions or portions with another, name any new subdivision so created." The issue,
however, is whether the legislature can validly delegate to the Executive such power.
The power to create a municipality is legislative in character. American authorities have therefore
favored the view that it cannot be delegated; that what is delegable is not the power to create
municipalities but only the power to determine the existence of facts under which creation of a
municipality will result (37 Am. Jur. 628).
The test is said to lie in whether the statute allows any discretion on the delegate as to whether
the municipal corporation should be created. If so, there is an attempted delegation of legislative
power and the statute is invalid (Ibid.). Now Section 68 no doubt gives the President such
discretion, since it says that the President "may by executive order" exercise the powers therein
granted. Furthermore, Section 5 of the same Code states:
SEC. 5. Exercise of administrative discretion The exercise of the permissive powers of
all executive or administrative officers and bodies is based upon discretion, and when
such officer or body is given authority to do any act but not required to do such act, the
doing of the same shall be dependent on a sound discretion to be exercised for the good
of the service and benefit of the public, whether so expressed in the statute giving the
authority or not.
Under the prevailing rule in the United States and Section 68 is of American origin the
provision in question would be an invalid attempt to delegate purely legislative powers, contrary
to the principle of separation of powers.
It is very pertinent that Section 68 should be considered with the stream of history in mind. A
proper knowledge of the past is the only adequate background for the present. Section 68 was
adopted half a century ago. Political change, two world wars, the recognition of our
independence and rightful place in the family of nations, have since taken place. In 1917 the
Philippines had for its Organic Act the Jones Law. And under the setup ordained therein no strict
separation of powers was adhered to. Consequently, Section 68 was not constitutionally
objectionable at the time of its enactment.
The advent of the Philippine Constitution in 1935 however altered the situation. For not only was
separation of powers strictly ordained, except only in specific instances therein provided, but the
power of the Chief Executive over local governments suffered an explicit reduction.
Formerly, Section 21 of the Jones Law provided that the Governor-General "shall have general
supervision and control of all the departments and bureaus of the government in the Philippine
Islands." Now Section 10 (1), Article VII of the Philippine Constitution provides: "The President
shall have control of all the executive departments, bureaus, or offices, exercise general
supervision over all local governments as may be provided by law, and take care that the laws be
faithfully executed.
In short, the power of control over local governments had now been taken away from the Chief
Executive. Again, to fully understand the significance of this provision, one must trace its
development and growth.
As early as April 7, 1900 President McKinley of the United States, in his Instructions to the
Second Philippine Commission, laid down the policy that our municipal governments should be
"subject to the least degree of supervision and control" on the part of the national government.
Said supervision and control was to be confined within the "narrowest limits" or so much only as
"may be necessary to secure and enforce faithful and efficient administration by local officers."
And the national government "shall have no direct administration except of matters of purely
general concern." (See Hebron v. Reyes, L-9158, July 28, 1958.)
All this had one aim, to enable the Filipinos to acquire experience in the art of self-government,
with the end in view of later allowing them to assume complete management and control of the
administration of their local affairs. Such aim is the policy now embodied in Section 10 (1),
Article VII of the Constitution (Rodriguez v. Montinola, 50 O.G. 4820).
It is the evident decree of the Constitution, therefore, that the President shall have no power of
control over local governments. Accordingly, Congress cannot by law grant him such power
(Hebron v. Reyes, supra). And any such power formerly granted under the Jones Law thereby
became unavoidably inconsistent with the Philippine Constitution.
It remains to examine the relation of the power to create and the power to control local
governments. Said relationship has already been passed upon by this Court in Hebron v.
Reyes, supra. In said case, it was ruled that the power to control is an incident of the power to
create or abolish municipalities. Respondent's view, therefore, that creating municipalities and
controlling their local governments are "two worlds apart," is untenable. And since as stated, the
power to control local governments can no longer be conferred on or exercised by the President,
it follows a fortiori that the power to create them, all the more cannot be so conferred or
exercised.
I am compelled to conclude, therefore, that Section 10 (1), Article VII of the Constitution has
repealed Section 68 of the Revised Administrative Code as far as the latter empowers the
President to create local governments. Repeal by the Constitution of prior statutes inconsistent
with it has already been sustained in De los Santos v. MaIlare, 87 Phil. 289. And it was there held
that such repeal differs from a declaration of unconstitutionality of a posterior legislation, so
much so that only a majority vote of the Court is needed to sustain a finding of repeal.
Since the Constitution repealed Section 68 as far back as 1935, it is academic to ask whether
Republic Act 2370 likewise has provisions in conflict with Section 68 so as to repeal it. Suffice it
to state, at any rate, that statutory prohibition on the President from creating a barrio does not, in
my opinion, warrant the inference of statutory prohibition for creating a municipality. For
although municipalities consist of barrios, there is nothing in the statute that would preclude
creation of new municipalities out of pre-existing barrios.
It is not contrary to the logic of local autonomy to be able to create larger political units and
unable to create smaller ones. For as long ago observed in President McKinley's Instructions to
the Second Philippine Commission, greater autonomy is to be imparted to the smaller of the two
political units. The smaller the unit of local government, the lesser is the need for the national
government's intervention in its political affairs. Furthermore, for practical reasons, local
autonomy cannot be given from the top downwards. The national government, in such a case,
could still exercise power over the supposedly autonomous unit, e.g., municipalities, by
exercising it over the smaller units that comprise them, e.g., the barrios. A realistic program of
decentralization therefore calls for autonomy from the bottom upwards, so that it is not
surprising for Congress to deny the national government some power over barrios without
denying it over municipalities. For this reason, I disagree with the majority view that because the
President could not create a barrio under Republic Act 2370, a fortiori he cannot create a
municipality.
It is my view, therefore, that the Constitution, and not Republic Act 2370, repealed Section 68 of
the Revised Administrative Code's provision giving the President authority to create local
governments. And for this reason I agree with the ruling in the majority opinion that the
executive orders in question are null and void.
In thus ruling, the Court is but sustaining the fulfillment of our historic desire to be free and
independent under a republican form of government, and exercising a function derived from the
very sovereignty that it upholds. Executive orders declared null and void.
Makalintal and Regala, JJ., concur.

SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-2662
March 26, 1949
SHIGENORI KURODA, petitioner,

vs.
Major General RAFAEL JALANDONI, Brigadier General CALIXTO DUQUE, Colonel
MARGARITO TORALBA, Colonel IRENEO BUENCONSEJO, Colonel PEDRO
TABUENA, Major FEDERICO ARANAS, MELVILLE S. HUSSEY and ROBERT
PORT, respondents.
Pedro Serran, Jose G. Lukban, and Liberato B. Cinco for petitioner.
Fred Ruiz Castro Federico Arenas Mariano Yengco, Jr., Ricardo A. Arcilla and S. Melville
Hussey for respondents.
MORAN, C.J.:
Shigenori Kuroda, formerly a Lieutenant-General of the Japanese Imperial Army and

Commanding General of the Japanese Imperial Forces in The Philippines during a period
covering 19433 and 19444 who is now charged before a military Commission convened by the
Chief of Staff of the Armed forces of the Philippines with having unlawfully disregarded and
failed "to discharge his duties as such command, permitting them to commit brutal atrocities and
other high crimes against noncombatant civilians and prisoners of the Imperial Japanese Forces
in violation of the laws and customs of war" comes before this Court seeking to establish the
illegality of Executive Order No. 68 of the President of the Philippines: to enjoin and prohibit
respondents Melville S. Hussey and Robert Port from participating in the prosecution of
petitioner's case before the Military Commission and to permanently prohibit respondents from
proceeding with the case of petitioners.
In support of his case petitioner tenders the following principal arguments.
First. "That Executive Order No. 68 is illegal on the ground that it violates not only the
provision of our constitutional law but also our local laws to say nothing of the fact (that) the
Philippines is not a signatory nor an adherent to the Hague Convention on Rules and Regulations
covering Land Warfare and therefore petitioners is charged of 'crimes' not based on law, national
and international." Hence petitioner argues "That in view off the fact that this commission has
been empanelled by virtue of an unconstitutional law an illegal order this commission is without
jurisdiction to try herein petitioner."
Second. That the participation in the prosecution of the case against petitioner before the
Commission in behalf of the United State of America of attorneys Melville Hussey and Robert
Port who are not attorneys authorized by the Supreme Court to practice law in the Philippines is
a diminution of our personality as an independent state and their appointment as prosecutor are a
violation of our Constitution for the reason that they are not qualified to practice law in the
Philippines.
Third. That Attorneys Hussey and Port have no personality as prosecution the United State not
being a party in interest in the case.
Executive Order No. 68, establishing a National War Crimes Office prescribing rule and
regulation governing the trial of accused war criminals, was issued by the President of the
Philippines on the 29th days of July, 1947 This Court holds that this order is valid and
constitutional. Article 2 of our Constitution provides in its section 3, that
The Philippines renounces war as an instrument of national policy and adopts the
generally accepted principles of international law as part of the of the nation.
In accordance with the generally accepted principle of international law of the present day
including the Hague Convention the Geneva Convention and significant precedents of
international jurisprudence established by the United Nation all those person military or civilian
who have been guilty of planning preparing or waging a war of aggression and of the
commission of crimes and offenses consequential and incidental thereto in violation of the laws
and customs of war, of humanity and civilization are held accountable therefor. Consequently in
the promulgation and enforcement of Execution Order No. 68 the President of the Philippines
has acted in conformity with the generally accepted and policies of international law which are
part of the our Constitution.
The promulgation of said executive order is an exercise by the President of his power as
Commander in chief of all our armed forces as upheld by this Court in the case of
Yamashita vs. Styer (L-129, 42 Off. Gaz., 664) 1 when we said
War is not ended simply because hostilities have ceased. After cessation of armed
hostilities incident of war may remain pending which should be disposed of as in time of
war. An importance incident to a conduct of war is the adoption of measure by the
military command not only to repel and defeat the enemies but to seize and subject to
disciplinary measure those enemies who in their attempt to thwart or impede our military
effort have violated the law of war. (Ex parte Quirin 317 U.S., 1; 63 Sup. Ct., 2.) Indeed
the power to create a military commission for the trial and punishment of war criminals is
an aspect of waging war. And in the language of a writer a military commission has
jurisdiction so long as a technical state of war continues. This includes the period of an
armistice or military occupation up to the effective of a treaty of peace and may extend
beyond by treaty agreement. (Cowles Trial of War Criminals by Military Tribunals,
America Bar Association Journal June, 1944.)
Consequently, the President as Commander in Chief is fully empowered to consummate this
unfinished aspect of war namely the trial and punishment of war criminal through the issuance
and enforcement of Executive Order No. 68.
Petitioner argues that respondent Military Commission has no Jurisdiction to try petitioner for
acts committed in violation of the Hague Convention and the Geneva Convention because the
Philippines is not a signatory to the first and signed the second only in 1947. It cannot be denied
that the rules and regulation of the Hague and Geneva conventions form, part of and are wholly
based on the generally accepted principals of international law. In facts these rules and principles
were accepted by the two belligerent nation the United State and Japan who were signatories to
the two Convention, Such rule and principles therefore form part of the law of our nation even if
the Philippines was not a signatory to the conventions embodying them for our Constitution has
been deliberately general and extensive in its scope and is not confined to the recognition of rule
and principle of international law as continued inn treaties to which our government may have
been or shall be a signatory.
Furthermore when the crimes charged against petitioner were allegedly committed the
Philippines was under the sovereignty of United States and thus we were equally bound together
with the United States and with Japan to the right and obligation contained in the treaties
between the belligerent countries. These rights and obligation were not erased by our assumption
of full sovereignty. If at all our emergency as a free state entitles us to enforce the right on our
own of trying and punishing those who committed crimes against crimes against our people. In
this connection it is well to remember what we have said in the case of Laurel vs. Misa (76 Phil.,
372):
. . . The change of our form government from Commonwealth to Republic does not affect
the prosecution of those charged with the crime of treason committed during then
Commonwealth because it is an offense against the same sovereign people. . . .
By the same token war crimes committed against our people and our government while we were
a Commonwealth are triable and punishable by our present Republic.
Petitioner challenges the participation of two American attorneys namely Melville S. Hussey and
Robert Port in the prosecution of his case on the ground that said attorney's are not qualified to
practice law in Philippines in accordance with our Rules of court and the appointment of said
attorneys as prosecutors is violative of our national sovereignty.
In the first place respondent Military Commission is a special military tribunal governed by a
special law and not by the Rules of court which govern ordinary civil court. It has already been
shown that Executive Order No. 68 which provides for the organization of such military
commission is a valid and constitutional law. There is nothing in said executive order which
requires that counsel appearing before said commission must be attorneys qualified to practice
law in the Philippines in accordance with the Rules of Court. In facts it is common in military
tribunals that counsel for the parties are usually military personnel who are neither attorneys nor
even possessed of legal training.
Secondly the appointment of the two American attorneys is not violative of our nation
sovereignty. It is only fair and proper that United States, which has submitted the vindication of
crimes against her government and her people to a tribunal of our nation should be allowed
representation in the trial of those very crimes. If there has been any relinquishment of
sovereignty it has not been by our government but by the United State Government which has
yielded to us the trial and punishment of her enemies. The least that we could do in the spirit of
comity is to allow them representation in said trials.
Alleging that the United State is not a party in interest in the case petitioner challenges the
personality of attorneys Hussey and Port as prosecutors. It is of common knowledge that the
United State and its people have been equally if not more greatly aggrieved by the crimes with
which petitioner stands charged before the Military Commission. It can be considered a privilege
for our Republic that a leader nation should submit the vindication of the honor of its citizens
and its government to a military tribunal of our country.
The Military Commission having been convened by virtue of a valid law with jurisdiction over
the crimes charged which fall under the provisions of Executive Order No. 68, and having said
petitioner in its custody, this Court will not interfere with the due process of such Military
commission.
For all the foregoing the petition is denied with costs de oficio.
Paras, Feria, Pablo, Bengzon, Tuason, Montemayor and Reyes, JJ., concur.
Separate Opinions
PERFECTO, J., dissenting:
A military commission was empanelled on December 1, 1948 to try Lt. Gen. Shigenori Kuroda
for Violation of the laws and customs of land warfare.
Melville S. Hussey and Robert Port, American citizens and not authorized by the Supreme Court
to practice law were appointed prosecutor representing the American CIC in the trial of the case.
The commission was empanelled under the authority of Executive Order No. 68 of the President
of the Philippines the validity of which is challenged by petitioner on constitutional grounds.
Petitioner has also challenged the personality of Attorneys Hussey and Port to appear as
prosecutors before the commission.
The charges against petitioner has been filed since June 26, 1948 in the name of the people of the
Philippines as accusers.
We will consideration briefly the challenge against the appearance of Attorneys Hussey and Port.
It appearing that they are aliens and have not been authorized by the Supreme Court to practice
law there could not be any question that said person cannot appear as prosecutors in petitioner
case as with such appearance they would be practicing law against the law.
Said violation vanishes however into insignificance at the side of the momentous question
involved in the challenge against the validity of Executive Order No. 68. Said order is challenged
on several constitutional ground. To get a clear idea of the question raised it is necessary to read
the whole context of said order which is reproduced as follows:
EXECUTIVE ORDER NO. 68.
ESTABLISHING A NATIONAL WAR CRIMES OFFICE AND PRESCRIBING

RULES AND REGULATION GOVERNING THE TRIAL OF ACCUSED WAR
CRIMINAL.
I, Manuel Roxas president of the Philippines by virtue of the power vested in me by the
Constitution and laws of the Philippines do hereby establish a National War Crimes
Office charged with the responsibility of accomplishing the speedy trial of all Japanese
accused of war crimes committed in the Philippines and prescribe the rules and regulation
such trial.
The National War crimes office is established within the office of the Judge Advocate
General of the Army of the Philippines and shall function under the direction supervision
and control of the Judge Advocate General. It shall proceed to collect from all available
sources evidence of war crimes committed in the Philippines from the commencement of
hostilities by Japan in December 1941, maintain a record thereof and bring about the
prompt trial maintain a record thereof and bring about the prompt trial of the accused.
The National War Crimes Office shall maintain direct liaison with the Legal Section
General Headquarters, Supreme Commander for the Allied power and shall exchange
with the said Office information and evidence of war crimes.
The following rules and regulation shall govern the trial off person accused as war
criminals:
ESTABLISHMENT OF MILITARY COMMISSIONS
(a) General. person accused as war criminal shall be tried by military commission to
be convened by or under the authority of the Philippines.
II. JURISDICTION
(a) Over Person. Thee military commission appointed hereunder shall have
jurisdiction over all persons charged with war crimes who are in the custody of the
convening authority at the time of the trial.
(b) Over Offenses. The military commission established hereunder shall have
jurisdiction over all offenses including but not limited to the following:
(1) The planning preparation initiation or waging of a war of aggression or a war in
violation of international treaties agreement or assurance or participation in a common
plan or conspiracy for the accomplishment of any of the foregoing.
(2) Violation of the laws or customs of war. Such violation shall include but not be
limited to murder ill-treatment or deportation to slave labor or for other purpose of
civilian population of or in occupied territory; murder or ill-treatment of prisoners of war
or internees or person on the seas or elsewhere; improper treatment of hostage; plunder of
public or private property wanton destruction of cities towns or village; or devastation not
justified by military necessity.
(3) Murder extermination enslavement deportation and other inhuman acts committed
against civilian population before or during the war or persecution on political racial or
religion ground in executive of or in connection with any crime defined herein whether or
not in violation of the local laws.
III. MEMBERSHIP OF COMMISSIONS
(a) Appointment. The members of each military commission shall be appointed by the
President of the Philippines or under authority delegated by him. Alternates may be
appointed by the convening authority. Such shall attend all session of the commission,
and in case of illness or other incapacity of any principal member, an alternate shall take
the place of that member. Any vacancy among the members or alternates, occurring after
a trial has begun, may be filled by the convening authority but the substance of all
proceeding had evidence taken in that case shall be made known to the said new member
or alternate. This facts shall be announced by the president of the commission in open
court.
(b) Number of Members. Each commission shall consist of not less than three (3)
members.
(c) Qualifications. The convening authority shall appoint to the commission persons
whom he determines to be competent to perform the duties involved and not disqualified
by personal interest or prejudice, provided that no person shall be appointed to hear a
case in which he personally investigated or wherein his presence as a witness is required.
One specially qualified member whose ruling is final in so far as concerns the
commission on an objection to the admissibility of evidence offered during the trial.
(d) Voting. Except as to the admissibility of evidence all rulings and finding of the
Commission shall be by majority vote except that conviction and sentence shall be by the
affirmative vote of not less than conviction and sentence shall be by the affirmative vote
of not less than two-thirds (2\3) of the member present.
(e) Presiding Member. In the event that the convening authority does not name one of
the member as the presiding member, the senior officer among the member of the
Commission present shall preside.
IV. PROSECUTORS
(a) Appointment. The convening authority shall designate one or more person to
conduct the prosecution before each commission.
(b) Duties. The duties of the prosecutor are:
(1) To prepare and present charges and specifications for reference to a commission.
(2) To prepare cases for trial and to conduct the prosecution before the commission of all
cases referred for trial.
V. POWER AND PROCEDURE OF COMMISSION
(a) Conduct of the Trial. A Commission shall:
(1) Confine each trial strictly to fair and expeditious hearing on the issues raised by the
charges, excluding irrelevant issues or evidence and preventing any unnecessary delay or
interference.
(2) Deal summarily with any contumacy or contempt, imposing any appropriate
punishment therefor.
(3) Hold public session when otherwise decided by the commission.
(4) Hold each session at such time and place as it shall determine, or as may be directed
by the convening authority.
(b) Rights of the Accused. The accused shall be entitled:

(1) To have in advance of the trial a copy of the charges and specifications clearly worded
so as to apprise the accused of each offense charged.
(2) To be represented, prior to and during trial, by counsel appointed by the convening
authority or counsel of his own choice, or to conduct his own defense.
(3) To testify in his own behalf and have his counsel present relevant evidence at the trial
in support of his defense, and cross-examine each adverse witness who personally
appears before the commission.
(4) To have the substance of the charges and specifications, the proceedings and any
documentary evidence translated, when he is unable otherwise to understand them.
(c) Witnesses. The Commission shall have power:
(1) To summon witnesses and require their attendance and testimony; to administer oaths
or affirmations to witnesses and other persons and to question witnesses.
(2) To require the production of documents and other evidentiary material.
(3) To delegate the Prosecutors appointed by the convening authority the powers and
duties set forth in (1) and (2) above.
(4) To have evidence taken by a special commissioner appointed by the commission.
(d) Evidence.
(1) The commission shall admit such evidence as in its opinion shall be of assistance in
proving or disproving the charge, or such as in the commission's opinion would have
probative value in the mind of a reasonable man. The commission shall apply the rules of
evidence and pleading set forth herein with the greatest liberality to achieve expeditious
procedure. In particular, and without limiting in any way the scope of the foregoing
general rules, the following evidence may be admitted:
(a) Any document, irrespective of its classification, which appears to the commission to
have been signed or issued by any officer, department, agency or member of the armed
forces of any Government without proof of the signature or of the issuance of the
document.
(b) Any report which appears to the commission to have been signed or issued by the
International Red Cross or a member of any medical service personnel, or by any
investigator or intelligence officer, or by any other person whom commission considers
as possessing knowledge of the matters contained in the report.
(c) Affidavits, depositions or other signed statements.
(d) Any diary, letter to other document, including sworn statements, appearing to the
commission to contain information relating to the charge.
(e) A copy of any document or other secondary evidence of the contents, if the original is
not immediately available.
(2) The commission shall take judicial notice of facts of common knowledge, official
government documents of any nation, and the proceedings, records and findings of
military or other agencies of any of the United Nation.
(3) A commission may require the prosecution and the defense to make a preliminary
offer of proof whereupon the commission may rule in advance on the admissibility of
such evidence.
(4) The official position of the accused shall not absolve him from responsibility nor be
considered in mitigation of punishment. Further action pursuant to an order of the
accused's superior, or of his Government, shall not constitute a defense, but may be
considered in mitigation of punishment if the commission determines that justice so
requires.
(5) All purposed confessions or statements of the accused shall bee admissible in
evidence without any showing that they were voluntarily made. If it is shown that such
confession or statement was procured by mean which the commission believe to have
been of such a character that may have caused the accused to make a false statement the
commission may strike out or disregard any such portion thereof as was so procured.
(e) Trial Procedure. The proceedings of each trial shall be conducted substantially as
follows unless modified by the commission to suit the particular circumstances:
(1) Each charge and specification shall be read or its substance stated in open court.
(2) The presiding member shall ask each accused whether he pleads "Guilty" or "Not
guilty."
(3) The prosecution shall make its opening statement."(4) The presiding member may at
this or any other time require the prosecutor to state what evidence he proposes to submit
to the commission and the commission thereupon may rule upon the admissibility of such
evidence.
(4) The witnesses and other evidence for the prosecution shall be heard or presented. At
the close of the case for the prosecution, the commission may, on motion of the defense
for a finding of not guilty, consider and rule whether he evidence before the commission
may defer action on any such motion and permit or require the prosecution to reopen its
case and produce any further available evidence.
(5) The defense may make an opening statement prior to presenting its case. The
presiding member may, at this any other time require the defense to state what evidence it
proposes to submit to the commission where upon the commission may rule upon the
admissibility of such evidence.
(6) The witnesses and other evidence for the defense shall be heard or presented.
Thereafter, the prosecution and defense may introduce such evidence in rebuttal as the
commission may rule as being admissible.
(7) The defense and thereafter the prosecution shall address the commission.
(8) The commission thereafter shall consider the case in closed session and unless
otherwise directed by the convening authority, announce in open court its judgment and
sentence if any. The commission may state the reason on which judgment is based.
( f ) Record of Proceedings. Each commission shall make a separate record of its
proceeding in the trial of each case brought before it. The record shall be prepared by the
prosecutor under the direction of the commission and submitted to the defense counsel.
The commission shall be responsible for its accuracy. Such record, certified by the
presiding member of the commission or his successor, shall be delivered to the convening
authority as soon as possible after the trial.
(g) Sentence. The commission may sentence an accused, upon conviction to death by
hanging or shooting, imprisonment for life or for any less term, fine or such other
punishment as the commission shall determine to be proper.
(h) Approval of Sentence. No. sentence of a military commission shall be carried into
effect until approved by the chief off Staff: Provided, That no sentence of death or life
imprisonment shall be carried into execution until confirmed by the President of the
Philippines. For the purpose of his review the Chief of Staff shall create a Board of
Review to be composed of not more than three officers none of whom shall be on duty
with or assigned to the Judge Advocate General's Office. The Chief of Staff shall have
authority to approve, mitigate remit in whole or in part, commute, suspend, reduce or
otherwise alter the sentence imposed, or (without prejudice to the accused) remand the
case for rehearing before a new military commission; but he shall not have authority to
increase the severity of the sentence. Except as herein otherwise provided the judgment
and sentence of a commission shall final and not subject to review by any other tribunal.
VI. RULE-MAKING POWER
Supplementary Rule and Forms. Each commission shall adopt rules and forms to
govern its procedure, not inconsistent with the provision of this Order, or such rules and
forms as may be prescribed by the convening authority]or by the President of the
Philippines.
VII. The amount of amount of seven hundred thousand pesos is hereby set aside out of
the appropriations for the Army of the Philippines for use by the National War Crimes
Office in the accomplishment of its mission as hereinabove set forth, and shall be
expended in accordance with the recommendation of the Judge Advocate General as
approved by the President. The buildings, fixtures, installations, messing, and billeting
equipment and other property herefore used by then Legal Section, Manila Branch, of the
General Headquarters, Supreme Commander for the Allied Power, which will be turned
over by the United States Army to the Philippines Government through the Foreign
Liquidation Commission and the Surplus Property Commission are hereby specification
reserved for use off the National War Crimes Office.
Executive Order No. 64, dated August 16, 1945, is hereby repealed.
Done in the City of Manila, this 29th day of July in the year of Our Lord, nineteen
hundred and forty-seven, and of the Independence of the Philippines, the second.
MANUEL
President of the Philippines
ROXAS
By the President:
EMILIO
Chief of the Executive Office
ABELLO
EXECUTIVE LEGISLATION
Executive Order No. 68 is a veritable piece of Legislative measure, without the benefit of
congressional enactment.
The first question that is trust at our face spearheading a group of other no less important
question, is whether or not the President of the Philippines may exercise the legislative power
expressly vested in Congress by the Constitution. .
The Constitution provides:
The Legislative powers shall be vested in a Congress of the Philippines which shall
consist of a Senate and House of Representatives. (Section 1, Article VI.)
While there is no express provision in the fundamental law prohibiting the exercise of legislative
power by agencies other than Congress, a reading of the whole context of the Constitution would
dispel any doubt as to the constitutional intent that the legislative power is to be exercised
exclusively by Congress, subject only to the veto power of the President of the President of the
Philippines, to the specific provision which allow the president of the Philippines to suspend the
privileges of the writ of habeas corpus and to place any part of the Philippines under martial law,
and to the rule-making power expressly vested by the Constitution in the Supreme Court.
There cannot be any question that the member of the Constitutional Convention were believers in
the tripartite system of government as originally enunciated by Aristotle, further elaborated by
Montequieu and accepted and practiced by modern democracies, especially the United State of
America, whose Constitution, after which ours has been patterned, has allocated the three power
of government legislative, executive, judicial to distinct and separate department of
government.
Because the power vested by our Constitution to the several department of the government are in
the nature of grants, not recognition of pre-existing power, no department of government may
exercise any power or authority not expressly granted by the Constitution or by law by virtue
express authority of the Constitution.
Executive Order No. 68 establishes a National War Crimes Office and the power to establish
government office is essentially legislative.
The order provides that person accused as war criminals shall be tried by military commissions.
Whether such a provision is substantive or adjective, it is clearly legislative in nature. It confers
upon military commissions jurisdiction to try all persons charge with war crimes. The power to
define and allocate jurisdiction for the prosecution of person accused of any crime is exclusively
vested by the Constitution in Congress. .
It provides rules of procedure for the conduct of trial of trial. This provision on procedural
subject constitutes a usurpation of the rule-making power vested by Constitution in the Supreme
Court.
It authorized military commission to adopt additional rule of procedure. If the President of the
Philippines cannot exercise the rule -making power vested by the Constitution in the Supreme
Court, he cannot, with more reason, delegate that power to military commission.
It appropriates the sum of P7000,000 for the expenses of the National War Crimes office
established by the said Executive Order No. 68. This constitutes another usurpation of legislative
power as the power to vote appropriations belongs to Congress.
Executive Order No. 68., is, therefore, null and void, because, though it the President of the
Philippines usurped power expressly vested by the Constitution in Congress and in the Supreme
Court.
Challenged to show the constitutional or legal authority under which the President issued
Executive Order No. 68, respondent could not give any definite answer. They attempted,
however, to suggest that the President of the Philippines issued Executive Order No. 68 under the
emergency power granted to him by Commonwealth Act No. 600, as amended by

Commonwealth Act No. 620, and Commonwealth Act No. 671, both of which are transcribed
below:
COMMONWEALTH ACT NO. 600.

AN ACT DECLARING A STATE OF EMERGENCY AND AUTHORIZING
THE PRESIDENT TO PROMULGATE RULES AND REGULATION TO
SAFEGUARD THE INTEGRITY OF THE PHILIPPINES AND TO INSURE
THE TRANQUILITY OF ITS INHABITANTS.
SECTION 1. The existence of war in many parts of the world has created a national
emergency which makes it necessary to invest the President of the Philippines with
extraordinary power in order to safeguard the integrity of the Philippines and to insure the
tranquility of its inhabitants, by suppressing espionage, lawlessness, and all subversive to
the people adequate shelter and clothing and sufficient food supply, and by providing
means for the speedy evacuation of the civilian population the establishment of an air
protective service and the organization of volunteer guard units, and to adopt such other
measures as he may deem necessary for the interest of the public. To carry out this policy
the President is authorized to promulgate rules and regulations which shall have the force
and effect off law until the date of adjournment of the next regulation which shall have
the force and effect of law until the date of adjournment of the next regular session of the
First Congress of the Philippines, unless sooner amended or repealed by the Congress of
Philippines. Such rules and regulation may embrace the following objects: (1) to suppress
espionage and other subversive activities; (2) to require all able-bodied citizens (a) when
not engaged in any lawful occupation, to engage in farming or other productive activities
or (b) to perform such services as may bee necessary in the public interest; (3) to take
over farm lands in order to prevent or shortage of crops and hunger and destitution; (4) to
take over industrial establishment in order to insure adequate production, controlling
wages and profits therein; (5) to prohibit lockouts and strikes whenever necessary to
prevent the unwarranted suspension of work in productive enterprises or in the interest of
national security; (6) to regulate the normal hours of work for wage-earning and salaried
employees in industrial or business undertakings of all kinds; (7) to insure an even
distribution of labor among the productive enterprises; (8) to commandership and other
means of transportation in order to maintain, as much as possible, adequate and continued
transportation facilities; (9) to requisition and take over any public service or enterprise
for use or operation by the Government;(10) to regulate rents and the prices of articles or
commodities of prime necessity, both imported and locally produced or manufactured;
and (11) to prevent, locally or generally, scarcity, monopolization, hoarding injurious
speculations, and private control affecting the supply, distribution and movement of
foods, clothing, fuel, fertilizer, chemical, building, material, implements, machinery, and
equipment required in agriculture and industry, with power to requisition these
commodities subject to the payment of just compensation. (As amended by Com. Act No.
620.)
SEC. 2. For the purpose of administering this Act and carrying out its objective, the
President may designate any officer, without additional compensation, or any department,
bureau, office, or instrumentality of the National Government.
SEC. 3. Any person, firm, or corporation found guilty of the violation of any provision of
this Act or of this Act or any of the rules or regulations promulgated by the President
under the authority of section one of this Act shall be punished by imprisonment of not
more than ten years or by a fine of not more than ten thousand pesos, or by both. If such
violation is committed by a firm or corporation, the manager, managing director, or

person charge with the management of the business of such firm, or corporation shall be
criminally responsible therefor.
SEC. 4. The President shall report to the national Assembly within the first ten days from
the date of the opening of its next regular session whatever action has been taken by him
under the authority herein granted.
SEC. 5. To carry out the purposed of this Act, the President is authorized to spend such
amounts as may be necessary from the sum appropriated under section five
Commonwealth Act Numbered four hundred and ninety-eight.
SEC. 6. If any province of this Act shall be declared by any court of competent
jurisdiction to be unconstitutional and void, such declaration shall not invalidate the
remainder of this Act.
SEC. 7. This Act shall take upon its approval.
Approved, August 19, 1940.
COMMONWEALTH ACT NO. 671

AN ACT DECLARING A STATE OF TOTAL EMERGENCY AS A RESULT OF
WAR INVOLVING THE PHILIPPINES AND AUTHORIZING THE
PRESIDENT TO PROMULGATE RULE AND REGULATIONS TO MEET
SUCH EMERGENCY.
Be it enacted the National Assembly of the Philippines;
SECTION 1. The existed of war between the United State and other countries of Europe
and Asia, which involves the Philippines, makes it necessary to invest the President with
extraordinary powers in order to meet the resulting emergency.
SEC. 2. Pursuant to the provision of Article VI, section 16, of the Constitution, the
President is hereby authorized, during the existence of the emergency, to promulgate such
rules and regulation as he may deem necessary to carry out the national policy declared in
section 1 hereof. Accordingly, he is, among other things, empowered (a) to transfer the
seat of the Government or any of its subdivisions, branches, department, offices, agencies
or instrumentalities; (b) to reorganize the Government of the Commonwealth including
the determination of the order of precedence of the heads of the Executive Department;
(c) to create new subdivision, branches, departments, offices, agency or instrumentalities
of government and to abolish any of those already existing; (d) to continue in force laws
and appropriation which would lapse or otherwise became inoperative, and to modify or
suspend the operation or application of those of an administrative character; (e) to
imposed new taxes or to increase, reduce, suspend, or abolish those in existence; (f) to
raise funds through the issuance of bonds or otherwise, and to authorize the expensive of
the proceeds thereof; (g) to authorize the National, provincial, city or municipal
governments to incur in overdrafts for purposes that he may approve; (h) to declare the
suspension of the collection of credits or the payment of debts; and (i) to exercise such
other power as he may deem necessary to enable the Government to fulfill its
responsibilities and to maintain and enforce its authority.
SEC. 3. The President of the Philippines report thereto all the rules and regulation
promulgated by him under the power herein granted.
SEC. 4. This Act shall take effect upon its approval and the rules and regulations.
Approved December 16, 1941.
The above Acts cannot validly be invoked, Executive Order No. 68 was issued on July 29, 1947.
Said Acts had elapsed upon the liberation of the Philippines form the Japanese forces or, at the
latest, when the surrender of Japan was signed in Tokyo on September 2, 1945.
When both Acts were enacted by the Second National Assembly, we happened to have taken
direct part in their consideration and passage, not only as one of the members of said legislative
body as chairman of the Committee on Third Reading population Known as the "Little Senate."
We are, therefore in a position to state that said measures were enacted by the second national
Assembly for the purpose of facing the emergency of impending war and of the Pacific War that
finally broke out with the attack of Pearl Harbor on December 7, 1941. We approved said
extraordinary measures, by which under the exceptional circumstances then prevailing legislative
power were delegated to the President of the Philippines, by virtue of the following provisions of
the Constitution:
President, for a limited period and subject to such restrictions as it may prescribe to
promulgate rules and regulations to carry out declared national policy. (Article VI,
section 26.)
It has never been the purpose of the National Assembly to extend the delegation beyond the
emergency created by the war as to extend it farther would be violative of the express provision
of the Constitution. We are of the opinion that there is no doubt on this question.; but if there
could still be any the same should be resolved in favor of the presumption that the National
Assembly did not intend to violate the fundamental law.
The absurdity of the contention that the emergency Acts continued in effect even after the
surrender of Japan can not be gainsaid. Only a few months after liberation and even before the
surrender of Japan, or since the middle of 1945, the Congress started to function normally. In the
hypothesis that the contention can prevail, then, since 1945, that is, four years ago, even after the
Commonwealth was already replaced by the Republic of the Philippines with the proclamation
of our Independence, two district, separate and independence legislative organs, Congress and
the President of the Philippines would have been and would continue enacting laws, the
former to enact laws of every nature including those of emergency character, and the latter to
enact laws, in the form of executive orders, under the so-called emergency powers. The situation
would be pregnant with dangers to peace and order to the rights and liberties of the people and to
Philippines democracy.
Should there be any disagreement between Congress and the President of the Philippines, a
possibility that no one can dispute the President of the Philippines may take advantage of he long
recess of Congress (two-thirds of every year ) to repeal and overrule legislative enactments of
Congress, and may set up a veritable system of dictatorship, absolutely repugnant to the letter
and spirit of the Constitution.
Executive Order No. 68 is equally offensive to the Constitution because it violates the
fundamental guarantees of the due process and equal protection of the law. It is especially so,
because it permit the admission of many kinds evidence by which no innocent person can afford
to get acquittal and by which it is impossible to determine whether an accused is guilty or not
beyond all reasonable doubt.
The rules of evidence adopted in Executive Order No. 68 are a reproduction of the regulation
governing the trial of twelve criminal, issued by General Douglas Mac Arthur, Commander in
Chief of the United State Armed Forces in Western Pacific, for the purpose of trying among
other, General Yamashita and Homma. What we said in our concurring and dissenting opinion to
the decision promulgated on December 19, 1945, in the Yamashita case, L-129, and in our
concurring and dissenting opinion to the resolution of January 23, 1946 in disposing the Homma
case, L-244, are perfectly applicable to the offensive rules of evidence in Executive Order No.
68. Said rules of evidence are repugnant to conscience as under them no justice can expected.
For all the foregoing, conformably with our position in the Yamashita and Homma cases, we vote
to declare Executive Order No. 68 null and void and to grant petition.

SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-49112 February 2, 1979
LEOVILLO
C.
AGUSTIN, petitioner,
vs.
HON. ROMEO F. EDU, in his capacity as Land Transportation Commissioner; HON.
JUAN PONCE ENRILE, in his capacity as Minister of National Defense; HON. ALFREDO
L. JUINIO, in his capacity as Minister Of Public Works, Transportation and
Communications; and HON: BALTAZAR AQUINO, in his capacity as Minister of Public

Highways, respondents.
Leovillo C. Agustin Law Office for petitioner.
Solicitor General Estelito P. Mendoza, Assistant Solicitor General Ruben E. Agpalo and
Solicitor Amado D. Aquino for respondents.
FERNANDO, J.:
The validity of a letter of Instruction 1 providing for an early seaming device for motor vehicles
is assailed in this prohibition proceeding as being violative of the constitutional guarantee of due
process and, insofar as the rules and regulations for its implementation are concerned, for
transgressing the fundamental principle of non- delegation of legislative power. The Letter of
Instruction is stigmatized by petitioner who is possessed of the requisite standing, as being
arbitrary and oppressive. A temporary restraining order as issued and respondents Romeo F. Edu,
Land Transportation Commissioner Juan Ponce Enrile, Minister of National Defense; Alfredo L.
Juinio, Minister of Public Works, Transportation and Communications; and Baltazar Aquino,
Minister of Public Highways; were to answer. That they did in a pleading submitted by Solicitor
General Estelito P. Mendoza. 2 Impressed with a highly persuasive quality, it makes devoid clear
that the imputation of a constitutional infirmity is devoid of justification The Letter of Instruction
on is a valid police power measure. Nor could the implementing rules and regulations issued by
respondent Edu be considered as amounting to an exercise of legislative power. Accordingly, the
petition must be dismissed.
The facts are undisputed. The assailed Letter of Instruction No. 229 of President Marcos, issued
on December 2, 1974, reads in full: "[Whereas], statistics show that one of the major causes of
fatal or serious accidents in land transportation is the presence of disabled, stalled or parked
motor vehicles along streets or highways without any appropriate early warning device to signal
approaching motorists of their presence; [Whereas], the hazards posed by such obstructions to
traffic have been recognized by international bodies concerned with traffic safety, the 1968
Vienna Convention on Road Signs and Signals and the United Nations Organization (U.N.);
[Whereas], the said Vienna Convention which was ratified by the Philippine Government under
P.D. No. 207, recommended the enactment of local legislation for the installation of road safety
signs and devices; [Now, therefore, I, Ferdinand E. Marcos], President of the Philippines, in the
interest of safety on all streets and highways, including expressways or limited access roads, do
hereby direct: 1. That all owners, users or drivers of motor vehicles shall have at all times in their
motor vehicles at least one (1) pair of early warning device consisting of triangular, collapsible
reflectorized plates in red and yellow colors at least 15 cms. at the base and 40 cms. at the sides.
2. Whenever any motor vehicle is stalled or disabled or is parked for thirty (30) minutes or more
on any street or highway, including expressways or limited access roads, the owner, user or
driver thereof shall cause the warning device mentioned herein to be installed at least four meters
away to the front and rear of the motor vehicle staged, disabled or parked. 3. The Land
Transportation Commissioner shall cause Reflectorized Triangular Early Warning Devices, as
herein described, to be prepared and issued to registered owners of motor vehicles, except
motorcycles and trailers, charging for each piece not more than 15 % of the acquisition cost. He
shall also promulgate such rules and regulations as are appropriate to effectively implement this
order. 4. All hereby concerned shall closely coordinate and take such measures as are necessary
or appropriate to carry into effect then instruction. 3 Thereafter, on November 15, 1976, it was
amended by Letter of Instruction No. 479 in this wise. "Paragraph 3 of Letter of Instruction No.
229 is hereby amended to read as follows: 3. The Land transportation Commissioner shall
require every motor vehicle owner to procure from any and present at the registration of his
vehicle, one pair of a reflectorized early warning device, as d bed of any brand or make chosen
by mid motor vehicle . The Land Transportation Commissioner shall also promulgate such rule
and regulations as are appropriate to effectively implement this order.'" 4 There was issued
accordingly, by respondent Edu, the implementing rules and regulations on December 10,
1976. 5 They were not enforced as President Marcos on January 25, 1977, ordered a six-month
period of suspension insofar as the installation of early warning device as a pre-registration
requirement for motor vehicle was concerned. 6 Then on June 30, 1978, another Letter of
Instruction 7 the lifting of such suspension and directed the immediate implementation of Letter
of Instruction No. 229 as amended. 8 It was not until August 29, 1978 that respondent Edu issued
Memorandum Circular No. 32, worded thus: "In pursuance of Letter of Instruction No. 716,
dated June 30, 1978, the implementation of Letter of Instruction No. 229, as amended by Letter
of Instructions No. 479, requiring the use of Early Warning Devices (EWD) on motor vehicle,
the following rules and regulations are hereby issued: 1. LTC Administrative Order No. 1, dated
December 10, 1976; shall now be implemented provided that the device may come from
whatever source and that it shall have substantially complied with the EWD specifications
contained in Section 2 of said administrative order; 2. In order to insure that every motor
vehicle , except motorcycles, is equipped with the device, a pair of serially numbered stickers, to
be issued free of charge by this Commission, shall be attached to each EWD. The EWD. serial
number shall be indicated on the registration certificate and official receipt of payment of current
registration fees of the motor vehicle concerned. All Orders, Circulars, and Memoranda in
conflict herewith are hereby superseded, This Order shall take effect immediately. 9 It was for
immediate implementation by respondent Alfredo L. Juinio, as Minister of Public Works,
transportation, and Communications. 10
Petitioner, after setting forth that he "is the owner of a Volkswagen Beetle Car, Model 13035,
already properly equipped when it came out from the assembly lines with blinking lights fore
and aft, which could very well serve as an early warning device in case of the emergencies
mentioned in Letter of Instructions No. 229, as amended, as well as the implementing rules and
regulations in Administrative Order No. 1 issued by the land transportation
Commission," 11 alleged that said Letter of Instruction No. 229, as amended, "clearly violates the
provisions and delegation of police power, [sic] * * *: " For him they are "oppressive,
unreasonable, arbitrary, confiscatory, nay unconstitutional and contrary to the precepts of our
compassionate New Society." 12 He contended that they are "infected with arbitrariness because it
is harsh, cruel and unconscionable to the motoring public;" 13 are "one-sided, onerous and
patently illegal and immoral because [they] will make manufacturers and dealers instant
millionaires at the expense of car owners who are compelled to buy a set of the so-called early
warning device at the rate of P 56.00 to P72.00 per set." 14are unlawful and unconstitutional and
contrary to the precepts of a compassionate New Society [as being] compulsory and confiscatory
on the part of the motorists who could very well provide a practical alternative road safety
device, or a better substitute to the specified set of EWD's." 15 He therefore prayed for a
judgment both the assailed Letters of Instructions and Memorandum Circular void and
unconstitutional and for a restraining order in the meanwhile.
A resolution to this effect was handed down by this Court on October 19, 1978: "L-49112
(Leovillo C. Agustin v. Hon. Romeo F. Edu, etc., et al.) Considering the allegations contained,
the issues raised and the arguments adduced in the petition for prohibition with writ of p
prohibitory and/or mandatory injunction, the Court Resolved to (require) the respondents to file
an answer thereto within ton (10) days from notice and not to move to dismiss the petition. The
Court further Resolved to [issue] a [temporary restraining order] effective as of this date and
continuing until otherwise ordered by this Court. 16
Two motions for extension were filed by the Office of the Solicitor General and granted. Then on
November 15, 1978, he Answer for respondents was submitted. After admitting the factual
allegations and stating that they lacked knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief as to
petitioner owning a Volkswagen Beetle car," they "specifically deny the allegations and stating
they lacked knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief as to petitioner owning a
Volkswagen Beetle Car, 17 they specifically deny the allegations in paragraphs X and XI
(including its subparagraphs 1, 2, 3, 4) of Petition to the effect that Letter of Instruction No. 229
as amended by Letters of Instructions Nos. 479 and 716 as well as Land transportation
Commission Administrative Order No. 1 and its Memorandum Circular No. 32 violates the
constitutional provisions on due process of law, equal protection of law and undue delegation of
police power, and that the same are likewise oppressive, arbitrary, confiscatory, one-sided,
onerous, immoral unreasonable and illegal the truth being that said allegations are without legal
and factual basis and for the reasons alleged in the Special and Affirmative Defenses of this
Answer." 18 Unlike petitioner who contented himself with a rhetorical recital of his litany of
grievances and merely invoked the sacramental phrases of constitutional litigation, the Answer,
in demonstrating that the assailed Letter of Instruction was a valid exercise of the police power
and implementing rules and regulations of respondent Edu not susceptible to the charge that
there was unlawful delegation of legislative power, there was in the portion captioned Special
and Affirmative Defenses, a citation of what respondents believed to be the authoritative
decisions of this Tribunal calling for application. They are Calalang v. Williams, 19 Morfe v.
Mutuc, 20 and Edu v. Ericta. 21 Reference was likewise made to the 1968 Vienna Conventions of
the United Nations on road traffic, road signs, and signals, of which the Philippines was a
signatory and which was duly ratified. 22 Solicitor General Mendoza took pains to refute in detail,
in language calm and dispassionate, the vigorous, at times intemperate, accusation of petitioner
that the assailed Letter of Instruction and the implementing rules and regulations cannot survive
the test of rigorous scrutiny. To repeat, its highly-persuasive quality cannot be denied.
This Court thus considered the petition submitted for decision, the issues being clearly joined. As
noted at the outset, it is far from meritorious and must be dismissed.
1. The Letter of Instruction in question was issued in the exercise of the police power. That is
conceded by petitioner and is the main reliance of respondents. It is the submission of the former,
however, that while embraced in such a category, it has offended against the due process and
equal protection safeguards of the Constitution, although the latter point was mentioned only in
passing. The broad and expansive scope of the police power which was originally Identified by
Chief Justice Taney of the American Supreme Court in an 1847 decision as "nothing more or less
than the powers of government inherent in every sovereignty" 23 was stressed in the
aforementioned case of Edu v. Ericta thus: "Justice Laurel, in the first leading decision after the
Constitution came into force, Calalang v. Williams, Identified police power with state authority
to enact legislation that may interfere with personal liberty or property in order to promote the
general welfare. Persons and property could thus 'be subjected to all kinds of restraints and
burdens in order to we the general comfort, health and prosperity of the state.' Shortly after
independence in 1948, Primicias v. Fugoso reiterated the doctrine, such a competence being
referred to as 'the power to prescribe regulations to promote the health, morals, peace, education,
good order or safety, and general welfare of the people. The concept was set forth in negative
terms by Justice Malcolm in a pre-Commonwealth decision as 'that inherent and plenary power
in the State which enables it to prohibit all things hurtful to the comfort, safety and welfare of
society. In that sense it could be hardly distinguishable as noted by this Court in Morfe v. Mutuc
with the totality of legislative power. It is in the above sense the greatest and most powerful at.
tribute of government. It is, to quote Justice Malcolm anew, 'the most essential, insistent, and at
least table powers, I extending as Justice Holmes aptly pointed out 'to all the great public needs.'
Its scope, ever-expanding to meet the exigencies of the times, even to anticipate the future where
it could be done, provides enough room for an efficient and flexible response to conditions and
circumstances thus assuring the greatest benefits. In the language of Justice Cardozo: 'Needs that
were narrow or parochial in the past may be interwoven in the present with the well-being of the
nation. What is critical or urgent changes with the time.' The police power is thus a dynamic
agency, suitably vague and far from precisely defined, rooted in the conception that men in
organizing the state and imposing upon its government limitations to safeguard constitutional
rights did not intend thereby to enable an individual citizen or a group of citizens to obstruct
unreasonably the enactment of such salutary measures calculated to communal peace, safety,
good order, and welfare." 24
2. It was thus a heavy burden to be shouldered by petitioner, compounded by the fact that the
particular police power measure challenged was clearly intended to promote public safety. It
would be a rare occurrence indeed for this Court to invalidate a legislative or executive act of
that character. None has been called to our attention, an indication of its being non-existent. The
latest decision in point, Edu v. Ericta, sustained the validity of the Reflector Law, 25 an enactment
conceived with the same end in view. Calalang v. Williams found nothing objectionable in a
statute, the purpose of which was: "To promote safe transit upon, and. avoid obstruction on roads
and streets designated as national roads * * *. 26 As a matter of fact, the first law sought to be
nullified after the effectivity of the 1935 Constitution, the National Defense Act, 27 with
petitioner failing in his quest, was likewise prompted by the imperative demands of public safety.
3. The futility of petitioner's effort to nullify both the Letter of Instruction and the implementing
rules and regulations becomes even more apparent considering his failure to lay the necessary
factual foundation to rebut the presumption of validity. So it was held in Ermita-Malate Hotel
and Motel Operators Association, Inc. v. City Mayor of Manila. 28 The rationale was clearly set
forth in an excerpt from a decision of Justice Branders of the American Supreme Court, quoted
in the opinion: "The statute here questioned deals with a subject clearly within the scope of the
police power. We are asked to declare it void on the ground that the specific method of regulation
prescribed is unreasonable and hence deprives the plaintiff of due process of law. As underlying
questions of fact may condition the constitutionality of legislation of this character, the
presumption of constitutionality must prevail in the absence of some factual foundation of record
in overthrowing the statute. 29
4. Nor did the Solicitor General as he very well could, rely solely on such rebutted presumption
of validity. As was pointed out in his Answer "The President certainly had in his possession the
necessary statistical information and data at the time he issued said letter of instructions, and
such factual foundation cannot be defeated by petitioner's naked assertion that early warning
devices 'are not too vital to the prevention of nighttime vehicular accidents' because allegedly
only 390 or 1.5 per cent of the supposed 26,000 motor vehicle accidents that in 1976 involved
rear-end collisions (p. 12 of petition). Petitioner's statistics is not backed up by demonstrable data
on record. As aptly stated by this Honorable Court: Further: "It admits of no doubt therefore that
there being a presumption of validity, the necessity for evidence to rebut it is unavoidable, unless
the statute or ordinance is void on its face, which is not the case here"' * * *. But even as g the
verity of petitioner's statistics, is that not reason enough to require the installation of early
warning devices to prevent another 390 rear-end collisions that could mean the death of 390 or
more Filipinos and the deaths that could likewise result from head-on or frontal collisions with
stalled vehicles?" 30 It is quite manifest then that the issuance of such Letter of Instruction is
encased in the armor of prior, careful study by the Executive Department. To set it aside for
alleged repugnancy to the due process clause is to give sanction to conjectural claims that
exceeded even the broadest permissible limits of a pleader's well known penchant for
exaggeration.
5. The rather wild and fantastic nature of the charge of oppressiveness of this Letter of
Instruction was exposed in the Answer of the Solicitor General thus: "Such early warning device
requirement is not an expensive redundancy, nor oppressive, for car owners whose cars are
already equipped with 1) blinking lights in the fore and aft of said motor vehicles,' 2) "batterypowered blinking lights inside motor vehicles," 3) "built-in reflectorized tapes on front and rear
bumpers of motor vehicles," or 4) "well-lighted two (2) petroleum lamps (the Kinke) * * *
because: Being universal among the signatory countries to the said 1968 Vienna Conventions,
and visible even under adverse conditions at a distance of at least 400 meters, any motorist from
this country or from any part of the world, who sees a reflectorized rectangular early seaming
device installed on the roads, highways or expressways, will conclude, without thinking, that
somewhere along the travelled portion of that road, highway, or expressway, there is a motor
vehicle which is stationary, stalled or disabled which obstructs or endangers passing traffic. On
the other hand, a motorist who sees any of the aforementioned other built in warning devices or
the petroleum lamps will not immediately get adequate advance warning because he will still
think what that blinking light is all about. Is it an emergency vehicle? Is it a law enforcement
car? Is it an ambulance? Such confusion or uncertainty in the mind of the motorist will thus
increase, rather than decrease, the danger of collision. 31
6. Nor did the other extravagant assertions of constitutional deficiency go unrefuted in the
Answer of the Solicitor General "There is nothing in the questioned Letter of Instruction No.
229, as amended, or in Administrative Order No. 1, which requires or compels motor vehicle
owners to purchase the early warning device prescribed thereby. All that is required is for motor
vehicle owners concerned like petitioner, to equip their motor vehicles with a pair of this early
warning device in question, procuring or obtaining the same from whatever source. In fact, with
a little of industry and practical ingenuity, motor vehicle owners can even personally make or
produce this early warning device so long as the same substantially conforms with the
specifications laid down in said letter of instruction and administrative order. Accordingly the
early warning device requirement can neither be oppressive, onerous, immoral, nor confiscatory,
much less does it make manufacturers and dealers of said devices 'instant millionaires at the
expense of car owners' as petitioner so sweepingly concludes * * *. Petitioner's fear that with the
early warning device requirement 'a more subtle racket may be committed by those called upon
to enforce it * * * is an unfounded speculation. Besides, that unscrupulous officials may try to
enforce said requirement in an unreasonable manner or to an unreasonable degree, does not
render the same illegal or immoral where, as in the instant case, the challenged Letter of
Instruction No. 229 and implementing order disclose none of the constitutional defects alleged
against it. 32
7 It does appear clearly that petitioner's objection to this Letter of Instruction is not premised on
lack of power, the justification for a finding of unconstitutionality, but on the pessimistic, not to
say negative, view he entertains as to its wisdom. That approach, it put it at its mildest, is
distinguished, if that is the appropriate word, by its unorthodoxy. It bears repeating "that this
Court, in the language of Justice Laurel, 'does not pass upon questions of wisdom justice or
expediency of legislation.' As expressed by Justice Tuason: 'It is not the province of the courts to
supervise legislation and keep it within the bounds of propriety and common sense. That is
primarily and exclusively a legislative concern.' There can be no possible objection then to the
observation of Justice Montemayor. 'As long as laws do not violate any Constitutional provision,
the Courts merely interpret and apply them regardless of whether or not they are wise or salutary.
For they, according to Justice Labrador, 'are not supposed to override legitimate policy and * * *
never inquire into the wisdom of the law.' It is thus settled, to paraphrase Chief Justice
Concepcion in Gonzales v. Commission on Elections, that only congressional power or
competence, not the wisdom of the action taken, may be the basis for declaring a statute invalid.
This is as it ought to be. The principle of separation of powers has in the main wisely allocated
the respective authority of each department and confined its jurisdiction to such a sphere. There
would then be intrusion not allowable under the Constitution if on a matter left to the discretion
of a coordinate branch, the judiciary would substitute its own. If there be adherence to the rule of
law, as there ought to be, the last offender should be courts of justice, to which rightly litigants
submit their controversy precisely to maintain unimpaired the supremacy of legal norms and
prescriptions. The attack on the validity of the challenged provision likewise insofar as there may
be objections, even if valid and cogent on is wisdom cannot be sustained. 33
8. The alleged infringement of the fundamental principle of non-delegation of legislative power
is equally without any support well-settled legal doctrines. Had petitioner taken the trouble to
acquaint himself with authoritative pronouncements from this Tribunal, he would not have the
temerity to make such an assertion. An exempt from the aforecited decision of Edu v.
Ericta sheds light on the matter: "To avoid the taint of unlawful delegation, there must be a
standard, which implies at the very least that the legislature itself determines matters of principle
and lays down fundamental policy. Otherwise, the charge of complete abdication may be hard to
repel A standard thus defines legislative policy, marks its maps out its boundaries and specifies
the public agency to apply it. It indicates the circumstances under which the legislative command
is to be effected. It is the criterion by which legislative purpose may be carried out. Thereafter,
the executive or administrative office designated may in pursuance of the above guidelines
promulgate supplemental rules and regulations. The standard may be either express or implied. If
the former, the non-delegation objection is easily met. The standard though does not have to be
spelled out specifically. It could be implied from the policy and purpose of the act considered as
a whole. In the Reflector Law clearly, the legislative objective is public safety. What is sought to
be attained as in Calalang v. Williams is "safe transit upon the roads.' This is to adhere to the
recognition given expression by Justice Laurel in a decision announced not too long after the
Constitution came into force and effect that the principle of non-delegation "has been made to
adapt itself to the complexities of modern governments, giving rise to the adoption, within
certain limits, of the principle of "subordinate legislation" not only in the United States and
England but in practically all modern governments.' He continued: 'Accordingly, with the
growing complexity of modern life, the multiplication of the subjects of governmental
regulation, and the increased difficulty of administering the laws, there is a constantly growing
tendency toward the delegation of greater powers by the legislature and toward the approval of
the practice by the courts.' Consistency with the conceptual approach requires the reminder that
what is delegated is authority non-legislative in character, the completeness of the statute when it
leaves the hands of Congress being assumed." 34
9. The conclusion reached by this Court that this petition must be dismissed is reinforced by this
consideration. The petition itself quoted these two whereas clauses of the assailed Letter of
Instruction: "[Whereas], the hazards posed by such obstructions to traffic have been recognized
by international bodies concerned with traffic safety, the 1968 Vienna Convention on Road Signs
and Signals and the United Nations Organization (U.N.); [Whereas], the said Vionna
Convention, which was ratified by the Philippine Government under P.D. No. 207, recommended
the enactment of local legislation for the installation of road safety signs and devices; * * * " 35 It
cannot be disputed then that this Declaration of Principle found in the Constitution possesses
relevance: "The Philippines * * * adopts the generally accepted principles of international law as
part of the law of the land * * *." 36 The 1968 Vienna Convention on Road Signs and Signals is
impressed with such a character. It is not for this country to repudiate a commitment to which it
had pledged its word. The concept of Pacta sunt servanda stands in the way of such an attitude,
which is, moreover, at war with the principle of international morality.
10. That is about all that needs be said. The rather court reference to equal protection did not
even elicit any attempt on the Part of Petitioner to substantiate in a manner clear, positive, and
categorical why such a casual observation should be taken seriously. In no case is there a more
appropriate occasion for insistence on what was referred to as "the general rule" in Santiago v.
Far Eastern Broadcasting Co., 37 namely, "that the constitutionality of a law wig not be
considered unless the point is specially pleaded, insisted upon, and adequately argued." 38 "Equal
protection" is not a talismanic formula at the mere invocation of which a party to a lawsuit can
rightfully expect that success will crown his efforts. The law is anything but that.
WHEREFORE, this petition is dismissed. The restraining order is lifted. This decision is
immediately executory. No costs.
Castro, C.J., Barredo, Antonio, Santos, Fernandez, Guerrero, Abad Santos, De Castro and
Melencio-Herrera, concur.
Makasiar, J, reserves the right to file a separate opinion.
Aquino J., took no part.
Concepcion J., is on leave.
Castro, C.J., certifies that Justice Concepcion concurs in their decision.
Separate Opinions

I dissent from the majority's peremptory dismissal of the petition and lifting of the restraining
order issued on October 19, 1978 against the blanket enforcement of the requirement that all
motor vehicles be equipped with the so-called early warning device, without even hearing the
parties in oral argument as generally required by the Court in original cases of far-reaching
consequence such as the case at bar.
Lack of time presents my filing an extended dissent. I only wish to state that the petition
advances grave and serious grounds of assailing "the rules and regulations issued by the Land
Transportation Commission under Administrative Order No. 1 and Memorandum Circular No.
32 [which] do not reflect the real intent, noble objectives and spirit of Letter of Instructions No.
229, as amended by Letter of Instructions Nos. 479 and 716, because it is oppressive,
compassionate New Society," because of the following considerations, inter alia:
1. It is oppressive, arbitrary and discriminatory to require owners of motor vehicles with built-in
and more effective and efficient E.W.D.'S such as "a) blinking lights in the fore and aft of said
motor vehicles, 1)) battery-powered blinking lights inside motor vehicles, c) built-in
reflectorized tapes on front and rear bumpers of motor vehicles....... to purchase the E.W.D.
specified in the challenged administrative order, whose effectivity and utility have yet to be
demonstrated.
2. The public necessity for the challenged order has yet to be shown. No valid refutation has been
made of petitioner's assertion that the "E.W.D.'s are not too vital to the prevention of nighttime
vehicular accidents. Statistics shows that of the 26,000 motor vehicle accidents that occurred in
1976, only 390 or 1.5 per cent involved rear-end collisions," as to require the purchase and
installation of the questioned E.W.D. for almost 900,000 vehicles throughout the country;
3. The big financial burden to be imposed on all motorists is staggering, and petitioner's assertion
that "as of 1975, there were at least 865,037 motor vehicles all over the country requiring
E.W.D.'S and at the minimum price of 1156.00 per set, this would mean a consumer outlay of P
48,451,872.00, or close to P 50 million for the questioned E.W.D.'S "stands unchallenged;
4. No real effort has been made to show that there can be practical and less burdensome
alternative road safety devices for stalled vehicles than the prescribed E.W.D., such as the
common petroleum lamps "kinke" which can be placed just as effectively in front of stalled
vehicles on the highways; and
5. There is no imperative need for imposing such a bet requirement on all vehicles. The
respondents have not shown that they have availed of the powers and prerogatives vested in their
offices such as ridding the country of dilapidated trucks and vehicles which are the main cause of
the deplorable -highway accidents due to stoned vehicles, establishing an honest and foolproof
system of examination and licensing of motor vehicle drivers so as to ban the reckless and
irresponsible and a sustained education campaign to instill safe driving habits and attitudes that
can be carried out for much less than the P 50 million burden that would be imposed by the
challenged order.
I do feel that a greater "degree of receptivity and sympathy" could be extended to the petitioner
for his civic mindedness in having filed the present petition g as capricious and unreasonable the
"all pervading police power" of the State instead of throwing the case out of court and leaving
the wrong impression that the exercise of police power insofar as it may affect the life, liberty
and property of any person is no longer subject to judicial inquiry.
# Separate Opinions

I dissent from the majority's peremptory dismissal of the petition and lifting of the restraining
order issued on October 19, 1978 against the blanket enforcement of the requirement that all
motor vehicles be equipped with the so-called early warning device, without even hearing the
parties in oral argument as generally required by the Court in original cases of far-reaching
consequence such as the case at bar.
Lack of time presents my filing an extended dissent. I only wish to state that the petition
advances grave and serious grounds of assailing "the rules and regulations issued by the Land
Transportation Commission under Administrative Order No. 1 and Memorandum Circular No.
32 [which] do not reflect the real intent, noble objectives and spirit of Letter of Instructions No.
229, as amended by Letter of Instructions Nos. 479 and 716, because it is oppressive,
compassionate New Society," because of the following considerations, inter alia:
1. It is oppressive, arbitrary and discriminatory to require owners of motor vehicles with built-in
and more effective and efficient E.W.D.'S such as "a) blinking lights in the fore and aft of said
motor vehicles, 1)) battery-powered blinking lights inside motor vehicles, c) built-in
reflectorized tapes on front and rear bumpers of motor vehicles....... to purchase the E.W.D.
specified in the challenged administrative order, whose effectivity and utility have yet to be
demonstrated.
2. The public necessity for the challenged order has yet to be shown. No valid refutation has been
made of petitioner's assertion that the "E.W.D.'s are not too vital to the prevention of nighttime
vehicular accidents. Statistics shows that of the 26,000 motor vehicle accidents that occurred in
1976, only 390 or 1.5 per cent involved rear-end collisions," as to require the purchase and
installation of the questioned E.W.D. for almost 900,000 vehicles throughout the country;
3. The big financial burden to be imposed on all motorists is staggering, and petitioner's assertion
that "as of 1975, there were at least 865,037 motor vehicles all over the country requiring
E.W.D.'S and at the minimum price of 1156.00 per set, this would mean a consumer outlay of P
48,451,872.00, or close to P 50 million for the questioned E.W.D.'S "stands unchallenged;
4. No real effort has been made to show that there can be practical and less burdensome
alternative road safety devices for stalled vehicles than the prescribed E.W.D., such as the
common petroleum lamps "kinke" which can be placed just as effectively in front of stalled
vehicles on the highways; and
5. There is no imperative need for imposing such a bet requirement on all vehicles. The
respondents have not shown that they have availed of the powers and prerogatives vested in their
offices such as ridding the country of dilapidated trucks and vehicles which are the main cause of
the deplorable -highway accidents due to stoned vehicles, establishing an honest and foolproof
system of examination and licensing of motor vehicle drivers so as to ban the reckless and
irresponsible and a sustained education campaign to instill safe driving habits and attitudes that
can be carried out for much less than the P 50 million burden that would be imposed by the
challenged order.
I do feel that a greater "degree of receptivity and sympathy" could be extended to the petitioner
for his civic mindedness in having filed the present petition g as capricious and unreasonable the
"all pervading police power" of the State instead of throwing the case out of court and leaving
the wrong impression that the exercise of police power insofar as it may affect the life, liberty
and property of any person is no longer subject to judicial inquiry.

SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-14639
March 25, 1919
ZACARIAS VILLAVICENCIO, ET AL., petitioners,

vs.
JUSTO LUKBAN, ET AL., respondents.
Alfonso Mendoza for petitioners.
City Fiscal Diaz for respondents.
MALCOLM, J.:
The annals of juridical history fail to reveal a case quite as remarkable as the one which this
application forhabeas corpus submits for decision. While hardly to be expected to be met with in
this modern epoch of triumphant democracy, yet, after all, the cause presents no great difficulty
if there is kept in the forefront of our minds the basic principles of popular government, and if
we give expression to the paramount purpose for which the courts, as an independent power of
such a government, were constituted. The primary question is Shall the judiciary permit a
government of the men instead of a government of laws to be set up in the Philippine Islands?
Omitting much extraneous matter, of no moment to these proceedings, but which might prove
profitable reading for other departments of the government, the facts are these: The Mayor of the
city of Manila, Justo Lukban, for the best of all reasons, to exterminate vice, ordered the
segregated district for women of ill repute, which had been permitted for a number of years in
the city of Manila, closed. Between October 16 and October 25, 1918, the women were kept
confined to their houses in the district by the police. Presumably, during this period, the city
authorities quietly perfected arrangements with the Bureau of Labor for sending the women to
Davao, Mindanao, as laborers; with some government office for the use of the coastguard
cutters Corregidor and Negros, and with the Constabulary for a guard of soldiers. At any rate,
about midnight of October 25, the police, acting pursuant to orders from the chief of police,
Anton Hohmann and the Mayor of the city of Manila, Justo Lukban, descended upon the houses,
hustled some 170 inmates into patrol wagons, and placed them aboard the steamers that awaited
their arrival. The women were given no opportunity to collect their belongings, and apparently
were under the impression that they were being taken to a police station for an investigation.
They had no knowledge that they were destined for a life in Mindanao. They had not been asked
if they wished to depart from that region and had neither directly nor indirectly given their
consent to the deportation. The involuntary guests were received on board the steamers by a
representative of the Bureau of Labor and a detachment of Constabulary soldiers. The two
steamers with their unwilling passengers sailed for Davao during the night of October 25.
The vessels reached their destination at Davao on October 29. The women were landed and
receipted for as laborers by Francisco Sales, provincial governor of Davao, and by Feliciano
Yigo and Rafael Castillo. The governor and the hacendero Yigo, who appear as parties in the
case, had no previous notification that the women were prostitutes who had been expelled from
the city of Manila. The further happenings to these women and the serious charges growing out
of alleged ill-treatment are of public interest, but are not essential to the disposition of this case.
Suffice it to say, generally, that some of the women married, others assumed more or less
clandestine relations with men, others went to work in different capacities, others assumed a life
unknown and disappeared, and a goodly portion found means to return to Manila.
To turn back in our narrative, just about the time the Corregidor and the Negros were putting in
to Davao, the attorney for the relatives and friends of a considerable number of the deportees
presented an application forhabeas corpus to a member of the Supreme Court. Subsequently, the
application, through stipulation of the parties, was made to include all of the women who were
sent away from Manila to Davao and, as the same questions concerned them all, the application
will be considered as including them. The application set forth the salient facts, which need not
be repeated, and alleged that the women were illegally restrained of their liberty by Justo
Lukban, Mayor of the city of Manila, Anton Hohmann, chief of police of the city of Manila, and
by certain unknown parties. The writ was made returnable before the full court. The city fiscal
appeared for the respondents, Lukban and Hohmann, admitted certain facts relative to
sequestration and deportation, and prayed that the writ should not be granted because the
petitioners were not proper parties, because the action should have been begun in the Court of
First Instance for Davao, Department of Mindanao and Sulu, because the respondents did not
have any of the women under their custody or control, and because their jurisdiction did not
extend beyond the boundaries of the city of Manila. According to an exhibit attached to the
answer of the fiscal, the 170 women were destined to be laborers, at good salaries, on
the haciendas of Yigo and Governor Sales. In open court, the fiscal admitted, in answer to
question of a member of the court, that these women had been sent out of Manila without their
consent. The court awarded the writ, in an order of November 4, that directed Justo Lukban,
Mayor of the city of Manila, Anton Hohmann, chief of police of the city of Manila, Francisco
Sales, governor of the province of Davao, and Feliciano Yigo, an hacendero of Davao, to bring
before the court the persons therein named, alleged to be deprived of their liberty, on December
2, 1918.
Before the date mentioned, seven of the women had returned to Manila at their own expense. On
motion of counsel for petitioners, their testimony was taken before the clerk of the Supreme
Court sitting as commissioners. On the day named in the order, December 2nd, 1918, none of the
persons in whose behalf the writ was issued were produced in court by the respondents. It has
been shown that three of those who had been able to come back to Manila through their own
efforts, were notified by the police and the secret service to appear before the court. The fiscal
appeared, repeated the facts more comprehensively, reiterated the stand taken by him when
pleading to the original petition copied a telegram from the Mayor of the city of Manila to the
provincial governor of Davao and the answer thereto, and telegrams that had passed between the
Director of Labor and the attorney for that Bureau then in Davao, and offered certain affidavits
showing that the women were contained with their life in Mindanao and did not wish to return to
Manila. Respondents Sales answered alleging that it was not possible to fulfill the order of the
Supreme Court because the women had never been under his control, because they were at
liberty in the Province of Davao, and because they had married or signed contracts as laborers.
Respondent Yigo answered alleging that he did not have any of the women under his control
and that therefore it was impossible for him to obey the mandate. The court, after due
deliberation, on December 10, 1918, promulgated a second order, which related that the
respondents had not complied with the original order to the satisfaction of the court nor
explained their failure to do so, and therefore directed that those of the women not in Manila be
brought before the court by respondents Lukban, Hohmann, Sales, and Yigo on January 13,
1919, unless the women should, in written statements voluntarily made before the judge of first
instance of Davao or the clerk of that court, renounce the right, or unless the respondents should
demonstrate some other legal motives that made compliance impossible. It was further stated that
the question of whether the respondents were in contempt of court would later be decided and the
reasons for the order announced in the final decision.
Before January 13, 1919, further testimony including that of a number of the women, of certain
detectives and policemen, and of the provincial governor of Davao, was taken before the clerk of
the Supreme Court sitting as commissioner and the clerk of the Court of First Instance of Davao
acting in the same capacity. On January 13, 1919, the respondents technically presented before
the Court the women who had returned to the city through their own efforts and eight others who
had been brought to Manila by the respondents. Attorneys for the respondents, by their returns,
once again recounted the facts and further endeavored to account for all of the persons involved
in the habeas corpus. In substance, it was stated that the respondents, through their
representatives and agents, had succeeded in bringing from Davao with their consent eight
women; that eighty-one women were found in Davao who, on notice that if they desired they
could return to Manila, transportation fee, renounced the right through sworn statements; that
fifty-nine had already returned to Manila by other means, and that despite all efforts to find them
twenty-six could not be located. Both counsel for petitioners and the city fiscal were permitted to
submit memoranda. The first formally asked the court to find Justo Lukban, Mayor of the city of
Manila, Anton Hohmann, chief of police of the city of Manila, Jose Rodriguez and Fernando
Ordax, members of the police force of the city of Manila, Feliciano Yigo, an hacendero of
Davao, Modesto Joaquin, the attorney for the Bureau of Labor, and Anacleto Diaz, fiscal of the
city of Manila, in contempt of court. The city fiscal requested that the replica al memorandum de
los recurridos, (reply to respondents' memorandum) dated January 25, 1919, be struck from the
record.
In the second order, the court promised to give the reasons for granting the writ of habeas
corpus in the final decision. We will now proceed to do so.
One fact, and one fact only, need be recalled these one hundred and seventy women were
isolated from society, and then at night, without their consent and without any opportunity to
consult with friends or to defend their rights, were forcibly hustled on board steamers for
transportation to regions unknown. Despite the feeble attempt to prove that the women left
voluntarily and gladly, that such was not the case is shown by the mere fact that the presence of
the police and the constabulary was deemed necessary and that these officers of the law chose
the shades of night to cloak their secret and stealthy acts. Indeed, this is a fact impossible to
refute and practically admitted by the respondents.
With this situation, a court would next expect to resolve the question By authority of what law
did the Mayor and the Chief of Police presume to act in deporting by duress these persons from
Manila to another distant locality within the Philippine Islands? We turn to the statutes and we
find
Alien prostitutes can be expelled from the Philippine Islands in conformity with an Act of
congress. The Governor-General can order the eviction of undesirable aliens after a hearing from
the Islands. Act No. 519 of the Philippine Commission and section 733 of the Revised
Ordinances of the city of Manila provide for the conviction and punishment by a court of justice
of any person who is a common prostitute. Act No. 899 authorizes the return of any citizen of the
United States, who may have been convicted of vagrancy, to the homeland. New York and other
States have statutes providing for the commitment to the House of Refuge of women convicted
of being common prostitutes. Always a law! Even when the health authorities compel
vaccination, or establish a quarantine, or place a leprous person in the Culion leper colony, it is
done pursuant to some law or order. But one can search in vain for any law, order, or regulation,
which even hints at the right of the Mayor of the city of Manila or the chief of police of that city
to force citizens of the Philippine Islands and these women despite their being in a sense
lepers of society are nevertheless not chattels but Philippine citizens protected by the same
constitutional guaranties as are other citizens to change their domicile from Manila to another
locality. On the contrary, Philippine penal law specifically punishes any public officer who, not
being expressly authorized by law or regulation, compels any person to change his residence.
In other countries, as in Spain and Japan, the privilege of domicile is deemed so important as to
be found in the Bill of Rights of the Constitution. Under the American constitutional system,
liberty of abode is a principle so deeply imbedded in jurisprudence and considered so elementary

in nature as not even to require a constitutional sanction. Even the Governor-General of the
Philippine Islands, even the President of the United States, who has often been said to exercise
more power than any king or potentate, has no such arbitrary prerogative, either inherent or
express. Much less, therefore, has the executive of a municipality, who acts within a sphere of
delegated powers. If the mayor and the chief of police could, at their mere behest or even for the
most praiseworthy of motives, render the liberty of the citizen so insecure, then the presidents
and chiefs of police of one thousand other municipalities of the Philippines have the same
privilege. If these officials can take to themselves such power, then any other official can do the
same. And if any official can exercise the power, then all persons would have just as much right
to do so. And if a prostitute could be sent against her wishes and under no law from one locality
to another within the country, then officialdom can hold the same club over the head of any
citizen.
Law defines power. Centuries ago Magna Charta decreed that "No freeman shall be taken, or
imprisoned, or be disseized of his freehold, or liberties, or free customs, or be outlawed, or
exiled, or any other wise destroyed; nor will we pass upon him nor condemn him, but by lawful
judgment of his peers or by the law of the land. We will sell to no man, we will not deny or defer
to any man either justice or right." (Magna Charta, 9 Hen., 111, 1225, Cap. 29; 1 eng. stat. at
Large, 7.) No official, no matter how high, is above the law. The courts are the forum which
functionate to safeguard individual liberty and to punish official transgressors. "The law," said
Justice Miller, delivering the opinion of the Supreme Court of the United States, "is the only
supreme power in our system of government, and every man who by accepting office participates
in its functions is only the more strongly bound to submit to that supremacy, and to observe the
limitations which it imposes upon the exercise of the authority which it gives." (U.S. vs. Lee
[1882], 106 U.S., 196, 220.) "The very idea," said Justice Matthews of the same high tribunal in
another case, "that one man may be compelled to hold his life, or the means of living, or any
material right essential to the enjoyment of life, at the mere will of another, seems to be
intolerable in any country where freedom prevails, as being the essence of slavery itself." (Yick
Wo vs. Hopkins [1886], 118 U.S., 356, 370.) All this explains the motive in issuing the writ
of habeas corpus, and makes clear why we said in the very beginning that the primary question
was whether the courts should permit a government of men or a government of laws to be
established in the Philippine Islands.
What are the remedies of the unhappy victims of official oppression? The remedies of the citizen
are three: (1) Civil action; (2) criminal action, and (3) habeas corpus.
The first is an optional but rather slow process by which the aggrieved party may recoup money
damages. It may still rest with the parties in interest to pursue such an action, but it was never
intended effectively and promptly to meet any such situation as that now before us.
As to criminal responsibility, it is true that the Penal Code in force in these Islands provides:
Any public officer not thereunto authorized by law or by regulations of a general
character in force in the Philippines who shall banish any person to a place more than two
hundred kilometers distant from his domicile, except it be by virtue of the judgment of a
court, shall be punished by a fine of not less than three hundred and twenty-five and not
more than three thousand two hundred and fifty pesetas.
Any public officer not thereunto expressly authorized by law or by regulation of a general
character in force in the Philippines who shall compel any person to change his domicile
or residence shall suffer the penalty of destierro and a fine of not less than six hundred
and twenty-five and not more than six thousand two hundred and fifty pesetas. (Art. 211.)
We entertain no doubt but that, if, after due investigation, the proper prosecuting officers find
that any public officer has violated this provision of law, these prosecutors will institute and
press a criminal prosecution just as vigorously as they have defended the same official in this
action. Nevertheless, that the act may be a crime and that the persons guilty thereof can be
proceeded against, is no bar to the instant proceedings. To quote the words of Judge Cooley in a
case which will later be referred to "It would be a monstrous anomaly in the law if to an
application by one unlawfully confined, ta be restored to his liberty, it could be a sufficient
answer that the confinement was a crime, and therefore might be continued indefinitely until the
guilty party was tried and punished therefor by the slow process of criminal procedure." (In the
matter of Jackson [1867], 15 Mich., 416, 434.) The writ of habeas corpus was devised and exists
as a speedy and effectual remedy to relieve persons from unlawful restraint, and as the best and
only sufficient defense of personal freedom. Any further rights of the parties are left untouched
by decision on the writ, whose principal purpose is to set the individual at liberty.
Granted that habeas corpus is the proper remedy, respondents have raised three specific
objections to its issuance in this instance. The fiscal has argued (l) that there is a defect in parties
petitioners, (2) that the Supreme Court should not a assume jurisdiction, and (3) that the person
in question are not restrained of their liberty by respondents. It was finally suggested that the
jurisdiction of the Mayor and the chief of police of the city of Manila only extends to the city
limits and that perforce they could not bring the women from Davao.
The first defense was not presented with any vigor by counsel. The petitioners were relatives and
friends of the deportees. The way the expulsion was conducted by the city officials made it
impossible for the women to sign a petition for habeas corpus. It was consequently proper for
the writ to be submitted by persons in their behalf. (Code of Criminal Procedure, sec. 78; Code
of Civil Procedure, sec. 527.) The law, in its zealous regard for personal liberty, even makes it
the duty of a court or judge to grant a writ of habeas corpus if there is evidence that within the
court's jurisdiction a person is unjustly imprisoned or restrained of his liberty, though no
application be made therefor. (Code of Criminal Procedure, sec. 93.) Petitioners had standing in
court.
The fiscal next contended that the writ should have been asked for in the Court of First Instance
of Davao or should have been made returnable before that court. It is a general rule of good
practice that, to avoid unnecessary expense and inconvenience, petitions for habeas
corpus should be presented to the nearest judge of the court of first instance. But this is not a
hard and fast rule. The writ of habeas corpus may be granted by the Supreme Court or any judge
thereof enforcible anywhere in the Philippine Islands. (Code of Criminal Procedure, sec. 79;
Code of Civil Procedure, sec. 526.) Whether the writ shall be made returnable before the
Supreme Court or before an inferior court rests in the discretion of the Supreme Court and is
dependent on the particular circumstances. In this instance it was not shown that the Court of
First Instance of Davao was in session, or that the women had any means by which to advance
their plea before that court. On the other hand, it was shown that the petitioners with their
attorneys, and the two original respondents with their attorney, were in Manila; it was shown that
the case involved parties situated in different parts of the Islands; it was shown that the women
might still be imprisoned or restrained of their liberty; and it was shown that if the writ was to
accomplish its purpose, it must be taken cognizance of and decided immediately by the appellate
court. The failure of the superior court to consider the application and then to grant the writ
would have amounted to a denial of the benefits of the writ.
The last argument of the fiscal is more plausible and more difficult to meet. When the writ was
prayed for, says counsel, the parties in whose behalf it was asked were under no restraint; the
women, it is claimed, were free in Davao, and the jurisdiction of the mayor and the chief of
police did not extend beyond the city limits. At first blush, this is a tenable position. On closer
examination, acceptance of such dictum is found to be perversive of the first principles of the
writ of habeas corpus.
A prime specification of an application for a writ of habeas corpus is restraint of liberty. The
essential object and purpose of the writ of habeas corpus is to inquire into all manner of
involuntary restraint as distinguished from voluntary, and to relieve a person therefrom if such
restraint is illegal. Any restraint which will preclude freedom of action is sufficient. The forcible
taking of these women from Manila by officials of that city, who handed them over to other
parties, who deposited them in a distant region, deprived these women of freedom of locomotion
just as effectively as if they had been imprisoned. Placed in Davao without either money or
personal belongings, they were prevented from exercising the liberty of going when and where
they pleased. The restraint of liberty which began in Manila continued until the aggrieved parties
were returned to Manila and released or until they freely and truly waived his right.
Consider for a moment what an agreement with such a defense would mean. The chief executive
of any municipality in the Philippines could forcibly and illegally take a private citizen and place
him beyond the boundaries of the municipality, and then, when called upon to defend his official
action, could calmly fold his hands and claim that the person was under no restraint and that he,
the official, had no jurisdiction over this other municipality. We believe the true principle should
be that, if the respondent is within the jurisdiction of the court and has it in his power to obey the
order of the court and thus to undo the wrong that he has inflicted, he should be compelled to do
so. Even if the party to whom the writ is addressed has illegally parted with the custody of a
person before the application for the writ is no reason why the writ should not issue. If the mayor
and the chief of police, acting under no authority of law, could deport these women from the city
of Manila to Davao, the same officials must necessarily have the same means to return them
from Davao to Manila. The respondents, within the reach of process, may not be permitted to
restrain a fellow citizen of her liberty by forcing her to change her domicile and to avow the act
with impunity in the courts, while the person who has lost her birthright of liberty has no
effective recourse. The great writ of liberty may not thus be easily evaded.
It must be that some such question has heretofore been presented to the courts for decision.
Nevertheless, strange as it may seem, a close examination of the authorities fails to reveal any
analogous case. Certain decisions of respectable courts are however very persuasive in nature.
A question came before the Supreme Court of the State of Michigan at an early date as to
whether or not a writ ofhabeas corpus would issue from the Supreme Court to a person within
the jurisdiction of the State to bring into the State a minor child under guardianship in the State,
who has been and continues to be detained in another State. The membership of the Michigan
Supreme Court at this time was notable. It was composed of Martin, chief justice, and Cooley,
Campbell, and Christiancy, justices. On the question presented the court was equally divided.
Campbell, J., with whom concurred Martin, C. J., held that the writ should be quashed. Cooley,
J., one of the most distinguished American judges and law-writers, with whom concurred
Christiancy, J., held that the writ should issue. Since the opinion of Justice Campbell was
predicated to a large extent on his conception of the English decisions, and since, as will
hereafter appear, the English courts have taken a contrary view, only the following eloquent
passages from the opinion of Justice Cooley are quoted:
I have not yet seen sufficient reason to doubt the power of this court to issue the present
writ on the petition which was laid before us. . . .
It would be strange indeed if, at this late day, after the eulogiums of six centuries and a
half have been expended upon the Magna Charta, and rivers of blood shed for its
establishment; after its many confirmations, until Coke could declare in his speech on the
petition of right that "Magna Charta was such a fellow that he will have no sovereign,"
and after the extension of its benefits and securities by the petition of right, bill of rights
and habeas corpus acts, it should now be discovered that evasion of that great clause for
the protection of personal liberty, which is the life and soul of the whole instrument, is so
easy as is claimed here. If it is so, it is important that it be determined without delay, that
the legislature may apply the proper remedy, as I can not doubt they would, on the subject
being brought to their notice. . . .
The second proposition that the statutory provisions are confined to the case of
imprisonment within the state seems to me to be based upon a misconception as to the
source of our jurisdiction. It was never the case in England that the court of king's bench
derived its jurisdiction to issue and enforce this writ from the statute. Statutes were not
passed to give the right, but to compel the observance of rights which existed. . . .
The important fact to be observed in regard to the mode of procedure upon this writ is,
that it is directed to and served upon, not the person confined, but his jailor. It does not
reach the former except through the latter. The officer or person who serves it does not
unbar the prison doors, and set the prisoner free, but the court relieves him by compelling
the oppressor to release his constraint. The whole force of the writ is spent upon the
respondent, and if he fails to obey it, the means to be resorted to for the purposes of
compulsion are fine and imprisonment. This is the ordinary mode of affording relief, and
if any other means are resorted to, they are only auxiliary to those which are usual. The
place of confinement is, therefore, not important to the relief, if the guilty party is within
reach of process, so that by the power of the court he can be compelled to release his
grasp. The difficulty of affording redress is not increased by the confinement being
beyond the limits of the state, except as greater distance may affect it. The important
question is, where the power of control exercised? And I am aware of no other remedy.
(In the matter of Jackson [1867], 15 Mich., 416.)
The opinion of Judge Cooley has since been accepted as authoritative by other courts.
(Rivers vs. Mitchell [1881], 57 Iowa, 193; Breene vs. People [1911], Colo., 117 Pac. Rep.,
1000; Ex parte Young [1892], 50 Fed., 526.)
The English courts have given careful consideration to the subject. Thus, a child had been taken
out of English by the respondent. A writ of habeas corpus was issued by the Queen's Bench
Division upon the application of the mother and her husband directing the defendant to produce
the child. The judge at chambers gave defendant until a certain date to produce the child, but he
did not do so. His return stated that the child before the issuance of the writ had been handed
over by him to another; that it was no longer in his custody or control, and that it was impossible
for him to obey the writ. He was found in contempt of court. On appeal, the court, through Lord
Esher, M. R., said:
A writ of habeas corpus was ordered to issue, and was issued on January 22. That writ
commanded the defendant to have the body of the child before a judge in chambers at the
Royal Courts of Justice immediately after the receipt of the writ, together with the cause
of her being taken and detained. That is a command to bring the child before the judge
and must be obeyed, unless some lawful reason can be shown to excuse the
nonproduction of the child. If it could be shown that by reason of his having lawfully
parted with the possession of the child before the issuing of the writ, the defendant had
no longer power to produce the child, that might be an answer; but in the absence of any
lawful reason he is bound to produce the child, and, if he does not, he is in contempt of
the Court for not obeying the writ without lawful excuse. Many efforts have been made in
argument to shift the question of contempt to some anterior period for the purpose of
showing that what was done at some time prior to the writ cannot be a contempt. But the
question is not as to what was done before the issue of the writ. The question is whether
there has been a contempt in disobeying the writ it was issued by not producing the child
in obedience to its commands. (The Queen vs. Bernardo [1889], 23 Q. B. D., 305. See
also to the same effect the Irish case of In re Matthews, 12 Ir. Com. Law Rep. [N. S.],
233; The Queen vs. Barnardo, Gossage's Case [1890], 24 Q. B. D., 283.)
A decision coming from the Federal Courts is also of interest. A habeas corpus was directed to
the defendant to have before the circuit court of the District of Columbia three colored persons,
with the cause of their detention. Davis, in his return to the writ, stated on oath that he had
purchased the negroes as slaves in the city of Washington; that, as he believed, they were
removed beyond the District of Columbia before the service of the writ of habeas corpus, and
that they were then beyond his control and out of his custody. The evidence tended to show that
Davis had removed the negroes because he suspected they would apply for a writ of habeas
corpus. The court held the return to be evasive and insufficient, and that Davis was bound to
produce the negroes, and Davis being present in court, and refusing to produce them, ordered
that he be committed to the custody of the marshall until he should produce the negroes, or be
otherwise discharged in due course of law. The court afterwards ordered that Davis be released
upon the production of two of the negroes, for one of the negroes had run away and been lodged
in jail in Maryland. Davis produced the two negroes on the last day of the term. (United
States vs. Davis [1839], 5 Cranch C.C., 622, Fed. Cas. No. 14926. See also Robb vs. Connolly
[1883], 111 U.S., 624; Church on Habeas, 2nd ed., p. 170.)
We find, therefore, both on reason and authority, that no one of the defense offered by the
respondents constituted a legitimate bar to the granting of the writ of habeas corpus.
There remains to be considered whether the respondent complied with the two orders of the
Supreme Court awarding the writ of habeas corpus, and if it be found that they did not, whether
the contempt should be punished or be taken as purged.
The first order, it will be recalled, directed Justo Lukban, Anton Hohmann, Francisco Sales, and
Feliciano Yigo to present the persons named in the writ before the court on December 2, 1918.
The order was dated November 4, 1918. The respondents were thus given ample time, practically
one month, to comply with the writ. As far as the record discloses, the Mayor of the city of
Manila waited until the 21st of November before sending a telegram to the provincial governor
of Davao. According to the response of the attorney for the Bureau of Labor to the telegram of
his chief, there were then in Davao women who desired to return to Manila, but who should not
be permitted to do so because of having contracted debts. The half-hearted effort naturally
resulted in none of the parties in question being brought before the court on the day named.
For the respondents to have fulfilled the court's order, three optional courses were open: (1) They
could have produced the bodies of the persons according to the command of the writ; or (2) they
could have shown by affidavit that on account of sickness or infirmity those persons could not
safely be brought before the court; or (3) they could have presented affidavits to show that the
parties in question or their attorney waived the right to be present. (Code of Criminal Procedure,
sec. 87.) They did not produce the bodies of the persons in whose behalf the writ was granted;
they did not show impossibility of performance; and they did not present writings that waived
the right to be present by those interested. Instead a few stereotyped affidavits purporting to
show that the women were contended with their life in Davao, some of which have since been
repudiated by the signers, were appended to the return. That through ordinary diligence a
considerable number of the women, at least sixty, could have been brought back to Manila is
demonstrated to be found in the municipality of Davao, and that about this number either
returned at their own expense or were produced at the second hearing by the respondents.
The court, at the time the return to its first order was made, would have been warranted
summarily in finding the respondents guilty of contempt of court, and in sending them to jail
until they obeyed the order. Their excuses for the non-production of the persons were far from
sufficient. The, authorities cited herein pertaining to somewhat similar facts all tend to indicate
with what exactitude a habeas corpus writ must be fulfilled. For example, in Gossage's case,
supra, the Magistrate in referring to an earlier decision of the Court, said: "We thought that,
having brought about that state of things by his own illegal act, he must take the consequences;
and we said that he was bound to use every effort to get the child back; that he must do much
more than write letters for the purpose; that he must advertise in America, and even if necessary
himself go after the child, and do everything that mortal man could do in the matter; and that the
court would only accept clear proof of an absolute impossibility by way of excuse." In other
words, the return did not show that every possible effort to produce the women was made by the
respondents. That the court forebore at this time to take drastic action was because it did not wish
to see presented to the public gaze the spectacle of a clash between executive officials and the
judiciary, and because it desired to give the respondents another chance to demonstrate their
good faith and to mitigate their wrong.
In response to the second order of the court, the respondents appear to have become more
zealous and to have shown a better spirit. Agents were dispatched to Mindanao, placards were
posted, the constabulary and the municipal police joined in rounding up the women, and a
steamer with free transportation to Manila was provided. While charges and counter-charges in
such a bitterly contested case are to be expected, and while a critical reading of the record might
reveal a failure of literal fulfillment with our mandate, we come to conclude that there is a
substantial compliance with it. Our finding to this effect may be influenced somewhat by our
sincere desire to see this unhappy incident finally closed. If any wrong is now being perpetrated
in Davao, it should receive an executive investigation. If any particular individual is still
restrained of her liberty, it can be made the object of separate habeas corpus proceedings.
Since the writ has already been granted, and since we find a substantial compliance with it,
nothing further in this connection remains to be done.
The attorney for the petitioners asks that we find in contempt of court Justo Lukban, Mayor of
the city of Manila, Anton Hohmann, chief of police of the city of Manila, Jose Rodriguez, and
Fernando Ordax, members of the police force of the city of Manila, Modesto Joaquin, the
attorney for the Bureau of Labor, Feliciano Yigo, anhacendero of Davao, and Anacleto Diaz,
Fiscal of the city of Manila.
The power to punish for contempt of court should be exercised on the preservative and not on the
vindictive principle. Only occasionally should the court invoke its inherent power in order to
retain that respect without which the administration of justice must falter or fail. Nevertheless
when one is commanded to produce a certain person and does not do so, and does not offer a
valid excuse, a court must, to vindicate its authority, adjudge the respondent to be guilty of
contempt, and must order him either imprisoned or fined. An officer's failure to produce the body
of a person in obedience to a writ of habeas corpus when he has power to do so, is a contempt
committed in the face of the court. (Ex parte Sterns [1888], 77 Cal., 156; In re Patterson [1888],
99 N. C., 407.)
With all the facts and circumstances in mind, and with judicial regard for human imperfections,
we cannot say that any of the respondents, with the possible exception of the first named, has
flatly disobeyed the court by acting in opposition to its authority. Respondents Hohmann,
Rodriguez, Ordax, and Joaquin only followed the orders of their chiefs, and while, under the law
of public officers, this does not exonerate them entirely, it is nevertheless a powerful mitigating
circumstance. The hacendero Yigo appears to have been drawn into the case through a
misconstruction by counsel of telegraphic communications. The city fiscal, Anacleto Diaz, would
seem to have done no more than to fulfill his duty as the legal representative of the city
government. Finding him innocent of any disrespect to the court, his counter-motion to strike
from the record the memorandum of attorney for the petitioners, which brings him into this
undesirable position, must be granted. When all is said and done, as far as this record discloses,
the official who was primarily responsible for the unlawful deportation, who ordered the police
to accomplish the same, who made arrangements for the steamers and the constabulary, who
conducted the negotiations with the Bureau of Labor, and who later, as the head of the city
government, had it within his power to facilitate the return of the unfortunate women to Manila,
was Justo Lukban, the Mayor of the city of Manila. His intention to suppress the social evil was
commendable. His methods were unlawful. His regard for the writ of habeas corpus issued by
the court was only tardily and reluctantly acknowledged.
It would be possible to turn to the provisions of section 546 of the Code of Civil Procedure,
which relates to the penalty for disobeying the writ, and in pursuance thereof to require
respondent Lukban to forfeit to the parties aggrieved as much as P400 each, which would reach
to many thousands of pesos, and in addition to deal with him as for a contempt. Some members
of the court are inclined to this stern view. It would also be possible to find that since respondent
Lukban did comply substantially with the second order of the court, he has purged his contempt
of the first order. Some members of the court are inclined to this merciful view. Between the two
extremes appears to lie the correct finding. The failure of respondent Lukban to obey the first
mandate of the court tended to belittle and embarrass the administration of justice to such an
extent that his later activity may be considered only as extenuating his conduct. A nominal fine
will at once command such respect without being unduly oppressive such an amount is P100.
In resume as before stated, no further action on the writ of habeas corpus is necessary. The
respondents Hohmann, Rodriguez, Ordax, Joaquin, Yigo, and Diaz are found not to be in
contempt of court. Respondent Lukban is found in contempt of court and shall pay into the office
of the clerk of the Supreme Court within five days the sum of one hundred pesos (P100). The
motion of the fiscal of the city of Manila to strike from the record the Replica al Memorandum
de los Recurridos of January 25, 1919, is granted. Costs shall be taxed against respondents. So
ordered.
In concluding this tedious and disagreeable task, may we not be permitted to express the hope
that this decision may serve to bulwark the fortifications of an orderly government of laws and to
protect individual liberty from illegal encroachment.
Arellano,
C.J.,
Avancea
Johnson, and Street, JJ., concur in the result.
and
Moir,
JJ., concur.
Separate Opinions
TORRES, J., dissenting:
The undersigned does not entirely agree to the opinion of the majority in the decision of
the habeas corpusproceeding against Justo Lukban, the mayor of this city.
There is nothing in the record that shows the motive which impelled Mayor Lukban to oblige a
great number of women of various ages, inmates of the houses of prostitution situated in
Gardenia Street, district of Sampaloc, to change their residence.
We know no express law, regulation, or ordinance which clearly prohibits the opening of public
houses of prostitution, as those in the said Gardenia Street, Sampaloc. For this reason, when
more than one hundred and fifty women were assembled and placed aboard a steamer and
transported to Davao, considering that the existence of the said houses of prostitution has been
tolerated for so long a time, it is undeniable that the mayor of the city, in proceeding in the
manner shown, acted without authority of any legal provision which constitutes an exception to
the laws guaranteeing the liberty and the individual rights of the residents of the city of Manila.
We do not believe in the pomp and obstentation of force displayed by the police in complying
with the order of the mayor of the city; neither do we believe in the necessity of taking them to
the distant district of Davao. The said governmental authority, in carrying out his intention to
suppress the segregated district or the community formed by those women in Gardenia Street,
could have obliged the said women to return to their former residences in this city or in the
provinces, without the necessity of transporting them to Mindanao; hence the said official is
obliged to bring back the women who are still in Davao so that they may return to the places in
which they lived prior to their becoming inmates of certain houses in Gardenia Street.
As regards the manner whereby the mayor complied with the orders of this court, we do not find
any apparent disobedience and marked absence of respect in the steps taken by the mayor of the
city and his subordinates, if we take into account the difficulties encountered in bringing the said
women who were free at Davao and presenting them before this court within the time fixed,
inasmuch as it does not appear that the said women were living together in a given place. It was
not because they were really detained, but because on the first days there were no houses in
which they could live with a relative independent from one another, and as a proof that they were
free a number of them returned to Manila and the others succeeded in living separate from their
companions who continued living together.
To determine whether or not the mayor acted with a good purpose and legal object and whether
he has acted in good or bad faith in proceeding to dissolve the said community of prostitutes and
to oblige them to change their domicile, it is necessary to consider not only the rights and
interests of the said women and especially of the patrons who have been directing and
conducting such a reproachable enterprise and shameful business in one of the suburbs of this
city, but also the rights and interests of the very numerous people of Manila where relatively a
few transients accidentally and for some days reside, the inhabitants thereof being more than
three hundred thousand (300,000) who can not, with indifference and without repugnance, live in
the same place with so many unfortunate women dedicated to prostitution.
If the material and moral interests of the community as well as the demands of social morality
are to be taken into account, it is not possible to sustain that it is legal and permissible to
establish a house of pandering or prostitution in the midst of an enlightened population, for,
although there were no positive laws prohibiting the existence of such houses within a district of
Manila, the dictates of common sense and dictates of conscience of its inhabitants are sufficient
to warrant the public administration, acting correctly, in exercising the inevitable duty of
ordering the closing and abandonment of a house of prostitution ostensibly open to the public,
and of obliging the inmates thereof to leave it, although such a house is inhabited by its true
owner who invokes in his behalf the protection of the constitutional law guaranteeing his liberty,
his individual rights, and his right to property.
A cholera patient, a leper, or any other person affected by a known contagious disease cannot
invoke in his favor the constitutional law which guarantees his liberty and individual rights,
should the administrative authority order his hospitalization, reclusion, or concentration in a
certain island or distant point in order to free from contagious the great majority of the
inhabitants of the country who fortunately do not have such diseases. The same reasons exist or
stand good with respect to the unfortunate women dedicated to prostitution, and such reasons
become stronger because the first persons named have contracted their diseases without their
knowledge and even against their will, whereas the unfortunate prostitutes voluntarily adopted
such manner of living and spontaneously accepted all its consequences, knowing positively that
their constant intercourse with men of all classes, notwithstanding the cleanliness and precaution
which they are wont to adopt, gives way to the spread or multiplication of the disease known as
syphilis, a venereal disease, which, although it constitutes a secret disease among men and
women, is still prejudicial to the human species in the same degree, scope, and seriousness as
cholera, tuberculosis, leprosy, pest, typhoid, and other contagious diseases which produce great
mortality and very serious prejudice to poor humanity.
If a young woman, instead of engaging in an occupation or works suitable to her sex, which can
give her sufficient remuneration for her subsistence, prefers to put herself under the will of
another woman who is usually older than she is and who is the manager or owner of a house of
prostitution, or spontaneously dedicates herself to this shameful profession, it is undeniable that
she voluntarily and with her own knowledge renounces her liberty and individual rights
guaranteed by the Constitution, because it is evident that she can not join the society of decent
women nor can she expect to get the same respect that is due to the latter, nor is it possible for
her to live within the community or society with the same liberty and rights enjoyed by every
citizen. Considering her dishonorable conduct and life, she should therefore be comprised within
that class which is always subject to the police and sanitary regulations conducive to the
maintenance of public decency and morality and to the conservation of public health, and for this
reason it should not permitted that the unfortunate women dedicated to prostitution evade the just
orders and resolutions adopted by the administrative authorities.
It is regrettable that unnecessary rigor was employed against the said poor women, but those who
have been worrying so much about the prejudice resulting from a governmental measure, which
being a very drastic remedy may be considered arbitrary, have failed to consider with due
reflection the interests of the inhabitants of this city in general and particularly the duties and
responsibilities weighing upon the authorities which administer and govern it; they have
forgotten that many of those who criticize and censure the mayor are fathers of families and are
in duty bound to take care of their children.
For the foregoing reasons, we reach the conclusion that when the petitioners, because of the
abnormal life they assumed, were obliged to change their residence not by a private citizen but
by the mayor of the city who is directly responsible for the conservation of public health and
social morality, the latter could take the step he had taken, availing himself of the services of the
police in good faith and only with the purpose of protecting the immense majority of the
population from the social evils and diseases which the houses of prostitution situated in
Gardenia Street have been producing, which houses have been constituting for years a true center
for the propagation of general diseases and other evils derived therefrom. Hence, in ordering the
dissolution and abandonment of the said houses of prostitution and the change of the domicile of
the inmates thereof, the mayor did not in bad faith violate the constitutional laws which
guarantees the liberty and the individual rights of every Filipino, inasmuch as the women
petitioners do not absolutely enjoy the said liberty and rights, the exercise of which they have
voluntarily renounced in exchange for the free practice of their shameful profession.
In very highly advanced and civilized countries, there have been adopted by the administrative
authorities similar measures, more or less rigorous, respecting prostitutes, considering them
prejudicial to the people, although it is true that in the execution of such measures more humane
and less drastic procedures, fortiter in re et suaviter in forma, have been adopted, but such
procedures have always had in view the ultimate object of the Government for the sake of the
community, that is, putting an end to the living together in a certain place of women dedicated to
prostitution and changing their domicile, with the problematical hope that they adopt another
manner of living which is better and more useful to themselves and to society.
In view of the foregoing remarks, we should hold, as we hereby hold, that Mayor Justo Lukban is
obliged to take back and restore the said women who are at present found in Davao, and who
desire to return to their former respective residences, not in Gardenia Street, Sampaloc District,
with the exception of the prostitutes who should expressly make known to the clerk of court their
preference to reside in Davao, which manifestation must be made under oath. This resolution
must be transmitted to the mayor within the shortest time possible for its due compliance. The
costs shall be charged de officio.
ARAULLO, J., dissenting in part:
I regret to dissent from the respectable opinion of the majority in the decision rendered in these
proceedings, with respect to the finding as to the importance of the contempt committed,
according to the same decision, by Justo Lukban, Mayor of the city of Manila, and the
consequent imposition upon him of a nominal fine of P100.
In the said decision, it is said:
The first order, it will be recalled, directed Justo Lukban, Anton Hohmann, Francisco
Sales, and Feliciano Yigo to present the persons named in the writ before the court on
December 2, 1918. The order was dated November 4, 1918. The respondents were thus
given ample time, practically one month, to comply with the writ. As far as the record
disclosed, the mayor of the city of Manila waited until the 21st of November before
sending a telegram to the provincial governor of Davao. According to the response of the
Attorney for the Bureau of Labor to the telegram of his chief, there were then in Davao
women who desired to return to Manila, but who should not be permitted to do so
because of having contracted debts. The half-hearted effort naturally resulted in none of
the parties in question being brought before the court on the day named.
In accordance with section 87 of General Orders No. 58, as said in the same decision, the
respondents, for the purpose of complying with the order of the court, could have, (1) produced
the bodies of the persons according to the command of the writ; (2) shown by affidavits that on
account of sickness or infirmity the said women could not safely be brought before this court;
and (3) presented affidavits to show that the parties in question or their lawyers waived their
right to be present. According to the same decision, the said respondents ". . . did not produce the
bodies of the persons in whose behalf the writ was granted; did not show impossibility of
performance; and did not present writings, that waived the right to be present by those interested.
Instead, a few stereotyped affidavits purporting to show that the women were contented with
their life in Davao, some of which have since been repudiated by the signers, were appended to
the return. That through ordinary diligence a considerable number of the women, at least sixty,
could have been brought back to Manila is demonstrated by the fact that during this time they
were easily to be found in the municipality of Davao, and that about this number either returned
at their own expense or were produced at the second hearing by the respondents."
The majority opinion also recognized that, "That court, at the time the return to its first order was
made, would have been warranted summarily in finding the respondent guilty of contempt of
court, and in sending them to jail until they obeyed the order. Their excuses for the non
production of the persons were far from sufficient." To corroborate this, the majority decision
cites the case of the Queen vs. Barnardo, Gossage's Case ([1890], 24 Q. B. D., 283) and added
"that the return did not show that every possible effort to produce the women was made by the
respondents."
When the said return by the respondents was made to this court in banc and the case discussed,
my opinion was that Mayor Lukban should have been immediately punished for contempt.
Nevertheless, a second order referred to in the decision was issued on December 10, 1918,
requiring the respondents to produce before the court, on January 13, 1919, the women who were
not in Manila, unless they could show that it was impossible to comply with the said order on the
two grounds previously mentioned. With respect to this second order, the same decision has the
following to say:
In response to the second order of the court, the respondents appear to have become more
zealous and to have shown a better spirit. Agents were dispatched to Mindanao, placards
were posted, the constabulary and the municipal police joined in rounding up the women,
and a steamer with free transportation to Manila was provided. While charges and
countercharges in such a bitterly contested case are to be expected, and while a critical
reading of the record might reveal a failure of literal fulfillment with our mandate, we
come to conclude that there is a substantial compliance with it.
I do not agree to this conclusion.
The respondent mayor of the city of Manila, Justo Lukban, let 17 days elapse from the date of
the issuance of the first order on November 4th till the 21st of the same month before taking the
first step for compliance with the mandate of the said order; he waited till the 21st of November,
as the decision says, before he sent a telegram to the provincial governor o f Davao and naturally
this half-hearted effort, as is so qualified in the decision, resulted in that none of the women
appeared before this court on December 2nd. Thus, the said order was not complied with, and in
addition to this noncompliance there was the circumstances that seven of the said women having
returned to Manila at their own expense before the said second day of December and being in the
antechamber of the court room, which fact was known to Chief of Police Hohmann, who was
then present at the trial and to the attorney for the respondents, were not produced before the
court by the respondents nor did the latter show any effort to present them, in spite of the fact
that their attention was called to this particular by the undersigned.
The result of the said second order was, as is said in the same decision, that the respondents, on
January 13th, the day fixed for the protection of the women before this court, presented
technically the seven (7) women above-mentioned who had returned to the city at their own
expense and the other eight (8) women whom the respondents themselves brought to Manila,
alleging moreover that their agents and subordinates succeeded in bringing them from Davao
with their consent; that in Davao they found eighty-one (81) women who, when asked if they
desired to return to Manila with free transportation, renounced such a right, as is shown in the
affidavits presented by the respondents to this effect; that, through other means, fifty-nine (59)
women have already returned to Manila, but notwithstanding the efforts made to find them it was
not possible to locate the whereabouts of twenty-six (26) of them. Thus, in short, out of the one
hundred and eighty-one (181) women who, as has been previously said, have been illegally
detained by Mayor Lukban and Chief of Police Hohmann and transported to Davao against their
will, only eight (8) have been brought to Manila and presented before this court by the
respondents in compliance with the said two orders. Fifty-nine (59) of them have returned to
Manila through other means not furnished by the respondents, twenty-six of whom were brought
by the attorney for the petitioners, Mendoza, on his return from Davao. The said attorney paid
out of his own pocket the transportation of the said twenty-six women. Adding to these numbers
the other seven (7) women who returned to this city at their own expense before January 13 we
have a total of sixty-six (66), which evidently proves, on the one hand, the falsity of the
allegation by the respondents in their first answer at the trial of December 2, 1918, giving as one
of the reasons for their inability to present any of the said women that the latter were content
with their life in Mindanao and did not desire to return to Manila; and, on the other hand, that the
respondents, especially the first named, that is Mayor Justo Lukban, who acted as chief and
principal in all that refers to the compliance with the orders issued by this court, could bring
before December 2nd, the date of the first hearing of the case, as well as before January 13th, the
date fixed for the compliance with the second order, if not the seventy-four (74) women already
indicated, at least a great number of them, or at least sixty (60) of them, as is said in the majority
decision, inasmuch as the said respondent could count upon the aid of the Constabulary forces
and the municipal police, and had transportation facilities for the purpose. But the said
respondent mayor brought only eight (8) of the women before this court on January 13th. This
fact can not, in my judgment, with due respect to the majority opinion, justify the conclusion that
the said respondent has substantially complied with the second order of this court, but on the
other hand demonstrates that he had not complied with the mandate of this court in its first and
second orders; that neither of the said orders has been complied with by the respondent Justo
Lukban, Mayor of the city of Manila, who is, according to the majority decision, principally
responsible for the contempt, to which conclusion I agree. The conduct of the said respondent
with respect to the second order confirms the contempt committed by non-compliance with the
first order and constitutes a new contempt because of non-compliance with the second, because
of the production of only eight (8) of the one hundred and eighty-one (181) women who have
been illegally detained by virtue of his order and transported to Davao against their will,
committing the twenty-six (26) women who could not be found in Davao, demonstrates in my
opinion that, notwithstanding the nature of the case which deals with the remedy of habeas
corpus, presented by the petitioners and involving the question whether they should or not be
granted their liberty, the respondent has not given due attention to the same nor has he made any
effort to comply with the second order. In other words, he has disobeyed the said two orders; has
despised the authority of this court; has failed to give the respect due to justice; and lastly, he has
created and placed obstacles to the administration of justice in the said habeas
corpus proceeding, thus preventing, because of his notorious disobedience, the resolution of the
said proceeding with the promptness which the nature of the same required.
Contempt of court has been defined as a despising of the authority, justice, or dignity of
the court; and he is guilty of contempt whose conduct is such as tends to bring the
authority and administration of the law into disrespect or disregard. . . ." (Ruling Case
Law, vol. 6, p. 488.)
It is a general principle that a disobedience of any valid order of the court constitutes
contempt, unless the defendant is unable to comply therewith. (Ruling Case Law, vol. 6,
p. 502.)
It is contempt to employ a subterfuge to evade the judgment of the court, or to obstruct or

attempt to obstruct the service of legal process. If a person hinders or prevents the service
of process by deceiving the officer or circumventing him by any means, the result is the
same as though he had obstructed by some direct means. (Ruling Case Law, vol. 6, p.
503.)
While it may seem somewhat incongruous to speak, as the courts often do, of enforcing
respect for the law and for the means it has provided in civilized communities for
establishing justice, since true respect never comes in that way, it is apparent nevertheless
that the power to enforce decorum in the courts and obedience to their orders and just
measures is so essentially a part of the life of the courts that it would be difficult to
conceive of their usefulness or efficiency as existing without it. Therefore it may be said
generally that where due respect for the courts as ministers of the law is wanting, a
necessity arises for the use of compulsion, not, however, so much to excite individual
respect as to compel obedience or to remove an unlawful or unwarranted interference
with the administration of justice. (Ruling Case Law, vol. 6, p. 487.)
The power to punish for contempt is as old as the law itself, and has been exercised from
the earliest times. In England it has been exerted when the contempt consisted of
scandalizing the sovereign or his ministers, the law-making power, or the courts. In the
American states the power to punish for contempt, so far as the executive department and
the ministers of state are concerned, and in some degree so far as the legislative
department is concerned, is obsolete, but it has been almost universally preserved so far
as regards the judicial department. The power which the courts have of vindicating their
own authority is a necessary incident to every court of justice, whether of record or not;
and the authority for issuing attachments in a proper case for contempts out of court, it
has been declared, stands upon the same immemorial usage as supports the whole fabric
of the common law. . . . (Ruling Case Law, vol. 6, p. 489.)
The undisputed importance of the orders of this court which have been disobeyed; the loss of the
prestige of the authority of the court which issued the said orders, which loss might have been
caused by noncompliance with the same orders on the part of the respondent Justo Lukban; the
damages which might have been suffered by some of the women illegally detained, in view of
the fact that they were not brought to Manila by the respondents to be presented before the court
and of the further fact that some of them were obliged to come to this city at their own expense
while still others were brought to Manila by the attorney for the petitioners, who paid out of his
own pocket the transportation of the said women; and the delay which was necessarily incurred
in the resolution of the petition interposed by the said petitioners and which was due to the fact
that the said orders were not opportunately and duly obeyed and complied with, are
circumstances which should be taken into account in imposing upon the respondent Justo
Lukban the penalty corresponding to the contempt committed by him, a penalty which,
according to section 236 of the Code of Civil Procedure, should consist of a fine not exceeding
P1,000 or imprisonment not exceeding months, or both such fine and imprisonment. In the
imposition of the penalty, there should also be taken into consideration the special circumstance
that the contempt was committed by a public authority, the mayor of the city of Manila, the first
executive authority of the city, and consequently, the person obliged to be the first in giving an
example of obedience and respect for the laws and the valid and just orders of the duly
constituted authorities as well as for the orders emanating from the courts of justice, and in
giving help and aid to the said courts in order that justice may be administered with promptness
and rectitude.
I believe, therefore, that instead of the fine of one hundred pesos (P100), there should be
imposed upon the respondent Justo Lukban a fine of five hundred pesos (P500), and all the costs
should be charged against him. Lastly, I believe it to be my duty to state here that the records of
this proceeding should be transmitted to the Attorney-General in order that, after a study of the
same and deduction from the testimony which he may deem necessary, and the proper transmittal
of the same to the fiscal of the city of Manila and to the provincial fiscal of Davao, both the latter
shall present the corresponding informations for the prosecution and punishment of the crimes
which have been committed on the occasion when the illegal detention of the women was carried
into effect by Mayor Justo Lukban of the city of Manila and Chief of Police Anton Hohmann,
and also of those crimes committed by reason of the same detention and while the women were
in Davao. This will be one of the means whereby the just hope expressed in the majority decision
will be realized, that is, that in the Philippine Islands there should exist a government of laws and
not a government of men and that this decision may serve to bulwark the fortifications of an
orderly Government of laws and to protect individual liberty from illegal encroachments.

SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-7995
May 31, 1957
LAO H. ICHONG, in his own behalf and in behalf of other alien residents, corporations
and partnerships adversely affected. by Republic Act No. 1180, petitioner,
vs.
JAIME HERNANDEZ, Secretary of Finance, and MARCELINO SARMIENTO, City
Treasurer of Manila,respondents.
Ozaeta, Lichauco and Picazo and Sycip, Quisumbing, Salazar and Associates for petitioner.
Office of the Solicitor General Ambrosio Padilla and Solicitor Pacifico P. de Castro for
respondent Secretary of Finance.
City Fiscal Eugenio Angeles and Assistant City Fiscal Eulogio S. Serrano for respondent City
Treasurer.
Dionisio Reyes as Amicus Curiae.
Marcial G. Mendiola as Amicus Curiae.
Emiliano R. Navarro as Amicus Curiae.
LABRADOR, J.:
I. The case and issue, in general
This Court has before it the delicate task of passing upon the validity and constitutionality of a
legislative enactment, fundamental and far-reaching in significance. The enactment poses
questions of due process, police power and equal protection of the laws. It also poses an
important issue of fact, that is whether the conditions which the disputed law purports to remedy
really or actually exist. Admittedly springing from a deep, militant, and positive nationalistic
impulse, the law purports to protect citizen and country from the alien retailer. Through it, and
within the field of economy it regulates, Congress attempts to translate national aspirations for
economic independence and national security, rooted in the drive and urge for national survival
and welfare, into a concrete and tangible measures designed to free the national retailer from the
competing dominance of the alien, so that the country and the nation may be free from a
supposed economic dependence and bondage. Do the facts and circumstances justify the
enactment?
II. Pertinent provisions of Republic Act No. 1180
Republic Act No. 1180 is entitled "An Act to Regulate the Retail Business." In effect it
nationalizes the retail trade business. The main provisions of the Act are: (1) a prohibition against
persons, not citizens of the Philippines, and against associations, partnerships, or corporations the
capital of which are not wholly owned by citizens of the Philippines, from engaging directly or
indirectly in the retail trade; (2) an exception from the above prohibition in favor of aliens
actually engaged in said business on May 15, 1954, who are allowed to continue to engaged
therein, unless their licenses are forfeited in accordance with the law, until their death or
voluntary retirement in case of natural persons, and for ten years after the approval of the Act or
until the expiration of term in case of juridical persons; (3) an exception therefrom in favor of
citizens and juridical entities of the United States; (4) a provision for the forfeiture of licenses (to
engage in the retail business) for violation of the laws on nationalization, control weights and
measures and labor and other laws relating to trade, commerce and industry; (5) a prohibition
against the establishment or opening by aliens actually engaged in the retail business of
additional stores or branches of retail business, (6) a provision requiring aliens actually engaged
in the retail business to present for registration with the proper authorities a verified statement
concerning their businesses, giving, among other matters, the nature of the business, their assets
and liabilities and their offices and principal offices of judicial entities; and (7) a provision
allowing the heirs of aliens now engaged in the retail business who die, to continue such business
for a period of six months for purposes of liquidation.
III. Grounds upon which petition is based-Answer thereto
Petitioner, for and in his own behalf and on behalf of other alien residents corporations and
partnerships adversely affected by the provisions of Republic Act. No. 1180, brought this action
to obtain a judicial declaration that said Act is unconstitutional, and to enjoin the Secretary of
Finance and all other persons acting under him, particularly city and municipal treasurers, from
enforcing its provisions. Petitioner attacks the constitutionality of the Act, contending that: (1) it
denies to alien residents the equal protection of the laws and deprives of their liberty and
property without due process of law ; (2) the subject of the Act is not expressed or comprehended
in the title thereof; (3) the Act violates international and treaty obligations of the Republic of the
Philippines; (4) the provisions of the Act against the transmission by aliens of their retail
business thru hereditary succession, and those requiring 100% Filipino capitalization for a
corporation or entity to entitle it to engage in the retail business, violate the spirit of Sections 1
and 5, Article XIII and Section 8 of Article XIV of the Constitution.
In answer, the Solicitor-General and the Fiscal of the City of Manila contend that: (1) the Act
was passed in the valid exercise of the police power of the State, which exercise is authorized in
the Constitution in the interest of national economic survival; (2) the Act has only one subject
embraced in the title; (3) no treaty or international obligations are infringed; (4) as regards
hereditary succession, only the form is affected but the value of the property is not impaired, and
the institution of inheritance is only of statutory origin.
IV. Preliminary consideration of legal principles involved
a. The police power.
There is no question that the Act was approved in the exercise of the police power, but petitioner
claims that its exercise in this instance is attended by a violation of the constitutional
requirements of due process and equal protection of the laws. But before proceeding to the
consideration and resolution of the ultimate issue involved, it would be well to bear in mind
certain basic and fundamental, albeit preliminary, considerations in the determination of the ever
recurrent conflict between police power and the guarantees of due process and equal protection
of the laws. What is the scope of police power, and how are the due process and equal protection
clauses related to it? What is the province and power of the legislature, and what is the function
and duty of the courts? These consideration must be clearly and correctly understood that their
application to the facts of the case may be brought forth with clarity and the issue accordingly
resolved.
It has been said the police power is so far - reaching in scope, that it has become almost
impossible to limit its sweep. As it derives its existence from the very existence of the State
itself, it does not need to be expressed or defined in its scope; it is said to be co-extensive with
self-protection and survival, and as such it is the most positive and active of all governmental
processes, the most essential, insistent and illimitable. Especially is it so under a modern
democratic framework where the demands of society and of nations have multiplied to almost
unimaginable proportions; the field and scope of police power has become almost boundless, just
as the fields of public interest and public welfare have become almost all-embracing and have
transcended human foresight. Otherwise stated, as we cannot foresee the needs and demands of
public interest and welfare in this constantly changing and progressive world, so we cannot
delimit beforehand the extent or scope of police power by which and through which the State
seeks to attain or achieve interest or welfare. So it is that Constitutions do not define the scope or
extent of the police power of the State; what they do is to set forth the limitations thereof. The
most important of these are the due process clause and the equal protection clause.
b. Limitations on police power.
The basic limitations of due process and equal protection are found in the following provisions
of our Constitution:
SECTION 1.(1) No person shall be deprived of life, liberty or property without due
process of law, nor any person be denied the equal protection of the laws. (Article III,
Phil. Constitution)
These constitutional guarantees which embody the essence of individual liberty and freedom in
democracies, are not limited to citizens alone but are admittedly universal in their application,
without regard to any differences of race, of color, or of nationality. (Yick Wo vs. Hopkins, 30, L.
ed. 220, 226.)
c. The, equal protection clause.
The equal protection of the law clause is against undue favor and individual or class privilege, as
well as hostile discrimination or the oppression of inequality. It is not intended to prohibit
legislation, which is limited either in the object to which it is directed or by territory within
which is to operate. It does not demand absolute equality among residents; it merely requires that
all persons shall be treated alike, under like circumstances and conditions both as to privileges
conferred and liabilities enforced. The equal protection clause is not infringed by legislation
which applies only to those persons falling within a specified class, if it applies alike to all
persons within such class, and reasonable grounds exists for making a distinction between those
who fall within such class and those who do not. (2 Cooley, Constitutional Limitations, 824825.)
d. The due process clause.
The due process clause has to do with the reasonableness of legislation enacted in pursuance of
the police power. Is there public interest, a public purpose; is public welfare involved? Is the Act
reasonably necessary for the accomplishment of the legislature's purpose; is it not unreasonable,
arbitrary or oppressive? Is there sufficient foundation or reason in connection with the matter
involved; or has there not been a capricious use of the legislative power? Can the aims conceived
be achieved by the means used, or is it not merely an unjustified interference with private
interest? These are the questions that we ask when the due process test is applied.
The conflict, therefore, between police power and the guarantees of due process and equal
protection of the laws is more apparent than real. Properly related, the power and the guarantees
are supposed to coexist. The balancing is the essence or, shall it be said, the indispensable means
for the attainment of legitimate aspirations of any democratic society. There can be no absolute
power, whoever exercise it, for that would be tyranny. Yet there can neither be absolute liberty,
for that would mean license and anarchy. So the State can deprive persons of life, liberty and
property, provided there is due process of law; and persons may be classified into classes and
groups, provided everyone is given the equal protection of the law. The test or standard, as
always, is reason. The police power legislation must be firmly grounded on public interest and
welfare, and a reasonable relation must exist between purposes and means. And if distinction and
classification has been made, there must be a reasonable basis for said distinction.
e. Legislative discretion not subject to judicial review.
Now, in this matter of equitable balancing, what is the proper place and role of the courts? It
must not be overlooked, in the first place, that the legislature, which is the constitutional
repository of police power and exercises the prerogative of determining the policy of the State, is
by force of circumstances primarily the judge of necessity, adequacy or reasonableness and
wisdom, of any law promulgated in the exercise of the police power, or of the measures adopted
to implement the public policy or to achieve public interest. On the other hand, courts, although
zealous guardians of individual liberty and right, have nevertheless evinced a reluctance to
interfere with the exercise of the legislative prerogative. They have done so early where there has
been a clear, patent or palpable arbitrary and unreasonable abuse of the legislative prerogative.
Moreover, courts are not supposed to override legitimate policy, and courts never inquire into the
wisdom of the law.
V. Economic problems sought to be remedied
With the above considerations in mind, we will now proceed to delve directly into the issue
involved. If the disputed legislation were merely a regulation, as its title indicates, there would be
no question that it falls within the legitimate scope of legislative power. But it goes further and
prohibits a group of residents, the aliens, from engaging therein. The problem becomes more
complex because its subject is a common, trade or occupation, as old as society itself, which
from the immemorial has always been open to residents, irrespective of race, color or citizenship.
a. Importance of retail trade in the economy of the nation.
In a primitive economy where families produce all that they consume and consume all that they
produce, the dealer, of course, is unknown. But as group life develops and families begin to live
in communities producing more than what they consume and needing an infinite number of
things they do not produce, the dealer comes into existence. As villages develop into big
communities and specialization in production begins, the dealer's importance is enhanced. Under
modern conditions and standards of living, in which man's needs have multiplied and diversified
to unlimited extents and proportions, the retailer comes as essential as the producer, because thru
him the infinite variety of articles, goods and needed for daily life are placed within the easy
reach of consumers. Retail dealers perform the functions of capillaries in the human body, thru
which all the needed food and supplies are ministered to members of the communities
comprising the nation.
There cannot be any question about the importance of the retailer in the life of the community.
He ministers to the resident's daily needs, food in all its increasing forms, and the various little
gadgets and things needed for home and daily life. He provides his customers around his store
with the rice or corn, the fish, the salt, the vinegar, the spices needed for the daily cooking. He
has cloths to sell, even the needle and the thread to sew them or darn the clothes that wear out.
The retailer, therefore, from the lowly peddler, the owner of a small sari-sari store, to the
operator of a department store or, a supermarket is so much a part of day-to-day existence.
b. The alien retailer's trait.
The alien retailer must have started plying his trades in this country in the bigger centers of
population (Time there was when he was unknown in provincial towns and villages). Slowly but
gradually be invaded towns and villages; now he predominates in the cities and big centers of
population. He even pioneers, in far away nooks where the beginnings of community life appear,
ministering to the daily needs of the residents and purchasing their agricultural produce for sale
in the towns. It is an undeniable fact that in many communities the alien has replaced the native
retailer. He has shown in this trade, industry without limit, and the patience and forbearance of a
slave.
Derogatory epithets are hurled at him, but he laughs these off without murmur; insults of ill-bred
and insolent neighbors and customers are made in his face, but he heeds them not, and he forgets
and forgives. The community takes note of him, as he appears to be harmless and extremely
useful.
c. Alleged alien control and dominance.
There is a general feeling on the part of the public, which appears to be true to fact, about the
controlling and dominant position that the alien retailer holds in the nation's economy. Food and
other essentials, clothing, almost all articles of daily life reach the residents mostly through him.
In big cities and centers of population he has acquired not only predominance, but apparent
control over distribution of almost all kinds of goods, such as lumber, hardware, textiles,
groceries, drugs, sugar, flour, garlic, and scores of other goods and articles. And were it not for
some national corporations like the Naric, the Namarco, the Facomas and the Acefa, his control
over principal foods and products would easily become full and complete.
Petitioner denies that there is alien predominance and control in the retail trade. In one breath it
is said that the fear is unfounded and the threat is imagined; in another, it is charged that the law
is merely the result of radicalism and pure and unabashed nationalism. Alienage, it is said, is not
an element of control; also so many unmanageable factors in the retail business make control
virtually impossible. The first argument which brings up an issue of fact merits serious
consideration. The others are matters of opinion within the exclusive competence of the
legislature and beyond our prerogative to pass upon and decide.
The best evidence are the statistics on the retail trade, which put down the figures in black and
white. Between the constitutional convention year (1935), when the fear of alien domination and
control of the retail trade already filled the minds of our leaders with fears and misgivings, and
the year of the enactment of the nationalization of the retail trade act (1954), official statistics
unmistakably point out to the ever-increasing dominance and control by the alien of the retail
trade, as witness the following tables:
Assets
Year and
Retailers
Nationality
No.Establishment
s
Pesos
Gross Sales
Per cent
Distributio
n
Pesos
Per cent
Distributio
n
1941
:
Filipino
..........
106,671 200,323,13
8
55.82 174,181,92
4
51.74
Chinese
15,356 118,348,69
32.98 148,813,23
44.21
...........
Others .
...........
1,646 40,187,090
11.20 13,630,239
4.05
Filipino
..........
111,107 208,658,94
6
65.05 279,583,33
3
57.03
Chinese
...........
13,774 106,156,21
8
33.56 205,701,13
4
41.96
1947
:
Others .
..........
354
8,761,260
.49
4,927,168
1.01
1948 (Census
:
)
Filipino
..........
113,631 213,342,26
4
67.30 467,161,66
7
60.51
Chinese
..........
12,087 93,155,459
29.38 294,894,22
7
38.20
Others .
.........
422 10,514,675
Filipino
..........
Chinese
..........
3.32
9,995,402
1.29
113,659 213,451,60
2
60.89 462,532,90
1
53.47
16,248 125,223,33
6
35.72 392,414,87
5
45.36
1949
:
Others .
.........
486 12,056,365
3.39 10,078,364
1.17
Filipino
.........
119,352 224,053,62
0
61.09 466,058,05
2
53.07
Chinese
..........
17,429 134,325,30
3
36.60 404,481,38
4
46.06
1951
:
Others .
.........
347
8,614,025
2.31
7,645,327
AVERAGE
ASSETS AND GROSS SALES PER ESTABLISHMENT
Year and Retailer's

Nationality
Item
Assets
(Pesos)
Gross
Sales
(Pesos)
1941:
Filipino ...........................................
..
1,878
1,633
Chinese ...........................................
...
7,707
9,691
Others .............................................
..
24,415
8,281
1947:
87
1948:
Filipino ...........................................
..
1,878
2,516
Chinese ...........................................
7,707
14,934
Others .............................................
.
24,749
13,919
Filipino ...........................................
..
1,878
4,111
Chinese ...........................................
..
7,707
24,398
Others .............................................
.
24,916
23,686
Filipino ...........................................
..
1,878
4,069
Chinese ...........................................
...
7,707
24,152
Others .............................................
.
24,807
20,737
(Census)
1949:
1951:
Filipino ...........................................
..
1,877
3,905
Chinese ...........................................
..
7,707
33,207
Others .............................................
..
24,824
22,033
(Estimated Assets and Gross Sales of Retail Establishments, By Year and Nationality of
Owners, Benchmark: 1948 Census, issued by the Bureau of Census and Statistics,
Department of Commerce and Industry; pp. 18-19 of Answer.)
The above statistics do not include corporations and partnerships, while the figures on Filipino
establishments already include mere market vendors, whose capital is necessarily small..
The above figures reveal that in percentage distribution of assests and gross sales, alien
participation has steadily increased during the years. It is true, of course, that Filipinos have the
edge in the number of retailers, but aliens more than make up for the numerical gap through their
assests and gross sales which average between six and seven times those of the very many
Filipino retailers. Numbers in retailers, here, do not imply superiority; the alien invests more
capital, buys and sells six to seven times more, and gains much more. The same official report,
pointing out to the known predominance of foreign elements in the retail trade, remarks that the
Filipino retailers were largely engaged in minor retailer enterprises. As observed by respondents,
the native investment is thinly spread, and the Filipino retailer is practically helpless in matters of
capital, credit, price and supply.
d. Alien control and threat, subject of apprehension in Constitutional convention.
It is this domination and control, which we believe has been sufficiently shown to exist, that is
the legislature's target in the enactment of the disputed nationalization would never have been
adopted. The framers of our Constitution also believed in the existence of this alien dominance
and control when they approved a resolution categorically declaring among other things, that "it
is the sense of the Convention that the public interest requires the nationalization of the retail
trade; . . . ." (II Aruego, The Framing of the Philippine Constitution, 662-663, quoted on page 67
of Petitioner.) That was twenty-two years ago; and the events since then have not been either
pleasant or comforting. Dean Sinco of the University of the Philippines College of Law,
commenting on the patrimony clause of the Preamble opines that the fathers of our Constitution
were merely translating the general preoccupation of Filipinos "of the dangers from alien
interests that had already brought under their control the commercial and other economic
activities of the country" (Sinco, Phil. Political Law, 10th ed., p. 114); and analyzing the concern
of the members of the constitutional convention for the economic life of the citizens, in
connection with the nationalistic provisions of the Constitution, he says:
But there has been a general feeling that alien dominance over the economic life of the
country is not desirable and that if such a situation should remain, political independence
alone is no guarantee to national stability and strength. Filipino private capital is not big
enough to wrest from alien hands the control of the national economy. Moreover, it is but
of recent formation and hence, largely inexperienced, timid and hesitant. Under such
conditions, the government as the instrumentality of the national will, has to step in and
assume the initiative, if not the leadership, in the struggle for the economic freedom of
the nation in somewhat the same way that it did in the crusade for political freedom. Thus
. . . it (the Constitution) envisages an organized movement for the protection of the nation
not only against the possibilities of armed invasion but also against its economic
subjugation by alien interests in the economic field. (Phil. Political Law by Sinco, 10th
ed., p. 476.)
Belief in the existence of alien control and predominance is felt in other quarters. Filipino
businessmen, manufacturers and producers believe so; they fear the dangers coming from alien
control, and they express sentiments of economic independence. Witness thereto is Resolution
No. 1, approved on July 18, 1953, of the Fifth National convention of Filipino Businessmen, and
a similar resolution, approved on March 20, 1954, of the Second National Convention of
Manufacturers and Producers. The man in the street also believes, and fears, alien predominance
and control; so our newspapers, which have editorially pointed out not only to control but to
alien stranglehold. We, therefore, find alien domination and control to be a fact, a reality proved
by official statistics, and felt by all the sections and groups that compose the Filipino community.
e. Dangers of alien control and dominance in retail.
But the dangers arising from alien participation in the retail trade does not seem to lie in the
predominance alone; there is a prevailing feeling that such predominance may truly endanger the
national interest. With ample capital, unity of purpose and action and thorough organization,
alien retailers and merchants can act in such complete unison and concert on such vital matters as
the fixing of prices, the determination of the amount of goods or articles to be made available in
the market, and even the choice of the goods or articles they would or would not patronize or
distribute, that fears of dislocation of the national economy and of the complete subservience of
national economy and of the consuming public are not entirely unfounded. Nationals, producers
and consumers alike can be placed completely at their mercy. This is easily illustrated. Suppose
an article of daily use is desired to be prescribed by the aliens, because the producer or importer
does not offer them sufficient profits, or because a new competing article offers bigger profits for
its introduction. All that aliens would do is to agree to refuse to sell the first article, eliminating it
from their stocks, offering the new one as a substitute. Hence, the producers or importers of the
prescribed article, or its consumers, find the article suddenly out of the prescribed article, or its
consumers, find the article suddenly out of circulation. Freedom of trade is thus curtailed and
free enterprise correspondingly suppressed.
We can even go farther than theoretical illustrations to show the pernicious influences of alien
domination. Grave abuses have characterized the exercise of the retail trade by aliens. It is a fact
within judicial notice, which courts of justice may not properly overlook or ignore in the interests
of truth and justice, that there exists a general feeling on the part of the public that alien
participation in the retail trade has been attended by a pernicious and intolerable practices, the
mention of a few of which would suffice for our purposes; that at some time or other they have
cornered the market of essential commodities, like corn and rice, creating artificial scarcities to
justify and enhance profits to unreasonable proportions; that they have hoarded essential foods to
the inconvenience and prejudice of the consuming public, so much so that the Government has
had to establish the National Rice and Corn Corporation to save the public from their continuous
hoarding practices and tendencies; that they have violated price control laws, especially on foods
and essential commodities, such that the legislature had to enact a law (Sec. 9, Republic Act No.
1168), authorizing their immediate and automatic deportation for price control convictions; that
they have secret combinations among themselves to control prices, cheating the operation of the
law of supply and demand; that they have connived to boycott honest merchants and traders who
would not cater or yield to their demands, in unlawful restraint of freedom of trade and
enterprise. They are believed by the public to have evaded tax laws, smuggled goods and money
into and out of the land, violated import and export prohibitions, control laws and the like, in
derision and contempt of lawful authority. It is also believed that they have engaged in corrupting
public officials with fabulous bribes, indirectly causing the prevalence of graft and corruption in
the Government. As a matter of fact appeals to unscrupulous aliens have been made both by the
Government and by their own lawful diplomatic representatives, action which impliedly admits a
prevailing feeling about the existence of many of the above practices.
The circumstances above set forth create well founded fears that worse things may come in the
future. The present dominance of the alien retailer, especially in the big centers of population,
therefore, becomes a potential source of danger on occasions of war or other calamity. We do not
have here in this country isolated groups of harmless aliens retailing goods among nationals;
what we have are well organized and powerful groups that dominate the distribution of goods
and commodities in the communities and big centers of population. They owe no allegiance or
loyalty to the State, and the State cannot rely upon them in times of crisis or emergency. While
the national holds his life, his person and his property subject to the needs of his country, the
alien may even become the potential enemy of the State.
f. Law enacted in interest of national economic survival and security.
We are fully satisfied upon a consideration of all the facts and circumstances that the disputed
law is not the product of racial hostility, prejudice or discrimination, but the expression of the
legitimate desire and determination of the people, thru their authorized representatives, to free
the nation from the economic situation that has unfortunately been saddled upon it rightly or
wrongly, to its disadvantage. The law is clearly in the interest of the public, nay of the national
security itself, and indisputably falls within the scope of police power, thru which and by which
the State insures its existence and security and the supreme welfare of its citizens.
VI. The Equal Protection Limitation
a. Objections to alien participation in retail trade. The next question that now poses solution
is, Does the law deny the equal protection of the laws? As pointed out above, the mere fact of
alienage is the root and cause of the distinction between the alien and the national as a trader. The
alien resident owes allegiance to the country of his birth or his adopted country; his stay here is
for personal convenience; he is attracted by the lure of gain and profit. His aim or purpose of
stay, we admit, is neither illegitimate nor immoral, but he is naturally lacking in that spirit of
loyalty and enthusiasm for this country where he temporarily stays and makes his living, or of
that spirit of regard, sympathy and consideration for his Filipino customers as would prevent him
from taking advantage of their weakness and exploiting them. The faster he makes his pile, the
earlier can the alien go back to his beloved country and his beloved kin and countrymen. The
experience of the country is that the alien retailer has shown such utter disregard for his
customers and the people on whom he makes his profit, that it has been found necessary to adopt
the legislation, radical as it may seem.
Another objection to the alien retailer in this country is that he never really makes a genuine
contribution to national income and wealth. He undoubtedly contributes to general distribution,
but the gains and profits he makes are not invested in industries that would help the country's
economy and increase national wealth. The alien's interest in this country being merely transient
and temporary, it would indeed be ill-advised to continue entrusting the very important function
of retail distribution to his hands.
The practices resorted to by aliens in the control of distribution, as already pointed out above,
their secret manipulations of stocks of commodities and prices, their utter disregard of the
welfare of their customers and of the ultimate happiness of the people of the nation of which they
are mere guests, which practices, manipulations and disregard do not attend the exercise of the
trade by the nationals, show the existence of real and actual, positive and fundamental
differences between an alien and a national which fully justify the legislative classification
adopted in the retail trade measure. These differences are certainly a valid reason for the State to
prefer the national over the alien in the retail trade. We would be doing violence to fact and
reality were we to hold that no reason or ground for a legitimate distinction can be found
between one and the other.
b. Difference in alien aims and purposes sufficient basis for distinction.

The above objectionable characteristics of the exercise of the retail trade by the aliens, which are
actual and real, furnish sufficient grounds for legislative classification of retail traders into
nationals and aliens. Some may disagree with the wisdom of the legislature's classification. To
this we answer, that this is the prerogative of the law-making power. Since the Court finds that
the classification is actual, real and reasonable, and all persons of one class are treated alike, and
as it cannot be said that the classification is patently unreasonable and unfounded, it is in duty
bound to declare that the legislature acted within its legitimate prerogative and it can not declare
that the act transcends the limit of equal protection established by the Constitution.
Broadly speaking, the power of the legislature to make distinctions and classifications among
persons is not curtailed or denied by the equal protection of the laws clause. The legislative
power admits of a wide scope of discretion, and a law can be violative of the constitutional
limitation only when the classification is without reasonable basis. In addition to the authorities
we have earlier cited, we can also refer to the case of Linsey vs. Natural Carbonic Fas Co.
(1911), 55 L. ed., 369, which clearly and succinctly defined the application of equal protection
clause to a law sought to be voided as contrary thereto:
. . . . "1. The equal protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment does not take from the
state the power to classify in the adoption of police laws, but admits of the exercise of the
wide scope of discretion in that regard, and avoids what is done only when it is without
any reasonable basis, and therefore is purely arbitrary. 2. A classification having some
reasonable basis does not offend against that clause merely because it is not made with
mathematical nicety, or because in practice it results in some inequality. 3. When the
classification in such a law is called in question, if any state of facts reasonably can be
conceived that would sustain it, the existence of that state of facts at the time the law was
enacted must be assumed. 4. One who assails the classification in such a law must carry
the burden of showing that it does not rest upon any reasonable basis but is essentially
arbitrary."
c. Authorities recognizing citizenship as basis for classification.
The question as to whether or not citizenship is a legal and valid ground for classification has
already been affirmatively decided in this jurisdiction as well as in various courts in the United
States. In the case of Smith Bell & Co. vs. Natividad, 40 Phil. 136, where the validity of Act No.
2761 of the Philippine Legislature was in issue, because of a condition therein limiting the
ownership of vessels engaged in coastwise trade to corporations formed by citizens of the
Philippine Islands or the United States, thus denying the right to aliens, it was held that the
Philippine Legislature did not violate the equal protection clause of the Philippine Bill of Rights.
The legislature in enacting the law had as ultimate purpose the encouragement of Philippine
shipbuilding and the safety for these Islands from foreign interlopers. We held that this was a
valid exercise of the police power, and all presumptions are in favor of its constitutionality. In
substance, we held that the limitation of domestic ownership of vessels engaged in coastwise
trade to citizens of the Philippines does not violate the equal protection of the law and due
process or law clauses of the Philippine Bill of Rights. In rendering said decision we quoted with
approval the concurring opinion of Justice Johnson in the case of Gibbons vs. Ogden, 9 Wheat.,
I, as follows:
"Licensing acts, in fact, in legislation, are universally restraining acts; as, for example,
acts licensing gaming houses, retailers of spirituous liquors, etc. The act, in this instance,
is distinctly of that character, and forms part of an extensive system, the object of which
is to encourage American shipping, and place them on an equal footing with the shipping
of other nations. Almost every commercial nation reserves to its own subjects a
monopoly of its coasting trade; and a countervailing privilege in favor of American
shipping is contemplated, in the whole legislation of the United States on this subject. It
is not to give the vessel an American character, that the license is granted; that effect has
been correctly attributed to the act of her enrollment. But it is to confer on her American
privileges, as contra distinguished from foreign; and to preserve the Government from
fraud by foreigners; in surreptitiously intruding themselves into the American commercial
marine, as well as frauds upon the revenue in the trade coastwise, that this whole system
is projected."
The rule in general is as follows:
Aliens are under no special constitutional protection which forbids a classification
otherwise justified simply because the limitation of the class falls along the lines of
nationality. That would be requiring a higher degree of protection for aliens as a class
than for similar classes than for similar classes of American citizens. Broadly speaking,
the difference in status between citizens and aliens constitutes a basis for reasonable
classification in the exercise of police power. (2 Am., Jur. 468-469.)
In Commonwealth vs. Hana, 81 N. E. 149 (Massachusetts, 1907), a statute on the licensing of
hawkers and peddlers, which provided that no one can obtain a license unless he is, or has
declared his intention, to become a citizen of the United States, was held valid, for the following
reason: It may seem wise to the legislature to limit the business of those who are supposed to
have regard for the welfare, good order and happiness of the community, and the court cannot
question this judgment and conclusion. In Bloomfield vs. State, 99 N. E. 309 (Ohio, 1912), a
statute which prevented certain persons, among them aliens, from engaging in the traffic of
liquors, was found not to be the result of race hatred, or in hospitality, or a deliberate purpose to
discriminate, but was based on the belief that an alien cannot be sufficiently acquainted with "our
institutions and our life as to enable him to appreciate the relation of this particular business to
our entire social fabric", and was not, therefore, invalid. In Ohio ex rel. Clarke vs. Deckebach,
274 U. S. 392, 71 L. ed. 115 (1926), the U.S. Supreme Court had under consideration an
ordinance of the city of Cincinnati prohibiting the issuance of licenses (pools and billiard rooms)
to aliens. It held that plainly irrational discrimination against aliens is prohibited, but it does not
follow that alien race and allegiance may not bear in some instances such a relation to a
legitimate object of legislation as to be made the basis of permitted classification, and that it
could not state that the legislation is clearly wrong; and that latitude must be allowed for the
legislative appraisement of local conditions and for the legislative choice of methods for
controlling an apprehended evil. The case of State vs. Carrol, 124 N. E. 129 (Ohio, 1919) is a
parallel case to the one at bar. In Asakura vs. City of Seattle, 210 P. 30 (Washington, 1922), the
business of pawn brooking was considered as having tendencies injuring public interest, and
limiting it to citizens is within the scope of police power. A similar statute denying aliens the
right to engage in auctioneering was also sustained in Wright vs. May, L.R.A., 1915 P. 151
(Minnesota, 1914). So also in Anton vs. Van Winkle, 297 F. 340 (Oregon, 1924), the court said
that aliens are judicially known to have different interests, knowledge, attitude, psychology and
loyalty, hence the prohibitions of issuance of licenses to them for the business of pawnbroker,
pool, billiard, card room, dance hall, is not an infringement of constitutional rights. In Templar
vs. Michigan State Board of Examiners, 90 N.W. 1058 (Michigan, 1902), a law prohibiting the
licensing of aliens as barbers was held void, but the reason for the decision was the court's
findings that the exercise of the business by the aliens does not in any way affect the morals, the
health, or even the convenience of the community. In Takahashi vs. Fish and Game Commission,
92 L. ed. 1479 (1947), a California statute banning the issuance of commercial fishing licenses to
person ineligible to citizenship was held void, because the law conflicts with Federal power over
immigration, and because there is no public interest in the mere claim of ownership of the waters
and the fish in them, so there was no adequate justification for the discrimination. It further
added that the law was the outgrowth of antagonism toward the persons of Japanese ancestry.
However, two Justices dissented on the theory that fishing rights have been treated traditionally
as natural resources. In Fraser vs. McConway & Tarley Co., 82 Fed. 257 (Pennsylvania, 1897), a
state law which imposed a tax on every employer of foreign-born unnaturalized male persons
over 21 years of age, was declared void because the court found that there was no reason for the
classification and the tax was an arbitrary deduction from the daily wage of an employee.
d. Authorities contra explained.

It is true that some decisions of the Federal court and of the State courts in the United States hold
that the distinction between aliens and citizens is not a valid ground for classification. But in this
decision the laws declared invalid were found to be either arbitrary, unreasonable or capricious,
or were the result or product of racial antagonism and hostility, and there was no question of
public interest involved or pursued. In Yu Cong Eng vs. Trinidad, 70 L. ed. 1059 (1925), the
United States Supreme Court declared invalid a Philippine law making unlawful the keeping of
books of account in any language other than English, Spanish or any other local dialect, but the
main reasons for the decisions are: (1) that if Chinese were driven out of business there would be
no other system of distribution, and (2) that the Chinese would fall prey to all kinds of fraud,
because they would be deprived of their right to be advised of their business and to direct its
conduct. The real reason for the decision, therefore, is the court's belief that no public benefit
would be derived from the operations of the law and on the other hand it would deprive Chinese
of something indispensable for carrying on their business. In Yick Wo vs. Hopkins, 30 L. ed 220
(1885) an ordinance conferring powers on officials to withhold consent in the operation of
laundries both as to persons and place, was declared invalid, but the court said that the power
granted was arbitrary, that there was no reason for the discrimination which attended the
administration and implementation of the law, and that the motive thereof was mere racial
hostility. In State vs. Montgomery, 47 A. 165 (Maine, 1900), a law prohibiting aliens to engage as
hawkers and peddlers was declared void, because the discrimination bore no reasonable and just
relation to the act in respect to which the classification was proposed.
The case at bar is radically different, and the facts make them so. As we already have said, aliens
do not naturally possess the sympathetic consideration and regard for the customers with whom
they come in daily contact, nor the patriotic desire to help bolster the nation's economy, except in
so far as it enhances their profit, nor the loyalty and allegiance which the national owes to the
land. These limitations on the qualifications of the aliens have been shown on many occasions
and instances, especially in times of crisis and emergency. We can do no better than borrow the
language of Anton vs. Van Winkle, 297 F. 340, 342, to drive home the reality and significance of
the distinction between the alien and the national, thus:
. . . . It may be judicially known, however, that alien coming into this country are without
the intimate knowledge of our laws, customs, and usages that our own people have. So it
is likewise known that certain classes of aliens are of different psychology from our
fellow countrymen. Furthermore, it is natural and reasonable to suppose that the foreign
born, whose allegiance is first to their own country, and whose ideals of governmental
environment and control have been engendered and formed under entirely different
regimes and political systems, have not the same inspiration for the public weal, nor are
they as well disposed toward the United States, as those who by citizenship, are a part of
the government itself. Further enlargement, is unnecessary. I have said enough so that
obviously it cannot be affirmed with absolute confidence that the Legislature was without
plausible reason for making the classification, and therefore appropriate discriminations
against aliens as it relates to the subject of legislation. . . . .
VII. The Due Process of Law Limitation.
a. Reasonability, the test of the limitation; determination by legislature decisive.
We now come to due process as a limitation on the exercise of the police power. It has been
stated by the highest authority in the United States that:
. . . . And the guaranty of due process, as has often been held, demands only that the law
shall not be unreasonable, arbitrary or capricious, and that the means selected shall have a
real and substantial relation to the subject sought to be attained. . . . .
xxx
xxx
xxx
So far as the requirement of due process is concerned and in the absence of other
constitutional restriction a state is free to adopt whatever economic policy may
reasonably be deemed to promote public welfare, and to enforce that policy by legislation
adapted to its purpose. The courts are without authority either to declare such policy, or,
when it is declared by the legislature, to override it. If the laws passed are seen to have a
reasonable relation to a proper legislative purpose, and are neither arbitrary nor
discriminatory, the requirements of due process are satisfied, and judicial determination
to that effect renders a court functus officio. . . . (Nebbia vs. New York, 78 L. ed. 940,
950, 957.)
Another authority states the principle thus:
. . . . Too much significance cannot be given to the word "reasonable" in considering the
scope of the police power in a constitutional sense, for the test used to determine the
constitutionality of the means employed by the legislature is to inquire whether the
restriction it imposes on rights secured to individuals by the Bill of Rights are
unreasonable, and not whether it imposes any restrictions on such rights. . . .
xxx
xxx
xxx
. . . . A statute to be within this power must also be reasonable in its operation upon the
persons whom it affects, must not be for the annoyance of a particular class, and must not
be unduly oppressive. (11 Am. Jur. Sec. 302., 1:1)- 1074-1075.)
In the case of Lawton vs. Steele, 38 L. ed. 385, 388. it was also held:
. . . . To justify the state in thus interposing its authority in behalf of the public, it must
appear, first, that the interests of the public generally, as distinguished from those of a
particular class, require such interference; and second, that the means are reasonably
necessary for the accomplishment of the purpose, and not unduly oppressive upon
individuals. . . .
Prata Undertaking Co. vs. State Board of Embalming, 104 ALR, 389, 395, fixes this test of
constitutionality:
In determining whether a given act of the Legislature, passed in the exercise of the police
power to regulate the operation of a business, is or is not constitutional, one of the first
questions to be considered by the court is whether the power as exercised has a sufficient
foundation in reason in connection with the matter involved, or is an arbitrary,
oppressive, and capricious use of that power, without substantial relation to the health,
safety, morals, comfort, and general welfare of the public.
b. Petitioner's argument considered.
Petitioner's main argument is that retail is a common, ordinary occupation, one of those
privileges long ago recognized as essential to the orderly pursuant of happiness by free men; that
it is a gainful and honest occupation and therefore beyond the power of the legislature to prohibit
and penalized. This arguments overlooks fact and reality and rests on an incorrect assumption
and premise, i.e., that in this country where the occupation is engaged in by petitioner, it has
been so engaged by him, by the alien in an honest creditable and unimpeachable manner, without
harm or injury to the citizens and without ultimate danger to their economic peace, tranquility
and welfare. But the Legislature has found, as we have also found and indicated, that the
privilege has been so grossly abused by the alien, thru the illegitimate use of pernicious designs
and practices, that he now enjoys a monopolistic control of the occupation and threatens a deadly
stranglehold on the nation's economy endangering the national security in times of crisis and
emergency.
The real question at issue, therefore, is not that posed by petitioner, which overlooks and ignores
the facts and circumstances, but this, Is the exclusion in the future of aliens from the retail trade
unreasonable. Arbitrary capricious, taking into account the illegitimate and pernicious form and
manner in which the aliens have heretofore engaged therein? As thus correctly stated the answer
is clear. The law in question is deemed absolutely necessary to bring about the desired legislative
objective, i.e., to free national economy from alien control and dominance. It is not necessarily
unreasonable because it affects private rights and privileges (11 Am. Jur. pp. 1080-1081.) The
test of reasonableness of a law is the appropriateness or adequacy under all circumstances of the
means adopted to carry out its purpose into effect (Id.) Judged by this test, disputed legislation,
which is not merely reasonable but actually necessary, must be considered not to have infringed
the constitutional limitation of reasonableness.
The necessity of the law in question is explained in the explanatory note that accompanied the
bill, which later was enacted into law:
This bill proposes to regulate the retail business. Its purpose is to prevent persons who are
not citizens of the Philippines from having a strangle hold upon our economic life. If the
persons who control this vital artery of our economic life are the ones who owe no
allegiance to this Republic, who have no profound devotion to our free institutions, and
who have no permanent stake in our people's welfare, we are not really the masters of our
destiny. All aspects of our life, even our national security, will be at the mercy of other
people.
In seeking to accomplish the foregoing purpose, we do not propose to deprive persons
who are not citizens of the Philippines of their means of livelihood. While this bill seeks
to take away from the hands of persons who are not citizens of the Philippines a power
that can be wielded to paralyze all aspects of our national life and endanger our national
security it respects existing rights.
The approval of this bill is necessary for our national survival.
If political independence is a legitimate aspiration of a people, then economic independence is
none the less legitimate. Freedom and liberty are not real and positive if the people are subject to
the economic control and domination of others, especially if not of their own race or country.
The removal and eradication of the shackles of foreign economic control and domination, is one
of the noblest motives that a national legislature may pursue. It is impossible to conceive that
legislation that seeks to bring it about can infringe the constitutional limitation of due process.
The attainment of a legitimate aspiration of a people can never be beyond the limits of legislative
authority.
c. Law expressly held by Constitutional Convention to be within the sphere of legislative action.
The framers of the Constitution could not have intended to impose the constitutional restrictions
of due process on the attainment of such a noble motive as freedom from economic control and
domination, thru the exercise of the police power. The fathers of the Constitution must have
given to the legislature full authority and power to enact legislation that would promote the
supreme happiness of the people, their freedom and liberty. On the precise issue now before us,
they expressly made their voice clear; they adopted a resolution expressing their belief that the
legislation in question is within the scope of the legislative power. Thus they declared the their
Resolution:
That it is the sense of the Convention that the public interest requires the nationalization
of retail trade; but it abstain from approving the amendment introduced by the Delegate
for Manila, Mr. Araneta, and others on this matter because it is convinced that the
National Assembly is authorized to promulgate a law which limits to Filipino and
American citizens the privilege to engage in the retail trade. (11 Aruego, The Framing of
the Philippine Constitution, quoted on pages 66 and 67 of the Memorandum for the
Petitioner.)
It would do well to refer to the nationalistic tendency manifested in various provisions of the
Constitution. Thus in the preamble, a principle objective is the conservation of the patrimony of
the nation and as corollary the provision limiting to citizens of the Philippines the exploitation,
development and utilization of its natural resources. And in Section 8 of Article XIV, it is
provided that "no franchise, certificate, or any other form of authorization for the operation of the
public utility shall be granted except to citizens of the Philippines." The nationalization of the
retail trade is only a continuance of the nationalistic protective policy laid down as a primary
objective of the Constitution. Can it be said that a law imbued with the same purpose and spirit
underlying many of the provisions of the Constitution is unreasonable, invalid and
unconstitutional?
The seriousness of the Legislature's concern for the plight of the nationals as manifested in the
approval of the radical measures is, therefore, fully justified. It would have been recreant to its
duties towards the country and its people would it view the sorry plight of the nationals with the
complacency and refuse or neglect to adopt a remedy commensurate with the demands of public
interest and national survival. As the repository of the sovereign power of legislation, the
Legislature was in duty bound to face the problem and meet, through adequate measures, the
danger and threat that alien domination of retail trade poses to national economy.
d. Provisions of law not unreasonable.
A cursory study of the provisions of the law immediately reveals how tolerant, how reasonable
the Legislature has been. The law is made prospective and recognizes the right and privilege of
those already engaged in the occupation to continue therein during the rest of their lives; and
similar recognition of the right to continue is accorded associations of aliens. The right or
privilege is denied to those only upon conviction of certain offenses. In the deliberations of the
Court on this case, attention was called to the fact that the privilege should not have been denied
to children and heirs of aliens now engaged in the retail trade. Such provision would defeat the
law itself, its aims and purposes. Beside, the exercise of legislative discretion is not subject to
judicial review. It is well settled that the Court will not inquire into the motives of the
Legislature, nor pass upon general matters of legislative judgment. The Legislature is primarily
the judge of the necessity of an enactment or of any of its provisions, and every presumption is in
favor of its validity, and though the Court may hold views inconsistent with the wisdom of the
law, it may not annul the legislation if not palpably in excess of the legislative power.
Furthermore, the test of the validity of a law attacked as a violation of due process, is not its
reasonableness, but its unreasonableness, and we find the provisions are not unreasonable. These
principles also answer various other arguments raised against the law, some of which are: that the
law does not promote general welfare; that thousands of aliens would be thrown out of
employment; that prices will increase because of the elimination of competition; that there is no
need for the legislation; that adequate replacement is problematical; that there may be general
breakdown; that there would be repercussions from foreigners; etc. Many of these arguments are
directed against the supposed wisdom of the law which lies solely within the legislative
prerogative; they do not import invalidity.
VIII. Alleged defect in the title of the law
A subordinate ground or reason for the alleged invalidity of the law is the claim that the title
thereof is misleading or deceptive, as it conceals the real purpose of the bill which is to
nationalize the retail business and prohibit aliens from engaging therein. The constitutional
provision which is claimed to be violated in Section 21 (1) of Article VI, which reads:
No bill which may be enacted in the law shall embrace more than one subject which shall
be expressed in the title of the bill.
What the above provision prohibits is duplicity, that is, if its title completely fails to appraise the
legislators or the public of the nature, scope and consequences of the law or its operation (I
Sutherland, Statutory Construction, Sec. 1707, p. 297.) A cursory consideration of the title and
the provisions of the bill fails to show the presence of duplicity. It is true that the term "regulate"
does not and may not readily and at first glance convey the idea of "nationalization" and
"prohibition", which terms express the two main purposes and objectives of the law. But
"regulate" is a broader term than either prohibition or nationalization. Both of these have always
been included within the term regulation.
Under the title of an act to "regulate", the sale of intoxicating liquors, the Legislature may
prohibit the sale of intoxicating liquors. (Sweet vs. City of Wabash, 41 Ind., 7; quoted in
page 41 of Answer.)
Within the meaning of the Constitution requiring that the subject of every act of the
Legislature shall be stated in the tale, the title to regulate the sale of intoxicating liquors,
etc." sufficiently expresses the subject of an act prohibiting the sale of such liquors to
minors and to persons in the habit of getting intoxicated; such matters being properly
included within the subject of regulating the sale. (Williams vs. State, 48 Ind. 306, 308,
quoted in p. 42 of Answer.)
The word "regulate" is of broad import, and necessarily implies some degree of
restraint and prohibition of acts usually done in connection with the thing to be regulated.
While word regulate does not ordinarily convey meaning of prohibit, there is no absolute
reason why it should not have such meaning when used in delegating police power in
connection with a thing the best or only efficacious regulation of which involves
suppression. (State vs. Morton, 162 So. 718, 182 La. 887, quoted in p. 42 of Answer.)
The general rule is for the use of general terms in the title of a bill; it has also been said that the
title need not be an index to the entire contents of the law (I Sutherland, Statutory Construction,
See. 4803, p. 345.) The above rule was followed the title of the Act in question adopted the more
general term "regulate" instead of "nationalize" or "prohibit". Furthermore, the law also contains
other rules for the regulation of the retail trade which may not be included in the terms
"nationalization" or "prohibition"; so were the title changed from "regulate" to "nationalize" or
"prohibit", there would have been many provisions not falling within the scope of the title which
would have made the Act invalid. The use of the term "regulate", therefore, is in accord with the
principle governing the drafting of statutes, under which a simple or general term should be
adopted in the title, which would include all other provisions found in the body of the Act.
One purpose of the constitutional directive that the subject of a bill should be embraced in its
title is to apprise the legislators of the purposes, the nature and scope of its provisions, and
prevent the enactment into law of matters which have received the notice, action and study of the
legislators or of the public. In the case at bar it cannot be claimed that the legislators have been
appraised of the nature of the law, especially the nationalization and the prohibition provisions.
The legislators took active interest in the discussion of the law, and a great many of the persons
affected by the prohibitions in the law conducted a campaign against its approval. It cannot be
claimed, therefore, that the reasons for declaring the law invalid ever existed. The objection must
therefore, be overruled.
IX. Alleged violation of international treaties and obligations
Another subordinate argument against the validity of the law is the supposed violation thereby of
the Charter of the United Nations and of the Declaration of the Human Rights adopted by the
United Nations General Assembly. We find no merit in the Nations Charter imposes no strict or
legal obligations regarding the rights and freedom of their subjects (Hans Kelsen, The Law of the
United Nations, 1951 ed. pp. 29-32), and the Declaration of Human Rights contains nothing
more than a mere recommendation or a common standard of achievement for all peoples and all
nations (Id. p. 39.) That such is the import of the United Nations Charter aid of the Declaration of
Human Rights can be inferred the fact that members of the United Nations Organizations, such
as Norway and Denmark, prohibit foreigners from engaging in retail trade, and in most nations
of the world laws against foreigners engaged in domestic trade are adopted.
The Treaty of Amity between the Republic of the Philippines and the Republic of China of April
18, 1947 is also claimed to be violated by the law in question. All that the treaty guarantees is
equality of treatment to the Chinese nationals "upon the same terms as the nationals of any other
country." But the nationals of China are not discriminating against because nationals of all other
countries, except those of the United States, who are granted special rights by the Constitution,
are all prohibited from engaging in the retail trade. But even supposing that the law infringes
upon the said treaty, the treaty is always subject to qualification or amendment by a subsequent
law (U. S. vs. Thompson, 258, Fed. 257, 260), and the same may never curtail or restrict the
scope of the police power of the State (plaston vs. Pennsylvania, 58 L. ed. 539.)
X. Conclusion
Resuming what we have set forth above we hold that the disputed law was enacted to remedy a
real actual threat and danger to national economy posed by alien dominance and control of the
retail business and free citizens and country from dominance and control; that the enactment
clearly falls within the scope of the police power of the State, thru which and by which it protects
its own personality and insures its security and future; that the law does not violate the equal
protection clause of the Constitution because sufficient grounds exist for the distinction between
alien and citizen in the exercise of the occupation regulated, nor the due process of law clause,
because the law is prospective in operation and recognizes the privilege of aliens already
engaged in the occupation and reasonably protects their privilege; that the wisdom and efficacy
of the law to carry out its objectives appear to us to be plainly evident as a matter of fact it
seems not only appropriate but actually necessary and that in any case such matter falls within
the prerogative of the Legislature, with whose power and discretion the Judicial department of
the Government may not interfere; that the provisions of the law are clearly embraced in the title,
and this suffers from no duplicity and has not misled the legislators or the segment of the
population affected; and that it cannot be said to be void for supposed conflict with treaty
obligations because no treaty has actually been entered into on the subject and the police power
may not be curtailed or surrendered by any treaty or any other conventional agreement.
Some members of the Court are of the opinion that the radical effects of the law could have been
made less harsh in its impact on the aliens. Thus it is stated that the more time should have been
given in the law for the liquidation of existing businesses when the time comes for them to close.
Our legal duty, however, is merely to determine if the law falls within the scope of legislative
authority and does not transcend the limitations of due process and equal protection guaranteed
in the Constitution. Remedies against the harshness of the law should be addressed to the
Legislature; they are beyond our power and jurisdiction.
The petition is hereby denied, with costs against petitioner.
Paras, C.J., Bengzon, Reyes, A., Bautista Angelo, Concepcion, Reyes, J.B.L., Endencia and
Felix, JJ., concur.
Separate Opinions
PADILLA, J., concurring and dissenting:
I agree to the proposition, principle or rule that courts may not inquire into the wisdom of an the
Act passed by the Congress and duly approved by the President of the Republic. But the rule
does not preclude courts from inquiring and determining whether the Act offends against a
provision or provisions of the Constitution. I am satisfied that the Act assailed as violative of the
due process of law and the equal protection of the laws clauses of the Constitution does not
infringe upon them, insofar as it affects associations, partnership or corporations, the capital of
which is not wholly owned by the citizens of the Philippines, and aliens, who are not and have
not been engaged in the retail business. I am, however, unable to persuade myself that it does not
violate said clauses insofar as the Act applies to associations and partnerships referred to in the
Act and to aliens, who are and have heretofore been engaged in said business. When they did
engage in the retail business there was no prohibition on or against them to engage in it. They
assumed and believed in good faith they were entitled to engaged in the business. The Act allows
aliens to continue in business until their death or voluntary retirement from the business or
forfeiture of their license; and corporations, associations or partnership, the capital of which is
not wholly owned by the citizens of the Philippines to continue in the business for a period of ten
years from the date of the approval of the Act (19 June 1954) or until the expiry of term of the
existence of the association or partnership or corporation, whichever event comes first. The
prohibition on corporations, the capital of which is not wholly owned by citizens of the
Philippines, to engage in the retail business for a period of more than ten years from the date of
the approval of the Act or beyond the term of their corporate existence, whichever event comes
first, is valid and lawful, because the continuance of the existence of such corporations is subject
to whatever the Congress may impose reasonably upon them by subsequent legislation. 1 But the
prohibition to engage in the retail business by associations and partnerships, the capital of which
is not wholly owned by citizen of the Philippines, after ten years from the date of the approval of
the Act, even before the end of the term of their existence as agreed upon by the associates and
partners, and by alien heirs to whom the retail business is transmitted by the death of an alien
engaged in the business, or by his executor or administrator, amounts to a deprivation of their
property without due process of law. To my mind, the ten-year period from the date of the
approval of the Act or until the expiration of the term of the existence of the association and
partnership, whichever event comes first, and the six-month period granted to alien heirs of a
deceased alien, his executor or administrator, to liquidate the business, do not cure the defect of
the law, because the effect of the prohibition is to compel them to sell or dispose of their
business. The price obtainable at such forced sale of the business would be inadequate to
reimburse and compensate the associates or partners of the associations or partnership, and the
alien heirs of a deceased alien, engaged in the retail business for the capital invested in it. The
stock of merchandise bought and sold at retail does not alone constitute the business. The
goodwill that the association, partnership and the alien had built up during a long period of
effort, patience and perseverance forms part of such business. The constitutional provisions that
no person shall be deprived of his property without due process of law 2 and that no person shall
be denied the equal protection of the laws 3 would have no meaning as applied to associations or
partnership and alien heirs of an alien engaged in the retail business if they were to be compelled
to sell or dispose of their business within ten years from the date of the approval of the Act and
before the end of the term of the existence of the associations and partnership as agreed upon by
the associations and partners and within six months after the death of their predecessor-ininterest.
The authors of the Constitution were vigilant, careful and zealous in the safeguard of the
ownership of private agricultural lands which together with the lands of the public domain
constitute the priceless patrimony and mainstay of the nation; yet, they did not deem it wise and
prudent to deprive aliens and their heirs of such lands.4
For these reasons, I am of the opinion that section 1 of the Act, insofar as it compels associations
and partnership referred to therein to wind up their retail business within ten years from the date
of the approval of the Act even before the expiry of the term of their existence as agreed upon by
the associates and partners and section 3 of the Act, insofar as it compels the aliens engaged in
the retail business in his lifetime his executor or administrator, to liquidate the business, are
invalid, for they violate the due process of law and the equal protection of the laws clauses of the
Constitution.
August 15, 1961

IN RE: PETITION OF ARTURO EFREN GARCIA for admission to the Philippine Bar
without taking the examination. ARTURO EFREN GARCIA, petitioner.
RE S O LUTI ON
BARRERA, J.:
Arturo E. Garcia has applied for admission to the practice of law in the Philippines without
submitting to the required bar examinations. In his verified petition, he avers, among others, that
he is a Filipino citizen born in Bacolor City, Province of Negros Occidental, of Filipino
parentage; that he had taken and finished in Spain, the course of "Bachillerato Superior"; that he
was approved, selected and qualified by the "Instituto de Cervantes" for admission to the Central
University of Madrid where he studied and finished the law course graduating there as
"Licenciado En Derecho"; that thereafter he was allowed to practice the law profession in Spain;
and that under the provision of the Treaty of Academic Degrees and the Exercise of Professions
between the Republic of the Philippines and the Spanish state, he is entitled to practice the law
profession in the Philippines without submitting to the required bar examinations.
After due consideration, the Court resolved to deny the petition on the following grounds:
(1) the provisions of the Treaty on Academic Degrees and the Exercise of Professions between
the Republic of the Philippines and the Spanish State can not be invoked by applicant. Under
Article 11 thereof;
The Nationals of each of the two countries who shall have obtained recognition of the
validity of their academic degrees by virtue of the stipulations of this Treaty, can practice
their professions within the territory of the Other, . . .. (Emphasis supplied).
from which it could clearly be discerned that said Treaty was intended to govern Filipino citizens
desiring to practice their profession in Spain, and the citizens of Spain desiring to practice their
professions in the Philippines. Applicant is a Filipino citizen desiring to practice the legal
profession in the Philippines. He is therefore subject to the laws of his own country and is not
entitled to the privileges extended to Spanish nationals desiring to practice in the Philippines.
(2) Article I of the Treaty, in its pertinent part, provides .
The nationals of both countries who shall have obtained degree or diplomas to practice
the liberal professions in either of the Contracting States, issued by competent national
authorities, shall be deemed competent to exercise said professions in the territory of the
Other, subject to the laws and regulations of the latter. . . ..
It is clear, therefore, that the privileges provided in the Treaty invoked by the applicant are made
expressly subject to the laws and regulations of the contracting State in whose territory it is
desired to exercise the legal profession; and Section 1 of Rule 127, in connection with Sections
2,9, and 16 thereof, which have the force of law, require that before anyone can practice the legal
profession in the Philippine he must first successfully pass the required bar examinations; and
(3) The aforementioned Treaty, concluded between the Republic of the Philippines and the
Spanish State could not have been intended to modify the laws and regulations governing
admission to the practice of law in the Philippines, for the reason that the Executive Department
may not encroach upon the constitutional prerogative of the Supreme Court to promulgate rules
for admission to the practice of law in the Philippines, the lower to repeal, alter or supplement
such rules being reserved only to the Congress of the Philippines. (See Sec. 13, Art VIII, Phil.
Constitution).
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-45892
July 13, 1938
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,

vs.
TRANQUILINO LAGMAN, defendant-appellant.
----------------------------G.R. No. L-45893
July 13, 1938
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,

vs.
PRIMITIVO DE SOSA, defendant-appellant.
Severino P. Izon for appellants.
Office of the Solicitor-General Tuason for appellee.
AVANCEA, J.:
In these two cases (G.R. Nos. L-45892 and 45893), the appellants Tranquilino and Primitivo de
Sosa are charged with a violation of section 60 of Commonwealth Act No. 1, known as the
National Defense Law. It is alleged that these two appellants, being Filipinos and having reached
the age of twenty years in 1936, willfully and unlawfully refused to register in the military
service between the 1st and 7th of April of said year, notwithstanding the fact that they had been
required to do so. The evidence shows that these two appellants were duly notified by the
corresponding authorities to appear before the Acceptance Board in order to register for military
service in accordance with law, and that the said appellants, in spite of these notices, had not
registered up to the date of the filing of the information.
The appellants do not deny these facts, but they allege in defense that they have not registered in
the military service because Primitivo de Sosa is fatherless and has a mother and a brother eight
years old to support, and Tranquilino Lagman also has a father to support, has no military
learnings, and does not wish to kill or be killed.
Each of these appellants was sentenced by the Court of First Instance to one month and one day
of imprisonment, with the costs.
In this instance, the validity of the National Defense Law, under which the accused were
sentenced, is impugned on the ground that it is unconstitutional. Section 2, Article II of the
Constitution of the Philippines provides as follows:
SEC. 2. The defense of the state is a prime duty of government, and in the fulfillment of
this duty all citizens may be required by law to render personal military or civil service.
The National Defense Law, in so far as it establishes compulsory military service, does not go
against this constitutional provision but is, on the contrary, in faithful compliance therewith. The
duty of the Government to defend the State cannot be performed except through an army. To
leave the organization of an army to the will of the citizens would be to make this duty of the
Government excusable should there be no sufficient men who volunteer to enlist
therein.1vvphl.nt
In the United States the courts have held in a series of decisions that the compulsory military
service adopted by reason of the civil war and the world war does not violate the Constitution,
because the power to establish it is derived from that granted to Congress to declare war and to
organize and maintain an army. This is so because the right of the Government to require
compulsory military service is a consequence of its duty to defend the State and is reciprocal
with its duty to defend the life, liberty, and property of the citizen. In the case of Jacobson vs.
Massachusetts (197 U.S., 11; 25 Sup. Ct. Rep., 385), it was said that, without violating the
Constitution, a person may be compelled by force, if need be, against his will, against his
pecuniary interests, and even against his religious or political convictions, to take his place in the
ranks of the army of his country, and risk the chance of being shot down in its defense. In the
case of United States vs. Olson (253 Fed., 233), it was also said that this is not deprivation of
property without due process of law, because, in its just sense, there is no right of property to an
office or employment.
The circumstance that these decisions refer to laws enacted by reason on the actual existence of
war does not make our case any different, inasmuch as, in the last analysis, what justifies
compulsory military service is the defense of the State, whether actual or whether in preparation
to make it more effective, in case of need. The circumstance that the appellants have dependent
families to support does not excuse them from their duty to present themselves before the
Acceptance Board because, if such circumstance exists, they can ask for determent in complying
with their duty and, at all events, they can obtain the proper pecuniary allowance to attend to
these family responsibilities (secs. 65 and 69 of Commonwealth Act No. 1).
The appealed judgment rendered in these two cases is affirmed, with the costs to the appellants.
So ordered.
Villa-Real, Imperial, Diaz, Laurel and Concepcion, JJ., concur.
[G.R. No. 47800. December 2, 1940.]

MAXIMO CALALANG, Petitioner, v. A. D. WILLIAMS, ET AL., Respondents.
Maximo Calalang in his own behalf.
Solicitor General Ozaeta and Assistant Solicitor General Amparo for respondents Williams,
Fragante and Bayan
City Fiscal Mabanag for the other respondents.

SYLLABUS
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW; CONSTITUTIONALITY OF COMMONWEALTH ACT No. 648; DELEGATION OF
LEGISLATIVE POWER; AUTHORITY OF DIRECTOR OF PUBLIC WORKS AND

SECRETARY OF PUBLIC WORKS AND COMMUNICATIONS TO PROMULGATE RULES
AND REGULATIONS. The provisions of section 1 of Commonwealth Act No. 648 do not
confer legislative power upon the Director of Public Works and the Secretary of Public Works
and Communications. The authority therein conferred upon them and under which they
promulgated the rules and regulations now complained of is not to determine what public policy
demands but merely to carry out the legislative policy laid down by the National Assembly in
said Act, to wit, "to promote safe transit upon, and avoid obstructions on, roads and streets
designated as national roads by acts of the National Assembly or by executive orders of the
President of the Philippines" and to close them temporarily to any or all classes of traffic
"whenever the condition of the road or the traffic thereon makes such action necessary or
advisable in the public convenience and interest." The delegated power, if at all, therefore, is not
the determination of what the law shall be, but merely the ascertainment of the facts and
circumstances upon which the application of said law is to be predicated. To promulgate rules
and regulations on the use of national roads and to determine when and how long a national road
should be closed to traffic, in view of the condition of the road or the traffic thereon and the
requirements of public convenience and interest, is an administrative function which cannot be
directly discharged by the National Assembly. It must depend on the discretion of some other
government official to whom is confided the duty of determining whether the proper occasion
exists for executing the law. But it cannot be said that the exercise of such discretion is the
making of the law.
ID.; ID.; POLICE POWER; PERSONAL LIBERTY; GOVERNMENTAL AUTHORITY.
Commonwealth Act No. 548 was passed by the National Assembly in the exercise of the
paramount police power of the state. Said Act, by virtue of which the rules and regulations
complained of were promulgated, aims to promote safe transit upon and avoid obstructions on
national roads, in the interest and convenience of the public. In enacting said law, therefore, the
National Assembly was prompted by considerations of public convenience and welfare. It was
inspired by a desire to relieve congestion of traffic, which is, to say the least, a menace to public
safety. Public welfare, then, lies at the bottom of the enactment of said law, and the state in order
to promote the general welfare may interfere with personal liberty, with property, and with
business and occupations. Persons and property may be subjected to all kinds of restraints and
burdens, in order to secure the general comfort, health, and prosperity of the state (U.S. v. Gomer
Jesus, 31 Phil., 218). To this fundamental aim of our Government the rights of the individual are
subordinated. Liberty is a blessing without which life is a misery, but liberty should not be made
to prevail over authority because then society will fall into anarchy. Neither should authority be
made to prevail over liberty because then the individual will fall into slavery. The citizen should
achieve the required balance of liberty and authority in his mind through education and, personal
discipline, so that there may be established the resultant equilibrium, which means peace and
order and happiness for all. The moment greater authority is conferred upon the government,
logically so much is withdrawn from the residuum of liberty which resides in the people. The
paradox lies in the fact that the apparent curtailment of liberty is precisely the very means of
insuring its preservation.
3. ID.; ID.; SOCIAL JUSTICE. Social justice is "neither communism, nor despotism, nor
atomism, nor anarchy," but the humanization of laws and the equalization of social and economic
forces by the State so that justice in its rational and objectively secular conception may at least
be approximated. Social justice means the promotion of the welfare of all the people, the
adoption by the Government of measures calculated to insure economic stability of all the
competent elements of society, through the maintenance of a proper economic and social
equilibrium in the interrelations of the members of the community, constitutionally, through the
adoption of measures legally justifiable, or extra-constitutionally, through the exercise of powers
underlying the existence of all governments on the time-honored principle of salus populi est
suprema lex. Social justice, therefore, must be founded on the recognition of the necessity of
interdependence among divers and diverse units of a society and of the protection that should be
equally and evenly extended to all groups as a combined force in our social and economic life,
consistent with the fundamental and paramount objective of the state of promoting the health,
comfort, and quiet of all persons, and of bringing about "the greatest good to the greatest
number."
DECISION
LAUREL, J.:
Maximo Calalang, in his capacity as a private citizen and as a taxpayer of Manila, brought before
this court this petition for a writ of prohibition against the respondents, A. D. Williams, as
Chairman of the National Traffic Commission; Vicente Fragante, as Director of Public Works;
Sergio Bayan, as Acting Secretary of Public Works and Communications; Eulogio Rodriguez, as
Mayor of the City of Manila; and Juan Dominguez, as Acting Chief of Police of Manila.
It is alleged in the petition that the National Traffic Commission, in its resolution of July 17,
1940, resolved to recommend to the Director of Public Works and to the Secretary of Public
Works and Communications that animal-drawn vehicles be prohibited from passing along
Rosario Street extending from Plaza Calderon de la Barca to Dasmarias Street, from 7:30 a.m.
to 12:30 p.m. and from 1:30 p.m. to 5:30 p.m.; and along Rizal Avenue extending from the
railroad crossing at Antipolo Street to Echague Street, from 7 a.m. to 11 p.m., from a period of
one year from the date of the opening of the Colgante Bridge to traffic; that the Chairman of the
National Traffic Commission, on July 18, 1940 recommended to the Director of Public Works
the adoption of the measure proposed in the resolution aforementioned, in pursuance of the
provisions of Commonwealth Act No. 548 which authorizes said Director of Public Works, with
the approval of the Secretary of Public Works and Communications, to promulgate rules and
regulations to regulate and control the use of and traffic on national roads; that on August 2,
1940, the Director of Public Works, in his first indorsement to the Secretary of Public Works and
Communications, recommended to the latter the approval of the recommendation made by the
Chairman of the National Traffic Commission as aforesaid, with the modification that the closing
of Rizal Avenue to traffic to animal-drawn vehicles be limited to the portion thereof extending
from the railroad crossing at Antipolo Street to Azcarraga Street; that on August 10, 1940, the
Secretary of Public Works and Communications, in his second indorsement addressed to the
Director of Public Works, approved the recommendation of the latter that Rosario Street and
Rizal Avenue be closed to traffic of animal-drawn vehicles, between the points and during the
hours as above indicated, for a period of one year from the date of the opening of the Colgante
Bridge to traffic; that the Mayor of Manila and the Acting Chief of Police of Manila have
enforced and caused to be enforced the rules and regulations thus adopted; that as a consequence
of such enforcement, all animal-drawn vehicles are not allowed to pass and pick up passengers in
the places above-mentioned to the detriment not only of their owners but of the riding public as
well.
It is contended by the petitioner that Commonwealth Act No. 548 by which the Director of
Public Works, with the approval of the Secretary of Public Works and Communications, is
authorized to promulgate rules and regulations for the regulation and control of the use of and
traffic on national roads and streets is unconstitutional because it constitutes an undue delegation
of legislative power. This contention is untenable. As was observed by this court in Rubi v.
Provincial Board of Mindoro (39 Phil, 660, 700), "The rule has nowhere been better stated than
in the early Ohio case decided by Judge Ranney, and since followed in a multitude of cases,
namely: The true distinction therefore is between the delegation of power to make the law,
which necessarily involves a discretion as to what it shall be, and conferring an authority or
discretion as to its execution, to be exercised under and in pursuance of the law. The first cannot
be done; to the latter no valid objection can be made. (Cincinnati, W. & Z. R. Co. v. Commrs.
Clinton County, 1 Ohio St., 88.) Discretion, as held by Chief Justice Marshall in Wayman v.
Southard (10 Wheat., 1) may be committed by the Legislature to an executive department or
official. The Legislature may make decisions of executive departments or subordinate officials
thereof, to whom it has committed the execution of certain acts, final on questions of fact. (U.S.
v. Kinkead, 248 Fed., 141.) The growing tendency in the decisions is to give prominence to the
necessity of the case."cralaw virtua1aw library
Section 1 of Commonwealth Act No. 548 reads as follows:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"SECTION 1. To promote safe transit upon, and avoid obstructions on, roads and streets
designated as national roads by acts of the National Assembly or by executive orders of the
President of the Philippines, the Director of Public Works, with the approval of the Secretary of
Public Works and Communications, shall promulgate the necessary rules and regulations to
regulate and control the use of and traffic on such roads and streets. Such rules and regulations,
with the approval of the President, may contain provisions controlling or regulating the
construction of buildings or other structures within a reasonable distance from along the national
roads. Such roads may be temporarily closed to any or all classes of traffic by the Director of
Public Works and his duly authorized representatives whenever the condition of the road or the
traffic thereon makes such action necessary or advisable in the public convenience and interest,
or for a specified period, with the approval of the Secretary of Public Works and
Communications."cralaw virtua1aw library
The above provisions of law do not confer legislative power upon the Director of Public Works
and the Secretary of Public Works and Communications. The authority therein conferred upon
them and under which they promulgated the rules and regulations now complained of is not to
determine what public policy demands but merely to carry out the legislative policy laid down by
the National Assembly in said Act, to wit, "to promote safe transit upon and avoid obstructions
on, roads and streets designated as national roads by acts of the National Assembly or by
executive orders of the President of the Philippines" and to close them temporarily to any or all
classes of traffic "whenever the condition of the road or the traffic makes such action necessary
or advisable in the public convenience and interest." The delegated power, if at all, therefore, is
not the determination of what the law shall be, but merely the ascertainment of the facts and
circumstances upon which the application of said law is to be predicated. To promulgate rules
and regulations on the use of national roads and to determine when and how long a national road
should be closed to traffic, in view of the condition of the road or the traffic thereon and the
requirements of public convenience and interest, is an administrative function which cannot be
directly discharged by the National Assembly. It must depend on the discretion of some other
government official to whom is confided the duty of determining whether the proper occasion
exists for executing the law. But it cannot be said that the exercise of such discretion is the
making of the law. As was said in Lockes Appeal (72 Pa. 491): "To assert that a law is less than
a law, because it is made to depend on a future event or act, is to rob the Legislature of the power
to act wisely for the public welfare whenever a law is passed relating to a state of affairs not yet
developed, or to things future and impossible to fully know." The proper distinction the court
said was this: "The Legislature cannot delegate its power to make the law; but it can make a law
to delegate a power to determine some fact or state of things upon which the law makes, or
intends to make, its own action depend. To deny this would be to stop the wheels of government.
There are many things upon which wise and useful legislation must depend which cannot be
known to the law-making power, and, must, therefore, be a subject of inquiry and determination
outside of the halls of legislation." (Field v. Clark, 143 U. S. 649, 694; 36 L. Ed. 294.)
In the case of People v. Rosenthal and Osmea, G.R. Nos. 46076 and 46077, promulgated June
12, 1939, and in Pangasinan Transportation v. The Public Service Commission, G.R. No. 47065,
promulgated June 26, 1940, this Court had occasion to observe that the principle of separation of
powers has been made to adapt itself to the complexities of modern governments, giving rise to
the adoption, within certain limits, of the principle of "subordinate legislation," not only in the
United States and England but in practically all modern governments. Accordingly, with the
growing complexity of modern life, the multiplication of the subjects of governmental
regulations, and the increased difficulty of administering the laws, the rigidity of the theory of
separation of governmental powers has, to a large extent, been relaxed by permitting the
delegation of greater powers by the legislative and vesting a larger amount of discretion in
administrative and executive officials, not only in the execution of the laws, but also in the
promulgation of certain rules and regulations calculated to promote public interest.
The petitioner further contends that the rules and regulations promulgated by the respondents
pursuant to the provisions of Commonwealth Act No. 548 constitute an unlawful interference
with legitimate business or trade and abridge the right to personal liberty and freedom of
locomotion. Commonwealth Act No. 548 was passed by the National Assembly in the exercise of
the paramount police power of the state.
Said Act, by virtue of which the rules and regulations complained of were promulgated, aims to
promote safe transit upon and avoid obstructions on national roads, in the interest and
convenience of the public. In enacting said law, therefore, the National Assembly was prompted
by considerations of public convenience and welfare. It was inspired by a desire to relieve
congestion of traffic. which is, to say the least, a menace to public safety. Public welfare, then,
lies at the bottom of the enactment of said law, and the state in order to promote the general
welfare may interfere with personal liberty, with property, and with business and occupations.
Persons and property may be subjected to all kinds of restraints and burdens, in order to secure
the general comfort, health, and prosperity of the state (U.S. v. Gomez Jesus, 31 Phil., 218). To
this fundamental aim of our Government the rights of the individual are subordinated. Liberty is
a blessing without which life is a misery, but liberty should not be made to prevail over authority
because then society will fall into anarchy. Neither should authority be made to prevail over
liberty because then the individual will fall into slavery. The citizen should achieve the required
balance of liberty and authority in his mind through education and personal discipline, so that
there may be established the resultant equilibrium, which means peace and order and happiness
for all. The moment greater authority is conferred upon the government, logically so much is
withdrawn from the residuum of liberty which resides in the people. The paradox lies in the fact
that the apparent curtailment of liberty is precisely the very means of insuring its preservation.
The scope of police power keeps expanding as civilization advances. As was said in the case of
Dobbins v. Los Angeles (195 U.S. 223, 238; 49 L. ed. 169), "the right to exercise the police
power is a continuing one, and a business lawful today may in the future, because of the changed
situation, the growth of population or other causes, become a menace to the public health and
welfare, and be required to yield to the public good." And in People v. Pomar (46 Phil., 440), it
was observed that "advancing civilization is bringing within the police power of the state today
things which were not thought of as being within such power yesterday. The development of
civilization, the rapidly increasing population, the growth of public opinion, with an increasing
desire on the part of the masses and of the government to look after and care for the interests of
the individuals of the state, have brought within the police power many questions for regulation
which
formerly
were
not
so
considered."cralaw
virtua1aw
library
The petitioner finally avers that the rules and regulations complained of infringe upon the
constitutional precept regarding the promotion of social justice to insure the well-being and
economic security of all the people. The promotion of social justice, however, is to be achieved
not through a mistaken sympathy towards any given group. Social justice is "neither
communism, nor despotism, nor atomism, nor anarchy," but the humanization of laws and the
equalization of social and economic forces by the State so that justice in its rational and
objectively secular conception may at least be approximated. Social justice means the promotion
of the welfare of all the people, the adoption by the Government of measures calculated to insure
economic stability of all the competent elements of society, through the maintenance of a proper
economic and social equilibrium in the interrelations of the members of the community,
constitutionally, through the adoption of measures legally justifiable, or extra-constitutionally,
through the exercise of powers underlying the existence of all governments on the time-honored
principle of salus populi est suprema lex.
Social justice, therefore, must be founded on the recognition of the necessity of interdependence
among divers and diverse units of a society and of the protection that should be equally and
evenly extended to all groups as a combined force in our social and economic life, consistent
with the fundamental and paramount objective of the state of promoting the health, comfort, and
quiet of all persons, and of bringing about "the greatest good to the greatest number."cralaw
virtua1aw
library
In view of the foregoing, the writ of prohibition prayed for is hereby denied, with costs against
the petitioner. So ordered.
Avancea, C.J., Imperial, Diaz. and Horrilleno. JJ. concur.

SUPREME COURT
Manila
FIRST DIVISION
G.R. No. L-43800 July 29, 1977

LEONILA LAUREL ALMEDA and VENANCIO ALMEDA, Petitioners,
vs.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS and EULOGIO GONZALES, respondents.
Dizon & Vitug and Cornell S. Valdez for petitioners.
Dennis B. Recon Juanito Hernandez and Oseas A. Martin for private respondent,
MARTIN, J.:
This is an agrarian case. Three questions of consequential effects are raised: first is there a
tenant's right of redemption in sugar and coconut lands; second, is prior tender or judicial
consignation of the redemption price a condition precedent for the valid exercise of the right of
redemption; and third, does the Court of Agrarian Relations have jurisdiction over complaints for
redemption of sugar and coconut lands.
Respondent Eulogio Gonzales is an agricultural share tenant of Glicerio, Sinfroso, Susana,
Maria, Sebastian, Rufina, Bienvenido, Besmark and Cesar, all surnamed Angeles, on their
46,529-square land situated in Tanauan, Batangas, and devoted to sugar cane and coconuts. On
September 30, 1968, the landowners sold the property to petitioners-spouses Leonila Laurel
Almeda and Venancio Almeda without notifying respondent-tenant in writing of the sale. The
document of sale was registered with the Register of Deeds of Tanauan, Batangas on March 27,
1969. Respondent-tenant thus seeks the redemption of the land in a complaint filed on March 27,
1971, pursuant to the provisions of Sections 11 and 12 of the Code of Agrarian Reforms, with the
Court of Agrarian Relations at Lipa City.
Answering the complaint, petitioners-spouses state, among other things, that long before the
execution of the deed of sale, Glicerio Angeles and his nephew Cesar Angeles first offered the
sale of the land to respondent Gonzales, but the latter said that he had no money; that respondenttenant, instead, went personally to the house of petitioners-spouses and implored them to buy the
land for fear that if someone else would buy the land, he may not be taken in as tenant; that
respondent-tenant is a mere dummy of someone deeply interested in buying the land, that
respondent-tenant made to tender of payment or any valid consignation in court at the time he
filed the complaint for redemption.
At the hearing of May 29, 1973 the parties waived their right to present evidence and, instead,
agreed to file simultaneous memoranda upon which the decision of the court would be based.
On October 10, 1973, the Agrarian Court rendered judgment authorizing, the respondent-tenant,
Eulogio Gonzales, to redeem the tenanted land for P24,000.00, the said amount to be deposited
by him with the Clerk of Court within fifteen (15) days from receipt of the decision.
Petitioners-spouses excepted to the ruling of the Agrarian Court and appealed the case to the
Court of Appeals. On January 30, 1976, the Appellate Court, however, affirmed the decision of
the Agrarian Court. Denied of their motions for reconsideration, petitioners- spouses instituted
the present petition for review.
We find the appeal to be impressed with merits.

1. Prior to the enactment of the Agricultural Land Reform Code RA 3844), no right of preference
in the sale of the land under cultivation was enjoyed by the tenant-farmer. The absence of this
right freely opened the way to the landlords to ease out their tenants from the land by ostensible
conveyance of said land to another tenant who, in turn, sues for the ejectment of the first tenant
on ground of personal cultivation. While many of these sales were simulated, the tenant is
oftenly evicted from the land because of the formal transfer of ownership in the land. 1 On August
8, 1963, the Agricultural Land Reform Code was passed, impressed with the policy of the State,
among other things, "(t)o establish owner-cultivatorship and the economic family-size farm as
the basis of Philippine agriculture; to achieve a dignified existence of the small farmers free from
pernicious institutional restraints and practices; to make the small farmers more independent,
self-reliant and responsible citizens, and a source of genuine strength in our democratic
society."2 More importantly, a new right was given to the tenants-farmers: the right of preemption and redemption. It bolsters their security of tenure and further encourages them to
become owner-cultivators.3 Thus, Section II provides: "In case the agricultural lessor decides to
sell the landholding, the agricultural lessee shall have the preferential right to buy the same under
reasonable terms and conditions. ... The right of pre-emption under this Section may be exercised
within one hundred eighty days from notice in writing, which shall be served by the owner on all
lessees affected and the Department of Agrarian Reform.. If the agricultural lessee agrees with
the terms and conditions of the sale, he must give notice in writing to the agricultural lessor of
his intention to exercise his right of pre-emption within the balance of one hundred eighty days'
period still available to him, but in any case not less than thirty days. He must either tender
payment of, or present a certificate of the land bank that t shall make payment pursuant to
section eighty of this Code on the price of the landholding to the agricultural lessor. If the latter
refuses to accept such tender or presentment, he may consign it with the court." As protection of
this right, Section 12 was inserted: "In case the landholding is sold to a third person without the
knowledge of the agricultural lessee, the latter shall have the right to redeem the same at a
reasonable price and consideration. ... The right of redemption under this section may be
exercised within one hundred eighty days from notice in writing which shall be served by the
vendee on all lessees affected and the Department of Agrarian Reform upon the registration of
the sale, and shall have priority over any other right of legal redemption. The redemption price
shall be the reasonable price of the land at the time of the sale. 4 In the precedential case
of Hidalgo v. Hidalgo, 5 this right was held applicable to both leaseholdtenants and share tenants.
Presently, We are faced with an intricate question: is this right of redemption available to tenants
in sugar and coconut lands? We answer yes. Among those exempted from the automatic
conversion to agricultural leasehold upon the effectivity of the Agricultural Land Reform Code in
1963 or even after its amendments (Code of Agrarian Reforms) are sugar lands. Section 4 thereof
states: Agricultural share tenancy throughout the country, as herein defined, is hereby declared
contrary to public policy and shall be automatically converted to agricultural leasehold upon the
effectivity of this section. ... Provided, That in order not to jeopardize international commitments,
lands devoted to crops covered by marketing allotments shall be made the subject of a separate
proclamation by the President upon recommendation of' the department head that adequate
provisions, such as the organization of cooperatives marketing agreement, or similar other
workable arrangements, have been made to insure efficient management on all matters requiring
synchronization of the agricultural with the processing phases of such crops ..." Sugar is, of
course, one crop covered by marketing allotments. In other words this section
recognizes sharetenancy in sugar lands until after a special proclamation is made, which
proclamation shall have the same effect of an executive proclamation of the operation of the
Department of Agrarian Reform in any region or locality; the share tenants in the lands affected
will become agricultural lessees at the beginning of the agricultural year next succeeding the year
in which the proclamation is made. 6 But, there is nothing readable or even discernible in the
lawdenying to tenants in sugar lands the right of pre-emption and redemption under the Code.
The exemption is purely limited to the tenancy system; it does not exclude the other rights
conferred by the Code, such as the right of pre-emption and redemption. In the same manner,
coconut lands are exempted from the Code only with respect to the consideration and tenancy
system prevailing, implying that in other matters the right of pre-emption and redemption
which does not refer to the consideration of the tenancy the provisions of the Code apply.
Thus, Section 35 states: "Notwithstanding the provisions of the preceding Sections, in the case of
fishponds, saltbeds and lands principally planted to citrus, coconuts, cacao, coffee, durian, and
other similar permanent trees at the time of the approval of this Code, the consideration as well
as the tenancy system prevailing, shall be governed by the provisions of Republic Act Numbered
Eleven Hundred and Ninety-Nine, as amended."
It is to be noted that under the new Constitution, property ownership is impressed with social
function. Property use must not only be for the benefit of the owner but of society as well. The
State, in the promotion of social justice, may "regulate the acquisition, ownership, use,
enjoyment and disposition of private property, and equitably diffuse property ... ownership and
profits." 7 One governmental policy of recent date project emancipation of tenants from the
bondage of the soil and the transfer to them of the ownership of the land they till. This is
Presidential Decree No. 27 of October 21, 1972, ordaining that all tenant farmers "of private
agricultural lands devoted to rice and corn under a system of sharecrop or lease tenancy whether
classified as landed estates or not shall be deemed "owner of a portion constituting a family-size
farm of five (5) hectares if not irrigated and three (3) hectares if irrigated." 8
2. Nevertheless, while the Code secures to the tenant-farmer this right of redemption, in
particular, the exercise thereof must be in accordance with law in order to be valid. "The timely
exercise of the right of legal redemption," said the Court in Basbas v. Entena.9 "requires either
tender of the price or valid consignation thereof." The statutory periods within which the right
must be exercised "would be rendered meaningless and of easy evasion unless the redemptioner
is required to make an actual tender in good faith of what he believed to be reasonable price of
the land sought to be redeemed." "The existence of the right of redemption operates to depress
the market value of the land until the period expires, and to render that period indefinite by
permitting the tenant to file a suit for redemption, with either party unable to foresee when final
judgment will terminate the action, would render nugatory the period of two years (180 days
under the new law) fixed by the statute for making the redemption and virtually paralyze any
efforts of the landowner to realize the value of his land. No buyer can be expected to acquire it
without any certainty as to the amount for which least his investment in case of redemption. In
the meantime, the landowner's needs and obligations cannot be met. It is doubtful if any such
result was intended by the statute, absent clear wording to that effect." 10 Bona fide
redemption necessarily imports a seasonable and valid tender of the entire repurchase price. The
right of a redemptioner to pay a "reasonable price" does not excuse him from the duty to make
proper tender of the price that can be honestly deemed reasonable under the circumstances,
without prejudice to final arbitration by the courts. "It is not difficult to discern why the
redemption price should either be fully offered in legal tender or else validly consigned in court.
Only by such means can the buyer become certain that the offer to redeem is one made seriously
and in good faith. A buyer cannot be expected to entertain an offer of redemption without
attendant evidence that the redemptioner can, and is willing to accomplish the repurchase
immediately. A different rule would leave the buyer open to harassment by speculators or
crackpots as well as to unnecessary prolongation of the redemption period, contrary to the policy
of the law. While consignation of the tendered price is not always necessary because legal
redemption is not made to discharge a pre-existing debt (Asturias Sugar Central v. Cane
Molasses Co., 60 Phil. 253), a valid tender is indispensable, for the reasons already stated. Of
course, consignation of the price would remove all controversy as to the redemptioner's ability to
pay at the proper time." 11
In the case before Us, neither prior tender nor judicial consignation of the redemption price
accompanied the filing of the redemption suit. In fact, the Agrarian court had yet to order, when
it rendered its decision on October 10, 1973 (complaint was filed on March 27, 1971),
respondent-tenant to deposit the amount of M,000.00 as redemption price with the Clerk of Court
within fifteen (15) days from receipt of the decision. The absence of such tender or consignation
leaves Us, therefore, with no alternative but to declare that respondent-tenant had failed to
exercise his right of redemption in accordance with law.
3. Reliance cannot be placed upon the case of Hidalgo v. Hidalgo 12 as excuse for the failure to
make the requisite tender or consignation in court, because the Court did not rule therein that
prior tender or judicial consignation of the redemption price is not required for the valid exercise
of the right of redemption. In that case, the spouse Igmidio Hidalgo and Martina Resales were
the share tenants of Policarpio Hidalgo on his 22, 876-square meter agricultural land in Lumil,
San Jose, Batangas, while the spouses Hilario Aguila and Adela Hidalgo were his tenants on a
square meter land. Policarpio Hidalgo sold these lands without notifying his tenants: and so, the
tenants filed petitions before the Court of Agrarian Relations seeking the redemption of the lands
under Section 12 of the Code. The Agrarian Court dismiss the petitioners for the reason that the
right of redemption is available to leasehold tenants only but not to share tenants. On review, the
Court ruled that while the Agrarian Court "correctly focused on the sole issue of law" whether
the right of redemption granted 12 of Republic Act No. 3844 is applicable to share tenants it
(Agrarian Court) "arrived at its erroneous conclusion that the right of redemption granted by
Section 12 of the Land Reform Code is available to leasehold tenants only but not to share
tenants." The Court said that '(t)he Code intended ... to afford the farmers
who transitionally continued to be share tenants after its enactment but who inexorably would be
agricultural lessees by virtue of the Code's proclaimed abolition of tenancy, the same priority and
preferential right as those other share tenants, who upon the enactment of the Code or soon
thereafter were earlier converted by fortuitous circumstance into agricultural lessees, to acquire
the lands under their cultivation in the event of their voluntary sale by the owner or of their
acquisition, by expropriation or otherwise, by the Land Authority." But, the Court did not rule
that tender of payment or consignation of the redemption price in court is not a requisite in the
valid exercise of the right of redemption. In fact, it said that "(i)n the absence of any provision in
the Code as to the manner of and amounts payable on redemption, the pertinent provisions of the
Civil Code apply in a suppletory character" which, of course, imposes tender of payment or
judicial consignation of the repurchase price as condition for valid redemption. Besides, it is
noteworthy that in that case petitioners-tenants' possession of funds and compliance the
requirements of redemption were not questioned, the case having been submitted and decided on
the sole legal issue of the right of redemption being available to them as share tenants.
4. As a consequence, the Court of Agrarian Relations has jurisdiction over suits for redemption,
like the present case, of sugar and coconut lands. Section 154 of the Agricultural Land Reform
Code, as amended, states: "The Court of Agrarian Relations shall have original and exclusive
jurisdiction over (1) all cases or actions involvingmatters, controversies, disputes, or
money claims arising from agrarian relations ..." Since this case involves a matter, controversy
or dispute "arising from agrarian relations" whether respondent-tenant on sugar and coconut
lands has the right of redemption it is definite that the Agrarian Court has jurisdiction to hear
and decide the same. 13 The Court of Agrarian Relations came into being for the enforcement of
all laws and regulations governing the relations between capital and labor on all agricultural
lands under any system of cultivation with original and exclusive jurisdiction over the entire
Philippines, to consider, investigate, decide and settle all questions, matters, controversies, or
disputes involving or arising from such relationship. 14
ACCORDINGLY, the appealed decision of the Court of Appeals is hereby reversed and set aside.
Respondent Eulogio Gonzales is hereby held not to have validly exercised his right of
redemption over his tenanted agricultural land. No costs.
SO ORDERED.
Teehankee (Chairman), Muoz-Palma, Fernandez and Guerrero, JJ., concur.
Makasiar, J., reserved his vote.

SUPREME COURT
Manila
FIRST DIVISION
G.R. No. L-47088 July 10, 1981
CONSOLACION DUQUE SALONGA, assisted by her husband WENCESLAO
SALONGA, plaintiff-appellant,
vs.
JULITA B. FARRALES, and THE SHERIFF OF OLONGAPO CITY, defendants-appellees.
FERNANDEZ, J.:
This is an appeal certified to this Court by the Court of Appeals 1 from the decision of the Court
of First Instance of Zambales and Olongapo City, Third Judicial District, Branch III, Olongapo
City, in Civil Case No. 1144-0, entitled "Consolacion Duque Salonga, assisted by her husband,
Wenceslao Salonga, Plaintiff, versus Julita B. Farrales, and The Sheriff of Olongapo City,
Defendants," the dispositive part of which reads:
FOR THE REASONS GIVEN, judgment is hereby rendered dismissing plaintiff's
complaint, as well as defendants' counterclaim.
Costs against plaintiff.
SO ORDERED. 2
The records disclose that on January 2, 1973; the appellant, Consolacion Duque Salonga assisted
by her husband, filed a complaint against Julita B. Farrales and the Sheriff of Olongapo City with
the Court of First Instance of Zambales and Olongapo City, Third Judicial District, Branch III,
Olongapo City, seeking the following relief:
WHEREFORE, plaintiff most respectfully prays for the following relief:
a) Ordering defendant Julita Farrales to sell to plaintiff the parcel of land
containing an area of 156 Square Meters, more or less, where the house of strong
materials of plaintiff exists.
b) Ordering the defendants not to disturb nor interfere in the peaceful possession
or occupation of the land by plaintiff, until a final decision is rendered in this
case.
c) Ordering defendants jointly and severally to pay costs; and
d) Granting plaintiff such other relief conformable to law, justice and equity.
Sta. Rita, Olongapo City, December 28, 1972. 3
that on January 9, 1973, plaintiff-appellant, Salonga filed an urgent petition for the issuance of a
writ of preliminary injunction which was duly amended on January 16, 1973, 4 with the
following prayer:
WHEREFORE, plaintiff assisted by counsel most respectfully prays the Hon.
Court the following relief:
a) That a restraining order be issued pending resolution of the instant petition for
issuance of a Writ of Preliminary Injunction enjoining defendants, particularly the
Sheriff of Olongapo City to restrain from enforcing the Writ of Execution issued
in connection with the judgment rendered in Civil Case 650 for ejectment in the
City Court of Olongapo City;
b) That after due hearing of the present amended petition, a Writ of Preliminary
Injunction conditioned upon a reasonable bond be issued enjoining the
defendants, particularly, the Sheriff of Olongapo City, to restrain from enforcing
the Writ of Execution issued in connection with the judgment rendered in Civil
Case No. 650 for ejectment in the City Court of Olongapo City, in order to
maintain the status of the parties; in order to prevent the infliction of irreparable
injury to plaintiff; and in order that whatever judgment may be rendered in this
case, may not become moot, academic, illusory and ineffectual, and
c) Granting plaintiff such other relief conformable to law, justice and equity;
that on January 22, 1973, the court a quo issued an order temporarily restraining the carrying out
of the writ of execution issued pursuant to the judgment rendered by the City Court of Olongapo
City in Civil Case No. 650, a suit for ejectment filed by defendant-appellee Farrales against five
defendants, among whom the herein appellant, Consolacion Duque Salonga; 5 that on January
23, 1973, defendant-appellee Farrales filed a motion to deny the motion for the issuance of a
preliminary injunction for being vague and her answer with counterclaim to the complaint; 6that
an opposition to the amended petition for the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction was
also filed by the defendant-appellee Farrales on January 25, 1973; 7 that in an order dated
January 20, 1973, the court a quo denied the petition for the issuance of a preliminary injunction
and lifted the restraining order issued on January 22, 1973; 8 that plaintiff-appellant moved for
reconsideration of the order denying the motion for issuance of a preliminary injunction on
January 5, 1973; 9which was also denied by the court a quo on February 21, 1973; 10 that after the
trial on the merits of Civil Case No. 1144-0, the trial court rendered the judgment under review,
dismissing plaintiff's complaint; 11 that on August 13, 1973, the plaintiff, Consolacion Duque
Salonga, appealed from the said decision to the Court of Appeals; 12 that on February 25, 1974,
the plaintiff-appellant, Consolacion Duque Salonga, filed with the Court of Appeals a motion for
the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction in aid of appeal; 13 that in a resolution dated
March 6, 1974, the Court of Appeals denied the said motion on the ground that "the writ of
preliminary injunction prayed for being intended to restrain the enforcement of the writ of
execution issued in Civil Case No. 650 for Ejectment, which is not involved in this appeal, and
there being no justification for the issuance of the writ ... " 14 that on January 13, 1975, the
defendant-appellee Julita B. Farrales filed a motion to dismiss the appeal on the ground that the
appeal has become moot and academic because "the house of the plaintiffs-appellants, subject
matter of this appeal was demolished on October 21, 1974, Annex "A", Sheriff's return and the
land where this house was built was delivered to her and she is now the one in
possession ... ; 15 that the plaintiffs-appellants having failed to comment on the said motion to
dismiss when required by the Court of Appeals in its resolution dated January 16, 1975, 16 the
Court of Appeals resolved to submit the motion for decision in a resolution dated April 17,
1975; 17and that, likewise, the plaintiffs-appellants having failed to show cause why the case
should not be submitted for decision without the benefit of appellant's reply brief when required
to do so in a Court of Appeals resolution dated May 14, 1975, 18the Court of Appeals resolved on
July 8, 1975 to submit the case for decision without the benefit of appellants' reply brief.19
In a resolution promulgated on September 15, 1977 the Court of Appeals certified the case to the
Supreme Court because the issue raised in the appeal is purely legal. 20
The plaintiffs-appellants assign the following errors:
I THE COURT A QUO SERIOUSLY ERRED IN DISMISSING
APPELLANTS' COMPLAINT AND IN DENYING SAID APPELLANTS'
RELIEF TO PURCHASE FROM DEFENDANT-APPELLEE JULITA
FARRALES THE PIECE OF LAND IN QUESTION.
II THE COURT A QUO SERIOUSLY ERRED IN NOT APPLYING TO THE
SUIT AT BAR, SECTION 6, UNDER ARTICLE 11 OF THE NEW
CONSTITUTION, WHICH CONTROLS, DELIMITS AND REGULATES
PROPERTY RIGHTS AND PRIVATE GAINS. 21
The main legal question involved in this appeal is whether or not the court a quo erred in
dismissing the complaint for specific performance or the ground that there exists no legally
enforceable compromise agreement upon which the defendant-appellee Farrales can be
compelled to sell the piece of land in question to plaintiff-appellant, Consolacion Duque Salonga.
The facts, as found by the trial court, are:
At the pre-trial conference, the parties stipulated on the following facts (1) THAT the personal circumstances of the parties as alleged in the complaint are
admitted:
(2) THAT defendant Farrales is the titled owner of a parcel of residential land
situated in Sta. Rita, Olongapo City, Identity of which is not disputed, formerly
acquired by her from one Leoncio Dytuco who, in turn, acquired the same from
the Corpuz Family of which only 361 square meters, more or less, not actually
belong to said defendant after portions thereof had been sold to Marciala
Zarsadias, Catalino Pascual and Rosanna Quiocson*; (*Per Deed of Absolute
Sale, Exhibit B, the vendee is actually Dionisio Quiocson);
3) THAT even prior to the acquisition by defendant Farrales (if the land aforesaid,
plaintiff was already in possession as lessee of some 156 square meters thereof,
on which she had erected a house, paying rentals thereon first to the original
owners and later to defendant Farrales.
(4) THAT, sometime prior to November, 1968, defendant Farrales filed an
ejectment case for non-payment of rentals against plaintiff and her husbandjointly with other lessees of other portions of the land, to wit, Jorge Carvajal,
Catalino Pascua, Marciala Zarsadias, and the spouses Cesar and Rosalina
Quiocson - Civil Case No. 650 of the Olongapo City Court, Branch 1, in which,
on November 20, 1968, and reiterated on February 4, 1970, a decision was
rendered in favor of defendant Farrales and ordering the therein defendants,
including plaintiff herein and her husband, to vacate the portion occupied by them
and to pay rentals in arrears, attorney's fees and costs;
(5) THAT the decision aforesaid was elevated on appeal to the Court of First
Instance of Zambales and Olongapo City, Civil Case No. 581-0 thereof, and, in a
Decision dated November 11, 1971 of Branch III thereof, the same was affirmed
with modification only as to the amount of rentals arrears to be paid;
(6) THAT the affirmatory decision of the Court of First Instance aforesaid is now
final and executory the records of the case had been remanded to the Court for
execution, and the corresponding writ of execution had been issued partially
satisfied, as far as plaintiff herein is concerned, by the payment of all rentals in
arrears although the removal of said plaintiff's house from the land still remains to
be carried out by defendant Sheriff: and
(7) THAT, even before the rendition of the affirmatory decision of the Court of
First Instance, by common consent amongst themselves defendant sold to
Catalino Pascua, Marciala Zarsadias and the spouses Cesar and Rosalina
Quiocson the areas respectly occupied by them; while, with respect to Jorge
Carvajal, in a suit thereafter filed between him and defendant Farrales, a
compromise. agreement was entered into whereunder said defendant undertook to
pay for Carvajal's house on her land, so that the decision aforesaid is now being
executed, as far as ejectment is concerned, only against plaintiff herein. (Pre-Trial
Order, May 17, 1973, pp. 2-5) 22
The lower court explained its conclusion thus:
... From the very allegations of the complaint, it is clearly admitted 5. That plaintiff herein, in view of the sale to three tenants defendants of the
portions of land occupied by each of said three tenant-defendants, by defendant
Julita B. Farrales, also offered to purchase from said defendant the area of One
Hundred Fifty-Six (156) Square Meters, more or less, where plaintiff's house of
strong materials exists, but, defendant Julita B. Farrales, despite the fact that said
plaintiff's order to purchase was just, fair and reasonable persistently refused such
offer, and instead insisted to execute the judgment rendered in the ejectment case,
before the City Court of Olongapo City, thru the herein defendant Sheriff of
Olongapo City, with the sole and only purpose of causing damage and prejudice
to the plaintiff (Complaint, p. 3 emphasis supplied).
Being a judicial admission, the foregoing binds plaintiff who cannot subsequently
take a position contradictory thereto or inconsistent therewith (Section 2, Rule
129, Rules of Court; McDaniel vs. Apacible, 44 Phil. 248 Cunanan vs. Amparo,
80 Phil., 227). Hence, if plaintiff's offer to purchase was, as aforesaid persistently
refused by defendant, it is obvious that no meeting of the and, took place and,
accordingly, no contract, either to sell or of sale, was ever perfected between
them. This is only firmed up even more by plaintiff's admission on the witness
stand that no agreement respecting the purchase and sale of the disputed land was
finalized because, while defendant Farrales purportedly wanted payment in cash,
plaintiff did not have any money for that purpose and neither were negotiations
ever had respecting any possible arrangement for payment in installments. On all
fours to the case at bar, therefore, is Velasco et al., vs. Court of Appeals, et al,
G.R. No. L-31018, June 29, 1973, which was a case for specific performance to
compel the therein respondent Magdalena Estate, Inc. to sell a parcel of land to
petitioner per an alleged contract of sale in which the Supreme Court ruled:
It is not difficult to glean from the aforequoted averments that the
petitioners themselves admit that they and the respondent still had
to meet and agree on how and when the down payment and the
installment payments were to be paid. Such being the situation, it
cannot, therefore be said that a definite and firm sales agreement
between the parties had been perfected over the lot in question.
Indeed this Court has already ruled before that a definite agreement
on the manner of payment of the purchase price is an essential
element in the formation of a binding and enforceable contract of
sale.
Since contracts are enforceable only from the moment of perfection (Articles
1315 and 1475, Civil Code of the Philippines; Pacific Oxygen and Acetylene Co.
vs. Central Bank, G.R. No. L-21881, March 1, 1968; Atkins, Kroll and Co., Inc.
vs. B. Cua Hian Teck G.R. No. L-9817, January 31, 1958), and there is here no
perfected contract at all, it goes without saying that plaintiff has absolutely
nothing to enforce against defendant Farrales, and the fact that defendant Farrales
previously sold portions of the land to other lessees similarly situated as plaintiff
herein, does not change the situation because, as to said other lessees, a perfected
contract existed - which is not the case with plaintiff. 23
The trial court found as a fact that no compromise agreement to sell the land in question was ever
perfected between the defendant-appellee as vendor and the plaintiffs-appellants as vendees. 24
It is elementary that consent is an essential element for the existence of a contract, and where it is
wanting, the contract is non-existent. The essence of consent is the conformity of the parties on
the terms of the contract, the acceptance by one of the offer made by the other. The contract to
sell is a bilateral contract. Where there is merely an offer by one party, without the acceptance of
the other, there is no consent. 25
It appears in this case that the offeree, the defendant-appellee Julita B. Farrales not only did not
accept, but rejected the offer of plaintiffs-appellants, spouses Salonga to buy the land in question.
There being no consent there is. therefore, no contract to sell to speak of.
Likewise, it must be borne in mind that the alleged compromise agreement to sell the land in
question is unenforceable under the Statute of Frauds, 26 and thus, renders all the more ineffective
the action for specific performance in the court a quo.
Moreover, as correctly found by the trial court, the plaintiffs-appellants, as lessees, are neither
builders in good faith nor in bad faith. Their rights are governed not by Article 448 but by Art.
1678 of the New Civil Code. 27 As lessees, they may remove the improvements should the lessor
refuse to reimburse them, but the lessee does not have the right to buy the land. 28
Anent the appellants' claim that since the appellee sold to the three (3) other defendants in the
ejectment suit the three (3) portions of the land in question occupied by them, it follows that "she
must also sell that portion of the land where appellants' residential house was found to
appellants" is unmeritorious. The trial court correctly ruled that the fact that defendant-appellee
sold portions of the land to the other lessees similarly situated as plaintiffs-appellants Salonga
does not change the situation because as to said other lessees, a perfected contract of sale existed
which, as previously shown was not the case with the plaintiff. 29
As to the contention that Sec. 6, Article II of the New Constitution is applicable to the case at
bar, it must be remembered that social justice cannot be invoked to trample on the rights of
property owners who under our Constitution and laws are also entitled to protection. The social
justice consecrated in our constitution was not intended to take away rights from a person and
give them to another who is not entitled thereto. Evidently, the plea for social justice cannot
nullify the law on obligations and contracts, and is, therefore, beyond the power of the Court to
grant.
There is no showing that the trial court committed any reversible error.
WHEREFORE, the appeal is DISMISSED for lack of merit and the judgment appealed from is
hereby affirmed, without pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED

SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. 118295 May 2, 1997

WIGBERTO E. TAADA and ANNA DOMINIQUE COSETENG, as members of the
Philippine Senate and as taxpayers; GREGORIO ANDOLANA and JOKER ARROYO as
members of the House of Representatives and as taxpayers; NICANOR P. PERLAS and
HORACIO R. MORALES, both as taxpayers; CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION, NATIONAL
ECONOMIC PROTECTIONISM ASSOCIATION, CENTER FOR ALTERNATIVE
DEVELOPMENT INITIATIVES, LIKAS-KAYANG KAUNLARAN FOUNDATION,
INC., PHILIPPINE RURAL RECONSTRUCTION MOVEMENT, DEMOKRATIKONG
KILUSAN NG MAGBUBUKID NG PILIPINAS, INC., and PHILIPPINE PEASANT
INSTITUTE, in representation of various taxpayers and as non-governmental
organizations, petitioners,
vs.
EDGARDO ANGARA, ALBERTO ROMULO, LETICIA RAMOS-SHAHANI,
HEHERSON ALVAREZ, AGAPITO AQUINO, RODOLFO BIAZON, NEPTALI
GONZALES, ERNESTO HERRERA, JOSE LINA, GLORIA. MACAPAGAL-ARROYO,
ORLANDO MERCADO, BLAS OPLE, JOHN OSMEA, SANTANINA RASUL, RAMON
REVILLA, RAUL ROCO, FRANCISCO TATAD and FREDDIE WEBB, in their
respective capacities as members of the Philippine Senate who concurred in the ratification
by the President of the Philippines of the Agreement Establishing the World Trade
Organization; SALVADOR ENRIQUEZ, in his capacity as Secretary of Budget and
Management; CARIDAD VALDEHUESA, in her capacity as National Treasurer;
RIZALINO NAVARRO, in his capacity as Secretary of Trade and Industry; ROBERTO
SEBASTIAN, in his capacity as Secretary of Agriculture; ROBERTO DE OCAMPO, in his
capacity as Secretary of Finance; ROBERTO ROMULO, in his capacity as Secretary of
Foreign Affairs; and TEOFISTO T. GUINGONA, in his capacity as Executive
Secretary, respondents.
PANGANIBAN, J.:
The emergence on January 1, 1995 of the World Trade Organization, abetted by the membership
thereto of the vast majority of countries has revolutionized international business and economic
relations amongst states. It has irreversibly propelled the world towards trade liberalization and
economic globalization. Liberalization, globalization, deregulation and privatization, the thirdmillennium buzz words, are ushering in a new borderless world of business by sweeping away as
mere historical relics the heretofore traditional modes of promoting and protecting national
economies like tariffs, export subsidies, import quotas, quantitative restrictions, tax exemptions
and currency controls. Finding market niches and becoming the best in specific industries in a
market-driven and export-oriented global scenario are replacing age-old "beggar-thy-neighbor"
policies that unilaterally protect weak and inefficient domestic producers of goods and services.
In the words of Peter Drucker, the well-known management guru, "Increased participation in the
world economy has become the key to domestic economic growth and prosperity."
Brief Historical Background
To hasten worldwide recovery from the devastation wrought by the Second World War, plans for
the establishment of three multilateral institutions inspired by that grand political body, the
United Nations were discussed at Dumbarton Oaks and Bretton Woods. The first was the
World Bank (WB) which was to address the rehabilitation and reconstruction of war-ravaged and
later developing countries; the second, the International Monetary Fund (IMF) which was to deal
with currency problems; and the third, the International Trade Organization (ITO), which was to
foster order and predictability in world trade and to minimize unilateral protectionist policies that
invite challenge, even retaliation, from other states. However, for a variety of reasons, including
its non-ratification by the United States, the ITO, unlike the IMF and WB, never took off. What
remained was only GATT the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade. GATT was a
collection of treaties governing access to the economies of treaty adherents with no
institutionalized body administering the agreements or dependable system of dispute settlement.
After half a century and several dizzying rounds of negotiations, principally the Kennedy Round,
the Tokyo Round and the Uruguay Round, the world finally gave birth to that administering body
the World Trade Organization with the signing of the "Final Act" in Marrakesh, Morocco
and the ratification of the WTO Agreement by its members. 1
Like many other developing countries, the Philippines joined WTO as a founding member with
the goal, as articulated by President Fidel V. Ramos in two letters to the Senate (infra), of
improving "Philippine access to foreign markets, especially its major trading partners, through
the reduction of tariffs on its exports, particularly agricultural and industrial products." The
President also saw in the WTO the opening of "new opportunities for the services sector . . . ,
(the reduction of) costs and uncertainty associated with exporting . . . , and (the attraction of)
more investments into the country." Although the Chief Executive did not expressly mention it in
his letter, the Philippines and this is of special interest to the legal profession will benefit
from the WTO system of dispute settlement by judicial adjudication through the independent
WTO settlement bodies called (1) Dispute Settlement Panels and (2) Appellate Tribunal.
Heretofore, trade disputes were settled mainly through negotiations where solutions were arrived
at frequently on the basis of relative bargaining strengths, and where naturally, weak and
underdeveloped countries were at a disadvantage.
The Petition in Brief
Arguing mainly (1) that the WTO requires the Philippines "to place nationals and products of
member-countries on the same footing as Filipinos and local products" and (2) that the WTO
"intrudes, limits and/or impairs" the constitutional powers of both Congress and the Supreme
Court, the instant petition before this Court assails the WTO Agreement for violating the
mandate of the 1987 Constitution to "develop a self-reliant and independent national economy
effectively controlled by Filipinos . . . (to) give preference to qualified Filipinos (and to) promote
the preferential use of Filipino labor, domestic materials and locally produced goods."
Simply stated, does the Philippine Constitution prohibit Philippine participation in worldwide
trade liberalization and economic globalization? Does it proscribe Philippine integration into a
global economy that is liberalized, deregulated and privatized? These are the main questions
raised in this petition for certiorari, prohibition andmandamus under Rule 65 of the Rules of
Court praying (1) for the nullification, on constitutional grounds, of the concurrence of the
Philippine Senate in the ratification by the President of the Philippines of the Agreement
Establishing the World Trade Organization (WTO Agreement, for brevity) and (2) for the
prohibition of its implementation and enforcement through the release and utilization of public
funds, the assignment of public officials and employees, as well as the use of government
properties and resources by respondent-heads of various executive offices concerned therewith.
This concurrence is embodied in Senate Resolution No. 97, dated December 14, 1994.
The Facts
On April 15, 1994, Respondent Rizalino Navarro, then Secretary of The Department of Trade
and Industry (Secretary Navarro, for brevity), representing the Government of the Republic of
the Philippines, signed in Marrakesh, Morocco, the Final Act Embodying the Results of the
Uruguay Round of Multilateral Negotiations (Final Act, for brevity).
By signing the Final Act, 2 Secretary Navarro on behalf of the Republic of the Philippines,
agreed:
(a) to submit, as appropriate, the WTO Agreement for the consideration of their
respective competent authorities, with a view to seeking approval of the
Agreement in accordance with their procedures; and
(b) to adopt the Ministerial Declarations and Decisions.
On August 12, 1994, the members of the Philippine Senate received a letter dated August 11,
1994 from the President of the Philippines, 3 stating among others that "the Uruguay Round Final
Act is hereby submitted to the Senate for its concurrence pursuant to Section 21, Article VII of
the Constitution."
On August 13, 1994, the members of the Philippine Senate received another letter from the
President of the Philippines 4 likewise dated August 11, 1994, which stated among others that
"the Uruguay Round Final Act, the Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, the
Ministerial Declarations and Decisions, and the Understanding on Commitments in Financial
Services are hereby submitted to the Senate for its concurrence pursuant to Section 21, Article
VII of the Constitution."
On December 9, 1994, the President of the Philippines certified the necessity of the immediate
adoption of P.S. 1083, a resolution entitled "Concurring in the Ratification of the Agreement
Establishing the World Trade Organization." 5
On December 14, 1994, the Philippine Senate adopted Resolution No. 97 which "Resolved, as it
is hereby resolved, that the Senate concur, as it hereby concurs, in the ratification by the
President of the Philippines of the Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization." 6 The
text of the WTO Agreement is written on pages 137 et seq. of Volume I of the 36volume Uruguay Round of Multilateral Trade Negotiations and includes various agreements and
associated legal instruments (identified in the said Agreement as Annexes 1, 2 and 3 thereto and
collectively referred to as Multilateral Trade Agreements, for brevity) as follows:
ANNEX 1
Annex 1A: Multilateral Agreement on Trade in Goods
General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 1994
Agreement on Agriculture
Agreement on the Application of Sanitary and
Phytosanitary Measures
Agreement on Textiles and Clothing

Agreement on Technical Barriers to Trade
Agreement on Trade-Related Investment Measures
Agreement on Implementation of Article VI of he
General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade
1994
Agreement on Implementation of Article VII of the
General on Tariffs and Trade 1994
Agreement on Pre-Shipment Inspection
Agreement on Rules of Origin
Agreement on Imports Licensing Procedures
Agreement on Subsidies and Coordinating
Measures
Agreement on Safeguards
Annex 1B: General Agreement on Trade in Services and Annexes
Annex 1C: Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual
Property Rights
ANNEX 2
Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing
the Settlement of Disputes
ANNEX 3
Trade Policy Review Mechanism
On December 16, 1994, the President of the Philippines signed 7 the Instrument of Ratification,
declaring:
NOW THEREFORE, be it known that I, FIDEL V. RAMOS, President of the
Republic of the Philippines, after having seen and considered the aforementioned
Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization and the agreements and
associated legal instruments included in Annexes one (1), two (2) and three (3) of
that Agreement which are integral parts thereof, signed at Marrakesh, Morocco on
15 April 1994, do hereby ratify and confirm the same and every Article and
Clause thereof.
To emphasize, the WTO Agreement ratified by the President of the Philippines is composed of
the Agreement Proper and "the associated legal instruments included in Annexes one (1), two (2)
and three (3) of that Agreement which are integral parts thereof."
On the other hand, the Final Act signed by Secretary Navarro embodies not only the WTO
Agreement (and its integral annexes aforementioned) but also (1) the Ministerial Declarations
and Decisions and (2) the Understanding on Commitments in Financial Services. In his
Memorandum dated May 13, 1996, 8 the Solicitor General describes these two latter documents
as follows:
The Ministerial Decisions and Declarations are twenty-five declarations and

decisions on a wide range of matters, such as measures in favor of least developed
countries, notification procedures, relationship of WTO with the International
Monetary Fund (IMF), and agreements on technical barriers to trade and on
dispute settlement.
The Understanding on Commitments in Financial Services dwell on, among other
things, standstill or limitations and qualifications of commitments to existing nonconforming measures, market access, national treatment, and definitions of nonresident supplier of financial services, commercial presence and new financial
service.
On December 29, 1994, the present petition was filed. After careful deliberation on respondents'
comment and petitioners' reply thereto, the Court resolved on December 12, 1995, to give due
course to the petition, and the parties thereafter filed their respective memoranda. The court also
requested the Honorable Lilia R. Bautista, the Philippine Ambassador to the United Nations
stationed in Geneva, Switzerland, to submit a paper, hereafter referred to as "Bautista
Paper," 9 for brevity, (1) providing a historical background of and (2) summarizing the said
agreements.
During the Oral Argument held on August 27, 1996, the Court directed:
(a) the petitioners to submit the (1) Senate Committee Report on the matter in
controversy and (2) the transcript of proceedings/hearings in the Senate; and
(b) the Solicitor General, as counsel for respondents, to file (1) a list of Philippine
treaties signed prior to the Philippine adherence to the WTO Agreement, which
derogate from Philippine sovereignty and (2) copies of the multi-volume WTO
Agreement and other documents mentioned in the Final Act, as soon as possible.
After receipt of the foregoing documents, the Court said it would consider the case submitted for
resolution. In a Compliance dated September 16, 1996, the Solicitor General submitted a printed
copy of the 36-volume Uruguay Round of Multilateral Trade Negotiations, and in another
Compliance dated October 24, 1996, he listed the various "bilateral or multilateral treaties or
international instruments involving derogation of Philippine sovereignty." Petitioners, on the
other hand, submitted their Compliance dated January 28, 1997, on January 30, 1997.
The Issues
In their Memorandum dated March 11, 1996, petitioners summarized the issues as follows:
A. Whether the petition presents a political question or is otherwise not
justiciable.
B. Whether the petitioner members of the Senate who participated in the
deliberations and voting leading to the concurrence are estopped from impugning
the validity of the Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization or of the
validity of the concurrence.
C. Whether the provisions of the Agreement Establishing the World Trade

Organization contravene the provisions of Sec. 19, Article II, and Secs. 10 and 12,
Article XII, all of the 1987 Philippine Constitution.
D. Whether provisions of the Agreement Establishing the World Trade
Organization unduly limit, restrict and impair Philippine sovereignty specifically
the legislative power which, under Sec. 2, Article VI, 1987 Philippine
Constitution is "vested in the Congress of the Philippines";
E. Whether provisions of the Agreement Establishing the World Trade
Organization interfere with the exercise of judicial power.
F. Whether the respondent members of the Senate acted in grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction when they voted for
concurrence in the ratification of the constitutionally-infirm Agreement
Establishing the World Trade Organization.
G. Whether the respondent members of the Senate acted in grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction when they concurred only in
the ratification of the Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, and
not with the Presidential submission which included the Final Act, Ministerial
Declaration and Decisions, and the Understanding on Commitments in Financial
Services.
On the other hand, the Solicitor General as counsel for respondents "synthesized the several
issues raised by petitioners into the following": 10
1. Whether or not the provisions of the "Agreement Establishing the World Trade
Organization and the Agreements and Associated Legal Instruments included in
Annexes one (1), two (2) and three (3) of that agreement" cited by petitioners
directly contravene or undermine the letter, spirit and intent of Section 19, Article
II and Sections 10 and 12, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution.
2. Whether or not certain provisions of the Agreement unduly limit, restrict or
impair the exercise of legislative power by Congress.
3. Whether or not certain provisions of the Agreement impair the exercise of
judicial power by this Honorable Court in promulgating the rules of evidence.
4. Whether or not the concurrence of the Senate "in the ratification by the
President of the Philippines of the Agreement establishing the World Trade
Organization" implied rejection of the treaty embodied in the Final Act.
By raising and arguing only four issues against the seven presented by petitioners, the Solicitor
General has effectively ignored three, namely: (1) whether the petition presents a political
question or is otherwise not justiciable; (2) whether petitioner-members of the Senate (Wigberto
E. Taada and Anna Dominique Coseteng) are estopped from joining this suit; and (3) whether
the respondent-members of the Senate acted in grave abuse of discretion when they voted for
concurrence in the ratification of the WTO Agreement. The foregoing notwithstanding, this
Court resolved to deal with these three issues thus:
(1) The "political question" issue being very fundamental and vital, and being a matter that
probes into the very jurisdiction of this Court to hear and decide this case was deliberated
upon by the Court and will thus be ruled upon as the first issue;
(2) The matter of estoppel will not be taken up because this defense is waivable and the
respondents have effectively waived it by not pursuing it in any of their pleadings; in any event,
this issue, even if ruled in respondents' favor, will not cause the petition's dismissal as there are
petitioners other than the two senators, who are not vulnerable to the defense of estoppel; and
(3) The issue of alleged grave abuse of discretion on the part of the respondent senators will be
taken up as an integral part of the disposition of the four issues raised by the Solicitor General.
During its deliberations on the case, the Court noted that the respondents did not question
the locus standi of petitioners. Hence, they are also deemed to have waived the benefit of such
issue. They probably realized that grave constitutional issues, expenditures of public funds and
serious international commitments of the nation are involved here, and that transcendental public
interest requires that the substantive issues be met head on and decided on the merits, rather than
skirted or deflected by procedural matters. 11
To recapitulate, the issues that will be ruled upon shortly are:
(1) DOES THE PETITION PRESENT A JUSTICIABLE CONTROVERSY?
OTHERWISE STATED, DOES THE PETITION INVOLVE A POLITICAL
QUESTION OVER WHICH THIS COURT HAS NO JURISDICTION?
(2) DO THE PROVISIONS OF THE WTO AGREEMENT AND ITS THREE
ANNEXES CONTRAVENE SEC. 19, ARTICLE II, AND SECS. 10 AND 12,
ARTICLE XII, OF THE PHILIPPINE CONSTITUTION?
(3) DO THE PROVISIONS OF SAID AGREEMENT AND ITS ANNEXES
LIMIT, RESTRICT, OR IMPAIR THE EXERCISE OF LEGISLATIVE POWER
BY CONGRESS?
(4) DO SAID PROVISIONS UNDULY IMPAIR OR INTERFERE WITH THE
EXERCISE OF JUDICIAL POWER BY THIS COURT IN PROMULGATING
RULES ON EVIDENCE?
(5) WAS THE CONCURRENCE OF THE SENATE IN THE WTO
AGREEMENT AND ITS ANNEXES SUFFICIENT AND/OR VALID,
CONSIDERING THAT IT DID NOT INCLUDE THE FINAL ACT,
MINISTERIAL DECLARATIONS AND DECISIONS, AND THE
UNDERSTANDING ON COMMITMENTS IN FINANCIAL SERVICES?
The First Issue: Does the Court
Have Jurisdiction Over the Controversy?
In seeking to nullify an act of the Philippine Senate on the ground that it contravenes the
Constitution, the petition no doubt raises a justiciable controversy. Where an action of the
legislative branch is seriously alleged to have infringed the Constitution, it becomes not only the
right but in fact the duty of the judiciary to settle the dispute. "The question thus posed is judicial
rather than political. The duty (to adjudicate) remains to assure that the supremacy of the
Constitution is upheld." 12 Once a "controversy as to the application or interpretation of a

constitutional provision is raised before this Court (as in the instant case), it becomes a legal
issue which the Court is bound by constitutional mandate to decide." 13
The jurisdiction of this Court to adjudicate the matters 14 raised in the petition is clearly set out in
the 1987 Constitution, 15 as follows:
government.
The foregoing text emphasizes the judicial department's duty and power to strike down grave
abuse of discretion on the part of any branch or instrumentality of government including
Congress. It is an innovation in our political law. 16 As explained by former Chief Justice Roberto
Concepcion, 17 "the judiciary is the final arbiter on the question of whether or not a branch of
government or any of its officials has acted without jurisdiction or in excess of jurisdiction or so
capriciously as to constitute an abuse of discretion amounting to excess of jurisdiction. This is
not only a judicial power but a duty to pass judgment on matters of this nature."
As this Court has repeatedly and firmly emphasized in many cases, 18 it will not shirk, digress
from or abandon its sacred duty and authority to uphold the Constitution in matters that involve
grave abuse of discretion brought before it in appropriate cases, committed by any officer,
agency, instrumentality or department of the government.
As the petition alleges grave abuse of discretion and as there is no other plain, speedy or
adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law, we have no hesitation at all in holding that this
petition should be given due course and the vital questions raised therein ruled upon under Rule
65 of the Rules of Court. Indeed, certiorari, prohibition andmandamus are appropriate remedies
to raise constitutional issues and to review and/or prohibit/nullify, when proper, acts of
legislative and executive officials. On this, we have no equivocation.
We should stress that, in deciding to take jurisdiction over this petition, this Court will not review
the wisdom of the decision of the President and the Senate in enlisting the country into the WTO,
or pass upon the merits of trade liberalization as a policy espoused by said international body.
Neither will it rule on the propriety of the government's economic policy of reducing/removing
tariffs, taxes, subsidies, quantitative restrictions, and other import/trade barriers. Rather, it will
only exercise its constitutional duty "to determine whether or not there had been a grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction" on the part of the Senate in ratifying the
WTO Agreement and its three annexes.
Second Issue: The WTO Agreement
and Economic Nationalism
This is the lis mota, the main issue, raised by the petition.
Petitioners vigorously argue that the "letter, spirit and intent" of the Constitution mandating
"economic nationalism" are violated by the so-called "parity provisions" and "national treatment"
clauses scattered in various parts not only of the WTO Agreement and its annexes but also in the
Ministerial Decisions and Declarations and in the Understanding on Commitments in Financial

Services.
Specifically, the "flagship" constitutional provisions referred to are Sec 19, Article II, and Secs.
10 and 12, Article XII, of the Constitution, which are worded as follows:
Article II
DECLARATION OF PRINCIPLES
AND STATE POLICIES
xxx xxx xxx
Sec. 19. The State shall develop a self-reliant and independent national economy
effectively controlled by Filipinos.
xxx xxx xxx
Article XII
NATIONAL ECONOMY AND PATRIMONY
xxx xxx xxx
Sec. 10. . . . The Congress shall enact measures that will encourage the formation
and operation of enterprises whose capital is wholly owned by Filipinos.
In the grant of rights, privileges, and concessions covering the national economy
and patrimony, the State shall give preference to qualified Filipinos.
xxx xxx xxx
Sec. 12. The State shall promote the preferential use of Filipino labor, domestic
materials and locally produced goods, and adopt measures that help make them
competitive.
Petitioners aver that these sacred constitutional principles are desecrated by the following WTO
provisions quoted in their memorandum: 19
a) In the area of investment measures related to trade in goods (TRIMS, for
brevity):
Article 2
National Treatment and Quantitative Restrictions.
1. Without prejudice to other rights and obligations under GATT
1994, no Member shall apply any TRIM that is inconsistent with
the provisions of Article II or Article XI of GATT 1994.
2. An illustrative list of TRIMS that are inconsistent with the
obligations of general elimination of quantitative restrictions
provided for in paragraph I of Article XI of GATT 1994 is

contained in the Annex to this Agreement." (Agreement on TradeRelated Investment Measures, Vol. 27, Uruguay Round, Legal
Instruments, p. 22121, emphasis supplied).
The Annex referred to reads as follows:
ANNEX
Illustrative List
1. TRIMS that are inconsistent with the obligation of national treatment provided
for in paragraph 4 of Article III of GATT 1994 include those which are mandatory
or enforceable under domestic law or under administrative rulings, or compliance
with which is necessary to obtain an advantage, and which require:
(a) the purchase or use by an enterprise of products of domestic
origin or from any domestic source, whether specified in terms of
particular products, in terms of volume or value of products, or in
terms of proportion of volume or value of its local production; or
(b) that an enterprise's purchases or use of imported products be
limited to an amount related to the volume or value of local
products that it exports.
2. TRIMS that are inconsistent with the obligations of general elimination of
quantitative restrictions provided for in paragraph 1 of Article XI of GATT 1994
include those which are mandatory or enforceable under domestic laws or under
administrative rulings, or compliance with which is necessary to obtain an
advantage, and which restrict:
(a) the importation by an enterprise of products used in or related
to the local production that it exports;
(b) the importation by an enterprise of products used in or related
to its local production by restricting its access to foreign exchange
inflows attributable to the enterprise; or
(c) the exportation or sale for export specified in terms of
particular products, in terms of volume or value of products, or in
terms of a preparation of volume or value of its local production.
(Annex to the Agreement on Trade-Related Investment Measures,
Vol. 27, Uruguay Round Legal Documents, p. 22125, emphasis
supplied).
The paragraph 4 of Article III of GATT 1994 referred to is quoted as follows:
The products of the territory of any contracting party imported into
the territory of any other contracting party shall be accorded
treatment no less favorable than that accorded to like products of
national origin in respect of laws, regulations and requirements
affecting their internal sale, offering for sale, purchase,

transportation, distribution or use, the provisions of this paragraph
shall not prevent the application of differential internal
transportation charges which are based exclusively on the
economic operation of the means of transport and not on the
nationality of the product." (Article III, GATT 1947, as amended
by the Protocol Modifying Part II, and Article XXVI of GATT, 14
September 1948, 62 UMTS 82-84 in relation to paragraph 1(a) of
the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 1994, Vol. 1, Uruguay
Round, Legal Instruments p. 177, emphasis supplied).
(b) In the area of trade related aspects of intellectual property rights (TRIPS, for
brevity):
Each Member shall accord to the nationals of other Members
treatment no less favourable than that it accords to its own
nationals with regard to the protection of intellectual property. . .
(par. 1 Article 3, Agreement on Trade-Related Aspect of
Intellectual Property rights, Vol. 31, Uruguay Round, Legal
Instruments, p. 25432 (emphasis supplied)
(c) In the area of the General Agreement on Trade in Services:
National Treatment
1. In the sectors inscribed in its schedule, and subject to any
conditions and qualifications set out therein, each Member shall
accord to services and service suppliers of any other Member, in
respect of all measures affecting the supply of services, treatment
no less favourable than it accords to its own like services and
service suppliers.
2. A Member may meet the requirement of paragraph I by
according to services and service suppliers of any other Member,
either formally suppliers of any other Member, either formally
identical treatment or formally different treatment to that it accords
to its own like services and service suppliers.
3. Formally identical or formally different treatment shall be
considered to be less favourable if it modifies the conditions of
completion in favour of services or service suppliers of the
Member compared to like services or service suppliers of any other
Member. (Article XVII, General Agreement on Trade in Services,
Vol. 28, Uruguay Round Legal Instruments, p. 22610 emphasis
supplied).
It is petitioners' position that the foregoing "national treatment" and "parity provisions" of the
WTO Agreement "place nationals and products of member countries on the same footing as
Filipinos and local products," in contravention of the "Filipino First" policy of the Constitution.
They allegedly render meaningless the phrase "effectively controlled by Filipinos." The
constitutional conflict becomes more manifest when viewed in the context of the clear duty
imposed on the Philippines as a WTO member to ensure the conformity of its laws, regulations
and administrative procedures with its obligations as provided in the annexed
agreements. 20 Petitioners further argue that these provisions contravene constitutional limitations
on the role exports play in national development and negate the preferential treatment accorded
to Filipino labor, domestic materials and locally produced goods.
On the other hand, respondents through the Solicitor General counter (1) that such Charter
provisions are not self-executing and merely set out general policies; (2) that these nationalistic
portions of the Constitution invoked by petitioners should not be read in isolation but should be
related to other relevant provisions of Art. XII, particularly Secs. 1 and 13 thereof; (3) that read
properly, the cited WTO clauses do not conflict with Constitution; and (4) that the WTO
Agreement contains sufficient provisions to protect developing countries like the Philippines
from the harshness of sudden trade liberalization.
We shall now discuss and rule on these arguments.
Declaration of Principles
Not Self-Executing
By its very title, Article II of the Constitution is a "declaration of principles and state policies."
The counterpart of this article in the 1935 Constitution 21 is called the "basic political creed of the
nation" by Dean Vicente Sinco. 22 These principles in Article II are not intended to be selfexecuting principles ready for enforcement through the courts. 23 They are used by the judiciary
as aids or as guides in the exercise of its power of judicial review, and by the legislature in its
enactment of laws. As held in the leading case of Kilosbayan, Incorporated vs. Morato, 24 the
principles and state policies enumerated in Article II and some sections of Article XII are not
"self-executing provisions, the disregard of which can give rise to a cause of action in the courts.
They do not embody judicially enforceable constitutional rights but guidelines for legislation."
In the same light, we held in Basco vs. Pagcor 25 that broad constitutional principles need
legislative enactments to implement the, thus:
On petitioners' allegation that P.D. 1869 violates Sections 11 (Personal Dignity)
12 (Family) and 13 (Role of Youth) of Article II; Section 13 (Social Justice) of
Article XIII and Section 2 (Educational Values) of Article XIV of the 1987
Constitution, suffice it to state also that these are merely statements of principles
and policies. As such, they are basically not self-executing, meaning a law should
be passed by Congress to clearly define and effectuate such principles.
In general, therefore, the 1935 provisions were not intended to be
self-executing principles ready for enforcement through the courts.
They were rather directives addressed to the executive and to the
legislature. If the executive and the legislature failed to heed the
directives of the article, the available remedy was not judicial but
political. The electorate could express their displeasure with the
failure of the executive and the legislature through the language of
the ballot. (Bernas, Vol. II, p. 2).
The reasons for denying a cause of action to an alleged infringement of board constitutional
principles are sourced from basic considerations of due process and the lack of judicial authority
to wade "into the uncharted ocean of social and economic policy making." Mr. Justice Florentino
P. Feliciano in his concurring opinion inOposa vs. Factoran, Jr., 26 explained these reasons as
follows:
My suggestion is simply that petitioners must, before the trial court, show a more
specific legal right a right cast in language of a significantly lower order of
generality than Article II (15) of the Constitution that is or may be violated by
the actions, or failures to act, imputed to the public respondent by petitioners so
that the trial court can validly render judgment grating all or part of the relief
prayed for. To my mind, the court should be understood as simply saying that
such a more specific legal right or rights may well exist in our corpus of law,
considering the general policy principles found in the Constitution and the
existence of the Philippine Environment Code, and that the trial court should have
given petitioners an effective opportunity so to demonstrate, instead of aborting
the proceedings on a motion to dismiss.
It seems to me important that the legal right which is an essential component of a
cause of action be a specific, operable legal right, rather than a constitutional or
statutory policy, for at least two (2) reasons. One is that unless the legal right
claimed to have been violated or disregarded is given specification in operational
terms, defendants may well be unable to defend themselves intelligently and
effectively; in other words, there are due process dimensions to this matter.
The second is a broader-gauge consideration where a specific violation of law
or applicable regulation is not alleged or proved, petitioners can be expected to
fall back on the expanded conception of judicial power in the second paragraph of
Section 1 of Article VIII of the Constitution which reads:
Sec. 1. . . .
Judicial power includes the duty of the courts of justice to settle
actual controversies involving rights which are legally demandable
and enforceable, and to determine whether or not there has been a
grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the
Government. (Emphasis supplied)
When substantive standards as general as "the right to a balanced and healthy
ecology" and "the right to health" are combined with remedial standards as broad
ranging as "a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction," the result will be, it is respectfully submitted, to propel courts into
the uncharted ocean of social and economic policy making. At least in respect of
the vast area of environmental protection and management, our courts have no
claim to special technical competence and experience and professional
qualification. Where no specific, operable norms and standards are shown to exist,
then the policy making departments the legislative and executive departments
must be given a real and effective opportunity to fashion and promulgate those
norms and standards, and to implement them before the courts should intervene.
Economic Nationalism Should Be Read with

Other Constitutional Mandates to Attain
Balanced Development of Economy
On the other hand, Secs. 10 and 12 of Article XII, apart from merely laying down general
principles relating to the national economy and patrimony, should be read and understood in
relation to the other sections in said article, especially Secs. 1 and 13 thereof which read:
Sec. 1. The goals of the national economy are a more equitable distribution of
opportunities, income, and wealth; a sustained increase in the amount of goods
and services produced by the nation for the benefit of the people; and an
expanding productivity as the key to raising the quality of life for all especially
the underprivileged.
The State shall promote industrialization and full employment based on sound
agricultural development and agrarian reform, through industries that make full
and efficient use of human and natural resources, and which are competitive in
both domestic and foreign markets. However, the State shall protect Filipino
enterprises against unfair foreign competition and trade practices.
In the pursuit of these goals, all sectors of the economy and all regions of the
country shall be given optimum opportunity to develop. . . .
xxx xxx xxx
Sec. 13. The State shall pursue a trade policy that serves the general welfare and
utilizes all forms and arrangements of exchange on the basis of equality and
reciprocity.
As pointed out by the Solicitor General, Sec. 1 lays down the basic goals of national economic
development, as follows:
1. A more equitable distribution of opportunities, income and wealth;
2. A sustained increase in the amount of goods and services provided by the nation for the benefit
of the people; and
3. An expanding productivity as the key to raising the quality of life for all especially the
underprivileged.
With these goals in context, the Constitution then ordains the ideals of economic nationalism (1)
by expressing preference in favor of qualified Filipinos "in the grant of rights, privileges and
concessions covering the national economy and patrimony" 27 and in the use of "Filipino labor,
domestic materials and locally-produced goods"; (2) by mandating the State to "adopt measures
that help make them competitive; 28 and (3) by requiring the State to "develop a self-reliant and
independent national economy effectively controlled by Filipinos." 29 In similar language, the
Constitution takes into account the realities of the outside world as it requires the pursuit of "a
trade policy that serves the general welfare and utilizes all forms and arrangements of exchange
on the basis of equality ad reciprocity"; 30 and speaks of industries "which are competitive in both
domestic and foreign markets" as well as of the protection of "Filipino enterprises
against unfair foreign competition and trade practices."
It is true that in the recent case of Manila Prince Hotel vs. Government Service Insurance
System, et al., 31 this Court held that "Sec. 10, second par., Art. XII of the 1987 Constitution is a
mandatory, positive command which is complete in itself and which needs no further guidelines
or implementing laws or rule for its enforcement. From its very words the provision does not
require any legislation to put it in operation. It is per se judicially enforceable." However, as the
constitutional provision itself states, it is enforceable only in regard to "the grants of rights,
privileges and concessions covering national economy and patrimony" and not to every aspect of
trade and commerce. It refers to exceptions rather than the rule. The issue here is not whether this
paragraph of Sec. 10 of Art. XII is self-executing or not. Rather, the issue is whether, as a rule,
there are enough balancing provisions in the Constitution to allow the Senate to ratify the
Philippine concurrence in the WTO Agreement. And we hold that there are.
All told, while the Constitution indeed mandates a bias in favor of Filipino goods, services, labor
and enterprises, at the same time, it recognizes the need for business exchange with the rest of
the world on the bases of equality and reciprocity and limits protection of Filipino enterprises
only against foreign competition and trade practices that are unfair. 32 In other words, the
Constitution did not intend to pursue an isolationist policy. It did not shut out foreign
investments, goods and services in the development of the Philippine economy. While the
Constitution does not encourage the unlimited entry of foreign goods, services and investments
into the country, it does not prohibit them either. In fact, it allows an exchange on the basis of
equality and reciprocity, frowning only on foreign competition that is unfair.
WTO Recognizes Need to
Protect Weak Economies
Upon the other hand, respondents maintain that the WTO itself has some built-in advantages to
protect weak and developing economies, which comprise the vast majority of its members.
Unlike in the UN where major states have permanent seats and veto powers in the Security
Council, in the WTO, decisions are made on the basis of sovereign equality, with each member's
vote equal in weight to that of any other. There is no WTO equivalent of the UN Security
Council.
WTO decides by consensus whenever possible, otherwise, decisions of the
Ministerial Conference and the General Council shall be taken by the majority of
the votes cast, except in cases of interpretation of the Agreement or waiver of the
obligation of a member which would require three fourths vote. Amendments
would require two thirds vote in general. Amendments to MFN provisions and the
Amendments provision will require assent of all members. Any member may
withdraw from the Agreement upon the expiration of six months from the date of
notice of withdrawals. 33
Hence, poor countries can protect their common interests more effectively through the WTO than
through one-on-one negotiations with developed countries. Within the WTO, developing
countries can form powerful blocs to push their economic agenda more decisively than outside
the Organization. This is not merely a matter of practical alliances but a negotiating strategy
rooted in law. Thus, the basic principles underlying the WTO Agreement recognize the need of
developing countries like the Philippines to "share in the growth in international
trade commensurate with the needs of their economic development." These basic principles are
found in the preamble 34 of the WTO Agreement as follows:
The Parties to this Agreement,

Recognizing that their relations in the field of trade and economic endeavour
should be conducted with a view to raising standards of living, ensuring full
employment and a large and steadily growing volume of real income and effective
demand, and expanding the production of and trade in goods and services, while
allowing for the optimal use of the world's resources in accordance with the
objective of sustainable development, seeking both to protect and preserve the
environment and to enhance the means for doing so in a manner consistent with
their respective needs and concerns at different levels of economic development,
Recognizing further that there is need for positive efforts designed to ensure that
developing countries, and especially the least developed among them, secure
a share in the growth in international trade commensurate with the needs of their
economic development,
Being desirous of contributing to these objectives by entering into reciprocal and
mutually advantageous arrangements directed to the substantial reduction of
tariffs and other barriers to trade and to the elimination of discriminatory
treatment in international trade relations,
Resolved, therefore, to develop an integrated, more viable and durable
multilateral trading system encompassing the General Agreement on Tariffs and
Trade, the results of past trade liberalization efforts, and all of the results of the
Uruguay Round of Multilateral Trade Negotiations,
Determined to preserve the basic principles and to further the objectives
underlying this multilateral trading system, . . . (emphasis supplied.)
Specific
Protect Developing Countries
WTO
Provisos
So too, the Solicitor General points out that pursuant to and consistent with the foregoing basic
principles, the WTO Agreement grants developing countries a more lenient treatment, giving
their domestic industries some protection from the rush of foreign competition. Thus, with
respect to tariffs in general, preferential treatment is given to developing countries in terms of
the amount of tariff reduction and the period within which the reduction is to be spread out.
Specifically, GATT requires an average tariff reduction rate of 36% for developed countries to be
effected within a period of six (6) years while developing countries including the Philippines
are required to effect an average tariff reduction of only 24% within ten (10) years.
In respect to domestic subsidy, GATT requires developed countries to reduce domestic support to
agricultural products by 20% over six (6) years, as compared to only 13% for developing
countries to be effected within ten (10) years.
In regard to export subsidy for agricultural products, GATT requires developed countries to
reduce their budgetary outlays for export subsidy by 36% and export volumes receiving export
subsidy by 21% within a period of six (6) years. For developing countries, however, the
reduction rate is only two-thirds of that prescribed for developed countries and a longer period of
ten (10) years within which to effect such reduction.
Moreover, GATT itself has provided built-in protection from unfair foreign competition and
trade practices including anti-dumping measures, countervailing measures and safeguards against
import surges. Where local businesses are jeopardized by unfair foreign competition, the
Philippines can avail of these measures. There is hardly therefore any basis for the statement that
under the WTO, local industries and enterprises will all be wiped out and that Filipinos will be
deprived of control of the economy. Quite the contrary, the weaker situations of developing
nations like the Philippines have been taken into account; thus, there would be no basis to say
that in joining the WTO, the respondents have gravely abused their discretion. True, they have
made a bold decision to steer the ship of state into the yet uncharted sea of economic
liberalization. But such decision cannot be set aside on the ground of grave abuse of discretion,
simply because we disagree with it or simply because we believe only in other economic
policies. As earlier stated, the Court in taking jurisdiction of this case will not pass upon the
advantages and disadvantages of trade liberalization as an economic policy. It will only perform
its constitutional duty of determining whether the Senate committed grave abuse of discretion.
Constitution Does Not
Rule Out Foreign Competition
Furthermore, the constitutional policy of a "self-reliant and independent national
economy" 35 does not necessarily rule out the entry of foreign investments, goods and services. It
contemplates neither "economic seclusion" nor "mendicancy in the international community." As
explained by Constitutional Commissioner Bernardo Villegas, sponsor of this constitutional
policy:
Economic self-reliance is a primary objective of a developing country that is
keenly aware of overdependence on external assistance for even its most basic
needs. It does not mean autarky or economic seclusion; rather, it means avoiding
mendicancy in the international community. Independence refers to the freedom
from undue foreign control of the national economy, especially in such strategic
industries as in the development of natural resources and public utilities. 36
The WTO reliance on "most favored nation," "national treatment," and "trade without
discrimination" cannot be struck down as unconstitutional as in fact they are rules of equality and
reciprocity that apply to all WTO members. Aside from envisioning a trade policy based on
"equality and reciprocity," 37 the fundamental law encourages industries that are "competitive in
both domestic and foreign markets," thereby demonstrating a clear policy against a sheltered
domestic trade environment, but one in favor of the gradual development of robust industries that
can compete with the best in the foreign markets. Indeed, Filipino managers and Filipino
enterprises have shown capability and tenacity to compete internationally. And given a free trade
environment, Filipino entrepreneurs and managers in Hongkong have demonstrated the Filipino
capacity to grow and to prosper against the best offered under a policy of laissez faire.
Constitution Favors Consumers,
Not Industries or Enterprises
The Constitution has not really shown any unbalanced bias in favor of any business or enterprise,
nor does it contain any specific pronouncement that Filipino companies should be pampered with
a total proscription of foreign competition. On the other hand, respondents claim that
WTO/GATT aims to make available to the Filipino consumer the best goods and services
obtainable anywhere in the world at the most reasonable prices. Consequently, the question boils
down to whether WTO/GATT will favor the general welfare of the public at large.
Will adherence to the WTO treaty bring this ideal (of favoring the general welfare) to reality?
Will WTO/GATT succeed in promoting the Filipinos' general welfare because it will as
promised by its promoters expand the country's exports and generate more employment?
Will it bring more prosperity, employment, purchasing power and quality products at the most
reasonable rates to the Filipino public?
The responses to these questions involve "judgment calls" by our policy makers, for which they
are answerable to our people during appropriate electoral exercises. Such questions and the
answers thereto are not subject to judicial pronouncements based on grave abuse of discretion.
Constitution Designed to Meet
Future Events and Contingencies
No doubt, the WTO Agreement was not yet in existence when the Constitution was drafted and
ratified in 1987. That does not mean however that the Charter is necessarily flawed in the sense
that its framers might not have anticipated the advent of a borderless world of business. By the
same token, the United Nations was not yet in existence when the 1935 Constitution became
effective. Did that necessarily mean that the then Constitution might not have contemplated a
diminution of the absoluteness of sovereignty when the Philippines signed the UN Charter,
thereby effectively surrendering part of its control over its foreign relations to the decisions of
various UN organs like the Security Council?
It is not difficult to answer this question. Constitutions are designed to meet not only the vagaries
of contemporary events. They should be interpreted to cover even future and unknown
circumstances. It is to the credit of its drafters that a Constitution can withstand the assaults of
bigots and infidels but at the same time bend with the refreshing winds of change necessitated by
unfolding events. As one eminent political law writer and respected jurist 38 explains:
The Constitution must be quintessential rather than superficial, the root and not
the blossom, the base and frame-work only of the edifice that is yet to rise. It is
but the core of the dream that must take shape, not in a twinkling by mandate of
our delegates, but slowly "in the crucible of Filipino minds and hearts," where it
will in time develop its sinews and gradually gather its strength and finally
achieve its substance. In fine, the Constitution cannot, like the goddess Athena,
rise full-grown from the brow of the Constitutional Convention, nor can it conjure
by mere fiat an instant Utopia. It must grow with the society it seeks to restructure and march apace with the progress of the race, drawing from the
vicissitudes of history the dynamism and vitality that will keep it, far from
becoming a petrified rule, a pulsing, living law attuned to the heartbeat of the
nation.
Third Issue: The WTO Agreement and Legislative Power
The WTO Agreement provides that "(e)ach Member shall ensure the conformity of its laws,
regulations and administrative procedures with its obligations as provided in the annexed
Agreements." 39 Petitioners maintain that this undertaking "unduly limits, restricts and impairs
Philippine sovereignty, specifically the legislative power which under Sec. 2, Article VI of the
1987 Philippine Constitution is vested in the Congress of the Philippines. It is an assault on the
sovereign powers of the Philippines because this means that Congress could not pass legislation
that will be good for our national interest and general welfare if such legislation will not conform
with the WTO Agreement, which not only relates to the trade in goods . . . but also to the flow of
investments and money . . . as well as to a whole slew of agreements on socio-cultural
matters . . . 40
More specifically, petitioners claim that said WTO proviso derogates from the power to tax,
which is lodged in the Congress. 41 And while the Constitution allows Congress to authorize the
President to fix tariff rates, import and export quotas, tonnage and wharfage dues, and other
duties or imposts, such authority is subject to "specified limits and . . . such limitations and
restrictions" as Congress may provide, 42 as in fact it did under Sec. 401 of the Tariff and
Customs Code.
Sovereignty Limited by
International Law and Treaties
This Court notes and appreciates the ferocity and passion by which petitioners stressed their
arguments on this issue. However, while sovereignty has traditionally been deemed absolute and
all-encompassing on the domestic level, it is however subject to restrictions and limitations
voluntarily agreed to by the Philippines, expressly or impliedly, as a member of the family of
nations. Unquestionably, the Constitution did not envision a hermit-type isolation of the country
from the rest of the world. In its Declaration of Principles and State Policies, the Constitution
"adopts the generally accepted principles of international law as part of the law of the land, and
adheres to the policy of peace, equality, justice, freedom, cooperation and amity, with all
nations." 43 By the doctrine of incorporation, the country is bound by generally accepted
principles of international law, which are considered to be automatically part of our own
laws. 44 One of the oldest and most fundamental rules in international law is pacta sunt
servanda international agreements must be performed in good faith. "A treaty engagement is
not a mere moral obligation but creates a legally binding obligation on the parties . . . A state
which has contracted valid international obligations is bound to make in its legislations such
modifications as may be necessary to ensure the fulfillment of the obligations undertaken." 45
By their inherent nature, treaties really limit or restrict the absoluteness of sovereignty. By their
voluntary act, nations may surrender some aspects of their state power in exchange for greater
benefits granted by or derived from a convention or pact. After all, states, like individuals, live
with coequals, and in pursuit of mutually covenanted objectives and benefits, they also
commonly agree to limit the exercise of their otherwise absolute rights. Thus, treaties have been
used to record agreements between States concerning such widely diverse matters as, for
example, the lease of naval bases, the sale or cession of territory, the termination of war, the
regulation of conduct of hostilities, the formation of alliances, the regulation of commercial
relations, the settling of claims, the laying down of rules governing conduct in peace and the
establishment of international organizations.46 The sovereignty of a state therefore cannot in fact
and in reality be considered absolute. Certain restrictions enter into the picture: (1) limitations
imposed by the very nature of membership in the family of nations and (2) limitations imposed
by treaty stipulations. As aptly put by John F. Kennedy, "Today, no nation can build its destiny
alone. The age of self-sufficient nationalism is over. The age of interdependence is here." 47
UN Charter and Other Treaties

Limit Sovereignty
Thus, when the Philippines joined the United Nations as one of its 51 charter members, it
consented to restrict its sovereign rights under the "concept of sovereignty as auto-limitation." 47A Under Article 2 of the UN Charter, "(a)ll members shall give the United Nations every
assistance in any action it takes in accordance with the present Charter, and shall refrain from
giving assistance to any state against which the United Nations is taking preventive or
enforcement action." Such assistance includes payment of its corresponding share not merely in
administrative expenses but also in expenditures for the peace-keeping operations of the
organization. In its advisory opinion of July 20, 1961, the International Court of Justice held that
money used by the United Nations Emergency Force in the Middle East and in the Congo were
"expenses of the United Nations" under Article 17, paragraph 2, of the UN Charter. Hence, all its
members must bear their corresponding share in such expenses. In this sense, the Philippine
Congress is restricted in its power to appropriate. It is compelled to appropriate funds whether it
agrees with such peace-keeping expenses or not. So too, under Article 105 of the said Charter,
the UN and its representatives enjoy diplomatic privileges and immunities, thereby limiting
again the exercise of sovereignty of members within their own territory. Another example:
although "sovereign equality" and "domestic jurisdiction" of all members are set forth as
underlying principles in the UN Charter, such provisos are however subject to enforcement
measures decided by the Security Council for the maintenance of international peace and
security under Chapter VII of the Charter. A final example: under Article 103, "(i)n the event of a
conflict between the obligations of the Members of the United Nations under the present Charter
and their obligations under any other international agreement, their obligation under the present
charter shall prevail," thus unquestionably denying the Philippines as a member the
sovereign power to make a choice as to which of conflicting obligations, if any, to honor.
Apart from the UN Treaty, the Philippines has entered into many other international pacts
both bilateral and multilateral that involve limitations on Philippine sovereignty. These are
enumerated by the Solicitor General in his Compliance dated October 24, 1996, as follows:
(a) Bilateral convention with the United States regarding taxes on income, where
the Philippines agreed, among others, to exempt from tax, income received in the
Philippines by, among others, the Federal Reserve Bank of the United States, the
Export/Import Bank of the United States, the Overseas Private Investment
Corporation of the United States. Likewise, in said convention, wages, salaries
and similar remunerations paid by the United States to its citizens for labor and
personal services performed by them as employees or officials of the United
States are exempt from income tax by the Philippines.
(b) Bilateral agreement with Belgium, providing, among others, for the avoidance
of double taxation with respect to taxes on income.
(c) Bilateral convention with the Kingdom of Sweden for the avoidance of double
taxation.
(d) Bilateral convention with the French Republic for the avoidance of double
taxation.
(e) Bilateral air transport agreement with Korea where the Philippines agreed to
exempt from all customs duties, inspection fees and other duties or taxes aircrafts
of South Korea and the regular equipment, spare parts and supplies arriving with
said aircrafts.
(f) Bilateral air service agreement with Japan, where the Philippines agreed to
exempt from customs duties, excise taxes, inspection fees and other similar duties,
taxes or charges fuel, lubricating oils, spare parts, regular equipment, stores on
board Japanese aircrafts while on Philippine soil.
(g) Bilateral air service agreement with Belgium where the Philippines granted
Belgian air carriers the same privileges as those granted to Japanese and Korean
air carriers under separate air service agreements.
(h) Bilateral notes with Israel for the abolition of transit and visitor visas where
the Philippines exempted Israeli nationals from the requirement of obtaining
transit or visitor visas for a sojourn in the Philippines not exceeding 59 days.
(i) Bilateral agreement with France exempting French nationals from the
requirement of obtaining transit and visitor visa for a sojourn not exceeding 59
days.
(j) Multilateral Convention on Special Missions, where the Philippines agreed that
premises of Special Missions in the Philippines are inviolable and its agents can
not enter said premises without consent of the Head of Mission concerned.
Special Missions are also exempted from customs duties, taxes and related
charges.
(k) Multilateral convention on the Law of Treaties. In this convention, the
Philippines agreed to be governed by the Vienna Convention on the Law of
Treaties.
(l) Declaration of the President of the Philippines accepting compulsory
jurisdiction of the International Court of Justice. The International Court of
Justice has jurisdiction in all legal disputes concerning the interpretation of a
treaty, any question of international law, the existence of any fact which, if
established, would constitute a breach "of international obligation."
In the foregoing treaties, the Philippines has effectively agreed to limit the exercise of its
sovereign powers of taxation, eminent domain and police power. The underlying consideration in
this partial surrender of sovereignty is the reciprocal commitment of the other contracting states
in granting the same privilege and immunities to the Philippines, its officials and its citizens. The
same reciprocity characterizes the Philippine commitments under WTO-GATT.
International treaties, whether relating to nuclear disarmament, human rights, the
environment, the law of the sea, or trade, constrain domestic political sovereignty
through the assumption of external obligations. But unless anarchy in
international relations is preferred as an alternative, in most cases we accept that
the benefits of the reciprocal obligations involved outweigh the costs associated
with any loss of political sovereignty. (T)rade treaties that structure relations by
reference to durable, well-defined substantive norms and objective dispute
resolution procedures reduce the risks of larger countries exploiting raw economic
power to bully smaller countries, by subjecting power relations to some form of
legal ordering. In addition, smaller countries typically stand to gain
disproportionately from trade liberalization. This is due to the simple fact that
liberalization will provide access to a larger set of potential new trading
relationship than in case of the larger country gaining enhanced success to the
smaller country's market. 48
The point is that, as shown by the foregoing treaties, a portion of sovereignty may be waived
without violating the Constitution, based on the rationale that the Philippines "adopts the
generally accepted principles of international law as part of the law of the land and adheres to the
policy of . . . cooperation and amity with all nations."
Fourth Issue: The WTO Agreement and Judicial Power
Petitioners aver that paragraph 1, Article 34 of the General Provisions and Basic Principles of the
Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS) 49 intrudes on the
power of the Supreme Court to promulgate rules concerning pleading, practice and procedures. 50
To understand the scope and meaning of Article 34, TRIPS, 51 it will be fruitful to restate its full
text as follows:
Article 34
Process Patents: Burden of Proof
1. For the purposes of civil proceedings in respect of the infringement of the
rights of the owner referred to in paragraph 1 (b) of Article 28, if the subject
matter of a patent is a process for obtaining a product, the judicial authorities shall
have the authority to order the defendant to prove that the process to obtain an
identical product is different from the patented process. Therefore, Members shall
provide, in at least one of the following circumstances, that any identical product
when produced without the consent of the patent owner shall, in the absence of
proof to the contrary, be deemed to have been obtained by the patented process:
(a) if the product obtained by the patented process is new;
(b) if there is a substantial likelihood that the identical product was
made by the process and the owner of the patent has been unable
through reasonable efforts to determine the process actually used.
2. Any Member shall be free to provide that the burden of proof indicated in
paragraph 1 shall be on the alleged infringer only if the condition referred to in
subparagraph (a) is fulfilled or only if the condition referred to in subparagraph
(b) is fulfilled.
3. In the adduction of proof to the contrary, the legitimate interests of defendants
in protecting their manufacturing and business secrets shall be taken into account.
From the above, a WTO Member is required to provide a rule of disputable (not the words "in
the absence of proof to the contrary") presumption that a product shown to be identical to one
produced with the use of a patented process shall be deemed to have been obtained by the
(illegal) use of the said patented process, (1) where such product obtained by the patented
product is new, or (2) where there is "substantial likelihood" that the identical product was made
with the use of the said patented process but the owner of the patent could not determine the
exact process used in obtaining such identical product. Hence, the "burden of proof"
contemplated by Article 34 should actually be understood as the duty of the alleged patent
infringer to overthrow such presumption. Such burden, properly understood, actually refers to
the "burden of evidence" (burden of going forward) placed on the producer of the identical (or
fake) product to show that his product was produced without the use of the patented process.
The foregoing notwithstanding, the patent owner still has the "burden of proof" since, regardless
of the presumption provided under paragraph 1 of Article 34, such owner still has to introduce
evidence of the existence of the alleged identical product, the fact that it is "identical" to the
genuine one produced by the patented process and the fact of "newness" of the genuine product
or the fact of "substantial likelihood" that the identical product was made by the patented
process.
The foregoing should really present no problem in changing the rules of evidence as the present
law on the subject, Republic Act No. 165, as amended, otherwise known as the Patent Law,
provides a similar presumption in cases of infringement of patented design or utility model, thus:
Sec. 60. Infringement. Infringement of a design patent or of a patent for utility
model shall consist in unauthorized copying of the patented design or utility
model for the purpose of trade or industry in the article or product and in the
making, using or selling of the article or product copying the patented design or
utility model. Identity or substantial identity with the patented design or utility
model shall constitute evidence of copying. (emphasis supplied)
Moreover, it should be noted that the requirement of Article 34 to provide a disputable
presumption applies only if (1) the product obtained by the patented process in NEW or (2) there
is a substantial likelihood that the identical product was made by the process and the process
owner has not been able through reasonable effort to determine the process used. Where either of
these two provisos does not obtain, members shall be free to determine the appropriate method of
implementing the provisions of TRIPS within their own internal systems and processes.
By and large, the arguments adduced in connection with our disposition of the third issue
derogation of legislative power will apply to this fourth issue also. Suffice it to say that the
reciprocity clause more than justifies such intrusion, if any actually exists. Besides, Article 34
does not contain an unreasonable burden, consistent as it is with due process and the concept of
adversarial dispute settlement inherent in our judicial system.
So too, since the Philippine is a signatory to most international conventions on patents,
trademarks and copyrights, the adjustment in legislation and rules of procedure will not be
substantial. 52
Fifth Issue: Concurrence Only in the WTO Agreement and
Not in Other Documents Contained in the Final Act
Petitioners allege that the Senate concurrence in the WTO Agreement and its annexes but not
in the other documents referred to in the Final Act, namely the Ministerial Declaration and
Decisions and the Understanding on Commitments in Financial Services is defective and
insufficient and thus constitutes abuse of discretion. They submit that such concurrence in the
WTO Agreement alone is flawed because it is in effect a rejection of the Final Act, which in turn
was the document signed by Secretary Navarro, in representation of the Republic upon authority
of the President. They contend that the second letter of the President to the Senate 53 which
enumerated what constitutes the Final Act should have been the subject of concurrence of the
Senate.
"A final act, sometimes called protocol de cloture, is an instrument which records the winding up
of the proceedings of a diplomatic conference and usually includes a reproduction of the texts of
treaties, conventions, recommendations and other acts agreed upon and signed by the
plenipotentiaries attending the conference." 54 It is not the treaty itself. It is rather a summary of
the proceedings of a protracted conference which may have taken place over several years. The
text of the "Final Act Embodying the Results of the Uruguay Round of Multilateral Trade
Negotiations" is contained in just one page 55 in Vol. I of the 36-volume Uruguay Round of
Multilateral Trade Negotiations. By signing said Final Act, Secretary Navarro as representative
of the Republic of the Philippines undertook:
(a) to submit, as appropriate, the WTO Agreement for the consideration of their
respective competent authorities with a view to seeking approval of the
Agreement in accordance with their procedures; and
The assailed Senate Resolution No. 97 expressed concurrence in exactly what the Final Act
required from its signatories, namely, concurrence of the Senate in the WTO Agreement.
The Ministerial Declarations and Decisions were deemed adopted without need for ratification.
They were approved by the ministers by virtue of Article XXV: 1 of GATT which provides that
representatives of the members can meet "to give effect to those provisions of this Agreement
which invoke joint action, and generally with a view to facilitating the operation and furthering
the objectives of this Agreement." 56
The Understanding on Commitments in Financial Services also approved in Marrakesh does not
apply to the Philippines. It applies only to those 27 Members which "have indicated in their
respective schedules of commitments on standstill, elimination of monopoly, expansion of
operation of existing financial service suppliers, temporary entry of personnel, free transfer and
processing of information, and national treatment with respect to access to payment, clearing
systems and refinancing available in the normal course of business." 57
On the other hand, the WTO Agreement itself expresses what multilateral agreements are
deemed included as its integral parts, 58 as follows:
Article II
Scope of the WTO
1. The WTO shall provide the common institutional frame-work for the conduct
of trade relations among its Members in matters to the agreements and associated
legal instruments included in the Annexes to this Agreement.
2. The Agreements and associated legal instruments included in Annexes 1, 2, and

3, (hereinafter referred to as "Multilateral Agreements") are integral parts of this
Agreement, binding on all Members.
3. The Agreements and associated legal instruments included in Annex 4
(hereinafter referred to as "Plurilateral Trade Agreements") are also part of this
Agreement for those Members that have accepted them, and are binding on those
Members. The Plurilateral Trade Agreements do not create either obligation or
rights for Members that have not accepted them.
4. The General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 1994 as specified in annex 1A
(hereinafter referred to as "GATT 1994") is legally distinct from the General
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, dated 30 October 1947, annexed to the Final Act
adopted at the conclusion of the Second Session of the Preparatory Committee of
the United Nations Conference on Trade and Employment, as subsequently
rectified, amended or modified (hereinafter referred to as "GATT 1947").
It should be added that the Senate was well-aware of what it was concurring in as shown by the
members' deliberation on August 25, 1994. After reading the letter of President Ramos dated
August 11, 1994, 59 the senators of the Republic minutely dissected what the Senate was
concurring in, as follows: 60
THE CHAIRMAN: Yes. Now, the question of the validity of the submission came
up in the first day hearing of this Committee yesterday. Was the observation made
by Senator Taada that what was submitted to the Senate was not the agreement
on establishing the World Trade Organization by the final act of the Uruguay
Round which is not the same as the agreement establishing the World Trade
Organization? And on that basis, Senator Tolentino raised a point of order which,
however, he agreed to withdraw upon understanding that his suggestion for an
alternative solution at that time was acceptable. That suggestion was to treat the
proceedings of the Committee as being in the nature of briefings for Senators until
the question of the submission could be clarified.
And so, Secretary Romulo, in effect, is the President submitting a new . . . is he
making a new submission which improves on the clarity of the first submission?
MR. ROMULO: Mr. Chairman, to make sure that it is clear cut and there should
be no misunderstanding, it was his intention to clarify all matters by giving this
letter.
THE CHAIRMAN: Thank you.
Can this Committee hear from Senator Taada and later on Senator Tolentino
since they were the ones that raised this question yesterday?
Senator Taada, please.
SEN. TAADA: Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Based on what Secretary Romulo has read, it would now clearly appear that what
is being submitted to the Senate for ratification is not the Final Act of the
Uruguay Round, but rather the Agreement on the World Trade Organization as
well as the Ministerial Declarations and Decisions, and the Understanding and
Commitments in Financial Services.
I am now satisfied with the wording of the new submission of President Ramos.
SEN. TAADA. . . . of President Ramos, Mr. Chairman.
THE CHAIRMAN. Thank you, Senator Taada. Can we hear from Senator
Tolentino? And after him Senator Neptali Gonzales and Senator Lina.
SEN. TOLENTINO, Mr. Chairman, I have not seen the new submission actually
transmitted to us but I saw the draft of his earlier, and I think it now complies
with the provisions of the Constitution, and with the Final Act itself . The
Constitution does not require us to ratify the Final Act. It requires us to ratify the
Agreement which is now being submitted. The Final Act itself specifies what is
going to be submitted to with the governments of the participants.
In paragraph 2 of the Final Act, we read and I quote:
By signing the present Final Act, the representatives agree: (a) to submit as
appropriate the WTO Agreement for the consideration of the respective competent
authorities with a view to seeking approval of the Agreement in accordance with
their procedures.
In other words, it is not the Final Act that was agreed to be submitted to the
governments for ratification or acceptance as whatever their constitutional
procedures may provide but it is the World Trade Organization Agreement. And if
that is the one that is being submitted now, I think it satisfies both the Constitution
and the Final Act itself .
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
THE CHAIRMAN. Thank you, Senator Tolentino, May I call on Senator
Gonzales.
SEN. GONZALES. Mr. Chairman, my views on this matter are already a matter of
record. And they had been adequately reflected in the journal of yesterday's
session and I don't see any need for repeating the same.
Now, I would consider the new submission as an act ex abudante cautela.
THE CHAIRMAN. Thank you, Senator Gonzales. Senator Lina, do you want to
make any comment on this?
SEN. LINA. Mr. President, I agree with the observation just made by Senator
Gonzales out of the abundance of question. Then the new submission is, I believe,
stating the obvious and therefore I have no further comment to make.
Epilogue
In praying for the nullification of the Philippine ratification of the WTO Agreement, petitioners
are invoking this Court's constitutionally imposed duty "to determine whether or not there has
been grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction" on the part of the
Senate in giving its concurrence therein via Senate Resolution No. 97. Procedurally, a writ
of certiorari grounded on grave abuse of discretion may be issued by the Court under Rule 65 of
the Rules of Court when it is amply shown that petitioners have no other plain, speedy and
adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law.
By grave abuse of discretion is meant such capricious and whimsical exercise of judgment as is
equivalent to lack of jurisdiction. 61 Mere abuse of discretion is not enough. It must
be grave abuse of discretion as when the power is exercised in an arbitrary or despotic manner
by reason of passion or personal hostility, and must be so patent and so gross as to amount to an
evasion of a positive duty or to a virtual refusal to perform the duty enjoined or to act at all in
contemplation of law. 62 Failure on the part of the petitioner to show grave abuse of discretion
will result in the dismissal of the petition. 63
In rendering this Decision, this Court never forgets that the Senate, whose act is under review, is
one of two sovereign houses of Congress and is thus entitled to great respect in its actions. It is
itself a constitutional body independent and coordinate, and thus its actions are presumed regular
and done in good faith. Unless convincing proof and persuasive arguments are presented to
overthrow such presumptions, this Court will resolve every doubt in its favor. Using the
foregoing well-accepted definition of grave abuse of discretion and the presumption of regularity
in the Senate's processes, this Court cannot find any cogent reason to impute grave abuse of
discretion to the Senate's exercise of its power of concurrence in the WTO Agreement granted it
by Sec. 21 of Article VII of the Constitution. 64
It is true, as alleged by petitioners, that broad constitutional principles require the State to
develop an independent national economy effectively controlled by Filipinos; and to protect
and/or prefer Filipino labor, products, domestic materials and locally produced goods. But it is
equally true that such principles while serving as judicial and legislative guides are not in
themselves sources of causes of action. Moreover, there are other equally fundamental
constitutional principles relied upon by the Senate which mandate the pursuit of a "trade policy
that serves the general welfare and utilizes all forms and arrangements of exchange on the basis
of equality and reciprocity" and the promotion of industries "which are competitive in both
domestic and foreign markets," thereby justifying its acceptance of said treaty. So too, the
alleged impairment of sovereignty in the exercise of legislative and judicial powers is balanced
by the adoption of the generally accepted principles of international law as part of the law of the
land and the adherence of the Constitution to the policy of cooperation and amity with all
nations.
That the Senate, after deliberation and voting, voluntarily and overwhelmingly gave its consent
to the WTO Agreement thereby making it "a part of the law of the land" is a legitimate exercise
of its sovereign duty and power. We find no "patent and gross" arbitrariness or despotism "by
reason of passion or personal hostility" in such exercise. It is not impossible to surmise that this
Court, or at least some of its members, may even agree with petitioners that it is more
advantageous to the national interest to strike down Senate Resolution No. 97. But that is not a
legal reason to attribute grave abuse of discretion to the Senate and to nullify its decision. To do
so would constitute grave abuse in the exercise of our own judicial power and duty. Ineludably,
what the Senate did was a valid exercise of its authority. As to whether such exercise was wise,
beneficial or viable is outside the realm of judicial inquiry and review. That is a matter between
the elected policy makers and the people. As to whether the nation should join the worldwide
march toward trade liberalization and economic globalization is a matter that our people should
determine in electing their policy makers. After all, the WTO Agreement allows withdrawal of
membership, should this be the political desire of a member.
The eminent futurist John Naisbitt, author of the best seller Megatrends, predicts an Asian
Renaissance 65 where "the East will become the dominant region of the world economically,
politically and culturally in the next century." He refers to the "free market" espoused by WTO as
the "catalyst" in this coming Asian ascendancy. There are at present about 31 countries including
China, Russia and Saudi Arabia negotiating for membership in the WTO. Notwithstanding
objections against possible limitations on national sovereignty, the WTO remains as the only
viable structure for multilateral trading and the veritable forum for the development of
international trade law. The alternative to WTO is isolation, stagnation, if not economic selfdestruction. Duly enriched with original membership, keenly aware of the advantages and
disadvantages of globalization with its on-line experience, and endowed with a vision of the
future, the Philippines now straddles the crossroads of an international strategy for economic
prosperity and stability in the new millennium. Let the people, through their duly authorized
elected officers, make their free choice.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED for lack of merit.
SO ORDERED.
Narvasa, C.J., Regalado, Davide, Jr., Romero, Bellosillo, Melo, Puno, Kapunan, Mendoza,
Francisco, Hermosisima, Jr. and Torres, Jr., JJ., concur.
Padilla and Vitug, JJ., concur in the result.
Footnotes
1 In Annex "A" of her Memorandum, dated August 8, 1996, received by this
Court on August 12, 1996, Philippine Ambassador to the United Nations, World
Trade Organization and other international organizations Lilia R. Bautista
(hereafter referred to as "Bautista Paper") submitted a "46-year Chronology" of
GATT as follows:
1947 The birth of GATT. On 30 October 1947, the General
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) was signed by 23 nations
at the Palais des Nations in Geneva. The Agreement contained
tariff concessions agreed to in the first multilateral trade
negotiations and a set of rules designed to prevent these
concessions from being frustrated by restrictive trade measures.
The 23 founding contracting parties were members of the
Preparatory Committee established by the United Nations
Economic and Social Council in 1946 to draft the charter of the
International Trade Organization (ITO). The ITO was envisaged as
the final leg of a triad of post-War economic agencies (the other
two were the International Monetary Fund and the International
Bank for Reconstruction later the World Bank).
In parallel with this task, the Committee members decided to

negotiate tariff concessions among themselves. From April to
October 1947, the participants completed some 123 negotiations
and established 20 schedules containing the tariff reductions and
bindings which became an integral part of GATT. These schedules
resulting from the first Round covered some 45,000 tariff
concessions and about $10 billion in trade.
GATT was conceived as an interim measure that put into effect the
commercial-policy provisions of the ITO. In November,
delegations from 56 countries met in Havana, Cuba, to consider the
to ITO draft as a whole. After long and difficult negotiations, some
53 countries signed the Final Act authenticating the text of the
Havana Charter in March 1948. There was no commitment,
however, from governments to ratification and, in the end, the ITO
was stillborn, leaving GATT as the only international instrument
governing the conduct of world trade.
1948 Entry into force. On 1 January 1948, GATT entered into
force. The 23 founding members were: Australia, Belgium, Brazil,
Burma, Canada, Ceylon, Chile, China, Cuba, Czechoslovakia,
France, India, Lebanon, Luxembourg, Netherlands, New Zealand,
Norway, Pakistan, Southern Rhodesia, Syria, South Africa, United
Kingdom and the United States. The first Session of the
Contracting Parties was held from February to March in Havana,
Cuba. The secretariat of the Interim Commission for the ITO,
which served as the ad hoc secretariat of GATT, moved from Lake
Placid, New York, to Geneva. The Contracting Parties held their
second session in Geneva from August to September.
1949 Second Round at Annecy. During the second Round of trade
negotiations, held from April to August at Annecy, France, the
contracting parties exchanged some 5,000 tariff concessions. At
their third Session, they also dealt with the accession of ten more
countries.
1950 Third Round at Torquay. From September 1950 to April
1951, the contracting parties exchanged some 8,700 tariff
concessions in the English town, yielding tariff reduction of about
25 per cent in relation to the 1948 level. Four more countries
acceded to GATT. During the fifth Session of the Contracting
Parties, the United States indicated that the ITO Charter would not
be re-submitted to the US Congress; this, in effect, meant that ITO
would not come into operation.
1956 Fourth Round at Geneva. The fourth Round was completed
in May and produced some $2.5 billion worth of tariff reductions.
At the beginning of the year, the GATT commercial policy course
for officials of developing countries was inaugurated.
1958 The Haberler Report. GATT published Trends in

International Trade in October. Known as the "Haberler Report" in
honour of Professor Gottfried Haberler, the chairman of the panel
of eminent economists, it provided initial guidelines for the work
of GATT. The Contracting Parties at their 13th Sessions, attended
by Ministers, subsequently established three committees in GATT:
Committee I to convene a further tariff negotiating conference;
Committee II to review the agricultural policies of member
governments and Committee III to tackle the problem facing
developing countries in their trade. The establishment of the
European Economic Community during the previous year also
demanded large-scale tariff negotiations under Article XXIV: 6 of
the General Agreement.
1960 The Dillon Round. The fifth Round opened in September and
was divided into two phases: the first was concerned with
negotiations with EEC member states for the creation of a single
schedule of concessions for the Community based on its Common
External Tariff; and the second was a further general round of tariff
negotiations. Named in honour of US Under-Secretary of State
Douglas Dillon who proposed the negotiations, the Round was
concluded in July 1962 and resulted in about 4,400 tariff
concessions covering $4.9 billion of trade.
1961 The Short-Term Arrangement covering cotton textiles was
agreed as an exception to the GATT rules. The arrangement
permitted the negotiation of quota restrictions affecting the exports
of cotton-producing countries. In 1962 the "Short Term"
Arrangement became the "Long term" Arrangement, lasting until
1974 when the Multifibre Arrangement entered into force.
1964 The Kennedy Round. Meeting at Ministerial level, a Trade
Negotiations Committee formally opened the Kennedy Round in
May. In June 1967, the Round's Final Act was signed by some 50
participating countries which together accounted for 75 per cent of
world trade. For the first time, negotiations departed from the
product-by-product approach used in the previous Rounds to an
across-the-board or linear method of cutting tariffs for industrial
goods. The working hypothesis of a 50 per cent target cut in tariff
levels was achieved in many areas. Concessions covered an
estimated total value of trade of about $410 billion. Separate
agreements were reached on grains, chemical products and a Code
on Anti-Dumping.
1965 A New Chapter. The early 1960s marked the accession to the
general Agreement of many newly-independent developing
countries. In February, the Contracting Parties, meeting in a special
session, adopted the text of Part IV on Trade and Development.
The additional chapter to the GATT required developed countries
to accord high priority to the reduction of trade barriers to products
of developing countries. A Committee on Trade and Development

was established to oversee the functioning of the new GATT
provisions. In the preceding year, GATT had established the
International Trade Centre (ITC) to help developing countries in
trade promotion and identification of potential markets. Since
1968, the ITC had been jointly operated by GATT and the UN
Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD).
1973 The Tokyo Round. The seventh Round was launched by
Ministers in September at the Japanese capital. Some 99 countries
participated in negotiating a comprehensive body of agreements
covering both tariff and non-tariff matters. At the end of the Round
in November 1979, participants exchanged tariff reductions and
bindings which covered more than $300 billion of trade. As a result
of these cuts, the weighted average tariff on manufactured goods in
the world's nine major industrial markets declined from 7.0 to 4.7
per cent. Agreements were reached in the following areas:
subsidies and countervailing measures, technical barriers to trade,
import licensing procedures, government procurement, customs
valuation, a revised anti-dumping code, trade in bovine meat, trade
in dairy products and trade in civil aircraft. The first concrete result
of the Round was the reduction of import duties and other trade
barriers by industrial countries on tropical products exported by
developing countries.
1974 On 1 January 1974, the Arrangement Regarding International
Trade in Textiles, otherwise known as the Multifibre Arrangement
(MFA), entered into force. It superseded the arrangements that had
been governing trade in cotton textiles since 1961. The MFA seeks
to promote the expansion and progressive liberalization of trade in
textile products while at the same time avoiding disruptive effects
in individual markets and lines of production. The MFA was
extended in 1978, 1982, 1986, 1991 and 1992. MFA members
account for most of the world exports of textiles and clothing
which in 1986 amounted to US$128 billion.
1982 Ministerial Meeting. Meeting for the first time in nearly ten
years, the GATT Ministers in November at Geneva reaffirmed the
validity of GATT rules for the conduct of international trade and
committed themselves to combating protectionist pressures. They
also established a wide-ranging work programme for the GATT
which was to lay down the groundwork for a new Round 1986.
The Uruguay Round. The GATT Trade Ministers meeting at Punta
del Este, Uruguay, launched the eighth Round of trade negotiations
on 20 September. The Punta del Este Declaration, while
representing a single political undertaking, was divided into two
sections. The first covered negotiations on trade in goods and the
second initiated negotiation on trade in services. In the area of
trade in goods, the Ministers committed themselves to a
"standstill" on new trade measures inconsistent with their GATT
obligations and to a "rollback" programme aimed at phasing out

existing inconsistent measures. Envisaged to last four years,
negotiations started in early February 1987 in the following areas
tariffs, non-tariff measures, tropical products, natural resourcebased products, textiles and clothing, agriculture, subsidies, safeguards, trade-related aspects of intellectual property rights
including trade in counterfeit goods, and trade-related investment
measures. The work of other groups included a review of GATT
articles, the GATT dispute settlement procedure, the Tokyo Round
agreements, as well as the functioning of the GATT system as a
whole.
1994 "GATT 1994" is the updated version of GATT 1947 and takes
into account the substantive and institutional changes negotiated in
the Uruguay Round GATT 1994 is an integral part of the World
Trade Organization established on 1 January 1995. It is agreed that
there be a one year transition period during which certain GATT
1947 bodies and commitments would co-exist with those of the
World Trade Organization.
2 The Final Act was signed by representatives of 125 entities, namely Algeria,
Angola, Antigua and Barbuda, Argentine Republic, Australia, Republic of Austria,
State of Bahrain, People's Republic of Bangladesh, Barbados, The Kingdom of
Belgium Belize, Republic of Benin, Bolivia, Botswana, Brazil, Brunei
Darussalam, Burkina Faso, Burundi, Cameroon, Canada, Central African
Republic, Chad, Chile, People's Republic of China, Colombia, Congo, Costa Rica,
Republic of Cote d'Ivoire, Cuba, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Kingdom of Denmark,
Commonwealth of Dominica, Dominican Republic, Arab Republic of Egypt, El
Salvador, European Communities, Republic of Fiji, Finland, French Republic,
Gabonese Republic, Gambia, Federal Republic of Germany, Ghana, Hellenic
Republic, Grenada, Guatemala, Republic of Guinea-Bissau, Republic of Guyana,
Haiti, Honduras, Hong Kong, Hungary, Iceland, India, Indonesia, Ireland, State of
Israel, Italian Republic, Jamaica, Japan, Kenya, Korea, State of Kuwait, Kingdom
of Lesotho, Principality of Liechtenstein, Grand Duchy of Luxembourg, Macau,
Republic of Madagascar, Republic of Malawi, Malaysia, Republic of Maldives,
Republic of Mali, Republic of Malta, Islamic Republic of Mauritania, Republic of
Mauritius, United Mexican States, Kingdom of Morocco, Republic of
Mozambique, Union of Myanmar, Republic of Namibia, Kingdom of the
Netherlands, New Zealand, Nicaragua, Republic of Niger, Federal Republic of
Nigeria, Kingdom of Norway, Islamic Republic of Pakistan, Paraguay, Peru,
Philippines, Poland, Potuguese Republic, State of Qatar, Romania, Rwandese
Republic, Saint Kitts and Nevis, Saint Lucia, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines,
Senegal, Sierra Leone, Singapore, Slovak Republic, South Africa, Kingdom of
Spain, Democratic Socialist Republic of Sri Lanka, Republic of Surinam,
Kingdom of Swaziland, Kingdom of Sweden, Swiss Confederation, United
Republic of Tanzania, Kingdom of Thailand, Togolese Republic, Republic of
Trinidad and Tobago, Tunisia, Turkey, Uganda, United Arab Emirates, United
Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, United States of America,
Eastern Republic of Uruguay, Venezuela, Republic of Zaire, Republic of Zambia,
Republic of Zimbabwe; seepp. 6-25, Vol. 1, Uruguay Round of Multilateral Trade

Negotiations.
3 11 August 1994
The Honorable Members
Senate
Through Senate President Edgardo Angara
Manila
Ladies and Gentlemen:
I have the honor to forward herewith an authenticated copy of the Uruguay Round
Final Act signed by Department of Trade and Industry Secretary Rizalino S.
Navarro for the Philippines on 15 April 1994 in Marrakesh, Morocco.
The Uruguay Round Final Act aims to liberalize and expand world trade and
strengthen the interrelationship between trade and economic policies affecting
growth and development.
The Final Act will improve Philippine access to foreign markets, especially its
major trading partners through the reduction of tariffs on its exports particularly
agricultural and industrial products. These concessions may be availed of by the
Philippines, only if it is a member of the World Trade Organization. By GATT
estimates, the Philippines can acquire additional export from $2.2 to $2.7 Billion
annually under Uruguay Round. This will be on top of the normal increase in
exports that the Philippines may experience.
The Final Act will also open up new opportunities for the services sector in such
areas as the movement of personnel, (e.g. professional services and construction
services), cross-border supply (e.g. computer-related services), consumption
abroad (e.g. tourism, convention services, etc.) and commercial presence.
The clarified and improved rules and disciplines on anti-dumping and
countervailing measures will also benefit Philippine exporters by reducing the
costs ad uncertainty associated with exporting while at the same time providing
means for domestic industries to safeguard themselves against unfair imports.
Likewise, the provision of adequate protection for intellectual property rights is
expected to attract more investments into the country and to make it less
vulnerable to unilateral actions by its trading partners (e.g. Sec. 301 of the United
States' Omnibus Trade Law).
In view of the foregoing, the Uruguay Round Final Act is hereby submitted to the
Senate for its concurrence pursuant to Section 21, Article VII of the Constitution.
A draft of a proposed Resolution giving its concurrence to the aforesaid
Agreement is enclosed.
Very truly yours,

(SGD.) FIDEL V. RAMOS
4 11 August 1994
The Honorable Members
Senate
Through Senate President Edgardo Angara
Manila
Ladies and Gentlemen:
I have the honor to forward herewith an authenticated copy of the Uruguay Round
Final Act signed by Department of Trade and Industry Secretary Rizalino S.
Navarro for the Philippines on 13 April 1994 in Marrakech (sic), Morocco.
Members of the trade negotiations committee, which included the Philippines,
agreed that the Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, the
Ministerial Declarations and Decisions, and the Understanding on Commitments
in Financial Services embody the results of their negotiations and form an integral
part of the Uruguay Round Final Act.
By signing the Uruguay Round Final Act, the Philippines, through Secretary
Navarro, agreed:
(a) To submit the Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization to the
Senate for its concurrence pursuant to Section 21, Article VII of the Constitution;
and
(b) To adopt the Ministerial Declarations and Decisions.
The Uruguay Round Final Act aims to liberalize and expand world trade and
strengthen the interrelationship between trade and economic policies affecting
growth and development.
The Final Act will improve Philippine access to foreign markets, especially its
major trading partners through the reduction of tariffs on its exports particularly
agricultural and industrial products. These concessions may be availed of by the
Philippines, only if it is a member of the World Trade Organization. By GATT
estimates, the Philippines can acquire additional export revenues from $2.2 to
$2.7 Billion annually under Uruguay Round. This will be on top of the normal
increase in the exports that the Philippines may experience.
The Final Act will also open up new opportunities for the services sector in such
areas as the movement of personnel, (e.g., professional services and construction
services), cross-border supply (e.g., computer-related services), consumption

abroad (e.g., tourism, convention services, etc.) and commercial presence.
The clarified and improved rules ad disciplines on anti-dumping and
countervailing measures will also benefit Philippine exporters by reducing the
costs and uncertainty associated with exporting while at the same time providing a
means for domestic industries to safeguard themselves against unfair imports.
Likewise, the provision of adequate protection for intellectual property rights is
expected to attract more investments into the country and to make it a less
vulnerable to unilateral actions by its trading partners (e.g., Sec. 301 of the United
States Omnibus Trade Law).
In view of the foregoing, the Uruguay Round Final Act, the Agreement
Establishing the World Trade Organization, the Ministerial Declarations and
Decisions, and the Understanding on Commitments in Financial Services, as
embodied in the Uruguay Round Final Act and forming and integral part thereof
are hereby submitted to the Senate for its concurrence pursuant to Section 21,
Article VII of the Constitution.
A draft of a proposed Resolution giving its concurrence to the aforesaid
Agreement is enclosed.
Very truly yours,
5 December 9, 1994
HON. EDGARDO J. ANGARA
Senate President
Senate Manila
Dear Senate President Angara:
Pursuant to the provisions of Sec. 26 (2) Article VI of the Constitution, I hereby
certify to the necessity of the immediate adoption of P.S. 1083 entitled:
CONCURRING IN THE RATIFICATION OF THE
AGREEMENT ESTABLISHING THE WORLD TRADE
ORGANIZATION
to meet a public emergency consisting of the need for immediate membership in
the WTO in order to assure the benefits to the Philippine economy arising from
such membership.
Very truly yours,

6 Attached as Annex A, Petition; rollo, p. 52. P.S. 1083 is the forerunner of
assailed Senate Resolution No. 97. It was prepared by the Committee of the
Whole on the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade chaired by Sen. Blas F.
Ople and co-chaired by Sen. Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo; seeAnnex C, Compliance
of petitioners dated January 28, 1997.
7 The Philippines is thus considered an original or founding member of WTO,
which as of July 26, 1996 had 123 members as follows: Antigua and Barbuda,
Argentina, Australia, Austria, Bahrain, Bangladesh, Barbados, Belguim, Belize,
Benin, Bolivia, Botswana, Brazil, Brunei Darussalam, Burkina Faso, Burundi,
Cameroon, Canada, Central African Republic, Chili, Colombia, Costa Rica, Cote
d'Ivoire, Cuba, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Denmark, Djibouti, Dominica,
Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Egypt, El Salvador, European Community, Fiji,
Finland, France, Gabon, Germany, Ghana, Greece, Grenada, Guatemala, Guinea,
Guinea Bissau, Guyana, Haiti, Honduras, Honkong, Hungary, Iceland, India,
Indonesia, Ireland, Israel, Italy, Jamaica, Japan, Kenya, Korea, Kuwait, Lesotho,
Liechtenstein, Luxembourg, Macau, Madagascar, Malawi, Malaysia, Maldives,
Mali, Malta, Mauritania, Mauritius, Mexico, Morocco, Mozambique, Myanmar,
Namibia, Netherlands for the Kingdom in Europe and for the Netherlands
Antilles, New Zealand, Nicaragua, Nigeria, Norway, Pakistan, Papua New
Guinea, Paraguay, Peru, Philippines, Poland, Portugal, Qatar, Romania, Rwanda,
Saint Kitts and Nevis, Saint Lucia, Saint Vincent & the Grenadines, Senegal,
Sierra Leone, Singapore, Slovak Republic, Slovenia, Solomon Islands, South
Africa, Spain, Sri Lanka, Surinam, Swaziland, Sweden, Switzerland, Tanzania,
Thailand, Togo, Trinidad and Tobago, Tunisia, Turkey, Uganda, United Arab
Emirates, United Kingdom, United States, Uruguay, Venezuela, Zambia, and
Zimbabwe. See Annex A, Bautista Paper, infra.
8 Page 6; rollo p. 261.
9 In compliance, Ambassador Bautista submitted to the Court on August 12, 1996,
a Memorandum (the "Bautista Paper") consisting of 56 pages excluding annexes.
This is the same document mentioned in footnote no. 1.
10 Memorandum for Respondents, p. 13; rollo, p. 268.
11 Cf . Kilosbayan Incorporated vs. Morato, 246 SCRA 540, July 17, 1995 for a
discussion on locus standi. See also the Concurring Opinion of Mr. Justice
Vicente V. Mendoza in Tatad vs. Garcia, Jr., 243 SCRA 473, April 6, 1995, as well
as Kilusang Mayo Uno Labor Center vs. Garcia, Jr., 239 SCRA 386, 414,
December 23, 1994.
12 Aquino, Jr. vs. Ponce Enrile, 59 SCRA 183, 196, September 17, 1974, cited in
Bondoc vs. Pineda, 201 SCRA 792, 795, September 26, 1991.
13 Guingona, Jr. vs. Gonzales, 219 SCRA 326, 337, March 1, 1993.
14 See Taada and Macapagal vs. Cuenco, et al., 103 Phil. 1051 for a discussion
on the scope of "political question."
15 Section 1, Article VIII, (par. 2).
16 In a privilege speech on May 17, 1993, entitled "Supreme Court Potential
Tyrant?" Senator Arturo Tolentino concedes that this new provision gives the
Supreme Court a duty "to intrude into the jurisdiction of the Congress or the
President."
17 I Record of the Constitutional Commission 436.
18 Cf . Daza vs. Singson, 180 SCRA 496, December 21, 1989.
19 Memorandum for Petitioners, pp. 14-16; rollo, pp. 204-206.
20 Par. 4, Article XVI, WTO Agreement, Uruguay Round of Multilateral Trade
Negotiations, Vol. 1. p. 146.
21 Also entitled "Declaration of Principles." The nomenclature in the 1973
Charter is identical with that in the 1987's.
22 Philippine Political Law, 1962 Ed., p. 116.
23 Bernas, The Constitution of the Philippines: A Commentary, Vol. II, 1988 Ed.,
p. 2. In the very recent case of Manila Prince Hotel v. GSIS, G.R. No. 122156,
February 3, 1997, p. 8, it was held that "A provision which lays down a general
principle, such as those found in Art. II of the 1987 Constitution, is usually not
self-executing."
24 246 SCRA 540, 564, July 17, 1995. See also Tolentino vs. Secretary of
Finance, G.R. No. 115455 and consolidated cases, August 25, 1995.
25 197 SCRA 52, 68, May 14, 1991.
26 224 SCRA 792, 817, July 30, 1993.
27 Sec. 10, Article XII.
28 Sec. 12, Article XII.
29 Sec. 19, Art. II.
30 Sec. 13, Art. XII.
31 G.R. No. 122156, February 3, 1997, pp. 13-14.
32 Sec. 1, Art. XII.
33 Bautista Paper, p. 19.
34 Preamble, WTO Agreement p. 137, Vol. 1, Uruguay Round of Multilateral

Trade Negotiations. Emphasis supplied.
35 Sec. 19, Article II, Constitution.
36 III Records of the Constitutional Commission 252.
37 Sec. 13, Article XII, Constitution.
38 Justice Isagani A. Cruz, Philippine Political Law, 1995 Ed., p. 13, quoting his
own article entitled, "A Quintessential Constitution" earlier published in the San
Beda Law Journal, April 1972; emphasis supplied.
39 Par. 4, Article XVI (Miscellaneous Provisions), WTO Agreement, p. 146, Vol.
1, Uruguay Round of Multilateral Trade Negotiations.
40 Memorandum for the Petitioners, p. 29; rollo, p. 219.
41 Sec. 24, Article VI, Constitution.
42 Subsection (2), Sec. 28, Article VI, Constitution.
43 Sec. 2, Article II, Constitution.
44 Cruz, Philippine Political Law, 1995 Ed., p. 55.
45 Salonga and Yap, op cit 305.
46 Salonga, op. cit., p. 287.
47 Quoted in Paras and Paras, Jr., International Law and World Politics, 1994 Ed.,
p. 178.
47-A Reagan vs. Commission of Internal Revenue, 30 SCRA 968, 973, December
27, 1969.
48 Trebilcock and Howse. The Regulation of International Trade, p. 14, London,
1995, cited on p. 55-56, Bautista Paper.
49 Uruguay Round of Multilateral Trade Negotiations, Vol. 31, p. 25445.
50 Item 5, Sec. 5, Article VIII, Constitution.
51 Uruguay Round of Multilateral Trade Negotiations, Vol. 31, p. 25445.
53 See footnote 3 of the text of this letter.
54 Salonga and Yap, op cit., pp. 289-290.
55 The full text, without the signatures, of the Final Act is as follows:
Final Act Embodying the Results of the

Uruguay Round of Multilateral Trade Negotiations
1. Having met in order to conclude the Uruguay Round of Multilateral Trade
Negotiations, representatives of the governments and of the European
Communities, members of the Trade Negotiations Committee, agree that the
Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization (referred to in the Final
Act as the "WTO Agreement"), the Ministerial Declarations and Decisions, and
the Understanding on Commitments in Financial Services, as annexed hereto,
embody the results of their negotiations and form an integral part of this Final
Act.
2. By signing to the present Final Act, the representatives agree.
(a) to submit, as appropriate, the WTO Agreement for the
consideration of their respective competent authorities with a view
to seeking approval of the Agreement in accordance with their
procedures; and
3. The representatives agree on the desirability of acceptance of the WTO
Agreement by all participants in the Uruguay Round of Multilateral Trade
Negotiations (hereinafter referred to as "participants") with a view to its entry into
force by 1 January 1995, or as early as possible thereafter. Not later than late
1994, Ministers will meet, in accordance with the final paragraph of the Punta del
Este Ministerial Declarations, to decide on the international implementation of the
results, including the timing of their entry into force.
4. the representatives agree that the WTO Agreement shall be open for acceptance
as a whole, by signature or otherwise, by all participants pursuant to Article XIV
thereof. The acceptance and entry into force of a Plurilateral Trade Agreement
included in Annex 4 of the WTO Agreement shall be governed by the provisions
of that Plurilateral Trade Agreement.
5. Before accepting the WTO Agreement, participants which are not contracting
parties to the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade must first have concluded
negotiations for their accession to the General Agreement and become contracting
parties thereto. For participants which are not contracting parties to the general
Agreement as of the date of the Final Act, the Schedules are not definitive and
shall be subsequently completed for the purpose of their accession to the General
Agreement and acceptance of the WTO Agreement.
6. This Final Act and the texts annexed hereto shall be deposited with the
Director-General to the CONTRACTING PARTIES to the General Agreement on
Tariffs and Trade who shall promptly furnish to each participant a certified copy
thereof.
DONE at Marrakesh this fifteenth day of April one thousand nine hundred and
ninety-four, in a single copy, in the English, French and Spanish languages, each
text being authentic.
57 Baustista Paper, p. 16.
58 Uruguay Round of Multilateral Trade Negotiations, Vol. I, pp. 137-138.
59 See footnote 3 for complete text.
60 Taken from pp. 63-85, "Respondent" Memorandum.
61 Zarate vs. Olegario, G.R. No. 90655, October 7, 1996.
62 San Sebastian College vs. Court of Appeals, 197 SCRA 138, 144, May 15,
1991; Commissioner of Internal Revenue vs. Court of Tax Appeals, 195 SCRA
444, 458 March 20, 1991; Simon vs. Civil Service Commission, 215 SCRA 410,
November 5, 1992; Bustamante vs. Commissioner on Audit, 216 SCRA 134, 136,
November 27, 1992.
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. 92024 November 9, 1990
CONGRESSMAN ENRIQUE T. GARCIA (Second District of Bataan), petitioner,
vs.
THE BOARD OF INVESTMENTS, THE DEPARTMENT OF TRADE AND INDUSTRY,
LUZON PETROCHEMICAL CORPORATION, and PILIPINAS SHELL
CORPORATION, respondents.
Abraham C. La Vina for petitioner.
Sycip, Salazar, Hernandez & Gatmaitan for Luzon Petrochemical Corporation.
Romulo, Mabanta, Buenaventura, Sayoc & De los Angeles for Pilipinas Shell Petroleum
Corporation.
GUTIERREZ, JR., J.:

This is a petition to annul and set aside the decision of the Board of Investments
(BOI)/Department of Trade and Industry (DTI) approving the transfer of the site of the proposed
petrochemical plant from Bataan to Batangas and the shift of feedstock for that plant from
naphtha only to naphtha and/or liquefied petroleum gas (LPG).
This petition is a sequel to the petition in G.R. No. 88637 entitled "Congressman Enrique T.
Garcia v. the Board of Investments", September 7, 1989, where this Court issued a decision,
ordering the BOI as follows:
WHEREFORE, the petition for certiorari is granted. The Board of Investments is
ordered: (1) to publish the amended application for registration of the Bataan
Petrochemical Corporation, (2) to allow the petitioner to have access to its records
on the original and amended applications for registration, as a petrochemical
manufacturer, of the respondent Bataan Petrochemical Corporation, excluding,
however, privileged papers containing its trade secrets and other business and
financial information, and (3) to set for hearing the petitioner's opposition to the
amended application in order that he may present at such hearing all the evidence
in his possession in support of his opposition to the transfer of the site of the BPC
petrochemical plant to Batangas province. The hearing shall not exceed a period
of ten (10) days from the date fixed by the BOI, notice of which should be served
by personal service to the petitioner through counsel, at least three (3) days in
advance. The hearings may be held from day to day for a period of ten (10) days
without postponements. The petition for a writ of prohibition or preliminary
injunction is denied. No costs. (Rollo, pages 450-451)
However, acting on the petitioner's motion for partial reconsideration asking that we rule on the
import of P.D. Nos. 949 and 1803 and on the foreign investor's claim of right of final choice of
plant site, in the light of the provisions of the Constitution and the Omnibus Investments Code of
1987, this Court on October 24, 1989, made the observation that P.D. Nos. 949 and 1803 "do not
provide that the Limay site should be the only petrochemical zone in the country, nor prohibit the
establishment of a petrochemical plant elsewhere in the country, that the establishment of a
petrochemical plant in Batangas does not violate P.D. No. 949 and P.D. No. 1803.
Our resolution skirted the issue of whether the investor given the initial inducements and other
circumstances surrounding its first choice of plant site may change it simply because it has the
final choice on the matter. The Court merely ruled that the petitioner appears to have lost interest
in the case by his failure to appear at the hearing that was set by the BOI after receipt of the
decision, so he may be deemed to have waived the fruit of the judgment. On this ground, the
motion for partial reconsideration was denied.
A motion for reconsideration of said resolution was filed by the petitioner asking that we resolve
the basic issue of whether or not the foreign investor has the right of final choice of plant site;
that the non-attendance of the petitioner at the hearing was because the decision was not yet final
and executory; and that the petitioner had not therefor waived the right to a hearing before the
BOI.
In the Court's resolution dated January 17, 1990, we stated:
Does the investor have a "right of final choice" of plant site? Neither under the
1987 Constitution nor in the Omnibus Investments Code is there such a 'right
of final choice.' In the first place, the investor's choice is subject to processing and
approval or disapproval by the BOI (Art. 7, Chapter II, Omnibus Investments
Code). By submitting its application and amended application to the BOI for
approval, the investor recognizes the sovereign prerogative of our Government,
through the BOI, to approve or disapprove the same after determining whether its
proposed project will be feasible, desirable and beneficial to our country. By

asking that his opposition to the LPC's amended application be heard by the BOI,
the petitioner likewise acknowledges that the BOI, not the investor, has the last
word or the "final choice" on the matter.
Secondly, as this case has shown, even a choice that had been approved by the
BOI may not be 'final', for supervening circumstances and changes in the
conditions of a place may dictate a corresponding change in the choice of plant
site in order that the project will not fail. After all, our country will benefit only
when a project succeeds, not when it fails. (Rollo, pp. 538-539)
Nevertheless, the motion for reconsideration of the petitioner was denied.
A minority composed of Justices Melencio-Herrera, Gancayco, Sarmiento and this ponente voted
to grant the motion for reconsideration stating that the hearing set by the BOI was premature as
the decision of the Court was not yet final and executory; that as contended by the petitioner the
Court must first rule on whether or not the investor has the right of final choice of plant site for if
the ruling is in the affirmative, the hearing would be a useless exercise; that in the October 19,
1989 resolution, the Court while upholding validity of the transfer of the plant site did not rule on
the issue of who has the final choice; that they agree with the observation of the majority that
"the investor has no final choice either under the 1987 Constitution or in the Omnibus
Investments Code and that it is the BOI who decides for the government" and that the plea of the
petitioner should be granted to give him the chance to show the justness of his claim and to
enable the BOI to give a second hard look at the matter.
Thus, the herein petition which relies on the ruling of the Court in the resolution of January 17,
1990 in G.R. No. 88637 that the investor has no right of final choice under the 1987 Constitution
and the Omnibus Investments Code.
Under P.D. No. 1803 dated January 16, 1981, 576 hectares of the public domain located in
Lamao, Limay, Bataan were reserved for the Petrochemical Industrial Zone under the
administration, management, and ownership of the Philippine National Oil Company (PNOC).
The Bataan Refining Corporation (BRC) is a wholly government owned corporation, located at
Bataan. It produces 60% of the national output of naphtha.
Taiwanese investors in a petrochemical project formed the Bataan Petrochemical Corporation
(BPC) and applied with BOI for registration as a new domestic producer of petrochemicals. Its
application specified Bataan as the plant site. One of the terms and conditions for registration of
the project was the use of "naphtha cracker" and "naphtha" as feedstock or fuel for its
petrochemical plant. The petrochemical plant was to be a joint venture with PNOC. BPC was
issued a certificate of registration on February 24, 1988 by BOI.
BPC was given pioneer status and accorded fiscal and other incentives by BOI, like: (1)
exemption from taxes on raw materials, (2) repatriation of the entire proceeds of liquidation
investments in currency originally made and at the exchange rate obtaining at the time of
repatriation; and (3) remittance of earnings on investments. As additional incentive, the House of
Representatives approved a bill introduced by the petitioner eliminating the 48%ad valorem tax
on naphtha if and when it is used as raw materials in the petrochemical plant. (G.R. No. 88637,
September 7, 1989, pp. 2-3. Rollo, pp. 441-442)
However, in February, 1989, A.T. Chong, chairman of USI Far East Corporation, the major
investor in BPC, personally delivered to Trade Secretary Jose Concepcion a letter dated January
25, 1989 advising him of BPC's desire to amend the original registration certification of its
project by changing the job site from Limay, Bataan, to Batangas. The reason adduced for the
transfer was the insurgency and unstable labor situation, and the presence in Batangas of a huge
liquefied petroleum gas (LPG) depot owned by the Philippine Shell Corporation.
The petitioner vigorously opposed the proposal and no less than President Aquino expressed her
preference that the plant be established in Bataan in a conference with the Taiwanese investors,
the Secretary of National Defense and The Chief of Staff of the Armed Forces.
Despite speeches in the Senate and House opposing the Transfer of the project to Batangas, BPC
filed on April 11, 1989 its request for approval of the amendments. Its application is as follows:
"(l) increasing the investment amount from US $220 million to US $320 million; (2) increasing
the production capacity of its naphtha cracker, polythylene plant and polypropylene plant; (3)
changing the feedstock from naphtha only to "naphtha and/or liquefied petroleum gas;" and (4)
transferring the job site from Limay, Bataan, to Batangas. (Annex B to Petition; Rollo, p. 25)
Notwithstanding opposition from any quarters and the request of the petitioner addressed to
Secretary Concepcion to be furnished a copy of the proposed amendment with its attachments
which was denied by the BOI on May 25, 1989, BOI approved the revision of the registration of
BPC's petrochemical project. (Petition, Annex F; Rollo, p. 32; See pp. 4 to 6, Decision in G.R.
No. 88637; supra.)
BOI Vice-Chairman Tomas I. Alcantara testifying before the Committee on Ways and Means of
the Senate asserted that:
The BOI has taken a public position preferring Bataan over Batangas as the site of
the petrochemical complex, as this would provide a better distribution of
industries around the Metro Manila area. ... In advocating the choice of Bataan as
the project site for the petrochemical complex, the BOI, however, made it clear,
and I would like to repeat this that the BOI made it clear in its view that the BOI
or the government for that matter could only recomend as to where the project
should be located. The BOI recognizes and respect the principle that the final
chouce is still with the proponent who would in the final analysis provide the
funding or risk capital for the project. (Petition, P. 13; Annex D to the petition)
This position has not been denied by BOI in its pleadings in G.R. No. 88637 and in the present
petition.
Section 1, Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution provides:
SECTION 1. The judicial power shall be vested in one Supreme Court and in
such lower courts as may be established by law.
Government.
There is before us an actual controversy whether the petrochemical plant should remain in
Bataan or should be transferred to Batangas, and whether its feedstock originally of naphtha only
should be changed to naphtha and/or liquefied petroleum gas as the approved amended
application of the BPC, now Luzon Petrochemical Corporation (LPC), shows. And in the light of
the categorical admission of the BOI that it is the investor who has the final choice of the site and
the decision on the feedstock, whether or not it constitutes a grave abuse of discretion for the
BOI to yield to the wishes of the investor, national interest notwithstanding.
We rule that the Court has a constitutional duty to step into this controversy and determine the
paramount issue. We grant the petition.
First, Bataan was the original choice as the plant site of the BOI to which the BPC agreed. That
is why it organized itself into a corporation bearing the name Bataan. There is available 576
hectares of public land precisely reserved as the petrochemical zone in Limay, Bataan under P.D.
No. 1803. There is no need to buy expensive real estate for the site unlike in the proposed
transfer to Batangas. The site is the result of careful study long before any covetous interests
intruded into the choice. The site is ideal. It is not unduly constricted and allows for expansion.
The respondents have not shown nor reiterated that the alleged peace and order situation in
Bataan or unstable labor situation warrant a transfer of the plant site to Batangas. Certainly, these
were taken into account when the firm named itself Bataan Petrochemical Corporation.
Moreover, the evidence proves the contrary.
Second, the BRC, a government owned Filipino corporation, located in Bataan produces 60% of
the national output of naphtha which can be used as feedstock for the plant in Bataan. It can
provide the feedstock requirement of the plant. On the other hand, the country is short of LPG
and there is need to import the same for use of the plant in Batangas. The local production
thereof by Shell can hardly supply the needs of the consumers for cooking purposes. Scarce
dollars will be diverted, unnecessarily, from vitally essential projects in order to feed the furnaces
of the transferred petrochemical plant.
Third, naphtha as feedstock has been exempted by law from the ad valorem tax by the approval
of Republic Act No. 6767 by President Aquino but excluding LPG from exemption from ad
valorem tax. The law was enacted specifically for the petrochemical industry. The policy
determination by both Congress and the President is clear. Neither BOI nor a foreign investor
should disregard or contravene expressed policy by shifting the feedstock from naphtha to LPG.
Fourth, under Section 10, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution, it is the duty of the State to
"regulate and exercise authority over foreign investments within its national jurisdiction and in
accordance with its national goals and priorities." The development of a self-reliant and
independent national economy effectively controlled by Filipinos is mandated in Section 19,
Article II of the Constitution.
In Article 2 of the Omnibus Investments Code of 1987 "the sound development of the national
economy in consonance with the principles and objectives of economic nationalism" is the set
goal of government.
Fifth, with the admitted fact that the investor is raising the greater portion of the capital for the
project from local sources by way of loan which led to the so-called "petroscam scandal", the
capital requirements would be greatly minimized if LPC does not have to buy the land for the
project and its feedstock shall be limited to naphtha which is certainly more economical, more
readily available than LPG, and does not have to be imported.
Sixth, if the plant site is maintained in Bataan, the PNOC shall be a partner in the venture to the
great benefit and advantage of the government which shall have a participation in the
management of the project instead of a firm which is a huge multinational corporation.
In the light of all the clear advantages manifest in the plant's remaining in Bataan, practically
nothing is shown to justify the transfer to Batangas except a near-absolute discretion given by
BOI to investors not only to freely choose the site but to transfer it from their own first choice for
reasons which remain murky to say the least.
And this brings us to a prime consideration which the Court cannot rightly ignore.
Section 1, Article XII of the Constitution provides that:
xxx xxx xxx
xxx xxx xxx
Every provision of the Constitution on the national economy and patrimony is infused with the
spirit of national interest. The non-alienation of natural resources, the State's full control over the
development and utilization of our scarce resources, agreements with foreigners being based on
real contributions to the economic growth and general welfare of the country and the regulation
of foreign investments in accordance with national goals and priorities are too explicit not to be
noticed and understood.
A petrochemical industry is not an ordinary investment opportunity. It should not be treated like
a garment or embroidery firm, a shoe-making venture, or even an assembler of cars or
manufacturer of computer chips, where the BOI reasoning may be accorded fuller faith and
credit. The petrochemical industry is essential to the national interest. In other ASEAN countries
like Indonesia and Malaysia, the government superintends the industry by controlling the
upstream or cracker facility.
In this particular BPC venture, not only has the Government given unprecedented favors, among
them:
(1) For an initial authorized capital of only P20 million, the Central Bank gave an
eligible relending credit or relending facility worth US $50 million and a debt to
swap arrangement for US $30 million or a total accommodation of US $80
million which at current exchange rates is around P2080 million.
(2) A major part of the company's capitalization shall not come from foreign
sources but from loans, initially a Pl Billion syndicated loan, to be given by both
government banks and a consortium of Philippine private banks or in common

parlance, a case of 'guiniguisa sa sariling manteca.'
(3) Tax exemptions and privileges were given as part of its 'preferred pioneer
status.'
(4) Loan applications of other Philippine firms will be crowded out of the Asian
Development Bank portfolio because of the petrochemical firm's massive loan
request. (Taken from the proceedings before the Senate Blue Ribbon Committee).
but through its regulatory agency, the BOI, it surrenders even the power to make a company
abide by its initial choice, a choice free from any suspicion of unscrupulous machinations and a
choice which is undoubtedly in the best interests of the Filipino people.
The Court, therefore, holds and finds that the BOI committed a grave abuse of discretion in
approving the transfer of the petrochemical plant from Bataan to Batangas and authorizing the
change of feedstock from naphtha only to naphtha and/or LPG for the main reason that the final
say is in the investor all other circumstances to the contrary notwithstanding. No cogent
advantage to the government has been shown by this transfer. This is a repudiation of the
independent policy of the government expressed in numerous laws and the Constitution to run its
own affairs the way it deems best for the national interest.
One can but remember the words of a great Filipino leader who in part said he would not mind
having a government run like hell by Filipinos than one subservient to foreign dictation. In this
case, it is not even a foreign government but an ordinary investor whom the BOI allows to
dictate what we shall do with our heritage.
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby granted. The decision of the respondent Board of
Investments approving the amendment of the certificate of registration of the Luzon
Petrochemical Corporation on May 23, 1989 under its Resolution No. 193, Series of 1989,
(Annex F to the Petition) is SET ASIDE as NULL and VOID. The original certificate of
registration of BPC' (now LPC) of February 24, 1988 with Bataan as the plant site and naphtha
as the feedstock is, therefore, ordered maintained.
SO ORDERED.
Cruz, Gancayco, Padilla, Bidin, Sarmiento and Medialdea, JJ., concur.
Fernan, C.J., Paras, JJ., took no part.
Feliciano, J., is on leave.
Separate Opinions
GRIO-AQUINO, J., dissenting Opinion:
This is the petitioner's second petition for certiorari and prohibition with application for a
temporary restraining order or preliminary injunction against the respondents Board of
Investments (BOI), Department of Trade and Industry (DTI), the Luzon Petrochemical
Corporation (LPC), formerly Bataan Petrochemical Corporation, and Pilipinas Shell Corporation
(SHELL) on the transfer of the LPC petrochemical plant site from Bataan to Batangas. The first
case was docketed in this Court as G.R. No. 88637 and was decided on September 7, 1989.
Consistent with my opinion in the first case, I vote once more to deny the petition.
The petitioner filed this second petition supposedly "upon the authority and strength" of this
Court's statement in its Resolution of January 9, 1990 in G.R. No. 88637 that the foreign investor
(LPC) does not have a right of final choice of plant site because its choice is subject to approval
or disapproval by the BOI (p. 3, Rollo). Ergo, the BOI has the "final choice."
Petitioner contends that since the BOI had earlier approved Bataan as the plant site of the LPG
petrochemical complex, and of "naphtha only" as the feedstock, that approval was "final" and
may not be changed. Hence, the BOI allegedly abused its discretion: (1) in approving the transfer
of the LPC's plant site from Bataan to Batangas (in spite of the BOI's initial preference for
Bataan) "upon the false and unlawful thesis that the foreign investor has the right of final choice
by plant site" (p. 13, Rollo), and (2) in allowing the LPC to shift feedstock from naphtha only, to
naphtha and/or LPG, despite the disadvantages of using LPG. Petitioner prays the Court to annul
the BOI's action and prohibit LPC from transferring its plant site to Batangas and shifting
feedstock to naphtha and/ or LPG (p. 22, Rollo).
The petition is not well-taken. There is no provision in the 1987 Investments Code prohibiting
the amendment of the investor's application for registration of its project, such as, in this case, its
plant site, the feedstock to be used, and the capitalization of the project.
Neither does the law prohibit the BOI from approving the amended application.
Since the investor may amend its application and the BOI may approve or disapprove the
amendments, when may the BOI be deemed to have made a "final choice" regarding those
aspects of the project which have been changed?
Only the BOI or the Chief Executive is competent to answer that question, for the matter of
choosing an appropriate site for the investor's project is a political and economic decision which,
under our system of separation of powers, only the executive branch, as implementor of policy
formulated by the legislature (in this case, the policy of encouraging and inviting foreign
investments into our country), is empowered to make. It is not for this Court to determine what
is, or should be, the BOI's "final choice" of plant site and feedstock, for, as we said in our
decision in G.R. No. 88637:
This Court ... does not possess the necessary technology and scientific expertise to
detail e whether the transfer of the proposed BPC (now LPC) petrochemical
complex from Bataan to Batangas and the change of fuel from 'naphtha only to
naphtha and/or LPG' will be best for the project and for our country. This Court is
not about to delve into the economics and politics of this case. It is concerned
simply with the alleged violation of due process and the alleged extra limitation of
power and discretion on the part of the public respondents in approving the
transfer of the project to Batangas without giving due notice and an opportunity to
be heard to the vocal opponents of that move." (pp. 445-446, Rollo of G.R. No.
88637.)
Although we did say in our decision in G.R. No. 88637 that the BOI, not the foreign investor, has
the right of "final choice" of plant site for the LPC project, the Court would be overstepping the
bounds of its jurisdiction were it to usurp the prerogative of the BOI to make that choice or
change it.
The petitioner's contention that the BOI abused its discretion in approving the transfer of the
LPC plant site to Batangas because the BOI, in effect, yielded to the investor's choice, is not well
taken. The record shows that the BOI approved the transfer because "the BOI recognizes the
justification given by the proponent of the project (p. 30, Rollo). The fact that the petitioner
disagrees with the BOI's decision does not make it wrong. The petitioner's recourse against the
BOI's action is by an appeal to the President (Sec. 36, 1987 Investments Code), not to this Court.
This Court, in the exercise of its judicial power, may review and annul executive as well as
legislative actions when they clash with the Constitution or with existing laws, or when any
branch or instrumentality of the Government has acted with grave abuse of discretion amounting
to lack or excess of jurisdiction (Sec. 1, Art. VIII, 1987 Constitution) but the Court may not do
more than that. It may not make the decisions that the executive should have made nor pass the
laws that the legislature should have passed. Not even the much publicized "petroscam"
involving the financial arrangements (not the issue in this case) for the LPC project would justify
the intervention of this court in a matter that pertains to the exclusive domain of the executive
department. The court does not have a panacea for all the ills that afflict our country nor a
solution for every problem that besets it.
Did the BOI gravely abuse its discretion in approving the LPC's amended application for
registration of its petrochemical project to warrant the intervention of this Court? Grave abuse of
discretion implies such capricious and whimsical exercise of judgment as is equivalent to lack of
jurisdiction (Abad Santos vs. Prov. of Tarlac, 67 Phil. 480; Alafriz vs. Nable, 70 Phil. 278).
In light of the LPC's justifications for the transfer of its project site and the shift from one kind of
feedstock to two, we are not prepared to hold that the BOI's decision to approve the changes was
the product of a capricious and arbitrary exercise of judgment on its part, despite the seemingly
impressive arguments of the petitioner showing the advantages of establishing the petrochemical
plant in Bataan and of using naphtha only as feedstock. We are not prepared to substitute the
judgment of the BOI on this matter with one crafted by this Court.
With regard to the scandalously liberal financial accommodations that local banks have allegedly
agreed to grant to the LPC (the so-called "petroscam") to enable it to raise a major part of its
capital requirements from local sources (hence, a betrayal of the people's expectation that foreign
investors will bring in foreign exchange to finance their projects in this country) it is significant
that the petitioner has not led an outcry for the disapproval and cancellation of the project on this
score. Apparently, the petitioner is not seriously disturbed by the moral implications of the
"scam" provided the petrochemical plant is set up in Bataan.
The decision of the BOI to allow the transfer of the LPC petrochemical project to Batangas and
shift feedstock from naphtha only to naphtha and/or LPG, may appear to the petitioner to be
extremely unwise and inadvisable, but the Court may not, for that reason annul the BOI's action
or prohibit it from acting on a matter that lies within its particular sphere of competence, for the
Court is not a judge of the wisdom and soundness of the actions of the two other co-equal
branches of the Government, but only of their legality and constitutionality.
WHEREFORE, I vote to deny the petition for certiorari and prohibition for lack of merit.
Melencio-Herrera, Narvasa and Regalado, JJ., concur.
Consistent with my dissent in G.R. No. 88637, the first petition, I concur in the dissent herein of
Mme. Justice Aquino and merely wish to add that in its Decision, the majority has actually
imposed its own views on matters falling within the competence of a policy-making body of the
Government. It decided upon the wisdom of the transfer of the site of the proposed project (pp.
8-9); the reasonableness of the feedstock to be used (pp. 8-9); the undesirability of the
capitalization aspect of the project (p. 10), and injected its own concept of the national interest as
regards the establishment of a basic industry of strategic importance to the country (p. 13).
It is true that the judicial power embodied in Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution speaks of the
duty of Courts of justice to determine whether or not there has been grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the
Government. By no means, however, does it vest in the Courts the power to enter the realm of
policy considerations under the guise of the commission of grave abuse of discretion.
But this is exactly what the majority Decision has resulted in. It has made a sweeping policy
determination and has unwittingly transformed itself into what might be termed a "government
by the Judiciary," something never intended by the framers of the Constitution when they
provided for separation of powers among the three co-equal branches of government and
excluded the Judiciary from policy-making.
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. 101083 July 30, 1993

JUAN ANTONIO, ANNA ROSARIO and JOSE ALFONSO, all surnamed OPOSA, minors,
and represented by their parents ANTONIO and RIZALINA OPOSA, ROBERTA
NICOLE SADIUA, minor, represented by her parents CALVIN and ROBERTA SADIUA,
CARLO, AMANDA SALUD and PATRISHA, all surnamed FLORES, minors and
represented by their parents ENRICO and NIDA FLORES, GIANINA DITA R. FORTUN,
minor, represented by her parents SIGRID and DOLORES FORTUN, GEORGE II and
MA. CONCEPCION, all surnamed MISA, minors and represented by their parents
GEORGE and MYRA MISA, BENJAMIN ALAN V. PESIGAN, minor, represented by his
parents ANTONIO and ALICE PESIGAN, JOVIE MARIE ALFARO, minor, represented
by her parents JOSE and MARIA VIOLETA ALFARO, MARIA CONCEPCION T.
CASTRO, minor, represented by her parents FREDENIL and JANE CASTRO,
JOHANNA DESAMPARADO,
minor, represented by her parents JOSE and ANGELA DESAMPRADO, CARLO

JOAQUIN T. NARVASA, minor, represented by his parents GREGORIO II and
CRISTINE CHARITY NARVASA, MA. MARGARITA, JESUS IGNACIO, MA. ANGELA
and MARIE GABRIELLE, all surnamed SAENZ, minors, represented by their parents
ROBERTO and AURORA SAENZ, KRISTINE, MARY ELLEN, MAY, GOLDA
MARTHE and DAVID IAN, all surnamed KING, minors, represented by their parents
MARIO and HAYDEE KING, DAVID, FRANCISCO and THERESE VICTORIA, all
surnamed ENDRIGA, minors, represented by their parents BALTAZAR and TERESITA
ENDRIGA, JOSE MA. and REGINA MA., all surnamed ABAYA, minors, represented by
their parents ANTONIO and MARICA ABAYA, MARILIN, MARIO, JR. and
MARIETTE, all surnamed CARDAMA, minors, represented by their parents MARIO and
LINA CARDAMA, CLARISSA, ANN MARIE, NAGEL, and IMEE LYN, all surnamed
OPOSA, minors and represented by their parents RICARDO and MARISSA OPOSA,
PHILIP JOSEPH, STEPHEN JOHN and ISAIAH JAMES, all surnamed QUIPIT, minors,
represented by their parents JOSE MAX and VILMI QUIPIT, BUGHAW CIELO,
CRISANTO, ANNA, DANIEL and FRANCISCO, all surnamed BIBAL, minors,
represented by their parents FRANCISCO, JR. and MILAGROS BIBAL, and THE
PHILIPPINE ECOLOGICAL NETWORK, INC., petitioners,
vs.
THE HONORABLE FULGENCIO S. FACTORAN, JR., in his capacity as the Secretary of
the Department of Environment and Natural Resources, and THE HONORABLE
ERIBERTO U. ROSARIO, Presiding Judge of the RTC, Makati, Branch 66, respondents.
Oposa Law Office for petitioners.
The Solicitor General for respondents.
DAVIDE, JR., J.:

In a broader sense, this petition bears upon the right of Filipinos to a balanced and healthful
ecology which the petitioners dramatically associate with the twin concepts of "intergenerational responsibility" and "inter-generational justice." Specifically, it touches on the issue
of whether the said petitioners have a cause of action to "prevent the misappropriation or
impairment" of Philippine rainforests and "arrest the unabated hemorrhage of the country's vital
life support systems and continued rape of Mother Earth."
The controversy has its genesis in Civil Case No. 90-77 which was filed before Branch 66
(Makati, Metro Manila) of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), National Capital Judicial Region.
The principal plaintiffs therein, now the principal petitioners, are all minors duly represented and
joined by their respective parents. Impleaded as an additional plaintiff is the Philippine
Ecological Network, Inc. (PENI), a domestic, non-stock and non-profit corporation organized for
the purpose of, inter alia, engaging in concerted action geared for the protection of our
environment and natural resources. The original defendant was the Honorable Fulgencio S.
Factoran, Jr., then Secretary of the Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR).
His substitution in this petition by the new Secretary, the Honorable Angel C. Alcala, was
subsequently ordered upon proper motion by the petitioners. 1 The complaint 2 was instituted as a
taxpayers' class suit 3 and alleges that the plaintiffs "are all citizens of the Republic of the
Philippines, taxpayers, and entitled to the full benefit, use and enjoyment of the natural resource
treasure that is the country's virgin tropical forests." The same was filed for themselves and
others who are equally concerned about the preservation of said resource but are "so numerous
that it is impracticable to bring them all before the Court." The minors further asseverate that
they "represent their generation as well as generations yet unborn." 4 Consequently, it is prayed
for that judgment be rendered:
. . . ordering defendant, his agents, representatives and other persons acting in his
behalf to
(1) Cancel all existing timber license agreements in the country;
(2) Cease and desist from receiving, accepting, processing, renewing or approving
new timber license agreements.
and granting the plaintiffs ". . . such other reliefs just and equitable under the premises." 5
The complaint starts off with the general averments that the Philippine archipelago of 7,100
islands has a land area of thirty million (30,000,000) hectares and is endowed with rich, lush and
verdant rainforests in which varied, rare and unique species of flora and fauna may be found;
these rainforests contain a genetic, biological and chemical pool which is irreplaceable; they are
also the habitat of indigenous Philippine cultures which have existed, endured and flourished
since time immemorial; scientific evidence reveals that in order to maintain a balanced and
healthful ecology, the country's land area should be utilized on the basis of a ratio of fifty-four
per cent (54%) for forest cover and forty-six per cent (46%) for agricultural, residential,
industrial, commercial and other uses; the distortion and disturbance of this balance as a
consequence of deforestation have resulted in a host of environmental tragedies, such as (a)
water shortages resulting from drying up of the water table, otherwise known as the "aquifer," as
well as of rivers, brooks and streams, (b) salinization of the water table as a result of the intrusion
therein of salt water, incontrovertible examples of which may be found in the island of Cebu and
the Municipality of Bacoor, Cavite, (c) massive erosion and the consequential loss of soil fertility
and agricultural productivity, with the volume of soil eroded estimated at one billion
(1,000,000,000) cubic meters per annum approximately the size of the entire island of
Catanduanes, (d) the endangering and extinction of the country's unique, rare and varied flora
and fauna, (e) the disturbance and dislocation of cultural communities, including the
disappearance of the Filipino's indigenous cultures, (f) the siltation of rivers and seabeds and
consequential destruction of corals and other aquatic life leading to a critical reduction in marine
resource productivity, (g) recurrent spells of drought as is presently experienced by the entire
country, (h) increasing velocity of typhoon winds which result from the absence of windbreakers,
(i) the floodings of lowlands and agricultural plains arising from the absence of the absorbent
mechanism of forests, (j) the siltation and shortening of the lifespan of multi-billion peso dams
constructed and operated for the purpose of supplying water for domestic uses, irrigation and the
generation of electric power, and (k) the reduction of the earth's capacity to process carbon
dioxide gases which has led to perplexing and catastrophic climatic changes such as the
phenomenon of global warming, otherwise known as the "greenhouse effect."
Plaintiffs further assert that the adverse and detrimental consequences of continued and
deforestation are so capable of unquestionable demonstration that the same may be submitted as
a matter of judicial notice. This notwithstanding, they expressed their intention to present expert
witnesses as well as documentary, photographic and film evidence in the course of the trial.
As their cause of action, they specifically allege that:

CAUSE OF ACTION
7. Plaintiffs replead by reference the foregoing allegations.
8. Twenty-five (25) years ago, the Philippines had some sixteen (16) million
hectares of rainforests constituting roughly 53% of the country's land mass.
9. Satellite images taken in 1987 reveal that there remained no more than 1.2
million hectares of said rainforests or four per cent (4.0%) of the country's land
area.
10. More recent surveys reveal that a mere 850,000 hectares of virgin old-growth
rainforests are left, barely 2.8% of the entire land mass of the Philippine
archipelago and about 3.0 million hectares of immature and uneconomical
secondary growth forests.
11. Public records reveal that the defendant's, predecessors have granted timber
license agreements ('TLA's') to various corporations to cut the aggregate area of
3.89 million hectares for commercial logging purposes.
A copy of the TLA holders and the corresponding areas covered is hereto attached
as Annex "A".
12. At the present rate of deforestation, i.e. about 200,000 hectares per annum or
25 hectares per hour nighttime, Saturdays, Sundays and holidays included
the Philippines will be bereft of forest resources after the end of this ensuing
decade, if not earlier.
13. The adverse effects, disastrous consequences, serious injury and irreparable
damage of this continued trend of deforestation to the plaintiff minor's generation
and to generations yet unborn are evident and incontrovertible. As a matter of
fact, the environmental damages enumerated in paragraph 6 hereof are already
being felt, experienced and suffered by the generation of plaintiff adults.
14. The continued allowance by defendant of TLA holders to cut and deforest the
remaining forest stands will work great damage and irreparable injury to plaintiffs
especially plaintiff minors and their successors who may never see, use,
benefit from and enjoy this rare and unique natural resource treasure.
This act of defendant constitutes a misappropriation and/or impairment of the
natural resource property he holds in trust for the benefit of plaintiff minors and
succeeding generations.
15. Plaintiffs have a clear and constitutional right to a balanced and healthful
ecology and are entitled to protection by the State in its capacity as the parens
patriae.
16. Plaintiff have exhausted all administrative remedies with the defendant's
office. On March 2, 1990, plaintiffs served upon defendant a final demand to
cancel all logging permits in the country.
A copy of the plaintiffs' letter dated March 1, 1990 is hereto attached as Annex
"B".
17. Defendant, however, fails and refuses to cancel the existing TLA's to the
continuing serious damage and extreme prejudice of plaintiffs.
18. The continued failure and refusal by defendant to cancel the TLA's is an act
violative of the rights of plaintiffs, especially plaintiff minors who may be left
with a country that is desertified (sic), bare, barren and devoid of the wonderful
flora, fauna and indigenous cultures which the Philippines had been abundantly
blessed with.
19. Defendant's refusal to cancel the aforementioned TLA's is manifestly contrary
to the public policy enunciated in the Philippine Environmental Policy which, in
pertinent part, states that it is the policy of the State
(a) to create, develop, maintain and improve conditions under which man and
nature can thrive in productive and enjoyable harmony with each other;
(b) to fulfill the social, economic and other requirements of present and future
generations of Filipinos and;
(c) to ensure the attainment of an environmental quality that is conductive to a life
of dignity and well-being. (P.D. 1151, 6 June 1977)
20. Furthermore, defendant's continued refusal to cancel the aforementioned
TLA's is contradictory to the Constitutional policy of the State to
a. effect "a more equitable distribution of opportunities, income and wealth" and
"make full and efficient use of natural resources (sic)." (Section 1, Article XII of
the Constitution);
b. "protect the nation's marine wealth." (Section 2, ibid);
c. "conserve and promote the nation's cultural heritage and resources (sic)"
(Section 14, Article XIV,id.);
d. "protect and advance the right of the people to a balanced and healthful ecology
in accord with the rhythm and harmony of nature." (Section 16, Article II, id.)
21. Finally, defendant's act is contrary to the highest law of humankind the
natural law and violative of plaintiffs' right to self-preservation and
perpetuation.
22. There is no other plain, speedy and adequate remedy in law other than the
instant action to arrest the unabated hemorrhage of the country's vital life support
systems and continued rape of Mother Earth. 6
On 22 June 1990, the original defendant, Secretary Factoran, Jr., filed a Motion to Dismiss the
complaint based on two (2) grounds, namely: (1) the plaintiffs have no cause of action against
him and (2) the issue raised by the plaintiffs is a political question which properly pertains to the
legislative or executive branches of Government. In their 12 July 1990 Opposition to the Motion,
the petitioners maintain that (1) the complaint shows a clear and unmistakable cause of action,
(2) the motion is dilatory and (3) the action presents a justiciable question as it involves the
defendant's abuse of discretion.
On 18 July 1991, respondent Judge issued an order granting the aforementioned motion to
dismiss. 7 In the said order, not only was the defendant's claim that the complaint states no
cause of action against him and that it raises a political question sustained, the respondent
Judge further ruled that the granting of the relief prayed for would result in the impairment of
contracts which is prohibited by the fundamental law of the land.
Plaintiffs thus filed the instant special civil action for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Revised
Rules of Court and ask this Court to rescind and set aside the dismissal order on the ground that
the respondent Judge gravely abused his discretion in dismissing the action. Again, the parents of
the plaintiffs-minors not only represent their children, but have also joined the latter in this case. 8
On 14 May 1992, We resolved to give due course to the petition and required the parties to
submit their respective Memoranda after the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) filed a
Comment in behalf of the respondents and the petitioners filed a reply thereto.
Petitioners contend that the complaint clearly and unmistakably states a cause of action as it
contains sufficient allegations concerning their right to a sound environment based on Articles
19, 20 and 21 of the Civil Code (Human Relations), Section 4 of Executive Order (E.O.) No. 192
creating the DENR, Section 3 of Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 1151 (Philippine Environmental
Policy), Section 16, Article II of the 1987 Constitution recognizing the right of the people to a
balanced and healthful ecology, the concept of generational genocide in Criminal Law and the
concept of man's inalienable right to self-preservation and self-perpetuation embodied in natural
law. Petitioners likewise rely on the respondent's correlative obligation per Section 4 of E.O. No.
192, to safeguard the people's right to a healthful environment.
It is further claimed that the issue of the respondent Secretary's alleged grave abuse of discretion
in granting Timber License Agreements (TLAs) to cover more areas for logging than what is
available involves a judicial question.
Anent the invocation by the respondent Judge of the Constitution's non-impairment clause,
petitioners maintain that the same does not apply in this case because TLAs are not contracts.
They likewise submit that even if TLAs may be considered protected by the said clause, it is well
settled that they may still be revoked by the State when the public interest so requires.
On the other hand, the respondents aver that the petitioners failed to allege in their complaint a
specific legal right violated by the respondent Secretary for which any relief is provided by law.
They see nothing in the complaint but vague and nebulous allegations concerning an
"environmental right" which supposedly entitles the petitioners to the "protection by the state in
its capacity as parens patriae." Such allegations, according to them, do not reveal a valid cause
of action. They then reiterate the theory that the question of whether logging should be permitted
in the country is a political question which should be properly addressed to the executive or
legislative branches of Government. They therefore assert that the petitioners' resources is not to
file an action to court, but to lobby before Congress for the passage of a bill that would ban
logging totally.
As to the matter of the cancellation of the TLAs, respondents submit that the same cannot be
done by the State without due process of law. Once issued, a TLA remains effective for a certain
period of time usually for twenty-five (25) years. During its effectivity, the same can neither
be revised nor cancelled unless the holder has been found, after due notice and hearing, to have
violated the terms of the agreement or other forestry laws and regulations. Petitioners'
proposition to have all the TLAs indiscriminately cancelled without the requisite hearing would
be violative of the requirements of due process.
Before going any further, We must first focus on some procedural matters. Petitioners instituted
Civil Case No. 90-777 as a class suit. The original defendant and the present respondents did not
take issue with this matter. Nevertheless, We hereby rule that the said civil case is indeed a class
suit. The subject matter of the complaint is of common and general interest not just to several,
but to all citizens of the Philippines. Consequently, since the parties are so numerous, it, becomes
impracticable, if not totally impossible, to bring all of them before the court. We likewise declare
that the plaintiffs therein are numerous and representative enough to ensure the full protection of
all concerned interests. Hence, all the requisites for the filing of a valid class suit under Section
12, Rule 3 of the Revised Rules of Court are present both in the said civil case and in the instant
petition, the latter being but an incident to the former.
This case, however, has a special and novel element. Petitioners minors assert that they represent
their generation as well as generations yet unborn. We find no difficulty in ruling that they can,
for themselves, for others of their generation and for the succeeding generations, file a class suit.
Their personality to sue in behalf of the succeeding generations can only be based on the concept
of intergenerational responsibility insofar as the right to a balanced and healthful ecology is
concerned.
Such
a
right,
as
hereinafter
expounded,
considers
the "rhythm and harmony of nature." Nature means the created world in its entirety. 9 Such
rhythm and harmony indispensably include, inter alia, the judicious disposition, utilization,
management, renewal and conservation of the country's forest, mineral, land, waters, fisheries,
wildlife, off-shore areas and other natural resources to the end that their exploration,
development and utilization be equitably accessible to the present as well as future
generations. 10 Needless to say, every generation has a responsibility to the next to preserve that
rhythm and harmony for the full enjoyment of a balanced and healthful ecology. Put a little
differently, the minors' assertion of their right to a sound environment constitutes, at the same
time, the performance of their obligation to ensure the protection of that right for the generations
to come.
The locus standi of the petitioners having thus been addressed, We shall now proceed to the
merits of the petition.
After a careful perusal of the complaint in question and a meticulous consideration and
evaluation of the issues raised and arguments adduced by the parties, We do not hesitate to find
for the petitioners and rule against the respondent Judge's challenged order for having been
issued with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction. The pertinent portions of
the said order reads as follows:
xxx xxx xxx
After a careful and circumspect evaluation of the Complaint, the Court cannot
help but agree with the defendant. For although we believe that plaintiffs have but
the noblest of all intentions, it (sic) fell short of alleging, with sufficient
definiteness, a specific legal right they are seeking to enforce and protect, or a
specific legal wrong they are seeking to prevent and redress (Sec. 1, Rule 2,
RRC). Furthermore, the Court notes that the Complaint is replete with vague
assumptions and vague conclusions based on unverified data. In fine, plaintiffs
fail to state a cause of action in its Complaint against the herein defendant.
Furthermore, the Court firmly believes that the matter before it, being impressed
with political color and involving a matter of public policy, may not be taken
cognizance of by this Court without doing violence to the sacred principle of
"Separation of Powers" of the three (3) co-equal branches of the Government.
The Court is likewise of the impression that it cannot, no matter how we stretch
our jurisdiction, grant the reliefs prayed for by the plaintiffs, i.e., to cancel all
existing timber license agreements in the country and to cease and desist from
receiving, accepting, processing, renewing or approving new timber license
agreements. For to do otherwise would amount to "impairment of contracts"
abhored (sic) by the fundamental law. 11
We do not agree with the trial court's conclusions that the plaintiffs failed to allege with sufficient
definiteness a specific legal right involved or a specific legal wrong committed, and that the
complaint is replete with vague assumptions and conclusions based on unverified data. A reading
of the complaint itself belies these conclusions.
The complaint focuses on one specific fundamental legal right the right to a balanced and
healthful ecology which, for the first time in our nation's constitutional history, is solemnly
incorporated in the fundamental law. Section 16, Article II of the 1987 Constitution explicitly
provides:
Sec. 16. The State shall protect and advance the right of the people to a balanced
and healthful ecology in accord with the rhythm and harmony of nature.
This right unites with the right to health which is provided for in the preceding
section of the same article:
Sec. 15. The State shall protect and promote the right to health of the people and
instill health consciousness among them.
While the right to a balanced and healthful ecology is to be found under the Declaration of
Principles and State Policies and not under the Bill of Rights, it does not follow that it is less
important than any of the civil and political rights enumerated in the latter. Such a right belongs
to a different category of rights altogether for it concerns nothing less than self-preservation and
self-perpetuation aptly and fittingly stressed by the petitioners the advancement of which
may even be said to predate all governments and constitutions. As a matter of fact, these basic
rights need not even be written in the Constitution for they are assumed to exist from the
inception of humankind. If they are now explicitly mentioned in the fundamental charter, it is
because of the well-founded fear of its framers that unless the rights to a balanced and healthful
ecology and to health are mandated as state policies by the Constitution itself, thereby
highlighting their continuing importance and imposing upon the state a solemn obligation to
preserve the first and protect and advance the second, the day would not be too far when all else
would be lost not only for the present generation, but also for those to come generations
which stand to inherit nothing but parched earth incapable of sustaining life.
The right to a balanced and healthful ecology carries with it the correlative duty to refrain from
impairing the environment. During the debates on this right in one of the plenary sessions of the
1986 Constitutional Commission, the following exchange transpired between Commissioner
Wilfrido Villacorta and Commissioner Adolfo Azcuna who sponsored the section in question:
MR. VILLACORTA:
Does this section mandate the State to provide sanctions against all
forms of pollution air, water and noise pollution?
MR. AZCUNA:
Yes, Madam President. The right to healthful (sic) environment
necessarily carries with it the correlative duty of not impairing the
same and, therefore, sanctions may be provided for impairment of
environmental balance. 12
The said right implies, among many other things, the judicious management and conservation of
the country's forests.
Without such forests, the ecological or environmental balance would be irreversiby
disrupted.
Conformably with the enunciated right to a balanced and healthful ecology and the right to
health, as well as the other related provisions of the Constitution concerning the conservation,
development and utilization of the country's natural resources, 13 then President Corazon C.
Aquino promulgated on 10 June 1987 E.O. No. 192, 14 Section 4 of which expressly mandates
that the Department of Environment and Natural Resources "shall be the primary government
agency responsible for the conservation, management, development and proper use of the
country's environment and natural resources, specifically forest and grazing lands, mineral,
resources, including those in reservation and watershed areas, and lands of the public domain, as
well as the licensing and regulation of all natural resources as may be provided for by law in
order to ensure equitable sharing of the benefits derived therefrom for the welfare of the present
and future generations of Filipinos." Section 3 thereof makes the following statement of policy:
Sec. 3. Declaration of Policy. It is hereby declared the policy of the State to
ensure the sustainable use, development, management, renewal, and conservation
of the country's forest, mineral, land, off-shore areas and other natural resources,
including the protection and enhancement of the quality of the environment, and
equitable access of the different segments of the population to the development
and the use of the country's natural resources, not only for the present generation
but for future generations as well. It is also the policy of the state to recognize and
apply a true value system including social and environmental cost implications
relative to their utilization, development and conservation of our natural
resources.
This policy declaration is substantially re-stated it Title XIV, Book IV of the Administrative Code
of 1987, 15specifically in Section 1 thereof which reads:
Sec. 1. Declaration of Policy. (1) The State shall ensure, for the benefit of the
Filipino people, the full exploration and development as well as the judicious
disposition, utilization, management, renewal and conservation of the country's
forest, mineral, land, waters, fisheries, wildlife, off-shore areas and other natural
resources, consistent with the necessity of maintaining a sound ecological balance
and protecting and enhancing the quality of the environment and the objective of
making the exploration, development and utilization of such natural resources
equitably accessible to the different segments of the present as well as future
generations.
(2) The State shall likewise recognize and apply a true value system that takes
into account social and environmental cost implications relative to the utilization,
development and conservation of our natural resources.
The above provision stresses "the necessity of maintaining a sound ecological balance and
protecting and enhancing the quality of the environment." Section 2 of the same Title, on the
other hand, specifically speaks of the mandate of the DENR; however, it makes particular
reference to the fact of the agency's being subject to law and higher authority. Said section
provides:
Sec. 2. Mandate. (1) The Department of Environment and Natural Resources
shall be primarily responsible for the implementation of the foregoing policy.
(2) It shall, subject to law and higher authority, be in charge of carrying out the
State's constitutional mandate to control and supervise the exploration,
development, utilization, and conservation of the country's natural resources.
Both E.O. NO. 192 and the Administrative Code of 1987 have set the objectives which will serve
as the bases for policy formulation, and have defined the powers and functions of the DENR.
It may, however, be recalled that even before the ratification of the 1987 Constitution, specific
statutes already paid special attention to the "environmental right" of the present and future
generations. On 6 June 1977, P.D. No. 1151 (Philippine Environmental Policy) and P.D. No.
1152 (Philippine Environment Code) were issued. The former "declared a continuing policy of
the State (a) to create, develop, maintain and improve conditions under which man and nature
can thrive in productive and enjoyable harmony with each other, (b) to fulfill the social,
economic and other requirements of present and future generations of Filipinos, and (c) to insure
the attainment of an environmental quality that is conducive to a life of dignity and wellbeing." 16 As its goal, it speaks of the "responsibilities of each generation as trustee and guardian
of the environment for succeeding generations." 17 The latter statute, on the other hand, gave
flesh to the said policy.
Thus, the right of the petitioners (and all those they represent) to a balanced and healthful
ecology is as clear as the DENR's duty under its mandate and by virtue of its powers and
functions under E.O. No. 192 and the Administrative Code of 1987 to protect and advance the
said right.
A denial or violation of that right by the other who has the corelative duty or obligation to respect
or protect the same gives rise to a cause of action. Petitioners maintain that the granting of the
TLAs, which they claim was done with grave abuse of discretion, violated their right to a
balanced and healthful ecology; hence, the full protection thereof requires that no further TLAs
should be renewed or granted.
A cause of action is defined as:
. . . an act or omission of one party in violation of the legal right or rights of the
other; and its essential elements are legal right of the plaintiff, correlative
obligation of the defendant, and act or omission of the defendant in violation of
said legal right. 18
It is settled in this jurisdiction that in a motion to dismiss based on the ground that the complaint
fails to state a cause of action, 19 the question submitted to the court for resolution involves the
sufficiency of the facts alleged in the complaint itself. No other matter should be considered;
furthermore, the truth of falsity of the said allegations is beside the point for the truth thereof is
deemed hypothetically admitted. The only issue to be resolved in such a case is: admitting such
alleged facts to be true, may the court render a valid judgment in accordance with the prayer in
the complaint? 20 InMilitante vs. Edrosolano, 21 this Court laid down the rule that the judiciary
should "exercise the utmost care and circumspection in passing upon a motion to dismiss on the
ground of the absence thereof [cause of action] lest, by its failure to manifest a correct
appreciation of the facts alleged and deemed hypothetically admitted, what the law grants or
recognizes is effectively nullified. If that happens, there is a blot on the legal order. The law itself
stands in disrepute."
After careful examination of the petitioners' complaint, We find the statements under the
introductory affirmative allegations, as well as the specific averments under the sub-heading
CAUSE OF ACTION, to be adequate enough to show, prima facie, the claimed violation of their
rights. On the basis thereof, they may thus be granted, wholly or partly, the reliefs prayed for. It
bears stressing, however, that insofar as the cancellation of the TLAs is concerned, there is the
need to implead, as party defendants, the grantees thereof for they are indispensable parties.
The foregoing considered, Civil Case No. 90-777 be said to raise a political question. Policy
formulation or determination by the executive or legislative branches of Government is not
squarely put in issue. What is principally involved is the enforcement of a right vis-a-vis policies
already formulated and expressed in legislation. It must, nonetheless, be emphasized that the
political question doctrine is no longer, the insurmountable obstacle to the exercise of judicial
power or the impenetrable shield that protects executive and legislative actions from judicial
inquiry or review. The second paragraph of section 1, Article VIII of the Constitution states that:
Government.
Commenting on this provision in his book, Philippine Political Law, 22 Mr. Justice Isagani A.
Cruz, a distinguished member of this Court, says:
The first part of the authority represents the traditional concept of judicial power,
involving the settlement of conflicting rights as conferred as law. The second part
of the authority represents a broadening of judicial power to enable the courts of
justice to review what was before forbidden territory, to wit, the discretion of the
political departments of the government.
As worded, the new provision vests in the judiciary, and particularly the Supreme
Court, the power to rule upon even the wisdom of the decisions of the executive
and the legislature and to declare their acts invalid for lack or excess of
jurisdiction because tainted with grave abuse of discretion. The catch, of course, is
the meaning of "grave abuse of discretion," which is a very elastic phrase that can
expand or contract according to the disposition of the judiciary.
In Daza vs. Singson, 23 Mr. Justice Cruz, now speaking for this Court, noted:
In the case now before us, the jurisdictional objection becomes even less tenable
and decisive. The reason is that, even if we were to assume that the issue
presented before us was political in nature, we would still not be precluded from
revolving it under the expanded jurisdiction conferred upon us that now covers, in
proper cases, even the political question. Article VII, Section 1, of the
Constitution clearly provides: . . .
The last ground invoked by the trial court in dismissing the complaint is the non-impairment of
contracts clause found in the Constitution. The court a quo declared that:
The Court is likewise of the impression that it cannot, no matter how we stretch
our jurisdiction, grant the reliefs prayed for by the plaintiffs, i.e., to cancel all
existing timber license agreements in the country and to cease and desist from
receiving, accepting, processing, renewing or approving new timber license
agreements. For to do otherwise would amount to "impairment of contracts"
abhored (sic) by the fundamental law. 24
We are not persuaded at all; on the contrary, We are amazed, if not shocked, by such a sweeping
pronouncement. In the first place, the respondent Secretary did not, for obvious reasons, even
invoke in his motion to dismiss the non-impairment clause. If he had done so, he would have
acted with utmost infidelity to the Government by providing undue and unwarranted benefits and
advantages to the timber license holders because he would have forever bound the Government
to strictly respect the said licenses according to their terms and conditions regardless of changes
in policy and the demands of public interest and welfare. He was aware that as correctly pointed
out by the petitioners, into every timber license must be read Section 20 of the Forestry Reform
Code (P.D. No. 705) which provides:
. . . Provided, That when the national interest so requires, the President may
amend, modify, replace or rescind any contract, concession, permit, licenses or
any other form of privilege granted herein . . .
Needless to say, all licenses may thus be revoked or rescinded by executive action. It is
not a contract, property or a property right protested by the due process clause of the
Constitution. In Tan vs. Director of Forestry, 25 this Court held:
. . . A timber license is an instrument by which the State regulates the utilization

and disposition of forest resources to the end that public welfare is promoted. A
timber license is not a contract within the purview of the due process clause; it is
only a license or privilege, which can be validly withdrawn whenever dictated by
public interest or public welfare as in this case.
A license is merely a permit or privilege to do what otherwise would be unlawful,
and is not a contract between the authority, federal, state, or municipal, granting it
and the person to whom it is granted; neither is it property or a property right, nor
does it create a vested right; nor is it taxation (37 C.J. 168). Thus, this Court held
that the granting of license does not create irrevocable rights, neither is it property
or property rights (People vs. Ong Tin, 54 O.G. 7576).
We reiterated this pronouncement in Felipe Ysmael, Jr. & Co., Inc. vs. Deputy Executive
Secretary: 26
. . . Timber licenses, permits and license agreements are the principal instruments
by which the State regulates the utilization and disposition of forest resources to
the end that public welfare is promoted. And it can hardly be gainsaid that they
merely evidence a privilege granted by the State to qualified entities, and do not
vest in the latter a permanent or irrevocable right to the particular concession area
and the forest products therein. They may be validly amended, modified, replaced
or rescinded by the Chief Executive when national interests so require. Thus, they
are not deemed contracts within the purview of the due process of law clause
[See Sections 3(ee) and 20 of Pres. Decree No. 705, as amended. Also, Tan v.
Director of Forestry, G.R. No. L-24548, October 27, 1983, 125 SCRA 302].
Since timber licenses are not contracts, the non-impairment clause, which reads:
Sec. 10. No law impairing, the obligation of contracts shall be passed. 27
cannot be invoked.
In the second place, even if it is to be assumed that the same are contracts, the instant case does
not involve a law or even an executive issuance declaring the cancellation or modification of
existing timber licenses. Hence, the non-impairment clause cannot as yet be invoked.
Nevertheless, granting further that a law has actually been passed mandating cancellations or
modifications, the same cannot still be stigmatized as a violation of the non-impairment clause.
This is because by its very nature and purpose, such as law could have only been passed in the
exercise of the police power of the state for the purpose of advancing the right of the people to a
balanced and healthful ecology, promoting their health and enhancing the general welfare.
In Abe
vs.
Foster
Wheeler
28
Corp. this Court stated:
The freedom of contract, under our system of government, is not meant to be
absolute. The same is understood to be subject to reasonable legislative regulation
aimed at the promotion of public health, moral, safety and welfare. In other
words, the constitutional guaranty of non-impairment of obligations of contract is
limited by the exercise of the police power of the State, in the interest of public
health, safety, moral and general welfare.
The reason for this is emphatically set forth in Nebia vs. New York, 29 quoted in Philippine
American Life Insurance Co. vs. Auditor General, 30 to wit:
Under our form of government the use of property and the making of contracts are
normally matters of private and not of public concern. The general rule is that
both shall be free of governmental interference. But neither property rights nor
contract rights are absolute; for government cannot exist if the citizen may at will
use his property to the detriment of his fellows, or exercise his freedom of
contract to work them harm. Equally fundamental with the private right is that of
the public to regulate it in the common interest.
In short, the non-impairment clause must yield to the police power of the state. 31
Finally, it is difficult to imagine, as the trial court did, how the non-impairment clause could
apply with respect to the prayer to enjoin the respondent Secretary from receiving, accepting,
processing, renewing or approving new timber licenses for, save in cases of renewal, no contract
would have as of yet existed in the other instances. Moreover, with respect to renewal, the holder
is not entitled to it as a matter of right.
WHEREFORE, being impressed with merit, the instant Petition is hereby GRANTED, and the
challenged Order of respondent Judge of 18 July 1991 dismissing Civil Case No. 90-777 is
hereby set aside. The petitioners may therefore amend their complaint to implead as defendants
the holders or grantees of the questioned timber license agreements.
No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.
Cruz, Padilla, Bidin, Grio-Aquino, Regalado, Romero, Nocon, Bellosillo, Melo and Quiason,
JJ., concur.
Narvasa, C.J., Puno and Vitug, JJ., took no part.
Separate Opinions
FELICIANO, J., concurring

I join in the result reached by my distinguished brother in the Court, Davide, Jr., J., in this case
which, to my mind, is one of the most important cases decided by this Court in the last few years.
The seminal principles laid down in this decision are likely to influence profoundly the direction
and course of the protection and management of the environment, which of course embraces the
utilization of all the natural resources in the territorial base of our polity. I have therefore sought
to clarify, basically to myself, what the Court appears to be saying.
The Court explicitly states that petitioners have the locus standi necessary to sustain the bringing
and, maintenance of this suit (Decision, pp. 11-12). Locus standi is not a function of petitioners'
claim that their suit is properly regarded as a class suit. I understand locus standi to refer to the
legal interest which a plaintiff must have in the subject matter of the suit. Because of the very
broadness of the concept of "class" here involved membership in this "class" appears to
embrace everyone living
in
the
country
whether
now
or
in
the
future it appears to me that everyone who may be expected to benefit from the course of
action petitioners seek to require public respondents to take, is vested with the necessary locus
standi. The Court may be seen therefore to be recognizing a beneficiaries' right of action in the
field of environmental protection, as against both the public administrative agency directly
concerned and the private persons or entities operating in the field or sector of activity involved.
Whether such beneficiaries' right of action may be found under any and all circumstances, or
whether some failure to act, in the first instance, on the part of the governmental agency
concerned must be shown ("prior exhaustion of administrative remedies"), is not discussed in the
decision and presumably is left for future determination in an appropriate case.
The Court has also declared that the complaint has alleged and focused upon "one specific
fundamental legal right the right to a balanced and healthful ecology" (Decision, p. 14). There
is no question that "the right to a balanced and healthful ecology" is "fundamental" and that,
accordingly, it has been "constitutionalized." But although it is fundamental in character, I
suggest, with very great respect, that it cannot be characterized as "specific," without doing
excessive violence to language. It is in fact very difficult to fashion language more
comprehensive in scope and generalized in character than a right to "a balanced and healthful
ecology." The list of particular claims which can be subsumed under this rubic appears to be
entirely open-ended: prevention and control of emission of toxic fumes and smoke from factories
and motor vehicles; of discharge of oil, chemical effluents, garbage and raw sewage into rivers,
inland and coastal waters by vessels, oil rigs, factories, mines and whole communities; of
dumping of organic and inorganic wastes on open land, streets and thoroughfares; failure to
rehabilitate land after strip-mining or open-pit mining; kaingin or slash-and-burn farming;
destruction of fisheries, coral reefs and other living sea resources through the use of dynamite or
cyanide and other chemicals; contamination of ground water resources; loss of certain species of
fauna and flora; and so on. The other statements pointed out by the Court: Section 3, Executive
Order No. 192 dated 10 June 1987; Section 1, Title XIV, Book IV of the 1987 Administrative
Code; and P.D. No. 1151, dated 6 June 1977 all appear to be formulations of policy, as general
and abstract as the constitutional statements of basic policy in Article II, Section 16 ("the right
to a balanced and healthful ecology") and 15 ("the right to health").
P.D. No. 1152, also dated 6 June 1977, entitled "The Philippine Environment Code," is, upon the
other hand, a compendious collection of more "specific environment management policies" and
"environment quality standards" (fourth "Whereas" clause, Preamble) relating to an extremely
wide range of topics:
(a) air quality management;
(b) water quality management;
(c) land use management;
(d) natural resources management and conservation embracing:
(i) fisheries and aquatic resources;

(ii) wild life;
(iii) forestry and soil conservation;
(iv) flood control and natural calamities;
(v) energy development;
(vi) conservation and utilization of surface and ground water
(vii) mineral resources
Two (2) points are worth making in this connection. Firstly, neither petitioners nor the Court has
identified the particular provision or provisions (if any) of the Philippine Environment Code
which give rise to a specific legal right which petitioners are seeking to enforce. Secondly, the
Philippine Environment Code identifies with notable care the particular government agency
charged with the formulation and implementation of guidelines and programs dealing with each
of the headings and sub-headings mentioned above. The Philippine Environment Code does not,
in other words, appear to contemplate action on the part of private persons who are beneficiaries
of implementation of that Code.
As a matter of logic, by finding petitioners' cause of action as anchored on a legal right
comprised in the constitutional statements above noted, the Court is in effect saying that Section
15 (and Section 16) of Article II of the Constitution are self-executing and judicially enforceable
even in their present form. The implications of this doctrine will have to be explored in future
cases; those implications are too large and far-reaching in nature even to be hinted at here.
My suggestion is simply that petitioners must, before the trial court, show a more specific legal
right a right cast in language of a significantly lower order of generality than Article II (15) of
the Constitution that is or may be violated by the actions, or failures to act, imputed to the
public respondent by petitioners so that the trial court can validly render judgment granting all or
part of the relief prayed for. To my mind, the Court should be understood as simply saying that
such a more specific legal right or rights may well exist in our corpus of law, considering the
general policy principles found in the Constitution and the existence of the Philippine
Environment Code, and that the trial court should have given petitioners an effective opportunity
so to demonstrate, instead of aborting the proceedings on a motion to dismiss.
It seems to me important that the legal right which is an essential component of a cause of action
be a specific, operable legal right, rather than a constitutional or statutory policy, for at least two
(2) reasons. One is that unless the legal right claimed to have been violated or disregarded is
given specification in operational terms, defendants may well be unable to defend themselves
intelligently and effectively; in other words, there are due process dimensions to this matter.
The second is a broader-gauge consideration where a specific violation of law or applicable
regulation is not alleged or proved, petitioners can be expected to fall back on the expanded
conception of judicial power in the second paragraph of Section 1 of Article VIII of the
Constitution which reads:
Section 1. . . .
to determine whether or not there has been agrave abuse of discretion amounting
to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of
the Government. (Emphasis supplied)
When substantive standards as general as "the right to a balanced and healthy ecology"
and "the right to health" are combined with remedial standards as broad ranging as "a
grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction," the result will be, it
is respectfully submitted, to propel courts into the uncharted ocean of social and
economic policy making. At least in respect of the vast area of environmental protection
and management, our courts have no claim to special technical competence and
experience and professional qualification. Where no specific, operable norms and
standards are shown to exist, then the policy making departments the legislative and
executive departments must be given a real and effective opportunity to fashion and
promulgate those norms and standards, and to implement them before the courts should
intervene.
My learned brother Davide, Jr., J., rightly insists that the timber companies, whose concession
agreements or TLA's petitioners demand public respondents should cancel, must be impleaded in
the proceedings below. It might be asked that, if petitioners' entitlement to the relief demanded
is not dependent upon proof of breach by the timber companies of one or more of the specific
terms and conditions of their concession agreements (and this, petitioners implicitly assume),
what will those companies litigate about? The answer I suggest is that they may seek to dispute
the existence of the specific legal right petitioners should allege, as well as the reality of the
claimed factual nexus between petitioners' specific legal rights and the claimed wrongful acts or
failures to act of public respondent administrative agency. They may also controvert the
appropriateness of the remedy or remedies demanded by petitioners, under all the circumstances
which exist.
I vote to grant the Petition for Certiorari because the protection of the environment, including
the forest cover of our territory, is of extreme importance for the country. The doctrines set out in
the Court's decision issued today should, however, be subjected to closer examination.
# Separate Opinions
FELICIANO, J., concurring
I join in the result reached by my distinguished brother in the Court, Davide, Jr., J., in this case
which, to my mind, is one of the most important cases decided by this Court in the last few years.
The seminal principles laid down in this decision are likely to influence profoundly the direction
and course of the protection and management of the environment, which of course embraces the
utilization of all the natural resources in the territorial base of our polity. I have therefore sought
to clarify, basically to myself, what the Court appears to be saying.
The Court explicitly states that petitioners have the locus standi necessary to sustain the bringing
and, maintenance of this suit (Decision, pp. 11-12). Locus standi is not a function of petitioners'
claim that their suit is properly regarded as a class suit. I understand locus standi to refer to the
legal interest which a plaintiff must have in the subject matter of the suit. Because of the very
broadness of the concept of "class" here involved membership in this "class" appears to
embrace everyone living
in
the
country
whether
now
or
in
the
future it appears to me that everyone who may be expected to benefit from the course of
action petitioners seek to require public respondents to take, is vested with the necessary locus
standi. The Court may be seen therefore to be recognizing a beneficiaries' right of action in the
field of environmental protection, as against both the public administrative agency directly
concerned and the private persons or entities operating in the field or sector of activity involved.
Whether such beneficiaries' right of action may be found under any and all circumstances, or
whether some failure to act, in the first instance, on the part of the governmental agency
concerned must be shown ("prior exhaustion of administrative remedies"), is not discussed in the
decision and presumably is left for future determination in an appropriate case.
The Court has also declared that the complaint has alleged and focused upon "one specific
fundamental legal right the right to a balanced and healthful ecology" (Decision, p. 14). There
is no question that "the right to a balanced and healthful ecology" is "fundamental" and that,
accordingly, it has been "constitutionalized." But although it is fundamental in character, I
suggest, with very great respect, that it cannot be characterized as "specific," without doing
excessive violence to language. It is in fact very difficult to fashion language more
comprehensive in scope and generalized in character than a right to "a balanced and healthful
ecology." The list of particular claims which can be subsumed under this rubic appears to be
entirely open-ended: prevention and control of emission of toxic fumes and smoke from factories
and motor vehicles; of discharge of oil, chemical effluents, garbage and raw sewage into rivers,
inland and coastal waters by vessels, oil rigs, factories, mines and whole communities; of
dumping of organic and inorganic wastes on open land, streets and thoroughfares; failure to
rehabilitate land after strip-mining or open-pit mining; kaingin or slash-and-burn farming;
destruction of fisheries, coral reefs and other living sea resources through the use of dynamite or
cyanide and other chemicals; contamination of ground water resources; loss of certain species of
fauna and flora; and so on. The other statements pointed out by the Court: Section 3, Executive
Order No. 192 dated 10 June 1987; Section 1, Title XIV, Book IV of the 1987 Administrative
Code; and P.D. No. 1151, dated 6 June 1977 all appear to be formulations of policy, as general
and abstract as the constitutional statements of basic policy in Article II, Section 16 ("the right
to a balanced and healthful ecology") and 15 ("the right to health").
P.D. No. 1152, also dated 6 June 1977, entitled "The Philippine Environment Code," is, upon the
other hand, a compendious collection of more "specific environment management policies" and
"environment quality standards" (fourth "Whereas" clause, Preamble) relating to an extremely
wide range of topics:
(a) air quality management;
(b) water quality management;
(c) land use management;
(d) natural resources management and conservation embracing:
(i) fisheries and aquatic resources;
(ii) wild life;
(iii) forestry and soil conservation;

(iv) flood control and natural calamities;
(v) energy development;
(vi) conservation and utilization of surface and ground water
(vii) mineral resources
Two (2) points are worth making in this connection. Firstly, neither petitioners nor the Court has
identified the particular provision or provisions (if any) of the Philippine Environment Code
which give rise to a specific legal right which petitioners are seeking to enforce. Secondly, the
Philippine Environment Code identifies with notable care the particular government agency
charged with the formulation and implementation of guidelines and programs dealing with each
of the headings and sub-headings mentioned above. The Philippine Environment Code does not,
in other words, appear to contemplate action on the part of private persons who are beneficiaries
of implementation of that Code.
As a matter of logic, by finding petitioners' cause of action as anchored on a legal right
comprised in the constitutional statements above noted, the Court is in effect saying that Section
15 (and Section 16) of Article II of the Constitution are self-executing and judicially enforceable
even in their present form. The implications of this doctrine will have to be explored in future
cases; those implications are too large and far-reaching in nature even to be hinted at here.
My suggestion is simply that petitioners must, before the trial court, show a more specific legal
right a right cast in language of a significantly lower order of generality than Article II (15) of
the Constitution that is or may be violated by the actions, or failures to act, imputed to the
public respondent by petitioners so that the trial court can validly render judgment granting all or
part of the relief prayed for. To my mind, the Court should be understood as simply saying that
such a more specific legal right or rights may well exist in our corpus of law, considering the
general policy principles found in the Constitution and the existence of the Philippine
Environment Code, and that the trial court should have given petitioners an effective opportunity
so to demonstrate, instead of aborting the proceedings on a motion to dismiss.
It seems to me important that the legal right which is an essential component of a cause of action
be a specific, operable legal right, rather than a constitutional or statutory policy, for at least two
(2) reasons. One is that unless the legal right claimed to have been violated or disregarded is
given specification in operational terms, defendants may well be unable to defend themselves
intelligently and effectively; in other words, there are due process dimensions to this matter.
The second is a broader-gauge consideration where a specific violation of law or applicable
regulation is not alleged or proved, petitioners can be expected to fall back on the expanded
conception of judicial power in the second paragraph of Section 1 of Article VIII of the
Section 1. . . .
to determine whether or not there has been agrave abuse of discretion amounting
to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of

the Government. (Emphasis supplied)
When substantive standards as general as "the right to a balanced and healthy ecology"
and "the right to health" are combined with remedial standards as broad ranging as "a
grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction," the result will be, it
is respectfully submitted, to propel courts into the uncharted ocean of social and
economic policy making. At least in respect of the vast area of environmental protection
and management, our courts have no claim to special technical competence and
experience and professional qualification. Where no specific, operable norms and
standards are shown to exist, then the policy making departments the legislative and
executive departments must be given a real and effective opportunity to fashion and
promulgate those norms and standards, and to implement them before the courts should
intervene.
My learned brother Davide, Jr., J., rightly insists that the timber companies, whose concession
agreements or TLA's petitioners demand public respondents should cancel, must be impleaded in
the proceedings below. It might be asked that, if petitioners' entitlement to the relief demanded
is not dependent upon proof of breach by the timber companies of one or more of the specific
terms and conditions of their concession agreements (and this, petitioners implicitly assume),
what will those companies litigate about? The answer I suggest is that they may seek to dispute
the existence of the specific legal right petitioners should allege, as well as the reality of the
claimed factual nexus between petitioners' specific legal rights and the claimed wrongful acts or
failures to act of public respondent administrative agency. They may also controvert the
appropriateness of the remedy or remedies demanded by petitioners, under all the circumstances
which exist.
I vote to grant the Petition for Certiorari because the protection of the environment, including
the forest cover of our territory, is of extreme importance for the country. The doctrines set out in
the Court's decision issued today should, however, be subjected to closer examination.
# Footnotes
1 Rollo, 164; 186.
2 Id., 62-65, exclusive of annexes.
3 Under Section 12, Rule 3, Revised Rules of Court.
4 Rollo, 67.
5 Id., 74.
6 Rollo, 70-73.
7 Annex "B" of Petitions; Id., 43-44.
8 Paragraph 7, Petition, 6; Rollo, 20.
9 Webster's Third New International Dictionary, unabridged, 1986, 1508.
10 Title XIV (Environment and Natural Resources), Book IV of the

Administrative Code of 1987, E.O. No. 292.
11 Annex "B" of Petition; Rollo, 43-44.
12 Record of the Constitutional Commission, vol. 4, 913.
13 For instance, the Preamble and Article XII on the National Economy and
Patrimony.
14 The Reorganization Act of the Department of Environment and Natural
Resources.
15 E.O. No. 292.
16 Section 1.
17 Section 2.
18 Ma-ao Sugar Central Co. vs. Barrios, 79 Phil. 666 [1947]; Community
Investment and Finance Corp. vs. Garcia, 88 Phil. 215 [1951]; Remitere vs. Vda.
de Yulo, 16 SCRA 251 [1966]; Caseas vs. Rosales, 19 SCRA 462 [1967]; Virata
vs. Sandiganbayan, 202 SCRA 680 [1991]; Madrona vs. Rosal, 204 SCRA 1
[1991].
19 Section 1(q), Rule 16, Revised Rules of Court.
20 Adamos vs. J.M. Tuason and Co., Inc. 25 SCRA 529 [1968]; Virata vs.
Sandiganbayn, supra; Madrona vs. Rosal, supra.
21 39 SCRA 473, 479 [1971].
22 1991 ed., 226-227.
23 180 SCRA 496, 501-502 [1989]. See also, Coseteng vs. Mitra, 187 SCRA 377
[1990]; Gonzales vs. Macaraig, 191 SCRA 452 [1990]; Llamas vs. Orbos, 202
SUPREME COURT
Manila
THIRD DIVISION
G.R. No. 110120 March 16, 1994

LAGUNA LAKE DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY, petitioner,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS, HON. MANUEL JN. SERAPIO, Presiding Judge RTC, Branch
127, Caloocan City, HON. MACARIO A. ASISTIO, JR., City Mayor of Caloocan and/or
THE CITY GOVERNMENT OF CALOOCAN,respondents.
Alberto N. Hidalgo and Ma. Teresa T. Oledan for petitioner.

The City Legal Officer & Chief, Law Department for Mayor Macario A. Asistio, Jr. and the City
Government of Caloocan.
ROMERO, J.:
The clash between the responsibility of the City Government of Caloocan to dispose off the 350
tons of garbage it collects daily and the growing concern and sensitivity to a pollution-free
environment of the residents of Barangay Camarin, Tala Estate, Caloocan City where these tons
of garbage are dumped everyday is the hub of this controversy elevated by the protagonists to the
Laguna Lake Development Authority (LLDA) for adjudication.
The instant case stemmed from an earlier petition filed with this Court by Laguna Lake
Development
Authority
(LLDA
for
short)
docketed
as
G.R.
No. 107542 against the City Government of Caloocan, et al. In the Resolution of November 10,
1992, this Court referred G.R. No. 107542 to the Court of Appeals for appropriate disposition.
Docketed
therein
as
CA-G.R.
SP
1
No. 29449, the Court of Appeals, in a decision promulgated on January 29, 1993 ruled that the
LLDA has no power and authority to issue a cease and desist order enjoining the dumping of
garbage in Barangay Camarin, Tala Estate, Caloocan City. The LLDA now seeks, in this petition,
a review of the decision of the Court of Appeals.
The facts, as disclosed in the records, are undisputed.
On March 8, 1991, the Task Force Camarin Dumpsite of Our Lady of Lourdes Parish, Barangay
Camarin, Caloocan City, filed a letter-complaint 2 with the Laguna Lake Development Authority
seeking to stop the operation of the 8.6-hectare open garbage dumpsite in Tala Estate, Barangay
Camarin, Caloocan City due to its harmful effects on the health of the residents and the
possibility of pollution of the water content of the surrounding area.
On November 15, 1991, the LLDA conducted an on-site investigation, monitoring and test
sampling of the leachate 3 that seeps from said dumpsite to the nearby creek which is a tributary
of the Marilao River. The LLDA Legal and Technical personnel found that the City Government
of Caloocan was maintaining an open dumpsite at the Camarin area without first securing an
Environmental Compliance Certificate (ECC) from the Environmental Management Bureau
(EMB) of the Department of Environment and Natural Resources, as required under Presidential
Decree No. 1586, 4 and clearance from LLDA as required under Republic Act No. 4850, 5 as
amended by Presidential Decree No. 813 and Executive Order No. 927, series of 1983. 6
After a public hearing conducted on December 4, 1991, the LLDA, acting on the complaint of
Task Force Camarin Dumpsite, found that the water collected from the leachate and the receiving
streams could considerably affect the quality, in turn, of the receiving waters since it indicates the
presence of bacteria, other than coliform, which may have contaminated the sample during
collection or handling. 7 On December 5, 1991, the LLDA issued a Cease and Desist
Order 8 ordering the City Government of Caloocan, Metropolitan Manila Authority, their
contractors, and other entities, to completely halt, stop and desist from dumping any form or kind
of garbage and other waste matter at the Camarin dumpsite.
The dumping operation was forthwith stopped by the City Government of Caloocan. However,
sometime in August 1992 the dumping operation was resumed after a meeting held in July 1992
among the City Government of Caloocan, the representatives of Task Force Camarin Dumpsite
and LLDA at the Office of Environmental Management Bureau Director Rodrigo U. Fuentes
failed to settle the problem.
After an investigation by its team of legal and technical personnel on August 14, 1992, the
LLDA issued another order reiterating the December 5, 1991, order and issued an Alias Cease
and Desist Order enjoining the City Government of Caloocan from continuing its dumping
operations at the Camarin area.
On September 25, 1992, the LLDA, with the assistance of the Philippine National Police,
enforced its Alias Cease and Desist Order by prohibiting the entry of all garbage dump trucks
into the Tala Estate, Camarin area being utilized as a dumpsite.
Pending resolution of its motion for reconsideration earlier filed on September 17, 1992 with the
LLDA, the City Government of Caloocan filed with the Regional Trial Court of Caloocan City
an action for the declaration of nullity of the cease and desist order with prayer for the issuance
of writ of injunction, docketed as Civil Case No. C-15598. In its complaint, the City Government
of Caloocan sought to be declared as the sole authority empowered to promote the health and
safety and enhance the right of the people in Caloocan City to a balanced ecology within its
territorial jurisdiction. 9
On September 25, 1992, the Executive Judge of the Regional Trial Court of Caloocan City issued
a temporary restraining order enjoining the LLDA from enforcing its cease and desist order.
Subsequently, the case was raffled to the Regional Trial Court, Branch 126 of Caloocan which, at
the time, was presided over by Judge Manuel Jn. Serapio of the Regional Trial Court, Branch
127, the pairing judge of the recently-retired presiding judge.
The LLDA, for its part, filed on October 2, 1992 a motion to dismiss on the ground, among
others, that under Republic Act No. 3931, as amended by Presidential Decree No. 984, otherwise
known as the Pollution Control Law, the cease and desist order issued by it which is the subject
matter of the complaint is reviewable both upon the law and the facts of the case by the Court of
Appeals and not by the Regional Trial Court. 10
On October 12, 1992 Judge Manuel Jn. Serapio issued an order consolidating Civil Case No. C15598 with Civil Case No. C-15580, an earlier case filed by the Task Force Camarin Dumpsite
entitled "Fr. John Moran, et al. vs. Hon. Macario Asistio." The LLDA, however, maintained
during the trial that the foregoing cases, being independent of each other, should have been
treated separately.
On October 16, 1992, Judge Manuel Jn. Serapio, after hearing the motion to dismiss, issued in
the consolidated cases an order 11 denying LLDA's motion to dismiss and granting the issuance of
a writ of preliminary injunction enjoining the LLDA, its agent and all persons acting for and on
its behalf, from enforcing or implementing its cease and desist order which prevents plaintiff
City of Caloocan from dumping garbage at the Camarin dumpsite during the pendency of this
case and/or until further orders of the court.
On November 5, 1992, the LLDA filed a petition for certiorari, prohibition and injunction with
prayer for restraining order with the Supreme Court, docketed as G.R. No. 107542, seeking to
nullify the aforesaid order dated October 16, 1992 issued by the Regional Trial Court, Branch
127 of Caloocan City denying its motion to dismiss.
The Court, acting on the petition, issued a Resolution 12 on November 10, 1992 referring the case
to the Court of Appeals for proper disposition and at the same time, without giving due course to
the petition, required the respondents to comment on the petition and file the same with the Court
of Appeals within ten (10) days from notice. In the meantime, the Court issued a temporary
restraining order, effective immediately and continuing until further orders from it, ordering the
respondents: (1) Judge Manuel Jn. Serapio, Presiding Judge, Regional Trial Court, Branch 127,
Caloocan City to cease and desist from exercising jurisdiction over the case for declaration of
nullity of the cease and desist order issued by the Laguna Lake Development Authority (LLDA);
and (2) City Mayor of Caloocan and/or the City Government of Caloocan to cease and desist
from dumping its garbage at the Tala Estate, Barangay Camarin, Caloocan City.
Respondents City Government of Caloocan and Mayor Macario A. Asistio, Jr. filed on
November 12, 1992 a motion for reconsideration and/or to quash/recall the temporary restraining
order and an urgent motion for reconsideration alleging that ". . . in view of the calamitous
situation that would arise if the respondent city government fails to collect 350 tons of garbage
daily for lack of dumpsite (i)t is therefore, imperative that the issue be resolved with dispatch or
with sufficient leeway to allow the respondents to find alternative solutions to this garbage
problem."
On November 17, 1992, the Court issued a Resolution 13 directing the Court of Appeals to
immediately set the case for hearing for the purpose of determining whether or not the temporary
restraining order issued by the Court should be lifted and what conditions, if any, may be
required if it is to be so lifted or whether the restraining order should be maintained or converted
into a preliminary injunction.
The Court of Appeals set the case for hearing on November 27, 1992, at 10:00 in the morning at
the Hearing Room, 3rd Floor, New Building, Court of Appeals. 14 After the oral argument, a
conference was set on December 8, 1992 at 10:00 o'clock in the morning where the Mayor of
Caloocan City, the General Manager of LLDA, the Secretary of DENR or his duly authorized
representative and the Secretary of DILG or his duly authorized representative were required to
appear.
It was agreed at the conference that the LLDA had until December 15, 1992 to finish its study
and review of respondent's technical plan with respect to the dumping of its garbage and in the
event of a rejection of respondent's technical plan or a failure of settlement, the parties will
submit within 10 days from notice their respective memoranda on the merits of the case, after
which the petition shall be deemed submitted for resolution. 15 Notwithstanding such efforts, the
parties failed to settle the dispute.
On April 30, 1993, the Court of Appeals promulgated its decision holding that: (1) the Regional
Trial Court has no jurisdiction on appeal to try, hear and decide the action for annulment of
LLDA's cease and desist order, including the issuance of a temporary restraining order and
preliminary injunction in relation thereto, since appeal therefrom is within the exclusive and
appellate jurisdiction of the Court of Appeals under Section 9, par. (3), of Batas Pambansa Blg.
129; and (2) the Laguna Lake Development Authority has no power and authority to issue a
cease and desist order under its enabling law, Republic Act No. 4850, as amended by P.D. No.
813
No. 927, series of 1983.
and
Executive
Order
The Court of Appeals thus dismissed Civil Case No. 15598 and the preliminary injunction issued
in the said case was set aside; the cease and desist order of LLDA was likewise set aside and the
temporary restraining order enjoining the City Mayor of Caloocan and/or the City Government
of Caloocan to cease and desist from dumping its garbage at the Tala Estate, Barangay Camarin,
Caloocan City was lifted, subject, however, to the condition that any future dumping of garbage
in said area, shall be in conformity with the procedure and protective works contained in the
proposal attached to the records of this case and found on pages 152-160 of the Rollo, which was
thereby adopted by reference and made an integral part of the decision, until the corresponding
restraining and/or injunctive relief is granted by the proper Court upon LLDA's institution of the
necessary legal proceedings.
Hence, the Laguna Lake Development Authority filed the instant petition for review
on certiorari, now docketed as G.R. No. 110120, with prayer that the temporary restraining order
lifted by the Court of Appeals be re-issued until after final determination by this Court of the
issue on the proper interpretation of the powers and authority of the LLDA under its enabling
law.
On July, 19, 1993, the Court issued a temporary restraining order 16 enjoining the City Mayor of
Caloocan and/or the City Government of Caloocan to cease and desist from dumping its garbage
at the Tala Estate, Barangay Camarin, Caloocan City, effective as of this date and containing
until otherwise ordered by the Court.
It is significant to note that while both parties in this case agree on the need to protect the
environment and to maintain the ecological balance of the surrounding areas of the Camarin
open dumpsite, the question as to which agency can lawfully exercise jurisdiction over the matter
remains highly open to question.
The City Government of Caloocan claims that it is within its power, as a local government unit,
pursuant to the general welfare provision of the Local Government Code, 17 to determine the
effects of the operation of the dumpsite on the ecological balance and to see that such balance is
maintained. On the basis of said contention, it questioned, from the inception of the dispute
before the Regional Trial Court of Caloocan City, the power and authority of the LLDA to issue a
cease and desist order enjoining the dumping of garbage in the Barangay Camarin over which
the City Government of Caloocan has territorial jurisdiction.
The Court of Appeals sustained the position of the City of Caloocan on the theory that Section 7
of Presidential Decree No. 984, otherwise known as the Pollution Control law, authorizing the
defunct National Pollution Control Commission to issue an ex-parte cease and desist order was
not incorporated in Presidential Decree No. 813 nor in Executive Order No. 927, series of
1983. The Court of Appeals ruled that under Section 4, par. (d), of Republic Act No. 4850, as
amended, the LLDA is instead required "to institute the necessary legal proceeding against any
person who shall commence to implement or continue implementation of any project, plan or
program within the Laguna de Bay region without previous clearance from the Authority."
The LLDA now assails, in this partition for review, the abovementioned ruling of the Court of
Appeals, contending that, as an administrative agency which was granted regulatory and
adjudicatory powers and functions by Republic Act No. 4850 and its amendatory laws,
Presidential Decree No. 813 and Executive Order No. 927, series of 1983, it is invested with the
power and authority to issue a cease and desist order pursuant to Section 4 par. (c), (d), (e), (f)
and (g) of Executive Order No. 927 series of 1983 which provides, thus:
Sec. 4. Additional Powers and Functions. The authority shall have the following
powers and functions:
xxx xxx xxx
(c) Issue orders or decisions to compel compliance with the provisions of this
Executive Order and its implementing rules and regulations only after proper
notice and hearing.
(d) Make, alter or modify orders requiring the discontinuance of pollution
specifying the conditions and the time within which such discontinuance must be
accomplished.
(e) Issue, renew, or deny permits, under such conditions as it may determine to be
reasonable, for the prevention and abatement of pollution, for the discharge of
sewage, industrial waste, or for the installation or operation of sewage works and
industrial disposal system or parts thereof.
(f) After due notice and hearing, the Authority may also revoke, suspend or
modify any permit issued under this Order whenever the same is necessary to
prevent or abate pollution.
(g) Deputize in writing or request assistance of appropriate government agencies
or instrumentalities for the purpose of enforcing this Executive Order and its
implementing rules and regulations and the orders and decisions of the Authority.
The LLDA claims that the appellate court deliberately suppressed and totally disregarded the
above provisions of Executive Order No. 927, series of 1983, which granted administrative
quasi-judicial functions to LLDA on pollution abatement cases.
In light of the relevant environmental protection laws cited which are applicable in this case, and
the corresponding overlapping jurisdiction of government agencies implementing these laws, the
resolution of the issue of whether or not the LLDA has the authority and power to issue an order
which, in its nature and effect was injunctive, necessarily requires a determination of the
threshold question: Does the Laguna Lake Development Authority, under its Charter and its
amendatory laws, have the authority to entertain the complaint against the dumping of garbage in
the open dumpsite in Barangay Camarin authorized by the City Government of Caloocan which
is allegedly endangering the health, safety, and welfare of the residents therein and the sanitation
and quality of the water in the area brought about by exposure to pollution caused by such open
garbage dumpsite?
The matter of determining whether there is such pollution of the environment that requires
control, if not prohibition, of the operation of a business establishment is essentially addressed to
the Environmental Management Bureau (EMB) of the DENR which, by virtue of Section 16 of
Executive Order No. 192, series of 1987, 18 has assumed the powers and functions of the defunct
National Pollution Control Commission created under Republic Act No. 3931. Under said
Executive Order, a Pollution Adjudication Board (PAB) under the Office of the DENR Secretary
now assumes the powers and functions of the National Pollution Control Commission with
respect to adjudication of pollution cases. 19
As a general rule, the adjudication of pollution cases generally pertains to the Pollution
Adjudication Board (PAB), except in cases where the special law provides for another forum. It
must be recognized in this regard that the LLDA, as a specialized administrative agency, is
specifically mandated under Republic Act No. 4850 and its amendatory laws to carry out and
make effective the declared national policy 20 of promoting and accelerating the development and
balanced growth of the Laguna Lake area and the surrounding provinces of Rizal and Laguna
and the cities of San Pablo, Manila, Pasay, Quezon and Caloocan 21 with due regard and
adequate provisions for environmental management and control, preservation of the quality of
human life and ecological systems, and the prevention of undue ecological disturbances,
deterioration and pollution. Under such a broad grant and power and authority, the LLDA, by
virtue of its special charter, obviously has the responsibility to protect the inhabitants of the
Laguna Lake region from the deleterious effects of pollutants emanating from the discharge of
wastes from the surrounding areas. In carrying out the aforementioned declared policy, the
LLDA is mandated, among others, to pass upon and approve or disapprove all plans, programs,
and projects proposed by local government offices/agencies within the region, public
corporations, and private persons or enterprises where such plans, programs and/or projects are
related to those of the LLDA for the development of the region. 22
In the instant case, when the complainant Task Force Camarin Dumpsite of Our Lady of Lourdes
Parish, Barangay Camarin, Caloocan City, filed its letter-complaint before the LLDA, the latter's
jurisdiction under its charter was validly invoked by complainant on the basis of its allegation
that the open dumpsite project of the City Government of Caloocan in Barangay Camarin was
undertaken without a clearance from the LLDA, as required under Section 4, par. (d), of
Republic Act. No. 4850, as amended by P.D. No. 813 and Executive Order No. 927. While there
is also an allegation that the said project was without an Environmental Compliance Certificate
from the Environmental Management Bureau (EMB) of the DENR, the primary jurisdiction of
the LLDA over this case was recognized by the Environmental Management Bureau of the
DENR when the latter acted as intermediary at the meeting among the representatives of the City
Government of Caloocan, Task Force Camarin Dumpsite and LLDA sometime in July 1992 to
discuss
the
possibility
of
re-opening the open dumpsite.
Having thus resolved the threshold question, the inquiry then narrows down to the following
issue: Does the LLDA have the power and authority to issue a "cease and desist" order under
Republic Act No. 4850 and its amendatory laws, on the basis of the facts presented in this case,
enjoining the dumping of garbage in Tala Estate, Barangay Camarin, Caloocan City.
The irresistible answer is in the affirmative.
The cease and desist order issued by the LLDA requiring the City Government of Caloocan to
stop dumping its garbage in the Camarin open dumpsite found by the LLDA to have been done
in violation of Republic Act No. 4850, as amended, and other relevant environment
laws, 23 cannot be stamped as an unauthorized exercise by the LLDA of injunctive powers. By its
express terms, Republic Act No. 4850, as amended by P.D. No. 813 and Executive Order No.
927, series of 1983, authorizes the LLDA to "make, alter or modify order requiring the
discontinuance or pollution." 24(Emphasis supplied) Section 4, par. (d) explicitly authorizes the
LLDA to make whatever order may be necessary in the exercise of its jurisdiction.
To be sure, the LLDA was not expressly conferred the power "to issue and ex-parte cease and
desist order" in a language, as suggested by the City Government of Caloocan, similar to the
express grant to the defunct National Pollution Control Commission under Section 7 of P.D. No.
984 which, admittedly was not reproduced in P.D. No. 813 and E.O. No. 927, series of 1983.
However, it would be a mistake to draw therefrom the conclusion that there is a denial of the
power to issue the order in question when the power "to make, alter or modify orders requiring
the discontinuance of pollution" is expressly and clearly bestowed upon the LLDA by Executive
Order No. 927, series of 1983.
Assuming arguendo that the authority to issue a "cease and desist order" were not expressly
conferred by law, there is jurisprudence enough to the effect that the rule granting such authority
need not necessarily be express.25 While it is a fundamental rule that an administrative agency
has only such powers as are expressly granted to it by law, it is likewise a settled rule that an
administrative agency has also such powers as are necessarily implied in the exercise of its
express powers. 26 In the exercise, therefore, of its express powers under its charter as a
regulatory and quasi-judicial body with respect to pollution cases in the Laguna Lake region, the
authority of the LLDA to issue a "cease and desist order" is, perforce, implied. Otherwise, it may
well be reduced to a "toothless" paper agency.
In this connection, it must be noted that in Pollution Adjudication Board v. Court of Appeals, et
al., 27 the Court ruled that the Pollution Adjudication Board (PAB) has the power to issue an exparte cease and desist order when there is prima facie evidence of an establishment exceeding
the allowable standards set by the anti-pollution laws of the country. Theponente, Associate
Justice Florentino P. Feliciano, declared:
Ex parte cease and desist orders are permitted by law and regulations in situations
like that here presented precisely because stopping the continuous discharge of
pollutive and untreated effluents into the rivers and other inland waters of the
Philippines cannot be made to wait until protracted litigation over the ultimate
correctness or propriety of such orders has run its full course, including multiple
and sequential appeals such as those which Solar has taken, which of course may
take several years. The relevant pollution control statute and implementing
regulations were enacted and promulgated in the exercise of that pervasive,
sovereign power to protect the safety, health, and general welfare and comfort of
the public, as well as the protection of plant and animal life, commonly
designated as the police power. It is a constitutional commonplace that the
ordinary requirements of procedural due process yield to the necessities of
protecting vital public interests like those here involved, through the exercise of
police power. . . .
The immediate response to the demands of "the necessities of protecting vital public interests"
gives vitality to the statement on ecology embodied in the Declaration of Principles and State
Policies or the 1987 Constitution. Article II, Section 16 which provides:
The State shall protect and advance the right of the people to a balanced and
healthful ecology in accord with the rhythm and harmony of nature.
As a constitutionally guaranteed right of every person, it carries the correlative duty of nonimpairment. This is but in consonance with the declared policy of the state "to protect and
promote the right to health of the people and instill health consciousness among them." 28 It is to
be borne in mind that the Philippines is party to the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and
the Alma Conference Declaration of 1978 which recognize health as a fundamental human
right. 29
The issuance, therefore, of the cease and desist order by the LLDA, as a practical matter of
procedure under the circumstances of the case, is a proper exercise of its power and authority
under its charter and its amendatory laws. Had the cease and desist order issued by the LLDA
been complied with by the City Government of Caloocan as it did in the first instance, no further
legal steps would have been necessary.
The charter of LLDA, Republic Act No. 4850, as amended, instead of conferring upon the LLDA
the means of directly enforcing such orders, has provided under its Section 4 (d) the power to
institute "necessary legal proceeding against any person who shall commence to implement or
continue implementation of any project, plan or program within the Laguna de Bay region
without previous clearance from the LLDA."
Clearly, said provision was designed to invest the LLDA with sufficiently broad powers in the
regulation of all projects initiated in the Laguna Lake region, whether by the government or the
private sector, insofar as the implementation of these projects is concerned. It was meant to deal
with cases which might possibly arise where decisions or orders issued pursuant to the exercise
of such broad powers may not be obeyed, resulting in the thwarting of its laudabe objective. To
meet such contingencies, then the writs of mandamus and injunction which are beyond the power
of the LLDA to issue, may be sought from the proper courts.
Insofar as the implementation of relevant anti-pollution laws in the Laguna Lake region and its
surrounding provinces, cities and towns are concerned, the Court will not dwell further on the
related issues raised which are more appropriately addressed to an administrative agency with
the special knowledge and expertise of the LLDA.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The temporary restraining order issued by the Court
on July 19, 1993 enjoining the City Mayor of Caloocan and/or the City Government of Caloocan
from dumping their garbage at the Tala Estate, Barangay Camarin, Caloocan City is hereby made
permanent.
SO ORDERED.
Feliciano, Bidin, Melo and Vitug, JJ., concur.
#Footnotes
1 Jorge S. Imperial, J., ponente, Vicente V. Mendoza and Quirino D. Abad Santos,
Jr., JJ., concurring.
2 Annex "C", Petition, G.R. No. 107542, Rollo, pp. 47-51.
3 Webster's Third International Dictionary (1986) defines "leachate" as the liquid
that has percolated through soil or other medium.
4 Establishing An Environmental Impact Statement System, Including Other

Environmental Management Related Measures And For Other Purposes
(June 11, 1978).
5 An Act Creating The Laguna Lake Development Authority, Prescribing Its
Powers, Functions and Duties, Providing Funds Therefor, And For Other
Purposes
(July 18, 1966).
6 Annex "D", Petition, G.R. No. 107542, Rollo, pp. 52-54.
7 Ibid.
8 Annex "G", Petition, G.R. No. 107542, Rollo, pp. 58-63.
9 Annex "M", Petition, G.R. No. 107542, Rollo, pp. 77-81.
10 Annex "O", Petition, G.R. No. 107542, Rollo, pp. 83-90.
11 Annex "A", Petition, G.R. No. 107542, Rollo, pp. 29-37.
12 G.R. No. 107542, Rollo, pp. 93-95.
13 G.R. No. 107542, Rollo, pp. 98-99.
14 Ibid, p. 97.
15 G.R. No. 107542, Rollo, pp. 129-130.
16 G.R. No. 110120, Rollo, p. 70.
17 Section 16, Republic Act No. 7160, otherwise known as "The Local
Government Code of 1991."
18 Providing For The Reorganization Of The Department Of Environment,
Energy And Natural Resources, Renaming It As The Department of Environment
and Natural Resources, And For Other Purposes (June 10, 1987).
SECOND DIVISION
[G.R. No. 111088. June 13, 1997]
C & M TIMBER CORPORATION (CMTC), petitioner, vs. HON. ANGEL C. ALCALA,

Secretary of the Department of Environment & Natural Resources, HON.
ANTONIO T. CARPIO, Chief Presidential Legal Counsel, and HON. RENATO C.
CORONA, Assistant Executive Secretary for Legal Affairs, respondents.
DECISION
MENDOZA, J.:
This is a petition for certiorari by which C & M Timber Corporation seeks the nullification
of the order dated February 26, 1993 and the resolution dated June 7, 1993 of the Office of the
President, declaring as of no force and effect Timber License Agreement (TLA) No. 106 issued
to petitioner on June 30, 1972. TLA No. 106, with the expiry date June 30, 1997, covers 67,680
hectares of forest land in the municipalities of Dipaculao and Dinalongan in the Province of
Aurora and the Municipality of Maddela in Quirino province.[1]
It appears that in a letter dated July 20, 1984[2] to President Marcos, Filipinas Loggers
Development Corporation (FLDC), through its president and general manager, requested a
timber concession over the same area covered by petitioners TLA No. 106, alleging that the same
had been cancelled pursuant to a presidential directive banning all forms of logging in the
area. The request was granted in a note dated August 14, 1984 by President Marcos who wrote,
as was his wont, on the margin of the letter of FLDC: Approved.[3]
Accordingly, on September 21, 1984, the Ministry of Natural Resources, as it was then
called, issued TLA No. 360, with the expiry date September 30, 1994, to FLDC, covering the
area subject of TLA No. 106. In 1985, FLDC began logging operations.
On June 26, 1986, then Minister of Natural Resources Ernesto M. Maceda suspended TLA
No. 360 for FLDCs gross violation of the terms and conditions thereof, especially the
reforestation and selective logging activities and in consonance with the national policy on forest
conservation.[4] On July 26, 1986, Minister Maceda issued another order cancelling the license of
FLDC on the ground that in spite of the suspension order dated June 26, 1986, said
concessionaire has continued logging operations in violation of forestry rules and regulations.[5]
Learning of the cancellation of FLDCs TLA, petitioner, through its officer-in-charge, wrote
Minister Maceda a letter dated October 10, 1986, requesting revalidation of its TLA No. 106.
[6]
As FLDC sought a reconsideration of the order cancelling its TLA, petitioner wrote another
letter dated February 13, 1987,[7] alleging that because of the log ban imposed by the previous
administration it had to stop its logging operations, but that when the ban was lifted on
September 21, 1984, its concession area was awarded to FLDC as a result of [FLDCs] covetous
maneuvers and unlawful machinations. (Petitioner was later to say that those behind FLDC,
among them being the former Presidents sister, Mrs. Fortuna Barba, were very influential
because of their very strong connections with the previous Marcos regime.) [8] Petitioner prayed
that it be allowed to resume logging operations.
In his order dated May 2, 1988,[9] Secretary Fulgencio Factoran, Jr., of the DENR, declared
petitioners TLA No. 106 as of no more force and effect and consequently denied the petition for
its restoration, even as he denied FLDCs motion for reconsideration of the cancellation of TLA
No. 360. Secretary Factoran, Jr. ruled that petitioners petition was barred by reason of laches,
because petitioner did not file its opposition to the issuance of a TLA to FLDC until February 13,
1987, after FLDC had been logging under its license for almost two years. On the other hand,
FLDCs motion for reconsideration was denied, since the findings on which the cancellation order
had been based, notably gross violation of the terms and conditions of its license, such as
reforestation and selective logging activities appear to be firmly grounded.
Both petitioner CMTC and FLDC appealed to the Office of the President. Petitioner denied
that it was guilty of laches. It alleged that it had sent a letter to the then Minister of Natural
Resources Rodolfo del Rosario dated September 24, 1984 protesting the grant of a TLA to FLDC
over the area covered by its (petitioners) TLA and, for this reason, requesting nullification of
FLDCs TLA.
In a decision dated March 21, 1991, [10] the Office of the President, through then Executive
Secretary Oscar Orbos, affirmed the DENRs order of May 2, 1988. Like the DENR it found
petitioner guilty of laches, the alleged filing by petitioner of a protest on September 24, 1984 not
having been duly proven. The decision of the Office of the President stated:[11]
As disclosed by the records, this Office, in a letter of June 1, 1989, had requested the DENR
to issue a certification as to the authenticity/veracity of CMTCs aforesaid Annex A to enable
it to resolve this case judiciously and expeditiously.Said letter-request pertinently reads:
x x x C & M Timber Corporation has attached to its Supplemental Petition For Review, dated
June 1, 1988, a xerox copy of (Annex A) of its letter to the Minister of Natural Resources
Rodolfo del Rosario, dated September 24, 1984, prepared by its counsel, Atty. Norberto J.
Quisumbing, protesting against the award of the contested area to Filipinas Loggers
Development Corporation and requesting that it be annulled and voided.
Considering that the aforementioned Annex A constitutes a vital defense to C & M Timber
Corporation and could be a pivotal factor in the resolution by this Office of the instant appeal,
may we request your good office for a certification as to the authenticity/veracity of said
document (Annex A) to enable us to resolve the case judiciously and expeditiously.
In reply thereto, the DENR, thru Assistant Secretary for Legal Affairs Romulo D. San Juan, in a
letter of July 7, 1989, informed this Office, thus:
xxx
Despite diligent efforts exerted to locate the alleged aforementioned Annex A, no such document
could be found or is on file in this Office.
This Office, therefore, regrets that it can not issue the desired certification as to the
authenticity/veracity of the document.
On September 10, 1990, this Office requested an updated comment of the DENR on (a) the
duplicate original copy of Annex A; (b) a xerox copy of Page 164, entry No. 2233, of the MNRs
logbook tending to show that the original copy of Annex A was received by the MNR; and (c) a
xerox copy of Page 201 of the logbook of the BFD indicating that the original copy of Annex
A was received by BFD from the MNR.
On October 26, 1990, DENR Assistant Secretary San Juan endorsed to this Office the updated
comment of Director of Forest Management Bureau (FMB) in a 2nd endorsement of October 25,
1990, which pertinently reads as follows:
Please be informed that this Office is not the addressee and repository of the letter dated
September 24, 1984 of Atty. Norberto Quisumbing. This Office was just directed by then
Minister Rodolfo del Rosario to act on the purported letter of Atty. Quisumbing and as directed,
we prepared a memorandum to the President which was duly complied with as shown by the
entries in the logbook. Annex A, which is the main document of the letter-appeal of C & M
Timber Corporation is presumed appended to the records when it was acted upon by the BFD
(now FMB) and forwarded to the Secretary (then Minister). Therefore this Office is not in a
position to certify as to the authenticity of Annex A.
Clearly therefore, CMTCs reliance on its Annex A is misplaced, the authenticity thereof not
having been duly proven or established. Significantly, we note that in all the pleadings filed by
CMTC in the office a quo, and during the hearing conducted, nothing is mentioned therein about
its letter of September 24, 1984 (Annex A). Jurisprudence teaches that issues neither averred in
the pleadings nor raised during the trial below cannot be raised for the first time on appeal (City
of Manila vs. Ebay, 1 SCRA 1086, 1089); that issues of fact not adequately brought to the
attention of the trial court need not be considered by a reviewing court, as they cannot be raised
for the first time on appeal (Santos v. Intermediate Appellate Court, 145 SCRA 592, 595); and
that parties, may not, on appeal, adopt a position inconsistent with what they sustained below
(People v. Archilla, 1 SCRA 698, 700-701)
The Office of the President also declined to set aside the DENRs order of July 31, 1986,
cancelling FLDCs TLA No. 360, after finding the same to be fully substantiated.
Petitioner and FLDC moved for reconsideration. In its order dated January 25, 1993, [12] the
Office of the President, through Chief Presidential Legal Counsel Antonio T. Carpio, denied
petitioners motion for reconsideration. It held that even assuming that CMTC did file regularly
its letter-protest of September 24, 1984 with MNR on September 25, 1984, CMTC failed to
protect its rights for more than two (2) years until it opposed reinstatement of FLDCs TLA on
February 13, 1987. Within that two (2) year period, FLDC logged the area without any
opposition from CMTC. In the same order, the Office of the President, however, directed the
reinstatement of FLDCs TLA No. 360, in view of the favorable report of the Bureau of Forest
Development dated March 23, 1987. Later, the Presidents office reconsidered its action after the
Secretary of Environment and Natural Resources Angel C. Alcala, on February 15, 1993,
expressed concern that reinstatement of FLDCs TLA No. 360 might negate efforts to enhance the
conservation and protection of our forest resources. In a new order dated February 26, 1993,
[13]
the Office of the President reinstated its March 21, 1991 decision.
Petitioner again moved for a reconsideration of the decision dated March 21, 1991 and for
its license to be revived/restored. Petitioners motion was, however, denied by the Office of the
President on June 7, 1993[14] in a resolution signed by Assistant Executive Secretary for Legal
Affairs Renato C. Corona. The Presidents office ruled:
The above Order of February 26, 1993 was predicated, as stated therein, on a new policy
consideration on forest conservation and protection, unmistakably implied from the
Presidents handwritten instruction. Accordingly, this Order shall be taken not only as an
affirmation of the March 21, 1991 decision, but also as a FINAL disposition of the case
and ALL matters incident thereto, like CMTCs motion for reconsideration, dated April 16,
1991.
Hence, this petition. Petitioner contends that laches cannot be imputed to it because it did
not incur delay in asserting its rights and even if there was delay, the delay did not work to the
prejudice of other parties, particularly FLDC, because the cancellation of the FLDCs TLA was
attributable only to its own actions. Petitioner also denies that its license had been suspended by
reason of mediocre performance in reforestation by order of then Minister of Natural Resources
Teodoro O. Pea. It says that it did not receive any order to this effect. Finally, petitioner claims
that the denial of its petition, because of a new policy consideration on forest conservation and
protection, unmistakably implied from the Presidents handwritten instruction, as stated in the
resolution of June 7, 1993 of the Office of the President, would deny it the due process of
law. Petitioner points out that there is no total log ban in the country; that Congress has yet to
make a pronouncement on the issue; that any notice to this effect must be stated in good form,
not implied; and that in any case, any new policy consideration should be prospective in
application and cannot affect petitioners vested rights in its TLA No. 106.
We find the petition to be without merit.
First. As already stated, the DENR order of May 2, 1988, declaring petitioners TLA No. 106
as no longer of any force and effect, was based on its finding that although TLA No. 106s date of
expiry was June 30, 1997 it had been suspended on June 3, 1983 because of CMTCs mediocre
performance in reforestation and petitioners laches in failing to protest the subsequent award of
the same area to FLDC. There is considerable dispute whether there was really an order dated
June 3, 1983 suspending petitioners TLA because of mediocre performance in reforestation, just
as there is a dispute whether there indeed was a letter written on September 24, 1984 on behalf of
petitioner protesting the award of the concession covered by its TLA No. 106 to FLDC, so as to
show that petitioner did not sleep on its rights.
The alleged order of June 3, 1983 cannot be produced. The Office of the Solicitor General
was given until May 14, 1997 to secure a copy of the order but on May 7, 1997 the OSG
manifested that the order in question could not be found in the records of this case in which the
order might be.[15] Earlier, petitioner requested a copy of the order but the DENR, through
Regional Executive Director Antonio G. Principe, said that based from our records there is no
file copy of said alleged order.[16]
On the other hand, the alleged letter of September 24, 1984 written by Atty. Norberto J.
Quisumbing, protesting the award of the concession in question to FLDC cannot be found in the
records of the DENR either. The Assistant Secretary for Legal Affairs of the DENR certified that
Despite diligent efforts exerted to locate the alleged [letter], no such document could be found or
is on file in this Office.[17] In a later certification, however, Ofelia Castro Biron of the DENR,
claimed that she was a receiving clerk at the Records and Documents Section of the Ministry of
Natural Resources and that on September 25, 1984 she received the letter of Atty. Quisumbing
and placed on all copies thereof the stamp of the MNR. She stated that the copy in the possession
of petitioner was a faithful copy of the letter in question.[18]
The difficulty of ascertaining the existence of the two documents is indeed a reflection on
the sorry state of record keeping in an important office of the executive department. Yet these
two documents are vital to the presentation of the evidence of both parties in this
case. Fortunately, there are extant certain records from which it is possible to determine whether
these documents even existed.
With respect to the alleged order of June 3, 1983 suspending petitioners TLA No. 106 for
mediocre performance in reforestation, the Court will presume that there is such an order in
accordance with the presumption of regularity in the performance of official functions inasmuch
as such order is cited both in the order dated May 2, 1988 of the DENR, declaring as of no force
and effect TLA No. 106, and in the decision dated March 21, 1991 of the Office of the President
affirming the order of the DENR. It is improbable that so responsible officials as the Secretary of
the DENR and the Executive Secretary would cite an order that did not exist.
On the other hand, with respect to the letter dated September 24, 1984, there are
circumstances indicating that it existed. In addition to the aforesaid certification of Ofelia Castro
Biron that she was the person who received the letter for the DENR, the logbook of the Ministry
of Natural Resources contains entries indicating that the letter was received by the Bureau of
Forest Development from the MNR.[19] DENR Assistant Secretary Romulo San Juan likewise
informed the Office of the President that the Bureau of Forest Management prepared a
memorandum on the aforesaid letter of September 24, 1984,[20] thereby implying that there was
such a letter.
On the premise that there was an order dated June 3, 1983, we find that after suspending
petitioners TLA for mediocre performance in reforestation under this order, the DENR cancelled
the TLA, this time because of a Presidential directive imposing a log ban. The records of G.R.
No. 76538, entitled Felipe Ysmael, Jr. & Co. v. Deputy Executive Secretary, the decision in
which is reported in 190 SCRA 673 (1990), contain a copy of the memorandum of then Director
Edmundo V. Cortes of the Bureau of Forest Development to the Regional Director of Region 2,
in Tuguegarao, Cagayan, informing the latter that pursuant to the instruction of the President and
the memorandum dated August 18, 1983 of then Minister Teodoro Q. Pea, the log ban previously
declared included the concessions of the companies enumerated in Cortes memorandum, in
consequence of which the concessions in question were deemed cancelled. The memorandum of
Director Cortes stated:
MEMORANDUM ORDER
TO : The Regional Director
Region 2, Tuguegarao, Cagayan
FROM : The Director
DATE : 24 August 1983
SUBJECT : Stopping of all logging operations
in Nueva Vizcaya and Quirino
REMARKS :
Following Presidential Instructions and Memorandum Order of Minister Teodoro Q. Pea dated
18 August 1983, and in connection with my previous radio message, please be informed that the
coverage of the logging ban in Quirino and Nueva Vizcaya provinces include the following
concessions which are deemed cancelled as of the date of the previous notice:
- Felipe Ysmael Co., Inc.
- Industries Dev. Corp.
- Luzon Loggers, Inc.
- C & M Timber Corporation
- Buzon Industrial Dev. Corporation
- Dominion Forest Resources Corp.
- FCA Timber Development Corp.
- Kasibu Logging Corp.
- RCC Timber Company
- Benjamin Cuaresma
You are hereby reminded to insure full compliance with this order to stop logging operations by
all licensees above mentioned and submit a report on the pullout of equipment and inventory of
logs within five days upon receipt hereof.
ACTION
DESIRED : For your immediate implementation.
EDMUNDO V. CORTES
(Emphasis added)
It thus appears that petitioners license had been cancelled way back in 1983, a year before its
concession was awarded to FLDC. It is noteworthy that petitioner admits that at the time of the
award to FLDC in 1984 petitioner was no longer operating its concession because of a log ban
although it claims that the suspension of operations was only temporary. As a result of the log
ban, the TLA of petitioner, along with those of other loggers in the region, were cancelled and
petitioner and others were ordered to stop operations. Petitioner also admits that it received a
telegram sent on August 24, 1983 by Director Cortes of the BFD, directing it to stop all logging
operations to conserve our remaining forests.[21] It is then not true, as Atty. Quisumbing stated in
protesting the award of the concession to FLDC, that the logging ban did not cancel [petitioners]
timber license agreement.
Now petitioner did not protest the cancellation of its TLA. Consequently, even if
consideration is given to the fact that a year later, on September 24, 1984, its counsel protested
the grant of the concession to another party (FLDC), this failure of petitioner to contest first the
suspension of its license on June 3, 1983 and later its cancellation on August 24, 1983 must be
deemed fatal to its present action.
Second. Except for the letter of its counsel to the Minister of Natural Resources, which it
reiterated in its letter to the President of the Philippines, petitioner took no legal steps to protect
its interest. After receiving no favorable response to its two letters, petitioner could have brought
the necessary action in court for the restoration of its license. It did not. Instead it waited until
FLDCs concession was cancelled in 1986 by asking for the revalidation of its (petitioners) on
TLA No. 106.
Petitioners excuse before the DENR is that it did not pursue its protest because its president,
Ricardo C. Silverio, had been told by President Marcos that the area in question had been
awarded to the Presidents sister, Mrs. Fortuna Barba, and petitioner was afraid to go against the
wishes of the former President.[22] This is a poor excuse for petitioners inaction. In Felipe
Ysmael, Jr. & Co., Inc. v. Deputy Executive Secretary,[23] a similar excuse was given that Ysmael
& Cos license had been cancelled and its concession awarded to entities controlled or owned by
relatives or cronies of then President Marcos. For this reason, after the EDSA Revolution,
Ysmael & Co. sought in 1986 the reinstatement of its timber license agreement and the
revocation of those issued to the alleged presidential cronies. As its request was denied by the
Office of the President, Ysmael & Co. filed a petition for certiorari with this Court. On the basis
of the facts stated, this Court denied the petition: (1) because the August 25, 1983 order of the
Bureau of Forest Development, cancelling petitioners timber license agreement had become final
and executory. Although petitioner sent a letter dated September 19, 1983 to President Marcos
seeking reconsideration of the 1983 order of cancellation of the BFD, the grounds stated there
were different from those later relied upon by petitioner for seeking its reinstatement; (2) because
the fact that petitioner failed to seasonably take judicial recourse to have the earlier
administrative actions [cancelling its license and granting another one covering the same
concession to respondent] reviewed by the court through a petition for certiorari is prejudicial to
its cause. Such special civil action of certiorari should have been filed within a reasonable
time. And since none was filed within such period, petitioners action was barred by laches; and
(3) because executive evaluation of timber licenses and their consequent cancellation in the
process of formulating policies with regard to the utilization of timber lands is a prerogative of
the executive department and in the absence of evidence showing grave abuse of discretion
courts will not interfere with the exercise of that discretion.
This case is governed by the decision in Felipe Ysmael, Jr. & Co., Inc. v. Deputy Executive
Secretary.
Third. It is finally contended that any policy consideration on forest conservation and
protection justifying the decision of the executive department not to reinstate petitioners license
must be formally enunciated and cannot merely be implied from the Presidents instruction to his
subordinates and that, at all events, the new policy cannot be applied to existing licenses such as
petitioners.
The Presidents order reconsidering the resolution of the Presidential Legal Adviser (insofar
as it reinstated the license of FLDC) was prompted by concerns expressed by the then Secretary
of Environment and Natural Resources that said reinstatement [of FLDCs license] may negate
our efforts to enhance conservation and protection of our forest resources. There was really no
new policy but, as noted in Felipe Ysmael, Jr. & Co., Inc., a mere reiteration of a policy of
conservation and protection. The policy is contained in Art. II, 16 of the Constitution which
commands the State to protect and promote the right of the people to a balanced and healthful
ecology in accord with the rhythm and harmony of nature. There is therefore no merit in
petitioners contention that no new policy can be applied to existing licenses.
As to petitioners contention that the cancellation of its license constitutes an impairment of
the obligation of its contract, suffice it for us to quote what we held in Felipe Ysmael, Jr. & Co.
Inc. v. Deputy Executive Secretary:[24]
A cursory reading of the assailed orders issued by public respondent Minister Maceda of the
MNR, which were affirmed by the Office of the President, will disclose public policy
considerations which effectively forestall judicial interference in the case at bar.
Public respondents herein, upon whose shoulders rests the task of implementing the policy to
develop and conserve the countrys natural resources, have indicated an ongoing department
evaluation of all timber license agreements entered into, and permits or licenses issued, under the
previous dispensation. . . .
The ongoing administrative reassessment is apparently in response to the renewed and growing
global concern over the despoliation of forest lands and the utter disregard of their crucial role in
sustaining a balanced ecological system. The legitimacy of such concern can hardly be disputed,
most especially in this country. . . .
Thus, while the administration grapples with the complex and multifarious problems caused by
unbridled exploitation of these resources, the judiciary will stand clear. . . . More so where, as in
the present case, the interests of a private logging company are pitted against that of the public at
large on the pressing public policy issue of forest conservation. . . . Timber licenses, permits and
license agreements are the principal instruments by which the State regulates the utilization and
disposition of forest resources to the end that public welfare is promoted. And it can hardly be
gainsaid that they merely evidence a privilege granted by the State to qualified entities, and do
not vest in the latter a permanent or irrevocable right to the particular concession area and the
forest products therein. They may be validly amended, modified, replaced or rescinded by the
Chief Executive when national interests so require. Thus, they are not deemed contracts within
the purview of the due process of law clause [See Sections 3(33) and 20 of Pres. Decree No. 705,
as amended. Also, Tan v. Director of Forestry, G.R. No. L-24548, October 27, 1983, 125 SCRA
302].
WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED.
SO ORDERED.
Regalado, (Chairman), Romero, Puno, and Torres, Jr., JJ., concur.

SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. 78742 July 14, 1989
ASSOCIATION OF SMALL LANDOWNERS IN THE PHILIPPINES, INC., JUANITO D.
GOMEZ, GERARDO B. ALARCIO, FELIPE A. GUICO, JR., BERNARDO M.
ALMONTE, CANUTO RAMIR B. CABRITO, ISIDRO T. GUICO, FELISA I. LLAMIDO,
FAUSTO J. SALVA, REYNALDO G. ESTRADA, FELISA C. BAUTISTA, ESMENIA J.
CABE, TEODORO B. MADRIAGA, AUREA J. PRESTOSA, EMERENCIANA J. ISLA,
FELICISIMA C. ARRESTO, CONSUELO M. MORALES, BENJAMIN R.
SEGISMUNDO, CIRILA A. JOSE & NAPOLEON S. FERRER, petitioners,

vs.
HONORABLE SECRETARY OF AGRARIAN REFORM, respondent.
G.R. No. 79310 July 14, 1989
ARSENIO AL. ACUNA, NEWTON JISON, VICTORINO FERRARIS, DENNIS JEREZA,
HERMINIGILDO GUSTILO, PAULINO D. TOLENTINO and PLANTERS'
COMMITTEE, INC., Victorias Mill District, Victorias, Negros Occidental, petitioners,
vs.
JOKER ARROYO, PHILIP E. JUICO and PRESIDENTIAL AGRARIAN REFORM
COUNCIL, respondents.
G.R. No. 79744 July 14, 1989
INOCENTES
PABICO, petitioner,
vs.
HON. PHILIP E. JUICO, SECRETARY OF THE DEPARTMENT OF AGRARIAN
REFORM, HON. JOKER ARROYO, EXECUTIVE SECRETARY OF THE OFFICE OF
THE PRESIDENT, and Messrs. SALVADOR TALENTO, JAIME ABOGADO,
CONRADO AVANCENA and ROBERTO TAAY, respondents.
G.R. No. 79777 July 14, 1989
NICOLAS
S.
MANAAY
and
AGUSTIN
HERMANO,
JR., petitioners,
vs.
HON. PHILIP ELLA JUICO, as Secretary of Agrarian Reform, and LAND BANK OF
THE PHILIPPINES,respondents.
CRUZ, J.:
In ancient mythology, Antaeus was a terrible giant who blocked and challenged Hercules for his
life on his way to Mycenae after performing his eleventh labor. The two wrestled mightily and
Hercules flung his adversary to the ground thinking him dead, but Antaeus rose even stronger to
resume their struggle. This happened several times to Hercules' increasing amazement. Finally,
as they continued grappling, it dawned on Hercules that Antaeus was the son of Gaea and could
never die as long as any part of his body was touching his Mother Earth. Thus forewarned,
Hercules then held Antaeus up in the air, beyond the reach of the sustaining soil, and crushed him
to death.
Mother Earth. The sustaining soil. The giver of life, without whose invigorating touch even the
powerful Antaeus weakened and died.
The cases before us are not as fanciful as the foregoing tale. But they also tell of the elemental
forces of life and death, of men and women who, like Antaeus need the sustaining strength of the
precious earth to stay alive.
"Land for the Landless" is a slogan that underscores the acute imbalance in the distribution of
this precious resource among our people. But it is more than a slogan. Through the brooding
centuries, it has become a battle-cry dramatizing the increasingly urgent demand of the
dispossessed among us for a plot of earth as their place in the sun.
Recognizing this need, the Constitution in 1935 mandated the policy of social justice to "insure
the well-being and economic security of all the people," 1 especially the less privileged. In 1973,
the new Constitution affirmed this goal adding specifically that "the State shall regulate the
acquisition, ownership, use, enjoyment and disposition of private property and equitably diffuse
property ownership and profits." 2 Significantly, there was also the specific injunction to
"formulate and implement an agrarian reform program aimed at emancipating the tenant from the
bondage of the soil." 3
The Constitution of 1987 was not to be outdone. Besides echoing these sentiments, it also
adopted one whole and separate Article XIII on Social Justice and Human Rights, containing
grandiose but undoubtedly sincere provisions for the uplift of the common people. These include
a call in the following words for the adoption by the State of an agrarian reform program:
SEC. 4. The State shall, by law, undertake an agrarian reform program founded on
the right of farmers and regular farmworkers, who are landless, to own directly or
collectively the lands they till or, in the case of other farmworkers, to receive a
just share of the fruits thereof. To this end, the State shall encourage and
undertake the just distribution of all agricultural lands, subject to such priorities
and reasonable retention limits as the Congress may prescribe, taking into account
ecological, developmental, or equity considerations and subject to the payment of
just compensation. In determining retention limits, the State shall respect the right
of small landowners. The State shall further provide incentives for voluntary landsharing.
Earlier, in fact, R.A. No. 3844, otherwise known as the Agricultural Land Reform Code, had
already been enacted by the Congress of the Philippines on August 8, 1963, in line with the
above-stated principles. This was substantially superseded almost a decade later by P.D. No. 27,
which was promulgated on October 21, 1972, along with martial law, to provide for the
compulsory acquisition of private lands for distribution among tenant-farmers and to specify
maximum retention limits for landowners.
The people power revolution of 1986 did not change and indeed even energized the thrust for
agrarian reform. Thus, on July 17, 1987, President Corazon C. Aquino issued E.O. No. 228,
declaring full land ownership in favor of the beneficiaries of P.D. No. 27 and providing for the
valuation of still unvalued lands covered by the decree as well as the manner of their payment.
This was followed on July 22, 1987 by Presidential Proclamation No. 131, instituting a
comprehensive agrarian reform program (CARP), and E.O. No. 229, providing the mechanics for
its implementation.
Subsequently, with its formal organization, the revived Congress of the Philippines took over
legislative power from the President and started its own deliberations, including extensive public
hearings, on the improvement of the interests of farmers. The result, after almost a year of
spirited debate, was the enactment of R.A. No. 6657, otherwise known as the Comprehensive
Agrarian Reform Law of 1988, which President Aquino signed on June 10, 1988. This law, while
considerably changing the earlier mentioned enactments, nevertheless gives them suppletory
effect insofar as they are not inconsistent with its provisions. 4
The above-captioned cases have been consolidated because they involve common legal
questions, including serious challenges to the constitutionality of the several measures mentioned
above. They will be the subject of one common discussion and resolution, The different
antecedents of each case will require separate treatment, however, and will first be explained
hereunder.
G.R. No. 79777
Squarely raised in this petition is the constitutionality of P.D. No. 27, E.O. Nos. 228 and 229, and
R.A. No. 6657.
The subjects of this petition are a 9-hectare riceland worked by four tenants and owned by
petitioner Nicolas Manaay and his wife and a 5-hectare riceland worked by four tenants and
owned by petitioner Augustin Hermano, Jr. The tenants were declared full owners of these lands
by E.O. No. 228 as qualified farmers under P.D. No. 27.
The petitioners are questioning P.D. No. 27 and E.O. Nos. 228 and 229 on grounds inter alia of
separation of powers, due process, equal protection and the constitutional limitation that no
private property shall be taken for public use without just compensation.
They contend that President Aquino usurped legislative power when she promulgated E.O. No.
228. The said measure is invalid also for violation of Article XIII, Section 4, of the Constitution,
for failure to provide for retention limits for small landowners. Moreover, it does not conform to
Article VI, Section 25(4) and the other requisites of a valid appropriation.
In connection with the determination of just compensation, the petitioners argue that the same
may be made only by a court of justice and not by the President of the Philippines. They invoke
the recent cases of EPZA v. Dulay 5and Manotok v. National Food Authority. 6 Moreover, the just
compensation contemplated by the Bill of Rights is payable in money or in cash and not in the
form of bonds or other things of value.
In considering the rentals as advance payment on the land, the executive order also deprives the
petitioners of their property rights as protected by due process. The equal protection clause is
also violated because the order places the burden of solving the agrarian problems on the owners
only of agricultural lands. No similar obligation is imposed on the owners of other properties.
The petitioners also maintain that in declaring the beneficiaries under P.D. No. 27 to be the
owners of the lands occupied by them, E.O. No. 228 ignored judicial prerogatives and so
violated due process. Worse, the measure would not solve the agrarian problem because even the
small farmers are deprived of their lands and the retention rights guaranteed by the Constitution.
In his Comment, the Solicitor General stresses that P.D. No. 27 has already been upheld in the
earlier cases ofChavez v. Zobel, 7 Gonzales v. Estrella, 8 and Association of Rice and Corn
Producers of the Philippines, Inc. v. The National Land Reform Council. 9 The determination of
just compensation by the executive authorities conformably to the formula prescribed under the
questioned order is at best initial or preliminary only. It does not foreclose judicial intervention
whenever sought or warranted. At any rate, the challenge to the order is premature because no
valuation of their property has as yet been made by the Department of Agrarian Reform. The
petitioners are also not proper parties because the lands owned by them do not exceed the
maximum retention limit of 7 hectares.
Replying, the petitioners insist they are proper parties because P.D. No. 27 does not provide for
retention limits on tenanted lands and that in any event their petition is a class suit brought in
behalf of landowners with landholdings below 24 hectares. They maintain that the determination
of just compensation by the administrative authorities is a final ascertainment. As for the cases
invoked by the public respondent, the constitutionality of P.D. No. 27 was merely assumed
in Chavez, while what was decided in Gonzales was the validity of the imposition of martial law.
In the amended petition dated November 22, 1588, it is contended that P.D. No. 27, E.O. Nos.
228 and 229 (except Sections 20 and 21) have been impliedly repealed by R.A. No. 6657.
Nevertheless, this statute should itself also be declared unconstitutional because it suffers from
substantially the same infirmities as the earlier measures.
A petition for intervention was filed with leave of court on June 1, 1988 by Vicente Cruz, owner
of a 1. 83- hectare land, who complained that the DAR was insisting on the implementation of
P.D. No. 27 and E.O. No. 228 despite a compromise agreement he had reached with his tenant on
the payment of rentals. In a subsequent motion dated April 10, 1989, he adopted the allegations
in the basic amended petition that the above- mentioned enactments have been impliedly
repealed by R.A. No. 6657.
G.R. No. 79310

The petitioners herein are landowners and sugar planters in the Victorias Mill District, Victorias,
Negros Occidental. Co-petitioner Planters' Committee, Inc. is an organization composed of 1,400
planter-members. This petition seeks to prohibit the implementation of Proc. No. 131 and E.O.
No. 229.
The petitioners claim that the power to provide for a Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program
as decreed by the Constitution belongs to Congress and not the President. Although they agree
that the President could exercise legislative power until the Congress was convened, she could
do so only to enact emergency measures during the transition period. At that, even assuming that
the interim legislative power of the President was properly exercised, Proc. No. 131 and E.O.
No. 229 would still have to be annulled for violating the constitutional provisions on just
compensation, due process, and equal protection.
They also argue that under Section 2 of Proc. No. 131 which provides:
Agrarian Reform Fund.-There is hereby created a special fund, to be known as the Agrarian
Reform Fund, an initial amount of FIFTY BILLION PESOS (P50,000,000,000.00) to cover the
estimated cost of the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program from 1987 to 1992 which shall
be sourced from the receipts of the sale of the assets of the Asset Privatization Trust and Receipts
of sale of ill-gotten wealth received through the Presidential Commission on Good Government
and such other sources as government may deem appropriate. The amounts collected and
accruing to this special fund shall be considered automatically appropriated for the purpose
authorized in this Proclamation the amount appropriated is in futuro, not in esse. The money
needed to cover the cost of the contemplated expropriation has yet to be raised and cannot be
appropriated at this time.
Furthermore, they contend that taking must be simultaneous with payment of just compensation
as it is traditionally understood, i.e., with money and in full, but no such payment is
contemplated in Section 5 of the E.O. No. 229. On the contrary, Section 6, thereof provides that
the Land Bank of the Philippines "shall compensate the landowner in an amount to be
established by the government, which shall be based on the owner's declaration of current fair
market value as provided in Section 4 hereof, but subject to certain controls to be defined and
promulgated by the Presidential Agrarian Reform Council." This compensation may not be paid
fully in money but in any of several modes that may consist of part cash and part bond, with
interest, maturing periodically, or direct payment in cash or bond as may be mutually agreed
upon by the beneficiary and the landowner or as may be prescribed or approved by the PARC.
The petitioners also argue that in the issuance of the two measures, no effort was made to make a
careful study of the sugar planters' situation. There is no tenancy problem in the sugar areas that
can justify the application of the CARP to them. To the extent that the sugar planters have been
lumped in the same legislation with other farmers, although they are a separate group with
problems exclusively their own, their right to equal protection has been violated.
A motion for intervention was filed on August 27,1987 by the National Federation of Sugarcane
Planters (NASP) which claims a membership of at least 20,000 individual sugar planters all over
the country. On September 10, 1987, another motion for intervention was filed, this time by
Manuel Barcelona, et al., representing coconut and riceland owners. Both motions were granted
by the Court.
NASP alleges that President Aquino had no authority to fund the Agrarian Reform Program and
that, in any event, the appropriation is invalid because of uncertainty in the amount appropriated.
Section 2 of Proc. No. 131 and Sections 20 and 21 of E.O. No. 229 provide for an initial
appropriation of fifty billion pesos and thus specifies the minimum rather than the maximum
authorized amount. This is not allowed. Furthermore, the stated initial amount has not been
certified to by the National Treasurer as actually available.
Two additional arguments are made by Barcelona, to wit, the failure to establish by clear and
convincing evidence the necessity for the exercise of the powers of eminent domain, and the
violation of the fundamental right to own property.
The petitioners also decry the penalty for non-registration of the lands, which is the expropriation
of the said land for an amount equal to the government assessor's valuation of the land for tax
purposes. On the other hand, if the landowner declares his own valuation he is unjustly required
to immediately pay the corresponding taxes on the land, in violation of the uniformity rule.
In his consolidated Comment, the Solicitor General first invokes the presumption of
constitutionality in favor of Proc. No. 131 and E.O. No. 229. He also justifies the necessity for
the expropriation as explained in the "whereas" clauses of the Proclamation and submits that,
contrary to the petitioner's contention, a pilot project to determine the feasibility of CARP and a
general survey on the people's opinion thereon are not indispensable prerequisites to its
promulgation.
On the alleged violation of the equal protection clause, the sugar planters have failed to show
that they belong to a different class and should be differently treated. The Comment also suggests
the possibility of Congress first distributing public agricultural lands and scheduling the
expropriation of private agricultural lands later. From this viewpoint, the petition for prohibition
would be premature.
The public respondent also points out that the constitutional prohibition is against the payment of
public money without the corresponding appropriation. There is no rule that only money already
in existence can be the subject of an appropriation law. Finally, the earmarking of fifty billion
pesos as Agrarian Reform Fund, although denominated as an initial amount, is actually the
maximum sum appropriated. The word "initial" simply means that additional amounts may be
appropriated later when necessary.
On April 11, 1988, Prudencio Serrano, a coconut planter, filed a petition on his own behalf,
assailing the constitutionality of E.O. No. 229. In addition to the arguments already raised,
Serrano contends that the measure is unconstitutional because:
(1) Only public lands should be included in the CARP;
(2) E.O. No. 229 embraces more than one subject which is not expressed in the
title;
(3) The power of the President to legislate was terminated on July 2, 1987; and
(4) The appropriation of a P50 billion special fund from the National Treasury did
not originate from the House of Representatives.
G.R. No. 79744
The petitioner alleges that the then Secretary of Department of Agrarian Reform, in violation of
due process and the requirement for just compensation, placed his landholding under the
coverage of Operation Land Transfer. Certificates of Land Transfer were subsequently issued to
the private respondents, who then refused payment of lease rentals to him.
On September 3, 1986, the petitioner protested the erroneous inclusion of his small landholding
under Operation Land transfer and asked for the recall and cancellation of the Certificates of
Land Transfer in the name of the private respondents. He claims that on December 24, 1986, his
petition was denied without hearing. On February 17, 1987, he filed a motion for
reconsideration, which had not been acted upon when E.O. Nos. 228 and 229 were issued. These
orders rendered his motion moot and academic because they directly effected the transfer of his
land to the private respondents.
The petitioner now argues that:

(1) E.O. Nos. 228 and 229 were invalidly issued by the President of the
Philippines.
(2) The said executive orders are violative of the constitutional provision that no
private property shall be taken without due process or just compensation.
(3) The petitioner is denied the right of maximum retention provided for under the
1987 Constitution.
The petitioner contends that the issuance of E.0. Nos. 228 and 229 shortly before Congress
convened is anomalous and arbitrary, besides violating the doctrine of separation of powers. The
legislative power granted to the President under the Transitory Provisions refers only to
emergency measures that may be promulgated in the proper exercise of the police power.
The petitioner also invokes his rights not to be deprived of his property without due process of
law and to the retention of his small parcels of riceholding as guaranteed under Article XIII,
Section 4 of the Constitution. He likewise argues that, besides denying him just compensation for
his land, the provisions of E.O. No. 228 declaring that:
Lease rentals paid to the landowner by the farmer-beneficiary after October 21,
1972 shall be considered as advance payment for the land.
is an unconstitutional taking of a vested property right. It is also his contention that the inclusion
of even small landowners in the program along with other landowners with lands consisting of
seven hectares or more is undemocratic.
In his Comment, the Solicitor General submits that the petition is premature because the motion
for reconsideration filed with the Minister of Agrarian Reform is still unresolved. As for the
validity of the issuance of E.O. Nos. 228 and 229, he argues that they were enacted pursuant to
Section 6, Article XVIII of the Transitory Provisions of the 1987 Constitution which reads:
The incumbent president shall continue to exercise legislative powers until the first Congress is
convened.
On the issue of just compensation, his position is that when P.D. No. 27 was promulgated on
October 21. 1972, the tenant-farmer of agricultural land was deemed the owner of the land he
was tilling. The leasehold rentals paid after that date should therefore be considered amortization
payments.
In his Reply to the public respondents, the petitioner maintains that the motion he filed was
resolved on December 14, 1987. An appeal to the Office of the President would be useless with
the promulgation of E.O. Nos. 228 and 229, which in effect sanctioned the validity of the public
respondent's acts.
G.R. No. 78742
The petitioners in this case invoke the right of retention granted by P.D. No. 27 to owners of rice
and corn lands not exceeding seven hectares as long as they are cultivating or intend to cultivate
the same. Their respective lands do not exceed the statutory limit but are occupied by tenants
who are actually cultivating such lands.
According to P.D. No. 316, which was promulgated in implementation of P.D. No. 27:
No tenant-farmer in agricultural lands primarily devoted to rice and corn shall be
ejected or removed from his farmholding until such time as the respective rights
of the tenant- farmers and the landowner shall have been determined in
accordance with the rules and regulations implementing P.D. No. 27.
The petitioners claim they cannot eject their tenants and so are unable to enjoy their right of
retention because the Department of Agrarian Reform has so far not issued the implementing
rules required under the above-quoted decree. They therefore ask the Court for a writ of
mandamus to compel the respondent to issue the said rules.
In his Comment, the public respondent argues that P.D. No. 27 has been amended by LOI 474
removing any right of retention from persons who own other agricultural lands of more than 7
hectares in aggregate area or lands used for residential, commercial, industrial or other purposes
from which they derive adequate income for their family. And even assuming that the petitioners
do not fall under its terms, the regulations implementing P.D. No. 27 have already been issued, to
wit, the Memorandum dated July 10, 1975 (Interim Guidelines on Retention by Small
Landowners, with an accompanying Retention Guide Table), Memorandum Circular No. 11
dated April 21, 1978, (Implementation Guidelines of LOI No. 474), Memorandum Circular No.
18-81 dated December 29,1981 (Clarificatory Guidelines on Coverage of P.D. No. 27 and
Retention by Small Landowners), and DAR Administrative Order No. 1, series of 1985
(Providing for a Cut-off Date for Landowners to Apply for Retention and/or to Protest the
Coverage of their Landholdings under Operation Land Transfer pursuant to P.D. No. 27). For
failure to file the corresponding applications for retention under these measures, the petitioners
are now barred from invoking this right.
The public respondent also stresses that the petitioners have prematurely initiated this case
notwithstanding the pendency of their appeal to the President of the Philippines. Moreover, the
issuance of the implementing rules, assuming this has not yet been done, involves the exercise of
discretion which cannot be controlled through the writ of mandamus. This is especially true if
this function is entrusted, as in this case, to a separate department of the government.
In their Reply, the petitioners insist that the above-cited measures are not applicable to them
because they do not own more than seven hectares of agricultural land. Moreover, assuming
arguendo that the rules were intended to cover them also, the said measures are nevertheless not
in force because they have not been published as required by law and the ruling of this Court
in Tanada v. Tuvera. 10 As for LOI 474, the same is ineffective for the additional reason that a
mere letter of instruction could not have repealed the presidential decree.
I
Although holding neither purse nor sword and so regarded as the weakest of the three
departments of the government, the judiciary is nonetheless vested with the power to annul the
acts of either the legislative or the executive or of both when not conformable to the fundamental
law. This is the reason for what some quarters call the doctrine of judicial supremacy. Even so,
this power is not lightly assumed or readily exercised. The doctrine of separation of powers
imposes upon the courts a proper restraint, born of the nature of their functions and of their
respect for the other departments, in striking down the acts of the legislative and the executive as
unconstitutional. The policy, indeed, is a blend of courtesy and caution. To doubt is to sustain.
The theory is that before the act was done or the law was enacted, earnest studies were made by
Congress or the President, or both, to insure that the Constitution would not be breached.
In addition, the Constitution itself lays down stringent conditions for a declaration of
unconstitutionality, requiring therefor the concurrence of a majority of the members of the
Supreme Court who took part in the deliberations and voted on the issue during their session en
banc. 11 And as established by judge made doctrine, the Court will assume jurisdiction over a
constitutional question only if it is shown that the essential requisites of a judicial inquiry into
such a question are first satisfied. Thus, there must be an actual case or controversy involving a
conflict of legal rights susceptible of judicial determination, the constitutional question must
have been opportunely raised by the proper party, and the resolution of the question is
unavoidably necessary to the decision of the case itself. 12
With particular regard to the requirement of proper party as applied in the cases before us, we
hold that the same is satisfied by the petitioners and intervenors because each of them has
sustained or is in danger of sustaining an immediate injury as a result of the acts or measures
complained of. 13 And even if, strictly speaking, they are not covered by the definition, it is still
within the wide discretion of the Court to waive the requirement and so remove the impediment
to its addressing and resolving the serious constitutional questions raised.
In the first Emergency Powers Cases, 14 ordinary citizens and taxpayers were allowed to question
the constitutionality of several executive orders issued by President Quirino although they were
invoking only an indirect and general interest shared in common with the public. The Court
dismissed the objection that they were not proper parties and ruled that "the transcendental
importance to the public of these cases demands that they be settled promptly and definitely,
brushing aside, if we must, technicalities of procedure." We have since then applied this
exception in many other cases. 15
The other above-mentioned requisites have also been met in the present petitions.
In must be stressed that despite the inhibitions pressing upon the Court when confronted with
constitutional issues like the ones now before it, it will not hesitate to declare a law or act invalid
when it is convinced that this must be done. In arriving at this conclusion, its only criterion will
be the Constitution as God and its conscience give it the light to probe its meaning and discover
its purpose. Personal motives and political considerations are irrelevancies that cannot influence
its decision. Blandishment is as ineffectual as intimidation.
For all the awesome power of the Congress and the Executive, the Court will not hesitate to
"make the hammer fall, and heavily," to use Justice Laurel's pithy language, where the acts of
these departments, or of any public official, betray the people's will as expressed in the
Constitution.
It need only be added, to borrow again the words of Justice Laurel, that
... when the judiciary mediates to allocate constitutional boundaries, it does not
assert any superiority over the other departments; it does not in reality nullify or
invalidate an act of the Legislature, but only asserts the solemn and sacred
obligation assigned to it by the Constitution to determine conflicting claims of
authority under the Constitution and to establish for the parties in an actual
controversy the rights which that instrument secures and guarantees to them. This
is in truth all that is involved in what is termed "judicial supremacy" which
properly is the power of judicial review under the Constitution. 16
The cases before us categorically raise constitutional questions that this Court must categorically
resolve. And so we shall.
II
We proceed first to the examination of the preliminary issues before resolving the more serious
challenges to the constitutionality of the several measures involved in these petitions.
The promulgation of P.D. No. 27 by President Marcos in the exercise of his powers under martial
law has already been sustained in Gonzales v. Estrella and we find no reason to modify or
reverse it on that issue. As for the power of President Aquino to promulgate Proc. No. 131 and
E.O. Nos. 228 and 229, the same was authorized under Section 6 of the Transitory Provisions of
the 1987 Constitution, quoted above.
The said measures were issued by President Aquino before July 27, 1987, when the Congress of
the Philippines was formally convened and took over legislative power from her. They are not
"midnight" enactments intended to pre-empt the legislature because E.O. No. 228 was issued on
July 17, 1987, and the other measures, i.e., Proc. No. 131 and E.O. No. 229, were both issued on
July 22, 1987. Neither is it correct to say that these measures ceased to be valid when she lost her
legislative power for, like any statute, they continue to be in force unless modified or repealed by
subsequent law or declared invalid by the courts. A statute does not ipso facto become
inoperative simply because of the dissolution of the legislature that enacted it. By the same
token, President Aquino's loss of legislative power did not have the effect of invalidating all the
measures enacted by her when and as long as she possessed it.
Significantly, the Congress she is alleged to have undercut has not rejected but in fact
substantially affirmed the challenged measures and has specifically provided that they shall be
suppletory to R.A. No. 6657 whenever not inconsistent with its provisions. 17 Indeed, some
portions of the said measures, like the creation of the P50 billion fund in Section 2 of Proc. No.
131, and Sections 20 and 21 of E.O. No. 229, have been incorporated by reference in the CARP
Law.18
That fund, as earlier noted, is itself being questioned on the ground that it does not conform to
the requirements of a valid appropriation as specified in the Constitution. Clearly, however, Proc.
No. 131 is not an appropriation measure even if it does provide for the creation of said fund, for
that is not its principal purpose. An appropriation law is one the primary and specific purpose of
which is to authorize the release of public funds from the treasury. 19 The creation of the fund is
only incidental to the main objective of the proclamation, which is agrarian reform.
It should follow that the specific constitutional provisions invoked, to wit, Section 24 and
Section 25(4) of Article VI, are not applicable. With particular reference to Section 24, this
obviously could not have been complied with for the simple reason that the House of
Representatives, which now has the exclusive power to initiate appropriation measures, had not
yet been convened when the proclamation was issued. The legislative power was then solely
vested in the President of the Philippines, who embodied, as it were, both houses of Congress.
The argument of some of the petitioners that Proc. No. 131 and E.O. No. 229 should be
invalidated because they do not provide for retention limits as required by Article XIII, Section 4
of the Constitution is no longer tenable. R.A. No. 6657 does provide for such limits now in
Section 6 of the law, which in fact is one of its most controversial provisions. This section
declares:
Retention Limits. Except as otherwise provided in this Act, no person may
own or retain, directly or indirectly, any public or private agricultural land, the
size of which shall vary according to factors governing a viable family-sized
farm, such as commodity produced, terrain, infrastructure, and soil fertility as
determined by the Presidential Agrarian Reform Council (PARC) created
hereunder, but in no case shall retention by the landowner exceed five (5)
hectares. Three (3) hectares may be awarded to each child of the landowner,
subject to the following qualifications: (1) that he is at least fifteen (15) years of
age; and (2) that he is actually tilling the land or directly managing the farm;
Provided, That landowners whose lands have been covered by Presidential Decree
No. 27 shall be allowed to keep the area originally retained by them thereunder,
further, That original homestead grantees or direct compulsory heirs who still own
the original homestead at the time of the approval of this Act shall retain the same
areas as long as they continue to cultivate said homestead.
The argument that E.O. No. 229 violates the constitutional requirement that a bill shall have only
one subject, to be expressed in its title, deserves only short attention. It is settled that the title of
the bill does not have to be a catalogue of its contents and will suffice if the matters embodied in
the text are relevant to each other and may be inferred from the title. 20
The Court wryly observes that during the past dictatorship, every presidential issuance, by
whatever name it was called, had the force and effect of law because it came from President
Marcos. Such are the ways of despots. Hence, it is futile to argue, as the petitioners do in G.R.
No. 79744, that LOI 474 could not have repealed P.D. No. 27 because the former was only a
letter of instruction. The important thing is that it was issued by President Marcos, whose word
was law during that time.
But for all their peremptoriness, these issuances from the President Marcos still had to comply
with the requirement for publication as this Court held in Tanada v. Tuvera. 21 Hence, unless
published in the Official Gazette in accordance with Article 2 of the Civil Code, they could not
have any force and effect if they were among those enactments successfully challenged in that
case. LOI 474 was published, though, in the Official Gazette dated November 29,1976.)
Finally, there is the contention of the public respondent in G.R. No. 78742 that the writ of
mandamus cannot issue to compel the performance of a discretionary act, especially by a specific
department of the government. That is true as a general proposition but is subject to one
important qualification. Correctly and categorically stated, the rule is that mandamus will lie to
compel the discharge of the discretionary duty itself but not to control the discretion to be
exercised. In other words, mandamus can issue to require action only but not specific action.
Whenever a duty is imposed upon a public official and an unnecessary and
unreasonable delay in the exercise of such duty occurs, if it is a clear duty
imposed by law, the courts will intervene by the extraordinary legal remedy of
mandamus to compel action. If the duty is purely ministerial, the courts will
require specific action. If the duty is purely discretionary, the courts
by mandamus will require action only. For example, if an inferior court, public
official, or board should, for an unreasonable length of time, fail to decide a
particular question to the great detriment of all parties concerned, or a court
should refuse to take jurisdiction of a cause when the law clearly gave it
jurisdiction mandamus will issue, in the first case to require a decision, and in the
second to require that jurisdiction be taken of the cause. 22
And while it is true that as a rule the writ will not be proper as long as there is still a plain,
speedy and adequate remedy available from the administrative authorities, resort to the courts
may still be permitted if the issue raised is a question of law. 23
III
There are traditional distinctions between the police power and the power of eminent domain that
logically preclude the application of both powers at the same time on the same subject. In the
case of City of Baguio v. NAWASA, 24 for example, where a law required the transfer of all
municipal waterworks systems to the NAWASA in exchange for its assets of equivalent value,
the Court held that the power being exercised was eminent domain because the property involved
was wholesome and intended for a public use. Property condemned under the police power is
noxious or intended for a noxious purpose, such as a building on the verge of collapse, which
should be demolished for the public safety, or obscene materials, which should be destroyed in
the interest of public morals. The confiscation of such property is not compensable, unlike the
taking of property under the power of expropriation, which requires the payment of just
compensation to the owner.
In the case of Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 25 Justice Holmes laid down the limits of the
police power in a famous aphorism: "The general rule at least is that while property may be
regulated to a certain extent, if regulation goes too far it will be recognized as a taking." The
regulation that went "too far" was a law prohibiting mining which might cause the subsidence of
structures for human habitation constructed on the land surface. This was resisted by a coal
company which had earlier granted a deed to the land over its mine but reserved all mining rights
thereunder, with the grantee assuming all risks and waiving any damage claim. The Court held
the law could not be sustained without compensating the grantor. Justice Brandeis filed a lone
dissent in which he argued that there was a valid exercise of the police power. He said:
Every restriction upon the use of property imposed in the exercise of the police
power deprives the owner of some right theretofore enjoyed, and is, in that sense,
an abridgment by the State of rights in property without making compensation.
But restriction imposed to protect the public health, safety or morals from dangers
threatened is not a taking. The restriction here in question is merely the
prohibition of a noxious use. The property so restricted remains in the possession
of its owner. The state does not appropriate it or make any use of it. The state
merely prevents the owner from making a use which interferes with paramount
rights of the public. Whenever the use prohibited ceases to be noxious as it
may because of further changes in local or social conditions the restriction will
have to be removed and the owner will again be free to enjoy his property as
heretofore.
Recent trends, however, would indicate not a polarization but a mingling of the police power and
the power of eminent domain, with the latter being used as an implement of the former like the
power of taxation. The employment of the taxing power to achieve a police purpose has long
been accepted. 26 As for the power of expropriation, Prof. John J. Costonis of the University of
Illinois College of Law (referring to the earlier case of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 US 365,
which sustained a zoning law under the police power) makes the following significant remarks:
Euclid, moreover, was decided in an era when judges located the Police and
eminent domain powers on different planets. Generally speaking, they viewed
eminent domain as encompassing public acquisition of private property for
improvements that would be available for public use," literally construed. To the
police power, on the other hand, they assigned the less intrusive task of preventing
harmful externalities a point reflected in the Euclid opinion's reliance on an
analogy to nuisance law to bolster its support of zoning. So long as suppression of
a privately authored harm bore a plausible relation to some legitimate "public
purpose," the pertinent measure need have afforded no compensation whatever.
With the progressive growth of government's involvement in land use, the
distance between the two powers has contracted considerably. Today government
often employs eminent domain interchangeably with or as a useful complement to
the police power-- a trend expressly approved in the Supreme Court's 1954
decision in Berman v. Parker, which broadened the reach of eminent domain's
"public use" test to match that of the police power's standard of "public
purpose." 27
The Berman case sustained a redevelopment project and the improvement of blighted areas in the
District of Columbia as a proper exercise of the police power. On the role of eminent domain in
the attainment of this purpose, Justice Douglas declared:
If those who govern the District of Columbia decide that the Nation's Capital
should be beautiful as well as sanitary, there is nothing in the Fifth Amendment
that stands in the way.
Once the object is within the authority of Congress, the right to realize it through
the exercise of eminent domain is clear.
For the power of eminent domain is merely the means to the end. 28
In Penn Central Transportation Co. v. New York City, 29 decided by a 6-3 vote in 1978, the U.S
Supreme Court sustained the respondent's Landmarks Preservation Law under which the owners
of the Grand Central Terminal had not been allowed to construct a multi-story office building
over the Terminal, which had been designated a historic landmark. Preservation of the landmark
was held to be a valid objective of the police power. The problem, however, was that the owners
of the Terminal would be deprived of the right to use the airspace above it although other
landowners in the area could do so over their respective properties. While insisting that there was
here no taking, the Court nonetheless recognized certain compensatory rights accruing to Grand
Central Terminal which it said would "undoubtedly mitigate" the loss caused by the regulation.
This "fair compensation," as he called it, was explained by Prof. Costonis in this wise:
In return for retaining the Terminal site in its pristine landmark status, Penn Central was
authorized to transfer to neighboring properties the authorized but unused rights accruing to the
site prior to the Terminal's designation as a landmark the rights which would have been
exhausted by the 59-story building that the city refused to countenance atop the Terminal.
Prevailing bulk restrictions on neighboring sites were proportionately relaxed, theoretically
enabling Penn Central to recoup its losses at the Terminal site by constructing or selling to others
the right to construct larger, hence more profitable buildings on the transferee sites. 30
The cases before us present no knotty complication insofar as the question of compensable
taking is concerned. To the extent that the measures under challenge merely prescribe retention
limits for landowners, there is an exercise of the police power for the regulation of private
property in accordance with the Constitution. But where, to carry out such regulation, it becomes
necessary to deprive such owners of whatever lands they may own in excess of the maximum
area allowed, there is definitely a taking under the power of eminent domain for which payment
of just compensation is imperative. The taking contemplated is not a mere limitation of the use of
the land. What is required is the surrender of the title to and the physical possession of the said
excess and all beneficial rights accruing to the owner in favor of the farmer-beneficiary. This is
definitely an exercise not of the police power but of the power of eminent domain.
Whether as an exercise of the police power or of the power of eminent domain, the several
measures before us are challenged as violative of the due process and equal protection clauses.
The challenge to Proc. No. 131 and E.O. Nos. 228 and 299 on the ground that no retention limits
are prescribed has already been discussed and dismissed. It is noted that although they excited
many bitter exchanges during the deliberation of the CARP Law in Congress, the retention limits
finally agreed upon are, curiously enough, not being questioned in these petitions. We therefore
do not discuss them here. The Court will come to the other claimed violations of due process in
connection with our examination of the adequacy of just compensation as required under the
power of expropriation.
The argument of the small farmers that they have been denied equal protection because of the
absence of retention limits has also become academic under Section 6 of R.A. No. 6657.
Significantly, they too have not questioned the area of such limits. There is also the complaint
that they should not be made to share the burden of agrarian reform, an objection also made by
the sugar planters on the ground that they belong to a particular class with particular interests of
their own. However, no evidence has been submitted to the Court that the requisites of a valid
classification have been violated.
Classification has been defined as the grouping of persons or things similar to each other in
certain particulars and different from each other in these same particulars. 31 To be valid, it must
conform to the following requirements: (1) it must be based on substantial distinctions; (2) it
must be germane to the purposes of the law; (3) it must not be limited to existing conditions
only; and (4) it must apply equally to all the members of the class. 32 The Court finds that all
these requisites have been met by the measures here challenged as arbitrary and discriminatory.
Equal protection simply means that all persons or things similarly situated must be treated alike
both as to the rights conferred and the liabilities imposed. 33 The petitioners have not shown that
they belong to a different class and entitled to a different treatment. The argument that not only
landowners but also owners of other properties must be made to share the burden of
implementing land reform must be rejected. There is a substantial distinction between these two
classes of owners that is clearly visible except to those who will not see. There is no need to
elaborate on this matter. In any event, the Congress is allowed a wide leeway in providing for a
valid classification. Its decision is accorded recognition and respect by the courts of justice
except only where its discretion is abused to the detriment of the Bill of Rights.
It is worth remarking at this juncture that a statute may be sustained under the police power only
if there is a concurrence of the lawful subject and the lawful method. Put otherwise, the interests
of the public generally as distinguished from those of a particular class require the interference of
the State and, no less important, the means employed are reasonably necessary for the attainment
of the purpose sought to be achieved and not unduly oppressive upon individuals. 34 As the
subject and purpose of agrarian reform have been laid down by the Constitution itself, we may
say that the first requirement has been satisfied. What remains to be examined is the validity of
the method employed to achieve the constitutional goal.
One of the basic principles of the democratic system is that where the rights of the individual are
concerned, the end does not justify the means. It is not enough that there be a valid objective; it
is also necessary that the means employed to pursue it be in keeping with the Constitution. Mere
expediency will not excuse constitutional shortcuts. There is no question that not even the
strongest moral conviction or the most urgent public need, subject only to a few notable
exceptions, will excuse the bypassing of an individual's rights. It is no exaggeration to say that a,
person invoking a right guaranteed under Article III of the Constitution is a majority of one even
as against the rest of the nation who would deny him that right.
That right covers the person's life, his liberty and his property under Section 1 of Article III of
the Constitution. With regard to his property, the owner enjoys the added protection of Section 9,
which reaffirms the familiar rule that private property shall not be taken for public use without
just compensation.
This brings us now to the power of eminent domain.
IV
Eminent domain is an inherent power of the State that enables it to forcibly
acquire private lands intended for public use upon payment of just compensation
to the owner. Obviously, there is no need to expropriate where the owner is
willing to sell under terms also acceptable to the purchaser, in which case an
ordinary deed of sale may be agreed upon by the parties. 35 It is only where the
owner is unwilling to sell, or cannot accept the price or other conditions offered
by the vendee, that the power of eminent domain will come into play to assert the
paramount authority of the State over the interests of the property owner. Private
rights must then yield to the irresistible demands of the public interest on the
time-honored justification, as in the case of the police power, that the welfare of
the people is the supreme law.
But for all its primacy and urgency, the power of expropriation is by no means absolute (as
indeed no power is absolute). The limitation is found in the constitutional injunction that "private
property shall not be taken for public use without just compensation" and in the abundant
jurisprudence that has evolved from the interpretation of this principle. Basically, the
requirements for a proper exercise of the power are: (1) public use and (2) just compensation.
Let us dispose first of the argument raised by the petitioners in G.R. No. 79310 that the State
should first distribute public agricultural lands in the pursuit of agrarian reform instead of
immediately disturbing property rights by forcibly acquiring private agricultural lands.
Parenthetically, it is not correct to say that only public agricultural lands may be covered by the
CARP as the Constitution calls for "the just distribution of all agricultural lands." In any event,
the decision to redistribute private agricultural lands in the manner prescribed by the CARP was
made by the legislative and executive departments in the exercise of their discretion. We are not
justified in reviewing that discretion in the absence of a clear showing that it has been abused.
A becoming courtesy admonishes us to respect the decisions of the political departments when
they decide what is known as the political question. As explained by Chief Justice Concepcion in
the case of Taada v. Cuenco: 36
The term "political question" connotes what it means in ordinary parlance,
namely, a question of policy. It refers to "those questions which, under the
Constitution, are to be decided by the people in their sovereign capacity; or in
regard to which full discretionary authority has been delegated to the legislative or
executive branch of the government." It is concerned with issues dependent upon
the wisdom, not legality, of a particular measure.
It is true that the concept of the political question has been constricted with the enlargement of
judicial power, which now includes the authority of the courts "to determine whether or not there
has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of
any branch or instrumentality of the Government." 37 Even so, this should not be construed as a
license for us to reverse the other departments simply because their views may not coincide with
ours.
The legislature and the executive have been seen fit, in their wisdom, to include in the CARP the
redistribution of private landholdings (even as the distribution of public agricultural lands is first
provided for, while also continuing apace under the Public Land Act and other cognate laws).
The Court sees no justification to interpose its authority, which we may assert only if we believe
that the political decision is not unwise, but illegal. We do not find it to be so.
In U.S. v. Chandler-Dunbar Water Power Company, 38 it was held:
Congress having determined, as it did by the Act of March 3,1909 that the entire
St. Mary's river between the American bank and the international line, as well as
all of the upland north of the present ship canal, throughout its entire length, was
"necessary for the purpose of navigation of said waters, and the waters connected
therewith," that determination is conclusive in condemnation proceedings
instituted by the United States under that Act, and there is no room for judicial
review of the judgment of Congress ... .
As earlier observed, the requirement for public use has already been settled for us by the
Constitution itself No less than the 1987 Charter calls for agrarian reform, which is the reason
why private agricultural lands are to be taken from their owners, subject to the prescribed
maximum retention limits. The purposes specified in P.D. No. 27, Proc. No. 131 and R.A. No.
6657 are only an elaboration of the constitutional injunction that the State adopt the necessary
measures "to encourage and undertake the just distribution of all agricultural lands to enable
farmers who are landless to own directly or collectively the lands they till." That public use, as
pronounced by the fundamental law itself, must be binding on us.
The second requirement, i.e., the payment of just compensation, needs a longer and more
thoughtful examination.
Just compensation is defined as the full and fair equivalent of the property taken from its owner
by the expropriator. 39 It has been repeatedly stressed by this Court that the measure is not the
taker's gain but the owner's loss.40 The word "just" is used to intensify the meaning of the word
"compensation" to convey the idea that the equivalent to be rendered for the property to be taken
shall be real, substantial, full, ample. 41
It bears repeating that the measures challenged in these petitions contemplate more than a mere
regulation of the use of private lands under the police power. We deal here with an actual taking
of private agricultural lands that has dispossessed the owners of their property and deprived them
of all its beneficial use and enjoyment, to entitle them to the just compensation mandated by the
Constitution.
As held in Republic of the Philippines v. Castellvi, 42 there is compensable taking when the
following conditions concur: (1) the expropriator must enter a private property; (2) the entry
must be for more than a momentary period; (3) the entry must be under warrant or color of legal
authority; (4) the property must be devoted to public use or otherwise informally appropriated or
injuriously affected; and (5) the utilization of the property for public use must be in such a way
as to oust the owner and deprive him of beneficial enjoyment of the property. All these requisites
are envisioned in the measures before us.
Where the State itself is the expropriator, it is not necessary for it to make a deposit upon its
taking possession of the condemned property, as "the compensation is a public charge, the good
faith of the public is pledged for its payment, and all the resources of taxation may be employed
in raising the amount." 43 Nevertheless, Section 16(e) of the CARP Law provides that:
Upon receipt by the landowner of the corresponding payment or, in case of
rejection or no response from the landowner, upon the deposit with an accessible
bank designated by the DAR of the compensation in cash or in LBP bonds in
accordance with this Act, the DAR shall take immediate possession of the land
and shall request the proper Register of Deeds to issue a Transfer Certificate of
Title (TCT) in the name of the Republic of the Philippines. The DAR shall
thereafter proceed with the redistribution of the land to the qualified beneficiaries.
Objection is raised, however, to the manner of fixing the just compensation, which it is claimed
is entrusted to the administrative authorities in violation of judicial prerogatives. Specific
reference is made to Section 16(d), which provides that in case of the rejection or disregard by
the owner of the offer of the government to buy his land... the DAR shall conduct summary administrative proceedings to determine the
compensation for the land by requiring the landowner, the LBP and other
interested parties to submit evidence as to the just compensation for the land,
within fifteen (15) days from the receipt of the notice. After the expiration of the
above period, the matter is deemed submitted for decision. The DAR shall decide
the case within thirty (30) days after it is submitted for decision.
To be sure, the determination of just compensation is a function addressed to the courts of justice
and may not be usurped by any other branch or official of the government. EPZA v.
Dulay 44 resolved a challenge to several decrees promulgated by President Marcos providing that
the just compensation for property under expropriation should be either the assessment of the
property by the government or the sworn valuation thereof by the owner, whichever was lower.
In declaring these decrees unconstitutional, the Court held through Mr. Justice Hugo E.
Gutierrez, Jr.:
The method of ascertaining just compensation under the aforecited decrees
constitutes impermissible encroachment on judicial prerogatives. It tends to
render this Court inutile in a matter which under this Constitution is reserved to it
for final determination.
Thus, although in an expropriation proceeding the court technically would still
have the power to determine the just compensation for the property, following the
applicable decrees, its task would be relegated to simply stating the lower value of
the property as declared either by the owner or the assessor. As a necessary
consequence, it would be useless for the court to appoint commissioners under
Rule 67 of the Rules of Court. Moreover, the need to satisfy the due process
clause in the taking of private property is seemingly fulfilled since it cannot be
said that a judicial proceeding was not had before the actual taking. However, the
strict application of the decrees during the proceedings would be nothing short of
a mere formality or charade as the court has only to choose between the valuation
of the owner and that of the assessor, and its choice is always limited to the lower
of the two. The court cannot exercise its discretion or independence in
determining what is just or fair. Even a grade school pupil could substitute for the
judge insofar as the determination of constitutional just compensation is
concerned.
xxx
In the present petition, we are once again confronted with the same question of
whether the courts under P.D. No. 1533, which contains the same provision on
just compensation as its predecessor decrees, still have the power and authority to
determine just compensation, independent of what is stated by the decree and to
this effect, to appoint commissioners for such purpose.
This time, we answer in the affirmative.
xxx
It is violative of due process to deny the owner the opportunity to prove that the
valuation in the tax documents is unfair or wrong. And it is repulsive to the basic
concepts of justice and fairness to allow the haphazard work of a minor
bureaucrat or clerk to absolutely prevail over the judgment of a court promulgated
only after expert commissioners have actually viewed the property, after evidence
and arguments pro and con have been presented, and after all factors and
considerations essential to a fair and just determination have been judiciously
evaluated.
A reading of the aforecited Section 16(d) will readily show that it does not suffer from the
arbitrariness that rendered the challenged decrees constitutionally objectionable. Although the
proceedings are described as summary, the landowner and other interested parties are
nevertheless allowed an opportunity to submit evidence on the real value of the property. But
more importantly, the determination of the just compensation by the DAR is not by any means
final and conclusive upon the landowner or any other interested party, for Section 16(f) clearly
provides:
Any party who disagrees with the decision may bring the matter to the court of
proper jurisdiction for final determination of just compensation.
The determination made by the DAR is only preliminary unless accepted by all parties
concerned. Otherwise, the courts of justice will still have the right to review with finality the said
determination in the exercise of what is admittedly a judicial function.
The second and more serious objection to the provisions on just compensation is not as easily
resolved.
This refers to Section 18 of the CARP Law providing in full as follows:
SEC. 18. Valuation and Mode of Compensation. The LBP shall compensate the
landowner in such amount as may be agreed upon by the landowner and the DAR
and the LBP, in accordance with the criteria provided for in Sections 16 and 17,
and other pertinent provisions hereof, or as may be finally determined by the
court, as the just compensation for the land.
The compensation shall be paid in one of the following modes, at the option of the
landowner:
(1) Cash payment, under the following terms and conditions:
(a) For lands above fifty (50) hectares, insofar as the
excess hectarage is concerned Twenty-five
percent (25%) cash, the balance to be paid in
government financial instruments negotiable at any
time.
(b) For lands above twenty-four (24) hectares and
up to fifty (50) hectares Thirty percent (30%)
cash, the balance to be paid in government financial
instruments negotiable at any time.
(c) For lands twenty-four (24) hectares and below
Thirty-five percent (35%) cash, the balance to be
paid in government financial instruments negotiable
at any time.
(2) Shares of stock in government-owned or controlled corporations, LBP
preferred shares, physical assets or other qualified investments in accordance with
guidelines set by the PARC;
(3) Tax credits which can be used against any tax liability;
(4) LBP bonds, which shall have the following features:
(a) Market interest rates aligned with 91-day
treasury bill rates. Ten percent (10%) of the face
value of the bonds shall mature every year from the
date of issuance until the tenth (10th) year:
Provided, That should the landowner choose to
forego the cash portion, whether in full or in part, he
shall be paid correspondingly in LBP bonds;
(b) Transferability and negotiability. Such LBP
bonds may be used by the landowner, his
successors-ininterest or his assigns, up to the
amount of their face value, for any of the following:
(i) Acquisition of land or other real properties of the
government, including assets under the Asset
Privatization Program and other assets foreclosed
by government financial institutions in the same
province or region where the lands for which the
bonds were paid are situated;
(ii) Acquisition of shares of stock of governmentowned or controlled corporations or shares of stock
owned by the government in private corporations;
(iii) Substitution for surety or bail bonds for the
provisional release of accused persons, or for
performance bonds;
(iv) Security for loans with any government

financial institution, provided the proceeds of the
loans shall be invested in an economic enterprise,
preferably in a small and medium- scale industry, in
the same province or region as the land for which
the bonds are paid;
(v) Payment for various taxes and fees to
government: Provided, That the use of these bonds
for these purposes will be limited to a certain
percentage of the outstanding balance of the
financial instruments; Provided, further, That the
PARC shall determine the percentages mentioned
above;
(vi) Payment for tuition fees of the immediate
family of the original bondholder in government
universities, colleges, trade schools, and other
institutions;
(vii) Payment for fees of the immediate family of
the original bondholder in government hospitals;
and
(viii) Such other uses as the PARC may from time
to time allow.
The contention of the petitioners in G.R. No. 79777 is that the above provision is
unconstitutional insofar as it requires the owners of the expropriated properties to accept just
compensation therefor in less than money, which is the only medium of payment allowed. In
support of this contention, they cite jurisprudence holding that:
The fundamental rule in expropriation matters is that the owner of the property
expropriated is entitled to a just compensation, which should be neither more nor
less, whenever it is possible to make the assessment, than the money equivalent of
said property. Just compensation has always been understood to be the just and
complete equivalent of the loss which the owner of the thing expropriated has to
suffer by reason of the expropriation . 45 (Emphasis supplied.)
In J.M. Tuazon Co. v. Land Tenure Administration, 46 this Court held:
It is well-settled that just compensation means the equivalent for the value of the
property at the time of its taking. Anything beyond that is more, and anything
short of that is less, than just compensation. It means a fair and full equivalent for
the loss sustained, which is the measure of the indemnity, not whatever gain
would accrue to the expropriating entity. The market value of the land taken is the
just compensation to which the owner of condemned property is entitled, the
market value being that sum of money which a person desirous, but not compelled
to buy, and an owner, willing, but not compelled to sell, would agree on as a price
to be given and received for such property. (Emphasis supplied.)
In the United States, where much of our jurisprudence on the subject has been derived, the
weight of authority is also to the effect that just compensation for property expropriated is
payable only in money and not otherwise. Thus
The medium of payment of compensation is ready money or cash. The condemnor
cannot compel the owner to accept anything but money, nor can the owner compel
or require the condemnor to pay him on any other basis than the value of the
property in money at the time and in the manner prescribed by the Constitution
and the statutes. When the power of eminent domain is resorted to, there must be
a standard medium of payment, binding upon both parties, and the law has fixed
that standard as money in cash. 47 (Emphasis supplied.)
Part cash and deferred payments are not and cannot, in the nature of things, be
regarded as a reliable and constant standard of compensation. 48
"Just compensation" for property taken by condemnation means a fair equivalent
in money, which must be paid at least within a reasonable time after the taking,
and it is not within the power of the Legislature to substitute for such payment
future obligations, bonds, or other valuable advantage. 49 (Emphasis supplied.)
It cannot be denied from these cases that the traditional medium for the payment of just
compensation is money and no other. And so, conformably, has just compensation been paid in
the past solely in that medium. However, we do not deal here with the traditional excercise of the
power of eminent domain. This is not an ordinary expropriation where only a specific property of
relatively limited area is sought to be taken by the State from its owner for a specific and perhaps
local purpose.
What we deal with here is a revolutionary kind of expropriation.
The expropriation before us affects all private agricultural lands whenever found and of whatever
kind as long as they are in excess of the maximum retention limits allowed their owners. This
kind of expropriation is intended for the benefit not only of a particular community or of a small
segment of the population but of the entire Filipino nation, from all levels of our society, from
the impoverished farmer to the land-glutted owner. Its purpose does not cover only the whole
territory of this country but goes beyond in time to the foreseeable future, which it hopes to
secure and edify with the vision and the sacrifice of the present generation of Filipinos.
Generations yet to come are as involved in this program as we are today, although hopefully only
as beneficiaries of a richer and more fulfilling life we will guarantee to them tomorrow through
our thoughtfulness today. And, finally, let it not be forgotten that it is no less than the
Constitution itself that has ordained this revolution in the farms, calling for "a just distribution"
among the farmers of lands that have heretofore been the prison of their dreams but can now
become the key at least to their deliverance.
Such a program will involve not mere millions of pesos. The cost will be tremendous.
Considering the vast areas of land subject to expropriation under the laws before us, we estimate
that hundreds of billions of pesos will be needed, far more indeed than the amount of P50 billion
initially appropriated, which is already staggering as it is by our present standards. Such amount
is in fact not even fully available at this time.
We assume that the framers of the Constitution were aware of this difficulty when they called for
agrarian reform as a top priority project of the government. It is a part of this assumption that
when they envisioned the expropriation that would be needed, they also intended that the just
compensation would have to be paid not in the orthodox way but a less conventional if more
practical method. There can be no doubt that they were aware of the financial limitations of the
government and had no illusions that there would be enough money to pay in cash and in full for
the lands they wanted to be distributed among the farmers. We may therefore assume that their
intention was to allow such manner of payment as is now provided for by the CARP Law,
particularly the payment of the balance (if the owner cannot be paid fully with money), or indeed
of the entire amount of the just compensation, with other things of value. We may also suppose
that what they had in mind was a similar scheme of payment as that prescribed in P.D. No. 27,
which was the law in force at the time they deliberated on the new Charter and with which they
presumably agreed in principle.
The Court has not found in the records of the Constitutional Commission any categorical
agreement among the members regarding the meaning to be given the concept of just
compensation as applied to the comprehensive agrarian reform program being contemplated.
There was the suggestion to "fine tune" the requirement to suit the demands of the project even
as it was also felt that they should "leave it to Congress" to determine how payment should be
made to the landowner and reimbursement required from the farmer-beneficiaries. Such
innovations as "progressive compensation" and "State-subsidized compensation" were also
proposed. In the end, however, no special definition of the just compensation for the lands to be
expropriated was reached by the Commission. 50
On the other hand, there is nothing in the records either that militates against the assumptions we
are making of the general sentiments and intention of the members on the content and manner of
the payment to be made to the landowner in the light of the magnitude of the expenditure and the
limitations of the expropriator.
With these assumptions, the Court hereby declares that the content and manner of the just
compensation provided for in the aforequoted Section 18 of the CARP Law is not violative of
the Constitution. We do not mind admitting that a certain degree of pragmatism has influenced
our decision on this issue, but after all this Court is not a cloistered institution removed from the
realities and demands of society or oblivious to the need for its enhancement. The Court is as
acutely anxious as the rest of our people to see the goal of agrarian reform achieved at last after
the frustrations and deprivations of our peasant masses during all these disappointing decades.
We are aware that invalidation of the said section will result in the nullification of the entire
program, killing the farmer's hopes even as they approach realization and resurrecting the spectre
of discontent and dissent in the restless countryside. That is not in our view the intention of the
Constitution, and that is not what we shall decree today.
Accepting the theory that payment of the just compensation is not always required to be made
fully in money, we find further that the proportion of cash payment to the other things of value
constituting the total payment, as determined on the basis of the areas of the lands expropriated,
is not unduly oppressive upon the landowner. It is noted that the smaller the land, the bigger the
payment in money, primarily because the small landowner will be needing it more than the big
landowners, who can afford a bigger balance in bonds and other things of value. No less
importantly, the government financial instruments making up the balance of the payment are
"negotiable at any time." The other modes, which are likewise available to the landowner at his
option, are also not unreasonable because payment is made in shares of stock, LBP bonds, other
properties or assets, tax credits, and other things of value equivalent to the amount of just
compensation.
Admittedly, the compensation contemplated in the law will cause the landowners, big and small,
not a little inconvenience. As already remarked, this cannot be avoided. Nevertheless, it is
devoutly hoped that these countrymen of ours, conscious as we know they are of the need for
their forebearance and even sacrifice, will not begrudge us their indispensable share in the
attainment of the ideal of agrarian reform. Otherwise, our pursuit of this elusive goal will be like
the quest for the Holy Grail.
The complaint against the effects of non-registration of the land under E.O. No. 229 does not
seem to be viable any more as it appears that Section 4 of the said Order has been superseded by
Section 14 of the CARP Law. This repeats the requisites of registration as embodied in the earlier
measure but does not provide, as the latter did, that in case of failure or refusal to register the
land, the valuation thereof shall be that given by the provincial or city assessor for tax purposes.
On the contrary, the CARP Law says that the just compensation shall be ascertained on the basis
of the factors mentioned in its Section 17 and in the manner provided for in Section 16.
The last major challenge to CARP is that the landowner is divested of his property even before
actual payment to him in full of just compensation, in contravention of a well- accepted principle
of eminent domain.
The recognized rule, indeed, is that title to the property expropriated shall pass from the owner to
the expropriator only upon full payment of the just compensation. Jurisprudence on this settled
principle is consistent both here and in other democratic jurisdictions. Thus:
Title to property which is the subject of condemnation proceedings does not vest the condemnor
until the judgment fixing just compensation is entered and paid, but the condemnor's title relates
back to the date on which the petition under the Eminent Domain Act, or the commissioner's
report under the Local Improvement Act, is filed. 51
... although the right to appropriate and use land taken for a canal is complete at the time of entry,
title to the property taken remains in the owner until payment is actually made. 52 (Emphasis
supplied.)
In Kennedy v. Indianapolis, 53 the US Supreme Court cited several cases holding that title to
property does not pass to the condemnor until just compensation had actually been made. In fact,
the decisions appear to be uniformly to this effect. As early as 1838, in Rubottom v. McLure, 54 it
was held that "actual payment to the owner of the condemned property was a condition precedent
to the investment of the title to the property in the State" albeit "not to the appropriation of it to
public use." In Rexford v. Knight, 55 the Court of Appeals of New York said that the construction
upon the statutes was that the fee did not vest in the State until the payment of the compensation
although the authority to enter upon and appropriate the land was complete prior to the payment.
Kennedy further said that "both on principle and authority the rule is ... that the right to enter on
and use the property is complete, as soon as the property is actually appropriated under the
authority of law for a public use, but that the title does not pass from the owner without his
consent, until just compensation has been made to him."
Our own Supreme Court has held in Visayan Refining Co. v. Camus and Paredes, 56 that:
If the laws which we have exhibited or cited in the preceding discussion are
attentively examined it will be apparent that the method of expropriation adopted
in this jurisdiction is such as to afford absolute reassurance that no piece of land
can be finally and irrevocably taken from an unwilling owner until compensation
is paid ... . (Emphasis supplied.)
It is true that P.D. No. 27 expressly ordered the emancipation of tenant-farmer as October 21,
1972 and declared that he shall "be deemed the owner" of a portion of land consisting of a
family-sized farm except that "no title to the land owned by him was to be actually issued to him
unless and until he had become a full-fledged member of a duly recognized farmers'
cooperative." It was understood, however, that full payment of the just compensation also had to
be made first, conformably to the constitutional requirement.
When E.O. No. 228, categorically stated in its Section 1 that:
All qualified farmer-beneficiaries are now deemed full owners as of October 21,
1972 of the land they acquired by virtue of Presidential Decree No. 27. (Emphasis
supplied.)
it was obviously referring to lands already validly acquired under the said decree, after proof of
full-fledged membership in the farmers' cooperatives and full payment of just compensation.
Hence, it was also perfectly proper for the Order to also provide in its Section 2 that the "lease
rentals paid to the landowner by the farmer- beneficiary after October 21, 1972 (pending transfer
of ownership after full payment of just compensation), shall be considered as advance payment
for the land."
The CARP Law, for its part, conditions the transfer of possession and ownership of the land to
the government on receipt by the landowner of the corresponding payment or the deposit by the
DAR of the compensation in cash or LBP bonds with an accessible bank. Until then, title also
remains with the landowner. 57 No outright change of ownership is contemplated either.
Hence, the argument that the assailed measures violate due process by arbitrarily transferring
title before the land is fully paid for must also be rejected.
It is worth stressing at this point that all rights acquired by the tenant-farmer under P.D. No. 27,
as recognized under E.O. No. 228, are retained by him even now under R.A. No. 6657. This
should counter-balance the express provision in Section 6 of the said law that "the landowners
whose lands have been covered by Presidential Decree No. 27 shall be allowed to keep the area
originally retained by them thereunder, further, That original homestead grantees or direct
compulsory heirs who still own the original homestead at the time of the approval of this Act
shall retain the same areas as long as they continue to cultivate said homestead."
In connection with these retained rights, it does not appear in G.R. No. 78742 that the appeal
filed by the petitioners with the Office of the President has already been resolved. Although we
have said that the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies need not preclude immediate
resort to judicial action, there are factual issues that have yet to be examined on the
administrative level, especially the claim that the petitioners are not covered by LOI 474 because
they do not own other agricultural lands than the subjects of their petition.
Obviously, the Court cannot resolve these issues. In any event, assuming that the petitioners have
not yet exercised their retention rights, if any, under P.D. No. 27, the Court holds that they are
entitled to the new retention rights provided for by R.A. No. 6657, which in fact are on the whole
more liberal than those granted by the decree.
V
The CARP Law and the other enactments also involved in these cases have been the subject of
bitter attack from those who point to the shortcomings of these measures and ask that they be
scrapped entirely. To be sure, these enactments are less than perfect; indeed, they should be
continuously re-examined and rehoned, that they may be sharper instruments for the better
protection of the farmer's rights. But we have to start somewhere. In the pursuit of agrarian
reform, we do not tread on familiar ground but grope on terrain fraught with pitfalls and
expected difficulties. This is inevitable. The CARP Law is not a tried and tested project. On the
contrary, to use Justice Holmes's words, "it is an experiment, as all life is an experiment," and so
we learn as we venture forward, and, if necessary, by our own mistakes. We cannot expect
perfection although we should strive for it by all means. Meantime, we struggle as best we can in
freeing the farmer from the iron shackles that have unconscionably, and for so long, fettered his
soul to the soil.
By the decision we reach today, all major legal obstacles to the comprehensive agrarian reform
program are removed, to clear the way for the true freedom of the farmer. We may now glimpse
the day he will be released not only from want but also from the exploitation and disdain of the
past and from his own feelings of inadequacy and helplessness. At last his servitude will be
ended forever. At last the farm on which he toils will be his farm. It will be his portion of the
Mother Earth that will give him not only the staff of life but also the joy of living. And where
once it bred for him only deep despair, now can he see in it the fruition of his hopes for a more
fulfilling future. Now at last can he banish from his small plot of earth his insecurities and dark
resentments and "rebuild in it the music and the dream."
WHEREFORE, the Court holds as follows:
1. R.A. No. 6657, P.D. No. 27, Proc. No. 131, and E.O. Nos. 228 and 229 are
SUSTAINED against all the constitutional objections raised in the herein
petitions.
2. Title to all expropriated properties shall be transferred to the State only upon
full payment of compensation to their respective owners.
3. All rights previously acquired by the tenant- farmers under P.D. No. 27 are
retained and recognized.
4. Landowners who were unable to exercise their rights of retention under P.D.
No. 27 shall enjoy the retention rights granted by R.A. No. 6657 under the
conditions therein prescribed.
5. Subject to the above-mentioned rulings all the petitions are DISMISSED,
without pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.
Fernan, (C.J.), Narvasa, Melencio-Herrera, Gutierrez, Jr., Paras, Feliciano, Gancayco, Padilla,
Bidin, Sarmiento, Cortes, Grio-Aquino, Medialdea and Regalado, JJ., concur.
35 Noble v. City of Manila, 67 Phil. 1.

36 100 Phil. 1101.
37 1987 Constitution, Art. VIII, Sec. 1.
38 57 L ed. 1063.
39 Manila Railroad Co. v. Velasquez, 32 Phil. 286.
40 Province of Tayabas v. Perez, 66 Phil. 467; J.M. Tuazon & Co., Inc. v. Land
Tenure Administration, 31 SCRA 413; Municipality of Daet v. Court of Appeals,
93 SCRA 503; Manotok v. National Housing Authority, 150 SCRA 89.
41 City of Manila v. Estrada, 25 Phil. 208.
42 58 SCRA 336.
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. 171101
July 5, 2011
HACIENDA LUISITA, INCORPORATED, Petitioner,

LUISITA INDUSTRIAL PARK CORPORATION and RIZAL COMMERCIAL BANKING
CORPORATION,Petitioners-in-Intervention,
vs.
PRESIDENTIAL AGRARIAN REFORM COUNCIL; SECRETARY NASSER
PANGANDAMAN OF THE DEPARTMENT OF AGRARIAN REFORM; ALYANSA NG
MGA MANGGAGAWANG BUKID NG HACIENDA LUISITA, RENE GALANG, NOEL
MALLARI, and JULIO SUNIGA1 and his SUPERVISORY GROUP OF THE HACIENDA
LUISITA, INC. and WINDSOR ANDAYA, Respondents.
DECISION
VELASCO, JR., J.:
"Land for the landless," a shibboleth the landed gentry doubtless has received with much
misgiving, if not resistance, even if only the number of agrarian suits filed serves to be the norm.
Through the years, this battle cry and root of discord continues to reflect the seemingly ceaseless
discourse on, and great disparity in, the distribution of land among the people, "dramatizing the
increasingly urgent demand of the dispossessed x x x for a plot of earth as their place in the
sun."2 As administrations and political alignments change, policies advanced, and agrarian
reform laws enacted, the latest being what is considered a comprehensive piece, the face of land
reform varies and is masked in myriads of ways. The stated goal, however, remains the same:
clear the way for the true freedom of the farmer.3
Land reform, or the broader term "agrarian reform," has been a government policy even before
the Commonwealth era. In fact, at the onset of the American regime, initial steps toward land
reform were already taken to address social unrest. 4 Then, under the 1935 Constitution, specific
provisions on social justice and expropriation of landed estates for distribution to tenants as a
solution to land ownership and tenancy issues were incorporated.
In 1955, the Land Reform Act (Republic Act No. [RA] 1400) was passed, setting in motion the
expropriation of all tenanted estates.5
On August 8, 1963, the Agricultural Land Reform Code (RA 3844) was enacted, 6 abolishing
share tenancy and converting all instances of share tenancy into leasehold tenancy.7 RA 3844
created the Land Bank of the Philippines (LBP) to provide support in all phases of agrarian
reform.
As its major thrust, RA 3844 aimed to create a system of owner-cultivatorship in rice and corn,
supposedly to be accomplished by expropriating lands in excess of 75 hectares for their eventual
resale to tenants. The law, however, had this restricting feature: its operations were confined
mainly to areas in Central Luzon, and its implementation at any level of intensity limited to the
pilot project in Nueva Ecija.8
Subsequently, Congress passed the Code of Agrarian Reform (RA 6389) declaring the entire
country a land reform area, and providing for the automatic conversion of tenancy to leasehold
tenancy in all areas. From 75 hectares, the retention limit was cut down to seven hectares.9
Barely a month after declaring martial law in September 1972, then President Ferdinand Marcos
issued Presidential Decree No. 27 (PD 27) for the "emancipation of the tiller from the bondage of
the soil."10 Based on this issuance, tenant-farmers, depending on the size of the landholding
worked on, can either purchase the land they tilled or shift from share to fixed-rent leasehold
tenancy.11 While touted as "revolutionary," the scope of the agrarian reform program PD 27
enunciated covered only tenanted, privately-owned rice and corn lands.12
Then came the revolutionary government of then President Corazon C. Aquino and the drafting
and eventual ratification of the 1987 Constitution. Its provisions foreshadowed the establishment
of a legal framework for the formulation of an expansive approach to land reform, affecting all
agricultural lands and covering both tenant-farmers and regular farmworkers.13
So it was that Proclamation No. 131, Series of 1987, was issued instituting a comprehensive
agrarian reform program (CARP) to cover all agricultural lands, regardless of tenurial
arrangement and commodity produced, as provided in the Constitution.
On July 22, 1987, Executive Order No. 229 (EO 229) was issued providing, as its
title14 indicates, the mechanisms for CARP implementation. It created the Presidential Agrarian
Reform Council (PARC) as the highest policy-making body that formulates all policies, rules,
and regulations necessary for the implementation of CARP.
On June 15, 1988, RA 6657 or the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law of 1988, also known as
CARL or the CARP Law, took effect, ushering in a new process of land classification,
acquisition, and distribution. As to be expected, RA 6657 met stiff opposition, its validity or
some of its provisions challenged at every possible turn.Association of Small Landowners in the
Philippines, Inc. v. Secretary of Agrarian Reform 15 stated the observation that the assault was
inevitable, the CARP being an untried and untested project, "an experiment [even], as all life is
an experiment," the Court said, borrowing from Justice Holmes.
The Case
In this Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition under Rule 65 with prayer for preliminary
injunctive relief, petitioner Hacienda Luisita, Inc. (HLI) assails and seeks to set aside PARC
Resolution No. 2005-32-0116 and Resolution No. 2006-34-0117 issued on December 22, 2005 and
May 3, 2006, respectively, as well as the implementing Notice of Coverage dated January 2,
2006 (Notice of Coverage).18
The Facts
At the core of the case is Hacienda Luisita de Tarlac (Hacienda Luisita), once a 6,443-hectare
mixed agricultural-industrial-residential expanse straddling several municipalities of Tarlac and
owned by Compaia General de Tabacos de Filipinas (Tabacalera). In 1957, the Spanish owners
of Tabacalera offered to sell Hacienda Luisita as well as their controlling interest in the sugar
mill within the hacienda, the Central Azucarera de Tarlac (CAT), as an indivisible transaction.
The Tarlac Development Corporation (Tadeco), then owned and/or controlled by the Jose
Cojuangco, Sr. Group, was willing to buy. As agreed upon, Tadeco undertook to pay the purchase
price for Hacienda Luisita in pesos, while that for the controlling interest in CAT, in US dollars.19
To facilitate the adverted sale-and-purchase package, the Philippine government, through the
then Central Bank of the Philippines, assisted the buyer to obtain a dollar loan from a US
bank.20 Also, the Government Service Insurance System (GSIS) Board of Trustees extended on
November 27, 1957 a PhP 5.911 million loan in favor of Tadeco to pay the peso price component
of the sale. One of the conditions contained in the approving GSIS Resolution No. 3203, as later
amended by Resolution No. 356, Series of 1958, reads as follows:
That the lots comprising the Hacienda Luisita shall be subdivided by the applicant-corporation
and sold at cost to the tenants, should there be any, and whenever conditions should exist
warranting such action under the provisions of the Land Tenure Act;21
As of March 31, 1958, Tadeco had fully paid the purchase price for the acquisition of Hacienda
Luisita and Tabacaleras interest in CAT.22
The details of the events that happened next involving the hacienda and the political color some
of the parties embossed are of minimal significance to this narration and need no belaboring.
Suffice it to state that on May 7, 1980, the martial law administration filed a suit before the
Manila Regional Trial Court (RTC) against Tadeco, et al., for them to surrender Hacienda Luisita
to the then Ministry of Agrarian Reform (MAR, now the Department of Agrarian Reform
[DAR]) so that the land can be distributed to farmers at cost. Responding, Tadeco or its owners
alleged that Hacienda Luisita does not have tenants, besides which sugar landsof which the
hacienda consistedare not covered by existing agrarian reform legislations. As perceived then,
the government commenced the case against Tadeco as a political message to the family of the
late Benigno Aquino, Jr.23
Eventually, the Manila RTC rendered judgment ordering Tadeco to surrender Hacienda Luisita to
the MAR. Therefrom, Tadeco appealed to the Court of Appeals (CA).
On March 17, 1988, the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) moved to withdraw the
governments case against Tadeco, et al. By Resolution of May 18, 1988, the CA dismissed the
case the Marcos government initially instituted and won against Tadeco, et al. The dismissal
action was, however, made subject to the obtention by Tadeco of the PARCs approval of a stock
distribution plan (SDP) that must initially be implemented after such approval shall have been
secured.24 The appellate court wrote:
The defendants-appellants x x x filed a motion on April 13, 1988 joining the x x x governmental
agencies concerned in moving for the dismissal of the case subject, however, to the following
conditions embodied in the letter dated April 8, 1988 (Annex 2) of the Secretary of the [DAR]
quoted, as follows:
1. Should TADECO fail to obtain approval of the stock distribution plan for failure to
comply with all the requirements for corporate landowners set forth in the guidelines
issued by the [PARC]: or
2. If such stock distribution plan is approved by PARC, but TADECO fails to initially
implement it.
xxxx
WHEREFORE, the present case on appeal is hereby dismissed without prejudice, and should be
revived if any of the conditions as above set forth is not duly complied with by the TADECO.25
Markedly, Section 10 of EO 22926 allows corporate landowners, as an alternative to the actual
land transfer scheme of CARP, to give qualified beneficiaries the right to purchase shares of
stocks of the corporation under a stock ownership arrangement and/or land-to-share ratio.
Like EO 229, RA 6657, under the latters Sec. 31, also provides two (2) alternative modalities,
i.e., land or stock transfer, pursuant to either of which the corporate landowner can comply with
CARP, but subject to well-defined conditions and timeline requirements. Sec. 31 of RA 6657
provides:
SEC. 31. Corporate Landowners.Corporate landowners may voluntarily transfer ownership
over their agricultural landholdings to the Republic of the Philippines pursuant to Section 20
hereof or to qualified beneficiaries x x x.
Upon certification by the DAR, corporations owning agricultural lands may give their qualified
beneficiaries the right to purchase such proportion of the capital stock of the corporation
that the agricultural land, actually devoted to agricultural activities, bears in relation to the
companys total assets, under such terms and conditions as may be agreed upon by them. In no
case shall the compensation received by the workers at the time the shares of stocks are
distributed be reduced. x x x
Corporations or associations which voluntarily divest a proportion of their capital stock, equity
or participation in favor of their workers or other qualified beneficiaries under this section shall
be deemed to have complied with the provisions of this Act: Provided, That the following
conditions are complied with:
(a) In order to safeguard the right of beneficiaries who own shares of stocks to dividends
and other financial benefits, the books of the corporation or association shall be subject to
periodic audit by certified public accountants chosen by the beneficiaries;
(b) Irrespective of the value of their equity in the corporation or association, the
beneficiaries shall be assured of at least one (1) representative in the board of directors, or
in a management or executive committee, if one exists, of the corporation or association;
(c) Any shares acquired by such workers and beneficiaries shall have the same rights and
features as all other shares; and
(d) Any transfer of shares of stocks by the original beneficiaries shall be void ab initio
unless said transaction is in favor of a qualified and registered beneficiary within the
same corporation.
If within two (2) years from the approval of this Act, the [voluntary] land or stock transfer
envisioned above is not made or realized or the plan for such stock distribution approved by the
PARC within the same period, the agricultural land of the corporate owners or corporation shall
be subject to the compulsory coverage of this Act. (Emphasis added.)
Vis--vis the stock distribution aspect of the aforequoted Sec. 31, DAR issued Administrative
Order No. 10, Series of 1988 (DAO 10), 27 entitled Guidelines and Procedures for Corporate
Landowners Desiring to Avail Themselves of the Stock Distribution Plan under Section 31 of RA
6657.
From the start, the stock distribution scheme appeared to be Tadecos preferred option, for, on
August 23, 1988,28 it organized a spin-off corporation, HLI, as vehicle to facilitate stock
acquisition by the farmworkers. For this purpose, Tadeco assigned and conveyed to HLI the
agricultural land portion (4,915.75 hectares) and other farm-related properties of Hacienda
Luisita in exchange for HLI shares of stock.29
Pedro Cojuangco, Josephine C. Reyes, Teresita C. Lopa, Jose Cojuangco, Jr., and Paz C. Teopaco
were the incorporators of HLI.30
To accommodate the assets transfer from Tadeco to HLI, the latter, with the Securities and
Exchange Commissions (SECs) approval, increased its capital stock on May 10, 1989 from PhP
1,500,000 divided into 1,500,000 shares with a par value of PhP 1/share to PhP 400,000,000
divided into 400,000,000 shares also with par value of PhP 1/share, 150,000,000 of which were
to be issued only to qualified and registered beneficiaries of the CARP, and the remaining
250,000,000 to any stockholder of the corporation.31
As appearing in its proposed SDP, the properties and assets of Tadeco contributed to the capital
stock of HLI, as appraised and approved by the SEC, have an aggregate value of PhP
590,554,220, or after deducting the total liabilities of the farm amounting to PhP 235,422,758, a
net value of PhP 355,531,462. This translated to 355,531,462 shares with a par value of PhP
1/share.32
On May 9, 1989, some 93% of the then farmworker-beneficiaries (FWBs) complement of
Hacienda Luisita signified in a referendum their acceptance of the proposed HLIs Stock
Distribution Option Plan. On May 11, 1989, the Stock Distribution Option Agreement (SDOA),
styled as a Memorandum of Agreement (MOA),33 was entered into by Tadeco, HLI, and the
5,848 qualified FWBs34 and attested to by then DAR Secretary Philip Juico. The SDOA
embodied the basis and mechanics of the SDP, which would eventually be submitted to the
PARC for approval. In the SDOA, the parties agreed to the following:
1. The percentage of the value of the agricultural land of Hacienda Luisita
(P196,630,000.00) in relation to the total assets (P590,554,220.00) transferred and
conveyed to the SECOND PARTY [HLI] is 33.296% that, under the law, is the proportion
of the outstanding capital stock of the SECOND PARTY, which is P355,531,462.00 or
355,531,462 shares with a par value of P1.00 per share, that has to be distributed to the
THIRD PARTY [FWBs] under the stock distribution plan, the said 33.296% thereof
being P118,391,976.85 or 118,391,976.85 shares.
2. The qualified beneficiaries of the stock distribution plan shall be the farmworkers who
appear in the annual payroll, inclusive of the permanent and seasonal employees, who are
regularly or periodically employed by the SECOND PARTY.
3. At the end of each fiscal year, for a period of 30 years, the SECOND PARTY shall
arrange with the FIRST PARTY [Tadeco] the acquisition and distribution to the THIRD
PARTY on the basis of number of days worked and at no cost to them of one-thirtieth
(1/30) of 118,391,976.85 shares of the capital stock of the SECOND PARTY that are
presently owned and held by the FIRST PARTY, until such time as the entire block of
118,391,976.85 shares shall have been completely acquired and distributed to the THIRD
PARTY.
4.The SECOND PARTY shall guarantee to the qualified beneficiaries of the [SDP] that
every year they will receive on top of their regular compensation, an amount that
approximates the equivalent of three (3%) of the total gross sales from the production of
the agricultural land, whether it be in the form of cash dividends or incentive bonuses or
both.
5. Even if only a part or fraction of the shares earmarked for distribution will have been
acquired from the FIRST PARTY and distributed to the THIRD PARTY, FIRST PARTY
shall execute at the beginning of each fiscal year an irrevocable proxy, valid and effective
for one (1) year, in favor of the farmworkers appearing as shareholders of the SECOND
PARTY at the start of said year which will empower the THIRD PARTY or their
representative to vote in stockholders and board of directors meetings of the SECOND
PARTY convened during the year the entire 33.296% of the outstanding capital stock of
the SECOND PARTY earmarked for distribution and thus be able to gain such number of
seats in the board of directors of the SECOND PARTY that the whole 33.296% of the
shares subject to distribution will be entitled to.
6. In addition, the SECOND PARTY shall within a reasonable time subdivide and
allocate for free and without charge among the qualified family-beneficiaries residing in
the place where the agricultural land is situated, residential or homelots of not more than
240 sq.m. each, with each family-beneficiary being assured of receiving and owning a
homelot in the barangay where it actually resides on the date of the execution of this
Agreement.
7. This Agreement is entered into by the parties in the spirit of the (C.A.R.P.) of the
government and with the supervision of the [DAR], with the end in view of improving
the lot of the qualified beneficiaries of the [SDP] and obtaining for them greater benefits.
(Emphasis added.)
As may be gleaned from the SDOA, included as part of the distribution plan are: (a) productionsharing equivalent to three percent (3%) of gross sales from the production of the agricultural
land payable to the FWBs in cash dividends or incentive bonus; and (b) distribution of free
homelots of not more than 240 square meters each to family-beneficiaries. The productionsharing, as the SDP indicated, is payable "irrespective of whether [HLI] makes money or not,"
implying that the benefits do not partake the nature of dividends, as the term is ordinarily
understood under corporation law.
While a little bit hard to follow, given that, during the period material, the assigned value of the
agricultural land in the hacienda was PhP 196.63 million, while the total assets of HLI was PhP
590.55 million with net assets of PhP 355.53 million, Tadeco/HLI would admit that the ratio of
the land-to-shares of stock corresponds to 33.3% of the outstanding capital stock of the HLI
equivalent to 118,391,976.85 shares of stock with a par value of PhP 1/share.
Subsequently, HLI submitted to DAR its SDP, designated as "Proposal for Stock Distribution
under C.A.R.P.,"35which was substantially based on the SDOA.
Notably, in a follow-up referendum the DAR conducted on October 14, 1989, 5,117 FWBs, out
of 5,315 who participated, opted to receive shares in HLI. 36 One hundred thirty-two (132) chose
actual land distribution.37
After a review of the SDP, then DAR Secretary Miriam Defensor-Santiago (Sec. DefensorSantiago) addressed a letter dated November 6, 1989 38 to Pedro S. Cojuangco (Cojuangco), then
Tadeco president, proposing that the SDP be revised, along the following lines:
1. That over the implementation period of the [SDP], [Tadeco]/HLI shall ensure that there
will be no dilution in the shares of stocks of individual [FWBs];
2. That a safeguard shall be provided by [Tadeco]/HLI against the dilution of the
percentage shareholdings of the [FWBs], i.e., that the 33% shareholdings of the [FWBs]
will be maintained at any given time;
3. That the mechanics for distributing the stocks be explicitly stated in the [MOA] signed
between the [Tadeco], HLI and its [FWBs] prior to the implementation of the stock plan;
4. That the stock distribution plan provide for clear and definite terms for determining the
actual number of seats to be allocated for the [FWBs] in the HLI Board;
5. That HLI provide guidelines and a timetable for the distribution of homelots to
qualified [FWBs]; and
6. That the 3% cash dividends mentioned in the [SDP] be expressly provided for [in] the
MOA.
In a letter-reply of November 14, 1989 to Sec. Defensor-Santiago, Tadeco/HLI explained that the
proposed revisions of the SDP are already embodied in both the SDP and MOA. 39 Following that
exchange, the PARC, under then Sec. Defensor-Santiago, by Resolution No. 89-12-240 dated
November 21, 1989, approved the SDP of Tadeco/HLI.41
At the time of the SDP approval, HLI had a pool of farmworkers, numbering 6,296, more or less,
composed of permanent, seasonal and casual master list/payroll and non-master list members.
From 1989 to 2005, HLI claimed to have extended the following benefits to the FWBs:
(a) 3 billion pesos (P3,000,000,000) worth of salaries, wages and fringe benefits
(b) 59 million shares of stock distributed for free to the FWBs;
(c) 150 million pesos (P150,000,000) representing 3% of the gross produce;
(d) 37.5 million pesos (P37,500,000) representing 3% from the sale of 500 hectares of
converted agricultural land of Hacienda Luisita;
(e) 240-square meter homelots distributed for free;
(f) 2.4 million pesos (P2,400,000) representing 3% from the sale of 80 hectares at 80
million pesos (P80,000,000) for the SCTEX;
(g)
Social
service
benefits,
such
as
but
not
limited
to
free
hospitalization/medical/maternity services, old age/death benefits and no interest bearing
salary/educational loans and rice sugar accounts. 42
Two separate groups subsequently contested this claim of HLI.
On August 15, 1995, HLI applied for the conversion of 500 hectares of land of the hacienda from
agricultural to industrial use,43 pursuant to Sec. 65 of RA 6657, providing:
SEC. 65. Conversion of Lands.After the lapse of five (5) years from its award, when the land
ceases to be economically feasible and sound for agricultural purposes, or the locality has
become urbanized and the land will have a greater economic value for residential, commercial or
industrial purposes, the DAR, upon application of the beneficiary or the landowner, with due
notice to the affected parties, and subject to existing laws, may authorize the reclassification, or
conversion of the land and its disposition: Provided, That the beneficiary shall have fully paid its
obligation.
The application, according to HLI, had the backing of 5,000 or so FWBs, including respondent
Rene Galang, and Jose Julio Suniga, as evidenced by the Manifesto of Support they signed and
which was submitted to the DAR. 44After the usual processing, the DAR, thru then Sec. Ernesto
Garilao, approved the application on August 14, 1996, per DAR Conversion Order No.
030601074-764-(95), Series of 1996,45 subject to payment of three percent (3%) of the gross
selling price to the FWBs and to HLIs continued compliance with its undertakings under the
SDP, among other conditions.
On December 13, 1996, HLI, in exchange for subscription of 12,000,000 shares of stocks of
Centennary Holdings, Inc. (Centennary), ceded 300 hectares of the converted area to the
latter.46 Consequently, HLIs Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. 28791047 was canceled and
TCT No. 29209148 was issued in the name of Centennary. HLI transferred the remaining 200
hectares covered by TCT No. 287909 to Luisita Realty Corporation (LRC)49 in two separate
transactions in 1997 and 1998, both uniformly involving 100 hectares for PhP 250 million each.50
Centennary, a corporation with an authorized capital stock of PhP 12,100,000 divided into
12,100,000 shares and wholly-owned by HLI, had the following incorporators: Pedro Cojuangco,
Josephine C. Reyes, Teresita C. Lopa, Ernesto G. Teopaco, and Bernardo R. Lahoz.
Subsequently, Centennary sold51 the entire 300 hectares to Luisita Industrial Park Corporation
(LIPCO) for PhP 750 million. The latter acquired it for the purpose of developing an industrial
complex.52 As a result, Centennarys TCT No. 292091 was canceled to be replaced by TCT No.
31098653 in the name of LIPCO.
From the area covered by TCT No. 310986 was carved out two (2) parcels, for which two (2)
separate titles were issued in the name of LIPCO, specifically: (a) TCT No. 365800 54 and (b)
TCT No. 365801,55 covering 180 and four hectares, respectively. TCT No. 310986 was,
accordingly, partially canceled.
Later on, in a Deed of Absolute Assignment dated November 25, 2004, LIPCO transferred the
parcels covered by its TCT Nos. 365800 and 365801 to the Rizal Commercial Banking
Corporation (RCBC) by way of dacion en pagoin payment of LIPCOs PhP 431,695,732.10 loan
obligations. LIPCOs titles were canceled and new ones, TCT Nos. 391051 and 391052, were
issued to RCBC.
Apart from the 500 hectares alluded to, another 80.51 hectares were later detached from the area
coverage of Hacienda Luisita which had been acquired by the government as part of the SubicClark-Tarlac Expressway (SCTEX) complex. In absolute terms, 4,335.75 hectares remained of
the original 4,915 hectares Tadeco ceded to HLI.56
Such, in short, was the state of things when two separate petitions, both undated, reached the
DAR in the latter part of 2003. In the first, denominated as Petition/Protest, 57 respondents Jose
Julio Suniga and Windsor Andaya, identifying themselves as head of the Supervisory Group of
HLI (Supervisory Group), and 60 other supervisors sought to revoke the SDOA, alleging that
HLI had failed to give them their dividends and the one percent (1%) share in gross sales, as well
as the thirty-three percent (33%) share in the proceeds of the sale of the converted 500 hectares
of land. They further claimed that their lives have not improved contrary to the promise and
rationale for the adoption of the SDOA. They also cited violations by HLI of the SDOAs
terms.58 They prayed for a renegotiation of the SDOA, or, in the alternative, its revocation.
Revocation and nullification of the SDOA and the distribution of the lands in the hacienda were
the call in the second petition, styled as Petisyon (Petition).59 The Petisyon was ostensibly filed
on December 4, 2003 by Alyansa ng mga Manggagawang Bukid ng Hacienda Luisita
(AMBALA), where the handwritten name of respondents Rene Galang as "Pangulo AMBALA"
and Noel Mallari as "Sec-Gen. AMBALA"60 appeared. As alleged, the petition was filed on
behalf of AMBALAs members purportedly composing about 80% of the 5,339 FWBs of
Hacienda Luisita.
HLI would eventually answer61 the petition/protest of the Supervisory Group. On the other hand,
HLIs answer62to the AMBALA petition was contained in its letter dated January 21, 2005 also
filed with DAR.
Meanwhile, the DAR constituted a Special Task Force to attend to issues relating to the SDP of
HLI. Among other duties, the Special Task Force was mandated to review the terms and
conditions of the SDOA and PARC Resolution No. 89-12-2 relative to HLIs SDP; evaluate
HLIs compliance reports; evaluate the merits of the petitions for the revocation of the SDP;
conduct ocular inspections or field investigations; and recommend appropriate remedial
measures for approval of the Secretary.63
After investigation and evaluation, the Special Task Force submitted its "Terminal Report:
Hacienda Luisita, Incorporated (HLI) Stock Distribution Plan (SDP) Conflict" 64 dated September
22, 2005 (Terminal Report), finding that HLI has not complied with its obligations under RA
6657 despite the implementation of the SDP.65 The Terminal Report and the Special Task Forces
recommendations were adopted by then DAR Sec. Nasser Pangandaman (Sec. Pangandaman).66
Subsequently, Sec. Pangandaman recommended to the PARC Executive Committee (Excom) (a)
the recall/revocation of PARC Resolution No. 89-12-2 dated November 21, 1989 approving
HLIs SDP; and (b) the acquisition of Hacienda Luisita through the compulsory acquisition
scheme. Following review, the PARC Validation Committee favorably endorsed the DAR
Secretarys recommendation afore-stated.67
On December 22, 2005, the PARC issued the assailed Resolution No. 2005-32-01, disposing as
follows:
NOW, THEREFORE, on motion duly seconded, RESOLVED, as it is HEREBY RESOLVED, to
approve and confirm the recommendation of the PARC Executive Committee adopting in toto
the report of the PARC ExCom Validation Committee affirming the recommendation of the DAR
to recall/revoke the SDO plan of Tarlac Development Corporation/Hacienda Luisita
Incorporated.
RESOLVED, further, that the lands subject of the recalled/revoked TDC/HLI SDO plan be
forthwith placed under the compulsory coverage or mandated land acquisition scheme of the
[CARP].
APPROVED.68
A copy of Resolution No. 2005-32-01 was served on HLI the following day, December 23,
without any copy of the documents adverted to in the resolution attached. A letter-request dated
December 28, 200569 for certified copies of said documents was sent to, but was not acted upon
by, the PARC secretariat.
Therefrom, HLI, on January 2, 2006, sought reconsideration. 70 On the same day, the DAR Tarlac
provincial office issued the Notice of Coverage71 which HLI received on January 4, 2006.
Its motion notwithstanding, HLI has filed the instant recourse in light of what it considers as the
DARs hasty placing of Hacienda Luisita under CARP even before PARC could rule or even read
the motion for reconsideration.72 As HLI later rued, it "can not know from the above-quoted
resolution the facts and the law upon which it is based."73
PARC would eventually deny HLIs motion for reconsideration via Resolution No. 2006-34-01
dated May 3, 2006.
By Resolution of June 14, 2006,74 the Court, acting on HLIs motion, issued a temporary
restraining order,75enjoining the implementation of Resolution No. 2005-32-01 and the notice of
coverage.
On July 13, 2006, the OSG, for public respondents PARC and the DAR, filed its Comment 76 on
the petition.
On December 2, 2006, Noel Mallari, impleaded by HLI as respondent in his capacity as "SecGen. AMBALA," filed his Manifestation and Motion with Comment Attached dated December
4, 2006 (Manifestation and Motion).77 In it, Mallari stated that he has broken away from
AMBALA with other AMBALA ex-members and formed Farmworkers Agrarian Reform
Movement, Inc. (FARM).78 Should this shift in alliance deny him standing, Mallari also prayed
that FARM be allowed to intervene.
As events would later develop, Mallari had a parting of ways with other FARM members,
particularly would-be intervenors Renato Lalic, et al. As things stand, Mallari returned to the
AMBALA fold, creating the AMBALA-Noel Mallari faction and leaving Renato Lalic, et al. as
the remaining members of FARM who sought to intervene.
On January 10, 2007, the Supervisory Group79 and the AMBALA-Rene Galang faction submitted
their Comment/Opposition dated December 17, 2006.80
On October 30, 2007, RCBC filed a Motion for Leave to Intervene and to File and Admit
Attached Petition-In-Intervention dated October 18, 2007.81 LIPCO later followed with a similar
motion.82 In both motions, RCBC and LIPCO contended that the assailed resolution effectively
nullified the TCTs under their respective names as the properties covered in the TCTs were
veritably included in the January 2, 2006 notice of coverage. In the main, they claimed that the
revocation of the SDP cannot legally affect their rights as innocent purchasers for value. Both
motions for leave to intervene were granted and the corresponding petitions-in-intervention
admitted.
On August 18, 2010, the Court heard the main and intervening petitioners on oral arguments. On
the other hand, the Court, on August 24, 2010, heard public respondents as well as the respective
counsels of the AMBALA-Mallari-Supervisory Group, the AMBALA-Galang faction, and the
FARM and its 27 members83 argue their case.
Prior to the oral arguments, however, HLI; AMBALA, represented by Mallari; the Supervisory
Group, represented by Suniga and Andaya; and the United Luisita Workers Union, represented
by Eldifonso Pingol, filed with the Court a joint submission and motion for approval of a
Compromise Agreement (English and Tagalog versions)dated August 6, 2010.
On August 31, 2010, the Court, in a bid to resolve the dispute through an amicable settlement,
issued a Resolution84 creating a Mediation Panel composed of then Associate Justice Ma. Alicia
Austria-Martinez, as chairperson, and former CA Justices Hector Hofilea and Teresita DyLiacco Flores, as members. Meetings on five (5) separate dates, i.e., September 8, 9, 14, 20, and
27, 2010, were conducted. Despite persevering and painstaking efforts on the part of the panel,
mediation had to be discontinued when no acceptable agreement could be reached.
The Issues
HLI raises the following issues for our consideration:

I.
WHETHER OR NOT PUBLIC RESPONDENTS PARC AND SECRETARY
PANGANDAMAN HAVE JURISDICTION, POWER AND/OR AUTHORITY TO
NULLIFY, RECALL, REVOKE OR RESCIND THE SDOA.
II.
[IF SO], x x x CAN THEY STILL EXERCISE SUCH JURISDICTION, POWER
AND/OR AUTHORITY AT THIS TIME, I.E., AFTER SIXTEEN (16) YEARS FROM
THE EXECUTION OF THE SDOA AND ITS IMPLEMENTATION WITHOUT
VIOLATING SECTIONS 1 AND 10 OF ARTICLE III (BILL OF RIGHTS) OF THE
CONSTITUTION AGAINST DEPRIVATION OF PROPERTY WITHOUT DUE
PROCESS OF LAW AND THE IMPAIRMENT OF CONTRACTUAL RIGHTS AND
OBLIGATIONS? MOREOVER, ARE THERE LEGAL GROUNDS UNDER THE
CIVIL CODE, viz, ARTICLE 1191 x x x, ARTICLES 1380, 1381 AND 1382 x x x
ARTICLE 1390 x x x AND ARTICLE 1409 x x x THAT CAN BE INVOKED TO
NULLIFY, RECALL, REVOKE, OR RESCIND THE SDOA?
III.
WHETHER THE PETITIONS TO NULLIFY, RECALL, REVOKE OR RESCIND THE
SDOA HAVE ANY LEGAL BASIS OR GROUNDS AND WHETHER THE
PETITIONERS THEREIN ARE THE REAL PARTIES-IN-INTEREST TO FILE SAID
PETITIONS.
IV.
WHETHER THE RIGHTS, OBLIGATIONS AND REMEDIES OF THE PARTIES
TO THE SDOA ARE NOW GOVERNED BY THE CORPORATION CODE
(BATAS PAMBANSA BLG. 68) AND NOT BY THE x x x [CARL] x x x.
On the other hand, RCBC submits the following issues:
I.
RESPONDENT PARC COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION
AMOUNTING TO LACK OR EXCESS OF JURISDICTION WHEN IT DID NOT
EXCLUDE THE SUBJECT PROPERTY FROM THE COVERAGE OF THE CARP
DESPITE THE FACT THAT PETITIONER-INTERVENOR RCBC HAS ACQUIRED
VESTED RIGHTS AND INDEFEASIBLE TITLE OVER THE SUBJECT PROPERTY
AS AN INNOCENT PURCHASER FOR VALUE.
A. THE ASSAILED RESOLUTION NO. 2005-32-01 AND THE NOTICE OF
COVERAGE DATED 02 JANUARY 2006 HAVE THE EFFECT OF
NULLIFYING TCT NOS. 391051 AND 391052 IN THE NAME OF
PETITIONER-INTERVENOR RCBC.
B. AS AN INNOCENT PURCHASER FOR VALUE, PETITIONERINTERVENOR RCBC CANNOT BE PREJUDICED BY A SUBSEQUENT
REVOCATION OR RESCISSION OF THE SDOA.
II.
THE ASSAILED RESOLUTION NO. 2005-32-01 AND THE NOTICE OF

COVERAGE DATED 02 JANUARY 2006 WERE ISSUED WITHOUT AFFORDING
PETITIONER-INTERVENOR RCBC ITS RIGHT TO DUE PROCESS AS AN
INNOCENT PURCHASER FOR VALUE.
LIPCO, like RCBC, asserts having acquired vested and indefeasible rights over certain portions
of the converted property, and, hence, would ascribe on PARC the commission of grave abuse of
discretion when it included those portions in the notice of coverage. And apart from raising
issues identical with those of HLI, such as but not limited to the absence of valid grounds to
warrant the rescission and/or revocation of the SDP, LIPCO would allege that the assailed
resolution and the notice of coverage were issued without affording it the right to due process as
an innocent purchaser for value. The government, LIPCO also argues, is estopped from
recovering properties which have since passed to innocent parties.
Simply formulated, the principal determinative issues tendered in the main petition and to which
all other related questions must yield boil down to the following: (1) matters of standing; (2) the
constitutionality of Sec. 31 of RA 6657; (3) the jurisdiction of PARC to recall or revoke HLIs
SDP; (4) the validity or propriety of such recall or revocatory action; and (5) corollary to (4), the
validity of the terms and conditions of the SDP, as embodied in the SDOA.
Our Ruling
I.
We first proceed to the examination of the preliminary issues before delving on the more serious
challenges bearing on the validity of PARCs assailed issuance and the grounds for it.
Supervisory Group, AMBALA and their
respective leaders are real parties-in-interest
HLI would deny real party-in-interest status to the purported leaders of the Supervisory Group
and AMBALA, i.e., Julio Suniga, Windsor Andaya, and Rene Galang, who filed the revocatory
petitions before the DAR. As HLI would have it, Galang, the self-styled head of AMBALA,
gained HLI employment in June 1990 and, thus, could not have been a party to the SDOA
executed a year earlier.85 As regards the Supervisory Group, HLI alleges that supervisors are not
regular farmworkers, but the company nonetheless considered them FWBs under the SDOA as a
mere concession to enable them to enjoy the same benefits given qualified regular farmworkers.
However, if the SDOA would be canceled and land distribution effected, so HLI claims, citing
Fortich v. Corona,86 the supervisors would be excluded from receiving lands as farmworkers
other than the regular farmworkers who are merely entitled to the "fruits of the land."87
The SDOA no less identifies "the SDP qualified beneficiaries" as "the farmworkers who appear
in the annual payroll, inclusive of the permanent and seasonal employees, who are regularly or
periodically employed by [HLI]."88 Galang, per HLIs own admission, is employed by HLI, and
is, thus, a qualified beneficiary of the SDP; he comes within the definition of a real party-ininterest under Sec. 2, Rule 3 of the Rules of Court, meaning, one who stands to be benefited or
injured by the judgment in the suit or is the party entitled to the avails of the suit.
The same holds true with respect to the Supervisory Group whose members were admittedly
employed by HLI and whose names and signatures even appeared in the annex of the SDOA.
Being qualified beneficiaries of the SDP, Suniga and the other 61 supervisors are certainly
parties who would benefit or be prejudiced by the judgment recalling the SDP or replacing it
with some other modality to comply with RA 6657.
Even assuming that members of the Supervisory Group are not regular farmworkers, but are in
the category of "other farmworkers" mentioned in Sec. 4, Article XIII of the Constitution, 89 thus
only entitled to a share of the fruits of the land, as indeed Fortich teaches, this does not detract
from the fact that they are still identified as being among the "SDP qualified beneficiaries." As
such, they are, thus, entitled to bring an action upon the SDP.90 At any rate, the following
admission made by Atty. Gener Asuncion, counsel of HLI, during the oral arguments should put
to rest any lingering doubt as to the status of protesters Galang, Suniga, and Andaya:
Justice Bersamin: x x x I heard you a while ago that you were conceding the qualified farmer
beneficiaries of Hacienda Luisita were real parties in interest?
Atty. Asuncion: Yes, Your Honor please, real party in interest which that question refers to the
complaints of protest initiated before the DAR and the real party in interest there be considered
as possessed by the farmer beneficiaries who initiated the protest.91
Further, under Sec. 50, paragraph 4 of RA 6657, farmer-leaders are expressly allowed to
represent themselves, their fellow farmers or their organizations in any proceedings before the
DAR. Specifically:
SEC. 50. Quasi-Judicial Powers of the DAR.x x x
xxxx
Responsible farmer leaders shall be allowed to represent themselves, their fellow farmers
or their organizations in any proceedings before the DAR: Provided, however, that when
there are two or more representatives for any individual or group, the representatives should
choose only one among themselves to represent such party or group before any DAR
proceedings. (Emphasis supplied.)
Clearly, the respective leaders of the Supervisory Group and AMBALA are contextually real
parties-in-interest allowed by law to file a petition before the DAR or PARC.
This is not necessarily to say, however, that Galang represents AMBALA, for as records show
and as HLI aptly noted,92 his "petisyon" filed with DAR did not carry the usual authorization of
the individuals in whose behalf it was supposed to have been instituted. To date, such
authorization document, which would logically include a list of the names of the authorizing
FWBs, has yet to be submitted to be part of the records.
PARCs Authority to Revoke a Stock Distribution Plan
On the postulate that the subject jurisdiction is conferred by law, HLI maintains that PARC is
without authority to revoke an SDP, for neither RA 6657 nor EO 229 expressly vests PARC with
such authority. While, as HLI argued, EO 229 empowers PARC to approve the plan for stock
distribution in appropriate cases, the empowerment only includes the power to disapprove, but
not to recall its previous approval of the SDP after it has been implemented by the parties. 93 To
HLI, it is the court which has jurisdiction and authority to order the revocation or rescission of
the PARC-approved SDP.
We disagree.
Under Sec. 31 of RA 6657, as implemented by DAO 10, the authority to approve the plan for
stock distribution of the corporate landowner belongs to PARC. However, contrary to petitioner
HLIs posture, PARC also has the power to revoke the SDP which it previously approved. It may
be, as urged, that RA 6657 or other executive issuances on agrarian reform do not explicitly vest
the PARC with the power to revoke/recall an approved SDP. Such power or authority, however,
is deemed possessed by PARC under the principle of necessary implication, a basic postulate that
what is implied in a statute is as much a part of it as that which is expressed.94
We have explained that "every statute is understood, by implication, to contain all such
provisions as may be necessary to effectuate its object and purpose, or to make effective rights,
powers, privileges or jurisdiction which it grants, including all such collateral and subsidiary
consequences as may be fairly and logically inferred from its terms." 95 Further, "every statutory
grant of power, right or privilege is deemed to include all incidental power, right or privilege.96
Gordon v. Veridiano II is instructive:
The power to approve a license includes by implication, even if not expressly granted, the power
to revoke it. By extension, the power to revoke is limited by the authority to grant the license,
from which it is derived in the first place. Thus, if the FDA grants a license upon its finding that
the applicant drug store has complied with the requirements of the general laws and the
implementing administrative rules and regulations, it is only for their violation that the FDA may
revoke the said license. By the same token, having granted the permit upon his ascertainment
that the conditions thereof as applied x x x have been complied with, it is only for the violation
of such conditions that the mayor may revoke the said permit.97 (Emphasis supplied.)
Following the doctrine of necessary implication, it may be stated that the conferment of express
power to approve a plan for stock distribution of the agricultural land of corporate owners
necessarily includes the power to revoke or recall the approval of the plan.
As public respondents aptly observe, to deny PARC such revocatory power would reduce it into
a toothless agency of CARP, because the very same agency tasked to ensure compliance by the
corporate landowner with the approved SDP would be without authority to impose sanctions for
non-compliance with it.98 With the view We take of the case, only PARC can effect such
revocation. The DAR Secretary, by his own authority as such, cannot plausibly do so, as the
acceptance and/or approval of the SDP sought to be taken back or undone is the act of PARC
whose official composition includes, no less, the President as chair, the DAR Secretary as vicechair, and at least eleven (11) other department heads.99
On another but related issue, the HLI foists on the Court the argument that subjecting its
landholdings to compulsory distribution after its approved SDP has been implemented would
impair the contractual obligations created under the SDOA.
The broad sweep of HLIs argument ignores certain established legal precepts and must,
therefore, be rejected.
A law authorizing interference, when appropriate, in the contractual relations between or among
parties is deemed read into the contract and its implementation cannot successfully be resisted by
force of the non-impairment guarantee. There is, in that instance, no impingement of the
impairment clause, the non-impairment protection being applicable only to laws that derogate
prior acts or contracts by enlarging, abridging or in any manner changing the intention of the
parties. Impairment, in fine, obtains if a subsequent law changes the terms of a contract between
the parties, imposes new conditions, dispenses with those agreed upon or withdraws existing
remedies for the enforcement of the rights of the parties. 100 Necessarily, the constitutional
proscription would not apply to laws already in effect at the time of contract execution, as in the
case of RA 6657, in relation to DAO 10, vis--vis HLIs SDOA. As held in Serrano v. Gallant
Maritime Services, Inc.:
The prohibition [against impairment of the obligation of contracts] is aligned with the general
principle that laws newly enacted have only a prospective operation, and cannot affect acts or
contracts already perfected; however, as to laws already in existence, their provisions are read
into contracts and deemed a part thereof. Thus, the non-impairment clause under Section 10,
Article II [of the Constitution] is limited in application to laws about to be enacted that would in
any way derogate from existing acts or contracts by enlarging, abridging or in any manner
changing the intention of the parties thereto.101 (Emphasis supplied.)
Needless to stress, the assailed Resolution No. 2005-32-01 is not the kind of issuance within the
ambit of Sec. 10, Art. III of the Constitution providing that "[n]o law impairing the obligation of
contracts shall be passed."
Parenthetically, HLI tags the SDOA as an ordinary civil law contract and, as such, a breach of its
terms and conditions is not a PARC administrative matter, but one that gives rise to a cause of
action cognizable by regular courts.102 This contention has little to commend itself. The SDOA is
a special contract imbued with public interest, entered into and crafted pursuant to the provisions
of RA 6657. It embodies the SDP, which requires for its validity, or at least its enforceability,
PARCs approval. And the fact that the certificate of compliance 103to be issued by agrarian
authorities upon completion of the distribution of stocksis revocable by the same issuing
authority supports the idea that everything about the implementation of the SDP is, at the first
instance, subject to administrative adjudication.
HLI also parlays the notion that the parties to the SDOA should now look to the Corporation
Code, instead of to RA 6657, in determining their rights, obligations and remedies. The Code, it
adds, should be the applicable law on the disposition of the agricultural land of HLI.
Contrary to the view of HLI, the rights, obligations and remedies of the parties to the SDOA
embodying the SDP are primarily governed by RA 6657. It should abundantly be made clear that
HLI was precisely created in order to comply with RA 6657, which the OSG aptly described as
the "mother law" of the SDOA and the SDP.104 It is, thus, paradoxical for HLI to shield itself
from the coverage of CARP by invoking exclusive applicability of the Corporation Code under
the guise of being a corporate entity.
Without in any way minimizing the relevance of the Corporation Code since the FWBs of HLI
are also stockholders, its applicability is limited as the rights of the parties arising from the SDP
should not be made to supplant or circumvent the agrarian reform program.
Without doubt, the Corporation Code is the general law providing for the formation, organization
and regulation of private corporations. On the other hand, RA 6657 is the special law on agrarian
reform. As between a general and special law, the latter shall prevailgeneralia specialibus non
derogant.105 Besides, the present impasse between HLI and the private respondents is not an
intra-corporate dispute which necessitates the application of the Corporation Code. What private
respondents questioned before the DAR is the proper implementation of the SDP and HLIs
compliance with RA 6657. Evidently, RA 6657 should be the applicable law to the instant case.
HLI further contends that the inclusion of the agricultural land of Hacienda Luisita under the
coverage of CARP and the eventual distribution of the land to the FWBs would amount to a
disposition of all or practically all of the corporate assets of HLI. HLI would add that this
contingency, if ever it comes to pass, requires the applicability of the Corporation Code
provisions on corporate dissolution.
We are not persuaded.
Indeed, the provisions of the Corporation Code on corporate dissolution would apply insofar as
the winding up of HLIs affairs or liquidation of the assets is concerned. However, the mere
inclusion of the agricultural land of Hacienda Luisita under the coverage of CARP and the lands
eventual distribution to the FWBs will not, without more, automatically trigger the dissolution of
HLI. As stated in the SDOA itself, the percentage of the value of the agricultural land of
Hacienda Luisita in relation to the total assets transferred and conveyed by Tadeco to HLI
comprises only 33.296%, following this equation: value of the agricultural lands divided by total
corporate assets. By no stretch of imagination would said percentage amount to a disposition of
all or practically all of HLIs corporate assets should compulsory land acquisition and
distribution ensue.
This brings us to the validity of the revocation of the approval of the SDP sixteen (16) years after
its execution pursuant to Sec. 31 of RA 6657 for the reasons set forth in the Terminal Report of
the Special Task Force, as endorsed by PARC Excom. But first, the matter of the constitutionality
of said section.
Constitutional Issue
FARM asks for the invalidation of Sec. 31 of RA 6657, insofar as it affords the corporation, as a
mode of CARP compliance, to resort to stock distribution, an arrangement which, to FARM,
impairs the fundamental right of farmers and farmworkers under Sec. 4, Art. XIII of the
Constitution.106
To a more specific, but direct point, FARM argues that Sec. 31 of RA 6657 permits stock transfer
in lieu of outright agricultural land transfer; in fine, there is stock certificate ownership of the
farmers or farmworkers instead of them owning the land, as envisaged in the Constitution. For
FARM, this modality of distribution is an anomaly to be annulled for being inconsistent with the
basic concept of agrarian reform ingrained in Sec. 4, Art. XIII of the Constitution.107
Reacting, HLI insists that agrarian reform is not only about transfer of land ownership to farmers
and other qualified beneficiaries. It draws attention in this regard to Sec. 3(a) of RA 6657 on the
concept and scope of the term "agrarian reform." The constitutionality of a law, HLI added,
cannot, as here, be attacked collaterally.
The instant challenge on the constitutionality of Sec. 31 of RA 6657 and necessarily its
counterpart provision in EO 229 must fail as explained below.
When the Court is called upon to exercise its power of judicial review over, and pass upon the
constitutionality of, acts of the executive or legislative departments, it does so only when the
following essential requirements are first met, to wit:
(1) there is an actual case or controversy;
(2) that the constitutional question is raised at the earliest possible opportunity by a
proper party or one with locus standi; and
(3) the issue of constitutionality must be the very lis mota of the case.108
Not all the foregoing requirements are satisfied in the case at bar.
While there is indeed an actual case or controversy, intervenor FARM, composed of a small
minority of 27 farmers, has yet to explain its failure to challenge the constitutionality of Sec. 3l
of RA 6657, since as early as November 21, l989 when PARC approved the SDP of Hacienda
Luisita or at least within a reasonable time thereafter and why its members received benefits
from the SDP without so much of a protest. It was only on December 4, 2003 or 14 years after
approval of the SDP via PARC Resolution No. 89-12-2 dated November 21, 1989 that said plan
and approving resolution were sought to be revoked, but not, to stress, by FARM or any of its
members, but by petitioner AMBALA. Furthermore, the AMBALA petition did NOT question
the constitutionality of Sec. 31 of RA 6657, but concentrated on the purported flaws and gaps in
the subsequent implementation of the SDP. Even the public respondents, as represented by the
Solicitor General, did not question the constitutionality of the provision. On the other hand,
FARM, whose 27 members formerly belonged to AMBALA, raised the constitutionality of Sec.
31 only on May 3, 2007 when it filed its Supplemental Comment with the Court. Thus, it took
FARM some eighteen (18) years from November 21, 1989 before it challenged the
constitutionality of Sec. 31 of RA 6657 which is quite too late in the day. The FARM members
slept on their rights and even accepted benefits from the SDP with nary a complaint on the
alleged unconstitutionality of Sec. 31 upon which the benefits were derived. The Court cannot
now be goaded into resolving a constitutional issue that FARM failed to assail after the lapse of a
long period of time and the occurrence of numerous events and activities which resulted from the
application of an alleged unconstitutional legal provision.
It has been emphasized in a number of cases that the question of constitutionality will not be
passed upon by the Court unless it is properly raised and presented in an appropriate case at the
first opportunity.109 FARM is, therefore, remiss in belatedly questioning the constitutionality of
Sec. 31 of RA 6657. The second requirement that the constitutional question should be raised at
the earliest possible opportunity is clearly wanting.
The last but the most important requisite that the constitutional issue must be the very lis mota of
the case does not likewise obtain. The lis mota aspect is not present, the constitutional issue
tendered not being critical to the resolution of the case. The unyielding rule has been to avoid,
whenever plausible, an issue assailing the constitutionality of a statute or governmental act. 110 If
some other grounds exist by which judgment can be made without touching the constitutionality
of a law, such recourse is favored.111 Garcia v. Executive Secretary explains why:
Lis Mota the fourth requirement to satisfy before this Court will undertake judicial review
means that the Court will not pass upon a question of unconstitutionality, although properly
presented, if the case can be disposed of on some other ground, such as the application of the
statute or the general law. The petitioner must be able to show that the case cannot be legally
resolved unless the constitutional question raised is determined. This requirement is based on the
rule that every law has in its favor the presumption of constitutionality; to justify its nullification,
there must be a clear and unequivocal breach of the Constitution, and not one that is doubtful,
speculative, or argumentative.112 (Italics in the original.)
The lis mota in this case, proceeding from the basic positions originally taken by AMBALA (to
which the FARM members previously belonged) and the Supervisory Group, is the alleged noncompliance by HLI with the conditions of the SDP to support a plea for its revocation. And
before the Court, the lis mota is whether or not PARC acted in grave abuse of discretion when it
ordered the recall of the SDP for such non-compliance and the fact that the SDP, as couched and
implemented, offends certain constitutional and statutory provisions. To be sure, any of these key
issues may be resolved without plunging into the constitutionality of Sec. 31 of RA 6657.
Moreover, looking deeply into the underlying petitions of AMBALA, et al., it is not the said
section per se that is invalid, but rather it is the alleged application of the said provision in the
SDP that is flawed.
It may be well to note at this juncture that Sec. 5 of RA 9700, 113 amending Sec. 7 of RA 6657,
has all but superseded Sec. 31 of RA 6657 vis--vis the stock distribution component of said Sec.
31. In its pertinent part, Sec. 5 of RA 9700 provides: "[T]hat after June 30, 2009, the modes of
acquisition shall be limited to voluntary offer to sell and compulsory acquisition." Thus, for all
intents and purposes, the stock distribution scheme under Sec. 31 of RA 6657 is no longer an
available option under existing law. The question of whether or not it is unconstitutional should
be a moot issue.
It is true that the Court, in some cases, has proceeded to resolve constitutional issues otherwise
already moot and academic114 provided the following requisites are present:
x x x first, there is a grave violation of the Constitution; second, the exceptional character of the
situation and the paramount public interest is involved; third, when the constitutional issue raised
requires formulation of controlling principles to guide the bench, the bar, and the public; fourth,
the case is capable of repetition yet evading review.
These requisites do not obtain in the case at bar.
For one, there appears to be no breach of the fundamental law. Sec. 4, Article XIII of the
Constitution reads:
The State shall, by law, undertake an agrarian reform program founded on the right of the
farmers and regular farmworkers, who are landless, to OWN directly or COLLECTIVELY THE
LANDS THEY TILL or, in the case of other farmworkers, to receive a just share of the fruits
thereof. To this end, the State shall encourage and undertake the just distribution of all
agricultural lands, subject to such priorities and reasonable retention limits as the Congress may
prescribe, taking into account ecological, developmental, or equity considerations, and subject to
the payment of just compensation. In determining retention limits, the State shall respect the
right of small landowners. The State shall further provide incentives for voluntary land-sharing.
(Emphasis supplied.)
The wording of the provision is unequivocalthe farmers and regular farmworkers have a right
TO OWN DIRECTLY OR COLLECTIVELY THE LANDS THEY TILL. The basic law allows
two (2) modes of land distributiondirect and indirect ownership. Direct transfer to individual
farmers is the most commonly used method by DAR and widely accepted. Indirect transfer
through collective ownership of the agricultural land is the alternative to direct ownership of
agricultural land by individual farmers. The aforequoted Sec. 4 EXPRESSLY authorizes
collective ownership by farmers. No language can be found in the 1987 Constitution that
disqualifies or prohibits corporations or cooperatives of farmers from being the legal entity
through which collective ownership can be exercised. The word "collective" is defined as
"indicating a number of persons or things considered as constituting one group or
aggregate,"115 while "collectively" is defined as "in a collective sense or manner; in a mass or
body."116 By using the word "collectively," the Constitution allows for indirect ownership of land
and not just outright agricultural land transfer. This is in recognition of the fact that land reform
may become successful even if it is done through the medium of juridical entities composed of
farmers.
Collective ownership is permitted in two (2) provisions of RA 6657. Its Sec. 29 allows workers
cooperatives or associations to collectively own the land, while the second paragraph of Sec. 31
allows corporations or associations to own agricultural land with the farmers becoming
stockholders or members. Said provisions read:
SEC. 29. Farms owned or operated by corporations or other business associations.In the case
of farms owned or operated by corporations or other business associations, the following rules
shall be observed by the PARC.
In general, lands shall be distributed directly to the individual worker-beneficiaries.
In case it is not economically feasible and sound to divide the land, then it shall be owned
collectively by the worker beneficiaries who shall form a workers cooperative or association
which will deal with the corporation or business association. x x x (Emphasis supplied.)
SEC. 31. Corporate Landowners. x x x
xxxx
beneficiaries the right to purchase such proportion of the capital stock of the corporation that the
agricultural land, actually devoted to agricultural activities, bears in relation to the companys
total assets, under such terms and conditions as may be agreed upon by them. In no case shall the
compensation received by the workers at the time the shares of stocks are distributed be reduced.
The same principle shall be applied to associations, with respect to their equity or participation. x
x x (Emphasis supplied.)
Clearly, workers cooperatives or associations under Sec. 29 of RA 6657 and corporations or
associations under the succeeding Sec. 31, as differentiated from individual farmers, are
authorized vehicles for the collective ownership of agricultural land. Cooperatives can be
registered with the Cooperative Development Authority and acquire legal personality of their
own, while corporations are juridical persons under the Corporation Code. Thus, Sec. 31 is
constitutional as it simply implements Sec. 4 of Art. XIII of the Constitution that land can be
owned COLLECTIVELY by farmers. Even the framers of the l987 Constitution are in unison
with respect to the two (2) modes of ownership of agricultural lands tilled by farmersDIRECT
and COLLECTIVE, thus:
MR. NOLLEDO. And when we talk of the phrase "to own directly," we mean the principle of
direct ownership by the tiller?
MR. MONSOD. Yes.
MR. NOLLEDO. And when we talk of "collectively," we mean communal ownership,
stewardship or State ownership?
MS. NIEVA. In this section, we conceive of cooperatives; that is farmers cooperatives owning
the land, not the State.
MR. NOLLEDO. And when we talk of "collectively," referring to farmers cooperatives, do the
farmers own specific areas of land where they only unite in their efforts?
MS. NIEVA. That is one way.
MR. NOLLEDO. Because I understand that there are two basic systems involved: the "moshave"
type of agriculture and the "kibbutz." So are both contemplated in the report?
MR. TADEO. Ang dalawa kasing pamamaraan ng pagpapatupad ng tunay na reporma sa lupa ay
ang pagmamay-ari ng lupa na hahatiin sa individual na pagmamay-ari directly at ang
tinatawag na sama-samang gagawin ng mga magbubukid. Tulad sa Negros, ang gusto ng mga
magbubukid ay gawin nila itong "cooperative or collective farm." Ang ibig sabihin ay samasama nilang sasakahin.
xxxx
MR. TINGSON. x x x When we speak here of "to own directly or collectively the lands they
till," is this land for the tillers rather than land for the landless? Before, we used to hear "land for
the landless," but now the slogan is "land for the tillers." Is that right?
MR. TADEO. Ang prinsipyong umiiral dito ay iyong land for the tillers. Ang ibig sabihin ng
"directly" ay tulad sa implementasyon sa rice and corn lands kung saan inaari na ng mga
magsasaka ang lupang binubungkal nila. Ang ibig sabihin naman ng "collectively" ay samasamang paggawa sa isang lupain o isang bukid, katulad ng sitwasyon sa Negros. 117 (Emphasis
supplied.)
As Commissioner Tadeo explained, the farmers will work on the agricultural land "sama-sama"
or collectively. Thus, the main requisite for collective ownership of land is collective or group
work by farmers of the agricultural land. Irrespective of whether the landowner is a cooperative,
association or corporation composed of farmers, as long as concerted group work by the farmers
on the land is present, then it falls within the ambit of collective ownership scheme.
Likewise, Sec. 4, Art. XIII of the Constitution makes mention of a commitment on the part of the
State to pursue,by law, an agrarian reform program founded on the policy of land for the
landless, but subject to such priorities as Congress may prescribe, taking into account such
abstract variable as "equity considerations." The textual reference to a law and Congress
necessarily implies that the above constitutional provision is not self-executoryand that
legislation is needed to implement the urgently needed program of agrarian reform. And RA
6657 has been enacted precisely pursuant to and as a mechanism to carry out the constitutional
directives. This piece of legislation, in fact, restates 118 the agrarian reform policy established in
the aforementioned provision of the Constitution of promoting the welfare of landless farmers
and farmworkers. RA 6657 thus defines "agrarian reform" as "the redistribution of lands to
farmers and regular farmworkers who are landless to lift the economic status of the
beneficiaries and all other arrangements alternative to the physical redistribution of lands,
such as production or profit sharing, labor administration and the distribution of shares of
stock which will allow beneficiaries to receive a just share of the fruits of the lands they work."
With the view We take of this case, the stock distribution option devised under Sec. 31 of RA
6657 hews with the agrarian reform policy, as instrument of social justice under Sec. 4 of Article
XIII of the Constitution. Albeit land ownership for the landless appears to be the dominant theme
of that policy, We emphasize that Sec. 4, Article XIII of the Constitution, as couched, does not
constrict Congress to passing an agrarian reform law planted on direct land transfer to and
ownership by farmers and no other, or else the enactment suffers from the vice of
unconstitutionality. If the intention were otherwise, the framers of the Constitution would have
worded said section in a manner mandatory in character.
For this Court, Sec. 31 of RA 6657, with its direct and indirect transfer features, is not
inconsistent with the States commitment to farmers and farmworkers to advance their interests
under the policy of social justice. The legislature, thru Sec. 31 of RA 6657, has chosen a
modality for collective ownership by which the imperatives of social justice may, in its
estimation, be approximated, if not achieved. The Court should be bound by such policy choice.
FARM contends that the farmers in the stock distribution scheme under Sec. 31 do not own the
agricultural land but are merely given stock certificates. Thus, the farmers lose control over the
land to the board of directors and executive officials of the corporation who actually manage the
land. They conclude that such arrangement runs counter to the mandate of the Constitution that
any agrarian reform must preserve the control over the land in the hands of the tiller.
This contention has no merit.
While it is true that the farmer is issued stock certificates and does not directly own the land,
still, the Corporation Code is clear that the FWB becomes a stockholder who acquires an
equitable interest in the assets of the corporation, which include the agricultural lands. It was
explained that the "equitable interest of the shareholder in the property of the corporation is
represented by the term stock, and the extent of his interest is described by the term shares. The
expression shares of stock when qualified by words indicating number and ownership expresses
the extent of the owners interest in the corporate property." 119 A share of stock typifies an aliquot
part of the corporations property, or the right to share in its proceeds to that extent when
distributed according to law and equity and that its holder is not the owner of any part of the
capital of the corporation.120 However, the FWBs will ultimately own the agricultural lands
owned by the corporation when the corporation is eventually dissolved and liquidated.
Anent the alleged loss of control of the farmers over the agricultural land operated and managed
by the corporation, a reading of the second paragraph of Sec. 31 shows otherwise. Said provision
provides that qualified beneficiaries have "the right to purchase such proportion of the capital
stock of the corporation that the agricultural land, actually devoted to agricultural activities,
bears in relation to the companys total assets." The wording of the formula in the computation of
the number of shares that can be bought by the farmers does not mean loss of control on the part
of the farmers. It must be remembered that the determination of the percentage of the capital
stock that can be bought by the farmers depends on the value of the agricultural land and the
value of the total assets of the corporation.
There is, thus, nothing unconstitutional in the formula prescribed by RA 6657. The policy on
agrarian reform is that control over the agricultural land must always be in the hands of the
farmers. Then it falls on the shoulders of DAR and PARC to see to it the farmers should always
own majority of the common shares entitled to elect the members of the board of directors to
ensure that the farmers will have a clear majority in the board. Before the SDP is approved, strict
scrutiny of the proposed SDP must always be undertaken by the DAR and PARC, such that the
value of the agricultural land contributed to the corporation must always be more than 50% of
the total assets of the corporation to ensure that the majority of the members of the board of
directors are composed of the farmers. The PARC composed of the President of the Philippines
and cabinet secretaries must see to it that control over the board of directors rests with the
farmers by rejecting the inclusion of non-agricultural assets which will yield the majority in the
board of directors to non-farmers. Any deviation, however, by PARC or DAR from the correct
application of the formula prescribed by the second paragraph of Sec. 31 of RA 6675 does not
make said provision constitutionally infirm. Rather, it is the application of said provision that can
be challenged. Ergo, Sec. 31 of RA 6657 does not trench on the constitutional policy of ensuring
control by the farmers.
A view has been advanced that there can be no agrarian reform unless there is land distribution
and that actual land distribution is the essential characteristic of a constitutional agrarian reform
program. On the contrary, there have been so many instances where, despite actual land
distribution, the implementation of agrarian reform was still unsuccessful. As a matter of fact,
this Court may take judicial notice of cases where FWBs sold the awarded land even to nonqualified persons and in violation of the prohibition period provided under the law. This only
proves to show that the mere fact that there is land distribution does not guarantee a successful
implementation of agrarian reform.
As it were, the principle of "land to the tiller" and the old pastoral model of land ownership
where non-human juridical persons, such as corporations, were prohibited from owning
agricultural lands are no longer realistic under existing conditions. Practically, an individual
farmer will often face greater disadvantages and difficulties than those who exercise ownership
in a collective manner through a cooperative or corporation. The former is too often left to his
own devices when faced with failing crops and bad weather, or compelled to obtain usurious
loans in order to purchase costly fertilizers or farming equipment. The experiences learned from
failed land reform activities in various parts of the country are lack of financing, lack of farm
equipment, lack of fertilizers, lack of guaranteed buyers of produce, lack of farm-to-market
roads, among others. Thus, at the end of the day, there is still no successful implementation of
agrarian reform to speak of in such a case.
Although success is not guaranteed, a cooperative or a corporation stands in a better position to
secure funding and competently maintain the agri-business than the individual farmer. While
direct singular ownership over farmland does offer advantages, such as the ability to make quick
decisions unhampered by interference from others, yet at best, these advantages only but offset
the disadvantages that are often associated with such ownership arrangement. Thus, government
must be flexible and creative in its mode of implementation to better its chances of success. One
such option is collective ownership through juridical persons composed of farmers.
Aside from the fact that there appears to be no violation of the Constitution, the requirement that
the instant case be capable of repetition yet evading review is also wanting. It would be
speculative for this Court to assume that the legislature will enact another law providing for a
similar stock option.
As a matter of sound practice, the Court will not interfere inordinately with the exercise by
Congress of its official functions, the heavy presumption being that a law is the product of
earnest studies by Congress to ensure that no constitutional prescription or concept is
infringed.121 Corollarily, courts will not pass upon questions of wisdom, expediency and justice
of legislation or its provisions. Towards this end, all reasonable doubts should be resolved in
favor of the constitutionality of a law and the validity of the acts and processes taken pursuant
thereof.122
Consequently, before a statute or its provisions duly challenged are voided, an unequivocal
breach of, or a clear conflict with the Constitution, not merely a doubtful or argumentative one,
must be demonstrated in such a manner as to leave no doubt in the mind of the Court. In other
words, the grounds for nullity must be beyond reasonable doubt. 123 FARM has not presented
compelling arguments to overcome the presumption of constitutionality of Sec. 31 of RA 6657.
The wisdom of Congress in allowing an SDP through a corporation as an alternative mode of
implementing agrarian reform is not for judicial determination. Established jurisprudence tells us
that it is not within the province of the Court to inquire into the wisdom of the law, for, indeed,
We are bound by words of the statute.124
II.
The stage is now set for the determination of the propriety under the premises of the revocation
or recall of HLIs SDP. Or to be more precise, the inquiry should be: whether or not PARC
gravely abused its discretion in revoking or recalling the subject SDP and placing the hacienda
under CARPs compulsory acquisition and distribution scheme.
The findings, analysis and recommendation of the DARs Special Task Force contained and
summarized in its Terminal Report provided the bases for the assailed PARC revocatory/recalling
Resolution. The findings may be grouped into two: (1) the SDP is contrary to either the policy on
agrarian reform, Sec. 31 of RA 6657, or DAO 10; and (2) the alleged violation by HLI of the
conditions/terms of the SDP. In more particular terms, the following are essentially the reasons
underpinning PARCs revocatory or recall action:
(1) Despite the lapse of 16 years from the approval of HLIs SDP, the lives of the FWBs
have hardly improved and the promised increased income has not materialized;
(2) HLI has failed to keep Hacienda Luisita intact and unfragmented;
(3) The issuance of HLI shares of stock on the basis of number of hours workedor the
so-called "man days"is grossly onerous to the FWBs, as HLI, in the guise of rotation,
can unilaterally deny work to anyone. In elaboration of this ground, PARCs Resolution
No. 2006-34-01, denying HLIs motion for reconsideration of Resolution No. 2005-3201, stated that the man days criterion worked to dilute the entitlement of the original
share beneficiaries;125
(4) The distribution/transfer of shares was not in accordance with the timelines fixed by
law;
(5) HLI has failed to comply with its obligations to grant 3% of the gross sales every year
as production-sharing benefit on top of the workers salary; and
(6) Several homelot awardees have yet to receive their individual titles.
Petitioner HLI claims having complied with, at least substantially, all its obligations under the
SDP, as approved by PARC itself, and tags the reasons given for the revocation of the SDP as
unfounded.
Public respondents, on the other hand, aver that the assailed resolution rests on solid grounds set
forth in the Terminal Report, a position shared by AMBALA, which, in some pleadings, is
represented by the same counsel as that appearing for the Supervisory Group.
FARM, for its part, posits the view that legal bases obtain for the revocation of the SDP, because
it does not conform to Sec. 31 of RA 6657 and DAO 10. And training its sight on the resulting
dilution of the equity of the FWBs appearing in HLIs masterlist, FARM would state that the
SDP, as couched and implemented, spawned disparity when there should be none; parity when
there should have been differentiation.126
The petition is not impressed with merit.
In the Terminal Report adopted by PARC, it is stated that the SDP violates the agrarian reform
policy under Sec. 2 of RA 6657, as the said plan failed to enhance the dignity and improve the
quality of lives of the FWBs through greater productivity of agricultural lands. We disagree.
Sec. 2 of RA 6657 states:
SECTION 2. Declaration of Principles and Policies.It is the policy of the State to pursue a
Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program (CARP). The welfare of the landless farmers and farm
workers will receive the highest consideration to promote social justice and to move the nation
towards sound rural development and industrialization, and the establishment of owner
cultivatorship of economic-sized farms as the basis of Philippine agriculture.
To this end, a more equitable distribution and ownership of land, with due regard to the rights of
landowners to just compensation and to the ecological needs of the nation, shall be undertaken to
provide farmers and farm workers with the opportunity to enhance their dignity and improve the
quality of their lives through greater productivity of agricultural lands.
The agrarian reform program is founded on the right of farmers and regular farm workers, who
are landless, to own directly or collectively the lands they till or, in the case of other farm
workers, to receive a share of the fruits thereof. To this end, the State shall encourage the just
distribution of all agricultural lands, subject to the priorities and retention limits set forth in this
Act, having taken into account ecological, developmental, and equity considerations, and subject
to the payment of just compensation. The State shall respect the right of small landowners and
shall provide incentives for voluntary land-sharing. (Emphasis supplied.)
Paragraph 2 of the above-quoted provision specifically mentions that "a more equitable
distribution and ownership of land x x x shall be undertaken to provide farmers and farm workers
with the opportunity to enhance their dignity and improve the quality of their lives through
greater productivity of agricultural lands." Of note is the term "opportunity" which is defined as a
favorable chance or opening offered by circumstances.127 Considering this, by no stretch of
imagination can said provision be construed as a guarantee in improving the lives of the FWBs.
At best, it merely provides for a possibility or favorable chance of uplifting the economic status
of the FWBs, which may or may not be attained.
Pertinently, improving the economic status of the FWBs is neither among the legal obligations of
HLI under the SDP nor an imperative imposition by RA 6657 and DAO 10, a violation of which
would justify discarding the stock distribution option. Nothing in that option agreement, law or
department order indicates otherwise.
Significantly, HLI draws particular attention to its having paid its FWBs, during the regime of
the SDP (1989-2005), some PhP 3 billion by way of salaries/wages and higher benefits exclusive
of free hospital and medical benefits to their immediate family. And attached as Annex "G" to
HLIs Memorandum is the certified true report of the finance manager of Jose Cojuangco & Sons
Organizations-Tarlac Operations, captioned as "HACIENDA LUISITA, INC. Salaries, Benefits
and Credit Privileges (in Thousand Pesos) Since the Stock Option was Approved by
PARC/CARP," detailing what HLI gave their workers from 1989 to 2005. The sum total, as
added up by the Court, yields the following numbers: Total Direct Cash Out (Salaries/Wages &
Cash Benefits) = PhP 2,927,848; Total Non-Direct Cash Out (Hospital/Medical Benefits) = PhP
303,040. The cash out figures, as stated in the report, include the cost of homelots; the PhP 150
million or so representing 3% of the gross produce of the hacienda; and the PhP 37.5 million
representing 3% from the proceeds of the sale of the 500-hectare converted lands. While not
included in the report, HLI manifests having given the FWBs 3% of the PhP 80 million paid for
the 80 hectares of land traversed by the SCTEX. 128 On top of these, it is worth remembering that
the shares of stocks were given by HLI to the FWBs for free. Verily, the FWBs have benefited
from the SDP.
To address urgings that the FWBs be allowed to disengage from the SDP as HLI has not anyway
earned profits through the years, it cannot be over-emphasized that, as a matter of common
business sense, no corporation could guarantee a profitable run all the time. As has been
suggested, one of the key features of an SDP of a corporate landowner is the likelihood of the
corporate vehicle not earning, or, worse still, losing money.129
The Court is fully aware that one of the criteria under DAO 10 for the PARC to consider the
advisability of approving a stock distribution plan is the likelihood that the plan "would result in
increased income and greater benefits to [qualified beneficiaries] than if the lands were divided
and distributed to them individually."130 But as aptly noted during the oral arguments, DAO 10
ought to have not, as it cannot, actually exact assurance of success on something that is subject to
the will of man, the forces of nature or the inherent risky nature of business. 131 Just like in actual
land distribution, an SDP cannot guarantee, as indeed the SDOA does not guarantee, a
comfortable life for the FWBs. The Court can take judicial notice of the fact that there were
many instances wherein after a farmworker beneficiary has been awarded with an agricultural
land, he just subsequently sells it and is eventually left with nothing in the end.
In all then, the onerous condition of the FWBs economic status, their life of hardship, if that
really be the case, can hardly be attributed to HLI and its SDP and provide a valid ground for the
plans revocation.
Neither does HLIs SDP, whence the DAR-attested SDOA/MOA is based, infringe Sec. 31 of RA
6657, albeit public respondents erroneously submit otherwise.
The provisions of the first paragraph of the adverted Sec. 31 are without relevance to the issue on
the propriety of the assailed order revoking HLIs SDP, for the paragraph deals with the transfer
of agricultural lands to the government, as a mode of CARP compliance, thus:
SEC. 31. Corporate Landowners.Corporate landowners may voluntarily transfer ownership
over their agricultural landholdings to the Republic of the Philippines pursuant to Section 20
hereof or to qualified beneficiaries under such terms and conditions, consistent with this Act, as
they may agree, subject to confirmation by the DAR.
The second and third paragraphs, with their sub-paragraphs, of Sec. 31 provide as follows:
beneficiaries the right to purchase such proportion of the capital stock of the corporation
that the agricultural land, actually devoted to agricultural activities, bears in relation to the
companys total assets, under such terms and conditions as may be agreed upon by them. In no
case shall the compensation received by the workers at the time the shares of stocks are
distributed be reduced. x x x
Corporations or associations which voluntarily divest a proportion of their capital stock, equity
or participation in favor of their workers or other qualified beneficiaries under this section shall
be deemed to have complied with the provisions of this Act: Provided, That the following
conditions are complied with:
(a) In order to safeguard the right of beneficiaries who own shares of stocks to dividends
and other financial benefits, the books of the corporation or association shall be subject to
periodic audit by certified public accountants chosen by the beneficiaries;
(b) Irrespective of the value of their equity in the corporation or association, the
beneficiaries shall be assured of at least one (1) representative in the board of directors, or
in a management or executive committee, if one exists, of the corporation or association;
(c) Any shares acquired by such workers and beneficiaries shall have the same rights and
features as all other shares; and
(d) Any transfer of shares of stocks by the original beneficiaries shall be void ab initio
unless said transaction is in favor of a qualified and registered beneficiary within the
same corporation.
The mandatory minimum ratio of land-to-shares of stock supposed to be distributed or allocated
to qualified beneficiaries, adverting to what Sec. 31 of RA 6657 refers to as that "proportion of
the capital stock of the corporation that the agricultural land, actually devoted to agricultural
activities, bears in relation to the companys total assets" had been observed.
Paragraph one (1) of the SDOA, which was based on the SDP, conforms to Sec. 31 of RA 6657.
The stipulation reads:
1. The percentage of the value of the agricultural land of Hacienda Luisita (P196,630,000.00) in
relation to the total assets (P590,554,220.00) transferred and conveyed to the SECOND PARTY
is 33.296% that, under the law, is the proportion of the outstanding capital stock of the SECOND
PARTY, which is P355,531,462.00 or 355,531,462 shares with a par value of P1.00 per share,
that has to be distributed to the THIRD PARTY under the stock distribution plan, the said
33.296% thereof being P118,391,976.85 or 118,391,976.85 shares.
The appraised value of the agricultural land is PhP 196,630,000 and of HLIs other assets is PhP
393,924,220. The total value of HLIs assets is, therefore, PhP 590,554,220. 132 The percentage of
the value of the agricultural lands (PhP 196,630,000) in relation to the total assets (PhP
590,554,220) is 33.296%, which represents the stockholdings of the 6,296 original qualified
farmworker-beneficiaries (FWBs) in HLI. The total number of shares to be distributed to said
qualified FWBs is 118,391,976.85 HLI shares. This was arrived at by getting 33.296% of the
355,531,462 shares which is the outstanding capital stock of HLI with a value of PhP
355,531,462. Thus, if we divide the 118,391,976.85 HLI shares by 6,296 FWBs, then each FWB
is entitled to 18,804.32 HLI shares. These shares under the SDP are to be given to FWBs for free.
The Court finds that the determination of the shares to be distributed to the 6,296 FWBs strictly
adheres to the formula prescribed by Sec. 31(b) of RA 6657.
Anent the requirement under Sec. 31(b) of the third paragraph, that the FWBs shall be assured of
at least one (1) representative in the board of directors or in a management or executive
committee irrespective of the value of the equity of the FWBs in HLI, the Court finds that the
SDOA contained provisions making certain the FWBs representation in HLIs governing board,
thus:
5. Even if only a part or fraction of the shares earmarked for distribution will have been acquired
from the FIRST PARTY and distributed to the THIRD PARTY, FIRST PARTY shall execute at
the beginning of each fiscal year an irrevocable proxy, valid and effective for one (1) year, in
favor of the farmworkers appearing as shareholders of the SECOND PARTY at the start of said
year which will empower the THIRD PARTY or their representative to vote in stockholders and
board of directors meetings of the SECOND PARTY convened during the year the entire
33.296% of the outstanding capital stock of the SECOND PARTY earmarked for distribution and
thus be able to gain such number of seats in the board of directors of the SECOND PARTY that
the whole 33.296% of the shares subject to distribution will be entitled to.
Also, no allegations have been made against HLI restricting the inspection of its books by
accountants chosen by the FWBs; hence, the assumption may be made that there has been no
violation of the statutory prescription under sub-paragraph (a) on the auditing of HLIs accounts.
Public respondents, however, submit that the distribution of the mandatory minimum ratio of
land-to-shares of stock, referring to the 118,391,976.85 shares with par value of PhP 1 each,
should have been made in full within two (2) years from the approval of RA 6657, in line with
the last paragraph of Sec. 31 of said law.133
Public respondents submission is palpably erroneous. We have closely examined the last
paragraph alluded to, with particular focus on the two-year period mentioned, and nothing in it
remotely supports the public respondents posture. In its pertinent part, said Sec. 31 provides:
SEC. 31. Corporate Landowners x x x
If within two (2) years from the approval of this Act, the [voluntary] land or stock transfer
envisioned above is not made or realized or the plan for such stock distribution approved by the
PARC within the same period, the agricultural land of the corporate owners or corporation shall
be subject to the compulsory coverage of this Act. (Word in bracket and emphasis added.)
Properly viewed, the words "two (2) years" clearly refer to the period within which the corporate
landowner, to avoid land transfer as a mode of CARP coverage under RA 6657, is to avail of the
stock distribution option or to have the SDP approved. The HLI secured approval of its SDP in
November 1989, well within the two-year period reckoned from June 1988 when RA 6657 took
effect.
Having hurdled the alleged breach of the agrarian reform policy under Sec. 2 of RA 6657 as well
as the statutory issues, We shall now delve into what PARC and respondents deem to be other
instances of violation of DAO 10 and the SDP.
On the Conversion of Lands
Contrary to the almost parallel stance of the respondents, keeping Hacienda Luisita
unfragmented is also not among the imperative impositions by the SDP, RA 6657, and DAO 10.
The Terminal Report states that the proposed distribution plan submitted in 1989 to the PARC
effectively assured the intended stock beneficiaries that the physical integrity of the farm shall
remain inviolate. Accordingly, the Terminal Report and the PARC-assailed resolution would take
HLI to task for securing approval of the conversion to non-agricultural uses of 500 hectares of
the hacienda. In not too many words, the Report and the resolution view the conversion as an
infringement of Sec. 5(a) of DAO 10 which reads: "a. that the continued operation of the
corporation with its agricultural land intact and unfragmented is viable with potential for growth
and increased profitability."
The PARC is wrong.
In the first place, Sec. 5(a)just like the succeeding Sec. 5(b) of DAO 10 on increased income
and greater benefits to qualified beneficiariesis but one of the stated criteria to guide PARC in
deciding on whether or not to accept an SDP. Said Sec. 5(a) does not exact from the corporate
landowner-applicant the undertaking to keep the farm intact and unfragmented ad infinitum. And
there is logic to HLIs stated observation that the key phrase in the provision of Sec. 5(a) is
"viability of corporate operations": "[w]hat is thus required is not the agricultural land remaining
intact x x x but the viability of the corporate operations with its agricultural land being intact and
unfragmented. Corporate operation may be viable even if the corporate agricultural land does not
remain intact or [un]fragmented."134
It is, of course, anti-climactic to mention that DAR viewed the conversion as not violative of any
issuance, let alone undermining the viability of Hacienda Luisitas operation, as the DAR
Secretary approved the land conversion applied for and its disposition via his Conversion Order
dated August 14, 1996 pursuant to Sec. 65 of RA 6657 which reads:
Sec. 65. Conversion of Lands.After the lapse of five years from its award when the land ceases
to be economically feasible and sound for agricultural purposes, or the locality has become
urbanized and the land will have a greater economic value for residential, commercial or
industrial purposes, the DAR upon application of the beneficiary or landowner with due notice to
the affected parties, and subject to existing laws, may authorize the x x x conversion of the land
and its dispositions. x x x
On the 3% Production Share
On the matter of the alleged failure of HLI to comply with sharing the 3% of the gross
production sales of the hacienda and pay dividends from profit, the entries in its financial books
tend to indicate compliance by HLI of the profit-sharing equivalent to 3% of the gross sales from
the production of the agricultural land on top of (a) the salaries and wages due FWBs as
employees of the company and (b) the 3% of the gross selling price of the converted land and
that portion used for the SCTEX. A plausible evidence of compliance or non-compliance, as the
case may be, could be the books of account of HLI. Evidently, the cry of some groups of not
having received their share from the gross production sales has not adequately been validated on
the ground by the Special Task Force.
Indeed, factual findings of administrative agencies are conclusive when supported by substantial
evidence and are accorded due respect and weight, especially when they are affirmed by the
CA.135 However, such rule is not absolute. One such exception is when the findings of an
administrative agency are conclusions without citation of specific evidence on which they are
based,136 such as in this particular instance. As culled from its Terminal Report, it would appear
that the Special Task Force rejected HLIs claim of compliance on the basis of this ratiocination:
The Task Force position: Though, allegedly, the Supervisory Group receives the 3% gross
production share and that others alleged that they received 30 million pesos still others
maintain that they have not received anything yet. Item No. 4 of the MOA is clear and
must be followed. There is a distinction between the total gross sales from the production
of the land and the proceeds from the sale of the land. The former refers to the fruits/yield
of the agricultural land while the latter is the land itself. The phrase "the beneficiaries are
entitled every year to an amount approximately equivalent to 3% would only be feasible
if the subject is the produce since there is at least one harvest per year, while such is not
the case in the sale of the agricultural land. This negates then the claim of HLI that, all
that the FWBs can be entitled to, if any, is only 3% of the purchase price of the converted
land.
Besides, the Conversion Order dated 14 August 1996 provides that "the benefits, wages
and the like, presently received by the FWBs shall not in any way be reduced or
adversely affected. Three percent of the gross selling price of the sale of the converted
land shall be awarded to the beneficiaries of the SDO." The 3% gross production share
then is different from the 3% proceeds of the sale of the converted land and, with more
reason, the 33% share being claimed by the FWBs as part owners of the Hacienda, should
have been given the FWBs, as stockholders, and to which they could have been entitled if
only the land were acquired and redistributed to them under the CARP.
xxxx
The FWBs do not receive any other benefits under the MOA except the aforementioned
[(viz: shares of stocks (partial), 3% gross production sale (not all) and homelots (not all)].
Judging from the above statements, the Special Task Force is at best silent on whether HLI has
failed to comply with the 3% production-sharing obligation or the 3% of the gross selling price
of the converted land and the SCTEX lot. In fact, it admits that the FWBs, though not all, have
received their share of the gross production sales and in the sale of the lot to SCTEX. At most,
then, HLI had complied substantially with this SDP undertaking and the conversion order. To be
sure, this slight breach would not justify the setting to naught by PARC of the approval action of
the earlier PARC. Even in contract law, rescission, predicated on violation of reciprocity, will not
be permitted for a slight or casual breach of contract; rescission may be had only for such
breaches that are substantial and fundamental as to defeat the object of the parties in making the
agreement.137
Despite the foregoing findings, the revocation of the approval of the SDP is not without basis as
shown below.
On Titles to Homelots
Under RA 6657, the distribution of homelots is required only for corporations or business
associations owning or operating farms which opted for land distribution. Sec. 30 of RA 6657
states:
SEC. 30. Homelots and Farmlots for Members of Cooperatives.The individual members of the
cooperatives or corporations mentioned in the preceding section shall be provided with homelots
and small farmlots for their family use, to be taken from the land owned by the cooperative or
corporation.
The "preceding section" referred to in the above-quoted provision is as follows:
SEC. 29. Farms Owned or Operated by Corporations or Other Business Associations.In the
case of farms owned or operated by corporations or other business associations, the following
rules shall be observed by the PARC.
In general, lands shall be distributed directly to the individual worker-beneficiaries.
In case it is not economically feasible and sound to divide the land, then it shall be owned
collectively by the worker-beneficiaries who shall form a workers cooperative or association
which will deal with the corporation or business association. Until a new agreement is entered
into by and between the workers cooperative or association and the corporation or business
association, any agreement existing at the time this Act takes effect between the former and the
previous landowner shall be respected by both the workers cooperative or association and the
corporation or business association.
Noticeably, the foregoing provisions do not make reference to corporations which opted for stock
distribution under Sec. 31 of RA 6657. Concomitantly, said corporations are not obliged to
provide for it except by stipulation, as in this case.
Under the SDP, HLI undertook to "subdivide and allocate for free and without charge among the
qualified family-beneficiaries x x x residential or homelots of not more than 240 sq. m. each,
with each family beneficiary being assured of receiving and owning a homelot in the barrio or
barangay where it actually resides," "within a reasonable time."
More than sixteen (16) years have elapsed from the time the SDP was approved by PARC, and
yet, it is still the contention of the FWBs that not all was given the 240-square meter homelots
and, of those who were already given, some still do not have the corresponding titles.
During the oral arguments, HLI was afforded the chance to refute the foregoing allegation by
submitting proof that the FWBs were already given the said homelots:
Justice Velasco: x x x There is also an allegation that the farmer beneficiaries, the qualified
family beneficiaries were not given the 240 square meters each. So, can you also [prove] that the
qualified family beneficiaries were already provided the 240 square meter homelots.
Atty. Asuncion: We will, your Honor please.138
Other than the financial report, however, no other substantial proof showing that all the qualified
beneficiaries have received homelots was submitted by HLI. Hence, this Court is constrained to
rule that HLI has not yet fully complied with its undertaking to distribute homelots to the FWBs
under the SDP.
On "Man Days" and the Mechanics of Stock Distribution
In our review and analysis of par. 3 of the SDOA on the mechanics and timelines of stock
distribution, We find that it violates two (2) provisions of DAO 10. Par. 3 of the SDOA states:
3. At the end of each fiscal year, for a period of 30 years, the SECOND PARTY [HLI] shall
arrange with the FIRST PARTY [TDC] the acquisition and distribution to the THIRD PARTY
[FWBs] on the basis of number of days worked and at no cost to them of one-thirtieth (1/30) of
118,391,976.85 shares of the capital stock of the SECOND PARTY that are presently owned and
held by the FIRST PARTY, until such time as the entire block of 118,391,976.85 shares shall
have been completely acquired and distributed to the THIRD PARTY.
Based on the above-quoted provision, the distribution of the shares of stock to the FWBs, albeit
not entailing a cash out from them, is contingent on the number of "man days," that is, the
number of days that the FWBs have worked during the year. This formula deviates from Sec. 1
of DAO 10, which decrees the distribution of equal number of shares to the FWBs as the
minimum ratio of shares of stock for purposes of compliance with Sec. 31 of RA 6657. As stated
in Sec. 4 of DAO 10:
Section 4. Stock Distribution Plan.The [SDP] submitted by the corporate landowner-applicant
shall provide for the distribution of an equal number of shares of the same class and value, with
the same rights and features as all other shares, to each of the qualified beneficiaries. This
distribution plan in all cases, shall be at least the minimum ratio for purposes of compliance with
Section 31 of R.A. No. 6657.
On top of the minimum ratio provided under Section 3 of this Implementing Guideline, the
corporate landowner-applicant may adopt additional stock distribution schemes taking into
account factors such as rank, seniority, salary, position and other circumstances which may be
deemed desirable as a matter of sound company policy. (Emphasis supplied.)
The above proviso gives two (2) sets or categories of shares of stock which a qualified
beneficiary can acquire from the corporation under the SDP. The first pertains, as earlier
explained, to the mandatory minimum ratio of shares of stock to be distributed to the FWBs in
compliance with Sec. 31 of RA 6657. This minimum ratio contemplates of that "proportion of
the capital stock of the corporation that the agricultural land, actually devoted to agricultural
activities, bears in relation to the companys total assets." 139 It is this set of shares of stock which,
in line with Sec. 4 of DAO 10, is supposed to be allocated "for the distribution of an equal
number of shares of stock of the same class and value, with the same rights and features as all
other shares, to each of the qualified beneficiaries."
On the other hand, the second set or category of shares partakes of a gratuitous extra grant,
meaning that this set or category constitutes an augmentation share/s that the corporate
landowner may give under an additional stock distribution scheme, taking into account such
variables as rank, seniority, salary, position and like factors which the management, in the
exercise of its sound discretion, may deem desirable.140
Before anything else, it should be stressed that, at the time PARC approved HLIs SDP, HLI
recognized 6,296individuals as qualified FWBs. And under the 30-year stock distribution
program envisaged under the plan, FWBs who came in after 1989, new FWBs in fine, may be
accommodated, as they appear to have in fact been accommodated as evidenced by their receipt
of HLI shares.
Now then, by providing that the number of shares of the original 1989 FWBs shall depend on the
number of "man days," HLI violated the afore-quoted rule on stock distribution and effectively
deprived the FWBs of equal shares of stock in the corporation, for, in net effect, these 6,296
qualified FWBs, who theoretically had given up their rights to the land that could have been
distributed to them, suffered a dilution of their due share entitlement. As has been observed
during the oral arguments, HLI has chosen to use the shares earmarked for farmworkers as
reward system chips to water down the shares of the original 6,296 FWBs.141 Particularly:
Justice Abad: If the SDOA did not take place, the other thing that would have happened is that
there would be CARP?
Atty. Dela Merced: Yes, Your Honor.
Justice Abad: Thats the only point I want to know x x x. Now, but they chose to enter SDOA
instead of placing the land under CARP. And for that reason those who would have gotten their
shares of the land actually gave up their rights to this land in place of the shares of the stock, is
that correct?
Atty. Dela Merced: It would be that way, Your Honor.
Justice Abad: Right now, also the government, in a way, gave up its right to own the land because
that way the government takes own [sic] the land and distribute it to the farmers and pay for the
land, is that correct?
Justice Abad: And then you gave thirty-three percent (33%) of the shares of HLI to the farmers at
that time that numbered x x x those who signed five thousand four hundred ninety eight (5,498)
beneficiaries, is that correct?
Justice Abad: But later on, after assigning them their shares, some workers came in from 1989,
1990, 1991, 1992 and the rest of the years that you gave additional shares who were not in the
original list of owners?
Justice Abad: Did those new workers give up any right that would have belong to them in 1989
when the land was supposed to have been placed under CARP?
Atty. Dela Merced: If you are talking or referring (interrupted)
Justice Abad: None! You tell me. None. They gave up no rights to land?
Atty. Dela Merced: They did not do the same thing as we did in 1989, Your Honor.
Justice Abad: No, if they were not workers in 1989 what land did they give up? None, if they
become workers later on.
Atty. Dela Merced: None, Your Honor, I was referring, Your Honor, to the original
(interrupted)
Justice Abad: So why is it that the rights of those who gave up their lands would be diluted,
because the company has chosen to use the shares as reward system for new workers who come
in? It is not that the new workers, in effect, become just workers of the corporation whose
stockholders were already fixed. The TADECO who has shares there about sixty six percent
(66%) and the five thousand four hundred ninety eight (5,498) farmers at the time of the SDOA?
Explain to me. Why, why will you x x x what right or where did you get that right to use this
shares, to water down the shares of those who should have been benefited, and to use it as a
reward system decided by the company?142
From the above discourse, it is clear as day that the original 6,296 FWBs, who were qualified
beneficiaries at the time of the approval of the SDP, suffered from watering down of shares. As
determined earlier, each original FWB is entitled to 18,804.32 HLI shares. The original FWBs
got less than the guaranteed 18,804.32 HLI shares per beneficiary, because the acquisition and
distribution of the HLI shares were based on "man days" or "number of days worked" by the
FWB in a years time. As explained by HLI, a beneficiary needs to work for at least 37 days in a
fiscal year before he or she becomes entitled to HLI shares. If it falls below 37 days, the FWB,
unfortunately, does not get any share at year end. The number of HLI shares distributed varies
depending on the number of days the FWBs were allowed to work in one year. Worse, HLI hired
farmworkers in addition to the original 6,296 FWBs, such that, as indicated in the Compliance
dated August 2, 2010 submitted by HLI to the Court, the total number of farmworkers of HLI as
of said date stood at 10,502. All these farmworkers, which include the original 6,296 FWBs,
were given shares out of the 118,931,976.85 HLI shares representing the 33.296% of the total
outstanding capital stock of HLI. Clearly, the minimum individual allocation of each original
FWB of 18,804.32 shares was diluted as a result of the use of "man days" and the hiring of
additional farmworkers.
Going into another but related matter, par. 3 of the SDOA expressly providing for a 30-year
timeframe for HLI-to-FWBs stock transfer is an arrangement contrary to what Sec. 11 of DAO
10 prescribes. Said Sec. 11 provides for the implementation of the approved stock distribution
plan within three (3) months from receipt by the corporate landowner of the approval of the plan
by PARC. In fact, based on the said provision, the transfer of the shares of stock in the names of
the qualified FWBs should be recorded in the stock and transfer books and must be submitted to
the SEC within sixty (60) days from implementation. As stated:
Section 11. Implementation/Monitoring of Plan.The approved stock distribution plan shall
be implemented within three (3) months from receipt by the corporate landowner-applicant of the
approval thereof by the PARC, and the transfer of the shares of stocks in the names of the
qualified beneficiaries shall be recorded in stock and transfer books and submitted to the
Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) within sixty (60) days from the said implementation
of the stock distribution plan. (Emphasis supplied.)
It is evident from the foregoing provision that the implementation, that is, the distribution of the
shares of stock to the FWBs, must be made within three (3) months from receipt by HLI of the
approval of the stock distribution plan by PARC. While neither of the clashing parties has made a
compelling case of the thrust of this provision, the Court is of the view and so holds that the
intent is to compel the corporate landowner to complete, not merely initiate, the transfer process
of shares within that three-month timeframe. Reinforcing this conclusion is the 60-day stock
transfer recording (with the SEC) requirement reckoned from the implementation of the SDP.
To the Court, there is a purpose, which is at once discernible as it is practical, for the three-month
threshold. Remove this timeline and the corporate landowner can veritably evade compliance
with agrarian reform by simply deferring to absurd limits the implementation of the stock
distribution scheme.
The argument is urged that the thirty (30)-year distribution program is justified by the fact that,
under Sec. 26 of RA 6657, payment by beneficiaries of land distribution under CARP shall be
made in thirty (30) annual amortizations. To HLI, said section provides a justifying dimension to
its 30-year stock distribution program.
HLIs reliance on Sec. 26 of RA 6657, quoted in part below, is obviously misplaced as the said
provision clearly deals with land distribution.
SEC. 26. Payment by Beneficiaries.Lands awarded pursuant to this Act shall be paid for by the
beneficiaries to the LBP in thirty (30) annual amortizations x x x.
Then, too, the ones obliged to pay the LBP under the said provision are the beneficiaries. On the
other hand, in the instant case, aside from the fact that what is involved is stock distribution, it is
the corporate landowner who has the obligation to distribute the shares of stock among the
FWBs.
Evidently, the land transfer beneficiaries are given thirty (30) years within which to pay the cost
of the land thus awarded them to make it less cumbersome for them to pay the government. To
be sure, the reason underpinning the 30-year accommodation does not apply to corporate
landowners in distributing shares of stock to the qualified beneficiaries, as the shares may be
issued in a much shorter period of time.
Taking into account the above discussion, the revocation of the SDP by PARC should be upheld
for violating DAO 10. It bears stressing that under Sec. 49 of RA 6657, the PARC and the DAR
have the power to issue rules and regulations, substantive or procedural. Being a product of such
rule-making power, DAO 10 has the force and effect of law and must be duly complied
with.143 The PARC is, therefore, correct in revoking the SDP. Consequently, the PARC
Resolution No. 89-12-2 dated November 21, l989 approving the HLIs SDP is nullified and
voided.
III.
We now resolve the petitions-in-intervention which, at bottom, uniformly pray for the exclusion
from the coverage of the assailed PARC resolution those portions of the converted land within
Hacienda Luisita which RCBC and LIPCO acquired by purchase.
Both contend that they are innocent purchasers for value of portions of the converted farm land.
Thus, their plea for the exclusion of that portion from PARC Resolution 2005-32-01, as
implemented by a DAR-issued Notice of Coverage dated January 2, 2006, which called for
mandatory CARP acquisition coverage of lands subject of the SDP.
To restate the antecedents, after the conversion of the 500 hectares of land in Hacienda Luisita,
HLI transferred the 300 hectares to Centennary, while ceding the remaining 200-hectare portion
to LRC. Subsequently, LIPCO purchased the entire three hundred (300) hectares of land from
Centennary for the purpose of developing the land into an industrial complex. 144 Accordingly, the
TCT in Centennarys name was canceled and a new one issued in LIPCOs name. Thereafter,
said land was subdivided into two (2) more parcels of land. Later on, LIPCO transferred about
184 hectares to RCBC by way of dacion en pago, by virtue of which TCTs in the name of RCBC
were subsequently issued.
Under Sec. 44 of PD 1529 or the Property Registration Decree, "every registered owner
receiving a certificate of title in pursuance of a decree of registration and every subsequent
purchaser of registered land taking a certificate of title for value and in good faith shall hold the
same free from all encumbrances except those noted on the certificate and enumerated
therein."145
It is settled doctrine that one who deals with property registered under the Torrens system need
not go beyond the four corners of, but can rely on what appears on, the title. He is charged with
notice only of such burdens and claims as are annotated on the title. This principle admits of
certain exceptions, such as when the party has actual knowledge of facts and circumstances that
would impel a reasonably cautious man to make such inquiry, or when the purchaser has
knowledge of a defect or the lack of title in his vendor or of sufficient facts to induce a
reasonably prudent man to inquire into the status of the title of the property in litigation. 146 A
higher level of care and diligence is of course expected from banks, their business being
impressed with public interest.147
Millena v. Court of Appeals describes a purchaser in good faith in this wise:

x x x A purchaser in good faith is one who buys property of another, without notice that some
other person has a right to, or interest in, such property at the time of such purchase, or before he
has notice of the claim or interest of some other persons in the property. Good faith, or the lack
of it, is in the final analysis a question of intention; but in ascertaining the intention by which one
is actuated on a given occasion, we are necessarily controlled by the evidence as to the conduct
and outward acts by which alone the inward motive may, with safety, be determined. Truly, good
faith is not a visible, tangible fact that can be seen or touched, but rather a state or condition of
mind which can only be judged by actual or fancied tokens or signs. Otherwise stated, good faith
x x x refers to the state of mind which is manifested by the acts of the individual
concerned.148 (Emphasis supplied.)
In fine, there are two (2) requirements before one may be considered a purchaser in good faith,
namely: (1) that the purchaser buys the property of another without notice that some other person
has a right to or interest in such property; and (2) that the purchaser pays a full and fair price for
the property at the time of such purchase or before he or she has notice of the claim of another.
It can rightfully be said that both LIPCO and RCBC arebased on the above requirements and
with respect to the adverted transactions of the converted land in questionpurchasers in good
faith for value entitled to the benefits arising from such status.
First, at the time LIPCO purchased the entire three hundred (300) hectares of industrial land,
there was no notice of any supposed defect in the title of its transferor, Centennary, or that any
other person has a right to or interest in such property. In fact, at the time LIPCO acquired said
parcels of land, only the following annotations appeared on the TCT in the name of Centennary:
the Secretarys Certificate in favor of Teresita Lopa, the Secretarys Certificate in favor of
Shintaro Murai, and the conversion of the property from agricultural to industrial and residential
use.149
The same is true with respect to RCBC. At the time it acquired portions of Hacienda Luisita,
only the following general annotations appeared on the TCTs of LIPCO: the Deed of
Restrictions, limiting its use solely as an industrial estate; the Secretarys Certificate in favor of
Koji Komai and Kyosuke Hori; and the Real Estate Mortgage in favor of RCBC to guarantee the
payment of PhP 300 million.
It cannot be claimed that RCBC and LIPCO acted in bad faith in acquiring the lots that were
previously covered by the SDP. Good faith "consists in the possessors belief that the person
from whom he received it was the owner of the same and could convey his title. Good faith
requires a well-founded belief that the person from whom title was received was himself the
owner of the land, with the right to convey it. There is good faith where there is an honest
intention to abstain from taking any unconscientious advantage from another." 150 It is the
opposite of fraud.
To be sure, intervenor RCBC and LIPCO knew that the lots they bought were subjected to CARP
coverage by means of a stock distribution plan, as the DAR conversion order was annotated at
the back of the titles of the lots they acquired. However, they are of the honest belief that the
subject lots were validly converted to commercial or industrial purposes and for which said lots
were taken out of the CARP coverage subject of PARC Resolution No. 89-12-2 and, hence, can
be legally and validly acquired by them. After all, Sec. 65 of RA 6657 explicitly allows
conversion and disposition of agricultural lands previously covered by CARP land acquisition
"after the lapse of five (5) years from its award when the land ceases to be economically feasible
and sound for agricultural purposes or the locality has become urbanized and the land will have a
greater economic value for residential, commercial or industrial purposes." Moreover, DAR
notified all the affected parties, more particularly the FWBs, and gave them the opportunity to
comment or oppose the proposed conversion. DAR, after going through the necessary processes,
granted the conversion of 500 hectares of Hacienda Luisita pursuant to its primary jurisdiction
under Sec. 50 of RA 6657 to determine and adjudicate agrarian reform matters and its original
exclusive jurisdiction over all matters involving the implementation of agrarian reform. The
DAR conversion order became final and executory after none of the FWBs interposed an appeal
to the CA. In this factual setting, RCBC and LIPCO purchased the lots in question on their
honest and well-founded belief that the previous registered owners could legally sell and convey
the lots though these were previously subject of CARP coverage. Ergo, RCBC and LIPCO acted
in good faith in acquiring the subject lots.
And second, both LIPCO and RCBC purchased portions of Hacienda Luisita for value.
Undeniably, LIPCO acquired 300 hectares of land from Centennary for the amount of PhP 750
million pursuant to a Deed of Sale dated July 30, 1998. 151 On the other hand, in a Deed of
Absolute Assignment dated November 25, 2004, LIPCO conveyed portions of Hacienda Luisita
in favor of RCBC by way of dacion en pago to pay for a loan of PhP 431,695,732.10.
As bona fide purchasers for value, both LIPCO and RCBC have acquired rights which cannot
just be disregarded by DAR, PARC or even by this Court. As held in Spouses Chua v. Soriano:
With the property in question having already passed to the hands of purchasers in good faith, it is
now of no moment that some irregularity attended the issuance of the SPA, consistent with our
pronouncement in Heirs of Spouses Benito Gavino and Juana Euste v. Court of Appeals, to wit:
x x x the general rule that the direct result of a previous void contract cannot be valid, is
inapplicable in this case as it will directly contravene the Torrens system of registration. Where
innocent third persons, relying on the correctness of the certificate of title thus issued,
acquire rights over the property, the court cannot disregard such rights and order the
cancellation of the certificate. The effect of such outright cancellation will be to impair public
confidence in the certificate of title. The sanctity of the Torrens system must be preserved;
otherwise, everyone dealing with the property registered under the system will have to inquire in
every instance as to whether the title had been regularly or irregularly issued, contrary to the
evident purpose of the law.
Being purchasers in good faith, the Chuas already acquired valid title to the property. A
purchaser in good faith holds an indefeasible title to the property and he is entitled to the
protection of the law.152 x x x (Emphasis supplied.)
To be sure, the practicalities of the situation have to a point influenced Our disposition on the
fate of RCBC and LIPCO. After all, the Court, to borrow from Association of Small Landowners
in the Philippines, Inc.,153 is not a "cloistered institution removed" from the realities on the
ground. To note, the approval and issuances of both the national and local governments showing
that certain portions of Hacienda Luisita have effectively ceased, legally and physically, to be
agricultural and, therefore, no longer CARPable are a matter of fact which cannot just be ignored
by the Court and the DAR. Among the approving/endorsing issuances:154
(a) Resolution No. 392 dated 11 December 1996 of the Sangguniang Bayan of Tarlac
favorably endorsing the 300-hectare industrial estate project of LIPCO;
(b) BOI Certificate of Registration No. 96-020 dated 20 December 1996 issued in
accordance with the Omnibus Investments Code of 1987;
(c) PEZA Certificate of Board Resolution No. 97-202 dated 27 June 1997, approving
LIPCOs application for a mixed ecozone and proclaiming the three hundred (300)
hectares of the industrial land as a Special Economic Zone;
(d) Resolution No. 234 dated 08 August 1997 of the Sangguniang Bayan of Tarlac,
approving the Final Development Permit for the Luisita Industrial Park II Project;
(e) Development Permit dated 13 August 1997 for the proposed Luisita Industrial Park II
Project issued by the Office of the Sangguniang Bayan of Tarlac;155
(f) DENR Environmental Compliance Certificate dated 01 October 1997 issued for the
proposed project of building an industrial complex on three hundred (300) hectares of
industrial land;156
(g) Certificate of Registration No. 00794 dated 26 December 1997 issued by the HLURB
on the project of Luisita Industrial Park II with an area of three million (3,000,000)
square meters;157
(h) License to Sell No. 0076 dated 26 December 1997 issued by the HLURB authorizing
the sale of lots in the Luisita Industrial Park II;
(i) Proclamation No. 1207 dated 22 April 1998 entitled "Declaring Certain Parcels of
Private Land in Barangay San Miguel, Municipality of Tarlac, Province of Tarlac, as a
Special Economic Zone pursuant to Republic Act No. 7916," designating the Luisita
Industrial Park II consisting of three hundred hectares (300 has.) of industrial land as a
Special Economic Zone; and
(j) Certificate of Registration No. EZ-98-05 dated 07 May 1998 issued by the PEZA,
stating that pursuant to Presidential Proclamation No. 1207 dated 22 April 1998 and
Republic Act No. 7916, LIPCO has been registered as an Ecozone Developer/Operator of
Luisita Industrial Park II located in San Miguel, Tarlac, Tarlac.
While a mere reclassification of a covered agricultural land or its inclusion in an economic zone
does not automatically allow the corporate or individual landowner to change its use, 158 the
reclassification process is a prima facie indicium that the land has ceased to be economically
feasible and sound for agricultural uses. And if only to stress, DAR Conversion Order No.
030601074-764-(95) issued in 1996 by then DAR Secretary Garilao had effectively converted
500 hectares of hacienda land from agricultural to industrial/commercial use and authorized their
disposition.
In relying upon the above-mentioned approvals, proclamation and conversion order, both RCBC
and LIPCO cannot be considered at fault for believing that certain portions of Hacienda Luisita
are industrial/commercial lands and are, thus, outside the ambit of CARP. The PARC, and
consequently DAR, gravely abused its discretion when it placed LIPCOs and RCBCs property
which once formed part of Hacienda Luisita under the CARP compulsory acquisition scheme via
the assailed Notice of Coverage.
As regards the 80.51-hectare land transferred to the government for use as part of the SCTEX,
this should also be excluded from the compulsory agrarian reform coverage considering that the
transfer was consistent with the governments exercise of the power of eminent domain 159 and
none of the parties actually questioned the transfer.
While We affirm the revocation of the SDP on Hacienda Luisita subject of PARC Resolution
Nos. 2005-32-01 and 2006-34-01, the Court cannot close its eyes to certain "operative facts" that
had occurred in the interim. Pertinently, the "operative fact" doctrine realizes that, in declaring
a law or executive action null and void, or, by extension, no longer without force and effect,
undue harshness and resulting unfairness must be avoided. This is as it should realistically be,
since rights might have accrued in favor of natural or juridical persons and obligations justly
incurred in the meantime.160 The actual existence of a statute or executive act is, prior to such a
determination, an operative fact and may have consequences which cannot justly be ignored; the
past cannot always be erased by a new judicial declaration.161
The oft-cited De Agbayani v. Philippine National Bank162 discussed the effect to be given to a
legislative or executive act subsequently declared invalid:
x x x It does not admit of doubt that prior to the declaration of nullity such challenged legislative
or executive act must have been in force and had to be complied with. This is so as until after the
judiciary, in an appropriate case, declares its invalidity, it is entitled to obedience and respect.
Parties may have acted under it and may have changed their positions. What could be more
fitting than that in a subsequent litigation regard be had to what has been done while such
legislative or executive act was in operation and presumed to be valid in all respects. It is now
accepted as a doctrine that prior to its being nullified, its existence as a fact must be reckoned
with. This is merely to reflect awareness that precisely because the judiciary is the government
organ which has the final say on whether or not a legislative or executive measure is valid, a
period of time may have elapsed before it can exercise the power of judicial review that may lead
to a declaration of nullity. It would be to deprive the law of its quality of fairness and justice
then, if there be no recognition of what had transpired prior to such adjudication.
In the language of an American Supreme Court decision: "The actual existence of a statute, prior
to such a determination of [unconstitutionality], is an operative fact and may have consequences
which cannot justly be ignored. The past cannot always be erased by a new judicial declaration.
The effect of the subsequent ruling as to invalidity may have to be considered in various
aspects,with respect to particular relations, individual and corporate, and particular conduct,
private and official." x x x
Given the above perspective and considering that more than two decades had passed since the
PARCs approval of the HLIs SDP, in conjunction with numerous activities performed in good
faith by HLI, and the reliance by the FWBs on the legality and validity of the PARC-approved
SDP, perforce, certain rights of the parties, more particularly the FWBs, have to be respected
pursuant to the application in a general way of the operative fact doctrine.
A view, however, has been advanced that the operative fact doctrine is of minimal or altogether
without relevance to the instant case as it applies only in considering the effects of a declaration
of unconstitutionality of a statute, and not of a declaration of nullity of a contract. This is
incorrect, for this view failed to consider is that it is NOT the SDOA dated May 11, 1989 which
was revoked in the instant case. Rather, it is PARCs approval of the HLIs Proposal for Stock
Distribution under CARP which embodied the SDP that was nullified.
A recall of the antecedent events would show that on May 11, 1989, Tadeco, HLI, and the
qualified FWBs executed the SDOA. This agreement provided the basis and mechanics of the
SDP that was subsequently proposed and submitted to DAR for approval. It was only after its
review that the PARC, through then Sec. Defensor-Santiago, issued the assailed Resolution No.
89-12-2 approving the SDP. Considerably, it is not the SDOA which gave legal force and effect
to the stock distribution scheme but instead, it is the approval of the SDP under the PARC
Resolution No. 89-12-2 that gave it its validity.
The above conclusion is bolstered by the fact that in Sec. Pangandamans recommendation to the
PARC Excom, what he proposed is the recall/revocation of PARC Resolution No. 89-12-2
approving HLIs SDP, and not the revocation of the SDOA. Sec. Pangandamans
recommendation was favorably endorsed by the PARC Validation Committee to the PARC
Excom, and these recommendations were referred to in the assailed Resolution No. 2005-32-01.
Clearly, it is not the SDOA which was made the basis for the implementation of the stock
distribution scheme.
That the operative fact doctrine squarely applies to executive actsin this case, the approval by
PARC of the HLI proposal for stock distributionis well-settled in our jurisprudence. In Chavez
v. National Housing Authority,163We held:
Petitioner postulates that the "operative fact" doctrine is inapplicable to the present case because
it is an equitable doctrine which could not be used to countenance an inequitable result that is
contrary to its proper office.
On the other hand, the petitioner Solicitor General argues that the existence of the various
agreements implementing the SMDRP is an operative fact that can no longer be disturbed or
simply ignored, citing Rieta v. People of the Philippines.
The argument of the Solicitor General is meritorious.
The "operative fact" doctrine is embodied in De Agbayani v. Court of Appeals, wherein it is
stated that a legislative or executive act, prior to its being declared as unconstitutional by the
courts, is valid and must be complied with, thus:
xxx
xxx
xxx
This doctrine was reiterated in the more recent case of City of Makati v. Civil Service
Commission, wherein we ruled that:
Moreover, we certainly cannot nullify the City Government's order of suspension, as we have no
reason to do so, much less retroactively apply such nullification to deprive private respondent of
a compelling and valid reason for not filing the leave application. For as we have held, a void act
though in law a mere scrap of paper nonetheless confers legitimacy upon past acts or omissions
done in reliance thereof. Consequently, the existence of a statute or executive order prior to its
being adjudged void is an operative fact to which legal consequences are attached. It would
indeed be ghastly unfair to prevent private respondent from relying upon the order of suspension
in lieu of a formal leave application. (Citations omitted; Emphasis supplied.)
The applicability of the operative fact doctrine to executive acts was further explicated by this
Court in Rieta v. People,164 thus:
Petitioner contends that his arrest by virtue of Arrest Search and Seizure Order (ASSO) No. 4754
was invalid, as the law upon which it was predicated General Order No. 60, issued by then
President Ferdinand E. Marcos was subsequently declared by the Court, in Taada v. Tuvera,
33 to have no force and effect. Thus, he asserts, any evidence obtained pursuant thereto is
inadmissible in evidence.
We do not agree. In Taada, the Court addressed the possible effects of its declaration of the
invalidity of various presidential issuances. Discussing therein how such a declaration might
affect acts done on a presumption of their validity, the Court said:
". . .. In similar situations in the past this Court had taken the pragmatic and realistic course set
forth in Chicot County Drainage District vs. Baxter Bank to wit:
The courts below have proceeded on the theory that the Act of Congress, having been found to
be unconstitutional, was not a law; that it was inoperative, conferring no rights and imposing no
duties, and hence affording no basis for the challenged decree. . . . It is quite clear, however, that
such broad statements as to the effect of a determination of unconstitutionality must be taken
with qualifications. The actual existence of a statute, prior to [the determination of its invalidity],
is an operative fact and may have consequences which cannot justly be ignored. The past cannot
always be erased by a new judicial declaration. The effect of the subsequent ruling as to
invalidity may have to be considered in various aspects with respect to particular conduct,
private and official. Questions of rights claimed to have become vested, of status, of prior
determinations deemed to have finality and acted upon accordingly, of public policy in the light
of the nature both of the statute and of its previous application, demand examination. These
questions are among the most difficult of those which have engaged the attention of courts, state
and federal, and it is manifest from numerous decisions that an all-inclusive statement of a
principle of absolute retroactive invalidity cannot be justified.
xxx
xxx
xxx
"Similarly, the implementation/enforcement of presidential decrees prior to their publication in

the Official Gazette is an operative fact which may have consequences which cannot be justly
ignored. The past cannot always be erased by a new judicial declaration . . . that an all-inclusive
statement of a principle of absolute retroactive invalidity cannot be justified."
The Chicot doctrine cited in Taada advocates that, prior to the nullification of a statute, there is
an imperative necessity of taking into account its actual existence as an operative fact negating
the acceptance of "a principle of absolute retroactive invalidity." Whatever was done while the
legislative or the executive act was in operation should be duly recognized and presumed to be
valid in all respects. The ASSO that was issued in 1979 under General Order No. 60 long
before our Decision in Taada and the arrest of petitioner is an operative fact that can no
longer be disturbed or simply ignored. (Citations omitted; Emphasis supplied.)
To reiterate, although the assailed Resolution No. 2005-32-01 states that it revokes or recalls the
SDP, what it actually revoked or recalled was the PARCs approval of the SDP embodied in
Resolution No. 89-12-2. Consequently, what was actually declared null and void was an
executive act, PARC Resolution No. 89-12-2,165and not a contract (SDOA). It is, therefore,
wrong to say that it was the SDOA which was annulled in the instant case. Evidently, the
operative fact doctrine is applicable.
IV.
While the assailed PARC resolutions effectively nullifying the Hacienda Luisita SDP are upheld,
the revocation must, by application of the operative fact principle, give way to the right of the
original 6,296 qualified FWBs to choose whether they want to remain as HLI stockholders or
not. The Court cannot turn a blind eye to the fact that in 1989, 93% of the FWBs agreed to the
SDOA (or the MOA), which became the basis of the SDP approved by PARC per its Resolution
No. 89-12-2 dated November 21, 1989. From 1989 to 2005, the FWBs were said to have
received from HLI salaries and cash benefits, hospital and medical benefits, 240-square meter
homelots, 3% of the gross produce from agricultural lands, and 3% of the proceeds of the sale of
the 500-hectare converted land and the 80.51-hectare lot sold to SCTEX. HLI shares totaling
118,391,976.85 were distributed as of April 22, 2005. 166 On August 6, 20l0, HLI and private
respondents submitted a Compromise Agreement, in which HLI gave the FWBs the option of
acquiring a piece of agricultural land or remain as HLI stockholders, and as a matter of fact, most
FWBs indicated their choice of remaining as stockholders. These facts and circumstances tend to
indicate that some, if not all, of the FWBs may actually desire to continue as HLI shareholders. A
matter best left to their own discretion.
With respect to the other FWBs who were not listed as qualified beneficiaries as of November
21, 1989 when the SDP was approved, they are not accorded the right to acquire land but shall,
however, continue as HLI stockholders. All the benefits and homelots167 received by the 10,502
FWBs (6,296 original FWBs and 4,206 non-qualified FWBs) listed as HLI stockholders as of
August 2, 2010 shall be respected with no obligation to refund or return them since the benefits
(except the homelots) were received by the FWBs as farmhands in the agricultural enterprise of
HLI and other fringe benefits were granted to them pursuant to the existing collective bargaining
agreement with Tadeco. If the number of HLI shares in the names of the original FWBs who opt
to remain as HLI stockholders falls below the guaranteed allocation of 18,804.32 HLI shares per
FWB, the HLI shall assign additional shares to said FWBs to complete said minimum number of
shares at no cost to said FWBs.
With regard to the homelots already awarded or earmarked, the FWBs are not obliged to return
the same to HLI or pay for its value since this is a benefit granted under the SDP. The homelots
do not form part of the 4,915.75 hectares covered by the SDP but were taken from the 120.9234
hectare residential lot owned by Tadeco. Those who did not receive the homelots as of the
revocation of the SDP on December 22, 2005 when PARC Resolution No. 2005-32-01 was
issued, will no longer be entitled to homelots. Thus, in the determination of the ultimate
agricultural land that will be subjected to land distribution, the aggregate area of the homelots
will no longer be deducted.
There is a claim that, since the sale and transfer of the 500 hectares of land subject of the August
14, 1996 Conversion Order and the 80.51-hectare SCTEX lot came after compulsory coverage
has taken place, the FWBs should have their corresponding share of the lands value. There is
merit in the claim. Since the SDP approved by PARC Resolution No. 89-12-2 has been nullified,
then all the lands subject of the SDP will automatically be subject of compulsory coverage under
Sec. 31 of RA 6657. Since the Court excluded the 500-hectare lot subject of the August 14, 1996
Conversion Order and the 80.51-hectare SCTEX lot acquired by the government from the area
covered by SDP, then HLI and its subsidiary, Centennary, shall be liable to the FWBs for the
price received for said lots. HLI shall be liable for the value received for the sale of the 200hectare land to LRC in the amount of PhP 500,000,000 and the equivalent value of the
12,000,000 shares of its subsidiary, Centennary, for the 300-hectare lot sold to LIPCO for the
consideration of PhP 750,000,000. Likewise, HLI shall be liable for PhP 80,511,500 as
consideration for the sale of the 80.51-hectare SCTEX lot.
We, however, note that HLI has allegedly paid 3% of the proceeds of the sale of the 500-hectare
land and 80.51-hectare SCTEX lot to the FWBs. We also take into account the payment of taxes
and expenses relating to the transfer of the land and HLIs statement that most, if not all, of the
proceeds were used for legitimate corporate purposes. In order to determine once and for all
whether or not all the proceeds were properly utilized by HLI and its subsidiary, Centennary,
DAR will engage the services of a reputable accounting firm to be approved by the parties to
audit the books of HLI to determine if the proceeds of the sale of the 500-hectare land and the
80.51-hectare SCTEX lot were actually used for legitimate corporate purposes, titling expenses
and in compliance with the August 14, 1996 Conversion Order. The cost of the audit will be
shouldered by HLI. If after such audit, it is determined that there remains a balance from the
proceeds of the sale, then the balance shall be distributed to the qualified FWBs.
A view has been advanced that HLI must pay the FWBs yearly rent for use of the land from
1989. We disagree. It should not be forgotten that the FWBs are also stockholders of HLI, and
the benefits acquired by the corporation from its possession and use of the land ultimately
redounded to the FWBs benefit based on its business operations in the form of salaries, and
other fringe benefits under the CBA. To still require HLI to pay rent to the FWBs will result in
double compensation.
For sure, HLI will still exist as a corporation even after the revocation of the SDP although it will
no longer be operating under the SDP, but pursuant to the Corporation Code as a private stock
corporation. The non-agricultural assets amounting to PhP 393,924,220 shall remain with HLI,
while the agricultural lands valued at PhP 196,630,000 with an original area of 4,915.75 hectares
shall be turned over to DAR for distribution to the FWBs. To be deducted from said area are the
500-hectare lot subject of the August 14, 1996 Conversion Order, the 80.51-hectare SCTEX lot,
and the total area of 6,886.5 square meters of individual lots that should have been distributed to
FWBs by DAR had they not opted to stay in HLI.
HLI shall be paid just compensation for the remaining agricultural land that will be transferred to
DAR for land distribution to the FWBs. We find that the date of the "taking" is November 21,
1989, when PARC approved HLIs SDP per PARC Resolution No. 89-12-2. DAR shall
coordinate with LBP for the determination of just compensation. We cannot use May 11, 1989
when the SDOA was executed, since it was the SDP, not the SDOA, that was approved by
PARC.
The instant petition is treated pro hac vice in view of the peculiar facts and circumstances of the
case.
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is DENIED. PARC Resolution No. 2005-32-01 dated
December 22, 2005 and Resolution No. 2006-34-01 dated May 3, 2006, placing the lands subject
of HLIs SDP under compulsory coverage on mandated land acquisition scheme of the CARP,
are hereby AFFIRMED with the MODIFICATION that the original 6,296 qualified FWBs shall
have the option to remain as stockholders of HLI. DAR shall immediately schedule meetings
with the said 6,296 FWBs and explain to them the effects, consequences and legal or practical
implications of their choice, after which the FWBs will be asked to manifest, in secret voting,
their choices in the ballot, signing their signatures or placing their thumbmarks, as the case may
be, over their printed names.
Of the 6,296 FWBs, he or she who wishes to continue as an HLI stockholder is entitled to
18,804.32 HLI shares, and, in case the HLI shares already given to him or her is less than
18,804.32 shares, the HLI is ordered to issue or distribute additional shares to complete said
prescribed number of shares at no cost to the FWB within thirty (30) days from finality of this
Decision. Other FWBs who do not belong to the original 6,296 qualified beneficiaries are not
entitled to land distribution and shall remain as HLI shareholders. All salaries, benefits, 3%
production share and 3% share in the proceeds of the sale of the 500-hectare converted land and
the 80.51-hectare SCTEX lot and homelots already received by the 10,502 FWBs, composed of
6,296 original FWBs and 4,206 non-qualified FWBs, shall be respected with no obligation to
refund or return them.
Within thirty (30) days after determining who from among the original FWBs will stay as
stockholders, DAR shall segregate from the HLI agricultural land with an area of 4,915.75
hectares subject of PARCs SDP-approving Resolution No. 89-12-2 the following: (a) the 500hectare lot subject of the August 14, l996 Conversion Order; (b) the 80.51-hectare lot sold to, or
acquired by, the government as part of the SCTEX complex; and (c) the aggregate area of
6,886.5 square meters of individual lots that each FWB is entitled to under the CARP had he or
she not opted to stay in HLI as a stockholder. After the segregation process, as indicated, is done,
the remaining area shall be turned over to DAR for immediate land distribution to the original
qualified FWBs who opted not to remain as HLI stockholders.
The aforementioned area composed of 6,886.5-square meter lots allotted to the FWBs who
stayed with the corporation shall form part of the HLI assets.
HLI is directed to pay the 6,296 FWBs the consideration of PhP 500,000,000 received by it from
Luisita Realty, Inc. for the sale to the latter of 200 hectares out of the 500 hectares covered by the
August 14, 1996 Conversion Order, the consideration of PhP 750,000,000 received by its owned
subsidiary, Centennary Holdings, Inc. for the sale of the remaining 300 hectares of the
aforementioned 500-hectare lot to Luisita Industrial Park Corporation, and the price of PhP
80,511,500 paid by the government through the Bases Conversion Development Authority for
the sale of the 80.51-hectare lot used for the construction of the SCTEX road network. From the
total amount of PhP 1,330,511,500 (PhP 500,000,000 + PhP 750,000,000 + PhP 80,511,500 =
PhP 1,330,511,500) shall be deducted the 3% of the total gross sales from the production of the
agricultural land and the 3% of the proceeds of said transfers that were paid to the FWBs, the
taxes and expenses relating to the transfer of titles to the transferees, and the expenditures
incurred by HLI and Centennary Holdings, Inc. for legitimate corporate purposes. For this
purpose, DAR is ordered to engage the services of a reputable accounting firm approved by the
parties to audit the books of HLI and Centennary Holdings, Inc. to determine if the PhP
1,330,511,500 proceeds of the sale of the three (3) aforementioned lots were used or spent for
legitimate corporate purposes. Any unspent or unused balance as determined by the audit shall be
distributed to the 6,296 original FWBs.
HLI is entitled to just compensation for the agricultural land that will be transferred to DAR to
be reckoned from November 21, 1989 per PARC Resolution No. 89-12-2. DAR and LBP are
ordered to determine the compensation due to HLI.
DAR shall submit a compliance report after six (6) months from finality of this judgment. It shall
also submit, after submission of the compliance report, quarterly reports on the execution of this
judgment to be submitted within the first 15 days at the end of each quarter, until fully
implemented.
The temporary restraining order is lifted.
SO ORDERED.

SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. 91649
May 14, 1991
ATTORNEYS HUMBERTO BASCO, EDILBERTO BALCE, SOCRATES MARANAN

AND LORENZO SANCHEZ,petitioners,
vs.
PHILIPPINE AMUSEMENTS AND GAMING CORPORATION (PAGCOR), respondent.
H.B. Basco & Associates for petitioners.
Valmonte Law Offices collaborating counsel for petitioners.
Aguirre, Laborte and Capule for respondent PAGCOR.
PARAS, J.:
A TV ad proudly announces:
"The new PAGCOR responding through responsible gaming."

But the petitioners think otherwise, that is why, they filed the instant petition seeking to annul the
Philippine Amusement and Gaming Corporation (PAGCOR) Charter PD 1869, because it is
allegedly contrary to morals, public policy and order, and because
A. It constitutes a waiver of a right prejudicial to a third person with a right recognized by
law. It waived the Manila City government's right to impose taxes and license fees, which
is recognized by law;
B. For the same reason stated in the immediately preceding paragraph, the law has
intruded into the local government's right to impose local taxes and license fees. This, in
contravention of the constitutionally enshrined principle of local autonomy;
C. It violates the equal protection clause of the constitution in that it legalizes PAGCOR
conducted gambling, while most other forms of gambling are outlawed, together with
prostitution, drug trafficking and other vices;
D. It violates the avowed trend of the Cory government away from monopolistic and
crony economy, and toward free enterprise and privatization. (p. 2, Amended Petition; p.
7, Rollo)
In their Second Amended Petition, petitioners also claim that PD 1869 is contrary to the declared
national policy of the "new restored democracy" and the people's will as expressed in the 1987
Constitution. The decree is said to have a "gambling objective" and therefore is contrary to
Sections 11, 12 and 13 of Article II, Sec. 1 of Article VIII and Section 3 (2) of Article XIV, of the
present Constitution (p. 3, Second Amended Petition; p. 21, Rollo).
The procedural issue is whether petitioners, as taxpayers and practicing lawyers (petitioner
Basco being also the Chairman of the Committee on Laws of the City Council of Manila), can
question and seek the annulment of PD 1869 on the alleged grounds mentioned above.
The Philippine Amusements and Gaming Corporation (PAGCOR) was created by virtue of P.D.
1067-A dated January 1, 1977 and was granted a franchise under P.D. 1067-B also dated January
1, 1977 "to establish, operate and maintain gambling casinos on land or water within the
territorial jurisdiction of the Philippines." Its operation was originally conducted in the well
known floating casino "Philippine Tourist." The operation was considered a success for it proved
to be a potential source of revenue to fund infrastructure and socio-economic projects, thus, P.D.
1399 was passed on June 2, 1978 for PAGCOR to fully attain this objective.
Subsequently, on July 11, 1983, PAGCOR was created under P.D. 1869 to enable the
Government to regulate and centralize all games of chance authorized by existing franchise or
permitted by law, under the following declared policy
Sec. 1. Declaration of Policy. It is hereby declared to be the policy of the State to
centralize and integrate all games of chance not heretofore authorized by existing
franchises or permitted by law in order to attain the following objectives:
(a) To centralize and integrate the right and authority to operate and conduct games of
chance into one corporate entity to be controlled, administered and supervised by the
Government.
(b) To establish and operate clubs and casinos, for amusement and recreation, including
sports gaming pools, (basketball, football, lotteries, etc.) and such other forms of
amusement and recreation including games of chance, which may be allowed by law
within the territorial jurisdiction of the Philippines and which will: (1) generate sources
of additional revenue to fund infrastructure and socio-civic projects, such as flood control
programs, beautification, sewerage and sewage projects, Tulungan ng Bayan Centers,

Nutritional Programs, Population Control and such other essential public services; (2)
create recreation and integrated facilities which will expand and improve the country's
existing tourist attractions; and (3) minimize, if not totally eradicate, all the evils,
malpractices and corruptions that are normally prevalent on the conduct and operation of
gambling clubs and casinos without direct government involvement. (Section 1, P.D.
1869)
To attain these objectives PAGCOR is given territorial jurisdiction all over the Philippines.
Under its Charter's repealing clause, all laws, decrees, executive orders, rules and regulations,
inconsistent therewith, are accordingly repealed, amended or modified.
It is reported that PAGCOR is the third largest source of government revenue, next to the Bureau
of Internal Revenue and the Bureau of Customs. In 1989 alone, PAGCOR earned P3.43 Billion,
and directly remitted to the National Government a total of P2.5 Billion in form of franchise tax,
government's income share, the President's Social Fund and Host Cities' share. In addition,
PAGCOR sponsored other socio-cultural and charitable projects on its own or in cooperation
with various governmental agencies, and other private associations and organizations. In its 3 1/2
years of operation under the present administration, PAGCOR remitted to the government a total
of P6.2 Billion. As of December 31, 1989, PAGCOR was employing 4,494 employees in its nine
(9) casinos nationwide, directly supporting the livelihood of Four Thousand Four Hundred
Ninety-Four (4,494) families.
But the petitioners, are questioning the validity of P.D. No. 1869. They allege that the same is
"null and void" for being "contrary to morals, public policy and public order," monopolistic and
tends toward "crony economy", and is violative of the equal protection clause and local
autonomy as well as for running counter to the state policies enunciated in Sections 11 (Personal
Dignity and Human Rights), 12 (Family) and 13 (Role of Youth) of Article II, Section 1 (Social
Justice) of Article XIII and Section 2 (Educational Values) of Article XIV of the 1987
Constitution.
This challenge to P.D. No. 1869 deserves a searching and thorough scrutiny and the most
deliberate consideration by the Court, involving as it does the exercise of what has been
described as "the highest and most delicate function which belongs to the judicial department of
the government." (State v. Manuel, 20 N.C. 144; Lozano v. Martinez, 146 SCRA 323).
As We enter upon the task of passing on the validity of an act of a co-equal and coordinate
branch of the government We need not be reminded of the time-honored principle, deeply
ingrained in our jurisprudence, that a statute is presumed to be valid. Every presumption must be
indulged in favor of its constitutionality. This is not to say that We approach Our task with
diffidence or timidity. Where it is clear that the legislature or the executive for that matter, has
over-stepped the limits of its authority under the constitution, We should not hesitate to wield the
axe and let it fall heavily, as fall it must, on the offending statute (Lozano v. Martinez, supra).
In Victoriano v. Elizalde Rope Workers' Union, et al, 59 SCRA 54, the Court thru Mr. Justice
Zaldivar underscored the
. . . thoroughly established principle which must be followed in all cases where questions
of constitutionality as obtain in the instant cases are involved. All presumptions are
indulged in favor of constitutionality; one who attacks a statute alleging
unconstitutionality must prove its invalidity beyond a reasonable doubt; that a law may
work hardship does not render it unconstitutional; that if any reasonable basis may be
conceived which supports the statute, it will be upheld and the challenger must negate all
possible basis; that the courts are not concerned with the wisdom, justice, policy or
expediency of a statute and that a liberal interpretation of the constitution in favor of the
constitutionality of legislation should be adopted. (Danner v. Hass, 194 N.W. 2nd 534,
539; Spurbeck v. Statton, 106 N.W. 2nd 660, 663; 59 SCRA 66; see also e.g. Salas v.
Jarencio, 46 SCRA 734, 739 [1970]; Peralta v. Commission on Elections, 82 SCRA 30,
55 [1978]; and Heirs of Ordona v. Reyes, 125 SCRA 220, 241-242 [1983] cited in
Citizens Alliance for Consumer Protection v. Energy Regulatory Board, 162 SCRA 521,
540)
Of course, there is first, the procedural issue. The respondents are questioning the legal
personality of petitioners to file the instant petition.
Considering however the importance to the public of the case at bar, and in keeping with the
Court's duty, under the 1987 Constitution, to determine whether or not the other branches of
government have kept themselves within the limits of the Constitution and the laws and that they
have not abused the discretion given to them, the Court has brushed aside technicalities of
procedure and has taken cognizance of this petition. (Kapatiran ng mga Naglilingkod sa
Pamahalaan ng Pilipinas Inc. v. Tan, 163 SCRA 371)
With particular regard to the requirement of proper party as applied in the cases before us,
We hold that the same is satisfied by the petitioners and intervenors because each of them
has sustained or is in danger of sustaining an immediate injury as a result of the acts or
measures complained of. And even if, strictly speaking they are not covered by the
definition, it is still within the wide discretion of the Court to waive the requirement and
so remove the impediment to its addressing and resolving the serious constitutional
questions raised.
In the first Emergency Powers Cases, ordinary citizens and taxpayers were allowed to
question the constitutionality of several executive orders issued by President Quirino
although they were involving only an indirect and general interest shared in common
with the public. The Court dismissed the objection that they were not proper parties and
ruled that "the transcendental importance to the public of these cases demands that they
be settled promptly and definitely, brushing aside, if we must technicalities of procedure."
We have since then applied the exception in many other cases. (Association of Small
Landowners in the Philippines, Inc. v. Sec. of Agrarian Reform, 175 SCRA 343).
Having disposed of the procedural issue, We will now discuss the substantive issues raised.
Gambling in all its forms, unless allowed by law, is generally prohibited. But the prohibition of
gambling does not mean that the Government cannot regulate it in the exercise of its police
power.
The concept of police power is well-established in this jurisdiction. It has been defined as the
"state authority to enact legislation that may interfere with personal liberty or property in order to
promote the general welfare." (Edu v. Ericta, 35 SCRA 481, 487) As defined, it consists of (1) an
imposition or restraint upon liberty or property, (2) in order to foster the common good. It is not
capable of an exact definition but has been, purposely, veiled in general terms to underscore its
all-comprehensive embrace. (Philippine Association of Service Exporters, Inc. v. Drilon, 163
SCRA 386).
Its scope, ever-expanding to meet the exigencies of the times, even to anticipate the future where
it could be done, provides enough room for an efficient and flexible response to conditions and
circumstances thus assuming the greatest benefits. (Edu v. Ericta, supra)
It finds no specific Constitutional grant for the plain reason that it does not owe its origin to the
charter. Along with the taxing power and eminent domain, it is inborn in the very fact of
statehood and sovereignty. It is a fundamental attribute of government that has enabled it to
perform the most vital functions of governance. Marshall, to whom the expression has been
credited, refers to it succinctly as the plenary power of the state "to govern its citizens". (Tribe,
American Constitutional Law, 323, 1978). The police power of the State is a power co-extensive
with self-protection and is most aptly termed the "law of overwhelming necessity." (Rubi v.
Provincial Board of Mindoro, 39 Phil. 660, 708) It is "the most essential, insistent, and
illimitable of powers." (Smith Bell & Co. v. National, 40 Phil. 136) It is a dynamic force that
enables the state to meet the agencies of the winds of change.
What was the reason behind the enactment of P.D. 1869?
P.D. 1869 was enacted pursuant to the policy of the government to "regulate and centralize thru
an appropriate institution all games of chance authorized by existing franchise or permitted by
law" (1st whereas clause, PD 1869). As was subsequently proved, regulating and centralizing
gambling operations in one corporate entity the PAGCOR, was beneficial not just to the
Government but to society in general. It is a reliable source of much needed revenue for the cash
strapped Government. It provided funds for social impact projects and subjected gambling to
"close scrutiny, regulation, supervision and control of the Government" (4th Whereas Clause, PD
1869). With the creation of PAGCOR and the direct intervention of the Government, the evil
practices and corruptions that go with gambling will be minimized if not totally eradicated.
Public welfare, then, lies at the bottom of the enactment of PD 1896.
Petitioners contend that P.D. 1869 constitutes a waiver of the right of the City of Manila to
impose taxes and legal fees; that the exemption clause in P.D. 1869 is violative of the principle of
local autonomy. They must be referring to Section 13 par. (2) of P.D. 1869 which exempts
PAGCOR, as the franchise holder from paying any "tax of any kind or form, income or
otherwise, as well as fees, charges or levies of whatever nature, whether National or Local."
(2) Income and other taxes. a) Franchise Holder: No tax of any kind or form, income
or otherwise as well as fees, charges or levies of whatever nature, whether National or
Local, shall be assessed and collected under this franchise from the Corporation; nor shall
any form or tax or charge attach in any way to the earnings of the Corporation, except a
franchise tax of five (5%) percent of the gross revenues or earnings derived by the
Corporation from its operations under this franchise. Such tax shall be due and payable
quarterly to the National Government and shall be in lieu of all kinds of taxes, levies, fees
or assessments of any kind, nature or description, levied, established or collected by any
municipal, provincial or national government authority (Section 13 [2]).
Their contention stated hereinabove is without merit for the following reasons:
(a) The City of Manila, being a mere Municipal corporation has no inherent right to impose taxes
(Icard v. City of Baguio, 83 Phil. 870; City of Iloilo v. Villanueva, 105 Phil. 337; Santos v.
Municipality of Caloocan, 7 SCRA 643). Thus, "the Charter or statute must plainly show an
intent to confer that power or the municipality cannot assume it" (Medina v. City of Baguio, 12
SCRA 62). Its "power to tax" therefore must always yield to a legislative act which is superior
having been passed upon by the state itself which has the "inherent power to tax" (Bernas, the
Revised [1973] Philippine Constitution, Vol. 1, 1983 ed. p. 445).
(b) The Charter of the City of Manila is subject to control by Congress. It should be stressed that
"municipal corporations are mere creatures of Congress" (Unson v. Lacson, G.R. No. 7909,
January 18, 1957) which has the power to "create and abolish municipal corporations" due to its
"general legislative powers" (Asuncion v. Yriantes, 28 Phil. 67; Merdanillo v. Orandia, 5 SCRA
541). Congress, therefore, has the power of control over Local governments (Hebron v. Reyes,
G.R. No. 9124, July 2, 1950). And if Congress can grant the City of Manila the power to tax
certain matters, it can also provide for exemptions or even take back the power.
(c) The City of Manila's power to impose license fees on gambling, has long been revoked. As
early as 1975, the power of local governments to regulate gambling thru the grant of "franchise,
licenses or permits" was withdrawn by P.D. No. 771 and was vested exclusively on the National
Government, thus:
Sec. 1. Any provision of law to the contrary notwithstanding, the authority of chartered
cities and other local governments to issue license, permit or other form of franchise to
operate, maintain and establish horse and dog race tracks, jai-alai and other forms of
gambling is hereby revoked.
Sec. 2. Hereafter, all permits or franchises to operate, maintain and establish, horse and
dog race tracks, jai-alai and other forms of gambling shall be issued by the national
government upon proper application and verification of the qualification of the applicant .
..
Therefore, only the National Government has the power to issue "licenses or permits" for the
operation of gambling. Necessarily, the power to demand or collect license fees which is a
consequence of the issuance of "licenses or permits" is no longer vested in the City of Manila.
(d) Local governments have no power to tax instrumentalities of the National Government.
PAGCOR is a government owned or controlled corporation with an original charter, PD 1869.
All of its shares of stocks are owned by the National Government. In addition to its corporate
powers (Sec. 3, Title II, PD 1869) it also exercises regulatory powers thus:
Sec. 9. Regulatory Power. The Corporation shall maintain a Registry of the affiliated
entities, and shall exercise all the powers, authority and the responsibilities vested in the
Securities and Exchange Commission over such affiliating entities mentioned under the
preceding section, including, but not limited to amendments of Articles of Incorporation
and By-Laws, changes in corporate term, structure, capitalization and other matters
concerning the operation of the affiliated entities, the provisions of the Corporation Code
of the Philippines to the contrary notwithstanding, except only with respect to original
incorporation.
PAGCOR has a dual role, to operate and to regulate gambling casinos. The latter role is
governmental, which places it in the category of an agency or instrumentality of the Government.
Being an instrumentality of the Government, PAGCOR should be and actually is exempt from
local taxes. Otherwise, its operation might be burdened, impeded or subjected to control by a
mere Local government.
The states have no power by taxation or otherwise, to retard, impede, burden or in any
manner control the operation of constitutional laws enacted by Congress to carry into
execution the powers vested in the federal government. (MC Culloch v. Marland, 4
Wheat 316, 4 L Ed. 579)
This doctrine emanates from the "supremacy" of the National Government over local
governments.
Justice Holmes, speaking for the Supreme Court, made reference to the entire absence of
power on the part of the States to touch, in that way (taxation) at least, the
instrumentalities of the United States (Johnson v. Maryland, 254 US 51) and it can be
agreed that no state or political subdivision can regulate a federal instrumentality in such
a way as to prevent it from consummating its federal responsibilities, or even to seriously
burden it in the accomplishment of them. (Antieau, Modern Constitutional Law, Vol. 2, p.
140, emphasis supplied)
Otherwise, mere creatures of the State can defeat National policies thru extermination of what
local authorities may perceive to be undesirable activities or enterprise using the power to tax as
"a tool for regulation" (U.S. v. Sanchez, 340 US 42).
The power to tax which was called by Justice Marshall as the "power to destroy" (Mc Culloch v.
Maryland, supra) cannot be allowed to defeat an instrumentality or creation of the very entity
which has the inherent power to wield it.
(e) Petitioners also argue that the Local Autonomy Clause of the Constitution will be violated by
P.D. 1869. This is a pointless argument. Article X of the 1987 Constitution (on Local Autonomy)
provides:
Sec. 5. Each local government unit shall have the power to create its own source of
revenue and to levy taxes, fees, and other charges subject to such guidelines and
limitation as the congress may provide, consistent with the basic policy on local
autonomy. Such taxes, fees and charges shall accrue exclusively to the local government.
(emphasis supplied)
The power of local government to "impose taxes and fees" is always subject to "limitations"
which Congress may provide by law. Since PD 1869 remains an "operative" law until "amended,
repealed or revoked" (Sec. 3, Art. XVIII, 1987 Constitution), its "exemption clause" remains as
an exception to the exercise of the power of local governments to impose taxes and fees. It
cannot therefore be violative but rather is consistent with the principle of local autonomy.
Besides, the principle of local autonomy under the 1987 Constitution simply means
"decentralization" (III Records of the 1987 Constitutional Commission, pp. 435-436, as cited in
Bernas, The Constitution of the Republic of the Philippines, Vol. II, First Ed., 1988, p. 374). It
does not make local governments sovereign within the state or an "imperium in imperio."
Local Government has been described as a political subdivision of a nation or state which
is constituted by law and has substantial control of local affairs. In a unitary system of
government, such as the government under the Philippine Constitution, local
governments can only be an intra sovereign subdivision of one sovereign nation, it cannot
be an imperium in imperio. Local government in such a system can only mean a measure
of decentralization of the function of government. (emphasis supplied)
As to what state powers should be "decentralized" and what may be delegated to local
government units remains a matter of policy, which concerns wisdom. It is therefore a political
question. (Citizens Alliance for Consumer Protection v. Energy Regulatory Board, 162 SCRA
539).
What is settled is that the matter of regulating, taxing or otherwise dealing with gambling is a
State concern and hence, it is the sole prerogative of the State to retain it or delegate it to local
governments.
As gambling is usually an offense against the State, legislative grant or express charter
power is generally necessary to empower the local corporation to deal with the
subject. . . . In the absence of express grant of power to enact, ordinance provisions on
this subject which are inconsistent with the state laws are void. (Ligan v. Gadsden, Ala
App. 107 So. 733 Ex-Parte Solomon, 9, Cals. 440, 27 PAC 757 following in re Ah You,
88 Cal. 99, 25 PAC 974, 22 Am St. Rep. 280, 11 LRA 480, as cited in Mc Quinllan Vol.
3 Ibid, p. 548, emphasis supplied)
Petitioners next contend that P.D. 1869 violates the equal protection clause of the Constitution,
because "it legalized PAGCOR conducted gambling, while most gambling are outlawed
together with prostitution, drug trafficking and other vices" (p. 82, Rollo).
We, likewise, find no valid ground to sustain this contention. The petitioners' posture ignores the
well-accepted meaning of the clause "equal protection of the laws." The clause does not preclude
classification of individuals who may be accorded different treatment under the law as long as
the classification is not unreasonable or arbitrary (Itchong v. Hernandez, 101 Phil. 1155). A law
does not have to operate in equal force on all persons or things to be conformable to Article III,
Section 1 of the Constitution (DECS v. San Diego, G.R. No. 89572, December 21, 1989).
The "equal protection clause" does not prohibit the Legislature from establishing classes of
individuals or objects upon which different rules shall operate (Laurel v. Misa, 43 O.G. 2847).
The Constitution does not require situations which are different in fact or opinion to be treated in
law as though they were the same (Gomez v. Palomar, 25 SCRA 827).
Just how P.D. 1869 in legalizing gambling conducted by PAGCOR is violative of the equal
protection is not clearly explained in the petition. The mere fact that some gambling activities
like cockfighting (P.D 449) horse racing (R.A. 306 as amended by RA 983), sweepstakes,
lotteries and races (RA 1169 as amended by B.P. 42) are legalized under certain conditions, while
others are prohibited, does not render the applicable laws, P.D. 1869 for one, unconstitutional.
If the law presumably hits the evil where it is most felt, it is not to be overthrown because
there are other instances to which it might have been applied. (Gomez v. Palomar, 25
SCRA 827)
The equal protection clause of the 14th Amendment does not mean that all occupations
called by the same name must be treated the same way; the state may do what it can to
prevent which is deemed as evil and stop short of those cases in which harm to the few
concerned is not less than the harm to the public that would insure if the rule laid down
were made mathematically exact. (Dominican Hotel v. Arizona, 249 US 2651).
Anent petitioners' claim that PD 1869 is contrary to the "avowed trend of the Cory Government
away from monopolies and crony economy and toward free enterprise and privatization" suffice
it to state that this is not a ground for this Court to nullify P.D. 1869. If, indeed, PD 1869 runs
counter to the government's policies then it is for the Executive Department to recommend to
Congress its repeal or amendment.
The judiciary does not settle policy issues. The Court can only declare what the law is
and not what the law should be.1wphi1 Under our system of government, policy issues
are within the domain of the political branches of government and of the people
themselves as the repository of all state power. (Valmonte v. Belmonte, Jr., 170 SCRA
256).
On the issue of "monopoly," however, the Constitution provides that:
Sec. 19. The State shall regulate or prohibit monopolies when public interest so requires.
No combinations in restraint of trade or unfair competition shall be allowed. (Art. XII,
National Economy and Patrimony)
It should be noted that, as the provision is worded, monopolies are not necessarily prohibited by
the Constitution. The state must still decide whether public interest demands that monopolies be
regulated or prohibited. Again, this is a matter of policy for the Legislature to decide.
On petitioners' allegation that P.D. 1869 violates Sections 11 (Personality Dignity) 12 (Family)
and 13 (Role of Youth) of Article II; Section 13 (Social Justice) of Article XIII and Section 2
(Educational Values) of Article XIV of the 1987 Constitution, suffice it to state also that these are
merely statements of principles and, policies. As such, they are basically not self-executing,
meaning a law should be passed by Congress to clearly define and effectuate such principles.
In general, therefore, the 1935 provisions were not intended to be self-executing
principles ready for enforcement through the courts. They were rather directives
addressed to the executive and the legislature. If the executive and the legislature failed to
heed the directives of the articles the available remedy was not judicial or political. The
electorate could express their displeasure with the failure of the executive and the
legislature through the language of the ballot. (Bernas, Vol. II, p. 2)
Every law has in its favor the presumption of constitutionality (Yu Cong Eng v. Trinidad, 47 Phil.
387; Salas v. Jarencio, 48 SCRA 734; Peralta v. Comelec, 82 SCRA 30; Abbas v. Comelec, 179
SCRA 287). Therefore, for PD 1869 to be nullified, it must be shown that there is a clear and
unequivocal breach of the Constitution, not merely a doubtful and equivocal one. In other words,
the grounds for nullity must be clear and beyond reasonable doubt. (Peralta v. Comelec, supra)
Those who petition this Court to declare a law, or parts thereof, unconstitutional must clearly
establish the basis for such a declaration. Otherwise, their petition must fail. Based on the
grounds raised by petitioners to challenge the constitutionality of P.D. 1869, the Court finds that
petitioners have failed to overcome the presumption. The dismissal of this petition is therefore,
inevitable. But as to whether P.D. 1869 remains a wise legislation considering the issues of
"morality, monopoly, trend to free enterprise, privatization as well as the state principles on
social justice, role of youth and educational values" being raised, is up for Congress to
determine.
As this Court held in Citizens' Alliance for Consumer Protection v. Energy Regulatory Board,
162 SCRA 521
Presidential Decree No. 1956, as amended by Executive Order No. 137 has, in any case,
in its favor the presumption of validity and constitutionality which petitioners Valmonte
and the KMU have not overturned. Petitioners have not undertaken to identify the
provisions in the Constitution which they claim to have been violated by that statute. This
Court, however, is not compelled to speculate and to imagine how the assailed legislation
may possibly offend some provision of the Constitution. The Court notes, further, in this
respect that petitioners have in the main put in question the wisdom, justice and
expediency of the establishment of the OPSF, issues which are not properly addressed to
this Court and which this Court may not constitutionally pass upon. Those issues should
be addressed rather to the political departments of government: the President and the
Congress.
Parenthetically, We wish to state that gambling is generally immoral, and this is precisely so
when the gambling resorted to is excessive. This excessiveness necessarily depends not only on
the financial resources of the gambler and his family but also on his mental, social, and spiritual
outlook on life. However, the mere fact that some persons may have lost their material fortunes,
mental control, physical health, or even their lives does not necessarily mean that the same are
directly attributable to gambling. Gambling may have been the antecedent, but certainly not
necessarily the cause. For the same consequences could have been preceded by an overdose of
food, drink, exercise, work, and even sex.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED for lack of merit.
SO ORDERED.
Fernan, C.J., Narvasa, Gutierrez, Jr., Cruz, Feliciano, Gancayco, Bidin, Sarmiento, GrioAquino, Medialdea, Regalado and Davide, Jr., JJ., concur.
Separate Opinions
I concur in the result of the learned decision penned by my brother Mr. Justice Paras. This means
that I agree with the decision insofar as it holds that the prohibition, control, and regulation of the
entire activity known as gambling properly pertain to "state policy." It is, therefore, the political
departments of government, namely, the legislative and the executive that should decide on what
government should do in the entire area of gambling, and assume full responsibility to the people
for such policy.
The courts, as the decision states, cannot inquire into the wisdom, morality or expediency of
policies adopted by the political departments of government in areas which fall within their
authority, except only when such policies pose a clear and present danger to the life, liberty or
property of the individual. This case does not involve such a factual situation.
However, I hasten to make of record that I do not subscribe to gambling in any form. It demeans
the human personality, destroys self-confidence and eviscerates one's self-respect, which in the
long run will corrode whatever is left of the Filipino moral character. Gambling has wrecked and
will continue to wreck families and homes; it is an antithesis to individual reliance and reliability
as well as personal industry which are the touchstones of real economic progress and national
development.
Gambling is reprehensible whether maintained by government or privatized. The revenues
realized by the government out of "legalized" gambling will, in the long run, be more than offset
and negated by the irreparable damage to the people's moral values.
Also, the moral standing of the government in its repeated avowals against "illegal gambling" is
fatally flawed and becomes untenable when it itself engages in the very activity it seeks to
eradicate.
One can go through the Court's decision today and mentally replace the activity referred to
therein as gambling, which is legal only because it is authorized by law and run by the
government, with the activity known asprostitution. Would prostitution be any less reprehensible
were it to be authorized by law, franchised, and "regulated" by the government, in return for the
substantial revenues it would yield the government to carry out its laudable projects, such as
infrastructure and social amelioration? The question, I believe, answers itself. I submit that the
sooner the legislative department outlaws all forms of gambling, as a fundamental state policy,
and the sooner the executive implements such policy, the better it will be for the nation.
Melencio-Herrera, J., concur.
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. 80391 February 28, 1989
SULTAN ALIMBUSAR P. LIMBONA, petitioner,
vs.
CONTE MANGELIN, SALIC ALI, SALINDATO ALI, PILIMPINAS CONDING,
ACMAD TOMAWIS, GERRY TOMAWIS, JESUS ORTIZ, ANTONIO DELA FUENTE,
DIEGO PALOMARES, JR., RAUL DAGALANGIT, and BIMBO SINSUAT, respondents.
Ambrosio Padilla, Mempin & Reyes Law Offices for petitioner petitioner.
Makabangkit B. Lanto for respondents.
SARMIENTO, J.:
The acts of the Sangguniang Pampook of Region XII are assailed in this petition. The antecedent
facts are as follows:
1. On September 24, 1986, petitioner Sultan Alimbusar Limbona was appointed as

a member of the Sangguniang Pampook, Regional Autonomous Government,
Region XII, representing Lanao del Sur.
2. On March 12, 1987 petitioner was elected Speaker of the Regional Legislative
Assembly or Batasang Pampook of Central Mindanao (Assembly for brevity).
3. Said Assembly is composed of eighteen (18) members. Two of said members,
respondents Acmad Tomawis and Pakil Dagalangit, filed on March 23, 1987 with
the Commission on Elections their respective certificates of candidacy in the May
11, 1987 congressional elections for the district of Lanao del Sur but they later
withdrew from the aforesaid election and thereafter resumed again their positions
as members of the Assembly.
4. On October 21, 1987 Congressman Datu Guimid Matalam, Chairman of the
Committee on Muslim Affairs of the House of Representatives, invited Mr.
Xavier Razul, Pampook Speaker of Region XI, Zamboanga City and the
petitioner in his capacity as Speaker of the Assembly, Region XII, in a letter
which reads:
The Committee on Muslim Affairs well undertake consultations
and dialogues with local government officials, civic, religious
organizations and traditional leaders on the recent and present
political developments and other issues affecting Regions IX and
XII.
The result of the conference, consultations and dialogues would
hopefully chart the autonomous governments of the two regions as
envisioned and may prod the President to constitute immediately
the Regional Consultative Commission as mandated by the
Commission.
You are requested to invite some members of the Pampook
Assembly of your respective assembly on November 1 to 15, 1987,
with venue at the Congress of the Philippines. Your presence,
unstinted support and cooperation is (sic) indispensable.
5. Consistent with the said invitation, petitioner sent a telegram to Acting
Secretary Johnny Alimbuyao of the Assembly to wire all Assemblymen that there
shall be no session in November as "our presence in the house committee hearing
of Congress take (sic) precedence over any pending business in batasang
pampook ... ."
6. In compliance with the aforesaid instruction of the petitioner, Acting Secretary
Alimbuyao sent to the members of the Assembly the following telegram:
TRANSMITTING FOR YOUR INFORMATION AND
GUIDANCE TELEGRAM RECEIVED FROM SPEAKER
LIMBONA QUOTE CONGRESSMAN JIMMY MATALAM
CHAIRMAN OF THE HOUSE COMMITTEE ON MUSLIM
AFFAIRS REQUESTED ME TO ASSIST SAID COMMITTEE
IN THE DISCUSSION OF THE PROPOSED AUTONOMY
ORGANIC NOV. 1ST TO 15. HENCE WERE ALL
ASSEMBLYMEN THAT THERE SHALL BE NO SESSION IN
NOVEMBER AS OUR PRESENCE IN THE HOUSE
COMMITTEE
HEARING
OF
CONGRESS
TAKE
PRECEDENCE OVER ANY PENDING BUSINESS IN
BATASANG PAMPOOK
UNQUOTE REGARDS.
OF
MATALAM
FOLLOWS
7. On November 2, 1987, the Assembly held session in defiance of petitioner's

advice, with the following assemblymen present:
1. Sali, Salic
2. Conding, Pilipinas (sic)
3. Dagalangit, Rakil
4. Dela Fuente, Antonio
5. Mangelen, Conte
6. Ortiz, Jesus
7. Palomares, Diego
8. Sinsuat, Bimbo
9. Tomawis, Acmad
10. Tomawis, Jerry
After declaring the presence of a quorum, the Speaker Pro-Tempore was
authorized to preside in the session. On Motion to declare the seat of the Speaker
vacant, all Assemblymen in attendance voted in the affirmative, hence, the chair
declared said seat of the Speaker vacant. 8. On November 5, 1987, the session of
the Assembly resumed with the following Assemblymen present:
1. Mangelen Conte-Presiding Officer
2. Ali Salic
3. Ali Salindatu
4. Aratuc, Malik
5. Cajelo, Rene
6. Conding, Pilipinas (sic)
7. Dagalangit, Rakil
8. Dela Fuente, Antonio
9. Ortiz, Jesus
10 Palomares, Diego
11. Quijano, Jesus
12. Sinsuat, Bimbo
13. Tomawis, Acmad
14. Tomawis, Jerry

An excerpt from the debates and proceeding of said session reads:
HON. DAGALANGIT: Mr. Speaker, Honorable Members of the House, with the
presence of our colleagues who have come to attend the session today, I move to
call the names of the new comers in order for them to cast their votes on the
previous motion to declare the position of the Speaker vacant. But before doing
so, I move also that the designation of the Speaker Pro Tempore as the Presiding
Officer and Mr. Johnny Evangelists as Acting Secretary in the session last
November 2, 1987 be reconfirmed in today's session.
HON. SALIC ALI: I second the motions.
PRESIDING OFFICER: Any comment or objections on the two motions
presented? Me chair hears none and the said motions are approved. ...
Twelve (12) members voted in favor of the motion to declare the seat of the
Speaker vacant; one abstained and none voted against. 1
Accordingly, the petitioner prays for judgment as follows:
WHEREFORE, petitioner respectfully prays that(a) This Petition be given due course;
(b) Pending hearing, a restraining order or writ of preliminary injunction be issued
enjoining respondents from proceeding with their session to be held on November
5, 1987, and on any day thereafter;
(c) After hearing, judgment be rendered declaring the proceedings held by
respondents of their session on November 2, 1987 as null and void;
(d) Holding the election of petitioner as Speaker of said Legislative Assembly or
Batasan Pampook, Region XII held on March 12, 1987 valid and subsisting, and
(e) Making the injunction permanent.
Petitioner likewise prays for such other relief as may be just and equitable. 2
Pending further proceedings, this Court, on January 19, 1988, received a resolution filed by the
Sangguniang Pampook, "EXPECTING ALIMBUSAR P. LIMBONA FROM MEMBERSHIP OF
THE SANGGUNIANG PAMPOOK AUTONOMOUS REGION XII," 3 on the grounds, among
other things, that the petitioner "had caused to be prepared and signed by him paying [sic] the
salaries and emoluments of Odin Abdula, who was considered resigned after filing his Certificate
of Candidacy for Congressmen for the First District of Maguindanao in the last May 11,
elections. . . and nothing in the record of the Assembly will show that any request for
reinstatement by Abdula was ever made . . ." 4 and that "such action of Mr. Lim bona in paying
Abdula his salaries and emoluments without authority from the Assembly . . . constituted a
usurpation of the power of the Assembly," 5 that the petitioner "had recently caused withdrawal
of so much amount of cash from the Assembly resulting to the non-payment of the salaries and
emoluments of some Assembly [sic]," 6 and that he had "filed a case before the Supreme Court
against some members of the Assembly on question which should have been resolved within the
confines of the Assembly," 7 for which the respondents now submit that the petition had become
"moot and academic". 8
The first question, evidently, is whether or not the expulsion of the petitioner (pending litigation)
has made the case moot and academic.
We do not agree that the case has been rendered moot and academic by reason simply of the
expulsion resolution so issued. For, if the petitioner's expulsion was done purposely to make this
petition moot and academic, and to preempt the Court, it will not make it academic.
On the ground of the immutable principle of due process alone, we hold that the expulsion in
question is of no force and effect. In the first place, there is no showing that the Sanggunian had
conducted an investigation, and whether or not the petitioner had been heard in his defense,
assuming that there was an investigation, or otherwise given the opportunity to do so. On the
other hand, what appears in the records is an admission by the Assembly (at least, the
respondents) that "since November, 1987 up to this writing, the petitioner has not set foot at the
Sangguniang Pampook." 9 "To be sure, the private respondents aver that "[t]he Assemblymen, in
a conciliatory gesture, wanted him to come to Cotabato City," 10 but that was "so that their
differences could be threshed out and settled."11 Certainly, that avowed wanting or desire to
thresh out and settle, no matter how conciliatory it may be cannot be a substitute for the notice
and hearing contemplated by law.
While we have held that due process, as the term is known in administrative law, does not
absolutely require notice and that a party need only be given the opportunity to be heard, 12 it
does not appear herein that the petitioner had, to begin with, been made aware that he had in fact
stood charged of graft and corruption before his collegues. It cannot be said therefore that he was
accorded any opportunity to rebut their accusations. As it stands, then, the charges now levelled
amount to mere accusations that cannot warrant expulsion.
In the second place, (the resolution) appears strongly to be a bare act of vendetta by the other
Assemblymen against the petitioner arising from what the former perceive to be abduracy on the
part of the latter. Indeed, it (the resolution) speaks of "a case [having been filed] [by the
petitioner] before the Supreme Court . . . on question which should have been resolved within the
confines of the Assemblyman act which some members claimed unnecessarily and unduly assails
their integrity and character as representative of the people" 13 an act that cannot possibly justify
expulsion. Access to judicial remedies is guaranteed by the Constitution, 14 and, unless the
recourse amounts to malicious prosecution, no one may be punished for seeking redress in the
courts.
We therefore order reinstatement, with the caution that should the past acts of the petitioner
indeed warrant his removal, the Assembly is enjoined, should it still be so minded, to commence
proper proceedings therefor in line with the most elementary requirements of due process. And
while it is within the discretion of the members of the Sanggunian to punish their erring
colleagues, their acts are nonetheless subject to the moderating band of this Court in the event
that such discretion is exercised with grave abuse.
It is, to be sure, said that precisely because the Sangguniang Pampook(s) are "autonomous," the
courts may not rightfully intervene in their affairs, much less strike down their acts. We come,
therefore, to the second issue: Are the so-called autonomous governments of Mindanao, as they
are now constituted, subject to the jurisdiction of the national courts? In other words, what is the
extent of self-government given to the two autonomous governments of Region IX and XII?
The autonomous governments of Mindanao were organized in Regions IX and XII by
Presidential Decree No. 1618 15 promulgated on July 25, 1979. Among other things, the Decree
established "internal autonomy" 16 in the two regions "[w]ithin the framework of the national
sovereignty and territorial integrity of the Republic of the Philippines and its
Constitution," 17 with legislative and executive machinery to exercise the powers and
responsibilities 18 specified therein.
It requires the autonomous regional governments to "undertake all internal administrative matters
for the respective regions," 19 except to "act on matters which are within the jurisdiction and
competence of the National Government," 20 "which include, but are not limited to, the
following:
(1) National defense and security;
(2) Foreign relations;
(3) Foreign trade;
(4) Currency, monetary affairs, foreign exchange, banking and quasi-banking, and
external borrowing,
(5) Disposition, exploration, development, exploitation or utilization of all natural
resources;
(6) Air and sea transport
(7) Postal matters and telecommunications;
(8) Customs and quarantine;
(9) Immigration and deportation;
(10) Citizenship and naturalization;
(11) National economic, social and educational planning; and
(12) General auditing. 21
In relation to the central government, it provides that "[t]he President shall have the power of
general supervision and control over the Autonomous Regions ..." 22
Now, autonomy is either decentralization of administration or decentralization of power. There is
decentralization of administration when the central government delegates administrative powers
to political subdivisions in order to broaden the base of government power and in the process to
make local governments "more responsive and accountable," 23 "and ensure their fullest
development as self-reliant communities and make them more effective partners in the pursuit of
national development and social progress." 24 At the same time, it relieves the central government
of the burden of managing local affairs and enables it to concentrate on national concerns. The
President exercises "general supervision" 25 over them, but only to "ensure that local affairs are
administered according to law." 26 He has no control over their acts in the sense that he can
substitute their judgments with his own. 27
Decentralization of power, on the other hand, involves an abdication of political power in the
favor of local governments units declare to be autonomous . In that case, the autonomous
government is free to chart its own destiny and shape its future with minimum intervention from
central authorities. According to a constitutional author, decentralization of power amounts to
"self-immolation," since in that event, the autonomous government becomes accountable not to
the central authorities but to its constituency. 28
But the question of whether or not the grant of autonomy Muslim Mindanao under the 1987
Constitution involves, truly, an effort to decentralize power rather than mere administration is a
question foreign to this petition, since what is involved herein is a local government unit
constituted prior to the ratification of the present Constitution. Hence, the Court will not resolve
that controversy now, in this case, since no controversy in fact exists. We will resolve it at the
proper time and in the proper case.
Under the 1987 Constitution, local government units enjoy autonomy in these two senses, thus:
Section 1. The territorial and political subdivisions of the Republic of the
Philippines are the provinces, cities, municipalities, and barangays. Here shall be
autonomous regions in Muslim Mindanao ,and the Cordilleras as hereinafter
provided. 29
Sec. 2. The territorial and political subdivisions shall enjoy local autonomy. 30
xxx xxx xxx
See. 15. Mere shall be created autonomous regions in Muslim Mindanao and in
the Cordilleras consisting of provinces, cities, municipalities, and geographical
areas sharing common and distinctive historical and cultural heritage, economic
and social structures, and other relevant characteristics within the framework of
this Constitution and the national sovereignty as well as territorial integrity of the
Republic of the Philippines. 31
An autonomous government that enjoys autonomy of the latter category [CONST. (1987), art. X,
sec. 15.] is subject alone to the decree of the organic act creating it and accepted principles on the
effects and limits of "autonomy." On the other hand, an autonomous government of the former
class is, as we noted, under the supervision of the national government acting through the
President (and the Department of Local Government). 32 If the Sangguniang Pampook (of Region
XII), then, is autonomous in the latter sense, its acts are, debatably beyond the domain of this
Court in perhaps the same way that the internal acts, say, of the Congress of the Philippines are
beyond our jurisdiction. But if it is autonomous in the former category only, it comes unarguably
under our jurisdiction. An examination of the very Presidential Decree creating the autonomous
governments of Mindanao persuades us that they were never meant to exercise autonomy in the
second sense, that is, in which the central government commits an act of self-immolation.
Presidential Decree No. 1618, in the first place, mandates that "[t]he President shall have the
power of general supervision and control over Autonomous Regions." 33 In the second place, the
Sangguniang Pampook, their legislative arm, is made to discharge chiefly administrative
services, thus:
SEC. 7. Powers of the Sangguniang Pampook. The Sangguniang Pampook shall
exercise local legislative powers over regional affairs within the framework of
national development plans, policies and goals, in the following areas:
(1) Organization of regional administrative system;
(2) Economic, social and cultural development of the Autonomous Region;
(3) Agricultural, commercial and industrial programs for the Autonomous Region;
(4) Infrastructure development for the Autonomous Region;
(5) Urban and rural planning for the Autonomous Region;
(6) Taxation and other revenue-raising measures as provided for in this Decree;
(7) Maintenance, operation and administration of schools established by the
Autonomous Region;
(8) Establishment, operation and maintenance of health, welfare and other social
services, programs and facilities;
(9) Preservation and development of customs, traditions, languages and culture
indigenous to the Autonomous Region; and
(10) Such other matters as may be authorized by law,including the enactment of
such measures as may be necessary for the promotion of the general welfare of
the people in the Autonomous Region.
The President shall exercise such powers as may be necessary to assure that
enactment and acts of the Sangguniang Pampook and the Lupong
Tagapagpaganap ng Pook are in compliance with this Decree, national legislation,
policies, plans and programs.
The Sangguniang Pampook shall maintain liaison with the Batasang Pambansa. 34
Hence, we assume jurisdiction. And if we can make an inquiry in the validity of the expulsion in
question, with more reason can we review the petitioner's removal as Speaker.
Briefly, the petitioner assails the legality of his ouster as Speaker on the grounds that: (1) the
Sanggunian, in convening on November 2 and 5, 1987 (for the sole purpose of declaring the
office of the Speaker vacant), did so in violation of the Rules of the Sangguniang Pampook since
the Assembly was then on recess; and (2) assuming that it was valid, his ouster was ineffective
nevertheless for lack of quorum.
Upon the facts presented, we hold that the November 2 and 5, 1987 sessions were invalid. It is
true that under Section 31 of the Region XII Sanggunian Rules, "[s]essions shall not be
suspended or adjourned except by direction of the Sangguniang Pampook," 35 but it provides
likewise that "the Speaker may, on [sic] his discretion, declare a recess of "short intervals." 36 Of
course, there is disagreement between the protagonists as to whether or not the recess called by
the petitioner effective November 1 through 15, 1987 is the "recess of short intervals" referred
to; the petitioner says that it is while the respondents insist that, to all intents and purposes, it was
an adjournment and that "recess" as used by their Rules only refers to "a recess when arguments
get heated up so that protagonists in a debate can talk things out informally and obviate
dissenssion [sic] and disunity. 37 The Court agrees with the respondents on this regard, since
clearly, the Rules speak of "short intervals." Secondly, the Court likewise agrees that the Speaker
could not have validly called a recess since the Assembly had yet to convene on November 1, the
date session opens under the same Rules. 38 Hence, there can be no recess to speak of that could
possibly interrupt any session. But while this opinion is in accord with the respondents' own, we
still invalidate the twin sessions in question, since at the time the petitioner called the "recess," it
was not a settled matter whether or not he could. do so. In the second place, the invitation
tendered by the Committee on Muslim Affairs of the House of Representatives provided a
plausible reason for the intermission sought. Thirdly, assuming that a valid recess could not be
called, it does not appear that the respondents called his attention to this mistake. What appears is
that instead, they opened the sessions themselves behind his back in an apparent act of mutiny.
Under the circumstances, we find equity on his side. For this reason, we uphold the "recess"
called on the ground of good faith.
It does not appear to us, moreover, that the petitioner had resorted to the aforesaid "recess" in
order to forestall the Assembly from bringing about his ouster. This is not apparent from the
pleadings before us. We are convinced that the invitation was what precipitated it.
In holding that the "recess" in question is valid, we are not to be taken as establishing a
precedent, since, as we said, a recess can not be validly declared without a session having been
first opened. In upholding the petitioner herein, we are not giving him a carte blanche to order
recesses in the future in violation of the Rules, or otherwise to prevent the lawful meetings
thereof.
Neither are we, by this disposition, discouraging the Sanggunian from reorganizing itself
pursuant to its lawful prerogatives. Certainly, it can do so at the proper time. In the event that be
petitioner should initiate obstructive moves, the Court is certain that it is armed with enough
coercive remedies to thwart them. 39
In view hereof, we find no need in dwelling on the issue of quorum.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is GRANTED. The Sangguniang Pampook,
Region XII, is ENJOINED to (1) REINSTATE the petitioner as Member, Sangguniang Pampook,
Region XII; and (2) REINSTATE him as Speaker thereof. No costs.
SO ORDERED.
Fernan, C.J., Narvasa, Melencio-Herrera, Gutierrez, Jr., Cruz, Paras, Feliciano, Gancayco,
Bidin, Cortes, Grio-Aquino, Medialdea and Regalado, JJ., concur.
Padilla, J., took no part.

SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. 161872
April 13, 2004
REV. ELLY CHAVEZ PAMATONG, ESQUIRE, petitioner,

vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, respondent.
RESOLUTION
TINGA, J.:
Petitioner Rev. Elly Velez Pamatong filed his Certificate of Candidacy for President on
December 17, 2003. Respondent Commission on Elections (COMELEC) refused to give due
course to petitioners Certificate of Candidacy in its Resolution No. 6558 dated January 17, 2004.
The decision, however, was not unanimous since Commissioners Luzviminda G. Tancangco and
Mehol K. Sadain voted to include petitioner as they believed he had parties or movements to
back up his candidacy.
On January 15, 2004, petitioner moved for reconsideration of Resolution No.

6558. Petitioners Motion for Reconsideration was docketed as SPP (MP) No. 04-001. The
COMELEC, acting on petitioners Motion for Reconsideration and on similar motions filed by
other aspirants for national elective positions, denied the same under the aegis of Omnibus
Resolution No. 6604 dated February 11, 2004. The COMELEC declared petitioner and thirty-five
(35) others nuisance candidates who could not wage a nationwide campaign and/or are not
nominated by a political party or are not supported by a registered political party with a national
constituency. Commissioner Sadain maintained his vote for petitioner. By then, Commissioner
Tancangco had retired.
In this Petition For Writ of Certiorari, petitioner seeks to reverse the resolutions which were
allegedly rendered in violation of his right to "equal access to opportunities for public service"
under Section 26, Article II of the 1987
Constitution,1 by limiting the number of qualified candidates only to those who can afford to
wage a nationwide campaign and/or are nominated by political parties. In so doing, petitioner
argues that the COMELEC indirectly amended the constitutional provisions on the electoral
process and limited the power of the sovereign people to choose their leaders. The COMELEC
supposedly erred in disqualifying him since he is the most qualified among all the presidential
candidates, i.e., he possesses all the constitutional and legal qualifications for the office of the
president, he is capable of waging a national campaign since he has numerous national
organizations under his leadership, he also has the capacity to wage an international campaign
since he has practiced law in other countries, and he has a platform of government. Petitioner
likewise attacks the validity of the form for theCertificate of Candidacy prepared by the
COMELEC. Petitioner claims that the form does not provide clear and reasonable guidelines for
determining the qualifications of candidates since it does not ask for the candidates bio-data and
his program of government.
First, the constitutional and legal dimensions involved.
Implicit in the petitioners invocation of the constitutional provision ensuring "equal access to
opportunities for public office" is the claim that there is a constitutional right to run for or hold
public office and, particularly in his case, to seek the presidency. There is none. What is
recognized is merely a privilege subject to limitations imposed by law. Section 26, Article II of
the Constitution neither bestows such a right nor elevates the privilege to the level of an
enforceable right. There is nothing in the plain language of the provision which suggests such a
thrust or justifies an interpretation of the sort.
The "equal access" provision is a subsumed part of Article II of the Constitution, entitled
"Declaration of Principles and State Policies." The provisions under the Article are generally
considered not self-executing,2 and there is no plausible reason for according a different
treatment to the "equal access" provision. Like the rest of the policies enumerated in Article II,
the provision does not contain any judicially enforceable constitutional right but merely specifies
a guideline for legislative or executive action. 3 The disregard of the provision does not give rise
to any cause of action before the courts.4
An inquiry into the intent of the framers 5 produces the same determination that the provision is
not self-executory. The original wording of the present Section 26, Article II had read, "The State
shall broaden opportunities to public office and prohibit public dynasties." 6 Commissioner (now
Chief Justice) Hilario Davide, Jr. successfully brought forth an amendment that changed the
word "broaden" to the phrase "ensure equal access," and the substitution of the word "office" to
"service." He explained his proposal in this wise:
I changed the word "broaden" to "ENSURE EQUAL ACCESS TO" because what is
important would be equal access to the opportunity. If you broaden, it would
necessarily mean that the government would be mandated to create as many offices
as are possible to accommodate as many people as are also possible. That is the
meaning of broadening opportunities to public service. So, in order that we should not
mandate the State to make the government the number one employer and to limit
offices only to what may be necessary and expedient yet offering equal opportunities
to access to it, I change the word "broaden."7 (emphasis supplied)
Obviously, the provision is not intended to compel the State to enact positive measures that
would accommodate as many people as possible into public office. The approval of the "Davide
amendment" indicates the design of the framers to cast the provision as simply enunciatory of a
desired policy objective and not reflective of the imposition of a clear State burden.
Moreover, the provision as written leaves much to be desired if it is to be regarded as the source
of positive rights. It is difficult to interpret the clause as operative in the absence of legislation
since its effective means and reach are not properly defined. Broadly written, the myriad of
claims that can be subsumed under this rubric appear to be entirely open-ended. 8 Words and
phrases such as "equal access," "opportunities," and "public service" are susceptible to countless
interpretations owing to their inherent impreciseness. Certainly, it was not the intention of the
framers to inflict on the people an operative but amorphous foundation from which innately
unenforceable rights may be sourced.
As earlier noted, the privilege of equal access to opportunities to public office may be subjected
to limitations. Some valid limitations specifically on the privilege to seek elective office are
found in the provisions9 of the Omnibus Election Code on "Nuisance Candidates" and
COMELEC Resolution No. 645210 dated December 10, 2002 outlining the instances wherein the
COMELEC may motu proprio refuse to give due course to or cancel aCertificate of Candidacy.
As long as the limitations apply to everybody equally without discrimination, however, the equal
access clause is not violated. Equality is not sacrificed as long as the burdens engendered by the
limitations are meant to be borne by any one who is minded to file a certificate of candidacy. In
the case at bar, there is no showing that any person is exempt from the limitations or the burdens
which they create.
Significantly, petitioner does not challenge the constitutionality or validity of Section 69 of the
Omnibus Election Code and COMELEC Resolution No. 6452 dated 10 December 2003. Thus,
their presumed validity stands and has to be accorded due weight.
Clearly, therefore, petitioners reliance on the equal access clause in Section 26, Article II of the
Constitution is misplaced.
The rationale behind the prohibition against nuisance candidates and the disqualification of
candidates who have not evinced a bona fide intention to run for office is easy to divine. The
State has a compelling interest to ensure that its electoral exercises are rational, objective, and
orderly. Towards this end, the State takes into account the practical considerations in conducting
elections. Inevitably, the greater the number of candidates, the greater the opportunities for
logistical confusion, not to mention the increased allocation of time and resources in preparation
for the election. These practical difficulties should, of course, never exempt the State from the
conduct of a mandated electoral exercise. At the same time, remedial actions should be available
to alleviate these logistical hardships, whenever necessary and proper. Ultimately, a disorderly
election is not merely a textbook example of inefficiency, but a rot that erodes faith in our
democratic institutions. As the United States Supreme Court held:
[T]here is surely an important state interest in requiring some preliminary showing of a
significant modicum of support before printing the name of a political organization and
its candidates on the ballot the interest, if no other, in avoiding confusion, deception
and even frustration of the democratic [process].11
The COMELEC itself recognized these practical considerations when it promulgated Resolution
No. 6558 on 17 January 2004, adopting the study Memorandum of its Law Department dated 11
January 2004. As observed in the COMELECs Comment:
There is a need to limit the number of candidates especially in the case of candidates for
national positions because the election process becomes a mockery even if those who
cannot clearly wage a national campaign are allowed to run. Their names would have to
be printed in the Certified List of Candidates, Voters Information Sheet and the Official
Ballots. These would entail additional costs to the government. For the official ballots in
automated counting and canvassing of votes, an additional page would amount to more or
less FOUR HUNDRED FIFTY MILLION PESOS (P450,000,000.00).
xxx[I]t serves no practical purpose to allow those candidates to continue if they cannot
wage a decent campaign enough to project the prospect of winning, no matter how slim.12
The preparation of ballots is but one aspect that would be affected by allowance of "nuisance
candidates" to run in the elections. Our election laws provide various entitlements for candidates
for public office, such as watchers in every polling place, 13 watchers in the board of
canvassers,14 or even the receipt of electoral contributions.15Moreover, there are election rules
and regulations the formulations of which are dependent on the number of candidates in a given
election.
Given these considerations, the ignominious nature of a nuisance candidacy becomes even more
galling. The organization of an election with bona fide candidates standing is onerous enough. To
add into the mix candidates with no serious intentions or capabilities to run a viable campaign
would actually impair the electoral process. This is not to mention the candidacies which are
palpably ridiculous so as to constitute a one-note joke. The poll body would be bogged by
irrelevant minutiae covering every step of the electoral process, most probably posed at the
instance of these nuisance candidates. It would be a senseless sacrifice on the part of the State.
Owing to the superior interest in ensuring a credible and orderly election, the State could exclude
nuisance candidates and need not indulge in, as the song goes, "their trips to the moon on
gossamer wings."
The Omnibus Election Code and COMELEC Resolution No. 6452 are cognizant of the
compelling State interest to ensure orderly and credible elections by excising impediments
thereto, such as nuisance candidacies that distract and detract from the larger purpose. The
COMELEC is mandated by the Constitution with the administration of elections 16 and endowed
with considerable latitude in adopting means and methods that will ensure the promotion of free,
orderly and honest elections.17 Moreover, the Constitution guarantees that only bona
fidecandidates for public office shall be free from any form of harassment and
discrimination.18 The determination ofbona fide candidates is governed by the statutes, and the
concept, to our mind is, satisfactorily defined in the Omnibus Election Code.
Now, the needed factual premises.
However valid the law and the COMELEC issuance involved are, their proper application in the
case of the petitioner cannot be tested and reviewed by this Court on the basis of what is now
before it. The assailed resolutions of the COMELEC do not direct the Court to the evidence
which it considered in determining that petitioner was a nuisance candidate. This precludes the
Court from reviewing at this instance whether the COMELEC committed grave abuse of
discretion in disqualifying petitioner, since such a review would necessarily take into account the
matters which the COMELEC considered in arriving at its decisions.
Petitioner has submitted to this Court mere photocopies of various documents purportedly
evincing his credentials as an eligible candidate for the presidency. Yet this Court, not being a
trier of facts, can not properly pass upon the reproductions as evidence at this level. Neither the
COMELEC nor the Solicitor General appended any document to their respective Comments.
The question of whether a candidate is a nuisance candidate or not is both legal and factual. The
basis of the factual determination is not before this Court. Thus, the remand of this case for the
reception of further evidence is in order.
A word of caution is in order. What is at stake is petitioners aspiration and offer to serve in the
government. It deserves not a cursory treatment but a hearing which conforms to the
requirements of due process.
As to petitioners attacks on the validity of the form for the certificate of candidacy, suffice it to
say that the form strictly complies with Section 74 of the Omnibus Election Code. This provision
specifically enumerates what a certificate of candidacy should contain, with the required
information tending to show that the candidate possesses the minimum qualifications for the
position aspired for as established by the Constitution and other election laws.
IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, COMELEC Case No. SPP (MP) No. 04-001 is hereby
remanded to the COMELEC for the reception of further evidence, to determine the question on
whether petitioner Elly Velez Lao Pamatong is a nuisance candidate as contemplated in Section
69 of the Omnibus Election Code.
The COMELEC is directed to hold and complete the reception of evidence and report its
findings to this Court with deliberate dispatch.
SO ORDERED.
Davide, Jr., Puno, Vitug*, Panganiban, Quisumbing, Ynares-Santiago, Sandoval-Gutierrez,
Carpio, Austria-Martinez, Corona, Carpio-Morales, Callejo, Sr., and Azcuna, JJ., concur.

SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. 74930 February 13, 1989
RICARDO VALMONTE, OSWALDO CARBONELL, DOY DEL CASTILLO, ROLANDO
BARTOLOME, LEO OBLIGAR, JUN GUTIERREZ, REYNALDO BAGATSING, JUN
"NINOY" ALBA, PERCY LAPID, ROMMEL CORRO and ROLANDO
FADUL, petitioners,
vs.
FELICIANO BELMONTE, JR., respondent.
Ricardo C. Valmonte for and in his own behalf and his co-petitioners.
The Solicitor General for respondent.
CORTES, J.:
Petitioners in this special civil action for mandamus with preliminary injunction invoke their
right to information and pray that respondent be directed:
(a) to furnish petitioners the list of the names of the Batasang

Pambansa members belonging to the UNIDO and PDP-Laban who
were able to secure clean loans immediately before the February 7
election thru the intercession/marginal note of the then First Lady
Imelda Marcos; and/or
(b) to furnish petitioners with certified true copies of the
documents evidencing their respective loans; and/or
(c) to allow petitioners access to the public records for the subject
information. (Petition, pp. 4-5; paragraphing supplied.]
The controversy arose when petitioner Valmonte wrote respondent Belmonte the following letter:
June 4, 1986
Hon. Feliciano Belmonte
GSIS General Manager
Arroceros, Manila
Sir:
As a lawyer, member of the media and plain citizen of our Republic, I am
requesting that I be furnished with the list of names of the opposition members of
(the) Batasang Pambansa who were able to secure a clean loan of P2 million each
on guarranty (sic) of Mrs. Imelda Marcos. We understand that OIC Mel Lopez of
Manila was one of those aforesaid MPs. Likewise, may we be furnished with the
certified true copies of the documents evidencing their loan. Expenses in
connection herewith shall be borne by us.
If we could not secure the above documents could we have access to them?
We are premising the above request on the following provision of the Freedom
Constitution of the present regime.
The right of the people to information on matters of public concern
shall be recognized. Access to official records, and to documents
and papers pertaining to official acts, transactions or decisions,
shall be afforded the citizen subject to such limitation as may be
provided by law. (Art. IV, Sec. 6).
We trust that within five (5) days from receipt hereof we will receive your
favorable response on the matter.
(Sgd.) RICARDO C. VALMONTE
[Rollo, p. 7.]
To the aforesaid letter, the Deputy General Counsel of the GSIS replied:
June 17, 1986

Atty. Ricardo C. Valmonte
108 E. Benin Street
Caloocan City
Dear Compaero:
Possibly because he must have thought that it contained serious legal
implications, President & General Manager Feliciano Belmonte, Jr. referred to me
for study and reply your letter to him of June 4, 1986 requesting a list of the
opposition members of Batasang Pambansa who were able to secure a clean loan
of P2 million each on guaranty of Mrs. Imelda Marcos.
My opinion in this regard is that a confidential relationship exists between the
GSIS and all those who borrow from it, whoever they may be; that the GSIS has a
duty to its customers to preserve this confidentiality; and that it would not be
proper for the GSIS to breach this confidentiality unless so ordered by the courts.
As a violation of this confidentiality may mar the image of the GSIS as a
reputable financial institution, I regret very much that at this time we cannot
respond positively to your request.
Very truly yours,
(Sgd.) MEYNARDO A. TIRO
Deputy General Counsel
[Rollo, p. 40.]
On June 20, 1986, apparently not having yet received the reply of the Government Service and
Insurance System (GSIS) Deputy General Counsel, petitioner Valmonte wrote respondent
another letter, saying that for failure to receive a reply, "(W)e are now considering ourselves free
to do whatever action necessary within the premises to pursue our desired objective in pursuance
of public interest." [Rollo, p. 8.]
On June 26, 1986, Valmonte, joined by the other petitioners, filed the instant suit.
On July 19, 1986, the Daily Express carried a news item reporting that 137 former members of
the defunct interim and regular Batasang Pambansa, including ten (10) opposition members,
were granted housing loans by the GSIS [Rollo, p. 41.]
Separate comments were filed by respondent Belmonte and the Solicitor General. After
petitioners filed a consolidated reply, the petition was given due course and the parties were
required to file their memoranda. The parties having complied, the case was deemed submitted
for decision.
In his comment respondent raises procedural objections to the issuance of a writ of mandamus,
among which is that petitioners have failed to exhaust administrative remedies.
Respondent claims that actions of the GSIS General Manager are reviewable by the Board of
Trustees of the GSIS. Petitioners, however, did not seek relief from the GSIS Board of Trustees.
It is therefore asserted that since administrative remedies were not exhausted, then petitioners
have no cause of action.
To this objection, petitioners claim that they have raised a purely legal issue, viz., whether or not
they are entitled to the documents sought, by virtue of their constitutional right to information.
Hence, it is argued that this case falls under one of the exceptions to the principle of exhaustion
of administrative remedies.
Among the settled principles in administrative law is that before a party can be allowed to resort
to the courts, he is expected to have exhausted all means of administrative redress available
under the law. The courts for reasons of law, comity and convenience will not entertain a case
unless the available administrative remedies have been resorted to and the appropriate authorities
have been given opportunity to act and correct the errors committed in the administrative forum.
However, the principle of exhaustion of administrative remedies is subject to settled exceptions,
among which is when only a question of law is involved [Pascual v. Provincial Board, 106 Phil.
466 (1959); Aguilar v. Valencia, et al., G.R. No. L-30396, July 30, 1971, 40 SCRA 210;
Malabanan v. Ramento, G.R. No. L-2270, May 21, 1984, 129 SCRA 359.] The issue raised by
petitioners, which requires the interpretation of the scope of the constitutional right to
information, is one which can be passed upon by the regular courts more competently than the
GSIS or its Board of Trustees, involving as it does a purely legal question. Thus, the exception of
this case from the application of the general rule on exhaustion of administrative remedies is
warranted. Having disposed of this procedural issue, We now address ourselves to the issue of
whether or not mandamus hes to compel respondent to perform the acts sought by petitioners to
be done, in pursuance of their right to information.
We shall deal first with the second and third alternative acts sought to be done, both of which
involve the issue of whether or not petitioners are entitled to access to the documents evidencing
loans granted by the GSIS.
This is not the first time that the Court is confronted with a controversy directly involving the
constitutional right to information. In Taada v. Tuvera, G.R. No. 63915, April 24,1985, 136
SCRA 27 and in the recent case of Legaspi v. Civil Service Commission, G.R. No. 72119, May
29, 1987,150 SCRA 530, the Court upheld the people's constitutional right to be informed of
matters of public interest and ordered the government agencies concerned to act as prayed for by
the petitioners.
The pertinent provision under the 1987 Constitution is Art. 111, Sec. 7 which states:
The right of the people to information on matters of public concern shall be
recognized. Access to official records, and to documents, and papers pertaining to
official acts, transactions, or decisions, as well as to government research data
used as basis for policy development, shall be afforded the citizen, subject to such
limitations as may be provided by law.
The right of access to information was also recognized in the 1973 Constitution, Art. IV Sec. 6 of
which provided:
The right of the people to information on 'matters of public concern shall be
recognized. Access to official records, and to documents and papers pertaining to
official acts, transactions, or decisions, shall be afforded the citizen subject to
such limitations as may be provided by law.
An informed citizenry with access to the diverse currents in political, moral and artistic thought
and data relative to them, and the free exchange of ideas and discussion of issues thereon, is vital
to the democratic government envisioned under our Constitution. The cornerstone of this
republican system of government is delegation of power by the people to the State. In this
system, governmental agencies and institutions operate within the limits of the authority
conferred by the people. Denied access to information on the inner workings of government, the
citizenry can become prey to the whims and caprices of those to whom the power had been
delegated. The postulate of public office as a public trust, institutionalized in the Constitution (in
Art. XI, Sec. 1) to protect the people from abuse of governmental power, would certainly be
were empty words if access to such information of public concern is denied, except under
limitations prescribed by implementing legislation adopted pursuant to the Constitution.
Petitioners are practitioners in media. As such, they have both the right to gather and the
obligation to check the accuracy of information the disseminate. For them, the freedom of the
press and of speech is not only critical, but vital to the exercise of their professions. The right of
access to information ensures that these freedoms are not rendered nugatory by the government's
monopolizing pertinent information. For an essential element of these freedoms is to keep open a
continuing dialogue or process of communication between the government and the people. It is
in the interest of the State that the channels for free political discussion be maintained to the end
that the government may perceive and be responsive to the people's will. Yet, this open dialogue
can be effective only to the extent that the citizenry is informed and thus able to formulate its
will intelligently. Only when the participants in the discussion are aware of the issues and have
access to information relating thereto can such bear fruit.
The right to information is an essential premise of a meaningful right to speech and expression.
But this is not to say that the right to information is merely an adjunct of and therefore restricted
in application by the exercise of the freedoms of speech and of the press. Far from it. The right to
information goes hand-in-hand with the constitutional policies of full public disclosure * and
honesty in the public service. ** It is meant to enhance the widening role of the citizenry in
governmental decision-making as well as in checking abuse in government.
Yet, like all the constitutional guarantees, the right to information is not absolute. As stated
in Legaspi, the people's right to information is limited to "matters of public concern," and is
further "subject to such limitations as may be provided by law." Similarly, the State's policy of
full disclosure is limited to "transactions involving public interest," and is "subject to reasonable
conditions prescribed by law."
Hence, before mandamus may issue, it must be clear that the information sought is of "public
interest" or "public concern," and is not exempted by law from the operation of the constitutional
guarantee [Legazpi v. Civil Service Commission, supra, at p. 542.]
The Court has always grappled with the meanings of the terms "public interest" and "public
concern". As observed in Legazpi:
In determining whether or not a particular information is of public concern there
is no rigid test which can be applied. "Public concern" like "public interest" is a
term that eludes exact definition. Both terms embrace a broad spectrum of
subjects which the public may want to know, either because these directly affect
their lives, or simply because such matters naturally arouse the interest of an
ordinary citezen. In the final analysis, it is for the courts to determine on a case by
case basis whether the matter at issue is of interest or importance, as it relates to
or affects the public. [Ibid. at p. 541]
In the Taada case the public concern deemed covered by the constitutional right to information
was the need for adequate notice to the public of the various laws which are to regulate the
actions and conduct of citezens. InLegaspi, it was the "legitimate concern of citezensof ensure
that government positions requiring civil service eligibility are occupied only by persons who are
eligibles" [Supra at p. 539.]
The information sought by petitioners in this case is the truth of reports that certain Members of
the Batasang Pambansa belonging to the opposition were able to secure "clean" loans from the
GSIS immediately before the February 7, 1986 election through the intercession of th eformer
First Lady, Mrs. Imelda Marcos.
The GSIS is a trustee of contributions from the government and its employees and the
administrator of various insurance programs for the benefit of the latter. Undeniably, its funds
assume a public character. More particularly, Secs. 5(b) and 46 of P.D. 1146, as amended (the
Revised Government Service Insurance Act of 1977), provide for annual appropriations to pay
the contributions, premiums, interest and other amounts payable to GSIS by the government, as
employer, as well as the obligations which the Republic of the Philippines assumes or guarantees
to pay. Considering the nature of its funds, the GSIS is expected to manage its resources with
utmost prudence and in strict compliance with the pertinent laws or rules and regulations. Thus,
one of the reasons that prompted the revision of the old GSIS law (C.A. No. 186, as amended)
was the necessity "to preserve at all times the actuarial solvency of the funds administered by the
System" [Second Whereas Clause, P.D. No. 1146.] Consequently, as respondent himself admits,
the GSIS "is not supposed to grant 'clean loans.'" [Comment, p. 8.] It is therefore the legitimate
concern of the public to ensure that these funds are managed properly with the end in view of
maximizing the benefits that accrue to the insured government employees. Moreover, the
supposed borrowers were Members of the defunct Batasang Pambansa who themselves
appropriated funds for the GSIS and were therefore expected to be the first to see to it that the
GSIS performed its tasks with the greatest degree of fidelity and that an its transactions were
above board.
In sum, the public nature of the loanable funds of the GSIS and the public office held by the
alleged borrowers make the information sought clearly a matter of public interest and concern.
A second requisite must be met before the right to information may be enforced through
mandamus proceedings,viz., that the information sought must not be among those excluded by
law.
Respondent maintains that a confidential relationship exists between the GSIS and its borrowers.
It is argued that a policy of confidentiality restricts the indiscriminate dissemination of
information.
Yet, respondent has failed to cite any law granting the GSIS the privilege of confidentiality as
regards the documents subject of this petition. His position is apparently based merely on
considerations of policy. The judiciary does not settle policy issues. The Court can only declare
what the law is, and not what the law should be. Under our system of government, policy issues
are within the domain of the political branches of the government, and of the people themselves
as the repository of all State power.
Respondent however contends that in view of the right to privacy which is equally protected by
the Constitution and by existing laws, the documents evidencing loan transactions of the GSIS
must be deemed outside the ambit of the right to information.
There can be no doubt that right to privacy is constitutionally protected. In the landmark case
of Morfe v. Mutuc[130 Phil. 415 (1968), 22 SCRA 424], this Court, speaking through then Mr.
Justice Fernando, stated:
... The right to privacy as such is accorded recognition independently of its
identification with liberty; in itself, it is fully deserving of constitutional
protection. The language of Prof. Emerson is particularly apt: "The concept of
limited government has always included the idea that governmental powers stop
short of certain intrusions into the personal life of the citizen. This is indeed one
of the basic distinctions between absolute and limited government. UItimate and
pervasive control of the individual, in all aspects of his life, is the hallmark of the
absolute. state, In contrast, a system of limited government safeguards a private
sector, which belongs to the individual, firmly distinguishing it from the public
sector, which the state can control. Protection of this private sector protection,
in other words, of the dignity and integrity of the individual has become
increasingly important as modem society has developed. All the forces of
technological age industrialization, urbanization, and organization operate
to narrow the area of privacy and facilitate intrusion into it. In modern terms, the
capacity to maintain and support this enclave of private life marks the difference
between a democratic and a totalitarian society." [at pp. 444-445.]
When the information requested from the government intrudes into the privacy of a citizen, a
potential conflict between the rights to information and to privacy may arise. However, the
competing interests of these rights need not be resolved in this case. Apparent from the abovequoted statement of the Court in Morfe is that the right to privacy belongs to the individual in his
private capacity, and not to public and governmental agencies like the GSIS. Moreover, the right
cannot be invoked by juridical entities like the GSIS. As held in the case of Vassar College v.
Loose Wills Biscuit Co. [197 F. 982 (1912)], a corporation has no right of privacy in its name
since the entire basis of the right to privacy is an injury to the feelings and sensibilities of the
party and a corporation would have no such ground for relief.
Neither can the GSIS through its General Manager, the respondent, invoke the right to privacy of
its borrowers. The right is purely personal in nature [Cf. Atkinson v. John Doherty & Co., 121
Mich 372, 80 N.W. 285, 46 L.RA. 219 (1899); Schuyler v. Curtis, 147 N.Y. 434, 42 N.E. 22, 31
L.R.A. 286 (1895)), and hence may be invoked only by the person whose privacy is claimed to
be violated.
It may be observed, however, that in the instant case, the concerned borrowers themselves may
not succeed if they choose to invoke their right to privacy, considering the public offices they
were holding at the time the loans were alleged to have been granted. It cannot be denied that
because of the interest they generate and their newsworthiness, public figures, most especially
those holding responsible positions in government, enjoy a more limited right to privacy as
compared to ordinary individuals, their actions being subject to closer public scrutiny [Cf.Ayer
Productions Pty. Ltd. v. Capulong, G.R. Nos. 82380 and 82398, April 29, 1988; See also Cohen
v. Marx, 211 P. 2d 321 (1949).]
Respondent next asserts that the documents evidencing the loan transactions of the GSIS
are private in nature and hence, are not covered by the Constitutional right to information on
matters of public concern which guarantees "(a)ccess to official records, and to documents, and
papers pertaining to official acts, transactions, or decisions" only.
It is argued that the records of the GSIS, a government corporation performing proprietary
functions, are outside the coverage of the people's right of access to official records.
It is further contended that since the loan function of the GSIS is merely incidental to its
insurance function, then its loan transactions are not covered by the constitutional policy of full
public disclosure and the right to information which is applicable only to "official" transactions.
First of all, the "constituent ministrant" dichotomy characterizing government function has
long been repudiated. In ACCFA v. Confederation of Unions and Government Corporations and
Offices (G.R. Nos. L-21484 and L-23605, November 29, 1969, 30 SCRA 6441, the Court said
that the government, whether carrying out its sovereign attributes or running some business,
discharges the same function of service to the people.
Consequently, that the GSIS, in granting the loans, was exercising a proprietary function would
not justify the exclusion of the transactions from the coverage and scope of the right to
information.
Moreover, the intent of the members of the Constitutional Commission of 1986, to include
government-owned and controlled corporations and transactions entered into by them within the
coverage of the State policy of fun public disclosure is manifest from the records of the
proceedings:
xxx xxx xxx
THE PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. Colayco).
Commissioner Suarez is recognized.
MR. SUAREZ. Thank you. May I ask the Gentleman a few question?
MR. OPLE. Very gladly.
MR. SUAREZ. Thank you.
When we declare a "policy of full public disclosure of all its
transactions" referring to the transactions of the State and
when we say the "State" which I suppose would include all of the
various agencies, departments, ministries and instrumentalities of
the government....
MR. OPLE. Yes, and individual public officers, Mr. Presiding Officer.
MR. SUAREZ. Including government-owned and controlled corporations.
MR. OPLE. That is correct, Mr. Presiding Officer.
MR. SUAREZ. And when we say "transactions"
which should be distinguished from contracts,
agreements, or treaties or whatever, does the
Gentleman refer to the steps leading to the
consummation of the contract, or does he refer to
the contract itself?
MR. OPLE. The "transactions" used here I suppose
is generic and, therefore, it can cover both steps
leading to a contract, and already a consummated
contract, Mr. Presiding Officer.
MR. SUAREZ. This contemplates inclusion of
negotiations leading to the consummation of the
transaction.
MR. OPLE. Yes, subject only to reasonable
safeguards on the national interest.
MR. SUAREZ. Thank you. [V Record of the
Constitutional Commission 24-25.] (Emphasis
supplied.)
Considering the intent of the framers of the Constitution which, though not binding upon the
Court, are nevertheless persuasive, and considering further that government-owned and
controlled corporations, whether performing proprietary or governmental functions are
accountable to the people, the Court is convinced that transactions entered into by the GSIS, a
government-controlled corporation created by special legislation are within the ambit of the
people's right to be informed pursuant to the constitutional policy of transparency in government
dealings.
In fine, petitioners are entitled to access to the documents evidencing loans granted by the GSIS,
subject to reasonable regulations that the latter may promulgate relating to the manner and hours
of examination, to the end that damage to or loss of the records may be avoided, that undue
interference with the duties of the custodian of the records may be prevented and that the right of
other persons entitled to inspect the records may be insured [Legaspi v. Civil Service
Commission, supra at p. 538, quoting Subido v. Ozaeta, 80 Phil. 383, 387.] The petition, as to
the second and third alternative acts sought to be done by petitioners, is meritorious.
However, the same cannot be said with regard to the first act sought by petitioners, i.e., "to
furnish petitioners the list of the names of the Batasang Pambansa members belonging to the
UNIDO and PDP-Laban who were able to secure clean loans immediately before the February 7
election thru the intercession/marginal note of the then First Lady Imelda Marcos."
Although citizens are afforded the right to information and, pursuant thereto, are entitled to
"access to official records," the Constitution does not accord them a right to compel custodians
of official records to prepare lists, abstracts, summaries and the like in their desire to acquire
information on matters of public concern.
It must be stressed that it is essential for a writ of mandamus to issue that the applicant has a
well-defined, clear and certain legal right to the thing demanded and that it is the imperative duty
of defendant to perform the act required. The corresponding duty of the respondent to perform
the required act must be clear and specific [Lemi v. Valencia, G.R. No. L-20768, November
29,1968,126 SCRA 203; Ocampo v. Subido, G.R. No. L-28344, August 27, 1976, 72 SCRA
443.] The request of the petitioners fails to meet this standard, there being no duty on the part of
respondent to prepare the list requested.
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is hereby granted and respondent General Manager of the
Government Service Insurance System is ORDERED to allow petitioners access to documents
and records evidencing loans granted to Members of the former Batasang Pambansa, as
petitioners may specify, subject to reasonable regulations as to the time and manner of
inspection, not incompatible with this decision, as the GSIS may deem necessary.
SO ORDERED.
Fernan, C.J., Narvasa, Melencio-Herrera, Gutierrez, Jr., Paras, Feliciano, Gancayco, Padilla,
Bidin, Sarmiento, Grio-Aquino, Medialdea and Regalado, JJ., concur.
Separate Opinions
CRUZ, J., concurring:

Instead of merely affixing my signature to signify my concurrence, I write this separate opinion
simply to say I have nothing to add to Justice Irene R. Cortes' exceptionally eloquent celebration
of the right to information on matters of public concern.
Separate Opinions
CRUZ, J., concurring:

Instead of merely affixing my signature to signify my concurrence, I write this separate opinion
simply to say I have nothing to add to Justice Irene R. Cortes' exceptionally eloquent celebration
of the right to information on matters of public concern.
Footnotes
* Art. II, Sec. 28. Subject to reasonable conditions prescribed by law, the State
adopts and implements a policy of full public disclosure of all its transactions
involving public interest.
** Art XI, Sec. 1. Public office is a public trust. Public officers and employees
must at all times be accountable to the people, serve them with utmost
responsibility, integrity, loyalty, and efficiency, act with partriotism and justice,
and lead modest lives.
The following provisions of the 1987 Constitution are further indicative of the
policy of transparency:
Art. VII, Sec. 12. In case of serious illness of the President, the public shall be
informed of the state of his health. The members of the cabinet in charge of
national security and foreign relations and the Chief of Staff of the Armed Forces
of the Philippines shall not be denied access to the President during such illness.
Art. XI, Sec. 17. A public officer or employee shall, upon assumption of office
and as often thereafter as may be required by law, submit a declaration under oath
or his assets liabilities, and net worth. In the case of the President, the VicePresident, the Members of the Cabinet, the Congress, the Supreme Court, the
Constitutional Commissions and other constitutional offices, and officers of the
armed forces with general or flag rank, the declaration shall be disclosed to the
public in the manner provided by law.
Art. XII, Sec. 21. Foreign loans may only be incurred in accordance with law and
the regulation of the monetary authority. Information on foreign loans obtained or
guaranteed by the Government shall be made available to the public.

SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-72119 May 29, 1987
VALENTIN L. LEGASPI, petitioner,
vs.
CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION, respondent.
CORTES, J.:
The fundamental right of the people to information on matters of public concern is invoked in
this special civil action for mandamus instituted by petitioner Valentin L. Legaspi against the
Civil Service Commission. The respondent had earlier denied Legaspi's request for information
on the civil service eligibilities of certain persons employed as sanitarians in the Health
Department of Cebu City. These government employees, Julian Sibonghanoy and Mariano Agas,
had allegedly represented themselves as civil service eligibles who passed the civil service
examinations for sanitarians.
Claiming that his right to be informed of the eligibilities of Julian Sibonghanoy and Mariano
Agas, is guaranteed by the Constitution, and that he has no other plain, speedy and adequate
remedy to acquire the information, petitioner prays for the issuance of the extraordinary writ of
mandamus to compel the respondent Commission to disclose said information.
This is not the first tune that the writ of mandamus is sought to enforce the fundamental right to
information. The same remedy was resorted to in the case of Tanada et. al. vs. Tuvera et.
al., (G.R. No. L-63915, April 24,1985,136 SCRA 27) wherein the people's right to be informed
under the 1973 Constitution (Article IV, Section 6) was invoked in order to compel the
publication in the Official Gazette of various presidential decrees, letters of instructions and
other presidential issuances. Prior to the recognition of the right in said Constitution the statutory
right to information provided for in the Land Registration Act (Section 56, Act 496, as amended)
was claimed by a newspaper editor in another mandamus proceeding, this time to demand access
to the records of the Register of Deeds for the purpose of gathering data on real estate
transactions involving aliens (Subido vs. Ozaeta, 80 Phil. 383 [1948]).
The constitutional right to information on matters of public concern first gained recognition in
the Bill of Rights, Article IV, of the 1973 Constitution, which states:
Sec. 6. The right of the people to information on matters of public concern shall
be recognized. Access to official records, and to documents and papers pertaining
to official acts, transactions, or decisions, shall be afforded the citizen subject to
such limitations as may be provided by law.
The foregoing provision has been retained and the right therein provided amplified in Article III,
Sec. 7 of the 1987 Constitution with the addition of the phrase, "as well as to government
research data used as basis for policy development." The new provision reads:
used as basis. for policy development, shall be afforded the citizen, subject to
such stations as may be provided by law.
These constitutional provisions are self-executing. They supply the rules by means of which the
right to information may be enjoyed (Cooley, A Treatise on the Constitutional Limitations 167
[1927]) by guaranteeing the right and mandating the duty to afford access to sources of
information. Hence, the fundamental right therein recognized may be asserted by the people
upon the ratification of the constitution without need for any ancillary act of the Legislature.
(Id. at, p. 165) What may be provided for by the Legislature are reasonable conditions and
limitations upon the access to be afforded which must, of necessity, be consistent with the
declared State policy of full public disclosure of all transactions involving public interest
(Constitution, Art. 11, Sec. 28). However, it cannot be overemphasized that whatever limitation
may be prescribed by the Legislature, the right and the duty under Art. III Sec. 7 have become
operative and enforceable by virtue of the adoption of the New Charter. Therefore, the right may
be properly invoked in a mandamus proceeding such as this one.
The Solicitor General interposes procedural objections to Our giving due course to this Petition.
He challenges the petitioner's standing to sue upon the ground that the latter does not possess any
clear legal right to be informed of the civil service eligibilities of the government employees
concerned. He calls attention to the alleged failure of the petitioner to show his actual interest in
securing this particular information. He further argues that there is no ministerial duty on the part
of the Commission to furnish the petitioner with the information he seeks.
1. To be given due course, a Petition for mandamus must have been instituted by a party
aggrieved by the alleged inaction of any tribunal, corporation, board or person which unlawfully
excludes said party from the enjoyment of a legal right. (Ant;-Chinese League of the Philippines
vs. Felix, 77 Phil. 1012 [1947]). The petitioner in every case must therefore be an "aggrieved
party" in the sense that he possesses a clear legal right to be enforced and a direct interest in the
duty or act to be performed.
In the case before Us, the respondent takes issue on the personality of the petitioner to bring this
suit. It is asserted that, the instant Petition is bereft of any allegation of Legaspi's actual
interest in the civil service eligibilities of Julian Sibonghanoy and Mariano Agas, At most there is
a vague reference to an unnamed client in whose behalf he had allegedly acted when he made
inquiries on the subject (Petition, Rollo, p. 3).
But what is clear upon the face of the Petition is that the petitioner has firmly anchored his case
upon the right of the people to information on matters of public concern, which, by its very
nature, is a public right. It has been held that:
* * * when the question is one of public right and the object of the mandamus is
to procure the enforcement of a public duty, the people are regarded as the real
party in interest and the relator at whose instigation the proceedings are instituted
need not show that he has any legal or special interest in the result, it being
sufficient to show that he is a citizen and as such interested in the execution of the
laws * * * (Tanada et. al. vs. Tuvera, et. al., G.R. No. L- 63915, April 24, 1985,
136 SCRA 27, 36).
From the foregoing, it becomes apparent that when a mandamus proceeding involves the
assertion of a public right, the requirement of personal interest is satisfied by the mere fact that
the petitioner is a citizen, and therefore, part of the general "public" which possesses the right.
The Court had opportunity to define the word "public" in the Subido case, supra, when it held
that even those who have no direct or tangible interest in any real estate transaction are part of
the "public" to whom "(a)ll records relating to registered lands in the Office of the Register of
Deeds shall be open * * *" (Sec. 56, Act No. 496, as amended). In the words of the Court:
* * * "Public" is a comprehensive, all-inclusive term. Properly construed, it
embraces every person. To say that only those who have a present and existing
interest of a pecuniary character in the particular information sought are given the
right of inspection is to make an unwarranted distinction. *** (Subido vs.
Ozaeta, supra at p. 387).
The petitioner, being a citizen who, as such is clothed with personality to seek redress for the
alleged obstruction of the exercise of the public right. We find no cogent reason to deny his
standing to bring the present suit.
2. For every right of the people recognized as fundamental, there lies a corresponding duty on the
part of those who govern, to respect and protect that right. That is the very essence of the Bill of
Rights in a constitutional regime. Only governments operating under fundamental rules defining
the limits of their power so as to shield individual rights against its arbitrary exercise can
properly claim to be constitutional (Cooley, supra, at p. 5). Without a government's acceptance of
the limitations imposed upon it by the Constitution in order to uphold individual liberties,
without an acknowledgment on its part of those duties exacted by the rights pertaining to the
citizens, the Bill of Rights becomes a sophistry, and liberty, the ultimate illusion.
In recognizing the people's right to be informed, both the 1973 Constitution and the New Charter
expressly mandate the duty of the State and its agents to afford access to official records,
documents, papers and in addition, government research data used as basis for policy
development, subject to such limitations as may be provided by law. The guarantee has been
further enhanced in the New Constitution with the adoption of a policy of full public disclosure,
this time "subject to reasonable conditions prescribed by law," in Article 11, Section 28 thereof,
to wit:
Subject to reasonable conditions prescribed by law, the State adopts and
implements a policy of full public disclosure of all its transactions involving
public interest. (Art. 11, Sec. 28).
In the Tanada case, supra, the constitutional guarantee was bolstered by what this Court declared
as an imperative duty of the government officials concerned to publish all important legislative
acts and resolutions of a public nature as well as all executive orders and proclamations of
general applicability. We granted mandamus in said case, and in the process, We found occasion
to expound briefly on the nature of said duty:
* * * That duty must be enforced if the Constitutional right of the people to be
informed on matters of public concern is to be given substance and reality. The
law itself makes a list of what should be published in the Official Gazette. Such
listing, to our mind, leaves respondents with no discretion whatsoever as to what
must be in included or excluded from such publication. (Tanada v.
Tuvera,supra, at 39). (Emphasis supplied).
The absence of discretion on the part of government agencia es in allowing the examination of
public records, specifically, the records in the Office of the Register of Deeds, is emphasized
in Subido vs. Ozaeta, supra:
Except, perhaps when it is clear that the purpose of the examination is unlawful,
or sheer, idle curiosity, we do not believe it is the duty under the law of
registration officers to concern themselves with the motives, reasons, and objects
of the person seeking access to the records. It is not their prerogative to see that
the information which the records contain is not flaunted before public gaze, or
that scandal is not made of it. If it be wrong to publish the contents of the records,
it is the legislature and not the officials having custody thereof which is called
upon to devise a remedy. *** (Subido v. Ozaeta, supra at 388). (Emphasis
supplied).
It is clear from the foregoing pronouncements of this Court that government agencies are without
discretion in refusing disclosure of, or access to, information of public concern. This is not to
lose sight of the reasonable regulations which may be imposed by said agencies in custody of
public records on the manner in which the right to information may be exercised by the public. In
the Subido case, We recognized the authority of the Register of Deeds to regulate the manner in
which persons desiring to do so, may inspect, examine or copy records relating to registered
lands. However, the regulations which the Register of Deeds may promulgate are confined to:
* * * prescribing the manner and hours of examination to the end that damage to
or loss of, the records may be avoided, that undue interference with the duties of
the custodian of the books and documents and other employees may be prevented,
that the right of other persons entitled to make inspection may be insured * * *
(Subido vs. Ozaeta, 80 Phil. 383, 387)
Applying the Subido ruling by analogy, We recognized a similar authority in a municipal judge,
to regulate the manner of inspection by the public of criminal docket records in the case
of Baldoza vs. Dimaano (Adm. Matter No. 1120-MJ, May 5, 1976, 71 SCRA 14). Said
administrative case was filed against the respondent judge for his alleged refusal to allow
examination of the criminal docket records in his sala. Upon a finding by the Investigating Judge
that the respondent had allowed the complainant to open and view the subject records, We
absolved the respondent. In effect, We have also held that the rules and conditions imposed by
him upon the manner of examining the public records were reasonable.
In both the Subido and the Baldoza cases, We were emphatic in Our statement that the authority
to regulate the manner of examining public records does not carry with it the power to prohibit.
A distinction has to be made between the discretion to refuse outright the disclosure of or access
to a particular information and the authority to regulate the manner in which the access is to be
afforded. The first is a limitation upon the availability of access to the information sought, which
only the Legislature may impose (Art. III, Sec. 6, 1987 Constitution). The second pertains to the
government agency charged with the custody of public records. Its authority to regulate access is
to be exercised solely to the end that damage to, or loss of, public records may be avoided, undue
interference with the duties of said agencies may be prevented, and more importantly, that the
exercise of the same constitutional right by other persons shall be assured (Subido vs.
Ozaetal supra).
Thus, while the manner of examining public records may be subject to reasonable regulation by
the government agency in custody thereof, the duty to disclose the information of public concern,
and to afford access to public records cannot be discretionary on the part of said agencies.
Certainly, its performance cannot be made contingent upon the discretion of such agencies.
Otherwise, the enjoyment of the constitutional right may be rendered nugatory by any whimsical
exercise of agency discretion. The constitutional duty, not being discretionary, its performance
may be compelled by a writ of mandamus in a proper case.
But what is a proper case for Mandamus to issue? In the case before Us, the public right to be
enforced and the concomitant duty of the State are unequivocably set forth in the Constitution.
The decisive question on the propriety of the issuance of the writ of mandamus in this case is,
whether the information sought by the petitioner is within the ambit of the constitutional
guarantee.
3. The incorporation in the Constitution of a guarantee of access to information of public concern
is a recognition of the essentiality of the free flow of ideas and information in a democracy
(Baldoza v. Dimaano, Adm. Matter No. 1120-MJ, May 5, 1976, 17 SCRA 14). In the same way
that free discussion enables members of society to cope with the exigencies of their time
(Thornhill vs. Alabama, 310 U.S. 88,102 [1939]), access to information of general interest aids
the people in democratic decision-making (87 Harvard Law Review 1505 [1974]) by giving
them a better perspective of the vital issues confronting the nation.
But the constitutional guarantee to information on matters of public concern is not absolute. It
does not open every door to any and all information. Under the Constitution, access to official
records, papers, etc., are "subject to limitations as may be provided by law" (Art. III, Sec. 7,
second sentence). The law may therefore exempt certain types of information from public
scrutiny, such as those affecting national security (Journal No. 90, September 23, 1986, p. 10;
and Journal No. 91, September 24, 1986, p. 32, 1986 Constitutional Commission). It follows
that, in every case, the availability of access to a particular public record must be circumscribed
by the nature of the information sought, i.e., (a) being of public concern or one that involves
public interest, and, (b) not being exempted by law from the operation of the constitutional
guarantee. The threshold question is, therefore, whether or not the information sought is of public
interest or public concern.
a. This question is first addressed to the government agency having custody of the desired
information. However, as already discussed, this does not give the agency concerned any
discretion to grant or deny access. In case of denial of access, the government agency has the
burden of showing that the information requested is not of public concern, or, if it is of public
concern, that the same has been exempted by law from the operation of the guarantee. To hold
otherwise will serve to dilute the constitutional right. As aptly observed, ". . . the government is
in an advantageous position to marshall and interpret arguments against release . . ." (87 Harvard
Law Review 1511 [1974]). To safeguard the constitutional right, every denial of access by the
government agency concerned is subject to review by the courts, and in the proper case, access
may be compelled by a writ of Mandamus.
In determining whether or not a particular information is of public concern there is no rigid test
which can be applied. "Public concern" like "public interest" is a term that eludes exact
definition. Both terms embrace a broad spectrum of subjects which the public may want to know,
either because these directly affect their lives, or simply because such matters naturally arouse
the interest of an ordinary citizen. In the final analysis, it is for the courts to determine in a case
by case basis whether the matter at issue is of interest or importance, as it relates to or affects the
public.
The public concern invoked in the case of Tanada v. Tuvera, supra, was the need for adequate
notice to the public of the various laws which are to regulate the actions and conduct of citizens.
In Subido vs. Ozaeta, supra,the public concern deemed covered by the statutory right was the
knowledge of those real estate transactions which some believed to have been registered in
violation of the Constitution.
The information sought by the petitioner in this case is the truth of the claim of certain
government employees that they are civil service eligibles for the positions to which they were
appointed. The Constitution expressly declares as a State policy that:
Appointments in the civil service shall be made only according to merit and
fitness to be determined, as far as practicable, and except as to positions which are
policy determining, primarily confidential or highly technical, by competitive
examination. (Art. IX, B, Sec. 2.[2]).
Public office being a public trust, [Const. Art. XI, Sec. 1] it is the legitimate concern of citizens
to ensure that government positions requiring civil service eligibility are occupied only by
persons who are eligibles. Public officers are at all times accountable to the people even as to
their eligibilities for their respective positions.
b. But then, it is not enough that the information sought is of public interest. For mandamus to lie
in a given case, the information must not be among the species exempted by law from the
operation of the constitutional guarantee.
In the instant, case while refusing to confirm or deny the claims of eligibility, the respondent has
failed to cite any provision in the Civil Service Law which would limit the petitioner's right to
know who are, and who are not, civil service eligibles. We take judicial notice of the fact that the
names of those who pass the civil service examinations, as in bar examinations and licensure
examinations for various professions, are released to the public. Hence, there is nothing secret
about one's civil service eligibility, if actually possessed. Petitioner's request is, therefore, neither
unusual nor unreasonable. And when, as in this case, the government employees concerned claim
to be civil service eligibles, the public, through any citizen, has a right to verify their professed
eligibilities from the Civil Service Commission.
The civil service eligibility of a sanitarian being of public concern, and in the absence of express
limitations under the law upon access to the register of civil service eligibles for said position,
the duty of the respondent Commission to confirm or deny the civil service eligibility of any
person occupying the position becomes imperative. Mandamus, therefore lies.
WHEREFORE, the Civil Service Commission is ordered to open its register of eligibles for the
position of sanitarian, and to confirm or deny, the civil service eligibility of Julian Sibonghanoy
and Mariano Agas, for said position in the Health Department of Cebu City, as requested by the
petitioner Valentin L. Legaspi.
Teehankee, C.J., Yap, Fernan, Narvasa, Melencio-Herrera, Gutierrez, Jr., Cruz, Paras,
Gancayco, Padilla, Bidin and Sarmiento, JJ., concur.

SUPREME COURT
Manila
G.R. No. 92541 November 13, 1991
MA. CARMEN G. AQUINO-SARMIENTO, petitioner,
vs.
MANUEL L. MORATO (in his capacity as Chairman of the MTRCB) and the MOVIE &
TELEVISION REVIEW AND CLASSIFICATION BOARD, respondents.
Araullo, Zambrano, Gruba, Chua Law Firm for petitioner.
Francisco Ma. Chanco for respondents.
BIDIN, J.:p
At issue in this petition is the citizen's right of access to official records as guaranteed by the
constitution.
In February 1989, petitioner, herself a member of respondent Movie and Television Review and
Classification Board (MTRCB), wrote its records officer requesting that she be allowed to
examine the board's records pertaining to the voting slips accomplished by the individual board
members after a review of the movies and television productions. It is on the basis of said slips
that films are either banned, cut or classified accordingly.
Acting on the said request, the records officer informed petitioner that she has to secure prior
clearance from respondent Manuel Morato, as chairman of MTRCB, to gain access to the records
sought to be examined.
Petitioner's request was eventually denied by respondent Morato on the ground that whenever the
members of the board sit in judgment over a film, their decisions as reflected in the individual
voting slips partake the nature of conscience votes and as such, are purely and completely private
and personal. It is the submission of respondents that the individual voting slips is the exclusive
property of the member concerned and anybody who wants access thereto must first secure his
(the member's) consent, otherwise, a request therefor may be legally denied.
Petitioner argues, on the other hand, that the records she wishes to examine are public in
character and other than providing for reasonable conditions regulating the manner and hours of
examination, respondents Morato and the classification board have no authority to deny any
citizen seeking examination of the board's records.
On February 27, 1989, respondent Morato called an executive meeting of the MTRCB to
discuss, among others, the issue raised by petitioner. In said meeting, seventeen (17) members of
the board voted to declare their individual voting records as classified documents which rendered
the same inaccessible to the public without clearance from the chairman. Thereafter, respondent
Morato denied petitioner's request to examine the voting slips. However, it was only much
later, i.e., on July 27, 1989, that respondent Board issued Resolution No. 10-89 which declared
as confidential, private and personal, the decision of the reviewing committee and the voting
slips of the members.
Petitioner brought the matter to the attention of the Executive Secretary, which in turn, referred
the same to respondent Morato for appropriate comment.
Another incident which gave rise to this petition occurred in a board meeting held on June 22,
1989. In that meeting, respondent Morato told the board that he has ordered some deletions on
the movie "Mahirap ang Magmahal" notwithstanding the fact that said movie was earlier
approved for screening by the Board with classification "R-18 without cuts". He explained that
his power to unilaterally change the decision of the Review Committee is authorized by virtue of
MTRCB Resolution No. 88-1-25 (dated June 22,1988) which allows the chairman of the board
"to downgrade a film (already) reviewed especially those which are controversial."
Petitioner informed the Board, however, that respondent Morato possesses no authority to
unilaterally reverse a decision of the review committee under PD 1986 (Creating the Movie and
Television Review and Classification Board).
After the matter was referred by the Deputy Executive Secretary to the Justice Secretary, the
latter opined that PD 1896 does not vest respondent Morato any authority to unilaterally reverse
the decision of the review committee but declined to comment on the constitutionality of Res.
No. 10-89 on the ground that the resolution thereof is a judicial prerogative (Rollo, pp. 38-42).
The Justice Secretary's opinion to the contrary notwithstanding, respondent Morato opted to
ignore it.
Hence, this petition anchored on the following:
A. MORATO AND THE MTRCB BY APPROVING AND ENFORCING RESOLUTION NO.
10-89 ACTED WITH GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION TANTAMOUNT TO LACK OF
JURISDICTION BECAUSE THE SAME VIOLATES ARTICLE III SECTION 7 OF THE 1987
CONSTITUTION.
B. MTRCB RESOLUTION NO. 88-1-25 HAS NO LEGAL BASIS AND CONSTITUTES AN
UNLAWFUL DELEGATION OF DISCRETIONARY POWERS.
C. MORATO AND THE MTRCB BY REFUSING TO ABIDE BY OPINION NO. 1 SERIES OF
1990 OF THE SECRETARY OF JUSTICE AND BY INSISTING ON THE VALIDITY OF
RESOLUTION NO. 88-1-25 ACTED CAPRICIOUSLY, ARBITRARILY, IN BAD FAITH, IN
EXCESS OF THEIR JURISDICTION, AND WITH GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION.
Petitioner therefore seeks the nullification of 1) MTRCB Resolution No. 88-1-25 which allows
the Chairman of the Board to unilaterally downgrade a film (already) reviewed especially those
which are controversial and 2) MTRCB RESOLUTION No. 10-89 (dated July 27, 1989)
declaring as strictly confidential, private and personal a) the decision of a reviewing committee
which previously reviewed a certain film and b) the individual voting slips of the members of the
committee that reviewed the film.
Respondents argue at the outset that the instant petition should be dismissed outright for having
failed to comply with the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies.
We disagree. The doctrine of exhaustion of administrate remedies simply provides that before a
party litigant is allowed resort to the courts, he is required to comply with all administrative
remedies available under the law (Rosales v. Court of Appeals, 165 SCRA 344 [1988]). The
rationale behind this salutory principle is that for reasons of practical considerations, comity and
convenience, the courts of law will not entertain a case until all the available administrative
remedies provided by law have been resorted to and the appropriate authorities have been given
ample opportunity to act and to correct the errors committed in the administrative level. If the
error is rectified, judicial intervention would then be unnecessary.
Nonetheless, the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies is not absolute. The
applicability of the principle admits of certain exceptions, such as: 1) when no administrative
review is provided by law; 2) when the only question involved is one of law (Valmonte v.
Valmonte, 170 SCRA 256 [1989], citing Aguilar v. Valencia, 40 SCRA 210 [1971]; Malabanan v.
Ramento, 129 SCRA 359 [1984]; Bagatsing v. Ramirez, 74 SCRA 306; Del Mar v. Philippine
Veterans Administration, 51 SCRA 340 [1973]; Pascual v. Provincial Board, 106 Phil. 466
[1959]; 3) where the party invoking the doctrine is guilty of estoppel (Vda. de Tan v. Veterans'
Backpay Commission [1969]; 4) where the challenged administrative action is patently illegal,
arbitrary and oppressive (Azur v. Provincial Board, 27 SCRA 50 [1969]; National Development
Co. v. Collector of Customs of Manila, 9 SCRA 429 [1963]; 5) where there is unreasonable delay
or official inaction that would greatly prejudice the complainant (Gravador v. Mamigo, 20 SCRA
742 [1967]; Azuelo v. Arnaldo, 108 Phil. 293 [1960]; 6) where to exhaust administrative review
is impractical and unreasonable (Cipriano v. Marcelino, 43 SCRA 291); and 7) where the rule of
qualified political agency applies (Demaisip v. Court of Appeals, 106 Phil. 237 [1906]).
The issue raised in the instant petition is one of law, hence the doctrine of non-exhaustion of
administrative remedy relied upon by respondents is inapplicable and cannot be given any effect.
At any rate, records are replete with events pointing to the fact that petitioner adhered to the
administrative processes in the disposition of the assailed resolutions of public respondents prior
to filing the instant petition by, among others, writing the Executive Secretary and bringing the
matter to the attention of the Office of the President (Rollo, pp. 145-147). Respondents' claim
that petitioner failed to exhaust administrative remedies must therefore fail.
Having disposed of the procedural objection raised by respondents, We now proceed to resolve
the issues raised by petitioner. In this regard, We find respondents' refusal to allow petitioner to
examine the records of respondent MTRCB, pertaining to the decisions of the review committee
as well as the individual voting slips of its members, as violative of petitioner's constitutional
right of access to public records. More specifically, Sec. 7, Art. III of the Constitution provides
that:
recognized. Access to official records, and to documents, and papers pertaining
to official acts, transactions, or decisions,as well as to government research data
limitations as may be provided by law. (emphasis supplied)
As We held in Legaspi v. Civil Service Commission (150 SCRA 530 [1987]), this constitutional
provision is self-executory and supplies "the rules by means of which the right to information
may be enjoyed (Cooley, A Treatise on Constitutional Limitations 167 [1927]) by guaranteeing
the right and mandating the duty to afford access to sources of information. Hence, the
fundamental right therein recognized may be asserted by the people upon the ratification of the
constitution without need for any ancillary act of the Legislature (Id. at 165). What may be
provided for by the Legislature are reasonable conditions and limitations upon the access to be
afforded which must, of necessity, be consistent with the declared State Policy of full public
disclosure of all transactions involving public interest (Constitution, Art. II, Sec. 28)." (See also
Taada v. Tuvera, 136 SCRA 27 [1985]; Valmonte v. Belmonte, Jr., 170 SCRA 256 [1989]).
Respondents contend, however, that what is rendered by the members of the board in reviewing
films and reflected in their individual voting slip is their individual vote of conscience on the
motion picture or television program and as such, makes the individual voting slip purely private
and personal; an exclusive property of the member concerned.
The term private has been defined as "belonging to or concerning, an individual person,
company, or interest"; whereas, public means "pertaining to, or belonging to, or affecting a
nation, state, or community at large" (People v. Powell, 274 NW 372 [1937]). May the decisions
of respondent Board and the individual members concerned, arrived at in an official capacity, be
considered private? Certainly not. As may be gleaned from the decree (PD 1986) creating the
respondent classification board, there is no doubt that its very existence is public is character; it
is an office created to serve public interest. It being the case, respondents can lay no valid claim
to privacy. The right to privacy belongs to the individual acting in his private capacity and not to
a governmental agency or officers tasked with, and acting in, the discharge of public duties (See
Valmonte v. Belmonte, Jr., supra.) There can be no invasion of privacy in the case at bar since
what is sought to be divulged is a product of action undertaken in the course of performing
official functions. To declare otherwise would be to clothe every public official with an
impregnable mantle of protection against public scrutiny for their official acts.
Further, the decisions of the Board and the individual voting slips accomplished by the members
concerned are acts made pursuant to their official functions, and as such, are neither personal nor
private in nature but rather public in character. They are, therefore, public records access to
which is guaranteed to the citizenry by no less than the fundamental law of the land. Being a
public right, the exercise thereof cannot be made contingent on the discretion, nay, whim and
caprice, of the agency charged with the custody of the official records sought to be examined.
The constitutional recognition of the citizen's right of access to official records cannot be made
dependent upon the consent of the members of the board concerned, otherwise, the said right
would be rendered nugatory. As stated by this Court in Subido v. Ozaeta (80 Phil. 383 [1948]):
Except, perhaps when it is clear that the purpose of the examinations is unlawful,
or sheer, idle curiosity, we do not believe it is the duty under the law of
registration officers to concern themselves with the motives, reasons, and objects
of the person seeking access to the records. It is not their prerogative to see that
the information which the records contain is not flaunted before public gaze, or
that scandal is not made of it. If it be wrong to publish the contents of the records,
it is the legislature and not the officials having custody thereof which is called
upon to devise a remedy.(emphasis supplied)
It is significant to point out that this Court in the 1948 case of Subido v. Ozaeta, supra, upheld
the right to information based on the statutory right then provided in Sec. 56 of the Land
Registration Act (Act 496, as amended). Consequently, We see no cogent reason why said right,
now constitutionalized, should be given less efficacy and primacy than what the fundament law
mandates.
The Court is not unaware of RA 6713 (Code of Conduct and Ethical Standards for Public
Officials and Employees) which provides, among others, certain exceptions as regards the
availability of official records or documents to the requesting public, e.g., closed door Cabinet
sessions and deliberations of this Court. Suffice it to state, however, that the exceptions therein
enumerated find no application in the case at bar. Petitioner request is not concerned with the
deliberations of respondent Board but with its documents or records made after a decision or
order has been rendered. Neither will the examination involve disclosure of trade secrets or
matters pertaining to national security which would otherwise limit the right of access to official
records (See Legaspi v. Civil Service Commission, supra).
We are likewise not impressed with the proposition advanced by respondents that respondent
Morato is empowered by PD 1986 to unilaterally downgrade or upgrade a film reviewed
especially those which are controversial. The pertinent provisions of said decree provides:
Sec 4. Decision. The decision of the BOARD either approving or disapproving
for exhibition in the Philippines a motion picture, television program, still and
other pictorial advertisement submitted to it for examination and preview must be
rendered within a period of ten (10) days which shall be counted from the date of
receipt by the BOARD of an application for the purpose . . .
For each review session, the Chairman of the Board shall designate a subcommittee composed of at least three BOARD members to undertake the work of
review. Any disapproval or deletion must be approved by a majority of the subcommittee members so designated. After receipt of the written decision of the
sub-committee, a motion for reconsideration in writing may be made, upon which
the Chairman of the Board shall designate a sub-committee of five BOARD
members to undertake a second review session, whose decision on behalf of the
Board shall be rendered through a majority of the sub-committee members so
designated and present at the second review session. This second review session
shall be presided over by the Chairman, or the Vice-Chairman. The decision of the
BOARD in the second review session shall be rendered within five (5) days from
the date of receipt of the motion for reconsideration.
Every decision of the BOARD disapproving a motion picture, television program
or publicity material for exhibition in the Philippines must be in writing, and shall
state the reasons or grounds for such disapproval. No film or motion picture
intended for exhibition at the moviehouses or theaters or on television shall be
disapproved by reason of its topic, theme or subject matter, but upon the merits of
each picture or program considered in its entirety.
The second decision of the BOARD shall be final, with the exception of a
decision disapproving or prohibiting a motion picture or television program in its
entirety which shall be appealable to the President of the Philippines, who may
himself decide the appeal, or be assisted either by an ad hoe committee he may
create or by the Appeals Committee herein created.
An Appeals Committee in the Office of the President of the Philippines is hereby
created composed of a Chairman and four (4) members to be appointed by the
President of the Philippines, which shall submit its recommendation to the
President. The Office of the Presidential Assistant for Legal Affairs shall serve as
the Secretariat of the Appeals Committee.
The decision of the President of the Philippines on any appealed matter shall be
final.
Implementing Rules and Regulations
Sec 11. Review by Sub-Committee of Three. a) A proper application having
been filed, the Chairman of the Board shall, as the exigencies of the service may
permit, designate a Sub-Committee of at least three Board Members who shall
meet, with notice to the applicant, within ten days from receipt of the completed
application. The Sub-Committee shall then preview the motion picture subject of
the application.
b) Immediately after the preview, the applicant or his representative shall
withdraw to await the results of the deliberation of the Sub-Committee. After
reaching a decision, the Sub-Committee shall summon the applicant or his
representative and inform him of its decision giving him an opportunity either to
request reconsideration or to offer certain cuts or deletions in exchange for a
better classification. The decision shall be in writing, stating, in case of
disapproval of the film or denial of the classification rating desired or both, the
reason or reasons for such disapproval or denial and the classification considered
by the Sub-Committee member dissenting from the majority opinion may express
his dissent in writing.
c) The decision including the dissenting opinion, if any, shall immediately be
submitted to the Chairman of the Board for transmission to the applicant.
Sec 12. Review by Sub-Committee of Five. Within five days from receipt of a
copy of the decision of the Sub-Committee referred to in the preceding section,
the applicant may file a motion for reconsideration in writing of that decision. On
receipt of the motion, the Chairman of the Board shall designate a Sub-Committee
of Five Board Members which shall consider the motion and, within five days of
receipt of such motion, conduct a second preview of the film. The review shall, to
the extent applicable, follow the same procedure provided in the preceding
section.
Sec 13. Reclassification. An applicant desiring a change in the classification
rating given his film by either the Sub-Committee of Three? or Committee of Five
mentioned in the immediately preceeding two sections may re-edit such film and
apply anew with the Board for its review and reclassification.
Sec 14. Appeal. The decision of the Committee of Five Board Members in the
second review shall be final, with the exception of a decision disapproving or
prohibiting a motion picture in its entirety which shall be appealable to the
President of the Philippines who may himself decide the appeal or refer it to the
Appeals Committee in the Office of the President for adjudication.
On the other hand, the powers and functions of the MTRCB Chairman are found in Section 5 of
the same decree as follows:
Sec. 5. Executive Officer. The Chairman of the BOARD shall be the Chief
Executive Officer of the BOARD. He shall exercise the following functions,
powers and duties:
(a) Execute, implement and enforce the decisions, orders, awards, rules and
regulations issued by the BOARD;
(b) Direct and supervise the operations and the internal affairs of the BOARD;
(c) Establish the internal organization and administrative procedures of the
BOARD, and recommend to the BOARD the appointment of the necessary
administrative and subordinate personnel; and
(d) Exercise such other powers and functions and perform such duties as are not
specifically lodged in the BOARD.
It is at once apparent from a reading of the above provisions of PD 1986 that respondent Morato,
as Chairman of the MTRCB, is not vested with any authority to reverse or overrule by himself
alone a decision rendered by a committee which conducted a review of motion pictures or
television programs.
The power to classify motion pictures into categories such as "General Patronage" or "For Adults
Only" is vested with the respondent Board itself and not with the Chairman thereof (Sec. 3 [e],
PD 1986). As Chief Executive Officer, respondent Morato's function as Chairman of the Board
calls for the implementation and execution, not modification or reversal, of the decisions or
orders of the latter (Sec. 5 [a], Ibid.). The power of classification having been reposed by law
exclusively with the respondent Board, it has no choice but to exercise the same as mandated by
law, i.e., as a collegial body, and not transfer it elsewhere or discharge said power through the
intervening mind of another. Delegata potestas non potest delegari a delegated power cannot
be delegated. And since the act of classification involves an exercise of the Board's discretionary
power with more reason the Board cannot, by way of the assailed resolution, delegate said power
for it is an established rule in administrative law that discretionary authority cannot be a subject
of delegation.
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is GRANTED. Resolution Nos. 10-89 and 88-1-25 issued by
the respondent Board are hereby declared null and void.
SO ORDERED.
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-63915 April 24, 1985
LORENZO M. TAADA, ABRAHAM F. SARMIENTO, and MOVEMENT OF
ATTORNEYS FOR BROTHERHOOD, INTEGRITY AND NATIONALISM, INC.
[MABINI], petitioners,
vs.
HON. JUAN C. TUVERA, in his capacity as Executive Assistant to the President, HON.
JOAQUIN VENUS, in his capacity as Deputy Executive Assistant to the President ,
MELQUIADES P. DE LA CRUZ, in his capacity as Director, Malacaang Records Office,

and FLORENDO S. PABLO, in his capacity as Director, Bureau of Printing, respondents.
ESCOLIN, J.:
Invoking the people's right to be informed on matters of public concern, a right recognized in
Section 6, Article IV of the 1973 Philippine Constitution, 1 as well as the principle that laws to be
valid and enforceable must be published in the Official Gazette or otherwise effectively
promulgated, petitioners seek a writ of mandamus to compel respondent public officials to
publish, and/or cause the publication in the Official Gazette of various presidential decrees,
letters of instructions, general orders, proclamations, executive orders, letter of implementation
and administrative orders.
Specifically, the publication of the following presidential issuances is sought:
a] Presidential Decrees Nos. 12, 22, 37, 38, 59, 64, 103, 171, 179, 184, 197, 200,
234, 265, 286, 298, 303, 312, 324, 325, 326, 337, 355, 358, 359, 360, 361, 368,
404, 406, 415, 427, 429, 445, 447, 473, 486, 491, 503, 504, 521, 528, 551, 566,
573, 574, 594, 599, 644, 658, 661, 718, 731, 733, 793, 800, 802, 835, 836, 923,
935, 961, 1017-1030, 1050, 1060-1061, 1085, 1143, 1165, 1166, 1242, 1246,
1250, 1278, 1279, 1300, 1644, 1772, 1808, 1810, 1813-1817, 1819-1826, 18291840, 1842-1847.
b] Letter of Instructions Nos.: 10, 39, 49, 72, 107, 108, 116, 130, 136, 141, 150,
153, 155, 161, 173, 180, 187, 188, 192, 193, 199, 202, 204, 205, 209, 211-213,
215-224, 226-228, 231-239, 241-245, 248, 251, 253-261, 263-269, 271-273, 275283, 285-289, 291, 293, 297-299, 301-303, 309, 312-315, 325, 327, 343, 346,
349, 357, 358, 362, 367, 370, 382, 385, 386, 396-397, 405, 438-440, 444- 445,
473, 486, 488, 498, 501, 399, 527, 561, 576, 587, 594, 599, 600, 602, 609, 610,
611, 612, 615, 641, 642, 665, 702, 712-713, 726, 837-839, 878-879, 881, 882,
939-940, 964,997,1149-1178,1180-1278.
c] General Orders Nos.: 14, 52, 58, 59, 60, 62, 63, 64 & 65.
d] Proclamation Nos.: 1126, 1144, 1147, 1151, 1196, 1270, 1281, 1319-1526,
1529, 1532, 1535, 1538, 1540-1547, 1550-1558, 1561-1588, 1590-1595, 15941600, 1606-1609, 1612-1628, 1630-1649, 1694-1695, 1697-1701, 1705-1723,
1731-1734, 1737-1742, 1744, 1746-1751, 1752, 1754, 1762, 1764-1787, 17891795, 1797, 1800, 1802-1804, 1806-1807, 1812-1814, 1816, 1825-1826, 1829,
1831-1832, 1835-1836, 1839-1840, 1843-1844, 1846-1847, 1849, 1853-1858,
1860, 1866, 1868, 1870, 1876-1889, 1892, 1900, 1918, 1923, 1933, 1952, 1963,
1965-1966, 1968-1984, 1986-2028, 2030-2044, 2046-2145, 2147-2161, 21632244.
e] Executive Orders Nos.: 411, 413, 414, 427, 429-454, 457- 471, 474-492, 494507, 509-510, 522, 524-528, 531-532, 536, 538, 543-544, 549, 551-553, 560, 563,
567-568, 570, 574, 593, 594, 598-604, 609, 611- 647, 649-677, 679-703, 705-707,
712-786, 788-852, 854-857.
f] Letters of Implementation Nos.: 7, 8, 9, 10, 11-22, 25-27, 39, 50, 51, 59, 76, 8081, 92, 94, 95, 107, 120, 122, 123.
g] Administrative Orders Nos.: 347, 348, 352-354, 360- 378, 380-433, 436-439.
The respondents, through the Solicitor General, would have this case dismissed outright on the
ground that petitioners have no legal personality or standing to bring the instant petition. The
view is submitted that in the absence of any showing that petitioners are personally and directly
affected or prejudiced by the alleged non-publication of the presidential issuances in
question 2 said petitioners are without the requisite legal personality to institute this mandamus
proceeding, they are not being "aggrieved parties" within the meaning of Section 3, Rule 65 of
the Rules of Court, which we quote:
SEC. 3. Petition for Mandamus.When any tribunal, corporation, board or
person unlawfully neglects the performance of an act which the law specifically
enjoins as a duty resulting from an office, trust, or station, or unlawfully excludes
another from the use a rd enjoyment of a right or office to which such other is
entitled, and there is no other plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary
course of law, the person aggrieved thereby may file a verified petition in the
proper court alleging the facts with certainty and praying that judgment be
rendered commanding the defendant, immediately or at some other specified time,
to do the act required to be done to Protect the rights of the petitioner, and to pay
the damages sustained by the petitioner by reason of the wrongful acts of the
defendant.
Upon the other hand, petitioners maintain that since the subject of the petition concerns a public
right and its object is to compel the performance of a public duty, they need not show any
specific interest for their petition to be given due course.
The issue posed is not one of first impression. As early as the 1910 case of Severino vs.
Governor General, 3 this Court held that while the general rule is that "a writ of mandamus
would be granted to a private individual only in those cases where he has some private or
particular interest to be subserved, or some particular right to be protected, independent of that
which he holds with the public at large," and "it is for the public officers exclusively to apply for
the writ when public rights are to be subserved [Mithchell vs. Boardmen, 79 M.e., 469],"
nevertheless, "when the question is one of public right and the object of the mandamus is to
procure the enforcement of a public duty, the people are regarded as the real party in interest and
the relator at whose instigation the proceedings are instituted need not show that he has any legal
or special interest in the result, it being sufficient to show that he is a citizen and as such
interested in the execution of the laws [High, Extraordinary Legal Remedies, 3rd ed., sec. 431].
Thus, in said case, this Court recognized the relator Lope Severino, a private individual, as a
proper party to the mandamus proceedings brought to compel the Governor General to call a
special election for the position of municipal president in the town of Silay, Negros Occidental.
Speaking for this Court, Mr. Justice Grant T. Trent said:
We are therefore of the opinion that the weight of authority supports the
proposition that the relator is a proper party to proceedings of this character when
a public right is sought to be enforced. If the general rule in America were
otherwise, we think that it would not be applicable to the case at bar for the reason
'that it is always dangerous to apply a general rule to a particular case without
keeping in mind the reason for the rule, because, if under the particular
circumstances the reason for the rule does not exist, the rule itself is not
applicable and reliance upon the rule may well lead to error'
No reason exists in the case at bar for applying the general rule insisted upon by
counsel for the respondent. The circumstances which surround this case are
different from those in the United States, inasmuch as if the relator is not a proper
party to these proceedings no other person could be, as we have seen that it is not
the duty of the law officer of the Government to appear and represent the people
in cases of this character.
The reasons given by the Court in recognizing a private citizen's legal personality in the
aforementioned case apply squarely to the present petition. Clearly, the right sought to be
enforced by petitioners herein is a public right recognized by no less than the fundamental law of
the land. If petitioners were not allowed to institute this proceeding, it would indeed be difficult
to conceive of any other person to initiate the same, considering that the Solicitor General, the
government officer generally empowered to represent the people, has entered his appearance for
respondents in this case.
Respondents further contend that publication in the Official Gazette is not a sine qua non
requirement for the effectivity of laws where the laws themselves provide for their own
effectivity dates. It is thus submitted that since the presidential issuances in question contain
special provisions as to the date they are to take effect, publication in the Official Gazette is not
indispensable for their effectivity. The point stressed is anchored on Article 2 of the Civil Code:
Art. 2. Laws shall take effect after fifteen days following the completion of their
publication in the Official Gazette, unless it is otherwise provided, ...
The interpretation given by respondent is in accord with this Court's construction of said article.
In a long line of decisions, 4 this Court has ruled that publication in the Official Gazette is
necessary in those cases where the legislation itself does not provide for its effectivity date-for
then the date of publication is material for determining its date of effectivity, which is the
fifteenth day following its publication-but not when the law itself provides for the date when it
goes into effect.
Respondents' argument, however, is logically correct only insofar as it equates the effectivity of
laws with the fact of publication. Considered in the light of other statutes applicable to the issue
at hand, the conclusion is easily reached that said Article 2 does not preclude the requirement of
publication in the Official Gazette, even if the law itself provides for the date of its effectivity.
Thus, Section 1 of Commonwealth Act 638 provides as follows:
Section 1. There shall be published in the Official Gazette [1] all important
legisiative acts and resolutions of a public nature of the, Congress of the
Philippines; [2] all executive and administrative orders and proclamations, except
such as have no general applicability; [3] decisions or abstracts of decisions of the
Supreme Court and the Court of Appeals as may be deemed by said courts of
sufficient importance to be so published; [4] such documents or classes of
documents as may be required so to be published by law; and [5] such documents
or classes of documents as the President of the Philippines shall determine from
time to time to have general applicability and legal effect, or which he may
authorize so to be published. ...
The clear object of the above-quoted provision is to give the general public adequate notice of
the various laws which are to regulate their actions and conduct as citizens. Without such notice
and publication, there would be no basis for the application of the maxim "ignorantia legis non
excusat." It would be the height of injustice to punish or otherwise burden a citizen for the
transgression of a law of which he had no notice whatsoever, not even a constructive one.
Perhaps at no time since the establishment of the Philippine Republic has the publication of laws
taken so vital significance that at this time when the people have bestowed upon the President a
power heretofore enjoyed solely by the legislature. While the people are kept abreast by the mass
media of the debates and deliberations in the Batasan Pambansaand for the diligent ones,
ready access to the legislative recordsno such publicity accompanies the law-making process
of the President. Thus, without publication, the people have no means of knowing what
presidential decrees have actually been promulgated, much less a definite way of informing
themselves of the specific contents and texts of such decrees. As the Supreme Court of Spain
ruled: "Bajo la denominacion generica de leyes, se comprenden tambien los reglamentos, Reales
decretos, Instrucciones, Circulares y Reales ordines dictadas de conformidad con las mismas por
el Gobierno en uso de su potestad. 5
The very first clause of Section I of Commonwealth Act 638 reads: "There shall be published in
the Official Gazette ... ." The word "shall" used therein imposes upon respondent officials an
imperative duty. That duty must be enforced if the Constitutional right of the people to be
informed on matters of public concern is to be given substance and reality. The law itself makes
a list of what should be published in the Official Gazette. Such listing, to our mind, leaves
respondents with no discretion whatsoever as to what must be included or excluded from such
publication.
The publication of all presidential issuances "of a public nature" or "of general applicability" is
mandated by law. Obviously, presidential decrees that provide for fines, forfeitures or penalties
for their violation or otherwise impose a burden or. the people, such as tax and revenue
measures, fall within this category. Other presidential issuances which apply only to particular
persons or class of persons such as administrative and executive orders need not be published on
the assumption that they have been circularized to all concerned. 6
It is needless to add that the publication of presidential issuances "of a public nature" or "of
general applicability" is a requirement of due process. It is a rule of law that before a person may
be bound by law, he must first be officially and specifically informed of its contents. As Justice
Claudio Teehankee said in Peralta vs. COMELEC 7:
In a time of proliferating decrees, orders and letters of instructions which all form
part of the law of the land, the requirement of due process and the Rule of Law
demand that the Official Gazette as the official government repository promulgate
and publish the texts of all such decrees, orders and instructions so that the people
may know where to obtain their official and specific contents.
The Court therefore declares that presidential issuances of general application, which have not
been published, shall have no force and effect. Some members of the Court, quite apprehensive
about the possible unsettling effect this decision might have on acts done in reliance of the
validity of those presidential decrees which were published only during the pendency of this
petition, have put the question as to whether the Court's declaration of invalidity apply to P.D.s
which had been enforced or implemented prior to their publication. The answer is all too
familiar. In similar situations in the past this Court had taken the pragmatic and realistic course
set forth in Chicot County Drainage District vs. Baxter Bank 8 to wit:
The courts below have proceeded on the theory that the Act of Congress, having
been found to be unconstitutional, was not a law; that it was inoperative,
conferring no rights and imposing no duties, and hence affording no basis for the
challenged decree. Norton v. Shelby County, 118 U.S. 425, 442; Chicago, 1. & L.
Ry. Co. v. Hackett, 228 U.S. 559, 566. It is quite clear, however, that such broad
statements as to the effect of a determination of unconstitutionality must be taken
with qualifications. The actual existence of a statute, prior to such a
determination, is an operative fact and may have consequences which cannot
justly be ignored. The past cannot always be erased by a new judicial declaration.
The effect of the subsequent ruling as to invalidity may have to be considered in
various aspects-with respect to particular conduct, private and official. Questions
of rights claimed to have become vested, of status, of prior determinations
deemed to have finality and acted upon accordingly, of public policy in the light
of the nature both of the statute and of its previous application, demand
examination. These questions are among the most difficult of those which have
engaged the attention of courts, state and federal and it is manifest from numerous
decisions that an all-inclusive statement of a principle of absolute retroactive
invalidity cannot be justified.
Consistently with the above principle, this Court in Rutter vs. Esteban 9 sustained the right of a
party under the Moratorium Law, albeit said right had accrued in his favor before said law was
declared unconstitutional by this Court.
Similarly, the implementation/enforcement of presidential decrees prior to their publication in the
Official Gazette is "an operative fact which may have consequences which cannot be justly
ignored. The past cannot always be erased by a new judicial declaration ... that an all-inclusive
statement of a principle of absolute retroactive invalidity cannot be justified."
From the report submitted to the Court by the Clerk of Court, it appears that of the presidential
decrees sought by petitioners to be published in the Official Gazette, only Presidential Decrees
Nos. 1019 to 1030, inclusive, 1278, and 1937 to 1939, inclusive, have not been so
published. 10 Neither the subject matters nor the texts of these PDs can be ascertained since no
copies thereof are available. But whatever their subject matter may be, it is undisputed that none
of these unpublished PDs has ever been implemented or enforced by the government. In Pesigan
vs. Angeles, 11 the Court, through Justice Ramon Aquino, ruled that "publication is necessary to
apprise the public of the contents of [penal] regulations and make the said penalties binding on
the persons affected thereby. " The cogency of this holding is apparently recognized by
respondent officials considering the manifestation in their comment that "the government, as a
matter of policy, refrains from prosecuting violations of criminal laws until the same shall have
been published in the Official Gazette or in some other publication, even though some criminal
laws provide that they shall take effect immediately.
WHEREFORE, the Court hereby orders respondents to publish in the Official Gazette all
unpublished presidential issuances which are of general application, and unless so published,
they shall have no binding force and effect.
SO ORDERED.
Separate Opinions
FERNANDO, C.J., concurring (with qualification):

There is on the whole acceptance on my part of the views expressed in the ably written opinion
of Justice Escolin. I am unable, however, to concur insofar as it would unqualifiedly impose the
requirement of publication in the Official Gazette for unpublished "presidential issuances" to
have binding force and effect.
I shall explain why.
1. It is of course true that without the requisite publication, a due process question would arise if
made to apply adversely to a party who is not even aware of the existence of any legislative or
executive act having the force and effect of law. My point is that such publication required need
not be confined to the Official Gazette. From the pragmatic standpoint, there is an advantage to
be gained. It conduces to certainty. That is too be admitted. It does not follow, however, that
failure to do so would in all cases and under all circumstances result in a statute, presidential
decree or any other executive act of the same category being bereft of any binding force and
effect. To so hold would, for me, raise a constitutional question. Such a pronouncement would
lend itself to the interpretation that such a legislative or presidential act is bereft of the attribute
of effectivity unless published in the Official Gazette. There is no such requirement in the
Constitution as Justice Plana so aptly pointed out. It is true that what is decided now applies only
to past "presidential issuances". Nonetheless, this clarification is, to my mind, needed to avoid
any possible misconception as to what is required for any statute or presidential act to be
impressed with binding force or effectivity.
2. It is quite understandable then why I concur in the separate opinion of Justice Plana. Its first
paragraph sets forth what to me is the constitutional doctrine applicable to this case. Thus: "The
Philippine Constitution does not require the publication of laws as a prerequisite for their
effectivity, unlike some Constitutions elsewhere. It may be said though that the guarantee of due
process requires notice of laws to affected Parties before they can be bound thereby; but such
notice is not necessarily by publication in the Official Gazette. The due process clause is not that
precise. 1 I am likewise in agreement with its closing paragraph: "In fine, I concur in the majority
decision to the extent that it requires notice before laws become effective, for no person should
be bound by a law without notice. This is elementary fairness. However, I beg to disagree insofar
as it holds that such notice shall be by publication in the Official Gazette. 2
3. It suffices, as was stated by Judge Learned Hand, that law as the command of the government
"must be ascertainable in some form if it is to be enforced at all. 3 It would indeed be to reduce it
to the level of mere futility, as pointed out by Justice Cardozo, "if it is unknown and
unknowable. 4 Publication, to repeat, is thus essential. What I am not prepared to subscribe to is
the doctrine that it must be in the Official Gazette. To be sure once published therein there is the
ascertainable mode of determining the exact date of its effectivity. Still for me that does not
dispose of the question of what is the jural effect of past presidential decrees or executive acts
not so published. For prior thereto, it could be that parties aware of their existence could have
conducted themselves in accordance with their provisions. If no legal consequences could attach
due to lack of publication in the Official Gazette, then serious problems could arise. Previous
transactions based on such "Presidential Issuances" could be open to question. Matters deemed
settled could still be inquired into. I am not prepared to hold that such an effect is contemplated
by our decision. Where such presidential decree or executive act is made the basis of a criminal
prosecution, then, of course, its ex post facto character becomes evident. 5 In civil cases though,
retroactivity as such is not conclusive on the due process aspect. There must still be a showing of
arbitrariness. Moreover, where the challenged presidential decree or executive act was issued
under the police power, the non-impairment clause of the Constitution may not always be
successfully invoked. There must still be that process of balancing to determine whether or not it
could in such a case be tainted by infirmity. 6 In traditional terminology, there could arise then a
question of unconstitutional application. That is as far as it goes.
4. Let me make therefore that my qualified concurrence goes no further than to affirm that
publication is essential to the effectivity of a legislative or executive act of a general application.
I am not in agreement with the view that such publication must be in the Official Gazette. The
Civil Code itself in its Article 2 expressly recognizes that the rule as to laws taking effect after
fifteen days following the completion of their publication in the Official Gazette is subject to this
exception, "unless it is otherwise provided." Moreover, the Civil Code is itself only a legislative
enactment, Republic Act No. 386. It does not and cannot have the juridical force of a
constitutional command. A later legislative or executive act which has the force and effect of law
can legally provide for a different rule.
5. Nor can I agree with the rather sweeping conclusion in the opinion of Justice Escolin that
presidential decrees and executive acts not thus previously published in the Official Gazette
would be devoid of any legal character. That would be, in my opinion, to go too far. It may be
fraught, as earlier noted, with undesirable consequences. I find myself therefore unable to yield
assent to such a pronouncement.
I am authorized to state that Justices Makasiar, Abad Santos, Cuevas, and Alampay concur in this
separate opinion.
Makasiar, Abad Santos, Cuevas and Alampay, JJ., concur.
TEEHANKEE, J., concurring:
I concur with the main opinion of Mr. Justice Escolin and the concurring opinion of Mme.
Justice Herrera. The Rule of Law connotes a body of norms and laws published and ascertainable
and of equal application to all similarly circumstances and not subject to arbitrary change but
only under certain set procedures. The Court has consistently stressed that "it is an elementary
rule of fair play and justice that a reasonable opportunity to be informed must be afforded to the
people who are commanded to obey before they can be punished for its violation, 1 citing the
settled principle based on due process enunciated in earlier cases that "before the public is bound
by its contents, especially its penal provisions, a law, regulation or circular must first be
published and the people officially and specially informed of said contents and its penalties.
Without official publication in the Official Gazette as required by Article 2 of the Civil Code and
the Revised Administrative Code, there would be no basis nor justification for the corollary rule
of Article 3 of the Civil Code (based on constructive notice that the provisions of the law are
ascertainable from the public and official repository where they are duly published) that
"Ignorance of the law excuses no one from compliance therewith.
Respondents' contention based on a misreading of Article 2 of the Civil Code that "only laws
which are silent as to their effectivity [date] need be published in the Official Gazette for their
effectivity" is manifestly untenable. The plain text and meaning of the Civil Code is that "laws
shall take effect after fifteen days following the completion of their publication in the Official
Gazette, unless it is otherwise provided, " i.e. a different effectivity date is provided by the law
itself. This proviso perforce refers to a law that has been duly published pursuant to the basic
constitutional requirements of due process. The best example of this is the Civil Code itself: the
same Article 2 provides otherwise that it "shall take effect [only] one year [not 15 days] after
such publication. 2 To sustain respondents' misreading that "most laws or decrees specify the date
of their effectivity and for this reason, publication in the Official Gazette is not necessary for
their effectivity 3 would be to nullify and render nugatory the Civil Code's indispensable and
essential requirement of prior publication in the Official Gazette by the simple expedient of
providing for immediate effectivity or an earlier effectivity date in the law itself before the
completion of 15 days following its publication which is the period generally fixed by the Civil
Code for its proper dissemination.
MELENCIO-HERRERA, J., concurring:
I agree. There cannot be any question but that even if a decree provides for a date of effectivity, it
has to be published. What I would like to state in connection with that proposition is that when a
date of effectivity is mentioned in the decree but the decree becomes effective only fifteen (15)
days after its publication in the Official Gazette, it will not mean that the decree can have
retroactive effect to the date of effectivity mentioned in the decree itself. There should be no
retroactivity if the retroactivity will run counter to constitutional rights or shall destroy vested
rights.
PLANA, J., concurring (with qualification):

The Philippine Constitution does not require the publication of laws as a prerequisite for their
effectivity, unlike some Constitutions elsewhere. * It may be said though that the guarantee of
due process requires notice of laws to affected parties before they can be bound thereby; but such
precise. Neither is the publication of laws in the Official Gazette required by any statute as a
prerequisite for their effectivity, if said laws already provide for their effectivity date.
Article 2 of the Civil Code provides that "laws shall take effect after fifteen days following the
completion of their publication in the Official Gazette, unless it is otherwise provided " Two
things may be said of this provision: Firstly, it obviously does not apply to a law with a built-in
provision as to when it will take effect. Secondly, it clearly recognizes that each law may provide
not only a different period for reckoning its effectivity date but also a different mode of notice.
Thus, a law may prescribe that it shall be published elsewhere than in the Official Gazette.
Commonwealth Act No. 638, in my opinion, does not support the proposition that for their
effectivity, laws must be published in the Official Gazette. The said law is simply "An Act to
Provide for the Uniform Publication and Distribution of the Official Gazette." Conformably
therewith, it authorizes the publication of the Official Gazette, determines its frequency, provides
for its sale and distribution, and defines the authority of the Director of Printing in relation
thereto. It also enumerates what shall be published in the Official Gazette, among them,
"important legislative acts and resolutions of a public nature of the Congress of the Philippines"
and "all executive and administrative orders and proclamations, except such as have no general
applicability." It is noteworthy that not all legislative acts are required to be published in the
Official Gazette but only "important" ones "of a public nature." Moreover, the said law does not
provide that publication in the Official Gazette is essential for the effectivity of laws. This is as it
should be, for all statutes are equal and stand on the same footing. A law, especially an earlier
one of general application such as Commonwealth Act No. 638, cannot nullify or restrict the
operation of a subsequent statute that has a provision of its own as to when and how it will take
effect. Only a higher law, which is the Constitution, can assume that role.
In fine, I concur in the majority decision to the extent that it requires notice before laws become
effective, for no person should be bound by a law without notice. This is elementary fairness.
However, I beg to disagree insofar as it holds that such notice shall be by publication in the
Official Gazette.
Cuevas and Alampay, JJ., concur.
GUTIERREZ, Jr., J., concurring:
I concur insofar as publication is necessary but reserve my vote as to the necessity of such
publication being in the Official Gazette.
DE LA FUENTE, J., concurring:
I concur insofar as the opinion declares the unpublished decrees and issuances of a public nature
or general applicability ineffective, until due publication thereof.
Separate Opinions
FERNANDO, C.J., concurring (with qualification):
There is on the whole acceptance on my part of the views expressed in the ably written opinion
of Justice Escolin. I am unable, however, to concur insofar as it would unqualifiedly impose the
requirement of publication in the Official Gazette for unpublished "presidential issuances" to
have binding force and effect.
I shall explain why.
1. It is of course true that without the requisite publication, a due process question would arise if
made to apply adversely to a party who is not even aware of the existence of any legislative or
executive act having the force and effect of law. My point is that such publication required need
not be confined to the Official Gazette. From the pragmatic standpoint, there is an advantage to
be gained. It conduces to certainty. That is too be admitted. It does not follow, however, that
failure to do so would in all cases and under all circumstances result in a statute, presidential
decree or any other executive act of the same category being bereft of any binding force and
effect. To so hold would, for me, raise a constitutional question. Such a pronouncement would
lend itself to the interpretation that such a legislative or presidential act is bereft of the attribute
of effectivity unless published in the Official Gazette. There is no such requirement in the
Constitution as Justice Plana so aptly pointed out. It is true that what is decided now applies only
to past "presidential issuances". Nonetheless, this clarification is, to my mind, needed to avoid
any possible misconception as to what is required for any statute or presidential act to be
impressed with binding force or effectivity.
2. It is quite understandable then why I concur in the separate opinion of Justice Plana. Its first
paragraph sets forth what to me is the constitutional doctrine applicable to this case. Thus: "The
Philippine Constitution does not require the publication of laws as a prerequisite for their
effectivity, unlike some Constitutions elsewhere. It may be said though that the guarantee of due
process requires notice of laws to affected Parties before they can be bound thereby; but such
precise. 1 I am likewise in agreement with its closing paragraph: "In fine, I concur in the majority
decision to the extent that it requires notice before laws become effective, for no person should
be bound by a law without notice. This is elementary fairness. However, I beg to disagree insofar
as it holds that such notice shall be by publication in the Official Gazette. 2
3. It suffices, as was stated by Judge Learned Hand, that law as the command of the government
"must be ascertainable in some form if it is to be enforced at all. 3 It would indeed be to reduce it
to the level of mere futility, as pointed out by Justice Cardozo, "if it is unknown and
unknowable. 4 Publication, to repeat, is thus essential. What I am not prepared to subscribe to is
the doctrine that it must be in the Official Gazette. To be sure once published therein there is the
ascertainable mode of determining the exact date of its effectivity. Still for me that does not
dispose of the question of what is the jural effect of past presidential decrees or executive acts
not so published. For prior thereto, it could be that parties aware of their existence could have
conducted themselves in accordance with their provisions. If no legal consequences could attach
due to lack of publication in the Official Gazette, then serious problems could arise. Previous
transactions based on such "Presidential Issuances" could be open to question. Matters deemed
settled could still be inquired into. I am not prepared to hold that such an effect is contemplated
by our decision. Where such presidential decree or executive act is made the basis of a criminal
prosecution, then, of course, its ex post facto character becomes evident. 5 In civil cases though,
retroactivity as such is not conclusive on the due process aspect. There must still be a showing of
arbitrariness. Moreover, where the challenged presidential decree or executive act was issued
under the police power, the non-impairment clause of the Constitution may not always be
successfully invoked. There must still be that process of balancing to determine whether or not it
could in such a case be tainted by infirmity. 6 In traditional terminology, there could arise then a
question of unconstitutional application. That is as far as it goes.
4. Let me make therefore that my qualified concurrence goes no further than to affirm that
publication is essential to the effectivity of a legislative or executive act of a general application.
I am not in agreement with the view that such publication must be in the Official Gazette. The
Civil Code itself in its Article 2 expressly recognizes that the rule as to laws taking effect after
fifteen days following the completion of their publication in the Official Gazette is subject to this
exception, "unless it is otherwise provided." Moreover, the Civil Code is itself only a legislative
enactment, Republic Act No. 386. It does not and cannot have the juridical force of a
constitutional command. A later legislative or executive act which has the force and effect of law
can legally provide for a different rule.
5. Nor can I agree with the rather sweeping conclusion in the opinion of Justice Escolin that
presidential decrees and executive acts not thus previously published in the Official Gazette
would be devoid of any legal character. That would be, in my opinion, to go too far. It may be
fraught, as earlier noted, with undesirable consequences. I find myself therefore unable to yield
assent to such a pronouncement.
I am authorized to state that Justices Makasiar, Abad Santos, Cuevas, and Alampay concur in this
separate opinion.
Makasiar, Abad Santos, Cuevas and Alampay, JJ., concur.
TEEHANKEE, J., concurring:

I concur with the main opinion of Mr. Justice Escolin and the concurring opinion of Mme.
Justice Herrera. The Rule of Law connotes a body of norms and laws published and ascertainable
and of equal application to all similarly circumstances and not subject to arbitrary change but
only under certain set procedures. The Court has consistently stressed that "it is an elementary
rule of fair play and justice that a reasonable opportunity to be informed must be afforded to the
people who are commanded to obey before they can be punished for its violation, 1 citing the
settled principle based on due process enunciated in earlier cases that "before the public is bound
by its contents, especially its penal provisions, a law, regulation or circular must first be
published and the people officially and specially informed of said contents and its penalties.
Without official publication in the Official Gazette as required by Article 2 of the Civil Code and
the Revised Administrative Code, there would be no basis nor justification for the corollary rule
of Article 3 of the Civil Code (based on constructive notice that the provisions of the law are
ascertainable from the public and official repository where they are duly published) that
"Ignorance of the law excuses no one from compliance therewith.
Respondents' contention based on a misreading of Article 2 of the Civil Code that "only laws
which are silent as to their effectivity [date] need be published in the Official Gazette for their
effectivity" is manifestly untenable. The plain text and meaning of the Civil Code is that "laws
shall take effect after fifteen days following the completion of their publication in the Official
Gazette, unless it is otherwise provided, " i.e. a different effectivity date is provided by the law
itself. This proviso perforce refers to a law that has been duly published pursuant to the basic
constitutional requirements of due process. The best example of this is the Civil Code itself: the
same Article 2 provides otherwise that it "shall take effect [only] one year [not 15 days] after
such publication. 2 To sustain respondents' misreading that "most laws or decrees specify the date
of their effectivity and for this reason, publication in the Official Gazette is not necessary for
their effectivity 3 would be to nullify and render nugatory the Civil Code's indispensable and
essential requirement of prior publication in the Official Gazette by the simple expedient of
providing for immediate effectivity or an earlier effectivity date in the law itself before the
completion of 15 days following its publication which is the period generally fixed by the Civil
Code for its proper dissemination.
MELENCIO-HERRERA, J., concurring:

I agree. There cannot be any question but that even if a decree provides for a date of effectivity, it
has to be published. What I would like to state in connection with that proposition is that when a
date of effectivity is mentioned in the decree but the decree becomes effective only fifteen (15)
days after its publication in the Official Gazette, it will not mean that the decree can have
retroactive effect to the date of effectivity mentioned in the decree itself. There should be no
retroactivity if the retroactivity will run counter to constitutional rights or shall destroy vested
rights.
PLANA, J., concurring (with qualification):

The Philippine Constitution does not require the publication of laws as a prerequisite for their
effectivity, unlike some Constitutions elsewhere. * It may be said though that the guarantee of
due process requires notice of laws to affected parties before they can be bound thereby; but such
precise. Neither is the publication of laws in the Official Gazette required by any statute as a
prerequisite for their effectivity, if said laws already provide for their effectivity date.
Article 2 of the Civil Code provides that "laws shall take effect after fifteen days following the
completion of their publication in the Official Gazette, unless it is otherwise provided " Two
things may be said of this provision: Firstly, it obviously does not apply to a law with a built-in
provision as to when it will take effect. Secondly, it clearly recognizes that each law may provide
not only a different period for reckoning its effectivity date but also a different mode of notice.
Thus, a law may prescribe that it shall be published elsewhere than in the Official Gazette.
Commonwealth Act No. 638, in my opinion, does not support the proposition that for their
effectivity, laws must be published in the Official Gazette. The said law is simply "An Act to
Provide for the Uniform Publication and Distribution of the Official Gazette." Conformably
therewith, it authorizes the publication of the Official Gazette, determines its frequency, provides
for its sale and distribution, and defines the authority of the Director of Printing in relation
thereto. It also enumerates what shall be published in the Official Gazette, among them,
"important legislative acts and resolutions of a public nature of the Congress of the Philippines"
and "all executive and administrative orders and proclamations, except such as have no general
applicability." It is noteworthy that not all legislative acts are required to be published in the
Official Gazette but only "important" ones "of a public nature." Moreover, the said law does not
provide that publication in the Official Gazette is essential for the effectivity of laws. This is as it
should be, for all statutes are equal and stand on the same footing. A law, especially an earlier
one of general application such as Commonwealth Act No. 638, cannot nullify or restrict the
operation of a subsequent statute that has a provision of its own as to when and how it will take
effect. Only a higher law, which is the Constitution, can assume that role.
In fine, I concur in the majority decision to the extent that it requires notice before laws become
effective, for no person should be bound by a law without notice. This is elementary fairness.
However, I beg to disagree insofar as it holds that such notice shall be by publication in the
Official Gazette.
Cuevas and Alampay, JJ., concur.
GUTIERREZ, Jr., J., concurring:

I concur insofar as publication is necessary but reserve my vote as to the necessity of such
publication being in the Official Gazette.
DE LA FUENTE, J., concurring:

I concur insofar as the opinion declares the unpublished decrees and issuances of a public nature
or general applicability ineffective, until due publication thereof.

SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. 157870
November 3, 2008
SOCIAL JUSTICE SOCIETY (SJS), petitioner

vs.
DANGEROUS DRUGS BOARD and PHILIPPINE DRUG ENFORCEMENT AGENCY
(PDEA),respondents.
x-----------------------------------------------x
G.R. No. 158633
November 3, 2008
ATTY. MANUEL J. LASERNA, JR., petitioner

vs.
DANGEROUS DRUGS BOARD and PHILIPPINE DRUG ENFORCEMENT
AGENCY, respondents.
x-----------------------------------------------x
G.R. No. 161658
November 3, 2008
AQUILINO Q. PIMENTEL, JR., petitioner

vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, respondents.
DECISION
VELASCO, JR., J.:
In these kindred petitions, the constitutionality of Section 36 of Republic Act No. (RA) 9165,
otherwise known as the Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002, insofar as it requires
mandatory drug testing of candidates for public office, students of secondary and tertiary
schools, officers and employees of public and private offices, and persons charged before the
prosecutor's office with certain offenses, among other personalities, is put in issue.
As far as pertinent, the challenged section reads as follows:
SEC. 36. Authorized Drug Testing. - Authorized drug testing shall be done by any
government forensic laboratories or by any of the drug testing laboratories accredited and
monitored by the DOH to safeguard the quality of the test results. x x x The drug testing
shall employ, among others, two (2) testing methods, the screening test which will
determine the positive result as well as the type of drug used and the confirmatory test
which will confirm a positive screening test. x x x The following shall be subjected to
undergo drug testing:
xxxx
(c) Students of secondary and tertiary schools. - Students of secondary and tertiary
schools shall, pursuant to the related rules and regulations as contained in the school's
student handbook and with notice to the parents, undergo a random drug testing x x x;
(d) Officers and employees of public and private offices. - Officers and employees of
public and private offices, whether domestic or overseas, shall be subjected to undergo a
random drug test as contained in the company's work rules and regulations, x x x for
purposes of reducing the risk in the workplace. Any officer or employee found positive
for use of dangerous drugs shall be dealt with administratively which shall be a ground
for suspension or termination, subject to the provisions of Article 282 of the Labor Code
and pertinent provisions of the Civil Service Law;
xxxx
(f) All persons charged before the prosecutor's office with a criminal offense having an
imposable penalty of imprisonment of not less than six (6) years and one (1) day shall
undergo a mandatory drug test;
(g) All candidates for public office whether appointed or elected both in the national or
local government shall undergo a mandatory drug test.
In addition to the above stated penalties in this Section, those found to be positive for dangerous
drugs use shall be subject to the provisions of Section 15 of this Act.
G.R. No. 161658 (Aquilino Q. Pimentel, Jr. v. Commission on Elections)
On December 23, 2003, the Commission on Elections (COMELEC) issued Resolution No. 6486,
prescribing the rules and regulations on the mandatory drug testing of candidates for public
office in connection with the May 10, 2004 synchronized national and local elections. The
pertinent portions of the said resolution read as follows:
WHEREAS, Section 36 (g) of Republic Act No. 9165 provides:
SEC. 36. Authorized Drug Testing. - x x x
xxxx
(g) All candidates for public office x x x both in the national or local government shall
undergo a mandatory drug test.
WHEREAS, Section 1, Article XI of the 1987 Constitution provides that public officers
and employees must at all times be accountable to the people, serve them with utmost
responsibility, integrity, loyalty and efficiency;
WHEREAS, by requiring candidates to undergo mandatory drug test, the public will
know the quality of candidates they are electing and they will be assured that only those
who can serve with utmost responsibility, integrity, loyalty, and efficiency would be
elected x x x.
NOW THEREFORE, The [COMELEC], pursuant to the authority vested in it under the
Constitution, Batas Pambansa Blg. 881 (Omnibus Election Code), [RA] 9165 and other
election laws, RESOLVED to promulgate, as it hereby promulgates, the following rules
and regulations on the conduct of mandatory drug testing to candidates for public
office[:]
SECTION 1. Coverage. - All candidates for public office, both national and local, in
the May 10, 2004 Synchronized National and Local Elections shall undergo
mandatory drug test in government forensic laboratories or any drug testing laboratories
monitored and accredited by the Department of Health.
SEC. 3. x x x
On March 25, 2004, in addition to the drug certificates filed with their respective offices,
the Comelec Offices and employees concerned shall submit to the Law Department two
(2) separate lists of candidates. The first list shall consist of those candidates who
complied with the mandatory drug test while the second list shall consist of those
candidates who failed to comply x x x.
SEC. 4. Preparation and publication of names of candidates. - Before the start of the
campaign period, the [COMELEC] shall prepare two separate lists of candidates. The
first list shall consist of those candidates who complied with the mandatory drug test
while the second list shall consist of those candidates who failed to comply with said
drug test. x x x
SEC. 5. Effect of failure to undergo mandatory drug test and file drug test certificate. No person elected to any public office shall enter upon the duties of his office until he has
undergone mandatory drug test and filed with the offices enumerated under Section 2
hereof the drug test certificate herein required. (Emphasis supplied.)
Petitioner Aquilino Q. Pimentel, Jr., a senator of the Republic and a candidate for re - election in
the May 10, 2004 elections,1 filed a Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition under Rule 65. In it,
he seeks (1) to nullify Sec. 36(g) of RA 9165 and COMELEC Resolution No. 6486 dated
December 23, 2003 for being unconstitutional in that they impose a qualification for candidates
for senators in addition to those already provided for in the 1987 Constitution; and (2) to enjoin
the COMELEC from implementing Resolution No. 6486.
Pimentel invokes as legal basis for his petition Sec. 3, Article VI of the Constitution, which
states:
SECTION 3. No person shall be a Senator unless he is a natural - born citizen of the
Philippines, and, on the day of the election, is at least thirty - five years of age, able to
read and write, a registered voter, and a resident of the Philippines for not less than two
years immediately preceding the day of the election.
According to Pimentel, the Constitution only prescribes a maximum of five (5) qualifications for
one to be a candidate for, elected to, and be a member of the Senate. He says that both the
Congress and COMELEC, by requiring, via RA 9165 and Resolution No. 6486, a senatorial
aspirant, among other candidates, to undergo a mandatory drug test, create an additional
qualification that all candidates for senator must first be certified as drug free. He adds that there
is no provision in the Constitution authorizing the Congress or COMELEC to expand the
qualification requirements of candidates for senator.
G.R. No. 157870 (Social Justice Society v. Dangerous
Drugs Board and Philippine Drug Enforcement Agency)
In its Petition for Prohibition under Rule 65, petitioner Social Justice Society (SJS), a registered
political party, seeks to prohibit the Dangerous Drugs Board (DDB) and the Philippine Drug
Enforcement Agency (PDEA) from enforcing paragraphs (c), (d), (f), and (g) of Sec. 36 of RA
9165 on the ground that they are constitutionally infirm. For one, the provisions constitute undue
delegation of legislative power when they give unbridled discretion to schools and employers to
determine the manner of drug testing. For another, the provisions trench in the equal protection
clause inasmuch as they can be used to harass a student or an employee deemed undesirable. And
for a third, a person's constitutional right against unreasonable searches is also breached by said
provisions.
G.R. No. 158633 (Atty. Manuel J. Laserna, Jr. v. Dangerous
Drugs Board and Philippine Drug Enforcement Agency)
Petitioner Atty. Manuel J. Laserna, Jr., as citizen and taxpayer, also seeks in his Petition for
Certiorari and Prohibition under Rule 65 that Sec. 36(c), (d), (f), and (g) of RA 9165 be struck
down as unconstitutional for infringing on the constitutional right to privacy, the right against
unreasonable search and seizure, and the right against self - incrimination, and for being contrary
to the due process and equal protection guarantees.
The Issue on Locus Standi
First off, we shall address the justiciability of the cases at bench and the matter of the standing of
petitioners SJS and Laserna to sue. As respondents DDB and PDEA assert, SJS and Laserna
failed to allege any incident amounting to a violation of the constitutional rights mentioned in
their separate petitions.2
It is basic that the power of judicial review can only be exercised in connection with a bona
fidecontroversy which involves the statute sought to be reviewed. 3 But even with the presence of
an actual case or controversy, the Court may refuse to exercise judicial review unless the
constitutional question is brought before it by a party having the requisite standing to challenge
it.4 To have standing, one must establish that he or she has suffered some actual or threatened
injury as a result of the allegedly illegal conduct of the government; the injury is fairly traceable
to the challenged action; and the injury is likely to be redressed by a favorable action.5
The rule on standing, however, is a matter of procedure; hence, it can be relaxed for non traditional plaintiffs, like ordinary citizens, taxpayers, and legislators when the public interest so
requires, such as when the matter is of transcendental importance, of overarching significance to
society, or of paramount public interest. 6 There is no doubt that Pimentel, as senator of the
Philippines and candidate for the May 10, 2004 elections, possesses the requisite standing since
he has substantial interests in the subject matter of the petition, among other preliminary
considerations. Regarding SJS and Laserna, this Court is wont to relax the rule on locus
standi owing primarily to the transcendental importance and the paramount public interest
involved in the enforcement of Sec. 36 of RA 9165.
The Consolidated Issues
The principal issues before us are as follows:
(1) Do Sec. 36(g) of RA 9165 and COMELEC Resolution No. 6486 impose an additional
qualification for candidates for senator? Corollarily, can Congress enact a law prescribing
qualifications for candidates for senator in addition to those laid down by the Constitution? and
(2) Are paragraphs (c), (d), (f), and (g) of Sec. 36, RA 9165 unconstitutional? Specifically, do
these paragraphs violate the right to privacy, the right against unreasonable searches and seizure,
and the equal protection clause? Or do they constitute undue delegation of legislative power?
Pimentel Petition
(Constitutionality of Sec. 36[g] of RA 9165 and
COMELEC Resolution No. 6486)
In essence, Pimentel claims that Sec. 36(g) of RA 9165 and COMELEC Resolution No. 6486
illegally impose an additional qualification on candidates for senator. He points out that, subject
to the provisions on nuisance candidates, a candidate for senator needs only to meet the
qualifications laid down in Sec. 3, Art. VI of the Constitution, to wit: (1) citizenship, (2) voter
registration, (3) literacy, (4) age, and (5) residency. Beyond these stated qualification
requirements, candidates for senator need not possess any other qualification to run for senator
and be voted upon and elected as member of the Senate. The Congress cannot validly amend or
otherwise modify these qualification standards, as it cannot disregard, evade, or weaken the force
of a constitutional mandate,7 or alter or enlarge the Constitution.
Pimentel's contention is well - taken. Accordingly, Sec. 36(g) of RA 9165 should be, as it is
hereby declared as, unconstitutional. It is basic that if a law or an administrative rule violates any
norm of the Constitution, that issuance is null and void and has no effect. The Constitution is the
basic law to which all laws must conform; no act shall be valid if it conflicts with the
Constitution.8 In the discharge of their defined functions, the three departments of government
have no choice but to yield obedience to the commands of the Constitution. Whatever limits it
imposes must be observed.9
Congress' inherent legislative powers, broad as they may be, are subject to certain limitations. As
early as 1927, in Government v. Springer, the Court has defined, in the abstract, the limits on
legislative power in the following wise:
Someone has said that the powers of the legislative department of the Government, like
the boundaries of the ocean, are unlimited. In constitutional governments, however, as
well as governments acting under delegated authority, the powers of each of the
departments x x x are limited and confined within the four walls of the constitution or the
charter, and each department can only exercise such powers as are necessarily implied
from the given powers. The Constitution is the shore of legislative authority against
which the waves of legislative enactment may dash, but over which it cannot leap.10
Thus, legislative power remains limited in the sense that it is subject to substantive and
constitutional limitations which circumscribe both the exercise of the power itself and the
allowable subjects of legislation.11 The substantive constitutional limitations are chiefly found in
the Bill of Rights12 and other provisions, such as Sec. 3, Art. VI of the Constitution prescribing
the qualifications of candidates for senators.
In the same vein, the COMELEC cannot, in the guise of enforcing and administering election
laws or promulgating rules and regulations to implement Sec. 36(g), validly impose
qualifications on candidates for senator in addition to what the Constitution prescribes. If
Congress cannot require a candidate for senator to meet such additional qualification, the
COMELEC, to be sure, is also without such power. The right of a citizen in the democratic
process of election should not be defeated by unwarranted impositions of requirement not
otherwise specified in the Constitution.13
Sec. 36(g) of RA 9165, as sought to be implemented by the assailed COMELEC resolution,
effectively enlarges the qualification requirements enumerated in the Sec. 3, Art. VI of the
Constitution. As couched, said Sec. 36(g) unmistakably requires a candidate for senator to be
certified illegal - drug clean, obviously as a pre - condition to the validity of a certificate of
candidacy for senator or, with like effect, a condition sine qua non to be voted upon and, if
proper, be proclaimed as senator - elect. The COMELEC resolution completes the chain with the
proviso that "[n]o person elected to any public office shall enter upon the duties of his office until
he has undergone mandatory drug test." Viewed, therefore, in its proper context, Sec. 36(g) of
RA 9165 and the implementing COMELEC Resolution add another qualification layer to what
the 1987 Constitution, at the minimum, requires for membership in the Senate. Whether or not
the drug - free bar set up under the challenged provision is to be hurdled before or after election
is really of no moment, as getting elected would be of little value if one cannot assume office for
non - compliance with the drug - testing requirement.
It may of course be argued, in defense of the validity of Sec. 36(g) of RA 9165, that the provision
does not expressly state that non - compliance with the drug test imposition is a disqualifying
factor or would work to nullify a certificate of candidacy. This argument may be accorded
plausibility if the drug test requirement is optional. But the particular section of the law, without
exception, made drug - testing on those covered mandatory, necessarily suggesting that the
obstinate ones shall have to suffer the adverse consequences for not adhering to the statutory
command. And since the provision deals with candidates for public office, it stands to reason that
the adverse consequence adverted to can only refer to and revolve around the election and the
assumption of public office of the candidates. Any other construal would reduce the mandatory
nature of Sec. 36(g) of RA 9165 into a pure jargon without meaning and effect whatsoever.
While it is anti - climactic to state it at this juncture, COMELEC Resolution No. 6486 is no
longer enforceable, for by its terms, it was intended to cover only the May 10, 2004
synchronized elections and the candidates running in that electoral event. Nonetheless, to obviate
repetition, the Court deems it appropriate to review and rule, as it hereby rules, on its validity as
an implementing issuance.
It ought to be made abundantly clear, however, that the unconstitutionality of Sec. 36(g) of RA
9165 is rooted on its having infringed the constitutional provision defining the qualification or
eligibility requirements for one aspiring to run for and serve as senator.
SJS Petition
(Constitutionality of Sec. 36[c], [d], [f], and [g] of RA 9165)
The drug test prescribed under Sec. 36(c), (d), and (f) of RA 9165 for secondary and tertiary
level students and public and private employees, while mandatory, is a random and suspicionless
arrangement. The objective is to stamp out illegal drug and safeguard in the process "the well
being of [the] citizenry, particularly the youth, from the harmful effects of dangerous drugs."
This statutory purpose, per the policy - declaration portion of the law, can be achieved via the
pursuit by the state of "an intensive and unrelenting campaign against the trafficking and use of
dangerous drugs x x x through an integrated system of planning, implementation and
enforcement of anti - drug abuse policies, programs and projects." 14 The primary legislative
intent is not criminal prosecution, as those found positive for illegal drug use as a result of this
random testing are not necessarily treated as criminals. They may even be exempt from criminal
liability should the illegal drug user consent to undergo rehabilitation. Secs. 54 and 55 of RA
9165 are clear on this point:
Sec. 54. Voluntary Submission of a Drug Dependent to Confinement, Treatment and
Rehabilitation. - A drug dependent or any person who violates Section 15 of this Act may,
by himself/herself or through his/her parent, [close relatives] x x x apply to the Board x x
x for treatment and rehabilitation of the drug dependency. Upon such application, the
Board shall bring forth the matter to the Court which shall order that the applicant be
examined for drug dependency. If the examination x x x results in the certification that
the applicant is a drug dependent, he/she shall be ordered by the Court to undergo
treatment and rehabilitation in a Center designated by the Board x x x.
xxxx
Sec. 55. Exemption from the Criminal Liability Under the Voluntary Submission
Program. - A drug dependent under the voluntary submission program, who is finally
discharged from confinement, shall be exempt from the criminal liability under Section
15 of this Act subject to the following conditions:
xxxx
School children, the US Supreme Court noted, are most vulnerable to the physical,
psychological, and addictive effects of drugs. Maturing nervous systems of the young are more
critically impaired by intoxicants and are more inclined to drug dependency. Their recovery is
also at a depressingly low rate.15
The right to privacy has been accorded recognition in this jurisdiction as a facet of the right
protected by the guarantee against unreasonable search and seizure 16 under Sec. 2, Art. III17 of the
Constitution. But while the right to privacy has long come into its own, this case appears to be
the first time that the validity of a state - decreed search or intrusion through the medium of
mandatory random drug testing among students and employees is, in this jurisdiction, made the
focal point. Thus, the issue tendered in these proceedings is veritably one of first impression.
US jurisprudence is, however, a rich source of persuasive jurisprudence. With respect to random
drug testing among school children, we turn to the teachings of Vernonia School District 47J v.
Acton (Vernonia) and Board of Education of Independent School District No. 92 of
Pottawatomie County, et al. v. Earls, et al. (Board of Education),18 both fairly pertinent US
Supreme Court - decided cases involving the constitutionality of governmental search.
In Vernonia, school administrators in Vernonia, Oregon wanted to address the drug menace in
their respective institutions following the discovery of frequent drug use by school athletes. After
consultation with the parents, they required random urinalysis drug testing for the school's
athletes. James Acton, a high school student, was denied participation in the football program
after he refused to undertake the urinalysis drug testing. Acton forthwith sued, claiming that the
school's drug testing policy violated, inter alia, the Fourth Amendment19 of the US Constitution.
The US Supreme Court, in fashioning a solution to the issues raised in Vernonia, considered the
following: (1) schools stand in loco parentis over their students; (2) school children, while not
shedding their constitutional rights at the school gate, have less privacy rights; (3) athletes have
less privacy rights than non - athletes since the former observe communal undress before and
after sports events; (4) by joining the sports activity, the athletes voluntarily subjected themselves
to a higher degree of school supervision and regulation; (5) requiring urine samples does not
invade a student's privacy since a student need not undress for this kind of drug testing; and (6)
there is need for the drug testing because of the dangerous effects of illegal drugs on the young.
The US Supreme Court held that the policy constituted reasonable search under the Fourth 20 and
14th Amendments and declared the random drug - testing policy constitutional.
In Board of Education, the Board of Education of a school in Tecumseh, Oklahoma required a
drug test for high school students desiring to join extra - curricular activities. Lindsay Earls, a
member of the show choir, marching band, and academic team declined to undergo a drug test
and averred that the drug - testing policy made to apply to non - athletes violated the Fourth and
14th Amendments. As Earls argued, unlike athletes who routinely undergo physical examinations
and undress before their peers in locker rooms, non - athletes are entitled to more privacy.
The US Supreme Court, citing Vernonia, upheld the constitutionality of drug testing even among
non - athletes on the basis of the school's custodial responsibility and authority. In so ruling, said
court made no distinction between a non - athlete and an athlete. It ratiocinated that schools and
teachers act in place of the parents with a similar interest and duty of safeguarding the health of
the students. And in holding that the school could implement its random drug - testing policy, the
Court hinted that such a test was a kind of search in which even a reasonable parent might need
to engage.
In sum, what can reasonably be deduced from the above two cases and applied to this
jurisdiction are: (1) schools and their administrators stand in loco parentis with respect to their
students; (2) minor students have contextually fewer rights than an adult, and are subject to the
custody and supervision of their parents, guardians, and schools; (3) schools, acting in loco
parentis, have a duty to safeguard the health and well - being of their students and may adopt
such measures as may reasonably be necessary to discharge such duty; and (4) schools have the
right to impose conditions on applicants for admission that are fair, just, and non-discriminatory.
Guided by Vernonia and Board of Education, the Court is of the view and so holds that the
provisions of RA 9165 requiring mandatory, random, and suspicionless drug testing of students
are constitutional. Indeed, it is within the prerogative of educational institutions to require, as a
condition for admission, compliance with reasonable school rules and regulations and policies.
To be sure, the right to enroll is not absolute; it is subject to fair, reasonable, and equitable
requirements.
The Court can take judicial notice of the proliferation of prohibited drugs in the country that
threatens the well - being of the people,21 particularly the youth and school children who usually
end up as victims. Accordingly, and until a more effective method is conceptualized and put in
motion, a random drug testing of students in secondary and tertiary schools is not only
acceptable but may even be necessary if the safety and interest of the student population,
doubtless a legitimate concern of the government, are to be promoted and protected. To borrow
from Vernonia, "[d]eterring drug use by our Nation's schoolchildren is as important as enhancing
efficient enforcement of the Nation's laws against the importation of drugs"; the necessity for the
State to act is magnified by the fact that the effects of a drug - infested school are visited not just
upon the users, but upon the entire student body and faculty.22 Needless to stress, the random
testing scheme provided under the law argues against the idea that the testing aims to incriminate
unsuspecting individual students.
Just as in the case of secondary and tertiary level students, the mandatory but random drug test
prescribed by Sec. 36 of RA 9165 for officers and employees of public and private offices is
justifiable, albeit not exactly for the same reason. The Court notes in this regard that petitioner
SJS, other than saying that "subjecting almost everybody to drug testing, without probable cause,
is unreasonable, an unwarranted intrusion of the individual right to privacy," 23 has failed to show
how the mandatory, random, and suspicionless drug testing under Sec. 36(c) and (d) of RA 9165
violates the right to privacy and constitutes unlawful and/or unconsented search under Art. III,
Secs. 1 and 2 of the Constitution.24 Petitioner Laserna's lament is just as simplistic, sweeping, and
gratuitous and does not merit serious consideration. Consider what he wrote without elaboration:
The US Supreme Court and US Circuit Courts of Appeals have made various rulings on
the constitutionality of mandatory drug tests in the school and the workplaces. The US
courts have been consistent in their rulings that the mandatory drug tests violate a
citizen's constitutional right to privacy and right against unreasonable search and seizure.
They are quoted extensively hereinbelow.25
The essence of privacy is the right to be left alone. 26 In context, the right to privacy means the
right to be free from unwarranted exploitation of one's person or from intrusion into one's private
activities in such a way as to cause humiliation to a person's ordinary sensibilities. 27 And while
there has been general agreement as to the basic function of the guarantee against unwarranted
search, "translation of the abstract prohibition against unreasonable searches and seizures' into
workable broad guidelines for the decision of particular cases is a difficult task," to borrow
from C. Camara v. Municipal Court.28 Authorities are agreed though that the right to privacy
yields to certain paramount rights of the public and defers to the state's exercise of police
power.29
As the warrantless clause of Sec. 2, Art III of the Constitution is couched and as has been held,
"reasonableness" is the touchstone of the validity of a government search or intrusion. 30 And
whether a search at issue hews to the reasonableness standard is judged by the balancing of the
government - mandated intrusion on the individual's privacy interest against the promotion of
some compelling state interest.31 In the criminal context, reasonableness requires showing of
probable cause to be personally determined by a judge. Given that the drug - testing policy for
employees--and students for that matter--under RA 9165 is in the nature of administrative search
needing what was referred to inVernonia as "swift and informal disciplinary procedures," the
probable - cause standard is not required or even practicable. Be that as it may, the review should
focus on the reasonableness of the challenged administrative search in question.
The first factor to consider in the matter of reasonableness is the nature of the privacy interest
upon which the drug testing, which effects a search within the meaning of Sec. 2, Art. III of the
Constitution, intrudes. In this case, the office or workplace serves as the backdrop for the
analysis of the privacy expectation of the employees and the reasonableness of drug testing
requirement. The employees' privacy interest in an office is to a large extent circumscribed by the
company's work policies, the collective bargaining agreement, if any, entered into by
management and the bargaining unit, and the inherent right of the employer to maintain
discipline and efficiency in the workplace. Their privacy expectation in a regulated office
environment is, in fine, reduced; and a degree of impingement upon such privacy has been
upheld.
Just as defining as the first factor is the character of the intrusion authorized by the challenged
law. Reduced to a question form, is the scope of the search or intrusion clearly set forth, or, as
formulated in Ople v. Torres, is the enabling law authorizing a search "narrowly drawn" or
"narrowly focused"?32
The poser should be answered in the affirmative. For one, Sec. 36 of RA 9165 and its
implementing rules and regulations (IRR), as couched, contain provisions specifically directed
towards preventing a situation that would unduly embarrass the employees or place them under a
humiliating experience. While every officer and employee in a private establishment is under the
law deemed forewarned that he or she may be a possible subject of a drug test, nobody is really
singled out in advance for drug testing. The goal is to discourage drug use by not telling in
advance anyone when and who is to be tested. And as may be observed, Sec. 36(d) of RA 9165
itself prescribes what, in Ople, is a narrowing ingredient by providing that the employees
concerned shall be subjected to "random drug test as contained in the company's work rules and
regulations x x x for purposes of reducing the risk in the work place."
For another, the random drug testing shall be undertaken under conditions calculated to protect
as much as possible the employee's privacy and dignity. As to the mechanics of the test, the law
specifies that the procedure shall employ two testing methods, i.e., the screening test and the
confirmatory test, doubtless to ensure as much as possible the trustworthiness of the results. But
the more important consideration lies in the fact that the test shall be conducted by trained
professionals in access - controlled laboratories monitored by the Department of Health (DOH)
to safeguard against results tampering and to ensure an accurate chain of custody.33 In addition,
the IRR issued by the DOH provides that access to the drug results shall be on the "need to
know" basis;34 that the "drug test result and the records shall be [kept] confidential subject to the
usual accepted practices to protect the confidentiality of the test results." 35 Notably, RA 9165
does not oblige the employer concerned to report to the prosecuting agencies any information or
evidence relating to the violation of the Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act received as a
result of the operation of the drug testing. All told, therefore, the intrusion into the employees'
privacy, under RA 9165, is accompanied by proper safeguards, particularly against embarrassing
leakages of test results, and is relatively minimal.
To reiterate, RA 9165 was enacted as a measure to stamp out illegal drug in the country and thus
protect the well - being of the citizens, especially the youth, from the deleterious effects of
dangerous drugs. The law intends to achieve this through the medium, among others, of
promoting and resolutely pursuing a national drug abuse policy in the workplace via a mandatory
random drug test.36 To the Court, the need for drug testing to at least minimize illegal drug use is
substantial enough to override the individual's privacy interest under the premises. The Court can
consider that the illegal drug menace cuts across gender, age group, and social - economic lines.
And it may not be amiss to state that the sale, manufacture, or trafficking of illegal drugs, with
their ready market, would be an investor's dream were it not for the illegal and immoral
components of any of such activities. The drug problem has hardly abated since the martial law
public execution of a notorious drug trafficker. The state can no longer assume a laid back stance
with respect to this modern - day scourge. Drug enforcement agencies perceive a mandatory
random drug test to be an effective way of preventing and deterring drug use among employees
in private offices, the threat of detection by random testing being higher than other modes. The
Court holds that the chosen method is a reasonable and enough means to lick the problem.
Taking into account the foregoing factors, i.e., the reduced expectation of privacy on the part of
the employees, the compelling state concern likely to be met by the search, and the well - defined
limits set forth in the law to properly guide authorities in the conduct of the random testing, we
hold that the challenged drug test requirement is, under the limited context of the case,
reasonable and, ergo, constitutional.
Like their counterparts in the private sector, government officials and employees also labor under
reasonable supervision and restrictions imposed by the Civil Service law and other laws on
public officers, all enacted to promote a high standard of ethics in the public service. 37 And if RA
9165 passes the norm of reasonableness for private employees, the more reason that it should
pass the test for civil servants, who, by constitutional command, are required to be accountable at
all times to the people and to serve them with utmost responsibility and efficiency.38
Petitioner SJS' next posture that Sec. 36 of RA 9165 is objectionable on the ground of undue
delegation of power hardly commends itself for concurrence. Contrary to its position, the
provision in question is not so extensively drawn as to give unbridled options to schools and
employers to determine the manner of drug testing. Sec. 36 expressly provides how drug testing
for students of secondary and tertiary schools and officers/employees of public/private offices
should be conducted. It enumerates the persons who shall undergo drug testing. In the case of
students, the testing shall be in accordance with the school rules as contained in the student
handbook and with notice to parents. On the part of officers/employees, the testing shall take into
account the company's work rules. In either case, the random procedure shall be observed,
meaning that the persons to be subjected to drug test shall be picked by chance or in an
unplanned way. And in all cases, safeguards against misusing and compromising the
confidentiality of the test results are established.
Lest it be overlooked, Sec. 94 of RA 9165 charges the DDB to issue, in consultation with the
DOH, Department of the Interior and Local Government, Department of Education, and
Department of Labor and Employment, among other agencies, the IRR necessary to enforce the
law. In net effect then, the participation of schools and offices in the drug testing scheme shall
always be subject to the IRR of RA 9165. It is, therefore, incorrect to say that schools and
employers have unchecked discretion to determine how often, under what conditions, and where
the drug tests shall be conducted.
The validity of delegating legislative power is now a quiet area in the constitutional
landscape.39 In the face of the increasing complexity of the task of the government and the
increasing inability of the legislature to cope directly with the many problems demanding its
attention, resort to delegation of power, or entrusting to administrative agencies the power of
subordinate legislation, has become imperative, as here.
Laserna Petition (Constitutionality of Sec. 36[c], [d],
[f], and [g] of RA 9165)
Unlike the situation covered by Sec. 36(c) and (d) of RA 9165, the Court finds no valid
justification for mandatory drug testing for persons accused of crimes. In the case of students, the
constitutional viability of the mandatory, random, and suspicionless drug testing for students
emanates primarily from the waiver by the students of their right to privacy when they seek entry
to the school, and from their voluntarily submitting their persons to the parental authority of
school authorities. In the case of private and public employees, the constitutional soundness of
the mandatory, random, and suspicionless drug testing proceeds from the reasonableness of the
drug test policy and requirement.
We find the situation entirely different in the case of persons charged before the public
prosecutor's office with criminal offenses punishable with six (6) years and one (1) day
imprisonment. The operative concepts in the mandatory drug testing are "randomness" and
"suspicionless." In the case of persons charged with a crime before the prosecutor's office, a
mandatory drug testing can never be random or suspicionless. The ideas of randomness and
being suspicionless are antithetical to their being made defendants in a criminal complaint. They
are not randomly picked; neither are they beyond suspicion. When persons suspected of
committing a crime are charged, they are singled out and are impleaded against their will. The
persons thus charged, by the bare fact of being haled before the prosecutor's office and peaceably
submitting themselves to drug testing, if that be the case, do not necessarily consent to the
procedure, let alone waive their right to privacy.40 To impose mandatory drug testing on the
accused is a blatant attempt to harness a medical test as a tool for criminal prosecution, contrary
to the stated objectives of RA 9165. Drug testing in this case would violate a persons' right to
privacy guaranteed under Sec. 2, Art. III of the Constitution. Worse still, the accused persons are
veritably forced to incriminate themselves.
WHEREFORE, the Court resolves to GRANT the petition in G.R. No. 161658 and
declares Sec.
36(g) of RA
9165 and COMELEC
Resolution
No.
6486 as UNCONSTITUTIONAL; and toPARTIALLY GRANT the petition in G.R. Nos.

157870 and 158633 by declaring Sec. 36(c) and (d) ofRA 9165 CONSTITUTIONAL, but
declaring its Sec. 36(f) UNCONSTITUTIONAL. All concerned agencies are, accordingly,
permanently enjoined from implementing Sec. 36(f) and (g) of RA 9165. No costs.
SO ORDERED.
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-114783 December 8, 1994

ROBERT V. TOBIAS, RAMON M. GUZMAN, TERRY T. LIM, GREGORIO D.
GABRIEL, and ROBERTO R. TOBIAS, JR. petitioners,
vs.
HON. CITY MAYOR BENJAMIN S. ABALOS, CITY TREASURER WILLIAM
MARCELINO, and THE SANGGUNIANG PANLUNGSOD, all of the City of
Mandaluyong, Metro Manila, respondents.
Estrella, Bautista & Associates for petitioners.
BIDIN, J.:
Invoking their rights as taxpayers and as residents of Mandaluyong, herein petitioners assail the
constitutionality of Republic Act No. 7675, otherwise known as "An Act Converting the
Municipality of Mandaluyong into a Highly Urbanized City to be known as the City of
Mandaluyong."
Prior to the enactment of the assailed statute, the municipalities of Mandaluyong and San Juan
belonged to only one legislative district. Hon. Ronaldo Zamora, the incumbent congressional
representative of this legislative district, sponsored the bill which eventually became R.A. No.
7675. President Ramos signed R.A. No. 7675 into law on February 9, 1994.
Pursuant to the Local Government Code of 1991, a plebiscite was held on April 10, 1994. The
people of Mandaluyong were asked whether they approved of the conversion of the Municipality
of Mandaluyong into a highly urbanized city as provided under R.A. No. 7675. The turnout at
the plebiscite was only 14.41% of the voting population. Nevertheless, 18,621 voted "yes"
whereas 7,911 voted "no." By virtue of these results, R.A. No. 7675 was deemed ratified and in
effect.
Petitioners now come before this Court, contending that R.A. No. 7675, specifically Article VIII,
Section 49 thereof, is unconstitutional for being violative of three specific provisions of the
Constitution.
Article VIII, Section 49 of R.A. No. 7675 provides:

As a highly-urbanized city, the City of Mandaluyong shall have its own legislative
district with the first representative to be elected in the next national elections
after the passage of this Act. The remainder of the former legislative district of
San Juan/Mandaluyong shall become the new legislative district of San Juan with
its first representative to be elected at the same election.
Petitioner's first objection to the aforequoted provision of R.A. No. 7675 is that it contravenes
the "one subject-one bill" rule, as enunciated in Article VI, Section 26(1) of the Constitution, to
wit:
Sec. 26(1). Every bill passed by the Congress shall embrace only one subject
which shall be expressed in the title thereof.
Petitioners allege that the inclusion of the assailed Section 49 in the subject law resulted in the
latter embracing two principal subjects, namely: (1) the conversion of Mandaluyong into a highly
urbanized city; and (2) the division of the congressional district of San Juan/Mandaluyong into
two separate districts.
Petitioners contend that the second aforestated subject is not germane to the subject matter of
R.A. No. 7675 since the said law treats of the conversion of Mandaluyong into a highly
urbanized city, as expressed in the title of the law. Therefore, since Section 49 treats of a subject
distinct from that stated in the title of the law, the "one subject-one bill" rule has not been
complied with.
Petitioners' second and third objections involve Article VI, Sections 5(1) and (4) of the
Constitution, which provide, to wit:
Sec. 5(1). The House of Representatives shall be composed of not more than two
hundred and fifty members, unless otherwise fixed by law, who shall be elected
from legislative districts apportioned among the provinces, cities, and the
Metropolitan Manila area in accordance with the number of their respective
inhabitants, and on the basis of a uniform and progressive ratio, and those who, as
provided by law, shall be elected through a party list system of registered national,
regional and sectoral parties or organizations.
Sec. 5(4). Within three years following the return of every census, the Congress
shall make a reapportionment of legislative districts based on the standard
provided in this section.
Petitioners argue that the division of San Juan and Mandaluyong into separate congressional
districts under Section 49 of the assailed law has resulted in an increase in the composition of the
House of Representatives beyond that provided in Article VI, Sec. 5(1) of the Constitution.
Furthermore, petitioners contend that said division was not made pursuant to any census showing
that the subject municipalities have attained the minimum population requirements. And finally,
petitioners assert that Section 49 has the effect of preempting the right of Congress to reapportion
legislative districts pursuant to Sec. 5(4) as aforecited.
The contentions are devoid of merit.
Anent the first issue, we agree with the observation of the Solicitor General that the statutory
conversion of Mandaluyong into a highly urbanized city with a population of not less than two
hundred fifty thousand indubitably ordains compliance with the "one city-one representative"
proviso in the Constitution:
. . . Each city with a population of at least two hundred fifty thousand, or each
province, shall have at least one representative" (Article VI, Section 5(3),
Constitution).
Hence, it is in compliance with the aforestated constitutional mandate that the creation of a
separate congressional district for the City of Mandaluyong is decreed under Article VIII,
Section 49 of R.A. No. 7675.
Contrary to petitioners' assertion, the creation of a separate congressional district for
Mandaluyong is not a subject separate and distinct from the subject of its conversion into a
highly urbanized city but is a natural and logical consequence of its conversion into a highly
urbanized city. Verily, the title of R.A. No. 7675, "An Act Converting the Municipality of
Mandaluyong Into a Highly Urbanized City of Mandaluyong" necessarily includes and
contemplates the subject treated under Section 49 regarding the creation of a separate
congressional district for Mandaluyong.
Moreover, a liberal construction of the "one title-one subject" rule has been invariably adopted
by this court so as not to cripple or impede legislation. Thus, in Sumulong v. Comelec (73 Phil.
288 [1941]), we ruled that the constitutional requirement as now expressed in Article VI, Section
26(1) "should be given a practical rather than a technical construction. It should be sufficient
compliance with such requirement if the title expresses the general subject and all the provisions
are germane to that general subject."
The liberal construction of the "one title-one subject" rule had been further elucidated in Lidasan
v. Comelec (21 SCRA 496 [1967]), to wit:
Of course, the Constitution does not require Congress to employ in the title of an
enactment, language of such precision as to mirror, fully index or catalogue all the
contents and the minute details therein. It suffices if the title should serve the
purpose of the constitutional demand that it inform the legislators, the persons
interested in the subject of the bill and the public, of the nature, scope
and consequences of the proposed law and its operation" (emphasis supplied).
Proceeding now to the other constitutional issues raised by petitioners to the effect that there is
no mention in the assailed law of any census to show that Mandaluyong and San Juan had each
attained the minimum requirement of 250,000 inhabitants to justify their separation into two
legislative districts, the same does not suffice to strike down the validity of R.A. No. 7675. The
said Act enjoys the presumption of having passed through the regular congressional processes,
including due consideration by the members of Congress of the minimum requirements for the
establishment of separate legislative districts. At any rate, it is not required that all laws
emanating from the legislature must contain all relevant data considered by Congress in the
enactment of said laws.
As to the contention that the assailed law violates the present limit on the number of
representatives as set forth in the Constitution, a reading of the applicable provision, Article VI,
Section 5(1), as aforequoted, shows that the present limit of 250 members is not absolute. The
Constitution clearly provides that the House of Representatives shall be composed of not more
than 250 members, "unless otherwise provided by law." The inescapable import of the latter
clause is that the present composition of Congress may be increased, if Congress itself so
mandates through a legislative enactment. Therefore, the increase in congressional representation
mandated by R.A. No. 7675 is not unconstitutional.
Thus, in the absence of proof that Mandaluyong and San Juan do not qualify to have separate
legislative
districts,
the
assailed
Section
49
of
R.A.
No. 7675 must be allowed to stand.
As to the contention that Section 49 of R.A. No. 7675 in effect preempts the right of Congress to
reapportion legislative districts, the said argument borders on the absurd since petitioners
overlook the glaring fact that it was Congress itself which drafted, deliberated upon and enacted
the assailed law, including Section 49 thereof. Congress cannot possibly preempt itself on a right
which pertains to itself.
Aside from the constitutional objections to R.A. No. 7675, petitioners present further arguments
against the validity thereof.
Petitioners contend that the people of San Juan should have been made to participate in the
plebiscite on R.A. No. 7675 as the same involved a change in their legislative district. The
contention is bereft of merit since the principal subject involved in the plebiscite was the
conversion of Mandaluyong into a highly urbanized city. The matter of separate district
representation was only ancillary thereto. Thus, the inhabitants of San Juan were properly
excluded from the said plebiscite as they had nothing to do with the change of status of
neighboring Mandaluyong.
Similarly, petitioners' additional argument that the subject law has resulted in "gerrymandering,"
which is the practice of creating legislative districts to favor a particular candidate or party, is not
worthy of credence. As correctly observed by the Solicitor General, it should be noted that Rep.
Ronaldo Zamora, the author of the assailed law, is the incumbent representative of the former
San Juan/Mandaluyong district, having consistently won in both localities. By dividing San
Juan/Mandaluyong, Rep. Zamora's constituency has in fact been diminished, which development
could hardly be considered as favorable to him.
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DISMISSED for lack of merit.
SO ORDERED.
Narvasa, C.J., Padilla, Regalado, Davide, Jr., Romero, Bellosillo, Melo, Quiason, Puno, Vitug,
Kapunan and Mendoza, JJ., concur.
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. 118577 March 7, 1995

JUANITO MARIANO, JR. et al., petitioners,
vs.
THE COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, THE MUNICIPALITY OF MAKATI, HON.
JEJOMAR BINAY, THE MUNICIPAL TREASURER, AND SANGGUNIANG BAYAN OF
MAKATI, respondents.
G.R. No. 118627 March 7, 1995
JOHN R. OSMEA, petitioner,
vs.
THE COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, THE MUNICIPALITY OF MAKATI, HON.
JEJOMAR BINAY, MUNICIPAL TREASURER, AND SANGGUNIANG BAYAN OF
MAKATI, respondents.
PUNO, J.:
At bench are two (2) petitions assailing certain provisions of Republic Act No. 7854 as
unconstitutional. R.A. No. 7854 as unconstitutional. R.A. No. 7854 is entitled, "An Act
Converting the Municipality of Makati Into a Highly Urbanized City to be known as the City of
Makati." 1
G.R. No. 118577 involves a petition for prohibition and declaratory relief. It was filed by
petitioners Juanito Mariano, Jr., Ligaya S. Bautista, Teresita Tibay, Camilo Santos, Frankie Cruz,
Ricardo Pascual, Teresita Abang, Valentina Pitalvero, Rufino Caldoza, Florante Alba, and
Perfecto Alba. Of the petitioners, only Mariano, Jr., is a resident of Makati. The others are
residents of Ibayo Ususan, Taguig, Metro Manila. Suing as taxpayers, they assail as
unconstitutional sections 2, 51, and 52 of R.A. No. 7854 on the following grounds:
1. Section 2 of R.A. No. 7854 did not properly identify the land area or territorial
jurisdiction of Makati by metes and bounds, with technical descriptions, in
violation of Section 10, Article X of the Constitution, in relation to Sections 7 and
450 of the Local Government Code;
2. Section 51 of R.A. No. 7854 attempts to alter or restart the "three consecutive
term" limit for local elective officials, in violation of Section 8, Article X and
Section 7, Article VI of the Constitution.
3. Section 52 of R.A. No. 7854 is unconstitutional for:
(a) it increased the legislative district of Makati only by special law
(the Charter in violation of the constitutional provision requiring a
general reapportionment law to be passed by Congress within three
(3) years following the return of every census;
(b) the increase in legislative district was not expressed in the title
of the bill; and
(c) the addition of another legislative district in Makati is not in

accord with Section 5 (3), Article VI of the Constitution for as of
the latest survey (1990 census), the population of Makati stands at
only 450,000.
G.R. No. 118627 was filed by the petitioner John H. Osmea as senator, taxpayer, and concerned
citizen. Petitioner assails section 52 of R.A. No. 7854 as unconstitutional on the same grounds as
aforestated.
We find no merit in the petitions.
I
Section 2, Article I of R.A. No. 7854 delineated the land areas of the proposed city of Makati,
thus:
Sec. 2. The City of Makati. The Municipality of Makati shall be converted into
a highly urbanized city to be known as the City of Makati, hereinafter referred to
as the City, which shall comprise the present territory of the Municipality of
Makati in Metropolitan Manila Area over which it has jurisdiction bounded on the
northeast by Pasig River and beyond by the City of Mandaluyong and the
Municipality of Pasig; on the southeast by the municipalities of Pateros and
Taguig; on the southwest by the City of Pasay and the Municipality of Taguig;
and, on the northwest, by the City of Manila.
The foregoing provision shall be without prejudice to the resolution by the
appropriate agency or forum of existing boundary disputes or cases involving
questions of territorial jurisdiction between the City of Makati and the adjoining
local government units. (Emphasis supplied)
In G.R. No. 118577, petitioners claim that this delineation violates sections 7 and 450 of the
Local Government Code which require that the area of a local government unit should be made
by metes and bounds with technical descriptions. 2
The importance of drawing with precise strokes the territorial boundaries of a local unit of
government cannot be overemphasized. The boundaries must be clear for they define the limits
of the territorial jurisdiction of a local government unit. It can legitimately exercise powers of
government only within the limits, its acts are ultra vires. Needless to state, any uncertainty in
the boundaries of local government units will sow costly conflicts in the exercise of
governmental powers which ultimately will prejudice the people's welfare. This is the evil sought
to avoided by the Local Government Code in requiring that the land area of a local government
unit must be spelled out in metes and bounds, with technical descriptions.
Given the facts of the cases at bench, we cannot perceive how this evil can be brought about by
the description made in section 2 of R.A. No. 7854, Petitioners have not demonstrated that the
delineation of the land area of the proposed City of Makati will cause confusion as to its
boundaries. We note that said delineation did not change even by an inch the land area previously
covered by Makati as a municipality. Section 2 did not add, subtract, divide, or multiply the
established land area of Makati. In language that cannot be any clearer, section 2 stated that, the
city's land area "shall comprise the present territory of the municipality."
The deliberations of Congress will reveal that there is a legitimate reason why the land area of
the proposed City of Makati was not defined by metes and bounds, with technical descriptions.
At the time of the consideration of R.A. No. 7854, the territorial dispute between the
municipalities of Makati and Taguig over Fort Bonifacio was under court litigation. Out of a
becoming sense of respect to co-equal department of government, legislators felt that the dispute
should be left to the courts to decide. They did not want to foreclose the dispute by making a
legislative finding of fact which could decide the issue. This would have ensued if they defined
the land area of the proposed city by its exact metes and bounds, with technical
descriptions. 3 We take judicial notice of the fact that Congress has also refrained from using the
metes and bounds description of land areas of other local government units with unsettled
boundary disputes. 4
We hold that the existence of a boundary dispute does not per se present an insurmountable
difficulty which will prevent Congress from defining with reasonable certitude the territorial
jurisdiction of a local government unit. In the cases at bench, Congress maintained the existing
boundaries of the proposed City of Makati but as an act of fairness, made them subject to the
ultimate resolution by the courts. Considering these peculiar circumstances, we are not prepared
to hold that section 2 of R.A. No. 7854 is unconstitutional. We sustain the submission of the
Solicitor General in this regard, viz.:
Going now to Sections 7 and 450 of the Local Government Code, it is beyond
cavil that the requirement stated therein, viz.: "the territorial jurisdiction of newly
created or converted cities should be described by meted and bounds, with
technical descriptions" was made in order to provide a means by which the
area of said cities may be reasonably ascertained. In other words, the requirement
on metes and bounds was meant merely as tool in the establishment of local
government units. It is not an end in itself. Ergo, so long as the territorial
jurisdiction of a city may be reasonably ascertained, i.e., by referring to common
boundaries with neighboring municipalities, as in this case, then, it may be
concluded that the legislative intent behind the law has been sufficiently served.
Certainly, Congress did not intends that laws creating new cities must contain
therein detailed technical descriptions similar to those appearing in Torrens titles,
as petitioners seem to imply. To require such description in the law as a
condition sine qua non for its validity would be to defeat the very purpose which
the Local Government Code to seeks to serve. The manifest intent of the Code is
to empower local government units and to give them their rightful due. It seeks to
make local governments more responsive to the needs of their constituents while
at the same time serving as a vital cog in national development. To invalidate R.A.
No. 7854 on the mere ground that no cadastral type of description was used in the
law would serve the letter but defeat the spirit of the Code. It then becomes a case
of the master serving the slave, instead of the other way around. This could not be
the intendment of the law.
Too well settled is the rule that laws must be enforced when ascertained, although
it may not be consistent with the strict letter of the statute. Courts will not follow
the letter of the statute when to do so would depart from the true intent of the
legislature or would otherwise yield conclusions inconsistent with the general
purpose of the act. (Torres v. Limjap, 56 Phil., 141; Taada v. Cuenco, 103 Phil.
1051; Hidalgo v. Hidalgo, 33 SCRA 1105). Legislation is an active instrument of
government, which, for purposes of interpretation, means that laws have ends to
achieve, and statutes should be so construed as not to defeat but to carry out such
ends and purposes (Bocolbo v. Estanislao, 72 SCRA 520). The same rule must
indubitably apply to the case at bar.
II
Petitioners in G.R. No. 118577 also assail the constitutionality of section 51, Article X of R.A.
No. 7854. Section 51 states:
Sec. 51. Officials of the City of Makati. The represent elective officials of the
Municipality of Makati shall continue as the officials of the City of Makati and
shall exercise their powers and functions until such time that a new election is
held and the duly elected officials shall have already qualified and assume their
offices: Provided, The new city will acquire a new corporate existence. The
appointive officials and employees of the City shall likewise continues exercising
their functions and duties and they shall be automatically absorbed by the city
government of the City of Makati.
They contend that this section collides with section 8, Article X and section 7, Article VI of the
Constitution which provide:
Sec. 8. The term of office of elective local officials, except barangay officials,
which shall be determined by law, shall be three years and no such official shall
serve for more than three consecutive terms. Voluntary renunciation of the office
for any length of time shall not be considered as an interruption in the continuity
of his service for the full term for which he was elected.
xxx xxx xxx
Sec. 7. The Members of the House of Representatives shall be elected for a term
of three years which shall begin, unless otherwise provided by law, at noon on the
thirtieth day of June next following their election.
No Member of the House of Representatives shall serve for more than three
consecutive terms. Voluntary renunciation of the office for any length of time
shall not be considered as an interruption in the continuity of his service for the
full term for which he was elected.
Petitioners stress that under these provisions, elective local officials, including Members of the
House of Representative, have a term of three (3) years and are prohibited from serving for more
than three (3)consecutive terms. They argue that by providing that the new city shall acquire a
new corporate existence, section 51 of R.A. No. 7854 restarts the term of the present municipal
elective officials of Makati and disregards the terms previously served by them. In particular,
petitioners point that section 51 favors the incumbent Makati Mayor, respondent Jejomar Binay,
who has already served for two (2) consecutive terms. They further argue that should Mayor
Binay decide to run and eventually win as city mayor in the coming elections, he can still run for
the same position in 1998 and seek another three-year consecutive term since his previous threeyear consecutive term asmunicipal mayor would not be counted. Thus, petitioners conclude that
said section 51 has been conveniently crafted to suit the political ambitions of respondent Mayor
Binay.
We cannot entertain this challenge to the constitutionality of section 51. The requirements before
a litigant can challenge the constitutionality of a law are well delineated. They are: 1) there must
be an actual case or controversy; (2) the question of constitutionality must be raised by the
proper party; (3) the constitutional question must be raised at the earliest possible opportunity;
and (4) the decision on the constitutional question must be necessary to the determination of the
case itself. 5
Petitioners have far from complied with these requirements. The petition is premised on the
occurrence of many contingent events, i.e., that Mayor Binay will run again in this coming
mayoralty elections; that he would be re-elected in said elections; and that he would seek reelection for the same position in the 1998 elections. Considering that these contingencies may or
may not happen, petitioners merely pose a hypothetical issue which has yet to ripen to an actual
case or controversy. Petitioners who are residents of Taguig (except Mariano) are not also the
proper parties to raise this abstract issue. Worse, they hoist this futuristic issue in a petition for
declaratory relief over which this Court has no jurisdiction.
III
Finally, petitioners in the two (2) cases at bench assail the constitutionality of section 52, Article
X of R.A. No. 7854. Section 52 of the Charter provides:
Sec. 52. Legislative Districts. Upon its conversion into a highly-urbanized city,
Makati shall thereafter have at least two (2) legislative districts that shall initially
correspond to the two (2) existing districts created under Section 3(a) of Republic
Act. No. 7166 as implemented by the Commission on Elections to commence at
the next national elections to be held after the effectivity of this Act. Henceforth,
barangays Magallanes, Dasmarias and Forbes shall be with the first district, in
lieu of Barangay Guadalupe-Viejo which shall form part of the second district.
(emphasis supplied)
They contend. that the addition of another legislative district in Makati is unconstitutional for:
(1) reapportionment6 cannot made by a special law, (2) the addition of a legislative district is not
expressed in the title of the bill 7 and (3) Makati's population, as per the 1990 census, stands at
only four hundred fifty thousand (450,000).
These issues have been laid to rest in the recent case of Tobias v. Abalos. 8 In said case, we ruled
that reapportionment of legislative districts may be made through a special law, such as in the
charter of a new city. The Constitution 9 clearly provides that Congress shall be composed of not
more than two hundred fifty (250) members, unless otherwise fixed by law. As thus worded, the
Constitution did not preclude Congress from increasing its membership by passing a law, other
than a general reapportionment of the law. This is its exactly what was done by Congress in
enacting R.A. No. 7854 and providing for an increase in Makati's legislative district. Moreover,
to hold that reapportionment can only be made through a general apportionment law, with a
review of all the legislative districts allotted to each local government unit nationwide, would
create an inequitable situation where a new city or province created by Congress will be denied
legislative representation for an indeterminate period of time. 10 The intolerable situations will
deprive the people of a new city or province a particle of their sovereignty. 11 Sovereignty cannot
admit of any kind of subtraction. It is indivisible. It must be forever whole or it is not
sovereignty.
Petitioners cannot insist that the addition of another legislative district in Makati is not in accord
with section 5(3), Article VI 12 of the Constitution for as of the latest survey (1990 census), the
population of Makati stands at only four hundred fifty thousand (450,000). 13 Said section
provides, inter alia, that a city with a population of at least two hundred fifty thousand (250,000)
shall have at least one representative. Even granting that the population of Makati as of the 1990
census stood at four hundred fifty thousand (450,000), its legislative district may still be
increased since it has met the minimum population requirement of two hundred fifty thousand
(250,000). In fact, section 3 of the Ordinance appended to the Constitution provides that a city
whose population has increased to more than two hundred fifty thousand (250,000) shall be
entitled to at least one congressional representative. 14
Finally, we do not find merit in petitioners' contention that the creation of an additional
legislative district in Makati should have been expressly stated in the title of the bill. In the same
case of Tobias v. Abalos, op cit., we reiterated the policy of the Court favoring a liberal
construction of the "one title-one subject" rule so as not to impede legislation. To be sure, with
Constitution does not command that the title of a law should exactly mirror, fully index, or
completely catalogue all its details. Hence, we ruled that "it should be sufficient compliance if
the title expresses the general subject and all the provisions are germane to such general subject."
WHEREFORE, the petitions are hereby DISMISSED for lack of merit No costs.
SO ORDERED.
Narvasa, C.J., Feliciano, Padilla, Bidin, Regalado, Romero, Bellosillo, Melo, Quiason, Vitug,
Kapunan, Mendoza and Francisco, JJ., concur.
Separate Opinions
DAVIDE, JR., J., concurring:

I concur in the well written opinion of Mr. Justice Reynato S. Puno. I wish, however, to add a
few observations.
I.
Section 10, Article X of the Constitution provides that "[n]o province, city, municipality or
barangay may be created, divided, merged, abolished, or its boundary substantially altered,
except in accordance with the criteria established in the local government code and subject to the
approval by a majority of the votes cast in a plebiscite in the political units directly affected."
These criteria are now set forth in Section 7 of the Local Government Code of 1991 (R.A. No.
7160). One of these is that the territorial jurisdiction of the local government unit to be created or
converted should be properly identified by metes and bounds with technical descriptions.
The omission of R.A. No. 7854 (An Act Converting the Municipality of Makati Into a Highly
Urbanized City to be Known as the City of Makati) to describe the territorial boundaries of the
city by metes and bounds does not make R.A. No. 7854 unconstitutional or illegal. The
Constitution does not provide for a description by metes and bounds as a condition sine qua
non for the creation of a local government unit or its conversion from one level to another. The
criteria provided for in Section 7 of R.A. No. 7854 are not absolute, for, as a matter of fact, the
section starts with the clause "as a general rule." The petitioners' reliance on Section 450 of R.A.
No. 7160 is unavailing Said section only applies to the conversion of a municipality or a cluster
of barangays into a COMPONENT CITY, not a highly urbanized city. It pertinently reads as
follows:
Sec. 450. Requisite for creation. (a) A municipality or a cluster of barangays
may be converted into a component city if it has an average annual income, as
certified by the Department of Finance, of at least Twenty million pesos
(P20,000,000.00) for the last two (2) consecutive years based on 1991 constant
prices, and if it has either of the following requisites:
xxx xxx xxx
(b) The territorial jurisdiction of a newly created city shall be properly identified
by metes and bounds. . . .
The constitution classifies cities as either highly urbanized or component. Section 12 of Article X
thereof provides:
Sec. 12. Cities that are highly urbanized, as determined by law, and component
cities whose charters prohibit their voters from voting for provincial elective
officials, shall be independent of the province. The voters of component cities
within a province, whose charters contain no such prohibition, shall not be
deprived of their right to vote for elective provincial officials.
And Section 451 of R.A. No. 7160 provides:
Sec. 451. Cities Classified. A city may either be component or highly
urbanized: Provided, however, That the criteria established in this Code shall not
affect the classification and corporate status of existing cities.
Independent component cities are those component cities whose charters prohibit
their voters from voting for provincial elective officials. Independent component
cities shall be independent of the province.
II.
Strictly speaking, the increase in the number of legislative seats for the City of Makati provided
for in R.A. No. 7854 is not an increase justified by the clause unless otherwise fixed by law in
paragraph 1, Section 5, Article VI of the Constitution. That clause contemplates of
the reapportionment mentioned in the succeeding paragraph (4) of the said Section which reads
in full as follows:
Within three years following the return of every census, the Congress shall make
a reapportionment of legislative districts based on the standards provided in this
section.
In short, the clause refers to a general reapportionment law.
The increase under R.A. No. 7854 is a permissible increase under Sections 1 and 3 of the
Ordinance appended to the Constitution which reads:
Sec. 1. For purposes of the election of Members of the House of Representatives
of the First Congress of the Philippines under the Constitution proposed by the
1986 Constitutional Commissionand subsequent elections, and until otherwise
provided by law, the Members thereof shall be elected from legislative districts
apportioned among the provinces, cities, and the Metropolitan Manila Areaas
follows:
METROPOLITAN MANILA AREA
xxx xxx xxx
MAKATI one (1)
xxx xxx xxx
Sec. 3. Any province that may hereafter be created, or any city whose population
may hereafter increase to more than two hundred fifty thousand shall be entitled
in the immediately following election to at least one Member or such number of
Members as it may be entitled to on the basis of the number of its inhabitants and
according to the standards set forth in paragraph (3), Section 5 of Article VI of
the Constitution. The number of Members apportioned to the province out of
which such new province was created, or where the city, whose population has so
increased, is geographically located shall be correspondingly adjusted by the
Commission on Elections but such adjustment shall not be made within one
hundred and twenty days before the election. (Emphases supplied)
Separate Opinions
DAVIDE, JR., J., concurring:
I concur in the well written opinion of Mr. Justice Reynato S. Puno. I wish, however, to add a
few observations.
I.
Section 10, Article X of the Constitution provides that "[n]o province, city, municipality or
barangay may be created, divided, merged, abolished, or its boundary substantially altered,
except in accordance with the criteria established in the local government code and subject to the
approval by a majority of the votes cast in a plebiscite in the political units directly affected."
These criteria are now set forth in Section 7 of the Local Government Code of 1991 (R.A. No.
7160). One of these is that the territorial jurisdiction of the local government unit to be created or
converted should be properly identified by metes and bounds with technical descriptions.
The omission of R.A. No. 7854 (An Act Converting the Municipality of Makati Into a Highly
Urbanized City to be Known as the City of Makati) to describe the territorial boundaries of the
city by metes and bounds does not make R.A. No. 7854 unconstitutional or illegal. The
Constitution does not provide for a description by metes and bounds as a condition sine qua
non for the creation of a local government unit or its conversion from one level to another. The
criteria provided for in Section 7 of R.A. No. 7854 are not absolute, for, as a matter of fact, the
section starts with the clause "as a general rule." The petitioners' reliance on Section 450 of R.A.
No. 7160 is unavailing Said section only applies to the conversion of a municipality or a cluster
of barangays into a COMPONENT CITY, not a highly urbanized city. It pertinently reads as
follows:
Sec. 450. Requisite for creation. (a) A municipality or a cluster of barangays
may be converted into a component city if it has an average annual income, as
certified by the Department of Finance, of at least Twenty million pesos
(P20,000,000.00) for the last two (2) consecutive years based on 1991 constant
prices, and if it has either of the following requisites:
xxx xxx xxx
(b) The territorial jurisdiction of a newly created city shall be properly identified
by metes and bounds. . . .
The constitution classifies cities as either highly urbanized or component. Section 12 of Article X
thereof provides:
Sec. 12. Cities that are highly urbanized, as determined by law, and component
cities whose charters prohibit their voters from voting for provincial elective
officials, shall be independent of the province. The voters of component cities
within a province, whose charters contain no such prohibition, shall not be
deprived of their right to vote for elective provincial officials.
And Section 451 of R.A. No. 7160 provides:
Sec. 451. Cities Classified. A city may either be component or highly
urbanized: Provided, however, That the criteria established in this Code shall not
affect the classification and corporate status of existing cities.
Independent component cities are those component cities whose charters prohibit
their voters from voting for provincial elective officials. Independent component
cities shall be independent of the province.
II.
Strictly speaking, the increase in the number of legislative seats for the City of Makati provided
for in R.A. No. 7854 is not an increase justified by the clause unless otherwise fixed by law in
paragraph 1, Section 5, Article VI of the Constitution. That clause contemplates of
the reapportionment mentioned in the succeeding paragraph (4) of the said Section which reads
in full as follows:
Within three years following the return of every census, the Congress shall make
a reapportionment of legislative districts based on the standards provided in this
section.
In short, the clause refers to a general reapportionment law.
The increase under R.A. No. 7854 is a permissible increase under Sections 1 and 3 of the
Ordinance appended to the Constitution which reads:
1986 Constitutional Commissionand subsequent elections, and until otherwise
apportioned among the provinces, cities, and the Metropolitan Manila Areaas
follows:
METROPOLITAN MANILA AREA
xxx xxx xxx
MAKATI one (1)
xxx xxx xxx
according to the standards set forth in paragraph (3), Section 5 of Article VI of
the Constitution. The number of Members apportioned to the province out of
which such new province was created, or where the city, whose population has so
hundred and twenty days before the election. (Emphases supplied)

SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. 118702 March 16, 1995

CIRILO ROY G. MONTEJO, petitioner,

vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, respondent.
SERGIO A.F. APOSTOL, intervenor.
PUNO, J.:
More than political fortunes are at stake in the case at bench. Petitioner Cirilo Roy G. Montejo,
representing the First District of Leyte, pleads for the annulment of section 1 of Resolution No.
2736 of the COMELEC, redistricting certain municipalities in Leyte, on the ground that it
violates the principle of equality of representation. To remedy the alleged inequity, petitioner
seeks to transfer the municipality of Tolosa from his district to the Second District of the
province. Intervenor Sergio A.F. Apostol, representing the Second District, vigorously opposed
the inclusion ofTolosa in his district. We gave due course to the petition considering that, at
bottom, it involves the validity of the unprecedented exercise by the COMELEC of
the legislative power of redistricting and reapportionment.
The province of Leyte with the cities of Tacloban and Ormoc is composed of five (5) legislative
districts. 1
The first district 2 covers Tacloban City and the municipalities of Alangalang, Babatngon, Palo,
San Miguel, Sta. Fe, Tanauan and Tolosa.
The second district 3 is composed of the municipalities of Barugo, Barauen, Capoocan, Carigara,
Dagami, Dulag, Jaro, Julita, La Pat, Mayorga, MacArthur, Pastrana, Tabontabon, and Tunga.
The third district 4 is composed of the municipalities of Almeria, Biliran, Cabucgayan, Caibiran,
Calubian, Culaba, Kawayan, Leyte, Maripipi, Naval, San Isidro, Tabango, and Villaba.
The fourth district 5 is composed of Ormoc City and the municipalities of Albuera, Isabel,
Kananga, Matagob, Merida, and Palompon.
The fifth district 6 is composed of the municipalities of Abuyog, Bate, Baybay, Hilongos,
Hindang, Inopacan, Javier, Mahaplag, and Matalom.
Biliran, located in the third district of Leyte , was made its sub-province by virtue of Republic
Act No. 2141 Section 1 of the law spelled out enacted on April 8, 1959. 7
Section 1 of the law spelled out the municipalities comprising the sub-province, viz.: "Almeria,
Biliran, Cabucgayan, Caibiran, Culaba, Kawayan, Maripipi and Naval and all the territories
comprised therein."
On January 1, 1992, the Local Government Code took effect. Pursuant to its Section 462, the
sub-province of Biliran became a regular province. It provides:
Existing sub-provinces are hereby converted into regular provinces
upon approval by a majority of the votes cast in a plebiscite to be
held in the sub-provinces and the original provinces directly
affected. The plebiscite shall be conducted by the COMELEC

simultaneously with the national elections following the effectivity
of this code. The new legislative districts created as a result of such
conversion shall continue to be represented in Congress by the
duly-elected representatives of the original districts out of which
said new provinces or districts were created until their own
representatives shall have been elected in the next regular
congressional elections and qualified.
The conversion of Biliran into a regular province was approved by a majority of the votes cast in
a plebiscite held on May 11, 1992. As a consequence of the conversion, eight (8) municipalities
of the Third District composed the new province of Biliran, i.e., Almeria, Biliran, Cabucgayan,
Caibiran, Culaba, Kawayan, Maripipi, and Naval. A further consequence was to reduce the Third
District to five (5) municipalities with a total population of 145,067 as per the 1990 census.
To remedy the resulting inequality in the distribution of inhabitants, voters and municipalities in
the province of Leyte, respondent COMELEC held consultation meetings with the incumbent
representatives of the province and other interested parties. On December 29, 1994, it
promulgated Resolution No. 2736 where, among others, it transferred the municipality of
Capoocan of the Second District and the municipality of Palompon of the Fourth District to the
Third District of Leyte. The composition of the First District which includes the municipality
of Tolosaand the composition of the Fifth District were not disturbed. After the movement of
municipalities, the composition of the five (5) legislative districts appeared as follows:
First District: Population Registered
Voters
(1990) (1994)
1. Tacloban City, 137,190 81,679
2. Alangalang, 33,375 20,543
3. Babatngon, 17,795 9,929
4. Palo, 38,100 20,816
5. San Miguel, 13,438 8,167
6. Sta. Fe, 12,119 7,497
7. Tanauan and, 38,033 22,357
8. Tolosa; 13,299 7,700

TOTAL 303,349 178,688
Second District: Population Registered
Voters
(1990) (1994)
1. Barugo, 23,817 13,237
2. Barauen, 46,029 23,307
3. Carigara 38,863 22,036
4. Dagami, 25,606 16,519
5. Dulag, 33,020 19,375
6. Jaro, 31,727 17,139
7. Julita, 9,944 6,196
8. La Paz, 14,311 9,003

9. Mayorga, 10,530 5,868
10. Mac Arthur, 13,159 8,628
11. Pastrana, 12,565 7,348
12. Tabontabon, and 7,183 4,419
13. Tunga; 5,413 3,387

TOTAL 272,167 156,462
Third District: Population Registered
Voters
(1990) (1994)
1. Calubian, 25,968 16,649
2. Leyte, 32,575 16,415
3. San Isidro, 24,442 14,916
4. Tabango, 29,743 15,48
5. Villaba, 32,339 21,227
6. Capoocan, and 23,687 13,595
7. Palompon; 45,745 27,474

TOTAL 214,499 125,763
Fourth District: Population Registered
Voters
(1990) (1994)
1. Ormoc City, 129,456 75,140
2. Albuera, 32,395 17,493
3. Isabel, 33,389 21,889
4. Kananga, 36,288 19,873
5. Matagob, 15,474 9,407
6. Merida, and 22,345 12,474

TOTAL 269,347 155,995
Fifth District: Population Registered
Voters
(1990) (1994)
1. Abuyog, 47,265 28,682
2. Bato, 28,197 116,13
3. Baybay, 82,281 47,923
4. Hilongos, 48,617 26,871
5. Hindang, 16,272 9,659
6. Inopacan, 16,894 10,401
7. Javier, 18,658 11,713
8. Mahaplag, and 22,673 13,616
9. Matalom 28,291 16,247

TOTAL 309,148 181,242
Petitioner Montejo filed a motion for reconsideration calling the attention of respondent
COMELEC, among others, to the inequitable distribution of inhabitants and voters between the
First and Second Districts. He alleged that the First District has 178,688 registered voters while
the Second District has 156,462 registered voters or a difference of 22,226 registered voters. To
diminish the difference, he proposed that the municipality of Tolosa with 7,7000 registered
voters be transferred from the First to the Second District. The motion was opposed by
intervenor, Sergio A.F. Apostol. Respondent Commission denied the motion ruling that: (1) its
adjustment of municipalities involved the least disruption of the territorial composition of each
district; and (2) said adjustment complied with the constitutional requirement that each
legislative district shall comprise, as far as practicable, contiguous, compact and adjacent
territory.
In this petition, petitioner insists that Section I of Resolution No. 2736 violates the principle of
equality of representation ordained in the Constitution. Citing Wesberry v. Sanders, 8 he argues
that respondent COMELEC violated "the constitutional precept that as much as practicable one
man's vote in a congressional election is to be worth as much as another's." The Solicitor
General, in his Comment, concurred with the views of the petitioner. The intervenor, however,
opposed the petition on two (2) grounds: (1) COMELEC has no jurisdiction to promulgate
Resolution No. 2736; and (2) assuming it has jurisdiction, said Resolution is in accord with the
Constitution. Respondent COMELEC filed its own Comment alleging that it acted within the
parameters of the Constitution.
We find section 1 of Resolution No. 2736 void.
While the petition at bench presents a significant issue, our first inquiry will relate to the
constitutional power of the respondent COMELEC 9 to transfer municipalities from one
legislative district to another legislative district in the province of Leyte. The basic powers of
respondent COMELEC, as enforcer and administrator of our election laws, are spelled out in
black and white in section 2(c), Article IX of the Constitution. Rightly, respondent COMELEC
does not invoke this provision but relies on the Ordinance appended to the 1987 Constitution as
the source of its power of redistricting which is traditionally regarded as part of the power to
make laws. The Ordinance is entitled "Apportioning the Seats of the House of Representatives of
the Congress of the Philippines to the Different Legislative Districts in Provinces and Cities and
the Metropolitan Manila Area." Its substantive sections state:
1986 Constitutional Commission and subsequent elections, and until otherwise
apportioned among the provinces, cities, and the Metropolitan Manila Area as
follows:
xxx xxx xxx
Sec. 2. The Commission on Elections is hereby empowered to make minor
adjustments of the reapportionment herein made.
according to the standards set forth in paragraph (3), Section 5 of Article VI of the
Constitution. The number of Members apportioned to the province out of which
such new province was created or where the city, whose population has so
hundred and twenty days before the election. (Emphasis supplied)
The Ordinance was made necessary because Proclamation No. 3 10 of President Corazon C.
Aquino, ordaining the Provisional Constitution of the Republic of the Philippines, abolished
the Batasang Pambansa. 11 She then exercised legislative powers under the Provisional
Constitution. 12
The Ordinance was the principal handiwork of then Commissioner Hilario G. Davide, Jr., 13 now
a distinguished member of this Court. The records reveal that the Constitutional Commission had
to resolve several prejudicial issues before authorizing the first congressional elections under the
1987 Constitution. Among the vital issues were: whether the members of the House of
Representatives would be elected by district or by province; who shall undertake the
apportionment of the legislative districts; and, how the apportionment should be
made. 14 Commissioner Davide, Jr. offered three (3) options for the Commission to consider: (1)
allow President Aquino to do the apportionment by law; (2) empower the COMELEC to make
the apportionment; or (3) let the Commission exercise the power by way of an Ordinance
appended to the Constitution. 15 The different dimensions of the options were discussed by
Commissioners Davide, Felicitas S. Aquino and Blas F. Ople. We quote the debates
in extenso, viz.: 16
xxx xxx xxx
MR. PADILLA. Mr. Presiding Officer.
THE PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. Jamir). Commissioner Padilla is recognized.
MR. PADILLA. I think I have filed a very simple motion by way of amendment
by substitution and this was, I believe, a prior or a proposed amendment. Also, the
chairman of the Committee on the Legislative said that he was proposing a vote
first by the Chamber on the concept of whether the election is by province and
cities on the one hand, or by legislative districts on the other. So I propose this
simple formulation which reads: "FOR THE FIRST ELECTION UNDER THIS
CONSTITUTION
THE
LEGISLATIVE
DISTRICTS
SHALL
BE
APPORTIONED BY THE COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS." I hope the
chairman will accept the proposed amendment.
SUSPENSION OF SESSION
MR. DAVIDE. The effect is, more or less, the same insofar as the apportionment
is concerned, but the Bernas-Sarmiento et al. proposal would also provide for a
mandate for the apportionment later, meaning after the first election, which will in
effect embody what the Commission had approved, reading as follows: "Within
three years following the return of every census, the Congress shall make a
reapportionment of legislative districts based on the standards provided in this
section."
So, Mr. Presiding Officer, may I request for a suspension of the session, so that all
the proponents can work together.
THE PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. Jamir). The session is suspended.
It was 3:33 p.m.
RESUMPTION OF SESSION
At 3:40 p.m., the session was resumed.
THE PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. Jamir). The session is resumed.
Commissioner Davide is recognized.
MR. DAVIDE. Mr. Presiding Officer, as a compromise, I wonder if the
Commission will allow this. We will just delete the proposed subparagraph (4)
and all the capitalized words in paragraph (5). So that in paragraph (5), what
would be left would only be the following: "Within three years following the
return of every census, the Congress shall make a reapportionment of legislative
districts based on the standards provided in this section."
But we shall have an ordinance appended to the new Constitution indicating
specifically the following: "FOR PURPOSES OF THE ELECTION OF
MEMBERS OF THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES IN THE FIRST
CONGRESSIONAL ELECTION IMMEDIATELY FOLLOWING THE
RATIFICATION OF THIS CONSTITUTION PROPOSED BY THE 1986
CONSTITUTIONAL COMMISSION AND SUBSEQUENT ELECTIONS AND
UNTIL OTHERWISE PROVIDED BY LAW, THE MEMBERS OF THE
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES SHALL BE ELECTED FROM
LEGISLATIVE DISTRICTS APPORTIONED AMONG THE PROVINCES,
CITIES AND THE METROPOLITAN MANILA AREA AS FOLLOWS."
And what will follow will be the allocation of seats to Metropolitan Manila Area,
to the provinces and to the cities, without indicating the municipalities comprising
each of the districts. Then, under Section 2, we will mandate the COMELEC to
make the actual apportionment on the basis of the number of seats provided for
and allocated to each province by us.
MS. AQUINO. Mr. Presiding Officer.
THE PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. Jamir). Commissioner Aquino is recognized.
MS. AQUINO. I have to object to the provision which will give mandate to
COMELEC to do the redistricting. Redistricting is vitally linked to the baneful
practices of cutting up areas or spheres of influence; in other words,
gerrymandering. This Commission, being a nonpartisan, a nonpolitical
deliberative body, is in the best possible situation under the circumstances to

undertake that responsibility. We are not wanting in expertise and in time because
in the first place, the Committee on the Legislative has prepared the report on the
basis of the recommendation of the COMELEC.
MR. OPLE. Mr. Presiding Officer.
THE PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. Jamir). Commissioner Ople is recognized.
MR. OPLE. I would like to support the position taken by Commissioner Aquino
in this respect. We know that the reapportionment of provinces and cities for the
purpose of redistricting is generally inherent in the constituent power or in the
legislative power. And I would feel very uncertain about delegating this to a
quasi-judicial body even if it is one of the constitutional offices created under this
Constitution. We have the assurance of Commissioner Davide, as chairman of the
Committee on the Legislative, that even given the very short time remaining in
the life of this Commission, there is no reason why we cannot complete the work
of reapportionment on the basis of the COMELEC plan which the committee has
already thoroughly studied and which remains available to the Constitutional
Commission.
So, I support the position taken by Commissioner Aquino, Mr. Presiding Officer. I
think, it is the safest, the most reasonable, and the most workable approach that is
available to this Commission.
THE PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. Jamir). What does Commissioner Davide say:
MR. DAVIDE. The issue now is whether this body will make the apportionment
itself or whether we will leave it to the COMELEC. So, there arises, therefore, a
prejudicial question for the body to decide. I would propose that the Commission
should now decide what body should make the apportionment. Should it be the
Commission or should it be the COMELEC? And the Committee on the
Legislative will act accordingly on the basis of the decision.
MR. BENGZON. Mr. Presiding Officer.
THE PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. Jamir). Commissioner Bengzon is recognized.
MR. BENGZON. Apropos of that, I would like to inform the body that I believe
the Committee on the Legislative has precisely worked on this matter and they are
ready with a list of apportionment. They have, in fact, apportioned the whole
country into various districts based on the recommendation of the COMELEC. So
they are ready with the list and if this body would wish to apportion the whole
country by district itself, then I believe we have the time to do it because the
Committee on the Legislative is ready with that particular report which need only
to be appended to the Constitution. So if this body is ready to accept the work of
the Committee on the Legislative we would have no problem. I just would like to
give that information so that the people here would be guided accordingly when
they vote.
MR. RODRIGO. Mr. Presiding Officer.
THE PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. Jamir) Commissioner Rodrigo is recognized.

MR. RODRIGO. I just would like to ask Commissioner Davide some questions.
THE PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. Jamir). Commissioner Davide may yield if he
so desires.
MR. DAVIDE. Gladly.
MR. RODRIGO. Will this apportionment which we are considering apply only to
the first election after the enactment of the Constitution?
MR. DAVIDE. On the basis of the Padilla proposal, it will be for the first election;
on the basis of the Sarmiento proposal, it will only apply to the first election.
MR. RODRIGO. And after that, Congress will have the power to reapportion.
MR. DAVIDE. Yes.
MR. RODRIGO. So, if we attach this to the Constitution the reapportionment
based on the COMELEC study and between the approval of the Constitution and
the first election the COMELEC no longer has the power to change that even a
bit.
xxx xxx xxx
THE PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. Jamir) Commissioner Regalado is recognized.
MR. REGALADO. May I address a clarificatory question to Commissioner
Davide?
THE PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. Jamir). Gentleman will please proceed.
MR. REGALADO. On the basis of the Commissioner's proposed apportionment
and considering the fact that there will be a corresponding reduction to 183 seats,
would there be instances representation of under non-representation?
MR. DAVIDE. None at all, Mr. Presiding Officer. I can assure the Commission
that there will be no case of inequitable distribution. It will come out to be one for
every 350 to 400,000 inhabitants.
MR. REGALADO. And that would be within the standard that we refer.
MR. DAVIDE. Yes, Mr. Presiding Officer.
MR. REGALADO. Thank you.
MR. RAMA. Mr. Presiding Officer.
THE PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. Jamir). The Floor Leader is recognized.
MR. RAMA. The parliamentary situation is that there was a motion by

Commissioner Sarmiento to mandate COMELEC to do the redistricting. This was
also almost the same motion by Commissioner Padilla and I think we have had
some kind of meeting of minds. On the other hand, there seems to be a prejudicial
question, an amendment to the amendment as suggested by Commissioner
Aquino, that instead of the COMELEC, it should be this Commission that shall
make the redistricting. So may I ask Commissioner Aquino, if she insists on that
idea, to please formulate it into a motion so we can vote on that first as an
amendment to the amendment.
THE PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. Jamir).Commissioner Aquino is recognized.
MS . AQUINO. The motion is for this Commission to undertake the
apportionment of the legislative districts instead of the proposal that COMELEC
be given the mandate to undertake the responsibility.
xxx xxx xxx
MR. SARMIENTO. May I be clarified, Mr. Presiding Officer. Is it the motion or
the proposed amendment?
THE PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. Jamir). The proposed amendment.
MR. SARMIENTO. May we move for the approval of this proposed amendment
which we substitute for paragraphs 4 and 5.
MR. DAVIDE. May I request that it should be treated merely as a motion to be
followed by a deletion of paragraph 4 because that should not really appear as a
paragraph in Section 5; otherwise, it will appear very ugly in the Constitution
where we mandate a Commission that will become functus officioto have the
authority. As a matter of fact, we cannot exercise that authority until after the
ratification of the new Constitution.
THE PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. Jamir). What does Commissioner Sarmiento
say?
MR. SARMIENTO. It is accepted, Mr. Presiding Officer. So, may I move for the
approval of this proposed amendment.
THE PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. Jamir). Commissioner Aquino is recognized.
MS. AQUINO. Would that require a two-thirds vote or a simple plurality to adopt
that motion?
THE PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. Jamir). That will require a two-thirds vote.
MS. AQUINO. Thank you. Mr. Presiding Officer.
MR. SARMIENTO. May I restate the motion, Mr. Presiding Officer.
THE PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. Jamir) The Gentleman may proceed.

MR. SARMIENTO. May I move that this Commission do the reapportionment
legislative districts.
THE PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. Jamir). What is the pleasure of Commissioner
Aquino?
MS. AQUINO. May I be clarified again on the motion. Is Commissioner
Sarmiento, therefore, adopting my motion? Would it not be right for him to move
that the COMELEC be mandated?
MR. SARMIENTO. No, we accepted the amendment. It is already the
Commission that will be mandated.
MS. AQUINO. So, the Gentlemen has accepted the amendment the amendment.
Thank you.
MR. SARMIENTO. I am voting that this Commission do the reapportionment.
VOTING
THE PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. Jamir). Let us proceed to vote.
As many as are in favor, please raise their hand. (Several Members raised their
hand.)
As many as are against, please raise their hand. (No Member raised his hand.)
The results show 30 votes in favor and none against; the motion is approved.
Clearly then, the Constitutional Commission denied to the COMELEC the major power of
legislative apportionment as it itself exercised the power. Section 2 of the Ordinance only
empowered the COMELEC "to make minor adjustments of the reapportionment herein made."
The meaning of the phrase "minor adjustments was again clarified in the debates 17 of the
Commission, viz.:
xxx xxx xxx
MR. GUINGONA. This is just clarificatory, Mr. Presiding Officer. In Section 2,
the Commission on Elections is empowered to make minor adjustments on the
apportionment made here.
MR. DAVIDE. Yes, Mr. Presiding Officer.
MR. GUINGONA. We have not set any time limit for this.
MR. DAVIDE. We should not set a time limit unless during the period of
amendments a proposal is made. The authority conferred would be on minor
corrections or amendments, meaning to say, for instance, that we may have

forgotten an intervening municipality in the enumeration, which ought to be
included in one district. That we shall consider a minor amendment.
MR. GUINGONA. Thank you.
xxx xxx xxx
THE PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. Romulo). Commissioner de Castro is
recognized.
MR. DE CASTRO. Thank you.
I was about to ask the committee the meaning of minor adjustment. Can it be
possible that one municipality in a district be transferred to another district and
call it a minor adjustment?
MR. DAVIDE. That cannot be done, Mr. Presiding Officer. Minor, meaning, that
there should be no change in the allocations per district. However, it may happen
that we have forgotten a municipality in between which is still in the territory of
one assigned district, or there may be an error in the correct name of a particular
municipality because of changes made by the interim Batasang Pambansa and the
Regular Batasang Pambansa. There were many batas pambansa enacted by both
the interim and the Regular Batasang Pambansa changing the names of
municipalities.
MR. DE CASTRO. So, the minor adjustment may be made only if one of the
municipalities is not mentioned in the ordinance appended to, and it will be up for
the COMELEC now to adjust or to put such municipality to a certain district.
MR. DAVIDE. Yes, Mr. Presiding Officer. For instance, we may not have the data
regarding a division of a municipality by the interim Batasang Pambansa or the
Regular Batasang Pambansa into two municipalities, meaning, a mother
municipality and the new municipality, but still actually these are within the
geographical district area.
MR. DE CASTRO. So the minor adjustment which the COMELEC cannot do is
that, if, for example, my municipality is in the First District of Laguna, they
cannot put that in any other district.
MR. DAVIDE. That is not even a minor correction. It is a substantive one.
MR. DE CASTRO. Thank you.
Consistent with the limits of its power to make minor adjustments, Section 3 of the Ordinance
did not also give the respondent COMELEC any authority to transfer municipalities from one
legislative district to another district. The power granted by Section 3 to the respondent
COMELEC is to adjust the number of members (not municipalities) "apportioned to the province
out of which such new province was created. . . ."
Prescinding from these premises, we hold that respondent COMELEC committed grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction when it promulgated section 1 of its Resolution No.
2736 transferring the municipality of Capoocan of the Second District and the municipality of
Palompon of the Fourth District to the Third District of Leyte.
It may well be that the conversion of Biliran from a sub-province to a regular province brought
about an imbalance in the distribution of voters and inhabitants in the five (5) legislative districts
of the province of Leyte. This imbalance, depending on its degree, could devalue a citizen's vote
in violation of the equal protection clause of the Constitution. Be that as it may, it is not proper at
this time for petitioner to raise this issue using the case at bench as his legal vehicle. The issue
involves a problem of reapportionment of legislative districts and petitioner's remedy lies with
Congress. Section 5(4), Article VI of the Constitution categorically gives Congress the power to
reapportion, thus: "Within three (3) years following the return of every census, the Congress
shall make a reapportionment of legislative districts based on the standards provided in this
section." In Macias v. COMELEC,18 we ruled that the validity of a legislative apportionment is a
justiciable question. But while this Court can strike down an unconstitutional reapportionment, it
cannot itself make the reapportionment as petitioner would want us to do by directing respondent
COMELEC to transfer the municipality of Tolosa from the First District to the Second District of
the province of Leyte.
IN VIEW WHEREOF, section 1 of Resolution No. 2736 insofar as it transferred the municipality
of Capoocan of the Second District and the municipality of Palompon of the Fourth District to
the Third District of the province of Leyte, is annulled and set aside. We also deny the Petition
praying for the transfer of the municipality of Tolosafrom the First District to the Second District
of the province of Leyte. No costs.
SO ORDERED.
Narvasa, C.J., Feliciano, Padilla, Bidin, Regalado, Davide, Jr., Romero, Bellosillo, Melo,
Quiason, Vitug, Kapunan, Mendoza and Francisco, JJ., concur.

SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. 189793
April 7, 2010
SENATOR BENIGNO SIMEON C. AQUINO III and MAYOR JESSE

ROBREDO, Petitioners,
vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS represented by its Chairman JOSE A.R. MELO and its
Commissioners, RENE V. SARMIENTO, NICODEMO T. FERRER, LUCENITO N.
TAGLE, ARMANDO VELASCO, ELIAS R. YUSOPH AND GREGORIO
LARRAZABAL, Respondents.
DECISION
PEREZ, J.:
This case comes before this Court by way of a Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition under Rule
65 of the Rules of Court. In this original action, petitioners Senator Benigno Simeon C. Aquino
III and Mayor Jesse Robredo, as public officers, taxpayers and citizens, seek the nullification as
unconstitutional of Republic Act No. 9716, entitled "An Act Reapportioning the Composition of
the First (1st) and Second (2nd) Legislative Districts in the Province of Camarines Sur and
Thereby Creating a New Legislative District From Such Reapportionment." Petitioners
consequently pray that the respondent Commission on Elections be restrained from making any
issuances and from taking any steps relative to the implementation of Republic Act No. 9716.
Republic Act No. 9716 originated from House Bill No. 4264, and was signed into law by
President Gloria Macapagal Arroyo on 12 October 2009. It took effect on 31 October 2009, or
fifteen (15) days following its publication in the Manila Standard, a newspaper of general
circulation.1 In substance, the said law created an additional legislative district for the Province
of Camarines Sur by reconfiguring the existing first and second legislative districts of the
province.
Prior to Republic Act No. 9716, the Province of Camarines Sur was estimated to have a
population of 1,693,821,2distributed among four (4) legislative districts in this wise:
District
1st District
2nd District
3rd District
4th District
Municipalities/Cities
Del Gallego
Ragay
Lupi
Sipocot
Cabusao
Libmanan
Minalabac
Pamplona
Pasacao
San Fernando
Gainza
Milaor
Naga
Pili
Ocampo
Canaman
Camaligan
Magarao
Bombon
Calabanga
Caramoan
Garchitorena
Goa
Lagonoy
Presentacion
Sangay
San Jose
Tigaon
Tinamba
Siruma
Iriga
Baao
Balatan
Bato
Buhi
Bula
Nabua
Population
417,304
474,899
372,548
429,070
Following the enactment of Republic Act No. 9716, the first and second districts of Camarines
Sur were reconfigured in order to create an additional legislative district for the province. Hence,
the first district municipalities of Libmanan, Minalabac, Pamplona, Pasacao, and San Fernando
were combined with the second district municipalities of Milaor and Gainza to form a new
second legislative district. The following table3 illustrates the reapportionment made by Republic
Act No. 9716:
District
Municipalities/Cities
1st District
Del Gallego
Ragay
Lupi
Sipocot
Cabusao
2nd District
Population
176,383
Libmanan
Minalabac
Pamplona
Pasacao
San Fernando
Gainza
Milaor
3rd District (formerly 2nd District)
Naga
Pili
Ocampo
Canaman
Camaligan
Magarao
Bombon
Calabanga
439,043
4th District (formerly 3rd District)
Caramoan
Garchitorena
Goa
Lagonoy
Presentacion
Sangay
San Jose
Tigaon
Tinamba
Siruma
372,548
5th District (formerly 4th District)
Iriga
Baao
Balatan
Bato
Buhi
Bula
Nabua
429,070
276,777
Republic Act No. 9716 is a well-milled legislation. The factual recitals by both parties of the
origins of the bill that became the law show that, from the filing of House Bill No. 4264 until its
approval by the Senate on a vote of thirteen (13) in favor and two (2) against, the process
progressed step by step, marked by public hearings on the sentiments and position of the local
officials of Camarines Sur on the creation of a new congressional district, as well as
argumentation and debate on the issue, now before us, concerning the stand of the oppositors of
the bill that a population of at least 250,000 is required by the Constitution for such new district.4
Petitioner Aquino III was one of two senators who voted against the approval of the Bill by the
Senate. His co-petitioner, Robredo, is the Mayor of Naga City, which was a part of the former
second district from which the municipalities of Gainza and Milaor were taken for inclusion in
the new second district. No other local executive joined the two; neither did the representatives
of the former third and fourth districts of the province.
Petitioners contend that the reapportionment introduced by Republic Act No. 9716, runs afoul of
the explicit constitutional standard that requires a minimum population of two hundred fifty
thousand (250,000) for the creation of a legislative district. 5 The petitioners claim that the
reconfiguration by Republic Act No. 9716 of the first and second districts of Camarines Sur is
unconstitutional, because the proposed first district will end up with a population of less than
250,000 or only 176,383.
Petitioners rely on Section 5(3), Article VI of the 1987 Constitution as basis for the cited 250,000
minimum population standard.6 The provision reads:
Article VI
Section 5. (1) x x x x
(2) x x x x
(3) Each legislative district shall comprise, as far as practicable, contiguous, compact, and
adjacent territory. Each city with a population of at least two hundred fifty thousand, or
each province, shall have at least one representative.
(4) x x x x (Emphasis supplied).
The petitioners posit that the 250,000 figure appearing in the above-cited provision is the
minimum population requirement for the creation of a legislative district. 7 The petitioners
theorize that, save in the case of a newly created province, each legislative district created by
Congress must be supported by a minimum population of at least 250,000 in order to be
valid.8 Under this view, existing legislative districts may be reapportioned and severed to form
new districts, provided each resulting district will represent a population of at least 250,000. On
the other hand, if the reapportionment would result in the creation of a legislative seat
representing a populace of less than 250,000 inhabitants, the reapportionment must be stricken
down as invalid for non-compliance with the minimum population requirement.
In support of their theory, the petitioners point to what they claim is the intent of the framers of
the 1987 Constitution to adopt a population minimum of 250,000 in the creation of additional
legislative seats.9 The petitioners argue that when the Constitutional Commission fixed the
original number of district seats in the House of Representatives to two hundred (200), they took
into account the projected national population of fifty five million (55,000,000) for the year
1986.10 According to the petitioners, 55 million people represented by 200 district representatives
translates to roughly 250,000 people for every one (1) representative. 11 Thus, the 250,000
population requirement found in Section 5(3), Article VI of the 1987 Constitution is actually
based on the population constant used by the Constitutional Commission in distributing the
initial 200 legislative seats.
Thus did the petitioners claim that in reapportioning legislative districts independently from the
creation of a province, Congress is bound to observe a 250,000 population threshold, in the same
manner that the Constitutional Commission did in the original apportionment.
Verbatim, the submission is that:
1. Republic Act 9716 is unconstitutional because the newly apportioned first district of
Camarines Sur failed to meet the population requirement for the creation of the
legislative district as explicitly provided in Article VI, Section 5, Paragraphs (1) and (3)
of the Constitution and Section 3 of the Ordinance appended thereto; and
2. Republic Act 9716 violates the principle of proportional representation as provided in
Article VI, Section 5 paragraphs (1), (3) and (4) of the Constitution.12
The provision subject of this case states:
Article VI
Section 5. (1) The House of Representatives shall be composed of not more than two hundred
and fifty members, unless otherwise fixed by law, who shall be elected from legislative districts
apportioned among the provinces, cities and the Metropolitan Manila area in accordance with the
number of their respective inhabitants, and on the basis of a uniform and progressive ratio, and
those who, as provided by law, shall be elected through a party-list system of registered national,
(2) x x x x
(3) Each legislative district shall comprise, as far as practicable, contiguous, compact, and
adjacent territory. Each city with a population of at least two hundred fifty thousand, or
each province, shall have at least one representative.
(4) Within three years following the return of every census, the Congress shall make a
reapportionment of legislative districts based on the standards provided in this section.
On the other hand, the respondents, through the Office of the Solicitor General, seek the
dismissal of the present petition based on procedural and substantive grounds.
On procedural matters, the respondents argue that the petitioners are guilty of two (2) fatal
technical defects: first, petitioners committed an error in choosing to assail the constitutionality
of Republic Act No. 9716 via the remedy of Certiorari and Prohibition under Rule 65 of the
Rules of Court; and second, the petitioners have no locus standi to question the constitutionality
of Republic Act No. 9716.
On substantive matters, the respondents call attention to an apparent distinction between cities
and provinces drawn by Section 5(3), Article VI of the 1987 Constitution. The respondents
concede the existence of a 250,000 population condition, but argue that a plain and simple
reading of the questioned provision will show that the same has no application with respect to the
creation of legislative districts in provinces. 13 Rather, the 250,000 minimum population is only a
requirement for the creation of a legislative district in a city.
In sum, the respondents deny the existence of a fixed population requirement for the
reapportionment of districts in provinces. Therefore, Republic Act No. 9716, which only creates
an additional legislative district within the province of Camarines Sur, should be sustained as a
perfectly valid reapportionment law.
We first pass upon the threshold issues.
The respondents assert that by choosing to avail themselves of the remedies of Certiorari and
Prohibition, the petitioners have committed a fatal procedural lapse. The respondents cite the
following reasons:
1. The instant petition is bereft of any allegation that the respondents had acted without or
in excess of jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion.1avvphi1
2. The remedy of Certiorari and Prohibition must be directed against a tribunal, board,
officer or person, whether exercising judicial, quasi-judicial, or ministerial functions.
Respondents maintain that in implementing Republic Act No. 9716, they were not acting
as a judicial or quasi-judicial body, nor were they engaging in the performance of a
ministerial act.
3. The petitioners could have availed themselves of another plain, speedy and adequate
remedy in the ordinary course of law. Considering that the main thrust of the instant
petition is the declaration of unconstitutionality of Republic Act No. 9716, the same
could have been ventilated through a petition for declaratory relief, over which the
Supreme Court has only appellate, not original jurisdiction.
The respondents likewise allege that the petitioners had failed to show that they had sustained, or
is in danger of sustaining any substantial injury as a result of the implementation of Republic Act
No. 9716. The respondents, therefore, conclude that the petitioners lack the required legal
standing to question the constitutionality of Republic Act No. 9716.
This Court has paved the way away from procedural debates when confronted with issues that,
by reason of constitutional importance, need a direct focus of the arguments on their content and
substance.
The Supreme Court has, on more than one occasion, tempered the application of procedural
rules,14 as well as relaxed the requirement of locus standi whenever confronted with an important
issue of overreaching significance to society.15
Hence, in Del Mar v. Philippine Amusement and Gaming Corporation (PAGCOR) 16 and Jaworski
v. PAGCOR,17this Court sanctioned momentary deviation from the principle of the hierarchy of
courts, and took original cognizance of cases raising issues of paramount public importance. The
Jaworski case ratiocinates:
Granting arguendo that the present action cannot be properly treated as a petition for
prohibition, the transcendental importance of the issues involved in this case warrants that we set
aside the technical defects and take primary jurisdiction over the petition at bar. One cannot deny
that the issues raised herein have potentially pervasive influence on the social and moral well
being of this nation, specially the youth; hence, their proper and just determination is an
imperative need. This is in accordance with the well-entrenched principle that rules of procedure
are not inflexible tools designed to hinder or delay, but to facilitate and promote the
administration of justice. Their strict and rigid application, which would result in technicalities
that tend to frustrate, rather than promote substantial justice, must always be eschewed.
(Emphasis supplied)
Anent the locus standi requirement, this Court has already uniformly ruled in Kilosbayan v.
Guingona,18 Tatad v. Executive Secretary,19 Chavez v. Public Estates Authority20 and Bagong
Alyansang Makabayan v. Zamora,21 just to name a few, that absence of direct injury on the part
of the party seeking judicial review may be excused when the latter is able to craft an issue of
transcendental importance. In Lim v. Executive Secretary,22 this Court held that in cases of
transcendental importance, the cases must be settled promptly and definitely, and so, the standing
requirements may be relaxed. This liberal stance has been echoed in the more recent decision on
Chavez v. Gonzales.23
Given the weight of the issue raised in the instant petition, the foregoing principles must apply.
The beaten path must be taken. We go directly to the determination of whether or not a
population of 250,000 is an indispensable constitutional requirement for the creation of a new
legislative district in a province.
We deny the petition.
We start with the basics. Any law duly enacted by Congress carries with it the presumption of
constitutionality.24Before a law may be declared unconstitutional by this Court, there must be a
clear showing that a specific provision of the fundamental law has been violated or transgressed.
When there is neither a violation of a specific provision of the Constitution nor any proof
showing that there is such a violation, the presumption of constitutionality will prevail and the
law must be upheld. To doubt is to sustain.25
There is no specific provision in the Constitution that fixes a 250,000 minimum population that
must compose a legislative district.
As already mentioned, the petitioners rely on the second sentence of Section 5(3), Article VI of
the 1987 Constitution, coupled with what they perceive to be the intent of the framers of the
Constitution to adopt a minimum population of 250,000 for each legislative district.
The second sentence of Section 5(3), Article VI of the Constitution, succinctly provides: "Each
city with a population of at least two hundred fifty thousand, or each province, shall have at least
one representative."
The provision draws a plain and clear distinction between the entitlement of a city to a district on
one hand, and the entitlement of a province to a district on the other. For while a province is
entitled to at least a representative, with nothing mentioned about population, a city must first
meet a population minimum of 250,000 in order to be similarly entitled.
The use by the subject provision of a comma to separate the phrase "each city with a population
of at least two hundred fifty thousand" from the phrase "or each province" point to no other
conclusion than that the 250,000 minimum population is only required for a city, but not for a
province. 26
Plainly read, Section 5(3) of the Constitution requires a 250,000 minimum population only for a
city to be entitled to a representative, but not so for a province.
The 250,000 minimum population requirement for legislative districts in cities was, in turn, the
subject of interpretation by this Court in Mariano, Jr. v. COMELEC.27
In Mariano, the issue presented was the constitutionality of Republic Act No. 7854, which was
the law that converted the Municipality of Makati into a Highly Urbanized City. As it happened,
Republic Act No. 7854 created an additional legislative district for Makati, which at that time
was a lone district. The petitioners in that case argued that the creation of an additional district
would violate Section 5(3), Article VI of the Constitution, because the resulting districts would
be supported by a population of less than 250,000, considering that Makati had a total population
of only 450,000. The Supreme Court sustained the constitutionality of the law and the validity of
the newly created district, explaining the operation of the Constitutional phrase "each city with a
population of at least two hundred fifty thousand," to wit:
Petitioners cannot insist that the addition of another legislative district in Makati is not in accord
with section 5(3), Article VI of the Constitution for as of the latest survey (1990 census), the
population of Makati stands at only four hundred fifty thousand (450,000). Said section
provides, inter alia, that a city with a population of at least two hundred fifty thousand (250,000)
shall have at least one representative. Even granting that the population of Makati as of the 1990
census stood at four hundred fifty thousand (450,000), its legislative district may still be
increased since it has met the minimum population requirement of two hundred fifty thousand
(250,000). In fact, Section 3 of the Ordinance appended to the Constitution provides that a city
whose population has increased to more than two hundred fifty thousand (250,000) shall be
entitled to at least one congressional representative.28(Emphasis supplied)
The Mariano case limited the application of the 250,000 minimum population requirement for
cities only to its initial legislative district. In other words, while Section 5(3), Article VI of the
Constitution requires a city to have a minimum population of 250,000 to be entitled to a
representative, it does not have to increase its population by another 250,000 to be entitled to an
additional district.
There is no reason why the Mariano case, which involves the creation of an additional district
within a city, should not be applied to additional districts in provinces. Indeed, if an additional
legislative district created within a city is not required to represent a population of at least
250,000 in order to be valid, neither should such be needed for an additional district in a
province, considering moreover that a province is entitled to an initial seat by the mere fact of its
creation and regardless of its population.
Apropos for discussion is the provision of the Local Government Code on the creation of a
province which, by virtue of and upon creation, is entitled to at least a legislative district. Thus,
Section 461 of the Local Government Code states:
Requisites for Creation. (a) A province may be created if it has an average annual income, as
certified by the Department of Finance, of not less than Twenty million pesos (P20,000,000.00)
based on 1991 constant prices and either of the following requisites:
(i) a contiguous territory of at least two thousand (2,000) square kilometers, as certified
by the Lands Management Bureau; or
(ii) a population of not less than two hundred fifty thousand (250,000) inhabitants as
certified by the National Statistics Office.
Notably, the requirement of population is not an indispensable requirement, but is merely
an alternative addition to the indispensable income requirement.
Mariano, it would turn out, is but a reflection of the pertinent ideas that ran through the
deliberations on the words and meaning of Section 5 of Article VI.
The whats, whys, and wherefores of the population requirement of "at least two hundred fifty
thousand" may be gleaned from the records of the Constitutional Commission which, upon
framing the provisions of Section 5 of Article VI, proceeded to form an ordinance that would be
appended to the final document. The Ordinance is captioned "APPORTIONING THE SEATS OF
THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES OF THE CONGRESS OF THE PHILIPPINES TO
THE DIFFERENT LEGISLATIVE DISTRICTS IN PROVINCES AND CITIES AND THE
METROPOLITAN MANILA AREA." Such records would show that the 250,000 population
benchmark
was
used
for
the
1986
nationwide apportionment of
legislative
districts among provinces, cities and Metropolitan Manila. Simply put, the population figure was
used to determine how many districts a province, city, or Metropolitan Manila should
have. Simply discernible too is the fact that, for the purpose, population had to be the
determinant. Even then, the requirement of 250,000 inhabitants was not taken as an absolute
minimum for one legislative district. And, closer to the point herein at issue, in the determination
of the precise district within the province to which, through the use of the population benchmark,
so many districts have been apportioned, population as a factor was not the sole, though it was
among, several determinants.
From its journal,29 we can see that the Constitutional Commission originally divided the entire
country into two hundred (200) districts, which corresponded to the original number of district
representatives. The 200 seats were distributed by the Constitutional Commission in this manner:
first, one (1) seat each was given to the seventy-three (73) provinces and the ten (10) cities with a
population of at least 250,000;30 second, the remaining seats were then redistributed among the
provinces, cities and the Metropolitan Area "in accordance with the number of their inhabitants
on the basis of a uniform and progressive ratio."31 Commissioner Davide, who later became a
Member and then Chief Justice of the Court, explained this in his sponsorship remark 32 for the
Ordinance to be appended to the 1987 Constitution:
Commissioner Davide: The ordinance fixes at 200 the number of legislative seats which are, in
turn, apportioned among provinces and cities with a population of at least 250, 000 and the
Metropolitan Area in accordance with the number of their respective inhabitants on the basis of a
uniform and progressive ratio. The population is based on the 1986 projection, with the 1980
official enumeration as the point of reckoning. This projection indicates that our population is
more or less 56 million. Taking into account the mandate that each city with at least 250, 000
inhabitants and each province shall have at least one representative, we first allotted one seat for
each of the 73 provinces, and each one for all cities with a population of at least 250, 000, which
are the Cities of Manila, Quezon, Pasay, Caloocan, Cebu, Iloilo, Bacolod, Cagayan de Oro,
Davao and Zamboanga. Thereafter, we then proceed[ed] to increase whenever appropriate the
number of seats for the provinces and cities in accordance with the number of their inhabitants
on the basis of a uniform and progressive ratio. (Emphasis supplied).
Thus was the number of seats computed for each province and city. Differentiated from this, the
determination of the districts within the province had to consider "all protests and complaints
formally received" which, the records show, dealt with determinants other than population as
already mentioned.
Palawan is a case in point. Journal No. 107 of the Constitutional Commission narrates:
INTERPELLATION OF MR. NOLLEDO:
Mr. Nolledo inquired on the reason for including Puerto Princesa in the northern towns when it
was more affinity with the southern town of Aborlan, Batarasa, Brookes Point, Narra, Quezon
and Marcos. He stated that the First District has a greater area than the Second District. He then
queried whether population was the only factor considered by the Committee in redistricting.
Replying thereto, Mr. Davide explained that the Committee took into account the standards set in
Section 5 of the Article on the Legislative Department, namely: 1) the legislative seats should be
apportioned among the provinces and cities and the Metropolitan Manila area in accordance with
their inhabitants on the basis of a uniform and progressive ratio; and 2) the legislative district
must be compact, adjacent and contiguous.
Mr. Nolledo pointed out that the last factor was not met when Puerto Princesa was included with
the northern towns. He then inquired what is the distance between Puerto Princesa from San
Vicente.
xxxx
Thereupon, Mr. Nolledo stated that Puerto Princesa has a population of 75,480 and based on the
apportionment, its inclusion with the northern towns would result in a combined population of
265,000 as against only 186,000 for the south. He added that Cuyo and Coron are very important
towns in the northern part of Palawan and, in fact, Cuyo was the capital of Palawan before its
transfer to Puerto Princesa. He also pointed out that there are more potential candidates in the
north and therefore if Puerto Princesa City and the towns of Cuyo and Coron are lumped
together, there would be less candidates in the south, most of whose inhabitants are not interested
in politics. He then suggested that Puerto Princesa be included in the south or the Second
District.
Mr. Davide stated that the proposal would be considered during the period of amendments. He
requested that the COMELEC staff study said proposal.33
"PROPOSED AMENDMENT OF MR. NOLLEDO
On the districting of Palawan, Mr. Nolledo pointed out that it was explained in the interpellations
that District I has a total population of 265,358 including the City of Puerto Princesa, while the
Second District has a total population of 186,733. He proposed, however, that Puerto Princesa be
included in the Second District in order to satisfy the contiguity requirement in the Constitution
considering that said City is nearer the southern towns comprising the Second District.
In reply to Mr. Monsods query, Mr. Nolledo explained that with the proposed transfer of Puerto
Princesa City to the Second District, the First District would only have a total population of
190,000 while the Second District would have 262,213, and there would be no substantial
changes.
Mr. Davide accepted Mr. Nolledos proposal to insert Puerto Princesa City before the
Municipality of Aborlan.
There being no objection on the part of the Members the same was approved by the Body.
APPROVAL OF THE APPORTIONMENT AND DISTRICTING OF PALAWAN
There being no other amendment, on motion of Mr. Davide, there being no objection, the
apportionment and districting for the province of Palawan was approved by the Body.34
The districting of Palawan disregarded the 250,000 population figure. It was decided by the
importance of the towns and the city that eventually composed the districts.
Benguet and Baguio are another reference point. The Journal further narrates:
At this juncture, Mr. Davide informed the Body that Mr. Regalado made a reservation with the
Committee for the possible reopening of the approval of Region I with respect to Benguet and
Baguio City.
REMARKS OF MR. REGALADO
Mr. Regalado stated that in the formulation of the Committee, Baguio City and Tuba are placed
in one district. He stated that he was toying with the idea that, perhaps as a special consideration
for Baguio because it is the summer capital of the Philippines, Tuba could be divorced from
Baguio City so that it could, by itself, have its own constituency and Tuba could be transferred to
the Second District together with Itogon. Mr. Davide, however, pointed out that the population of
Baguio City is only 141,149.
Mr. Regalado admitted that the regular population of Baguio may be lower during certain times
of the year, but the transient population would increase the population substantially and,
therefore, for purposes of business and professional transactions, it is beyond question that
population-wise, Baguio would more than qualify, not to speak of the official business matters,
transactions and offices that are also there.
Mr. Davide adverted to Director de Limas statement that unless Tuba and Baguio City are
united, Tuba will be isolated from the rest of Benguet as the place can only be reached by
passing through Baguio City. He stated that the Committee would submit the matter to the Body.
Upon inquiry of the Chair whether he is insisting on his amendment, Mr. Regalado stated that the
Body should have a say on the matter and that the considerations he had given are not on the
demographic aspects but on the fact that Baguio City is the summer capital, the venue and situs
of many government offices and functions.
On motion of Mr. Davide, there being no objection, the Body approved the reconsideration of the
earlier approval of the apportionment and districting of Region I, particularly Benguet.
Thereafter, on motion of Mr. Davide, there being no objection, the amendment of Mr. Regalado
was put to a vote. With 14 Members voting in favor and none against, the amendment was
approved by the Body.
Mr. Davide informed that in view of the approval of the amendment, Benguet with Baguio City
will have two seats. The First District shall comprise of the municipalities of Mankayan,
Buguias, Bakun, Kabayan, Kibungan, Bokod, Atok, Kapangan, Tublay, La Trinidad, Sablan,
Itogon and Tuba. The Second District shall comprise of Baguio City alone.
There being no objection, the Body approved the apportionment and districting of Region I.35
Quite emphatically, population was explicitly removed as a factor.
It may be additionally mentioned that the province of Cavite was divided into districts based on
the distribution of its three cities, with each district having a city: one district "supposed to be a
fishing area; another a vegetable and fruit area; and the third, a rice growing area," because such
consideration "fosters common interests in line with the standard of compactness." 36 In the
districting of Maguindanao, among the matters discussed were "political stability and common
interest among the people in the area" and the possibility of "chaos and disunity" considering the
"accepted regional, political, traditional and sectoral leaders."37 For Laguna, it was mentioned
that municipalities in the highland should not be grouped with the towns in the lowland. For
Cebu, Commissioner Maambong proposed that they should "balance the area and population."38
Consistent with Mariano and with the framer deliberations on district apportionment, we stated
in Bagabuyo v. COMELEC39 that:
x x x Undeniably, these figures show a disparity in the population sizes of the districts. The
Constitution, however, does not require mathematical exactitude or rigid equality as a standard in
gauging equality of representation. x x x. To ensure quality representation through commonality
of interests and ease of access by the representative to the constituents, all that the Constitution
requires is that every legislative district should comprise, as far as practicable, contiguous,
compact and adjacent territory. (Emphasis supplied).
This 2008 pronouncement is fresh reasoning against the uncompromising stand of petitioner that
an additional provincial legislative district, which does not have at least a 250,000 population is
not allowed by the Constitution.
The foregoing reading and review lead to a clear lesson.
Neither in the text nor in the essence of Section 5, Article VI of the Constitution can, the petition
find support. And the formulation of the Ordinance in the implementation of the provision, nay,
even the Ordinance itself, refutes the contention that a population of 250,000 is a constitutional
sine qua non for the formation of an additional legislative district in a province, whose
population growth has increased beyond the 1986 numbers.
Translated in the terms of the present case:
1. The Province of Camarines Sur, with an estimated population of 1,693,821 in 2007 is
based on the formula and constant number of 250,000 used by the Constitutional
Commission in nationally apportioning legislative districts among provinces and cities
entitled to two (2) districts in addition to the four (4) that it was given in the 1986
apportionment. Significantly, petitioner Aquino concedes this point.40 In other words,
Section 5 of Article VI as clearly written allows and does not prohibit an additional
district for the Province of Camarines Sur, such as that provided for in Republic Act No.
9786;
2. Based on the pith and pitch of the exchanges on the Ordinance on the protests and
complaints against strict conformity with the population standard, and more importantly
based on the final districting in the Ordinance on considerations other than population,
the reapportionment or the recomposition of the first and second legislative districts in
the Province of Camarines Sur that resulted in the creation of a new legislative district is
valid even if the population of the new district is 176,383 and not 250,000 as insisted
upon by the petitioners.
3. The factors mentioned during the deliberations on House Bill No. 4264, were:
(a) the dialects spoken in the grouped municipalities;
(b) the size of the original groupings compared to that of the regrouped
municipalities;
(c) the natural division separating the municipality subject of the discussion from
the reconfigured District One; and
(d) the balancing of the areas of the three districts resulting from the redistricting
of Districts One and Two.41
Each of such factors and in relation to the others considered together, with the increased
population of the erstwhile Districts One and Two, point to the utter absence of abuse of
discretion, much less grave abuse of discretion, 42 that would warrant the invalidation of Republic
Act No. 9716.
To be clear about our judgment, we do not say that in the reapportionment of the first and second
legislative districts of Camarines Sur, the number of inhabitants in the resulting additional
district should not be considered. Our ruling is that population is not the only factor but is just
one of several other factors in the composition of the additional district. Such settlement is in
accord with both the text of the Constitution and the spirit of the letter, so very clearly given
form in the Constitutional debates on the exact issue presented by this petition.1avvphi1
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DISMISSED. Republic Act No. 9716 entitled "An Act
Reapportioning the Composition of the First (1st) and Second (2nd) Legislative Districts in the
Province of Camarines Sur and Thereby Creating a New Legislative District From Such
Reapportionment" is a VALID LAW.
SO ORDERED.
JOSE PORTUGAL PEREZ
Associate Justice

SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. 136781
October 6, 2000
VETERANS FEDERATION PARTY, ALYANSANG BAYANIHAN NG MGA

MAGSASAKA, MANGGAGAWANG BUKID AT MANGINGISDA, ADHIKAIN AT
KILUSAN NG ORDINARYONG TAO PARA SA LUPA, PABAHAY AT KAUNLARAN,
and LUZON FARMERS PARTY, petitioners,
vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, PAG-ASA, SENIOR CITIZENS, AKAP AKSYON,
PINATUBO, NUPA, PRP, AMIN, PAG-ASA, MAHARLIKA, OCW-UNIFIL, PCCI,
AMMA-KATIPUNAN, KAMPIL, BANTAY-BAYAN, AFW, ANG LAKAS OCW,
WOMEN-POWER, INC., FEJODAP, CUP, VETERANS CARE, 4L, AWATU, PMP,
ATUCP, NCWP, ALU, BIGAS, COPRA, GREEN, ANAKBAYAN, ARBA, MINFA, AYOS,
ALL COOP, PDP-LABAN, KATIPUNAN, ONEWAY PRINT, AABANTE KA PILIPINAS
-- All Being Party-List Parties/Organizations -- and Hon. MANUEL B. VILLAR, JR. in His
Capacity as Speaker of the House of Representatives, respondents.
x-----------------------x
G.R. No. 136786
October 6, 2000
AKBAYAN! (CITIZENS' ACTION PARTY), ADHIKAIN AT KILUSAN NG

ORDINARYONG TAO PARA SA LUPA, PABAHAY AT KAUNLARAN (AKO), and
ASSOCIATION OF PHILIPPINE ELECTRIC COOPERATIVES (APEC),petitioners,
vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS (COMELEC), HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
represented by Speaker Manuel B. Villar, PAG-ASA, SENIOR CITIZENS, AKAP,
AKSYON, PINATUBO, NUPA, PRP, AMIN, MAHARLIKA, OCW, UNIFIL, PCCI,
AMMA-KATIPUNAN, KAMPIL, BANTAY-BAYAN, AFW, ANG LAKAS OCW,

WOMENPOWER INC., FEJODAP, CUP, VETERANS CARE, FOUR "L", AWATU, PMP,
ATUCP, NCWP, ALU, BIGAS, COPRA, GREEN, ANAK-BAYAN, ARBA, MINFA, AYOS,
ALL COOP, PDP-LABAN, KATIPUNAN, ONEWAY PRINT, AABANTE KA
PILIPINAS, respondents.
x-----------------------x
G.R. No. 136795
October 6, 2000
ALAGAD (PARTIDO NG MARALITANG-LUNGSOD), NATIONAL CONFEDERATION

OF SMALL COCONUT FARMERS' ORGANIZATIONS (NCSFCO), and LUZON
FARMERS' PARTY (BUTIL), petitioners,
vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, SENIOR CITIZENS, AKAP, AKSYON, PINATUBO,
NUPA, PRP, AMIN, PAG-ASA, MAHARLIKA, OCW, UNIFIL, PCCI, AMMAKATIPUNAN, KAMPIL, BANTAY-BAYAN, AFW, ANG LAKAS OCW, WOMENPOWER
INC., FEJODAP, CUP, VETERANS CARE, 4L, AWATU, PMP, ATUCP, NCWP, ALU,
BIGAS, COPRA, GREEN, ANAK-BAYAN, ARBA, MINFA, AYOS, ALL COOP, PDPLABAN, KATIPUNAN, ONEWAY PRINT, and AABANTE KA PILIPINAS, respondents.
DECISION
PANGANIBAN, J.:*
Prologue
To determine the winners in a Philippine-style party-list election, the Constitution and Republic
Act (RA) No. 7941 mandate at least four inviolable parameters. These are:
First, the twenty percent allocation - the combined number of all party-list congressmen shall not
exceed twenty percent of the total membership of the House of Representatives, including those
elected under the party list.
Second, the two percent threshold - only those parties garnering a minimum of two percent of the
total valid votes cast for the party-list system are "qualified" to have a seat in the House of
Representatives;
Third, the three-seat limit - each qualified party, regardless of the number of votes it actually
obtained, is entitled to a maximum of three seats; that is, one "qualifying" and two additional
seats.
Fourth, proportional representation - the additional seats which a qualified party is entitled to
shall be computed "in proportion to their total number of votes."
Because the Comelec violated these legal parameters, the assailed Resolutions must be struck
down for having been issued in grave abuse of discretion. The poll body is mandated to enforce
and administer election-related laws. It has no power to contravene or amend them. Neither does
it have authority to decide the wisdom, propriety or rationality of the acts of Congress.
Its bounden duty is to craft rules, regulations, methods and formulas to implement election laws
-- not to reject, ignore, defeat, obstruct or circumvent them.
In fine, the constitutional introduction of the party-list system - a normal feature of parliamentary
democracies - into our presidential form of government, modified by unique Filipino statutory
parameters, presents new paradigms and novel questions, which demand innovative legal
solutions convertible into mathematical formulations which are, in turn, anchored on time-tested
jurisprudence.
The Case
Before the Court are three consolidated Petitions for Certiorari (with applications for the
issuance of a temporary restraining order or writ of preliminary injunction) under Rule 65 of the
Rules of Court, assailing (1) the October 15, 1998 Resolution1 of the Commission on Elections
(Comelec), Second Division, in Election Matter 98-065;2and (2) the January 7, 1999
Resolution3 of the Comelec en banc, affirming the said disposition. The assailed Resolutions
ordered the proclamation of thirty-eight (38) additional party-list representatives "to complete the
full complement of 52 seats in the House of Representatives as provided under Section 5, Article
VI of the 1987 Constitution and R.A. 7941."
The Facts and the Antecedents
Our 1987 Constitution introduced a novel feature into our presidential system of government -the party-list method of representation. Under this system, any national, regional or sectoral party
or organization registered with the Commission on Elections may participate in the election of
party-list representatives who, upon their election and proclamation, shall sit in the House of
Representatives as regular members.4 In effect, a voter is given two (2) votes for the House -one for a district congressman and another for a party-list representative.5
Specifically, this system of representation is mandated by Section 5, Article VI of the
Constitution, which provides:
"Sec. 5. (1) The House of Representatives shall be composed of not more than two hundred and
fifty members, unless otherwise fixed by law, who shall be elected from legislative districts
apportioned among the provinces, cities, and the Metropolitan Manila area in accordance with
the number of their respective inhabitants, and on the basis of a uniform and progressive ratio,
and those who, as provided by law, shall be elected by a party-list system of registered national,
regional, and sectoral parties or organizations.
(2) The party-list representatives shall constitute twenty per centum of the total number of
representatives including those under the party-list. For three consecutive terms after the
ratification of this Constitution, one half of the seats allocated to party-list representatives shall
be filled, as provided by law, by selection or election from the labor, peasant, urban poor,
indigenous cultural communities, women, youth, and such other sectors as may be provided by
law, except the religious sector."
Complying with its constitutional duty to provide by law the "selection or election" of party-list
representatives, Congress enacted RA 7941 on March 3, 1995. Under this statutes policy
declaration, the State shall "promote proportional representation in the election of representatives
to the House of Representatives through a party-list system of registered national, regional and
sectoral parties or organizations or coalitions thereof, which will enable Filipino citizens
belonging to marginalized and underrepresented sectors, organizations and parties, and who lack
well-defined political constituencies but who could contribute to the formulation and enactment
of appropriate legislation that will benefit the nation as a whole, to become members of the
House of Representatives. Towards this end, the State shall develop and guarantee a full, free and
open party system in order to attain the broadest possible representation of party, sectoral or
group interests in the House of Representatives by enhancing their chances to compete for and
win seats in the legislature, and shall provide the simplest scheme possible." (italics ours.)
The requirements for entitlement to a party-list seat in the House are prescribed by this law (RA
7941) in this wise:
"Sec. 11. Number of Party-List Representatives. -- The party-list representatives shall constitute
twenty per centum (20%) of the total number of the members of the House of Representatives
including those under the party-list.
For purposes of the May 1998 elections, the first five (5) major political parties on the basis of
party representation in the House of Representatives at the start of the Tenth Congress of the
Philippines shall not be entitled to participate in the party-list system.
In determining the allocation of seats for the second vote, the following procedure shall be
observed:
(a) The parties, organizations, and coalitions shall be ranked from the highest to the
lowest based on the number of votes they garnered during the elections.
(b) The parties, organizations, and coalitions receiving at least two percent (2%) of the
total votes cast for the party-list system shall be entitled to one seat each; Provided, That
those garnering more than two percent (2%) of the votes shall be entitled to additional
seats in proportion to their total number of votes; Provided, finally, That each party,
organization, or coalition shall be entitled to not more than three (3) seats.
Pursuant to Section 18 of RA 7941, the Comelec en banc promulgated Resolution No. 2847,
prescribing the rules and regulations governing the election of party-list representatives through
the party-list system.
Election of the Fourteen Party-List Representatives
On May 11, 1998, the first election for party-list representation was held simultaneously with the
national elections. A total of one hundred twenty-three (123) parties, organizations and coalitions
participated. On June 26, 1998, the Comelec en banc proclaimed thirteen (13) party-list
representatives from twelve (12) parties and organizations, which had obtained at least two
percent of the total number of votes cast for the party-list system. Two of the proclaimed
representatives belonged to Petitioner APEC, which obtained 5.5 percent of the votes. The
proclaimed winners and the votes cast in their favor were as follows:6
Party/Organization/
Coalition
Number of
Votes Obtained
Percentage
Total Votes
Nominees
1. APEC
503,487
5.5%
Rene M. Silos
Melvyn D. Eballe
2. ABA
321,646
3.51%
Leonardo Q. Montemayor
3. ALAGAD
312,500
3.41%
Diogenes S. Osabel
4. VETERANS
FEDERATION
304,802
3.33%
Eduardo P. Pilapil
5. PROMDI
255,184
2.79%
Joy A.G. Young
6. AKO
239,042
2.61%
Ariel A. Zartiga
7. NCSCFO
238,303
2.60%
Gorgonio P. Unde
8. ABANSE! PINAY
235,548
2.57%
Patricia M. Sarenas
9. AKBAYAN
232,376
2.54%
Loreta Ann P. Rosales
10. BUTIL
215,643
2.36%
Benjamin A. Cruz
11. SANLAKAS
194,617
2.13%
Renato B. Magtubo
12. COOP-NATCCO
189,802
2.07%
Cresente C. Paez
After passing upon the results of the special elections held on July 4, 18, and 25, 1998, the
Comelec en banc further determined that COCOFED (Philippine Coconut Planters Federation,
Inc.) was entitled to one party-list seat for having garnered 186,388 votes, which were equivalent
to 2.04 percent of the total votes cast for the party-list system. Thus, its first nominee, Emerito S.
Calderon, was proclaimed on September 8, 1998 as the 14th party-list representative.7
On July 6, 1998, PAG-ASA (Peoples Progressive Alliance for Peace and Good Government
Towards Alleviation of Poverty and Social Advancement) filed with the Comelec a "Petition to
Proclaim [the] Full Number of Party-List Representatives provided by the Constitution." It
alleged that the filling up of the twenty percent membership of party-list representatives in the
House of Representatives, as provided under the Constitution, was mandatory. It further claimed
that the literal application of the two percent vote requirement and the three-seat limit under RA
7941 would defeat this constitutional provision, for only 25 nominees would be declared
winners, short of the 52 party-list representatives who should actually sit in the House.
Thereafter, nine other party-list organizations8 filed their respective Motions for Intervention,
seeking the same relief as that sought by PAG-ASA on substantially the same grounds. Likewise,
PAG-ASAs Petition was joined by other party-list organizations in a Manifestation they filed on
August 28, 1998. These organizations were COCOFED, Senior Citizens, AKAP, AKSYON,
PINATUBO, NUPA, PRP, AMIN, PCCI, AMMA-KATIPUNAN, OCW-UNIFIL, KAMPIL,
MAHARLIKA, AFW, Women Power, Inc., Ang Lakas OCW, FEJODAP, CUP, Veterans Care,
Bantay Bayan, 4L, AWATU, PMP, ATUCP, ALU and BIGAS.
On October 15, 1998, the Comelec Second Division promulgated the present assailed Resolution
granting PAG-ASA's Petition. It also ordered the proclamation of herein 38 respondents who, in
addition to the 14 already sitting, would thus total 52 party-list representatives. It held that "at all
times, the total number of congressional9 seats must be filled up by eighty (80%) percent district
representatives and twenty (20%) percent party-list representatives." In allocating the 52 seats, it
disregarded the two percent-vote requirement prescribed under Section 11 (b) of RA 7941.
Instead, it identified three "elements of the party-list system," which should supposedly
determine "how the 52 seats should be filled up." First, "the system was conceived to enable the
marginalized sectors of the Philippine society to be represented in the House of Representatives."
Second, "the system should represent the broadest sectors of the Philippine society." Third, "it
should encourage [the] multi-party system." (Boldface in the original.) Considering these
elements, but ignoring the two percent threshold requirement of RA 7941, it concluded that "the
party-list groups ranked Nos. 1 to 51 x x x should have at least one representative." It thus
disposed as follows:
"WHEREFORE, by virtue of the powers vested in it by the Constitution, the Omnibus Election
Code (B.P. 881), Republic Act No. 7941 and other election laws, the Commission (Second
Division) hereby resolves to GRANT the instant petition and motions for intervention, to include
those similarly situated.
ACCORDINGLY, the nominees from the party-list hereinbelow enumerated based on the list of
names submitted by their respective parties, organizations and coalitions are PROCLAIMED as
party-list representatives, to wit:
1. SENIOR CITIZENS
2. AKAP
3. AKSYON
4. PINATUBO
5. NUPA
6. PRP
7. AMIN
8. PAG-ASA
9. MAHARLIKA
10. OCW-UNIFIL
11. FCL
12. AMMA-KATIPUNAN
13. KAMPIL
14. BANTAY BAYAN
15. AFW
16. ANG LAKAS OCW
17. WOMENPOWER, INC.
18. FEJODAP
19. CUP
20. VETERANS CARE
21. 4L
22. AWATU
23. PMP
24. ATUCP
25. NCWP
26. ALU
27. BIGAS
28. COPRA
29. GREEN
30. ANAKBAYAN
31. ARBA
32. MINFA
33. AYOS
34. ALL COOP

35. PDP-LABAN
36. KATIPUNAN
37. ONEWAY PRINT
38. AABANTE KA PILIPINAS
to complete the full complement of 52 seats in the House of Representatives as provided in
Section 5, Article VI of the 1987 Constitution and R.A. 7941."
The foregoing disposition sums up a glaring bit of inconsistency and flip-flopping. In its
Resolution No. 2847 dated June 25, 1996, the Comelec en banc had unanimously promulgated a
set of "Rules and Regulations Governing the Election of x x x Party-List Representatives
Through the Party-List System." Under these Rules and Regulations, one additional seat shall be
given for every two percent of the vote, a formula the Comelec illustrated in its Annex "A." It
apparently relied on this method when it proclaimed the 14 incumbent party-list solons (two for
APEC and one each for the 12 other qualified parties). However, for inexplicable reasons, it
abandoned said unanimous Resolution and proclaimed, based on its three "elements," the "Group
of 38" private respondents.10
The twelve (12) parties and organizations, which had earlier been proclaimed winners on the
basis of having obtained at least two percent of the votes cast for the party-list system, objected
to the proclamation of the 38 parties and filed separate Motions for Reconsideration. They
contended that (1) under Section 11 (b) of RA 7941, only parties, organizations or coalitions
garnering at least two percent of the votes for the party-list system were entitled to seats in the
House of Representatives; and (2) additional seats, not exceeding two for each, should be
allocated to those which had garnered the two percent threshold in proportion to the number of
votes cast for the winning parties, as provided by said Section 11.
Ruling of the Comelec En Banc
Noting that all the parties -- movants and oppositors alike - had agreed that the twenty percent
membership of party-list representatives in the House "should be filled up," the Comelec en banc
resolved only the issue concerning the apportionment or allocation of the remaining seats. In
other words, the issue was: Should the remaining 38 unfilled seats allocated to party-list solons
be given (1) to the thirteen qualified parties that had each garnered at least two percent of the
total votes, or (2) to the Group of 38 - herein private respondents - even if they had not passed
the two percent threshold?
The poll body held that to allocate the remaining seats only to those who had hurdled the two
percent vote requirement "will mean the concentration of representation of party, sectoral or
group interests in the House of Representatives to thirteen organizations representing two
political parties, three coalitions and four sectors: urban poor, veterans, women and peasantry x x
x. Such strict application of the 2% 'threshold' does not serve the essence and object of the
Constitution and the legislature -- to develop and guarantee a full, free and open party system in
order to attain the broadest possible representation of party, sectoral or group interests in the
House of Representatives x x x." Additionally, it "will also prevent this Commission from
complying with the constitutional and statutory decrees for party-list representatives to compose
20% of the House of Representatives."
Thus, in its Resolution dated January 7, 1999, the Comelec en banc, by a razor-thin majority -with three commissioners concurring11 and two members12 dissenting -- affirmed the Resolution
of its Second Division. It, however, held in abeyance the proclamation of the 51st party
(AABANTE KA PILIPINAS), "pending the resolution of petitions for correction of manifest

errors."
Without expressly declaring as unconstitutional or void the two percent vote requirement
imposed by RA 7941, the Commission blithely rejected and circumvented its application,
holding that there were more important considerations than this statutory threshold.
Consequently, several petitions for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus, with prayers for the
issuance of temporary restraining orders or writs of preliminary injunction, were filed before this
Court by the parties and organizations that had obtained at least two per cent of the total votes
cast for the party-list system.13 In the suits, made respondents together with the Comelec were the
38 parties, organizations and coalitions that had been declared by the poll body as likewise
entitled to party-list seats in the House of Representatives. Collectively, petitioners sought the
proclamation of additional representatives from each of their parties and organizations, all of
which had obtained at least two percent of the total votes cast for the party-list system.
On January 12, 1999, this Court issued a Status Quo Order directing the Comelec "to CEASE
and DESIST from constituting itself as a National Board of Canvassers on 13 January 1999 or on
any other date and proclaiming as winners the nominees of the parties, organizations and
coalitions enumerated in the dispositive portions of its 15 October 1998 Resolution or its 7
January 1999 Resolution, until further orders from this Court."
On July 1, 1999, oral arguments were heard from the parties. Atty. Jeremias U. Montemayor
appeared for petitioners in GR No. 136781; Atty. Gregorio A. Andolana, for petitioners in GR
No. 136786; Atty. Rodante D. Marcoleta for petitioners in GR No. 136795; Attys. Ricardo
Blancaflor and Pete Quirino Quadra, for all the private respondents; Atty. Porfirio V. Sison for
Intervenor NACUSIP; and Atty. Jose P. Balbuena for Respondent Comelec. Upon invitation of
the Court, retired Comelec Commissioner Regalado E. Maambong acted as amicus curiae.
Solicitor General Ricardo P. Galvez appeared, not for any party but also as a friend of the Court.
Thereafter, the parties and the amici curiae were required to submit their respective Memoranda
in amplification of their verbal arguments.14
The Issues
The Court believes, and so holds, that the main question of how to determine the winners of the
subject party-list election can be fully settled by addressing the following issues:
1. Is the twenty percent allocation for party-list representatives mentioned in Section 5
(2), Article VI of the Constitution, mandatory or is it merely a ceiling? In other words,
should the twenty percent allocation for party-list solons be filled up completely and all
the time?
2. Are the two percent threshold requirement and the three-seat limit provided in Section
11 (b) of RA 7941 constitutional?
3. If the answer to Issue 2 is in the affirmative, how should the additional seats of a
qualified party be determined?
The Courts Ruling
The Petitions are partly meritorious. The Court agrees with petitioners that the assailed
Resolutions should be nullified, but disagrees that they should all be granted additional seats.
First Issue: Whether the Twenty Percent
Constitutional Allocation Is Mandatory
The pertinent provision15 of the Constitution on the composition of the House of Representatives
reads as follows:
"Sec. 5. (1) The House of Representatives shall be composed of not more than two hundred and
and those who, as provided by law, shall be elected by a party-list system of registered national,
regional, and sectoral parties or organizations.
representatives including those under the party-list. For three consecutive terms after the
ratification of this Constitution, one half of the seats allocated to party-list representatives shall
law, except the religious sector."
Determination of the Total Number of Party-List Lawmakers
Clearly, the Constitution makes the number of district representatives the determinant in arriving
at the number of seats allocated for party-list lawmakers, who shall comprise "twenty per centum
of the total number of representatives including those under the party-list." We thus translate this
legal provision into a mathematical formula, as follows:
No. of district representatives
x .20 = No. of party-list representatives
.80
This formulation16 means that any increase in the number of district representatives, as may be
provided by law, will necessarily result in a corresponding increase in the number of party-list
seats. To illustrate, considering that there were 208 district representatives to be elected during
the 1998 national elections, the number of party-list seats would be 52, computed as follows:
208
x .20 = 52
.80
The foregoing computation of seat allocation is easy enough to comprehend. The problematic
question, however, is this: Does the Constitution require all such allocated seats to be filled up all
the time and under all circumstances? Our short answer is "No."
Twenty Percent Allocation a Mere Ceiling
The Constitution simply states that "[t]he party-list representatives shall constitute twenty per
centum of the total number of representatives including those under the party-list."
According to petitioners, this percentage is a ceiling; the mechanics by which it is to be filled up
has been left to Congress. In the exercise of its prerogative, the legislature enacted RA 7941, by
which it prescribed that a party, organization or coalition participating in the party-list election
must obtain at least two percent of the total votes cast for the system in order to qualify for a seat
in the House of Representatives.
Petitioners further argue that the constitutional provision must be construed together with this
legislative requirement. If there is no sufficient number of participating parties, organizations or
coalitions which could hurdle the two percent vote threshold and thereby fill up the twenty
percent party-list allocation in the House, then naturally such allocation cannot be filled up
completely. The Comelec cannot be faulted for the "incompleteness," for ultimately the voters
themselves are the ones who, in the exercise of their right of suffrage, determine who and how
many should represent them.
On the other hand, Public Respondent Comelec, together with the respondent parties, avers that
the twenty percent allocation for party-list lawmakers is mandatory, and that the two percent vote
requirement in RA 7941 is unconstitutional, because its strict application would make it
mathematically impossible to fill up the House party-list complement.
We rule that a simple reading of Section 5, Article VI of the Constitution, easily conveys the
equally simple message that Congress was vested with the broad power to define and prescribe
the mechanics of the party-list system of representation. The Constitution explicitly sets down
only the percentage of the total membership in the House of Representatives reserved for partylist representatives.
In the exercise of its constitutional prerogative, Congress enacted RA 7941. As said earlier,
Congress declared therein a policy to promote "proportional representation" in the election of
party-list representatives in order to enable Filipinos belonging to the marginalized and
underrepresented sectors to contribute legislation that would benefit them. It however deemed it
necessary to require parties, organizations and coalitions participating in the system to obtain at
least two percent of the total votes cast for the party-list system in order to be entitled to a partylist seat. Those garnering more than this percentage could have "additional seats in proportion to
their total number of votes." Furthermore, no winning party, organization or coalition can have
more than three seats in the House of Representatives. Thus the relevant portion of Section 11(b)
of the law provides:
"(b) The parties, organizations, and coalitions receiving at least two percent (2%) of the total
votes cast for the party-list system shall be entitled to one seat each; Provided, That those
garnering more than two percent (2%) of the votes shall be entitled to additional seats in
proportion to their total number of votes; Provided, finally, That each party, organization, or
coalition shall be entitled to not more than three (3) seats."
Considering the foregoing statutory requirements, it will be shown presently that Section 5 (2),
Article VI of the Constitution is not mandatory. It merely provides a ceiling for party-list seats in
Congress.
On the contention that a strict application of the two percent threshold may result in a
"mathematical impossibility," suffice it to say that the prerogative to determine whether to adjust
or change this percentage requirement rests in Congress.17 Our task now, as should have been the
Comelecs, is not to find fault in the wisdom of the law through highly unlikely scenarios of
clinical extremes, but to craft an innovative mathematical formula that can, as far as practicable,
implement it within the context of the actual election process.
Indeed, the function of the Supreme Court, as well as of all judicial and quasi-judicial agencies,
is to apply the law as we find it, not to reinvent or second-guess it. Unless declared
unconstitutional, ineffective, insufficient or otherwise void by the proper tribunal, a statute
remains a valid command of sovereignty that must be respected and obeyed at all times. This is
the essence of the rule of law.
Second Issue: The Statutory Requirement and Limitation
The Two Percent Threshold
In imposing a two percent threshold, Congress wanted to ensure that only those parties,
organizations and coalitions having a sufficient number of constituents deserving of
representation are actually represented in Congress. This intent can be gleaned from the
deliberations on the proposed bill. We quote below a pertinent portion of the Senate discussion:
"SENATOR GONZALES: For purposes of continuity, I would want to follow up a point that was
raised by, I think, Senator Osmea when he said that a political party must have obtained at least
a minimum percentage to be provided in this law in order to qualify for a seat under the party-list
system.
They do that in many other countries. A party must obtain at least 2 percent of the votes cast, 5
percent or 10 percent of the votes cast. Otherwise, as I have said, this will actually proliferate
political party groups and those who have not really been given by the people sufficient basis for
them to represent their constituents and, in turn, they will be able to get to the Parliament through
the backdoor under the name of the party-list system, Mr. President."18
A similar intent is clear from the statements of the bill sponsor in the House of Representatives,
as the following shows:
"MR. ESPINOSA. There is a mathematical formula which this computation is based at, arriving
at a five percent ratio which would distribute equitably the number of seats among the different
sectors. There is a mathematical formula which is, I think, patterned after that of the party list of
the other parliaments or congresses, more particularly the Bundestag of Germany."19
Moreover, even the framers of our Constitution had in mind a minimum-vote requirement, the
specification of which they left to Congress to properly determine. Constitutional Commissioner
Christian S. Monsod explained:
"MR. MONSOD. x x x We are amenable to modifications in the minimum percentage of votes.
Our proposal is that anybody who has two-and-a-half percent of the votes gets a seat. There are
about 20 million who cast their votes in the last elections. Two-and-a-half percent would mean
500,000 votes. Anybody who has a constituency of 500,000 votes nationwide deserves a seat in
the Assembly. If we bring that down to two percent, we are talking about 400,000 votes. The
average vote per family is three. So, here we are talking about 134,000 families. We believe that
there are many sectors who will be able to get seats in the Assembly because many of them have
memberships of over 10,000. In effect, that is the operational implication of our proposal. What
we are trying to avoid is this selection of sectors, the reserve seat system. We believe that it is our
job to open up the system and that we should not have within that system a reserve seat. We think
that people should organize, should work hard, and should earn their seats within that system."20
The two percent threshold is consistent not only with the intent of the framers of the Constitution
and the law, but with the very essence of "representation." Under a republican or representative
state, all government authority emanates from the people, but is exercised by representatives
chosen by them.21 But to have meaningful representation, the elected persons must have the
mandate of a sufficient number of people. Otherwise, in a legislature that features the party-list
system, the result might be the proliferation of small groups which are incapable of contributing
significant legislation, and which might even pose a threat to the stability of Congress. Thus,
even legislative districts are apportioned according to "the number of their respective inhabitants,
and on the basis of a uniform and progressive ratio"22 to ensure meaningful local representation.
All in all, we hold that the statutory provision on this two percent requirement is precise and
crystalline. When the law is clear, the function of courts is simple application, not interpretation
or circumvention.23
The Three-Seat-Per-Party Limit
An important consideration in adopting the party-list system is to promote and encourage a
multiparty system of representation. Again, we quote Commissioner Monsod:
"MR. MONSOD. Madam President, I just want to say that we suggested or proposed the party
list system because we wanted to open up the political system to a pluralistic society through a
multiparty system. But we also wanted to avoid the problems of mechanics and operation in the
implementation of a concept that has very serious shortcomings of classification and of double or
triple votes. We are for opening up the system, and we would like very much for the sectors to be
there. That is why one of the ways to do that is to put a ceiling on the number of representatives
from any single party that can sit within the 50 allocated under the party list system. This way,
we will open it up and enable sectoral groups, or maybe regional groups, to earn their seats
among the fifty. x x x."24
Consistent with the Constitutional Commission's pronouncements, Congress set the seat-limit to
three (3) for each qualified party, organization or coalition. "Qualified" means having hurdled the
two percent vote threshold. Such three-seat limit ensures the entry of various interestrepresentations into the legislature; thus, no single group, no matter how large its membership,
would dominate the party-list seats, if not the entire House.
We shall not belabor this point, because the validity of the three-seat limit is not seriously
challenged in these consolidated cases.
Third Issue: Method of Allocating Additional Seats
Having determined that the twenty percent seat allocation is merely a ceiling, and having upheld
the constitutionality of the two percent vote threshold and the three-seat limit imposed under RA
7941, we now proceed to the method of determining how many party-list seats the qualified
parties, organizations and coalitions are entitled to. The very first step - there is no dispute on this
- is to rank all the participating parties, organizations and coalitions (hereafter collectively
referred to as "parties") according to the votes they each obtained. The percentage of their
respective votes as against the total number of votes cast for the party-list system is then
determined. All those that garnered at least two percent of the total votes cast have an assured or
guaranteed seat in the House of Representatives. Thereafter, "those garnering more than two
percent of the votes shall be entitled to additional seats in proportion to their total number of
votes." The problem is how to distribute additional seats "proportionally," bearing in mind the
three-seat limit further imposed by the law.
One Additional Seat Per Two Percent Increment
One proposed formula is to allocate one additional seat for every additional proportion of the
votes obtained equivalent to the two percent vote requirement for the first seat.25 Translated in
figures, a party that wins at least six percent of the total votes cast will be entitled to three seats;
another party that gets four percent will be entitled to two seats; and one that gets two percent
will be entitled to one seat only. This proposal has the advantage of simplicity and ease of
comprehension. Problems arise, however, when the parties get very lop-sided votes -- for
example, when Party A receives 20 percent of the total votes cast; Party B, 10 percent; and Party
C, 6 percent. Under the method just described, Party A would be entitled to 10 seats; Party B, to
5 seats and Party C, to 3 seats. Considering the three-seat limit imposed by law, all the parties
will each uniformly have three seats only. We would then have the spectacle of a party garnering
two or more times the number of votes obtained by another, yet getting the same number of seats
as the other one with the much lesser votes. In effect, proportional representation will be
contravened and the law rendered nugatory by this suggested solution. Hence, the Court
discarded it.
The Niemeyer Formula
Another suggestion that the Court considered was the Niemeyer formula, which was developed
by a German mathematician and adopted by Germany as its method of distributing party-list
seats in the Bundestag. Under this formula, the number of additional seats to which a qualified
party would be entitled is determined by multiplying the remaining number of seats to be
allocated by the total number of votes obtained by that party and dividing the product by the total
number of votes garnered by all the qualified parties. The integer portion of the resulting product
will be the number of additional seats that the party concerned is entitled to. Thus:
No. of remaining seats

to be allocated
x
Total no. of votes of
qualified parties
No. of votes of
party concerned
No. of additional
seats of party
concerned
(Integer.decimal)
The next step is to distribute the extra seats left among the qualified parties in the descending
order of the decimal portions of the resulting products. Based on the 1998 election results, the
distribution of party-list seats under the Niemeyer method would be as follows:
Party
Number of
Votes
Guaranteed
Seats
Additional
Extra
Seats
Total
1. APEC
503,487
5.73
2. ABA
321,646
3.66
3. ALAGAD
312,500
3.55
4. VETERANS
FEDERATION
304,802
3.47
5. PROMDI
255,184
2.90
6. AKO
239,042
2.72
7. NCSCFO
238,303
2.71
8. ABANSE! PINAY
235,548
2.68
9. AKBAYAN
232,376
2.64
10. BUTIL
215,643
2.45
11. SANLAKAS
194,617
2.21
12. COOP-NATCCO
189,802
2.16
13. COCOFED
186,388
2.12
3,429,338
13
32
Total
52
However, since Section 11 of RA 7941 sets a limit of three (3) seats for each party, those
obtaining more than the limit will have to give up their excess seats. Under our present set of
facts, the thirteen qualified parties will each be entitled to three seats, resulting in an overall total
of 39. Note that like the previous proposal, the Niemeyer formula would violate the principle of
"proportional representation," a basic tenet of our party-list system.
The Niemeyer formula, while no doubt suitable for Germany, finds no application in the
Philippine setting, because of our three-seat limit and the non-mandatory character of the twenty
percent allocation. True, both our Congress and the Bundestag have threshold requirements -two percent for us and five for them. There are marked differences between the two models,
however. As ably pointed out by private respondents,26 one half of the German Parliament is
filled up by party-list members. More important, there are no seat limitations, because German
law discourages the proliferation of small parties. In contrast, RA 7941, as already mentioned,
imposes a three-seat limit to encourage the promotion of the multiparty system. This major
statutory difference makes the Niemeyer formula completely inapplicable to the Philippines.
Just as one cannot grow Washington apples in the Philippines or Guimaras mangoes in the Arctic
because of fundamental environmental differences, neither can the Niemeyer formula be
transplanted in toto here because of essential variances between the two party-list models.
The Legal and Logical Formula for the Philippines

It is now obvious that the Philippine style party-list system is a unique paradigm which demands
an equally unique formula. In crafting a legally defensible and logical solution to determine the
number of additional seats that a qualified party is entitled to, we need to review the parameters
of the Filipino party-list system.
As earlier mentioned in the Prologue, they are as follows:
First, the twenty percent allocation - the combined number of all party-list congressmen
shall not exceed twenty percent of the total membership of the House of Representatives,
including those elected under the party list.
Second, the two percent threshold - only those parties garnering a minimum of two
percent of the total valid votes cast for the party-list system are "qualified" to have a seat
in the House of Representatives;
Third, the three-seat limit - each qualified party, regardless of the number of votes it
actually obtained, is entitled to a maximum of three seats; that is, one "qualifying" and
two additional seats.
Fourth, proportional representation - the additional seats which a qualified party is
entitled to shall be computed "in proportion to their total number of votes."
The problem, as already stated, is to find a way to translate "proportional representation" into a
mathematical formula that will not contravene, circumvent or amend the above-mentioned
parameters.
After careful deliberation, we now explain such formula, step by step.
Step One. There is no dispute among the petitioners, the public and the private respondents, as
well as the members of this Court, that the initial step is to rank all the participating parties,
organizations and coalitions from the highest to the lowest based on the number of votes they
each received. Then the ratio for each party is computed by dividing its votes by the total votes
cast for all the parties participating in the system. All parties with at least two percent of the total
votes are guaranteed one seat each. Only these parties shall be considered in the computation of
additional seats. The party receiving the highest number of votes shall thenceforth be referred to
as the "first" party.
Step Two. The next step is to determine the number of seats the first party is entitled to, in order
to be able to compute that for the other parties. Since the distribution is based on proportional
representation, the number of seats to be allotted to the other parties cannot possibly exceed that
to which the first party is entitled by virtue of its obtaining the most number of votes.
For example, the first party received 1,000,000 votes and is determined to be entitled to two
additional seats. Another qualified party which received 500,000 votes cannot be entitled to the
same number of seats, since it garnered only fifty percent of the votes won by the first party.
Depending on the proportion of its votes relative to that of the first party whose number of seats
has already been predetermined, the second party should be given less than that to which the first
one is entitled.
The other qualified parties will always be allotted less additional seats than the first party for two
reasons: (1) the ratio between said parties and the first party will always be less than 1:1, and (2)
the formula does not admit of mathematical rounding off, because there is no such thing as a
fraction of a seat. Verily, an arbitrary rounding off could result in a violation of the twenty
percent allocation. An academic mathematical demonstration of such incipient violation is not
necessary because the present set of facts, given the number of qualified parties and the voting
percentages obtained, will definitely not end up in such constitutional contravention.
The Court has previously ruled in Guingona Jr. v. Gonzales27 that a fractional membership cannot
be converted into a whole membership of one when it would, in effect, deprive another party's
fractional membership. It would be a violation of the constitutional mandate of proportional
representation. We said further that "no party can claim more than what it is entitled to x x x."
In any case, the decision on whether to round off the fractions is better left to the legislature.
Since Congress did not provide for it in the present law, neither will this Court. The Supreme
Court does not make the law; it merely applies it to a given set of facts.
Formula for Determining Additional Seats for the First Party
Now, how do we determine the number of seats the first party is entitled to? The only basis given
by the law is that a party receiving at least two percent of the total votes shall be entitled to one
seat. Proportionally, if the first party were to receive twice the number of votes of the second
party, it should be entitled to twice the latter's number of seats and so on. The formula, therefore,
for computing the number of seats to which the first party is entitled is as follows:
Number of votes
of first party
=
Total votes for
party-list system
Proportion of votes of
first party relative to
total votes for party-list system
If the proportion of votes received by the first party without rounding it off is equal to at least six
percent of the total valid votes cast for all the party list groups, then the first party shall be
entitled to two additional seats or a total of three seats overall. If the proportion of votes without
a rounding off is equal to or greater than four percent, but less than six percent, then the first
party shall have one additional or a total of two seats. And if the proportion is less than four
percent, then the first party shall not be entitled to any additional seat.
We adopted this six percent bench mark, because the first party is not always entitled to the
maximum number of additional seats. Likewise, it would prevent the allotment of more than the
total number of available seats, such as in an extreme case wherein 18 or more parties tie for the
highest rank and are thus entitled to three seats each. In such scenario, the number of seats to
which all the parties are entitled may exceed the maximum number of party-list seats reserved in
the House of Representatives.1wphi1
Applying the above formula, APEC, which received 5.5% of the total votes cast, is entitled to
one additional seat or a total of two seats.
Note that the above formula will be applicable only in determining the number of additional
seats the first party is entitled to. It cannot be used to determine the number of additional seats of
the other qualified parties. As explained earlier, the use of the same formula for all would
contravene the proportional representation parameter. For example, a second party obtains six
percent of the total number of votes cast. According to the above formula, the said party would
be entitled to two additional seats or a total of three seats overall. However, if the first party
received a significantly higher amount of votes -- say, twenty percent -- to grant it the same
number of seats as the second party would violate the statutory mandate of proportional
representation, since a party getting only six percent of the votes will have an equal number of
representatives as the one obtaining twenty percent. The proper solution, therefore, is to grant the
first party a total of three seats; and the party receiving six percent, additional seats in proportion
to those of the first party.
Formula for Additional Seats of Other Qualified Parties

Step Three The next step is to solve for the number of additional seats that the other qualified
parties are entitled to, based on proportional representation. The formula is encompassed by the
following complex fraction:
No. of votes of
concerned party
Additional seats
for concerned
party
Total No. of votes

for party-list system
=
No. of additional
seats allocated to
the first party
x
No. of votes of
first party
Total No. of
for party list system
In simplified form, it is written as follows:

No. of votes of
concerned party
Additional seats
for concerned
party
No. of additional
seats allocated to
the first party
x
No. of votes of
first party
Thus, in the case of ABA, the additional number of seats it would be entitled to is
computed as follows:
No. of votes
of ABA
Additional seats
for concerned
party (ABA)
x
No. of vites of
first party (APEC)
No. of additional
seats allocated to
the first party
Substituting actual values would result in the following equation:

Additional seats
for concerned
party (ABA)
321,646
=
.64 or 0 additional seat, since

rounding off is not to be applied
x1=
503,487
Applying the above formula, we find the outcome of the 1998 party-list election to be as
follows:
Organization
Votes
Garnered
%age of
Total Votes
Initial
No.
of Seats
Additional
Seats
Total
1. APEC
503,487
5.50%
2. ABA
321,646
3.51%
321,646 / 503,487 * 1 =
0.64
3. ALAGAD
312,500
3.41%
312,500 / 503,487 * 1 =
0.62
4. VETERANS
FEDERATION
304,802
3.33%
304,802 / 503,487 * 1 =
0.61
5. PROMDI
255,184
2.79%
255,184 / 503,487 * 1 =
0.51
6. AKO
239,042
2.61%
239,042 / 503,487 * 1 =
0.47
7. NCSFO
238,303
2.60%
238,303 / 503,487 * 1 =
0.47
8. ABANSE!
235,548
2.57%
321,646 / 503,487 * 1 =
0.47
9. AKBAYAN!
232,376
2.54%
232,376 / 503,487 * 1 =
0.46
10. BUTIL
215,643
2.36%
215,643 / 503,487 * 1 =
0.43 1
11. SANLAKAS
194,617
2.13%
194,617 / 503,487 * 1 =
0.39
12. COOP-NATCCO
189,802
2.07%
189,802 / 503,487 * 1 =
0.38
13. COCOFED
186,388
2.04%
186,388 / 503,487 * 1 =
0.37
PINAY
Incidentally, if the first party is not entitled to any additional seat, then the ratio of the number of
votes for the other party to that for the first one is multiplied by zero. The end result would be
zero additional seat for each of the other qualified parties as well.
The above formula does not give an exact mathematical representation of the number of
additional seats to be awarded since, in order to be entitled to one additional seat, an exact whole
number is necessary. In fact, most of the actual mathematical proportions are not whole numbers
and are not rounded off for the reasons explained earlier. To repeat, rounding off may result in
the awarding of a number of seats in excess of that provided by the law. Furthermore, obtaining
absolute proportional representation is restricted by the three-seat-per-party limit to a maximum
of two additional slots. An increase in the maximum number of additional representatives a party
may be entitled to would result in a more accurate proportional representation. But the law itself
has set the limit: only two additional seats. Hence, we need to work within such extant
parameter.
The net result of the foregoing formula for determining additional seats happily coincides with
the present number of incumbents; namely, two for the first party (APEC) and one each for the
twelve other qualified parties. Hence, we affirm the legality of the incumbencies of their
nominees, albeit through the use of a different formula and methodology.
In his Dissent, Justice Mendoza criticizes our methodology for being too strict. We say, however,
that our formula merely translated the Philippine legal parameters into a mathematical equation,
no more no less. If Congress in its wisdom decides to modify RA 7941 to make it "less strict,"
then the formula will also be modified to reflect the changes willed by the lawmakers.
Epilogue
In sum, we hold that the Comelec gravely abused its discretion in ruling that the thirty-eight (38)
herein respondent parties, organizations and coalitions are each entitled to a party-list seat,
because it glaringly violated two requirements of RA 7941: the two percent threshold and
proportional representation.
In disregarding, rejecting and circumventing these statutory provisions, the Comelec effectively
arrogated unto itself what the Constitution expressly and wholly vested in the legislature: the
power and the discretion to define the mechanics for the enforcement of the system. The wisdom
and the propriety of these impositions, absent any clear transgression of the Constitution or grave
abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction, are beyond judicial review.28
Indeed, the Comelec and the other parties in these cases - both petitioners and respondents - have
failed to demonstrate that our lawmakers gravely abused their discretion in prescribing such
requirements. By grave abuse of discretion is meant such capricious or whimsical exercise of
judgment equivalent to lack or excess of jurisdiction.29
The Comelec, which is tasked merely to enforce and administer election-related laws,30 cannot
simply disregard an act of Congress exercised within the bounds of its authority. As a mere
implementing body, it cannot judge the wisdom, propriety or rationality of such act. Its recourse
is to draft an amendment to the law and lobby for its approval and enactment by the legislature.
Furthermore, a reading of the entire Constitution reveals no violation of any of its provisions by
the strict enforcement of RA 7941. It is basic that to strike down a law or any of its provisions as
unconstitutional, there must be a clear and unequivocal showing that what the Constitution
prohibits, the statute permits.31
Neither can we grant petitioners prayer that they each be given additional seats (for a total of
three each), because granting such plea would plainly and simply violate the "proportional
representation" mandated by Section 11 (b) of RA 7941.
The low turnout of the party-list votes during the 1998 elections should not be interpreted as a
total failure of the law in fulfilling the object of this new system of representation. It should not
be deemed a conclusive indication that the requirements imposed by RA 7941 wholly defeated
the implementation of the system. Be it remembered that the party-list system, though already
popular in parliamentary democracies, is still quite new in our presidential system. We should
allow it some time to take root in the consciousness of our people and in the heart of our
tripartite form of republicanism. Indeed, the Comelec and the defeated litigants should not
despair.
Quite the contrary, the dismal result of the first election for party-list representatives should serve
as a challenge to our sectoral parties and organizations. It should stir them to be more active and
vigilant in their campaign for representation in the State's lawmaking body. It should also serve
as a clarion call for innovation and creativity in adopting this novel system of popular
democracy.
With adequate information dissemination to the public and more active sectoral parties, we are
confident our people will be more responsive to future party-list elections. Armed with patience,
perseverance and perspicacity, our marginalized sectors, in time, will fulfill the Filipino dream of
full representation in Congress under the aegis of the party-list system, Philippine style.
WHEREFORE, the Petitions are hereby partially GRANTED. The assailed Resolutions of the
Comelec are SET ASIDE and NULLIFIED. The proclamations of the fourteen (14) sitting partylist representatives - two for APEC and one each for the remaining twelve (12) qualified parties are AFFIRMED. No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.
Davide, Jr., C.J., Purisima, Pardo, Buena, Gonzaga-Reyes, Ynares-Santiago, and De Leon Jr., JJ.,
concur.
Bellosillo, Melo, and Vitug, JJ., in the result.

Puno , J., see separate concurring opinion.
Mendoza , J., dissents.
Kapunan, and Quisumbing, JJ., join the opinion of J. Mendoza.
Footnotes
*
At the outset of this case, I offered to inhibit myself from participating in these cases
because, prior to my appointment to this Court, I had been a general counsel and director
of one of the respondents. However, the Court unanimously resolved to deny my request
for the following reasons: (1) I was merely a voluntary non-compensated officer of the
non-profit Philippine Chamber of Commerce and Industry (PCCI), (2) the present case
and its antecedents were not extant during my incumbency at PCCI, and (3) this case
involved important constitutional questions, and the Court believed that all justices
should as much as possible participate and vote. This Court action was announced during
the Oral Argument on July 1, 1999.
1
Rollo in GR No. 136781, pp. 62-71. Penned by Comm. Japal M. Guiani, concurred in
by Comm. Abdul Gani M. Marohombsar, Al. Haj.; with Pres. Comm. Julio F. Desamito,
dissenting.
2
People's Progressive Alliance for Peace and Good Government Toward Alleviation of
Poverty and Social Advancement (PAG-ASA) v. Comelec.
3
Rollo in GR No. 136781, pp. 81-109. Per curiam, concurred in by Comm. and Officerin-Charge Luzviminda G. Tancangco, and Comms. Japal M. Guiani and Abdul Gani M.
Marohombsar, Al. Haj. Comms. Julio F. Desamito and Teresita Dy-Liacco Flores
dissented; while Comm. Manolo B. Gorospe took no part, being "out of town."
4
See II Record of the Constitutional Commission 253.
10, RA 7941.
Commission on Elections, Party-List Canvass Report No. 16 (By Rank); Assailed

Comelec en banc Resolution, p. 22.
7
Resolution No. 3047-C, September 9, 1998.
People's Reform Party (PRP), Ang Lakas OCW, KAMPIL, Maharlika, Women Power,
Inc., NACUSIP, Aniban Ng Mga Magsasaka, Mangingisda at Manggagawa sa
Agrikultura Inc., All Trade Unions Congress Party (ATUCP), and Anak-Mindanao
(AMIN).
9
More accurately, it should be "House of Representatives."
10
See Dissenting Opinion of Comm. T.D. Flores and the Memorandum for petitioners in
GR No. 136786 which was filed with the Court on July 12, 1999 and signed by Attys.
Hans Leo J. Cacdac, Raissa H. Jajurie and Manuel Senar.
11
Comms. Luzviminda G. Tancangco, Japal M. Guiani and Abdul Gani M. Marohombsar.
12
Comms. Julio F. Desamito and Teresita Dy-Liacco Flores. Comm. Manolo B. Gorospe
did not vote, as he was "out of town."
13
The Petitions of PROMDI, ABANSE! PINAY and COOP-NATCCO were dismissed

for procedural deficiencies. SANLAKAS did not file any petition.
14
These consolidated cases were deemed submitted for resolution upon receipt by the
Court of Intervenor NACUSIP's Memorandum on July 20, 1999. This was signed by
Attys. Froilan M. Bacungan, Porfirio V. Sison and Zoilo V. de la Cruz. The writing of this
Decision was, however, assigned to this ponente only on September 26, 2000 during the
deliberations and verbal discussions of the contentious issues, wherein the Court, by
majority vote, upheld his then dissenting views.
15
5, Article VI, 1987 Constitution.
16
In their Consolidated Memorandum filed on July 12, 1999 and signed by Attys.
Rodante B. Marcoleta, Jeremias U. Montemayor, R.A.V. Saguisag, Romeo G. Roxas and
Katrina Legarda-Santos, petitioners submitted this similar computation:
"208 : = 208/4 = 52 or 208 : 0.8 (0.20) = 52"
17
See the Concurring Opinion of Comm. Tancangco, in which she posits that the "strict
application" of the two percent threshold may become a "mathematical impossibility,"
because "52 seats multiplied by two percent yields a total of 104 percent." Though
theoretically imaginable, such feared impossibility will not ripen to a judicial
controversy, because two percent of the votes will never be achieved by each of 52
parties in the same election. In short, the fear is purely academic. Besides, the
mathematical impossibility wrongly assumes that the Constitution requires all 52 seats to
be filled up all the time. See also Memorandum for private respondents dated July 9,
1999 and signed by Attys. Arturo M. Tolentino, C. Fortunato R. Balasbas and Miguel
Amador S.O. Camero.
18
II Record of the Senate 145, Second Regular Session, Ninth Congress.
19
Transcript, House of Representatives, November 22, 1994, p. 34.
20
II Record of the Constitutional Commission 256.
21
Joaquin G. Bernas, SJ, The 1987 Constitution of the Philippines: A Reviewer-Primer,

2nd ed. (1992), p. 15.
22
5, Article VI of the Constitution.
23
Quijano v. Development Board, 35 SCRA 270, October 16, 1970; Luzon Surety v. de
Garcia, 30 SCRA 111, October 31, 1969, cited in the Memorandum of the Solicitor
General, filed on July 12, 1999 and signed by Sol. Gen. Ricardo P. Galvez, Asst. Sol.
Gen. Cecilio O. Estoesta and Sol. Ma. Antonia Edita C. Dizon.
24
Supra.
25
In its en banc Resolution No. 2847 dated June 25, 1996, Comelec adopted this simple
formula, but discarded it in the assailed Resolutions.
26
In fairness, the Group of 38 explains these differences in the context of its concluding
plea to dilute the two percent threshold. See Memorandum for private respondents, pp.
44-46.
27
214 SCRA 789, October 20, 1992; 219 SCRA 329, March 1, 1993 (Resolution on the
Motion for Reconsideration).
28
See Taada v. Angara, 272 SCRA 18, May 2, 1997; Santiago v. Guingona, 298 SCRA
756, November 18, 1998.
29
Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. Court of Appeals, 257 SCRA 200, 209, June 4,
1996; Santiago v. Guingona Jr., 298 SCRA 756, 786, November 18, 1998; People v.
Court of Appeals and Casan Maquiling, GR No. 128986, June 21, 1999.
30
2 (1), Article IX-C of the Constitution.
31
Garcia v. Commission on Elections, 227 SCRA 100, October 5, 1993.
The Lawphil Project - Arellano Law Foundation
SEPARATE CONCURRING OPINION

PUNO, J.:
I. Prefatory Statement
The case at bar is one of first impression and of immense difficulty. The constitutional issues
involved are full of slippery slopes but the most difficult one concerns the apportionment of
additional seats to the parties that hurdled the 2% threshold requirement. There is much to be
admired in the mathematical formula forwarded by our esteemed colleague, Mr. Justice Vicente
V. Mendoza, but with due respect, I find more attractive the majority formula, crafted with equal
expertise by another esteemed colleague, Mr. Justice Artemio Panganiban. To be sure, the two
formulae may be faulted by mathematicians obsessed with exactitude but the fault lies with the
inexactitude of the law itself. However it may be, I join the majority of my brethren for I find its
geometry of the phrase "proportionately according to the percentage of votes obtained by each
party, organization, or coalition as against the total nationwide votes cast for the party-list
system" more expressive of the spirit of the Constitution, albeit, arguable.
II. Issues
The case at bar, however, is suffused with other significant constitutional issues. They are:
1. Is it a mandatory requirement that a party/organization/coalition should obtain at least
2% of the total votes cast for the party-list system to be entitled to a seat?
2. Is it mandatory to fill up all the 52 seats allotted for the party-list representatives of the
House of Representatives as provided for under Article VI, Sec. 5(2) of the 1987
Constitution? If so, how are the seats to be allocated?
3. Whether Sec. 5(2), Article VI of the Constitution requires that every time the number
of district representatives is increased from 200 there should be a corresponding increase
in the number of party-list representatives so that, as there are now 208 district
representatives, there should be 52 party-list representatives constituting 20% of the total
number of members of the House of Representatives;
4. Whether the 2% threshold requirement in Section 11(b), R.A. 7941 is not
unconstitutional; and
5. Whether the three-seat limit provided in Section 11 (b), R.A. 7941 is not
unconstitutional.
In addition to the scholarly disquisitions of the majority opinion, I humbly offer the following:
III. Submissions
A. The 2% threshold requirement
Respondent Commission refused to give a strict and literal interpretation to the 2% requirement
of Section 11 of R.A. 7941 on the ground that it runs contrary to the Constitution and the law
which is "to enable the marginalized sectors of the Philippine society to be represented in the
House of Representatives," "to represent the broadest sector of the Philippine society," and "to
encourage multi-party system." It likewise proffered the thesis that to allow only the 13
proclaimed parties/organization to be represented in the House of Representatives will result in
the concentration of party-list representation to only a few sectors, namely urban poor, veterans,
women and peasantry. Thus, respondent Commission holds that all the sectors should be equally
represented and hence should be given one seat each.
Like the majority of the brethren, I cannot support such a stance. The Record of the 1986
Constitutional Commission, as well as that of the Senate deliberations, will clearly disclose
a specific intent to impose a minimum percentage of votes to be obtained, that is, at least
two (2%) percent of the total votes cast nationwide, in order that a
party/organization/coalition under the party-list system may have a seat in the House of
Representatives. I quote relevant excerpts from the Record of the 1986 Constitutional
Commission:
"a) MR. MONSOD. x x x Anybody who has at least 2 1/2 percent of the vote qualifies
and the 50 seats are apportioned among all of these parties who get at least 2 1/2 percent
of the vote.
"What does that mean? It means that any group or party who has a constituency of, say, 500,000
nationwide gets a seat in the National Assembly. What is the justification for that? When we
allocate legislative districts, we are saying that any district that has 200,000 votes gets a seat.
There is no reason why a group that has a national constituency, even if it is a sectoral or special
interest group, should not have a voice in the National Assembly. x x x If each of them gets only
one percent or five of them get one percent, they are not entitled to any representative. So, they
will begin to think that if they really have a common interest, they should band together, form a
coalition and get five percent of the vote and, therefore, have two seats in the Assembly. Those
are the dynamics of a party list system.
"We feel that this approach gets around the mechanics of sectoral representation while at the
same time making sure that those who really have a national constituency or sectoral
constituency will get a chance to have a seat in the National Assembly.1
"b) MR. MONSOD. x x x When these parties register with the COMELEC, they would
simultaneously submit a list of the people who would sit in case they win the required
number of votes in the order in which they place them. x x x If they win the required
number of votes, let us say they win 400,000 votes, then they will have one seat. If they
win 2 million votes, then they will have five seats.2
"c) MR. MONSOD. Madam President, I just want to say that we suggested or proposed
the party list system because we wanted to open up the political system to a pluralistic
society through a multiparty system. But we also wanted to avoid the problems of
mechanics and operation in the implementation of a concept that has very serious
shortcomings of classification and of double or triple votes. We are for opening up the
system, and we would like very much for the sectors to be there. That is why one of the
ways to do that is to put a ceiling on the number of representatives from any single party
that can sit within the 50 allocated under the party list system. This way, we will open it
up and enable sectoral groups, or maybe regional groups, to earn their seats among the
fifty. When we talk about limiting it, if there are two parties, then we are opening it up to
the extent of 30 seats. We are amenable to modifications in the minimum percentage of
votes. Our proposal is that anybody who has two-and-a-half percent of the votes gets a
seat. There are about 20 million who cast their votes in the last elections. Two-and-a-half
percent would mean 500,000 votes. Anybody who has a constituency of 500,000 votes,
nationwide, deserves a seat in the Assembly. If we bring that down to two percent, we are
talking about 400,000 votes. The average vote per family is three. So, here we are talking
about 134,000 families. We believe that there are many sectors who will be able to get
seats in the Assembly because many of them have memberships over 10,000. In effect,
that is the operational implication of our proposal. What we are trying to avoid is this
selection of sectors, the reserve seat system. We believe that it is our job to open up the
system and that we should not have within that system a reserve seat. We think that
people should organize, should work hard, and should earn their seats within that system.3
"d) MR. TADEO. x x x Ngayon, sa ganitong kalagayan, gusto ko po lamang ipaliwanag
ang party list. Ang ibig sabihin nito, doon sa ilalim ng two-party system, kapag kumuha
ka ng 51 percent, iyong ibang partido ay wala nang nakuhang puwesto sa legislature. Ang
ibig sabihin ng party list system, makakuha ka lamang ng 2.5 percent ay mayroon ka
nang isang puwesto.4
Similarly, I call attention to the pertinent debates in the Senate, viz.:
"a) Senator Gonzales: Yes, Mr. President. But nonetheless, if his party qualifies, at least,
for the minimum number of the requirement to be entitled to a seat, then he would be
proclaimed by the Commission as having been elected under the party-list system.5
"b) Senator Gonzales: For purposes of continuity, I would want to follow up a point that
was raised by, I think, Senator Osmena when he said that a political party must have
obtained at least a minimum percentage to be provided in this law in order to qualify for a
seat under the party-list system.
"They do that in many other countries. A party must obtain at least 2 percent of the votes cast, 5
percent or 10 percent of the votes cast. Otherwise, as I have said, this will actually proliferate
political party groups and those who have not really been given by the people sufficient basis for
them to represent their constituents and, in turn, they will be able to get to the Parliament through
the backdoor under the name of party-list system, Mr. President.6
"c) Senator Tolentino: x x x Mr. President, the required number of votes here refers to the
votes that will qualify it for certain number of representatives. The phrase "required
number of votes" simply means here the number of votes that will qualify it to have a
certain number of representatives in the House of Representatives.7
"d) Senator Gonzales: Would not all of them be entitled to a proportionate seat in the
three categories allocated for the party-list members?
"Senator Tolentino: If they do not receive the votes that would be needed in order to give them a
proportionate number of seats, then, of course, they would not have any seat in the category in
which they are.
"Senator Gonzales: That is why in my interpellation during our last session, I suggested that,
probably, it would be better to set a minimum percentage of votes to be received by them in
order to qualify for a seat so that we can, more or less, limit the party-list members to those who
obtain a substantial portion of the votes cast, Mr. President.8
"e) Senator Gonzales: x x x The idea is to open the system so that it is not all or nothing.
Kahit na hindi manalo ang kaniyang kandidato but he obtained at least the minimum
number of votes cast, which I would propose later in order to ensure that only those with
a more or less substantial following can be represented, then the purpose of party-list
system has already been achieved.9
"f) Senator Gonzales: My amendment, Mr. President, will be x x x add the following:
"Provided, however that a political party or group whether national, regional, or sectoral
must obtain at least two (2) percent of the votes cast to be entitled to a seat."
"Senator Tolentino: A minimum of 2 percent of what?
"Senator Gonzales: My initial position, Mr. President, is the total votes cast nationwide. At least,
it would have a right to demand representation. Imagine a political party obtaining only 10,000
votes nationwide, it is already entitled to a seat. I do not think that is doing justice to the
representative system.10
"g) Senator Gonzales: x x x We said that in the minimum number of votes for a political
party, whether national or regional or a sectoral organization to be entitled to the party
list, it must have received at least 2 percent of the votes cast in that category."11
The rationale for the 2% threshold can thus be synthesized as follows:
1. to avoid a situation where the candidate will just use the party-list system as a fallback
position;12
2. to discourage nuisance candidates or parties, who are not ready and whose chances are
very low, from participating in the elections;13
3. to avoid the reserve seat system by opening up the system ;
4. to encourage the marginalized sectors to organize, work hard, and earn their seats
within the system;14
5. to enable sectoral representatives to rise to the same majesty as that of the elected
representatives in the legislative body, rather than owing to some degree their seats in the
legislative body either to an outright constitutional gift or to an appointment by the
President of the Philippines;15
6. if no threshold is imposed, this will actually proliferate political party groups and those
who have not really been given by the people sufficient basis for them to represent their
constituents and, in turn, they will be able to get to the Parliament through the backdoor
under the name of the party-list system;16 and
7. to ensure that only those with a more or less substantial following can be represented.17
We are not at liberty to pass judgment on the wisdom of the law. The principle of separation of
powers prohibits this Court from engaging in judicial legislation. Both the legislative intent and
the language of the law as to the 2% threshold requirement are clear and unambiguous. It leaves
no room for further interpretation. It demands our obeisance.
Respondent Commission is of the mind that the sectoral groups have a vested right to a seat in
the House of Representatives. It assumes that this is mandated by the law which aims to provide
a party-list system where the marginalized and underrepresented sectors of society can actively
participate and attain the broadest possible representation in the House of Representatives. The
assumption cannot stand scrutiny.
First, in order that a sectoral group or party can participate under the party-list system, it should
comply with certain statutory requirements such as the filing, before the Comelec, of a
manifestation (Section 4) and a petition (Section 5) expressing its intent to participate in the
party-list system. Comelec is required to verify and review such petition, and is empowered to
refuse or cancel the registration of a sectoral party on grounds stated in the law.
Second, during the deliberations in the Constitutional Commission and the Senate, it was clear
that the party-list system is not synonymous with that of sectoral representation. Sectoral
representation means that certain sectors would have reserved seats; under the party-list system,
there are no reserved seats for sectors.18 The party-list system recognizes the right of sectoral
parties or organizations to register. Nonetheless, it only enables these sectors to be part of the
party, if they have the capacity, but it does not reserve any seat for the sectors. To stress, it is not
a reserve seat system.19
Third, the framers of the Constitution knew that the sectoral groups suffer from major
disadvantages in the competitive election arena. They sought to remedy this inequality through
an outright constitutional gift of reserve seats for the first three terms of the sectoral
representatives and no further. Thereafter, they have to earn their seats through participation in
the party-list system. Thus:
"MR. OPLE. x x x The ideal manner of securing functional representation is through a
party list system through popular suffrage so that when sectoral representatives get into a
legislative body on this basis, rather than direct regional or district representation, they
can rise to the same majesty as that of the elected representatives in the legislative body,
rather than owing to some degree their seats in the legislative body either to an outright
constitutional gift or to an appointment by the President of the Philippines. I think,
therefore, this proposed amendment now meets this test. There is an outright
constitutional gift for the first two terms of the sectoral representatives but, after that,
they will have to earn the seats through participation in a party list system or, even
beyond that, to be direct competitors with established and more orthodox parties in the
general political arena. I see no reason why after having occupied seats in the House of
Representatives for two terms, the representatives of the sectors may not be able to
combine their forces in order to form their own political parties or become powerful
adjuncts to existing political parties so that they will enjoy not only the benefits of a party
list system but also the benefits of being able to compete directly in the wider political
arena.
"x x x And after two or three terms, then they will be in a position to take full advantage of the
party list system so that on the basis of two-and-a-half percent or two percent of all the qualified
voters in the country, one seat is earned x x x. Let us assume that the representatives of these
organizations x x x occupy the seats for two terms, will not six years be enough for them to
amalgamate their forces if there is enough basis of unification so that, from their platform in the
legislature, they can, through a party list system, amass as many seats as are available now
outside territorial representation? And beyond that, they can even rise to the level of a major
political party able to compete for territorial representation both for the Senate and the House of
Representatives.
"x x x Therefore, I support this amendment. It installs sectoral representation as a constitutional
gift, but at the same time, it challenges the sector to rise to the majesty of being elected
representatives later on through a party list system, and even beyond that, to become actual
political parties capable of contesting political power in the constitutional arena for major
political parties."20
Fourth, the objective of the party-list system is not alone to provide representation to sectoral
groups but also to accord proportionate representation for political parties participating in the
election, so that those political parties whose candidates did not win in any district but obtained a
substantial amount of the votes cast by the people will not be completely denied representation in
the House.21
Fifth, in the Senate, it was proposed that all the sectors mentioned in the law should be entitled
to at least one seat each.22 This proposal was not approved for it is nowhere to be found in the
present law. Thus, it cannot be doubted that the lawmakers did not contemplate a reserve seat
system for the sectoral groups. Verily, the ruling of respondent Commission that the party-list
groups from rank nos. 1 to 51 shall be given one seat each so that all sectors are represented runs
contrary to the intendment of the legislature.
There is no constitutional right to win elections, only the constitutional right to equal
opportunity to participate in and influence the selection of candidates. It is not a violation of
equal protection to deny legislative seats to losing candidates. The fact that minorities or interest
groups in an electoral unit find themselves consistently outvoted and without a person elected
from their particular group is no basis for invoking constitutional remedies where there is no
indication that the complaining minority or interest group has been denied access to the political
system.23
And neither can the sectoral groups claim discrimination simply because they failed to get a seat
in the House of Representatives. It is not enough to prove that some of the sectors are not
represented because the party or organization representing them failed to win in the elections. It
must be shown that the party-list system was conceived or operated as a purposeful device to
further discriminate against them.24
In the past, it cannot be gainsaid that there was a hostility against sectoral groups as their
unelected representatives were criticized as people who owed their seats to a constitutional
provision and could not rise to the same status or dignity as those elected by the people.25 This
criticism was laid to rest with the passage of the party-list system where sectoral representatives
had to undergo an election. To be sure, these sectoral candidates were given a favored treatment.
During the Senate deliberations on Senate Bill No. 1913, which later became R.A. 7941, Senator
Tolentino emphatically declared that the purpose of the party-list system is "to give access to the
House those who are considered as marginal political groups that cannot elect a representative in
one district, but when taken together nationally, they may be able to have a representative."26 But
while given a favored treatment, the sectoral candidates were not guaranteed seats. Indeed, the
party-list system was devised to replace the reserve seat system. For unlike the reserve seat
system which assured sectoral groups of a seat in the House of Representatives, the party-list
system merely provides for a mechanism by which the sectoral groups can run for election as
sectoral representatives. The very essence of the party-list system is representation by election.
The lack of success in the elections is not indicative of a lack of access to the political system but
rather from a failure of the parties/organizations to turn out as many of the voters as will enable
them to meet the required number of votes. The access guideline touches upon whether the
political processes are open to minorities or sectoral groups, not on whether such groups are
successful once access has been obtained.27 The party-list system was conceived in order to open
the system to sectoral representation, but it does not warrant representation for these sectors with
absolute certainty.
Finally, Section 6 of R.A. 7941 provides that the Comelec may, motu proprio or upon verified
complaint of any interested party, refuse or cancel, after due notice and hearing, the registration
of any national, regional or sectoral party if it fails to obtain at least two percent of the votes cast
under the party-list system in the two preceding elections for the constituency in which it has
registered. If a sectoral party cannot even register when it fails to obtain the 2% required number
of votes, with more reason that it should not be entitled to get a seat in the House of
Representatives. An absurdity may arise where a sectoral party which failed to meet the 2%
threshold is given a seat in the House but is actually disqualified for registration and therefore
has no legal personality and standing as such.
B. The 20% membership requirement for sectoral representatives
Respondent Commission held that a restriction on the allocation of seats only to those obtaining
the 2% threshold will prevent compliance with the purported constitutional and statutory
mandate that the party-list representatives shall be composed of 20% of the entire membership of
the House of Representatives, including the party list. The ruling is predicated on the supposition
that the 20% requirement is mandatory and that the law requires that all the seats apportioned to
sectoral representatives must be filled up.
Article VI, Section 5, subparagraph 1 of the Constitution provides that "the House of
Representatives shall be composed of not more than two hundred and fifty members x x x who
shall be elected from legislative districts, x x x and those who x x x shall be elected through a
party-list system of registered national, regional and sectoral parties or organizations." The
record of the ConCom will show that the delegates considered this provision as a grant of
authority to the legislature, and hence should not be viewed as either directory or mandatory.28
Section 5 further provides, under subparagraph (2) thereof, that "the party-list representatives
shall constitute twenty per centum of the total number of representatives including those under
the party list." Axiomatic is the rule that a provision of law must be read in harmony with the
other provisions. Consequently, subparagraph (2) should be accorded a similar treatment as
subparagraph (1), i.e., that it is neither directory nor mandatory, but simply a grant of legislative
authority.
In the exercise of such authority, Congress passed R.A. 7941 which contains exactly the same
provision as that found in the Constitution. The query is whether Congress intended the 20%
requirement as a ceiling or whether it intended all the seats allocated to sectoral groups to be
filled up. Section 5 of Article VI, as originally worded, provides that "the sectoral or party-list
representatives shall in no case exceed twenty percent of the entire membership of the House of
Representatives." From the language thereof, it is clear that the framers intended to simply
impose a ceiling. Nevertheless, in its final form, the phrase "in no case exceed" was deleted.
Does this mean then that the 20% requirement was meant to be mandatory? A perusal of the
Record of the ConCom will negate this implication, thus:
"MR. GASCON. In the Gentlemans proposal, he has replaced the words SHALL APPOINT"
by "MAY APPOINT" which means there is a possibility that the President will not appoint. Will
it not be best that to make that assurance - since it was the intent, I believe, during our
deliberation that either we should write an ordinance with regard to sectoral representation or
encourage an appointment by the President - we change the words "MAY APPOINT" to
"SHALL APPOINT"?
"x x x
xxx
xxx
"MR. MONSOD. x x x I would be more comfortable by just saying: "THE PRESIDENT MAY
FILL."
"The President may have her commitments to labor and the peasant sector. But a directive on this
point may in fact be counterproductive because she may not have the full period to look into how
to implement the selection. If we do it that way, the President may be hurried into a selection
because she has to comply with it by July and it may not be a good or meaningful selection. It
may be necessary that there will be, as Commissioner Lerum said, various congresses in order to
make it a real systematic choice. I do not know if there is enough time. But why do we not leave
it to the President to determine if there is time to do this properly?"29
The word "may" was used in the final version of the Constitution. Ostensibly, ConCom wanted
to give the President the discretion whether to appoint sectoral representatives or not. If the
President does not, then there can be vacancies in the seats allocated for sectoral representatives.
Perforce, such an eventuality is not highly improbable and cannot thus be disregarded or ignored.
The Senate deliberations on the matter are more revealing:
"1) Senator Alvarez: But, Mr. President, we already have a ceiling of 20 percent for
party-list representatives.30
"2) Senator Herrera: So that if there will only be two organizations participating, even if
we have to give them the maximum, these two organizations will only be entitled to ten
seats, and that will be less than the number of 25 seats that are supposed to be covered
under the party list system.
"Senator Tolentino: Yes, Mr. President. That is what is going to happen if we limit to five seats.
But as had been brought out in the interpellations last night, if we use as a basis the total number
of votes cast for the parties that are participating in the party-list system of election, then,
perhaps, there would be no need of a limitation to five seats because the proportion can be
strictly applied.
"x x x
xxx
xxx
"Senator Maceda: Mr. President, just on this point. In the example given, if a party gets a certain
percentage of votes that should entitle it to seven seats or eight seats and then it is cut down to
five seats - the first computation will be to compute the percentage of all the parties, and they get
a corresponding number of seats - what happens to the excess since there is a limitation on five
seats?
"Senator Tolentino: What is going to happen is, there may be vacancies under this system.
"Senator Maceda: I just wanted to clarify that.
"Senator Tolentino: That is why, I think, the basis must always be the total number of votes and
give them what is due them in the mathematical proportion.
"Senator Maceda: But even based on the total number of votes, we may have one or two major
parties or major labor organizations, for that matter, really getting more than five seats.
"Senator Tolentino: Yes, that is going to happen, Mr. President, if there is no limitation. But the
alternative is we will have some vacancies in the House of Representatives.
"Senator Maceda: Because the alternative to vacancies, if it is so provided in the law, would be to
further redistribute the vacancies. After providing for the parties that get a maximum of five
seats, then the excess could be reapportioned among all the parties that would not be getting the
maximum of five seats.
"Senator Tolentino: That could be expressly provided for.
"Senator Maceda: Yes, that could be the other alternative. But as framed now, the result would be
that there would be vacancies if some parties get more than five seats.
"Senator Tolentino: That is right, Mr. President.31
It bears to stress that in imposing a limitation on the number of seats to which a sectoral group or
organization may be entitled, the lawmakers anticipated that vacancies will occur. To obviate the
possibility, it was proposed in the Senate that "the excess of seats, if any, shall be proportionally
allotted to the participants entitled to a smaller number of seats." The purpose was to distribute
proportionately the excess seats to those who are lower in rank.32 The proposal was approved in
the Senate, but was not included in the final version of the law. Hence, it stands to reason that the
lawmakers did not intend to fill up the entire 20% allotted to the sectoral groups. This is not at all
surprising given the sentiment shared among members of the House of Representatives against
sectoral representation.33
Respondent Commission further held that allocating the seats only to those obtaining the 2%
threshold will prevent compliance with the alleged constitutional mandate that the party-list
representatives shall be composed of 20% of the entire membership of the House of
Representatives. Again, I beg to disagree for it unduly assumes that the 2% threshold is not
mandatory and that it is essential to fill up the entire 20% of the seats allocated to party-list
representatives. In effect, the respondent Commission effectively voids the 2% threshold using
the mandatory or directory nature of certain provisions of the law. This is too artificial a
technique of interpretation for what we ought to decipher is the real legislative intent, which can
only be ascertained from the nature and object of the act, and the consequences which would
result from construing it one way or another.34 Using these guidelines, it is clear that the 2%
threshold is mandatory while the 20% requirement is but a ceiling.
A corollary issue raised is whether Article VI, Section 5(2) of the Constitution requires that
everytime the number of district representatives is increased from 200 there shall be a
corresponding increase in the number of party-list representatives. The answer can be found in
the discussions of the Constitutional Commission, to wit:
"MR. GASCON. I would like to ask a question. Is the intent of the proposal of Commissioner
Monsod to maintain the ratio of 80 percent legislative district and 20 percent party list
representatives on a constant basis?
"MR. MONSOD. Yes, Mr. Presiding Officer.
"MR. GASCON. Regardless of the number of legislative representatives and the number of the
party list representatives?
"MR. MONSOD. Yes, Mr. Presiding Officer."
Similarly, the Senate records reveal the following exchange between Senator Osmena and
Senator Tolentino:
"Senator Osmena: x x x Going to paragraph (2), it states:
"The party-list representatives shall constitute twenty per centum of the total number of
representatives including those under the party list.
And paragraph (1) states:
"The House shall be composed of not more than 250 members. Twenty percent of 250 would be
50. Is that the total number to be elected? Or is it 20 percent of the existing membership of the
House which, I think, is 207?
"The membership of the House is changing because every time we enact a law creating a
province, a new member is added. Like in the case of Mandaluyong, a newly created city, a new
member is added.
"As a matter of fact, we have a bill before us - which I do not think is the right thing to do which creates one more seat in Makati through the operation of a simple law and not through
reapportionment.
"In effect, Mr. President, the number of members of the House is not static. It can change from
time to time. It can increase or it can even conceivably decrease if there are mergers.
"What is the 20 percent going to be based on, Mr. President?
"Senator Tolentino: The 20 per centum would be what is provided already by law. I think the
creation of new cities may not automatically involve an increase in the number of members of
the House but may have to wait until a new district is provided by law, Mr. President.
"In other words, if that is the interpretation, then the membership will remain the same.
"But if we take a different view that every city or every new province is entitled, by the
Constitution itself, to a member, that means the number will actually change depending upon the
number of seats that we add by the creation of new urbanized cities or new provinces.
"That will mean that in every election where there is a party list system, the computation of the
number of seats for the party list will change."35
Upon further clarification by Senator Lina, it was explained by Senator Tolentino that it will not
be a fixed and definite number of seats but that the party-list representatives shall constitute a
given percentage of the total number of the Members of the House of Representatives to be
elected including those under the party-list.36
C. The 3-seat limitation
The rationale for the 3-seat limit is to distribute party-list representation to as many party groups
as possible. According to Senator Tolentino, if one party will be allowed to dominate, then the
idea of giving as much as possible to the marginalized groups may be defeated.37 The purpose is
to allow as many as possible of the marginalized groups that would be entitled to representation
to have a seat in Congress,38 and to have enough seats left for those who are way below the
list.39 There is nothing offensive to this requirement as to warrant a declaration of
unconstitutionality. Indeed, the parties do not attack this provision as legally infirmed.
IV. Conclusion
The party list-system of election is one of the major innovations in our 1987 Constitution. The
system gives the poor and the powerless in our society a fighting chance to elect representatives
in Congress who will act as their real mouthpieces. In a country like ours where vested interest
reigns and may reign till kingdom come, this rare opportunity given by the Constitution to our
less privileged people should be re-examined so that the exercise of the privilege will not be
diluted by undemocratic restraints. R.A. 7941 while brimming with good intention can stand a
lot of improvements. Hopefully, the bills filed and that may still be filed in Congress improving
R.A. 7941 may bring about the day when our democracy will be more vibrant, as they who have
less in life will have more in law because they themselves can make the law.
I vote with the majority.
Footnotes
1
Record of the ConCom, Vol. II, pp. 85-86.
Id., p. 253.
Id., p. 256.
Id., p. 562.
Record of the Senate, Vol. II, No. 33, p. 143.
Id., p. 145.
Id., No. 34, p. 164.
Id., p. 186.
Id., p. 343.
10
Id., No. 37, p. 349.
11
Id., No. 40, p. 511.
12
Id., p. 500.
13
Id., p. 501.
14
Record of the ConCom, Vol. II, p. 256.
15
Id., p. 567.
16
17
Id., No. 37, p. 343.
18
Record of the ConCom, Vol. II, p. 85.
19
Id., p. 253.
20
Id., pp. 567-568.
21
Record of the Senate, Vol. II, No. 37, pp. 342-343.
22
Id., p. 352.
23
Shapiro v. State of Maryland, 336 F.Supp. 1205 (1972).
24
Nevett, et al. v. Sides, et al., 571 F.2d 209 (1978).
25
Record of the ConCom, Vol. V, p. 332.
26
27
Clark, et al. v. Marengo County, et al., 469 F. Supp. 1150 (1979).
28
Record of the ConCom, Vol. V, p. 80.
29
Id., p. 335.
30
31
Id., No. 34, p. 159.
32
Id., No. 37, pp. 195, 344.
33
See: Record of the Senate, Vol. II, No. 32, p. 129; No. 37, p. 351.
34
Menssen, et al. v. Eureka Unit Dist. No. 140, Woodford County, et al., 388 N.E.2d 273
(1979).
35
Record of the Senate, Vol. II, No. 33, pp. 137-138.
36
Id., No. 37, pp. 349-350.
37
Id., No. 32, p. 126.
38
Id., No. 33, p. 139.
39
Id., No. 34, p. 159.
DISSENTING
MENDOZA, J.:
My disagreement with the majority is in respect of its computation of the number of seats to
which the parties, organizations, and coalitions, which obtained more than 2 percent of the votes
for the party-list system are entitled to have under the Constitution and the implementing law,
R.A. No. 7941. Beyond affirming the election of the 14 party-list representatives as the majority
does, I contend that 25 more should be proclaimed to give each of the winning parties,
organizations, and coalitions the maximum three seats allowed by law, thus bringing the total
number of party-list representatives in the House of Representatives to 39. I am afraid that
todays ruling, denying additional seats to the winning groups, bodes ill for the future of the
party-list system in this country.
I
To be sure, those who drafted the Constitution simply sketched out the basic features of
proportional representation, leaving it to Congress to flesh out the bare bones of an idea. The
record of the Constitutional Commission shows:
MR. RODRIGO: Then, I will propound my question to Commissioner Monsod whose name
appears as number one in the list.
My question have reference to the party list system and the sectoral representation in the House
of Representatives. I would like to preface my questions by stating that I am in favor of the basic
idea of having sectoral representation and representation by means of the party list in the House
of Representatives. However, from the very beginning, I already expressed my misgivings about
the mechanics, the practicableness of this idea. I think this is in line with the thinking of the
Constitutional Commission on this matter. We like this party list and sectoral representation, if
they can be implemented properly. And we should leave to the legislature the enactment of the
implementing laws or the enabling acts. The legislature will have more time to study the problem
on how this can be implemented. The legislature can go into details on the mechanics. This we
cannot do in the Constitutional Commission because a Constitution must be brief, concise and
broad.
So, I am very glad when I read this proposed amendment which stated twice the phrase "AS
PROVIDED BY LAW." . . .
And so, my first question is: In the light of the phrase "AS PROVIDED BY LAW," do I take it
that this party list system and the sectoral representation provision will not take effect until an
enabling act or an implementing legislation shall have been enacted by Congress?
MR. MONSOD: Madam President, the first Assembly will be in March or April. But when we
say "AS PROVIDED BY LAW," it could really mean that it may be by ordinance appended to
this Constitution or an executive order by the incumbent President or, as the Gentleman has said,
by law provided by the incoming Congress. So, it could be any of these ways.
MR. RODRIGO: Madam President, we are all witnesses to the difficulty in arriving at a
consensus of these very novel ideas on the disputes that we have had. And up to now, there is no
real consensus yet. Does the Commissioner believe that we should really try to go into the details
by enacting an ordinance to the Constitution? In other words, should we force the issue? Should
we insist that before this Constitution is submitted to the people in a plebiscite, we shall have
already defined the details on how this party list system and sectoral representation can be
implemented in the first election after the ratification of the Constitution?
MR. MONSOD: We just want to establish the principle of the party list system with sectoral
representation in the present Constitution. We can discuss whether the body in its collective
wisdom feels that it is qualified or should go into the ordinance after we have established the
principle, and we will be guided by the vote or judgment of this Commission.1
When the fundamental law, therefore, emerged from the Commission, Art. VI, 5 merely
provided:
SEC. 5. (1) The House of Representatives shall be composed of not more than two hundred fifty
members, unless otherwise fixed by law, who shall be elected from legislative districts
and those who, as provided by law, shall be elected through a party-list system of registered
national, regional, and sectoral parties or organizations.
representatives including those under the party list. For three consecutive terms after the
ratification of this Constitution, one-half of the seats allocated to party-list representatives shall
law except the religious sector.
Pursuant to its mandate under the Constitution, Congress enacted R.A. No. 7941 which in
pertinent parts provides:
SEC. 11. Number of Party-List Representatives.-The party-list representatives shall constitute
including those under the party-list.
....
In determining the allocation of seats for the second vote, the following procedure shall be
observed:
(a) The parties, organizations, and coalitions shall be ranked from the highest to the
(b) The parties, organizations, and coalitions receiving at least two percent (2%) of the
total votes cast for the party-list system shall be entitled to one seat each; Provided, That
seats in proportion to their total number of votes: Provided, finally, That each party,
organization, or coalition shall be entitled to not more than three (3) seats.
Rep. Tito R. Espinosa, co-sponsor of the bill which became R.A. No. 7941, explained that the
system embodied in the law was largely patterned after the mixed party-list system in Germany.
Indeed, the decision to use the German model is clear from the exchanges in the Constitutional
Commission between Commissioners Blas F. Ople and Christian S. Monsod.2 The difference
between our system and that of Germany is that whereas in Germany half (328) of the seats in
the Bundestag are filled by direct vote and the other half (328) are filled through the party-list
system, in our case the membership of the House of Representatives is composed of 80 percent
district and 20 percent party-list representatives.
The party-list system of proportional representation is based on the Niemeyer formula, embodied
in Art. 6(2) of the German Federal Electoral Law, which provides that, in determining the
number of seats a party is entitled to have in the Bundestag, seats should be multiplied by the
number of votes obtained by each party and then the product should be divided by the sum total
of the second votes obtained by all the parties that have polled at least 5 percent of the votes.
First, each party receives one seat for each whole number resulting from the calculation. The
remaining seats are then allocated in the descending sequence of the decimal fractions. The
Niemeyer formula was adopted in R.A. No. 7941, 11. As Representative Espinosa said:
MR. ESPINOSA: [T]his mathematical computation or formula was patterned after that of
Niemeyer formula which is being practiced in Germany as formerly stated. As this is the formula
or mathematical computation which they have seen most fit to be applied in a party-list system.
This is not just a formula arrived at because of suggestions of individual Members of the
Committee but rather a pattern which was already used, as I have said, in the assembly of
Germany.3
The rules in 11 require a four-step process of distributing the seats for the party-list system.
Using the results of the last elections, the application of the rules in 11 is as follows:
Step 1. R.A. No. 7941, 11 states that "the parties, organizations, and coalitions shall be ranked
from the highest to the lowest based on the number of votes they garnered during the elections."
The first step, therefore, is to rank the groups taking part in the election for party-list seats and
get the total number of votes cast for all of them. Then determine which of them obtained at least
2 percent of the total votes cast. The application of this rule shows that only 13 parties,
organizations, and coalitions obtained at least 2 percent of the total votes (9,155,309) cast for the
party-list system.
Step 2. R.A. No. 7941, 11 provides that "the parties, organizations, or coalitions receiving at
least two percent (2%) of the total votes cast for the party-list system shall be entitled to one seat
each." Since only 13 parties, organizations, and coalitions obtained at least 2 percent of the total
votes cast, only they should initially get one seat each. The results of applying Steps 1 and 2 are
shown in Table 1:
Table 1
DETERMINATION OF 2 PERCENTERS AND INITIAL
DISTRIBUTION OF SEATS TO THEM
Group
Actual votes
received
1. APEC
2. ABA
3. ALAGAD
503,487
321,646
312,500
Percentage of
votes cast for
party-list
5.50%
3.51%
3.41%
Guaranteed
seat
1
1
1
4. VETERANS FEDERATION
5. PROMDI
6. AKO
7. NCSFO
8. ABANSE! PINAY
9. AKBAYAN!
10. BUTIL
11. SANLAKAS
12. COOP-NATCCO
13. COCOFED
14. SENIOR CITIZENS
15. Other Parties
Total
304,902
255,184
239,042
338,303
235,548
232,376
215,643
194,617
189,802
186,388
143,444
5,582,427
3.33%
2.79%
2.61%
2.60%
2.57%
2.54%
2.36%
2.13%
2.07%
2.04%
1.57%
Each with
less than
2%
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
9,155,309
100%
13
Step 3. R.A. No. 7941, 11 provides that "those garnering more than two percent (2%) of the
votes shall be entitled to additional seats in proportion to their total number of votes." The initial
allocation of seats to the 13 parties and organizations which obtained at least 2 percent of the
votes leaves 39 seats (52 minus 13) available for further distribution. How should this be done?
As stated earlier, Congress adopted the Niemeyer formula for distributing seats in the Bundestag.
Accordingly, the number of additional seats to which a 2 percenter is entitled should be
determined by multiplying the number of seats remaining by the total number of votes obtained
by that party and dividing the product by the total number of votes (3,429,438) garnered by all
the 2 percenters. The 2 percenters are each entitled to the additional seats equivalent to the
integer portion of the resulting product. Thus, APEC will have five additional seats computed as
follows:
39 x 503,487
= 5.73
3,429,438
The result of the application of this formula is shown in Column 4 of Table 2, with 32 seats (the
sum of the integer portions of the resulting products) being apportioned among the 2 percenters.
The seats remaining after the distribution of seats in accordance with Step 3 should be distributed
to the two percenters in the descending order of the decimal portions of the products shown in
Column 4. This distribution of the remaining seats is shown in Column 5.
Table 2
SECOND DISTRIBUTION OF SEATS
Group
Guaranteed
seats
(1)
Total votes
obtained
Additional
seats
(2)
Extra
seats
(3)
Total
(4)
1. APEC
503,487
5.73
2. ABA
321,646
3.66
3. ALAGAD
312,500
3.55
4. VETERANS
FEDERATION
304,902
3.47
5. PROMDI
255,184
2.90
6. AKO
239,042
2.72
7. NCSFO
238,303
2.71
8. ABANSE! PINAY
235,548
2.68
9. AKBAYAN!
232,376
2.64
10. BUTIL
215,643
2.45
11. SANLAKAS
194,617
2.21
12. COOP-NATCCO
189,802
2.16
13. COCOFED
186,388
2.12
3,429,438
13
32
Total
52
It may be asked why, despite the fact that most of the parties have already exceeded the threeseat limit while the rest have obtained three seats, the computation is still brought forward. The
answer is that it is possible that every party will get three or more seats after following the
procedure in Step 3. The only reason why, in the cases at bar, the results seem to make the
distribution of excess seats superfluous is that the 2 percenters are not sufficiently numerous.
Indeed, the goal should be to fill all seats allowed for party-list representatives, which at present
are 52. Thus, Art. VI, 5(2) of the Constitution that "the party-list representatives shall constitute
twenty per centum of the total number of representatives including those under the party-list."
This provision thus fixes a ratio of 80 percent district representatives to 20 percent party-list
representatives. If in fact all seats reserved for party-list representatives are not filled, that is due
to the fact that the law limits parties, organizations, and coalitions to three (3) seats each. To
maintain this ratio, the entire number of seats for the party-list system, after deducting the
number of seats initially distributed to the 2 percenters, must be allocated to them.
The above formula is similar to that used by this Court in determining the proportional
representation of political parties in the Commission on Appointments of Congress. Art. VI, 18
of the Constitution provides that the Commission shall be composed of "the President of the
Senate as ex officio Chairman, twelve Senators and twelve Members of the House of
Representatives elected by each House on the basis of proportional representation from the
political parties and parties or organizations registered under the party-list system represented
therein." In Guingona Jr. v. Gonzales,4 this Court held:5
As a result of the national elections held last May 11, 1992, the Senate is composed of the
following members or Senators representing the respective political affiliations:
LDP
15 senators
NPC
5 senators
LAKAS-NUCD
3 senators
LP-PDP-LABAN
1 senator
Applying the mathematical formula agreed to by the parties as follows:

No. of senators of a political party
x 12 seats
Total No. of senators elected
the resulting composition of the senate based on the rule of proportional representation of each
political party with elected representatives in the Senate, is as follows:
Political Party/
Political Coalition
Proportional
Representatives
Membership
LDP
15
7.5 members
NPC
2.5 members
LAKAS-NUCD
1.5 members
LP-PDP-LABAN
.5 members
Step 4. Finally, R.A. No. 7941, 11 provides that "each party, organization, or coalition shall be
entitled to not more than three (3) seats." Hence, the 2 percenters, which are determined to be
entitled to more than three seats are finally allotted three seats each, or 38 seats in all, as shown
in Column 8 of Table 3. This incidentally leaves 13 seats in the House of Representatives for the
party-list vacant.
Table 3
FINAL DISTRIBUTION OF SEATS
Party/organization/
coalition
Total number of
seats obtained
Seats in excess
of 3
Total number
seats allowed
1. APEC
2. ABA
3. ALAGAD
4. VETERANS
FEDERATION
5. PROMDI
6. AKO
7. NCSFO
8. ABANSE! PINAY
9. AKBAYAN!
10. BUTIL
11. SANLAKAS
12. COOP-NATCCO
13. COCOFED
52
13
39
TOTAL
On the basis of the foregoing computations, I reach the following conclusions:

1. The proclamation by the COMELEC of the 13 parties, which obtained at least 2
percent of the votes cast for the party-list system, should be affirmed.
2. The 13 parties should be given two (2) additional seats, with the exception of APEC
which should be allotted only one (1) additional seat, thus giving each party the
maximum three (3) seats allowed by law, on the basis of votes obtained by them in
proportion to the votes cast for all of them. This means a total of 25 party-list
representatives belonging to the 13 parties will be added to the 14 now in office, bringing
to 39 the total number of party-list representatives in the House.
3. The decision of the COMELEC en banc allocating seats to 38 other parties, all of
which failed to obtain at least 2 percent of the total votes cast, is set aside.
4. The proclamation of 25 additional party-list representatives will leave 13 seats for
party-list representatives vacant. While Art. VI, 5(b) of the Constitution fixes a ratio of
80 percent district to 20 percent party-list representatives, does not really require that all
seats allotted to party-list representatives - at present 52 - be filled.
The results of the application of the foregoing steps are summarized and explained in the
Consolidated Table appended to this opinion.
II
The majority holds that "the Niemeyer formula, while no doubt suitable for Germany, finds no
application in the Philippine setting, because of our three-seat limit and the non-mandatory
character of the twenty percent allocation." Claiming that it is "obvious that the Philippine style
party-list system is a unique model which demands an equally unique formula," the majority
instead allocates seats to the winning groups in a manner which cannot be justified in terms of
the rules in 11. While it disavows any intention to "reinvent or second-guess [the law]," the
majority in reality does so and in the process engages in a bit of judicial legislation.
First. In determining the number of seats to which the first party is entitled, the majority applies
the "one seat for every 2 percent" rule.6 But after once applying the rule to the highest ranking
party, the majority does not apply it to the rest of the 2 percenters. Indeed, it cannot consistently
do so because it is mathematically impossible to require that the 52 seats for party-list
representatives be filled at the rate of 2 percent per seat. That would mean that the votes needed
to win the 52 seats is 104 percent of the votes cast in the election. The majority admits this. It
says that its "formula will be applicable only in determining the number of additional seats the
first party is entitled to. It cannot be used to determine the additional seats of the other qualified
parties."
If the formula applies only to the first party, then it is no formula at all because it is incapable of
consistent and general application. It is even iniquitous. If a party got 5.5 percent of the votes and
is given two (2) seats, it is hard to see why the next ranking party, which got 5 percent of the
votes should get only one (1) seat.
Indeed, the law does not distinguish between the first ranking party and the rest of the other 2
percenters insofar as obtaining additional seats are concerned. The law provides that "those
proportion to their total number of votes." The operative word is "their" which refers to none
other than the total number of votes cast for the 2 percenters. The plain language of the law is
that the basis for the allocation of additional seats is the total number of votes cast for the 2
percenters. This rule applies to all parties obtaining more than 2 percent of the votes cast for the
winning parties.
Second. In determining the additional seats for the 2 percenters after determining the number of
seats for the first ranking party, the majority uses the following formula:
Additional seats
for concerned
party
No of votes of
concerned party
No. of votes of
No. of additional
seats allocated to the
first party
first party
R.A. No. 7941, 11 requires the determination of two types of proportions. The first is the
determination of the proportion of the votes obtained by a party in relation to the total number of
votes cast for the party-list. The purpose of the rule is to determine whether a party was able to
hurdle the 2 percent threshold. The second is the determination of number of votes a party
obtained in proportion to the number of votes cast for all the parties obtaining at least 2 percent
of the votes. The purpose for determining the second proportion is to allocate the seats left after
the initial allocation of one (1) seat each to every 2 percenter. The total number of votes obtained
by a party in relation to the total number of votes obtained by all 2 percenters is multiplied by the
remaining number of seats.
If an analogy is needed to explain this formula, the remaining 39 seats may be likened to a pie to
be distributed among the 2 percenters. The way to distribute it is to use the weight of their
individual votes in relation to their total number of votes. There is no reason for using the
number of votes of the first party as a divisor since it is not the votes obtained by the first ranking
party which are being distributed.
In truth, 11 does not say that those garnering more than 2 percent of the votes "shall be entitled
to additional seats in proportion to the number of additional seats given to the highest ranking
party." What it says is that such additional seats must be "in proportion to their total number of
votes," the antecedent of "their" being "those garnering more than two percent (2%) of the
votes."
Third. I see no legal or logical basis for the majoritys fixation with designating the highest
ranking participant as a "first" party. This procedure, as admitted by the majority, assumes that
the seats to be allocated to the qualified parties depend on the seats of the so-called first party.
One will search in vain the proceedings of both Houses of Congress for a discussion of this
procedure or even just a reference to it. There is none.
Fourth. Still it is argued that there should be a distinction between the number of seats for the
first ranking party and those for the rest of the 2 percenters. As an example, the majority cites the
case of a first ranking party obtaining 20 percent of the votes and the second ranking party
obtaining 6 percent of the votes. According to the majority, to give the two parties the same
number of seats would be to violate the "proportional representation parameter."
As already stated, however, the majoritys inordinate concern with the first ranking party is not
consistently carried to the other 2 percenters. The result is that if the first ranking party obtains
5.99 percent of the total votes cast, the second ranking party 5.98 percent, and the last ranking
party 2.0 percent, under the majoritys formula, the .01 percent difference between the first and
the second ranking party will justify the difference of one (1) seat between them. However, the
3.98 percent difference between the second ranking party and the last ranking party is
disregarded by the majority. Indeed, even under the majoritys novel formula of proportional
representation, its own parameters are violated.
Fifth. In essence, the majority "formula" amounts simply to the following prescription: (1)
follow the "1 seat for every 2%" rule in allocating seats to the first ranking party only and (2)
with respect to the rest of the 2 percenters, give each party one (1) seat, unless the first ranking
party gets at least six percent, in which case all 2 percenters with at least one-half of the votes of
the first ranking party should get an extra seat. I cannot see how this formula could have been
intended by Congress. Only in a Pickwickian sense can the result of the application of such
"formula" be considered proportional representation.
Sixth. The formula adopted by the majority effectively deprives party-list representatives of
representation considering that it eliminates the ratio 4 district representatives to 1 party-list
representative in the House. This is so because, under the rule formulated by the majority, it
becomes very difficult to reach the ceiling of 20 percent of the House. In the case at bar, to fill 52
seats in the House, the first ranking party would have to obtain exactly 6 percent of the votes and
25 other parties must get at least 3 percent. In practical terms, this formula violates the
Constitution insofar as it makes it improbable to obtain the ceiling of 20 percent thereby
preventing the realization of the framerss intent of opening up the system to party-list
representatives.
Seventh. The scheme adopted by the majority will prevent all 2 percenters, which are not the first
ranking party, from obtaining the maximum number of seats. This is so because, with their votes
being proportioned against the votes of the first ranking party, there will never be an instance
where the additional seats of these parties will be equivalent to 2. Again, this is contrary to R.A.
No. 7941, 11 which contemplates the possibility of more than one (1) party obtaining the
maximum number of seats allowed by law.
_________________
Already, the proportion of party-list representatives to district representatives is small compared
to the mixed system in Germany where half of the seats (328) of the Bundestag are district
representatives and the other half (328) are reserved for party-list representatives. The ruling
announced today would ensure that the proportion of party-list representatives to the district
representatives who constitute 80 percent of the total membership in the House of
Representatives is even less than 20 percent. The constitutional intent to afford marginalized
groups in our society to be represented in the House is thus frustrated if not subverted.
For these reasons, I vote to grant the petitions in these cases and to order the Commission on
Elections to proclaim as elected one additional nominee of APEC and two additional nominees
of each of the following parties, organizations, or coalitions: ABA, ALAGAD, VETERANS
FEDERATION, PROMDI, AKO, NCSCFO, ABANSE! PINAY, AKBAYAN!, BUTIL,
SANLAKAS, COOP-NATCCO, and COCOFED.
Footnotes
1
2 RECORD OF THE CONSTITUTIONAL COMMISSION (hereafter referred to as

RECORD) 572-573 (Session of August 1, 1986).
2
2 Record 258 (Session of July 25, 1986); 567-568 (Session of Aug. 1, 1986).
Transcript, House of Representatives, Session of November 22, 1994, pp. 66-67.
214 SCRA 789 (1992).
Id. at 791-92.
The rule is allegedly based on Resolution No. 2847 of the COMELEC. The resolution
does not, however, contain the alleged rule. To the contrary, it reiterates in 12 that "The
parties, organizations, and coalitions receiving at least two percent (2%) of the total votes
cast for the party-list system shall be entitled to one seat each; Provided, That those
proportion to their total number of votes; Provided finally, That each party, organization,
or coalition shall be entitled to not more than three (3) seats each." It is only in the
illustration attached as Annex A to the resolution where it is stated that the computation
under Column D of the Table of Allocation of Seats is made at the rate of "1 seat for
every 2%; maximum of 3 seats." How this was arrived at was not explained.
Consolidated Table
DISTRIBUTION OF SEATS
Group
1. APEC
2. ABA
3. ALAGAD
4.
VETERANS
FEDERATIO
N
5. PROMDI
6. AKO
7. NCSFO
8. ABANSE!
PINAY
9. AKBAYAN!
10 BUTIL
11.
SANLAKAS
12. COOPNATCCO
13.
COCOFED
14. SENIOR
CITIZENS
15. Other
Parties
TOTAL
(1)
(2)
(3)
(4)
(5) (6)
Actual Percentag Guarantee Additiona Extra Total6
votes
e of
d
l
seats
1
3
4
5
received votes cast
seat
seats
for
party-list2
503,487 5.50%
1
5.73
1
7
321,646 3.51%
1
3.66
1
5
312,500 3.41%
1
3.55
4
304,902 3.33%
1
3.47
4
(7)
(8)
Seats Total
in number
exces of seats
s of allowed
7
3
4
3
2
3
1
3
1
3
255,184
239,042
338,303
235,548
2.79%
2.61%
2.60%
2.57%
1
1
1
1
2.90
2.72
2.71
2.68
1
1
1
1
4
4
4
4
1
1
1
1
3
3
3
3
232,376
215,643
194,617
2.54%
2.36%
2.13%
1
1
1
2.64
2.45
2.21
4
3
3
1
-
3
3
3
189,802
2.07%
2.16
186,388
2.04%
2.12
143,444
1.57%
13
32
52
13
39
5,582,42 Each with

7
less than
2%
9,155,30 100%
9
COMELEC Canvass Report dated June 1, 1998.
Obtained by dividing the votes received by one party by the total number of votes cast
for the party-list system.
3
Pursuant to the first clause of R.A. No. 7941, 11(b) which provides: "The parties,
organizations, and coalitions receiving at least two percent (2%) of the total votes cast for
the party-list system shall be entitled to one seat each."
4
Pursuant to the second clause of R.A. No. 7941, 11(b) which provides: "Provided, That
seats in proportion to their total number of votes." This is obtained by dividing the total
votes received by a 2 percenter over the total votes received by all 2 percenters.
5
Allocated by ranking the decimal portions of the resulting products shown in Column 4.
Sum of integers in Column 4 & 5.
Pursuant to the third clause of R.A. NO. 7941 which provides: "Provided, finally, That
each party, organization, or coalition shall be entitled to not more than three (3) seats."
EN BANC
BARANGAY ASSOCIATION FOR G.R. No. 179271

NATIONAL ADVANCEMENT
AND TRANSPARENCY (BANAT),
Petitioner,
- versus COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS
(sitting as the National Board of
Canvassers),
Respondent.
ARTS BUSINESS AND SCIENCE
PROFESSIONALS,
Intervenor.
AANGAT TAYO,
Intervenor.
COALITION OF ASSOCIATIONS
OF SENIOR CITIZENS IN THE
PHILIPPINES, INC. (SENIOR
CITIZENS),
Intervenor.
x- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - x
BAYAN MUNA, ADVOCACY FOR G.R. No. 179295
TEACHER EMPOWERMENT
THROUGH ACTION, COOPERATION Present:
AND HARMONY TOWARDS
EDUCATIONAL REFORMS, INC., PUNO, C.J.,
and ABONO, QUISUMBING,
Petitioners, YNARES-SANTIAGO,
CARPIO,
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ,
CORONA,
- versus - CARPIO MORALES,
TINGA,
CHICO-NAZARIO,
VELASCO, JR.,
NACHURA,
LEONARDO-DE CASTRO,
BRION,
PERALTA, and
BERSAMIN, JJ.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, Promulgated:

Respondent.
_______________________
x---------------------------------------------------x
DECISION
CARPIO, J.:
The Case
Petitioner in G.R. No. 179271 Barangay Association for National Advancement and
Transparency (BANAT) in a petition for certiorari and mandamus, [1] assails the
Resolution[2] promulgated on 3 August 2007 by the Commission on Elections (COMELEC) in
NBC No. 07-041 (PL). The COMELECs resolution in NBC No. 07-041 (PL) approved the
recommendation of Atty. Alioden D. Dalaig, Head of the National Board of Canvassers (NBC)
Legal Group, to deny the petition of BANAT for being moot. BANAT filed before the
COMELEC En Banc, acting as NBC, a Petition to Proclaim the Full Number of Party-List
Representatives Provided by the Constitution.
The following are intervenors in G.R. No. 179271: Arts Business and Science Professionals
(ABS), Aangat Tayo (AT), and Coalition of Associations of Senior Citizens in the Philippines,
Inc. (Senior Citizens).
Petitioners in G.R. No. 179295 Bayan Muna, Abono, and Advocacy for Teacher Empowerment
Through Action, Cooperation and Harmony Towards Educational Reforms (A Teacher) in a
petition for certiorari with mandamus and prohibition,[3] assails NBC Resolution No. 0760[4] promulgated on 9 July 2007. NBC No. 07-60 made a partial proclamation of parties,
organizations and coalitions that obtained at least two percent of the total votes cast under the
Party-List System. The COMELEC announced that, upon completion of the canvass of the partylist results, it would determine the total number of seats of each winning party, organization, or
coalition in accordance with Veterans Federation Party v. COMELEC[5] (Veterans).
Estrella DL Santos, in her capacity as President and First Nominee of the Veterans Freedom
Party, filed a motion to intervene in both G.R. Nos. 179271 and 179295.
The Facts
The 14 May 2007 elections included the elections for the party-list representatives. The
COMELEC counted 15,950,900 votes cast for 93 parties under the Party-List System.[6]
On 27 June 2002, BANAT filed a Petition to Proclaim the Full Number of Party-List
Representatives Provided by the Constitution, docketed as NBC No. 07-041 (PL) before the
NBC. BANAT filed its petition because [t]he Chairman and the Members of the [COMELEC]
have recently been quoted in the national papers that the [COMELEC] is duty bound to and shall
implement the Veterans ruling, that is, would apply the Panganiban formula in allocating partylist seats.[7] There were no intervenors in BANATs petition before the NBC. BANAT filed a
memorandum on 19 July 2007.
On 9 July 2007, the COMELEC, sitting as the NBC, promulgated NBC Resolution No. 0760. NBC Resolution No. 07-60 proclaimed thirteen (13) parties as winners in the party-list
elections, namely: Buhay Hayaan Yumabong (BUHAY), Bayan Muna, Citizens Battle Against
Corruption (CIBAC), Gabrielas Women Party (Gabriela), Association of Philippine Electric
Cooperatives (APEC), A Teacher, Akbayan! Citizens Action Party (AKBAYAN), Alagad, Luzon
Farmers Party (BUTIL), Cooperative-Natco Network Party (COOP-NATCCO), Anak Pawis,
Alliance of Rural Concerns (ARC), and Abono. We quote NBC Resolution No. 07-60 in its
entirety below:
WHEREAS, the Commission on Elections sitting en banc as National Board of
Canvassers, thru its Sub-Committee for Party-List, as of 03 July 2007, had
officially canvassed, in open and public proceedings, a total of fifteen million
two hundred eighty three thousand six hundred fifty-nine (15,283,659) votes
under the Party-List System of Representation, in connection with the National
and Local Elections conducted last 14 May 2007;
WHEREAS, the study conducted by the Legal and Tabulation Groups of the
National Board of Canvassers reveals that the projected/maximum total party-list
votes cannot go any higher than sixteen million seven hundred twenty three
thousand one hundred twenty-one (16,723,121) votes given the following
statistical data:
Projected/Maximum Party-List Votes for May 2007 Elections
i. Total party-list votes already canvassed/tabulated
ii. Total party-list votes remaining uncanvassed/
untabulated (i.e. canvass deferred)
iii. Maximum party-list votes (based on 100%
outcome) from areas not yet submitted for canvass
(Bogo, Cebu; Bais City; Pantar, Lanao del Norte; and
15,283,659
1,337,032
Pagalungan, Maguindanao)
102,430
Maximum Total Party-List Votes
16,723,121
WHEREAS, Section 11 of Republic Act No. 7941 (Party-List System Act)

provides in part:
The parties, organizations, and coalitions receiving at least two
percent (2%) of the total votes cast for the party-list system shall be
entitled to one seat each: provided, that those garnering more than
two percent (2%) of the votes shall be entitled to additional seats in
proportion to their total number of votes: provided, finally, that each
party, organization, or coalition shall be entitled to not more than
three (3) seats.
WHEREAS, for the 2007 Elections, based on the above projected total of partylist votes, the presumptive two percent (2%) threshold can be pegged at three
hundred thirty four thousand four hundred sixty-two (334,462)votes;
WHEREAS, the Supreme Court, in Citizens Battle Against Corruption (CIBAC)
versus COMELEC, reiterated its ruling in Veterans Federation Party versus
COMELEC adopting a formula for the additional seats of each party, organization
or coalition receving more than the required two percent (2%) votes, stating that
the same shall be determined only after all party-list ballots have been completely
canvassed;
WHEREAS, the parties, organizations, and coalitions that have thus far garnered
at least three hundred thirty four thousand four hundred sixty-two
(334,462) votes are as follows:
RANK
PARTY/ORGANIZATION/
COALITION
VOTES
RECEIVED
BUHAY
1,163,218
BAYAN MUNA
972,730
CIBAC
760,260
GABRIELA
610,451
APEC
538,971
A TEACHER
476,036
AKBAYAN
470,872
ALAGAD
423,076
BUTIL
405,052
10
COOP-NATCO
390,029
11
BATAS
386,361
12
ANAK PAWIS
376,036
13
ARC
338,194
14
ABONO
337,046
WHEREAS, except for Bagong Alyansang Tagapagtaguyod ng Adhikaing

Sambayanan (BATAS), against which an URGENT PETITION FOR
CANCELLATION/REMOVAL OF REGISTRATION AND DISQUALIFICATION
OF PARTY-LIST NOMINEE (With Prayer for the Issuance of Restraining
Order) has been filed before the Commission, docketed as SPC No. 07-250, all
the parties, organizations and coalitions included in the aforementioned list are
therefore entitled to at least one seat under the party-list system of representation
in the meantime.
NOW, THEREFORE, by virtue of the powers vested in it by the Constitution, the
Omnibus Election Code, Executive Order No. 144, Republic Act Nos. 6646,
7166, 7941, and other election laws, the Commission on Elections, sitting en
banc as the National Board of Canvassers, hereby RESOLVES to PARTIALLY
PROCLAIM, subject to certain conditions set forth below, the following parties,
organizations and coalitions participating under the Party-List System:
1 Buhay Hayaan Yumabong
BUHAY
2 Bayan Muna
BAYAN MUNA
3 Citizens Battle Against Corruption
CIBAC
4 Gabriela Womens Party

5 Association
of
Philippine
GABRIELA
Electric
APEC
Cooperatives
6 Advocacy for Teacher Empowerment
Through Action, Cooperation and Harmony
Towards Educational Reforms, Inc.
A TEACHER
7 Akbayan! Citizens Action Party
AKBAYAN
8 Alagad
ALAGAD
9 Luzon Farmers Party

10 Cooperative-Natco Network Party
11 Anak Pawis
12 Alliance of Rural Concerns
13 Abono
BUTIL
COOP-NATCCO
ANAKPAWIS
ARC
ABONO
This is without prejudice to the proclamation of other parties, organizations, or

coalitions which may later on be established to have obtained at least two percent
(2%) of the total actual votes cast under the Party-List System.
The total number of seats of each winning party, organization or coalition shall be
determined pursuant to Veterans Federation Party versus COMELEC formula
upon completion of the canvass of the party-list results.
The proclamation of Bagong Alyansang Tagapagtaguyod ng Adhikaing
Sambayanan (BATAS) is hereby deferred until final resolution of SPC No. 07250, in order not to render the proceedings therein moot and academic.
Finally, all proclamation of the nominees of concerned parties, organizations and

coalitions with pending disputes shall likewise be held in abeyance until final
resolution of their respective cases.
Let the Clerk of the Commission implement this Resolution, furnishing a copy
thereof to the Speaker of the House of Representatives of the Philippines.
SO ORDERED.[8] (Emphasis in the original)
Pursuant to NBC Resolution No. 07-60, the COMELEC, acting as NBC, promulgated NBC
Resolution No. 07-72, which declared the additional seats allocated to the appropriate
parties. We quote from the COMELECs interpretation of the Veterans formula as found in NBC
Resolution No. 07-72:
WHEREAS, on July 9, 2007, the Commission on Elections sitting en banc as the

National Board of Canvassers proclaimed thirteen (13) qualified parties,
organization[s] and coalitions based on the presumptive two percent (2%)
threshold of 334,462 votes from the projected maximum total number of party-list
votes of 16,723,121, and were thus given one (1) guaranteed party-list seat each;
WHEREAS, per Report of the Tabulation Group and Supervisory Committee of
the National Board of Canvassers, the projected maximum total party-list votes,
as of July 11, 2007, based on the votes actually canvassed, votes canvassed but
not included in Report No. 29, votes received but uncanvassed, and maximum
votes expected for Pantar, Lanao del Norte, is 16,261,369; and that the projected
maximum total votes for the thirteen (13) qualified parties, organizations and
coalition[s] are as follows:
Party-List
Projected total number of votes
BUHAY
1,178,747
BAYAN MUNA
977,476
CIBAC
755,964
GABRIELA
621,718
APEC
622,489
A TEACHER
492,369
AKBAYAN
462,674
ALAGAD
423,190
BUTIL
409,298
10
COOP-NATCO
412,920
11
ANAKPAWIS
370,165
12
ARC
375,846
13
ABONO
340,151
WHEREAS, based on the above Report, Buhay Hayaan Yumabong (Buhay)

obtained the highest number of votes among the thirteen (13) qualified parties,
organizations and coalitions, making it the first party in accordance withVeterans
Federation Party versus COMELEC, reiterated in Citizens Battle Against
Corruption (CIBAC) versus COMELEC;
WHEREAS, qualified parties, organizations and coalitions participating under the
party-list system of representation that have obtained one guaranteed (1) seat may
be entitled to an additional seat or seats based on the formula prescribed by the
Supreme Court in Veterans;
WHEREAS, in determining the additional seats for the first party, the correct
formula as expressed in Veterans, is:
Number of votes of first party Proportion of votes of first
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - = party relative to total votes for
Total votes for party-list system party-list system
wherein the proportion of votes received by the first party (without rounding off)
shall entitle it to additional seats:
Proportion of votes received
by the first party
Additional seats
Equal to or at least 6%
Two (2) additional seats
Equal to or greater than 4% but less than 6%
One (1) additional seat
Less than 4%
No additional seat
WHEREAS, applying the above formula, Buhay obtained the following

percentage:
1,178,747
- - - - - - - - = 0.07248 or 7.2%
16,261,369
which entitles it to two (2) additional seats.
WHEREAS, in determining the additional seats for the other qualified parties,
organizations and coalitions, the correct formula as expressed in Veterans and
reiterated in CIBAC is, as follows:
No. of votes of
concerned party No. of additional
Additional seats for = ------------------- x seats allocated to
a concerned party No. of votes of first party
first party
WHEREAS, applying the above formula, the results are as follows:
Party List
Percentage
Additional Seat
BAYAN MUNA
1.65
CIBAC
1.28
GABRIELA
1.05
APEC
1.05
A TEACHER
0.83
AKBAYAN
0.78
ALAGAD
0.71
BUTIL
0.69
COOP-NATCO
0.69
ANAKPAWIS
0.62
ARC
0.63
ABONO
0.57
NOW THEREFORE, by virtue of the powers vested in it by the Constitution,

Omnibus Election Code, Executive Order No. 144, Republic Act Nos. 6646,
7166, 7941 and other elections laws, the Commission on Elections en banc sitting
as the National Board of Canvassers, hereby RESOLVED, as it hereby
RESOLVES, to proclaim the following parties, organizations or coalitions as
entitled to additional seats, to wit:
Party List
Additional Seats
BUHAY
BAYAN MUNA
CIBAC
GABRIELA
APEC
This is without prejudice to the proclamation of other parties, organizations or

coalitions which may later on be established to have obtained at least two per cent
(2%) of the total votes cast under the party-list system to entitle them to one (1)
guaranteed seat, or to the appropriate percentage of votes to entitle them to one
(1) additional seat.
Finally, all proclamation of the nominees of concerned parties, organizations and
coalitions with pending disputes shall likewise be held in abeyance until final
resolution of their respective cases.
Let the National Board of Canvassers Secretariat implement this Resolution,
furnishing a copy hereof to the Speaker of the House of Representatives of the
Philippines.
SO ORDERED.[9]
Acting on BANATs petition, the NBC promulgated NBC Resolution No. 07-88 on 3 August
2007, which reads as follows:
This pertains to the Petition to Proclaim the Full Number of Party-List

Representatives Provided by the Constitution filed by the Barangay Association
for National Advancement and Transparency (BANAT).
Acting on the foregoing Petition of the Barangay Association for National
Advancement and Transparency (BANAT) party-list, Atty. Alioden D. Dalaig,
Head, National Board of Canvassers Legal Group submitted his
comments/observations and recommendation thereon [NBC 07-041 (PL)], which
reads:
COMMENTS / OBSERVATIONS:
Petitioner Barangay Association for National Advancement and
Transparency (BANAT), in its Petition to Proclaim the Full
Number of Party-List Representatives Provided by the Constitution
prayed for the following reliefs, to wit:
1. That the full number -- twenty percent (20%) -- of Party-List
representatives as mandated by Section 5, Article VI of the
Constitution shall be proclaimed.
2. Paragraph (b), Section 11 of RA 7941 which prescribes the 2%
threshold votes, should be harmonized with Section 5, Article VI of
the Constitution and with Section 12 of the same RA 7941 in that it
should be applicable only to the first party-list representative seats
to be allotted on the basis of their initial/first ranking.
3. The 3-seat limit prescribed by RA 7941 shall be applied; and
4. Initially, all party-list groups shall be given the number of seats
corresponding to every 2% of the votes they received and the
additional seats shall be allocated in accordance with Section 12 of
RA 7941, that is, in proportion to the percentage of votes obtained
by each party-list group in relation to the total nationwide votes
cast in the party-list election, after deducting the corresponding
votes of those which were allotted seats under the 2% threshold
rule. In fine, the formula/procedure prescribed in the
ALLOCATION OF PARTY-LIST SEATS, ANNEX A of
COMELEC RESOLUTION 2847 dated 25 June 1996, shall be
used for [the] purpose of determining how many seats shall be
proclaimed, which party-list groups are entitled to representative
seats and how many of their nominees shall seat [sic].
5. In the alternative, to declare as unconstitutional Section 11 of
Republic Act No. 7941 and that the procedure in allocating seats
for party-list representative prescribed by Section 12 of RA 7941
shall be followed.
RECOMMENDATION:
The petition of BANAT is now moot and academic.
The Commission En Banc in NBC Resolution No. 07-60
promulgated July 9, 2007 re In the Matter of the Canvass of Votes
and Partial Proclamation of the Parties, Organizations and
Coalitions Participating Under the Party-List System During the
May 14, 2007 National and Local Elections resolved among others
that the total number of seats of each winning party, organization

or coalition shall be determined pursuant to the Veterans
Federation Party versus COMELEC formula upon completion of
the canvass of the party-list results.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the National Board of Canvassers
RESOLVED, as it hereby RESOLVES, to approve and adopt the recommendation
of Atty. Alioden D. Dalaig, Head, NBC Legal Group, to DENY the herein petition
of BANAT for being moot and academic.
Let the Supervisory Committee implement this resolution.
SO ORDERED.[10]
BANAT filed a petition for certiorari and mandamus assailing the ruling in NBC Resolution No.
07-88. BANAT did not file a motion for reconsideration of NBC Resolution No. 07-88.
On 9 July 2007, Bayan Muna, Abono, and A Teacher asked the COMELEC, acting as NBC, to
reconsider its decision to use the Veterans formula as stated in its NBC Resolution No. 07-60
because the Veteransformula is violative of the Constitution and of Republic Act No. 7941 (R.A.
No. 7941). On the same day, the COMELEC denied reconsideration during the proceedings of
the NBC.[11]
Aside from the thirteen party-list organizations proclaimed on 9 July 2007, the COMELEC
proclaimed three other party-list organizations as qualified parties entitled to one guaranteed seat
under the Party-List System: Agricultural Sector Alliance of the Philippines, Inc. (AGAP),
[12]
Anak Mindanao (AMIN),[13] and An Waray.[14] Per the certification[15] by COMELEC, the
following party-list organizations have been proclaimed as of 19 May 2008:
Party-List
No. of Seat(s)
1.1
Buhay
1.2
Bayan Muna
1.3
CIBAC
1.4
Gabriela
1.5
APEC
1.6
A Teacher
1.7
Akbayan
1.8
Alagad
1.9
Butil
1.10
Coop-Natco [sic]
1.11
Anak Pawis
1.12
ARC
1.13
Abono
1.14
AGAP
1.15
AMIN
The proclamation of Bagong Alyansang Tagapagtaguyod ng Adhikaing Sambayanan (BATAS),

against which an Urgent Petition for Cancellation/Removal of Registration and Disqualification
of Party-list Nominee (with Prayer for the Issuance of Restraining Order) has been filed before
the COMELEC, was deferred pending final resolution of SPC No. 07-250.
Issues
BANAT brought the following issues before this Court:
1. Is the twenty percent allocation for party-list representatives provided in
Section 5(2), Article VI of the Constitution mandatory or is it merely a ceiling?
2. Is the three-seat limit provided in Section 11(b) of RA 7941 constitutional?
3. Is the two percent threshold and qualifier votes prescribed by the same Section
11(b) of RA 7941 constitutional?
4. How shall the party-list representatives be allocated?[16]
Bayan Muna, A Teacher, and Abono, on the other hand, raised the following issues in their
petition:
I. Respondent Commission on Elections, acting as National Board of Canvassers,
committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction
when it promulgated NBC Resolution No. 07-60 to implement the First-Party
Rule in the allocation of seats to qualified party-list organizations as said rule:
A. Violates the constitutional principle of proportional representation.
B. Violates the provisions of RA 7941 particularly:
1. The 2-4-6 Formula used by the First Party Rule in allocating additional seats
for the First Party violates the principle of proportional representation under RA
7941.
2. The use of two formulas in the allocation of additional seats, one for the First
Party and another for the qualifying parties, violates Section 11(b) of RA 7941.
3. The proportional relationships under the First Party Rule are different from
those required under RA 7941;
C. Violates the Four Inviolable Parameters of the Philippine party-list system as
provided for under the same case of Veterans Federation Party, et al. v.
COMELEC.
II. Presuming that the Commission on Elections did not commit grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction when it implemented the
First-Party Rule in the allocation of seats to qualified party-list organizations, the
same being merely in consonance with the ruling in Veterans Federations Party,
et al. v. COMELEC, the instant Petition is a justiciable case as the issues involved
herein are constitutional in nature, involving the correct interpretation and
implementation of RA 7941, and are of transcendental importance to our nation.
[17]
Considering the allegations in the petitions and the comments of the parties in these cases, we
defined the following issues in our advisory for the oral arguments set on 22 April 2008:
1. Is the twenty percent allocation for party-list representatives in Section 5(2),
Article VI of the Constitution mandatory or merely a ceiling?
2. Is the three-seat limit in Section 11(b) of RA 7941 constitutional?
3. Is the two percent threshold prescribed in Section 11(b) of RA 7941 to qualify
for one seat constitutional?
4. How shall the party-list representative seats be allocated?
5. Does the Constitution prohibit the major political parties from participating in
the party-list elections? If not, can the major political parties be barred from
participating in the party-list elections?[18]
The Ruling of the Court

The petitions have partial merit. We maintain that a Philippine-style party-list election has at
least four inviolable parameters as clearly stated in Veterans. For easy reference, these are:
First, the twenty percent allocation the combined number of all party-list
congressmen shall not exceed twenty percent of the total membership of the
House of Representatives, including those elected under the party list;
Second, the two percent threshold only those parties garnering a minimum of two
percent of the total valid votes cast for the party-list system are qualified to have a
seat in the House of Representatives;
Third, the three-seat limit each qualified party, regardless of the number of votes it
actually obtained, is entitled to a maximum of three seats; that is, one qualifying
and two additional seats;
Fourth, proportional representation the additional seats which a qualified party is
entitled to shall be computed in proportion to their total number of votes.[19]
However, because the formula in Veterans has flaws in its mathematical interpretation of the
term proportional representation, this Court is compelled to revisit the formula for the allocation
of additional seats to party-list organizations.
Number of Party-List Representatives:
The Formula Mandated by the Constitution
Section 5, Article VI of the Constitution provides:

Section 5. (1) The House of Representatives shall be composed of not more than
two hundred and fifty members, unless otherwise fixed by law, who shall be
elected from legislative districts apportioned among the provinces, cities, and the
Metropolitan Manila area in accordance with the number of their respective
inhabitants, and on the basis of a uniform and progressive ratio, and those who, as
provided by law, shall be elected through a party-list system of registered
national, regional, and sectoral parties or organizations.
(2) The party-list representatives shall constitute twenty per centum of the total
number of representatives including those under the party-list. For three
consecutive terms after the ratification of this Constitution, one-half of the seats
allocated to party-list representatives shall be filled, as provided by law, by
selection or election from the labor, peasant, urban poor, indigenous cultural
communities, women, youth, and such other sectors as may be provided by law,
except the religious sector.
The first paragraph of Section 11 of R.A. No. 7941 reads:

Section 11. Number of Party-List Representatives. The party-list representatives
shall constitute twenty per centum (20%) of the total number of the members of
the House of Representatives including those under the party-list.
xxx
Section 5(1), Article VI of the Constitution states that the House of Representatives shall be
composed of not more than two hundred and fifty members, unless otherwise fixed by law. The
House of Representatives shall be composed of district representatives and party-list
representatives. The Constitution allows the legislature to modify the number of the members of
the House of Representatives.
Section 5(2), Article VI of the Constitution, on the other hand, states the ratio of party-list
representatives to the total number of representatives. We compute the number of seats available
to party-list representatives from the number of legislative districts. On this point, we do not
deviate from the first formula in Veterans, thus:
Number of seats available
to legislative districts
x .20 =
Number of seats available to

party-list representatives
.80
This formula allows for the corresponding increase in the number of seats available for party-list
representatives whenever a legislative district is created by law. Since the 14 th Congress of the
Philippines has 220 district representatives, there are 55 seats available to party-list
representatives.
220
x .20 =
55
.80
After prescribing the ratio of the number of party-list representatives to the total number of
representatives, the Constitution left the manner of allocating the seats available to party-list
representatives to the wisdom of the legislature.
Allocation of Seats for Party-List Representatives:
The Statutory Limits Presented by the Two Percent Threshold
and the Three-Seat Cap
All parties agree on the formula to determine the maximum number of seats reserved under the
Party-List System, as well as on the formula to determine the guaranteed seats to party-list
candidates garnering at least two-percent of the total party-list votes. However, there are
numerous interpretations of the provisions of R.A. No. 7941 on the allocation of additional
seats under the Party-List System. Veteransproduced the First Party Rule, [20] and Justice Vicente
V. Mendozas dissent in Veterans presented Germanys Niemeyer formula[21] as an alternative.
The Constitution left to Congress the determination of the manner of allocating the seats for
party-list representatives. Congress enacted R.A. No. 7941, paragraphs (a) and (b) of Section 11
and Section 12 of which provide:
Section 11. Number of Party-List Representatives. x x x
In determining the allocation of seats for the second vote, [22] the following
procedure shall be observed:
(a) The parties, organizations, and coalitions shall be ranked from the highest to
the lowest based on the number of votes they garnered during the elections.
(b) The parties, organizations, and coalitions receiving at least two percent (2%)
of the total votes cast for the party-list system shall be entitled to one seat
each: Provided, That those garnering more than two percent (2%) of the
votes shall be entitled to additional seats in proportion to their total number
of votes: Provided, finally, That each party, organization, or coalition shall be
entitled to not more than three (3) seats.
Section 12. Procedure in Allocating Seats for Party-List Representatives. The
COMELEC shall tally all the votes for the parties, organizations, or coalitions on
a nationwide basis, rank them according to the number of votes received and
allocate party-list representatives proportionately according to the percentage of
votes obtained by each party, organization, or coalition as against the total
nationwide votes cast for the party-list system. (Emphasis supplied)
In G.R. No. 179271, BANAT presents two interpretations through three formulas to allocate
party-list representative seats.
The first interpretation allegedly harmonizes the provisions of Section 11(b) on the 2%
requirement with Section 12 of R.A. No. 7941. BANAT described this procedure as follows:
(a) The party-list representatives shall constitute twenty percent (20%) of the total
Members of the House of Representatives including those from the party-list
groups as prescribed by Section 5, Article VI of the Constitution, Section 11
(1st par.) of RA 7941 and Comelec Resolution No. 2847 dated 25 June 1996. Since
there are 220 District Representatives in the 14th Congress, there shall be 55 PartyList Representatives. All seats shall have to be proclaimed.
(b) All party-list groups shall initially be allotted one (1) seat for every two per
centum (2%) of the total party-list votes they obtained; provided, that no party-list
groups shall have more than three (3) seats (Section 11, RA 7941).
(c) The remaining seats shall, after deducting the seats obtained by the party-list
groups under the immediately preceding paragraph and after deducting from their
total the votes corresponding to those seats, the remaining seats shall be allotted
proportionately to all the party-list groups which have not secured the maximum
three (3) seats under the 2% threshold rule, in accordance with Section 12 of RA
7941.[23]
Forty-four (44) party-list seats will be awarded under BANATs first interpretation.
The second interpretation presented by BANAT assumes that the 2% vote requirement is
declared unconstitutional, and apportions the seats for party-list representatives by following
Section 12 of R.A. No. 7941. BANAT states that the COMELEC:
(a) shall tally all the votes for the parties, organizations, or coalitions on a
nationwide basis;
(b) rank them according to the number of votes received; and,
(c) allocate party-list representatives proportionately according to the percentage
of votes obtained by each party, organization or coalition as against the total
nationwide votes cast for the party-list system.[24]
BANAT used two formulas to obtain the same results: one is based on the proportional
percentage of the votes received by each party as against the total nationwide party-list votes,
and the other is by making the votes of a party-list with a median percentage of votes as the
divisor in computing the allocation of seats.[25] Thirty-four (34) party-list seats will be awarded
under BANATs second interpretation.
In G.R. No. 179295, Bayan Muna, Abono, and A Teacher criticize both the COMELECs original
2-4-6 formula and the Veterans formula for systematically preventing all the party-list seats from
being filled up. They claim that both formulas do not factor in the total number of seats alloted
for the entire Party-List System. Bayan Muna, Abono, and A Teacher reject the three-seat cap,
but accept the 2% threshold.After determining the qualified parties, a second percentage is
generated by dividing the votes of a qualified party by the total votes of all qualified parties
only. The number of seats allocated to a qualified party is computed by multiplying the total
party-list seats available with the second percentage. There will be a first round of seat
allocation, limited to using the whole integers as the equivalent of the number of seats allocated
to the concerned party-list. After all the qualified parties are given their seats, a second round of
seat allocation is conducted. The fractions, or remainders, from the whole integers are ranked
from highest to lowest and the remaining seats on the basis of this ranking are allocated until all
the seats are filled up.[26]
We examine what R.A. No. 7941 prescribes to allocate seats for party-list representatives.
Section 11(a) of R.A. No. 7941 prescribes the ranking of the participating parties from the
highest to the lowest based on the number of votes they garnered during the elections.
Table 1. Ranking of the participating parties from the highest to the lowest based
on the number of votes garnered during the elections.[27]
Rank
Party
Votes
Rank
Garnered
1 BUHAY
1,169,234
2 BAYAN
MUNA
Party
Votes
Garnered
48 KALAHI
88,868
979,039
49 APOI
79,386
3 CIBAC
755,686
50 BP
78,541
4 GABRIELA
621,171
51 AHONBAYAN
78,424
5 APEC
619,657
52 BIGKIS
77,327
6 A TEACHER
490,379
53 PMAP
75,200
7 AKBAYAN
466,112
54 AKAPIN
74,686
8 ALAGAD
423,149
55 PBA
71,544
9 COOPNATCCO
409,883
56 GRECON
62,220
10 BUTIL
409,160
57 BTM
60,993
11 BATAS
385,810
58 A SMILE
58,717
12 ARC
374,288
59 NELFFI
57,872
13 ANAKPAWIS
370,261
60 AKSA
57,012
14 ABONO
339,990
61 BAGO
55,846
15 AMIN
338,185
62 BANDILA
54,751
16 AGAP
328,724
63 AHON
54,522
17 AN WARAY
321,503
64 ASAHAN MO
51,722
18 YACAP
310,889
65 AGBIAG!
50,837
19 FPJPM
300,923
66 SPI
50,478
20 UNI-MAD
245,382
67 BAHANDI
46,612
21 ABS
235,086
68 ADD
45,624
22 KAKUSA
228,999
69 AMANG
43,062
23 KABATAAN
228,637
70 ABAY PARAK
42,282
24 ABA-AKO
218,818
71 BABAE KA
36,512
25 ALIF
217,822
72 SB
34,835
26 SENIOR
CITIZENS
213,058
73 ASAP
34,098
27 AT
197,872
74 PEP
33,938
28 VFP
196,266
75 ABA
ILONGGO
33,903
29 ANAD
188,521
76 VENDORS
33,691
30 BANAT
177,028
77 ADD-TRIBAL
32,896
31 ANG
KASANGGA
170,531
78 ALMANA
32,255
32 BANTAY
169,801
79 AANGAT KA
PILIPINO
29,130
33 ABAKADA
166,747
80 AAPS
26,271
34 1-UTAK
164,980
81 HAPI
25,781
35 TUCP
162,647
82 AAWAS
22,946
36 COCOFED
155,920
83 SM
20,744
37 AGHAM
146,032
84 AG
16,916
38 ANAK
141,817
85 AGING PINOY
16,729
39 ABANSE!
PINAY
130,356
86 APO
16,421
40 PM
119,054
87 BIYAYANG
BUKID
16,241
41 AVE
110,769
88 ATS
14,161
42 SUARA
110,732
89 UMDJ
9,445
43 ASSALAM
110,440
90 BUKLOD
FILIPINA
8,915
44 DIWA
107,021
91 LYPAD
8,471
45 ANC
99,636
92 AA-KASOSYO
8,406
46 SANLAKAS
97,375
93 KASAPI
6,221
47 ABC
90,058
TOTAL
15,950,900
The first clause of Section 11(b) of R.A. No. 7941 states that parties, organizations, and
coalitions receiving at least two percent (2%) of the total votes cast for the party-list system shall
be entitled to one seat each. This clause guarantees a seat to the two-percenters. In Table 2 below,
we use the first 20 party-list candidates for illustration purposes. The percentage of votes
garnered by each party is arrived at by dividing the number of votes garnered by each party by
15,950,900, the total number of votes cast for all party-list candidates.
Table 2. The first 20 party-list candidates and their respective percentage of votes
garnered over the total votes for the party-list.[28]
Rank
Party
Votes Garnered
Votes
over Total Votes Guaranteed
Garnered for Party-List,
Seat
in %
1 BUHAY
1,169,234
7.33%
2 BAYAN MUNA
979,039
6.14%
3 CIBAC
755,686
4.74%
4 GABRIELA
621,171
3.89%
5 APEC
619,657
3.88%
6 A TEACHER
490,379
3.07%
7 AKBAYAN
466,112
2.92%
8 ALAGAD
423,149
2.65%
9 COOP-NATCCO
409,883
2.57%
10 BUTIL
409,160
2.57%
11 BATAS[29]
385,810
2.42%
12 ARC
374,288
2.35%
13 ANAKPAWIS
370,261
2.32%
14 ABONO
339,990
2.13%
15 AMIN
338,185
2.12%
16 AGAP
328,724
2.06%
17 AN WARAY
321,503
2.02%
Total
1
17
18 YACAP
310,889
1.95%
19 FPJPM
300,923
1.89%
20 UNI-MAD
245,382
1.54%
From Table 2 above, we see that only 17 party-list candidates received at least 2% from the total
number of votes cast for party-list candidates. The 17 qualified party-list candidates, or the twopercenters, are the party-list candidates that are entitled to one seat each, or the guaranteed
seat. In this first round of seat allocation, we distributed 17 guaranteed seats.
The second clause of Section 11(b) of R.A. No. 7941 provides that those garnering more than
two percent (2%) of the votes shall be entitled to additional seats in proportion to their total
number of votes.This is where petitioners and intervenors problem with the formula
in Veterans lies. Veterans interprets the clause in proportion to their total number of votes to be in
proportion to the votes of the first party.This interpretation is contrary to the express language
of R.A. No. 7941.
We rule that, in computing the allocation of additional seats, the continued operation of the two
percent threshold for the distribution of the additional seats as found in the second clause
of Section 11(b) of R.A. No. 7941 is unconstitutional. This Court finds that the two percent
threshold makes it mathematically impossible to achieve the maximum number of available party
list seats when the number of available party list seats exceeds 50. The continued operation of
the two percent threshold in the distribution of the additional seats frustrates the attainment of the
permissive ceiling that 20% of the members of the House of Representatives shall consist of
party-list representatives.
To illustrate: There are 55 available party-list seats. Suppose there are 50 million votes cast for
the 100 participants in the party list elections. A party that has two percent of the votes cast, or
one million votes, gets a guaranteed seat. Let us further assume that the first 50 parties all get one
million votes. Only 50 parties get a seat despite the availability of 55 seats. Because of the
operation of the two percent threshold, this situation will repeat itself even if we increase the
available party-list seats to 60 seats and even if we increase the votes cast to 100 million. Thus,
even if the maximum number of parties get two percent of the votes for every party, it is always
impossible for the number of occupied party-list seats to exceed 50 seats as long as the two
percent threshold is present.
We therefore strike down the two percent threshold only in relation to the distribution of the
additional seats as found in the second clause of Section 11(b) of R.A. No. 7941. The two
percent threshold presents an unwarranted obstacle to the full implementation of Section 5(2),
Article VI of the Constitution and prevents the attainment of the broadest possible representation
of party, sectoral or group interests in the House of Representatives.[30]
In determining the allocation of seats for party-list representatives under Section 11 of R.A. No.
7941, the following procedure shall be observed:
1.
The parties, organizations, and coalitions shall be ranked from the highest to the
2.
The parties, organizations, and coalitions receiving at least two percent (2%) of the
total votes cast for the party-list system shall be entitled to one guaranteed seat each.
3.
Those garnering sufficient number of votes, according to the ranking in paragraph 1,
shall be entitled to additional seats in proportion to their total number of votes until all the
additional seats are allocated.
4.
seats.
Each party, organization, or coalition shall be entitled to not more than three (3)
In computing the additional seats, the guaranteed seats shall no longer be included because they
have already been allocated, at one seat each, to every two-percenter. Thus, the remaining
available seats for allocation as additional seats are the maximum seats reserved under the Party
List System less the guaranteed seats. Fractional seats are disregarded in the absence of a
provision in R.A. No. 7941 allowing for a rounding off of fractional seats.
In declaring the two percent threshold unconstitutional, we do not limit our allocation of
additional seats in Table 3 below to the two-percenters. The percentage of votes garnered by each
party-list candidate is arrived at by dividing the number of votes garnered by each party by
15,950,900, the total number of votes cast for party-list candidates. There are two steps in the
second round of seat allocation. First, the percentage is multiplied by the remaining available
seats, 38, which is the difference between the 55 maximum seats reserved under the Party-List
System and the 17 guaranteed seats of the two-percenters. The whole integer of the product of
the percentage and of the remaining available seats corresponds to a partys share in the
remaining available seats. Second, we assign one party-list seat to each of the parties next in rank
until all available seats are completely distributed. We distributed all of the remaining 38 seats in
the second round of seat allocation. Finally, we apply the three-seat cap to determine the number
of seats each qualified party-list candidate is entitled. Thus:
Table 3. Distribution of Available Party-List Seats

Rank
Party
Votes
Votes
Guaranteed Additiona (B) plus Applyin
Garnered
over
Total
Votes for
Party
Garnered
List, in %
l
Seats
Seat
(First
Round)
(A)
(C), in
g the
whole
three
integers seat cap
(Second
Round)
(B)
(D)
(C)
(E)
BUHAY
1,169,234
7.33%
2.79
N.A.
BAYAN
MUNA
979,039
6.14%
2.33
N.A.
CIBAC
755,686
4.74%
1.80
N.A.
GABRIELA
621,171
3.89%
1.48
N.A.
APEC
619,657
3.88%
1.48
N.A.
A Teacher
490,379
3.07%
1.17
N.A.
AKBAYAN
466,112
2.92%
1.11
N.A.
ALAGAD
423,149
2.65%
1.01
N.A.
9[31]
COOPNATCCO
409,883
2.57%
N.A.
10
BUTIL
409,160
2.57%
N.A.
11
BATAS
385,810
2.42%
N.A.
12
ARC
374,288
2.35%
N.A.
13
ANAKPAWI
S
370,261
2.32%
N.A.
14
ABONO
339,990
2.13%
N.A.
15
AMIN
338,185
2.12%
N.A.
16
AGAP
328,724
2.06%
N.A.
17
AN WARAY
321,503
2.02%
N.A.
18
YACAP
310,889
1.95%
N.A.
19
FPJPM
300,923
1.89%
N.A.
20
UNI-MAD
245,382
1.54%
N.A.
21
ABS
235,086
1.47%
N.A.
22
KAKUSA
228,999
1.44%
N.A.
23
KABATAAN
228,637
1.43%
N.A.
24
ABA-AKO
218,818
1.37%
N.A.
25
ALIF
217,822
1.37%
N.A.
26
SENIOR
CITIZENS
213,058
1.34%
N.A.
27
AT
197,872
1.24%
N.A.
28
VFP
196,266
1.23%
N.A.
29
ANAD
188,521
1.18%
N.A.
30
BANAT
177,028
1.11%
N.A.
31
ANG
KASANGGA
170,531
1.07%
N.A.
32
BANTAY
169,801
1.06%
N.A.
33
ABAKADA
166,747
1.05%
N.A.
34
1-UTAK
164,980
1.03%
N.A.
35
TUCP
162,647
1.02%
N.A.
36
COCOFED
155,920
0.98%
N.A.
Total
17
55
Applying the procedure of seat allocation as illustrated in Table 3 above, there are 55 party-list
representatives from the 36 winning party-list organizations. All 55 available party-list seats are
filled. The additional seats allocated to the parties with sufficient number of votes for one whole
seat, in no case to exceed a total of three seats for each party, are shown in column (D).
Participation of Major Political Parties in Party-List Elections
The Constitutional Commission adopted a multi-party system that allowed all political parties
to participate in the party-list elections. The deliberations of the Constitutional Commission
clearly bear this out, thus:
MR. MONSOD. Madam President, I just want to say that we suggested or
proposed the party list system because we wanted to open up the political system
to a pluralistic society through a multiparty system. x x x We are for opening up
the system, and we would like very much for the sectors to be there. That is
why one of the ways to do that is to put a ceiling on the number of
representatives from any single party that can sit within the 50 allocated
under the party list system. x x x.
xxx
MR. MONSOD. Madam President, the candidacy for the 198 seats is not limited
to political parties. My question is this: Are we going to classify for example
Christian Democrats and Social Democrats as political parties? Can they run
under the party list concept or must they be under the district legislation side of it
only?
MR. VILLACORTA. In reply to that query, I think these parties that the
Commissioner mentioned can field candidates for the Senate as well as for the
House of Representatives. Likewise, they can also field sectoral candidates for
the 20 percent or 30 percent, whichever is adopted, of the seats that we are
allocating under the party list system.
MR. MONSOD. In other words, the Christian Democrats can field district
candidates and can also participate in the party list system?
MR. VILLACORTA. Why not? When they come to the party list system, they
will be fielding only sectoral candidates.
MR. MONSOD. May I be clarified on that? Can UNIDO participate in the party
list system?
MR. VILLACORTA. Yes, why not? For as long as they field candidates who
come from the different marginalized sectors that we shall designate in this
Constitution.
MR. MONSOD. Suppose Senator Taada wants to run under BAYAN group and
says that he represents the farmers, would he qualify?
MR. VILLACORTA. No, Senator Taada would not qualify.
MR. MONSOD. But UNIDO can field candidates under the party list system and
say Juan dela Cruz is a farmer. Who would pass on whether he is a farmer or not?
MR. TADEO. Kay Commissioner Monsod, gusto ko lamang linawin ito. Political
parties, particularly minority political parties, are not prohibited to
participate in the party list election if they can prove that they are also
organized along sectoral lines.
MR. MONSOD. What the Commissioner is saying is that all political parties can
participate because it is precisely the contention of political parties that they
represent the broad base of citizens and that all sectors are represented in
them. Would the Commissioner agree?
MR. TADEO. Ang punto lamang namin, pag pinayagan mo ang UNIDO na isang
political party, it will dominate the party list at mawawalang saysay din yung
sector. Lalamunin mismo ng political parties ang party list system.Gusto ko
lamang bigyan ng diin ang reserve. Hindi ito reserve seat sa marginalized
sectors. Kung titingnan natin itong 198 seats, reserved din ito sa political parties.
MR. MONSOD. Hindi po reserved iyon kasi anybody can run there. But my
question to Commissioner Villacorta and probably also to Commissioner Tadeo is
that under this system, would UNIDO be banned from running under the party list
system?
MR. VILLACORTA. No, as I said, UNIDO may field sectoral candidates. On

that condition alone, UNIDO may be allowed to register for the party list
system.
MR. MONSOD. May I inquire from Commissioner Tadeo if he shares that
answer?
MR. TADEO. The same.
MR. VILLACORTA. Puwede po ang UNIDO, pero sa sectoral lines.
xxxx
MR. OPLE. x x x In my opinion, this will also create the stimulus for political
parties and mass organizations to seek common ground. For example, we have the
PDP-Laban and the UNIDO. I see no reason why they should not be able to make
common goals with mass organizations so that the very leadership of these parties
can be transformed through the participation of mass organizations. And if this is
true of the administration parties, this will be true of others like the Partido ng
Bayan which is now being formed. There is no question that they will be
attractive to many mass organizations. In the opposition parties to which we
belong, there will be a stimulus for us to contact mass organizations so that with
their participation, the policies of such parties can be radically transformed
because this amendment will create conditions that will challenge both the mass
organizations and the political parties to come together. And the party list system
is certainly available, although it is open to all the parties. It is understood that the
parties will enter in the roll of the COMELEC the names of representatives of
mass organizations affiliated with them. So that we may, in time, develop this
excellent system that they have in Europe where labor organizations and
cooperatives, for example, distribute themselves either in the Social Democratic
Party and the Christian Democratic Party in Germany, and their very presence
there has a transforming effect upon the philosophies and the leadership of those
parties.
It is also a fact well known to all that in the United States, the AFL-CIO always
vote with the Democratic Party. But the businessmen, most of them, always vote
with the Republican Party, meaning that there is no reason at all why political
parties and mass organizations should not combine, reenforce, influence and
interact with each other so that the very objectives that we set in this Constitution
for sectoral representation are achieved in a wider, more lasting, and more
institutionalized way. Therefore, I support this [Monsod-Villacorta] amendment. It
installs sectoral representation as a constitutional gift, but at the same time, it
challenges the sector to rise to the majesty of being elected representatives later
on through a party list system; and even beyond that, to become actual political
parties capable of contesting political power in the wider constitutional arena for
major political parties.
x x x [32] (Emphasis supplied)
R.A. No. 7941 provided the details for the concepts put forward by the Constitutional
Commission. Section 3 of R.A. No. 7941 reads:
Definition of Terms. (a) The party-list system is a mechanism of proportional
representation in the election of representatives to the House of Representatives
from national, regional and sectoral parties or organizations or coalitions thereof
registered with the Commission on Elections (COMELEC). Component parties or
organizations of a coalition may participate independently provided the coalition

of which they form part does not participate in the party-list system.
(b) A party means either a political party or a sectoral party or a coalition of
parties.
(c) A political party refers to an organized group of citizens advocating an
ideology or platform, principles and policies for the general conduct of
government and which, as the most immediate means of securing their adoption,
regularly nominates and supports certain of its leaders and members as candidates
for public office.
It is a national party when its constituency is spread over the geographical
territory of at least a majority of the regions. It is a regional party when its
constituency is spread over the geographical territory of at least a majority of the
cities and provinces comprising the region.
(d) A sectoral party refers to an organized group of citizens belonging to any of
the sectors enumerated in Section 5 hereof whose principal advocacy pertains to
the special interests and concerns of their sector,
(e) A sectoral organization refers to a group of citizens or a coalition of groups of
citizens who share similar physical attributes or characteristics, employment,
interests or concerns.
(f) A coalition refers to an aggrupation of duly registered national, regional,
sectoral parties or organizations for political and/or election purposes.
Congress, in enacting R.A. No. 7941, put the three-seat cap to prevent any party from
dominating the party-list elections.
Neither the Constitution nor R.A. No. 7941 prohibits major political parties from participating in
the party-list system. On the contrary, the framers of the Constitution clearly intended the major
political parties to participate in party-list elections through their sectoral wings. In fact,
the members of the Constitutional Commission voted down, 19-22, any permanent sectoral seats,
and in the alternative the reservation of the party-list system to the sectoral groups. [33] In defining
a party that participates in party-list elections as either a political party or a sectoral party, R.A.
No. 7941 also clearly intended that major political parties will participate in the party-list
elections. Excluding the major political parties in party-list elections is manifestly against the
Constitution, the intent of the Constitutional Commission, and R.A. No. 7941. This Court cannot
engage in socio-political engineering and judicially legislate the exclusion of major political
parties from the party-list elections in patent violation of the Constitution and the law.
Read together, R.A. No. 7941 and the deliberations of the Constitutional Commission state that
major political parties are allowed to establish, or form coalitions with, sectoral organizations for
electoral or political purposes. There should not be a problem if, for example, the Liberal Party
participates in the party-list election through the Kabataang Liberal ng Pilipinas (KALIPI), its
sectoral youth wing. The other major political parties can thus organize, or affiliate with, their
chosen sector or sectors. To further illustrate, the Nacionalista Party can establish a fisherfolk
wing to participate in the party-list election, and this fisherfolk wing can field its fisherfolk
nominees. Kabalikat ng Malayang Pilipino (KAMPI) can do the same for the urban poor.
The qualifications of party-list nominees are prescribed in Section 9 of R.A. No. 7941:
Qualifications of Party-List Nominees. No person shall be nominated as party-list

representative unless he is a natural born citizen of the Philippines, a registered
voter, a resident of the Philippines for a period of not less than one (1) year
immediately preceding the day of the elections, able to read and write, bona
fide member of the party or organization which he seeks to represent for at least
ninety (90) days preceding the day of the election, and is at least twenty-five (25)
years of age on the day of the election.
In case of a nominee of the youth sector, he must at least be twenty-five (25) but
not more than thirty (30) years of age on the day of the election. Any youth
sectoral representative who attains the age of thirty (30) during his term shall be
allowed to continue until the expiration of his term.
Under Section 9 of R.A. No. 7941, it is not necessary that the party-list organizations nominee
wallow in poverty, destitution and infirmity[34] as there is no financial status required in the law. It
is enough that the nominee of the sectoral party/organization/coalition belongs to the
marginalized and underrepresented sectors,[35] that is, if the nominee represents the fisherfolk, he
or she must be a fisherfolk, or if the nominee represents the senior citizens, he or she must be a
senior citizen.
Neither the Constitution nor R.A. No. 7941 mandates the filling-up of the entire 20% allocation
of party-list representatives found in the Constitution. The Constitution, in paragraph 1, Section 5
of Article VI, left the determination of the number of the members of the House of
Representatives to Congress: The House of Representatives shall be composed of not more than
two hundred and fifty members, unless otherwise fixed by law, x x x. The 20% allocation of
party-list representatives is merely a ceiling; party-list representatives cannot be more than 20%
of the members of the House of Representatives. However, we cannot allow the continued
existence of a provision in the law which will systematically prevent the constitutionally
allocated 20% party-list representatives from being filled. The three-seat cap, as a limitation to
the number of seats that a qualified party-list organization may occupy, remains a valid statutory
device that prevents any party from dominating the party-list elections. Seats for party-list
representatives shall thus be allocated in accordance with the procedure used in Table 3 above.
However, by a vote of 8-7, the Court decided to continue the ruling in Veterans disallowing
major political parties from participating in the party-list elections, directly or indirectly. Those
who voted to continue disallowing major political parties from the party-list elections joined
Chief Justice Reynato S. Puno in his separate opinion. On the formula to allocate party-list seats,
the Court is unanimous in concurring with this ponencia.
WHEREFORE, we PARTIALLY GRANT the petition. We SET ASIDE the Resolution of the
COMELEC dated 3 August 2007 in NBC No. 07-041 (PL) as well as the Resolution dated 9 July
2007 in NBC No. 07-60. We declare unconstitutional the two percent threshold in the
distribution of additional party-list seats. The allocation of additional seats under the Party-List
System shall be in accordance with the procedure used in Table 3 of this Decision. Major
political parties are disallowed from participating in party-list elections. This Decision is
immediately executory. No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.
ANTONIO T. CARPIO
Associate Justice
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. 147589
June 26, 2001
ANG BAGONG BAYANI-OFW LABOR PARTY (under the acronym OFW), represented
herein by its secretary-general, MOHAMMAD OMAR FAJARDO, petitioner,
vs.
ANG BAGONG BAYANI-OFW LABOR PARTY GO! GO! PHILIPPINES; THE TRUE
MARCOS LOYALIST ASSOCIATION OF THE PHILIPPINES; PHILIPPINE LOCAL
AUTONOMY; CITIZENS MOVEMENT FOR JUSTICE, ECONOMY, ENVIRONMENT
AND PEACE; CHAMBER OF REAL ESTATE BUILDERS ASSOCIATION; SPORTS &
HEALTH ADVANCEMENT FOUNDATION, INC.; ANG LAKAS NG OVERSEAS
CONTRACT WORKERS (OCW); BAGONG BAYANI ORGANIZATION and others
under "Organizations/Coalitions" of Omnibus Resolution No. 3785; PARTIDO NG
MASANG PILIPINO; LAKAS NUCD-UMDP; NATIONALIST PEOPLE'S COALITION;
LABAN NG DEMOKRATIKONG PILIPINO; AKSYON DEMOKRATIKO; PDPLABAN; LIBERAL PARTY; NACIONALISTA PARTY; ANG BUHAY HAYAANG
YUMABONG; and others under "Political Parties" of Omnibus Resolution No.
3785. respondents.
x---------------------------------------------------------x
G.R. No. 147613 June 26, 2001
BAYAN MUNA, petitioner,
vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS; NATIONALIST PEOPLE'S COALITION (NPC);
LABAN NG DEMOKRATIKONG PILIPINO (LDP); PARTIDO NG MASANG PILIPINO
(PMP); LAKAS-NUCD-UMDP; LIBERAL PARTY; MAMAMAYANG AYAW SA
DROGA; CREBA; NATIONAL FEDERATION OF SUGARCANE PLANTERS; JEEP;

and BAGONG BAYANI ORGANIZATION, respondents.
PANGANIBAN, J.:
The party-list system is a social justice tool designed not only to give more law to the great
masses of our people who have less in life, but also to enable them to become veritable
lawmakers themselves, empowered to participate directly in the enactment of laws designed to
benefit them. It intends to make the marginalized and the underrepresented not merely passive
recipients of the State's benevolence, but active participants in the mainstream of representative
democracy. Thus, allowing all individuals and groups, including those which now dominate
district elections, to have the same opportunity to participate in party-list elections would
desecrate this lofty objective and mongrelize the social justice mechanism into an atrocious
veneer for traditional politics.
The Case
Before us are two Petitions under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, challenging Omnibus
Resolution No. 3785 1issued by the Commission on Elections (Comelec) on March 26, 2001.
This Resolution approved the participation of 154 organizations and parties, including those
herein impleaded, in the 2001 party-list elections. Petitioners seek the disqualification of private
respondents, arguing mainly that the party-list system was intended to benefit the marginalized
and underrepresented; not the mainstream political parties, the non-marginalized or
overrepresented.
The Factual Antecedents
With the onset of the 2001 elections, the Comelec received several Petitions for registration filed
by sectoral parties, organizations and political parties. According to the Comelec, "[v]erifications
were made as to the status and capacity of these parties and organizations and hearings were
scheduled day and night until the last party w[as] heard. With the number of these petitions and
the observance of the legal and procedural requirements, review of these petitions as well as
deliberations takes a longer process in order to arrive at a decision and as a result the two (2)
divisions promulgated a separate Omnibus Resolution and individual resolution on political
parties. These numerous petitions and processes observed in the disposition of these petition[s]
hinder the early release of the Omnibus Resolutions of the Divisions which were promulgated
only on 10 February 2001." 2
Thereafter, before the February 12, 2001 deadline prescribed under Comelec Resolution No.
3426 dated December 22, 2000, the registered parties and organizations filed their respective
Manifestations, stating their intention to participate in the party-list elections. Other sectoral and
political parties and organizations whose registrations were denied also filed Motions for
Reconsideration, together with Manifestations of their intent to participate in the party-list
elections. Still other registered parties filed their Manifestations beyond the deadline.
The Comelec gave due course or approved the Manifestations (or accreditations) of 154 parties
and organizations, but denied those of several others in its assailed March 26, 2001 Omnibus
Resolution No. 3785, which we quote:
"We carefully deliberated the foregoing matters, having in mind that this system of proportional
representation scheme will encourage multi-partisan [sic] and enhance the inability of small, new
or sectoral parties or organization to directly participate in this electoral window.
"It will be noted that as defined, the 'party-list system' is a 'mechanism of proportional
representation' in the election of representatives to the House of Representatives from national,
regional, and sectoral parties or organizations or coalitions thereof registered with the
Commission on Elections.
"However, in the course of our review of the matters at bar, we must recognize the fact that there
is a need to keep the number of sectoral parties, organizations and coalitions, down to a
manageable level, keeping only those who substantially comply with the rules and regulations
and more importantly the sufficiency of the Manifestations or evidence on the Motions for
Reconsiderations or Oppositions." 3
On April 10, 2001, Akbayan Citizens Action Party filed before the Comelec a Petition praying
that "the names of [some of herein respondents] be deleted from the 'Certified List of Political
Parties/Sectoral Parties/Organizations/Coalitions Participating in the Party List System for the
May 14, 2001 Elections' and that said certified list be accordingly amended." It also asked, as an
alternative, that the votes cast for the said respondents not be counted or canvassed, and that the
latter's nominees not be proclaimed. 4 On April 11, 2001, Bayan Muna and Bayan Muna-Youth
also filed a Petition for Cancellation of Registration and Nomination against some of herein
respondents. 5
On April 18, 2001, the Comelec required the respondents in the two disqualification cases to file
Comments within three days from notice. It also set the date for hearing on April 26, 2001, 6 but
subsequently reset it to May 3, 2001. 7 During the hearing, however, Commissioner Ralph C.
Lantion merely directed the parties to submit their respective memoranda. 8
Meanwhile, dissatisfied with the pace of the Comelec, Ang Bagong Bayani-OFW Labor Party
filed a Petition 9before this Court on April 16, 2001. This Petition, docketed as GR No. 147589,
assailed Comelec Omnibus Resolution No. 3785. In its Resolution dated April 17, 2001, 10 the
Court directed respondents to comment on the Petition within a non-extendible period of five
days from notice. 11
On April 17, 2001, Petitioner Bayan Muna also filed before this Court a Petition, 12 docketed as
GR No. 147613, also challenging Comelec Omnibus Resolution No. 3785. In its Resolution
dated May 9, 2001, 13 the Court ordered the consolidation of the two Petitions before it; directed
respondents named in the second Petition to file their respective Comments on or before noon of
May 15, 2001; and called the parties to an Oral Argument on May 17, 2001. It added that the
Comelec may proceed with the counting and canvassing of votes cast for the party-list elections,
but barred the proclamation of any winner therein, until further orders of the Court.
Thereafter, Comments 14 on the second Petition were received by the Court and, on May 17,
2001, the Oral Argument was conducted as scheduled. In an Order given in open court, the
parties were directed to submit their respective Memoranda simultaneously within a nonextendible period of five days. 15
Issues:
During the hearing on May 17, 2001, the Court directed the parties to address the following
issues:
"1. Whether or not recourse under Rule 65 is proper under the premises. More
specifically, is there no other plain, speedy or adequate remedy in the ordinary course of
law?
"2. Whether or not political parties may participate in the party-list elections.
"3. Whether or not the party-list system is exclusive to 'marginalized and
underrepresented' sectors and organizations.
"4. Whether or not the Comelec committed grave abuse of discretion in promulgating
Omnibus Resolution No. 3785." 16
The Court's Ruling
The Petitions are partly meritorious. These cases should be remanded to the Comelec which will
determine, after summary evidentiary hearings, whether the 154 parties and organizations
enumerated in the assailed Omnibus Resolution satisfy the requirements of the Constitution and
RA 7941, as specified in this Decision.
First Issue:
Recourse Under Rule 65
Respondents contend that the recourse of both petitioners under Rule 65 is improper because
there are other plain, speedy and adequate remedies in the ordinary course of law. 17 The Office
of the Solicitor General argues that petitioners should have filed before the Comelec a petition
either for disqualification or for cancellation of registration, pursuant to Sections 19, 20, 21 and
22 of Comelec Resolution No. 3307-A 18 dated November 9, 2000. 19
We disagree. At bottom, petitioners attack the validity of Comelec Omnibus Resolution 3785 for
having been issued with grave abuse of discretion, insofar as it allowed respondents to
participate in the party-list elections of 2001. Indeed, under both the Constitution 20 and the Rules
of Court, such challenge may be brought before this Court in a verified petition for certiorari
under Rule 65.
Moreover, the assailed Omnibus Resolution was promulgated by Respondent Commission en
banc; hence, no motion for reconsideration was possible, it being a prohibited pleading under
Section 1 (d), Rule 13 of the Comelec Rules of Procedure. 21
The Court also notes that Petitioner Bayan Muna had filed before the Comelec a Petition for
Cancellation of Registration and Nomination against some of herein respondents. 22 The
Comelec, however, did not act on that Petition. In view of the pendency of the elections,
Petitioner Bayan Muna sought succor from this Court, for there was no other adequate recourse
at the time. Subsequent events have proven the urgency of petitioner's action; to this date, the
Comelec has not yet formally resolved the Petition before it. But a resolution may just be a
formality because the Comelec, through the Office of the Solicitor General, has made its position
on the matter quite clear.
In any event, this case presents an exception to the rule that certiorari shall lie only in the
absence of any other plain, speedy and adequate remedy. 23 It has been held that certiorari is
available, notwithstanding the presence of other remedies, "where the issue raised is one purely
of law, where public interest is involved, and in case of urgency." 24 Indeed, the instant case is
indubitably imbued with public interest and with extreme urgency, for it potentially involves the
composition of 20 percent of the House of Representatives.
Moreover, this case raises transcendental constitutional issues on the party-list system, which this
Court must urgently resolve, consistent with its duty to "formulate guiding and controlling
constitutional principles, precepts, doctrines, or rules." 25
Finally, procedural requirements "may be glossed over to prevent a miscarriage of justice, when
the issue involves the principle of social justice x x x when the decision sought to be set aside is
a nullity, or when the need for relief is extremely urgent and certiorari is the only adequate and
speedy remedy available." 26
Second Issue:
Participation of Political Parties
In its Petition, Ang Bagong Bayani-OFW Labor Party contends that "the inclusion of political
parties in the party-list system is the most objectionable portion of the questioned
Resolution." 27 For its part, Petitioner Bayan Muna objects to the participation of "major political
parties." 28 On the other hand, the Office of the Solicitor General, like the impleaded political
parties, submits that the Constitution and RA No. 7941 allow political parties to participate in the
party-list elections. It argues that the party-list system is, in fact, open to all "registered national,
regional and sectoral parties or organizations." 29
We now rule on this issue. Under the Constitution and RA 7941, private respondents cannot be
disqualified from the party-list elections, merely on the ground that they are political parties.
Section 5, Article VI of the Constitution provides that members of the House of Representatives
may "be elected through a party-list system of registered national, regional, and sectoral parties
or organizations."
Furthermore, under Sections 7 and 8, Article IX (C) of the Constitution, political parties may be
registered under the party-list system.
"Sec. 7. No votes cast in favor of a political party, organization, or coalition shall be
valid, except for those registered under the party-list system as provided in this
Constitution.
"Sec. 8. Political parties, or organizations or coalitions registered under the party-list
system, shall not be represented in the voters' registration boards, boards of election
inspectors, boards of canvassers, or other similar bodies. However, they shall be entitled
to appoint poll watchers in accordance with law." 30
During the deliberations in the Constitutional Commission, Comm. Christian S. Monsod pointed
out that the participants in the party-list system may "be a regional party, a sectoral party, a
national party, UNIDO, 31Magsasaka, or a regional party in Mindanao." 32 This was also clear
from the following exchange between Comms. Jaime Tadeo and Blas Ople: 33
"MR. TADEO. Naniniwala ba kayo na ang party list ay pwedeng paghati-hatian ng UNIDO,
PDP-Laban, PNP, Liberal at Nacionalista?
MR. OPLE. Maaari yan sapagkat bukas ang party list system sa lahat ng mga partido."
Indeed, Commissioner Monsod stated that the purpose of the party-list provision was to open up
the system, in order to give a chance to parties that consistently place third or fourth in
congressional district elections to win a seat in Congress. 34 He explained: "The purpose of this is
to open the system. In the past elections, we found out that there were certain groups or parties
that, if we count their votes nationwide, have about 1,000,000 or 1,500,000 votes. But they were
always third or fourth place in each of the districts. So, they have no voice in the Assembly. But
this way, they would have five or six representatives in the Assembly even if they would not win
individually in legislative districts. So, that is essentially the mechanics, the purpose and
objectives of the party-list system."
For its part, Section 2 of RA 7941 also provides for "a party-list system of registered national,
regional and sectoral parties or organizations or coalitions thereof, x x x." Section 3 expressly
states that a "party" is "either a political party or a sectoral party or a coalition of parties." More
to the point, the law defines "political party" as "an organized group of citizens advocating an
ideology or platform, principles and policies for the general conduct of government and which,
as the most immediate means of securing their adoption, regularly nominates and supports
certain of its leaders and members as candidates for public office."
Furthermore, Section 11 of RA 7941 leaves no doubt as to the participation of political parties in
the party-list system. We quote the pertinent provision below:
"x x x
"For purposes of the May 1998 elections, the first five (5) major political parties on the basis of
party representation in the House of Representatives at the start of the Tenth Congress of the
Philippines shall not be entitled to participate in the party-list system.
x x x"
Indubitably, therefore, political parties even the major ones -- may participate in the party-list
elections.
Third Issue:
Marginalized and Underrepresented
That political parties may participate in the party-list elections does not mean, however, that any
political party -- or any organization or group for that matter -- may do so. The requisite
character of these parties or organizations must be consistent with the purpose of the party-list
system, as laid down in the Constitution and RA 7941. Section 5, Article VI of the Constitution,
provides as follows:
"(1) The House of Representatives shall be composed of not more than two hundred and
fifty members, unless otherwise fixed by law, who shall be elected from legislative
districts apportioned among the provinces, cities, and the Metropolitan Manila area in
accordance with the number of their respective inhabitants, and on the basis of a uniform
and progressive ratio, and those who, as provided by law, shall be elected through a
party-list system of registered national, regional, and sectoral parties or organizations.
ratification of this Constitution, one-half of the seats allocated to party-list representatives
shall be filled, as provided by law, by selection or election from the labor, peasant, urban
poor, indigenous cultural communities, women, youth, and such other sectors as may be
provided by law, except the religious sector." (Emphasis supplied.)
Notwithstanding the sparse language of the provision, a distinguished member of the
Constitutional Commission declared that the purpose of the party-list provision was to give
"genuine power to our people" in Congress. Hence, when the provision was discussed, he
exultantly announced: "On this first day of August 1986, we shall, hopefully, usher in a new
chapter to our national history, by giving genuine power to our people in the legislature."35
The foregoing provision on the party-list system is not self-executory. It is, in fact, interspersed
with phrases like "in accordance with law" or "as may be provided by law"; it was thus up to
Congress to sculpt in granite the lofty objective of the Constitution. Hence, RA 7941 was
enacted. It laid out the statutory policy in this wise:
"SEC. 2. Declaration of Policy. -- The State shall promote proportional representation in the
election of representatives to the House of Representatives through a party-list system of
registered national, regional and sectoral parties or organizations or coalitions thereof, which will
enable Filipino citizens belonging to marginalized and underrepresented sectors, organizations
and parties, and who lack well-defined political constituencies but who could contribute to the
formulation and enactment of appropriate legislation that will benefit the nation as a whole, to
become members of the House of Representatives. Towards this end, the State shall develop and
guarantee a full, free and open party system in order to attain the broadest possible representation
of party, sectoral or group interests in the House of Representatives by enhancing their chances
to compete for and win seats in the legislature, and shall provide the simplest scheme possible."
The Marginalized and Underrepresented to Become Lawmakers Themselves
The foregoing provision mandates a state policy of promoting proportional representation by
means of the Filipino-style party-list system, which will "enable" the election to the House of
Representatives of Filipino citizens,
1. who belong to marginalized and underrepresented sectors, organizations and parties;
and
2. who lack well-defined constituencies; but
3. who could contribute to the formulation and enactment of appropriate legislation that
will benefit the nation as a whole.
The key words in this policy are "proportional representation," "marginalized and
underrepresented," and "lack ofwell-defined constituencies."
"Proportional representation" here does not refer to the number of people in a particular district,
because the party-list election is national in scope. Neither does it allude to numerical strength in
a distressed or oppressed group. Rather, it refers to the representation of the "marginalized and
underrepresented" as exemplified by the enumeration in Section 5 of the law; namely, "labor,
peasant, fisherfolk, urban poor, indigenous cultural communities, elderly, handicapped, women,
youth, veterans, overseas workers, and professionals."
However, it is not enough for the candidate to claim representation of the marginalized and
underrepresented, because representation is easy to claim and to feign. The party-list
organization or party must factually and truly represent the marginalized and underrepresented
constituencies mentioned in Section 5. 36 Concurrently, the persons nominated by the party-list
candidate-organization must be "Filipino citizens belonging to marginalized and
underrepresented sectors, organizations and parties."
Finally, "lack of well-defined constituenc[y] " refers to the absence of a traditionally identifiable
electoral group, like voters of a congressional district or territorial unit of government. Rather, it
points again to those with disparate interests identified with the "marginalized or
underrepresented."
In the end, the role of the Comelec is to see to it that only those Filipinos who are "marginalized
and underrepresented" become members of Congress under the party-list system, Filipino-style.
The intent of the Constitution is clear: to give genuine power to the people, not only by giving
more law to those who have less in life, but more so by enabling them to become veritable
lawmakers themselves. Consistent with this intent, the policy of the implementing law, we
repeat, is likewise clear: "to enable Filipino citizens belonging to marginalized and
underrepresented sectors, organizations and parties, x x x, to become members of the House of
Representatives." Where the language of the law is clear, it must be applied according to its
express terms. 37
The marginalized and underrepresented sectors to be represented under the party-list system are
enumerated in Section 5 of RA 7941, which states:
"SEC. 5. Registration. -- Any organized group of persons may register as a party, organization or
coalition for purposes of the party-list system by filing with the COMELEC not later than ninety
(90) days before the election a petition verified by its president or secretary stating its desire to
participate in the party-list system as a national, regional or sectoral party or organization or a
coalition of such parties or organizations, attaching thereto its constitution, by-laws, platform or
program of government, list of officers, coalition agreement and other relevant information as the
COMELEC may require: Provided, that the sector shall include labor, peasant, fisherfolk, urban
poor, indigenous cultural communities, elderly, handicapped, women, youth, veterans, overseas
workers, and professionals."
While the enumeration of marginalized and underrepresented sectors is not exclusive, it
demonstrates the clear intent of the law that not all sectors can be represented under the party-list
system. It is a fundamental principle of statutory construction that words employed in a statute
are interpreted in connection with, and their meaning is ascertained by reference to, the words
and the phrases with which they are associated or related. Thus, the meaning of a term in a
statute may be limited, qualified or specialized by those in immediate association. 38
The Party-List System Desecrated by the OSG Contentions
Notwithstanding the unmistakable statutory policy, the Office of the Solicitor General submits
that RA No. 7941 "does not limit the participation in the party-list system to the marginalized
and underrepresented sectors of society." 39 In fact, it contends that any party or group that is not
disqualified under Section 6 40 of RA 7941 may participate in the elections. Hence, it admitted
during the Oral Argument that even an organization representing the super rich of Forbes Park or
Dasmarias Village could participate in the party-list elections. 41
The declared policy of RA 7941 contravenes the position of the Office of the Solicitor General
(OSG). We stress that the party-list system seeks to enable certain Filipino citizens specifically
those belonging to marginalized and underrepresented sectors, organizations and parties to be
elected to the House of Representatives. The assertion of the OSG that the party-list system is not
exclusive to the marginalized and underrepresented disregards the clear statutory policy. Its claim
that even the super-rich and overrepresented can participate desecrates the spirit of the party-list
system.
Indeed, the law crafted to address the peculiar disadvantages of Payatas hovel dwellers cannot be
appropriated by the mansion owners of Forbes Park. The interests of these two sectors are
manifestly disparate; hence, the OSG's position to treat them similarly defies reason and
common sense. In contrast, and with admirable candor, Atty. Lorna Patajo-Kapunan 42 admitted
during the Oral Argument that a group of bankers, industrialists and sugar planters could not join
the party-list system as representatives of their respective sectors. 43
While the business moguls and the mega-rich are, numerically speaking, a tiny minority, they are
neither marginalized nor underrepresented, for the stark reality is that their economic clout
engenders political power more awesome than their numerical limitation. Traditionally, political
power does not necessarily emanate from the size of one's constituency; indeed, it is likely to
arise more directly from the number and amount of one's bank accounts.
It is ironic, therefore, that the marginalized and underrepresented in our midst are the majority
who wallow in poverty, destitution and infirmity. It was for them that the party-list system was
enacted -- to give them not only genuine hope, but genuine power; to give them the opportunity
to be elected and to represent the specific concerns of their constituencies; and simply to give
them a direct voice in Congress and in the larger affairs of the State. In its noblest sense, the
party-list system truly empowers the masses and ushers a new hope for genuine change. Verily, it
invites those marginalized and underrepresented in the past the farm hands, the fisher folk, the
urban poor, even those in the underground movement to come out and participate, as indeed
many of them came out and participated during the last elections. The State cannot now
disappoint and frustrate them by disabling and desecrating this social justice vehicle.
Because the marginalized and underrepresented had not been able to win in the congressional
district elections normally dominated by traditional politicians and vested groups, 20 percent of
the seats in the House of Representatives were set aside for the party-list system. In arguing that
even those sectors who normally controlled 80 percent of the seats in the House could participate
in the party-list elections for the remaining 20 percent, the OSG and the Comelec disregard the
fundamental difference between the congressional district elections and the party-list elections.
As earlier noted, the purpose of the party-list provision was to open up the system, 44 in order to
enhance the chance of sectoral groups and organizations to gain representation in the House of
Representatives through the simplest scheme possible. 45 Logic shows that the system has been
opened to those who have never gotten a foothold within it -- those who cannot otherwise win in
regular elections and who therefore need the "simplest scheme possible" to do so. Conversely, it
would be illogical to open the system to those who have long been within it -- those privileged
sectors that have long dominated the congressional district elections.
The import of the open party-list system may be more vividly understood when compared to a
student dormitory "open house," which by its nature allows outsiders to enter the facilities.
Obviously, the "open house" is for the benefit of outsiders only, not the dormers themselves who
can enter the dormitory even without such special privilege. In the same vein, the open party-list
system is only for the "outsiders" who cannot get elected through regular elections otherwise; it
is not for the non-marginalized or overrepresented who already fill the ranks of Congress.
Verily, allowing the non-marginalized and overrepresented to vie for the remaining seats under
the party-list system would not only dilute, but also prejudice the chance of the marginalized and
underrepresented, contrary to the intention of the law to enhance it. The party-list system is a tool
for the benefit of the underprivileged; the law could not have given the same tool to others, to the
prejudice of the intended beneficiaries.
This Court, therefore, cannot allow the party-list system to be sullied and prostituted by those
who are neither marginalized nor underrepresented. It cannot let that flicker of hope be snuffed
out. The clear state policy must permeate every discussion of the qualification of political parties
and other organizations under the party-list system.
Refutation of the Separate Opinions
The Separate Opinions of our distinguished colleagues, Justices Jose C. Vitug and Vicente V.
Mendoza, are anchored mainly on the supposed intent of the framers of the Constitution as culled
from their deliberations.
The fundamental principle in constitutional construction, however, is that the primary source
from which to ascertain constitutional intent or purpose is the language of the provision itself.
The presumption is that the words in which the constitutional provisions are couched express the
objective sought to be attained. 46 In other words, verba legis still prevails. Only when the
meaning of the words used is unclear and equivocal should resort be made to extraneous aids of
construction and interpretation, such as the proceedings of the Constitutional Commission or
Convention, in order to shed light on and ascertain the true intent or purpose of the provision
being construed. 47
Indeed, as cited in the Separate Opinion of Justice Mendoza, this Court stated in Civil Liberties
Union v. Executive Secretary 48 that "the debates and proceedings of the constitutional
convention [may be consulted] in order to arrive at the reason and purpose of the resulting
Constitution x x x only when other guides fail as said proceedings are powerless to vary the
terms of the Constitution when the meaning is clear. Debates in the constitutional convention 'are
of value as showing the views of the individual members, and as indicating the reason for their
votes, but they give us no light as to the views of the large majority who did not talk, much less
of the mass or our fellow citizens whose votes at the polls gave that instrument the force of
fundamental law. We think it safer to construe the constitution from what appears upon its face.'
The proper interpretation therefore depends more on how it was understood by the people
adopting it than in the framers' understanding thereof."
Section 5, Article VI of the Constitution, relative to the party-list system, is couched in clear
terms: the mechanics of the system shall be provided by law. Pursuant thereto, Congress enacted
RA 7941. In understanding and implementing party-list representation, we should therefore look

at the law first. Only when we find its provisions ambiguous should the use of extraneous aids of
construction be resorted to.
But, as discussed earlier, the intent of the law is obvious and clear from its plain words. Section 2
thereof unequivocally states that the party-list system of electing congressional representatives
was designed to "enable underrepresented sectors, organizations and parties, and who lack welldefined political constituencies but who could contribute to the formulation and enactment of
appropriate legislation that will benefit the nation as a whole x x x." The criteria for participation
is well defined. Thus, there is no need for recourse to constitutional deliberations, not even to the
proceedings of Congress. In any event, the framers' deliberations merely express their individual
opinions and are, at best, only persuasive in construing the meaning and purpose of the
constitution or statute.
Be it remembered that the constitutionality or validity of Sections 2 and 5 of RA 7941 is not an
issue here. Hence, they remain parts of the law, which must be applied plainly and simply.
Fourth Issue:
Grave Abuse of Discretion
From its assailed Omnibus Resolution, it is manifest that the Comelec failed to appreciate fully
the clear policy of the law and the Constitution. On the contrary, it seems to have ignored the
facet of the party-list system discussed above. The OSG as its counsel admitted before the Court
that any group, even the non-marginalized and overrepresented, could field candidates in the
party-list elections.
When a lower court, or a quasi-judicial agency like the Commission on Elections, violates or
ignores the Constitution or the law, its action can be struck down by this Court on the ground of
grave abuse of discretion. 49Indeed, the function of all judicial and quasi-judicial instrumentalities
is to apply the law as they find it, not to reinvent or second-guess it. 50
In its Memorandum, Petitioner Bayan Muna passionately pleads for the outright disqualification
of the major political parties Respondents Lakas-NUCD, LDP, NPC, LP and PMP on the
ground that under Comelec Resolution No. 4073, they have been accredited as the five (six,
including PDP-Laban) major political parties in the May 14, 2001 elections. It argues that
because of this, they have the "advantage of getting official Comelec Election Returns,
Certificates of Canvass, preferred poll watchers x x x." We note, however, that this accreditation
does not refer to the party-list election, but, inter alia, to the election of district representatives
for the purpose of determining which parties would be entitled to watchers under Section 26 of
Republic Act No. 7166.
What is needed under the present circumstances, however, is a factual determination of whether
respondents herein and, for that matter, all the 154 previously approved groups, have the
necessary qualifications to participate in the party-list elections, pursuant to the Constitution and
the law.
Bayan Muna also urges us to immediately rule out Respondent Mamamayan Ayaw sa Droga
(MAD), because "it is a government entity using government resources and privileges." This
Court, however, is not a trier of facts. 51It is not equipped to receive evidence and determine the
truth of such factual allegations.
Basic rudiments of due process require that respondents should first be given an opportunity to
show that they qualify under the guidelines promulgated in this Decision, before they can be
deprived of their right to participate in and be elected under the party-list system.
Guidelines for Screening Party-List Participants
The Court, therefore, deems it proper to remand the case to the Comelec for the latter to
determine, after summary evidentiary hearings, whether the 154 parties and organizations
allowed to participate in the party-list elections comply with the requirements of the law. In this
light, the Court finds it appropriate to lay down the following guidelines, culled from the law and
the Constitution, to assist the Comelec in its work.
First, the political party, sector, organization or coalition must represent the marginalized and
underrepresented groups identified in Section 5 of RA 7941. In other words, it must show -through its constitution, articles of incorporation, bylaws, history, platform of government and
track record -- that it represents and seeks to uplift marginalized and underrepresented sectors.
Verily, majority of its membership should belong to the marginalized and underrepresented. And
it must demonstrate that in a conflict of interests, it has chosen or is likely to choose the interest
of such sectors.
Second, while even major political parties are expressly allowed by RA 7941 and the
Constitution to participate in the party-list system, they must comply with the declared statutory
policy of enabling "Filipino citizens belonging to marginalized and underrepresented sectors x x
x to be elected to the House of Representatives." In other words, while they are not disqualified
merely on the ground that they are political parties, they must show, however, that they represent
the interests of the marginalized and underrepresented. The counsel of Aksyon Demokratiko and
other similarly situated political parties admitted as much during the Oral Argument, as the
following quote shows:
"JUSTICE PANGANIBAN: I am not disputing that in my question. All I am saying is, the
political party must claim to represent the marginalized and underrepresented sectors?
ATTY. KAPUNAN: Yes, Your Honor, the answer is yes."52
Third, in view of the objections53 directed against the registration of Ang Buhay Hayaang
Yumabong, which is allegedly a religious group, the Court notes the express constitutional
provision that the religious sector may not be represented in the party-list system. The extent of
the constitutional proscription is demonstrated by the following discussion during the
deliberations of the Constitutional Commission:
"MR. OPLE. x x x
In the event that a certain religious sect with nationwide and even international networks of
members and supporters, in order to circumvent this prohibition, decides to form its own political
party in emulation of those parties I had mentioned earlier as deriving their inspiration and
philosophies from well-established religious faiths, will that also not fall within this prohibition?
MR. MONSOD. If the evidence shows that the intention is to go around the prohibition, then
certainly the Comelec can pierce through the legal fiction."54
The following discussion is also pertinent:
"MR. VILLACORTA. When the Commissioner proposed "EXCEPT RELIGIOUS GROUPS,"

he is not, of course, prohibiting priests, imams or pastors who may be elected by, say, the
indigenous community sector to represent their group.
REV. RIGOS. Not at all, but I am objecting to anybody who represents the Iglesia ni Kristo, the
Catholic Church, the Protestant Church et cetera."55
Furthermore, the Constitution provides that "religious denominations and sects shall not be
registered."56 The prohibition was explained by a member 57 of the Constitutional Commission in
this wise: "[T] he prohibition is on any religious organization registering as a political party. I do
not see any prohibition here against a priest running as a candidate. That is not prohibited here; it
is the registration of a religious sect as a political party."58
Fourth, a party or an organization must not be disqualified under Section 6 of RA 7941, which
enumerates the grounds for disqualification as follows:
"(1) It is a religious sect or denomination, organization or association organized for
religious purposes;
(2) It advocates violence or unlawful means to seek its goal;
(3) It is a foreign party or organization;
(4) It is receiving support from any foreign government, foreign political party,
foundation, organization, whether directly or through any of its officers or members or
indirectly through third parties for partisan election purposes;
(5) It violates or fails to comply with laws, rules or regulations relating to elections;
(6) It declares untruthful statements in its petition;
(7) It has ceased to exist for at least one (1) year; or
(8) It fails to participate in the last two (2) preceding elections or fails to obtain at least
two per centum (2%) of the votes cast under the party-list system in the two (2) preceding
elections for the constituency in which it has registered."59
Note should be taken of paragraph 5, which disqualifies a party or group for violation of or
failure to comply with election laws and regulations. These laws include Section 2 of RA 7941,
which states that the party-list system seeks to "enable Filipino citizens belonging to
marginalized and underrepresented sectors, organizations and parties x x x to become members
of the House of Representatives." A party or an organization, therefore, that does not comply
with this policy must be disqualified.
Fifth, the party or organization must not be an adjunct of, or a project organized or an entity
funded or assisted by, the government. By the very nature of the party-list system, the party or
organization must be a group of citizens, organized by citizens and operated by citizens. It must
be independent of the government. The participation of the government or its officials in the
affairs of a party-list candidate is not only illegal60 and unfair to other parties, but also deleterious
to the objective of the law: to enable citizens belonging to marginalized and underrepresented
sectors and organizations to be elected to the House of Representatives.
Sixth, the party must not only comply with the requirements of the law; its nominees must
likewise do so. Section 9 of RA 7941 reads as follows:
"SEC. 9. Qualifications of Party-List Nominees. No person shall be nominated as party-list
representative unless he is a natural-born citizen of the Philippines, a registered voter, a resident
of the Philippines for a period of not less than one (1) year immediately preceding the day of the
election, able to read and write, a bona fide member of the party or organization which he seeks
to represent for at least ninety (90) days preceding the day of the election, and is at least twentyfive (25) years of age on the day of the election.
In case of a nominee of the youth sector, he must at least be twenty-five (25) but not more than
thirty (30) years of age on the day of the election. Any youth sectoral representative who attains
the age of thirty (30) during his term shall be allowed to continue in office until the expiration of
his term."
Seventh, not only the candidate party or organization must represent marginalized and
underrepresented sectors; so also must its nominees. To repeat, under Section 2 of RA 7941, the
nominees must be Filipino citizens "who belong to marginalized and underrepresented sectors,
organizations and parties." Surely, the interests of the youth cannot be fully represented by a
retiree; neither can those of the urban poor or the working class, by an industrialist. To allow
otherwise is to betray the State policy to give genuine representation to the marginalized and
underrepresented.
Eighth, as previously discussed, while lacking a well-defined political constituency, the nominee
must likewise be able to contribute to the formulation and enactment of appropriate legislation
that will benefit the nation as a whole. Senator Jose Lina explained during the bicameral
committee proceedings that "the nominee of a party, national or regional, is not going to
represent a particular district x x x."61
Epilogue
The linchpin of this case is the clear and plain policy of the law: "to enable Filipino citizens
belonging to marginalized and underrepresented sectors, organizations and parties, and who lack
well-defined political constituencies but who could contribute to the formulation and enactment
of appropriate legislation that will benefit the nation as a whole, to become members of the
House of Representatives."
Crucial to the resolution of this case is the fundamental social justice principle that those who
have less in life should have more in law. The party-list system is one such tool intended to
benefit those who have less in life. It gives the great masses of our people genuine hope and
genuine power. It is a message to the destitute and the prejudiced, and even to those in the
underground, that change is possible. It is an invitation for them to come out of their limbo and
seize the opportunity.
Clearly, therefore, the Court cannot accept the submissions of the Comelec and the other
respondents that the party-list system is, without any qualification, open to all. Such position
does not only weaken the electoral chances of the marginalized and underrepresented; it also
prejudices them. It would gut the substance of the party-list system. Instead of generating hope, it
would create a mirage. Instead of enabling the marginalized, it would further weaken them and
aggravate their marginalization.
In effect, the Comelec would have us believe that the party-list provisions of the Constitution and
RA 7941 are nothing more than a play on dubious words, a mockery of noble intentions, and an
empty offering on the altar of people empowerment. Surely, this could not have been the
intention of the framers of the Constitution and the makers of RA 7941.
WHEREFORE, this case is REMANDED to the Comelec, which is hereby DIRECTED to
immediately conduct summary evidentiary hearings on the qualifications of the party-list
participants in the light of the guidelines enunciated in this Decision. Considering the extreme
urgency of determining the winners in the last party-list elections, the Comelec is directed to
begin its hearings for the parties and organizations that appear to have garnered such number of
votes as to qualify for seats in the House of Representatives. The Comelec is further DIRECTED
to submit to this Court its compliance report within 30 days from notice hereof.1wphi1.nt
The Resolution of this Court dated May 9, 2001, directing the Comelec "to refrain from
proclaiming any winner" during the last party-list election, shall remain in force until after the
Comelec itself will have complied and reported its compliance with the foregoing disposition.
This Decision is immediately executory upon the Commission on Elections' receipt thereof. No
pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.
Bellosillo, Melo, Puno, Kapunan, Pardo, Buena, and Gonzaga-Reyes, JJ., concur.
Davide, Jr., C.J., in the result.
Vitug and Mendoza, JJ., see dissenting opinion.
Quisumbing, De Leon, Jr., and Sandoval-Gutierrez, JJ., join the dissent of J. Vicente M.
Mendoza.
Ynares-Santiago, J., abroad on official business.

SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. 203766
April 2, 2013
ATONG PAGLAUM, INC., represented by its President, Mr. Alan Igot, Petitioner,
vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, Respondent.
x-----------------------x
G.R. Nos. 203818-19
AKO BICOL POLITICAL PARTY (AKB), Petitioner,
vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS EN BANC, Respondent.
x-----------------------x
G.R. No. 203922

ASSOCIATION OF PHILIPPINE ELECTRIC COOPERATIVES (APEC),represented by
its President Congressman Ponciano D. Payuyo, Petitioner,
vs.
x-----------------------x
G.R. No. 203936
AKSYON MAGSASAKA-PARTIDO TINIG NG MASA, represented by its President
Michael Abas Kida,Petitioner,
vs.
x-----------------------x
G.R. No. 203958
KAPATIRAN NG MGA NAKULONG NA WALANG SALA, INC. (KAKUSA), Petitioner,
vs.
x-----------------------x
G.R. No. 203960
1st CONSUMERS ALLIANCE FOR RURAL ENERGY, INC. (1-CARE), Petitioner,
vs.
x-----------------------x
G.R. No. 203976
ALLIANCE FOR RURAL AND AGRARIAN RECONSTRUCTION, INC.
(ARARO), Petitioner,
vs.
x-----------------------x
G.R. No. 203981
ASSOCIATION FOR RIGHTEOUSNESS ADVOCACY ON LEADERSHIP (ARAL)
PARTY-LIST, represented herein by Ms. Lourdes L. Agustin, the partys Secretary
General, Petitioner,
vs.
x-----------------------x
G.R. No. 204002
ALLIANCE FOR RURAL CONCERNS, Petitioner,

vs.
x-----------------------x
G.R. No. 204094
ALLIANCE FOR NATIONALISM AND DEMOCRACY (ANAD), Petitioner,
vs.
x-----------------------x
G.R. No. 204100
1-BRO PHILIPPINE GUARDIANS BROTHERHOOD, INC., (1BRO-PGBI) formerly
PGBI, Petitioner,
vs.
x-----------------------x
G.R. No. 204122
1 GUARDIANS NATIONALIST PHILIPPINES, INC.,
(1GANAP/GUARDIANS), Petitioner,
vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS EN BANC composed of SIXTO S. BRILLANTES, JR.,
Chairman, RENE V. SARMIENTO, Commissioner,LUCENITO N. TAGLE,
Commissioner,ARMANDO C. VELASCO, Commissioner,ELIAS R. YUSOPH,
Commissioner, andCHRISTIAN ROBERT S. LIM, Commissioner,Respondents.
x-----------------------x
G.R. No. 204125
AGAPAY NG INDIGENOUS PEOPLES RIGHTS ALLIANCE, INC. (A-IPRA),
represented by its Secretary General,Ronald D. Macaraig, Petitioner,
vs.
x-----------------------x
G.R. No. 204126
KAAGAPAY NG NAGKAKAISANG AGILANG PILIPINONG MAGSASAKA (KAP),
formerly known as AKO AGILA NG NAGKAKAISANG MAGSASAKA (AKO AGILA),
represented by its Secretary General, Leo R. San Buenaventura, Petitioner,
vs.
x-----------------------x
G.R. No. 204139
ALAB NG MAMAMAHAYAG (ALAM), represented by Atty. Berteni Catalua

Causing, Petitioner,
vs.
x-----------------------x
G.R. No. 204141
BANTAY PARTY LIST, represented by Maria Evangelina F. Palparan,
President, Petitioner,
vs.
x-----------------------x
G.R. No. 204153
PASANG MASDA NATIONWIDE PARTY by its President Roberto "Ka Obet"
Martin, Petitioner,
vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, Respondents.
x-----------------------x
G.R. No. 204158
ABROAD PARTY LIST, Petitioner,
vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, CHAIRMAN SIXTO S. BRILLANTES, JR.,
COMMISSIONERS RENE V. SARMIENTO, ARMANDO C. VELASCO, ELIAS R.
YUSOPH, CHRISTIAN ROBERT S. LIM, MARIA GRACIA CIELO M. PADACA,
LUCENITO TAGLE, AND ALL OTHER PERSONS ACTING ON THEIR
BEHALF,Respondents.
x-----------------------x
G.R. No. 204174
AANGAT TAYO PARTY LIST-PARTY, represented by its President Simeon T. Silva,
Jr., Petitioner,
vs.
x-----------------------x
G.R. No. 204216
COCOFED-PHILIPPINE COCONUT PRODUCERS FEDERATION, INC., Petitioner,
vs.
x-----------------------x
G.R. No. 204220
ABANG LINGKOD PARTY-LIST, Petitioner,

vs.
x-----------------------x
G.R. No. 204236
FIRM 24-K ASSOCIATION, INC., Petitioner,
vs.
x-----------------------x
G.R. No. 204238
ALLIANCE OF BICOLNON PARTY (ABP), Petitioner,
vs.
x-----------------------x
G.R. No. 204239
GREEN FORCE FOR THE ENVIRONMENT SONS AND DAUGHTERS OF MOTHER
EARTH (GREENFORCE),Petitioner,
vs.
x-----------------------x
G.R. No. 204240
AGRI-AGRA NA REPORMA PARA SA MAGSASAKA NG PILIPINAS MOVEMENT
(AGRI), represented by its Secretary General, Michael Ryan A. Enriquez, Petitioner,
vs.
x-----------------------x
G.R. No. 204263
A BLESSED PARTY LIST A.K.A. BLESSEDFEDERATION OF FARMERS AND
FISHERMEN INTERNATIONAL, INC., Petitioner,
vs.
x-----------------------x
G.R. No. 204318
UNITED MOVEMENT AGAINST DRUGS FOUNDATION (UNIMAD) PARTYLIST, Petitioner,
vs.
x-----------------------x
G.R. No. 204321

ANG AGRIKULTURA NATIN ISULONG (AANI), represented by its Secretary General
Jose C. Policarpio, Jr.,Petitioner,
vs.
x-----------------------x
G.R. No. 204323
BAYANI PARTYLIST as represented byHomer Bueno, Fitrylin Dalhani,Israel de Castro,
Dante Navarroand Guiling Mamondiong, Petitioner,
vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, CHAIRMAN SIXTO S. BRILLANTES, JR.,
COMMISSIONERS RENE V. SARMIENTO, LUCENITO N. TAGLE, ARMANDO C.
VELASCO, ELIAS R. YUSOPH, CHRISTIAN ROBERT S. LIM, and MARIA GRACIA
CIELO M. PADACA, Respondents.
x-----------------------x
G.R. No. 204341
ACTION LEAGUE OF INDIGENOUS MASSES(ALIM) PARTY-LIST, represented herein
by its President Fatani S. Abdul Malik, Petitioner,
vs.
x-----------------------x
G.R. No. 204356
BUTIL FARMERS PARTY, Petitioner,
vs.
x-----------------------x
G.R. No. 204358
ALLIANCE OF ADVOCATES IN MININGADVANCEMENT FOR NATIONAL
PROGRESS (AAMA), Petitioner,
vs.
x-----------------------x
G.R. No. 204359
SOCIAL MOVEMENT FOR ACTIVEREFORM AND TRANSPARENCY (SMART),
represented by its Chairman, Carlito B. Cubelo, Petitioner,
vs.
x-----------------------x
G.R. No. 204364
ADHIKAIN AT KILUSAN NG ORDINARYONG-TAO, PARA SA LUPA, PABAHAY,

HANAPBUHAY AT KAUNLARAN (AKO BUHAY), Petitioner,
vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS EN BANC, SIXTO S. BRILLANTES, JR., RENE V.
SARMIENTO, LUCENITO N. TAGLE, ARMANDO C. VELASCO, ELIAS R. YUSOPH,
CHRISTIAN ROBERT S. LIM, and MA. GRACIA CIELO M. PADACA, in their
capacities as Commissioners thereof, Respondents.
x-----------------------x
G.R. No. 204367
AKBAY KALUSUGAN INCORPORATION(AKIN), Petitioner,
vs.
x-----------------------x
G.R. No. 204370
AKO AN BISAYA (AAB), represented by itsSecretary General, Rodolfo T.
Tuazon, Petitioner,
vs.
x-----------------------x
G.R. No. 204374
BINHI-PARTIDO NG MGA MAGSASAKA PARA SA MGA MAGSASAKA, Petitioner,
vs.
x-----------------------x
G.R. No. 204379
ALAGAD NG SINING (ASIN) represented by its President, Faye Maybelle
Lorenz, Petitioner,
vs.
x-----------------------x
G.R. No. 204394
ASSOCIATION OF GUARD UTILITY HELPER, AIDER, RIDER, DRIVER/DOMESTIC
HELPER, JANITOR, AGENT AND NANNY OF THE PHILIPPINES, INC.
(GUARDJAN), Petitioner,
vs.
x-----------------------x
G.R. No. 204402
KALIKASAN PARTY-LIST, represented by its President, Clemente G. Bautista, Jr., and

Secretary General, Frances Q. Quimpo, Petitioner,
vs.
x-----------------------x
G.R. No. 204408
PILIPINO ASSOCIATION FOR COUNTRY-URBAN POOR YOUTH ADVANCEMENT
AND WELFARE (PACYAW),Petitioner,
vs.
x-----------------------x
G.R. No. 204410
1-UNITED TRANSPORT KOALISYON (1-UTAK), Petitioner,
vs.
x-----------------------x
G.R. No. 204421
COALITION OF ASSOCIATIONS OF SENIOR CITIZENS IN THE PHILIPPINES, INC.
SENIOR CITIZEN PARTY-LIST, represented herein by its 1st nominee and Chairman,
Francisco G. Datol, Jr., Petitioner,
vs.
x-----------------------x
G.R. No. 204425
COALITION OF ASSOCIATIONS OF SENIOR CITIZENS IN THE PHILIPPINES,
INC., Petitioner,
vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS and ANY OF ITS OFFICERS AND AGENTS, ACTING
FOR AND IN ITS BEHALF, INCLUDING THE CHAIR AND MEMBERSOF THE
COMMISSION, Respondents.
x-----------------------x
G.R. No. 204426
ASSOCIATION OF LOCAL ATHLETICS ENTREPRENEURS AND HOBBYISTS, INC.
(ALA-EH), Petitioner,
vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS EN BANC, SIXTO S. BRILLANTES, JR., RENE V.
SARMIENTO, LUCENITO N. TAGLE, ARMANDO C. VELASCO, ELIAS R. YUSOPH,
CHRISTIAN ROBERT S. LIM, and MA. GRACIA CIELO M. PADACA, in their
respective capacities as COMELEC Chairperson and Commissioners, Respondents.
x-----------------------x
G.R. No. 204428

ANG GALING PINOY (AG), represented by its Secretary General, Bernardo R. Corella,
Jr., Petitioner,
vs.
x-----------------------x
G.R. No. 204435
1 ALLIANCE ADVOCATING AUTONOMY PARTY (1AAAP), Petitioner,
vs.
x-----------------------x
G.R. No. 204436
ABYAN ILONGGO PARTY (AI), represented byits Party President, Rolex T.
Suplico, Petitioner,
vs.
x-----------------------x
G.R. No. 204455
MANILA TEACHER SAVINGS AND LOAN ASSOCIATION, INC., Petitioner,
vs.
x-----------------------x
G.R. No. 204484
PARTIDO NG BAYAN ANG BIDA (PBB), represented by its Secretary General, Roger M.
Federazo, Petitioner,
vs.
x-----------------------x
G.R. No. 204485
ALLIANCE OF ORGANIZATIONS, NETWORKS AND ASSOCIATIONS OF THE
PHILIPPINES, INC. (ALONA),Petitioner,
vs.
x-----------------------x
G.R. No. 204486
1st KABALIKAT NG BAYAN GINHAWANG SANGKATAUHAN (1st
KABAGIS), Petitioner,
vs.
x-----------------------x
G.R. No. 204490
PILIPINAS PARA SA PINOY (PPP), Petitioner,
vs.
PERLAS-BERNABE,*
DECISION
CARPIO, J.:
The Cases
These cases constitute 54 Petitions for Certiorari and Petitions for Certiorari and
Prohibition1 filed by 52 party-list groups and organizations assailing the Resolutions issued by
the Commission on Elections (COMELEC) disqualifying them from participating in the 13 May
2013 party-list elections, either by denial of their petitions for registration under the party-list
system, or cancellation of their registration and accreditation as party-list organizations.
This Court resolved to consolidate the 54 petitions in the Resolutions dated 13 November
2012,2 20 November 2012,3 27 November 2012,4 4 December 2012,5 11 December 2012,6 and 19
February 2013.7
The Facts Pursuant to the provisions of Republic Act No. 7941 (R.A. No. 7941) and COMELEC
Resolution Nos. 9366 and 9531, approximately 280 groups and organizations registered and
manifested their desire to participate in the 13 May 2013 party-list elections.
G.R.
No.
SPP No.
Group
Grounds for Denial
A. Via the COMELEC En Bancs automatic review of the COMELEC

Divisions resolutions approving registration of groups/organizations
Resolution dated 23 November 20128
1
204379
12-099
(PLM)
Alagad ng
Sining (ASIN)
- The "artists" sector is not

considered marginalized and
underrepresented;
- Failure to prove track
record; and
- Failure of the nominees to
qualify under RA 7941 and
Ang Bagong Bayani.
Omnibus Resolution dated 27 November 20129

2
204455
12-041
(PLM)
Manila Teachers
Savings and
Loan
Association, Inc.
(Manila
Teachers)
- A non-stock savings and

loan association cannot be
considered marginalized and
underrepresented; and
- The first and second
nominees are not teachers by
profession.
3
204426
12-011
(PLM)
Association of
Local Athletics
Entrepreneurs
and Hobbyists,
Inc. (ALA-EH)
- Failure to show that its

members belong to the
marginalized; and
qualify.

4
204435
12-057
(PLM)
1 Alliance
Advocating
Autonomy Party
(1AAAP)

qualify: although registering
as a regional political party,
two of the nominees are not
residents of the region; and
four of the five nominees do
not belong to the
marginalized and
underrepresented.

5
204367
12-104
(PL)
Akbay
Kalusugan
(AKIN), Inc.
- Failure of the group to show

that its nominees belong to
the urban poor sector.

6
204370
12-011
(PP)
Ako An Bisaya
(AAB)
- Failure to represent a
marginalized sector of
society, despite the formation
of a sectoral wing for the
benefit of farmers of Region
8;
- Constituency has district
representatives;
- Lack of track record in
representing peasants and
farmers; and
- Nominees are neither
farmers nor peasants.
Resolution dated 4 December 201213

7
204436
12-009
(PP),
12-165
(PLM)
Abyan Ilonggo
Party (AI)
- Failure to show that the

party represents a
marginalized and
underrepresented sector, as
the Province of Iloilo has
district representatives;
- Untruthful statements in the
memorandum; and
- Withdrawal of three of its
five nominees.

8
204485
12-175
(PL)
Alliance of
Organizations,
Networks and Associations
of
- Failure to establish that the

group can represent 14
sectors; - The sectors of
homeowners
the Philippines,
Inc. (ALONA)
associations, entrepreneurs
and cooperatives are not
marginalized and
- The nominees do not belong
to the marginalized and
underrepresented.
B. Via the COMELEC En Bancs review on motion for reconsideration

of the COMELEC Divisions resolutions denying registration of groups
and organizations
9
204139
12-127
(PL)
Alab ng
Mamamahayag
(ALAM)
- Failure to prove track

record as an organization;
group actually represents the
marginalized and
group can represent all
sectors it seeks to represent.

1
0
204402
12-061
(PP)
Kalikasan Party-List
(KALIKASAN)
- The group reflects an

advocacy for the
environment, and is not
representative of the
marginalized and
underrepresented;
- There is no proof that
majority of its members
belong to the marginalized
and underrepresented;
- The group represents
sectors with conflicting
interests; and
to the sector which the group
claims to represent.

11 204394
12-145
(PL)
Association of
Guard, Utility
Helper, Aider,
Rider, Driver/
Domestic
Helper,
Janitor, Agent
and
Nanny of the
Philippines, Inc.
(GUARDJAN)
- Failure to prove
membership base and track
record;
- Failure to present activities
that sufficiently benefited its
intended constituency; and
to any of the sectors which
the group seeks to represent.

1
204490
12-073
Pilipinas Para sa
(PLM)
Pinoy (PPP)
group represents a
marginalized and
underrepresented sector, as
Region 12 has district
representatives; and
- Failure to show a track
record of undertaking
programs for the welfare of
the sector the group seeks to
represent.
In a Resolution dated 5 December 2012,19 the COMELEC En Banc affirmed the COMELEC
Second Divisions resolution to grant Partido ng Bayan ng Bidas (PBB) registration and
accreditation as a political party in the National Capital Region. However, PBB was denied
participation in the 13 May 2013 party-list elections because PBB does not represent any
"marginalized and underrepresented" sector; PBB failed to apply for registration as a party-list
group; and PBB failed to establish its track record as an organization that seeks to uplift the lives
of the "marginalized and underrepresented."20
These 13 petitioners (ASIN, Manila Teachers, ALA-EH, 1AAAP, AKIN, AAB, AI, ALONA,
ALAM, KALIKASAN, GUARDJAN, PPP, and PBB) were not able to secure a mandatory
injunction from this Court. The COMELEC, on 7 January 2013 issued Resolution No.
9604,21 and excluded the names of these 13 petitioners in the printing of the official ballot for the
13 May 2013 party-list elections.
Pursuant to paragraph 222 of Resolution No. 9513, the COMELEC En Banc scheduled summary
evidentiary hearings to determine whether the groups and organizations that filed manifestations
of intent to participate in the 13 May 2013 party-list elections have continually complied with the
requirements of R.A. No. 7941 and Ang Bagong Bayani-OFW Labor Party v. COMELEC 23 (Ang
Bagong Bayani). The COMELEC disqualified the following groups and organizations from
participating in the 13 May 2013 party-list elections:
G.R. No.
SPP
No.
Group
Grounds for Denial
Resolution dated 10 October 201224

1
20381819
12-154
(PLM)
12-177
(PLM)
AKO Bicol
Political Party
(AKB)
Retained registration and

accreditation as a political
party, but denied participation
in the May 2013 party-list
elections
- Failure to represent any
marginalized and
underrepresented sector;
- The Bicol region already
has representatives in
Congress; and
- The nominees are not
marginalized and
underrepresented.
Omnibus Resolution dated 11 October 201225

2
203766
12-161
(PLM)
Atong Paglaum,
Inc. (Atong
Paglaum)
Cancelled registration and

accreditation
to the sectors which the party
represents; and
- The party failed to file its
Statement of Contributions
and Expenditures for the
2010 Elections.
3
203981
12-187
(PLM)
Association for
Righteousness
Advocacy on
Leadership
(ARAL)

accreditation
- Failure to comply, and for
violation of election laws;
- The nominees do not
represent the sectors which
the party represents; and
- There is doubt that the party
is organized for religious
purposes.
204002
12-188
(PLM)
Alliance for
Rural Concerns
(ARC)

accreditation
qualify; and
- Failure of the party to prove
that majority of its members
belong to the sectors it seeks
to represent.
204318
12-220
(PLM)
United
Movement
Against Drugs
Foundation
(UNIMAD)

accreditation
- The sectors of drug
counsellors and lecturers,
veterans and the youth, are
not marginalized and
underrepresented;
- Failure to establish track
record; and
qualify as representatives of
the youth and young urban
professionals.

6
204100
12-196
(PLM)
1-Bro Philippine
Guardians
Brotherhood,
Inc. (1BRO-PGBI)
Cancelled registration
- Failure to define the sector
it seeks to represent; and
to a marginalized and
underrepresented sector.
204122
12-223
(PLM)
1 Guardians
Nationalist
Philippines, Inc.
(1GANAP/
GUARDIANS)
- The party is a military
fraternity;
- The sector of community
volunteer workers is too
broad to allow for meaningful
representation; and
- The nominees do not appear
to belong to the sector of
community volunteer
workers.
8
20426
12-257
(PLM)
Blessed
Federation of
Farmers and
Fishermen
International,
Inc. (A
BLESSED
Party-List)
- Three of the seven
nominees do not belong to
the sector of farmers and
fishermen, the sector sought
to be represented; and
- None of the nominees are
registered voters of Region
XI, the region sought to be
represented.

9
203960
12-260
(PLM)
1st
Consumers
Alliance for
Rural Energy,
Inc. (1-CARE)
- The sector of rural energy
consumers is not
marginalized and
underrepresented;
- The partys track record is
related to electric
cooperatives and not rural
energy consumers; and
to the sector of rural energy
consumers.

10 203922
12-201
(PLM)
Association of
Philippine
Electric
Cooperatives
(APEC)

accreditation
- Failure to represent a
marginalized and
underrepresented sector; and
to the sector that the party
claims to represent.

11 204174
12-232
(PLM)
Aangat Tayo
Party-List Party
( AT )

accreditation
- The incumbent
representative in Congress
failed to author or sponsor
bills that are beneficial to the
sectors that the party
represents (women, elderly,
youth, urban poor); and
to the marginalized sectors
that the party seeks to
represent.

12 203976
12-288
(PLM)
Alliance for
Rural and
Agrarian

accreditation
- The interests of the peasant
Reconstruction,
Inc. (ARARO)
and urban poor sectors that

the party represents differ;
to the sectors that the party
seeks to represent;
- Failure to show that three of
the nominees are bona fide
party members; and
- Lack of a Board resolution
to participate in the party-list
elections.

13 204240
12-279
(PLM)
Agri-Agra na
Reporma Para sa
Magsasaka ng
Pilipinas
Movement
(AGRI)
- The party ceased to exist for
more than a year immediately
after the May 2010 elections;
to the sector of peasants and
farmers that the party seeks to
represent;
- Only four nominees were
submitted to the COMELEC;
and
- Failure to show meaningful
activities for its constituency.
14 203936
12-248
(PLM)
Aksyon
Magsasaka-Partido
Tinig ng
Masa (AKMA-PTM)
- Failure to show that
majority of its members are
marginalized and
underrepresented;
- Failure to prove that four of
its nine nominees actually
belong to the farmers sector;
and
- Failure to show that five of
its nine nominees work on
uplifting the lives of the
members of the sector.
15 204126
12-263
(PLM)
Kaagapay ng
Nagkakaisang
Agilang
Pilipinong
Magsasaka
(KAP)
- The Manifestation of Intent
and Certificate of Nomination
were not signed by an
appropriate officer of the
party;
- Failure to show track record
for the farmers and peasants
sector; and
nominees actually belong to
the sector, or that they have
undertaken meaningful
activities for the sector.
16 204364
12-180
(PLM)
Adhikain at
Kilusan ng
Ordinaryong
Tao Para sa
Lupa, Pabahay,
Hanapbuhay at
Kaunlaran
(AKO-BAHAY)

the sector, or that they have
undertaken meaningful
activities for the sector.
17 204141
12-229
(PLM)
The True
Marcos Loyalist
(for God,
Country and
People)
Association of
the Philippines,
Inc. (BANTAY)
marginalized and
- Failure to prove that two of
its nominees actually belong
to the marginalized and
underrepresented.
18 204408
12-217
(PLM)
Pilipino
Association for
Country Urban
Poor Youth
Advancement
and Welfare
( PA C YAW )
- Change of sector (from
urban poor youth to urban
poor) necessitates a new
application;
for the marginalized and
underrepresented;
- Failure to prove that
majority of its members and
officers are from the urban
poor sector; and
members of the urban poor
sector.
19 204153
12-277
(PLM)
Pasang Masda
Nationwide
Party (PASANG
MASDA)
- The party represents drivers
and operators, who may have
conflicting interests; and
- Nominees are either
operators or former operators.
20 203958
12-015
(PLM)
Kapatiran ng
mga Nakulong
na Walang Sala,
Inc. (KAKUSA)
- Failure to prove that
na Walang Sala,
Inc. (KAKUSA)
majority of its officers and
members belong to the
marginalized and
underrepresented;
- The incumbent
representative in Congress
failed to author or sponsor
bills that are beneficial to the
sector that the party
represents (persons
imprisoned without proof of
guilt beyond reasonable
doubt);

- The nominees did not
appear to be marginalized and
underrepresented.
21 204428
12-256
(PLM)
Ang Galing
Pinoy (AG)

accreditation
- Failure to attend the
summary hearing;
- The nominees did not
appear to be marginalized and
underrepresented.

22 204094
12-185
(PLM)
Alliance for
Nationalism and
Democracy
(ANAD)

accreditation
- Failure to represent an
identifiable marginalized and
underrepresented sector;
- Only three nominees were
submitted to the COMELEC;
belong to the marginalized
and underrepresented; and
- Failure to submit its
Statement of Contribution
and Expenditures for the
2007 Elections.
Omnibus Resolution dated 7 November 201234

23 204239
12-060
(PLM)
Green Force for

the Environment
Sons and
Daughters of
Mother Earth
(GREENFORCE)

accreditation
- The party is an advocacy
group and does not represent
the marginalized and
underrepresented;
- Failure to comply with the
track record requirement; and
marginalized citizens.
24 204236
12-254
(PLM)
Firm 24-K
Association, Inc.
(FIRM 24-K)

accreditation
belong to the sector that the
party seeks to represent
(urban poor and peasants of
the National Capital Region);
- Only two of its nominees
reside in the National Capital
Region; and
track record requirement.

25 204341
12-269
(PLM)
Action League
of Indigenous
Masses (ALIM)

accreditation
- Failure to establish that its
nominees are members of the
indigenous people in the
Mindanao and Cordilleras
sector that the party seeks to
represent;
- Only two of the partys
nominees reside in the
Mindanao and Cordilleras;
and
- Three of the nominees do
not appear to belong to the
marginalized.

26 204358
12-204
(PLM)
Alliance of
Advocates in
Mining
Advancement
for National
Progress
(AAMA)
- The sector it represents is a
specifically defined group
which may not be allowed
registration under the party-list system;
and
the sector.

27 204359
12-272
(PLM)
Social
Movement for
Active Reform
and
Transparency
(SMART)
- The nominees are
disqualified from
representing the sectors that
the party represents;
track record requirement; and
- There is doubt as to whether
marginalized and
underrepresented.

28 204238
12-173
(PLM)
Alliance of
Bicolnon Party
(ABP)

accreditation
- Defective registration and
accreditation dating back to
2010;
- Failure to represent any
sector; and
nominees are employed in the
construction industry, the
sector it claims to represent.
29 204323
12-210
(PLM)
Bayani Party
List (BAYANI)

accreditation
- Failure to prove a track
record of trying to uplift the
marginalized and
underrepresented sector of
professionals; and
- One nominee was declared
unqualified to represent the
sector of professionals.

30 204321
12-252
(PLM)
Ang Agrikultura
Natin Isulong
(AANI)

accreditation
- Failure to establish a track
record of enhancing the lives
of the marginalized and
underrepresented farmers
which it claims to represent;
and
- More than a majority of the
partys nominees do not
belong to the farmers sector.

31 204125
12-292
(PLM)
Agapay ng
Indigenous
Peoples Rights
Alliance, Inc.
(A-IPRA)

accreditation
- Failure to prove that its five
nominees are members of the
indigenous people sector;
- Failure to prove that its five
nominees actively
participated in the
undertakings of the party; and
- Failure to prove that its five nominees
are bona fide
members.

32 204216
12-202
(PLM)
Philippine
Coconut
Producers
Federation, Inc.
(COCOFED)

accreditation
- The party is affiliated with
private and government
agencies and is not
marginalized;
- The party is assisted by the
government in various
projects; and
members of the marginalized
sector of coconut farmers and
producers.

33 204220
12-238
(PLM)
Abang Lingkod
Party-List
- Failure to establish a track
(ABANG
LINGKOD)
record of continuously
representing the peasant
farmers sector;
members actually belong to
the peasant farmers sector;
and
nominees are marginalized
and underrepresented, have
actively participated in
programs for the
advancement of farmers, and
adhere to its advocacies.

34 204158
12-158
(PLM)
Action
Brotherhood for Active
Dreamers, Inc.
(ABROAD)

accreditation - Failure to show that the
party is actually able to
represent all of the sectors it
claims to represent;
- Failure to show a complete
track record of its activities
since its registration; and
- The nominees are not part
of any of the sectors which
the party seeks to represent.

35 204374
12-228
(PLM)
Binhi-Partido ng
mga Magsasaka
Para sa mga
Magsasaka
(BINHI)

accreditation
- The party receives
assistance from the
government through the
Department of Agriculture;
and
- Failure to prove that the
group is marginalized and
underrepresented.

36 204356
12-136
(PLM)
Butil Farmers
Party (BUTIL)

accreditation
agriculture and cooperative
sectors are marginalized and
- The partys nominees
neither appear to belong to
the sectors they seek to
represent, nor to have
actively participated in the
undertakings of the party.

37 204486
12-194
1st
(PLM)
Kabalikat ng
Bayan
Ginhawang
Sangkatauhan
(1st
KABAGIS)
accreditation
- Declaration of untruthful
statements;
- Failure to exist for at least
one year; and
- None of its nominees
belong to the labor,
fisherfolk, and urban poor
indigenous cultural
communities sectors which it
seeks to represent.

38 204410
12-198
(PLM)
1-United
Transport
Koalisyon (1-UTAK)
Cancelled accreditation
- The party represents drivers
and operators, who may have
conflicting interests; and
- The partys nominees do not
belong to any marginalized
and underrepresented sector.

39 204421,
204425
12-157
(PLM),
12-191
(PLM)
Coalition of
Senior Citizens
in the
Philippines, Inc.
(SENIOR
CITIZENS)
- The party violated election
laws because its nominees
had a term-sharing
agreement.
These 39 petitioners (AKB, Atong Paglaum, ARAL, ARC, UNIMAD, 1BRO-PGBI,

1GANAP/GUARDIANS, A BLESSED Party-List, 1-CARE, APEC, AT, ARARO, AGRI,
AKMA-PTM, KAP, AKO-BAHAY, BANTAY, PACYAW, PASANG MASDA, KAKUSA, AG,
ANAD, GREENFORCE, FIRM 24-K, ALIM, AAMA, SMART, ABP, BAYANI, AANI, A-IPRA,
COCOFED, ABANG LINGKOD, ABROAD, BINHI, BUTIL, 1st KABAGIS, 1-UTAK,
SENIOR CITIZENS) were able to secure a mandatory injunction from this Court, directing the
COMELEC to include the names of these 39 petitioners in the printing of the official ballot for
the 13 May 2013 party-list elections.
Petitioners prayed for the issuance of a temporary restraining order and/or writ of preliminary
injunction. This Court issued Status Quo Ante Orders in all petitions. This Decision governs only
the 54 consolidated petitions that were granted Status Quo Ante Orders, namely:
G.R. No.
SPP No.
Group

203818-19
12-154
(PLM)
12-177
(PLM)
AKO Bicol Political Party (AKB)
203981
12-187
(PLM)
Association for Righteousness Advocacy on

Leadership (ARAL)
204002
12-188
(PLM)
Alliance for Rural Concerns (ARC)
203922
12-201
Association of Philippine Electric Cooperatives
(PLM)
(APEC)
203960
12-260
(PLM)
1st
Consumers Alliance for Rural Energy, Inc.
(1-CARE)
203936
12-248
(PLM)
Aksyon Magsasaka-Partido Tinig ng Masa

(AKMA-PTM)
203958
12-015
(PLM)
Kapatiran ng mga Nakulong na Walang Sala,

Inc. (KAKUSA)
203976
12-288
(PLM)
Alliance for Rural and Agrarian Reconstruction,

Inc. (ARARO)

204094
12-185
(PLM)
Alliance for Nationalism and Democracy

(ANAD)
204125
12-292
(PLM)
Agapay ng Indigenous Peoples Rights Alliance,

Inc. (A-IPRA)
204100
12-196
(PLM)
1-Bro Philippine Guardians Brotherhood, Inc.

(1BRO-PGBI)

204141
12-229
(PLM)
The True Marcos Loyalist (for God, Country

and People) Association of the Philippines, Inc.
(BANTAY)
204240
12-279
(PLM)
Agri-Agra na Reporma Para sa Magsasaka ng

Pilipinas Movement (AGRI)
204216
12-202
(PLM)
Philippine Coconut Producers Federation, Inc.

(COCOFED)
204158
12-158
(PLM)
Action Brotherhood for Active Dreamer, Inc.

(ABROAD)
Resolutions dated 4 December 2012

204122
12-223
(PLM)
1 Guardians Nationalist Philippines, Inc.

(1GANAP/GUARDIANS)
203766
12-161
(PLM)
Atong Paglaum, Inc. (Atong Paglaum)
204318
12-220
(PLM)
United Movement Against Drugs Foundation

(UNIMAD)
204263
12-257
(PLM)
Blessed Federation of Farmers and Fishermen

International, Inc. (A BLESSED Party-List)
204174
12-232
(PLM)
Aangat Tayo Party-List Party (AT)
204126
12-263
(PLM)
Kaagapay ng Nagkakaisang Agilang Pilipinong

Magsasaka (KAP)
204364
12-180
(PLM)
Adhikain at Kilusan ng Ordinaryong Tao Para sa

Lupa, Pabahay, Hanapbuhay at Kaunlaran
(AKO-BAHAY)
204139
12-127 (PL)
Alab ng Mamamahayag (ALAM)
204220
12-238
(PLM)
Abang Lingkod Party-List (ABANG

LINGKOD)
204236
12-254
(PLM)
Firm 24-K Association, Inc. (FIRM 24-K)
204238
12-173
(PLM)
Alliance of Bicolnon Party (ABP)
204239
12-060
(PLM)
Green Force for the Environment Sons and

Daughters of Mother Earth (GREENFORCE)
204321
12-252
(PLM)
Ang Agrikultura Natin Isulong (AANI)
204323
12-210
(PLM)
Bayani Party List (BAYANI)
204341
12-269
(PLM)
Action League of Indigenous Masses (ALIM)
204358
12-204
(PLM)
Alliance of Advocates in Mining Advancement

for National Progress (AAMA)
204359
12-272
(PLM)
Social Movement for Active Reform and

Transparency (SMART)
204356
12-136
(PLM)
Butil Farmers Party (BUTIL)

204402
12-061 (PL)
Kalikasan Party-List (KALIKASAN)
204394
12-145 (PL)
Association of Guard, Utility Helper, Aider,

Rider, Driver/Domestic Helper, Janitor, Agent
and Nanny of the Philippines, Inc.
(GUARDJAN)
204408
12-217
(PLM)
Pilipino Association for Country Urban Poor

Youth Advancement and Welfare (PACYAW)
204428
12-256
(PLM)
Ang Galing Pinoy (AG)
204490
12-073
(PLM)
Pilipinas Para sa Pinoy (PPP)
204379
12-099
(PLM)
Alagad ng Sining (ASIN)
204367
12-104 (PL)
Akbay Kalusugan (AKIN)
204426
12-011
(PLM)
Association of Local Athletics Entrepreneurs

and Hobbyists, Inc. (ALA-EH)
204455
12-041
(PLM)
Manila Teachers Savings and Loan Association,

Inc. (Manila Teachers)
204374
12-228
(PLM)
Binhi-Partido ng mga Magsasaka Para sa mga

Magsasaka (BINHI)
204370
12-011 (PP)
Ako An Bisaya (AAB)
204435
12-057
(PLM)
1 Alliance Advocating Autonomy Party

(1AAAP)
204486
12-194
(PLM)
1st Kabalikat ng Bayan Ginhawang

Sangkatauhan (1st KABAGIS)
204410
12-198
(PLM)
1-United Transport Koalisyon (1-UTAK)
204421,
204425
12-157
(PLM)
12-191
(PLM)
Coalition of Senior Citizens in the Philippines,

Inc. (SENIOR CITIZENS)
204436
12-009 (PP),
12-165
(PLM)
Abyan Ilonggo Party (AI)
204485
12-175 (PL)
Alliance of Organizations, Networks and

Associations of the Philippines, Inc. (ALONA)
204484
11-002
Partido ng Bayan ng Bida (PBB)

204153
12-277
(PLM)
Pasang Masda Nationwide Party (PASANG

MASDA)
The Issues
We rule upon two issues: first, whether the COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in disqualifying petitioners from participating in the
13 May 2013 party-list elections, either by denial of their new petitions for registration under the
party-list system, or by cancellation of their existing registration and accreditation as party-list
organizations; and second, whether the criteria for participating in the party-list system laid down
in Ang Bagong Bayani and Barangay Association for National Advancement and Transparency
v. Commission on Elections49 (BANAT) should be applied by the COMELEC in the coming 13
May 2013 party-list elections.
The Courts Ruling
We hold that the COMELEC did not commit grave abuse of discretion in following prevailing
decisions of this Court in disqualifying petitioners from participating in the coming 13 May 2013
party-list elections. However, since the Court adopts in this Decision new parameters in the
qualification of national, regional, and sectoral parties under the party-list system, thereby
abandoning the rulings in the decisions applied by the COMELEC in disqualifying petitioners,
we remand to the COMELEC all the present petitions for the COMELEC to determine who are
qualified to register under the party-list system, and to participate in the coming 13 May 2013
party-list elections, under the new parameters prescribed in this Decision.
The Party-List System
The 1987 Constitution provides the basis for the party-list system of representation. Simply put,
the party-list system is intended to democratize political power by giving political parties that
cannot win in legislative district elections a chance to win seats in the House of
Representatives.50 The voter elects two representatives in the House of Representatives: one for
his or her legislative district, and another for his or her party-list group or organization of choice.
The 1987 Constitution provides:
Section 5, Article VI
(1) The House of Representatives shall be composed of not more than two hundred and
fifty members, unless otherwise fixed by law, who shall be elected from legislative
districts apportioned among the provinces, cities, and the Metropolitan Manila area in
accordance with the number of their respective inhabitants, and on the basis of a uniform
and progressive ratio, and those who, as provided by law, shall be elected through a
party-list system of registered national, regional, and sectoral parties or organizations.
ratification of this Constitution, one-half of the seats allocated to party-list representatives
shall be filled, as provided by law, by selection or election from the labor, peasant, urban
poor, indigenous cultural communities, women, youth, and such other sectors as may be
provided by law, except the religious sector.
Sections 7 and 8, Article IX-C
Sec. 7. No votes cast in favor of a political party, organization, or coalition shall be valid, except
for those registered under the party-list system as provided in this Constitution.
Sec. 8. Political parties, or organizations or coalitions registered under the party-list system, shall
not be represented in the voters registration boards, boards of election inspectors, boards of
canvassers, or other similar bodies. However, they shall be entitled to appoint poll watchers in
accordance with law.
Commissioner Christian S. Monsod, the main sponsor of the party-list system, stressed that "the
party-list system is not synonymous with that of the sectoral representation."51 The
constitutional provisions on the party-list system should be read in light of the following
discussion among its framers:
MR. MONSOD: x x x.
I would like to make a distinction from the beginning that the proposal for the party list system is
not synonymous with that of the sectoral representation. Precisely, the party list system seeks to
avoid the dilemma of choice of sectors and who constitute the members of the sectors. In making
the proposal on the party list system, we were made aware of the problems precisely cited by
Commissioner Bacani of which sectors will have reserved seats. In effect, a sectoral
representation in the Assembly would mean that certain sectors would have reserved seats; that
they will choose among themselves who would sit in those reserved seats. And then, we have the
problem of which sector because as we will notice in Proclamation No. 9, the sectors cited were
the farmers, fishermen, workers, students, professionals, business, military, academic, ethnic and
other similar groups. So these are the nine sectors that were identified here as "sectoral
representatives" to be represented in this Commission. The problem we had in trying to approach
sectoral representation in the Assembly was whether to stop at these nine sectors or include other
sectors. And we went through the exercise in a caucus of which sector should be included which
went up to 14 sectors. And as we all know, the longer we make our enumeration, the more
limiting the law become because when we make an enumeration we exclude those who are not in
the enumeration. Second, we had the problem of who comprise the farmers. Let us just say the
farmers and the laborers. These days, there are many citizens who are called "hyphenated
citizens." A doctor may be a farmer; a lawyer may also be a farmer. And so, it is up to the
discretion of the person to say "I am a farmer" so he would be included in that sector.
The third problem is that when we go into a reserved seat system of sectoral representation in the
Assembly, we are, in effect, giving some people two votes and other people one vote. We sought
to avoid these problems by presenting a party list system. Under the party list system, there are
no reserved seats for sectors. Let us say, laborers and farmers can form a sectoral party or a
sectoral organization that will then register and present candidates of their party. How do the
mechanics go? Essentially, under the party list system, every voter has two votes, so there is no
discrimination. First, he will vote for the representative of his legislative district. That is one
vote. In that same ballot, he will be asked: What party or organization or coalition do you wish to
be represented in the Assembly? And here will be attached a list of the parties, organizations or
coalitions that have been registered with the COMELEC and are entitled to be put in that list.
This can be a regional party, a sectoral party, a national party, UNIDO, Magsasaka or a regional
party in Mindanao. One need not be a farmer to say that he wants the farmers' party to be
represented in the Assembly. Any citizen can vote for any party. At the end of the day, the
COMELEC will then tabulate the votes that had been garnered by each party or each
organization one does not have to be a political party and register in order to participate as a
party and count the votes and from there derive the percentage of the votes that had been cast
in favor of a party, organization or coalition.
When such parties register with the COMELEC, we are assuming that 50 of the 250 seats will be
for the party list system. So, we have a limit of 30 percent of 50. That means that the maximum
that any party can get out of these 50 seats is 15. When the parties register they then submit a list
of 15 names. They have to submit these names because these nominees have to meet the
minimum qualifications of a Member of the National Assembly. At the end of the day, when the
votes are tabulated, one gets the percentages. Let us say, UNIDO gets 10 percent or 15 percent of
the votes; KMU gets 5 percent; a womens party gets 2 1/2 percent and anybody who has at least
2 1/2 percent of the vote qualifies and the 50 seats are apportioned among all of these parties
who get at least 2 1/2 percent of the vote.
What does that mean? It means that any group or party who has a constituency of, say, 500,000
nationwide gets a seat in the National Assembly. What is the justification for that? When we
allocate legislative districts, we are saying that any district that has 200,000 votes gets a seat.
There is no reason why a group that has a national constituency, even if it is a sectoral or special
interest group, should not have a voice in the National Assembly. It also means that, let us say,
there are three or four labor groups, they all register as a party or as a group. If each of them gets
only one percent or five of them get one percent, they are not entitled to any representative. So,
they will begin to think that if they really have a common interest, they should band together,
form a coalition and get five percent of the vote and, therefore, have two seats in the Assembly.
Those are the dynamics of a party list system.
We feel that this approach gets around the mechanics of sectoral representation while at the same
time making sure that those who really have a national constituency or sectoral constituency will
get a chance to have a seat in the National Assembly. These sectors or these groups may not have
the constituency to win a seat on a legislative district basis. They may not be able to win a seat
on a district basis but surely, they will have votes on a nationwide basis.
The purpose of this is to open the system. In the past elections, we found out that there were
certain groups or parties that, if we count their votes nationwide; have about 1,000,000 or
1,500,000 votes. But they were always third place or fourth place in each of the districts. So, they
have no voice in the Assembly. But this way, they would have five or six representatives in the
Assembly even if they would not win individually in legislative districts. So, that is essentially
the mechanics, the purpose and objectives of the party list system.
BISHOP BACANI: Madam President, am I right in interpreting that when we speak now of
party list system though we refer to sectors, we would be referring to sectoral party list rather
than sectors and party list?
MR. MONSOD: As a matter of fact, if this body accepts the party list system, we do not even
have to mention sectors because the sectors would be included in the party list system. They can
be sectoral parties within the party list system.
xxxx
MR. MONSOD. Madam President, I just want to say that we suggested or proposed the party list
system because we wanted to open up the political system to a pluralistic society through a
multiparty system. x x x We are for opening up the system, and we would like very much for
the sectors to be there. That is why one of the ways to do that is to put a ceiling on the
number of representatives from any single party that can sit within the 50 allocated under
the party list system. x x x.
xxx
MR. MONSOD. Madam President, the candidacy for the 198 seats is not limited to political
parties. My question is this: Are we going to classify for example Christian Democrats and
Social Democrats as political parties? Can they run under the party list concept or must
they be under the district legislation side of it only?
MR. VILLACORTA. In reply to that query, I think these parties that the Commissioner
mentioned can field candidates for the Senate as well as for the House of Representatives.
Likewise, they can also field sectoral candidates for the 20 percent or 30 percent, whichever
is adopted, of the seats that we are allocating under the party list system.
MR. MONSOD. In other words, the Christian Democrats can field district candidates and
can also participate in the party list system?
MR. VILLACORTA. Why not? When they come to the party list system, they will be
fielding only sectoral candidates.
MR. MONSOD. May I be clarified on that? Can UNIDO participate in the party list
system?
MR. VILLACORTA. Yes, why not? For as long as they field candidates who come from the
different marginalized sectors that we shall designate in this Constitution.
MR. MONSOD. Suppose Senator Taada wants to run under BAYAN group and says that he
represents the farmers, would he qualify?
MR. VILLACORTA. No, Senator Taada would not qualify.
MR. MONSOD. But UNIDO can field candidates under the party list system and say Juan dela
Cruz is a farmer. Who would pass on whether he is a farmer or not?
MR. TADEO. Kay Commissioner Monsod, gusto ko lamang linawin ito. Political parties,
particularly minority political parties, are not prohibited to participate in the party list
election if they can prove that they are also organized along sectoral lines.
MR. MONSOD. What the Commissioner is saying is that all political parties can participate
because it is precisely the contention of political parties that they represent the broad base of
citizens and that all sectors are represented in them. Would the Commissioner agree?
MR. TADEO. Ang punto lamang namin, pag pinayagan mo ang UNIDO na isang political party,
it will dominate the party list at mawawalang saysay din yung sector. Lalamunin mismo ng
political parties ang party list system. Gusto ko lamang bigyan ng diin ang "reserve." Hindi ito
reserve seat sa marginalized sectors. Kung titingnan natin itong 198 seats, reserved din ito sa
political parties.
MR. MONSOD. Hindi po reserved iyon kasi anybody can run there. But my question to
Commissioner Villacorta and probably also to Commissioner Tadeo is that under this system,
would UNIDO be banned from running under the party list system?
MR. VILLACORTA. No, as I said, UNIDO may field sectoral candidates. On that condition
alone, UNIDO may be allowed to register for the party list system.
MR. MONSOD. May I inquire from Commissioner Tadeo if he shares that answer?
MR. TADEO. The same.
MR. VILLACORTA. Puwede po ang UNIDO, pero sa sectoral lines.
MR. MONSOD: Sino po ang magsasabi kung iyong kandidato ng UNIDO ay hindi talagang
labor leader or isang laborer? Halimbawa, abogado ito.
MR. TADEO: Iyong mechanics.
MR. MONSOD: Hindi po mechanics iyon because we are trying to solve an inherent problem of
sectoral representation. My question is: Suppose UNIDO fields a labor leader, would he qualify?
MR. TADEO: The COMELEC may look into the truth of whether or not a political party is
really organized along a specific sectoral line. If such is verified or confirmed, the political
party may submit a list of individuals who are actually members of such sectors. The lists
are to be published to give individuals or organizations belonging to such sector the chance
to present evidence contradicting claims of membership in the said sector or to question the
claims of the existence of such sectoral organizations or parties. This proceeding shall be
conducted by the COMELEC and shall be summary in character. In other words,
COMELEC decisions on this matter are final and unappealable.52 (Emphasis supplied)
Indisputably, the framers of the 1987 Constitution intended the party-list system to include not
only sectoral parties but also non-sectoral parties. The framers intended the sectoral parties to
constitute a part, but not the entirety, of the party-list system. As explained by Commissioner
Wilfredo Villacorta, political parties can participate in the party-list system "For as long as
they field candidates who come from the different marginalized sectors that we shall
designate in this Constitution."53
In fact, the framers voted down, 19-22, a proposal to reserve permanent seats to sectoral parties
in the House of Representatives, or alternatively, to reserve the party-list system exclusively to
sectoral parties. As clearly explained by Justice Jose C. Vitug in his Dissenting Opinion in Ang
Bagong Bayani:
The draft provisions on what was to become Article VI, Section 5, subsection (2), of the 1987
Constitution took off from two staunch positions the first headed by Commissioner Villacorta,
advocating that of the 20 per centum of the total seats in Congress to be allocated to party-list
representatives half were to be reserved to appointees from the marginalized and
underrepresented sectors. The proposal was opposed by some Commissioners. Mr. Monsod
expressed the difficulty in delimiting the sectors that needed representation. He was of the view
that reserving seats for the marginalized and underrepresented sectors would stunt their
development into full-pledged parties equipped with electoral machinery potent enough to
further the sectoral interests to be represented. The Villacorta group, on the other hand, was
apprehensive that pitting the unorganized and less-moneyed sectoral groups in an electoral
contest would be like placing babes in the lion's den, so to speak, with the bigger and more
established political parties ultimately gobbling them up. R.A. 7941 recognized this concern
when it banned the first five major political parties on the basis of party representation in the
House of Representatives from participating in the party-list system for the first party-list
elections held in 1998 (and to be automatically lifted starting with the 2001 elections). The
advocates for permanent seats for sectoral representatives made an effort towards a compromise
that the party-list system be open only to underrepresented and marginalized sectors. This
proposal was further whittled down by allocating only half of the seats under the party-list
system to candidates from the sectors which would garner the required number of votes. The
majority was unyielding. Voting 19-22, the proposal for permanent seats, and in the alternative
the reservation of the party-list system to the sectoral groups, was voted down. The only
concession the Villacorta group was able to muster was an assurance of reserved seats for
selected sectors for three consecutive terms after the enactment of the 1987 Constitution, by
which time they would be expected to gather and solidify their electoral base and brace
themselves in the multi-party electoral contest with the more veteran political
groups.54(Emphasis supplied)
Thus, in the end, the proposal to give permanent reserved seats to certain sectors was outvoted.
Instead, the reservation of seats to sectoral representatives was only allowed for the first three
consecutive terms.55 There can be no doubt whatsoever that the framers of the 1987 Constitution
expressly rejected the proposal to make the party-list system exclusively for sectoral parties only,
and that they clearly intended the party-list system to include both sectoral and non-sectoral
parties.
The common denominator between sectoral and non-sectoral parties is that they cannot expect to
win in legislative district elections but they can garner, in nationwide elections, at least the same
number of votes that winning candidates can garner in legislative district elections. The party-list
system will be the entry point to membership in the House of Representatives for both these nontraditional parties that could not compete in legislative district elections.
The indisputable intent of the framers of the 1987 Constitution to include in the party-list system
both sectoral and non-sectoral parties is clearly written in Section 5(1), Article VI of the
Constitution, which states:
Section 5. (1) The House of Representative shall be composed of not more that two hundred and
national, regional, and sectoral parties or organizations. (Emphasis supplied)
Section 5(1), Article VI of the Constitution is crystal-clear that there shall be "a party-list
system of registered national, regional, and sectoral parties or organizations." The commas
after the words "national," and "regional," separate national and regional parties from sectoral
parties. Had the framers of the 1987 Constitution intended national and regional parties to be at
the same time sectoral, they would have stated "national and regional sectoral parties." They did
not, precisely because it was never their intention to make the party-list system exclusively
sectoral.
What the framers intended, and what they expressly wrote in Section 5(1), could not be any
clearer: the party-list system is composed of three different groups, and the sectoral parties
belong to only one of the three groups. The text of Section 5(1) leaves no room for any doubt
that national and regional parties are separate from sectoral parties.
Thus, the party-list system is composed of three different groups: (1) national parties or
organizations; (2) regional parties or organizations; and (3) sectoral parties or organizations.
National and regional parties or organizations are different from sectoral parties or
organizations. National and regional parties or organizations need not be organized along
sectoral lines and need not represent any particular sector.
Moreover, Section 5(2), Article VI of the 1987 Constitution mandates that, during the first three
consecutive terms of Congress after the ratification of the 1987 Constitution, "one-half of the
seats allocated to party-list representatives shall be filled, as provided by law, by selection or
election from the labor, peasant, urban poor, indigenous cultural communities, women, youth,
and such other sectors as may be provided by law, except the religious sector." This provision
clearly shows again that the party-list system is not exclusively for sectoral parties for two
obvious reasons.
First, the other one-half of the seats allocated to party-list representatives would naturally be
open to non-sectoral party-list representatives, clearly negating the idea that the party-list system
is exclusively for sectoral parties representing the "marginalized and underrepresented." Second,
the reservation of one-half of the party-list seats to sectoral parties applies only for the first
"three consecutive terms after the ratification of this Constitution," clearly making the party-list
system fully open after the end of the first three congressional terms. This means that, after this
period, there will be no seats reserved for any class or type of party that qualifies under the three
groups constituting the party-list system.
Hence, the clear intent, express wording, and party-list structure ordained in Section 5(1)
and (2), Article VI of the 1987 Constitution cannot be disputed: the party-list system is not
for sectoral parties only, but also for non-sectoral parties.
Republic Act No. 7941 or the Party-List System Act, which is the law that implements the partylist system prescribed in the Constitution, provides:
Section 3. Definition of Terms. (a) The party-list system is a mechanism of proportional
representation in the election of representatives to the House of Representatives from national,
regional and sectoral parties or organizations or coalitions thereof registered with the
Commission on Elections (COMELEC). Component parties or organizations of a coalition may
participate independently provided the coalition of which they form part does not participate in
the party-list system.
(b) A party means either a political party or a sectoral party or a coalition of parties.
(c) A political party refers to an organized group of citizens advocating an ideology
or platform, principles and policies for the general conduct of government and
which, as the most immediate means of securing their adoption, regularly nominates
and supports certain of its leaders and members as candidates for public office.
It is a national party when its constituency is spread over the geographical territory of at
least a majority of the regions. It is a regional party when its constituency is spread over
the geographical territory of at least a majority of the cities and provinces comprising the
region.
(d) A sectoral party refers to an organized group of citizens belonging to any of the
sectors enumerated in Section 5 hereof whose principal advocacy pertains to the
special interest and concerns of their sector.
(e) A sectoral organization refers to a group of citizens or a coalition of groups of citizens
who share similar physical attributes or characteristics, employment, interests or
concerns.
(f) A coalition refers to an aggrupation of duly registered national, regional, sectoral
parties or organizations for political and/or election purposes. (Emphasis supplied)
Section 3(a) of R.A. No. 7941 defines a "party" as "either a political party or a sectoral
party or a coalition of parties." Clearly, a political party is different from a sectoral party. Section
3(c) of R.A. No. 7941 further provides that a "political party refers to an organized group of
citizens advocating an ideology or platform, principles and policies for the general conduct
of government." On the other hand, Section 3(d) of R.A. No. 7941 provides that a "sectoral
party refers to an organized group of citizens belonging to any of the sectors enumerated in
Section 5 hereof whose principal advocacy pertains to the special interest and concerns of
their sector." R.A. No. 7941 provides different definitions for a political and a sectoral party.
Obviously, they are separate and distinct from each other.
R.A. No. 7941 does not require national and regional parties or organizations to represent
the "marginalized and underrepresented" sectors. To require all national and regional parties
under the party-list system to represent the "marginalized and underrepresented" is to deprive
and exclude, by judicial fiat, ideology-based and cause-oriented parties from the party-list
system. How will these ideology-based and cause-oriented parties, who cannot win in legislative
district elections, participate in the electoral process if they are excluded from the party-list
system? To exclude them from the party-list system is to prevent them from joining the
parliamentary struggle, leaving as their only option the armed struggle. To exclude them from the
party-list system is, apart from being obviously senseless, patently contrary to the clear intent
and express wording of the 1987 Constitution and R.A. No. 7941.
Under the party-list system, an ideology-based or cause-oriented political party is clearly
different from a sectoral party. A political party need not be organized as a sectoral party and
need not represent any particular sector. There is no requirement in R.A. No. 7941 that a national
or regional political party must represent a "marginalized and underrepresented" sector. It is
sufficient that the political party consists of citizens who advocate the same ideology or platform,
or the same governance principles and policies, regardless of their economic status as citizens.
Section 5 of R.A. No. 7941 states that "the sectors shall include labor, peasant, fisherfolk, urban
poor, indigenous cultural communities, elderly, handicapped, women, youth, veterans, overseas
workers, and professionals."56The sectors mentioned in Section 5 are not all necessarily
"marginalized and underrepresented." For sure, "professionals" are not by definition
"marginalized and underrepresented," not even the elderly, women, and the youth. However,
professionals, the elderly, women, and the youth may "lack well-defined political
constituencies," and can thus organize themselves into sectoral parties in advocacy of the special
interests and concerns of their respective sectors.
Section 6 of R.A. No. 7941 provides another compelling reason for holding that the law does not
require national or regional parties, as well as certain sectoral parties in Section 5 of R.A. No.
7941, to represent the "marginalized and underrepresented." Section 6 provides the grounds for
the COMELEC to refuse or cancel the registration of parties or organizations after due notice and
hearing.
Section 6. Refusal and/or Cancellation of Registration. The COMELEC may, motu proprio or
upon verified complaint of any interested party, refuse or cancel, after due notice and hearing, the
registration of any national, regional or sectoral party, organization or coalition on any of the
following grounds:
(1) It is a religious sect or denomination, organization or association organized for
religious purposes;
elections for the constituency in which it has registered.
None of the 8 grounds to refuse or cancel registration refers to non-representation of the
"marginalized and underrepresented."
The phrase "marginalized and underrepresented" appears only once in R.A. No. 7941, in
Section 2 on Declaration of Policy.57 Section 2 seeks "to promote proportional representation in
the election of representatives to the House of Representatives through the party-list system,"
which will enable Filipinos belonging to the"marginalized and underrepresented sectors,
organizations and parties, and who lack well-defined political constituencies," to become
members of the House of Representatives. While the policy declaration in Section 2 of R.A. No.
7941 broadly refers to "marginalized and underrepresented sectors, organizations and parties,"
the specific implementing provisions of R.A. No. 7941 do not define or require that the sectors,
organizations or parties must be "marginalized and underrepresented." On the contrary, to even
interpret that all the sectors mentioned in Section 5 are "marginalized and underrepresented"
would lead to absurdities.
How then should we harmonize the broad policy declaration in Section 2 of R.A. No. 7941 with
its specific implementing provisions, bearing in mind the applicable provisions of the 1987
Constitution on the matter?
The phrase "marginalized and underrepresented" should refer only to the sectors in Section
5 that are, by their nature, economically "marginalized and underrepresented." These
sectors are: labor, peasant, fisherfolk, urban poor, indigenous cultural communities, handicapped,
veterans, overseas workers, and other similar sectors. For these sectors, a majority of the
members of the sectoral party must belong to the "marginalized and underrepresented."
The nominees of the sectoral party either must belong to the sector, or must have a track
record of advocacy for the sector represented. Belonging to the "marginalized and
underrepresented" sector does not mean one must "wallow in poverty, destitution or infirmity." It
is sufficient that one, or his or her sector, is below the middle class. More specifically, the
economically "marginalized and underrepresented" are those who fall in the low income group as
classified by the National Statistical Coordination Board.58
The recognition that national and regional parties, as well as sectoral parties of professionals, the
elderly, women and the youth, need not be "marginalized and underrepresented" will allow small
ideology-based and cause-oriented parties who lack "well-defined political constituencies" a
chance to win seats in the House of Representatives. On the other hand, limiting to the
"marginalized and underrepresented" the sectoral parties for labor, peasant, fisherfolk, urban
poor, indigenous cultural communities, handicapped, veterans, overseas workers, and other
sectors that by their nature are economically at the margins of society, will give the
"marginalized and underrepresented" an opportunity to likewise win seats in the House of
Representatives.
This interpretation will harmonize the 1987 Constitution and R.A. No. 7941 and will give rise to
a multi-party system where those "marginalized and underrepresented," both in economic and
ideological status, will have the opportunity to send their own members to the House of
Representatives. This interpretation will also make the party-list system honest and transparent,
eliminating the need for relatively well-off party-list representatives to masquerade as
"wallowing in poverty, destitution and infirmity," even as they attend sessions in Congress riding
in SUVs.
The major political parties are those that field candidates in the legislative district elections.
Major political parties cannot participate in the party-list elections since they neither lack "welldefined political constituencies" nor represent "marginalized and underrepresented"
sectors. Thus, the national or regional parties under the party-list system are necessarily
those that do not belong to major political parties. This automatically reserves the national
and regional parties under the party-list system to those who "lack well-defined political
constituencies," giving them the opportunity to have members in the House of Representatives.
To recall, Ang Bagong Bayani expressly declared, in its second guideline for the accreditation of
parties under the party-list system, that "while even major political parties are expressly allowed
by RA 7941 and the Constitution to participate in the party-list system, they must comply with
the declared statutory policy of enabling Filipino citizens belonging to marginalized and
underrepresented sectors xxx to be elected to the House of Representatives. "However, the
requirement in Ang Bagong Bayani, in its second guideline, that "the political party xxx must
represent the marginalized and underrepresented," automatically disqualified major political
parties from participating in the party-list system. This inherent inconsistency in Ang Bagong
Bayani has been compounded by the COMELECs refusal to register sectoral wings officially
organized by major political parties. BANAT merely formalized the prevailing practice when
it expressly prohibited major political parties from participating in the party-list system, even
through their sectoral wings.
Section 11 of R.A. No. 7941 expressly prohibited the "first five (5) major political parties on
the basis of party representation in the House of Representatives at the start of the Tenth
Congress" from participating in the May 1988 party-list elections. 59 Thus, major political
parties can participate in subsequent party-list elections since the prohibition is expressly
limited only to the 1988 party-list elections. However, major political parties should participate
in party-list elections only through their sectoral wings. The participation of major political
parties through their sectoral wings, a majority of whose members are "marginalized and
underrepresented" or lacking in "well-defined political constituencies," will facilitate the entry of
the "marginalized and underrepresented" and those who "lack well-defined political
constituencies" as members of the House of Representatives.
The 1987 Constitution and R.A. No. 7941 allow major political parties to participate in party-list
elections so as to encourage them to work assiduously in extending their constituencies to the
"marginalized and underrepresented" and to those who "lack well-defined political
constituencies." The participation of major political parties in party-list elections must be geared
towards the entry, as members of the House of Representatives, of the "marginalized and
underrepresented" and those who "lack well-defined political constituencies," giving them a
voice in law-making. Thus,to participate in party-list elections, a major political party that fields
candidates in the legislative district elections must organize a sectoral wing, like a labor, peasant,
fisherfolk, urban poor, professional, women or youth wing, that can register under the party-list
system.
Such sectoral wing of a major political party must have its own constitution, by-laws, platform or
program of government, officers and members, a majority of whom must belong to the sector
represented. The sectoral wing is in itself an independent sectoral party, and is linked to a major
political party through a coalition. This linkage is allowed by Section 3 of R.A. No. 7941, which
provides that "component parties or organizations of a coalition may participate independently
(in party-list elections) provided the coalition of which they form part does not participate in the
party-list system."
Section 9 of R.A. No. 7941 prescribes the qualifications of party-list nominees. This provision
prescribes a special qualification only for the nominee from the youth sector.
Section 9. Qualifications of Party-List Nominees. No person shall be nominated as party-list
of the Philippines for a period of not less than one (1) year immediately preceding the day of the
thirty (30) years of age on the day of the election.
Any youth sectoral representative who attains the age of thirty (30) during his term shall be
allowed to continue in office until the expiration of his term.1wphi1
A party-list nominee must be a bona fide member of the party or organization which he or she
seeks to represent.In the case of sectoral parties, to be a bona fide party-list nominee one
must either belong to the sector represented, or have a track record of advocacy for such
sector.
In disqualifying petitioners, the COMELEC used the criteria prescribed in Ang Bagong Bayani
and BANAT. Ang Bagong Bayani laid down the guidelines for qualifying those who desire to
participate in the party-list system:
First, the political party, sector, organization or coalition must represent the marginalized
and underrepresented groups identified in Section 5 of RA 7941. x x x
Second, while even major political parties are expressly allowed by RA 7941 and the
Constitution to participate in the party-list system, they must comply with the declared statutory
policy of enabling "Filipino citizens belonging to marginalized and underrepresented sectors x x
x to be elected to the House of Representatives." x x x.
xxxx
Third, x x x the religious sector may not be represented in the party-list system. x x x.
xxxx
Fourth, a party or an organization must not be disqualified under Section 6 of RA 7941, which
enumerates the grounds for disqualification as follows:
"(1) It is a religious sect or denomination, organization or association, organized for
religious purposes;
elections for the constituency in which it has registered."
Fifth, the party or organization must not be an adjunct of, or a project organized or an entity
funded or assisted by, the government. x x x.
xxxx
Sixth, the party must not only comply with the requirements of the law; its nominees must
likewise do so. Section 9 of RA 7941 reads as follows:
"SEC 9. Qualifications of Party-List Nominees. - No person shall be nominated as party-list
of the Philippines for a period of not less than one (1)year immediately preceding the day of the
thirty (30) years of age on the day of the election. Any youth sectoral representative who attains
the age of thirty (30) during his term shall be allowed to continue in office until the expiration of
his term."
Seventh, not only the candidate party or organization must represent marginalized and
underrepresented sectors; so also must its nominees. x x x.
Eighth, x x x the nominee must likewise be able to contribute to the formulation and enactment
of appropriate legislation that will benefit the nation as a whole. (Emphasis supplied)
In 2009, by a vote of 8-7 in BANAT, this Court stretched the Ang Bagong Bayani ruling further.
In BANAT, the majority officially excluded major political parties from participating in party-list
elections,60 abandoning even the lip-service that Ang Bagong Bayani accorded to the 1987
Constitution and R.A.No. 7941 that major political parties can participate in party-list elections.
The minority in BANAT, however, believed that major political parties can participate in the
party-list system through their sectoral wings. The minority expressed that "[e]xcluding the
major political parties in party-list elections is manifestly against the Constitution, the intent of
the Constitutional Commission, and R.A. No. 7941. This Court cannot engage in socio-political
engineering and judicially legislate the exclusion of major political parties from the party-list
elections in patent violation of the Constitution and the law." 61 The experimentations in sociopolitical engineering have only resulted in confusion and absurdity in the party-list system. Such
experimentations, in clear contravention of the 1987 Constitution and R.A. No. 7941, must now
come to an end.
We cannot, however, fault the COMELEC for following prevailing jurisprudence in
disqualifying petitioners. In following prevailing jurisprudence, the COMELEC could not have
committed grave abuse of discretion. However, for the coming 13 May 2013 party-list elections,
we must now impose and mandate the party-list system actually envisioned and
authorized under the 1987 Constitution and R.A. No. 7941. In BANAT, this Court devised a
new formula in the allocation of party-list seats, reversing the COMELEC's allocation which
followed the then prevailing formula in Ang Bagong Bayani. In BANAT, however, the Court did
not declare that the COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion. Similarly, even as we
acknowledge here that the COMELEC did not commit grave abuse of discretion, we declare that
it would not be in accord with the 1987 Constitution and R.A. No. 7941 to apply the criteria
in Ang Bagong Bayani and BANAT in determining who are qualified to participate in the
coming 13 May 2013 party-list elections. For this purpose, we suspend our rule 62 that a party
may appeal to this Court from decisions or orders of the COMELEC only if the COMELEC
committed grave abuse of discretion.
Thus, we remand all the present petitions to the COMELEC. In determining who may participate
in the coming 13 May 2013 and subsequent party-list elections, the COMELEC shall adhere to
the following parameters:
1. Three different groups may participate in the party-list system: (1) national parties or
organizations, (2) regional parties or organizations, and (3) sectoral parties or
organizations.
2. National parties or organizations and regional parties or organizations do not need to
organize along sectoral lines and do not need to represent any "marginalized and
underrepresented" sector.
3. Political parties can participate in party-list elections provided they register under the
party-list system and do not field candidates in legislative district elections. A political
party, whether major or not, that fields candidates in legislative district elections can
participate in party-list elections only through its sectoral wing that can separately
register under the party-list system. The sectoral wing is by itself an independent sectoral
party, and is linked to a political party through a coalition.
4. Sectoral parties or organizations may either be "marginalized and underrepresented" or
lacking in "well-defined political constituencies." It is enough that their principal
advocacy pertains to the special interest and concerns of their sector. The sectors that are
"marginalized and underrepresented" include labor, peasant, fisherfolk, urban poor,
indigenous cultural communities, handicapped, veterans, and overseas workers. The
sectors that lack "well-defined political constituencies" include professionals, the elderly,
women, and the youth.
5. A majority of the members of sectoral parties or organizations that represent the
"marginalized and underrepresented" must belong to the "marginalized and
underrepresented" sector they represent. Similarly, a majority of the members of sectoral
parties or organizations that lack "well-defined political constituencies" must belong to
the sector they represent. The nominees of sectoral parties or organizations that represent
the "marginalized and underrepresented," or that represent those who lack "well-defined
political constituencies," either must belong to their respective sectors, or must have a
track record of advocacy for their respective sectors. The nominees of national and
regional parties or organizations must be bona-fide members of such parties or
organizations.
6. National, regional, and sectoral parties or organizations shall not be disqualified if
some of their nominees are disqualified, provided that they have at least one nominee
who remains qualified.
The COMELEC excluded from participating in the 13 May 2013 party-list elections those that
did not satisfy these two criteria: (1) all national, regional, and sectoral groups or organizations
must represent the "marginalized and underrepresented" sectors, and (2) all nominees must
belong to the "marginalized and underrepresented" sector they represent. Petitioners may have
been disqualified by the COMELEC because as political or regional parties they are not
organized along sectoral lines and do not represent the "marginalized and underrepresented."
Also, petitioners' nominees who do not belong to the sectors they represent may have been
disqualified, although they may have a track record of advocacy for their sectors. Likewise,
nominees of non-sectoral parties may have been disqualified because they do not belong to any
sector. Moreover, a party may have been disqualified because one or more of its nominees failed
to qualify, even if the party has at least one remaining qualified nominee. As discussed above, the
disqualification of petitioners, and their nominees, under such circumstances is contrary to the
1987 Constitution and R.A. No. 7941.
This Court is sworn to uphold the 1987 Constitution, apply its provisions faithfully, and desist
from engaging in socio-economic or political experimentations contrary to what the Constitution
has ordained. Judicial power does not include the power to re-write the Constitution. Thus, the
present petitions should be remanded to the COMELEC not because the COMELEC committed
grave abuse of discretion in disqualifying petitioners, but because petitioners may now possibly
qualify to participate in the coming 13 May 2013 party-list elections under the new parameters
prescribed by this Court.
WHEREFORE, all the present 54 petitions are GRANTED. The 13 petitions, which have been
granted Status Quo Ante Orders but without mandatory injunction to include the names of
petitioners in the printing of ballots, are remanded to the Commission on Elections only for
determination whether petitioners are qualified to register under the party-list system under the
parameters prescribed in this Decision but they shall not participate in the 13 May 2013 part-list
elections. The 41 petitions, which have been granted mandatory injunctions to include the names
of petitioners in the printing of ballots, are remanded to the Commission on Elections for
determination whether petitioners are qualified to register under the party-list system and to
participate in the 13 May 2013 party-list elections under the parameters prescribed in this
Decision. The Commission on Elections may conduct summary evidentiary hearings for this
purpose. This Decision is immediately executory.
SO ORDERED.
ANTONIO T. CARPIO
Associate Justice
CONCURRING AND DISSENTING OPINION
SERENO, J.:
The party-list system is primarily a
Tool for social justice.
I believe that the ponencia may have further marginalized the already marginalized and
underrepresented of this country. In the guise of political plurality, it allows national and regional
parties or organizations to invade what is and should be constitutionally and statutorily protected
space. What the ponencia fails to appreciate is that the party-list system under the 1987
Constitution and the party-list law or RA 7941 is not about mere political plurality, but plurality
with a heart for the poor and disadvantaged.
The creation of a party-list system under the 1987 Constitution and RA 7941 was not done in a
vacuum. It comprehends the reality of a Filipino nation that has been and still is struggling to
come to terms with much social injustice that has been perpetrated over centuries against a
majority of its people by foreign invaders and even by its own governments.
This injustice is the fertile ground for the seeds which, watered by the blood spilled during the
Martial Law years, ripened to the revolution of 1986. It is from this ferment that the 1987
Constitution was born. Thus, any reading of the 1987 Constitution must be appropriately
sensitive to the context from which it arose. As stated in Civil Liberties Union v. Executive
Secretary:
A foolproof yardstick in constitutional construction is the intention underlying the provision
under consideration. Thus, it has been held that the Court in construing a Constitution should
bear in mind the object sought to be accomplished by its adoption, and the evils, if any, sought to
be prevented or remedied. A doubtful provision will be examined in the light of the history of the
times, and the condition and circumstances under which the Constitution was framed. The object
is to ascertain the reason which induced the frames of the Constitution to enact the particular
provision and the purpose sought to be accomplished thereby, in order to construe the whole as
to make the words consonant to that reason and calculated to effect that purpose. 1 (Emphasis
supplied)
The heart of the 1987 Constitution is the Article on Social Justice. This is apropos since it is a
document that not only recognizes but tries to heal the wounds of history. To harken to the words
of Cecilia Muos-Palma, President of the 1986 Constitutional Commission:
THE PRESIDENT: My distinguished colleagues in this Assembly:
xxx
xxx
xxx
My colleagues, in all humility, but with profound pride, I vote in favor of the Constitution
drafted by this Constitutional Commission because I believe that the document is a worthy and
inspiring legacy we can hand down to the Filipino people of today, tomorrow, and for posterity.
The reason I will give have been given by most of the Members of this Constitutional
Commission this evening. But permit me to restate them just to stress the reason why I am voting
in favor.
For the first time in the history of constitution- making in our country, we set forth in clear and
positive terms in the Preamble which is the beacon light of the new Charter, the noble goal to
establish a just and humane society. This must be so because at present we have to admit that
there are so few with so much and so many with so little. We uphold the Rule of Law where no
man is above the law, and we adhere to the principles of truth, justice, freedom, equality, love
and peace. Yes, for the first time and possibly this is the first Constitution where "love" is
enshrined. This is most significant at this period in our national life when the nation is bleeding
under the forces of hatred and violence, brothers fighting against brothers, Filipinos torturing and
killing their own countrymen. Without love, there can be no peace.
The new Charter establishes a republican democratic form of government with three branches
each independent and coequal of each affording a check and balance of powers. Sovereignty
resides in the people.
xxx
xxx
xxx
For the first time, and possibly this is the first and only Constitution which provides for the
creation of a Commission on Human Rights entrusted with the grave responsibility of
investigating violations of civil and political right by any party or groups and recommending
remedies therefor. The new Charter also sets forth quite lengthily provisions on economic, social
and cultural rights spread out in separate articles such as the Articles on Social Justice, Education
and Declaration of Principles. It is a document which in clear and in unmistakable terms reaches
out to the underprivileged, the paupers, the sick, the elderly, disabled, veterans and other sectors
of society. It is a document which opens an expanded improved way of life for the farmers, the
workers, fishermen, the rank and file of those in service in the government. And that is why I say
that the Article on Social Justice is the heart of the new Charter.2 (Emphasis supplied)
That is why Section 1, Article XIII, provides that: "The Congress shall give highest priority to
the enactment of measures that protect and enhance the right of all the people to human dignity,
reduce social, economic, and political inequalities, and remove cultural inequities by equitably
diffusing wealth and political power for the common good."3 As explained by this Court:
Further, the quest for a better and more "equal" world calls for the use of equal protection as a
tool of effective judicial intervention.
Equality is one ideal which cries out for bold attention and action in the Constitution. The
Preamble proclaims "equality" as an ideal precisely in protest against crushing inequities in
Philippine society. The command to promote social justice in Article II, Section 10, in "all phases
of national development," further explicitated in Article XIII, are clear commands to the State to
take affirmative action in the direction of greater equality. There is thus in the Philippine
Constitution no lack of doctrinal support for a more vigorous state effort towards achieving a
reasonable measure of equality.
Cur present Constitution has gone further in guaranteeing vital social and economic rights to
marginalized groups of society, including labor. Under the policy of social justice, the law bends
over backward to accommodate the interests of the working class on the humane justification
that those with less privilege in life should have more in law. And the obligation to afford
protection to labor is incumbent not only on the legislative and executive branches but also on
the judiciary to translate this pledge into a living reality. Social justice calls for the humanization
of laws and the equalization of social and economic forces by the State so that justice in its
rational and objectively secular conception may at least be approximated.4 (Emphasis supplied)
This is also why the 1987 Constitution is replace with other social justice provisions, including
Sections 9, 10, 13, 14, 18 and 22 of Article II, Section 2 of Article V, Section 5 (1) (2) of Article
VI, Sections 1, 2, 3, 5, 6, 10, 11, 12, 13 of Article XII, and Article XIII. As aptly pointed out by
Commissioner Guingona in his sponsorship speech for the approval of the entire draft of the
1987 Constitution, social justice was the underlying philosophy of the drafters when crafting the
provisions of the fundamental law. Thus:
MR. GUINGONA: Thank you, Mr. Presiding Officer.
This sponsorship speech is for the entire draft of the Constitution of the Republic of the
Philippines.
Today, we have completed the task of drafting a Constitution which is reflective of the spirit of
our time a spirit of nationalism, a spirit of liberation, a spirit of rising expectations.
On June 2, forty-eight men and women met in this hall-men and women from different walks of
life with diverse backgrounds and orientations, even with conflicting convictions, but all sharing
the same earnest desire to serve the people and to help draft a Constitution which will establish a
government that the people can trust and enthusiastically support, a Constitution that guarantees
individual rights and serves as a barrier against excesses of those in authority.
xxx
xxx
xxx
A Constitution of the people and for the people derives its authenticity and authority from the
sovereign will; the power of the people precedes it. As such, it should reflect the norms, the
values, the modes of thought of our society, preserve its heritage, promote its orderliness and
security, protect its cherished liberties and guard against the encroachments of would-be
dictators. These objectives have served as the framework in the work of drafting the 1986
Constitution.
xxx
xxx
xxx
A significant innovation, as far as the legislative department is concerned, refers to the

composition of the members of the House of Representatives. Representation in the Lower
House has been broadened to embrace various sectors of society; in effect, enlarging the
democratic base. It will be constituted by members who shall be elected in the traditional
manner, representing political districts, as well as by members who shall be elected through the
party list system.
xxx
xxx
xxx
The institutions through which the sovereign people rule themselves are essential for the
effective operation of government. But these are not enough in order that the body politic may
evolve and progress. There is need for an underlying socio-economic philosophy which would
direct these political structures and serve as the mainspring for development. So it is that the
draft Constitution contains separate Articles on Social Justice and National Economy and
Patrimony.
Talk of peoples freedom and legal equality would be empty rhetoric as long as they continue to
live in destitution and misery, without land, without employment, without hope. But in helping to
bring about transformation, in helping the common man break away from the bondage of
traditional society, in helping restore to him his dignity and worth, the right to individual
initiative and to property shall be respected.
The Social Justice Article, to which our Commission President, the Honorable Cecilia Muos
Palma, refers to as the "heart of the Constitution," provides that Congress shall give highest
priority to the enactment of measures that would reduce social, economic and political
inequalities. The same article addresses the problems of (1) labor local and overseas, organized
and unorganized recognizing the rights of all workers in the private as well as in the public
sector, the rank and file and the supervisory, to self-organization, collective bargaining and
peaceful and concerted activities including the right to strike in accordance with law; (2) the
farmers, the farm workers, the subsistence fishermen and the fishworkers, through agrarian and
natural resources reform; (3) the underprivileged and homeless citizens in urban centers and
resettlement arcas, through urban land reform and housing; (4) the health of the people, through
an integrated and comprehensive approach to health development; (5) the women, by ensuring
the fundamental equality of women and men before the law, and (6) peoples organizations, by
facilitating the establishment of adequate consultation mechanisms.
xxx
xxx
xxx
These are some of the provisions which we have constitutionalized. These are some of the
innovations that we have introduced. These are the ideas, values and institutions which we have
drawn and which we trust would serve as the foundation of our society, the keystone of our
national transformation and development, the driving force for what we pray would be our
irreversible march to progress. In brief, this is what the men and women of the 1986
Constitutional Commission have drafted under the able, firm and decided leadership of our
President, the Honorable Cecilia Muoz Palma.
The Constitution that we have drafted is a practical instrument suited to the circumstances of our
time. It is also a Constitution that does not limit its usefulness to present needs; one which, in the
words of U.S. Supreme Court Chief Justice John Marshall, and I quote, "is intended to endure for
ages to come and consequently to be adapted to the various crises of human affairs." As we
present the proposed fundamental law, we pray that our efforts would pave the way towards the
establishment of a renewed constitutional government which we were deprived of since 1972,
that these efforts would ensure that the triumph at EDSA so deserving won by the people shall
continue to be enjoyed by us and our posterity for all time, that these efforts would result in the
drafting of a democratic Constitution a Constitution that enshrines peoples power and the rule
of law; a Constitution which would seek to establish in this fair land a community characterized
by moral regeneration, social progress, political stability, economic prosperity, peace, love and
concern for one another; a Constitution that embodies vital living principles that seek to secure
for the people a better life founded on liberty and welfare for all.
Mr. Presiding Officer, on behalf of this Commissions Sponsorship Committee, I have the honor
to move for the approval of the draft Constitution of the Republic of the Philippines on Second
Reading.5
It is within this historical and textual millieu that the party-list provisions in the 1987
Constitution should be interpreted. Every provision should be read in the context of all the other
provisions so that contours of constitutional policy is made clear.6
The place of the party-list system in the constitutional scheme was that it provided for the
realization of the ideals on social justice in the political arena.7
The concept is not new, as discussed by political theorist Terry MacDonald:

First, an idea that has received much attention among democratic theorists is that representatives
should be selected to mirror the characteristics of those being represented in terms of gender,
ethnicity, and other such characteristics judged to be socially relevant. This idea has been
advocated most notably in some recent democratic debates focused on the need for special
representation of disadvantaged and under-represented social groups within democratic
assemblies. The applicability of this idea of mirror representation is not confined to debates
about representing marginalized minorities within nation-states; Iris Young further applies this
model of representation to global politics, arguing the global representation should be based on
representation of the various peoples of the world, each of which embodies its own distinctive
identity and perspective. In practice, special representation for certain social groups within a
mirror framework can be combined with election mechanisms in various ways such as by
according quotas of elected representatives to designated social groups. But since the selection of
these social groups for special representation would nonetheless remain a distinct element of
the process of selecting legitimate representatives, occurring prior to the electoral process, such
mirror representation is still recognizable as a distinct mechanism for selecting representative
agents.8(Emphasis supplied)
Two months after initial debates on the form and structure of government that would best
promote equality, the Commission broke ground on the promotion of political equality and
provided for sectoral representation in the party-list system of the legislature. Commissioner
Villacorta opened the debates on the party-list system.9
MR. VILLACORTA: On this first day of August 1986, we shall, hopefully, usher in a new
chapter in our national history by giving genuine power to our people in the legislature
Commissioner Jaime Tadeo explained the circumstances the party-list system sought to
address:10
MR. TADEO: Ang Cory government ay iniakyat ng peoples power. Kaya kami naririto sa
Con-Com ay dahil sa peoples power nasa amin ang people, wala sa amin ang power. Ganito
ito kahalaga.
The Legislature is supposed to implement or give flesh to the needs and aspirations of the
Filipino people.
Ganoon kahalaga and National Assembly kayat napakahalaga noong Section 5 and Section 31
ng ating Constitution. Our experience, however, has shown that legislation has tended to benefit
more the propertied class who constitutioes a small minority in our society than the
impoverished majority, 70 percent of whom live below the poverty line. This has come about
because the rich have managed to dominate and control the legislature, while the basic sectors
have been left out of it. So, the critical question is, how do we ensure ample representation of
basic sectors in the legislature so that laws reflect their needs and aspirations?
RA 7941 was enacted pursuant to the party-list provisions of the 1987 Constitution. Not only is it
a "social justice tool", as held in Ang Bagong,11 but it is primarily so. This is not mere semantics
but a matter of legal and historical accuracy with material consequences in the realm of statutory
interpretation.
The ponencia gives six (6) parameters that the COMELEC should adhere to in determining who
may participate in the coming 13 May 2013 and subsequent party-list elections. I shall discuss
below my position in relation to the second, fourth and sixth parameter enunciated in
the ponencia.
"Marginalized and underrepresented" under Section 2 of RA 7941 qualifies national,
Under the second parameter, "national parties or organizations and regional parties or
organizations do not need to organize along sectoral lines and do not need to represent any
"marginalized and underrepresented" in Section 2 of RA 7941 to qualify only sectoral parties or
organizations, and not national and regional parties or organizations.
I dessent for the following reasons.
First, since the party-list system is primarily a tool for social justice, the standard of
"marginalized and underrepresented" under Section 2 must be deemed to qualify national,
regional and sectoral parties or organizations. To argue otherwise is to divorce national and
regional parties or organizations from the primary objective of attaining social justice, which
objective surrounds, permeates, imbues, and underlies the entirety of both the 1987 Constitution
and RA 7941.
Second, Second 2 of RA 7941 states that the party-list system seeks to "enable Filipino citizens
belonging to themarginalized and underrepresented sectors, organizations and parties . . . to
become members of the House of Representatives" On its face, it is apparent that "marginalized
and underrepresented" qualifies "sectors", "organizations" and "parties".
Third, even assuming that it is not so apparent, in terms of statutory construction, the import of
"social justice" that has developed in various decisions is that when the law can be interpreted in
more ways than one, an interpretation that favors the underprivileged must be favored.12
Lastly, deliberations of the Constitutional Commission show that the party-list system is a
countervailing means for the weaker segments of our society to overcome the preponderant
advantages of the more entrenched and well-established political parties. To quote:
MR. OPLE: So, Commissioner Monsod grants that the basic principle for a prty list system is
that it is a countervailing means for the weaker segments of our society, if they want to seek
seats in the legislature, to overcome the preponderant advantages of the more entrenched
and well-established political parties, but he is concerned that the mechanics might be
inadequate at this time.
MR. MONSOD: Not only that; talking about labor, for example I think Commissioner Tadeo
said there are 10 to 12 million laborers and I understand that organized labor is about 4.8 million
or 4.5 million if the laborers get together, they can have seats. With 4 million votes, they would
have 10 seats under the party list system.
MR. OPLE: So, the Commissioner would favor a party list system that is open to all and would
not agree to a party list system which seeks to accommodate, in particular, the so-called sectoral
groups that are predominantly workers and peasants?
MR. MONSOD: If one puts a ceiling on the number that each party can put within the 50, and I
am assuming that maybe there are just two major parties or three at the most, then it is already a
form of operating it up for other groups to come in, All we are asking is that they produce
400,000 votes nationwide. The whole purpose of the system is precisely to give room for
those who have a national constituency who may never be able to win a seat on a legislative
district basis. But they must have a constituency of at least 400,000 in order to claim a voice in
the National Assembly.13 (emphasis supplied)
However, the second parameter would allow the more entrenched and well-established political
parties and organizations to complete with the weaker segments of society, which is the very evil
sought to be guarded against.
The ponencias second parameter is premised on the following grounds, among others.
First, the ponencia explains that the text of the 1987 Constitution and RA 7941, and the
proceedings of the Constitutional Commission evince an indisputable intent to allow national,
regional, and sectoral parties and organizations to participate in the party-list system. To require
national and regional parties and organizations to represent the marginalized and
underrepresented makes them effectively sectoral parties and organizations and violates this
intent.
The error here is to conclude that if the law treats national, regional and sectoral parties and
organizations the same by requiring that they represent the "marginalized and underrepresented,"
they become the same. By analogy, people can be treated similarly but that does not make them
identical.
Second, the ponencia rules that since under the Section 5 (2), Article VI of the 1987 Constitution,
only 50% of the seats are allocated during the first three consecutive terms of Congress after the
ratification of the 1987 Constitution to representatives from the labor, peasant, urban poor, etc., it
necessarily follows that the other 50% would be allocated to representatives from sectors which
are non-marginalized and underrepresented.
The error here is to conclude that the latter statement necessarily follows if the former is true.
This is not so since the latter 50% can very well include representatives from other nonenumerated sectors, or even national or regional parties and organizations, all of which can be
"marginalized and underrepresented."
Third, the ponencia adds that it would prevent ideology-based and cause-oriented parties, who
cannot win in legislative district elections, from participating in the party-list system.
The error here is to conclude that such ideology-based or cause-oriented parties are necessarily
non marginalized or underrepresented, which would in turn depend on how "marginalization and
underrepresentation" is defined. The ponencia appears to be operating under a preconceived
notion that "marginalized and underrepresented" refers only to those "economically"
marginalized.
However, there is no need for this Court to define the phrase "marginalized and
underrepresented,"primarily because it already constitutes sufficient legislative standard to
guide the COMELEC as an administrative agency in the exercise of its discretion to determine
the qualification of a party-list group.
As long as such discretion is not gravely abused, the determination of the COMELEC must be
upheld. This is consistent with our pronouncement in Ang Bagong Bayani that, "the role of the
COMELEC is to see to it that only those Filipinos that are marginalized and underrepresented
become members of the Congress under the party-list system."
For as long as the agency concerned will be able to promulgate rules and regulations to
implement a given legislation and effectuate its policies, and that these regulations are germane
to the objects and purposes of the law and not in contradiction to but in conformity with the
standards prescribed by the law, then the standards may be deemed sufficient.14
We should also note that there is a time element to be considered here, for those who are
marginalized and underrepresented today may no longer be one later on. Marginalization and
underrepresentation is an ever evolving concept, created to address social disparities, to be able
to give life to the "social justice" policy of our Constitution. 15 Confining its definition to the
present context may unduly restrict the COMELEC of its quasi-legislative powers which enables
it to issue rules and regulations to implement the election laws and to exercise such legislative
functions as may expressly be delegated to it by Congress.16
Flexibility of our laws is a key factor in reinforcing the stability of our Constitution, because the
legislature is certain to find it impracticable, if not impossible, to anticipate situations that may
be met in carrying laws into effect. 17 The growing complexity of modern life, the multiplication
of the subject of governmental regulations, and the increased difficulty of administering the laws,
the rigidity of the theory of separation of governmental powers is largely responsible in
empowering the COMELEC to not only execute elections laws, but also promulgate certain rules
and regulations calculated to promote public interest. 18 This is the principle of subordinate
legislation discussed inPeople v. Rosenthal19 and in Pangasinan Transportation vs. Public
Service Commission.20
This is consistent with our pronouncement in Ang Bagong Bayani that, "the role of the
COMELEC is to see to it that only those Filipinos that are marginalized and underrepresented
become members of the Congress under the party-list system."
Fourth, the ponencia holds that failure of national and regional parties to represent the
marginalized and underrepresented is not a ground for the COMELEC to refuse or cancel
registration under Section 6 of RA 7941.
The error here is that under Section 6 (5), the COMELEC may refuse or cancel if the party
"violates or fails to comply with laws." Thus, before the premise can be correct, it must be first
established that "marginalization and underrepresentation" is not a requirement of the law, which
is exactly what is at issue here.
Fifth, the ponencia makes too much of the fact that the requirement of "marginalization and
underrepresentation" appears only once in RA 7941.
The error here is to conclude that the phrase has to appear more than once to carry sufficient
legal significance. "Marginalization and underrepresentation" is in the nature of a legislative
standard to guide the COMELEC in the exercise of its administrative powers. This Court has
held that to avoid the taint of unlawful delegation, there must be a standard, which implies at the
very least that the legislature itself determines matters of principle and lays down fundamental
policy. Otherwise, the change of complete abdication may be hard to repel. A standards thus
defines legislative policy, marks its limits, maps out its boundaries and specifies the public
agency to apply it. The standard does not even have to be spelled out. It could be implied from
the policy and purpose of the act considered as a whole. 21 Consequently, we have held that
"public welfare"22 and "public interest"23 are examples of such sufficient standards. Therefore,
that it appears only once in RA 7941 is more than sufficient, since a standard could even be an
implied one.
National, regional and sectoral Parties or organizations must both Represent the
"marginalized and Underrepresented" and lack "well- Defined political
constituencies". The fourth parameter in the ponenciastates:
4. Sectoral parties or organizations may either be "marginalized and underrepresented" or lacking
in "well-defined political constituencies." It is enough that their principal advocacy pertains to
the special interest and concerns of their sector. The sectors that are "marginalized and
underrepresented" include labor, peasant, fisherfolk, urban poor, indigenous cultural
communities, handicapped, veterans, and overseas workers. The sectors that lack "welldefined political constituencies" include professionals, the elderly, women, and the youth.
I dissent for the following reasons.
First, Section 2 of RA 7941 clearly makes the "lack of a "well-defined political constituency" as
a requirement along with "marginalization and underrepresentation." They are cumulative
requirements, not alternative. Thus, underrepresentation." They are cumulative requirements, not
alternative. Thus, sectoral parties and organizations intending to run in the party-list elections
must meet both.
Second, the ponencia appears to be operating under preconceived notions of what it means to be
"marginalized and underrepresented" and to "lack a well-defined political constituency." For
reasons discussed above, the exact content of these legislative standards should be left to the
COMELEC. They are ever evolving concepts, created to address social disparities, to be able to
give life to the "social justice" policy of our Constitution.
The disqualification of a nominee should not disqualify the party-list group provided that:
(1) it meets Guideline Nos. 1-5 of Ang Bagong Bayani (alternately, on the basis of the new
parameters set in theponencia, that they validly qualify as national, regional or sectoral
party-list group); and (2) one of its top three (3) nominees remains qualified.
I concur with the ponencia that an advocate may qualify as a nominee. However, I would like to
explain my position with regard to the sixth parameter set forth in the ponencia with respect to
nominees.
To recall, the sixth parameter in the ponencia provides:
6. National, regional and sectoral parties or organizations shall not be disqualified if some of
their nominees are disqualified, provided that they have at least one nominee who remain
qualified.
I propose the view that the disqualification of a party-list group due to the disqualification of its
nominee is only reasonable if based on material misrepresentations regarding the nominees
qualifications. Otherwise, the disqualification of a nominee should not disqualify the partylist group provided that: (1) it meets Guideline Nos. 1-5 of Ang Bagong Bayani (alternately,
on the basis of the new parameters set in theponencia, that they validly qualify as national,
regional or sectoral party-list group); and (2) one of its top three (3) nominees remains
qualified, for reasons explained below.
The constitutional policy is to enable Filipinos belonging to the marginalized and
underrepresented sectors to contribute legislation that word benefit them. Consistent therewith,
R.A. No. 7941 provides that the State shall develop and guarantee a full, free and open party-list
system that would achieve proportional representation in the House of Representatives by
enhancing party-list groups "chances to complete for and win seats in the legislature." 24 Because
of this policy, I believe that the COMELEC cannot interpret Section 6 (5) of R.A. No. 7941 as a
grant of purely administrative, quasi-legislative or quasi-judicial power to ipso facto disqualify
party-list groups based on the disqualification of a single nominee.
It should also be pointed out that the law itself considers a violation of election laws as a
disqualifying circumstance. However, for an act or omission to be considered a violation of
election laws, it must be demonstrative of gross and willful disregard of the laws or public
policy. The standard cannot be less for the rules and regulations issued by the COMELEC. Thus,
any disqualification of a party-list group based on the disqualification of its nominee must be
based on a material misrepresentation regarding that nominees qualifications. This also finds
support in Section 6 (6) of R.A. No. 7941 which considers declaring "untruthful statements in its
petition" as a ground for disqualification.
As regards the second qualification mentioned above, party-list groups should have at least one
qualified nominee among its top three nominees for it to be allowed to participate in the
elections. This is because if all of its top three nominees are disqualified, even if its registration is
not cancelled and is thus allowed to participate in the elections, and should it obtain the required
number of votes to win a seat, it would still have no one to represent it, because the law does not
allow the group to replace its disqualified nominee through substitution. This is a necessary
consequence of applying Sections 13 in relation to Section 8 of R.A. No. 7941.
Section 13 provides that party-list representatives shall be proclaimed by the COMELEC based
on "the list of names submitted by the respective parties x x x according to their ranking in the
said list." The ranking of a party-list groups nominees is determined by the applicability or the
inapplicability of Section 8, the last paragraph of which reads:
x x x No change of names or alteration of the order of nominees shall be allowed after the names
shall have been submitted to the COMELEC except in cases where the nominee dies, or
withdraws in writing his nomination, becomes incapacitated in which case them name of the
substitute nominee shall be placed last in the list.
Thus, only in case of death, incapacity, or withdrawal does the law allow a party-list group to
change the ranking of its nominees in the list it initially submitted. The ranking of the nominees
is changed through substitution, which according to Section 8 is done by placing the name of the
substitute at the end of the list. In this case, all the names that come after the now vacant slot will
move up the list. After substitution takes effect, the new list with the new ranking will be used by
COMELEC to determine who among the nominees of the party-list group shall be proclaimed,
from the first to the last, in accordance with Section 13.
If any/some of the nominees is/are disqualified, no substitution will be allowed. Thus, their
ranking remains the same and should therefore be respected by the COMELEC in determining
the one/s that will represent the winning party-list group in Congress. This means that if the first
nominee is disqualified, and the party-list group is able to join the elections and becomes entitled
to one representative, the second cannot take the first nominees place and represent the party-list
group. If, however, the party-list group gets enough votes to be entitled to two seats, then the
second nominee can represent it.
Allowing a party-list group, which has successfully passed Guideline Nos. 1-5 of Ang Bagong
Bayani25(alternately, pursuant to the present holding of the ponencia, that it qualifies as a
national, regional or sectoral party or organization) and has established the qualification of at
least one (1) of its top three (3) nominees, to participate in the elections is a better interpretation
of the law. It is fully consistent with the policy of developing and guaranteering a full, free and
open party-list system that would achieve proportional representation in the House of
Representatives by enhancing party-list groups "chances to compete for and win seats in the
legislature""26 while providing sufficient disincentives for party-list groups to flood the
COMELEC with nominees as Section 8 of R.A. No. 7941 only requires that they submit not less
than five (5).
It must be noted that this method, together with the seat-allocation system introduce in BANAT v.
COMELEC,27will allow more party-list groups to be represented in Congress.
Let us use a hypothetical scenario to illustrate.
The table below uses the seat-allocation system introduced in BANAT. It assumes the following
facts: (1) 35 party-list groups participated in the elections; (2) 20 million votes were cast for the
party-list system; and (3) there are 50 seats in Congress reserved for the party-list
representatives.
The succeeding paragraphs will explain how the BANAT method will operate to distribute the 50
seats reserved in the House of Representatives given the foregoing facts and the number of votes
obtained by each of the 35 party-list groups.
Rank
Party-list group
Votes
Garnered
1st Round
(guaranteed
seats)
2nd Round
(guaranteed
seats)
Total #
Of seats
1,466,000
7.33%
1,228,000
6.41%
AAA
BBB
CCC
EEE
FFF
GGG
III
10
JJJ
11
KKK
12
LLL
NNN
15
OOO
16
PPP
RRR
19
SSS
20
TTT
21
UUU
23
1,020,000
3.89%
998,000
3.88%
960,000
3.07%
942,000
2.92%
926,000
2.65%
910,000
2.57%
796,000
2.57%
750,000
2.42%
738,000
2.35%
718,000
2.32%
698,000
2.13%
678,000
2.12%
658,000
2.06%
598,000
2.02%
482,000
1.95%
378,000
1.89%
318,000
1.54%
294,000
1.47%
292,000
1.44%
290,000
1.43%
280,000
1.37%
QQQ
18
22
MMM
14
17
HHH
13
4.74%
DDD
1,040,000
VVV
WWW
24
XXX
25
YYY
26
I-A
28
I-B
29
I-C
268,000
1.34%
256,000
1.24%
248,000
1.23%
238,000
1.18%
222,000
1.11%
214,000
1.07%
212,000
1.06%
210,000
1.05%
206,000
1.03%
194,000
1.02%
33
50
I-D
31
I-E
32
I-F
33
I-G
34
I-H
35
1.37%
ZZZ
27
30
274,000
I-I
20,000,000
17
We explained in BANAT that the first clause of Section 11(b) of R.A. 7941 guarantees a seat to
the party-list groups "receiving at least two percent (2%) of the total votes cast for the party-list
system." In our hypothetical scenario, the party-list groups ranked 1st to 17th received at least
2% of the 20 million votes cast for the party-list system. In effect, all 17 of them were given
guaranteed seats. The distribution of these so-called guaranteed seats to the "two percents" is
what BANAT calls the "first round of seat allocation."
From the first round of seat allocation, the total number of guaranteed seats allocated to the two
percenters will be subtracted from "20% of the members of the House of Representatives"
reserved by the Constitution for party-list representatives, which in this hypothetical scenario is
50 seats. Assuming all 17 of the two percenters were able to establish the qualification of their
first nominee, the remaining 33 will be distributed in what BANAT termed as the "second round
of seat allocation."
These remaining 33 seats are called "additional seats." The rules followed in the
distribution/allocation of these seats are fairly simple. If a party-list groups percentage is
multiplied by the total number of additional seats and the product is no less than 2, then that
party-list will be entitled to 2 additional seats. This is to keep in line with the 3-seat limit rule. In
our hypothetical scenario as shown by the table above, only the top two party-list groups, AAA
and BBB are entitled to 2 additional seats. Assuming, again, that the 2nd and 3rd nominees of
both AAA and BBB are qualified, then only 29 will be left for distribution.
In distributing the remaining 29 seats, it must be kept in mind that the number of votes cast in
favor of the remaining party-list groups becomes irrelevant. At this stage, the only thing that
matters is the groups ranking. The party-list group that comes after BBB will be given 1
additional seat and the distribution of one seat per party-list group, per rank, continues until all
50 seats are accounted for; the second round of seat allocation stops at this point. In the table
above, the 50th seat was awarded to I-E the party-list group that ranked 31st in the election.
In the foregoing discussion, all the nominees of the party-list groups are qualified. What happens
if one or some of the nominees are disqualified? Following the proposed method, if one two of
the party-list groups with guaranteed seats have a disqualified first nominee, their second
nominee, if qualified, can still represent them in Congress based on the second round of seat
allocation.
In the event that some of the nominees of party-list groupswhether or not entitled to
guaranteed seatsare disqualified, then those party-list groups, which without the
disqualification of these nominees would not be entitled to a seat, would now have a higher
chance to have a representative elected in Congress.
If, for example, the first nominee of BBB is disqualified, then it forfeits its guaranteed seat and
the additional seats for distribution in the second round will be increased by 1. With 34 seats to
be allocated, I-E will now qualify to obtain a seat in its favor, assuming that its first nominee is
qualified. If I-Es first nominee is disqualified, then we will proceed to the party-list next-inrank, which is I-G. This method is followed down the line until all 50 seats are allocated.
If we follow the proposed method, this would yield a higher number of party-list groups
represented in Congress, but with fewer representatives per group.
This proposed method can be further illustrated through another example, this time using a "nontwo percenter" party-list group. In the table above, RRR failed to garner at least 2% of the total
votes. However, in the second round of seat allocation, it was granted 1 seat. To be able to send a
representative in Congress, RRRs first nominee should be qualified to sit. Assuming that its first
nominee was disqualified, its second or third nominee cannot occupy said seat; instead, it will
forfeit the seat and such seat will now go to I-E. Again, this method is followed down the line
until all 50 seats are allocated.
In conclusion, I submit that a party-list group should be allowed to participate in the elections
despite the disqualification of some of its nominees, provided that there remains a qualified
nominee out of the top three initially submitted. Not only is this the better policy, but this is also
the interpretation supported by law.
Only nine of the petitions should be Remanded.
Given the circumstances above-mentioned, I respectfully dissent on the remand of all petitions to
the COMELEC for reasons to be discussed below.
The ponencia justifies the remand of all petitions in this wise, viz:
x x x Thus, the present petitions should be remanded to the COMELEC not because COMELEC
committed grave abuse of discretion in disqualifying petitioners, but because petitioners may
now possibly qualify to participate in the coming 13 May 2013 party-list elections under the
new parameters prescribed by this Court. (Emphasis supplied)
The "new parameters" set forth in the ponencias guidelines focus mainly on two (2) grounds
used by the COMELEC to cancel registration: (1) the standard of marginalized and
underrepresented as applied to national, regional and sectoral parties and organizations; and (2)
the qualification of nominees. From such examination, we can conclude that, ir relation to the
other grounds used by COMELEC to cancel registration (other than those two grounds
mentioned above), the doctrines remain unchanged. Thus, a remand of those petitions is
unnecessary, considering that the acts of the COMELEC pertaining to their petitions are upheld.
The ponencia even admits that COMELEC did not commit grave abuse of discretion in
following prevailing jurisprudence in disqualifying petitioners.
Consequently, the remand should only pertain to those party-list groups whose registration was
cancelled on the basis of applying the standard of "marginalized and underrepresented" and the
qualification of nominees wherein the "new parameters" apply. If other grounds were used by
COMELEC other than those with "new parameters,"say, for example, failure to prove track
record, a remand would be uncalled for because the doctrine pertaining to the other grounds
remain unchanged.
Despite the new doctrine set forth in the ponencia, at the very least, only nine (9) petitions
should be ordered remanded to the COMELEC. In these nine (9) petitions, the COMELEC
cancelled the registration of the party-list groups solely on the ground that their nominees are
disqualified. In making such a pronouncement, the COMELEC merely used as yardstick whether
they could qualify as advocates, and for this reason, I recommend that the following cases be
REMANDED to the COMELEC. These are:
1. Alliance for Rural and Agrarian Reonstruction, Inc. (ARARO)
2. Agapay ng Indigenous Peoples Rights Alliance, Inc. (A-IPRA)
3. Aangat Tayo (AT)
4. A Blessed Party-List (a.k.a. Blessed Federation of Farmers and Fishermen International,
Inc.) (A BLESSED)
5. Action League of Indigenous Masses (ALIM)
6. Butil Farmers Party (BUTIL)
7. Adhikain at Kilusan ng Ordinaryong Tao Para sa Lupa, Pabahay, Hanapbuhay at
Kaunlaran (AKO BAHAY)
8. Akbay Kalusugan, Inc. (AKIN)
9. 1-UNITED TRANSPORT KOALISYON (1-UTAK)
Assuming for the sake of argument that we agree with the ponencias take that the phrase
"marginalized and underrepresented" qualifies only sectoral parties, still, a remand of all the
petitions remain uncalled for. Out of the 52 petitions, there are only 11 party-list groups which
are classified as national or regional parties.28 Thus, if we were to strictly apply
the ponencias guidelines, only 20 petitions ought to be remanded.
The COMELEC did not violate Section 3, Article IX-C of the Constitution.
It bears stressing that COMELEC Resolution No. 9513 does not violate Section 3, Article IX-C
of the Constitution which requires a prior motion for reconsideration before the COMELEC can
decide election cases en banc. To recall, the Resolution allows the COMELEC en banc, without
a motion for reconsideration, to conduct (1) an automatic review of a decision of a COMELEC
division granting a petition for registration of a party-list group or organization; and (2) a
summary evidentiary hearing for those already accredited and which have manifested their intent
to participate in the 2013 national and local elections for the purpose of determining their
continuing compliance with the requirements of RA No. 7941 and the Ang Bagong
Bayani29 guidelines.
Section 3 only applies when the COMELEC is exercising its quasi-judicial powers which can be
found in Section 2 (2) of the same article. However, since the conduct of automatic review and
summary evidentiary hearing is an exercise of COMELECs administrative powers under

Section 2 (5), the prior motion for reconsideration in Section 3 is not required.
It is in this light that I would like to further elucidate why the power under Section 2 (5) is not
quasi-judicial but administrative in nature in order to help clarify the true distinction between the
two. In a number of cases, this Court has had the opportunity to distinguish quasi-judicial from
administrative power. Thus, in Limkaichong v COMELEC,30 we held that:
The term "administrative" connotes or pertains to "administration, especially management, as by
managing or conducting, directing or superintending, the execution, application, or conduct of
persons of things." It does not entail an opportunity to be heard, the production and
weighing of evidence, and a decision or resolution thereon. This is to be distinguish from
"quasi-judicial function", a term which applies, among others, to the action or discretion of
public administrative officers or bodies, who are required to investigate facts, or ascertain the
existence of facts, hold hearings, and draw conclusions from them, as a basis for their
official action and to exercise discretion of a judicial nature. (emphasis supplied)
However, there are administrative proceedings, such as a preliminary investigation before the
public prosecutor, that also entail the "opportunity to be heard, the production and weighing of
evidence, and a decision or resolution thereon," but are not considered quasi-judicial in the
proper sense of the term. As held in Bautista v CA:31
Petitioner submits that a prosecutor conducting a preliminary investigation performs a quasijudicial function, citing Cojuangco v. PCGG, Koh v. Court of Appeals, Andaya v. Provincial
Fiscal of Surigao del Norte and Crespo v. Mogul. In these cases this Court held that the power
to conduct preliminary investigation is quasi-judicial in nature. But this statement holds
true only in the sense that, like quasi- judicial bodies, the prosecutor is an office in the
executive department exercising powers akin to those of a court. Here is where the
similarity ends.
A closer security will show that preliminary investigation is very different from other quasijudicial proceedings. A quasi-judicial body has been defined as "an organ of government other
than a court and other than a legislature which affects the rights of private parties through either
adjudication or rule-making."
xxxx
On the other hand, the prosecutor in a preliminary investigation does not determine the guilt
or innocence of the accused. He does not exercise adjudication nor rule-making functions.
Preliminary investigation is merely inquisitorial, and is often the only means of discovering
the persons who may be reasonably charged with a crime and to enable the fiscal to
prepare his complaint or information. It is not a trial of the case on the merits and has so
purpose except that of determining whether a crime has been committed and whether there
is probable cause to believe that the accused is guilty thereof. While the fiscal makes that
determination, he cannot be said to be acting as a quasi-court, for it is the courts,
ultimately, that pass judgement on the accused, not the fiscal.
Hence, the Office of the Prosecutor is not a quasi-judicial body; necessarily, its decisions
approving the filing of a criminal complaint are not appealable to the Court of Appeals under
Rule 43. Since the ORSP has the power to resolve appeals with finally only where the penalty
prescribed for the offense does not exceed prision correccional, regardless of the imposable fine,
the only remedy of petitioner, in the absence of grave abuse of discretion, is to present her
defense in the trial of the case. (emphasis supplied)
While the exercise of quasi-judicial and administrative power may both involve an opportunity
to be heard, the production and weighing of evidence, and a decision or resolution thereon, the
distinction I believe is that the exercise of the former has for its purpose the adjudication of
rights with fianlity.32 This makes it akin to judicial power which has for its purpose, among
others, the settlement of actual controversies involving rights which are legally demandable and
enforceable.33
Another way to dispose of the issue of the necessity of a prior motion for reconsideration is to
look at it through the lens of an election case. The phrase "all such election cases" in Section 3
has been read in relation to Section 2 (2) of Article IX-C, viz:
What is included in the phrase "all such election cases" may be seen in Section 2(2) of Article
IX(C) of the Constitution which states:
Section 2. The Commission on Elections shall exercise the following powers and functions:
xxxx
(2) Exercise exclusive original jurisdiction over all contests relating to the elections, returns, and
qualifications of all elective regional, provincial, and city officials, and appellate jurisdiction
over all contests involving elective municipal of officials decided by trial courts of general
jurisdiction, or involving elective barangay officials decided by trial courts of limited
jurisdiction.34
As to the nature of "contests," the Court has already defined it under the penumbra of election as
follows:
Ordinary usage would characterize a "contest" in reference to a post-election scenario.
Election contests consists of either an election protest or a quo warranto which, although two
distinct remedies, would have one objective in view, i.e., to dislodge the winning candidate from
office.
xxxx
The rules categorically speak of the jurisdiction of the tribunal over contests relating to the
election, returns and qualifications of the "President" or "Vice-President", of the Philippines, and
not of "candidates" for President or Vice-President. A quo warranto proceeding is generally
defined as being an action against a person who usurps, intrudes into, or unlawfully holds or
exercises a public office. In such context, the election contest can only contemplate a postelection scenario. In Rule 14, only a registered candidate who would have received either
the second or third the second or third highest number of votes could file an election
protest. This rule again presupposes a post-election scenario.
It is fair to conclude that the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court, defined by Section 4, paragraph
7, of the 1987 Constitution, would not include cases directly brought before it, questioning
the qualifications of a candidate for the presidency or vice-presidency before the elections are
held. (Emphasis supplied)35
In Panlilio v Commission on Elections,36 it was also held that the primary purpose of an election
case is the ascertainment of the real candidate elected by the electorate. Thus, there must first be
an election before there can be an election before there can be an election case. Since the national
and local elections are still to be held on 13 May 2013, the conduct of automatic review and
summary evidentiary hearing under the Resolution No. 9513 cannot be an election case. For this
reason, a prior motion for reconsideration under Section 3 is not required.
In view of the foregoing, I vote to REMAND only the following cases: ARARO, A-IPRA, AT, A
BLESSED, ALIM, BUTIL, AKO BAHAY, AKIN, and 1-UTAK. The Petitioners of all the other
Petitioners should be dismissed.
MARIA LOURDES P. A. SERENO

Chief Justice

Supreme Court
Baguio City
EN BANC
ANG LADLAD LGBT PARTY
represented herein by its Chair,
DANTON REMOTO,
Petitioner,
G.R. No. 190582

Present:
PUNO, C. J.,
CARPIO,
CORONA,
CARPIO MORALES,
VELASCO, JR.,
NACHURA,
LEONARDO-DE CASTRO,
BRION,
PERALTA,
BERSAMIN,
DEL CASTILLO,
ABAD,
VILLARAMA, JR.,
PEREZ, and
MENDOZA, JJ.
- versus -
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS,
Promulgated:
Respondent.
April 8, 2010
x--------------------------------------------------------x
DECISION
DEL CASTILLO, J.:
... [F]reedom to differ is not limited to things that do not matter much. That would be a
mere shadow of freedom. The test of its substance is the right to differ as to things that
touch the heart of the existing order.
Justice Robert A. Jackson
West Virginia State Board of Education v. Barnette[1]
One unavoidable consequence of everyone having the freedom to choose is that others may make
different choices choices we would not make for ourselves, choices we may disapprove of, even choices
that may shock or offend or anger us. However, choices are not to be legally prohibited merely because
they are different, and the right to disagree and debate about important questions of public policy is a core
value protected by our Bill of Rights. Indeed, our democracy is built on genuine recognition of, and
respect for, diversity and difference in opinion.
Since ancient times, society has grappled with deep disagreements about the definitions and
demands of morality. In many cases, where moral convictions are concerned, harmony among those
theoretically opposed is an insurmountable goal. Yet herein lies the paradox philosophical justifications
about what is moral are indispensable and yet at the same time powerless to create agreement. This Court
recognizes, however, that practical solutions are preferable to ideological stalemates; accommodation is
better than intransigence; reason more worthy than rhetoric. This will allow persons of diverse viewpoints
to live together, if not harmoniously, then, at least, civilly.
Factual Background
This is a Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, with an application for a
writ of preliminary mandatory injunction, filed by Ang Ladlad LGBT Party (Ang Ladlad) against the
Resolutions of the Commission on Elections (COMELEC) dated November 11, 2009[2] (the First
Assailed Resolution) and December 16, 2009[3] (the Second Assailed Resolution) in SPP No. 09-228 (PL)
(collectively, the Assailed Resolutions). The case has its roots in the COMELECs refusal to accredit Ang
Ladlad as a party-list organization under Republic Act (RA) No. 7941, otherwise known as the Party-List
System Act.[4]
Ang Ladlad is an organization composed of men and women who identify themselves as
lesbians, gays, bisexuals, or trans-gendered individuals (LGBTs). Incorporated in 2003, Ang Ladlad first
applied for registration with the COMELEC in 2006. The application for accreditation was denied on the
ground that the organization had no substantial membership base. On August 17, 2009, Ang
Ladlad again filed a Petition[5] for registration with the COMELEC.
Before the COMELEC, petitioner argued that the LGBT community is a marginalized and
under-represented sector that is particularly disadvantaged because of their sexual orientation and gender
identity; that LGBTs are victims of exclusion, discrimination, and violence; that because of negative
societal attitudes, LGBTs are constrained to hide their sexual orientation; and that Ang Ladlad complied
with the 8-point guidelines enunciated by this Court in Ang Bagong Bayani-OFW Labor Party v.
Commission on Elections.[6] Ang Ladlad laid out its national membership base consisting of individual
members and organizational supporters, and outlined its platform of governance.[7]
On November 11, 2009, after admitting the petitioners evidence, the COMELEC (Second
Division) dismissed the Petition on moral grounds, stating that:
x x x This Petition is dismissible on moral grounds. Petitioner defines the Filipino
Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual and Transgender (LGBT) Community, thus:
x x x a marginalized and under-represented sector that is particularly
disadvantaged because of their sexual orientation and gender identity.
and proceeded to define sexual orientation as that which:
x x x refers to a persons capacity for profound emotional, affectional and
sexual attraction to, and intimate and sexual relations with, individuals of
a different gender, of the same gender, or more than one gender.
This definition of the LGBT sector makes it crystal clear that petitioner tolerates
immorality which offends religious beliefs. In Romans 1:26, 27, Paul wrote:
For this cause God gave them up into vile affections, for even their
women did change the natural use into that which is against nature: And
likewise also the men, leaving the natural use of the woman, burned in
their lust one toward another; men with men working that which is
unseemly, and receiving in themselves that recompense of their error
which was meet.
In the Koran, the hereunder verses are pertinent:
For ye practice your lusts on men in preference to women ye are indeed
a people transgressing beyond bounds. (7.81) And we rained down on
them a shower (of brimstone): Then see what was the end of those who
indulged in sin and crime! (7:84) He said: O my Lord! Help Thou me
against people who do mischief (29:30).
As correctly pointed out by the Law Department in its Comment dated October 2, 2008:
The ANG LADLAD apparently advocates sexual immorality as
indicated in the Petitions par. 6F: Consensual partnerships or
relationships by gays and lesbians who are already of age. It is further
indicated in par. 24 of the Petition which waves for the record: In
2007, Men Having Sex with Men or MSMs in the Philippines were
estimated
as
670,000
(Genesis
19
is
the
history
of Sodom and Gomorrah).
Laws are deemed incorporated in every contract, permit, license,
relationship, or accreditation. Hence, pertinent provisions of the Civil
Code and the Revised Penal Code are deemed part of the requirement to
be complied with for accreditation.
ANG LADLAD collides with Article 695 of the Civil Code which
defines nuisance as Any act, omission, establishment, business, condition
of property, or anything else which x x x (3) shocks, defies; or
disregards decency or morality x x x
It also collides with Article 1306 of the Civil Code: The contracting
parties may establish such stipulations, clauses, terms and conditions as
they may deem convenient, provided they are not contrary to
law, morals, good customs, public order or public policy. Art 1409 of the
Civil Code provides that Contracts whose cause, object or purpose is
contrary to law, morals, good customs, public order or public policy are
inexistent and void from the beginning.
Finally to safeguard the morality of the Filipino community, the Revised Penal Code, as
amended, penalizes Immoral doctrines, obscene publications and exhibitions and
indecent shows as follows:
Art. 201. Immoral doctrines, obscene publications and exhibitions, and
indecent shows. The penalty of prision mayor or a fine ranging from six
thousand to twelve thousand pesos, or both such imprisonment and fine,
shall be imposed upon:
1. Those who shall publicly expound or proclaim doctrines
openly contrary to public morals;
2. (a) The authors of obscene literature, published with their knowledge

in any form; the editors publishing such literature; and the
owners/operators of the establishment selling the same;
(b) Those who, in theaters, fairs, cinematographs or any other place,
exhibit indecent or immoral plays, scenes, acts or shows, it being
understood that the obscene literature or indecent or immoral plays,
scenes, acts or shows, whether live or in film, which are prescribed by
virtue hereof, shall include those which: (1) glorify criminals or condone
crimes; (2) serve no other purpose but to satisfy the market for
violence, lust or pornography; (3) offend any race or religion; (4) tend to
abet traffic in and use of prohibited drugs; and (5) are contrary to law,
public order, morals, good customs, established policies, lawful orders,
decrees and edicts.
3. Those who shall sell, give away or exhibit films, prints, engravings,
sculpture or literature which are offensive to morals.
Petitioner should likewise be denied accreditation not only for advocating immoral
doctrines but likewise for not being truthful when it said that it or any of its
nominees/party-list representatives have not violated or failed to comply with laws, rules,
or regulations relating to the elections.
Furthermore, should this Commission grant the petition, we will be exposing our youth to an
environment that does not conform to the teachings of our faith. Lehman Strauss, a
famous bible teacher and writer in the U.S.A. said in one article that older practicing
homosexuals are a threat to the youth. As an agency of the government, ours too is the
States avowed duty under Section 13, Article II of the Constitution to protect our youth
from moral and spiritual degradation.[8]
When Ang Ladlad sought reconsideration,[9] three commissioners voted to overturn the First
Assailed Resolution (Commissioners Gregorio Y. Larrazabal, Rene V. Sarmiento, and Armando Velasco),
while three commissioners voted to deny Ang Ladlads Motion for Reconsideration (Commissioners
Nicodemo T. Ferrer, Lucenito N. Tagle, and Elias R. Yusoph). The COMELEC Chairman, breaking the
tie and speaking for the majority in his Separate Opinion, upheld the First Assailed Resolution, stating
that:
I.
The Spirit of Republic Act No. 7941
Ladlad is applying for accreditation as a sectoral party in the party-list system. Even
assuming that it has properly proven its under-representation and marginalization, it
cannot be said that Ladlads expressed sexual orientations per se would benefit the nation
as a whole.
Section 2 of the party-list law unequivocally states that the purpose of the party-list
system of electing congressional representatives is to enable Filipino citizens belonging
to marginalized and under-represented sectors, organizations and parties, and who lack
well-defined political constituencies but who could contribute to the formulation and
enactment of appropriate legislation that will benefit the nation as a whole, to become
members of the House of Representatives.
If entry into the party-list system would depend only on the ability of an organization to
represent its constituencies, then all representative organizations would have found
themselves into the party-list race. But that is not the intention of the framers of the law.
The party-list system is not a tool to advocate tolerance and acceptance of misunderstood
persons or groups of persons. Rather, the party-list system is a tool for the realization
of aspirations of marginalized individuals whose interests are also the nations only
that their interests have not been brought to the attention of the nation because of their
under representation. Until the time comes when Ladlad is able to justify that having
mixed sexual orientations and transgender identities is beneficial to the nation, its
application for accreditation under the party-list system will remain just that.
II.
No substantial differentiation
In the United States, whose equal protection doctrine pervades Philippine jurisprudence,
courts do not recognize lesbians, gays, homosexuals, and bisexuals (LGBT) as a special
class of individuals. x x x Significantly, it has also been held that homosexuality is not a
constitutionally protected fundamental right, and that nothing in the U.S. Constitution
discloses a comparable intent to protect or promote the social or legal equality of
homosexual relations, as in the case of race or religion or belief.
xxxx
Thus, even if societys understanding, tolerance, and acceptance of LGBTs is elevated,
there can be no denying that Ladlad constituencies are still males and females, and they
will remain either male or female protected by the same Bill of Rights that applies
to all citizens alike.
xxxx
IV. Public Morals
x x x There is no question about not imposing on Ladlad Christian or Muslim religious
practices. Neither is there any attempt to any particular religious groups moral rules
on Ladlad. Rather, what are being adopted as moral parameters and precepts are
generally accepted public morals. They are possibly religious-based, but as a society, the
Philippines cannot ignore its more than 500 years of Muslim and Christian
upbringing, such that some moral precepts espoused by said religions have sipped
[sic] into society and these are not publicly accepted moral norms.
V.
Legal Provisions
But above morality and social norms, they have become part of the law of the land.
Article 201 of the Revised Penal Code imposes the penalty of prision mayor upon Those
who shall publicly expound or proclaim doctrines openly contrary to public morals. It
penalizes immoral doctrines, obscene publications and exhibition and indecent
shows. Ang Ladlad apparently falls under these legal provisions. This is clear from its
Petitions paragraph 6F: Consensual partnerships or relationships by gays and lesbians
who are already of age It is further indicated in par. 24 of the Petition which waves for
the record: In 2007, Men Having Sex with Men or MSMs in the Philippines were
estimated as 670,000. Moreoever, Article 694 of the Civil Code defines nuisance as any
act, omission x x x or anything else x x x which shocks, defies or disregards decency or
morality x x x. These are all unlawful.[10]
On January 4, 2010, Ang Ladlad filed this Petition, praying that the Court annul the Assailed
Resolutions and direct the COMELEC to grant Ang Ladlads application for accreditation. Ang
Ladlad also sought the issuance ex parte of a preliminary mandatory injunction against the COMELEC,
which had previously announced that it would begin printing the final ballots for the May 2010 elections
by January 25, 2010.
On January 6, 2010, we ordered the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) to file its Comment on
behalf of COMELEC not later than 12:00 noon of January 11, 2010.[11] Instead of filing a Comment,
however, the OSG filed a Motion for Extension, requesting that it be given until January 16, 2010 to
Comment.[12] Somewhat surprisingly, the OSG later filed a Comment in support of petitioners
application.[13] Thus, in order to give COMELEC the opportunity to fully ventilate its position, we
required it to file its own comment.[14] The COMELEC, through its Law Department, filed its Comment
on February 2, 2010.[15]
In the meantime, due to the urgency of the petition, we issued a temporary restraining order
on January 12, 2010, effective immediately and continuing until further orders from this Court, directing
the COMELEC to cease and desist from implementing the Assailed Resolutions.[16]
Also, on January 13, 2010, the Commission on Human Rights (CHR) filed a Motion to Intervene
or to Appear as Amicus Curiae, attaching thereto its Comment-in-Intervention.[17] The CHR opined that
the denial ofAng Ladlads petition on moral grounds violated the standards and principles of the
Constitution, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR), and the International Covenant on
Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR). OnJanuary 19, 2010, we granted the CHRs motion to intervene.
On January 26, 2010, Epifanio D. Salonga, Jr. filed his Motion to Intervene [18] which motion was
granted on February 2, 2010.[19]
The Parties Arguments
Ang Ladlad argued that the denial of accreditation, insofar as it justified the exclusion by using
religious dogma, violated the constitutional guarantees against the establishment of religion. Petitioner
also claimed that the Assailed Resolutions contravened its constitutional rights to privacy, freedom of
speech and assembly, and equal protection of laws, as well as constituted violations of
the Philippines international obligations against discrimination based on sexual orientation.
The OSG concurred with Ang Ladlads petition and argued that the COMELEC erred in denying
petitioners application for registration since there was no basis for COMELECs allegations of immorality.
It also opined that LGBTs have their own special interests and concerns which should have been
recognized by the COMELEC as a separate classification. However, insofar as the purported violations
of petitioners freedom of speech, expression, and assembly were concerned, the OSG maintained that
there had been no restrictions on these rights.
In its Comment, the COMELEC reiterated that petitioner does not have a concrete and genuine
national political agenda to benefit the nation and that the petition was validly dismissed on moral
grounds. It also arguedfor the first time that the LGBT sector is not among the sectors enumerated by the
Constitution and RA 7941, and that petitioner made untruthful statements in its petition when it alleged its
national existence contrary to actual verification reports by COMELECs field personnel.
Our Ruling
We grant the petition.
Compliance with the Requirements of the Constitution
and Republic Act No. 7941
The COMELEC denied Ang Ladlads application for registration on the ground that the LGBT
sector is neither enumerated in the Constitution and RA 7941, nor is it associated with or related to any of
the sectors in the enumeration.
Respondent mistakenly opines that our ruling in Ang Bagong Bayani stands for the proposition
that only those sectors specifically enumerated in the law or related to said sectors (labor, peasant,
fisherfolk, urban poor, indigenous cultural communities, elderly, handicapped, women, youth, veterans,
overseas workers, and professionals) may be registered under the party-list system. As we explicitly ruled
in Ang Bagong Bayani-OFW Labor Party v. Commission on Elections,[20] the enumeration of
marginalized and under-represented sectors is not exclusive. The crucial element is not whether a sector is
specifically enumerated, but whether a particular organization complies with the requirements of the
Constitution and RA 7941.
Respondent also argues that Ang Ladlad made untruthful statements in its petition when it
alleged that it had nationwide existence through its members and affiliate organizations. The COMELEC
claims that upon verification by its field personnel, it was shown that save for a few isolated places in the
country, petitioner does not exist in almost all provinces in the country.[21]
This argument that petitioner made untruthful statements in its petition when it alleged its national
existence is a new one; previously, the COMELEC claimed that petitioner was not being truthful when it
said that it or any of its nominees/party-list representatives have not violated or failed to comply with
laws, rules, or regulations relating to the elections. Nowhere was this ground for denial of petitioners
accreditation mentioned or even alluded to in the Assailed Resolutions. This, in itself, is quite curious,
considering that the reports of petitioners alleged non-existence were already available to the COMELEC
prior to the issuance of the First Assailed Resolution. At best, this is irregular procedure; at worst, a
belated afterthought, a change in respondents theory, and a serious violation of petitioners right to
procedural due process.
Nonetheless, we find that there has been no misrepresentation. A cursory perusal of Ang
Ladlads initial petition shows that it never claimed to exist in each province of the Philippines. Rather,
petitioner alleged that the LGBT community in the Philippines was estimated to constitute at least
670,000 persons; that it had 16,100 affiliates and members around the country, and 4,044 members in its
electronic discussion group.[22] Ang Ladladalso represented itself to be a national LGBT umbrella
organization with affiliates around the Philippines composed of the following LGBT networks:
Abra Gay Association
Aklan Butterfly Brigade (ABB) Aklan
Albay Gay Association
Arts Center of Cabanatuan City Nueva Ecija

Boys Legion Metro Manila
Cagayan de Oro People Like Us (CDO PLUS)
Cant Live in the Closet, Inc. (CLIC) Metro Manila
Cebu Pride Cebu City
Circle of Friends
Dipolog Gay Association Zamboanga del Norte
Gay, Bisexual, & Transgender Youth Association (GABAY)
Gay and Lesbian Activists Network for Gender Equality (GALANG)
Metro Manila
Gay Mens Support Group (GMSG) Metro Manila
Gay United for Peace and Solidarity (GUPS) Lanao del Norte
Iloilo City Gay Association Iloilo City
Kabulig Writers Group Camarines Sur
Lesbian Advocates Philippines, Inc. (LEAP)
LUMINA Baguio City
Marikina Gay Association Metro Manila
Metropolitan Community Church (MCC) Metro Manila
Naga City Gay Association Naga City
ONE BACARDI
Order of St. Aelred (OSAe) Metro Manila
PUP LAKAN
RADAR PRIDEWEAR
Rainbow Rights Project (R-Rights), Inc. Metro Manila
San Jose del Monte Gay Association Bulacan
Sining Kayumanggi Royal Family Rizal
Society of Transexual Women of the Philippines (STRAP)
Metro Manila
Soul Jive Antipolo, Rizal
The Link Davao City
Tayabas Gay Association Quezon
Womens Bisexual Network Metro Manila
Zamboanga Gay Association Zamboanga City[23]
Since the COMELEC only searched for the names ANG LADLAD LGBT or LADLAD LGBT, it
is no surprise that they found that petitioner had no presence in any of these regions. In fact, if
COMELECs findings are to be believed, petitioner does not even exist in Quezon City, which is
registered as Ang Ladlads principal place of business.
Against this backdrop, we find that Ang Ladlad has sufficiently demonstrated its compliance
with the legal requirements for accreditation. Indeed, aside from COMELECs moral objection and the
belated allegation of non-existence, nowhere in the records has the respondent ever found/ruled that Ang
Ladlad is not qualified to register as a party-list organization under any of the requisites under RA 7941 or
the guidelines in Ang Bagong Bayani. The difference, COMELEC claims, lies in Ang Ladlads morality,
or lack thereof.
Religion as the Basis for Refusal to Accept Ang
Ladlads Petition for Registration
Our Constitution provides in Article III, Section 5 that [n]o law shall be made respecting an
establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof. At bottom, what our non-establishment
clause calls for is government neutrality in religious matters.[24] Clearly, governmental reliance on
religious justification is inconsistent with this policy of neutrality.[25] We thus find that it was grave
violation of the non-establishment clause for the COMELEC to utilize the Bible and the Koran to justify
the exclusion of Ang Ladlad.
Rather than relying on religious belief, the legitimacy of the Assailed Resolutions should depend,
instead, on whether the COMELEC is able to advance some justification for its rulings beyond mere
conformity to religious doctrine. Otherwise stated, government must act for secular purposes and in ways
that have primarily secular effects. As we held in Estrada v. Escritor:[26]
x x x The morality referred to in the law is public and necessarily secular, not religious as
the dissent of Mr. Justice Carpio holds. "Religious teachings as expressed in public
debate may influence the civil public order but public moral disputes may be resolved
only on grounds articulable in secular terms." Otherwise, if government relies upon
religious beliefs in formulating public policies and morals, the resulting policies and
morals would require conformity to what some might regard as religious programs or
agenda. The non-believers would therefore be compelled to conform to a standard of
conduct buttressed by a religious belief, i.e., to a "compelled religion," anathema to
religious freedom. Likewise, if government based its actions upon religious beliefs, it
would tacitly approve or endorse that belief and thereby also tacitly disapprove contrary
religious or non-religious views that would not support the policy. As a result,
government will not provide full religious freedom for all its citizens, or even make it
appear that those whose beliefs are disapproved are second-class citizens.
In other words, government action, including its proscription of immorality as expressed
in criminal law like concubinage, must have a secular purpose. That is, the government
proscribes this conduct because it is "detrimental (or dangerous) to those conditions upon
which depend the existence and progress of human society" and not because the conduct
is proscribed by the beliefs of one religion or the other. Although admittedly, moral
judgments based on religion might have a compelling influence on those engaged in
public deliberations over what actions would be considered a moral disapprobation
punishable by law. After all, they might also be adherents of a religion and thus have
religious opinions and moral codes with a compelling influence on them; the human
mind endeavors to regulate the temporal and spiritual institutions of society in a uniform
manner, harmonizing earth with heaven. Succinctly put, a law could be religious or
Kantian or Aquinian or utilitarian in its deepest roots, but it must have an articulable and
discernible secular purpose and justification to pass scrutiny of the religion clauses. x x x
Recognizing the religious nature of the Filipinos and the elevating influence of religion in
society, however, the Philippine constitution's religion clauses prescribe not a strict but a
benevolent neutrality. Benevolent neutrality recognizes that government must pursue its
secular goals and interests but at the same time strive to uphold religious liberty to the
greatest extent possible within flexible constitutional limits. Thus, although the morality
contemplated by laws is secular, benevolent neutrality could allow for accommodation of
morality based on religion, provided it does not offend compelling state interests.[27]
Public Morals as a Ground to Deny Ang Ladlads
Petition for Registration
Respondent suggests that although the moral condemnation of homosexuality and homosexual
conduct may be religion-based, it has long been transplanted into generally accepted public morals. The
COMELEC argues:
Petitioners accreditation was denied not necessarily because their group consists of
LGBTs but because of the danger it poses to the people especially the youth. Once it is
recognized by the government, a sector which believes that there is nothing wrong in
having sexual relations with individuals of the same gender is a bad example. It will bring
down the standard of morals we cherish in our civilized society. Any society without a set
of moral precepts is in danger of losing its own existence.[28]
We are not blind to the fact that, through the years, homosexual conduct, and perhaps
homosexuals themselves, have borne the brunt of societal disapproval. It is not difficult to imagine the
reasons behind this censure religious beliefs, convictions about the preservation of marriage, family, and
procreation, even dislike or distrust of homosexuals themselves and their perceived lifestyle. Nonetheless,
we recall that the Philippines has not seen fit to criminalize homosexual conduct. Evidently, therefore,
these generally accepted public morals have not been convincingly transplanted into the realm of law.[29]
The Assailed Resolutions have not identified any specific overt immoral act performed by Ang
Ladlad. Even the OSG agrees that there should have been a finding by the COMELEC that the groups
members have committed or are committing immoral acts.[30] The OSG argues:
x x x A person may be sexually attracted to a person of the same gender, of a different
gender, or more than one gender, but mere attraction does not translate to immoral acts.
There is a great divide between thought and action. Reduction ad absurdum. If immoral
thoughts could be penalized, COMELEC would have its hands full of disqualification
cases against both the straights and the gays. Certainly this is not the intendment of the
law.[31]
Respondent has failed to explain what societal ills are sought to be prevented, or why special
protection is required for the youth. Neither has the COMELEC condescended to justify its position that
petitioners admission into the party-list system would be so harmful as to irreparably damage the moral
fabric of society. We, of course, do not suggest that the state is wholly without authority to regulate
matters concerning morality, sexuality, and sexual relations, and we recognize that the government will
and should continue to restrict behavior considered detrimental to society. Nonetheless, we cannot
countenance advocates who, undoubtedly with the loftiest of intentions, situate morality on one end of an
argument or another, without bothering to go through the rigors of legal reasoning and explanation. In
this, the notion of morality is robbed of all value. Clearly then, the bare invocation of morality will not
remove an issue from our scrutiny.
We also find the COMELECs reference to purported violations of our penal and civil laws flimsy,
at best; disingenuous, at worst. Article 694 of the Civil Code defines a nuisance as any act, omission,
establishment, condition of property, or anything else which shocks, defies, or disregards decency or
morality, the remedies for which are a prosecution under the Revised Penal Code or any local ordinance,
a civil action, or abatement without judicial proceedings.[32] A violation of Article 201 of the Revised
Penal Code, on the other hand, requires proof beyond reasonable doubt to support a criminal conviction.
It hardly needs to be emphasized that mere allegation of violation of laws is not proof, and a mere blanket
invocation of public morals cannot replace the institution of civil or criminal proceedings and a judicial
determination of liability or culpability.
As such, we hold that moral disapproval, without more, is not a sufficient governmental interest
to justify exclusion of homosexuals from participation in the party-list system. The denial of Ang
Ladlads registration on purely moral grounds amounts more to a statement of dislike and disapproval of
homosexuals, rather than a tool to further any substantial public interest. Respondents blanket
justifications give rise to the inevitable conclusion that the COMELEC targets homosexuals themselves
as a class, not because of any particular morally reprehensible act. It is this selective targeting that
implicates our equal protection clause.
Equal Protection
Despite the absolutism of Article III, Section 1 of our Constitution, which provides nor shall any
person be denied equal protection of the laws, courts have never interpreted the provision as an absolute
prohibition on classification. Equality, said Aristotle, consists in the same treatment of similar persons.
[33]
The equal protection clause guarantees that no person or class of persons shall be deprived of the same
protection of laws which is enjoyed by other persons or other classes in the same place and in like
circumstances.[34]
Recent jurisprudence has affirmed that if a law neither burdens a fundamental right nor targets a suspect
class, we will uphold the classification as long as it bears a rational relationship to some legitimate
government end.[35]In Central Bank Employees Association, Inc. v. Banko Sentral ng Pilipinas,[36] we
declared that [i]n our jurisdiction, the standard of analysis of equal protection challenges x x x have
followed the rational basis test, coupled with a deferential attitude to legislative classifications and a
reluctance to invalidate a law unless there is a showing of a clear and unequivocal breach of the
Constitution.[37]
The COMELEC posits that the majority of the Philippine population considers homosexual
conduct as immoral and unacceptable, and this constitutes sufficient reason to disqualify the petitioner.
Unfortunately for the respondent, the Philippine electorate has expressed no such belief. No law exists to
criminalize homosexual behavior or expressions or parties about homosexual behavior. Indeed, even if
we were to assume that public opinion is as the COMELEC describes it, the asserted state interest here
that is, moral disapproval of an unpopular minority is not a legitimate state interest that is sufficient to
satisfy rational basis review under the equal protection clause. The COMELECs differentiation, and its
unsubstantiated claim that Ang Ladlad cannot contribute to the formulation of legislation that would
benefit the nation, furthers no legitimate state interest other than disapproval of or dislike for a disfavored
group.
From the standpoint of the political process, the lesbian, gay, bisexual, and transgender have the
same interest in participating in the party-list system on the same basis as other political parties similarly
situated. State intrusion in this case is equally burdensome. Hence, laws of general application should
apply with equal force to LGBTs, and they deserve to participate in the party-list system on the same
basis as other marginalized and under-represented sectors.
It bears stressing that our finding that COMELECs act of differentiating LGBTs from
heterosexuals insofar as the party-list system is concerned does not imply that any other law
distinguishing between heterosexuals and homosexuals under different circumstances would similarly
fail. We disagree with the OSGs position that homosexuals are a class in themselves for the purposes of
the equal protection clause.[38] We are not prepared to single out homosexuals as a separate class meriting
special or differentiated treatment. We have not received sufficient evidence to this effect, and it is simply
unnecessary to make such a ruling today. Petitioner itself has merely demanded that it be recognized
under the same basis as all other groups similarly situated, and that the COMELEC made an unwarranted
and impermissible classification not justified by the circumstances of the case.
Freedom of Expression and Association
Under our system of laws, every group has the right to promote its agenda and attempt to
persuade society of the validity of its position through normal democratic means.[39] It is in the public
square that deeply held convictions and differing opinions should be distilled and deliberated upon. As
we held in Estrada v. Escritor:[40]
In a democracy, this common agreement on political and moral ideas is distilled in the
public square. Where citizens are free, every opinion, every prejudice, every aspiration,
and every moral discernment has access to the public square where people deliberate the
order of their life together. Citizens are the bearers of opinion, including opinion shaped
by, or espousing religious belief, and these citizens have equal access to the public square.
In this representative democracy, the state is prohibited from determining which
convictions and moral judgments may be proposed for public deliberation. Through a
constitutionally designed process, the people deliberate and decide. Majority rule is a
necessary principle in this democratic governance. Thus, when public deliberation on
moral judgments is finally crystallized into law, the laws will largely reflect the beliefs
and preferences of the majority, i.e., the mainstream or median groups. Nevertheless, in
the very act of adopting and accepting a constitution and the limits it specifies including
protection of religious freedom "not only for a minority, however small not only for a
majority, however large but for each of us" the majority imposes upon itself a selfdenying ordinance. It promises not to do what it otherwise could do: to ride roughshod
over the dissenting minorities.
Freedom of expression constitutes one of the essential foundations of a democratic society, and
this freedom applies not only to those that are favorably received but also to those that offend, shock, or
disturb. Any restriction imposed in this sphere must be proportionate to the legitimate aim pursued.
Absent any compelling state interest, it is not for the COMELEC or this Court to impose its views on the
populace. Otherwise stated, the COMELEC is certainly not free to interfere with speech for no better
reason than promoting an approved message or discouraging a disfavored one.
This position gains even more force if one considers that homosexual conduct is not illegal in this
country. It follows that both expressions concerning ones homosexuality and the activity of forming a
political association that supports LGBT individuals are protected as well.
Other jurisdictions have gone so far as to categorically rule that even overwhelming public
perception that homosexual conduct violates public morality does not justify criminalizing same-sex
conduct.[41] European and United Nations judicial decisions have ruled in favor of gay rights claimants on
both privacy and equality grounds, citing general privacy and equal protection provisions in foreign and
international texts.[42] To the extent that there is much to learn from other jurisdictions that have reflected
on the issues we face here, such jurisprudence is certainly illuminating. These foreign authorities, while
not formally binding on Philippine courts, may nevertheless have persuasive influence on the Courts
analysis.
In the area of freedom of expression, for instance, United States courts have ruled that existing
free speech doctrines protect gay and lesbian rights to expressive conduct. In order to justify the
prohibition of a particular expression of opinion, public institutions must show that their actions were
caused by something more than a mere desire to avoid the discomfort and unpleasantness that always
accompany an unpopular viewpoint.[43]
With respect to freedom of association for the advancement of ideas and beliefs, in Europe, with
its vibrant human rights tradition, the European Court of Human Rights (ECHR) has repeatedly stated
that a political party may campaign for a change in the law or the constitutional structures of a state if it
uses legal and democratic means and the changes it proposes are consistent with democratic principles.
The ECHR has emphasized that political ideas that challenge the existing order and whose realization is
advocated by peaceful means must be afforded a proper opportunity of expression through the exercise of
the right of association, even if such ideas may seem shocking or unacceptable to the authorities or the
majority of the population.[44] A political group should not be hindered solely because it seeks to publicly
debate controversial political issues in order to find solutions capable of satisfying everyone concerned.
[45]
Only if a political party incites violence or puts forward policies that are incompatible with democracy
does it fall outside the protection of the freedom of association guarantee.[46]
We do not doubt that a number of our citizens may believe that homosexual conduct is
distasteful, offensive, or even defiant. They are entitled to hold and express that view. On the other hand,
LGBTs and their supporters, in all likelihood, believe with equal fervor that relationships between
individuals of the same sex are morally equivalent to heterosexual relationships. They, too, are entitled to
hold and express that view. However, as far as this Court is concerned, our democracy precludes using
the religious or moral views of one part of the community to exclude from consideration the values of
other members of the community.
Of course, none of this suggests the impending arrival of a golden age for gay rights litigants. It well may
be that this Decision will only serve to highlight the discrepancy between the rigid constitutional analysis
of this Court and the more complex moral sentiments of Filipinos. We do not suggest that public opinion,
even at its most liberal, reflect a clear-cut strong consensus favorable to gay rights claims and we neither
attempt nor expect to affect individual perceptions of homosexuality through this Decision.
The OSG argues that since there has been neither prior restraint nor subsequent punishment imposed
on Ang Ladlad, and its members have not been deprived of their right to voluntarily associate, then there
has been no restriction on their freedom of expression or association. The OSG argues that:
There was no utterance restricted, no publication censored, or any assembly denied.
[COMELEC] simply exercised its authority to review and verify the qualifications of
petitioner as a sectoral party applying to participate in the party-list system. This lawful
exercise of duty cannot be said to be a transgression of Section 4, Article III of the
Constitution.
xxxx
A denial of the petition for registration x x x does not deprive the members of the
petitioner to freely take part in the conduct of elections. Their right to vote will not be
hampered by said denial. In fact, the right to vote is a constitutionally-guaranteed right
which cannot be limited.
As to its right to be elected in a genuine periodic election, petitioner contends that the
denial of Ang Ladlads petition has the clear and immediate effect of limiting, if not
outrightly nullifying the capacity of its members to fully and equally participate in public
life through engagement in the party list elections.
This argument is puerile. The holding of a public office is not a right but a
privilege subject to limitations imposed by law. x x x[47]
The OSG fails to recall that petitioner has, in fact, established its qualifications to participate in
the party-list system, and as advanced by the OSG itself the moral objection offered by the COMELEC
was not a limitation imposed by law. To the extent, therefore, that the petitioner has been precluded,
because of COMELECs action, from publicly expressing its views as a political party and participating
on an equal basis in the political process with other equally-qualified party-list candidates, we find that
there has, indeed, been a transgression of petitioners fundamental rights.
Non-Discrimination and International Law
In an age that has seen international law evolve geometrically in scope and promise, international
human rights law, in particular, has grown dynamically in its attempt to bring about a more just and
humane world order.For individuals and groups struggling with inadequate structural and governmental
support, international human rights norms are particularly significant, and should be effectively enforced
in domestic legal systems so that such norms may become actual, rather than ideal, standards of conduct.
Our Decision today is fully in accord with our international obligations to protect and promote
human rights. In particular, we explicitly recognize the principle of non-discrimination as it relates to the
right to electoral participation, enunciated in the UDHR and the ICCPR.
The principle of non-discrimination is laid out in Article 26 of the ICCPR, as follows:
Article 26
All persons are equal before the law and are entitled without any discrimination to the
equal protection of the law. In this respect, the law shall prohibit any discrimination and
guarantee to all persons equal and effective protection against discrimination on any
ground such as race, colour, sex, language, religion, political or other opinion, national or
social origin, property, birth or other status.
In this context, the principle of non-discrimination requires that laws of general application
relating to elections be applied equally to all persons, regardless of sexual orientation. Although sexual
orientation is not specifically enumerated as a status or ratio for discrimination in Article 26 of the
ICCPR, the ICCPR Human Rights Committee has opined that the reference to sex in Article 26 should be
construed to include sexual orientation.[48] Additionally, a variety of United Nations bodies have declared
discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation to be prohibited under various international agreements.
[49]
The UDHR provides:

Article 21.
(1) Everyone has the right to take part in the government of his country, directly
or through freely chosen representatives.
Likewise, the ICCPR states:
Article 25
Every citizen shall have the right and the opportunity, without any of the
distinctions mentioned in article 2 and without unreasonable restrictions:
(a) To take part in the conduct of public affairs, directly or through freely chosen
representatives;
(b) To vote and to be elected at genuine periodic elections which shall be by
universal and equal suffrage and shall be held by secret ballot, guaranteeing the free
expression of the will of the electors;
(c) To have access, on general terms of equality, to public service in his country.
As stated by the CHR in its Comment-in-Intervention, the scope of the right to electoral participation is
elaborated by the Human Rights Committee in its General Comment No. 25 (Participation in Public
Affairs and the Right to Vote) as follows:
1. Article 25 of the Covenant recognizes and protects the right of every citizen to
take part in the conduct of public affairs, the right to vote and to be elected and the right
to have access to public service. Whatever form of constitution or government is in force,
the Covenant requires States to adopt such legislative and other measures as may be
necessary to ensure that citizens have an effective opportunity to enjoy the rights it
protects. Article 25 lies at the core of democratic government based on the consent of the
people and in conformity with the principles of the Covenant.
xxxx
15. The effective implementation of the right and the opportunity to stand for
elective office ensures that persons entitled to vote have a free choice of candidates. Any
restrictions on the right to stand for election, such as minimum age, must be justifiable on
objective and reasonable criteria. Persons who are otherwise eligible to stand for election
should not be excluded by unreasonable or discriminatory requirements such as
education, residence or descent, or by reason of political affiliation. No person should
suffer discrimination or disadvantage of any kind because of that person's candidacy.
States parties should indicate and explain the legislative provisions which exclude any
group or category of persons from elective office.[50]
We stress, however, that although this Court stands willing to assume the responsibility of giving
effect to the Philippines international law obligations, the blanket invocation of international law is not
the panacea for all social ills. We refer now to the petitioners invocation of the Yogyakarta Principles (the
Application of International Human Rights Law In Relation to Sexual Orientation and Gender Identity),
[51]
which petitioner declares to reflect binding principles of international law.
At this time, we are not prepared to declare that these Yogyakarta Principles contain norms that
are obligatory on the Philippines. There are declarations and obligations outlined in said Principles which
are not reflective of the current state of international law, and do not find basis in any of the sources of
international law enumerated under Article 38(1) of the Statute of the International Court of Justice.
[52]
Petitioner has not undertaken any objective and rigorous analysis of these alleged principles of
international law to ascertain their true status.
We also hasten to add that not everything that society or a certain segment of society wants or
demands is automatically a human right. This is not an arbitrary human intervention that may be added to
or subtracted from at will. It is unfortunate that much of what passes for human rights today is a much
broader context of needs that identifies many social desires as rights in order to further claims that
international law obliges states to sanction these innovations. This has the effect of diluting real human
rights, and is a result of the notion that if wants are couched in rights language, then they are no longer
controversial.
Using even the most liberal of lenses, these Yogyakarta Principles, consisting of a declaration
formulated by various international law professors, are at best de lege ferenda and do not constitute
binding obligations on the Philippines. Indeed, so much of contemporary international law is
characterized by the soft law nomenclature, i.e., international law is full of principles that promote
international cooperation, harmony, and respect for human rights, most of which amount to no more than
well-meaning desires, without the support of either State practice or opinio juris.[53]
As a final note, we cannot help but observe that the social issues presented by this case are
emotionally charged, societal attitudes are in flux, even the psychiatric and religious communities are
divided in opinion. This Courts role is not to impose its own view of acceptable behavior. Rather, it is to
apply the Constitution and laws as best as it can, uninfluenced by public opinion, and confident in the
knowledge that our democracy is resilient enough to withstand vigorous debate.
WHEREFORE, the Petition is hereby GRANTED. The Resolutions of the Commission on Elections
dated November 11, 2009 and December 16, 2009 in SPP No. 09-228 (PL) are hereby SET
ASIDE. The Commission on Elections is directed to GRANT petitioners application for party-list
accreditation.
SO ORDERED.
MARIANO C. DEL CASTILLO

Associate Justice
EN BANC
DARYL GRACE J. ABAYON, G.R. No. 189466
Petitioner,
Present:
Puno, C.J.,
Carpio,
Corona,
Carpio Morales,
Velasco, Jr.,
Nachura,
- versus - Leonardo-De Castro,
Brion,
Peralta,
Bersamin,
Del Castillo,
Abad,
Villarama, Jr.,
Perez, and
Mendoza, JJ.
THE HONORABLE HOUSE OF
REPRESENTATIVES ELECTORAL
TRIBUNAL, PERFECTO C. LUCABAN,
JR., RONYL S. DE LA CRUZ
and AGUSTIN C. DOROGA,
Respondents.
x ---------------------------------------------- x
CONGRESSMAN JOVITO S. G.R. No. 189506
PALPARAN, JR.,
Petitioner,
- versus HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
ELECTORAL TRIBUNAL (HRET),
DR. REYNALDO LESACA, JR.,
CRISTINA PALABAY, RENATO M.
REYES, JR., ERLINDA CADAPAN,
ANTONIO FLORES and Promulgated:
JOSELITO USTAREZ,
Respondents. February 11, 2010
x ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- x
DECISION
ABAD, J.:
These two cases are about the authority of the House of Representatives Electoral
Tribunal (HRET) to pass upon the eligibilities of the nominees of the party-list groups that won
seats in the lower house of Congress.
The Facts and the Case
In G.R. 189466, petitioner Daryl Grace J. Abayon is the first nominee of the Aangat
Tayo party-list organization that won a seat in the House of Representatives during the 2007
elections.
Respondents Perfecto C. Lucaban, Jr., Ronyl S. Dela Cruz, and Agustin C. Doroga, all
registered voters, filed a petition for quo warranto with respondent HRET against Aangat
Tayo and its nominee, petitioner Abayon, in HRET Case 07-041. They claimed that Aangat
Tayo was not eligible for a party-list seat in the House of Representatives, since it did not
represent the marginalized and underrepresented sectors.
Respondent Lucaban and the others with him further pointed out that petitioner Abayon
herself was not qualified to sit in the House as a party-list nominee since she did not belong to
the marginalized and underrepresented sectors, she being the wife of an incumbent congressional
district representative. She moreover lost her bid as party-list representative of the party-list
organization called An Waray in the immediately preceding elections of May 10, 2004.
Petitioner Abayon countered that the Commission on Elections (COMELEC) had already
confirmed the status of Aangat Tayo as a national multi-sectoral party-list organization
representing the workers, women, youth, urban poor, and elderly and that she belonged to the
women sector. Abayon also claimed that although she was the second nominee of An
Waray party-list organization during the 2004 elections, she could not be regarded as having lost
a bid for an elective office.
Finally, petitioner Abayon pointed out that respondent HRET had no jurisdiction over the
petition for quo warranto since respondent Lucaban and the others with him collaterally attacked
the registration of Aangat Tayo as a party-list organization, a matter that fell within the
jurisdiction of the COMELEC. It was Aangat Tayo that was taking a seat in the House of
Representatives, and not Abayon who was just its nominee. All questions involving her
eligibility as first nominee, said Abayon, were internal concerns of Aangat Tayo.
On July 16, 2009 respondent HRET issued an order, dismissing the petition as against Aangat
Tayo but upholding its jurisdiction over the qualifications of petitioner Abayon. [1] The latter
moved for reconsideration but the HRET denied the same on September 17, 2009,[2] prompting
Abayon to file the present petition for special civil action of certiorari.
In G.R. 189506, petitioner Jovito S. Palparan, Jr. is the first nominee of the Bantay partylist group that won a seat in the 2007 elections for the members of the House of
Representatives. Respondents Reynaldo Lesaca, Jr., Cristina Palabay, Renato M. Reyes, Jr.,
Erlinda Cadapan, Antonio Flores, and Joselito Ustarez are members of some other party-list
groups.
Shortly after the elections, respondent Lesaca and the others with him filed with respondent
HRET a petition for quo warranto against Bantay and its nominee, petitioner Palparan, in HRET
Case 07-040.Lesaca and the others alleged that Palparan was ineligible to sit in the House of
Representatives as party-list nominee because he did not belong to the marginalized and
underrepresented sectors that Bantayrepresented, namely, the victims of communist rebels,
Civilian Armed Forces Geographical Units (CAFGUs), former rebels, and security
guards. Lesaca and the others said that Palparan committed gross human rights violations against
marginalized and underrepresented sectors and organizations.
Petitioner Palparan countered that the HRET had no jurisdiction over his person since it was
actually the party-list Bantay, not he, that was elected to and assumed membership in the House
of Representatives.Palparan claimed that he was just Bantays nominee. Consequently, any
question involving his eligibility as first nominee was an internal concern of Bantay. Such
question must be brought, he said, before that party-list group, not before the HRET.
On July 23, 2009 respondent HRET issued an order dismissing the petition
against Bantay for the reason that the issue of the ineligibility or qualification of the party-list
group fell within the jurisdiction of the COMELEC pursuant to the Party-List System
Act. HRET, however, defended its jurisdiction over the question of petitioner Palparans
qualifications.[3] Palparan moved for reconsideration but the HRET denied it by a resolution
dated September 10, 2009,[4] hence, the recourse to this Court through this petition for special
civil action of certiorari and prohibition.
Since the two cases raise a common issue, the Court has caused their consolidation.
The Issue Presented
The common issue presented in these two cases is:
Whether or not respondent HRET has jurisdiction over the question of qualifications
of petitioners Abayon and Palparan as nominees of Aangat Tayo and Bantay party-list
organizations, respectively,who took the seats at the House of Representatives that such
organizations won in the 2007 elections.
The Courts Ruling
Petitioners Abayon and Palparan have a common theory: Republic Act (R.A.) 7941, the
Party-List System Act, vests in the COMELEC the authority to determine which parties or
organizations have the qualifications to seek party-list seats in the House of Representatives
during the elections. Indeed, the HRET dismissed the petitions for quo warranto filed with it
insofar as they sought the disqualifications ofAangat Tayo and Bantay. Since petitioners Abayon
and Palparan were not elected into office but were chosen by their respective organizations under
their internal rules, the HRET has no jurisdiction to inquire into and adjudicate their
qualifications as nominees.
If at all, says petitioner Abayon, such authority belongs to the COMELEC which already
upheld her qualification as nominee of Aangat Tayo for the women sector. For Palparan, Bantays
personality is so inseparable and intertwined with his own person as its nominee so that the
HRET cannot dismiss the quo warranto action against Bantay without dismissing the action
against him.
But, although it is the party-list organization that is voted for in the elections, it is not the
organization that sits as and becomes a member of the House of Representatives. Section 5,
Article VI of the Constitution,[5] identifies who the members of that House are:
Sec. 5. (1). The House of Representatives shall be composed of not more than
elected from legislative districts apportioned among the provinces, cities, and
the Metropolitan Manila area in accordance with the number of their
respective inhabitants, and on the basis of a uniform and progressive
ratio, and those who, as provided by law, shall be elected through a party -list
system of registered national, regional, and sectoral parties or
organizations. (Underscoring supplied)
Clearly, the members of the House of Representatives are of two kinds: members x x x
who shall be elected from legislative districts and those who x x x shall be elected through a
party-list system of registered national, regional, and sectoral parties or organizations. This
means that, from the Constitutions point of view, it is the party-list representatives who are
elected into office, not their parties or organizations. These representatives are elected, however,
through that peculiar party-list system that the Constitution authorized and that Congress by law
established where the voters cast their votes for the organizations or parties to which such partylist representatives belong.
Once elected, both the district representatives and the party-list representatives are treated
in like manner. They have the same deliberative rights, salaries, and emoluments. They can
participate in the making of laws that will directly benefit their legislative districts or
sectors. They are also subject to the same term limitation of three years for a maximum of three
consecutive terms.
It may not be amiss to point out that the Party-List System Act itself recognizes party-list
nominees as members of the House of Representatives, thus:
Sec. 2. Declaration of Policy. - The State shall promote proportional
representation in the election of representatives to the House of
Representatives through a party-list system of registered national, regional
and sectoral parties or organizations or coalitions thereof, which will enable
Filipino citizens belonging to the marginalized and underrepresented sectors,
organizations and parties, and who lack well-defined political constituencies
but who could contribute to the formulation and enactment of appropriate
legislation that will benefit the nation as a whole, to become members of the
House of Representatives. Towards this end, the State shall develop and
guarantee a full, free and open party system in order to attain the broadest
possible representation of party, sectoral or group interests in the House of
Representatives by enhancing their chances to compete for and win seats in
the legislature, and shall provide the simplest scheme possible. (Underscoring
supplied)
As this Court also held in Bantay Republic Act or BA-RA 7941 v. Commission on
Elections,[6] a party-list representative is in every sense an elected member of the House of
Representatives. Although the vote cast in a party-list election is a vote for a party, such vote, in
the end, would be a vote for its nominees, who, in appropriate cases, would eventually sit in the
House of Representatives.
Both the Constitution and the Party-List System Act set the qualifications and grounds for
disqualification of party-list nominees. Section 9 of R.A. 7941, echoing the Constitution, states:
Sec. 9. Qualification of Party-List Nominees. No person shall be
nominated as party-list representative unless he is a natural-born citizen of
the Philippines, a registered voter, a resident of the Philippines for a period of
not less than one (1) year immediately preceding the day of the election, able
to read and write, bona fide member of the party or organization which he
seeks to represent for at least ninety (90) days preceding the day of the
election, and is at least twenty-five (25) years of age on the day of the election.
In case of a nominee of the youth sector, he must at least be twentyfive (25) but not more than thirty (30) years of age on the day of the
election. Any youth sectoral representative who attains the age of thirty (30)
during his term shall be allowed to continue until the expiration of his term.
In the cases before the Court, those who challenged the qualifications of petitioners
Abayon and Palparan claim that the two do not belong to the marginalized and underrepresented
sectors that they ought to represent. The Party-List System Act provides that a nominee must be
a bona fide member of the party or organization which he seeks to represent.[7]
It is for the HRET to interpret the meaning of this particular qualification of a nomineethe
need for him or her to be a bona fide member or a representative of his party-list organizationin
the context of the facts that characterize petitioners Abayon and Palparans relation to Aangat
Tayo and Bantay, respectively, and the marginalized and underrepresented interests that they
presumably embody.
Petitioners Abayon and Palparan of course point out that the authority to determine the
qualifications of a party-list nominee belongs to the party or organization that nominated
him. This is true, initially.The right to examine the fitness of aspiring nominees and, eventually,
to choose five from among them after all belongs to the party or organization that nominates
them.[8] But where an allegation is made that the party or organization had chosen and allowed a
disqualified nominee to become its party-list representative in the lower House and enjoy the
secured tenure that goes with the position, the resolution of the dispute is taken out of its hand.
Parenthetically, although the Party-List System Act does not so state, the COMELEC
seems to believe, when it resolved the challenge to petitioner Abayon, that it has the power to do
so as an incident of its authority to approve the registration of party-list organizations. But the
Court need not resolve this question since it is not raised here and has not been argued by the
parties.
What is inevitable is that Section 17, Article VI of the Constitution [9] provides that the
HRET shall be the sole judge of all contests relating to, among other things, the qualifications of
the members of the House of Representatives. Since, as pointed out above, party-list nominees
are elected members of the House of Representatives no less than the district representatives
are, the HRET has jurisdiction to hear and pass upon their qualifications. By analogy with the
cases of district representatives, once the party or organization of the party-list nominee has been
proclaimed and the nominee has taken his oath and assumed office as member of the House of
Representatives, the COMELECs jurisdiction over election contests relating to his qualifications
ends and the HRETs own jurisdiction begins.[10]
The Court holds that respondent HRET did not gravely abuse its discretion when it
dismissed the petitions for quo warranto against Aangat Tayo party-list and Bantay party-list but
upheld its jurisdiction over the question of the qualifications of petitioners Abayon and Palparan.
WHEREFORE, the
Court DISMISSES the
consolidated
petitions
and AFFIRMS the Order dated July 16, 2009 and Resolution 09-183 dated September 17, 2009
in HRET Case 07-041 of the House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal as well as its Order
dated July 23, 2009 and Resolution 09-178 dated September 10, 2009 in HRET Case 07-040.
SO ORDERED.
ROBERTO A. ABAD
Associate Justice
Supreme Court
Manila
EN BANC
PHILIPPINE GUARDIANS
BROTHERHOOD, INC. (PGBI),
represented by its Secretary-General
GEORGE FGBF GEORGE
DULDULAO,
Petitioner,
versus -
G.R. No. 190529

Present:
PUNO, C.J.,
CARPIO,
CORONA,
CARPIO MORALES,
VELASCO, JR.,
NACHURA,
LEONARDO-DE CASTRO,
BRION,
PERALTA,
BERSAMIN,
DEL CASTILLO,
ABAD,
VILLARAMA, JR.,
PEREZ, and
MENDOZA, JJ.
Promulgated:
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS,
Respondent.
April 29, 2010
x---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------x
RE S O LUTI ON
BRION, J.:
The Philippine Guardians Brotherhood, Inc. (PGBI) seeks in this petition for certiorari[1] and in
the motion for reconsideration it subsequently filed to nullify Commission on Elections
(COMELEC) Resolution No. 8679 dated October 13, 2009 insofar as it relates to PGBI, and the
Resolution dated December 9, 2009 denying PGBIs motion for reconsideration in SPP No. 09004 (MP). Via these resolutions, the COMELEC delisted PGBI from the roster of registered
national, regional or sectoral parties, organizations or coalitions under the party-list system.
BACKGROUND
Section 6(8) of Republic Act No. 7941 (RA 7941), otherwise known as the Party-List
System Act, provides:
Section 6. Removal and/or Cancellation of Registration. The COMELEC
may motu proprio or upon verified complaint of any interested party, remove or
cancel, after due notice and hearing, the registration of any national, regional or
sectoral party, organization or coalition on any of the following grounds:
xxxx
(8) It fails to participate in the last two (2) preceding elections or fails to
obtain at least two per centum (2%) of the votes cast under the party-list system in
the two (2) preceding elections for the constituency in which it has registered.
[Emphasis supplied.]
The COMELEC replicated this provision in COMELEC Resolution No. 2847 the Rules and
Regulations Governing the Election of the Party-List Representatives through the Party-List
System which it promulgated on June 25, 1996.
For the upcoming May 2010 elections, the COMELEC en banc issued on October 13, 2009
Resolution No. 8679 deleting several party-list groups or organizations from the list of registered
national, regional or sectoral parties, organizations or coalitions. Among the party-list
organizations affected was PGBI; it was delisted because it failed to get 2% of the votes cast
in 2004 and it did not participate in the 2007 elections. Nevertheless, the COMELEC stated in
this Resolution that any national, regional sectoral party or organizations or coalitions adversely
affected can personally or through its authorized representative file a verified opposition on
October 26, 2009.
PGBI filed its Opposition to Resolution No. 8679, but likewise sought, through its pleading, the
admission ad cautelam of its petition for accreditation as a party-list organization under the
Party-List System Act. Among other arguments, PGBI asserted that:
(1)
The assailed resolution negates the right of movant and those

similarly situated to invoke Section 4 of R.A. No. 7941, which allows any
party, organization and coalition already registered with the Commission
to no longer register anew; the party though is required to file with the
Commission, not later than ninety (90) days before the election, a
manifestation of its desire to participate in the party-list system; since
PGBI filed a Request/Manifestation seeking a deferment of its
participation in the 2007 elections within the required period prior to the
2007 elections, it has the option to choose whether or not to participate in
the next succeeding election under the same conditions as to rights
conferred and responsibilities imposed;
(2)
The Supreme Courts ruling in G.R. No. 177548 Philippine Mines

Safety Environment Association, also known as MINERO v. Commission
on Elections cannot apply in the instant controversy for two reasons: (a)
the factual milieu of the cited case is removed from PGBIs; (b)
MINERO, prior to delisting, was afforded the opportunity to be heard,
while PGBI and the 25 others similarly affected by Resolution No. 8679
were not.Additionally, the requirement of Section 6(8) has been relaxed by
the Courts ruling in G.R. No. 179271 (Banat v. COMELEC) and the
exclusion of PGBI and the 25 other party-list is a denial of the equal
protection of the laws;
(3)
The implementation of the challenged resolution should be suspended

and/or aborted to prevent a miscarriage of justice in view of the failure to
notify the parties in accordance with the same Section 6(8) or R.A. No.
7941.[2]
The COMELEC denied PGBIs motion/opposition for lack of merit.
First, the COMELEC observed that PGBI clearly misunderstood the import of Section 4
of R.A. 7941.[3] The provision simply means that without the required manifestation or if a party
or organization does not participate, the exemption from registration does not arise and the party,
organization or coalition must go through the process again and apply for requalification; a
request for deferment would not exempt PGBI from registering anew.
Second, the MINERO ruling is squarely in point, as MINERO failed to get 2% of the
votes in 2001 and did not participate at all in the 2004 elections.
Third, PGBI was given an opportunity to be heard or to seek the reconsideration of the
action or ruling complained of the essence of due process; this is clear from Resolution No. 8679
which expressly gave the adversely affected parties the opportunity to file their opposition.
As regards the alternative relief of application for accreditation, the COMELEC found the
motion to have been filed out of time, as August 17, 2009 was the deadline for accreditation
provided in Resolution 8646. The motion was obviously filed months after the deadline.
PGBI came to us in its petition for certiorari, arguing the same positions it raised with the
COMELEC when it moved to reconsider its delisting.
We initially dismissed the petition in light of our ruling in Philippine Mines Safety Environment
Association, also known as MINERO v. Commission on Elections (Minero);[4] we said that no
grave abuse of discretion exists in a ruling that correctly applies the prevailing law and
jurisprudence. Applying Section 6(8) of RA 7941, the Court disqualified MINERO under the
following reasoning:
Since petitioner by its own admission failed to get 2% of the votes in 2001 and
did not participate at all in the 2004 elections, it necessarily failed to get at least
two per centum (2%) of the votes cast in the two preceding elections.COMELEC,
therefore, is not duty bound to certify it.
PGBI subsequently moved to reconsider the dismissal of its petition. Among other
arguments, PGBI claimed that the dismissal of the petition was contrary to law, the evidence and
existing jurisprudence.Essentially, PGBI asserts that Section 6(8) of RA 7941 does not apply if
one is to follow the tenor and import of the deliberations inclusive of the interpellations in Senate
Bill No. 1913 on October 19, 1994. It cited the following excerpts from the Records of the
Senate:
Senator Gonzales: On the other hand, Mr. President, under ground no. (7),
Section 5 there are actually two grounds it states: Failure to participate in the
last two (2) preceding elections or its failure to obtain at least ten percent (10%)
of the votes case under the party-list system in either of the last two (2) preceding
elections for the constituency in which it has registered
In short, the first ground is that, it failed to participate in the last two (2) preceding
elections. The second is, failure to obtain at least 10 percent of the votes cast
under the party-list system in either of the last two preceding elections, Mr.
President,
Senator Tolentino: Actually, these are two separate grounds.

Senator Gonzales: There are actually two grounds, Mr. President.
Senator Tolentino: Yes, Mr. President.[5] [Underscoring supplied.]
PGBI thus asserts that Section 6(8) does not apply to its situation, as it is obvious that it failed to
participate in one (1) but not in the two (2) preceding elections. Implied in this is that it also
failed to secure the required percentage in one (1) but not in the two (2) preceding elections.
Considering PGBIs arguments, we granted the motion and reinstated the petition in the courts
docket.
THE ISSUES
We are called upon to resolve: (a) whether there is legal basis for delisting PGBI; and (b)
whether PGBIs right to due process was violated.
OUR RULING
We find the petition partly impressed with merit.
a.
The Minero Ruling
Our Minero ruling is an erroneous application of Section 6(8) of RA 7941; hence, it cannot
sustain PGBIs delisting from the roster of registered national, regional or sectoral parties,
organizations or coalitions under the party-list system.
First, the law is clear the COMELEC may motu proprio or upon verified complaint of
any interested party, remove or cancel, after due notice and hearing, the registration of any
national, regional or sectoral party, organization or coalition if it: (a) fails to participate in the
last two (2) preceding elections; or (b) fails to obtain at least two per centum (2%) of the votes
cast under the party-list system in the two (2) preceding elections for the constituency in which it
has registered.[6] The word or is a disjunctive term signifying disassociation and independence of
one thing from the other things enumerated; it should, as a rule, be construed in the sense in
which it ordinarily implies, as a disjunctive word.[7] Thus, the plain, clear and unmistakable
language of the law provides for two (2) separate reasons for delisting.
Second, Minero is diametrically opposed to the legislative intent of Section 6(8) of RA
7941, as PGBIs cited congressional deliberations clearly show.
Minero therefore simply cannot stand. Its basic defect lies in its characterization of the
non-participation of a party-list organization in an election as similar to a failure to garner the
2% threshold party-list vote. What Minero effectively holds is that a party list organization that
does not participate in an election necessarily gets, by default, less than 2% of the party-list
votes. To be sure, this is a confused interpretation of the law, given the laws clear and categorical
language and the legislative intent to treat the two scenarios differently. A delisting based on a
mixture or fusion of these two different and separate grounds for delisting is therefore a strained
application of the law in jurisdictional terms, it is an interpretation not within the contemplation
of the framers of the law and hence is a gravely abusive interpretation of the law.[8]
What we say here should of course take into account our ruling in Barangay Association
for Advancement and National Transparency v. COMELEC[9] (Banat) where
we partly invalidated the 2% party-list vote requirement provided in RA 7941 as follows:
We rule that, in computing the allocation of additional seats, the
continued operation of the two percent threshold for the distribution of the
additional seats as found in the second clause of Section 11(b) of R.A. No. 7941
is unconstitutional. This Court finds that the two percent threshold makes it
mathematically impossible to achieve the maximum number of available party list
seats when the number of available party list seats exceeds 50. The continued
operation of the two percent threshold in the distribution of the additional seats
frustrates the attainment of the permissive ceiling that 20% of the members of the
House of Representatives shall consist of party-list representatives.
The disqualification for failure to get 2% party-list votes in two (2) preceding elections should
therefore be understood in light of the Banat ruling that party-list groups or organizations
garnering less than 2% of the party-list votes may yet qualify for a seat in the allocation of
additional seats.
We need not extensively discuss Banats significance, except to state that a party-list group or
organization which qualified in the second round of seat allocation cannot now validly be
delisted for the reason alone that it garnered less than 2% in the last two elections. In other
words, the application of this disqualification should henceforth be contingent on the percentage
of party-list votes garnered by the last party-list organization that qualified for a seat in the
House of Representatives, a percentage that is less than the 2% threshold invalidated
in Banat. The disqualification should now necessarily be read to apply to party-list groups or
organizations that did not qualify for a seat in the two preceding elections for the constituency in
which it registered.
To reiterate, (a) Section 6(8) of RA 7941 provides for two separate grounds for delisting; these
grounds cannot be mixed or combined to support delisting; and (b) the disqualification for failure
to garner 2% party-list votes in two preceding elections should now be understood, in light of
the Banat ruling, to mean failure to qualify for a party-list seat in two preceding elections for the
constituency in which it has registered. This, we declare, is how Section 6(8) of RA 7941 should
be understood and applied. We do so under our authority to state what the law is, [10] and as an
exception to the application of the principle of stare decisis.
The doctrine of stare decisis et non quieta movere (to adhere to precedents and not to
unsettle things which are established) is embodied in Article 8 of the Civil Code of
the Philippines which provides, thus:
ART. 8. Judicial decisions applying or interpreting the laws or the
Constitution shall form a part of the legal system of the Philippines.
The doctrine enjoins adherence to judicial precedents. It requires courts in a country to follow
the rule established in a decision of its Supreme Court. That decision becomes a judicial
precedent to be followed in subsequent cases by all courts in the land. The doctrine of stare
decisis is based on the principle that once a question of law has been examined and decided, it
should be deemed settled and closed to further argument. [11] The doctrine is grounded on the
necessity for securing certainty and stability of judicial decisions, thus:
Time and again, the court has held that it is a very desirable and necessary
judicial practice that when a court has laid down a principle of law as applicable
to a certain state of facts, it will adhere to that principle and apply it to all future
cases in which the facts are substantially the same. Stare decisis et non quieta
movere. Stand by the decisions and disturb not what is settled. Stare
decisis simply means that for the sake of certainty, a conclusion reached in one
case should be applied to those that follow if the facts are substantially the
same, even though the parties may be different. It proceeds from the first
principle of justice that, absent any powerful countervailing considerations,
like cases ought to be decided alike. Thus, where the same questions relating to
the same event have been put forward by the parties similarly situated as in a
previous case litigated and decided by a competent court, the rule of stare
decisis is a bar to any attempt to relitigate the same issue.[12]
The doctrine though is not cast in stone for upon a showing that circumstances attendant
in a particular case override the great benefits derived by our judicial system from the doctrine
of stare decisis, the Court is justified in setting it aside.[13]
As our discussion above shows, the most compelling reason to abandon Minero exists; it was
clearly an erroneous application of the law an application that the principle of stability or
predictability of decisions alone cannot sustain. Minero did unnecessary violence to the language
of the law, the intent of the legislature, and to the rule of law in general. Clearly, we cannot allow
PGBI to be prejudiced by the continuing validity of an erroneous ruling. Thus, we now
abandon Minero and strike it out from our ruling case law.
We are aware that PGBIs situation a party list group or organization that failed to garner 2% in a
prior election and immediately thereafter did not participate in the preceding election is
something that is not covered by Section 6(8) of RA 7941. From this perspective, it may be an
unintended gap in the law and as such is a matter for Congress to address. We cannot and do not
address matters over which full discretionary authority is given by the Constitution to the
legislature; to do so will offend the principle of separation of powers. If a gap indeed exists, then
the present case should bring this concern to the legislatures notice.
b. The Issue of Due Process
On the due process issue, we agree with the COMELEC that PGBIs right to due process was not
violated for PGBI was given an opportunity to seek, as it did seek, a reconsideration of
Resolution No. 8679.The essence of due process, we have consistently held, is simply the
opportunity to be heard; as applied to administrative proceedings, due process is the opportunity
to explain ones side or the opportunity to seek a reconsideration of the action or ruling
complained of. A formal or trial-type hearing is not at all times and in all instances essential. The
requirement is satisfied where the parties are afforded fair and reasonable opportunity to explain
their side of the controversy at hand. What is frowned upon is absolute lack of notice and
hearing x x x.[14] We find it obvious under the attendant circumstances that PGBI was not denied
due process. In any case, given the result of this Resolution, PGBI has no longer any cause for
complaint on due process grounds.
WHEREFORE,
premises
considered,
we GRANT the
petition
and
accordingly ANNUL COMELEC Resolution No. 8679 dated October 13, 2009 insofar as the
petitioner PGBI is concerned, and the Resolution dated December 9, 2009 which denied PGBIs
motion for reconsideration in SPP No. 09-004 (MP). PGBI is qualified to be voted upon as a
party-list group or organization in the coming May 2010 elections.
SO ORDERED.
EN BANC
BANTAY REPUBLIC ACT OR BA-RA G.R. No. 177271

7941, represented by MR. AMEURFINO
E. CINCO, Chairman, AND URBAN
POOR FOR LEGAL REFORMS (UP- Present:
LR), represented by MRS. MYRNA P.
PORCARE,
SecretaryGeneral,Petitioners,
PUNO, C.J.,
QUISUMBING,
- versus COMMISSION
ON
ELECTIONS,
BIYAHENG PINOY, KAPATIRAN NG
MGA NAKAKULONG NA WALANG
SALA
(KAKUSA),
BARANGAY
ASSOCIATION
FOR
NATIONAL
ADVANCEMENT
AND
TRANSPARENCY (BANAT), AHON
PINOY, AGRICULTURAL SECTOR
ALLIANCE OF THE PHILIPPINES,
INC.
(AGAP),
PUWERSA
NG
BAYANING ATLETA (PBA), ALYANSA
NG MGA GRUPONG HALIGI NG
AGHAM AT TEKNOLOHIYA PARA
SA MAMAMAYAN, INC. (AGHAM),
BABAE PARA SA KAUNLARAN
YNARES-SANTIAGO,
SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ,
CARPIO,
*
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ,
CORONA,
CARPIO MORALES,
AZCUNA,
TINGA,
CHICO-NAZARIO,
GARCIA,
(BABAE
KA),
AKSYON
SAMBAYANAN (AKSA), ALAY SA
BAYAN
NG
MALAYANG
PROPESYUNAL AT REPORMANG
KALAKAL (ABAY-PARAK), AGBIAG
TIMPUYOG
ILOCANO,
INC.
(AGBIAG!), ABANTE ILONGGO, INC.
(ABA ILONGGO), AANGAT TAYO
(AT), AANGAT ANG KABUHAYAN
(ANAK),
BAGO
NATIONAL
CULTURAL SOCIETY OF THE
PHILIPPINES
(BAGO),
ANGAT
ANTAS-KABUHAYAN
PILIPINO
MOVEMENT
(AANGAT
KA
PILIPINO), ARTS BUSINESS AND
SCIENCE PROFESSIONAL (ABS),
ASSOSASYON NG MGA MALILIIT
NA NEGOSYANTENG GUMAGANAP
INC. (AMANG), SULONG BARANGAY
MOVEMENT,
KASOSYO
PRODUCERS
CONSUMER
EXCHANGE ASSOCIATION, INC.
(KASOSYO), UNITED MOVEMENT
AGAINST
DRUGS
(UNI-MAD),
PARENTS
ENABLING
PARENTS
(PEP),
ALLIANCE
OF
NEOCONSERVATIVES (ANC), FILIPINOS
FOR
PEACE,
JUSTICE
AND
PROGRESS MOVEMENT (FPJPM),
BIGKIS
PINOY
MOVEMENT
(BIGKIS), 1-UNITED TRANSPORT
KOALISYON (1-UNTAK), ALLIANCE
FOR BARANGAY CONCERNS (ABC),
BIYAYANG BUKID, INC., ALLIANCE
FOR
NATIONALISM
AND
DEMOCRACY
(ANAD),
AKBAY
PINOY
OFW-NATIONAL
INC.,
(APOI), ALLIANCE TRANSPORT
SECTOR (ATS), KALAHI SECTORAL
PARTY
(ADVOCATES
FOR
OVERSEAS
FILIPINO)
AND
ASSOCIATION
OF
ADMINISTRATORS,
PROFESSIONALS AND SENIORS
(AAPS),
Respondents.
x--------------------------------------------------x
VELASCO, JR., and

NACHURA, JJ.
Promulgated:
May 4, 2007
REP. LORETTA ANN P. ROSALES,
G.R. No. 177314
KILOSBAYAN FOUNDATION,
BANTAY KATARUNGAN FOUNDATION,
Petitioners,
- versus -
THE COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS,

Respondent.
X -------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- x
DECISION
GARCIA, J.:
Before the Court are these two consolidated petitions for certiorari and mandamus to nullify and
set aside certain issuances of the Commission on Elections (Comelec) respecting party-list
groups which have manifested their intention to participate in the party-list elections on May 14,
2007.
In the first petition, docketed as G.R. No. 177271, petitioners Bantay Republic Act (BA-RA
7941, for short) and the Urban Poor for Legal Reforms (UP-LR, for short) assail the various
Comelec resolutions accrediting private respondents Biyaheng Pinoy et al., to participate in the
forthcoming party-list elections on May 14, 2007 without simultaneously determining whether or
not their respective nominees possess the requisite qualifications defined in Republic Act (R.A.)
No. 7941, or the Party-List System Act and belong to the marginalized and underrepresented
sector each seeks to represent. In the second, docketed as G.R. No. 177314, petitioners Loreta
Ann P. Rosales, Kilosbayan Foundation and Bantay Katarungan Foundation

impugn Comelec Resolution 07-0724 dated April 3, 2007 effectively denying their request for
the release or disclosure of the names of the nominees of the fourteen (14) accredited
participating party-list groups mentioned in petitioner Rosales previous letter-request.
While both petitions commonly seek to compel the Comelec to disclose or publish the names of
the nominees of the various party-list groups named in the petitions,[1] the petitioners in G.R. No.
177271 have the following additional prayers: 1) that the 33 private respondents named therein
be declare[d] as unqualified to participate in the party-list elections as sectoral
organizations, parties or coalition for failure to comply with the guidelines prescribed by the
[Court] in [Ang Bagong Bayani v. Comelec[2]] and, 2) correspondingly, that the Comelec be
enjoined from allowing respondent groups from participating in the May 2007 elections.
In separate resolutions both dated April 24, 2007, the Court en banc required the public and
private respondents to file their respective comments on the petitions within a non-extendible
period of five (5) days from notice. Apart from respondent Comelec, seven (7) private
respondents[3] in G.R.
No.
177271 and
one
party-list
group[4] mentioned
in G.R. No. 177314 submitted their separate comments. In the main, theseparate comments
of the private respondents focused on the untenability and prematurity of the plea of petitioners
BA-RA 7941 and UP-LR to nullify their accreditation as party-list groups and thus disqualify
them and their respective nominees from participating in the May 14, 2007 party-list elections.
The facts:
On January 12, 2007, the Comelec issued Resolution No. 7804 prescribing rules and regulations
to govern the filing of manifestation of intent to participate and submission of names of
nominees under the party-list system of representation in connection with the May 14,
2007 elections. Pursuant thereto, a number of organized groups filed the
necessary manifestations. Among these and ostensibly subsequently accredited by the Comelec
to participate in the 2007 elections - are 14 party-list groups, namely: (1) BABAE KA; (2) ANG
KASANGGA; (3) AKBAY PINOY; (4) AKSA; (5) KAKUSA; (6) AHON PINOY; (7)OFW PARTY;
(8) BIYAHENG PINOY; (9) ANAD; (10) AANGAT ANG KABUHAYAN; (11) AGBIAG;
(12) BANAT; (13) BANTAY LIPAD; (14) AGING PINOY. Petitioners BA-RA 7941 and UP-LR
presented a longer, albeit an overlapping, list.
Subsequent events saw BA-RA 7941 and UP-LR filing with the Comelec an Urgent
Petition to Disqualify, thereunder seeking to disqualify the nominees of certain party-list
organizations. Bothpetitioners appear not to have the names of the nominees sought to be
disqualified since they still asked for a copy of the list of nominees. Docketed in the
Comelec as SPA Case No 07-026, this urgent petitionhas yet to be resolved.
Meanwhile, reacting to the emerging public perception that the individuals behind the
aforementioned 14 party-list groups do not, as they should, actually represent the poor and
marginalized sectors, petitioner Rosales, in G.R. No. 177314, addressed a letter[5] dated March
29, 2007 to Director Alioden Dalaig of the Comelecs Law Department requesting a list of that
groups nominees. Another letter[6] of the same tenor dated March 31, 2007 followed, this
time petitioner Rosales impressing upon Atty. Dalaig the particular urgency of the subject
request.
Neither the Comelec Proper nor its Law Department officially responded to petitioner
Rosales requests. The April 13, 2007 issue of the Manila Bulletin, however, carried the frontpage banner headline COMELEC WONT BARE PARTY-LIST NOMINEES, [7] with
the following sub-heading: Abalos says party-list polls not personality oriented.
On April 16, 2007, Atty. Emilio Capulong, Jr. and ex-Senator Jovito R. Salonga, in their
own behalves and as counsels of petitioner Rosales, forwarded a letter[8] to the Comelec formally
requesting action and definitive decision on Rosales earlier plea for information regarding the
names of several party-list nominees. Invoking their constitutionally-guaranteed right to
information, Messrs. Capulong andSalonga at the same time drew attention to the banner
headline adverted to earlier, with a request for the Comelec, collectively or individually, to issue
a formal clarification, either confirming or denying the banner headline and the alleged
statement of Chairman Benjamin Abalos, Sr. xxx Evidently unbeknownst then to Ms. Rosales, et
al., was the issuance of Comelec en banc Resolution 07-0724[9] under date April 3, 2007 virtually
declaring the nominees names confidential and in net effect denying petitioner Rosales basic
disclosure request. In its relevant part, Resolution 07-0724 reads as follows:
RESOLVED, moreover, that the Commission will disclose/publicize the names of partylist nominees in connection with the May 14, 2007 Elections only after 3:00
p.m. on election day.
Let the Law Department implement this resolution and reply to all letters addressed to the
Commission inquiring on the party-list nominees. (Emphasis added.)
According to petitioner Rosales, she was able to obtain a copy of the April 3,
2007 Resolution only on April 21, 2007. She would later state the observation that the last part of
the Order empowering the Law Department to implement this resolution and reply to all letters
inquiring on the party-list nominees is apparently a fool-proof bureaucratic way to distort and
mangle the truth and give the impression that the antedated Resolution of April 3, 2007 is the
final answer to the two formal requests of Petitioners.[10]
The herein consolidated petitions are cast against the foregoing factual setting, albeit
petitioners BA-RA 7941 and UP-LR appear not to be aware, when they filed their petition on
April 18, 2007, of the April 3, 2007 Comelec Resolution 07-0724.
To start off, petitioners BA-RA 7941 and UP-LR would have the Court cancel the accreditation
accorded by the Comelec to the respondent party-list groups named in their petition on the
ground that these groups and their respective nominees do not appear to be qualified. In the
words of petitioners BA-RA 7941 and UP-LR, Comelec xxx committed grave abuse of discretion when it granted the assailed
accreditations even without simultaneously determining whether the nominees
of herein private respondents are qualified or not, or whether or not the nominees
are likewise belonging to the marginalized and underrepresented sector they claim
to represent in Congress, in accordance with No. 7 of the eight-point guidelines
prescribed by the Honorable Supreme in the Ang Bagong Bayani[11] case which
states that, not only the candidate party or organization must represent
marginalized and underrepresented sectors; so also must its nominees. In the case
of private respondents, public respondent Comelec granted accreditations without
the required simultaneous determination of the qualification of the nominees as
part of the accreditation process of the party-list organization itself. (Words in
bracket added; italization in the original)[12]
The Court is unable to grant the desired plea of petitioners BA-RA 7941 and UP-LR
for cancellation of accreditation on the grounds thus advanced in their petition. For, such
course of action would entailgoing over and evaluating the qualities of the sectoral groups or
parties
in
question,
particularly
whether
or
not
they
indeed
represent
marginalized/underrepresented groups. The exercise would require the Court to make a

factual determination, a matter which is outside the office of judicial review by way of
special civil action for certiorari. In certiorari proceedings, the Court is not called upon to
decide factual issues and the case must be decided on the undisputed facts on record. [13] The
sole function of a writ of certiorari is to address issues of want of jurisdiction or grave abuse
of discretion and does not include a review of the tribunals evaluation of the evidence.[14]
Not lost on the Court of course is the pendency before the Comelec of SPA Case No.
07-026 in which petitioners BA-RA 7941 and UP-LR themselves seek to disqualify the
nominees of the respondent party-list groups named in their petition.
Petitioners BA-RA 7941s and UP-LRs posture that the Comelec committed grave
abuse
of
discretion
when
it
granted
the
assailed
accreditations
without simultaneously determining the qualifications of their nominees is without basis.

Nowhere in R.A. No. 7941 is there a requirement that the qualification of a party-list
nominee be determined simultaneously with the accreditation of an organization. And as
aptly pointed out by private respondent Babae Para sa Kaunlaran (Babae Ka), Section 4 of
R.A. No. 7941 requires a petition for registration of a party-list organization to be filed with
the Comelec not later than ninety (90) days before the election whereas the succeeding
Section 8 requires the submission not later than forty-five (45) days before the election of the
list of names whence party-list representatives shall be chosen.
Now to the other but core issues of the case. The petition in G.R. No. 177314 formulates
and captures the main issues tendered by the petitioners in these consolidated cases and they may
be summarized as follows:
1.
Whether respondent Comelec, by refusing to reveal the names of the

nominees of the various party-list groups, has violated the right to
information and free access to documents as guaranteed by the
Constitution; and
2.
Whether respondent Comelec is mandated by the Constitution to

disclose to the public the names of said nominees.
While the Comelec did not explicitly say so, it based its refusal to disclose the names
of the nominees of subject party-list groups on Section 7 of R.A. 7941. This provision, while
commanding thepublication and the posting in polling places of a certified list of party-list
system participating groups, nonetheless tells the Comelec not to show or include the names
of the party-list nominees in saidcertified list. Thus:
SEC. 7. Certified List of Registered Parties.- The COMELEC shall, not
later than sixty (60) days before election, prepare a certified list of national,
regional, or sectoral parties, organizations or coalitions which have applied or
who have manifested their desire to participate under the party-list system and
distribute copies thereof to all precincts for posting in the polling places on
election day. The names of the party-list nominees shall not be shown on the
certified list. (Emphasis added.)
And doubtless part of Comelecs reason for keeping the names of the party list
nominees away from the public is deducible from the following excerpts of the news report
appearing in the adverted April 13, 2007 issue of the Manila Bulletin:
The Commission on Elections (COMELEC) firmed up yesterday its
decision not to release the names of nominees of sectoral parties, organizations, or
coalitions accredited to participate in the party-list election which will be held
simultaneously with the May 14 mid-term polls.
COMELEC Chairman Benjamin S. Abalos, Sr. said he and [the other five
COMELEC] Commissioners --- believe that the party list elections must not be
personality oriented.
Abalos said under [R.A.] 7941 , the people are to vote for
sectoral parties, organizations, or coalitions, not for their nominees.
He said there is nothing in R.A. 7941 that requires the Comelec to disclose
the names of nominees. xxx (Words in brackets and emphasis added)
Insofar as the disclosure issue is concerned, the petitions are impressed with merit.
Assayed against the non-disclosure stance of the Comelec and the given rationale
therefor is the right to information enshrined in the self-executory [15] Section 7, Article III of
the Constitution, viz:
Sec.7. The right of the people to information on matters of public concern
shall be recognized. Access to official records, and to documents, and papers
pertaining to official acts, transactions, or decisions, as well to government
research data used as basis for policy development, shall be afforded the citizen,
subject to such limitations as may be provided by law.
Complementing and going hand in hand with the right to information is another
constitutional provision enunciating the policy of full disclosure and transparency
in Government. We refer to Section 28, Article II of the Constitution reading:
Sec. 28. Subject to reasonable conditions prescribed by law, the State

adopts and implements a policy of full public disclosure of all its transactions
involving public interest.
The right to information is a public right where the real parties in interest are the public, or
the citizens to be precise. And for every right of the people recognized as fundamental lies a
corresponding duty on the part of those who govern to respect and protect that right. This is the
essence of the Bill of Rights in a constitutional regime. [16] Without a governments acceptance of
the limitations upon it by the Constitution in order to uphold individual liberties, without an
acknowledgment on its part of those duties exacted by the rights pertaining to the citizens, the
Bill of Rights becomes a sophistry.
By weight of jurisprudence, any citizen can challenge any attempt to obstruct the exercise of
his right to information and may seek its enforcement by mandamus. [17] And since every citizen
by the simple fact of his citizenship possesses the right to be informed, objections on
ground of locus standi are ordinarily unavailing.[18]
Like all constitutional guarantees, however, the right to information and its companion
right of access to official records are not absolute. As articulated in Legaspi, supra, the peoples
right to know is limited to matters of public concern and is further subject to such limitation as
may be provided by law. Similarly, the policy of full disclosure is confined to transactions
involving public interest and is subject to reasonable conditions prescribed by law. Too, there is
also the need of preserving a measure of confidentiality on some matters, such as military, trade,
banking and diplomatic secrets or those affecting national security.[19]
The terms public concerns and public interest have eluded precise definition. But both
terms embrace, to borrow from Legaspi, a broad spectrum of subjects which the public may want
to know, either because these directly affect their lives, or simply because such matters naturally
whet the interest of an ordinary citizen. At the end of the day, it is for the courts to determine, on
a case to case basis, whether or not at issue is of interest or importance to the public.
If, as in Legaspi, it was the legitimate concern of a citizen to know if certain persons
employed as sanitarians of a health department of a city are civil service eligibles, surely the
identity of candidates for a lofty elective public office should be a matter of highest public
concern and interest.
As may be noted, no national security or like concerns is involved in the disclosure of the
names of the nominees of the party-list groups in question. Doubtless, the Comelec committed
grave abuse of discretion in refusing the legitimate demands of the petitioners for a list of the
nominees of the party-list groups subject of their respective petitions. Mandamus, therefore, lies.
The last sentence of Section 7 of R.A. 7941 reading: [T]he names of the party-list
nominees shall not be shown on the certified list is certainly not a justifying card for the
Comelec to deny the requested disclosure. To us, the prohibition imposed on the Comelec under
said Section 7 is limited in scope and duration, meaning, that it extends only to the certified
list which the same provision requires to be posted in the polling places on election day. To
stretch the coverage of the prohibition to the absolute is to read into the law something that is not
intended. As it were, there is absolutely nothing in R.A. No. 7941 that prohibits the Comelec
from disclosing or even publishing through mediums other than the Certified List the names of
the party-list nominees. The Comelec obviously misread the limited non-disclosure aspect of the
provision as an absolute bar to public disclosure before the May 2007 elections. The
interpretation thus given by the Comelec virtually tacks an unconstitutional dimension on the last
sentence of Section 7 of R.A. No. 7941.
The Comelecs reasoning that a party-list election is not an election of personalities is

valid to a point. It cannot be taken, however, to justify its assailed non-disclosure stance which
comes, as it were, with a weighty presumption of invalidity, impinging, as it does, on a
fundamental right to information.[20] While the vote cast in a party-list elections is a vote for a
party, such vote, in the end, would be a vote for its nominees, who, in appropriate cases,
would eventually sit in the House of Representatives.
The Court is very much aware of newspaper reports detailing the purported reasons
behind the Comelecs disinclination to release the names of party-list nominees. It is to be
stressed, however, that the Court is in the business of dispensing justice on the basis of hard facts
and applicable statutory and decisional laws. And lest it be overlooked, the Court always
assumes, at the first instance, the presumptive validity and regularity of official acts of
government officials and offices.
It has been repeatedly said in various contexts that the people have the right to elect their
representatives on the basis of an informed judgment. Hence the need for voters to be informed
about matters that have a bearing on their choice. The ideal cannot be achieved in a system of
blind voting, as veritably advocated in the assailed resolution of the Comelec. The Court, since
the 1914 case of Gardiner v. Romulo,[21] has consistently made it clear that it frowns upon any
interpretation of the law or rules that would hinder in any way the free and intelligent casting of
the votes in an election.[22] So it must be here for still other reasons articulated earlier.
In all, we agree with the petitioners that respondent Comelec has a constitutional duty to
disclose and release the names of the nominees of the party-list groups named in the herein
petitions.
WHEREFORE, the petition in G.R. No. 177271 is partly DENIED insofar as it seeks to nullify
the accreditation of the respondents named therein. However, insofar as it seeks to compel the
Comelec to disclose or publish the names of the nominees of party-list groups, sectors or
organizations accredited to participate in the May 14, 2007 elections, the same petition and the
petition in G.R. No. 177314 areGRANTED. Accordingly, the Comelec is hereby ORDERED to
immediately disclose and release the names of the nominees of the party-list groups, sectors or
organizations accredited to participate in theMay 14, 2007 party-list elections. The Comelec is
further DIRECTED to submit to the Court its compliance herewith within five (5) days from
notice hereof.
This Decision is declared immediately executory upon its receipt by the Comelec.
No pronouncement as to cost.
SO ORDERED.
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. 119976 September 18, 1995

IMELDA ROMUALDEZ-MARCOS, petitioner,
vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS and CIRILO ROY MONTEJO, respondents.
KAPUNAN, J.:
A constitutional provision should be construed as to give it effective operation and suppress the
mischief at which it is aimed. 1 The 1987 Constitution mandates that an aspirant for election to
the House of Representatives be "a registered voter in the district in which he shall be elected,
and a resident thereof for a period of not less than one year immediately preceding the
election." 2 The mischief which this provision reproduced verbatim from the 1973
Constitution seeks to prevent is the possibility of a "stranger or newcomer unacquainted with
the conditions and needs of a community and not identified with the latter, from an elective
office to serve that community." 3
Petitioner Imelda Romualdez-Marcos filed her Certificate of Candidacy for the position of
Representative of the First District of Leyte with the Provincial Election Supervisor on March 8,
1995, providing the following information in item no. 8: 4
RESIDENCE IN THE CONSTITUENCY WHERE I SEEK TO BE ELECTED
IMMEDIATELY PRECEDING THE ELECTION: __________ Years
and seven Months.
On March 23, 1995, private respondent Cirilo Roy Montejo, the incumbent Representative of the
First District of Leyte and a candidate for the same position, filed a "Petition for Cancellation
and Disqualification" 5 with the Commission on Elections alleging that petitioner did not meet
the constitutional requirement for residency. In his petition, private respondent contended that
Mrs. Marcos lacked the Constitution's one year residency requirement for candidates for the
House of Representatives on the evidence of declarations made by her in Voter Registration
Record 94-No. 3349772 6and in her Certificate of Candidacy. He prayed that "an order be issued
declaring (petitioner) disqualified and canceling the certificate of candidacy." 7
On March 29, 1995, petitioner filed an Amended/Corrected Certificate of Candidacy, changing
the entry "seven" months to "since childhood" in item no. 8 of the amended certificate. 8 On the
same day, the Provincial Election Supervisor of Leyte informed petitioner that:
[T]his office cannot receive or accept the aforementioned Certificate of
Candidacy on the ground that it is filed out of time, the deadline for the filing of
the same having already lapsed on March 20, 1995. The Corrected/Amended
Certificate of Candidacy should have been filed on or before the March 20, 1995
deadline. 9
Consequently, petitioner filed the Amended/Corrected Certificate of Candidacy with the
COMELEC's
Head
Office
in
Intramuros,
Manila
on
March 31, 1995. Her Answer to private respondent's petition in SPA No. 95-009 was likewise
filed with the head office on the same day. In said Answer, petitioner averred that the entry of the
word "seven" in her original Certificate of Candidacy was the result of an "honest
misinterpretation" 10 which she sought to rectify by adding the words "since childhood" in her
Amended/Corrected Certificate of Candidacy and that "she has always maintained Tacloban City
as her domicile or residence. 11 Impugning respondent's motive in filing the petition seeking her
disqualification, she noted that:
When respondent (petitioner herein) announced that she was intending to register
as a voter in Tacloban City and run for Congress in the First District of Leyte,
petitioner immediately opposed her intended registration by writing a letter stating
that "she is not a resident of said city but of Barangay Olot, Tolosa, Leyte. After
respondent had registered as a voter in Tolosa following completion of her six
month actual residence therein, petitioner filed a petition with the COMELEC to
transfer the town of Tolosa from the First District to the Second District and
pursued such a move up to the Supreme Court, his purpose being to remove
respondent as petitioner's opponent in the congressional election in the First
District. He also filed a bill, along with other Leyte Congressmen, seeking the
creation of another legislative district to remove the town of Tolosa out of the
First District, to achieve his purpose. However, such bill did not pass the Senate.
Having failed on such moves, petitioner now filed the instant petition for the same
objective, as it is obvious that he is afraid to submit along with respondent for the
judgment and verdict of the electorate of the First District of Leyte in an honest,
orderly, peaceful, free and clean elections on May 8, 1995. 12
On April 24, 1995, the Second Division of the Commission on Elections (COMELEC), by a vote
of 2 to 1, 13 came up with a Resolution 1) finding private respondent's Petition for
Disqualification in SPA 95-009 meritorious; 2) striking off petitioner's Corrected/Amended
Certificate of Candidacy of March 31, 1995; and 3) canceling her original Certificate of
Candidacy. 14 Dealing with two primary issues, namely, the validity of amending the original
Certificate of Candidacy after the lapse of the deadline for filing certificates of candidacy, and
petitioner's compliance with the one year residency requirement, the Second Division held:
Respondent raised the affirmative defense in her Answer that the printed word
"Seven" (months) was a result of an "honest misinterpretation or honest mistake"
on her part and, therefore, an amendment should subsequently be allowed. She
averred that she thought that what was asked was her "actual and physical"
presence in Tolosa and not residence of origin or domicile in the First Legislative
District, to which she could have responded "since childhood." In an
accompanying affidavit, she stated that her domicile is Tacloban City, a
component of the First District, to which she always intended to return whenever
absent and which she has never abandoned. Furthermore, in her memorandum,
she tried to discredit petitioner's theory of disqualification by alleging that she has
been a resident of the First Legislative District of Leyte since childhood, although
she only became a resident of the Municipality of Tolosa for seven months. She
asserts that she has always been a resident of Tacloban City, a component of the
First District, before coming to the Municipality of Tolosa.
Along this point, it is interesting to note that prior to her registration in Tolosa,
respondent announced that she would be registering in Tacloban City so that she
can be a candidate for the District. However, this intention was rebuffed when
petitioner wrote the Election Officer of Tacloban not to allow respondent since
she is a resident of Tolosa and not Tacloban. She never disputed this claim and
instead implicitly acceded to it by registering in Tolosa.
This incident belies respondent's claim of "honest misinterpretation or honest
mistake." Besides, the Certificate of Candidacy only asks for RESIDENCE. Since
on the basis of her Answer, she was quite aware of "residence of origin" which
she interprets to be Tacloban City, it is curious why she did not cite Tacloban City
in her Certificate of Candidacy. Her explanation that she thought what was asked
was her actual and physical presence in Tolosa is not easy to believe because there
is none in the question that insinuates about Tolosa. In fact, item no. 8 in the
Certificate
of
Candidacy speaks
clearly of
"Residency in
the
CONSTITUENCY where I seek to be elected immediately preceding the election."
Thus, the explanation of respondent fails to be persuasive.
From the foregoing, respondent's defense
misinterpretation, therefore, is devoid of merit.
of
an
honest
mistake
or
To further buttress respondent's contention that an amendment may be made, she

cited the case ofAlialy v. COMELEC (2 SCRA 957). The reliance of respondent
on the case of Alialy is misplaced. The case only applies to the "inconsequential
deviations which cannot affect the result of the election, or deviations from
provisions intended primarily to secure timely and orderly conduct of elections."
The Supreme Court in that case considered the amendment only as a matter of
form. But in the instant case, the amendment cannot be considered as a matter of
form or an inconsequential deviation. The change in the number of years of
residence in the place where respondent seeks to be elected is a substantial matter
which determines her qualification as a candidacy, specially those intended to
suppress, accurate material representation in the original certificate which
adversely affects the filer. To admit the amended certificate is to condone the evils
brought by the shifting minds of manipulating candidate, of the detriment of the
integrity of the election.
Moreover, to allow respondent to change the seven (7) month period of her
residency in order to prolong it by claiming it was "since childhood" is to allow
an untruthfulness to be committed before this Commission. The arithmetical
accuracy of the 7 months residency the respondent indicated in her certificate of
candidacy can be gleaned from her entry in her Voter's Registration Record
accomplished on January 28, 1995 which reflects that she is a resident of Brgy.
Olot, Tolosa, Leyte for 6 months at the time of the said registration (Annex A,
Petition). Said accuracy is further buttressed by her letter to the election officer of
San Juan, Metro Manila, dated August 24, 1994, requesting for the cancellation of
her registration in the Permanent List of Voters thereat so that she can be reregistered or transferred to Brgy. Olot, Tolosa, Leyte. The dates of these three (3)
different documents show the respondent's consistent conviction that she has
transferred her residence to Olot, Tolosa, Leyte from Metro Manila only for such
limited period of time, starting in the last week of August 1994 which on March 8,
1995 will only sum up to 7 months. The Commission, therefore, cannot be
persuaded to believe in the respondent's contention that it was an error.
xxx xxx xxx
Based on these reasons the Amended/Corrected Certificate of Candidacy cannot
be admitted by this Commission.
xxx xxx xxx
Anent the second issue, and based on the foregoing discussion, it is clear that
respondent has not complied with the one year residency requirement of the
Constitution.
In election cases, the term "residence" has always been considered as synonymous
with "domicile" which imports not only the intention to reside in a fixed place but
also personal presence in-that place, coupled with conduct indicative of such
intention. Domicile denotes a fixed permanent residence to which when absent for
business or pleasure, or for like reasons, one intends to return. (Perfecto Faypon
vs. Eliseo Quirino, 96 Phil 294; Romualdez vs. RTC-Tacloban, 226 SCRA 408).
In respondent's case, when she returned to the Philippines in 1991, the residence
she chose was not Tacloban but San Juan, Metro Manila. Thus, her animus
revertendi is pointed to Metro Manila and not Tacloban.
This Division is aware that her claim that she has been a resident of the First
District since childhood is nothing more than to give her a color of qualification
where she is otherwise constitutionally disqualified. It cannot hold ground in the
face of the facts admitted by the respondent in her affidavit. Except for the time
that she studied and worked for some years after graduation in Tacloban City, she
continuously lived in Manila. In 1959, after her husband was elected Senator, she
lived and resided in San Juan, Metro Manila where she was a registered voter. In
1965, she lived in San Miguel, Manila where she was again a registered voter. In
1978, she served as member of the Batasang Pambansa as the representative of
the City of Manila and later on served as the Governor of Metro Manila. She
could not have served these positions if she had not been a resident of the City of
Manila. Furthermore, when she filed her certificate of candidacy for the office of
the President in 1992, she claimed to be a resident of San Juan, Metro Manila. As
a matter of fact on August 24, 1994, respondent wrote a letter with the election
officer of San Juan, Metro Manila requesting for the cancellation of her
registration in the permanent list of voters that she may be re-registered or
transferred to Barangay Olot, Tolosa, Leyte. These facts manifest that she could
not have been a resident of Tacloban City since childhood up to the time she filed
her certificate of candidacy because she became a resident of many places,
including Metro Manila. This debunks her claim that prior to her residence in
Tolosa, Leyte, she was a resident of the First Legislative District of Leyte since
childhood.
In this case, respondent's conduct reveals her lack of intention to make Tacloban
her domicile. She registered as a voter in different places and on several occasions
declared that she was a resident of Manila. Although she spent her school days in
Tacloban, she is considered to have abandoned such place when she chose to stay
and reside in other different places. In the case of Romualdez vs. RTC(226 SCRA
408) the Court explained how one acquires a new domicile by choice. There must
concur: (1) residence or bodily presence in the new locality; (2) intention to
remain there; and (3) intention to abandon the old domicile. In other words there
must basically be animus manendi withanimus non revertendi. When respondent
chose to stay in Ilocos and later on in Manila, coupled with her intention to stay
there by registering as a voter there and expressly declaring that she is a resident
of that place, she is deemed to have abandoned Tacloban City, where she spent her
childhood and school days, as her place of domicile.
Pure intention to reside in that place is not sufficient, there must likewise be
conduct indicative of such intention. Respondent's statements to the effect that she
has always intended to return to Tacloban, without the accompanying conduct to
prove that intention, is not conclusive of her choice of residence. Respondent has
not presented any evidence to show that her conduct, one year prior the election,
showed intention to reside in Tacloban. Worse, what was evident was that prior to
her residence in Tolosa, she had been a resident of Manila.
It is evident from these circumstances that she was not a resident of the First
District of Leyte "since childhood."
To further support the assertion that she could have not been a resident of the First
District of Leyte for more than one year, petitioner correctly pointed out that on
January 28, 1995 respondent registered as a voter at precinct No. 18-A of Olot,
Tolosa, Leyte. In doing so, she placed in her Voter Registration Record that she
resided in the municipality of Tolosa for a period of six months. This may be
inconsequential as argued by the respondent since it refers only to her residence in
Tolosa, Leyte. But her failure to prove that she was a resident of the First District
of Leyte prior to her residence in Tolosa leaves nothing but a convincing proof
that she had been a resident of the district for six months only. 15
In a Resolution promulgated a day before the May 8, 1995 elections, the COMELEC en
banc denied petitioner's Motion for Reconsideration 16 of the April 24, 1995 Resolution declaring
her not qualified to run for the position of Member of the House of Representatives for the First
Legislative District of Leyte. 17 The Resolution tersely stated:
After deliberating on the Motion for Reconsideration, the Commission
RESOLVED to DENY it, no new substantial matters having been raised therein to
warrant re-examination of the resolution granting the petition for
disqualification. 18
On May 11, 1995, the COMELEC issued a Resolution allowing petitioner's proclamation should
the results of the canvass show that she obtained the highest number of votes in the congressional
elections in the First District of Leyte. On the same day, however, the COMELEC reversed itself
and issued a second Resolution directing that the proclamation of petitioner be suspended in the
event that she obtains the highest number of votes. 19
In a Supplemental Petition dated 25 May 1995, petitioner averred that she was the overwhelming
winner of the elections for the congressional seat in the First District of Leyte held May 8, 1995
based on the canvass completed by the Provincial Board of Canvassers on May 14, 1995.
Petitioner alleged that the canvass showed that she obtained a total of 70,471 votes compared to
the 36,833 votes received by Respondent Montejo. A copy of said Certificate of Canvass was
annexed to the Supplemental Petition.
On account of the Resolutions disqualifying petitioner from running for the congressional seat of
the First District of Leyte and the public respondent's Resolution suspending her proclamation,
petitioner comes to this court for relief.
Petitioner raises several issues in her Original and Supplemental Petitions. The principal issues
may be classified into two general areas:
I. The issue of Petitioner's qualifications
Whether or not petitioner was a resident, for election purposes, of the First
District of Leyte for a period of one year at the time of the May 9, 1995 elections.
II. The Jurisdictional Issue
a) Prior to the elections
Whether or not the COMELEC properly exercised its jurisdiction in disqualifying
petitioner outside the period mandated by the Omnibus Election Code for
disqualification cases under Article 78 of the said Code.
b) After the Elections
Whether or not the House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal assumed
exclusive jurisdiction over the question of petitioner's qualifications after the May
8, 1995 elections.
I. Petitioner's qualification
A perusal of the Resolution of the COMELEC's Second Division reveals a startling confusion in
the application of settled concepts of "Domicile" and "Residence" in election law. While the
COMELEC seems to be in agreement with the general proposition that for the purposes of
election law, residence is synonymous with domicile, the Resolution reveals a tendency to
substitute or mistake the concept of domicile for actual residence, a conception not intended for
the purpose of determining a candidate's qualifications for election to the House of
Representatives as required by the 1987 Constitution. As it were, residence, for the purpose of
meeting the qualification for an elective position, has a settled meaning in our jurisdiction.
Article 50 of the Civil Code decrees that "[f]or the exercise of civil rights and the fulfillment of
civil obligations, the domicile of natural persons is their place of habitual residence." In Ong
vs. Republic 20 this court took the concept of domicile to mean an individual's "permanent home",
"a place to which, whenever absent for business or for pleasure, one intends to return, and
depends on facts and circumstances in the sense that they disclose intent." 21 Based on the
foregoing, domicile includes the twin elements of "the fact of residing or physical presence in a
fixed place" and animus manendi, or the intention of returning there permanently.
Residence, in its ordinary conception, implies the factual relationship of an individual to a certain
place. It is the physical presence of a person in a given area, community or country. The essential
distinction between residence and domicile in law is that residence involves the intent to leave
when the purpose for which the resident has taken up his abode ends. One may seek a place for
purposes such as pleasure, business, or health. If a person's intent be to remain, it becomes his
domicile; if his intent is to leave as soon as his purpose is established it is residence. 22 It is thus,
quite perfectly normal for an individual to have different residences in various places. However,
a person can only have a single domicile, unless, for various reasons, he successfully abandons
his domicile in favor of another domicile of choice. In Uytengsu vs. Republic, 23 we laid this
distinction quite clearly:
There is a difference between domicile and residence. "Residence" is used to
indicate a place of abode, whether permanent or temporary; "domicile" denotes a
fixed permanent residence to which, when absent, one has the intention of
returning. A man may have a residence in one place and a domicile in another.
Residence is not domicile, but domicile is residence coupled with the intention to
remain for an unlimited time. A man can have but one domicile for the same
purpose at any time, but he may have numerous places of residence. His place of
residence is generally his place of domicile, but it is not by any means necessarily
so since no length of residence without intention of remaining will constitute
domicile.
For political purposes the concepts of residence and domicile are dictated by the peculiar criteria
of political laws. As these concepts have evolved in our election law, what has clearly and
unequivocally emerged is the fact that residence for election purposes is used synonymously with
domicile.
In Nuval vs. Guray, 24 the Court held that "the term residence. . . is synonymous with domicile
which imports not only intention to reside in a fixed place, but also personal presence in that
place, coupled with conduct indicative of such intention." 25 Larena vs. Teves 26 reiterated the
same doctrine in a case involving the qualifications of the respondent therein to the post of
Municipal President of Dumaguete, Negros Oriental. Faypon vs. Quirino, 27 held that the absence
from residence to pursue studies or practice a profession or registration as a voter other than in
the place where one is elected does not constitute loss of residence. 28 So settled is the concept
(of domicile) in our election law that in these and other election law cases, this Court has stated
that the mere absence of an individual from his permanent residence without the intention to
abandon it does not result in a loss or change of domicile.
The deliberations of the 1987 Constitution on the residence qualification for certain elective
positions have placed beyond doubt the principle that when the Constitution speaks of
"residence" in election law, it actually means only "domicile" to wit:
Mr. Nolledo: With respect to Section 5, I remember that in the 1971

Constitutional Convention, there was an attempt to require residence in the place
not less than one year immediately preceding the day of the elections. So my
question is: What is the Committee's concept of residence of a candidate for the
legislature? Is it actual residence or is it the concept of domicile or constructive
residence?
Mr. Davide: Madame President, insofar as the regular members of the National
Assembly are concerned, the proposed section merely provides, among others,
"and a resident thereof", that is, in the district for a period of not less than one
year preceding the day of the election. This was in effect lifted from the 1973
Constitution, the interpretation given to it was domicile. 29
xxx xxx xxx
Mrs. Rosario Braid: The next question is on Section 7, page 2. I think
Commissioner Nolledo has raised the same point that "resident" has been
interpreted at times as a matter of intention rather than actual residence.
Mr. De los Reyes: Domicile.
Ms. Rosario Braid: Yes, So, would the gentleman consider at the proper time to go
back to actual residence rather than mere intention to reside?
Mr. De los Reyes: But we might encounter some difficulty especially considering
that a provision in the Constitution in the Article on Suffrage says that Filipinos
living abroad may vote as enacted by law. So, we have to stick to the original
concept that it should be by domicile and not physical residence. 30
In Co vs. Electoral Tribunal of the House of Representatives, 31 this Court concluded that the
framers of the 1987 Constitution obviously adhered to the definition given to the term residence
in election law, regarding it as having the same meaning as domicile. 32
In the light of the principles just discussed, has petitioner Imelda Romualdez Marcos satisfied the
residency requirement mandated by Article VI, Sec. 6 of the 1987 Constitution? Of what
significance is the questioned entry in petitioner's Certificate of Candidacy stating her residence
in the First Legislative District of Leyte as seven (7) months?
It is the fact of residence, not a statement in a certificate of candidacy which ought to be decisive
in determining whether or not and individual has satisfied the constitution's residency
qualification requirement. The said statement becomes material only when there is or appears to
be a deliberate attempt to mislead, misinform, or hide a fact which would otherwise render a
candidate ineligible. It would be plainly ridiculous for a candidate to deliberately and knowingly
make a statement in a certificate of candidacy which would lead to his or her disqualification.
It stands to reason therefore, that petitioner merely committed an honest mistake in jotting the
word "seven" in the space provided for the residency qualification requirement. The
circumstances leading to her filing the questioned entry obviously resulted in the subsequent
confusion which prompted petitioner to write down the period of her actual stay in Tolosa, Leyte
instead of her period of residence in the First district, which was "since childhood" in the space
provided. These circumstances and events are amply detailed in the COMELEC's Second
Division's questioned resolution, albeit with a different interpretation. For instance, when herein
petitioner announced that she would be registering in Tacloban City to make her eligible to run in
the First District, private respondent Montejo opposed the same, claiming that petitioner was a
resident of Tolosa, not Tacloban City. Petitioner then registered in her place of actual residence in
the First District, which is Tolosa, Leyte, a fact which she subsequently noted down in her
Certificate of Candidacy. A close look at said certificate would reveal the possible source of the
confusion: the entry for residence (Item No. 7) is followed immediately by the entry for
residence in the constituency where a candidate seeks election thus:
7. RESIDENCE (complete Address): Brgy. Olot, Tolosa, Leyte
POST OFFICE ADDRESS FOR ELECTION PURPOSES: Brgy. Olot, Tolosa,
Leyte
8. RESIDENCE IN THE CONSTITUENCY WHERE I SEEK TO
BE ELECTED IMMEDIATELY PRECEDING THE ELECTION:_________
Years and Seven Months.
Having been forced by private respondent to register in her place of actual residence in Leyte
instead of petitioner's claimed domicile, it appears that petitioner had jotted down her period of
stay in her legal residence or domicile. The juxtaposition of entries in Item 7 and Item 8 the
first requiring actual residence and the second requiring domicile coupled with the
circumstances surrounding petitioner's registration as a voter in Tolosa obviously led to her
writing down an unintended entry for which she could be disqualified. This honest mistake
should not, however, be allowed to negate the fact of residence in the First District if such fact
were established by means more convincing than a mere entry on a piece of paper.
We now proceed to the matter of petitioner's domicile.
In support of its asseveration that petitioner's domicile could not possibly be in the First District
of Leyte, the Second Division of the COMELEC, in its assailed Resolution of April 24,1995
maintains that "except for the time when (petitioner) studied and worked for some years after
graduation in Tacloban City, she continuously lived in Manila." The Resolution additionally cites
certain facts as indicative of the fact that petitioner's domicile ought to be any place where she
lived in the last few decades except Tacloban, Leyte. First, according to the Resolution,
petitioner, in 1959, resided in San Juan, Metro Manila where she was also registered voter. Then,
in 1965, following the election of her husband to the Philippine presidency, she lived in San
Miguel, Manila where she as a voter. In 1978 and thereafter, she served as a member of the
Batasang Pambansa and Governor of Metro Manila. "She could not, have served these positions
if she had not been a resident of Metro Manila," the COMELEC stressed. Here is where the
confusion lies.
We have stated, many times in the past, that an individual does not lose his domicile even if he
has lived and maintained residences in different places. Residence, it bears repeating, implies a
factual relationship to a given place for various purposes. The absence from legal residence or
domicile to pursue a profession, to study or to do other things of a temporary or semi-permanent
nature does not constitute loss of residence. Thus, the assertion by the COMELEC that "she
could not have been a resident of Tacloban City since childhood up to the time she filed her
certificate of candidacy because she became a resident of many places" flies in the face of settled
jurisprudence in which this Court carefully made distinctions between (actual) residence and
domicile for election law purposes. In Larena vs. Teves, 33 supra, we stressed:
[T]his court is of the opinion and so holds that a person who has his own house
wherein he lives with his family in a municipality without having ever had the
intention of abandoning it, and without having lived either alone or with his
family in another municipality, has his residence in the former municipality,
notwithstanding his having registered as an elector in the other municipality in
question and having been a candidate for various insular and provincial positions,
stating every time that he is a resident of the latter municipality.
More significantly, in Faypon vs. Quirino, 34 We explained that:
A citizen may leave the place of his birth to look for "greener pastures," as the
saying goes, to improve his lot, and that, of course includes study in other places,
practice of his avocation, or engaging in business. When an election is to be held,
the citizen who left his birthplace to improve his lot may desire to return to his
native town to cast his ballot but for professional or business reasons, or for any
other reason, he may not absent himself from his professional or business
activities; so there he registers himself as voter as he has the qualifications to be
one and is not willing to give up or lose the opportunity to choose the officials
who are to run the government especially in national elections. Despite such
registration, the animus revertendi to his home, to his domicile or residence of
origin has not forsaken him. This may be the explanation why the registration of a
voter in a place other than his residence of origin has not been deemed sufficient
to constitute abandonment or loss of such residence. It finds justification in the
natural desire and longing of every person to return to his place of birth. This
strong feeling of attachment to the place of one's birth must be overcome by
positive proof of abandonment for another.
From the foregoing, it can be concluded that in its above-cited statements supporting its
proposition that petitioner was ineligible to run for the position of Representative of the First
District of Leyte, the COMELEC was obviously referring to petitioner's various places of
(actual) residence, not her domicile. In doing so, it not only ignored settled jurisprudence on
residence in election law and the deliberations of the constitutional commission but also the
provisions of the Omnibus Election Code (B.P. 881). 35
What is undeniable, however, are the following set of facts which establish the fact of petitioner's
domicile, which we lift verbatim from the COMELEC's Second Division's assailed Resolution: 36
In or about 1938 when respondent was a little over 8 years old, she established her
domicile in Tacloban, Leyte (Tacloban City). She studied in the Holy Infant
Academy in Tacloban from 1938 to 1949 when she graduated from high school.
She pursued her college studies in St. Paul's College, now Divine Word
University in Tacloban, where she earned her degree in Education. Thereafter, she
taught in the Leyte Chinese School, still in Tacloban City. In 1952 she went to
Manila to work with her cousin, the late speaker Daniel Z. Romualdez in his
office in the House of Representatives. In 1954, she married ex-President
Ferdinand E. Marcos when he was still a congressman of Ilocos Norte and
registered there as a voter. When her husband was elected Senator of the Republic
in 1959, she and her husband lived together in San Juan, Rizal where she
registered as a voter. In 1965, when her husband was elected President of the
Republic of the Philippines, she lived with him in Malacanang Palace and
registered as a voter in San Miguel, Manila.
[I]n February 1986 (she claimed that) she and her family were abducted and
kidnapped to Honolulu, Hawaii. In November 1991, she came home to Manila. In
1992, respondent ran for election as President of the Philippines and filed her
Certificate of Candidacy wherein she indicated that she is a resident and
registered voter of San Juan, Metro Manila.
Applying the principles discussed to the facts found by COMELEC, what is inescapable is that
petitioner held various residences for different purposes during the last four decades. None of
these purposes unequivocally point to an intention to abandon her domicile of origin in Tacloban,
Leyte. Moreover, while petitioner was born in Manila, as a minor she naturally followed the
domicile of her parents. She grew up in Tacloban, reached her adulthood there and eventually
established residence in different parts of the country for various reasons. Even during her
husband's presidency, at the height of the Marcos Regime's powers, petitioner kept her close ties
to her domicile of origin by establishing residences in Tacloban, celebrating her birthdays and
other important personal milestones in her home province, instituting well-publicized projects for
the benefit of her province and hometown, and establishing a political power base where her
siblings and close relatives held positions of power either through the ballot or by appointment,
always with either her influence or consent. These well-publicized ties to her domicile of origin
are part of the history and lore of the quarter century of Marcos power in our country. Either they
were entirely ignored in the COMELEC'S Resolutions, or the majority of the COMELEC did not
know what the rest of the country always knew: the fact of petitioner's domicile in Tacloban,
Leyte.
Private respondent in his Comment, contends that Tacloban was not petitioner's domicile of
origin because she did not live there until she was eight years old. He avers that after leaving the
place in 1952, she "abandoned her residency (sic) therein for many years and . . . (could not) reestablish her domicile in said place by merely expressing her intention to live there again." We
do not agree.
First, minor follows the domicile of his parents. As domicile, once acquired is retained until a
new one is gained, it follows that in spite of the fact of petitioner's being born in Manila,
Tacloban, Leyte was her domicile of origin by operation of law. This domicile was not
established only when her father brought his family back to Leyte contrary to private
respondent's averments.
Second, domicile of origin is not easily lost. To successfully effect a change of domicile, one
must demonstrate: 37
1. An actual removal or an actual change of domicile;
2. A bona fide intention of abandoning the former place of residence and
establishing a new one; and
3. Acts which correspond with the purpose.
In the absence of clear and positive proof based on these criteria, the residence of origin should
be deemed to continue. Only with evidence showing concurrence of all three requirements can
the presumption of continuity or residence be rebutted, for a change of residence requires an
actual and deliberate abandonment, and one cannot have two legal residences at the same
time. 38 In the case at bench, the evidence adduced by private respondent plainly lacks the degree
of persuasiveness required to convince this court that an abandonment of domicile of origin in
favor of a domicile of choice indeed occurred. To effect an abandonment requires the voluntary
act of relinquishing petitioner's former domicile with an intent to supplant the former domicile
with one of her own choosing (domicilium voluntarium).
In this connection, it cannot be correctly argued that petitioner lost her domicile of origin by
operation of law as a result of her marriage to the late President Ferdinand E. Marcos in 1952.
For there is a clearly established distinction between the Civil Code concepts of "domicile" and
"residence." 39 The presumption that the wife automatically gains the husband's domicile by
operation of law upon marriage cannot be inferred from the use of the term "residence" in Article
110 of the Civil Code because the Civil Code is one area where the two concepts are well
delineated. Dr. Arturo Tolentino, writing on this specific area explains:
In the Civil Code, there is an obvious difference between domicile and residence.
Both terms imply relations between a person and a place; but in residence, the
relation is one of fact while in domicile it is legal or juridical, independent of the
necessity of physical presence. 40
Article 110 of the Civil Code provides:
Art. 110. The husband shall fix the residence of the family. But the court may
exempt the wife from living with the husband if he should live abroad unless in
the service of the Republic.
A survey of jurisprudence relating to Article 110 or to the concepts of domicile or residence as
they affect the female spouse upon marriage yields nothing which would suggest that the female
spouse automatically loses her domicile of origin in favor of the husband's choice of residence
upon marriage.
Article 110 is a virtual restatement of Article 58 of the Spanish Civil Code of 1889 which states:
La mujer esta obligada a seguir a su marido donde quiera que fije su residencia.
Los Tribunales, sin embargo, podran con justa causa eximirla de esta obligacion
cuando el marido transende su residencia a ultramar o' a pais extranjero.
Note the use of the phrase "donde quiera su fije de residencia" in the aforequoted article, which
means wherever (the husband) wishes to establish residence. This part of the article clearly
contemplates only actual residence because it refers to a positive act of fixing a family home or
residence. Moreover, this interpretation is further strengthened by the phrase "cuando el marido
translade su residencia" in the same provision which means, "when the husband shall
transfer his residence," referring to another positive act of relocating the family to another home
or place of actual residence. The article obviously cannot be understood to refer to domicile
which
is
a
fixed,
fairly-permanent concept when it plainly connotes the possibility of transferring from one place
to another not only once, but as often as the husband may deem fit to move his family, a
circumstance more consistent with the concept of actual residence.
The right of the husband to fix the actual residence is in harmony with the intention of the law to
strengthen and unify the family, recognizing the fact that the husband and the wife bring into the
marriage different domiciles (of origin). This difference could, for the sake of family unity, be
reconciled only by allowing the husband to fix a single place of actual residence.
Very significantly, Article 110 of the Civil Code is found under Title V under the heading:
RIGHTS AND OBLIGATIONS BETWEEN HUSBAND AND WIFE. Immediately preceding
Article 110 is Article 109 which obliges the husband and wife to live together, thus:
Art. 109. The husband and wife are obligated to live together, observe mutual
respect and fidelity and render mutual help and support.
The duty to live together can only be fulfilled if the husband and wife are physically together.
This takes into account the situations where the couple has many residences (as in the case of the
petitioner). If the husband has to stay in or transfer to any one of their residences, the wife should
necessarily be with him in order that they may "live together." Hence, it is illogical to conclude
that Art. 110 refers to "domicile" and not to "residence." Otherwise, we shall be faced with a
situation where the wife is left in the domicile while the husband, for professional or other
reasons, stays in one of their (various) residences. As Dr. Tolentino further explains:
Residence and Domicile Whether the word "residence" as used with reference
to particular matters is synonymous with "domicile" is a question of some
difficulty, and the ultimate decision must be made from a consideration of the
purpose and intent with which the word is used. Sometimes they are used
synonymously, at other times they are distinguished from one another.
xxx xxx xxx
Residence in the civil law is a material fact, referring to the physical presence of a
person in a place. A person can have two or more residences, such as a country
residence and a city residence. Residence is acquired by living in place; on the

other hand, domicile can exist without actually living in the place. The important
thing for domicile is that, once residence has been established in one place, there
be an intention to stay there permanently, even if residence is also established in
some
other
41
place.
In fact, even the matter of a common residence between the husband and the wife during the
marriage is not an iron-clad principle; In cases applying the Civil Code on the question of a
common matrimonial residence, our jurisprudence has recognized certain situations 42 where the
spouses could not be compelled to live with each other such that the wife is either allowed to
maintain a residence different from that of her husband or, for obviously practical reasons, revert
to her original domicile (apart from being allowed to opt for a new one). In De la Vina
vs. Villareal 43 this Court held that "[a] married woman may acquire a residence or domicile
separate from that of her husband during the existence of the marriage where the husband has
given cause for divorce." 44 Note that the Court allowed the wife either to obtain new residence
or to choose a new domicile in such an event. In instances where the wife actually opts, .under
the Civil Code, to live separately from her husband either by taking new residence or reverting to
her domicile of origin, the Court has held that the wife could not be compelled to live with her
husband on pain of contempt. In Arroyo vs. Vasques de Arroyo45 the Court held that:
Upon examination of the authorities, we are convinced that it is not within the
province of the courts of this country to attempt to compel one of the spouses to
cohabit with, and render conjugal rights to, the other. Of course where the
property rights of one of the pair are invaded, an action for restitution of such
rights can be maintained. But we are disinclined to sanction the doctrine that an
order, enforcible (sic) by process of contempt, may be entered to compel the
restitution of the purely personal right of consortium. At best such an order can be
effective for no other purpose than to compel the spouses to live under the same
roof; and he experience of those countries where the courts of justice have
assumed to compel the cohabitation of married people shows that the policy of the
practice is extremely questionable. Thus in England, formerly the Ecclesiastical
Court entertained suits for the restitution of conjugal rights at the instance of
either husband or wife; and if the facts were found to warrant it, that court would
make a mandatory decree, enforceable by process of contempt in case of
disobedience, requiring the delinquent party to live with the other and render
conjugal rights. Yet this practice was sometimes criticized even by the judges who
felt bound to enforce such orders, and in Weldon v. Weldon (9 P.D. 52), decided in
1883, Sir James Hannen, President in the Probate, Divorce and Admiralty
Division of the High Court of Justice, expressed his regret that the English law on
the subject was not the same as that which prevailed in Scotland, where a decree
of adherence, equivalent to the decree for the restitution of conjugal rights in
England, could be obtained by the injured spouse, but could not be enforced by
imprisonment. Accordingly, in obedience to the growing sentiment against the
practice, the Matrimonial Causes Act (1884) abolished the remedy of
imprisonment; though a decree for the restitution of conjugal rights can still be
procured, and in case of disobedience may serve in appropriate cases as the basis
of an order for the periodical payment of a stipend in the character of alimony.
In the voluminous jurisprudence of the United States, only one court, so far as we
can discover, has ever attempted to make a preemptory order requiring one of the
spouses to live with the other; and that was in a case where a wife was ordered to
follow and live with her husband, who had changed his domicile to the City of
New Orleans. The decision referred to (Bahn v. Darby, 36 La. Ann., 70) was
based on a provision of the Civil Code of Louisiana similar to article 56 of the
Spanish Civil Code. It was decided many years ago, and the doctrine evidently
has not been fruitful even in the State of Louisiana. In other states of the
American Union the idea of enforcing cohabitation by process of contempt is

rejected. (21 Cyc., 1148).
In a decision of January 2, 1909, the Supreme Court of Spain appears to have
affirmed an order of the Audiencia Territorial de Valladolid requiring a wife to
return to the marital domicile, and in the alternative, upon her failure to do so, to
make a particular disposition of certain money and effects then in her possession
and to deliver to her husband, as administrator of the ganancial property, all
income, rents, and interest which might accrue to her from the property which she
had brought to the marriage. (113 Jur. Civ., pp. 1, 11) But it does not appear that
this order for the return of the wife to the marital domicile was sanctioned by any
other penalty than the consequences that would be visited upon her in respect to
the use and control of her property; and it does not appear that her disobedience to
that order would necessarily have been followed by imprisonment for contempt.
Parenthetically when Petitioner was married to then Congressman Marcos, in 1954, petitioner
was obliged by virtue of Article 110 of the Civil Code to follow her husband's actual place
of residence fixed by him. The problem here is that at that time, Mr. Marcos had several places of
residence, among which were San Juan, Rizal and Batac, Ilocos Norte. There is no showing
which of these places Mr. Marcos did fix as his family's residence. But assuming that Mr. Marcos
had fixed any of these places as the conjugal residence, what petitioner gained upon marriage
was actual residence. She did not lose her domicile of origin.
On the other hand, the common law concept of "matrimonial domicile" appears to have been
incorporated, as a result of our jurisprudential experiences after the drafting of the Civil Code of
1950, into the New Family Code. To underscore the difference between the intentions of the
Civil Code and the Family Code drafters, the term residence has been supplanted by the term
domicile in an entirely new provision (Art. 69) distinctly different in meaning and spirit from
that found in Article 110. The provision recognizes revolutionary changes in the concept of
women's rights in the intervening years by making the choice of domicile a product of mutual
agreement between the spouses. 46
Without as much belaboring the point, the term residence may mean one thing in civil law (or
under the Civil Code) and quite another thing in political law. What stands clear is that insofar as
the Civil Code is concerned-affecting the rights and obligations of husband and wife the term
residence should only be interpreted to mean "actual residence." The inescapable conclusion
derived from this unambiguous civil law delineation therefore, is that when petitioner married
the former President in 1954, she kept her domicile of origin and merely gained a new home, not
a domicilium necessarium.
Even assuming for the sake of argument that petitioner gained a new "domicile" after her
marriage and only acquired a right to choose a new one after her husband died, petitioner's acts
following her return to the country clearly indicate that she not only impliedly but expressly
chose her domicile of origin (assuming this was lost by operation of law) as her domicile. This
"choice" was unequivocally expressed in her letters to the Chairman of the PCGG when
petitioner sought the PCGG's permission to "rehabilitate (our) ancestral house in Tacloban and
Farm in Olot, Leyte. . . to make them livable for the Marcos family to have a home in our
homeland." 47 Furthermore, petitioner obtained her residence certificate in 1992 in Tacloban,
Leyte, while living in her brother's house, an act which supports the domiciliary intention clearly
manifested in her letters to the PCGG Chairman. She could not have gone straight to her home in
San Juan, as it was in a state of disrepair, having been previously looted by vandals. Her "homes"
and "residences" following her arrival in various parts of Metro Manila merely qualified as
temporary or "actual residences," not domicile. Moreover, and proceeding from our discussion
pointing out specific situations where the female spouse either reverts to her domicile of origin
or chooses a new one during the subsistence of the marriage, it would be highly illogical for us to
assume that she cannot regain her original domicile upon the death of her husband absent a
positive act of selecting a new one where situations exist within the subsistence of the marriage
itself where the wife gains a domicile different from her husband.
In the light of all the principles relating to residence and domicile enunciated by this court up to
this point, we are persuaded that the facts established by the parties weigh heavily in favor of a
conclusion supporting petitioner's claim of legal residence or domicile in the First District of
Leyte.
II. The jurisdictional issue
Petitioner alleges that the jurisdiction of the COMELEC had already lapsed considering that the
assailed resolutions were rendered on April 24, 1995, fourteen (14) days before the election in
violation of Section 78 of the Omnibus Election Code. 48 Moreover, petitioner contends that it is
the House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal and not the COMELEC which has jurisdiction
over the election of members of the House of Representatives in accordance with Article VI Sec.
17 of the Constitution. This is untenable.
It is a settled doctrine that a statute requiring rendition of judgment within a specified time is
generally construed to be merely directory, 49 "so that non-compliance with them does not
invalidate the judgment on the theory that if the statute had intended such result it would have
clearly indicated it." 50 The difference between a mandatory and a directory provision is often
made on grounds of necessity. Adopting the same view held by several American authorities, this
court inMarcelino vs. Cruz held that: 51
The difference between a mandatory and directory provision is often determined
on grounds of expediency, the reason being that less injury results to the general
public by disregarding than enforcing the letter of the law.
In Trapp v. Mc Cormick, a case calling for the interpretation of a statute
containing a limitation of thirty (30) days within which a decree may be entered
without the consent of counsel, it was held that "the statutory provisions which
may be thus departed from with impunity, without affecting the validity of
statutory proceedings, are usually those which relate to the mode or time of doing
that which is essential to effect the aim and purpose of the Legislature or some
incident of the essential act." Thus, in said case, the statute under examination was
construed merely to be directory.
The mischief in petitioner's contending that the COMELEC should have abstained from
rendering a decision after the period stated in the Omnibus Election Code because it lacked
jurisdiction, lies in the fact that our courts and other quasi-judicial bodies would then refuse to
render judgments merely on the ground of having failed to reach a decision within a given or
prescribed period.
In any event, with the enactment of Sections 6 and 7 of R.A. 6646 in relation to Section 78 of
B.P. 881, 52 it is evident that the respondent Commission does not lose jurisdiction to hear and
decide a pending disqualification case under Section 78 of B.P. 881 even after the elections.
As to the House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal's supposed assumption of jurisdiction over
the issue of petitioner's qualifications after the May 8, 1995 elections, suffice it to say that
HRET's jurisdiction as the sole judge of all contests relating to the elections, returns and
qualifications of members of Congress begins only after a candidate has become a member of the
House of Representatives. 53 Petitioner not being a member of the House of Representatives, it is
obvious that the HRET at this point has no jurisdiction over the question.
It would be an abdication of many of the ideals enshrined in the 1987 Constitution for us to
either to ignore or deliberately make distinctions in law solely on the basis of the personality of a
petitioner in a case. Obviously a distinction was made on such a ground here. Surely, many
established principles of law, even of election laws were flouted for the sake perpetuating power
during the pre-EDSA regime. We renege on these sacred ideals, including the meaning and spirit
of EDSA ourselves bending established principles of principles of law to deny an individual what
he or she justly deserves in law. Moreover, in doing so, we condemn ourselves to repeat the
mistakes of the past.
WHEREFORE, having determined that petitioner possesses the necessary residence
qualifications to run for a seat in the House of Representatives in the First District of Leyte, the
COMELEC's questioned Resolutions dated April 24, May 7, May 11, and May 25, 1995 are
hereby SET ASIDE. Respondent COMELEC is hereby directed to order the Provincial Board of
Canvassers to proclaim petitioner as the duly elected Representative of the First District of
Leyte.
SO ORDERED.

SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. 120265 September 18, 1995

AGAPITO A. AQUINO, petitioner,
vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, MOVE MAKATI, MATEO BEDON and JUANITO
ICARO, respondents.
KAPUNAN, J.:
The sanctity of the people's will must be observed at all times if our nascent democracy is to be
preserved. In any challenge having the effect of reversing a democratic choice, expressed
through the ballot, this Court should be ever so vigilant in finding solutions which would give
effect to the will of the majority, for sound public policy dictates that all elective offices are filled
by those who have received the highest number of votes cast in an election. When a challenge to
a winning candidate's qualifications however becomes inevitable, the ineligibility ought to be so
noxious to the Constitution that giving effect to the apparent will of the people would ultimately
do harm to our democratic institutions.
On March 20, 1995, petitioner Agapito A. Aquino filed his Certificate of Candidacy for the
position of Representative for the new Second Legislative District of Makati City. Among others,
Aquino provided the following information in his certificate of candidacy, viz:.
(7) RESIDENCE (Complete Address): 284 AMAPOLA COR. ADALLA STS.,
PALM VILLAGE, MAKATI.
xxx xxx xxx
(8) RESIDENCE IN THE CONSTITUENCY WHERE I SEEK TO BE

ELECTED IMMEDIATELY PRECEDING THE ELECTION: ______ Years
and 10 Months.
xxx xxx xxx
THAT I AM ELIGIBLE for said Office; That I will support and defend the
Constitution of the Republic of the Philippines and will maintain true faith and
allegiance thereto; That I will obey the law, rules and decrees promulgated by the
duly constituted authorities; That the obligation imposed to such is assumed
voluntarily, without mental reservation or purpose of evasion, and that the facts
therein are true to the best of my knowledge. 1
On April 24, 1995, Move Makati, a duly registered political party, and Mateo Bedon, Chairman
of the LAKAS-NUCD-UMDP of Barangay Cembo, Makati City, filed a petition to disqualify
Agapito A. Aquino 2 on the ground that the latter lacked the residence qualification as a candidate
for congressman which, under Section 6, Art. VI of the 1987 the Constitution, should be for a
period not less than one (1) year immediately preceding the May 8, 1995 elections. The petition
was docketed as SPA No. 95-113 and was assigned to the Second Division of the Commission on
Elections (COMELEC).
On April 25, 1995, a day after said petition for disqualification was filed, petitioner filed another
certificate of candidacy amending the certificate dated March 20, 1995. This time, petitioner
stated in Item 8 of his certificate that he had resided in the constituency where he sought to be
elected for one (l) year and thirteen (13) days. 3
On May 2, 1995, petitioner filed his Answer dated April 29, 1995 praying for the dismissal of the
disqualification case. 4
On the same day, May 2, 1995, a hearing was conducted by the COMELEC wherein petitioner
testified and presented in evidence, among others, his Affidavit dated May 2, 1995, 5 lease
contract between petitioner and Leonor Feliciano dated April 1, 1994, 6 Affidavit of Leonor
Feliciano dated April 28,1995 7 and Affidavit of Daniel Galamay dated April 28, 1995. 8
After hearing of the petition for disqualification, the Second Division of the COMELEC
promulgated a Resolution dated May 6, 1995, the decretal portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, this Commission (Second Division)
RESOLVES to DISMISS the instant: petition for Disqualification against
respondent AGAPITO AQUINO and declares him ELIGIBLE to run for the
Office of Representative in the Second Legislative District of Makati City.
SO ORDERED. 9
On May 7, 1995, Move Makati and Mateo Bedon filed a Motion for Reconsideration of the May
6, 1995 resolution with the COMELEC en banc.
Meanwhile, on May 8, 1995, elections were held. In Makati City where three (3) candidates vied
for the congressional seat in the Second District, petitioner garnered thirty eight thousand five
hundred forty seven (38,547) votes as against another candidate, Agusto Syjuco, who obtained
thirty five thousand nine hundred ten (35,910) votes. 10
On May 10, 1995, private respondents Move Makati and Bedon filed an Urgent Motion Ad
Cautelum to Suspend Proclamation of petitioner. Thereafter, they filed an Omnibus Motion for
Reconsideration of the COMELEC's Second Division resolution dated May 6, 1995 and a 2nd
Urgent Motion Ad Cautelum to Suspend Proclamation of petitioner.
On May 15, 1995, COMELEC en banc issued an Order suspending petitioner's proclamation.
The dispositive portion of the order reads:
WHEREFORE, pursuant to the provisions of Section 6 of Republic Act No. 6646,
the Board of Canvassers of the City of Makati is hereby directed to complete the
canvassing of election returns of the Second District of Makati, but to suspend the
proclamation of respondent Agapito A. Aquino should he obtain the winning
number of votes for the position of Representative of the Second District of the
City of Makati, until the motion for reconsideration filed by the petitioners on
May 7, 1995, shall have been resolved by the Commission.
The Executive Director, this Commission, is directed to cause the immediate
implementation of this Order. The Clerk of Court of the Commission is likewise
directed to inform the parties by the fastest means available of this Order, and to
calendar the hearing of the Motion for Reconsideration on May 17, 1995, at 10:00
in the morning, PICC Press Center, Pasay City.
SO ORDERED. 11
On May 16, 1995, petitioner filed his Comment/Opposition with urgent motion to lift order of
suspension of proclamation.
On June 1, 1995, petitioner filed a "Motion to File Supplemental Memorandum and Motion to
Resolve Urgent Motion to Resolve Motion to Lift Suspension of Proclamation" wherein he
manifested his intention to raise, among others, the issue of whether of not the determination of
the qualifications of petitioner after the elections is lodged exclusively in the House of
Representatives Electoral Tribunal pursuant to Section 17, Article VI of the 1987 Constitution.
Resolving petitioner's motion to lift suspension of his proclamation, the COMELEC en
banc issued an Order on June 2, 1995, the decretal portion thereof residing:
Pursuant to the said provisions and considering the attendant circumstances of the
case, the Commission RESOLVED to proceed with the promulgation but to
suspend its rules, to accept the filing of the aforesaid motion, and to allow the
parties to be heard thereon because the issue of jurisdiction now before the
Commission has to be studied with more reflection and judiciousness. 12
On the same day, June 2, 1995, the COMELEC en banc issued a Resolution reversing the
resolution of the Second Division dated May 6, 1995. The fallo reads as follows:
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, petitioners' Motion for Reconsideration
of the Resolution of the Second Division, promulgated on May 6, 1995, is
GRANTED. Respondent Agapito A. Aquino is declared ineligible and thus
disqualified as a candidate for the Office of Representative of the Second
Legislative District of Makati City in the May 8, 1995 elections, for lack of the
constitutional qualification of residence. Consequently, the order of suspension of
proclamation of the respondent should he obtain the winning number of votes,
issued by this Commission on May 15, 1995 is now made permanent.
Upon the finality of this Resolution, the Board of Canvassers of the City of
Makati shall immediately reconvene and, on the basis of the completed canvass of
election returns, determine the winner out of the remaining qualified candidates,
who shall be immediately be proclaimed.
SO ORDERED. 13
Hence, the instant Petition for Certiorari 14 assailing the orders dated May 15, 1995 and June 2,
1995, as well as the resolution dated June 2, 1995 issued by the COMELEC en banc. Petitioner's
raises the following errors for consideration, to wit:
A
THE COMELEC HAS NO JURISDICTION TO DETERMINE AND ADJUDGE
THE DISQUALIFICATION ISSUE INVOLVING CONGRESSIONAL
CANDIDATES AFTER THE MAY 8, 1995 ELECTIONS, SUCH
DETERMINATION BEING RESERVED TO AND LODGE EXCLUSIVELY
WITH THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVE ELECTORAL TRIBUNAL
B
ASSUMING ARGUENDO THAT THE COMELEC HAS JURISDICTION, SAID
JURISDICTION CEASED IN THE INSTANT CASE AFTER THE
ELECTIONS, AND THE REMEDY/IES AVAILABLE TO THE ADVERSE
PARTIES LIE/S IN ANOTHER FORUM WHICH, IT IS SUBMITTED, IS THE
HRET CONSISTENT WITH SECTION 17, ARTICLE VI OF THE 1987
CONSTITUTION
C
THE COMELEC COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION WHEN IT
PROCEEDED TO PROMULGATE ITS QUESTIONED DECISION (ANNEX
"C", PETITION) DESPITE IT OWN RECOGNITION THAT A THRESHOLD
ISSUE OF JURISDICTION HAS TO BE JUDICIOUSLY REVIEWED AGAIN,
ASSUMING ARGUENDO THAT THE COMELEC HAS JURISDICTION, THE
COMELEC COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION, AND SERIOUS
ERROR IN DIRECTING WITHOUT NOTICE THE SUSPENSION OF THE
PROCLAMATION OF THE PETITIONER AS THE WINNING
CONGRESSIONAL CANDIDATE AND DESPITE THE MINISTERIAL
NATURE OF SUCH DUTY TO PROCLAIM (PENDING THE FINALITY OF
THE DISQUALIFICATION CASE AGAINST THE PETITIONER) IF ONLY
NOT TO THWART THE PEOPLE'S WILL.
D
THE COMELEC'S FINDING OF NON-COMPLIANCE WITH THE
RESIDENCY REQUIREMENT OF ONE YEAR AGAINST THE PETITIONER
IS CONTRARY TO EVIDENCE AND TO APPLICABLE LAWS AND
JURISPRUDENCE.
E
IN ANY CASE, THE COMELEC CRITICALLY ERRED IN FAILING TO
APPRECIATE THE LEGAL IMPOSSIBILITY OF ENFORCING THE ONE
YEAR RESIDENCY REQUIREMENT OF CONGRESSIONAL CANDIDATES
IN NEWLY CREATED POLITICAL DISTRICTS WHICH WERE ONLY
EXISTING FOR LESS THAN A YEAR AT THE TIME OF THE ELECTION
AND BARELY FOUR MONTHS IN THE CASE OF PETITIONER'S DISTRICT
IN MAKATI OF CONGRESSIONAL.
F
THE COMELEC COMMITTED SERIOUS ERROR AMOUNTING TO LACK
OF JURISDICTION WHEN IT ORDERED THE BOARD OF CANVASSERS
TO "DETERMINE AND PROCLAIM THE WINNER OUT OF THE

REMAINING QUALIFIED CANDIDATES" AFTER THE ERRONEOUS
DISQUALIFICATION OF YOUR PETITIONER IN THAT SUCH DIRECTIVE
IS IN TOTAL DISREGARD OF THE WELL SETTLED DOCTRINE THAT A
SECOND PLACE CANDIDATE OR PERSON WHO WAS REPUDIATED BY
THE ELECTORATE IS A LOSER AND CANNOT BE PROCLAIMED AS
SUBSTITUTE
WINNER. 15
I
In his first three assignments of error, petitioner vigorously contends that after the May 8, 1995
elections, the COMELEC lost its jurisdiction over the question of petitioner's qualifications to
run for member of the House of Representatives. He claims that jurisdiction over the petition for
disqualification is exclusively lodged with the House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal
(HRET). Given the yet unresolved question of jurisdiction, petitioner avers that the COMELEC
committed serious error and grave abuse of discretion in directing the suspension of his
proclamation as the winning candidate in the Second Congressional District of Makati City. We
disagree.
Petitioner conveniently confuses the distinction between an unproclaimed candidate to the House
of Representatives and a member of the same. Obtaining the highest number of votes in an
election does not automatically vest the position in the winning candidate. Section 17 of Article
VI of the 1987 Constitution reads:
The Senate and the House of Representatives shall have an Electoral Tribunal
which shall be the sole judge of all contests relating to the election, returns and
qualifications of their respective Members.
Under the above-stated provision, the electoral tribunal clearly assumes jurisdiction over all
contests relative to the election, returns and qualifications of candidates for either the Senate or
the House only when the latter become members of either the Senate or the House of
Representatives. A candidate who has not been proclaimed 16 and who has not taken his oath of
office cannot be said to be a member of the House of Representatives subject to Section. 17 of
the Constitution. While the proclamation of a winning candidate in an election is ministerial, B.P.
881 in conjunction with Sec 6 of R.A. 6646 allows suspension of proclamation under
circumstances mentioned therein. Thus, petitioner's contention that "after the conduct of the
election and (petitioner) has been established the winner of the electoral exercise from the
moment of election, the COMELEC is automatically divested of authority to pass upon the
question of qualification" finds no basis, because even after the elections the COMELEC is
empowered by Section 6 (in relation to Section 7) of R.A. 6646 to continue to hear and decide
questions relating to qualifications of candidates Section 6 states:
Sec. 6. Effect of Disqualification Case. Any candidate, who has been declared
by final judgment to be disqualified shall not be voted for, and the votes cast for
him shall not be counted. If for any reason a candidate is not declared by final
judgment before an election to be disqualified and he is voted for and receives the
winning number of votes in such election, the Court or Commission shall
continue with the trial and hearing of the action, inquiry or protest and, upon
motion of the complainant or any intervenor, may during the pendency thereof
order the suspension of the proclamation of such candidate whenever the evidence
of guilt is strong.
Under the above-quoted provision, not only is a disqualification case against a candidate allowed
to continue after the election (and does not oust the COMELEC of its jurisdiction), but his
obtaining the highest number of votes will not result in the suspension or termination of the
proceedings against him when the evidence of guilt is strong. While the phrase "when the
evidence of guilt is strong" seems to suggest that the provisions of Section 6 ought to be
applicable only to disqualification cases under Section 68 of the Omnibus Election Code, Section
7 of R.A. 6646 allows the application of the provisions of Section 6 to cases involving
disqualification based on ineligibility under Section 78 of B.P. 881. Section 7 states:
Sec. 7. Petition to Deny Due Course or to Cancel a Certificate of Candidacy.
The procedure hereinabove provided shall apply to petition to deny due course to
or cancel a certificate of candidacy based on Sec. 78 of Batas Pambansa 881.
II
We agree with COMELEC's contention that in order that petitioner could qualify as a candidate
for Representative of the Second District of Makati City the latter "must prove that he has
established not just residence but domicileof choice. 17
The Constitution requires that a person seeking election to the House of Representatives should
be a resident of the district in which he seeks election for a period of not less than one (l) year
prior to the elections. 18 Residence, for election law purposes, has a settled meaning in our
jurisdiction.
In Co v. Electoral Tribunal of the House of Representatives 19 this Court held that the term
"residence" has always been understood as synonymous with "domicile" not only under the
previous Constitutions but also under the 1987 Constitution. The Court there held: 20
The deliberations of the Constitutional Commission reveal that the meaning of
residence vis-a-vis the qualifications of a candidate for Congress continues to
remain the same as that of domicile, to wit:
Mr. Nolledo: With respect to Section 5, I remember that in the
1971 Constitutional Convention, there was an attempt to require
residence in the place not less than one year immediately preceding
the day of elections. So my question is: What is the Committee's
concept of domicile or constructive residence?
Mr. Davide: Madame President, insofar as the regular members of
the National Assembly are concerned, the proposed section merely
provides, among others, and a resident thereof', that is, in the
district, for a period of not less than one year preceding the day of
the election. This was in effect lifted from the 1973
Constitution, the interpretation given to it was domicile (emphasis
ours) Records of the 1987 Constitutional Convention, Vol. II, July
22, 1986, p. 87).
xxx xxx xxx
Mrs. Rosario Braid: The next question is on section 7, page 2. I
think Commissioner Nolledo has raised the same point that
"resident" has been interpreted at times as a matter of intention
rather than actual residence.
Mr. De Los Reyes: Domicile.
Ms. Rosario Braid: Yes, So, would the gentlemen consider at the
proper time to go back to actual residence rather than mere
intention to reside?
Mr. De los Reyes: But We might encounter some difficulty

especially considering that the provision in the Constitution in the
Article on Suffrage says that Filipinos living abroad may vote as
enacted by law. So, we have to stick to the original concept that it
should be by domicile and not physical and actual residence.
(Records of the 1987 Constitutional Commission, Vol. II, July 22,
1986, p. 110).
The framers of the Constitution adhered to the earlier definition given to the word
"residence" which regarded it as having the same meaning as domicile.
Clearly, the place "where a party actually or constructively has his permanent home," 21 where
he, no matter where he may be found at any given time, eventually intends to return and
remain, i.e., his domicile, is that to which the Constitution refers when it speaks of residence for
the purposes of election law. The manifest purpose of this deviation from the usual conceptions
of residency in law as explained in Gallego vs. Vera at 22 is "to exclude strangers or newcomers
unfamiliar with the conditions and needs of the community" from taking advantage of favorable
circumstances existing in that community for electoral gain. While there is nothing wrong with
the practice of establishing residence in a given area for meeting election law requirements, this
nonetheless defeats the essence of representation, which is to place through the assent of voters
those most cognizant and sensitive to the needs of a particular district, if a candidate falls short of
the period of residency mandated by law for him to qualify. That purpose could be obviously best
met by individuals who have either had actual residence in the area for a given period or who
have been domiciled in the same area either by origin or by choice. It would, therefore, be
imperative for this Court to inquire into the threshold question as to whether or not petitioner
actually was a resident for a period of one year in the area now encompassed by the Second
Legislative District of Makati at the time of his election or whether or not he was domiciled in
the same.
As found by the COMELEC en banc petitioner in his Certificate of Candidacy for the May 11,
1992 elections, indicated not only that he was a resident of San Jose, Concepcion, Tarlac in 1992
but that he was a resident of the same for 52 years immediately preceding that election. 23 At the
time, his certificate indicated that he was also a registered voter of the same district. 24 His birth
certificate places Concepcion, Tarlac as the birthplace of both of his parents Benigno and
Aurora. 25 Thus, from data furnished by petitioner himself to the COMELEC at various times
during his political career, what stands consistently clear and unassailable is that this domicile of
origin of record up to the time of filing of his most recent certificate of candidacy for the 1995
elections was Concepcion, Tarlac.
Petitioner's alleged connection with the Second District of Makati City is an alleged lease
agreement of condominium unit in the area. As the COMELEC, in its disputed Resolution noted:
The intention not to establish a permanent home in Makati City is evident in his
leasing a condominium unit instead of buying one. While a lease contract maybe
indicative of respondent's intention to reside in Makati City it does not engender
the kind of permanency required to prove abandonment of one's
original domicile especially since, by its terms, it is only for a period of two (2)
years, and respondent Aquino himself testified that his intention was really for
only one (l) year because he has other "residences" in Manila or Quezon City. 26
While property ownership is not and should never be an indicia of the right to vote or to be voted
upon, the fact that petitioner himself claims that he has other residences in Metro Manila coupled
with the short length of time he claims to be a resident of the condominium unit in Makati (and
the fact, of his stated domicile in Tarlac) "indicate that the sole purpose of (petitioner) in
transferring his physical residence" 27 is not to acquire's new residence ordomicile "but only to
qualify as a candidate for Representative of the Second District of Makati City." 28 The absence
of clear and positive proof showing a successful abandonment of domicile under the conditions
stated above, the lack of identification sentimental, actual or otherwise with the area, and
the suspicious circumstances under which the lease agreement was effected all belie petitioner's
claim of residency for the period required by the Constitution, in the Second District of Makati.
As the COMELEC en banc emphatically pointed out:
[T]he lease agreement was executed mainly to support the one year residence
requirement as a qualification for a candidate of Representative, by establishing a
commencement date of his residence. If a perfectly valid lease agreement cannot,
by itself establish; a domicile of choice, this particular lease agreement cannot do
better. 29
Moreover, his assertion that he has transferred his domicile from Tarlac to Makati is a bare
assertion which is hardly supported by the facts in the case at bench. Domicile of origin is not
easily lost. To successfully effect a change of domicile, petitioner must prove an actual removal
or an actual change of domicile; a bona fide intention of abandoning the former place of
residence and establishing a new one and definite acts which correspond with the
purpose. 30 These requirements are hardly met by the evidence adduced in support of petitioner's
claims of a change of domicile from Tarlac to the Second District of Makati. In the absence of
clear and positive proof, the domicile of origin be deemed to continue requirements are hardly
met by the evidence adduced in support of petitioner's claims of a change of domicile from
Tarlac to the Second District of Makati. In the absence of clear and positive proof,
the domicile of origin should be deemed to continue.
Finally, petitioner's submission that it would be legally impossible to impose the one year
residency requirement in a newly created political district is specious and lacks basis in logic. A
new political district is not created out of thin air. It is carved out from part of a real and existing
geographic area, in this case the old Municipality of Makati. That people actually lived or were
domiciled in the area encompassed by the new Second District cannot be denied. Modern-day
carpetbaggers cannot be allowed take advantage of the creation of new political districts by
suddenly transplanting themselves in such new districts, prejudicing their genuine residents in
the process of taking advantage of existing conditions in these areas. It will be noted, as
COMELEC did in its assailed resolution, that petitioner was disqualified from running in the
Senate because of the constitutional two-term limit, and had to shop around for a place where he
could run for public office. Nothing wrong with that, but he must first prove with reasonable
certainty that he has effected a change of residence for election law purposes for the period
required by law. This he has not effectively done.
III
The next issue here is whether or not the COMELEC erred in issuing it Order instructing the
Board of Canvassers of Makati City to proclaim as winner the candidate receiving the next
higher number of votes. The answer must be in the negative.
To contend that Syjuco should be proclaimed because he was the "first" among the qualified
candidates in the May 8, 1995 elections is to misconstrue the nature of the democratic electoral
process and the sociological and psychological underpinnings behind voters' preferences. The
result suggested by private respondent would lead not only to our reversing the doctrines firmly
entrenched in the two cases of Labo vs. Comelec 31 but also to a massive disenfranchisement of
the thousands of voters who cast their vote in favor of a candidate they believed could be validly
voted for during the elections. Had petitioner been disqualified before the elections, the choice,
moreover, would have been different. The votes for Aquino given the acrimony which attended
the campaign, would not have automatically gone to second placer Syjuco. The nature of the
playing field would have substantially changed. To simplistically assume that the second placer
would have received the other votes would be to substitute our judgment for the mind of the
voter. The second placer is just that, a second placer. He lost the elections. He was repudiated by
either a majority or plurality of voters. He could not be considered the first among qualified
candidates because in a field which excludes the disqualified candidate, the conditions would
have substantially changed. We are not prepared to extrapolate the results under such
circumstances.
In these cases, the pendulum of judicial opinion in our country has swung from one end to the
other. In the early case of Topacio v. Paredes. 32 we declared as valid, votes cast in favor of a
disqualified, ineligilble or dead candidate provided the people who voted for such candidate
believed in good faith that at the time of the elections said candidate was either qualified, eligible
or alive. The votes cast in favor of a disqualified, ineligible or dead candidate who obtained the
next higher number of votes cannot be proclaimed as winner. According to this Court in the said
case, "there is not, strictly speaking, a contest, that wreath of victory cannot be transferred from
an ineligible candidate to any other candidate when the sole question is the eligibility of the one
receiving the plurality of the legally cast ballots."
Then in Ticson v. Comelec, 33 this Court held that votes cast in favor of a non-candidate in view
of his unlawful change of party affiliation (which was then a ground for disqualification) cannot
be considered in the canvassing of election returns and the votes fall into the category of invalid
and nonexistent votes because a disqualified candidate is no candidate at all and is not a
candidate in the eyes of the law. As a result, this Court upheld the proclamation of the only
candidate left in the disputed position.
In Geronimo v. Ramos 34 we reiterated our ruling in Topacio v. Paredes that the candidate who
lost in an election cannot be proclaimed the winner in the event the candidate who ran for the
portion is ineligible. We held in Geronimo:
[I]t would be extremely repugnant to the basic concept of the constitutionally
guaranteed right to suffrage if a candidate who has not acquired the majority or
plurality of votes is proclaimed a winner and imposed as the representative of a
constituency, the majority of which have positively declared through their ballots
that they do not choose him.
Sound policy dictates that public elective offices are filled by those who have
received the highest number of votes cast in the election for that office, and it is
fundamental idea in all republican forms of government that no one can be
declared elected and no measure can be declared carried unless he or it receives a
majority or plurality of the legal votes cast in the elections. (20 Corpus Juris 2nd,
S 243, p. 676.)
However, in Santos v. Comelec 35 we made a turnabout from our previous ruling in Geronimo
v. Ramos and pronounced that "votes cast for a disqualified candidate fall within the category of
invalid or non-existent votes because a disqualified candidate is no candidate at all in the eyes of
the law," reverting to our earlier ruling in Ticson v. Comelec.
In the more recent cases of Labo, Jr. v. Comelec 36 Abella v. Comelec; 37 and Benito
v. Comelec, 38 this Court reiterated and upheld the ruling in Topacio v. Paredes and Geronimo
v. Ramos to the effect that the ineligibility of a candidate receiving the next higher number of
votes to be declared elected, and that a minority or defeated candidate cannot be declared elected
to the office. In these cases, we put emphasis on our pronouncement in Geronimo v. Ramos that:
The fact that a candidate who obtained the highest number of votes is later
declared to be disqualified or not eligible for the office to which he was elected
does not necessarily entitle the candidate who obtained the second highest number
of votes to be declared the winner of the elective office. The votes cast for a dead,
disqualified, or non-eligible person may be valid to vote the winner into office or
maintain him there. However, in the absence of a statute which clearly asserts a
contrary political and legislative policy on the matter, if the votes were cast in
sincere belief that candidate was alive, qualified, or eligible; they should not be
treated as stray, void or meaningless.
Synthesizing these rulings we declared in the latest case of Labo, Jr. v. COMELEC that: 39
While Ortega may have garnered the second highest number of votes for the
office of city mayor, the fact remains that he was not the choice of the sovereign
will. Petitioner Labo was overwhelmingly voted by the electorate for the office of
mayor in the belief that he was then qualified to serve the people of Baguio City
and his subsequent disqualification does not make respondent Ortega the mayorelect. This is the import of the recent case of Abella v. Comelec (201 SCRA 253
[1991]), wherein we held that:
While it is true that SPC No. 88-546 was originally a petition to
deny due course to the certificate of candidacy of Larrazabal and
was filed before Larrazabal could be proclaimed the fact remains
that the local elections of Feb. 1, 1988 in the province of
Leyte proceeded with Larrazabal considered as a bona fide
candidate. The voters of the province voted for her in the sincere
belief that she was a qualified candidate for the position of
governor. Her votes was counted and she obtained the highest
number of votes. The net effect is that petitioner lost in the
election. He was repudiated by the electorate. . . What matters is
that in the event a candidate for an elected position who is voted
for and who obtains the highest number of votes is disqualified for
not possessing the eligibility, requirements at the time of the
election as provided by law, the candidate who obtains the second
highest number of votes for the same position cannot assume the
vacated position. (Emphasis supplied).
Our ruling in Abella applies squarely to the case at bar and we see no compelling
reason to depart therefrom. Like Abella, petitioner Ortega lost in the election. He
was repudiated by the electorate. He was obviously not the choice of the people of
Baguio City.
Thus, while respondent Ortega (G.R. No. 105111) originally filed a
disqualification case with the Comelec (docketed as SPA-92-029) seeking to deny
due course to petitioner's (Labo's) candidacy, the same did not deter the people of
Baguio City from voting for petitioner Labo, who, by then, was allowed by the
respondent Comelec to be voted upon, the resolution for his disqualification
having yet to attain the degree of finality (Sec. 78, Omnibus Election Code).
And in the earlier case of Labo v. Comelec. (supra), We held:
Finally, there is the question of whether or not the private
respondent, who filed the quo warranto petition, can replace the
petitioner as mayor. He cannot. The simple reason is that as he
obtained only the second highest number of votes in the election,
he was obviously not the choice of the people of Baguio City.
The latest ruling of the Court in this issue is Santos v. Commission
on Election, (137 SCRA 740) decided in 1985. In that case, the
candidate who placed second was proclaimed elected after the
votes for his winning rival, who was disqualified as a turncoat and
considered a non-candidate, were all disregarded as stray. In effect,
the second placer won by default. That decision was supported by
eight members of the Court then (Cuevas J., ponente, with
Makasiar, Concepcion, Jr., Escolin, Relova, De la Fuente,
Alampay, and Aquino, JJ., concurring) with three dissenting
(Teehankee, actingC.J., Abad Santos and Melencio-Herrera) and
another two reserving their votes (Plana and Gutierrez, Jr.). One
was on official leave (Fernando, C.J.)
Re-examining that decision, the Court finds, and so holds, that it should be
reversed in favor of the earlier case of Geronimo v. Santos (136 SCRA 435),
which represents the more logical and democratic rule. That case, which reiterated
the doctrine first announced in 1912 in Topacio vs.Paredes (23 Phil. 238) was
supported by ten members of the Court. . . .
The rule, therefore, is: the ineligibility of a candidate receiving majority votes
does not entitle the eligible candidate receiving the next highest number of votes
to be declared elected. A minority or defeated candidate cannot be deemed elected
to the office.
Indeed, this has been the rule in the United States since 1849 (State ex rel.
Dunning v. Giles, 52 Am. Dec. 149).
It is therefore incorrect to argue that since a candidate has been disqualified, the
votes intended for the disqualified candidate should, in effect, be considered null
and void. This would amount to disenfranchising the electorate in whom,
sovereignty resides. At the risk of being repetitious, the people of Baguio City
opted to elect petitioner Labo bona fide without any intention to missapply their
franchise, and in the honest belief that Labo was then qualified to be the person to
whom they would entrust the exercise of the powers of the government.
Unfortunately, petitioner Labo turned out to be disqualified and cannot assume the
office.
Whether or not the candidate whom the majority voted for can or cannot be
installed, under no circumstances can a minority or defeated candidate be deemed
elected to the office. Surely, the 12,602 votes cast for petitioner Ortega is not a
larger number than the 27,471 votes cast for petitioner Labo (as certified by the
Election Registrar of Baguio City; rollo, p. 109; G.R. No. 105111).
This, it bears repeating, expresses the more logical and democratic view. We cannot, in another
shift of the pendulum, subscribe to the contention that the runner-up in an election in which the
winner has been disqualified is actually the winner among the remaining qualified candidates
because this clearly represents a minority view supported only by a scattered number of obscure
American state and English court decisions. 40 These decisions neglect the possibility that the
runner-up, though obviously qualified, could receive votes so measly and insignificant in number
that the votes they receive would be tantamount to rejection. Theoretically, the "second placer"
could receive just one vote. In such a case, it is absurd to proclaim the totally repudiated
candidate as the voters' "choice." Moreover, even in instances where the votes received by the
second placer may not be considered numerically insignificant, voters preferences are
nonetheless so volatile and unpredictable that the result among qualified candidates, should the
equation change because of the disqualification of an ineligible candidate, would not be selfevident. Absence of the apparent though ineligible winner among the choices could lead to a
shifting of votes to candidates other than the second placer. By any mathematical formulation,
the runner-up in an election cannot be construed to have obtained a majority or plurality of votes
cast where an "ineligible" candidate has garnered either a majority or plurality of the votes.
In fine, we are left with no choice but to affirm the COMELEC's conclusion declaring herein
petitioner ineligible for the elective position of Representative of Makati City's Second District
on the basis of respondent commission's finding that petitioner lacks the one year residence in
the district mandated by the 1987 Constitution. A democratic government is necessarily a
government of laws. In a republican government those laws are themselves ordained by the
people. Through their representatives, they dictate the qualifications necessary for service in
government positions. And as petitioner clearly lacks one of the essential qualifications for
running for membership in the House of Representatives, not even the will of a majority or
plurality of the voters of the Second District of Makati City would substitute for a requirement
mandated by the fundamental law itself.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant petition is hereby DISMISSED. Our Order
restraining respondent COMELEC from proclaiming the candidate garnering the next highest
number of votes in the congressional elections for the Second District of Makati City is made
PERMANENT.
SO ORDERED.
Regalado, Melo, Puno and Hermosisima, Jr., JJ., concur.
Separate Opinions

I agree with the conclusion reached by the majority that petitioner Aquino has not shown by clear
and convincing evidence that he had established his residence in the second district of Makati
City for a period of not less than one (1) year prior to the 8 May 1995 elections. However, I do
not fully subscribe to its proposition that petitioner's residence (in Makati) should be his
"domicile of choice".
Article VI, Section 6 of the Constitution provides that:
No person shall be a member of the House of Representatives unless he is a
natural-born citizen of the Philippines and on the day of the election, is at least
twenty-five years of age, able to read and write, and, except the party list
representatives, a registered voter in the district in which he shall be elected, and
a resident thereof for a period of not less than one year immediately preceding the
day of the election. (emphasis supplied).
In G.R. No. 119976, Marcos vs. Comelec, I have maintained that the phrase "a resident thereof
for a period of not less than one year" means actual and physical presence in the legislative
district of the congressional candidate, and that said period of one year must be satisfied
regardless of whether or not a person's residence or domicile coincides.
To my mind, petitioner should be declared disqualified to run as representative in the 2nd district
of Makati City in the 8 May 1995 elections not because he failed to prove his residence therein
as his domicile of choice, but because he failed altogether to prove that he had actually and
physically resided therein for a period of not less than one (1) year immediately preceding the 8
May 1995 elections.
Noteworthy is the established fact before the Comelec that petitioner admits having
maintained other residencesin Metro Manila apart from his leased condominium unit in Makati's
2nd district. 1 This clear admission made by petitioner against his interest weakens his argument
that "where a party decides to transfer his legal residence so he can qualify for public office, he is
free to do so." (see p. 20, Petition).
Petitioner evidently wants to impress the Court that his other residences in Metro Manila could
never have become his domicile of choice because it never entered his mind and suddenly,
seemingly not contented with these other residences, he rents a condominium unit in Makati, and
calls it his domicile of choice all these without adding clear and convincing evidence that he
did actually live and reside in Makati for at least one year prior to 8 May 1995 and that he no
longer lived and resided in his other residences during said one year period.
It follows, likewise, that the lease contract relied upon by petitioner, standing alone, established
only the alleged date (April 25, 1994) of its due execution. Stated otherwise, the lease contract
tells us that petitioner had been leasing a condominium unit in Makati City for more than a year
prior to 8 May 1995, but it does not prove that petitioner actually and physically resided therein
for the same period, in the light of his admission that he maintained other residences in Metro
Manila.
In light of petitioner's disqualification, the corrollary issue to be resolved is whether or not
jurisdiction continued to be vested in the Comelec to order the Makati Board of Canvassers" to
determine and proclaim the winner out of the remaining qualified candidates" after petitioner had
been declared post 8 May 1995 as disqualified.
I agree with the proposition advanced by the Solicitor General that sec. 6 of R.A. 6646 clearly
provides that votes cast for a disqualified candidate shall not be counted, thus:
Sec. 6. Effect of Disqualification Case. Any candidate who has been declared
of his guilt is strong.
There can be no dispute that if a final judgment is rendered before the election, declaring a
particular candidate as disqualified, such disqualified candidate shall not be voted for and votes
cast for him shall not be counted, thus posing no problem in proclaiming the candidate who
receives the highest number of votes among the qualified candidates.
But what about after the election? Sec. 6 appears categorical enough in stating: "if any reason"
no final judgment of disqualification is rendered before the elections, and the candidate facing
disqualification is voted for and receives the winning number of votes, the Comelec or the Court
is not ousted of its jurisdiction to hear and try the case up to final judgment, hence, the power to
even suspend the proclamation of the erstwhile winning candidate when evidence of his guilt is
strong.
It thus appears clear that the law does not dichotomize the effect of a final judgment of
disqualification in terms of time considerations. There is only one natural and logical effect: the
disqualified candidate shall not be voted and, if voted, the votes cast for him shall not be
counted. Ubi lex non distinguit nec nos distinguere debemus (where the law does not distinguish,
we should not distinguish.)
At this point, what I said in Marcos, supra, follows:
What happens then when after the elections are over, one is declared disqualified?
Then, votes cast for him "shall not be counted" and in legal contemplation, he no
longer received the highest number of votes.
It stands to reason that Section 6 of RA 6646 does not make the second placer the
winner simply because a "winning candidate is disqualified," but that the law
considers him as the candidate who had obtained the highest number of votes as a
result of the votes cast for the disqualified candidate not being counted or
considered.
As this law clearly reflects the legislative policy on the matter, then there is no
reason why this Court should not re-examine and consequently abandon the
doctrine in the Jun Labo case. It has been stated that "the qualifications prescribed
for elective office cannot be erased by the electorate alone. The will of the people
as expressed through the ballot cannot cure the vice of ineligibility" most
especially when it is mandated by no less than the Constitution.
Therefore the candidate who received the highest number of votes from among the qualified
candidates, should be proclaimed
ACCORDINGLY, I vote to DISMISS the petition.
FRANCISCO, J., concurring and dissenting:

I concur with the well written ponencia of my most esteemed colleague, Mr. Justice Kapunan. I
wish, however, to express my views on some issues raised by the petitioner, viz., (1) jurisdiction
over the disqualification suit, (2)domicile, (3) theory of legal impossibility, and (4) "second
placer rule".
Petitioner emphatically maintains that only the House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal
(HRET) can declare his disqualification, especially after the elections. To bolster this stand, the
cases of Co v. HRET, 199 SCRA 692 (1991); Robles v. HRET, 181 SCRA 780 (1990); Lazatin
v. HRET, 168 SCRA 391 (1988); and Lachica v. Yap, 25 SCRA 140 (1968), have been cited as
supporting authorities. To my mind, this position is untenable. Section 17 of Article VI of the
1987 Constitution is clear and unambiguous that HRET jurisdiction applies only to
the members of the House of Representatives. The operative acts necessary for an electoral
candidate's rightful assumption of the office for which he ran are his proclamation and his taking
an oath of office. Petitioner cannot in anyway be considered as a member of the House of
Representatives for the purpose of divesting the Commission on Elections of jurisdiction to
declare his disqualification and invoking instead HRET's jurisdiction, it indubitably appearing
that he has yet to be proclaimed, much less has he taken an oath of office. Clearly, petitioner's
reliance on the aforecited cases which when perused involved Congressional members, is totally
misplaced, if not wholly inapplicable. That the jurisdiction conferred upon HRET extends only to
Congressional members is further established by judicial notice of HRET Rules of
procedure, 1 and HRET decisions 2 consistently holding that the proclamation the essential
requisite vesting jurisdiction on the HRET.
Moreover, a perusal of the records shows that the question on COMELEC's jurisdiction is now
barred by estoppel. It is to be noted that in his May 2, 1995 Answer, as well as in his
Memorandum and Supplemental Memorandum filed before the COMELEC's Second Division,
petitioner never assailed COMELEC's lacks of jurisdiction to rule on his qualification. On the
contrary, he asked that the disqualification suit against him be dismissed on the following
grounds: that it was filed outside the reglementary period; that the one year residence
requirement of the 1987 Constitution is inapplicable due to the recent conversion of the
municipality of Makati into a city under R.A. No. 7854; that he committed a simple inadvertence
in filing up his certificate of candidacy; that the proper procedure to attack his qualification is
by a quo warranto proceeding; that he had actually and physically resided in Makati for more
than a year; and for lack of merit, the case should be outrightly dismissed. In a hearing conducted
by the COMELEC on May 2, 1995, petitioner even submitted his evidence (e.g. affidavits,
amended certificate of candidacy, copy of the lease contract) to prove that he is qualified for the
position. Subsequently, on May 16, 1995, in response to the COMELEC En Banc's May 15,
1995 Order suspending the proclamation of the winner, petitioner filed his Comment/Opposition
with Urgent Motion To Lift Order of Suspension of Proclamation asking for the lifting of the
COMELEC's order of suspension. On May 19, 1995, petitioner again filed a Memorandum and
averred that the recent conversion of Makati into a city made the one-year residence requirement
inapplicable; that he resided in Makati for more than a year; that quo warranto is the right
remedy to question his qualification. In passing, petitioner also alleged that the issue on his
qualification should be "properly" ventilated in a full-dress hearing before the HRET, albeit
praying for the dismissal of the motion for reconsideration for utter lack of merit (and not for
lack of jurisdiction), and for lifting the suspension of his proclamation. It was only on June 01,
1995, in his Motion to File Supplemental Memorandum and Urgent Motion to Resolve Motion
to Lift Suspension of Proclamation, when the petitioner raised COMELEC's alleged lack of
jurisdiction to resolve the question on his qualification. Clearly then, petitioner has actively
participated in the proceedings both before the COMELEC's Second Division and the
COMELEC En Banc asking therein affirmative reliefs. The settled rule is that a party who
objects to the jurisdiction of the court and alleges at the same time any non-jurisdictional ground
for dismissing the action is deemed to have submitted himself to the jurisdiction of the
court. 3 Where a party voluntary submits to the jurisdiction of the court and thereafter loses on
the merits, he may not thereafter be heard to say that the court had no
jurisdiction. 4 In Jimenez v. Macaraig, 5 the Court, citing Crisostomo v. Court of Appeals, 32
SCRA 54, 60 (1970), elaborated on the rationale for this doctrine in this wise:
The petitioners, to borrow the language of Mr. Justice Bautista Angelo (People vs.
Archilla, G.R. No. L-15632, February 28, 1961, 1 SCRA 699, 700-701), cannot
adopt a posture of double-dealing without running afoul of the doctrine of
estoppel. The principle of estoppel is in the interest of a sound administration of
the laws. It should deter those who are disposed to trifle with the courts by taking
inconsistent positions contrary to the elementary principles of right dealing and
good faith (People v. Acierto, 92 Phil. 534, 541, [1953]). 6
It is not right for a party who has affirmed and invoked the jurisdiction of a court in a
particular matter to secure an affirmative relief to afterwards deny that same jurisdiction
to escape an adverse decision. 7Perforce, petitioner's asseveration that the COMELEC has
no jurisdiction to rule on his qualification must fail.
Petitioner insists that domicile is a matter of personal intention. Thus, petition asserts that if he
decides to transfer his legal residence so he can qualify for public office then he is entirely free to
do so. Thus argument to hold water, must be supported by a clear and convincing proofs that
petitioner has effectively abandoned his former domicile and that his intention is not doubtful.
Indeed, domicile once established is considered to continue and will not be deemed lost until a
new one is established (Co v. Electoral Tribunal House of Representatives, 199 SCRA 692, 711
[1991]). Petitioner from childhood until his last election as senator has consistently maintained
Concepcion, Tarlac, as his domicile. He moved to Amapola Street, Palm Village, Makati, and
thereafter claimed the same to be his new domicile. This claim, however, is dismally
unsupported by the records. The lease contract entered into by petitioner for a period of two
years on the third floor condominium unit in Palm Village, Makati, in my view, does not prove
his intent to abandon his domicile of origin. The intention to establish domicile must be an
intention to remain indefinitely or permanently in the new place. 8 This element is lacking in this
instance. Worse, public respondent Commission even found that "respondent Aquino himself
testified that his intention was really for only one (1) year because he has other 'residences' in
Manila
or
in
Quezon
City ([citing]
TSN,
May
2,
1995,
9
p. 92)". Noting that petitioner is already barred from running for senator due to the
constitutional consecutive two-term limit, his search for a place where he could further and
continue his political career and sudden transfer thereto make his intent suspect. The best test of
intention
to
establish
legal
residence
comes from one's acts and not by mere declarations alone. 10 To acquire, or effect a change of
domicile, the intention must be bonafide and unequivocal (28 C.J.S. 11). Petitioner, in my view,
miserably failed to show a bonafide and unequivocal intention to effect the change of his
domicile.
The theory of legal impossibility is advanced to justify non-compliance with the constitutional
qualification on residency. Petitioner explains his theory in this wise:
. . . THE COMELEC CRITICALLY ERRED IN FAILING TO APPRECIATE
THE LEGAL IMPOSSIBILITY OF ENFORCING THE ONE YEAR
RESIDENCY REQUIREMENT OF CONGRESSIONAL CANDIDATES IN
NEWLY CREATED POLITICAL DISTRICTS WHICH WERE ONLY
IN MAKATI. 11
Apparently, this theory is an offshoot of Republic Act. No. 7854, an act converting the
municipality of Makati into a highly urbanized city. This law enacted on January 2, 1995,
established a second Congressional district in Makati in which petitioner ran as a
Congressional candidate. Since the second district, according to petitioner, is barely four
(4) months old then the one (1) year residence qualification provided by the Constitution
is inapplicable. Petitioner's acts, however, as borne by the records, belie his own theory.
Originally, he placed in his certificate of candidacy an entry of ten (10) months residence
in Makati. Petitioner then had it amended to one (1) year and thirteen (13) days to correct
what claims as a mere inadvertent mistake. I doubt the sincerity of this representation. If
petitioner is indeed persuaded by his own theory, the ten months residence he initially
wrote would have more than sufficiently qualified him to run in the barely four-month
old Makati district. The amendment only reveals the true intent of petitioner to comply
with one year constitutional requirement for residence, adding an extra thirteen (13) days
full measure. Petitioner apparently wanted to argue one way (theory of legal
impossibility), but at the same time played it safe in the other (the constitutional one year
residence requirement). And that is not all. If we were to adhere to petitioner's theory of
legal impossibility, then residents in that district shorn of the constitutional six months
residence requirement for prospective voters (Article V, Section 1 of the 1987
Constitution) would have certainly qualified to vote. That would have legitimized the
entry and electoral exercise of flying voters one of the historic nemeses of a clean and
honest election. Furthermore, to subscribe to petitioner's contention that the constitutional
qualification of candidates should be brushed aside in view of the enactment of R.A. No.
7854 will indubitably violate the manner and procedure for the amendment or revision of
the constitution outlined under Article XVIII of the 1987 Constitution. A legislative
enactment, it has to be emphasized, cannot render nugatory the constitution. The
constitution is superior to a statute. It is the fundamental and organic law of the land to
which every statute must conform and harmonize.
Finally, it has been contended that a second place candidate cannot be proclaimed a substitute
winner. I find the proposition quite unacceptable. A disqualified "candidate" is not a candidate
and the votes which may have been cast in his favor are nothing but stray votes of no legal
consequence. A disqualified person like the petitioner receives no vote or zero vote. In short,
no-candidate-no vote. Petitioner had therefore no right, in fact and in law, to claim first place for
he has nothing to base his right. The legislative intent is clear as provided by R.A. 6646, Section
6, in that votes cast for a disqualified candidate shall not be counted as they are
considered stray (Section 211, Rule 24, Omnibus Election Code). It is only from the ranks of
qualified candidates can one be chosen as first placer and not from without. Necessarily,
petitioner, a disqualified candidate, cannot be a first placer as he claims himself to be. To count
the votes for a disqualified candidate would, in my view, disenfranchise voters who voted for a
qualified candidate. Legitimate votes cast for a qualified candidate should not be penalized
alongside a disqualified candidate. With this in mind, the other qualified candidate who garnered
the highest number of votes should be proclaimed the duly elected representative of the district. I
feel that the Labo doctrine ought to be abandoned.
I therefore vote to deny the petition and to lift the temporary restraining order issued by the
Court dated June 6, 1995.
DAVIDE, JR., J., dissenting:

In sustaining the COMELEC's acts of suspending the proclamation of petitioner Agapito A.
Aquino and of proceeding to hear the disqualification case against him, the majority opinion
relies on Section 6 of R.A. No. 6646 which it claims to be applicable by virtue of Section 7
thereof to petitions to deny due course to or cancel a certificate of candidacy under Section 78 of
the Omnibus Election Code (B.P. Blg. 881).
I disagree.
In the first place, the petition to disqualify the petitioner in SPA No. 95-113 is not a petition to
deny due course to or cancel a certificate of candidacy under Section 78, which reads:
Sec. 78. Petition to deny due course to or cancel a certificate of candidacy. A
verified petition seeking to deny due course or to cancel a certificate of candidacy
may be filed by any personexclusively on the ground that any material
representation contained therein as required under Section 74 hereof is false. The
petition may be filed at any time not later than twenty-five days from the time of
the filing of the certificate of candidacy and shall be decided, after due notice and
hearing, not later than fifteen days before the election. (emphasis supplied)
Nowhere in the petition in SPA No. 95-113 is it alleged by the private respondents that a material
representation contained in the petitioner's certificate of candidacy is false. What is being
attacked therein is the petitioner's lack of the one-year residence qualification in the new Second
Legislative District of Makati City where he sought to he elected for the office of Congressman.
The rule governing disqualification cases on the ground of ineligibility, which is also invoked by
the private respondents, is Rule 25 of the COMELEC Rules of Procedure, as amended on 15
February 1993. The amendment allows the, filing of a petition to disqualify a candidate on the
ground that he does not possess all the qualifications provided for by the Constitution or by
existing laws. In its original form, the rule only applied to petitions for disqualification based on
the commission of any act declared by law to be a ground for disqualification. The rule as thus
amended now reads as follows:
Rule 25 Disqualification of Candidates
Sec. 1. Grounds for Disqualification. Any candidate who does not possess all
the qualifications of a candidate as provided for by the Constitution or by existing
law or who commits any act declared by law to be grounds for disqualification
may be disqualified from continuing as a candidate.
Sec. 2. Who May File Petition for Disqualification. Any citizen of voting age,
or duly registered political party, organization or coalition of political parties may
file with the Law Department of the Commission a petition to disqualify a
candidate on grounds provided by law.
Sec. 3. Period to File Petition. The petition shall be filed any day after the last
day for filing of certificates of candidacy but not later than the date of
proclamation.
Sec. 4. Summary Proceeding. The petition shall be heard summarily after due
notice.
Sec. 5. Effect of Petition if Unresolved Before Completion of Canvass. If the
petition, for reasons beyond the control of the Commission, cannot be decided
before the completion of the canvass, the votes cast for the respondent may be
included in the counting and in the canvassing; however, if the evidence of guilt is
strong, his proclamation shall be suspended notwithstanding the fact that he
received the winning number of votes in such election.
The underscored portion is the amendment to Rule 25, which the COMELEC must have
deemed necessary to fill up a procedural hiatus in cases of disqualifications based on
other grounds in the light of this Court's interpretation in Loong vs. Commission on
Elections (216 SCRA 760 [1992]) that Rule 25 refers only to disqualifications under
Sections 12 and 68 of the Omnibus Election Code. This Court explicitly stated therein as
follows:
We do not agree with private respondent Ututalum's contention that the petition
for disqualification, as in the case at bar, may be filed at any time after the last day
for filing a certificate of candidacy but not later than the date of proclamation,
applying Section 3, Rule 25 of the Comelec Rules of Procedure.
Rule 25 of the Comelec Rules of Procedure refers to Disqualification of
Candidates; and Section 1 of said rule provides that any candidate who commits
any act declared by law to be a ground for disqualification maybe disqualified
from continuing as a candidate. The grounds for disqualification as expressed in
Sections 12 and 68 of the Code, are the following:
Sec. 12. Disqualification. Any person who has been declared by
competent authority insane or incompetent, or has been sentenced
by final judgment for subversion, insurrection, rebellion or for any
offense for which he has been sentenced to a penalty of more than
eighteen months or for a crime involving moral turpitude, shall be
disqualified to be a candidate and to hold any office, unless he has
been given plenary pardon or granted amnesty.
Sec. 63 DisquaIifications. Any candidate who, in an action or
protest in which he is a party is declared by final decision of 4
competent court guilty of, or found by the Commission of having
(a) given money or other material consideration to influence,
induce or corrupt the voters or public officials performing electoral
functions; (b) committed acts of terrorism to enhance his
candidacy; (c) spent in his election campaign an amount in excess
of that allowed by this Code; (d) solicited, received or made any
contribution prohibited under Sections 89, 95, 96, 97 and 104; or
(e) violated any of Sections 80, 83, 85, 86 and 261, paragraphs d,
e, k, v, and cc, sub-paragraph 6, shall be disqualified from
continuing as a candidate, or if he has been elected, from holding
the office. Any person who is a permanent resident of or an
immigrant to a foreign country shall not be qualified to run for any
elective office under this Code, unless said person has waived his
status as permanent resident or immigrant of a foreign country in
accordance with the residence requirement provided for in the
election laws.
The petition filed by private respondent Ututalum with the respondent Comelec to
disqualify petitioner Loong on the ground that the latter made a false
representation in his certificate of candidacy as to his age, clearly does not fall
under the grounds of disqualification as provided for in Rule 25 but is expressly
covered by Rule 23 of the Comelec Rules of Procedure governing petitions to
cancel certificate of candidacy. Moreover, Section 3, Rule 25 which allows the
filing of the petition at any time after the last day for the filing of certificates of
candidacy but not later than the date of proclamation, is merely a procedural rule
issued by respondent Commission which, although a constitutional body, has no
legislative powers. Thus, it can not supersede Section 78 of the Omnibus Election
Code which is a legislative enactment.
Second, even if we assume for the sake of argument that the petition in SPA No. 95-113 fall
under Section 78 of the Omnibus Election Code, still Section 6 of R.A. No. 6646 cannot be
applied by virtue of Section 7 thereof. Sections 6 and 7 reads:
Sec. 71 Petition to Deny Due Course to or Cancel a Certificate of Candidacy.
The procedure hereinabove provided shall apply to petitions to deny due course to
or cancel a certificate of candidacy as provided in Section 78 of Batas
Pambansa Blg. 881.
The "procedure hereinabove provided" mentioned in Section 7 cannot be construed to refer to
Section 6 whichdoes not provide for a procedure but for the EFFECTS of disqualification cases.
It can only refer to the procedureprovided in Section 5 of the said Act on nuisance candidates
which reads as follows:
Sec. 5. Procedure in Cases of Nuisance Candidates. A verified petition to
declare a duly registered candidate as a nuisance candidate under Section 69 .f
Batas Pambansa Blg. 881 shall be filed personally or through duly authorized
representative with the Commission by any registered candidate for the same
office within five (5) days from the last day for the filing of certificates of
candidacy. Filing by mail shall not be allowed.
(b) Within three (3) days from the filing of the petition, the Commission shall
issue summons to the respondent candidate together with a copy of the petition
and its enclosures, if any.
(c) The respondent shall be given three (3) days from receipt of the summons
within which to file his verified answer (not a motion to dismiss) to the petition,
serving copy thereof upon the petitioner. Grounds for a motion to dismiss may be
raised as affirmative defenses.
(d) The Commission may designate any of its officials who are lawyers to hear
the case and receive evidence. The proceeding shall be summary in nature.
In lieu of oral testimonies, the parties may be required to submit position papers
together with affidavits or counter-affidavits and other documentary evidence.
The hearing officer shall immediately submit to the Commission his findings,
reports, and recommendations within five (5) days from the completion of such
submission of evidence. The Commission shall render its decision within five (5)
days from receipt thereof.
(e) The decision, order, or ruling of the Commission shall, after five (5) days from
receipt of a copy thereof by the parties, be final and executory unless stayed by
the Supreme Court.
(f) The Commission shall within twenty-four hours, through the fastest available
means, disseminate its decision or the decision of the Supreme Court or the city or
municipal election registrars, boards of election inspectors, and the general public
in the political subdivision concerned.
and which is the only procedure that precedes Section 7 of the said Act. Heretofore, no
law provided for the procedure to govern cases under Section 78. Applying to such cases,
through Section 7 of R.A. No. 6646, the procedure applicable to cases of nuisance
candidates is prudent and wise, for both cases necessarily require that they be decided
before the day of the election; hence, only summary proceedings thereon can adequately
respond to the urgency of the matter.
Third, Section 6 merely supplements Section 72 of the Omnibus Election Code providing as
follows:
Sec. 72. Effects of disqualification cases and priority. The Commission and the
courts shall give priority to cases of disqualification by reason of violation of this
Act to the end that a final decision shall be rendered not later than seven days
before the election in which the disqualification is sought.
Any candidate who has been declared by final judgment to be disqualified shall
not be voted for, and the votes cast for him shall not be counted. Nevertheless, if
for any reason, a candidate is not declared by final judgment before an election to
be disqualified and he is voted for and receives the winning number of votes in
such election, his violation of the provisions of the preceding sections shall not
prevent his proclamation and assumption to office.
by granting the COMELEC or the Court the authority to continue hearing the case and to
suspend the proclamation if the evidence of guilt is strong. As observed by this Court in
its majority "the phrase 'when the evidence of guilt is strong' seems to suggest that the
provisions of Section 6 ought to be applicable only to disqualification cases under
Section 68 of the Omnibus Election Code."
Fourth, the amended Rule 25 of the COMELEC Rules of Procedure, which is the only rule
governing petitions filed before election or proclamation for the disqualification of a candidate
on the ground that he lacks the qualifications provided for by the Constitution or by law, does
not, as can be gathered from Section 5 thereof, authorize the COMELEC to continue hearing the
case after the election.
Fifth, even assuming that the second sentence of Section 6 of R.A. to No. 6646 is applicable to
disqualification cases based on the ground of lack of qualification, it cannot be applied to a case
does not involve elective regional, provincial, and city officials, and where suspension of
proclamation is not warranted because of the absence of strong evidence of guilt or ineligibility.
In such a case the candidate sought to be disqualified but who obtains the highest number of
votes has to be proclaimed. Once he is proclaimed, the COMELEC cannot continue with the
case, and the remedy of the opponent is to contest the winning candidate's eligibility within ten
days from proclamation in a quo warranto proceeding which is within the jurisdiction of the
metropolitan or municipal trial courts, in the case of barangay officials; the regional trial courts,
in case of municipal officials (Section 2(2), Article IX-C, Constitution; Section 253, paragraph 2,
B.P. Blg. 881); the House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal, in the case of Congressmen; the
Senate Electoral Tribunal, in the case of Senators (Section 17, Article VI, Constitution); and the
Supreme Court en banc, in the case of the President or Vice-President (Section 4, Article VII,
Constitution).
If what is involved is an elective regional, provincial, or city official, and the case cannot be
decided before the election, the COMELEC can, even after the proclamation of the candidate
sought to be disqualified, proceed with the case by treating it as a petition for quo warranto,
since such a case properly pertains to the exclusive jurisdiction of the COMELEC (Section 2(2),
Article IX-C, Constitution; Section 253, B.P. Blg. 881).
But even granting for the sake of argument that Sections 6 and 7 of R.A. No. 6646, in relation to
Section 78 of the Omnibus Election Code and the amended Rule 25 of the COMELEC Rules of
Procedure, are applicable, the order of suspension of the petitioner's proclamation issued on 15
May 1995 is null and void for having been issued with grave abuse of discretion. What was
before the COMELEC en banc at that stage was the decision of the Second Division of 6 May
1995 dismissing the petition to disqualify the petitioner and declaring him qualified for the
position. That decision is a direct and positive rejection of any claim that the evidence of the
petitioner's guilt is strong. Note that it was only on 2 June 1995, when the COMELEC en
banc reversed the decision of the Second Division, that it was found that the evidence of the
petitioner's ineligibility is strong. It would have been otherwise if the Second Division had
disqualified the petitioner.
Besides, at the time the questioned order was issued, there was no hearing yet on the private
respondents' motions for the suspension of the petitioner's proclamation. In fact, in that order the
COMELEC en banc admitted that the said motions could not be resolved without hearing, thus:
Pending the resolution of the petitioners' Motion for Reconsideration filed on May
7, 1995; Urgent Motion Ad Cautelam to Suspend Proclamation of Respondent
(May 10, 1995) filed on May 10, 1995; and OMNIBUS MOTION (For
Reconsideration of the Honorable Commission's [Second Division] Resolution
dated May 6, 1995, and 2nd Urgent Motion Ad Cautelam to Suspend
Proclamation of Respondent Aquino, which cannot be resolved without hearing,
without violating the right of the respondent to due process. . . .
For being void from the beginning; it is as if the order of 15 May 1995 had not existed and could
not, therefore, be made permanent by the COMELEC en banc through its resolution of 2 June
1995 whose dispositive portion reads in part: [c]onsequently, the order of suspension of the
respondent should he obtain the winning number of votes, issued by this Commission on 15 May
1995 is now made permanent."
Absent a valid finding before the election or after the canvass of election returns that the
evidence of the petitioner's guilt or ineligibility is strong, the COMELEC should not have
suspended the proclamation of the petitioner. After the completion of the canvass the petitioner
should have been proclaimed.
This case then must be distinguished from that of Imelda Romualdez-Marcos vs. Commission on
Elections, G.R. No. 119976, where the COMELEC en banc affirmed before the elections, or on 7
May 1995, the Second Division's resolution of 24 April 1995 disqualifying Mrs. Marcos.
Accordingly, the order of 15 May 1995 and the resolution of 2 June 1995 of the COMELEC en
banc must be annulled and set aside, and the COMELEC, through its City Board of Canvassers
of Makati, must be ordered to immediately proclaim the petitioner, without prejudice to the right
of his opponents to file a petition for quo warranto with the House of Representatives Electoral
Tribunal, which is the sole judge of all contests relating to the election, returns and qualifications
of the Members of the House of Representatives (Section 17, Article VI, Constitution).
In view of the foregoing, a disquisition on the merits of the ground for the petitioner's
disqualification will no longer be proper.
I vote to GRANT the instant petition, to ANNUL and SET ASIDE the challenged order and
resolution of the Commission on Elections en banc, and to DIRECT the Board of Canvassers of
Makati City to reconvene and proclaim the petitioner as the winning candidate, without prejudice
on the part of any aggrieved party to file the appropriate action in the House of Representatives
Electoral Tribunal.
Romero and Bellosillo, JJ., concur.
VITUG, J., separate opinion:

I find what I would consider as the relevant issues in this petition as similar in almost all material
respects to those obtaining in G.R. No. 119976 (Imelda Romualdez-Marcos vs. Commission on
Elections and Cirilo Roy Montejo). Let me then here just reiterate what I have there said in my
separate opinion.
The case at bench deals with explicit Constitutional mandates.
The Constitution is not a pliable instrument. It is a bedrock in our legal system that sets up ideals
and directions and render steady our strides hence. It only looks back so as to ensure that
mistakes in the past are not repeated. A complaint transience of a constitution belittles its basic
function and weakens its goals. A constitution may well become outdated by the realities of time.
When it does, it must be changed but while it remains, we owe it respect and allegiance.
Anarchy, open or subtle, has never been, nor must it ever be, the answer to perceived transitory
needs, let alone societal attitudes, or the Constitution might lose its very essence.
Constitutional provisions must be taken to be mandatory in character unless, either by express
statement or by necessary implication, a different intention is manifest (see Marcelino vs. Cruz,
121 SCRA 51).
The two provisions initially brought to focus are Section 6 and Section 17 of Article VI of the
fundamental law. These provisions read:
Sec. 6. No person shall be a Member of the House of Representatives unless he is
a natural-born citizen of the Philippines and, on the day of the election, is at least
twenty-five years of age, able to read and write, and, except the party-list
representatives, a registered voter in the district in which he shall be elected, and a
resident thereof for a period of not less than one year immediately preceding the
day of the election.
Sec. 17. The Senate and the House of Representatives shall each have an Electoral
Tribunal which shall be the sole judge of all contests relating to the election,
returns, and qualifications of their respective Members. Each Electoral Tribunal
shall be composed of nine Members, three of whom shall be Justices of the
Supreme Court to be designated by the Chief Justice, and the remaining six shall
be Members of the Senate or the House of Representatives, as the case may be,
who shall be chosen on the basis of proportional representation from the political
parties and the parties or organizations registered under the party-list system
represented therein. The senior Justice in the Electoral Tribunal shall be its
Chairman.
The Commission on Election (the "COMELEC") is constitutionally bound to enforce and
administer "all laws and regulations relative to the conduct of election . . ." (Art. IX, C, Sec. 2,
Constitution) that, there being nothing said to the contrary, should include its authority to pass
upon the qualification and disqualification prescribed by law ofcandidates to an elective office.
Indeed, pre-proclamation controversies are expressly placed under the COMELEC's jurisdiction
to hear and resolve (Art. IX, C, Sec. 3, Constitution).
The matter before us specifically calls for the observance of the constitutional one-year residency
requirement. This issue (whether or not there is here such compliance), to my mind, is basically a
question of fact or at least inextricably linked to such determination. The findings and judgment
of the COMELEC, in accordance with the long established rule and subject only to a number of
exceptions under the basic heading of "grave abuse of discretion," are not reviewable by this
Court.
I do not find much need to do a complex exercise on what seems to me to be a plain matter.
Generally,
the
term
"residence"
has
a
broader
connotation
that
mean permanent (domicile), official (place where one's official duties may require him to stay)
or temporary (the place where he sojourns during a considerable length of time). For Civil law
purposes, i.e., as regards the exercise of civil rights and the fulfillment of civil obligations, the
domicile of a natural person is the place of his habitual residence (see Article 50, Civil Code). In
election cases, the controlling rule is that heretofore announced by this Court in Romualdez
vs. Regional Trial Court, Branch 7, Tacloban City (226 SCRA 408, 409); thus:
In election cases, the Court treats domicile and residence as synonymous terms,
thus: "(t)he term "residence" as used in the election law is synonymous with
"domicile," which imports not only an intention to reside in a fixed place but also
personal presence in that place, coupled with conduct indicative of such
intention." "Domicile" denotes a fixed permanent residence to which when absent
for business or pleasure, or for like reasons, one intends to return. . . . Residence
thus acquired, however, may be lost by adopting another choice of domicile. In
order, in turn, to acquire a new domicile by choice, there must concur (1)
residence or bodily presence in the new locality, (2) an intention to remain there,
and (3) an intention to abandon the old domicile. In other words, there must
basically be animus manendi coupled with animus non revertendi. The purpose to
remain in or at the domicile of choice must be for an indefinite period of time; the
change of residence must be voluntary, and the residence at the place chosen for
the new domicile must be actual.
Using the above tests, I am not convinced that we can charge the COMELEC with having
committed grave abuse of discretion in its assailed resolution.
The COMELEC's jurisdiction, in the case of congressional elections, ends when the jurisdiction
of the Electoral Tribunal concerned begins. It signifies that the protestee must have theretofore
been duly proclaimed and has since become a "member" of the Senate or the House of
Representatives. The question can be asked on whether or not the proclamation of a candidate is
just a ministerial function of the Commission on Elections dictated solely on the number of votes
cast in an election exercise. I believe, it is not. A ministerial duty is an obligation the
performance of which, being adequately defined, does not allow the use of further judgment or
discretion. The COMELEC; in its particular case, is tasked with the full responsibility of
ascertaining all the facts and conditions such as may be required by law before a proclamation is
properly done.
The Court, on its part, should, in my view at least, refrain from any undue encroachment on the
ultimate exercise of authority by the Electoral Tribunals on matters which, by no less than a
constitutional fiat, are explicitly within their exclusive domain. The nagging question, if it were
otherwise, would be the effect of the Court's peremptory pronouncement on the ability of the
Electoral Tribunal to later come up with its own judgment in a contest "relating to the election,
returns and qualification" of its members.
Prescinding from all the foregoing, I should like to next touch base on the applicability to this
case of Section 6 of Republic Act No. 6646, in relation to Section 72 of Batas Pambansa Blg.
881, each providing thusly:
REPUBLIC ACT NO. 6646
xxx xxx xxx
BATAS PAMBANSA BLG. 881
xxx xxx xxx
be disqualified, and he is voted for and receives the winning number of votes in
I realize that in considering the significance of the law, it may be preferable to look for not so
much the specific instances they ostensibly would cover as the principle they clearly convey.
Thus, I will not scoff at the argument that it should be sound to say that votes cast in favor of the
disqualified candidate, whenever ultimately declared as such, should not be counted in his or her
favor and must accordingly be considered to be stray votes. The argument, nevertheless, is far
outweighed by the rationale of the now prevailing doctrine first enunciated in the case
of Topacio vs. Paredes (23 Phil. 238 (1912]) which, although later abandoned in Ticzon
vs. Comelec (103 SCRA 687 [1981]), and Santos vs. COMELEC (137 SCRA 740 [1985]), was
restored, along with the interim case of Geronimo vs. Ramos (136 SCRA 435 [1985]), by
the Labo (176 SCRA 1 [1989]), Abella (201 SCRA 253 [1991]), Labo (211 SCRA 297 [1992])
and, most recently, Benito (235 SCRA 436 (1994]) rulings. Benito vs.Comelec was a unanimous
decision penned by Justice Kapunan and concurred in by Chief Justice Narvasa, Justices
Feliciano, Padilla, Bidin, Regalado, Davide, Romero, Melo, Quiason, Puno, Vitug and Mendoza
(Justices Cruz and Bellosillo were on official leave). For easy reference, let me quote from the
first Labo decision:
Finally, there is the question of whether or not the private respondent, who filed
the quo warrantopetition, can replace the petitioner as mayor. He cannot. The
simple reason is that as he obtained only the second highest number of votes in
the election, he was obviously not the choice of the people of Baguio City.
The latest ruling of the Court on this issue is Santos v. Commission on Elections,
(137 SCRA 740) decided in 1985. In that case, the candidate who placed second
was proclaimed elected after the votes for his winning rival, who was disqualified
as a turncoat and considered a non-candidate, were all disregard as stray. In effect,
the second placer won by default. That decision was supported by eight members
of the Court then, (Cuevas, J., ponente, with Makasiar, Concepcion, Jr., Escolin,
Relova, De la Fuente, Alampay and Aquino, JJ., concurring.) with three
dissenting (Teehankee, Acting C.J., Abad Santos and Melencio-Herrera, JJ.) and
another two reserving their vote. (Plana and Gutierrez, Jr., JJ.) One was on
official leave. (Fernando, C.J.)
reversed in favor of the earlier case of Geronimo v. Ramos, (136 SCRA 435)
the doctrine first announced in 1912 in Topacio v.Paredes, (23 Phil. 238) was
supported by ten members of the Court, (Gutierrez, Jr., ponente, with Teehankee,
Abad Santos, Melencio-Herrera, Plana, Escolin, Relova, De la Fuente, Cuevas
and Alampay, JJ., concurring) without any dissent, although one reserved his
vote,
(Makasiar, J.) another took no part, (Aquino, J.) and two others were on leave.
(Fernando, C.J. and Concepcion, Jr., J.) There the Court held:
. . . it would be extremely repugnant to the basic concept of the
constitutionally guaranteed right to suffrage if a candidate who has
not acquired the majority or plurality of votes is proclaimed a
winner and imposed as the representative of a constituency, the
majority of which have positively declared through their ballots
Sound policy dictates that public elective offices are filled by those
who have received the highest number of votes cast in the election
for that office, and it is a fundamental idea in all republican forms
of government that no one can be declared elected and no measure
can be declared carried unless he or it receives a majority or
plurality of the legal votes cast in the election. (20 Corpus Juris
2nd, S 234, p. 676.)
The fact that the candidate who obtained the highest number of
votes is later declared to be disqualified or not eligible for the
office to which he was elected does not necessarily entitle the
candidate who obtained the second highest number of votes to be
declared the winner of the elective office. The votes cast for a
dead, disqualified, or non-eligible person may not be valid to vote
the winner into office or maintain him there. However, in the
absence of a statute which clearly asserts a contrary political and
legislative policy on the matter, if the votes were cast in the sincere
belief that the candidate was alive, qualified, or eligible, they
should not be treated as stray, void or meaningless. (at pp. 20-21)
Accordingly, I am constrained to vote for the dismissal of the petition.
MENDOZA, J., separate opinion:

For the reasons expressed in my separate opinion in the companion case. G.R. No.
119976. Imelda Romualdez-Marcos v. Commission on Elections. I am of the opinion that the
Commission on Elections has no jurisdiction over petitions for disqualification of candidates
based on alleged ineligibility for the office to which they seek election.
The May 15, 1995 resolution of the COMELEC en banc, suspending he obtain the highest
number of votes of Representative of the Second District of Makati, Metro Manila, purports to
have been issued pursuant to 6 of R.A. No. 6646. This provision authorizes the COMELEC to
order the suspension of the proclamation "whenever the evidence of his guilt is strong." As
explained in my separate opinion in G.R. No. 119976, however, this provision refers to
proceedings under 68 of the Omnibus Election Code which provides for the disqualification of
candidates found guilty of using what in political parlance have been referred to as "guns goons
or gold" to influence the outcome of elections. Since the disqualification of petitioner in this case
was not sought on this ground, the application of 6 of R.A.. No. 6646 is clearly a grave abuse of
discretion on the part of the COMELEC.
Nor may the petition to disqualify petitioner in the COMELEC be justified under 78 of the OEC
which authorizes the filing of a petition for the cancellation of certificates of candidacy since
such a petition maybe filed "exclusivelyon the ground that a material representation contained [in
the certificate] as required under section 74 is false." There was no allegation that in stating in his
certificate of candidacy that he is a resident of Amapola St., Palm Village, Guadalupe Viejo,
Makati, Metro Manila, petitioner made any false representation.
For this reason, I am of the opinion that the COMELEC had no jurisdiction over SPA No. 95113; that its proceedings in SPA No. 95-113, including the questioned orders, are void; and that
the qualifications of petitioner Agapito A. Aquino for the position of Representative of the
Second District of the City of Makati may only be inquired into by the House of Representatives
Electoral Tribunal.
This conclusion makes it unnecessary for me to express my view at this time on the question
whether, in the event the candidate who obtained the highest number of votes is declared
ineligible, the one who received the next highest number of votes is entitled to be declared the
winner.
Accordingly, I vote (1) to grant the petition in this case and (2) to annul the proceedings of the
Commission on Elections in SPA No. 95-113, including the questioned orders, dated May 6,
1995. May 15, 1995, and the two orders both dated June 2, 1995, so far as they declare petitioner
Agapito A. Aquino to be ineligible for the position of Representative of the Second District of
the City of Makati and direct the City Board of Canvassers of Makati to determine and proclaim
the winner out of the remaining qualified candidates.
Narvasa, J., concurs.
Separate Opinions
I agree with the conclusion reached by the majority that petitioner Aquino has not shown by clear
and convincing evidence that he had established his residence in the second district of Makati
City for a period of not less than one (1) year prior to the 8 May 1995 elections. However, I do
not fully subscribe to its proposition that petitioner's residence (in Makati) should be his
"domicile of choice".
Article VI, Section 6 of the Constitution provides that:
No person shall be a member of the House of Representatives unless he is a
natural-born citizen of the Philippines and on the day of the election, is at least
twenty-five years of age, able to read and write, and, except the party list
representatives, a registered voter in the district in which he shall be elected, and
a resident thereof for a period of not less than one year immediately preceding the
day of the election. (emphasis supplied).
In G.R. No. 119976, Marcos vs. Comelec, I have maintained that the phrase "a resident thereof
for a period of not less than one year" means actual and physical presence in the legislative
district of the congressional candidate, and that said period of one year must be satisfied
regardless of whether or not a person's residence or domicile coincides.
To my mind, petitioner should be declared disqualified to run as representative in the 2nd district
of Makati City in the 8 May 1995 elections not because he failed to prove his residence therein
as his domicile of choice, but because he failed altogether to prove that he had actually and
physically resided therein for a period of not less than one (1) year immediately preceding the 8
May 1995 elections.
Noteworthy is the established fact before the Comelec that petitioner admits having
maintained other residencesin Metro Manila apart from his leased condominium unit in Makati's
2nd district. 1 This clear admission made by petitioner against his interest weakens his argument
that "where a party decides to transfer his legal residence so he can qualify for public office, he is
free to do so." (see p. 20, Petition).
Petitioner evidently wants to impress the Court that his other residences in Metro Manila could
never have become his domicile of choice because it never entered his mind and suddenly,
seemingly not contented with these other residences, he rents a condominium unit in Makati, and
calls it his domicile of choice all these without adding clear and convincing evidence that he
did actually live and reside in Makati for at least one year prior to 8 May 1995 and that he no
longer lived and resided in his other residences during said one year period.
It follows, likewise, that the lease contract relied upon by petitioner, standing alone, established
only the alleged date (April 25, 1994) of its due execution. Stated otherwise, the lease contract
tells us that petitioner had been leasing a condominium unit in Makati City for more than a year
prior to 8 May 1995, but it does not prove that petitioner actually and physically resided therein
for the same period, in the light of his admission that he maintained other residences in Metro
Manila.
In light of petitioner's disqualification, the corrollary issue to be resolved is whether or not
jurisdiction continued to be vested in the Comelec to order the Makati Board of Canvassers" to
determine and proclaim the winner out of the remaining qualified candidates" after petitioner had
been declared post 8 May 1995 as disqualified.
I agree with the proposition advanced by the Solicitor General that sec. 6 of R.A. 6646 clearly
provides that votes cast for a disqualified candidate shall not be counted, thus:
There can be no dispute that if a final judgment is rendered before the election, declaring a
particular candidate as disqualified, such disqualified candidate shall not be voted for and votes
cast for him shall not be counted, thus posing no problem in proclaiming the candidate who
receives the highest number of votes among the qualified candidates.
But what about after the election? Sec. 6 appears categorical enough in stating: "if any reason"
no final judgment of disqualification is rendered before the elections, and the candidate facing
disqualification is voted for and receives the winning number of votes, the Comelec or the Court
is not ousted of its jurisdiction to hear and try the case up to final judgment, hence, the power to
even suspend the proclamation of the erstwhile winning candidate when evidence of his guilt is
strong.
It thus appears clear that the law does not dichotomize the effect of a final judgment of
disqualification in terms of time considerations. There is only one natural and logical effect: the
disqualified candidate shall not be voted and, if voted, the votes cast for him shall not be
counted. Ubi lex non distinguit nec nos distinguere debemus (where the law does not distinguish,
we should not distinguish.)
At this point, what I said in Marcos, supra, follows:
What happens then when after the elections are over, one is declared disqualified?
Then, votes cast for him "shall not be counted" and in legal contemplation, he no
longer received the highest number of votes.
It stands to reason that Section 6 of RA 6646 does not make the second placer the
winner simply because a "winning candidate is disqualified," but that the law
considers him as the candidate who had obtained the highest number of votes as a
result of the votes cast for the disqualified candidate not being counted or
considered.
As this law clearly reflects the legislative policy on the matter, then there is no
reason why this Court should not re-examine and consequently abandon the
doctrine in the Jun Labo case. It has been stated that "the qualifications prescribed
for elective office cannot be erased by the electorate alone. The will of the people
as expressed through the ballot cannot cure the vice of ineligibility" most
especially when it is mandated by no less than the Constitution.
Therefore the candidate who received the highest number of votes from among the qualified
candidates, should be proclaimed
ACCORDINGLY, I vote to DISMISS the petition.
FRANCISCO, J., concurring and dissenting:

I concur with the well written ponencia of my most esteemed colleague, Mr. Justice Kapunan. I
wish, however, to express my views on some issues raised by the petitioner, viz., (1) jurisdiction
over the disqualification suit, (2)domicile, (3) theory of legal impossibility, and (4) "second
placer rule".
Petitioner emphatically maintains that only the House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal
(HRET) can declare his disqualification, especially after the elections. To bolster this stand, the
cases of Co v. HRET, 199 SCRA 692 (1991); Robles v. HRET, 181 SCRA 780 (1990); Lazatin
v. HRET, 168 SCRA 391 (1988); and Lachica v. Yap, 25 SCRA 140 (1968), have been cited as
supporting authorities. To my mind, this position is untenable. Section 17 of Article VI of the
1987 Constitution is clear and unambiguous that HRET jurisdiction applies only to
the members of the House of Representatives. The operative acts necessary for an electoral
candidate's rightful assumption of the office for which he ran are his proclamation and his taking
an oath of office. Petitioner cannot in anyway be considered as a member of the House of
Representatives for the purpose of divesting the Commission on Elections of jurisdiction to
declare his disqualification and invoking instead HRET's jurisdiction, it indubitably appearing
that he has yet to be proclaimed, much less has he taken an oath of office. Clearly, petitioner's
reliance on the aforecited cases which when perused involved Congressional members, is totally
misplaced, if not wholly inapplicable. That the jurisdiction conferred upon HRET extends only to
Congressional members is further established by judicial notice of HRET Rules of
procedure, 1 and HRET decisions 2 consistently holding that the proclamation the essential
requisite vesting jurisdiction on the HRET.
Moreover, a perusal of the records shows that the question on COMELEC's jurisdiction is now
barred by estoppel. It is to be noted that in his May 2, 1995 Answer, as well as in his
Memorandum and Supplemental Memorandum filed before the COMELEC's Second Division,
petitioner never assailed COMELEC's lacks of jurisdiction to rule on his qualification. On the
contrary, he asked that the disqualification suit against him be dismissed on the following
grounds: that it was filed outside the reglementary period; that the one year residence
requirement of the 1987 Constitution is inapplicable due to the recent conversion of the
municipality of Makati into a city under R.A. No. 7854; that he committed a simple inadvertence
in filing up his certificate of candidacy; that the proper procedure to attack his qualification is
by a quo warranto proceeding; that he had actually and physically resided in Makati for more
than a year; and for lack of merit, the case should be outrightly dismissed. In a hearing conducted
by the COMELEC on May 2, 1995, petitioner even submitted his evidence (e.g. affidavits,
amended certificate of candidacy, copy of the lease contract) to prove that he is qualified for the
position. Subsequently, on May 16, 1995, in response to the COMELEC En Banc's May 15,
1995 Order suspending the proclamation of the winner, petitioner filed his Comment/Opposition
with Urgent Motion To Lift Order of Suspension of Proclamation asking for the lifting of the
COMELEC's order of suspension. On May 19, 1995, petitioner again filed a Memorandum and
averred that the recent conversion of Makati into a city made the one-year residence requirement
inapplicable; that he resided in Makati for more than a year; that quo warranto is the right
remedy to question his qualification. In passing, petitioner also alleged that the issue on his
qualification should be "properly" ventilated in a full-dress hearing before the HRET, albeit
praying for the dismissal of the motion for reconsideration for utter lack of merit (and not for
lack of jurisdiction), and for lifting the suspension of his proclamation. It was only on June 01,
1995, in his Motion to File Supplemental Memorandum and Urgent Motion to Resolve Motion
to Lift Suspension of Proclamation, when the petitioner raised COMELEC's alleged lack of
jurisdiction to resolve the question on his qualification. Clearly then, petitioner has actively
participated in the proceedings both before the COMELEC's Second Division and the
COMELEC En Banc asking therein affirmative reliefs. The settled rule is that a party who
objects to the jurisdiction of the court and alleges at the same time any non-jurisdictional ground
for dismissing the action is deemed to have submitted himself to the jurisdiction of the
court. 3 Where a party voluntary submits to the jurisdiction of the court and thereafter loses on
the merits, he may not thereafter be heard to say that the court had no
jurisdiction. 4 In Jimenez v. Macaraig, 5 the Court, citing Crisostomo v. Court of Appeals, 32
SCRA 54, 60 (1970), elaborated on the rationale for this doctrine in this wise:
The petitioners, to borrow the language of Mr. Justice Bautista Angelo (People vs.
Archilla, G.R. No. L-15632, February 28, 1961, 1 SCRA 699, 700-701), cannot
adopt a posture of double-dealing without running afoul of the doctrine of
estoppel. The principle of estoppel is in the interest of a sound administration of
the laws. It should deter those who are disposed to trifle with the courts by taking
inconsistent positions contrary to the elementary principles of right dealing and
good faith (People v. Acierto, 92 Phil. 534, 541, [1953]). 6
It is not right for a party who has affirmed and invoked the jurisdiction of a court in a
particular matter to secure an affirmative relief to afterwards deny that same jurisdiction
to escape an adverse decision. 7Perforce, petitioner's asseveration that the COMELEC has
no jurisdiction to rule on his qualification must fail.
Petitioner insists that domicile is a matter of personal intention. Thus, petition asserts that if he
decides to transfer his legal residence so he can qualify for public office then he is entirely free to
do so. Thus argument to hold water, must be supported by a clear and convincing proofs that
petitioner has effectively abandoned his former domicile and that his intention is not doubtful.
Indeed, domicile once established is considered to continue and will not be deemed lost until a
new one is established (Co v. Electoral Tribunal House of Representatives, 199 SCRA 692, 711
[1991]). Petitioner from childhood until his last election as senator has consistently maintained
Concepcion, Tarlac, as his domicile. He moved to Amapola Street, Palm Village, Makati, and
thereafter claimed the same to be his new domicile. This claim, however, is dismally
unsupported by the records. The lease contract entered into by petitioner for a period of two
years on the third floor condominium unit in Palm Village, Makati, in my view, does not prove
his intent to abandon his domicile of origin. The intention to establish domicile must be an
intention to remain indefinitely or permanently in the new place. 8 This element is lacking in this
instance. Worse, public respondent Commission even found that "respondent Aquino himself
testified that his intention was really for only one (1) year because he has other 'residences' in
Manila
or
in
Quezon
City ([citing]
TSN,
May
2,
1995,
p. 92)". 9 Noting that petitioner is already barred from running for senator due to the
constitutional consecutive two-term limit, his search for a place where he could further and
continue his political career and sudden transfer thereto make his intent suspect. The best test of
intention
to
establish
legal
residence
comes from one's acts and not by mere declarations alone. 10 To acquire, or effect a change of
domicile, the intention must be bonafide and unequivocal (28 C.J.S. 11). Petitioner, in my view,
miserably failed to show a bonafide and unequivocal intention to effect the change of his
domicile.
The theory of legal impossibility is advanced to justify non-compliance with the constitutional
qualification on residency. Petitioner explains his theory in this wise:
. . . THE COMELEC CRITICALLY ERRED IN FAILING TO APPRECIATE
THE LEGAL IMPOSSIBILITY OF ENFORCING THE ONE YEAR
RESIDENCY REQUIREMENT OF CONGRESSIONAL CANDIDATES IN
NEWLY CREATED POLITICAL DISTRICTS WHICH WERE ONLY
IN MAKATI. 11
Apparently, this theory is an offshoot of Republic Act. No. 7854, an act converting the
municipality of Makati into a highly urbanized city. This law enacted on January 2, 1995,
established a second Congressional district in Makati in which petitioner ran as a
Congressional candidate. Since the second district, according to petitioner, is barely four
(4) months old then the one (1) year residence qualification provided by the Constitution
is inapplicable. Petitioner's acts, however, as borne by the records, belie his own theory.
Originally, he placed in his certificate of candidacy an entry of ten (10) months residence
in Makati. Petitioner then had it amended to one (1) year and thirteen (13) days to correct
what claims as a mere inadvertent mistake. I doubt the sincerity of this representation. If
petitioner is indeed persuaded by his own theory, the ten months residence he initially
wrote would have more than sufficiently qualified him to run in the barely four-month
old Makati district. The amendment only reveals the true intent of petitioner to comply
with one year constitutional requirement for residence, adding an extra thirteen (13) days
full measure. Petitioner apparently wanted to argue one way (theory of legal
impossibility), but at the same time played it safe in the other (the constitutional one year
residence requirement). And that is not all. If we were to adhere to petitioner's theory of
legal impossibility, then residents in that district shorn of the constitutional six months
residence requirement for prospective voters (Article V, Section 1 of the 1987
Constitution) would have certainly qualified to vote. That would have legitimized the
entry and electoral exercise of flying voters one of the historic nemeses of a clean and
honest election. Furthermore, to subscribe to petitioner's contention that the constitutional
qualification of candidates should be brushed aside in view of the enactment of R.A. No.
7854 will indubitably violate the manner and procedure for the amendment or revision of
the constitution outlined under Article XVIII of the 1987 Constitution. A legislative
enactment, it has to be emphasized, cannot render nugatory the constitution. The
constitution is superior to a statute. It is the fundamental and organic law of the land to
which every statute must conform and harmonize.
Finally, it has been contended that a second place candidate cannot be proclaimed a substitute
winner. I find the proposition quite unacceptable. A disqualified "candidate" is not a candidate
and the votes which may have been cast in his favor are nothing but stray votes of no legal
consequence. A disqualified person like the petitioner receives no vote or zero vote. In short,
no-candidate-no vote. Petitioner had therefore no right, in fact and in law, to claim first place for
he has nothing to base his right. The legislative intent is clear as provided by R.A. 6646, Section
6, in that votes cast for a disqualified candidate shall not be counted as they are
considered stray (Section 211, Rule 24, Omnibus Election Code). It is only from the ranks of
qualified candidates can one be chosen as first placer and not from without. Necessarily,
petitioner, a disqualified candidate, cannot be a first placer as he claims himself to be. To count
the votes for a disqualified candidate would, in my view, disenfranchise voters who voted for a
qualified candidate. Legitimate votes cast for a qualified candidate should not be penalized
alongside a disqualified candidate. With this in mind, the other qualified candidate who garnered
the highest number of votes should be proclaimed the duly elected representative of the district. I
feel that the Labo doctrine ought to be abandoned.
I therefore vote to deny the petition and to lift the temporary restraining order issued by the
Court dated June 6, 1995.
DAVIDE, JR., J., dissenting:

In sustaining the COMELEC's acts of suspending the proclamation of petitioner Agapito A.
Aquino and of proceeding to hear the disqualification case against him, the majority opinion
relies on Section 6 of R.A. No. 6646 which it claims to be applicable by virtue of Section 7
thereof to petitions to deny due course to or cancel a certificate of candidacy under Section 78 of
the Omnibus Election Code (B.P. Blg. 881).
I disagree.
In the first place, the petition to disqualify the petitioner in SPA No. 95-113 is not a petition to
deny due course to or cancel a certificate of candidacy under Section 78, which reads:
Sec. 78. Petition to deny due course to or cancel a certificate of candidacy. A
may be filed by any personexclusively on the ground that any material
the filing of the certificate of candidacy and shall be decided, after due notice and
hearing, not later than fifteen days before the election. (emphasis supplied)
Nowhere in the petition in SPA No. 95-113 is it alleged by the private respondents that a material
representation contained in the petitioner's certificate of candidacy is false. What is being
attacked therein is the petitioner's lack of the one-year residence qualification in the new Second
Legislative District of Makati City where he sought to he elected for the office of Congressman.
The rule governing disqualification cases on the ground of ineligibility, which is also invoked by
the private respondents, is Rule 25 of the COMELEC Rules of Procedure, as amended on 15
February 1993. The amendment allows the, filing of a petition to disqualify a candidate on the
ground that he does not possess all the qualifications provided for by the Constitution or by
existing laws. In its original form, the rule only applied to petitions for disqualification based on
the commission of any act declared by law to be a ground for disqualification. The rule as thus
amended now reads as follows:
Rule 25 Disqualification of Candidates
Sec. 1. Grounds for Disqualification. Any candidate who does not possess all
the qualifications of a candidate as provided for by the Constitution or by existing
law or who commits any act declared by law to be grounds for disqualification
may be disqualified from continuing as a candidate.
Sec. 2. Who May File Petition for Disqualification. Any citizen of voting age,
or duly registered political party, organization or coalition of political parties may
file with the Law Department of the Commission a petition to disqualify a
candidate on grounds provided by law.
Sec. 3. Period to File Petition. The petition shall be filed any day after the last
day for filing of certificates of candidacy but not later than the date of
proclamation.
Sec. 4. Summary Proceeding. The petition shall be heard summarily after due
notice.
Sec. 5. Effect of Petition if Unresolved Before Completion of Canvass. If the
petition, for reasons beyond the control of the Commission, cannot be decided
before the completion of the canvass, the votes cast for the respondent may be
included in the counting and in the canvassing; however, if the evidence of guilt is
strong, his proclamation shall be suspended notwithstanding the fact that he
received the winning number of votes in such election.
The underscored portion is the amendment to Rule 25, which the COMELEC must have
deemed necessary to fill up a procedural hiatus in cases of disqualifications based on
other grounds in the light of this Court's interpretation in Loong vs. Commission on
Elections (216 SCRA 760 [1992]) that Rule 25 refers only to disqualifications under
Sections 12 and 68 of the Omnibus Election Code. This Court explicitly stated therein as
follows:
We do not agree with private respondent Ututalum's contention that the petition
for disqualification, as in the case at bar, may be filed at any time after the last day
for filing a certificate of candidacy but not later than the date of proclamation,
applying Section 3, Rule 25 of the Comelec Rules of Procedure.
Rule 25 of the Comelec Rules of Procedure refers to Disqualification of
Candidates; and Section 1 of said rule provides that any candidate who commits
any act declared by law to be a ground for disqualification maybe disqualified
from continuing as a candidate. The grounds for disqualification as expressed in
Sections 12 and 68 of the Code, are the following:
Sec. 12. Disqualification. Any person who has been declared by
competent authority insane or incompetent, or has been sentenced
by final judgment for subversion, insurrection, rebellion or for any
offense for which he has been sentenced to a penalty of more than
eighteen months or for a crime involving moral turpitude, shall be
disqualified to be a candidate and to hold any office, unless he has
been given plenary pardon or granted amnesty.
Sec. 63 DisquaIifications. Any candidate who, in an action or
protest in which he is a party is declared by final decision of 4
competent court guilty of, or found by the Commission of having
(a) given money or other material consideration to influence,
induce or corrupt the voters or public officials performing electoral
functions; (b) committed acts of terrorism to enhance his
candidacy; (c) spent in his election campaign an amount in excess
of that allowed by this Code; (d) solicited, received or made any
contribution prohibited under Sections 89, 95, 96, 97 and 104; or
(e) violated any of Sections 80, 83, 85, 86 and 261, paragraphs d,
e, k, v, and cc, sub-paragraph 6, shall be disqualified from
continuing as a candidate, or if he has been elected, from holding
the office. Any person who is a permanent resident of or an
immigrant to a foreign country shall not be qualified to run for any
elective office under this Code, unless said person has waived his
status as permanent resident or immigrant of a foreign country in
accordance with the residence requirement provided for in the
election laws.
The petition filed by private respondent Ututalum with the respondent Comelec to
disqualify petitioner Loong on the ground that the latter made a false
representation in his certificate of candidacy as to his age, clearly does not fall
under the grounds of disqualification as provided for in Rule 25 but is expressly
covered by Rule 23 of the Comelec Rules of Procedure governing petitions to
cancel certificate of candidacy. Moreover, Section 3, Rule 25 which allows the
filing of the petition at any time after the last day for the filing of certificates of
candidacy but not later than the date of proclamation, is merely a procedural rule
issued by respondent Commission which, although a constitutional body, has no
legislative powers. Thus, it can not supersede Section 78 of the Omnibus Election
Code which is a legislative enactment.
Second, even if we assume for the sake of argument that the petition in SPA No. 95-113 fall
under Section 78 of the Omnibus Election Code, still Section 6 of R.A. No. 6646 cannot be
applied by virtue of Section 7 thereof. Sections 6 and 7 reads:
Sec. 71 Petition to Deny Due Course to or Cancel a Certificate of Candidacy.
The procedure hereinabove provided shall apply to petitions to deny due course to
or cancel a certificate of candidacy as provided in Section 78 of Batas
Pambansa Blg. 881.
The "procedure hereinabove provided" mentioned in Section 7 cannot be construed to refer to
Section 6 whichdoes not provide for a procedure but for the EFFECTS of disqualification cases.
It can only refer to the procedureprovided in Section 5 of the said Act on nuisance candidates
which reads as follows:
Sec. 5. Procedure in Cases of Nuisance Candidates. A verified petition to
declare a duly registered candidate as a nuisance candidate under Section 69 .f
Batas Pambansa Blg. 881 shall be filed personally or through duly authorized
representative with the Commission by any registered candidate for the same
office within five (5) days from the last day for the filing of certificates of
candidacy. Filing by mail shall not be allowed.
(b) Within three (3) days from the filing of the petition, the Commission shall
issue summons to the respondent candidate together with a copy of the petition
and its enclosures, if any.
(c) The respondent shall be given three (3) days from receipt of the summons
within which to file his verified answer (not a motion to dismiss) to the petition,
serving copy thereof upon the petitioner. Grounds for a motion to dismiss may be
raised as affirmative defenses.
(d) The Commission may designate any of its officials who are lawyers to hear
the case and receive evidence. The proceeding shall be summary in nature.
In lieu of oral testimonies, the parties may be required to submit position papers
together with affidavits or counter-affidavits and other documentary evidence.
The hearing officer shall immediately submit to the Commission his findings,
reports, and recommendations within five (5) days from the completion of such
submission of evidence. The Commission shall render its decision within five (5)
days from receipt thereof.
(e) The decision, order, or ruling of the Commission shall, after five (5) days from
receipt of a copy thereof by the parties, be final and executory unless stayed by
the Supreme Court.
(f) The Commission shall within twenty-four hours, through the fastest available
means, disseminate its decision or the decision of the Supreme Court or the city or
municipal election registrars, boards of election inspectors, and the general public
in the political subdivision concerned.
and which is the only procedure that precedes Section 7 of the said Act. Heretofore, no
law provided for the procedure to govern cases under Section 78. Applying to such cases,
through Section 7 of R.A. No. 6646, the procedure applicable to cases of nuisance
candidates is prudent and wise, for both cases necessarily require that they be decided
before the day of the election; hence, only summary proceedings thereon can adequately
respond to the urgency of the matter.
Third, Section 6 merely supplements Section 72 of the Omnibus Election Code providing as
follows:
be disqualified and he is voted for and receives the winning number of votes in
by granting the COMELEC or the Court the authority to continue hearing the case and to
suspend the proclamation if the evidence of guilt is strong. As observed by this Court in
its majority "the phrase 'when the evidence of guilt is strong' seems to suggest that the
provisions of Section 6 ought to be applicable only to disqualification cases under
Section 68 of the Omnibus Election Code."
Fourth, the amended Rule 25 of the COMELEC Rules of Procedure, which is the only rule
governing petitions filed before election or proclamation for the disqualification of a candidate
on the ground that he lacks the qualifications provided for by the Constitution or by law, does
not, as can be gathered from Section 5 thereof, authorize the COMELEC to continue hearing the
case after the election.
Fifth, even assuming that the second sentence of Section 6 of R.A. to No. 6646 is applicable to
disqualification cases based on the ground of lack of qualification, it cannot be applied to a case
does not involve elective regional, provincial, and city officials, and where suspension of
proclamation is not warranted because of the absence of strong evidence of guilt or ineligibility.
In such a case the candidate sought to be disqualified but who obtains the highest number of
votes has to be proclaimed. Once he is proclaimed, the COMELEC cannot continue with the
case, and the remedy of the opponent is to contest the winning candidate's eligibility within ten
days from proclamation in a quo warranto proceeding which is within the jurisdiction of the
metropolitan or municipal trial courts, in the case of barangay officials; the regional trial courts,
in case of municipal officials (Section 2(2), Article IX-C, Constitution; Section 253, paragraph 2,
B.P. Blg. 881); the House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal, in the case of Congressmen; the
Senate Electoral Tribunal, in the case of Senators (Section 17, Article VI, Constitution); and the
Supreme Court en banc, in the case of the President or Vice-President (Section 4, Article VII,
Constitution).
If what is involved is an elective regional, provincial, or city official, and the case cannot be
decided before the election, the COMELEC can, even after the proclamation of the candidate
sought to be disqualified, proceed with the case by treating it as a petition for quo warranto,
since such a case properly pertains to the exclusive jurisdiction of the COMELEC (Section 2(2),
Article IX-C, Constitution; Section 253, B.P. Blg. 881).
But even granting for the sake of argument that Sections 6 and 7 of R.A. No. 6646, in relation to
Section 78 of the Omnibus Election Code and the amended Rule 25 of the COMELEC Rules of
Procedure, are applicable, the order of suspension of the petitioner's proclamation issued on 15
May 1995 is null and void for having been issued with grave abuse of discretion. What was
before the COMELEC en banc at that stage was the decision of the Second Division of 6 May
1995 dismissing the petition to disqualify the petitioner and declaring him qualified for the
position. That decision is a direct and positive rejection of any claim that the evidence of the
petitioner's guilt is strong. Note that it was only on 2 June 1995, when the COMELEC en
banc reversed the decision of the Second Division, that it was found that the evidence of the
petitioner's ineligibility is strong. It would have been otherwise if the Second Division had
disqualified the petitioner.
Besides, at the time the questioned order was issued, there was no hearing yet on the private
respondents' motions for the suspension of the petitioner's proclamation. In fact, in that order the
COMELEC en banc admitted that the said motions could not be resolved without hearing, thus:
Pending the resolution of the petitioners' Motion for Reconsideration filed on May
7, 1995; Urgent Motion Ad Cautelam to Suspend Proclamation of Respondent
(May 10, 1995) filed on May 10, 1995; and OMNIBUS MOTION (For
Reconsideration of the Honorable Commission's [Second Division] Resolution
dated May 6, 1995, and 2nd Urgent Motion Ad Cautelam to Suspend
Proclamation of Respondent Aquino, which cannot be resolved without hearing,
without violating the right of the respondent to due process. . . .
For being void from the beginning; it is as if the order of 15 May 1995 had not existed and could
not, therefore, be made permanent by the COMELEC en banc through its resolution of 2 June
1995 whose dispositive portion reads in part: [c]onsequently, the order of suspension of the
respondent should he obtain the winning number of votes, issued by this Commission on 15 May
1995 is now made permanent."
Absent a valid finding before the election or after the canvass of election returns that the
evidence of the petitioner's guilt or ineligibility is strong, the COMELEC should not have
suspended the proclamation of the petitioner. After the completion of the canvass the petitioner
should have been proclaimed.
This case then must be distinguished from that of Imelda Romualdez-Marcos vs. Commission on
Elections, G.R. No. 119976, where the COMELEC en banc affirmed before the elections, or on 7
May 1995, the Second Division's resolution of 24 April 1995 disqualifying Mrs. Marcos.
Accordingly, the order of 15 May 1995 and the resolution of 2 June 1995 of the COMELEC en
banc must be annulled and set aside, and the COMELEC, through its City Board of Canvassers
of Makati, must be ordered to immediately proclaim the petitioner, without prejudice to the right
of his opponents to file a petition for quo warranto with the House of Representatives Electoral
Tribunal, which is the sole judge of all contests relating to the election, returns and qualifications
of the Members of the House of Representatives (Section 17, Article VI, Constitution).
In view of the foregoing, a disquisition on the merits of the ground for the petitioner's
disqualification will no longer be proper.
I vote to GRANT the instant petition, to ANNUL and SET ASIDE the challenged order and
resolution of the Commission on Elections en banc, and to DIRECT the Board of Canvassers of
Makati City to reconvene and proclaim the petitioner as the winning candidate, without prejudice
on the part of any aggrieved party to file the appropriate action in the House of Representatives
Electoral Tribunal.
Romero and Bellosillo, JJ., concur.
VITUG, J., separate opinion:

I find what I would consider as the relevant issues in this petition as similar in almost all material
respects to those obtaining in G.R. No. 119976 (Imelda Romualdez-Marcos vs. Commission on
Elections and Cirilo Roy Montejo). Let me then here just reiterate what I have there said in my
separate opinion.
The case at bench deals with explicit Constitutional mandates.
The Constitution is not a pliable instrument. It is a bedrock in our legal system that sets up ideals
and directions and render steady our strides hence. It only looks back so as to ensure that
mistakes in the past are not repeated. A complaint transience of a constitution belittles its basic
function and weakens its goals. A constitution may well become outdated by the realities of time.
When it does, it must be changed but while it remains, we owe it respect and allegiance.
Anarchy, open or subtle, has never been, nor must it ever be, the answer to perceived transitory
needs, let alone societal attitudes, or the Constitution might lose its very essence.
Constitutional provisions must be taken to be mandatory in character unless, either by express
statement or by necessary implication, a different intention is manifest (see Marcelino vs. Cruz,
121 SCRA 51).
The two provisions initially brought to focus are Section 6 and Section 17 of Article VI of the
fundamental law. These provisions read:
Sec. 6. No person shall be a Member of the House of Representatives unless he is
a natural-born citizen of the Philippines and, on the day of the election, is at least
twenty-five years of age, able to read and write, and, except the party-list
representatives, a registered voter in the district in which he shall be elected, and a
resident thereof for a period of not less than one year immediately preceding the
day of the election.

Chairman.
The Commission on Election (the "COMELEC") is constitutionally bound to enforce and
administer "all laws and regulations relative to the conduct of election . . ." (Art. IX, C, Sec. 2,
Constitution) that, there being nothing said to the contrary, should include its authority to pass
upon the qualification and disqualification prescribed by law ofcandidates to an elective office.
Indeed, pre-proclamation controversies are expressly placed under the COMELEC's jurisdiction
to hear and resolve (Art. IX, C, Sec. 3, Constitution).
The matter before us specifically calls for the observance of the constitutional one-year residency
requirement. This issue (whether or not there is here such compliance), to my mind, is basically a
question of fact or at least inextricably linked to such determination. The findings and judgment
of the COMELEC, in accordance with the long established rule and subject only to a number of
exceptions under the basic heading of "grave abuse of discretion," are not reviewable by this
Court.
I do not find much need to do a complex exercise on what seems to me to be a plain matter.
Generally,
the
term
"residence"
has
a
broader
connotation
that
mean permanent (domicile), official (place where one's official duties may require him to stay)
or temporary (the place where he sojourns during a considerable length of time). For Civil law
purposes, i.e., as regards the exercise of civil rights and the fulfillment of civil obligations, the
domicile of a natural person is the place of his habitual residence (see Article 50, Civil Code). In
election cases, the controlling rule is that heretofore announced by this Court in Romualdez
vs. Regional Trial Court, Branch 7, Tacloban City (226 SCRA 408, 409); thus:
In election cases, the Court treats domicile and residence as synonymous terms,
thus: "(t)he term "residence" as used in the election law is synonymous with
"domicile," which imports not only an intention to reside in a fixed place but also
personal presence in that place, coupled with conduct indicative of such
intention." "Domicile" denotes a fixed permanent residence to which when absent
for business or pleasure, or for like reasons, one intends to return. . . . Residence
thus acquired, however, may be lost by adopting another choice of domicile. In
order, in turn, to acquire a new domicile by choice, there must concur (1)
residence or bodily presence in the new locality, (2) an intention to remain there,
and (3) an intention to abandon the old domicile. In other words, there must
basically be animus manendi coupled with animus non revertendi. The purpose to
remain in or at the domicile of choice must be for an indefinite period of time; the
change of residence must be voluntary, and the residence at the place chosen for
the new domicile must be actual.
Using the above tests, I am not convinced that we can charge the COMELEC with having
committed grave abuse of discretion in its assailed resolution.
The COMELEC's jurisdiction, in the case of congressional elections, ends when the jurisdiction
of the Electoral Tribunal concerned begins. It signifies that the protestee must have theretofore
been duly proclaimed and has since become a "member" of the Senate or the House of
Representatives. The question can be asked on whether or not the proclamation of a candidate is
just a ministerial function of the Commission on Elections dictated solely on the number of votes
cast in an election exercise. I believe, it is not. A ministerial duty is an obligation the
performance of which, being adequately defined, does not allow the use of further judgment or
discretion. The COMELEC; in its particular case, is tasked with the full responsibility of
ascertaining all the facts and conditions such as may be required by law before a proclamation is
properly done.
The Court, on its part, should, in my view at least, refrain from any undue encroachment on the
ultimate exercise of authority by the Electoral Tribunals on matters which, by no less than a
constitutional fiat, are explicitly within their exclusive domain. The nagging question, if it were
otherwise, would be the effect of the Court's peremptory pronouncement on the ability of the
Electoral Tribunal to later come up with its own judgment in a contest "relating to the election,
returns and qualification" of its members.
Prescinding from all the foregoing, I should like to next touch base on the applicability to this
case of Section 6 of Republic Act No. 6646, in relation to Section 72 of Batas Pambansa Blg.
881, each providing thusly:
REPUBLIC ACT NO. 6646
xxx xxx xxx
BATAS PAMBANSA BLG. 881
xxx xxx xxx
be disqualified, and he is voted for and receives the winning number of votes in
I realize that in considering the significance of the law, it may be preferable to look for not so
much the specific instances they ostensibly would cover as the principle they clearly convey.
Thus, I will not scoff at the argument that it should be sound to say that votes cast in favor of the
disqualified candidate, whenever ultimately declared as such, should not be counted in his or her
favor and must accordingly be considered to be stray votes. The argument, nevertheless, is far
outweighed by the rationale of the now prevailing doctrine first enunciated in the case
of Topacio vs. Paredes (23 Phil. 238 (1912]) which, although later abandoned in Ticzon
vs. Comelec (103 SCRA 687 [1981]), and Santos vs. COMELEC (137 SCRA 740 [1985]), was
restored, along with the interim case of Geronimo vs. Ramos (136 SCRA 435 [1985]), by
the Labo (176 SCRA 1 [1989]), Abella (201 SCRA 253 [1991]), Labo (211 SCRA 297 [1992])
and, most recently, Benito (235 SCRA 436 (1994]) rulings. Benito vs.Comelec was a unanimous
decision penned by Justice Kapunan and concurred in by Chief Justice Narvasa, Justices
Feliciano, Padilla, Bidin, Regalado, Davide, Romero, Melo, Quiason, Puno, Vitug and Mendoza
(Justices Cruz and Bellosillo were on official leave). For easy reference, let me quote from the
first Labo decision:
Finally, there is the question of whether or not the private respondent, who filed
the quo warrantopetition, can replace the petitioner as mayor. He cannot. The
simple reason is that as he obtained only the second highest number of votes in
the election, he was obviously not the choice of the people of Baguio City.
The latest ruling of the Court on this issue is Santos v. Commission on Elections,
(137 SCRA 740) decided in 1985. In that case, the candidate who placed second
was proclaimed elected after the votes for his winning rival, who was disqualified
as a turncoat and considered a non-candidate, were all disregard as stray. In effect,
the second placer won by default. That decision was supported by eight members
of the Court then, (Cuevas, J., ponente, with Makasiar, Concepcion, Jr., Escolin,
Relova, De la Fuente, Alampay and Aquino, JJ., concurring.) with three
dissenting (Teehankee, Acting C.J., Abad Santos and Melencio-Herrera, JJ.) and
another two reserving their vote. (Plana and Gutierrez, Jr., JJ.) One was on
official leave. (Fernando, C.J.)
reversed in favor of the earlier case of Geronimo v. Ramos, (136 SCRA 435)
the doctrine first announced in 1912 in Topacio v.Paredes, (23 Phil. 238) was
supported by ten members of the Court, (Gutierrez, Jr., ponente, with Teehankee,
Abad Santos, Melencio-Herrera, Plana, Escolin, Relova, De la Fuente, Cuevas
and Alampay, JJ., concurring) without any dissent, although one reserved his
vote,
(Makasiar, J.) another took no part, (Aquino, J.) and two others were on leave.
(Fernando, C.J. and Concepcion, Jr., J.) There the Court held:
. . . it would be extremely repugnant to the basic concept of the
constitutionally guaranteed right to suffrage if a candidate who has
not acquired the majority or plurality of votes is proclaimed a
winner and imposed as the representative of a constituency, the
majority of which have positively declared through their ballots
Sound policy dictates that public elective offices are filled by those
who have received the highest number of votes cast in the election
for that office, and it is a fundamental idea in all republican forms
of government that no one can be declared elected and no measure
can be declared carried unless he or it receives a majority or
plurality of the legal votes cast in the election. (20 Corpus Juris
2nd, S 234, p. 676.)
The fact that the candidate who obtained the highest number of
votes is later declared to be disqualified or not eligible for the
office to which he was elected does not necessarily entitle the
candidate who obtained the second highest number of votes to be
declared the winner of the elective office. The votes cast for a
dead, disqualified, or non-eligible person may not be valid to vote
the winner into office or maintain him there. However, in the
absence of a statute which clearly asserts a contrary political and
legislative policy on the matter, if the votes were cast in the sincere
belief that the candidate was alive, qualified, or eligible, they
should not be treated as stray, void or meaningless. (at pp. 20-21)
Accordingly, I am constrained to vote for the dismissal of the petition.
MENDOZA, J., separate opinion:

For the reasons expressed in my separate opinion in the companion case. G.R. No.
119976. Imelda Romualdez-Marcos v. Commission on Elections. I am of the opinion that the
Commission on Elections has no jurisdiction over petitions for disqualification of candidates
based on alleged ineligibility for the office to which they seek election.
The May 15, 1995 resolution of the COMELEC en banc, suspending he obtain the highest
number of votes of Representative of the Second District of Makati, Metro Manila, purports to
have been issued pursuant to 6 of R.A. No. 6646. This provision authorizes the COMELEC to
order the suspension of the proclamation "whenever the evidence of his guilt is strong." As
explained in my separate opinion in G.R. No. 119976, however, this provision refers to
proceedings under 68 of the Omnibus Election Code which provides for the disqualification of
candidates found guilty of using what in political parlance have been referred to as "guns goons
or gold" to influence the outcome of elections. Since the disqualification of petitioner in this case
was not sought on this ground, the application of 6 of R.A.. No. 6646 is clearly a grave abuse of
discretion on the part of the COMELEC.
Nor may the petition to disqualify petitioner in the COMELEC be justified under 78 of the OEC
which authorizes the filing of a petition for the cancellation of certificates of candidacy since
such a petition maybe filed "exclusivelyon the ground that a material representation contained [in
the certificate] as required under section 74 is false." There was no allegation that in stating in his
certificate of candidacy that he is a resident of Amapola St., Palm Village, Guadalupe Viejo,
Makati, Metro Manila, petitioner made any false representation.
For this reason, I am of the opinion that the COMELEC had no jurisdiction over SPA No. 95113; that its proceedings in SPA No. 95-113, including the questioned orders, are void; and that
the qualifications of petitioner Agapito A. Aquino for the position of Representative of the
Second District of the City of Makati may only be inquired into by the House of Representatives
Electoral Tribunal.
This conclusion makes it unnecessary for me to express my view at this time on the question
whether, in the event the candidate who obtained the highest number of votes is declared
ineligible, the one who received the next highest number of votes is entitled to be declared the
winner.
Accordingly, I vote (1) to grant the petition in this case and (2) to annul the proceedings of the
Commission on Elections in SPA No. 95-113, including the questioned orders, dated May 6,
1995. May 15, 1995, and the two orders both dated June 2, 1995, so far as they declare petitioner
Agapito A. Aquino to be ineligible for the position of Representative of the Second District of
the City of Makati and direct the City Board of Canvassers of Makati to determine and proclaim
the winner out of the remaining qualified candidates.
Narvasa, J., concurs.

Congress of the Philippines
Metro Manila
Eighth Congress

SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. Nos. 92191-92 July 30, 1991

ANTONIO Y. CO, petitioner,
vs.
ELECTORAL TRIBUNAL OF THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES AND JOSE ONG,
JR., respondents.
G.R. Nos. 92202-03 July 30, 1991
SIXTO T. BALANQUIT, JR., petitioner,
vs.
ELECTORAL TRIBUNAL OF THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES AND JOSE ONG,
JR., respondents.
Hechanova & Associates for petitioner Co.
Brillantes, Nachura, Navarro and Arcilla Law Offices for respondent Ong, Jr.
GUTIERREZ, JR., J.:p

The petitioners come to this Court asking for the setting aside and reversal of a decision of the
House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal (HRET).
The HRET declared that respondent Jose Ong, Jr. is a natural born Filipino citizen and a resident
of Laoang, Northern Samar for voting purposes. The sole issue before us is whether or not, in
making that determination, the HRET acted with grave abuse of discretion.
On May 11, 1987, the congressional election for the second district of Northern Samar was held.
Among the candidates who vied for the position of representative in the second legislative
district of Northern Samar are the petitioners, Sixto Balinquit and Antonio Co and the private
respondent, Jose Ong, Jr.
Respondent Ong was proclaimed the duly elected representative of the second district of
Northern Samar.
The petitioners filed election protests against the private respondent premised on the following
grounds:
1) Jose Ong, Jr. is not a natural born citizen of the Philippines; and
2) Jose Ong, Jr. is not a resident of the second district of Northern Samar.
The HRET in its decision dated November 6, 1989, found for the private respondent.
A motion for reconsideration was filed by the petitioners on November 12, 1989. This was,
however, denied by the HRET in its resolution dated February 22, 1989.
Hence, these petitions for certiorari.
We treat the comments as answers and decide the issues raised in the petitions.
ON THE ISSUE OF JURISDICTION
The first question which arises refers to our jurisdiction.
The Constitution explicitly provides that the House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal
(HRET) and the Senate Electoral Tribunal (SET) shall be the sole judges of all contests relating
to the election, returns, and qualificationsof their respective members. (See Article VI, Section
17, Constitution)
The authority conferred upon the Electoral Tribunal is full, clear and complete. The use of the
word soleemphasizes the exclusivity of the jurisdiction of these Tribunals.
The Supreme Court in the case of Lazatin v. HRET (168 SCRA 391 [1988]) stated that under the
1987 Constitution, the jurisdiction of the Electoral Tribunal is original and exclusive, viz:
The use of the word "sole" emphasizes the exclusive character of the jurisdiction
conferred (Angara v. Electoral Commission, supra at p. 162). The exercise of
power by the Electoral Commission under the 1935 Constitution has been
described as "intended to be as complete and unimpaired as if it had originally
remained in the legislature." (id., at p. 175) Earlier this grant of power to the
legislature was characterized by Justice Malcolm as "full, clear and complete;
(Veloso v. Board of Canvassers of Leyte and Samar, 39 Phil. 886 [1919]) Under
the amended 1935 Constitution, the power was unqualifiedly reposed upon the
Electoral Tribunal and it remained as full, clear and complete as that previously
granted the Legislature and the Electoral Commission, (Lachica v. Yap, 25 SCRA
140 [1968]) The same may be said with regard to the jurisdiction of the Electoral
Tribunal under the 1987 Constitution. (p. 401)
The Court continued further, ". . . so long as the Constitution grants the HRET the power to be
the sole judge of all contests relating to election, returns and qualifications of members of the
House of Representatives, any final action taken by the HRET on a matter within its jurisdiction
shall, as a rule, not be reviewed by this Court . . . the power granted to the Electoral Tribunal is
full, clear and complete and excludes the exercise of any authority on the part of this Court that
would in any wise restrict it or curtail it or even affect the same." (pp. 403-404)
When may the Court inquire into acts of the Electoral Tribunals under our constitutional grants
of power?
In the later case of Robles v. HRET (181 SCRA 780 [1990]) the Supreme Court stated that the
judgments of the Tribunal are beyond judicial interference save only "in the exercise of this
Court's so-called extraordinary jurisdiction, . . . upon a determination that the Tribunal's decision
or resolution was rendered without or in excess of its jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of
discretion or paraphrasing Morrero, upon a clear showing of such arbitrary and improvident use
by the Tribunal of its power as constitutes a denial of due process of law, or upon a
demonstration of a very clear unmitigated ERROR, manifestly constituting such GRAVE
ABUSE OF DISCRETION that there has to be a remedy for such abuse." (at pp. 785-786)
In the leading case of Morrero v. Bocar (66 Phil. 429 [1938]) the Court ruled that the power of
the Electoral Commission "is beyond judicial interference except, in any event, upon a clear
showing of such arbitrary and improvident use of power as will constitute a denial of due
process." The Court does not venture into the perilous area of trying to correct perceived errors
of independent branches of the Government, It comes in only when it has to vindicate a denial of
due process or correct an abuse of discretion so grave or glaring that no less than the Constitution
calls for remedial action.
The Supreme Court under the 1987 Constitution, has been given an expanded jurisdiction, so to
speak, to review the decisions of the other branches and agencies of the government to determine
whether or not they have acted within the bounds of the Constitution. (See Article VIII, Section
1, Constitution)
Yet, in the exercise thereof, the Court is to merely check whether or not the governmental branch
or agency has gone beyond the Constitutional limits of its jurisdiction, not that it erred or has a
different view. In the absence of a showing that the HRET has committed grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction, there is no occasion for the Court to exercise its
corrective power; it will not decide a matter which by its nature is for the HRET alone to decide.
(See Marcos v. Manglapus, 177 SCRA 668 [1989]) It has no power to look into what it thinks is
apparent error.
As constitutional creations invested with necessary power, the Electoral Tribunals, although not
powers in the tripartite scheme of the government, are, in the exercise of their functions
independent organs independent of Congress and the Supreme Court. The power granted to
HRET by the Constitution is intended to be as complete and unimpaired as if it had remained
originally in the legislature. (Angara v. Electoral Commission, 63 Phil. 139 [1936])
In passing upon petitions, the Court with its traditional and careful regard for the balance of
powers, must permit this exclusive privilege of the Tribunals to remain where the Sovereign
authority has place it. (See Veloso v. Boards of Canvassers of Leyte and Samar, 39 Phil. 886
[1919])
It has been argued that under Article VI, Section 17 of the present Constitution, the situation may
exist as it exists today where there is an unhealthy one-sided political composition of the two
Electoral Tribunals. There is nothing in the Constitution, however, that makes the HRET because
of its composition any less independent from the Court or its constitutional functions any less
exclusive. The degree of judicial intervention should not be made to depend on how many
legislative members of the HRET belong to this party or that party. The test remains the samemanifest grave abuse of discretion.
In the case at bar, the Court finds no improvident use of power, no denial of due process on the
part of the HRET which will necessitate the exercise of the power of judicial review by the
Supreme Court.
ON THE ISSUE OF CITIZENSHIP
The records show that in the year 1895, the private respondent's grandfather, Ong Te, arrived in
the Philippines from China. Ong Te established his residence in the municipality of Laoang,
Samar on land which he bought from the fruits of hard work.
As a resident of Laoang, Ong Te was able to obtain a certificate of residence from the then
Spanish colonial administration.
The father of the private respondent, Jose Ong Chuan was born in China in 1905. He was
brought by Ong Te to Samar in the year 1915.
Jose Ong Chuan spent his childhood in the province of Samar. In Laoang, he was able to
establish an enduring relationship with his neighbors, resulting in his easy assimilation into the
community.
As Jose Ong Chuan grew older in the rural and seaside community of Laoang, he absorbed
Filipino cultural values and practices. He was baptized into Christianity. As the years passed,
Jose Ong Chuan met a natural born-Filipino, Agripina Lao. The two fell in love and, thereafter,
got married in 1932 according to Catholic faith and practice.
The couple bore eight children, one of whom is the private respondent who was born in 1948.
The private respondent's father never emigrated from this country. He decided to put up a
hardware store and shared and survived the vicissitudes of life in Samar.
The business prospered. Expansion became inevitable. As a result, a branch was set-up in
Binondo, Manila. In the meantime, the father of the private respondent, unsure of his legal status
and in an unequivocal affirmation of where he cast his life and family, filed with the Court of
First Instance of Samar an application for naturalization on February 15, 1954.
On April 28, 1955, the CFI of Samar, after trial, declared Jose Ong Chuan a Filipino citizen.
On May 15, 1957, the Court of First Instance of Samar issued an order declaring the decision of
April 28, 1955 as final and executory and that Jose Ong Chuan may already take his Oath of
Allegiance.
Pursuant to said order, Jose Ong Chuan took his Oath of Allegiance; correspondingly, a
certificate of naturalization was issued to him.
At the time Jose Ong Chuan took his oath, the private respondent then a minor of nine years was
finishing his elementary education in the province of Samar. There is nothing in the records to
differentiate him from other Filipinos insofar as the customs and practices of the local populace
were concerned.
Fortunes changed. The house of the family of the private respondent in Laoang, Samar was
burned to the ground.
Undaunted by the catastrophe, the private respondent's family constructed another one in place of
their ruined house. Again, there is no showing other than that Laoang was their abode and home.
After completing his elementary education, the private respondent, in search for better education,
went to Manila in order to acquire his secondary and college education.
In the meantime, another misfortune was suffered by the family in 1975 when a fire gutted their
second house in Laoang, Samar. The respondent's family constructed still another house, this
time a 16-door apartment building, two doors of which were reserved for the family.
The private respondent graduated from college, and thereafter took and passed the CPA Board
Examinations.
Since employment opportunities were better in Manila, the respondent looked for work here. He
found a job in the Central Bank of the Philippines as an examiner. Later, however, he worked in
the hardware business of his family in Manila. In 1971, his elder brother, Emil, was elected as a
delegate to the 1971 Constitutional Convention. His status as a natural born citizen was
challenged. Parenthetically, the Convention which in drafting the Constitution removed the
unequal treatment given to derived citizenship on the basis of the mother's citizenship formally
and solemnly declared Emil Ong, respondent's full brother, as a natural born Filipino. The
Constitutional Convention had to be aware of the meaning of natural born citizenship since it
was precisely amending the article on this subject.
The private respondent frequently went home to Laoang, Samar, where he grew up and spent his
childhood days.
In 1984, the private respondent married a Filipina named Desiree Lim.
For the elections of 1984 and 1986, Jose Ong, Jr. registered himself as a voter of Laoang, Samar,
and correspondingly, voted there during those elections.
The private respondent after being engaged for several years in the management of their family
business decided to be of greater service to his province and ran for public office. Hence, when
the opportunity came in 1987, he ran in the elections for representative in the second district of
Northern Samar.
Mr. Ong was overwhelmingly voted by the people of Northern Samar as their representative in
Congress. Even if the total votes of the two petitioners are combined, Ong would still lead the
two by more than 7,000 votes.
The pertinent portions of the Constitution found in Article IV read:
SECTION 1, the following are citizens of the Philippines:
1. Those who are citizens of the Philippines at the time of the adoption of the
Constitution;
2. Those whose fathers or mothers are citizens of the Philippines;
3. Those born before January 17, 1973, of Filipino mothers, who elect Philippine
citizenship upon reaching the age of majority; and
4. Those who are naturalized in accordance with law.
SECTION 2, Natural-born Citizens are those who are citizens of the Philippines
from birth without having to perform any act to acquire or perfect their
citizenship. Those who elect Philippine citizenship in accordance with paragraph
3 hereof shall be deemed natural-born citizens.
The Court interprets Section 1, Paragraph 3 above as applying not only to those who elect
Philippine citizenship after February 2, 1987 but also to those who, having been born of Filipino
mothers, elected citizenship before that date.
The provision in Paragraph 3 was intended to correct an unfair position which discriminates
against Filipino women. There is no ambiguity in the deliberations of the Constitutional
Commission, viz:
Mr. Azcuna: With respect to the provision of section 4, would this
refer only to those who elect Philippine citizenship after the
effectivity of the 1973 Constitution or would it also cover those
who elected it under the 1973 Constitution?
Fr. Bernas: It would apply to anybody who elected Philippine
citizenship by virtue of the provision of the 1935 Constitution
whether the election was done before or after January 17, 1973.
(Records of the Constitutional Commission, Vol. 1, p. 228;
Emphasis supplied)
xxx xxx xxx

Mr. Trenas: The Committee on Citizenship, Bill of Rights, Political
Rights and Obligations and Human Rights has more or less
decided to extend the interpretation of who is a natural-born citizen
as provided in section 4 of the 1973 Constitution by adding that
persons who have elected Philippine Citizenship under the 1935
Constitution shall be natural-born? Am I right Mr. Presiding
Officer?
Fr. Bernas: yes.
xxx xxx xxx
Mr. Nolledo: And I remember very well that in the Reverend
Father Bernas' well written book, he said that the decision was
designed merely to accommodate former delegate Ernesto Ang and
that the definition on natural-born has no retroactive effect. Now it
seems that the Reverend Father Bernas is going against this
intention by supporting the amendment?
Fr. Bernas: As the Commissioner can see, there has been an
evolution in my thinking. (Records of the Constitutional
Commission, Vol. 1, p. 189)
xxx xxx xxx
Mr. Rodrigo: But this provision becomes very important because
his election of Philippine citizenship makes him not only a Filipino
citizen but a natural-born Filipino citizen entitling him to run for
Congress. . .
Fr. Bernas: Correct. We are quite aware of that and for that reason
we will leave it to the body to approve that provision of section 4.
Mr. Rodrigo: I think there is a good basis for the provision because
it strikes me as unfair that the Filipino citizen who was born a day
before January 17, 1973 cannot be a Filipino citizen or a naturalborn citizen. (Records of the Constitutional Commission, Vol. 1, p.
231)
xxx xxx xxx
Mr. Rodrigo: The purpose of that provision is to remedy an
inequitable situation. Between 1935 and 1973 when we were under
the 1935 Constitution, those born of Filipino fathers but alien
mothers were natural-born Filipinos. However, those born of
Filipino mothers but alien fathers would have to elect Philippine
citizenship upon reaching the age of majority; and if they do elect,
they become Filipino citizens but not natural-born Filipino
citizens. (Records of the Constitutional Commission, Vol. 1, p.
356)
The foregoing significantly reveals the intent of the framers. To make the provision prospective
from February 3, 1987 is to give a narrow interpretation resulting in an inequitable situation. It
must also be retroactive.
It should be noted that in construing the law, the Courts are not always to be hedged in by the
literal meaning of its language. The spirit and intendment thereof, must prevail over the letter,
especially where adherence to the latter would result in absurdity and injustice. (Casela v. Court
of Appeals, 35 SCRA 279 [1970])
A Constitutional provision should be construed so as to give it effective operation and suppress
the mischief at which it is aimed, hence, it is the spirit of the provision which should prevail over
the letter thereof. (Jarrolt v. Mabberly, 103 U.S. 580)
In the words of the Court in the case of J.M. Tuason v. LTA (31 SCRA 413 [1970]:
To that primordial intent, all else is subordinated. Our Constitution, any
constitution is not to be construed narrowly or pedantically for the prescriptions
therein contained, to paraphrase Justice Holmes, are not mathematical formulas
having their essence in their form but are organic living institutions, the
significance of which is vital not formal. . . . (p. 427)
The provision in question was enacted to correct the anomalous situation where one born of a
Filipino father and an alien mother was automatically granted the status of a natural-born citizen
while one born of a Filipino mother and an alien father would still have to elect Philippine
citizenship. If one so elected, he was not, under earlier laws, conferred the status of a naturalborn.
Under the 1973 Constitution, those born of Filipino fathers and those born of Filipino mothers
with an alien father were placed on equal footing. They were both considered as natural-born
citizens.
Hence, the bestowment of the status of "natural-born" cannot be made to depend on the fleeting
accident of time or result in two kinds of citizens made up of essentially the same similarly
situated members.
It is for this reason that the amendments were enacted, that is, in order to remedy this accidental
anomaly, and, therefore, treat equally all those born before the 1973 Constitution and who
elected Philippine citizenship either before or after the effectivity of that Constitution.
The Constitutional provision in question is, therefore curative in nature. The enactment was
meant to correct the inequitable and absurd situation which then prevailed, and thus, render those
acts valid which would have been nil at the time had it not been for the curative provisions.
(See Development Bank of the Philippines v. Court of Appeals, 96 SCRA 342 [1980])
There is no dispute that the respondent's mother was a natural born Filipina at the time of her
marriage. Crucial to this case is the issue of whether or not the respondent elected or chose to be
a Filipino citizen.
Election becomes material because Section 2 of Article IV of the Constitution accords natural
born status to children born of Filipino mothers before January 17, 1973, if they elect citizenship
upon reaching the age of majority.
To expect the respondent to have formally or in writing elected citizenship when he came of age
is to ask for the unnatural and unnecessary. The reason is obvious. He was already a citizen. Not
only was his mother a natural born citizen but his father had been naturalized when the
respondent was only nine (9) years old. He could not have divined when he came of age that in
1973 and 1987 the Constitution would be amended to require him to have filed a sworn
statement in 1969 electing citizenship inspite of his already having been a citizen since 1957. In
1969, election through a sworn statement would have been an unusual and unnecessary
procedure for one who had been a citizen since he was nine years old.
We have jurisprudence that defines "election" as both a formal and an informal process.
In the case of In Re: Florencio Mallare (59 SCRA 45 [1974]), the Court held that the exercise of
the right of suffrage and the participation in election exercises constitute a positive act of election
of Philippine citizenship. In the exact pronouncement of the Court, we held:
Esteban's exercise of the right of suffrage when he came of age, constitutes a
positive act of election of Philippine citizenship (p. 52; emphasis supplied)
The private respondent did more than merely exercise his right of suffrage. He has established
his life here in the Philippines.
For those in the peculiar situation of the respondent who cannot be expected to have elected
citizenship as they were already citizens, we apply the In Re Mallare rule.
The respondent was born in an outlying rural town of Samar where there are no alien enclaves
and no racial distinctions. The respondent has lived the life of a Filipino since birth. His father
applied for naturalization when the child was still a small boy. He is a Roman Catholic. He has
worked for a sensitive government agency. His profession requires citizenship for taking the
examinations and getting a license. He has participated in political exercises as a Filipino and has
always considered himself a Filipino citizen. There is nothing in the records to show that he does
not embrace Philippine customs and values, nothing to indicate any tinge of alien-ness no acts to
show that this country is not his natural homeland. The mass of voters of Northern Samar are
frilly aware of Mr. Ong's parentage. They should know him better than any member of this Court
will ever know him. They voted by overwhelming numbers to have him represent them in
Congress. Because of his acts since childhood, they have considered him as a Filipino.
The filing of sworn statement or formal declaration is a requirement for those who still have to
elect citizenship.For those already Filipinos when the time to elect came up, there are acts of
deliberate choice which cannot be less binding. Entering a profession open only to Filipinos,
serving in public office where citizenship is a qualification, voting during election time, running
for public office, and other categorical acts of similar nature are themselves formal
manifestations of choice for these persons.
An election of Philippine citizenship presupposes that the person electing is an alien. Or his
status is doubtful because he is a national of two countries. There is no doubt in this case about
Mr. Ong's being a Filipino when he turned twenty-one (21).
We repeat that any election of Philippine citizenship on the part of the private respondent would
not only have been superfluous but it would also have resulted in an absurdity. How can a
Filipino citizen elect Philippine citizenship?
The respondent HRET has an interesting view as to how Mr. Ong elected citizenship. It observed
that "when protestee was only nine years of age, his father, Jose Ong Chuan became a
naturalized Filipino. Section 15 of the Revised Naturalization Act squarely applies its benefit to
him for he was then a minor residing in this country. Concededly, it was the law itself that had
already elected Philippine citizenship for protestee by declaring him as such." (Emphasis
supplied)
The petitioners argue that the respondent's father was not, validly, a naturalized citizen because
of his premature taking of the oath of citizenship.
The Court cannot go into the collateral procedure of stripping Mr. Ong's father of his citizenship
after his death and at this very late date just so we can go after the son.
The petitioners question the citizenship of the father through a collateral approach. This can not
be done. In our jurisdiction, an attack on a person's citizenship may only be done through a direct
action for its nullity. (See Queto v. Catolico, 31 SCRA 52 [1970])
To ask the Court to declare the grant of Philippine citizenship to Jose Ong Chuan as null and
void would run against the principle of due process. Jose Ong Chuan has already been laid to
rest. How can he be given a fair opportunity to defend himself. A dead man cannot speak. To
quote the words of the HRET "Ong Chuan's lips have long been muted to perpetuity by his
demise and obviously he could not use beyond where his mortal remains now lie to defend
himself were this matter to be made a central issue in this case."
The issue before us is not the nullification of the grant of citizenship to Jose Ong Chuan. Our
function is to determine whether or not the HRET committed abuse of authority in the exercise
of its powers. Moreover, the respondent traces his natural born citizenship through his mother,
not through the citizenship of his father. The citizenship of the father is relevant only to
determine whether or not the respondent "chose" to be a Filipino when he came of age. At that
time and up to the present, both mother and father were Filipinos. Respondent Ong could not
have elected any other citizenship unless he first formally renounced Philippine citizenship in
favor of a foreign nationality. Unlike other persons faced with a problem of election, there was
no foreign nationality of his father which he could possibly have chosen.
There is another reason why we cannot declare the HRET as having committed manifest grave
abuse of discretion. The same issue of natural-born citizenship has already been decided by the
Constitutional Convention of 1971 and by the Batasang Pambansa convened by authority of the
Constitution drafted by that Convention. Emil Ong, full blood brother of the respondent, was
declared and accepted as a natural born citizen by both bodies.
Assuming that our opinion is different from that of the Constitutional Convention, the Batasang
Pambansa, and the respondent HRET, such a difference could only be characterized as error.
There would be no basis to call the HRET decision so arbitrary and whimsical as to amount
to grave abuse of discretion.
What was the basis for the Constitutional Convention's declaring Emil Ong a natural born
citizen?
Under the Philippine Bill of 1902, inhabitants of the Philippines who were Spanish subjects on
the 11th day of April 1899 and then residing in said islands and their children born subsequent
thereto were conferred the status of a Filipino citizen.
Was the grandfather of the private respondent a Spanish subject?
Article 17 of the Civil Code of Spain enumerates those who were considered Spanish
Subjects, viz:
ARTICLE 17. The following are Spaniards:
1. Persons born in Spanish territory.
2. Children born of a Spanish father or mother, even though they were born out of
Spain.
3. Foreigners who may have obtained naturalization papers.
4. Those without such papers, who may have acquired domicile in any town in the
Monarchy. (Emphasis supplied)
The domicile of a natural person is the place of his habitual residence. This domicile, once
established is considered to continue and will not be deemed lost until a new one is established.
(Article 50, NCC; Article 40, Civil Code of Spain; Zuellig v. Republic, 83 Phil. 768 [1949])
As earlier stated, Ong Te became a permanent resident of Laoang, Samar around 1895.
Correspondingly, a certificate of residence was then issued to him by virtue of his being a
resident of Laoang, Samar. (Report of the Committee on Election Protests and Credentials of the
1971 Constitutional Convention, September 7, 1972, p. 3)
The domicile that Ong Te established in 1895 continued until April 11, 1899; it even went
beyond the turn of the 19th century. It is also in this place were Ong Te set-up his business and
acquired his real property.
As concluded by the Constitutional Convention, Ong Te falls within the meaning of subparagraph 4 of Article 17 of the Civil Code of Spain.
Although Ong Te made brief visits to China, he, nevertheless, always returned to the Philippines.
The fact that he died in China, during one of his visits in said country, was of no moment. This
will not change the fact that he already had his domicile fixed in the Philippines and pursuant to
the Civil Code of Spain, he had become a Spanish subject.
If Ong Te became a Spanish subject by virtue of having established his domicile in a town under
the Monarchy of Spain, necessarily, Ong Te was also an inhabitant of the Philippines for an
inhabitant has been defined as one who has actual fixed residence in a place; one who has a
domicile in a place. (Bouvier's Law Dictionary, Vol. II) Apriori, there can be no other logical
conclusion but to educe that Ong Te qualified as a Filipino citizen under the provisions of section
4 of the Philippine Bill of 1902.
The HRET itself found this fact of absolute verity in concluding that the private respondent was
a natural-born Filipino.
The petitioners' sole ground in disputing this fact is that document presented to prove it were not
in compliance with the best the evidence rule. The petitioners allege that the private respondent
failed to present the original of the documentary evidence, testimonial evidence and of the
transcript of the proceedings of the body which the aforesaid resolution of the 1971
Constitutional Convention was predicated.
On the contrary, the documents presented by the private respondent fall under the exceptions to
the best evidence rule.
It was established in the proceedings before the HRET that the originals of the Committee Report
No. 12, the minutes of the plenary session of 1971 Constitutional Convention held on November
28, 1972 cannot be found.
This was affirmed by Atty. Ricafrente, Assistant Secretary of the 1971 Constitutional
Convention; by Atty. Nolledo, Delegate to the 1971 Constitutional Convention; and by Atty.
Antonio Santos, Chief Librarian of the U.P Law Center, in their respective testimonies given
before the HRET to the effect that there is no governmental agency which is the official
custodian of the records of the 1971 Constitutional Convention. (TSN, December 12, 1988, pp.
30-31; TSN, January 17, 1989, pp. 34-35; TSN, February 1, 1989, p. 44; TSN, February 6, 1989,
pp. 28-29)
The execution of the originals was established by Atty. Ricafrente, who as the Assistant Secretary
of the 1971 Constitutional Convention was the proper party to testify to such execution. (TSN,
December 12, 1989, pp. 11-24)
The inability to produce the originals before the HRET was also testified to as aforestated by
Atty. Ricafrente, Atty. Nolledo, and Atty. Santos. In proving the inability to produce, the law
does not require the degree of proof to be of sufficient certainty; it is enough that it be shown that
after a bona fide diligent search, the same cannot be found. (see Government of P.I. v. Martinez,
44 Phil. 817 [1918])
Since the execution of the document and the inability to produce were adequately established,
the contents of the questioned documents can be proven by a copy thereof or by the recollection
of witnesses.
Moreover, to erase all doubts as to the authenticity of the documentary evidence cited in the
Committee Report, the former member of the 1971 Constitutional Convention, Atty. Nolledo,
when he was presented as a witness in the hearing of the protest against the private respondent,
categorically stated that he saw the disputed documents presented during the hearing of the
election protest against the brother of the private respondent. (TSN, February 1, 1989, pp. 8-9)
In his concurring opinion, Mr. Justice Sarmiento, a vice-president of the Constitutional
Convention, states that he was presiding officer of the plenary session which deliberated on the
report on the election protest against Delegate Emil Ong. He cites a long list of names of
delegates present. Among them are Mr. Chief Justice Fernan, and Mr. Justice Davide, Jr. The
petitioners could have presented any one of the long list of delegates to refute Mr. Ong's having
been declared a natural-born citizen. They did not do so. Nor did they demur to the contents of
the documents presented by the private respondent. They merely relied on the procedural
objections respecting the admissibility of the evidence presented.
The Constitutional Convention was the sole judge of the qualifications of Emil Ong to be a
member of that body. The HRET by explicit mandate of the Constitution, is the sole judge of the
qualifications of Jose Ong, Jr. to be a member of Congress. Both bodies deliberated at length on
the controversies over which they were sole judges. Decisions were arrived at only after a full
presentation of all relevant factors which the parties wished to present. Even assuming that we
disagree with their conclusions, we cannot declare their acts as committed with grave abuse of
discretion. We have to keep clear the line between error and grave abuse.
ON THE ISSUE OF RESIDENCE
The petitioners question the residence qualification of respondent Ong.
The petitioners lose sight of the meaning of "residence" under the Constitution. The term
"residence" has been understood as synonymous with domicile not only under the previous
Constitutions but also under the 1987 Constitution.
The deliberations of the Constitutional Commission reveal that the meaning of residence vis-avis the qualifications of a candidate for Congress continues to remain the same as that of
domicile, to wit:
Mr. Nolledo: With respect to Section 5, I remember that in the
1971 Constitutional Convention, there was an attempt to require
residence in the place not less than one year immediately preceding
the day of the elections. So my question is: What is the
Committee's concept of residence of a candidate for the
legislature? Is it actual residence or is it the concept of domicile or
constructive residence?
Mr. Davide: Madame President, in so far as the regular members of
the National Assembly are concerned, the proposed section merely
provides, among others, and a resident thereof, that is, in the
district, for a period of not less than one year preceding the day of
the election. This was in effect lifted from the 1973 Constitution,
the interpretation given to it was domicile. (Records of the 1987
Constitutional Convention, Vol. 11, July 22, 1986. p. 87)
xxx xxx xxx
Mrs. Rosario Braid: The next question is on Section 7, page 2. I
think Commissioner Nolledo has raised the same point that
"resident" has been interpreted at times as a matter of intention
rather than actual residence.
Mr. De los Reyes: Domicile.
Ms. Rosario Braid: Yes, So, would the gentlemen consider at the
proper time to go back to actual residence rather than mere
intention to reside?
Mr. De los Reyes: But we might encounter some difficulty
especially considering that a provision in the Constitution in the
Article on Suffrage says that Filipinos living abroad may vote as
enacted by law. So, we have to stick to the original concept that it
should be by domicile and not physical and actual residence.
(Records of the 1987 Constitutional Commission, Vol. 11, July 22,
1986, p. 110)
The framers of the Constitution adhered to the earlier definition given to the word "residence"
which regarded it as having the same meaning as domicile.
The term "domicile" denotes a fixed permanent residence to which when absent for business or
pleasure, one intends to return. (Ong Huan Tin v. Republic, 19 SCRA 966 [1967]) The absence
of a person from said permanent residence, no matter how long, notwithstanding, it continues to
be the domicile of that person. In other words, domicile is characterized by animus
revertendi (Ujano v. Republic, 17 SCRA 147 [1966])
The domicile of origin of the private respondent, which was the domicile of his parents, is fixed
at Laoang, Samar. Contrary to the petitioners' imputation, Jose Ong, Jr. never abandoned said
domicile; it remained fixed therein even up to the present.
The private respondent, in the proceedings before the HRET sufficiently established that after the
fire that gutted their house in 1961, another one was constructed.
Likewise, after the second fire which again destroyed their house in 1975, a sixteen-door
apartment was built by their family, two doors of which were reserved as their family residence.
(TSN, Jose Ong, Jr., November 18,1988, p. 8)
The petitioners' allegation that since the private respondent owns no property in Laoang, Samar,
he cannot, therefore, be a resident of said place is misplaced.
The properties owned by the Ong Family are in the name of the private respondent's parents.
Upon the demise of his parents, necessarily, the private respondent, pursuant to the laws of
succession, became the co-owner thereof (as a co- heir), notwithstanding the fact that these were
still in the names of his parents.
Even assuming that the private respondent does not own any property in Samar, the Supreme
Court in the case of De los Reyes v. Solidum (61 Phil. 893 [1935]) held that it is not required that
a person should have a house in order to establish his residence and domicile. It is enough that
he should live in the municipality or in a rented house or in that of a friend or relative.

(Emphasis supplied)
To require the private respondent to own property in order to be eligible to run for Congress
would be tantamount to a property qualification. The Constitution only requires that the
candidate meet the age, citizenship, voting and residence requirements. Nowhere is it required by
the Constitution that the candidate should also own property in order to be qualified to run.
(see Maquera v. Borra, 122 Phil. 412 [1965])
It has also been settled that absence from residence to pursue studies or practice a profession or
registration as a voter other than in the place where one is elected, does not constitute loss of
residence. (Faypon v. Quirino, 96 Phil. 294 [1954])
As previously stated, the private respondent stayed in Manila for the purpose of finishing his
studies and later to practice his profession, There was no intention to abandon the residence in
Laoang, Samar. On the contrary, the periodical journeys made to his home province reveal that
he always had the animus revertendi.
The Philippines is made up not only of a single race; it has, rather, undergone an interracial
evolution. Throughout our history, there has been a continuing influx of Malays, Chinese,
Americans, Japanese, Spaniards and other nationalities. This racial diversity gives strength to our
country.
Many great Filipinos have not been whole-blooded nationals, if there is such a person, for there
is none. To mention a few, the great Jose Rizal was part Chinese, the late Chief Justice Claudio
Teehankee was part Chinese, and of course our own President, Corazon Aquino is also part
Chinese. Verily, some Filipinos of whom we are proud were ethnically more Chinese than the
private respondent.
Our citizens no doubt constitute the country's greatest wealth. Citizenship is a special privilege
which one must forever cherish.
However, in order to truly revere this treasure of citizenship, we do not, on the basis of too harsh
an interpretation, have to unreasonably deny it to those who qualify to share in its richness.
Under the overly strict jurisprudence surrounding our antiquated naturalization laws only the
very affluent backed by influential patrons, who were willing to suffer the indignities of a
lengthy, sometimes humiliating, and often corrupt process of clearances by minor bureaucrats
and whose lawyers knew how to overcome so many technical traps of the judicial process were
able to acquire citizenship. It is time for the naturalization law to be revised to enable a more
positive, affirmative, and meaningful examination of an applicant's suitability to be a Filipino. A
more humane, more indubitable and less technical approach to citizenship problems is essential.
WHEREFORE, the petitions are hereby DISMISSED. The questioned decision of the House of
Representatives Electoral Tribunal is AFFIRMED. Respondent Jose Ong, Jr. is declared a
natural-born citizen of the Philippines and a resident of Laoang, Northern Samar.
SO ORDERED.
Bidin, Grio-Aquino, Medialdea and Davide, Jr., JJ., concur.
Fernan, C.J., Melencio-Herrera, Cruz, Feliciano and Gancayco, JJ., took no part.

SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. 120295 June 28, 1996

JUAN G. FRIVALDO, petitioner,
vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, and RAUL R. LEE, respondents.
G.R. No. 123755 June 28, 1996
RAUL R. LEE, petitioner,
vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS and JUAN G. FRIVALDO, respondents.
PANGANIBAN, J.:p
The ultimate question posed before this Court in these twin cases is: Who should be declared the
rightful governor of Sorsogon (i) Juan G. Frivaldo, who unquestionably obtained the highest number of votes in three
successive elections but who was twice declared by this Court to be disqualified to hold such
office due to his alien citizenship, and who now claims to have re-assumed his lost Philippine
citizenship thru repatriation;
(ii) Raul R. Lee, who was the second placer in the canvass, but who claims that the votes cast in
favor of Frivaldo should be considered void; that the electorate should be deemed to have
intentionally thrown away their ballots; and that legally, he secured the most number
of valid votes; or
(iii) The incumbent Vice-Governor, Oscar G. Deri, who obviously was not voted directly to the
position of governor, but who according to prevailing jurisprudence should take over the said
post inasmuch as, by the ineligibility of Frivaldo, a "permanent vacancy in the contested office
has occurred"?
In ruling for Frivaldo, the Court lays down new doctrines on repatriation,
clarifies/reiterates/amplifies existing jurisprudence on citizenship and elections, and upholds the
superiority of substantial justice over pure legalisms.
G.R. No. 123755
This is a special civil action under Rules 65 and 58 of the Rules of Court for certiorari and
preliminary injunction to review and annul a Resolution of the respondent Commission on
Elections (Comelec), First Division, 1 promulgated on December 19, 1995 2 and another
Resolution of the Comelec en banc promulgated February 23, 1996 3 denying petitioner's motion
for reconsideration.
The Facts
On March 20, 1995, private respondent Juan G. Frivaldo filed his Certificate of Candidacy for
the office of Governor of Sorsogon in the May 8, 1995 elections. On March 23, 1995, petitioner
Raul R. Lee, another candidate, filed a petition 4 with the Comelec docketed as SPA No. 95-028
praying that Frivaldo "be disqualified from seeking or holding any public office or position by
reason of not yet being a citizen of the Philippines", and that his Certificate of Candidacy be
canceled. On May 1, 1995, the Second Division of the Comelec promulgated a
Resolution 5granting the petition with the following disposition 6:
WHEREFORE, this Division resolves to GRANT the petition and declares that
respondent is DISQUALIFIED to run for the Office of Governor of Sorsogon on
the ground that he is NOT a citizen of the Philippines. Accordingly, respondent's
certificate of candidacy is canceled.
The Motion for Reconsideration filed by Frivaldo remained unacted upon until after the May 8,
1995 elections. So, his candidacy continued and he was voted for during the elections held on
said date. On May 11, 1995, the Comelec en banc 7 affirmed the aforementioned Resolution of
the Second Division.
The Provincial Board of Canvassers completed the canvass of the election returns and a
Certificate of Votes 8dated May 27, 1995 was issued showing the following votes obtained by the
candidates for the position of Governor of Sorsogon:
Antonio H. Escudero, Jr. 51,060
Juan G. Frivaldo 73,440
Raul R. Lee 53,304
Isagani P. Ocampo 1,925
On June 9, 1995, Lee filed in said SPA No. 95-028, a (supplemental) petition 9 praying for his
proclamation as the duly-elected Governor of Sorsogon.
In an order 10 dated June 21, 1995, but promulgated according to the petition "only on June 29,
1995," the Comelec en banc directed "the Provincial Board of Canvassers of Sorsogon to
reconvene for the purpose of proclaiming candidate Raul Lee as the winning gubernatorial
candidate in the province of Sorsogon on June 29, 1995 . . ." Accordingly, at 8:30 in the evening
of June 30, 1995, Lee was proclaimed governor of Sorsogon.
On July 6, 1995, Frivaldo filed with the Comelec a new petition, 11 docketed as SPC No. 95-317,
praying for the annulment of the June 30, 1995 proclamation of Lee and for his own
proclamation. He alleged that on June 30, 1995, at 2:00 in the afternoon, he took his oath of
allegiance as a citizen of the Philippines after "his petition for repatriation under P.D. 725 which
he filed with the Special Committee on Naturalization in September 1994 had been granted". As
such, when "the said order (dated June 21, 1995) (of the Comelec) . . . was released and received
by Frivaldo on June 30, 1995 at 5:30 o'clock in the evening, there was no more legal impediment
to the proclamation (of Frivaldo) as governor . . ." In the alternative, he averred that pursuant to
the two cases of Labo vs. Comelec, 12 the Vice-Governor - not Lee - should occupy said position
of governor.
On December 19, 1995, the Comelec First Division promulgated the herein assailed
Resolution 13 holding that Lee, "not having garnered the highest number of votes," was not
legally entitled to be proclaimed as duly-elected governor; and that Frivaldo, "having garnered
the
highest
number
of
votes,
and . . . having reacquired his Filipino citizenship by repatriation on June 30, 1995 under the
provisions of Presidential Decree No. 725 . . . (is) qualified to hold the office of governor of
Sorsogon"; thus:
PREMISES CONSIDERED, the Commission (First Division), therefore

RESOLVES to GRANT the Petition.
Consistent with the decisions of the Supreme Court, the proclamation of Raul R.
Lee as Governor of Sorsogon is hereby ordered annulled, being contrary to law,
he not having garnered the highest number of votes to warrant his proclamation.
Upon the finality of the annulment of the proclamation of Raul R. Lee, the
Provincial Board of Canvassers is directed to immediately reconvene and, on the
basis of the completed canvass, proclaim petitioner Juan G. Frivaldo as the duly
elected Governor of Sorsogon having garnered the highest number of votes, and
he having reacquired his Filipino citizenship by repatriation on June 30, 1995
under the provisions of Presidential Decree No. 725 and, thus, qualified to hold
the office of Governor of Sorsogon.
Conformably with Section 260 of the Omnibus Election Code (B.P. Blg. 881), the
Clerk of the Commission is directed to notify His Excellency the President of the
Philippines, and the Secretary of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan of the Province
of Sorsogon of this resolution immediately upon the due implementation thereof.
On December 26, 1995, Lee filed a motion for reconsideration which was denied by the
Comelec en banc in its Resolution 14 promulgated on February 23, 1996. On February 26, 1996,
the present petition was filed. Acting on the prayer for a temporary restraining order, this Court
issued on February 27, 1996 a Resolution which inter alia directed the parties "to maintain
the status quo prevailing prior to the filing of this petition."
The Issues in G.R. No. 123755
Petitioner Lee's "position on the matter at hand may briefly be capsulized in the following
propositions" 15:
First -- The initiatory petition below was so far insufficient in form and substance
to warrant the exercise by the COMELEC of its jurisdiction with the result that, in
effect, the COMELEC acted without jurisdiction in taking cognizance of and
deciding said petition;
Second -- The judicially declared disqualification of respondent was a continuing
condition and rendered him ineligible to run for, to be elected to and to hold the
Office of Governor;
Third -- The alleged repatriation of respondent was neither valid nor is the effect
thereof retroactive as to cure his ineligibility and qualify him to hold the Office of
Governor; and
Fourth -- Correctly read and applied, the Labo Doctrine fully supports the validity
of petitioner's proclamation as duly elected Governor of Sorsogon.
G.R. No. 120295
This is a petition to annul three Resolutions of the respondent Comelec, the first two of which are
also at issue in G.R. No. 123755, as follows:
1. Resolution 16 of the Second Division, promulgated on May 1, 1995,
disqualifying Frivaldo from running for governor of Sorsogon in the May 8, 1995
elections "on the ground that he is not a citizen of the Philippines";
2. Resolution 17 of the Comelec en banc, promulgated on May 11, 1995; and
3. Resolution 18 of the Comelec en banc, promulgated also on May 11, 1995

suspending the proclamation of, among others, Frivaldo.
The Facts and the Issue
The facts of this case are essentially the same as those in G.R. No. 123755. However, Frivaldo
assails the above-mentioned resolutions on a different ground: that under Section 78 of the
Omnibus Election Code, which is reproduced hereinunder:
Sec. 78. Petition to deny due course or to cancel a certificate of candidacy. -- A
may be filed by any person exclusively on the ground that any material
the filing of the certificate of candidacy and shall be decided, after notice and
hearing, not later than fifteen days before the election. (Emphasis supplied.)
the Comelec had no jurisdiction to issue said Resolutions because they were not rendered
"within the period allowed by law" i.e., "not later than fifteen days before the election."
Otherwise stated, Frivaldo contends that the failure of the Comelec to act on the petition for
disqualification within the period of fifteen days prior to the election as provided by law is a
jurisdictional defect which renders the said Resolutions null and void.
By Resolution on March 12, 1996, the Court consolidated G.R. Nos. 120295 and 123755 since
they are intimately related in their factual environment and are identical in the ultimate question
raised, viz., who should occupy the position of governor of the province of Sorsogon.
On March 19, 1995, the Court heard oral argument from the parties and required them thereafter
to file simultaneously their respective memoranda.
The Consolidated Issues
From the foregoing submissions, the consolidated issues may be restated as follows:
1. Was the repatriation of Frivaldo valid and legal? If so, did it seasonably cure his lack of
citizenship as to qualify him to be proclaimed and to hold the Office of Governor? If not, may it
be given retroactive effect? If so, from when?
2. Is Frivaldo's "judicially declared" disqualification for lack of Filipino citizenship a continuing
bar to his eligibility to run for, be elected to or hold the governorship of Sorsogon?
3. Did the respondent Comelec have jurisdiction over the initiatory petition in SPC No. 95-317
considering that said petition is not "a pre-proclamation case, an election protest or a quo
warranto case"?
4. Was the proclamation of Lee, a runner-up in the election, valid and legal in light of existing
jurisprudence?
5. Did the respondent Commission on Elections exceed its jurisdiction in promulgating the
assailed Resolutions, all of which prevented Frivaldo from assuming the governorship of
Sorsogon, considering that they were not rendered within the period referred to in Section 78 of
the Omnibus Election Code, viz., "not later than fifteen days before the elections"?
The First Issue: Frivaldo's Repatriation
The validity and effectivity of Frivaldo's repatriation is the lis mota, the threshold legal issue in
this case. All the other matters raised are secondary to this.
The Local Government Code of 1991 19 expressly requires Philippine citizenship as a
qualification for elective local officials, including that of provincial governor, thus:
Sec. 39. Qualifications. -- (a) An elective local official must be a citizen of the
Philippines; a registered voter in the barangay, municipality, city, or province or,
in the case of a member of the sangguniang panlalawigan, sangguniang
panlungsod, or sangguniang bayan, the district where he intends to be elected; a
resident therein for at least one (1) year immediately preceding the day of the
election; and able to read and write Filipino or any other local language or dialect.
(b) Candidates for the position of governor, vice governor or
member of the sangguniang panlalawigan, or mayor, vice mayor or
member of the sangguniang panlungsod of highly urbanized cities
must be at least twenty-three (23) years of age on election day.
xxx xxx xxx
Inasmuch as Frivaldo had been declared by this Court 20 as a non-citizen, it is therefore
incumbent upon him to show that he has reacquired citizenship; in fine, that he possesses the
qualifications prescribed under the said statute (R.A. 7160).
Under Philippine law, 21 citizenship may be reacquired by direct act of Congress, by
naturalization or by repatriation. Frivaldo told this Court in G.R. No. 104654 22 and during the
oral argument in this case that he tried to resume his citizenship by direct act of Congress, but
that the bill allowing him to do so "failed to materialize, notwithstanding the endorsement of
several members of the House of Representatives" due, according to him, to the "maneuvers of
his political rivals." In the same case, his attempt at naturalization was rejected by this Court
because of jurisdictional, substantial and procedural defects.
Despite his lack of Philippine citizenship, Frivaldo was overwhelmingly elected governor by the
electorate of Sorsogon, with a margin of 27,000 votes in the 1988 elections, 57,000 in 1992, and
20,000 in 1995 over the same opponent Raul Lee. Twice, he was judicially declared a nonFilipino and thus twice disqualified from holding and discharging his popular mandate. Now, he
comes to us a third time, with a fresh vote from the people of Sorsogon and a favorable decision
from the Commission on Elections to boot. Moreover, he now boasts of having successfully
passed through the third and last mode of reacquiring citizenship: by repatriation under P.D. No.
725, with no less than the Solicitor General himself, who was the prime opposing counsel in the
previous cases he lost, this time, as counsel for co-respondent Comelec, arguing the validity of
his cause (in addition to his able private counsel Sixto S. Brillantes, Jr.). That he took his oath of
allegiance under the provisions of said Decree at 2:00 p.m. on June 30, 1995 is not disputed.
Hence, he insists that he -- not Lee -- should have been proclaimed as the duly-elected governor
of Sorsogon when the Provincial Board of Canvassers met at 8:30 p.m. on the said date since,
clearly and unquestionably, he garnered the highest number of votes in the elections and since at
that time, he already reacquired his citizenship.
En contrario, Lee argues that Frivaldo's repatriation is tainted with serious defects, which we
shall now discuss in seriatim.
First, Lee tells us that P.D. No. 725 had "been effectively repealed", asserting that "then
President Corazon Aquino exercising legislative powers under the Transitory Provisions of the
1987 Constitution, forbade the grant of citizenship by Presidential Decree or Executive Issuances
as the same poses a serious and contentious issue of policy which the present government, in the
exercise of prudence and sound discretion, should best leave to the judgment of the first
Congress under the 1987 Constitution", adding that in her memorandum dated March 27, 1987 to
the members of the Special Committee on Naturalization constituted for purposes of Presidential
Decree No. 725, President Aquino directed them "to cease and desist from undertaking any and
all proceedings within your functional area of responsibility as defined under Letter of
Instructions (LOI) No. 270 dated April 11, 1975, as amended." 23
This memorandum dated March 27, 1987 24 cannot by any stretch of legal hermeneutics be
construed as a law sanctioning or authorizing a repeal of P.D. No. 725. Laws are repealed only
by subsequent ones 25 and a repeal may be express or implied. It is obvious that no express
repeal was made because then President Aquino in her memorandum -- based on the copy
furnished us by Lee -- did not categorically and/or impliedly state that P.D. 725 was being
repealed or was being rendered without any legal effect. In fact, she did not even mention it
specifically by its number or text. On the other hand, it is a basic rule of statutory construction
that repeals by implication are not favored. An implied repeal will not be allowed "unless it is
convincingly and unambiguously demonstrated that the two laws are clearly repugnant and
patently inconsistent that they cannot co-exist". 26
The memorandum of then President Aquino cannot even be regarded as a legislative enactment,
for not every pronouncement of the Chief Executive even under the Transitory Provisions of the
1987 Constitution can nor should be regarded as an exercise of her law-making powers. At best,
it could be treated as an executive policy addressed to the Special Committee to halt the
acceptance and processing of applications for repatriation pending whatever "judgment the first
Congress under the 1987 Constitution" might make. In other words, the former President did not
repeal P.D. 725 but left it to the first Congress -- once created -- to deal with the matter. If she
had intended to repeal such law, she should have unequivocally said so instead of referring the
matter to Congress. The fact is she carefully couched her presidential issuance in terms that
clearly indicated the intention of "the present government, in the exercise of prudence and sound
discretion" to leave the matter of repeal to the new Congress. Any other interpretation of the said
Presidential Memorandum, such as is now being proffered to the Court by Lee, would visit
unmitigated violence not only upon statutory construction but on common sense as well.
Second, Lee also argues that "serious congenital irregularities flawed the repatriation
proceedings," asserting that Frivaldo's application therefor was "filed on June 29, 1995 . . . (and)
was approved in just one day or on June 30, 1995 . . .", which "prevented a judicious review and
evaluation of the merits thereof." Frivaldo counters that he filed his application for repatriation
with the Office of the President in Malacaang Palace on August 17, 1994. This is confirmed by
the Solicitor General. However, the Special Committee was reactivated only on June 8, 1995,
when presumably the said Committee started processing his application. On June 29, 1995, he
filled up and re-submitted the FORM that the Committee required. Under these circumstances, it
could not be said that there was "indecent haste" in the processing of his application.
Anent Lee's charge that the "sudden reconstitution of the Special Committee on Naturalization
was intended solely for the personal interest of respondent," 27 the Solicitor General explained
during the oral argument on March 19, 1996 that such allegation is simply baseless as there were
many others who applied and were considered for repatriation, a list of whom was submitted by
him to this Court, through a Manifestation 28 filed on April 3, 1996.
On the basis of the parties' submissions, we are convinced that the presumption of regularity in
the performance of official duty and the presumption of legality in the repatriation of Frivaldo
have not been successfully rebutted by Lee. The mere fact that the proceedings were speeded up
is by itself not a ground to conclude that such proceedings were necessarily tainted. After all, the
requirements of repatriation under P.D. No. 725 are not difficult to comply with, nor are they
tedious
and
cumbersome.
In
fact,
P.D.
725 29 itself requires very little of an applicant, and even the rules and regulations to implement
the said decree were left to the Special Committee to promulgate. This is not unusual since,
unlike in naturalization where an alien covets a first-timeentry into Philippine political life, in
repatriation the applicant is a former natural-born Filipino who is merely seeking to reacquire his
previous citizenship. In the case of Frivaldo, he was undoubtedly a natural-born citizen who
openly and faithfully served his country and his province prior to his naturalization in the United
States -- a naturalization he insists was made necessary only to escape the iron clutches of a
dictatorship he abhorred and could not in conscience embrace -- and who, after the fall of the
dictator and the re-establishment of democratic space, wasted no time in returning to his country
of birth to offer once more his talent and services to his people.
So too, the fact that ten other persons, as certified to by the Solicitor General, were granted
repatriation argues convincingly and conclusively against the existence of favoritism vehemently
posited by Raul Lee. At any rate, any contest on the legality of Frivaldo's repatriation should
have been pursued before the Committee itself, and, failing there, in the Office of the President,
pursuant to the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies.
Third, Lee further contends that assuming the assailed repatriation to be valid, nevertheless it
could only be effective as at 2:00 p.m. of June 30, 1995 whereas the citizenship qualification
prescribed by the Local Government Code "must exist on the date of his election, if not when the
certificate of candidacy is filed," citing our decision in G.R. 104654 30 which held that "both the
Local Government Code and the Constitution require that only Philippine citizens can run and
be elected to public office." Obviously, however, this was a mere obiter as the only issue in said
case was whether Frivaldo's naturalization was valid or not -- and NOT the effective date thereof.
Since the Court held his naturalization to be invalid, then the issue of when an aspirant for public
office should be a citizen was NOT resolved at all by the Court. Which question we shall now
directly rule on.
Under Sec. 39 of the Local Government Code, "(a)n elective local official must be:
* a citizen of the Philippines;
* a registered voter in the barangay, municipality, city, or province . . . where he
intends to be elected;
* a resident therein for at least one (1) year immediately preceding the day of the
election;
* able to read and write Filipino or any other local language or dialect.
* In addition, "candidates for the position of governor . . . must be at least twentythree (23) years of age on election day.
From the above, it will be noted that the law does not specify any particular date or time when
the candidate must possess citizenship, unlike that for residence (which must consist of at
least one year's residency immediately preceding the day of election) and age (at least twenty
three years of age on election day).
Philippine citizenship is an indispensable requirement for holding an elective public office, 31 and
the purpose of the citizenship qualification is none other than to ensure that no alien, i.e., no
person owing allegiance to another nation, shall govern our people and our country or a unit of
territory thereof. Now, an official begins to govern or to discharge his functions only upon his
proclamation and on the day the law mandates his term of office to begin. Since Frivaldo reassumed his citizenship on June 30, 1995 -- the very day 32 the term of office of governor (and
other elective officials) began -- he was therefore already qualified to be proclaimed, to hold
such office and to discharge the functions and responsibilities thereof as of said date. In short, at
that time, he was already qualified to govern his native Sorsogon. This is the liberal
interpretation that should give spirit, life and meaning to our law on qualifications consistent
with the purpose for which such law was enacted. So too, even from a literal (as distinguished
from liberal) construction, it should be noted that Section 39 of the Local Government Code
speaks of "Qualifications" of "ELECTIVE OFFICIALS", not of candidates. Why then should
such qualification be required at the time of election or at the time of the filing of the certificates
of candidacies, as Lee insists? Literally, such qualifications -- unless otherwise expressly

conditioned, as in the case of age and residence -- should thus be possessed when the "elective
[or elected] official" begins to govern, i.e., at the time he is proclaimed and at the start of his
term -- in this case, on June 30, 1995. Paraphrasing this Court's ruling in Vasquez vs. Giap and Li
Seng Giap & Sons, 33 if the purpose of the citizenship requirement is to ensure that our people
and country do not end up being governed by aliens,i.e., persons owing allegiance to another
nation, that aim or purpose would not be thwarted but instead achieved by construing the
citizenship qualification as applying to the time of proclamation of the elected official and at the
start of his term.
But perhaps the more difficult objection was the one raised during the oral argument 34 to the
effect that the citizenship qualification should be possessed at the time the candidate (or for that
matter the elected official) registered as a voter. After all, Section 39, apart from requiring the
official to be a citizen, also specifies as another item of qualification, that he be a "registered
voter". And, under the law 35 a "voter" must be a citizen of the Philippines. So therefore, Frivaldo
could not have been a voter -- much less a validly registered one -- if he was not a citizen at the
time of such registration.
The answer to this problem again lies in discerning the purpose of the requirement. If the law
intended thecitizenship qualification to be possessed prior to election consistent with the
requirement of being a registered voter, then it would not have made citizenship a SEPARATE
qualification. The law abhors a redundancy. It therefore stands to reason that the law intended
CITIZENSHIP to be a qualification distinct from being a VOTER, even if being a voter
presumes being a citizen first. It also stands to reason that the voter requirement was included as
another qualification (aside from "citizenship"), not to reiterate the need for nationality but to
require that the official be registered as a voter IN THE AREA OR TERRITORY he seeks to
govern, i.e., the law states: "a registered voter in the barangay, municipality, city, or province . . .
where he intends to be elected." It should be emphasized that the Local Government Code
requires an elective official to be a registered voter. It does not require him to vote actually.
Hence, registration -- not the actual voting -- is the core of this "qualification". In other words,
the law's purpose in this second requirement is to ensure that the prospective official is actually
registered in the area he seeks to govern -- and not anywhere else.
Before this Court, Frivaldo has repeatedly emphasized -- and Lee has not disputed -- that he "was
and is a registered voter of Sorsogon, and his registration as a voter has been sustained as valid
by judicial declaration . . . In fact, he cast his vote in his precinct on May 8, 1995." 36
So too, during the oral argument, his counsel steadfastly maintained that "Mr. Frivaldo has
always been a registered voter of Sorsogon. He has voted in 1987, 1988, 1992, then he voted
again in 1995. In fact, his eligibility as a voter was questioned, but the court dismissed (sic) his
eligibility as a voter and he was allowed to vote as in fact, he voted in all the previous elections
including on May 8, 1995." 37
It is thus clear that Frivaldo is a registered voter in the province where he intended to be elected.
There is yet another reason why the prime issue of citizenship should be reckoned from the date
of proclamation, not necessarily the date of election or date of filing of the certificate of
candidacy. Section 253 of the Omnibus Election Code 38 gives any voter, presumably including
the defeated candidate, the opportunity to question the ELIGIBILITY (or the disloyalty) of a
candidate. This is the only provision of the Code that authorizes a remedy on how to contest
before the Comelec an incumbent's ineligibility arising from failure to meet the qualifications
enumerated under Sec. 39 of the Local Government Code. Such remedy of Quo Warranto can be
availed of "within ten days after proclamation" of the winning candidate. Hence, it is only at
such time that the issue of ineligibility may be taken cognizance of by the Commission. And
since, at the very moment of Lee's proclamation (8:30 p.m., June 30, 1995), Juan G. Frivaldo
was already and indubitably a citizen, having taken his oath of allegiance earlier in the afternoon
of the same day, then he should have been the candidate proclaimed as he unquestionably
garnered the highest number of votes in the immediately preceding elections and such oath had
already cured his previous "judicially-declared" alienage. Hence, at such time, he was no longer
ineligible.
But to remove all doubts on this important issue, we also hold that the repatriation of Frivaldo
RETROACTED to the date of the filing of his application on August 17, 1994.
It is true that under the Civil Code of the Philippines, 39 "(l)aws shall have no retroactive effect,
unless the contrary is provided." But there are settled exceptions 40 to this general rule, such as
when the statute is CURATIVE or REMEDIAL in nature or when it CREATES NEW RIGHTS.
According to Tolentino, 41 curative statutes are those which undertake to cure errors and
irregularities, thereby validating judicial or administrative proceedings, acts of public officers, or
private deeds and contracts which otherwise would not produce their intended consequences by
reason of some statutory disability or failure to comply with some technical requirement. They
operate on conditions already existing, and are necessarily retroactive in operation. Agpalo, 42 on
the
other
hand,
says
that
curative
statutes
are
"healing acts . . . curing defects and adding to the means of enforcing existing obligations . . .
(and) are intended to supply defects, abridge superfluities in existing laws, and curb certain evils.
. . . By their very nature, curative statutes are retroactive . . . (and) reach back to past events to
correct errors or irregularities and to render valid and effective attempted acts which would be
otherwise ineffective for the purpose the parties intended."
On the other hand, remedial or procedural laws, i.e., those statutes relating to remedies or modes
of procedure, which do not create new or take away vested rights, but only operate in furtherance
of the remedy or confirmation of such rights, ordinarily do not come within the legal meaning of
a retrospective law, nor within the general rule against the retrospective operation of statutes. 43
A reading of P.D. 725 immediately shows that it creates a new right, and also provides for a new
remedy, thereby filling certain voids in our laws. Thus, in its preamble, P.D. 725 expressly
recognizes the plight of "many Filipino women (who) had lost their Philippine citizenship by
marriage to aliens" and who could not, under the existing law (C.A. No. 63, as amended) avail of
repatriation until "after the death of their husbands or the termination of their marital status" and
who could neither be benefitted by the 1973 Constitution's new provision allowing "a Filipino
woman who marries an alien to retain her Philippine citizenship . . ." because "such provision of
the new Constitution does not apply to Filipino women who had married aliens before said
constitution took effect." Thus, P.D. 725 granted a new right to these women -- the right to reacquire Filipino citizenship even during their marital coverture, which right did not exist prior to
P.D. 725. On the other hand, said statute also provided a new remedyand a new right in favor of
other "natural born Filipinos who (had) lost their Philippine citizenship but now desire to reacquire Philippine citizenship", because prior to the promulgation of P.D. 725 such former
Filipinos would have had to undergo the tedious and cumbersome process of naturalization, but
with the advent of P.D. 725 they could now re-acquire their Philippine citizenship under the
simplified procedure of repatriation.
The Solicitor General 44 argues:
By their very nature, curative statutes are retroactive, (DBP vs. CA, 96 SCRA
342), since they are intended to supply defects, abridge superfluities in existing
laws (Del Castillo vs. Securities and Exchange Commission, 96 Phil. 119) and
curb certain evils (Santos vs. Duata, 14 SCRA 1041).
In this case, P.D. No. 725 was enacted to cure the defect in the existing
naturalization law, specifically C.A. No. 63 wherein married Filipino women are
allowed to repatriate only upon the death of their husbands, and natural-born
Filipinos who lost their citizenship by naturalization and other causes faced the
difficulty of undergoing the rigid procedures of C.A. 63 for reacquisition of

Filipino citizenship by naturalization.
Presidential Decree No. 725 provided a remedy for the aforementioned legal
aberrations and thus its provisions are considered essentially remedial and
curative.
In light of the foregoing, and prescinding from the wording of the preamble, it is unarguable that
the legislative intent was precisely to give the statute retroactive operation. "(A) retrospective
operation is given to a statute or amendment where the intent that it should so operate clearly
appears from a consideration of the act as a whole, or from the terms thereof." 45 It is obvious to
the Court that the statute was meant to "reach back" to those persons, events and transactions not
otherwise covered by prevailing law and jurisprudence. And inasmuch as it has been held that
citizenship is a political and civil right equally as important as the freedom of speech, liberty of
abode, the right against unreasonable searches and seizures and other guarantees enshrined in the
Bill of Rights, therefore the legislative intent to give retrospective operation to P.D. 725 must be
given the fullest effect possible. "(I)t has been said that a remedial statute must be so construed
as to make it effect the evident purpose for which it was enacted, so that if the reason of the
statute extends to past transactions, as well as to those in the future, then it will be so applied
although the statute does not in terms so direct, unless to do so would impair some vested right
or violate some constitutional guaranty." 46 This is all the more true of P.D. 725, which did not
specify any restrictions on or delimit or qualify the right of repatriation granted therein.
At this point, a valid question may be raised: How can the retroactivity of P.D. 725 benefit
Frivaldo considering that said law was enacted on June 5, 1975, while Frivaldo lost his Filipino
citizenship much later, on January 20, 1983, and applied for repatriation even later, on August
17, 1994?
While it is true that the law was already in effect at the time that Frivaldo became an American
citizen, nevertheless, it is not only the law itself (P.D. 725) which is to be given retroactive effect,
but even the repatriation granted under said law to Frivaldo on June 30, 1995 is to be deemed to
have retroacted to the date of his application therefor, August 17, 1994. The reason for this is
simply that if, as in this case, it was the intent of the legislative authority that the law should
apply to past events -- i.e., situations and transactions existing even before the law came into
being -- in order to benefit the greatest number of former Filipinos possible thereby enabling
them to enjoy and exercise the constitutionally guaranteed right of citizenship, and such
legislative intention is to be given the fullest effect and expression, then there is all the more
reason to have the law apply in a retroactive or retrospective manner to situations, events and
transactions subsequent to the passage of such law. That is, the repatriation granted to Frivaldo
on June 30, 1995 can and should be made to take effect as of date of his application. As earlier
mentioned, there is nothing in the law that would bar this or would show a contrary intention on
the part of the legislative authority; and there is no showing that damage or prejudice to anyone,
or anything unjust or injurious would result from giving retroactivity to his repatriation. Neither
has Lee shown that there will result the impairment of any contractual obligation, disturbance of
any vested right or breach of some constitutional guaranty.
Being a former Filipino who has served the people repeatedly, Frivaldo deserves a liberal
interpretation of Philippine laws and whatever defects there were in his nationality should now
be deemed mooted by his repatriation.
Another argument for retroactivity to the date of filing is that it would prevent prejudice to
applicants. If P.D. 725 were not to be given retroactive effect, and the Special Committee decides
not to act, i.e., to delay the processing of applications for any substantial length of time, then the
former Filipinos who may be stateless, as Frivaldo -- having already renounced his American
citizenship -- was, may be prejudiced for causes outside their control. This should not be. In case
of doubt in the interpretation or application of laws, it is to be presumed that the law-making
body intended right and justice to prevail. 47
And as experience will show, the Special Committee was able to process, act upon and grant
applications for repatriation within relatively short spans of time after the same were filed. 48 The
fact that such interregna were relatively insignificant minimizes the likelihood of prejudice to the
government as a result of giving retroactivity to repatriation. Besides, to the mind of the Court,
direct prejudice to the government is possible only where a person's repatriation has the effect of
wiping out a liability of his to the government arising in connection with or as a result of his
being an alien, and accruing only during the interregnum between application and approval, a
situation that is not present in the instant case.
And it is but right and just that the mandate of the people, already twice frustrated, should now
prevail. Under the circumstances, there is nothing unjust or iniquitous in treating Frivaldo's
repatriation as having become effective as of the date of his application, i.e., on August 17, 1994.
This being so, all questions about his possession of the nationality qualification -- whether at the
date of proclamation (June 30, 1995) or the date of election (May 8, 1995) or date of filing his
certificate of candidacy (March 20, 1995) would become moot.
Based on the foregoing, any question regarding Frivaldo's status as a registered voter would also
be deemed settled. Inasmuch as he is considered as having been repatriated -- i.e., his Filipino
citizenship restored -- as of August 17, 1994, his previous registration as a voter is likewise
deemed validated as of said date.
It is not disputed that on January 20, 1983 Frivaldo became an American. Would the retroactivity
of his repatriation not effectively give him dual citizenship, which under Sec. 40 of the Local
Government Code would disqualify him "from running for any elective local position?" 49 We
answer this question in the negative, as there is cogent reason to hold that Frivaldo was really
STATELESS at the time he took said oath of allegiance and even before that, when he ran for
governor in 1988. In his Comment, Frivaldo wrote that he "had long renounced and had long
abandoned his American citizenship -- long before May 8, 1995. At best, Frivaldo was stateless
in the interim -- when he abandoned and renounced his US citizenship but before he was
repatriated to his Filipino citizenship." 50
On this point, we quote from the assailed Resolution dated December 19, 1995: 51
By the laws of the United States, petitioner Frivaldo lost his American citizenship
when he took his oath of allegiance to the Philippine Government when he ran for
Governor in 1988, in 1992, and in 1995. Every certificate of candidacy contains
an oath of allegiance to the Philippine Government."
These factual findings that Frivaldo has lost his foreign nationality long before the elections of
1995 have not been effectively rebutted by Lee. Furthermore, it is basic that such findings of the
Commission are conclusive upon this Court, absent any showing of capriciousness or
arbitrariness
or
52
abuse.
The Second Issue: Is Lack of Citizenship
a Continuing Disqualification?
Lee contends that the May 1, 1995 Resolution 53 of the Comelec Second Division in SPA No. 95028 as affirmed in totoby Comelec En Banc in its Resolution of May 11, 1995 "became final and
executory after five (5) days or on May 17, 1995, no restraining order having been issued by this
Honorable Court. 54 Hence, before Lee "was proclaimed as the elected governor on June 30,
1995, there was already a final and executory judgment disqualifying" Frivaldo. Lee adds that
this Court's two rulings (which Frivaldo now concedes were legally "correct") declaring Frivaldo
an alien have also become final and executory way before the 1995 elections, and these "judicial
pronouncements of his political status as an American citizen absolutely and for all time
disqualified (him) from running for, and holding any public office in the Philippines."
We do not agree.
It should be noted that our first ruling in G.R. No. 87193 disqualifying Frivaldo was rendered in
connection with the 1988 elections while that in G.R. No. 104654 was in connection with the
1992 elections. That he was disqualified for such elections is final and can no longer be changed.
In the words of the respondent Commission (Second Division) in its assailed Resolution: 55
The records show that the Honorable Supreme Court had decided that Frivaldo
was not a Filipino citizen and thus disqualified for the purpose of the 1988 and
1992 elections. However, there is no record of any "final judgment" of the
disqualification of Frivaldo as a candidate for the May 8, 1995 elections. What the
Commission said in its Order of June 21, 1995 (implemented on June 30, 1995),
directing the proclamation of Raul R. Lee, was that Frivaldo was not a Filipino
citizen "having been declared by the Supreme Court in its Order dated March 25,
1995, not a citizen of the Philippines." This declaration of the Supreme Court,
however, was in connection with the 1992 elections.
Indeed, decisions declaring the acquisition or denial of citizenship cannot govern a person's
future status with finality. This is because a person may subsequently reacquire, or for that matter
lose, his citizenship under any of the modes recognized by law for the purpose. Hence, in Lee
vs. Commissioner of Immigration, 56 we held:
Everytime the citizenship of a person is material or indispensable in a judicial or
administrative case, whatever the corresponding court or administrative authority
decides therein as to such citizenship is generally not considered res judicata,
hence it has to be threshed out again and again, as the occasion demands.
The Third Issue: Comelec's Jurisdiction
Over The Petition in SPC No. 95-317
Lee also avers that respondent Comelec had no jurisdiction to entertain the petition in SPC No.
95-317 because the only "possible types of proceedings that may be entertained by the Comelec
are a pre-proclamation case, an election protest or a quo warranto case". Again, Lee reminds us
that he was proclaimed on June 30, 1995 but that Frivaldo filed SPC No. 95-317 questioning his
(Lee's) proclamation only on July 6, 1995 -- "beyond the 5-day reglementary period." Hence,
according to him, Frivaldo's "recourse was to file either an election protest or a quo
warranto action."
This argument is not meritorious. The Constitution 57 has given the Comelec ample power to
"exercise exclusive original jurisdiction over all contests relating to the elections, returns and
qualifications of all elective . . . provincial . . . officials." Instead of dwelling at length on the
various petitions that Comelec, in the exercise of its constitutional prerogatives, may entertain,
suffice it to say that this Court has invariably recognized the Commission's authority to hear and
decide petitions for annulment of proclamations -- of which SPC No. 95-317 obviously is
one. 58 Thus, in Mentang vs.COMELEC, 59 we ruled:
The petitioner argues that after proclamation and assumption of office, a preproclamation controversy is no longer viable. Indeed, we are aware of cases
holding that pre-proclamation controversies may no longer be entertained by the
COMELEC after the winning candidate has been proclaimed. (citing Gallardo vs.
Rimando, 187 SCRA 463; Salvacion vs. COMELEC, 170 SCRA 513; Casimiro
vs. COMELEC, 171 SCRA 468.) This rule, however, is premised on an
assumption that the proclamation is no proclamation at all and the proclaimed
candidate's assumption of office cannot deprive the COMELEC of the power to
make such declaration of nullity. (citing Aguam vs. COMELEC, 23 SCRA 883;
Agbayani vs. COMELEC, 186 SCRA 484.)
The Court however cautioned that such power to annul a proclamation must "be done within ten
(10) days following the proclamation." Inasmuch as Frivaldo's petition was filed only six (6)
days after Lee's proclamation, there is no question that the Comelec correctly acquired
jurisdiction over the same.
The Fourth Issue: Was Lee's Proclamation Valid?
Frivaldo assails the validity of the Lee proclamation. We uphold him for the following reasons:
First. To paraphrase this Court in Labo vs. COMELEC, 60 "the fact remains that he (Lee) was not
the choice of the sovereign will," and in Aquino vs. COMELEC, 61 Lee is "a second placer, . . .
just that, a second placer."
In spite of this, Lee anchors his claim to the governorship on the pronouncement of this Court in
the aforesaid Labo 62 case, as follows:
The rule would have been different if the electorate fully aware in fact and in law
of a candidate's disqualification so as to bring such awareness within the realm of
notoriety, would nonetheless cast their votes in favor of the ineligible candidate.
In such case, the electorate may be said to have waived the validity and efficacy
of their votes by notoriously misapplying their franchise or throwing away their
votes, in which case, the eligible candidate obtaining the next higher number of
votes may be deemed elected.
But such holding is qualified by the next paragraph, thus:
But this is not the situation obtaining in the instant dispute. It has not been shown,
and none was alleged, that petitioner Labo was notoriously known as an ineligible
candidate, much less the electorate as having known of such fact. On the contrary,
petitioner Labo was even allowed by no less than the Comelec itself in its
resolution dated May 10, 1992 to be voted for the office of the city Payor as its
resolution dated May 9, 1992 denying due course to petitioner Labo's certificate
of candidacy had not yet become final and subject to the final outcome of this
case.
The last-quoted paragraph in Labo, unfortunately for Lee, is the ruling appropriate in this case
because Frivaldo was in 1995 in an identical situation as Labo was in 1992 when the Comelec's
cancellation of his certificate of candidacy was not yet final on election day as there was in both
cases a pending motion for reconsideration, for which reason Comelec issued an (omnibus)
resolution declaring that Frivaldo (like Labo in 1992) and several others can still be voted for in
the May 8, 1995 election, as in fact, he was.
Furthermore, there has been no sufficient evidence presented to show that the electorate of
Sorsogon was "fully aware in fact and in law" of Frivaldo's alleged disqualification as to "bring
such awareness within the realm of notoriety;" in other words, that the voters intentionally
wasted their ballots knowing that, in spite of their voting for him, he was ineligible. If Labo has
any relevance at all, it is that the vice-governor -- and not Lee -- should be proclaimed, since in
losing the election, Lee was, to paraphrase Labo again, "obviously not the choice of the people"
of Sorsogon. This is the emphatic teaching of Labo:
The rule, therefore, is: the ineligibility of a candidate receiving majority votes
does not entitle the eligible candidate receiving the next highest number of votes
to be declared elected. A minority or defeated candidate cannot be deemed elected
to the office.
Second. As we have earlier declared Frivaldo to have seasonably reacquired his citizenship and
inasmuch as he obtained the highest number of votes in the 1995 elections, he -- not Lee -837 | P a g e a t u e l , r a n d y v .
should be proclaimed. Hence, Lee's proclamation was patently erroneous and should now be
corrected.
The Fifth Issue: Is Section 78 of the
Election Code Mandatory?
In G.R. No. 120295, Frivaldo claims that the assailed Resolution of the Comelec (Second
Division) dated May 1, 1995 and the confirmatory en banc Resolution of May 11, 1995
disqualifying him for want of citizenship should be annulled because they were rendered beyond
the fifteen (15) day period prescribed by Section 78, of the Omnibus Election Code which reads
as follows:
Sec. 78. Petition to deny due course or to cancel a certificate of candidacy. -- A
may be filed by any person exclusively on the ground that any material
the filing of the certificate of candidacy and shall be decided after notice and
hearing, not later than fifteen days before the election. (Emphasis supplied.)
This claim is now moot and academic inasmuch as these resolutions are deemed superseded by
the subsequent ones issued by the Commission (First Division) on December 19, 1995,
affirmed en banc 63 on February 23, 1996; which both upheld his election. At any rate, it is
obvious that Section 78 is merely directory as Section 6 of R.A. No. 6646 authorizes the
Commission to try and decide petitions for disqualifications even after the elections, thus:
Sec. 6. Effect of Disqualification Case. -- Any candidate who has been declared
continue with the trial and hearing of the action, inquiry or protest and upon
order the suspension of the proclamation of such candidate whenever the
evidence of his guilt is strong. (emphasis supplied)
Refutation of
Mr. Justice Davide's Dissent
In his dissenting opinion, the esteemed Mr. Justice Hilario G. Davide, Jr. argues that President
Aquino's memorandum dated March 27, 1987 should be viewed as a suspension (not a repeal, as
urged by Lee) of P.D. 725. But whether it decrees a suspension or a repeal is a purely academic
distinction because the said issuance is not a statute that can amend or abrogate an existing law.
The existence and subsistence of P.D. 725 were recognized in the first Frivaldo case; 64 viz.,
"(u)nder CA No. 63 as amended by CA No. 473 and P.D. No. 725, Philippine citizenship maybe
reacquired by . . . repatriation". He also contends that by allowing Frivaldo to register and to
remain as a registered voter, the Comelec and in effect this Court abetted a "mockery" of our two
previous judgments declaring him a non-citizen. We do not see such abetting or mockery. The
retroactivity of his repatriation, as discussed earlier, legally cured whatever defects there may
have been in his registration as a voter for the purpose of the 1995 elections. Such retroactivity
did not change his disqualifications in 1988 and 1992, which were the subjects of such previous
rulings.
Mr. Justice Davide also believes that Quo Warranto is not the sole remedy to question the
ineligibility of a candidate, citing the Comelec's authority under Section 78 of the Omnibus
Election Code allowing the denial of a certificate of candidacy on the ground of a false material
representation therein as required by Section 74. Citing Loong, he then states his disagreement
with our holding that Section 78 is merely directory. We really have no quarrel. Our point is that
Frivaldo was in error in his claim in G.R. No. 120295 that the Comelec Resolutions promulgated
on May 1, 1995 and May 11, 1995 were invalid because they were issued "not later than fifteen
days before the election" as prescribed by Section 78. In dismissing the petition in G.R. No.
120295, we hold that the Comelec did not commit grave abuse of discretion because "Section 6
of R.A. 6646 authorizes the Comelec to try and decide disqualifications even after the elections."
In spite of his disagreement with us on this point, i.e., that Section 78 "is merely directory", we
note that just like us, Mr. Justice Davide nonetheless votes to "DISMISS G.R. No. 120295". One
other point. Loong, as quoted in the dissent, teaches that a petition to deny due course under
Section 78 must be filed within the 25-day period prescribed therein. The present case however
deals with the period during which the Comelec may decide such petition. And we hold that it
may be decided even after thefifteen day period mentioned in Section 78. Here, we rule that a
decision promulgated by the Comelec even after the elections is valid but Loong held that a
petition filed beyond the 25-day period is out of time. There is no inconsistency nor conflict.
Mr. Justice Davide also disagrees with the Court's holding that, given the unique factual
circumstances of Frivaldo, repatriation may be given retroactive effect. He argues that such
retroactivity "dilutes" our holding in the first Frivaldo case. But the first (and even the second
Frivaldo) decision did not directly involve repatriation as a mode of acquiring citizenship. If we
may repeat, there is no question that Frivaldo was not a Filipino for purposes of determining his
qualifications in the 1988 and 1992 elections. That is settled. But his supervening repatriation has
changed his political status -- not in 1988 or 1992, but only in the 1995 elections.
Our learned colleague also disputes our holding that Frivaldo was stateless prior to his
repatriation, saying that "informal renunciation or abandonment is not a ground to lose American
citizenship". Since our courts are charged only with the duty of determining who are Philippine
nationals, we cannot rule on the legal question of who are or who are not Americans. It is basic
in international law that a State determines ONLY those who are its own citizens -- not who are
the citizens of other countries. 65 The issue here is: the Comelec made a finding of fact that
Frivaldo was stateless and such finding has not been shown by Lee to be arbitrary or whimsical.
Thus, following settled case law, such finding is binding and final.
The dissenting opinion also submits that Lee who lost by chasmic margins to Frivaldo in all three
previous elections, should be declared winner because "Frivaldo's ineligibility for being an
American was publicly known". First, there is absolutely no empirical evidence for such "public"
knowledge. Second, even if there is, such knowledge can be true post facto only of the last two
previous elections. Third, even the Comelec and now this Court were/are still deliberating on his
nationality before, during and after the 1995 elections. How then can there be such "public"
knowledge?
Mr. Justice Davide submits that Section 39 of the Local Government Code refers to the
qualifications of electivelocal officials, i.e., candidates, and not elected officials, and that the
citizenship qualification [under par. (a) of that section] must be possessed by candidates, not
merely at the commencement of the term, but by election day at the latest. We see it differently.
Section 39, par. (a) thereof speaks of "elective local official" while par. (b) to (f) refer to
"candidates". If the qualifications under par. (a) were intended to apply to "candidates" and not
elected officials, the legislature would have said so, instead of differentiating par. (a) from the
rest of the paragraphs. Secondly, if Congress had meant that the citizenship qualification should
be possessed at election day or prior thereto, it would have specifically stated such detail, the
same way it did in pars. (b) to (f) far other qualifications of candidates for governor, mayor, etc.
Mr. Justice Davide also questions the giving of retroactive effect to Frivaldo's repatriation on the
ground, among others, that the law specifically provides that it is only after taking the oath of
allegiance that applicants shall be deemed to have reacquired Philippine citizenship. We do not
question what the provision states. We hold however that the provision should be understood
thus: that after taking the oath of allegiance the applicant is deemed to have reacquired
Philippine citizenship, which reacquisition (or repatriation) is deemed for all purposes and
intents to have retroacted to the date of his application therefor.
In any event, our "so too" argument regarding the literal meaning of the word "elective" in
reference to Section 39 of the Local Authority Code, as well as regarding Mr. Justice Davide's
thesis that the very wordings of P.D. 725 suggest non-retroactivity, were already taken up rather
extensively earlier in this Decision.
Mr. Justice Davide caps his paper with a clarion call: "This Court must be the first to uphold the
Rule of Law." We agree -- we must all follow the rule of law. But that is NOT the issue here. The
issue is how should the law be interpreted and applied in this case so it can be followed, so it can
rule!
At balance, the question really boils down to a choice of philosophy and perception of how to
interpret and apply laws relating to elections: literal or liberal; the letter or the spirit, the naked
provision or its ultimate purpose; legal syllogism or substantial justice; in isolation or in the
context of social conditions; harshly against or gently in favor of the voters' obvious choice. In
applying election laws, it would be far better to err in favor of popular sovereignty than to be
right in complex but little understood legalisms. Indeed, to inflict a thrice rejected candidate
upon the electorate of Sorsogon would constitute unmitigated judicial tyranny and an
unacceptable assault upon this Court's conscience.
EPILOGUE
In sum, we rule that the citizenship requirement in the Local Government Code is to be
possessed by an elective official at the latest as of the time he is proclaimed and at the start of the
term of office to which he has been elected. We further hold P.D. No. 725 to be in full force and
effect up to the present, not having been suspended or repealed expressly nor impliedly at any
time, and Frivaldo's repatriation by virtue thereof to have been properly granted and thus valid
and effective. Moreover, by reason of the remedial or curative nature of the law granting him a
new right to resume his political status and the legislative intent behind it, as well as his unique
situation of having been forced to give up his citizenship and political aspiration as his means of
escaping a regime he abhorred, his repatriation is to be given retroactive effect as of the date of
his application therefor, during the pendency of which he was stateless, he having given up his
U.S. nationality. Thus, in contemplation of law, he possessed the vital requirement of Filipino
citizenship as of the start of the term of office of governor, and should have been proclaimed
instead of Lee. Furthermore, since his reacquisition of citizenship retroacted to August 17, 1994,
his registration as a voter of Sorsogon is deemed to have been validated as of said date as well.
The foregoing, of course, are precisely consistent with our holding that lack of the citizenship
requirement is not a continuing disability or disqualification to run for and hold public office.
And once again, we emphasize herein our previous rulings recognizing the Comelec's authority
and jurisdiction to hear and decide petitions for annulment of proclamations.
This Court has time and again liberally and equitably construed the electoral laws of our country
to give fullest effect to the manifest will of our people, 66 for in case of doubt, political laws must
be interpreted to give life and spirit to the popular mandate freely expressed through the ballot.
Otherwise stated, legal niceties and technicalities cannot stand in the way of the sovereign will.
Consistently, we have held:
. . . (L)aws governing election contests must be liberally construed to the end that
the will of the people in the choice of public officials may not be defeated by
mere technical objections (citations omitted). 67
The law and the courts must accord Frivaldo every possible protection, defense and refuge, in
deference to the popular will. Indeed, this Court has repeatedly stressed the importance of giving
effect to the sovereign will in order to ensure the survival of our democracy. In any action
involving the possibility of a reversal of the popular electoral choice, this Court must exert
utmost effort to resolve the issues in a manner that would give effect to the will of the majority,
for it is merely sound public policy to cause elective offices to be filled by those who are the
choice of the majority. To successfully challenge a winning candidate's qualifications, the
petitioner must clearly demonstrate that the ineligibility is so patently antagonistic 68 to
constitutional and legal principles that overriding such ineligibility and thereby giving effect to
the apparent will of the people, would ultimately create greater prejudice to the very democratic
institutions and juristic traditions that our Constitution and laws so zealously protect and
promote. In this undertaking, Lee has miserably failed.
In Frivaldo's case. it would have been technically easy to find fault with his cause. The Court
could have refused to grant retroactivity to the effects of his repatriation and hold him still
ineligible due to his failure to show his citizenship at the time he registered as a voter before the
1995 elections. Or, it could have disputed the factual findings of the Comelec that he was
stateless at the time of repatriation and thus hold his consequent dual citizenship as a
disqualification "from running for any elective local position." But the real essence of justice
does not emanate from quibblings over patchwork legal technicality. It proceeds from the spirit's
gut consciousness of the dynamic role of law as a brick in the ultimate development of the social
edifice. Thus, the Court struggled against and eschewed the easy, legalistic, technical and
sometimes harsh anachronisms of the law in order to evoke substantial justice in the larger social
context consistent with Frivaldo's unique situation approximating venerability in Philippine
political life. Concededly, he sought American citizenship only to escape the clutches of the
dictatorship. At this stage, we cannot seriously entertain any doubt about his loyalty and
dedication to this country. At the first opportunity, he returned to this land, and sought to serve
his people once more. The people of Sorsogon overwhelmingly voted for him three times. He
took an oath of allegiance to this Republic every time he filed his certificate of candidacy and
during his failed naturalization bid. And let it not be overlooked, his demonstrated tenacity and
sheer determination to re-assume his nationality of birth despite several legal set-backs speak
more loudly, in spirit, in fact and in truth than any legal technicality, of his consuming intention
and burning desire to re-embrace his native Philippines even now at the ripe old age of 81 years.
Such loyalty to and love of country as well as nobility of purpose cannot be lost on this Court of
justice and equity. Mortals of lesser mettle would have given up. After all, Frivaldo was assured
of a life of ease and plenty as a citizen of the most powerful country in the world. But he opted,
nay, single-mindedly insisted on returning to and serving once more his struggling but beloved
land of birth. He therefore deserves every liberal interpretation of the law which can be applied
in his favor. And in the final analysis, over and above Frivaldo himself, the indomitable people of
Sorsogon most certainly deserve to be governed by a leader of their overwhelming choice.
WHEREFORE, in consideration of the foregoing:
(1) The petition in G.R. No. 123755 is hereby DISMISSED. The assailed Resolutions of the
respondent Commission are AFFIRMED.
(2) The petition in G.R. No. 120295 is also DISMISSED for being moot and academic. In any
event, it has no merit.
No costs.
SO ORDERED.

SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. 96859 October 15, 1991
MOHAMMAD ALI DIMAPORO, petitioner,
vs.
HON. RAMON V. MITRA, JR., Speaker, House of Representatives, and (Hon. QUIRINO
D. ABAD SANTOS, JR.) HON. CAMILO L. SABIO Secretary, House of
representatives, respondent.
Rilloraza, Africa, De Ocampo & Africa and Enrique M. Fernando for petitioner.
DAVIDE, JR., J.:p

Petitioner Mohamad Ali Dimaporo was elected Representative for the Second Legislative
District of Lanao del Sur during the 1987 congressional elections. He took his oath of office on 9
January 1987 and thereafter performed the duties and enjoyed the rights and privileges pertaining
thereto.
On 15 January 1990, petitioner filed with the Commission on Elections a Certificate of
Candidacy for the position of Regional Governor of the Autonomous Region in Muslim
Mindanao. The election was scheduled for 17 February 1990.
Upon being informed of this development by the Commission on Elections, respondents Speaker
and Secretary of the House of Representatives excluded petitioner's name from the Roll of
Members of the House of Representatives pursuant to Section 67, Article IX of the Omnibus
Election Code. As reported by the Speaker in the session of 9 February 1990:
The Order of Business today carries a communication from the Commission on
Elections which states that the Honorable Mohammad Ali Dimaporo of the
Second District of Lanao del Sur filed a certificate of candidacy for the regional
elections in Muslim Mindanao on February 17, 1990. The House Secretariat,
performing an administrative act, did not include the name of the Honorable Ali
Dimaporo in the Rolls pursuant to the provision of the Election Code, Article IX,
Section 67, which states: Any elective official whether national or local running
for any office other than the one which he is holding in a permanent capacity
except for President and Vice-President shall be consideredipso facto resigned
from his office upon the filing of his certificate of candidacy.' The word 'ipso
facto'is defined in Words and Phrases as by the very act itself by the mere act.
And therefore, by the very act of the (sic) filing his certificate of candidacy, the
Honorable Ali Dimaporo removed himself from the Rolls of the House of
Representatives; and, therefore, his name has not been carried in today's Roll and
will not be carried in the future Rolls of the House. ...
Having lost in the autonomous region elections, petitioner, in a letter dated 28 June 1990 and
addressed to respondent Speaker, expressed his intention "to resume performing my duties and
functions as elected Member of Congress." The record does not indicate what action was taken
on this communication, but it is apparent that petitioner failed in his bid to regain his seat in
Congress since this petition praying for such relief was subsequently filed on 31 January 1991.
In this petition, it is alleged that following the dropping of his name from the Roll, petitioner was
excluded from all proceedings of the House of Representatives; he was not paid the emoluments
due his office; his staff was dismissed and disbanded; and his office suites were occupied by
other persons. In effect, he was virtually barred and excluded from performing his duties and
from exercising his rights and privileges as the duly elected and qualified congressman from his
district.
Petitioner admits that he filed a Certificate of Candidacy for the position of Regional Governor
of Muslim Mindanao. He, however, maintains that he did not thereby lose his seat as
congressman because Section 67, Article IX of B.P. Blg. 881 is not operative under the present
Constitution, being contrary thereto, and therefore not applicable to the present members of
Congress.
In support of his contention, petitioner points out that the term of office of members of the House
of Representatives, as well as the grounds by which the incumbency of said members may be
shortened, are provided for in the Constitution. Section 2, Article XVIII thereof provides that
"the Senators, Members of the House of Representatives and the local officials first elected under
this Constitution shall serve until noon of June 30, 1992;" while Section 7, Article VI states:
"The Members of the House of Representatives shall be elected for a term of three years which
shall begin, unless otherwise provided by law, at noon on the thirtieth day of June next following
their election." On the other hand, the grounds by which such term may be shortened may be
summarized as follows:
a) Section 13, Article VI: Forfeiture of his seat by holding any other office or
employment in the government or any subdivision, agency or instrumentality
thereof, including government-owned or controlled corporations or subsidiaries;
b) Section 16 (3): Expulsion as a disciplinary action for disorderly behavior;
c) Section 17: Disqualification as determined by resolution of the Electoral
Tribunal in an election contest; and,
d) Section 7, par. 2: Voluntary renunciation of office.
He asserts that under the rule expressio unius est exclusio alterius, Section 67, Article IX of B.P.
Blg. 881 is repugnant to these constitutional provisions in that it provides for the shortening of a
congressman's term of office on a ground not provided for in the Constitution. For if it were the
intention of the framers to include the provisions of Section 67, Article IX of B.P. Blg. 881 as
among the means by which the term of a Congressman may be shortened, it would have been a
very simple matter to incorporate it in the present Constitution. They did not do so. On the
contrary, the Constitutional Commission only reaffirmed the grounds previously found in the
1935 and 1973 Constitutions and deliberately omitted the ground provided in Section 67, Article
IX of B.P. Blg. 881.
On the premise that the provision of law relied upon by respondents in excluding him from the
Roll of Members is contrary to the present Constitution, petitioner consequently concludes that
respondents acted without authority. He further maintains that respondents' so-called
"administrative act" of striking out his name is ineffective in terminating his term as
Congressman. Neither can it be justified as an interpretation of the Constitutional provision on
voluntary renunciation of office as only the courts may interpret laws. Moreover, he claims that
he cannot be said to have forfeited his seat as it is only when a congressman holds another office
or employment that forfeiture is decreed. Filing a certificate of candidacy is not equivalent to
holding another office or employment.
In sum, petitioner's demand that his rights as a duly elected member of the House of
Representatives be recognized, is anchored on the negative view of the following issues raised in
this petition:
A.
IS SECTION 67, ARTICLE IX, OF B.P. BLG. 881 OPERATIVE UNDER THE
PRESENT CONSTITUTION?
B.
COULD THE RESPONDENT SPEAKER AND/OR THE RESPONDENT
SECRETARY, 'BY ADMINISTRATIVE ACT', EXCLUDE THE PETITIONER
FROM THE ROLLS OF THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, THEREBY
PREVENTING HIM FROM EXERCISING HIS FUNCTIONS AS
CONGRESSMAN, AND DEPRIVING HIM OF HIS RIGHTS AND
PRIVILEGES AS SUCH?
On the other hand, respondents through the Office of the Solicitor General contend that Section
67, Article IX of B.P. Blg. 881 is still operative under the present Constitution, as the voluntary
act of resignation contemplated in said Section 67 falls within the term "voluntary renunciation"
of office enunciated in par. 2, Section 7, Article VI of the Constitution. That the ground provided
in Section 67 is not included in the Constitution does not affect its validity as the grounds
mentioned therein are not exclusive. There are, in addition, other modes of shortening the tenure
of office of Members of Congress, among which are resignation, death and conviction of a crime
which carries a penalty of disqualification to hold public office.
Respondents assert that petitioner's filing of a Certificate of Candidacy is an act of resignation
which estops him from claiming otherwise as he is presumed to be aware of existing laws. They
further maintain that their questioned "administrative act" is a mere ministerial act which did not
involve any encroachment on judicial powers.
Section 67, Article IX of B.P. Blg. 881 reads:
Any elective official whether national or local running for any office other than
the one which he is holding in a permanent capacity except for President and
Vice-President shall be considered ipso facto resigned from his office upon the
filing of his certificate of candidacy.
The precursor of this provision is the last paragraph of Section 2 of C.A. No. 666, which reads:
Any elective provincial, municipal, or city official running for an office, other
than the one for which he has been lastly elected, shall be considered resigned
from his office from the moment of the filing of his certificate of candidacy.
Section 27 of Article II of Republic Act No. 180 reiterated this rule in this wise:
Sec. 27. Candidate holding office. Any elective provincial, municipal or city
official running for an office, other than the one which he is actually holding,
shall be considered resigned from office from the moment of the filing of his
certificate of candidacy.
The 1971 Election Code imposed a similar proviso on local elective officials as follows:
Sec. 24. Candidate holding elective office. Any elective provincial, subprovincial, city, municipal or municipal district officer running for an office other
than the one which he is holding in a permanent capacity shall be considered ipso
facto resigned from his office from the moment of the filing of his certificate of
candidacy.
Every elected official shall take his oath of office on the day his term of office
commences, or within ten days after his proclamation if said proclamation takes
place after such day. His failure to take his oath of office as herein provided shall
be considered forfeiture of his right to the new office to which he has been elected
unless his failure is for a cause or causes beyond his control.
The 1978 Election Code provided a different rule, thus:
Sec. 30. Candidates holding political offices. Governors, mayors, members of
various sanggunians, or barangay officials, shall, upon filing of a certificate of
candidacy, be considered on forced leave of absence from office.
It must be noted that only in B.P. Blg. 881 are members of the legislature included in the
enumeration of elective public officials who are to be considered resigned from office from the
moment of the filing of their certificates of candidacy for another office, except for President and
Vice-President. The advocates of Cabinet Bill No. 2 (now Section 67, Article IX of B.P. Blg.
881) elucidated on the rationale of this inclusion, thus:
MR. PALMARES:
In the old Election Code, Your Honor, in the 1971 Election Code,
the provision seems to be different I think this is in Section 24
of Article III.
Any elective provincial, sub-provincial, city, municipal or
municipal district officer running for an office other than the one
which he is holding in a permanent capacity shall be
considered ipso facto resigned from his office from the moment of
the filing of his certificate of candidacy.
May I know, Your Honor, what is the reason of the Committee in
departing or changing these provisions of Section 24 of the old
Election Code and just adopting it en toto? Why do we have to
change it? What could possibly be the reason behind it, or the
rationale behind it?
MR. PEREZ (L.):
I have already stated the rationale for this, Mr. Speaker, but I don't mind repeating
it. The purpose is that the people must be given the right to choose any official
who belongs to, let us say, to the Batasan if he wants to run for another office.
However, because of the practice in the past where members of the legislature ran
for local offices, but did not assume the office, because of that spectacle the
impression is that these officials were just trifling with the mandate of the people.
They have already obtained a mandate to be a member of the legislature, and they
want to run for mayor or for governor and yet when the people give them that
mandate, they do not comply with that latter mandate, but still preferred (sic) to
remain in the earlier mandate. So we believe, Mr. Speaker, that the people's latest
mandate must be the one that will be given due course. ...
Assemblyman Manuel M. Garcia, in answer to the query of Assemblyman Arturo Tolentino on
the constitutionality of Cabinet Bill No. 2, said:
MR. GARCIA (M.M.):
Thank you, Mr. Speaker.
Mr. Speaker, on the part of the Committee, we made this proposal based on
constitutional grounds. We did not propose this amendment mainly on the
rationale as stated by the Gentlemen from Manila that the officials running for
office other than the ones they are holding will be considered resignednot because
of abuse of facilities of power or the use of office facilities but primarily because
under our Constitution, we have this new chapter on accountability of public
officers. Now, this was not in the 1935 Constitution. It states that (sic) Article
XIII, Section 1 Public office is a public trust. Public officers and employees
shall serve with the highest degree of responsibility, integrity, loyalty and
efficiency and shall remain accountable to the people.
Now, what is the significance of this new provision on accountability of public
officers? This only means that all elective public officials should honor the
mandate they have gotten from the people. Thus, under our Constitution, it says
that: 'Members of the Batasan shall serve for the term of 6 years, in the case of
local officials and 6 years in the case of barangay officials. Now, Mr. Speaker, we
have precisely included this as part of the Omnibus Election Code because a
Batasan Member who hold (sic) himself out with the people and seek (sic) their
support and mandate should not be allowed to deviate or allow himself to run for
any other position unless he relinquishes or abandons his office. Because his
mandate to the people is to serve for 6 years. Now, if you allow a Batasan or a
governor or a mayor who was mandated to serve for 6 years to file for an office
other than the one he was elected to, then, that clearly shows that he has not (sic)
intention to service the mandate of the people which was placed upon him and
therefore he should be considered ipso facto resigned. I think more than anything
that is the accountability that the Constitution requires of elective public officials.
It is not because of the use or abuse of powers or facilities of his office, but it is
because of the Constitution itself which I said under the 1973 Constitution called
and inserted this new chapter on accountability.
Now, argument was said that the mere filing is not the intention to run. Now, what
is it for? If a Batasan Member files the certificate of candidacy, that means that
he does not want to serve, otherwise, why should he file for an office other than
the one he was elected to? The mere fact therefore of filing a certificate should be
considered the overt act of abandoning or relinquishing his mandate to the people
and that he should therefore resign if he wants to seek another position which he
feels he could be of better service.
As I said, Mr. Speaker, I disagree with the statements of the Gentleman from
Manila because the basis of this Section 62 is the constitutional provision not only
of the fact that Members of the Batasan and local officials should serve the entire
6-year term for which we were elected, but because of this new chapter on the
accountability of public officers not only to the community which voted him to
office, but primarily because under this commentary on accountability of public
officers, the elective public officers must serve their principal, the people, not
their own personal ambition. And that is the reason, Mr. Speaker, why we opted
to propose Section 62 where candidates or elective public officers holding offices
other than the one to which they were elected, should be considered ipso
facto resigned from their office upon the filing of the certificate of candidacy."
It cannot be gainsaid that the same constitutional basis for Section 67, Article IX of B.P. Blg. 881
remains written in the 1987 Constitution. In fact, Section 1 of Article XI on "Accountability of
Public Officers" is more emphatic in stating:
Sec. 1. Public office is a public trust. Public officers and employees must at all
times be accountable to the people, serve them with utmost responsibility,
integrity, loyalty, and efficiency, act with patriotism and justice, and lead modest
lives.
Obviously then, petitioner's assumption that the questioned statutory provision is no longer
operative does not hold water. He failed to discern that rather than cut short the term of office of
elective public officials, this statutory provision seeks to ensure that such officials serve out their
entire term of office by discouraging them from running for another public office and thereby
cutting short their tenure by making it clear that should they fail in their candidacy, they cannot
go back to their former position. This is consonant with the constitutional edict that all public
officials must serve the people with utmost loyalty and not trifle with the mandate which they
have received from their constituents.
In theorizing that the provision under consideration cuts short the term of office of a Member of
Congress, petitioner seems to confuse "term" with "tenure" of office. As succinctly distinguished
by the Solicitor General:
The term of office prescribed by the Constitution may not be extended or
shortened by the legislature (22 R.C.L.), but the period during which an officer
actually holds the office (tenure) may be affected by circumstances within or
beyond the power of said officer. Tenure may be shorter than the term or it may
not exist at all. These situations will not change the duration of the term of office
(see Topacio Nueno vs. Angeles, 76 Phil 12).
Under the questioned provision, when an elective official covered thereby files a certificate of
candidacy for another office, he is deemed to have voluntarily cut short his tenure, not his term.
The term remains and his successor, if any, is allowed to serve its unexpired portion.
That the ground cited in Section 67, Article IX of B.P. Blg. 881 is not mentioned in the
Constitution itself as a mode of shortening the tenure of office of members of Congress, does not
preclude its application to present members of Congress. Section 2 of Article XI provides that
"(t)he President, the Vice-President, the Members of the Supreme Court, the Members of the
Constitutional Commissions, and the Ombudsman may be removed from office, on impeachment
for, and conviction of, culpable violation of the Constitution, treason, bribery, graft and
corruption, other high crimes, or betrayal of public trust. All other public officers and employees
may be removed from office as provided by law, but not by impeachment. Such constitutional
expression clearly recognizes that the four (4) grounds found in Article VI of the Constitution by
which the tenure of a Congressman may be shortened are not exclusive. As held in the case
of State ex rel. Berge vs. Lansing, the expression in the constitution of the circumstances which
shall bring about a vacancy does not necessarily exclude all others. Neither does it preclude the
legislature from prescribing other grounds. Events so enumerated in the constitution or statutes
are merely conditions the occurrence of any one of which the office shall become vacant not as a
penalty but simply as the legal effect of any one of the events. And would it not be preposterous
to say that a congressman cannot die and cut his tenure because death is not one of the grounds
provided for in the Constitution? The framers of our fundamental law never intended such
absurdity.
The basic principle which underlies the entire field of legal concepts pertaining to the validity of
legislation is that by enactment of legislation, a constitutional measure is presumed to be created.
This Court has enunciated the presumption in favor of constitutionality of legislative enactment.
To justify the nullification of a law, there must be a clear and unequivocal breach of the
Constitution, not a doubtful and argumentative implication. A doubt, even if well-founded, does
not suffice.
The maxim expressio unius est exclusio alterius is not to be applied with the same rigor in
construing a constitution as a statute and only those things expressed in such positive affirmative
terms as plainly imply the negative of what is not mentioned will be considered as inhibiting the
power of legislature. The maxim is only a rule of interpretation and not a constitutional
command. This maxim expresses a rule of construction and serves only as an aid in discovering
legislative intent where such intent is not otherwise manifest.
Even then, the concept of voluntary renunciation of office under Section 7, Article VI of the
Constitution is broad enough to include the situation envisioned in Section 67, Article IX of B.P.
Blg. 881. As discussed by the Constitutional Commissioners:
MR. MAAMBONG:
Could I address the clarificatory question to the Committee? The term 'voluntary
renunciation' does not only appear in Section 3; it appears in Section 6.
MR. DAVIDE:
Yes.
MR. MAAMBONG:
It is also a recurring phrase all over the constitution. Could the Committee please
enlighten us exactly what 'voluntary renunciation' means? Is this akin to
abandonment?
MR. DAVIDE:
Abandonment is voluntary. In other words, he cannot circumvent the restriction
by merely resigning at any given time on the second term.
MR. MAAMBONG:
Is the Committee saying that the term voluntary renunciation is more general than
abandonment and resignation?
MR. DAVIDE:
It is more general, more embracing.
That the act, contemplated in Section 67, Article IX of B.P. Blg. 881, of filing a certificate of
candidacy for another office constitutes an overt, concrete act of voluntary renunciation of the
elective office presently being held is evident from this exchange between then Members of
Parliament Arturo Tolentino and Jose Rono:
MR. RONO:
My reasonable ground is this: if you will make the person ... my, shall we say,
basis is that in one case the person is intending to run for an office which is
different from his own, and therefore it should be considered, at least from the
legal significance, an intention to relinquish his office.
MR. TOLENTINO:
Yes ...
MR. RONO:
And in the other, because he is running for the same position, it is otherwise.
MR. TOLENTINO:
Yes, but what I cannot see is why are you going to compel a person to quit an
office which he is only intending to leave? A relinquishment of office must be
clear, must be definite.
MR. RONO:
Yes, sir. That's precisely, Mr. Speaker, what I'm saying that while I do not disagree
with the conclusion that the intention cannot be enough, but I am saying that the
filing of the certificate of candidacy is an over act of such intention. It's not just
an intention; it's already there.
In Monroy vs. Court of Appeals, a case involving Section 27 of R.A. No. 180 above-quoted, this
Court categorically pronounced that "forfeiture (is) automatic and permanently effective upon
the filing of the certificate of candidacy for another office. Only the moment and act of filing are
considered. Once the certificate is filed, the seat is forever forfeited and nothing save a new
election or appointment can restore the ousted official. Thus, as We had occasion to remark,
through Justice J.B.L. Reyes, in Castro vs. Gatuslao:
... The wording of the law plainly indicates that only the date of filing of the
certificate of candidacy should be taken into account. The law does not make the
forfeiture dependent upon future contingencies, unforeseen and unforeseeable,
since the vacating is expressly made as of the moment of the filing of the
certificate of candidacy. ...
As the mere act of filing the certificate of candidacy for another office produces automatically
the permanent forfeiture of the elective position being presently held, it is not necessary, as
petitioner opines, that the other position be actually held. The ground for forfeiture in Section 13,
Article VI of the 1987 Constitution is different from the forfeiture decreed in Section 67, Article
IX of B.P. Blg. 881, which is actually a mode of voluntary renunciation of office under Section 7,
par. 2 of Article VI of the Constitution.
The legal effects of filing a certificate of candidacy for another office having been spelled out in
Section 67, Article IX, B.P. Blg. 881 itself, no statutory interpretation was indulged in by
respondents Speaker and Secretary of the House of Representatives in excluding petitioner's
name from the Roll of Members. The Speaker is the administrative head of the House of
Representatives and he exercises administrative powers and functions attached to his office. As
administrative officers, both the Speaker and House Secretary-General perform ministerial
functions. It was their duty to remove petitioner's name from the Roll considering the
unequivocal tenor of Section 67, Article IX, B.P. Blg. 881. When the Commission on Elections
communicated to the House of Representatives that petitioner had filed his certificate of
candidacy for regional governor of Muslim Mindanao, respondents had no choice but to abide by
the clear and unmistakable legal effect of Section 67, Article IX of B.P. Blg. 881. It was their
ministerial duty to do so. These officers cannot refuse to perform their duty on the ground of an
alleged invalidity of the statute imposing the duty. The reason for this is obvious. It might
seriously hinder the transaction of public business if these officers were to be permitted in all
cases to question the constitutionality of statutes and ordinances imposing duties upon them and
which have not judicially been declared unconstitutional. Officers of the government from the
highest to the lowest are creatures of the law and are bound to obey it.
In conclusion, We reiterate the basic concept that a public office is a public trust. It is created for
the interest and benefit of the people. As such, the holder thereof is subject to such regulations
and conditions as the law may impose and he cannot complain of any restrictions which public
policy may dictate on his office.
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is DISMISSED for lack of merit.
SO ORDERED.
December 28, 1987
AN ACT PRESCRIBING THE MANNER OF FILING A VACANCY IN THE CONGRESS

OF THE PHILIPPINES
Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the Philippines in Congress
assembled::
Section 1. In case a vacancy arises in the Senate at least eighteen (18) months or in the House of
Representatives at least (1) year before the next regular election for Members of Congress, the
Commission on Elections, upon receipt of a resolution of the Senate or the House of
Representatives, as the case may be, certifying to the existence of such vacancy and calling for a
special election, shall hold a special election to fill such vacancy.f Congress is in recess, an
official communication on the existence of the vacancy and call for a special election by the
President of the Senate or by the Speaker of the House of Representatives, as the case may be,
shall be sufficient for such purpose. The Senator or Member of the House of Representatives
thus elected shall serve only for the unexpired term.
Section 2. The Commission on Elections shall fix the date of the special election, which shall not
be earlier than forty-five (45) days not later than ninety (90) days from the date of such
resolution or communication, stating among other things the office or offices to be voted for:
provided, however, that if within the said period a general election is scheduled to be held, the
special election shall be held simultaneously with such general election.
Section 3. The Commission on Elections shall send copies of the resolution, in number sufficient
for due distribution and publication, to the Provincial of City Treasurer of each province or city
concerned, who in turn shall publish it in their respective localities by posting at least three
copies thereof in as many conspicuous places in each of their election precincts, and a copy in
each of the polling places and public markets, and in the municipal buildings.
Section 4. This Act shall take effect upon its publication in the Official Gazette or in at least two
newspapers of general circulation.
Approved: December 28, 1987.

SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-15905
August 3, 1966
NICANOR T. JIMENEZ, ET AL., plaintiffs and appellants,

vs.
BARTOLOME CABANGBANG, defendant and appellee.
Liwag and Vivo and S. Artiaga, Jr. for plaintiffs and appellants.
Jose S. Zafra and Associates and V. M. Fortich Zerda for defendant and appellee.
CONCEPCION, C.J.:
This is an ordinary civil action, originally instituted in the Court of First Instance of Rizal, for the
recovery, by plaintiffs Nicanor T. Jimenez, Carlos J. Albert and Jose L. Lukban, of several sums
of money, by way of damages for the publication of an allegedly libelous letter of defendant
Bartolome Cabangbang. Upon being summoned, the latter moved to dismiss the complaint upon
the ground that the letter in question is not libelous, and that, even if were, said letter is a
privileged communication. This motion having been granted by the lower court, plaintiffs
interposed the present appeal from the corresponding order of dismissal.
The issues before us are: (1) whether the publication in question is a privileged communication;
and, if not, (2) whether it is libelous or not.
The first issue stems from the fact that, at the time of said publication, defendant was a member
of the House of Representatives and Chairman of its Committee on National Defense, and that
pursuant to the Constitution:
The Senators and Members of the House of Representatives shall in all cases except
treason, felony, and breach of the peace, be privileged from arrest during their attendance
at the sessions of the Congress, and in going to and returning from the same; and for any
speech or debate therein, they shall not be questioned in any other place. (Article VI,
Section 15.)
The determination of the first issue depends on whether or not the aforementioned publication
falls within the purview of the phrase "speech or debate therein" that is to say, in Congress
used in this provision.
Said expression refers to utterances made by Congressmen in the performance of their official
functions, such as speeches delivered, statements made, or votes cast in the halls of Congress,
while the same is in session, as well as bills introduced in Congress, whether the same is in
session or not, and other acts performed by Congressmen, either in Congress or outside the
premises housing its offices, in the official discharge of their duties as members of Congress and
of Congressional Committees duly authorized to perform its functions as such, at the time of the
performance of the acts in question.1
The publication involved in this case does not belong to this category. According to the
complaint herein, it was an open letter to the President of the Philippines, dated November 14,
1958, when Congress presumably was not in session, and defendant caused said letter to be
published in several newspapers of general circulation in the Philippines, on or about said date. It
is obvious that, in thus causing the communication to be so published, he was not performing his
official duty, either as a member of Congress or as officer or any Committee thereof. Hence,
contrary to the finding made by His Honor, the trial Judge, said communication is not absolutely
privileged.
Was it libelous, insofar as the plaintiffs herein are concerned? Addressed to the President, the
communication began with the following paragraph:
In the light of the recent developments which however unfortunate had nevertheless
involved the Armed Forces of the Philippines and the unfair attacks against the duly
elected members of Congress of engaging in intriguing and rumor-mongering, allow me,
Your Excellency, to address this open letter to focus public attention to certain vital
information which, under the present circumstances, I feel it my solemn duty to our
people to expose.1wph1.t
It has come to my attention that there have been allegedly three operational plans under
serious study by some ambitious AFP officers, with the aid of some civilian political
strategists.
Then, it describes the "allegedly three (3) operational plans" referred to in the second paragraph.
The first plan is said to be "an insidious plan or a massive political build-up" of then Secretary of
National Defense, Jesus Vargas, by propagandizing and glamorizing him in such a way as to "be
prepared to become a candidate for President in 1961". To this end, the "planners" are said to
"have adopted the sales-talk that Secretary Vargas is 'Communists' Public Enemy No. 1 in the
Philippines." Moreover, the P4,000,000.00 "intelligence and psychological warfare funds" of the
Department of National Defense, and the "Peace and Amelioration Fund" the letter says
are "available to adequately finance a political campaign". It further adds:
It is reported that the "Planners" have under their control the following: (1) Col. Nicanor
Jimenez of NICA,(2) Lt. Col. Jose Lukban of NBI, (3) Capt. Carlos Albert (PN) of G-2
AFP, (4) Col. Fidel Llamas of MIS (5) Lt. Col. Jose Regala of the Psychological Warfare
Office, DND, and (6) Major Jose Reyna of the Public information Office, DND. To
insure this control, the "Planners" purportedly sent Lt. Col. Job Mayo, Chief of MIS to
Europe to study and while Mayo was in Europe, he was relieved by Col. Fidel Llamas.
They also sent Lt. Col. Deogracias Caballero, Chief of Psychological Warfare Office,
DND, to USA to study and while Caballero was in USA, he was relieved by Lt. Col. Jose
Regala. The "Planners" wanted to relieve Lt. Col. Ramon Galvezon, Chief of CIS (PC)
but failed. Hence, Galvezon is considered a missing link in the intelligence network. It is,
of course, possible that the offices mentioned above are unwitting tools of the plan of
which they may have absolutely no knowledge. (Emphasis ours.)
Among the means said to be used to carry out the plan the letter lists, under the heading "other
operational technique the following:
(a) Continuous speaking engagements all over the Philippines for Secretary Vargas to talk
on "Communism" and Apologetics on civilian supremacy over the military;
(b) Articles in magazines, news releases, and hundreds of letters "typed in two (2)
typewriters only" to Editors of magazines and newspapers, extolling Secretary Vargas
as the "hero of democracy in 1951, 1953, 1955 and 1957 elections";
(c) Radio announcements extolling Vargas and criticizing the administration;
(d) Virtual assumption by Vargas of the functions of the Chief of Staff and an attempt to
pack key positions in several branches of the Armed Forces with men belonging to his
clique;
(e) Insidious propaganda and rumors spread in such a way as to give the impression that
they reflect the feeling of the people or the opposition parties, to undermine the
administration.
Plan No. II is said to be a "coup d'etat", in connection with which the "planners" had gone no
further than the planning stage, although the plan "seems to be held in abeyance and subject to
future developments".
Plan No. III is characterized as a modification of Plan No. I, by trying to assuage the President
and the public with a loyalty parade, in connection with which Gen. Arellano delivered a speech
challenging the authority and integrity of Congress, in an effort to rally the officers and men of
the AFP behind him, and gain popular and civilian support.
The letter in question recommended.: (1) that Secretary Vargas be asked to resign; (2) that the
Armed Forces be divorced absolutely from politics; (3) that the Secretary of National Defense be
a civilian, not a professional military man; (4) that no Congressman be appointed to said office;
(5) that Gen. Arellano be asked to resign or retire; (6) that the present chiefs of the various
intelligence agencies in the Armed Forces including the chiefs of the NICA, NBI, and other
intelligence agencies mentioned elsewhere in the letter, be reassigned, considering that "they
were handpicked by Secretary Vargas and Gen. Arellano", and that, "most probably, they belong
to the Vargas-Arellano clique"; (7) that all military personnel now serving civilian offices be
returned to the AFP, except those holding positions by provision of law; (8) that the Regular
Division of the AFP stationed in Laur, Nueva Ecija, be dispersed by batallion strength to the
various stand-by or training divisions throughout the country; and (9) that Vargas and Arellano
should disqualify themselves from holding or undertaking an investigation of the planned coup
d'etat".
We are satisfied that the letter in question is not sufficient to support plaintiffs' action for
damages. Although the letter says that plaintiffs are under the control of the unnamed persons
therein alluded to as "planners", and that, having been handpicked by Secretary Vargas and Gen.
Arellano, plaintiffs "probably belong to the Vargas-Arellano clique", it should be noted that
defendant, likewise, added that "it is of course possible" that plaintiffs "are unwitting tools of the
plan of which they may have absolutely no knowledge". In other words, the very document upon
which plaintiffs' action is based explicitly indicates that they might be absolutely unaware of the
alleged operational plans, and that they may be merely unwitting tools of the planners. We do not
think that this statement is derogatory to the plaintiffs, to the point of entitling them to recover
damages, considering that they are officers of our Armed Forces, that as such they are by law,
under the control of the Secretary of National Defense and the Chief of Staff, and that the letter
in question seems to suggest that the group therein described as "planners" include these two (2)
high ranking officers.
It is true that the complaint alleges that the open letter in question was written by the defendant,
knowing that it is false and with the intent to impeach plaintiffs' reputation, to expose them to
public hatred, contempt, dishonor and ridicule, and to alienate them from their associates, but
these allegations are mere conclusions which are inconsistent with the contents of said letter and
can not prevail over the same, it being the very basis of the complaint. Then too, when plaintiffs
allege in their complaint that said communication is false, they could not have possibly meant
that they were aware of the alleged plan to stage a coup d'etat or that they were knowingly tools
of the "planners". Again, the aforementioned passage in the defendant's letter clearly implies that
plaintiffs were not among the "planners" of said coup d'etat, for, otherwise, they could not be
"tools", much less, unwittingly on their part, of said "planners".
Wherefore, the order appealed from is hereby affirmed. It is so ordered.
Reyes, J.B.L., Barrera, Dizon, Regala, Makalintal, Bengzon, J.P., Zaldivar, Sanchez and Castro,
JJ., concur
FIRST DIVISION
SANTOS L. NACAYTUNA, G.R. No. 171144
Petitioner,
Present:
Panganiban, C.J. (Chairperson),
- versus - Ynares-Santiago,
Austria-Martinez,
Callejo, Sr., and
Chico-Nazario, JJ.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES,
Respondent. Promulgated:
November 24, 2006
x ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- x
DECISION
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:
This petition for review[1] under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court assails the October 4, 2005
Decision[2] of the Sandiganbayan in Criminal Case No. 27759 finding petitioner Santos L.
Nacaytuna guilty beyond reasonable doubt of violating Sec. 3(e) of Republic Act (R.A.) No.
3019 otherwise known as the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act; and its January 4, 2006
Resolution[3] denying petitioners motion for reconsideration.
On November 17, 1999, petitioner Santos L. Nacaytuna, who was then Municipal Mayor
of San Miguel, Surigao del Sur appointed his wife, herein private complainant Marydole V.
Nacaytuna as Municipal Health Officer.[4] In the course of her employment, Marydole drafted a
letter of resignation dated April 7, 2000 which petitioner purportedly received on even date. In
May 2001, Marydole left the conjugal home and lived separately from petitioner. [5] Sometime in
April 2002, a certain Marly Prieto informed Marydole that petitioner has accepted her
resignation effective at the end of April 2002.[6]
Marydole questioned the acceptance of her resignation before the Civil Service
Commission (CSC) and the Office of the Ombudsman claiming that she never tendered the
resignation letter.
The CSC declared the acceptance of Marydoles resignation illegal and ordered her
reinstatement with full backwages. Meanwhile, upon recommendation by the Ombudsman, an
information was filed against petitioner for violation of Sec. 3(e) of R.A. No. 3019, which reads:
That sometime during the period of April 2002 or shortly prior or
subsequent thereto, in the Municipality of San Miguel, Surigao del Sur and within
the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, accused Santos L. Nacaytuna, a high
ranking public officer, being the Municipal Mayor of San Miguel, Surigao del
Sur, committing the offense while in the performance of his official functions, did
there and then, willfully, unlawfully, feloniously, and thru evident bad faith, cause
upon Dr. Marydole L. Nacaytuna undue injury by removing here from office as
the Rural Health Officer of San Miguel, Surigao del Sur using the latters supposed
resignation letter dated 07 April 2000 and approving the same on 23 April 2002
despite the fact that said resignation letter has not been officially tendered to the
accused thereby depriving her not only of her office but also the salaries and other
monetary benefits attached to it to her damage and prejudice.
CONTRARY TO LAW.[7]
Marydole testified that she drafted the resignation letter sometime in April 2000 but she
never tendered the same to petitioner; that she continued working even after drafting the letter
and after the same has been approved because she had no intention of resigning; that petitioner
probably got the letter from among her belongings which she left behind in their conjugal abode.
Petitioner testified that the April 7, 2000 resignation letter was received by his private
secretary on said date; that he kept the letter in his office until he accepted the resignation on
April 23, 2002; that he did not immediately approve the letter because he was still assessing
Marydoles performance; and that he consulted the CSC prior to approving the resignation.
On October 4, 2005, the Sandiganbayan rendered the assailed Decision, the dispositive
portion of which states:
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered finding accused Santos L.
Nacaytuna guilty beyond reasonable doubt of violating Sec. 3 (e) of R.A. 3019 as
charged, and applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law, sentencing him to suffer
imprisonment of six (6) years and one (1) month as minimum to ten (10) years as
maximum, and perpetual disqualification to hold public office.
SO ORDERED.[8]
Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration but was denied hence the instant petition
raising the following errors:[9]
I
THAT THE HONORABLE SANDIGANBAYAN ERRED IN CONCLUDING
THAT DR. MARYDOLE L. NACAYTUNA DID NOT TENDER HER
RESIGNATION
II
THAT THE GUILT OF THE PETITIONER WAS NOT PROVED BEYOND
REASONABLE DOUBT
III
THAT THE HONORABLE SANDIGANBAYAN ERRED IN DENYING THE
MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION
Petitioner contends that Marydole tendered her resignation on April 7, 2000, which he validly
accepted in April 2002. He claims he is presumed to have regularly performed his official duties
as Municipal Mayor; that his guilt was not proved beyond reasonable doubt; and that no undue
injury was caused to Marydole because she was reinstated and given her backwages.
The sole issue for resolution is whether the prosecution sufficiently proved petitioners guilt
beyond reasonable doubt.
After a careful review of the evidence on record, we find that the Sandiganbayan
correctly found petitioner guilty as charged. Section 3(e) of R.A. No. 3019 states:
SEC. 3. Corrupt practices by public officers. In addition to acts or
omissions of public officers already penalized by existing law, the following shall
constitute corrupt practices of any public officer and are hereby declared to be
unlawful:
xxxx
(e) Causing any undue injury to any party, including the Government, or
giving any private party any unwarranted benefits, advantage or preference in the
discharge of his official, administrative or judicial functions through manifest
partiality, evident bad faith or gross inexcusable negligence. This provision shall
apply to officers and employees of offices or government corporations charged

with the grant of licenses or permits or other concessions.
Violation of Section 3(e) of R.A. No. 3019 requires proof of the following facts:
1.) The accused is a public officer discharging administrative or official
functions or private persons charged in conspiracy with them;
2.) The public officer committed the prohibited act during the performance
of his official duty or in relation to his public position;
3.) The public officer acted with manifest partiality, evident bad faith or
gross, inexcusable negligence; and
4.) His action caused undue injury to the Government or any private party,
or gave any party any unwarranted benefit, advantage or preference to such
parties. [10]
All the foregoing facts were established beyond reasonable doubt. Petitioner, as Municipal
Mayor, was a public officer. His acceptance of Marydoles resignation was done in the
performance of his official duty.It was also proved that Marydole never tendered the resignation
letter hence petitioner was evidently acting in bad faith when he made it appear that it was
submitted. Worse, he accepted the same knowing that it was never tendered in the first
place. Petitioners actuations caused undue injury to Marydole because it resulted to her removal
from office and the withholding of her salaries.
Resignation is the act of giving up or the act of an officer by which he declines his office and
renounces the further right to use it. It implies an expression of the incumbent in some form,
express or implied, of the intention to surrender, renounce, and relinquish the office and its
acceptance by competent and lawful authority.[11] To constitute a complete and operative
resignation from public office, there must be: (a) an intention to relinquish a part of the term; (b)
an act of relinquishment; and (c) an acceptance by the proper authority.[12]
In the instant case, the intention to relinquish and the act of relinquishment are clearly
absent. While Marydole admits having written and prepared the resignation letter dated April 7,
2000, the evidence shows that she did not actually tender the same and refrained from pursuing
her intention to resign.
As observed by the Sandiganbayan, petitioners account of how he received the
resignation letter is rife with inconsistencies. Before the CSC, he claimed that Marydoles
resignation letter reached him not through the normal course of transmitting written
communications[13] because protocol is not strictly observed between them as husband and
wife. However, when he testified before the Sandiganbayan, he claimed that the letter was
received by his private secretary. The Sandiganbayan thus correctly disregarded petitioners
testimony.
On the other hand, Marydole consistently maintained that she never resigned from her
position as Municipal Health Officer. She continued working after the letter was drafted and
allegedly tendered onApril 7, 2000 until its supposed acceptance on April 23, 2002, and even
thereafter, despite the fact that her salaries were withheld. Upon being informed of the
acceptance of her resignation, she protested by writing petitioner a letter on April 24, 2002.
The length of time between the alleged resignation and its acceptance likewise negates
petitioners claim of good faith. The letter was allegedly drafted and tendered on April 7,
2000 but was accepted only two years hence or on April 23, 2002. Petitioners allegation that he
first observed and assessed Marydoles performance before accepting her resignation deserves no
credence at all. His contention that he consulted the CSC before taking any action on Marydoles
resignation was correctly disregarded by the Sandiganbayan, thus:
Accuseds allegation that he consulted the Civil Service Commission
before he accepted the resignation of the complainant and he was advised that the
acceptance is at his discretion does not lend strength to his cause for, not only is it
self-serving and unsupported by any other evidence, it betrays his desire to
remove the accused from her office and cause injury to her. Otherwise he could
have just asked the complainant if she was resigning or not, but he failed to do
so. Such failure and his belated acceptance of the complainants untendered
resignation, which may have been motivated by their apparent marital problems,
are clear indications of evident bad faith.[14]
The penalty for violation of Section 3(e) of R.A. No. 3019 is imprisonment for not less
than six years and one month nor more than fifteen years, perpetual disqualification from public
office.[15] Under the Indeterminate Sentence Law, if the offense is punished by special law, the
Court shall sentence the accused to an indeterminate penalty, the maximum term of which shall
not exceed the maximum fixed by said law and the minimum term shall not be less than the
minimum prescribed by the same.[16] Hence, the Sandiganbayan correctly imposed the
indeterminate penalty of imprisonment ranging from six (6) years and one (1) month, as
minimum, to ten (10) years, as maximum, with perpetual disqualification from public office.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The Decision dated October 4, 2005 of the
Sandiganbayan in Criminal Case No. 27759 finding petitioner Santos L. Nacaytuna guilty
beyond reasonable doubt of violation of Section 3 (e) of Republic Act No. 3019, and sentencing
him to suffer the indeterminate penalty of imprisonment ranging from six (6) years and one (1)
month, as minimum, to ten (10) years, as maximum, with perpetual disqualification to hold
public office, and its Resolution dated January 4, 2006 denying the motion for reconsideration,
are AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-7399
August 6, 1913
GREGORIA ABLANG, plaintiff-appellee,

vs.
MARIANO FERNANDEZ and CATALINO JANDOC, defendants-appellants.
Antonio M. Jimenez for appellants.
Alberto Reyes for appellee.
JOHNSON, J.:
This was an action commenced in the Court of First Instance of Ilocos Sur to recover the
possession of three parcels of land located in the municipality of Vigan of said province.
On the 19th day of January, 1911, one Vicente Donato, claiming to be the legitimate son and
private administrator of the property of one Chan-Peco (alias Oles), who was alleged to be
absent form the Philippine Islands in the Chinese Empire, presented a complaint against the said
defendants. To said complaint the defendants demurred. The demurrer was sustained and the
plaintiff required to amend his complaint. On the 1st day of March, 1911, an amended complaint
was presented in which the name of the plaintiff in the first complaint (Vicente Donato) was
substituted by that of Gregoria Ablang. In the amended complaint the now plaintiff (Gregoria
Ablang) alleged that she was the legitimate wife of the said Chan-Peco (alias Oles); that her
husband was absent and that the she did not know his whereabouts; that Chan-Peco (Oles) was
absent and was the absolute and true owner of the lands in question and was in possession of the
same through the plaintiff, and had been in possession of the same for a period of thirty years.
We deem it unnecessary, by reason of the issues presented, to state more of the facts contained in
the complaint.
To the complaint the defendants presented a demurrer in which they alleged:
First, that the plaintiff had not legal capacity to maintain the action and, second, that the
complaint did not state facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action.
Upon a consideration of said demurrer the lower court overruled the same and required the
defendant to answer. To the ruling of the lower court overruling the demurrer the defendant duly
excepted. Later the defendant did answer, and the cause was brought on for trial. After hearing
the evidence the lower court found that the plaintiff was entitled to the possession of the lands in
question, and rendered a judgment accordingly.
From the judgment of the lower court the defendants appealed, and in this court made a number
of assignments of error, one of which, the second, was as follows:
The lower court erred in overruling the demurrer presented to the amended complaint.
In support of the contention that the lower court committed an error in overruling their demurrer,
the defendants and appellants alleged that the plaintiff was without authority to maintain the
present action, by virtue of the provisions of articles 181, 185, 187 and 220 of the Civil Code. It
will be remembered that the plaintiff in the second complaint alleged that she was the wife of
Chan-Peco; that Chan-Peco was absent and that she did not know his whereabouts; that she was
administering his property. No allegation is made in the complaint that she had been appointed,
in accordance with the provisions of the law, by the courts to administer the property of her
absent husband, nor to maintain an action with reference to the same. Said article 181 provides:
When a person has disappeared from his domicile and his whereabouts is unknown, and
he has not left any attorney to manage his property, the judge, on petition of a lawful
party or the public attorney, may point some person to represent him in whatever may be
necessary.
Said article 185 provides that:

The declaration of absence may be demanded by:
1. The consort who is present.
2. The heirs instituted in his testament and who present sent a trustworthy copy of the
same.
Said article 187 provides that:
The administration of the property of the absentee is to be granted, according to the order
established in article 220 and the persons specified therein.
Under article 220 the administration of the property shall be granted as follows:
1. To the consort not legally separated.
xxx
xxx
xxx
3. To the children.
The complaint shows upon its face that the plaintiff, Gregoria Ablang, is the wife of Chan-Peco,
the admitted owner of the property in question; that he is absent and that his whereabouts are
unknown. The plaintiff as the wife of the absentee has failed utterly to allege sufficient facts to
show that she has complied with the conditions mentioned in the article above quoted of the
Civil Code. In the absence of such allegations, it is clear that she has not legal capacity to
maintain the present action.
The judgment of the lower court overruling the demurrer to the complaint is therefore hereby
reversed, and it is hereby ordered that the cause be remanded to the lower court, with permission
to the plaintiff to amend her complaint within a period of ten days after notice of the foregoing
decision.
Arellano, C.J., Torres, Mapa and Trent, JJ., concur.
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-46267
November 28, 1938
FRANCISCO ZANDUETA, petitioner,

vs.
SIXTO DE LA COSTA, respondent.
Vicente J. Francisco and Francisco Zandueta for petitioner.
Solicitor-General Ozaeta and Ramon Diokno for respondent.
VILLA-REAL, J.:
This is a quo warranto proceeding instituted by the Honorable Francisco Zandueta against the
Honorable Sixto de la Costa to obtain from this court a judgment declaring the respondent to be
illegally occupying the office of Judge of the Fifth Branch of the Court of First Instance of
Manila, Fourth Judicial District, ousting him from said office, and holding that the petitioner is
entitled to continue occupying the office in question by placing him in possession thereof, with
costs to said respondent.
Prior to the promulgation of Commonwealth Act No. 145, the petitioner, the Honorable
Francisco Zandueta was discharging the office of judge of first instance, Ninth Judicial District,
comprising solely the City of Manila, and was presiding over the Fifth Branch of the Court of
First Instance of said city, by virtue of an ad interimappointment issued by the President of the
Philippines in his favor on June 2, 1936, and confirmed by the Commission on Appointments of
the National Assembly on September 8th of the same year.
On
November 7, 1936, the date on which Commonwealth Act No. 145, otherwise known
as the Judicial Reorganization Law, took effect, the petitioner received from the President of the
Commonwealth a new ad interim appointment as judge of first instance, this time of the Fourth
Judicial District, with authority to preside over the Courts of First Instance of Manila and
Palawan, issued in accordance with said Act. As the National Assembly adjourned on
November 20, 1937, without its Commission on Appointments having acted on said ad
interim appointment, another ad interim appointment to the same office was issued in favor of
said petitioner, pursuant to which he took a new oath on
November 22, 1937, before
discharging the duties thereof. After his appointment and qualification as judge of first instance
of the Fourth Judicial District, the petitioner, acting as executive judge, performed several
executive acts, some of which consist in the designation of the assistant clerk of the Court of
First Instance of Manila, Ladislao Pasicolan, as administrative officer, under the orders of the
petitioner, as executive judge of said court, to take charge of all matters pertaining to the Court of
First Instance of Palawan, which are handled by said execute judge in Manila (Exhibit 2); in the
appointment of attorney Rufo M. San Juan as notary public for the Province of Palawan, said
appointment to expire on December 31, 1938 (Exhibit 3); in having authorized justice of the
peace Iigo R. Pea to defend a criminal case the hearing of which had begun during the past
sessions in Coron, Palawan (Exhibit 5); in having granted a leave of absence of ten days to
justice of the peace Abordo (of Puerto Princesa), Palawan (Exhibit 8); and in having granted a
leave of absence of thirteen days to the justice of the peace of Coron, Palawan (Exhibit 9).
On May 19, 1938, the Commission on Appointments of the National Assembly disapproved the
aforesaid ad interim appointment of said petitioner, who was advised thereof by the Secretary of
Justice on the 20th of said month and year.
On August 1, 1938, the President of the Philippines appointed the herein respondent, Honorable
Sixto de la Costa, judge of first instance of the Fourth Judicial District, with authority to preside
over the Fifth Branch of the Court of First Instance of Manila and the Court of First Instance of
Palawan, and his appointment was approved by the Commission on Appointments of the
National Assembly. By virtue of said appointment, the respondent took the necessary oath and
assumed office. On the same date, August 1, 1938, the President of the Philippines, pursuant to
said appointment of judge of first instance of the Fourth Judicial District and after confirmation
thereof, issued the corresponding final appointment in favor of the respondent, Honorable Sixto
de la Costa (Exhibit 11).
The respondent, in answer to the petition, admits some of the facts alleged therein and denies the
rest, and alleges, as one of his special defenses, that the petitioner is estopped from attacking the
constitutionality of Commonwealth Act No. 145, for having accepted his new appointment as
judge of first instance of the Fourth Judicial District, issued by virtue thereof, to preside over the
Courts of First Instance of Manila and Palawan, and for having taken the necessary oath,
entering into the discharge of the functions of his office and performing judicial as well as
administrative acts.
The defense of estoppel being procedural, we shall discuss it first to determine whether or not the
petitioner may proceed to question the constitutionality of the law by virtue of which the new ad
interim appointment of judge of first instance of the Fourth Judicial District, to preside over the
Courts of First Instance of Manila and Palawan, was issued in his favor.
As stated beforehand, while the petitioner Honorable Francisco Zandueta was presiding over the
Fifth Branch of the Court of First Instance of Manila, Ninth Judicial District, by virtue of an
appointment issued to him on June 2, 1936, and confirmed by the National Assembly on
September 8th of the same year, he received, on
November 7, 1936, a new ad
interim appointment, issued in accordance with the provisions of Commonwealth Act No. 145,
which took effect on the same date, to discharge the office of judge of first instance, Fourth
Judicial District, with authority to preside over the Fifth Branch of the Court of First Instance of
Manila and the Court of First Instance of Palawan, upon which he immediately took the
corresponding oath and entered into the discharge of his office. Under his former appointment of
June 2, 1936, the petitioner had authority preside solely over the Fifth Branch of the Court of
First Instance of Manila but not over the Court of First Instance of Palawan, while, according to
his new appointment of
November 7, 1936, he had authority to preside not only over said
Fifth Branch of said Court of First Instance of Manila but also over the Court of First Instance of
Palawan. It should be noted that the territory over which the petitioner could exercise and did
exercise jurisdiction by virtue of his last appointment is wider than that over which he could
exercise and did exercise jurisdiction by virtue of the former. Hence, there is incompatibility
between the two appointments and, consequently, in the discharge of the office conferred by each
of them, resulting in the absorption of the former by the latter. In accepting this appointment and
qualifying for the exercise of the functions of the office conferred by it, by taking the necessary
oath, and in discharging the same, disposing of both judicial and administrative cases
corresponding to the courts of First Instance of Manila and of Palawan, the petitioner abandoned
his appointment of June 2, 1936, and ceased in the exercise of the functions of the office
occupied by him by virtue thereof.
The rule of equity, sanctioned by jurisprudence, is that when a public official voluntarily accepts
an appointment to an office newly created or reorganized by law, which new office is
incompatible with the one formerly occupied by him , qualifies for the discharge of the
functions thereof by taking the necessary oath, and enters into the performance of his duties by
executing acts inherent in said newly created or reorganized office and receiving the
corresponding salary, he will be considered to have abandoned the office he was occupying by
virtue of his former appointment (46 Corpus Juris, 947, sec. 55), and he can not question the
constitutionality of the law by virtue of which he was last appointed (11 American Jurisprudence,
166, par. 121; id., 767, par. 123). He is excepted from said rule only when his non-acceptance of
the new appointment may affect public interest or when he is compelled to accept it by reason of
legal exigencies (11 American Jurisprudence, 770, par. 124). lawphi1.net
In the case under consideration, the petitioner was free to accept or not the ad
interim appointment issued by the President of the Commonwealth in his favor, in accordance
with said Commonwealth Act No. 145. Nothing or nobody compelled him to do so. While the
office of judge of first instance of public interest, being one of the means employed by the
Government to carry out one of its purposes, which is the administration of justice, considering
the organization of the courts of justice in the Philippines and the creation of the positions of
judges-at-large or substitutes, the temporary disability of a judge may be immediately remedied
without detriment to the smooth running of the judicial machinery. If the petitioner believed, as
he now seems to believe, that Commonwealth Act No. 145 is unconstitutional, he should have
refused to accept the appointment offered him or, at least, he should have accepted it with
reservation, had he believed that his duty of obedience to the laws compelled him to do so, and
afterwards resort to the power entrusted with the final determination of the question whether a
law is unconstitutional or not. The petitioner, being aware of his constitutional and legal rights
and obligations, by implied order of the law (art. 2, Civil Code), accepted the office of judge of
first instance of the Fourth Judicial District, with authority to preside over the Fifth Branch of the
Court of First Instance of Manila and the Court of First Instance of Palawan and entered into the
performance of the duties inherent therein, after taking the necessary oath, thereby acting with
full knowledge that if he voluntarily accepted the office to which he was appointed, he would
later be estopped from questioning the validity of said appointment by alleging that the law, by
virtue of which his appointment was issued, is unconstitutional. He likewise knew, or at least he
should know, that his ad interim appointment was subject to the approval of the Commission on
Appointments of the National Assembly and that if said commission were to disapprove the
same, it would become ineffective and he would cease discharging the office.
It appears from all the foregoing that the petitioner having voluntarily abandoned his
appointment of June 2, 1936, and, consequently, the office of judge of first instance of Manila,
Ninth Judicial District, whose Fifth Branch was being presided over by him by virtue thereof,
upon accepting the ad interim appointment of
November 7, 1936, to the office of judge of
first instance of the Fourth Judicial District, with authority to preside over said Fifth Branch of
the Court of First Instance of Manila together with the Court of First Instance of Palawan, and
entering into the discharge of the functions of said office, he can not now claim to be entitled to
repossess the office occupied by him under his said appointment of June 2, 1936 (22 R. C. L.,
560, par. 264), or question the constitutionality of Commonwealth Act No. 145, by virtue of
which he has been appointed judge of first instance of the Fourth Judicial District, with authority
to preside over the Fifth Branch of the Court of First Instance of Manila and the Court of First
Instance of Palawan, which appointment was disapproved by the Commission on Appointments
of the National Assembly.
Having arrived at the conclusion that the petitioner is estopped by his own act from proceeding
to question the constitutionality of Commonwealth Act No. 145, by virtue of which he was
appointed, by accepting said appointment and entering into the performance of the duties
appertaining to the office conferred therein, and pursuant to the well settled doctrine established
by both American and Philippine jurisprudence relative to the consideration of constitutional
questions, this court deems it unnecessary to decide the questions constitutional law raised in the
petition (Cruz vs. Youngberg, 56 Phil., 234; Walter E. Olsen and Co. vs. Aldanese and Trinidad,
43 Phil., 259; Yangco vs. Board of Public Utility Commissioner, 36 Phil., 116; Government of
the Philippine Islandsvs. Municipality of Binagonan, 34 Phil., 518; McGirr vs. Hamilton and
Abreu, 30 Phil., 563; 12 Corpus Juris, 699, section 40; id., 780, section 212).
For the foregoing considerations, we are of the opinion and so hold when a judge of first
instance, presiding over a branch of a Court of First Instance of a judicial district by virtue of a
legal and valid appointment, accepts another appointment to preside over the same branch of the
same Court of First Instance, in addition to another court of the same category, both of which
belong to a new judicial district formed by the addition of another Court of First Instance to the
old one, enters into the discharge of the functions of his new office and receives the
corresponding salary, he abandons his old office and cannot claim to be to repossess it or
question the constitutionality of the law by virtue of which his new appointment has been issued;
and, said new appointment having been disapproved by the Commission on Appointments of the
National Assembly, neither can he claim to continue occupying the office conferred upon him by
said new appointment, having ipso jure ceased in the discharge of the functions thereof.
Wherefore, the petition for quo warranto instituted is denied and the same is dismissed with costs
to the petitioner. So ordered.
Avancea, C.J., Abad Santos, Imperial and Concepcion, JJ., concur.

SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-51122 March 25, 1982
EUGENIO J. PUYAT, ERWIN L. CHIONGBIAN, EDGARDO P. REYES, ANTONIO G.

PUYAT, JAIME R. BLANCO, RAFAEL R. RECTO and REYNALDO L.
LARDIZABAL, petitioners,
vs.
HON. SIXTO T. J. DE GUZMAN, JR., as Associate Commissioner of the Securities &
Exchange Commission, EUSTAQUIO T. C. ACERO, R. G. VILDZIUS, ENRIQUE M.
BELO, MANUEL G. ABELLO, SERVILLANO DOLINA, JUANITO MERCADO and
ESTANISLAO A. FERNANDEZ, respondents.
MELENCIO-HERRERA, J.:
This suit for certiorari and Prohibition with Preliminary Injunction is poised against the Order of
respondent Associate Commissioner of the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) granting
Assemblyman Estanislao A. Fernandez leave to intervene in SEC Case No. 1747.
A question of novel import is in issue. For its resolution, the following dates and allegations are
being given and made:
a) May 14,1979. An election for the eleven Directors of the International Pipe Industries
Corporation (IPI) a private corporation, was held. Those in charge ruled that the following were
elected as Directors:
Eugenio J. Puyat Eustaquio T.C. Acero
Erwin L. Chiongbian R. G. Vildzius
Edgardo P. Reyes Enrique M. Belo
Antonio G. Puyat Servillano Dolina
Jaime R. Blanco Juanito Mercado
Rafael R. Recto
Those named on the left list may be called the Puyat Group; those on the right, the Acero Group.
Thus, the Puyat Group would be in control of the Board and of the management of IPI.
b) May 25, 1979. The Acero Group instituted at the Securities and Exchange Commission
(SEC) quo warrantoproceedings, docketed as Case No. 1747 (the SEC Case), questioning the
election of May 14, 1979. The Acero Group claimed that the stockholders' votes were not
properly counted.
c) May 25-31, 1979. The Puyat Group claims that at conferences of the parties with respondent
SEC Commissioner de Guzman, Justice Estanislao A. Fernandez, then a member of the Interim
Batasang Pambansa, orally entered his appearance as counsel for respondent Acero to which the
Puyat Group objected on Constitutional grounds. Section 11, Article VIII, of the 1973
Constitution, then in force, provided that no Assemblyman could "appear as counsel before ...
any administrative body", and SEC was an administrative body. Incidentally, the same
prohibition was maintained by the April 7, 1981 plebiscite. The cited Constitutional prohibition
being clear, Assemblyman Fernandez did not continue his appearance for respondent Acero.
d) May 31, 1979. When the SEC Case was called, it turned out that:
(i) On May 15, 1979, Assemblyman Estanislao A. Fernandez had purchased from
Augusto A. Morales ten (10) shares of stock of IPI for P200.00 upon request of
respondent Acero to qualify him to run for election as a Director.
(ii) The deed of sale, however, was notarized only on May 30, 1979 and was
sought to be registered on said date.
(iii) On May 31, 1979, the day following the notarization of Assemblyman
Fernandez' purchase, the latter had filed an Urgent Motion for Intervention in the
SEC Case as the owner of ten (10) IPI shares alleging legal interest in the matter
in litigation.
e) July 17, 1979. The SEC granted leave to intervene on the basis of Atty. Fernandez' ownership
of the said ten shares. 1 It is this Order allowing intervention that precipitated the instant petition
for certiorari and Prohibition with Preliminary Injunction.
f) July 3, 1979. Edgardo P. Reyes instituted a case before the Court of First Instance of Rizal
(Pasig), Branch XXI, against N.V. Verenigde Bueinzenfabrieken Excelsior De Maas and
respondent Eustaquio T. C. Acero and others, to annul the sale of Excelsior's shares in the IPI to
respondent Acero (CC No. 33739). In that case, Assemblyman Fernandez appeared as counsel
for defendant Excelsior In L-51928, we ruled that Assemblyman Fernandez could not appear as
counsel in a case originally filed with a Court of First Instance as in such situation the Court
would be one "without appellate jurisdiction."
On September 4, 1979, the Court en banc issued a temporary Restraining Order enjoining
respondent SEC Associate Commissioner from allowing the participation as an intervenor, of
respondent Assemblyman Estanislao Fernandez at the proceedings in the SEC Case.
The Solicitor General, in his Comment for respondent Commissioner, supports the stand of the
latter in allowing intervention. The Court en banc, on November 6, 1979, resolved to consider
the Comment as an Answer to the Petition.
The issue which will be resolved is whether or not Assemblyman Fernandez, as a then
stockholder of IPI may intervene in the SEC Case without violating Section 11, Article VIII of
the Constitution, which, as amended, now reads:
SEC. 11.
No Member of the Batasang Pambansa shall appear as counsel before any court
without appellate jurisdiction.
before any court in any civil case wherein the Government, or any subdivision,
agency, or instrumentality thereof is the adverse party,
or in any criminal case wherein any officer or employee of the Government is
accused of an offense committed in relation to his office,
or before any administrative body.
Neither shall he, directly or indirectly be interested financially in any contract
with, or in any franchise or special privilege granted by the Government, or any
subdivision, agency or instrumentality thereof, including any government-owned
or controlled corporation, during his term of office.
He shall not accept employment to intervene in any cause or matter where he may
be called to act on account of his office. (Emphasis supplied)
What really has to be resolved is whether or not, in intervening in the SEC Case, Assemblyman
Fernandez is, in effect, appearing as counsel, albeit indirectly, before an administrative body in
contravention of the Constitutional provision.
Ordinarily, by virtue of the Motion for Intervention, Assemblyman Fernandez cannot be said to
be appearing as counsel. Ostensibly, he is not appearing on behalf of another, although he is
joining the cause of the private respondents. His appearance could theoretically be for the
protection of his ownership of ten (10) shares of IPI in respect of the matter in litigation and not
for the protection of the petitioners nor respondents who have their respective capable and
respected counsel.
However, certain salient circumstances militate against the intervention of Assemblyman
Fernandez in the SEC Case. He had acquired a mere P200.00 worth of stock in IPI, representing
ten shares out of 262,843 outstanding shares. He acquired them "after the fact" that is, on May
30, 1979, after the contested election of Directors on May 14, 1979, after the quo warranto suit
had been filed on May 25, 1979 before SEC and one day before the scheduled hearing of the
case before the SEC on May 31, 1979. And what is more, before he moved to intervene, he had
signified his intention to appear as counsel for respondent Eustaquio T. C. Acero, 2 but which was
objected to by petitioners. Realizing, perhaps, the validity of the objection, he decided, instead,
to "intervene" on the ground of legal interest in the matter under litigation. And it maybe noted
that in the case filed before the Rizal Court of First Instance (L-51928), he appeared as counsel
for defendant Excelsior, co-defendant of respondent Acero therein.
Under those facts and circumstances, we are constrained to find that there has been an indirect
"appearance as counsel before ... an administrative body" and, in our opinion, that is a
circumvention of the Constitutional prohibition. The "intervention" was an afterthought to enable
him to appear actively in the proceedings in some other capacity. To believe the avowed purpose,
that is, to enable him eventually to vote and to be elected as Director in the event of an
unfavorable outcome of the SEC Case would be pure naivete. He would still appear as counsel
indirectly.
A ruling upholding the "intervention" would make the constitutional provision ineffective. All an
Assemblyman need do, if he wants to influence an administrative body is to acquire a minimal
participation in the "interest" of the client and then "intervene" in the proceedings. That which
the Constitution directly prohibits may not be done by indirection or by a general legislative act
which is intended to accomplish the objects specifically or impliedly prohibited. 3
In brief, we hold that the intervention of Assemblyman Fernandez in SEC. No. 1747 falls within
the ambit of the prohibition contained in Section 11, Article VIII of the Constitution.
Our resolution of this case should not be construed as, absent the question of the constitutional
prohibition against members of the Batasan, allowing any stockholder, or any number of
stockholders, in a corporation to intervene in any controversy before the SEC relating to intracorporate matters. A resolution of that question is not necessary in this case.
WHEREFORE, respondent Commissioner's Order granting Atty. Estanislao A. Fernandez leave
to intervene in SEC Case No. 1747 is hereby reversed and set aside. The temporary Restraining
Order heretofore issued is hereby made permanent.
No costs.
SO ORDERED.
Fernando, C.J., Teehankee, Makasiar, Concepcion, Jr., Fernandez, Guerrero, Abad Santos, De
Castro, Ericta, Plana and Escolin, JJ., concur.
Aquino, J., took no part.
Barredo, J., I reserve my vote.

SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. 134577 November 18, 1998

SEN. MIRIAM DEFENSOR SANTIAGO and SEN. FRANCISCO S. TATAD, petitioners,
vs.
SEN. TEOFISTO T. GUINGONA, JR. and SEN. MARCELO B. FERNAN, respondents.
PANGANIBAN, J.:
The principle of separation of powers ordains that each of the three great branches of
government has exclusive cognizance of and is supreme in matters falling within its own
constitutionally allocated sphere. Constitutional respect and a becoming regard for she sovereign
acts, of a coequal branch prevents this Court from prying into the internal workings of the
Senate. Where no provision of the Constitution or the laws or even the Rules of the Senate is
clearly shown to have been violated, disregarded or overlooked, grave abuse of discretion cannot
be imputed to Senate officials for acts done within their competence and authority. This Court
will be neither a tyrant nor a wimp; rather, it will remain steadfast and judicious in upholding the
rule and majesty of the law.
The Case
On July 31, 1998, Senators Miriam Defensor Santiago and Francisco S. Tatad instituted an
original petition forquo warranto under Rule 66, Section 5, Rules of Court, seeking the ouster of
Senator Teofisto T. Guingona, Jr. as minority leader of the Senate and the declaration of Senator
Tatad as the rightful minority leader.
On August 4, 1998, the Court, upon receipt of the Petition, required the respondents and the
solicitor general "to file COMMENT thereon within a non-extendible period of fifteen (15) days
from notice." On August 25, 1998, both respondents and the solicitor general submitted their
respective Comments. In compliance with a Resolution of the Court dated September 1, 1998,
petitioners filed their Consolidated Reply on September 23, 1998. Noting said pleading, this
Court gave due course to the petition and deemed the controversy submitted for decision,
without need of memoranda, on September 29, 1998.
In the regular course, the regional trial courts and this Court have concurrent jurisdiction 1 to hear
and decide petitions for quo warranto (as well as certiorari, prohibition and mandamus), and a
basic deference to the hierarchy of courts impels a filing of such petitions in the lower
tribunals. 2 However, for special and important reasons or for exceptional and compelling
circumstances, as in the present case, this Court has allowed exceptions to this doctrine. 3 In fact,
original petitions for certiorari, prohibition, mandamus and quo warranto assailing acts of
legislative officers like the Senate President 4 and the Speaker of the House 5 have been
recognized as exceptions to this rule.
The Facts
The Senate of the Philippines, with Sen. John Henry R. Osmea as presiding officer, convened
on July 27, 1998 for the first regular session of the eleventh Congress. At the time, in terms of
party affiliation, the composition of the Senate was as follows: 6
10 members Laban ng Masang Pilipino (LAMP)

7 members Lakas-National Union of Christian Democrats-United
Muslim Democrats of the Philippines (Lakas-NUCDUMDP)
1 member Liberal Party (LP)
1 member Aksyon Demokrasya
1 member People's Reform Party (PRP)
1 member Gabay Bayan
2 members Independent
23 total number of senators 7 (The last six members are all classified by
petitioners as "independent".)
On the agenda for the day was the election of officers. Nominated by Sen. Blas F. Ople to the
position of Senate President was Sen. Marcelo B. Fernan. Sen. Francisco S. Tatad was also
nominated to the same position by Sen. Miriam Defenser Santiago. By a vote of 20 to
2, 8 Senator Fernan was declared the duly elected President of the Senate.
The following were likewise elected: Senator Ople as president pro tempore, and Sen. Franklin
M. Drilon as majority leader.
Senator Tatad thereafter manifested that, with the agreement of Senator Santiago, allegedly the
only other member of the minority, he was assuming the position of minority leader. He
explained that those who had voted for Senator Fernan comprised the "majority," while only
those who had voted for him, the losing nominee, belonged to the "minority."
During the discussion on who should constitute the Senate "minority," Sen. Juan M. Flavier
manifested that the senators belonging to the Lakas-NUCD-UMDP Party numbering seven
(7) and, thus, also a minority had chosen Senator Guingona as the minority leader. No
consensus on the matter was arrived at. The following session day, the debate on the question
continued, with Senators Santiago and Tatad delivering privilege speeches. On the third session
day, the Senate met in caucus, but still failed to resolve the issue.
On July 30, 1998, the majority leader informed the body chat he was in receipt of a letter signed
by the seven Lakas-NUCD-UMDP senators, 9 stating that they had elected Senator Guingona as
the minority leader. By virtue thereof, the Senate President formally recognized Senator
Guingona as the minority leader of the Senate.
The following day, Senators Santiago and Tatad filed before this Court the subject petition
for quo warranto, alleging in the main that Senator Guingona had been usurping, unlawfully
holding and exercising the position of Senate minority leader, a position that, according to them,
rightfully belonged to Senator Tatad.
Issues
From the parties' pleadings, the Court formulated the following issues for resolution:
1. Does the Court have jurisdiction over the petition?

2. Was there an actual violation of the Constitution?
3. Was Respondent Guingona usurping, unlawfully holding and exercising the
position of Senate minority leader?
4. Did Respondent Fernan act with grave abuse of discretion in recognizing
Respondent Guingona as the minority leader?
The Court's Ruling
After a close perusal of the pleadings 10 and a careful deliberation on the arguments, pro and con,
the Court finds that no constitutional or legal infirmity or grave abuse of discretion attended the
recognition of and the assumption into office by Respondent Guingona as the Senate minority
leader.
First Issue:
The Court's Jurisdiction
Petitioners principally invoke Avelino v. Cuenco 11 in arguing that this Court has jurisdiction to
settle the issue of who is the lawful Senate minority leader. They submit that the definitions of
"majority" and "minority" involve an interpretation of the Constitution, specifically Section 16
(1), Article VI thereof, stating that "[t]he Senate shall elect its President and the House of
Representatives its Speaker, by a majority vote of all its respective Members."
Respondents and the solicitor general, in their separate Comments, contend in common that the
issue of who is the lawful Senate minority leader is an internal matter pertaining exclusively to
the domain of the legislature, over which the Court cannot exercise jurisdiction without
transgressing the principle of separation of powers. Allegedly, no constitutional issue is involved,
as the fundamental law does not provide for the office of a minority leader in the Senate. The
legislature alone has the full discretion to provide for such office and, in that event, to determine
the procedure of selecting its occupant.
Respondents also maintain that Avelino cannot apply, because there exists no question involving
an interpretation or application of the Constitution, the laws or even the Rules of the Senate;
neither are there "peculiar circumstances" impelling the Court to assume jurisdiction over the
petition. The solicitor general adds that there is not even any legislative practice to support the
petitioners' theory that a senator who votes for the winning Senate President is precluded from
becoming the minority leader.
To resolve the issue of jurisdiction, this Court carefully reviewed and deliberated on the various
important cases involving this very important and basic question, which it has ruled upon in the
past.
The early case Avelino v. Cuenco cautiously tackled the scope of the Court's power of judicial
review; that is, questions involving an interpretation or application of a provision of the
Constitution or the law, including the rules of either house of Congress. Within this scope falls
the jurisdiction of the Court over questions on the validity of legislative or executive acts that are
political in nature, whenever the tribunal "finds constitutionally imposed limits on powers or
functions conferred upon political bodies." 12
In the aforementioned case, the Court initially declined to resolve the question of who was the
rightful Senate President, since it was deemed a political controversy falling exclusively within
the domain of the Senate. Upon a motion for reconsideration, however, the Court ultimately
assumed jurisdiction (1) "in the light of subsequent events which justify its intervention;" and (2)
because the resolution of the issue hinged on the interpretation of the constitutional provision on
the presence of a quorum to hold a session 13 and therein elect a Senate President.
Justice Feria elucidated in his Concurring Opinion: "[I] concur with the majority that this Court
has jurisdiction over cases like the present . . . so as to establish in this country the judicial
supremacy, with the Supreme Court as the final arbiter, to see that no one branch or agency of the
government transcends the Constitution, not only in justiceable but political questions as well." 14
Justice Perfecto, also concurring, said in part:
Indeed there is no denying that the situation, as obtaining in the upper chamber of
Congress, is highly explosive. It had echoed in the House of Representatives. It
has already involved the President of the Philippines. The situation has created a
veritable national crisis, and it is apparent that solution cannot be expected from
any quarter other than this Supreme Court, upon which the hopes of the people for
an effective settlement are pinned. 15
. . . This case raises vital constitutional questions which no one can settle or
decide if this Court should refuse to decide them. 16
. . . The constitutional question of quorum should not be left unanswered. 17
In Taada v. Cueno, 18 this Court endeavored to define political question. And we said that "it
refers to 'those questions which, under the Constitution, are to be decided by the people in their
sovereign capacity, or in regard to which full discretionary authority has been delegated to the
legislative or executive branch of the government.' It is concerned with issues dependent upon
the wisdom, not [the] legality, of a particular measure." 19
The Court ruled that the validity of the selection of members of the Senate Electoral Tribunal by
the senators was not a political question. The choice of these members did not depend on the
Senate's "full discretionary authority," but was subject to mandatory constitutional
limitations. 20 Thus, the Court held that not only was it clearly within its jurisdiction to pass upon
the validity of the selection proceedings, but it was also its duty to consider and determine the
issue.
In another landmark case, Lansang v. Garcia, 21 Chief Justice Roberto Concepcion wrote that the
Court "had authority to and should inquire into the existence of the factual bases required by the
Constitution for the suspension of the privilege of the writ [of habeas corpus]." This ruling was
made in spite of the previous pronouncements in Barcelon v. Baker 22 andMontenegro v.
Castaeda 23 that "the authority to decide whether the exigency has arisen requiring suspension
(of the privilege . . .) belongs to the President and his 'decision is final and conclusive' upon the
courts and upon all other persons." But the Chief Justice cautioned: "the function of the Court is
merely to check not to supplant the Executive, or to ascertain merely whether he has gone
beyond the constitutional limits of his jurisdiction, not to exercise the power vested in him or to
determine the wisdom of his act."
The eminent Chief Justice aptly explained later in Javellana v. Executive Secretary: 24
The reason why the issue under consideration and other issues of similar character
are justiciable, not political, is plain and simple. One of the principal bases of the
non-justiciability of so-called political questions is the principle of separation of
powers characteristic of the presidential system of government the
functions of which are classified or divided, by reason of their nature, into three
(3) categories, namely, 1) those involving the making of laws, which are allocated
to the legislative department; 2) those concerning mainly with the enforcement of
such laws and of judicial decisions applying and/or interpreting the same, which
belong to the executive department; and 3) those dealing with the settlement of
disputes, controversies or conflicts involving rights, duties or prerogatives that are

legally demandable and enforceable, which are apportioned to courts of justice.
Within its own sphere but only within such sphere each department is
supreme and independent of the others, and each is devoid of authority not only to
encroach upon the powers or field of action assigned to any of the other
departments, but also to inquire into or pass upon the advisability or wisdom of
the acts performed, measures taken or decisions made by the other departments
provided that such acts, measures or decisions are within the area allocated thereto
by the Constitution.
Accordingly, when the grant of power is qualified, conditional or subject to
limitations, the issue of whether or not the prescribed qualifications or conditions
have been met, or the limitations respected is justiciable or non-political, the crux
of the problem being one of legality or validity of the contested act, not its
wisdom. Otherwise, said qualifications, conditions or limitations particularly
those prescribed by the Constitution would be set at naught. What is more, the
judicial inquiry into such issue and the settlement thereof are the main functions
of the courts of justice under the presidential form of government adopted in our
1935 Constitution, and the system of checks and balances, one of its basic
predicates. As a consequence, we have neither the authority nor the discretion to
decline passing upon said issue, but are under the ineluctable obligation made
particularly more exacting and peremptory by our oath, as members of the highest
Court of the land, to support and defend the Constitution to settle it. This
explains why, in Miller v. Johnson [92 Ky. 589, 18 SW 522, 523], it was held that
courts have a "duty, rather than a power," to determine whether another branch of
the government has "kept within constitutional limits."
Unlike our previous constitutions, the 1987 Constitution is explicit in defining the scope of
judicial power. The present Constitution now fortifies the authority of the courts to determine in
an appropriate action the validity of the acts of the political departments. It speaks of judicial
prerogative in terms of duty, viz.:
Government. 25
This express definition has resulted in clearer and more resolute pronouncements of the
Court. Daza v. Singson,26 Coseteng v. Mitra, Jr. 27 and Guingona Jr. v. Gonzales 28 similarly
resolved issues assailing the acts of the leaders of both houses of Congress in apportioning
among political parties the seats to which each chamber was entitled in the Commission on
Appointments. The Court held that the issue was justiciable, "even if the question were political
in nature," since it involved "the legality, not the wisdom, of the manner of filling the
Commission on Appointments as prescribed by [Section 18, Article VI of] the Constitution."
The same question of jurisdiction was raised in Taada v. Angara, 29 wherein the petitioners
sought to nullify the Senate's concurrence in the ratification of the World Trade Organization
(WTO) Agreement. The Court ruled: "Where an action of the legislative branch is seriously
alleged to have infringed the Constitution, it becomes not only the right but in fact the duty of the
judiciary to settle the dispute." The Court en banc unanimously stressed that in taking
jurisdiction over petitions questioning, an act of the political departments of government, it will
not review the wisdom, merits or propriety of such action, and will strike it down only on either
of two grounds: (1) unconstitutionality or illegality and (2) grave abuse of discretion.
Earlier in Co v. Electoral Tribunal of the House of Representatives 30 (HRET), the Court refused
to reverse a decision of the HRET, in the absence of a showing that said tribunal had committed
grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction. The Court ruled that full authority
had been conferred upon the electoral tribunals of the House of Representatives and of the
Senate as sole judges of all contests relating to the election, the returns, and the qualifications of
their respective members. Such jurisdiction is original and exclusive. 31 The Court may inquire
into a decision or resolution of said tribunals only if such "decision or resolution was rendered
without or in excess of jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion" 32
Recently, the Court, in Arroyo v. De Venecia, 33 was asked to reexamine the enrolled bill doctrine
and to look beyond the certification of the Speaker of the House of Representatives that the bill,
which was later enacted as Republic Act 8240, was properly approved by the legislative body.
Petitioners claimed that certain procedural rules of the House had been breached in the passage
of the bill. They averred further that a violation of the constitutionally mandated House rules was
a violation of the Constitution itself.
The Court, however, dismissed the petition, because the matter complained of concerned the
internal procedures of the House, with which the Court had no concern. It enucleated: 34
It would-be an unwarranted invasion of the prerogative of a coequal department
for this Court either to set aside a legislative action as void because the Court
thinks the House has disregarded its own rules of procedure, or to allow those
defeated in the political arena to seek a rematch in the judicial forum when
petitioners can find their remedy in that department itself. The Court has not been
invested with a roving commission to inquire into complaints, real or imagined, of
legislative skullduggery. It would be acting in excess of its power and would itself
be guilty of grave abuse of discretion were it to do so. . . . In the absence of
anything to the contrary, the Court must assume that Congress or any House
thereof acted in the good faith belief that its conduct was permitted by its rules,
and deference rather than disrespect is due the judgment of that body.
In the instant controversy, the petitioners one of whom is Senator Santiago, a well-known
constitutionalist try to hew closely to these jurisprudential parameters. They claim that
Section 16 (1), Article VI of the constitution, has not been observed in the selection of the Senate
minority leader. They also invoke the Court's "expanded" judicial power "to determine whether
or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction" on
the part of respondents.
Dissenting in part, Mr. Justice Vicente V. Mendoza submits that the Court has no jurisdiction
over the petition. Well-settled is the doctrine, however, that jurisdiction over the subject matter of
a case is determined by the allegations of the complaint or petition, regardless of whether the
plaintiff or petitioner is entitled to the relief asserted. 35 In light of the aforesaid allegations of
petitioners, it is clear that this Court has jurisdiction over the petition. It is well within the power
and jurisdiction of the Court to inquire whether indeed the Senate or its officials committed a
violation of the Constitution or gravely abused their discretion in the exercise of their functions
and prerogatives.
Second Issue:
Violation of the Constitution
Having assumed jurisdiction over the petition, we now go to the next crucial question: In
recognizing Respondent Guingona as the Senate minority leader, did the Senate or its officials,
particularly Senate President Fernan, violate the Constitution or the laws?
Petitioners answer the above question in the affirmative. They contend that the constitutional
provision requiring the election of the Senate President "by majority vote of all members" carries
with it a judicial duty to determine the concepts of "majority" and "minority," as well as who
may elect a minority leader. They argue that "majority" in the aforequoted constitutional
provision refers to that group of senators who (1) voted for the winning Senate President and (2)
accepted committee chairmanships. Accordingly, those who voted for the losing nominee and
accepted no such chairmanships comprise the minority, to whom the right to determine the
minority leader belongs. As a result, petitioners assert, Respondent Guingona cannot be the
legitimate minority leader, since he voted for Respondent Fernan as Senate President.
Furthermore, the members of the Lakas-NUCD-UMDP cannot choose the minority leader,
because they did not belong to the minority, having voted for Fernan and accepted committee
chairmanships.
We believe, however, that the interpretation proposed by petitioners finds no clear support from
the Constitution, the laws, the Rules of the Senate or even from practices of the Upper House.
The term "majority" has been judicially defined a number of times. When referring to a certain
number out of a total or aggregate, it simply "means the number greater than half or more than
half of any total." 36 The plain and unambiguous words of the subject constitutional clause simply
mean that the Senate President must obtain the votes of more than one half of all the senators.
Not by any construal does it thereby delineate who comprise the "majority," much less the
"minority," in the said body. And there is no showing that the framers of our Constitution had in
mind other than the usual meanings of these terms.
In effect, while the Constitution mandates that the President of the Senate must be elected by a
number constituting more than one half of all the members thereof, it does not provide that the
members who will not vote for him shall ipso facto constitute the "minority," who could thereby
elect the minority leader. Verily, no law or regulation states that the defeated candidate shall
automatically become the minority leader.
The Comment 37 of Respondent Guingona furnishes some relevant precedents, which were not
contested in petitioners' Reply. During the eighth Congress, which was the first to convene after
the ratification of the 1987 Constitution, the nomination of Sen. Jovito R Salonga as Senate
President was seconded by a member of the minority, then Sen. Joseph E. Estrada. 38 During the
ninth regular session, when Sen. Edgardo J. Angara assumed the Senate presidency in 1993, a
consensus was reached to assign committee chairmanships to all senators, including those
belonging to the minority. 39This practice continued during the tenth Congress, where even the
minority leader was allowed to chair a committee. 40History would also show that the "majority"
in either house of Congress has referred to the political party to which the most number of
lawmakers belonged, while the "minority" normally referred to a party with a lesser number of
members.
Let us go back to the definitions of the terms "majority" and "minority." Majority may also refer
to "the group, party, or faction with the larger number of votes," 41 not necessarily more than one
half. This is sometimes referred to as plurality. In contrast, minority is "a group, party, or faction
with a smaller number of votes or adherents than the majority." 42Between two unequal parts or
numbers comprising a whole or totality, the greater number would obviously be the majority
while the lesser would be the minority. But where there are more than two unequal groupings, it
is not as easy to say which is the minority entitled to select the leader representing all the
minorities. In a government with a multi-party system such as in the Philippines (as pointed out
by petitioners themselves), there could be several minority parties, one of which has to be
indentified by the Comelec as the "dominant minority party" for purposes of the general
elections. In the prevailing composition of the present Senate, members either belong to different
political parties or are independent. No constitutional or statutory provision prescribe which of
the many minority groups or the independents or a combination thereof has the right to select the
minority leader.
While the Constitution is explicit on the manner of electing a Senate President and a House
Speaker, it is, however, dead silent on the manner of selecting the other officers in both chambers
of Congress. All that the Charter says is that "[e]ach House shall choose such other officers as it
may deem necessary." 43 To our mind, themethod of choosing who will be such other officers is
merely a derivative of the exercise of the prerogative conferred by the aforequoted constitutional
provision. Therefore, such method must be prescribed by the Senate itself, not by this Court.
In this regard, the Constitution vests in each house of Congress the power "to determine the rules
of its proceedings." 44 Pursuant thereto, the Senate formulated and adopted a set of rules to
govern its internal affairs. 45Pertinent to the instant case are Rules I and II thereof, which provide:
Rule I
ELECTIVE OFFICERS
Sec 1. The Senate shall elect, in the manner hereinafter provided, a President, a
President Pro Tempore, a Secretary, and a Sergeant-at-Arms.
These officers shall take their oath of office before entering into the discharge of
their duties.
Rule II
ELECTION OF OFFICER
Sec. 2. The officers of the Senate shall be elected by the majority vote of all its
Members. Should there be more than one candidate for the same office, a nominal
vote shall be taken; otherwise, the elections shall be by viva voce or by resolution.
Notably, the Rules of the Senate do not provide for the positions of majority and minority
leaders. Neither is there an open clause providing specifically for such offices and prescribing the
manner of creating them or of choosing the holders thereof, At any rate, such offices, by tradition
and long practice, are actually extant. But, in the absence of constitutional or statutory guidelines
or specific rules, this Court is devoid of any basis upon which to determine the legality of the
acts of the Senate relative thereto. On grounds of respect for the basic concept of separation of
powers, courts may not intervene in the internal affairs of the legislature; it is not within the
province of courts to direct Congress how to do its work. 46 Paraphrasing the words of Justice
Florentino P. Feliciano, this Court is of the opinion that where no specific, operable norms and
standards are shown to exist, then the legislature must be given a real and effective opportunity
to fashion and promulgate as well as to implement them, before the courts may intervene.47
Needless to state, legislative rules, unlike statutory laws, do not have the imprints of permanence
and obligatoriness during their effectivity. In fact, they "are subject to revocation, modification or
waiver at the pleasure of the body adopting them." 48 Being merely matters of procedure, their
observance are of no concern to the courts, for said rules may be waived or disregarded by the
legislative body 49 at will, upon the concurrence of a majority.
In view of the foregoing, Congress verily has the power and prerogative to provide for such
officers as it may deem. And it is certainly within its own jurisdiction and discretion to prescribe
the parameters for the exercise of this prerogative. This Court has no authority to interfere and
unilaterally intrude into that exclusive realm, without running afoul of constitutional principles
that it is bound to protect and uphold the very duty that justifies the Court's being.
Constitutional respect and a becoming regard for the sovereign acts of a coequal branch prevents
this Court from prying into the internal workings of the Senate. To repeat, this Court will be
neither a tyrant nor a wimp; rather, it will remain steadfast and judicious in upholding the rule
and majesty of the law.
To accede, then, to the interpretation of petitioners would practically amount to judicial
legislation, a clear breach of the constitutional doctrine of separation of powers. If for this
argument alone, the petition would easily fail.
While no provision of the Constitution or the laws or the rules and even the practice of the
Senate was violated, and while the judiciary is without power to decide matters over which full
discretionary authority has been lodged in the legislative department, this Court may still inquire
whether an act of Congress or its officials has been made with grave abuse of discretion. 50 This
is the plain implication of Section 1, Article VIII of the Constitution, which expressly confers
upon the judiciary the power and the duty not only "to settle actual controversies involving rights
which are legally demandable and enforceable," but likewise "to determine whether or not there
any branch or instrumentality of the Government."
Explaining the above-quoted clause, former Chief Justice Concepcion, who was a member of the
1986 Constitutional Commission, said in part: 51
. . . the powers of government are generally considered divided into three
branches: the Legislative, the Executive and the Judiciary. Each one is supreme
within its own sphere and independent of the others. Because of that supremacy[,
the] power to determine whether a given law is valid or not is vested in courts of
justice.
Briefly stated, courts of justice determine the limits of power of the agencies and
offices of the government as well as those of its officers. In other words, the
judiciary is the final arbiter on the question whether or not a branch of
government or any of its officials has acted without jurisdiction or in excess of
jurisdiction, or so capriciously as to constitute an abuse of discretion amounting to
excess of jurisdiction or lack of jurisdiction. This is not only a judicial power but
a duty to pass judgment on matters of this nature.
This is the background of paragraph 2 of Section 1, which means that the courts
cannot hereafter evade the duty to settle matters of this nature, by claiming that
such matters constitute a political question.
With this paradigm, we now examine the two other issues challenging the actions, first, of
Respondent Guingona and, second, of Respondent Fernan.
Third Issue:
Usurpation of Office
Usurpation generally refers to unauthorized arbitrary assumption and exercise of power 52 by one
without color of title or who is not entitled by law thereto. 53 A quo warranto proceeding is the
proper legal remedy to determine the right or title to the contested public office and to oust the
holder from its enjoyment. 54 The action may be brought by the solicitor general or a public
prosecutor 55 or any person claiming to be entitled to the public office or position usurped or
unlawfully held or exercised by another. 56 The action shall be brought against the person who
allegedly usurped, intruded into or is unlawfully holding of exercising such office. 57
In order for a quo warranto proceeding to be successful, the person suing must show that he or
she has a clearright to the contested office or to use or exercise the functions of the office
allegedly usurped or unlawfully held by the respondent. 58 In this case, petitioners present no
sufficient proof of a clear and indubitable franchise to the office of the Senate minority leader.
As discussed earlier, the specific norms or standards that may be used in determining who may
lawfully occupy the disputed position has not been laid down by the Constitution, the statutes, or
the Senate itself in which the power has been vested. Absent any clear-cut guideline, in no way
can it be said that illegality or irregularity tainted Respondent Guingona's assumption and
exercise of the powers of the office of Senate minority leader. Furthermore, no grave abuse of
discretion has been shown to characterize any of his specific acts as minority leader.
Fourth Issue:
Fernan's Recognition of Guingona
The all-embracing and plenary power and duty of the Court "to determine whether or not there
any branch or instrumentality of the Government" is restricted only by the definition and
confines of the term "grave abuse of discretion."
By grave abuse of discretion is meant such capricious or whimsical exercise of
judgment as is equivalent to lack of jurisdiction. The abuse of discretion must be
patent and gross as to amount to an evasion of positive duty or a virtual refusal to
perform a duty enjoined by law, or to act at all in contemplation of law as where
the power is exercised in an arbitrary and despotic manner by reason of passion
and hostility. 59
By the above standard, we hold that Respondent Fernan did not gravely abuse his discretion as
Senate President in recognizing Respondent Guingona as the minority leader. Let us recall that
the latter belongs to one of the minority parties in the Senate, the Lakas-NUCD-UMDP. By
unanimous resolution of the members of this party that he be the minority leader, he was
recognized as such by the Senate President. Such formal recognition by Respondent Fernan came
only after at least two Senate sessions and a caucus, wherein both sides were liberally allowed to
articulate their standpoints.
Under these circumstances, we believe that the Senate President cannot be accused of
"capricious or whimsical exercise of judgment" or of "an arbitrary and despotic manner by
reason of passion or hostility." Where no provision of the Constitution, the laws or even the rules
of the Senate has been clearly shown to have been violated, disregarded or overlooked, grave
abuse of discretion cannot be imputed to Senate officials for acts done within their competence
and authority.
WHEREFORE, for the above reasons, the petition is hereby DISMISSED.
SO ORDERED.
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-2821
March 4, 1949
JOSE AVELINO, petitioner,

vs.
MARIANO J. CUENCO, respondent.
Vicente J. Francisco for petitioner.
Office of the Solicitor General Felix Angelo Bautista, Ramon Diokno and Lorenzo M. Taada for
respondent.
Teehankee, Fernando, Sunico & Rodrigo; Vera, Montesines & Navarro; Felixberto M. Serrano
and Vicente del Rosario as amici curiae.
RE S O LUTI ON
In G.R. No. L-2821, Avelino vs. Cuenco, the Court by a vote of six justices against four resolved
to deny the petition.
Without prejudice to the promulgation of a more extended opinion, this is now written briefly to
explain the principal grounds for the denial.
The Court believes the following essential facts have been established:
In the session of the Senate of February 18, 1949, Senator Lorenzo M. Taadare quested that his
right to speak on the next session day, February 21, 1949, to formulate charges against the then
Senate President Jose Avelino be reserved. His request was approved.
On February 21, 1949, hours before the opening of the session Senator Taada and Senator
Taada and Senator Prospero Sanidad filed with the Secretary of the Senate a resolution
enumerating charges against the then Senate President and ordering the investigation thereof.
Although a sufficient number of senators to constitute a quorum were at the Senate session hall
at the appointed time (10:00 A.M.), and the petitioner was already in his office, said petitioner
delayed his appearance at the session hall until about 11:35 A.M. When he finally ascended the
rostrum, he did not immediately open the session, but instead requested from the Secretary a
copy of the resolution submitted by Senators Taada and Sanidad and in the presence of the
public he read slowly and carefully said resolution, after which he called and conferred with his
colleagues Senator Francisco and Tirona.
Shortly before 12:00 noon, due to the session be opened, the petitioner finally called the meeting
to order. Except Senator Sotto who was confined in a hospital and Senator Confesor who is in the
United States, all the Senator were present.
Senator Sanidad, following a long established practice, moved that the roll call be dispensed
with, but Senator Tirona opposed said motion, obviously in pursuance of a premeditated plan of
petitioner and his partisans to make use of dilatory tactics to prevent Senator Taada from
delivering his privilege speech. The roll was called.
Senator Sanidad next moved, as is the usual practice, to dispense with the reading of the minutes,
but this motion was likewise opposed by Senator Tirona and David, evidently, again, in
pursuance of the above-mentioned conspiracy.
Before and after the roll call and before and after the reading of the minutes, Senator Taada
repeatedly stood up to claim his right to deliver his one-hour privilege speech but the petitioner,
then presiding, continuosly ignored him; and when after the reading of the minutes, Senator
Taada instead on being recognized by the Chair, the petitioner announced that he would order
the arrest of any senator who would speak without being previously recognized by him, but all
the while, tolerating the actions of his follower, Senator Tirona, who was continuously shouting
at Senator Sanidad "Out of order!" everytime the latter would ask for recognition of Senator
Taada.
At this juncture, some disorderly conduct broke out in the Senate gallery, as if by prearrangement. At about this same time Senator Pablo Angeles David, one of the petitioner's
followers, was recognized by petitioner, and he moved for adjournment of session, evidently,
again, in pursuance of the above-mentioned conspiracy to muzzle Senator Taada.
Senator Sanidad registered his opposition to the adjournment of the session and this opposition
was seconded by herein respondent who moved that the motion of adjournment be submitted to a
vote. Another commotion ensued.
Senator David reiterated his motion for adjournment and herein respondent also reiterated his
opposition to the adjournment and again moved that the motion of Senator David be submitted to
a vote.
Suddenly, the petitioner banged the gavel and abandoning the Chair hurriedly walked out of the
session hall followed by Senator David, Tirona, Francisco, Torres, Magalona and Clarin, while
the rest of the senators remained. Whereupon Senator Melencio Arranz, Senate President Protempore, urged by those senators present took the Chair and proceeded with the session.
Senator Cabili stood up, and asked that it be made of record it was so made that the
deliberate abandonment of the Chair by the petitioner, made it incumbent upon Senate President
Pro-tempore Arranz and the remaining members of the Senate to continue the session in order
not to paralyze the functions of the Senate.
Senate President Pro-tempore Arranz then suggested that respondent be designated to preside
over the session which suggestion was carried unanimously. the respondent thereupon took the
Chair.
Upon motion of Senator Arranz, which was approved Gregorio Abad was appointedActing
Secretary, because the Assistance Secretary, who was then acting as Secretary, had followed the
petitioner when the latter abandoned the session.
Senator Taada, after being recognized by the Chair, was then finally able to deliver his privilege
speech. Thereafter Senator Sanidad read aloud the complete text of said Resolution (No. 68), and
submitted his motion for approval thereof and the same was unanimously approved.
With Senate President Pro-tempore Arranz again occupying the Chair, after the respondent had
yielded it to him, Senator Sanidad introduced Resolution No. 67, entitled "Resolution declaring
vacant the position of the President of the Senate and designated the Honorable Mariano Jesus
Cuenco Acting President of the Senate." Put to a vote, the said resolution was unanimously
approved.
Senator Cuenco took the oath.
The next day the President of the Philippines recognized the respondent as acting president of the
Philippines Senate.
By his petition in this quo warranto proceeding petitioners asked the Court to declare him the
rightful President of the Philippines senate and oust respondent.
The Court has examined all principal angles of the controversy and believes that these are the
crucial points:
a. Does the Court have jurisdiction over the subject-matter?
b. If it is has, were resolution Nos. 68 and 67 validly approved?
c. Should the petition be granted?
To the first question, the answer is in the negative, in view of the separation of powers, the
political nature of the controversy (Alejandrino vs. Quezon, 46 Phil., 83; Vera vs. Avelino, 77
Phil., 192; Mabanag vs. Lopez Vito, 78 Phil., 1) and the constitutional grant to the Senate of the
power to elect its own president, which power should not be interfered with, nor taken over, by
the judiciary. We refused to take cognizance of the Vera case even if the rights of the electors of
the suspended senators were alleged affected without any immediate remedy. A fortiori we should
abstain in this case because the selection of the presiding officer affect only the Senators
themselves who are at liberty at any time to choose their officers, change or reinstate them.
Anyway, if, as the petition must imply to be acceptable, the majority of the Senators want
petitioner to preside, his remedy lies in the Senate Session Hall not in the Supreme Court.
The Court will not sally into the legitimate domain of the Senate on the plea that our refusal to
intercede might lead into a crisis, even a resolution. No state of things has been proved that
might change the temper of the Filipino people as a peaceful and law-abiding citizens. And we
should not allow ourselves to be stampeded into a rash action inconsistent with the calm that
should characterized judicial deliberations.
The precedent of Werts vs. Roger does not apply, because among other reasons, the situation is
not where two sets of senators have constituted themselves into two senates actually functioning
as such, (as in said Werts case), there being no question that there is presently one Philippines
Senate only. To their credit be it recorded that petitioner and his partisans have not erected
themselves into another Senate. The petitioner's claim is merely that respondent has not been
duly elected in his place in the same one Philippines Senate.
It is furthermore believed that the recognition accorded by the Chief Executive to the respondent
makes it advisable, more than ever, to adopt the hands-off policy wisely enunciated by this Court
in matters of similar nature.
The second question depends upon these sub-questions. (1) Was the session of the so-called
rump Senate a continuation of the session validly assembled with twenty two Senators in the
morning of February 21, 1949?; (2) Was there a quorum in that session? Mr. Justice Montemayor
and Mr. Justice Reyes deem it useless, for the present to pass on these questions once it is held,
as they do, that the Court has no jurisdiction over the case. What follows is the opinion of the
other four on those four on those sub-questions.
Supposing that the Court has jurisdiction, there is unanimity in the view that the session under
Senator Arranz was a continuation of the morning session and that a minority of ten senators may
not, by leaving the Hall, prevent the other twelve senators from passing a resolution that met
with their unanimous endorsement. The answer might be different had the resolution been
approved only by ten or less.
If the rump session was not a continuation of the morning session, was it validly constituted? In
other words, was there the majority required by the Constitution for the transaction of the
business of the Senate? Justice Paras, Feria, Pablo and Bengzon say there was, firstly because the
minute say so, secondly, because at the beginning of such session there were at least fourteen
senators including Senators Pendatun and Lopez, and thirdly because in view of the absence
from the country of Senator Tomas Confesor twelve senators constitute a majority of the Senate
of twelve three senators. When the Constitution declares that a majority of "each House" shall
constitute aquorum, "the House: does not mean "all" the members. Even a majority of all the
members constitute "the House". (Missouri Pac. vs. Kansas, 63 Law ed. [U. S.], p. 239). There is
a difference between a majority of "the House", the latter requiring less number than the first.
Therefore an absolute majority (12) of all the members of the Senate less one (23), constitutes
constitutional majority of the Senate for the purpose of a quorum. Mr. Justice Pablo believes
furthermore than even if the twelve did not constitute a quorum, they could have ordered the
arrest of one, at least, of the absent members; if one had been so arrested, there would be no
doubt Quorum then, and Senator Cuenco would have been elected just the same inasmuch as
there would be eleven for Cuenco, one against and one abstained.
In fine, all the four justice agree that the Court being confronted with the practical situation that
of the twenty three senators who may participate in the Senate deliberations in the days
immediately after this decision, twelve senators will support Senator Cuenco and, at most, eleven
will side with Senator Avelino, it would be most injudicious to declare the latter as the rightful
President of the Senate, that office being essentially one that depends exclusively upon the will
of the majority of the senators, the rule of the Senate about tenure of the President of that body
being amenable at any time by that majority. And at any session hereafter held with thirteen or
more senators, in order to avoid all controversy arising from the divergence of opinion here
aboutquorum and for the benefit of all concerned,the said twelve senators who approved the
resolutions herein involved could ratify all their acts and thereby place them beyond the shadow
of a doubt.
As already stated, the six justices hereinabove mentioned voted to dismiss the petition. Without
costs.

SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. 127255 June 26, 1998

JOKER P. ARROYO, EDCEL C. LAGMAN, JOHN HENRY R. OSMEA, WIGBERTO
E. TAADA, and RONALDO B. ZAMORA, petitioners,
vs.
JOSE DE VENECIA, RAUL DAZA, RODOLFO ALBANO, THE EXECUTIVE
SECRETARY, THE SECRETARY OF FINANCE, AND THE COMMISSIONER OF
INTERNAL REVENUE, respondents.
MENDOZA, J.:
Petitioners seek a rehearing and reconsideration of the Court's decision dismissing their petition
for certiorari and prohibition. Basically, their contention is that when the Majority Leader (Rep.
Rodolfo Albano) moved for the approval of the conference committee report on the bill that
became R.A. No. 8240, leading the Chair (Deputy Speaker Raul Daza) to ask if there was any
objection to the motion, and Rep. Joker P. Arroyo asked, "What is that, Mr. Speaker?", the Chair
allegedly ignored him and instead declared the report approved. Petitioners claim that the
question "What is that, Mr. Speaker?" was a privileged question or a point of order which, under
the rules of the House, has precedence over other matters, with the exception of motions to
adjourn.
The contention has no merit. Rep. Arroyo did not have floor. Without first drawing the attention
of the Chair, he simply stood up and started talking. As a result, the Chair did not hear him and
proceeded to ask if there were objections to the Majority Leader's motion. Hearing none, he
declared the report approved. Rule XVI, 96 of the Rules of the House of Representatives
provides:
96. Manner of Addressing the Chair. When a member desires to speak, he
shall rise and respectfully address the Chair "Mr. Speaker."
The Rules of the Senate are even more emphatic. Rule XXVI, 59 says:
59. Whenever a Senator wishes to speak, he shall rise and request the President
or the Presiding Officer to allow him to have the floor which consent shall be
necessary before he may proceed.
If various Senators wish to have the floor, the President or Presiding Officer shall
recognize the one who first made the request.
Indeed, the transcript of the proceedings of November 21, 1996 1 shows that after complaining
that he was being "hurried" by the Majority Leader to finish his interpellation of the sponsor
(Rep. Javier) of the conference committee report Rep. Arroyo concluded and then sat down.
However, when the Majority Leader moved for the approval of the conference committee report
and the Chair asked if there was any objection to the motion, Rep. Arroyo stood up again and,
without requesting to be recognized, asked, "What is that, Mr. Speaker?" Apparently, the Chair
did not hear Rep. Arroyo since his attention was on the Majority Leader. Thus, he proceeded to
ask if there was any objection and, hearing none, declared the report approved and brought down
the gavel. At that point, Rep. Arroyo shouted, "No, no, no, wait a minute," and asked what the
question was. Only after he had been told that the Chair had called for objection to the motion
for approval of the report did Rep. Arroyo register his objection. It is not, therefore, true that
Rep. Arroyo was ignored. He was simply not heard because he had not first obtained recognition
from the Chair.
Nor is it correct to say that the question ("What is that, Mr. Speaker?'') he was raising was a
question of privilege or a point of older. Rule XX, 121 of the Rules of the House defines a
question of privilege as follows
Sec. 121. Definition. Questions of privilege are those affecting the duties,
conduct, rights, privileges, dignity, integrity or reputation of the House or of its
members, collectively or individually.
while a point of order is defined as follows
Points of order or questions of order are legislative devices used in requiring the
House or any of its Members to observe its own rules and to follow regular or
established parliamentary procedure. In effect, they are either objections to
pending proceedings as violative of some of those rules or demands for immediate
return to the aforementioned parliamentary procedure. 2
Petitioners further charge that there was a disregard of Rule XIX, 112 and Rule XVII, 103 of
the Rules of the House which require that the Chair should state a motion and ask for the
individual votes of the members instead of merely asking whether there was any objection to the
motion. As explained already in the decision in this case, the practice in cases involving the
approval of a conference committee report is for the Chair simply to ask if there are objections to
the motion for approval of the report. This practice is well-established and is as much a part of
parliamentary law as the formal rules of the House. As then Majority Leader Arturo M. Tolentino
explained in 1957 when this practice was questioned:
MR. TOLENTINO. The fact that nobody objects means a unanimous action of the
House. Insofar as the matter of procedure is concerned, this has been a precedent
since I came here seven years ago, and it has been the procedure in this House
that if somebody objects, then a debate follows and after the debate, then the
voting comes in.
xxx xxx xxx
Mr. Speaker, a point of order was raised by the gentleman from Leyte, and I
wonder what his attitude is now on his point of order. I should just like to state
that I believe that we have had a substantial compliance with the Rules. The Rule
invoked is not one that refers to statutory or constitutional requirement, and a
substantial compliance, to my mind, is sufficient. When the Chair announces the
vote by saying "Is there any objection?" and nobody objects, then the Chair
announces "The bill is approved on second reading." If there was any doubt as to
the vote, any motion to divide would have been proper. So, if that motion is not
presented, we assume that the House approves the measure. So I believe there is
substantial compliance here, and if anybody wants a division of the House he can
always ask for it, and the Chair can announce how many are in favor and how
many are against.3
At all events, Rep. Arroyo could have asked for a reconsideration of the ruling of the Chair
declaring the conference committee report approved. It is not true he was prevented from doing
so. The session was suspended, obviously to settle the matter amicably. From all appearances,
the misunderstanding was patched up during the nearly hour-long suspension because, after the
session was resumed, Rep. Arroyo did not say anything anymore. As the Journal of November
21, 1996 of the House shows, the session was thereafter adjourned.
On the same day, the bill was signed by the Speaker of the House and the President of the
Senate, and certified by the respective secretaries of both houses of Congress as having been
finally passed. The following day, the bill was signed into law by the President of the
Philippines.
Finally, petitioners take exception to the following statement in the decision that "The question
of quorum cannot be raised repeatedly especially when the quorum is obviously present
for the purpose of delaying the business of the House." 4 They contend that, following this ruling,
even if only 10 members of the House remain in the session hall because the others have gone
home, the quorum may not be questioned.
That was not the situation in this case, however. As noted in the decision, at 11:48 a.m. on
November 21, 1996, Rep. Arroyo questioned the existence of a quorum, but after a roll call, it
was found that was one. After that, he announced he would again question the quorum,
apparently to delay the voting on the conference report. Hence, the statement in the decision that
the question of quorum cannot repeatedly be raised for the purpose of delaying the business of
the House.
In sum, there is no basis for the charge that the approval of the conference committee report on
what later became R.A. No. 8240 was railroaded through the House of Representatives. Nor is
there any need for petitioners to invoke the power of this Court under Art. VIII, 1 of the
Constitution to determine whether, in enacting R.A. No. 8240, the House of Representatives
acted with grave abuse of discretion, since that is what we have precisely done, although the
result of our review may not be what petitioners want. It should be added that, even if petitioners'
allegations are true, the disregard of the rules in this case would not affect the validity of R.A.
No. 8240, the rules allegedly violated being merely internal rules of procedure of the House
rather than constitutional requirements for the enactment of laws. It is well settled that a
legislative act will not be declared invalid for non-compliance with internal rules.
WHEREFORE, the motion for rehearing and reconsideration is DENIED with FINALITY.
SO ORDERED.
Narvasa, C.J., Regalado, Davide, Jr., Romero, Bellosillo, Melo, Puno, Kapunan, Martinez,
Quisumbing and Purisima, JJ., concur.
Vitug, J., I reiterate my separate (concurring) opinion promulgated with the decision.
Panganiban, J., took no part.
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-17144
October 28, 1960
SERGIO OSMEA, JR., petitioner,

vs.
SALIPADA K. PENDATUN, LEON Z. GUINTO, JR., VICENTE L. PERALTA,
FAUSTINO TOBIA, LORENZO G. TEVES, JOPSE J. ROY, FAUSTINO DUGENIO,
ANTONIO Y. DE PIO, BENJAMIN T. LIGOT, PEDRO G. TRONO, FELIPE ABRIGO,
FELIPE S. ABELEDA, TECLA SAN ANDRES ZIGA, ANGEL B. FERNADEZ, and
EUGENIO S. BALTAO, in their capacity as members of the Special Committee created by
House Resolution No. 59,respondents.
Antonio Y. de Pio in his own behalf.
F. S. Abeleda, A. b. Fernandez. E. S. Baltao and Tecla San Andres Ziga in their own behalf.
C. T. Villareal and R. D. Bagatsing as amici curiae.
BENGZON, J.:
On July 14, 1960, Congressman Sergio Osmea, Jr., submitted to this Court a verified petition
for "declaratory relief, certiorari and prohibition with preliminary injunction" against
Congressman Salapida K. Pendatun and fourteen other congressmen in their capacity as
members of the Special Committee created by House Resolution No. 59. He asked for annulment
of such Resolution on the ground of infringenment of his parliamentary immunity; he also asked,
principally, that said members of the special committee be enjoined from proceeding in
accordance with it, particularly the portion authorizing them to require him to substantiate his
charges against the President with the admonition that if he failed to do so, he must show cause
why the House should not punish him.
The petition attached a copy of House Resolution No. 59, the pertinent portions of which reads
as follows:
WHEREAS, on the 23rd day of June, 1960 , the Honorable Sergio Osmea, Jr., Member
of the House of Representatives from the Second District of the province of Cebu, took
the floor of this chamber on the one hour privilege to deliver a speech, entitled 'A
Message to Garcia;
WHEREAS, in the course of said speech, the Congressman from the Second District of
Cebu stated the following:.
xxx
xxx
xxx
The people, Mr. President, have been hearing of ugly reports that under your unpopular
administration the free things they used to get from the government are now for sale at
premium prices. They say that even pardons are for sale, and that regardless of the gravity
or seriousness of a criminal case, the culprit can always be bailed out forever from jail as
long as he can come across with a handsome dole. I am afraid, such an anomalous
situation would reflect badly on the kind of justice that your administration is
dispensing. . . . .
WHEREAS, the charges of the gentleman from the Second District of Cebu, if made
maliciously or recklessly and without basis in truth and in fact, would constitute a serious
assault upon the dignity and prestige of the Office of 37 3 the President, which is the one
visible symbol of the sovereignty of the Filipino people, and would expose said office to
contempt and disrepute; . . . .
Resolved by the House of Representative, that a special committee of fifteen Members to
be appointed by the Speaker be, and the same hereby is, created to investigate the truth of
the charges against the President of the Philippines made by Honorable Sergio Osmea,
Jr., in his privilege speech of June 223, 1960, and for such purpose it is authorized to
summon Honorable Sergio Osmea, jr., to appear before it to substantiate his charges, as
well as to issue subpoena and/or subpoena duces tecum to require the attendance of
witnesses and/or the production of pertinent papers before it, and if Honorable Sergio
Osmea, Jr., fails to do so to require him to show cause why he should not be punished
by the House. The special committee shall submit to the House a report of its findings
and recommendations before the adjournment of the present special session of the
Congress of the Philippines.
In support of his request, Congressman Osmea alleged; first, the Resolution violated his
constitutional absolute parliamentary immunity for speeches delivered in the House; second, his
words constituted no actionable conduct; and third, after his allegedly objectionable speech and
words, the House took up other business, and Rule XVII, sec. 7 of the Rules of House provides
that if other business has intervened after the member had uttered obnoxious words in debate, he
shall not be held to answer therefor nor be subject to censure by the House.
Although some members of the court expressed doubts of petitioner's cause of action and the
Court's jurisdiction, the majority decided to hear the matter further, and required respondents to
answer, without issuing any preliminary injunction. Evidently aware of such circumstance with
its implications, and pressed for time in view of the imminent adjournment of the legislative
session, the special committee continued to perform its talk, and after giving Congressman
Osmea a chance to defend himself, submitted its reports on July 18, 1960, finding said
congressman guilty of serious disorderly behaviour; and acting on such report, the House
approved on the same daybefore closing its sessionHouse Resolution No. 175, declaring
him guilty as recommended, and suspending him from office for fifteen months.
Thereafter, on July 19, 1960, the respondents (with the exception of Congressmen De Pio,
Abeleda, San Andres Ziga, Fernandez and Balatao)1 filed their answer, challenged the
jurisdiction of this Court to entertain the petition, defended the power of Congress to discipline
its members with suspension, upheld a House Resolution No. 175 and then invited attention to
the fact that Congress having ended its session on July 18, 1960, the Committeewhose
members are the sole respondentshad thereby ceased to exist.
There is no question that Congressman Osmea, in a privilege speech delivered before the
House, made the serious imputations of bribery against the President which are quoted in
Resolution No. 59 and that he refused to produce before the House Committee created for the
purpose, evidence to substantiate such imputations. There is also no question that for having
made the imputations and for failing to produce evidence in support thereof, he was, by
resolution of the House, suspended from office for a period of fifteen months for serious
disorderly behaviour.
Resolution No. 175 states in part:
WHEREAS, the Special Committee created under and by virtue of Resolution No. 59,
adopted on July 8, 1960, found Representative Sergio Osmea, Jr., guilty of serious
disorderly behaviour for making without basis in truth and in fact, scurrilous, malicious,
reckless and irresponsible charges against the President of the Philippines in his privilege
speech of June 23, 1960; and
WHEREAS, the said charges are so vile in character that they affronted and degraded the
dignity of the House of Representative: Now, Therefore, be it
RESOLVED by the House of Representatives. That Representative Sergio Osmea, Jr.,
be, as he hereby is, declared guilty of serious disorderly behaviour; and . . .
As previously stated, Osmea contended in his petition that: (1) the Constitution gave him
complete parliamentary immunity, and so, for words spoken in the House, he ought not to be
questioned; (20 that his speech constituted no disorderly behaviour for which he could be
punished; and (3) supposing he could be questioned and discipline therefor, the House had lost
the power to do so because it had taken up other business before approving House Resolution
No. 59. Now, he takes the additional position (4) that the House has no power, under the
Constitution, to suspend one of its members.
Section 15, Article VI of our Constitution provides that "for any speech or debate" in Congress,
the Senators or Members of the House of Representative "shall not be questioned in any other
place." This section was taken or is a copy of sec. 6, clause 1 of Art. 1 of the Constitution of the
United States. In that country, the provision has always been understood to mean that although
exempt from prosecution or civil actions for their words uttered in Congress, the members of
Congress may, nevertheless, be questioned in Congress itself. Observe that "they shall not be
questioned in any other place" than Congress.
Furthermore, the Rules of the House which petitioner himself has invoked (Rule XVII, sec. 7),
recognize the House's power to hold a member responsible "for words spoken in debate."
Our Constitution enshrines parliamentary immunity which is a fundamental privilege cherished
in every legislative assembly of the democratic world. As old as the English Parliament, its
purpose "is to enable and encourage a representative of the public to discharge his public trust
with firmness and success" for "it is indispensably necessary that he should enjoy the fullest
liberty of speech, and that he should be protected from the resentment of every one, however
powerful, to whom exercise of that liberty may occasion offense." 2 Such immunity has come to
this country from the practices of Parliamentary as construed and applied by the Congress of the
United States. Its extent and application remain no longer in doubt in so far as related to the
question before us. It guarantees the legislator complete freedom of expression without fear of
being made responsible in criminal or civil actions before the courts or any other
forum outside of the Congressional Hall. But is does not protect him from responsibility before
the legislative body itself whenever his words and conduct are considered by the latter disorderly
or unbecoming a member thereof. In the United States Congress, Congressman Fernando Wood
of New York was censured for using the following language on the floor of the House: "A
monstrosity, a measure the most infamous of the many infamous acts of the infamous Congress."
(Hinds' Precedents, Vol. 2,. pp. 798-799). Two other congressmen were censured for employing
insulting words during debate. (2 Hinds' Precedents, 799-801). In one case, a member of
Congress was summoned to testify on a statement made by him in debate, but invoked his
parliamentary privilege. The Committee rejected his plea. (3 Hinds' Precedents 123-124.)
For unparliamentary conduct, members of Parliament or of Congress have been, or could be
censured, committed to prison3, even expelled by the votes of their colleagues. The appendix to
this decision amply attest to the consensus of informed opinion regarding the practice and the
traditional power of legislative assemblies to take disciplinary action against its
members, including imprisonment, suspension or expulsion. It mentions one instance of
suspension of a legislator in a foreign country.
And to cite a local illustration, the Philippine Senate, in April 1949, suspended a senator for one
year.
Needless to add, the Rules of Philippine House of Representatives provide that the parliamentary
practices of the Congress of the United States shall apply in a supplementary manner to its
proceedings.
This brings up the third point of petitioner: the House may no longer take action against me, he
argues, because after my speech, and before approving Resolution No. 59, it had taken up other
business. Respondents answer that Resolution No. 59 was unanimously approved by the House,
that such approval amounted to a suspension of the House Rules, which according to standard
parliamentary practice may done by unanimous consent.
Granted, counters the petitioner, that the House may suspended the operation of its Rules, it may
not, however, affect past acts or renew its rights to take action which had already lapsed.
The situation might thus be compared to laws 4 extending the period of limitation of actions and
making them applicable to actions that had lapsed. The Supreme Court of the United States has
upheld such laws as against the contention that they impaired vested rights in violation of the
Fourteenth Amendment (Campbell vs. Holt, 115 U. S. 620). The states hold divergent views. At
any rate, court are subject to revocation modification or waiver at the pleasure of the body
adopting them."5 And it has been said that "Parliamentary rules are merely procedural, and with
their observancem, the courts have no concern. They may be waived or disregarded by the
legislative body." Consequently, "mere failure to conform to parliamentary usage will not
invalidate the action (taken by a deliberative body) when the requisited number of members have
agreed to a particular measure."6
The following is quoted from a reported decision of the Supreme court of Tennessee:
The rule here invoked is one of parliamentary procedure, and it is uniformly held that it is
within the power of all deliberative bodies to abolish, modify, or waive their own rules of
procedure, adopted for the orderly con duct of business, and as security against hasty
action. (Bennet vs. New Bedford, 110 Mass, 433; Holtvs. Somerville, 127 Mass. 408,
411; City of Sadalia vs. Scott, 104 Mo. App. 595, 78 S. W. 276; Ex parte Mayor, etc., of
Albany, 23 Wend. [N. Y.] 277, 280; Wheelock vs. City of Lowell, 196 Mass. 220, 230. 81
N. e. 977, 124 Am. St. Rep. 543, 12 Ann. Cas. 1109; City of Corinth vs. Sharp, 107 Miss.
696, 65 So. 888; McGraw vs. Whitson, 69 Iowa, 348, 28 N. W. 632; Tuell vs. Meacham
Contracting Co. 145 Ky. 181, 186, 140 S. W. Ann. Cas. 1913B, 802.) [Takenfrom the case
of Rutherford vs. City of Nashville, 78 south Western Reporter, p. 584.]
It may be noted in this connection, that in the case of Congressman Stanbery of Ohio, who
insulted the Speaker, for which Act a resolution of censure was presented, the House approved
the resolution, despite the argument that other business had intervened after the objectionable
remarks. (2 Hinds' Precedents pp. 799-800.)
On the question whether delivery of speeches attacking the Chief Executive constitutes
disorderly conduct for which Osmea may be discipline, many arguments pro and con have been
advanced. We believe, however, that the House is the judge of what constitutes disorderly
behaviour, not only because the Constitution has conferred jurisdiction upon it, but also because
the matter depends mainly on factual circumstances of which the House knows best but which
can not be depicted in black and white for presentation to, and adjudication by the Courts. For
one thing, if this Court assumed the power to determine whether Osmea conduct constituted
disorderly behaviour, it would thereby have assumed appellate jurisdiction, which the
Constitution never intended to confer upon a coordinate branch of the Government. The theory
of separation of powers fastidiously observed by this Court, demands in such situation a prudent
refusal to interfere. Each department, it has been said, had exclusive cognizance of matters
within its jurisdiction and is supreme within its own sphere. (Angara vs. Electoral Commission,
63 Phil., 139.)
SEC. 200. Judicial Interference with Legislature. The principle is well established that
the courts will not assume a jurisdiction in any case amount to an interference by the
judicial department with the legislature since each department is equally independent
within the power conferred upon it by the Constitution. . . . .
The general rule has been applied in other cases to cause the courts to refuse to intervene
in what are exclusively legislative functions. Thus, where the stated Senate is given the
power to example a member, the court will not review its action or revise even a most
arbitrary or unfair decision. (11 Am. Jur., Const. Law, sec. p. 902.) [Emphasis Ours.].
The above statement of American law merely abridged the landmark case of Clifford vs.
French.7 In 1905, several senators who had been expelled by the State Senate of California for
having taken a bribe, filed mandamus proceeding to compel reinstatement, alleging the Senate
had given them no hearing, nor a chance to make defense, besides falsity of the charges of
bribery. The Supreme Court of California declined to interfere , explaining in orthodox juristic
language:
Under our form of government, the judicial department has no power to revise even the
most arbitrary and unfair action of the legislative department, or of either house thereof,
taking in pursuance of the power committed exclusively to that department by the
Constitution. It has been held by high authority that, even in the absence of an express
provision conferring the power, every legislative body in which is vested the general
legislative power of the state has the implied power to expel a member for any cause
which it may deem sufficient. In Hiss. vs. Barlett, 3 Gray 473, 63 Am. Dec. 768, the
supreme court of Mass. says, in substance, that this power is inherent in every legislative
body; that it is necessary to the to enable the body 'to perform its high functions, and is
necessary to the safety of the state;' 'That it is a power of self-protection, and that the
legislative body must necessarily be the sole judge of the exigency which may justify and
require its exercise. '. . . There is no provision authority courts to control, direct,
supervise, or forbid the exercise by either house of the power to expel a member. These
powers are functions of the legislative department and therefore, in the exercise of the
power this committed to it, the senate is supreme. An attempt by this court to direct or
control the legislature, or either house thereof, in the exercise of the power, would be an
attempt to exercise legislative functions, which it is expressly forbidden to do.
We have underscored in the above quotation those lines which in our opinion emphasize the
principles controlling this litigation. Although referring to expulsion, they may as well be applied
to other disciplinary action. Their gist as applied to the case at bar: the House has exclusive
power; the courts have no jurisdiction to interfere.
Our refusal to intervene might impress some readers as subconscious hesitation due to discovery
of impermissible course of action in the legislative chamber. Nothing of that sort: we merely
refuse to disregard the allocation of constitutional functions which it is our special duty to
maintain. Indeed, in the interest of comity, we feel bound to state that in a conscientious survey
of governing principles and/or episodic illustrations, we found the House of Representatives of
the United States taking the position upon at least two occasions, that personal attacks upon the
Chief Executive constitute unparliamentary conduct or breach of orders. 8 And in several
instances, it took action against offenders, even after other business had been considered.9
Petitioner's principal argument against the House's power to suspend is the Alejandrino
precedent. In 1924, Senator Alejandrino was, by resolution of Senate, suspended from office for
12 months because he had assaulted another member of the that Body or certain phrases the latter
had uttered in the course of a debate. The Senator applied to this Court for reinstatement,
challenging the validity of the resolution. Although this Court held that in view of the separation
of powers, it had no jurisdiction to compel the Senate to reinstate petitioner, it nevertheless went
on to say the Senate had no power to adopt the resolution because suspension for 12 months
amounted to removal, and the Jones Law (under which the Senate was then functioning) gave the
Senate no power to remove an appointive member, like Senator Alejandrino. The Jones Law
specifically provided that "each house may punish its members for disorderly behaviour, and,
with the concurrence of two-thirds votes, expel an electivemember (sec. 18). Note particularly
the word "elective."
The Jones Law, it mist be observed, empowered the Governor General to appoint "without
consent of the Senate and without restriction as to residence senators . . . who will, in his
opinion, best represent the Twelfth District." Alejandrino was one appointive Senator.
It is true, the opinion in that case contained an obiter dictum that "suspension deprives the
electoral district of representation without that district being afforded any means by which to fill
that vacancy." But that remark should be understood to refer particularly to
the appointive senator who was then the affected party and who was by the same Jones Law
charged with the duty to represent the Twelfth District and maybe the view of the Government of
the United States or of the Governor-General, who had appointed him.
It must be observed, however, that at that time the Legislature had only those power which were
granted to it by the Jones Law 10; whereas now the Congress has the full legislative powers and
preprogatives of a sovereign nation, except as restricted by the Constitution. In other words, in
the Alejandrino case, the Court reached the conclusion that the Jones Law did not give the
Senate the power it then exercisedthe power of suspension for one year. Whereas now, as we
find, the Congress has the inherent legislative prerogative of suspension11 which the Constitution
did not impair. In fact, as already pointed out, the Philippine Senate suspended a Senator for 12
months in 1949.
The Legislative power of the Philippine Congress is plenary, subject only to such
limitations are found in the Republic's Constitution. So that any power deemed to be
legislative by usage or tradition, is necessarily possessed by the Philippine Congress,
unless the Constitution provides otherwise. (Vera vs. Avelino, 77 Phil., 192, 212 .)
In any event, petitioner's argument as to the deprivation of the district's representation can not be
more weightly in the matter of suspension than in the case of imprisonment of a legislator; yet
deliberative bodies have the power in proper cases, to commit one of their members to jail.12
Now come questions of procedure and jurisdiction. the petition intended to prevent the Special
Committee from acting tin pursuance of House Resolution No. 59. Because no preliminary
injunction had been issued, the Committee performed its task, reported to the House, and the
latter approved the suspension order. The House had closed it session, and the Committee has
ceased to exist as such. It would seem, therefore, the case should be dismissed for having
become moot or academic.13 Of course, there is nothing to prevent petitioner from filing new
pleadings to include all members of the House as respondents, ask for reinstatement and thereby
to present a justiciable cause. Most probable outcome of such reformed suit, however, will be a
pronouncement of lack of jurisdiction, as in Vera vs. Avelino14 and Alejandrino vs. Qeuaon.15
At any rate, having perceived suitable solutions to the important questions of political law, the
Court thought it proper to express at this time its conclusions on such issues as were deemed
relevant and decisive.
ACCORDINGLY, the petition has to be, and is hereby dismissed. So ordered.
Paras, C. J., Bautista Angelo, Concepcion, Barrera, Gutierrez David, Paredes, and Dizon,
JJ., concur.

SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. 128055
April 18, 2001
MIRIAM DEFENSOR SANTIAGO, petitioner,

vs.
SANDIGANBAYAN, FRANCIS E. GARCHITORENA, JOSE S. BALAJADIA AND
MINITA V. CHICO-NAZARIO, AS PRESIDING JUSTICE AND MEMBERS OF THE
FIRST DIVISION, respondents.
VITUG, J.:
The Court is called upon to review the act of the Sandiganbayan, and how far it can go, in
ordering the preventive suspension of petitioner, Mme. Senator Miriam Defensor-Santiago, in
connection with pending in criminal cases filed against her for alleged violation of Republic Act
No. 3019, as amended, otherwise known as the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act.
The instant case arose from complaints filed by a group of employees of the Commission of
Immigration and Deportation (CID) against petitioner, then CID Commissioner, for alleged
violation of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act. The investigating panel, that took over the
case from investigator Gualberto dela Llana after having been constituted by the Deputy
Ombudsman for Luzon upon petitioner's request, came up with a resolution which it referred, for
approval, to the Office of the Special Prosecutor (OSP) and the Ombudsman. In his
Memorandum, dated 26 April 1991, the Ombudsman directed the OSP to file the appropriate
informations against petitioner. On 13 May 1991, OSP submitted to the Ombudsman the
informations for clearance; approved, forthwith, three informations were filed on even date.
In Criminal Case No. 16698 filed before the Sandiganbayan, petitioner was indicted thusly:
"That on or about October 17, 1988, or sometime prior or subsequent thereto, in Manila,
Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, accused MIRIAM
DEFENSOR-SANTIAGO, a public officer, being then the Commissioner of the
Commission on Immigration and Deportation, with evident bad faith and manifest
partiality in the exercise of her official functions, did then and there willfully, unlawfully
and criminally approve the application for legalization for the stay of the following
aliens: Jhamtani Shalini Narendra, Ting Siok Hun, Ching Suat Liong Ting, Cu Kui Pein
Uy, Cu Kui Pwe Uy, Hong Shao Guan, Hong Xiao Yuan, Xu Li Xuan, Qui Ming Xia
Ong, Wu Sui Xin Qiui, Wu Hong Guan Qui @ Betty Go, Wu Hong Ru Qui @ Mary Go
Xu @ Yin Yin Kua, Hong Shao Hua Xu, Hong Shao Wei Xu, Lu Shing Qing, Lu Shi
Tian, Lu Se Chong, Shi Qing Yu, Xu Angun @ Xu An Cin, Xu Pinting, Wang Xiu Jin,
Cai Pian Pian, Cai Wen Xu, Cai Min Min, Cai Ping Ping, Choi Kin Kwok @ Bernardo
Suarez, Yen Liang Ju @ Jeslyn Gan, Cai Yan Nan, Yen Ling Chien @ Chrismayne Gan,
So Chen Yueh-O, Cai Ya Rong, who arrived in the Philippines after January 1, 1984 in
violation of Executive Order No. 324 dated April 13, 1988 which prohibits the
legalization of said disqualified aliens knowing fully well that said aliens are disqualified
thereby giving unwarranted benefits to said aliens whose stay in the Philippines was
unlawfully legalized by said accused." 1
Two other criminal cases, one for violation of the provisions of Presidential Decree No. 46 and
the other for libel, were filed with the Regional Trial Court of Manila, docketed, respectively,
No. 91-94555 and No. 91-94897.
Pursuant to the information filed with the Sandiganbayan, Presiding Justice Francis E.
Garchitorena issued an order for the arrest of petitioner, fixing the bail at Fifteen Thousand
(P15,000.00) Pesos. Petitioner posted a cash bail without need for physical appearance as she
was then recuperating from injuries sustained in a vehicular accident. The Sandiganbayan
granted her provisional liberty until 05 June 1991 or until her physical condition would warrant
her physical appearance in court. Upon manifestation by the Ombudsman, however, that
petitioner was able to come unaided to his office on 20 May 1991, Sandiganbayan issued an
order setting the arraignment on 27 May 1991.
Meanwhile, petitioner moved for the cancellation of her cash bond and prayed that she be
allowed provisional liberty upon a recognizance.
On 24 May 1991, petitioner filed, concurrently, a Petition for Certiorari with prohibition and
Preliminary Injunction before the Court, docketed G.R. No. 99289-90, seeking to enjoin the
Sandiganbayan from proceeding with Criminal Case No. 16698 and a motion before the
Sandiganbayan to meanwhile defer her arraignment. The Court taking cognizance of the petition
issued a temporary restraining order.
The Sandiganbayan, thus informed, issued an order deferring petitioner's arraignment and the
consideration of her motion to cancel the cash bond until further advice from the Court.
On 13 January 1992, the Court rendered its decision dismissing the petition and lifting the
temporary restraining order. The subsequent motion for reconsideration filed by petitioner
proved unavailing.
On 06 July 1992, in the wake of media reports announcing petitioner's intention to accept a
fellowship from the John F. Kennedy School of Government at Harvard University, the
Sandiganbayan issued an order to enjoin petitioner from leaving the country.
On 15 October 1992, petitioner moved to inhibit Sandiganbayan Presiding Justice Garchitorena
from the case and to defer her arraignment pending action on her motion to inhibit. On 09
November 1992, her motion was denied by the Sandiganbayan. The following day, she filed
anew a Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition with urgent Prayer for Preliminary Injunction with
the Court, docketed G.R. No. 99289-90. At the same time, petitioner filed a motion for bill of
particulars with the Sandiganbayan asseverating that the names of the aliens whose applications
she purportedly approved and thereby supposedly extended undue advantage were conspicuously
omitted in the complaint.
The Court, in its resolution of 12 November 1992, directed the Sandiganbayan to reset
petitioner's arraignment not later than five days from receipt of notice thereof.
On 07 December 1992, the OSP and the Ombudsman filed with the Sandiganbayan a motion to
admit thirty-two amended informations. Petitioner moved for the dismissal of the 32
informations. The court, in its 11th March 1993 resolution, denied her motion to dismiss the said
informations and directed her to post bail on the criminal cases, docketed Criminal Case No.
18371-18402, filed against her.
Unrelenting, petitioner, once again came to this Court via a Petition for Certiorari, docketed
G.R. No. 109266, assailing the 03rd March 1993 resolution of the Sandiganbayan which
resolved not to disqualify its Presiding Justice, as well as its 14th March 1993 resolution
admitting the 32 Amended Informations, and seeking the nullification thereof.
Initially, the Court issued a temporary restraining order directing Presiding Justice Garchitorena
to cease and desist from sitting in the case, as well as from enforcing the 11th March 1993
resolution ordering petitioner to post bail bonds for the 32 amended informations, and from
proceedings with her arraignment on 12 April 1993 until the matter of his disqualification would
have been resolved by the Court.
On 02 December 1993, the Court, in its decision in G.R. 109266, directed the OSP and
Ombudsman to consolidate the 32 amended informations. Conformably therewith, all the 32
informations were consolidated into one information under Criminal Case No. 16698.
Petitioner, then filed with the Sandiganbayan a Motion to "Redetermine Probable Cause" and to
dismiss or quash said information. Pending the resolution of this incident, the prosecution filed
on 31 July 1995 with the Sandiganbayan a motion to issue an order suspending petitioner.
On 03 August 1995, the Sandiganbayan resolved to allow the testimony of one Rodolfo
Pedellaga (Pedellaga). The presentation was scheduled on 15 September 1995.
In the interim, the Sandiganbayan directed petitioner to file her opposition to the 31st July 1995
motion of the prosecution within fifteen (15) days from receipt thereof.
On 18 August 1995, petitioner submitted to the Sandiganbayan a motion for reconsideration of

its 03rd August 1995 order which would allow the testimony of Pedellaga. The incident, later
denied by the Sandiganbayan, was elevated to the Court via a Petition for Review on Certiorari,
entitled "Miriam Defensor-Santiago vs. Sandiganbayan," docketed G.R. No. 123792.
On 22 August 1995, petitioner filed her opposition to the motion of the prosecution to suspend
her. On 25 January 1996, the Sandiganbayan resolved:
"WHEREFORE, for all the foregoing, the Court hereby grants the motion under
consideration and hereby suspends the accused Miriam Defensor-Santiago from her
position as Senator of the Republic of the Philippines and from any other government
position she may be holding at present or hereafter. Her suspension shall be for ninety
(90) days only and shall take effect immediately upon notice.
"Let a copy of this Resolution be furnished to the Hon. Ernesto Maceda, Senate
President, Senate of the Philippines, Executive House, Taft Ave., Manila, through the
Hon. Secretary of the Senate, for the implementation of the suspension herein ordered.
The Secretary of the Senate shall inform this Court of the action taken thereon within five
(5) days from receipt hereof.
"The said official shall likewise inform this Court of the actual date of implementation of
the suspension order as well as the expiry of the ninetieth day thereof so that the same
may be lifted at that time." 2
Hence, the instant recourse. The petition assails the authority of the Sandiganbayan to decree a
ninety-day preventive suspension of Mme. Miriam Defensor-Santiago, a Senator of the Republic
of the Philippines, from any government position, and furnishing a copy thereof to the Senate of
the Philippines for the implementation of the suspension order.
The authority of the Sandiganbayan to order the preventive suspension of an incumbent public
official charged with violation of the provisions of Republic Act No. 3019 has both legal and
jurisprudential support. Section 13 of the statute provides:
"SECTION 13. Suspension and loss of benefits. Any incumbent public officer against
whom any criminal prosecution under a valid information under this Act or under Title 7,
Book II of the Revised Penal Code or for any offense involving fraud upon government
or public funds or property whether as a simple or as a complex offense and in whatever
stage of execution and mode of participation, is pending in court, shall be suspended from
office. Should he be convicted by final judgment, he shall lose all retirement or gratuity
benefits under any law, but if he is acquitted, he shall be entitled to reinstatement and to
the salaries and benefits which he failed to receive during suspension, unless in the
meantime administrative proceedings have been filed against him.
"In the event that such convicted officer, who may have already been separated from the
service, has already received such benefits he shall be liable to restitute the same to the
Government. (As amended by BP Blg. 195, March 16, 1982)."
In the relatively recent case of Segovia vs. Sandiganbayan, 3 the Court reiterated:
"The validity of Section 13, R.A. 3019, as amended treating of the
suspension pendente lite of an accused public officer may no longer be put at issue,
having been repeatedly upheld by this Court.
"xxx
xxx
xxx
"The provision of suspension pendente lite applies to all persons indicted upon a valid
information under the Act, whether they be appointive or elective officials; or permanent
or temporary employees, or pertaining to the career or non-career service." 4
It would appear, indeed, to be a ministerial duty of the court to issue an order of suspension upon
determination of the validity of the information filed before it. Once the information is found to
be sufficient in form and substance, the court is bound to issue an order of suspension as a matter
of course, and there seems to be "no ifs and buts about it." 5 Explaining the nature of the
preventive suspension, the Court in the case of Bayot vs. Sandiganbayan 6 observed:
"x x x . It is not a penalty because it is not imposed as a result of judicial proceedings. In
fact, if acquitted, the official concerned shall be entitled to reinstatement and to the
salaries and benefits which he failed to receive during suspension." 7
In issuing the preventive suspension of petitioner, the Sandiganbayan merely adhered to the clear
and unequivocal mandate of the law, as well as the jurisprudence in which the Court has, more
than once, upheld Sandiganbayan's authority to decree the suspension of public officials and
employees indicted before it.
Section 13 of Republic Act No. 3019 does not state that the public officer concerned must be
suspended only in the office where he is alleged to have committed the acts with which he has
been charged. Thus, it has been held that the use of the word "office" would indicate that it
applies to any office which the officer charged may be holding, and not only the particular office
under which he stands accused. 8
En passant, while the imposition of suspension is not automatic or self-operative as the validity
of the information must be determined in a pre-suspension hearing, there is no hard and fast rule
as to the conduct thereof. It has been said that
"'x x x . No specific rules need be laid down for such pre-suspension hearing. Suffice it to
state that the accused should be given a fair and adequate opportunity to challenge the
VALIDITY OF THE CRIMINAL PROCEEDINGS against him e.g. that he has not been
afforded the right of due preliminary investigation; that the acts for which he stands
charged do not constitute a violation of the provisions of Republic Act 3019 or the
bribery provisions of the Revised Penal Code which would warrant his mandatory
suspension from office under section 13 of the Act; or he may present a motion to quash
the information on any of the grounds provided for in Rule 117 of the Rules of Court x x
x .'
"xxx
xxx
xxx
"Likewise, he is accorded the right to challenge the propriety of his prosecution on the
ground that the acts for which he is charged do not constitute a violation of Rep. Act
3019, or of the provisions on bribery of the Revised Penal Code, and the right to present a
motion to quash the information on any other grounds provided in Rule 117 of the Rules
of court.
"However, a challenge to the validity of the criminal proceedings on the ground that the
acts for which the accused is charged do not constitute a violation of the provisions of
Rep. Act 3019, or of the provisions on bribery of the revised Penal Code, should be
treated only in the same manner as a challenge to the criminal proceeding by way of a
motion to quash on the ground provided in Paragraph (a), Section 2 of Rule 117 of the
Rules of Court, i.e., that the facts charged do not constitute an offense. In other words, a
resolution of the challenge to the validity of the criminal proceeding, on such ground,
should be limited to an inquiry whether the facts alleged in the information, if
hypothetically admitted, constitute the elements of an offense punishable under Rep. Act
3019 or the provisions on bribery of the Revised Penal Code." 9
The law does not require that the guilt of the accused must be established in a presuspension
proceeding before trial on the merits proceeds. Neither does it contemplate a proceeding to
determine (1) the strength of the evidence of culpability against him, (2) the gravity of the
offense charged, or (3) whether or not his continuance in office could influence the witnesses or
pose a threat to the safety and integrity of the records and other evidence before the court could
have a valid basis in decreeing preventive suspension pending the trial of the case. All it secures
to the accused is adequate opportunity to challenge the validity or regularity of the proceedings
against him, such as, that he has not been afforded the right to due preliminary investigation, that
the acts imputed to him do not constitute a specific crime warranting his mandatory suspension
from office under Section 13 of Republic Act No. 3019, or that the information is subject to
quashal on any of the grounds set out in Section 3, Rule 117, of the Revised Rules on Criminal
Procedure. 10
The instant petition is not the first time that an incident relating to petitioner's case before the
Sandiganbayan has been brought to this Court. In previous occasions, the Court has been called
upon to resolve several other matters on the subject. Thus: (1) In Santiago vs.
Vasquez, 11 petitioner sought to enjoin the Sandiganbayan from proceeding with Criminal Case
No. 16698 for violation of Republic Act No. 3019; (2) in Santiago vs. Vasquez, 12petitioner
sought the nullification of the hold departure order issued by the Sandiganbayan via a "Motion to
Restrain the Sandiganbayan from Enforcing its Hold Departure Order with Prayer for Issuance of
a Temporary Restraining Order and/or Preliminary Injunction, with Motion to set Pending
Incident for Hearing; (3) in Santiago vs. Garchitorena, 13 petitioner sought the nullification of the
resolution, dated 03 March 1993, in Criminal Case No. 16698 of the Sandiganbayan (First
Division) and to declare Presiding Justice Garchitorena disqualified from acting in said criminal
case, and the resolution, dated 14 March 1993, which deemed as "filed" the 32 amended
informations against her; and (4) in Miriam Defensor Santiago vs. Sandiganbayan, 14 petitioner
assailed the denial by the Sandiganbayan of her motion for reconsideration from its 03rd August
1995 order allowing the testimony of Pedellaga. In one of these cases, 15 the Court declared:
"We note that petitioner had previously filed two petitions before us involving Criminal
Case No. 16698 (G.R. Nos. 99289-99290; G.R. No. 107598). Petitioner has not explained
why she failed to raise the issue of the delay in the preliminary investigation and the
filing of the information against her in those petitions. A piece-meal presentation of
issues, like the splitting of causes of action, is self-defeating.
"Petitioner next claims that the Amended informations did not charge any offense
punishable under Section 3 (e) of RA. No. 3019 because the official acts complained
therein were authorized under Executive Order No. 324 and that the Board of
Commissioners of the Bureau of Investigation adopted the policy of approving
applications for legalization of spouses and unmarried, minor children of "qualified
aliens" even though they had arrived in the Philippines after December 31, 1983. She
concludes that the Sandiganbayan erred in not granting her motion to quash the
informations (Rollo, pp. 25-31).
"In a motion to quash, the accused the accused admits hypothetically the allegations of
fact in the information (People vs. Supnad, 7 SCRA 603 [1963]). Therefore, petitioner
admitted hypothetically in her motion that:
(1) She was a public officer,
(2) She approved the application for legalization of the stay of aliens, who arrived
in the Philippines after January 1, 1984;
(3) Those aliens were disqualified;
(4) She was cognizant of such fact; and
(5) She acted in 'evident bad faith and manifest partiality in the execution of her
official functions.'
"The foregoing allegations of fact constitute the elements of the offense defined in
Section 3 (e) of R.A. No. 3019." 16
The pronouncement, upholding the validity of the information filed against petitioner, behooved
Sandiganbayan to discharge its mandated duty to forthwith issue the order of preventive
suspension.
The order of suspension prescribed by Republic Act No. 3019 is distinct from the power of
Congress to discipline its own ranks under the Constitution which provides that each
"x x x . house may determine the rules of its proceedings, punish its Members for
disorderly behavior, and, with the concurrence of two-thirds of all its Members, suspend
or expel a Member. A penalty of suspension, when imposed, shall not exceed sixty
days." 17
The suspension contemplated in the above constitutional provision is a punitive measure that is
imposed upon determination by the Senate or the House of Representatives, as the case may be,
upon an erring member. Thus, in its resolution in the case of Ceferino Paredes, Jr. vs.
Sandiganbayan, et al., 18 the Court affirmed the order of suspension of Congressman Paredes by
the Sandiganbayan, despite his protestations on the encroachment by the court on the
prerogatives of Congress. The Court ruled:
"x x x . Petitioner's invocation of Section 16 (3), Article VI of the Constitution which
deals with the power of each House of Congress inter alia to 'punish its Members for
disorderly behavior,' and 'suspend or expel a Member' by a vote of two-thirds of all its
Members subject to the qualification that the penalty of suspension, when imposed,
should not exceed sixty days is unavailing, as it appears to be quite distinct from the
suspension spoken of in Section 13 of RA 3019, which is not a penalty but a preliminary,
preventive measure, prescinding from the fact that the latter is not being imposed on
petitioner for misbehavior as a Member of the House of Representatives."
The doctrine of separation of powers by itself may not be deemed to have effectively excluded
members of Congress from Republic Act No. 3019 nor from its sanctions. The maxim simply
recognizes each of the three co-equal and independent, albeit coordinate, branches of the
government the Legislative, the Executive and the Judiciary has exclusive prerogatives and
cognizance within its own sphere of influence and effectively prevents one branch from unduly
intruding into the internal affairs of either branch.
Parenthetically, it might be well to elaborate a bit. Section 1, Article VIII, of the 1987
Constitution, empowers the Court to act not only in the settlement of "actual controversies
involving rights which are legally demandable and enforceable," but also in the determination of
"whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the Government. The provision
allowing the Court to look into any possible grave abuse of discretion committed by any
government instrumentality has evidently been couched in general terms in order to make it
malleable to judicial interpretation in the light of any emerging milieu. In its normal concept, the
term has been said to imply an arbitrary, despotic, capricious or whimsical exercise of judgment
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction. When the question, however, pertains to an affair
internal to either of Congress or the Executive, the Court subscribes to the view 19that unless an
infringement of any specific Constitutional proscription thereby inheres the Court should not
deign substitute its own judgment over that of any of the other two branches of government. It is
an impairment or a clear disregard of a specific constitutional precept or provision that can
unbolt the steel door for Judicial intervention. If any part of the Constitution is not, or ceases to
be, responsive to contemporary needs, it is the people, not the Court, who must promptly react in
the manner prescribed by the Charter itself.
Republic Act No. 3019 does not exclude from its coverage the members of Congress and that,
therefore, the Sandiganbayan did not err in thus decreeing the assailed preventive suspension
order.
Attention might be called to the fact that Criminal Case No. 16698 has been decided by the First
Division of the Sandiganbayan on 06 December 1999, acquitting herein petitioner. The Court,
nevertheless, deems it appropriate to render this decision for future guidance on the significant
issue raised by petitioner.
WHEREFORE, the instant petition for certiorari is DISMISSED. No costs.
SO ORDERED.
Davide, Jr., C .J ., Bellosillo, Melo, Puno, Kapunan, Mendoza, Panganiban, Quisumbing, Pardo,
Buena, Gonzaga-Reyes, Ynares-Santiago, De Leon, Jr. and Sandoval-Gutierrez, JJ ., concur.
EN BANC
[G.R. No. 108251. January 31, 1996]
CEFERINO S. PAREDES, JR. and MANSUETO J. HONRADA, petitioners, vs. THE

HONORABLE SANDIGANBAYAN, Second Division; HONORABLE ANIANO
DESIERTO, in his official capacity as Special Prosecutor; HONORABLE
CONRADO M. VASQUEZ, in his official capacity as Ombudsman; and TEOFILO
GELACIO, respondents.
SYLLABUS
1. REMEDIAL LAW; CRIMINAL PROCEDURE; PRELIMINARY INVESTIGATION;
MAY BE INITIATED AND CONCLUDED BY DIFFERENT INVESTIGATORS.
- Petitioners contend that the filing of charges against them was not recommended by the
prosecutor who conducted the preliminary investigation, but by another one who, it is
alleged, had no part at all in the investigation. There is no basis for petitioners claim that the
resolution was prepared by one who did not take any part in the investigation. What
happened here is similar to the trial of a case by one judge who, without being able to finish
the hearing, ceases from office for one reason or another and by necessity the decision is
rendered by another judge who has taken over the conduct of the case. Such an arrangement
has never been thought to raise any question of due process. For what is important is that the
judge who decides does so on the basis of the evidence in record. It does not matter that he
did not conduct the hearing of that case from the beginning.
2. ID.; EVIDENCE; WEIGHT AND SUFFICIENCY; CERTIFICATE; VALUE NOT
DIMINISHED BY FAILURE TO ANTICIPATE THAT HIS CERTIFICATE WOULD
BE USED IN EVIDENCE. - That Violan gave credence to the Certification of Judge Ario
in concluding that no arraignment had been held in Criminal Case No. 1393 is not proof that
Violan was biased against petitioners. Although Judge Ario subsequently gave an Affidavit,
he never in that Affidavit repudiated what he had earlier stated. Judge Ario never denied his
earlier Certification that Criminal Case No. 1393 never reached the arraignment stave,
because having learned that Paredes, Jr. had petitioned the Ministry of Justice for a review of
the fiscals resolution, Judge Ario suspended action until March 17, 1986 and in fact the
fiscal later moved for the dismissal of the case. The fact that Judge Ario did not anticipate
that his certificate might be used in evidence, much less in the criminal cases now pending
in the Sandiganbayan, is not a reason to disregard it. The fact is that Judge Ario did not
retract his previous Certification that there was no arraignment held in Criminal Case No.
1393. If that is the truth, then the fact that he now says he did not anticipate that his
certificate would be used in evidence in any case would not diminish a whit the value of the
certificate.
3. ID.; EVIDENCE; ADMISSIBILITY; RETRACTION OF AFFIDAVIT MADE IN
VIOLATION OF ATTORNEY-CLIENT PRIVILEGE, INADMISSIBLE. - There is
nothing in the resolution of Violan which shows that she based her conclusion (that
petitioners were probably guilty of falsification of public documents) on Atty. Sansaets
retraction. In her resolution, all that she stated is that the confession of Atty. Sansaet has
important bearing in this case. Otherwise she did not cite the confession as proof of the
falsification of public documents. To the contrary, Violan thought that the retraction was
made in violation of attorney-client privilege and therefore, would be inadmissible in
evidence. Violan could not, therefore, have relied on the affidavit of retraction.
4. ID.; DISQUALIFICATION OF JUDGES; DIVERGENCE OF OPINIONS BETWEEN A
JUDGE AND A PARTYS COUNSEL, NOT A GROUND. - Mere divergence of opinions
between a judge and a partys counsel as to applicable laws and jurisprudence is not
sufficient ground for disqualifying the judge from hearing the case on the ground of bias and
partiality.
5. ID.; ACTIONS; MERE FILING OF SEVERAL CASES BASED ON THE SAME
INCIDENT, NOT FORUM-SHOPPING; TEST. - The mere filing of several cases based
on the same incident does not necessarily constitute forum-shopping. The test is whether the
several actions filed involve the same transactions, essential facts, and circumstances.
6. ID.;
ID.;
ID.;
CASES
INVOLVING
SUBSTANTIALLY
DIFFERENT
TRANSACTIONS, FACTS AND CIRCUMSTANCES, NOT FORUM SHOPPING;
CASE AT BAR. - Here, although several cases were filed by the same complainant against
the same defendant and the subject matter of the actions of two of the cases was the same
incident (i.e., the application for free patent of petitioner Ceferino Paredes, Jr.), the fact is
that the several cases involve essentially different facts, circumstances and causes of action.
Thus, Criminal Case No. 1393, which was filed in the MCTC of San Francisco,. Agusan del
Sur, was for perjury, based on false statements allegedly made in 1975 by petitioner Paredes,
Jr. in connection with his free patent application. Criminal Case No. 13800, which was filed
in the Sandiganbayan, although based on the filing of the same application for free patent,
was for violation of the Anti-graft and Corrupt Practices Act, on the allegation that
petitioner, as Provincial Attorney, had unduly influenced the Public Land Inspector to secure
the approval of his free patent application. On the other hand, as already stated, the present
cases (Criminal Case Nos. 17791, 17792 and 17793) are for falsification of court records
pertaining to Criminal Case No. 1393. A.P. Case No. P-90-396 is an administrative case
against petitioner Honrada based on the same incident and facts that are subject of the
preceding criminal cases. The rest are incidents of these cases, being the petition for review
and motions for reconsideration ifl Criminal Case No. 13800 and A.P. Case No. P-90-396.
Thus the present cases involve substantially different transactions, facts and circumstances
from those involved in the other, though related, cases. Although they arose from the same
incident, i.e., petitioners public land application, they involve different issues. It is well
settled that a single act may offend against two or more distinct and related provisions of law
or that the same act may give rise to criminal as well as administrative liability. As such,
they may be prosecuted simultaneously or one after another, so long as they do not place the
accused in double jeopardy of being punished for the same offense.
7. ID.; CRIMINAL PROCEDURE; DISMISSAL OF ADMINISTRATIVE COMPLAINT
DOES NOT NECESSARILY BAR FILING OF CRIMINAL PROSECUTION.
- Petitioners call attention to the fact that the administrative complaint against petitioner
Honrada was dismissed. They invoke our ruling in Maceda v. Vasquez that only this Court
has the power to oversee court personnels compliance with laws and take the appropriate
administrative action against them for their failure to do so and that no other branch of the
government may exercise this power without running afoul of the principle of separation of
powers. But one thing is administrative liability. Quite another thing is the criminal liability
for the same act. Our determination of the administrative liability for falsification of public
documents is in no way conclusive of his lack of criminal liability. As we have held in Tan v.
Comelec, the dismissal of an administrative case does not necessarily bar the filing of a
criminal prosecution for the same or similar acts which were the subject of the
administrative complaint.
8. ID.; ID.; POLITICALLY MOTIVATED FILING OF CRIMINAL CHARGE CANNOT
JUSTIFY PROHIBITION OF CRIMINAL PROSECUTION IF THERE IS
EVIDENCE TO SUPPORT IT. - That the filing of the charges is politically motivated
cannot justify the prohibition of a criminal prosecution if there is otherwise evidence to
support them. Here a preliminary investigation of the complaint against petitioners was held
during which petitioners were heard. Their evidence, as well as that of private respondent
Gelacio, was considered in great detail in the resolution of GIO II Violan. Violans resolution
was reviewed by Special Prosecutor Erdulfo Querubin who made his own detailed
resolution concurring in the finding of Violan. We cannot say that, in approving the
resolutions of two investigators, the respondent Ombudsman and Special Prosecutor
committed an abuse of their discretion.
9. ID.; ID.; PRELIMINARY INVESTIGATION; PURPOSE. - A preliminary investigation is
not a trial. The function of the government prosecutor during the preliminary investigation is
merely to determine the existence of probable cause.
10. ID.; ID.; POLITICAL HARASSMENT; REQUISITES; CASE AT BAR. - To warrant a
finding of political harassment so as to justify the grant of the extraordinary writs of
certiorari and prohibition, it must be shown that the complainant possesses the power and
the influence to control the prosecution of cases. Here, the prosecution is handled by the
Office of the Ombudsman. Although it is intimated that petitioner Ceferino S. Paredes, Jr. is
the subject of persecution by his political enemies in Agusan del Sur, it has not been alleged,
much less shown, that his enemies have influence and power over the national prosecution
service. To show political harassment petitioners must prove that public prosecutor, and not
just the private complainant, is acting in bad faith in prosecuting the case or has lent himself
to a scheme that could have no other purpose than to place the accused in contempt and
disrepute. For it is only if he does so may the prosecutor, in conducting the preliminary
investigation, be said to have deserted the performance of his office to determine objectively
and impartially the existence of probable cause and thus justify judicial intervention in what
is essentially his province.
APPEARANCES OF COUNSEL
Rolando A. Suarez & Associates for petitioners.
Esmeraldo I. Guloy for private respondent.
DECISION
MENDOZA, J.:
This is a petition for certiorari, prohibition and injunction, seeking to set aside the resolution
dated December 9, 1992 of the Office of the Ombudsman, denying petitioners motion for the
reinvestigation of three cases of falsification of public documents which had been filed against
petitioners and to restrain the Second Division of the Sandiganbayan from hearing the cases.
The cases originated in a complaint filed on January 23, 1990 by Teofilo Gelacio, then vice
mayor of San Francisco, Agusan del Sur. Charged with petitioner Paredes, Jr., who was then the
provincial governor, were petitioner Mansueto J. Honrada, clerk of court of the Municipal
Circuit Trial Court of San Francisco, Agusan del Sur, and Atty. Generoso Sansaet, counsel of
petitioner Paredes, Jr. in Criminal Case No. 1393 of the MCTC.
In his complaint Gelacio alleged that MCTC clerk of court Honrada, in conspiracy with
petitioner Paredes, Jr. and the latters counsel Atty. Sansaet, certified as true a copy of a Notice of
Arraignment dated July 1, 1985 and of the Transcript of Stenographic Notes on July 9, 1985,
showing that an arraignment had been held in Criminal Case No. 1393 and issued a certification
dated March 24, 1986 to that effect when in truth no arraignment had been held in that case. In
support of his allegation, Gelacio submitted a Certification issued by Judge Ciriaco C. Ario of
the MCTC to the effect that Criminal Case No. 1393 had never reached the arraignment stage
before it was dismissed on motion of the prosecution.1
A preliminary investigation of the complaint was conducted by Public Prosecutor Albert
Axalan who had been deputized to assist the Deputy Ombudsman for Mindanao. Petitioners and
Atty. Sansaet, as respondents in the case, filed their respective counter-affidavits. Paredes, Jr.
denied the charges. He alleged that their filing was politically motivated and that the
complainant, Teofilo Gelacio, was being used by his political enemies to harass him. For his part,
Honrada maintained that an arraignment had indeed been held in Criminal Case No. 1393 as
certified by him. His claim was corroborated by Atty. Generoso Sansaet, who stated in an
affidavit that he was present during the arraignment, being the counsel of Paredes, Jr. Sansaet
called Judge Arios Certification, denying that there was an arraignment, the product of a faltering
mind.2
Prosecutor Axalan submitted his resolution to the Deputy Ombudsman for Mindanao, but
before it could be acted upon, Atty. Sansaet, one of the respondents, retracted his earlier
statement to the effect that Paredes, Jr. had been arraigned before the case against him was
dismissed. In an Affidavit of Explanations and Rectifications dated July 29, 1991, Sansaet
claimed that there was really no arraignment held in Criminal Case No. 1393 and that Honrada
made false certifications which were used to support the dismissal (on the ground of double
jeopardy) of Criminal Case No. 13800 which was then pending against Paredes, Jr. in the
Sandiganbayan.3
As a result of this development, Paredes, Jr. and Honrada, were required to comment.
Paredes, Jr. claimed that the Sansaets aboutface was the result of their political
estrangement.4 For his part Honrada insisted that an arraignment in Criminal Case No. 1393 had
indeed been held and that in making the certifications in question he stated the truth.
On the basis of the evidence of the parties, Gay Maggie Balajadia-Violan, Graft
Investigation Officer of the Office of the Deputy Ombudsman, recommended on February 24,
1992 that petitioners and Atty. Sansaet be charged with Falsification of Public Documents. Her
recommendation was indorsed by Deputy Ombudsman Cesar Nitorreda to Ombudsman Conrado
Vasquez, Who, upon the recommendation of Erdulfo Querubin of the Office of the Special
Prosecutor, approved the filing of three informations for falsification of public documents against
Paredes, Jr., Honrada and Sansaet with the Sandiganbayan.5 The cases were docketed as Criminal
Case Nos. 17791, 17792 and 17793.
On July 9, 1992, petitioners moved to quash the informations. Their motion was denied by
the Sandiganbayan in its resolution of August 25, 1992, as was the motion for reconsideration
they subsequently filed.
Petitioners next moved for a reinvestigation of the cases. They complained (1) that the
resolution, recommending the filing of the cases, was not prepared by Public Prosecutor Axalan,
who had conducted the preliminary investigation, but by GIO II Gay Maggie Balajadia-Violan,
who allegedly had no hand in the investigation; (2) that Violan relied solely on the retraction of
Atty. Generoso Sansaet and the Certification of Judge Ciriaco C. Ario and disregarded evidence
in favor of petitioners; and (3) that Prosecutor Erdulfo Q. Querubin, who reviewed Violans
recommendation, could not be expected to act fairly because he was the prosecutor in Criminal
Case No. 13800 in connection with which the allegedly falsified records were used and in fact
appealed the dismissal of the case to this Court.6
Although these grounds were the same ones invoked by petitioners in their motion to quash,
which the Sandiganbayan had denied, the Sandiganbayan nonetheless directed the prosecution to
conduct a reinvestigation of the cases. Accordingly, the Office of the Ombudsman required
complainant, the herein respondent Teofilo Gelacio, to comment on petitioners Motion for
Reinvestigation.
In a resolution dated December 9, 1992, Special Prosecution Officer Carlos D. Montemayor
recommended denial of petitioners motion. He noted that the matters raised in the motion were
the same ones contained in petitioners motion to quash which had already been denied and that
in fact a cursory examination of the resolution of GIO II Gay Maggie Balajadia-Violan shows
that the existence of a prima facie case has been duly established and the same was reviewed by
SPO III Erdulfo Querubin and also the approval of Honorable Conrado M. Vasquez. He held that
as no newly-discovered evidence or denial of due process had been shown, there was no basis for
petitioners request for a reinvestigation.
Montemayors recommendation was approved by Special Prosecutor Aniano Desierto and
Ombudsman Conrado Vasquez. Accordingly the Sandiganbayan set the cases for trial.
The present petition for certiorari, prohibition and injunction was then filed to enjoin the
trial of the criminal cases. Petitioners pray that:
(1) Upon the filing of this petition and before its final resolution, to issue a temporary restraining
order immediately ordering the Sandiganbayan, Second Division, to cease and desist from
proceeding with the scheduled hearing of this case;
(2) After due hearing, to adjudge that respondents Honorable Special Prosecutor Aniano A.
Desierto and Honorable Ombudsman Conrado M. Vasquez have committed grave abuse of
discretion, amounting to lack of jurisdiction, in issuing and approving the questioned resolution
dated December 9, 1992 and ordering said resolution denying petitioners motion for
reinvestigation be annulled and set aside;
(3) To adjudge that the Sandiganbayan, Second Division, is without jurisdiction to try Criminal
Case Nos. 17791, 17792, and 17793 all of which are apparently intended as political harassments
against the herein petitioners, particularly as against Ceferino S. Paredes, Jr., and prohibiting the
said court from proceeding (with) the hearing of the said cases on January 15, 1993, and likewise
ordering the said court to dismiss the said cases, with costs against respondents and Teofilo
Gelacio; and
(4) To issue a writ of injunction, thereby making the restraining order permanent, and prohibiting
the respondents and complainant Teofilo Gelacio from committing any act or acts tending to
harass and to inflict further damage and injury to petitioners, such as but not limited to the
continuation and further prosecution of said Criminal Cases Nos. 17791, 17792, and 17793.
Petitioners contend (1) that their constitutional right to due process was violated at various
stages of the preliminary investigation; (2) that the prosecutors closed their eyes to the fact that
in filing the cases private respondent Teofilo Gelacio engaged in forum-shopping; and (3) that
the cases were filed for political harassment and there is in fact no prima facie evidence to hold
them answerable for falsification of public documents.7
I.
Anent the first ground, petitioners contend that the filing of charges against them was not
recommended by the prosecutor who conducted the preliminary investigation, but by another one
who, it is alleged, had no part at all in the investigation.
Petitioners contention has no basis in fact. It appears that the preliminary investigation of the
complaint filed by Teofilo Gelacio was initially conducted by Public Prosecutor Albert Axalan
who had been deputized to assist the Deputy Ombudsman for Mindanao in the investigation of
graft cases. Axalan prepared a resolution. The records do not show what his recommendation
was. What is clear, however, is that no action had been taken on his recommendation in view of
the fact that Atty. Generoso Sansaet, one of the respondents in the cases, retracted an earlier
statement he had given to the effect that petitioner Ceferino S. Paredes, Jr. had been arraigned in
Criminal Case No. 1393 before the case was dismissed. Atty. Sansaet now claimed that no
arraignment had been held after all. This new development required the reopening of the
investigation (in fact Paredes, Jr. and Honrada were required to comment on the retraction), the
reevaluation of the evidence, and the preparation of a new resolution. Gay Maggie BalajadiaViolan, Graft Investigation Officer II of the Office of the Deputy Ombudsman for Mindanao,
was designated to conduct the investigation and prepare a report, which she did.
Violans recommendation was indorsed by Deputy Ombudsman Cesar Nitorreda to
Ombudsman Conrado Vasquez, who then referred the matter to Special Prosecution Officer Ill
Erdulfo Querubin for review. Querubin concurred in the recommendation of Violan but
suggested that, instead of one, three separate informations for falsification of public documents
be filed against respondents (Paredes, Jr., Honrada and Sansaet), considering that three
documents were involved.
On June 26, 1992, Ombudsman Conrado Vasquez approved the recommendations of Violan
and Querubin. Accordingly three cases were filed against petitioners with the Sandiganbayan,
where they were docketed as Criminal Case Nos. 17791, 17792 and 17793.
There is thus no basis for petitioners claim that the resolution was prepared by one who did
not take any part in the investigation. What happened here is similar to the trial of a case by one
judge who, without being able to finish the hearing, ceases from office for one reason or another
and by necessity the decision is rendered by another judge who has taken over the conduct of the
case. Such an arrangement has never been thought to raise any question of due process. For what
is important is that the judge who decides does so on the basis of the evidence in record. It does
not matter that he did not conduct the hearing of that case from the beginning.
Petitioners nonetheless charge that GIO II Violan and Prosecutor Querubin did not have such
cold neutrality of an impartial judge to be trusted to conduct a fair investigation. According to
petitioners, Violan gave credence to the Certification issued by Judge Ciriaco C. Ario when the
fact is that Judge Ario subsequently executed an affidavit, dated November 5, 1990, in which he
explained that he issued the said certificate without expectation that the same would be used as
evidence in any case and that the use of said certificate . . . is against [his] conscience. Worse, it
is contended, Violan considered the Affidavit of Explanations and Rectifications executed by
Atty. Sansaet, which she should have disregarded because it was made in violation of the
confidentiality of attorney-client communication under Rule 130, 24 (b) of the Rules of Court.
As for Prosecutor Querubin, they claim that he is the same prosecutor who had handled the
prosecution of Criminal Case No. 13800 against petitioner Paredes, Jr. in the Sandiganbayan and
after its dismissal, sought review in this Court and, therefore, he was biased against petitioners.
That Violan gave credence to the Certification of Judge Ario in concluding that no
arraignment had been held in Criminal Case No. 1393 is not proof that Violan was biased against
petitioners. Although Judge Ario subsequently gave an Affidavit, he never in that Affidavit
repudiated what he had earlier stated. In his Affidavit he merely stated:
1. That I am the incumbent Municipal Circuit Trial Court Judge in the First Municipal
Circuit Trial Court of San Francisco-Rosario-Bunawan, Agusan del Sur;
2. That I am the same Ciriaco C. Ario who issued a certificate in Criminal Case No.
1393 entitled Pp. vs. Ceferino S. Paredes, Jr. which certificate was used as evidence
in administrative complaint against Mansueto J. Honrada, in the Administrative
Complaint No. A.M. P-90-396 and Criminal Complaint against Mansueto J.
Honrada, incumbent Governor Ceferino S. Paredes, Jr. and Atty. Generoso S. Sansaet
before the Ombudsman under Criminal Case No. OBM-MIN-90-0053 (sic) entitled
Teofilo Gelacio vs. Mansueto J. Honrada, et. al.;
3. That honestly, the said certificate was issued without my expectation that the same be
used as evidence in any case and I be a witness;
4. That the use of said certificate as evidence in the above-mentioned cases is against
my conscience, more so upon discovery that the cases aforesaid are known to me to
be politically motivated and involves [sic] big time politicians in Agusan del Sur
about whom I am not at liberty to name names for security reason;
5. That in view of all the foregoing, I am not interested to testify in any investigation to
be conducted in connection thereof, either in the administrative or criminal
proceedings.
Thus, Judge Ario never denied his earlier Certification that Criminal Case No. 1393 never
reached the arraignment stage, because having learned that Paredes, Jr. had petitioned the
Ministry of Justice for a review of the fiscals resolution, Judge Ario suspended action until
March 17, 1986 and in fact the fiscal later moved for the dismissal of the case.
The fact that Judge Ario did not anticipate that his certificate might be used in evidence,
much less in the criminal cases now pending in the Sandiganbayan, is not a reason to disregard
it. The fact is that Judge Ario did not retract his previous Certification that there was no
arraignment held in Criminal Case No. 1393. If that is the truth, then the fact that he now says he
did not anticipate that his certificate would be used in evidence in any case would not diminish a
whit the value of the certificate.
Nor was consideration of the retraction of Atty. Sansaet proof that GIO II Violan was biased
against petitioners. Petitioners contend that Sansaets confession was privileged and that Violan
herself acknowledged that the affidavit of retraction might be inadmissible in court.
In the first place, there is nothing in the resolution of Violan which shows that she based her
conclusion (that petitioners were probably guilty of falsification of public documents) on Atty.
Sansaets retraction. In her resolution, all that she stated is that the confession of Atty. Sansaet has
falsification of public documents. To the contrary, Violan thought that the retraction was made in
violation of attorney-client privilege and therefore, would be inadmissible in evidence. Violan
could not, therefore, have relied on the affidavit of retraction.
Moreover, the admissibility of this piece of evidence is a question for the Sandiganbayan to
determine in the event it is used by the prosecution. It is untenable to ascribe bias and partiality
to the investigator because she considered this retraction in her resolution of the case. Even if she
relied on it mere divergence of opinions between a judge and a partys counsel as to applicable
laws and jurisprudence is not sufficient ground for disqualifying the judge from hearing the case
on the ground of bias and partiality.8
As for Prosecutor Querubin, simply because he was the one who handled the prosecution of
Criminal Case No. 13800, in connection with which the documents allegedly falsified were used
by petitioners, is not a reason for supposing he could not act fairly. As any other counsel in a
case, it was his duty to act with full devotion to [his clients] genuine interests, warm zeal in the
maintenance and defense of his rights, and the exertion of his utmost learning and ability. 9 It
cannot be casually assumed that because of his engagement in that case he had lost his
objectivity to such an extent that he forsook his duty to see to it that justice was done and not to
act out of vindictiveness.
Indeed, Querubin is a public prosecutor, not a private attorney. In the familiar terminology,
he is the representative not of an ordinary party to a controversy but of a sovereignty whose
obligation to govern impartially is as compelling as its obligation to govern at all and whose
interest, therefore, in a criminal prosecution is not that it shall win a case but that justice shall be
done.10 It may therefore be assumed that he was merely performing an official duty and that
nothing personal was involved in his recommendation to prosecute the cases.
Above all, it should be stressed that the decision to charge petitioners in the Sandiganbayan
was the decision not only of one person but of all those who in one way or another were called
upon to act in the cases, namely: Graft Investigation Officer Gay Maggie Balajadia-Violan,
Deputy Ombudsman Cesar Nitorreda, Ombudsman Conrado Vasquez, and Special Prosecutor
Aniano Desierto. Indeed, Querubins only contribution to the process was to suggest the filing of
three separate informations of falsification of public documents against petitioners.
II.
The second ground for the petition is that the Office of the Ombudsman closed its eyes to
the fact that in filing these cases, complainant Teofilo Gelacio is guilty of forum-shopping and
that his purpose for the filing of the cases is simply political harassment. To buttress their
contention, petitioners call attention to the factual background of the cases.11
According to petitioners, way back in 1984 private respondent Teofilo Gelacio charged
petitioner Paredes, Jr. with perjury on the ground that in 1975 Paredes, Jr. made false statements
in an affidavit which he used in support of his application for a free patent. As already noted, the
case which was filed with the Municipal Trial Court of San Francisco, Agusan del Sur, and
docketed there as Criminal Case No. 1393, was dismissed onMarch 24, 1986 upon motion of the
prosecution.
On October 28, 1986, Teofilo Gelacio filed another complaint against petitioner Paredes, Jr.,
then the acting governor of the province. The complaint was for violation of 3 (a) of Republic
Act 3019, otherwise known as Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act. Allegedly, in 1976
petitioner Paredes, Jr., then the Provincial Attorney of Agusan del Sur, unduly persuaded,
induced and influenced the Public Land Inspector to approve his (Paredes, Jrs) application for a
free patent. According to petitioners, this case involved the same application for a free patent of
petitioner Paredes, Jr., which was the subject of Criminal Case No. 1393.
The information was filed by Special Prosecutor Erdulfo Querubin in the Sandiganbayan
where it was docketed as Criminal Case No. 13800. Petitioner Paredes, Jr. moved to quash the
information, but the court denied his motion. He then filed a motion for reconsideration. It was in
connection with this motion that the procurement of allegedly falsified documents, now the
subject of prosecution, was made by petitioner Paredes, Jr. The documents were used to support
his motion for reconsideration.
On August 1, 1991, the Sandiganbayan reconsidered its previous resolution and dismissed
Criminal Case No. 13800, although on the ground of prescription. The Office of the Ombudsman
sought a review of the action of the Sandiganbayan, but its petition was dismissed by this Court
on July 3, 1992 in G.R. No. 101724. The motion for reconsideration filed by the prosecution was
likewise denied.
As an offshoot of the execution of these documents, two cases were filed by Teofilo Gelacio:
(1) an administrative complaint (A.P. Case No. P-90-3 96) for falsification of public documents
which was filed with this Court against Mansueto Honrada, the clerk of the MCTC who made
certifications and (2) a complaint for falsification of public documents, initially filed as OMBMIN-90-0053 with the Office of the Ombudsman and eventually as Criminal Case Nos. 17791,
17792, and 17793 in the Sandiganbayan, against the petitioners and Atty. Generoso Sansaet.
The first case was dismissed for insufficiency of the evidence. But with respect to the second
complaint, Graft Investigation Officer Violan found probable cause to proceed against petitioners
and against Atty. Sansaet and so recommended the filing of a case against them. Her
recommendation was approved by the Ombudsman on June 26, 1992, although upon the
recommendation of Special Prosecutor Querubin three separate informations were filed with the
Sandiganbayan. Earlier on July 29, 1991, Atty. Sansaet, one of the respondents, executed an
Affidavit of Explanations and Rectifications in which he stated that, contrary to his previous
affidavit, there was no arraignment held in Criminal Case No. 1393.
A. Petitioners contend that these cases should be dismissed, being merely the latest in a
series of cases which arose out of the same alleged incident - i.e. that of allegedly having induced
the land inspector to approve his (Paredes, Jr.s) land application, 12 for having been filed in
violation of the rules on forum-shopping. Petitioners cite the following statement in Crisostomo
v. Securities and Exchange Commission:13
There is forum-shopping whenever as a result of an adverse opinion in one forum, a party seeks a
favorable opinion (other than by appeal or certiorari) in another. The principle applies not only
with respect to suits filed in the courts while an administrative proceeding is pending as in this
case, in order to defeat administrative processes and in anticipation of an unfavorable
administrative ruling and a favorable court ruling. . . A violation of this rule shall constitute
contempt of court and shall be a cause for summary dismissal of both petitions, without prejudice
to the taking of appropriate action against the counsel or the party concerned.
The mere filing of several cases based on the same incident does not necessarily constitute
forum-shopping. The test is whether the several actions filed involve the same transactions,
essential facts, and circumstances.14 Here, although several cases were filed by the same
complainant against the same defendant and the subject matter of the actions of two of the cases
was the same incident (i.e., the application for free patent of petitioner Ceferino Paredes, Jr.), the
fact is that the several cases involve essentially different facts, circumstances and causes of
action.
Thus, Criminal Case No. 1393, which was filed in the MCTC of San Francisco, Agusan del
Sur, was for perjury, based on false statements allegedly made in 1975 by petitioner Paredes, Jr.
in connection with his free patent application. Criminal Case No. 13800, which was filed in the
Sandiganbayan, although based on the filing of the same application for free patent, was for
violation of the Anti-graft and Corrupt Practices Act, on the allegation that petitioner, as
Provincial Attorney, had unduly influenced the Public Land Inspector to secure the approval of
his free patent application. On the other hand, as already stated, the present cases (Criminal Case
Nos. 17791, 17792 and 17793) are for falsification of court records pertaining to Criminal Case
No. 1393. A.P. Case No. P-90-396 is an administrative case against petitioner Honrada based on
the same incident and facts that are subject of the preceding criminal cases. The rest are incidents
of these cases, being the petition for review and motions for reconsideration in Criminal Case
No. 13800 and A.P. Case No. P-90-396.
incident, i.e., petitioners public land application, they involve different issues. It is well settled
that a single act may offend against two or more distinct and related provisions of law 15 or that
the same act may give rise to criminal as well as administrative liability.16 As such, they may be
prosecuted simultaneously or one after another, so long as they do not place the accused in
double jeopardy of being punished for the same offense.
Petitioners call attention to the fact that the administrative complaint against petitioner
Honrada was dismissed. They invoke our ruling in Maceda v. Vasquez17 that only this Court has
the power to oversee court personnels compliance with laws and take the appropriate
powers.
But one thing is administrative liability. Quite another thing is the criminal liability for the
same act. Our determination of the administrative liability for falsification of public documents is
in no way conclusive of his lack of criminal liability. As we have held in Tan v. Comelec,18 the
dismissal of an administrative case does not necessarily bar the filing of a criminal prosecution
for the same or similar acts which were the subject of the administrative complaint.
Petitioners assertion that private respondent Alterado has resorted to forum-shopping is
unacceptable. The investigation then being conducted by the Ombudsman on the criminal case
for falsification and violation of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, on the one hand, and
the inquiry into the administrative charges by the COMELEC, on the other hand, are entirely
independent proceedings. Neither would the results in one conclude the other. Thus an
absolution from a criminal charge is not a bar to an administrative prosecution (Office of the
Court administrator v. Enriquez, 218 SCRA 1) or vice versa.19
B. As final argument, petitioners allege that the complaint in Criminal Case Nos. 17791,
17792 and 17793 was filed by political enemies of petitioner Paredes, Jr. merely to harass him
and that there is in fact no probable cause to support the prosecution of these cases. Petitioners
cite the following which allegedly indicate that the charges below have merely been trumped up:
(1) The affidavit of Agusan del Sur District Citizens Attorney Lou Nueva, stating that then
Congressman Democrito O. Plaza instructed Atty. Leonardo Cadiz to secure a certification from
Judge Ciriaco C. Ario that no arraignment had been held in Criminal Case No. 1393, threatening
that if the judge refused to give the certification, he (Congressman Plaza) would do everything
against
Judge Ciriaco C. Ario, including reviving certain cases against Judge Ario; 20 and (2) The
affidavit, dated November 5, 1990, of Judge Ario in which he stated that he did not expect that
the certificate which he had previously issued would be used in evidence and that the use of the
certificate in the cases below was against his conscience, because the cases were politically
motivated and he was not going to testify in any investigation concerning such certificate. 21 At
the same time petitioners seek to minimize the retraction of Atty. Sansaet by ascribing political
motivation for its execution. Petitioner Ceferino Paredes, Jr. claims that Sansaets obsession has
been to win in an election and that his loss to petitioner Paredes, Jr. in the May 11,
1992 congressional elections was Sansaets sixth defeat. As for private respondent Teofilo
Gelacio, petitioners say he is a political leader of Democrito Plaza. They claim that in 1991 Atty.
Sansaet changed political affiliation and allied himself with Democrito Plaza and Teofilo
Gelacio.
Petitioners argue that the certifications made by the clerk of court with respect to an
arraignment allegedly held on July 9, 1985 in Criminal Case No. 1393 is conclusive and cannot
be altered by Atty. Sansaets claim to the contrary. They cite what is now Rule 132, 23 of the
Revised Rules on Evidence, which provides that public instruments are evidence, even against a
third person, of the fact which gave rise to their execution and of the date of the latter.
We find the foregoing averments to be unpersuasive. First of all, that the filing of the
charges is politically motivated cannot justify the prohibition of a criminal prosecution if there is
otherwise evidence to support them. Here a preliminary investigation of the complaint against
petitioners was held during which petitioners were heard. Their evidence, as well as that of
private respondent Gelacio, was considered in great detail in the resolution of GIO II Violan.
Violans resolution was reviewed by Special Prosecutor Erdulfo Querubin who made his own
detailed resolution concurring in the finding of Violn. We cannot say that, in approving the
resolutions of two investigators, the respondent Ombudsman and Special Prosecutor committed
an abuse of their discretion.
Indeed, this Court is loath to interfere with the discretion of the Ombudsman unless such
discretion is clearly shown to have been abused. As explained in Young v. Office of the
Ombudsman:22
The rule is based not only upon respect for the investigatory and prosecutory powers granted by
the Constitution to the Office of the Ombudsman but upon practicality as well. Otherwise, the
functions of the courts will be grievously hampered by innumerable petitions assailing the
dismissal of investigatory proceedings conducted by the Office of the Ombudsman with regard to
complaints filed before it, in much the same way that the courts would be extremely swamped if
they could be compelled to review the exercise of discretion on the part of the fiscals or
prosecuting attorneys each time they decide to file an information in court or dismiss a complaint
by a private complainant.
There are instances, constituting exceptions to the general rule, when this Court will
intervene in the prosecution of cases. Some of these instances were enumerated in Brocka v.
Enrile,23 as follows:
a. Where injunction is justified by the necessity to afford protection to the constitutional
rights of the accused; (Hernandez vs. Albano, et al., L-19272, January 25, 1967, 19
SCRA 95)
b. When necessary for the orderly administration of justice or to avoid oppression or

multiplicity of actions; (Dimayuga, et al. vs. Fernandez, 43 Phil. 304; Hernandez vs.
Albano, supra; Fortun vs. Labang, et al. L-38383, May 27 1981, 104 SCRA 607)
c. When there is a prejudicial question which is sub judice;. (De Leon vs. Mabanag, 70
Phil. 202)
d. When the acts of the officer are without or in excess of authority; (Planas vs. Gil, 67
Phil 62)
e. Where the prosecution is under an invalid law, ordinance or regulation; (Young vs.
Rafferty, 33 Phil 556; Yu Co Eng vs. Trinidad, 47 Phil. 385, 389)
f. When double jeopardy is clearly apparent; (Sangalang vs. People and Avendia, 109
Phil. 1140)
g. Where the court has no jurisdiction over the offense; (Lopez vs. City Judge, L-25795,
October 29, 1966, 18 SCRA 616).
h. Where it is a case of persecution rather than prosecution; (Rustia vs. Ocampo, CAG.R. No. 4760, March 25, 1960)
i. Where the charges are manifestly false and motivated by the lust for vengeance;
(Recto vs. Castelo, 18 L.J. (1953), cited in Ranoa vs. Alvendia, CA G.R. No. 30720R, October 8, 1962; cf Guingona, et al. vs. City Fiscal, L-60033, April 4, 1984, 128
SCRA 577).
j. When there is clearly no prima facie case against the accused and motion to quash on
that ground has been denied; (Salonga vs. Pano, et al., L-59524, February 18, 1985,
134 SCRA 438); and
k. Preliminary injunction has been issued by the Supreme Court to prevent the
threatened unlawful arrest of petitioners. (Rodriguez vs. Castelo, L-6374, August 1,
1953) (cited in Regalado, REMEDIAL LAW COMPENDIUM, p. 188 1988 Ed).
But none of these instances is present here.
What petitioners raise are questions which go to the weight to be given to the affidavits by
Atty. Nueva and Judge Ario. These are matters for the trial courts appreciation. A preliminary
investigation is not a trial. The function of the government prosecutor during the preliminary
investigation is merely to determine the existence of probable cause. 24 As we explained in Pilapil
vs. Sandiganbayan,25 this function involves only the following:
Probable cause is a reasonable ground of presumption that a matter is, or may be, well-founded,
such a state of facts in the mind of the prosecutor as would lead a person of ordinary caution and
prudence to believe, or entertain an honest or strong suspicion, that a thing is so. (Words and
Phrases, Probable Cause v. 34, p. 12) The term does not mean actual and positive cause nor does
it import absolute certainty. It is merely based on opinion and reasonable belief. Thus a finding
of probable cause does not require an inquiry into whether there is sufficient evidence to procure
a conviction. It is enough that it is believed that the act or omission complained of constitutes the
offense charged. Precisely, there is a trial for the reception of evidence of the prosecution in
support of the charge.
Secondly, to warrant a finding of political harassment so as to justify the grant of the
extraordinary writs of certiorari and prohibition, it must be shown that the complainant possesses
the power and the influence to control the prosecution of cases. Here, the prosecution is handled
by the Office of the Ombudsman. Although it is intimated that Petitioner Ceferino S. Paredes, Jr.
is the subject of persecution by his political enemies in Agusan del Sur, it has not been alleged,
service.
To show political harassment petitioners must prove that public prosecutor, and not just the
private complainant, is acting in bad faith in prosecuting the case 26 or has lent himself to a
scheme that could have no other purpose than to place the accused in contempt and
disrepute.27 For it is only if he does so may the prosecutor, in conducting the preliminary
investigation, be said to have deserted the performance of his office to determine objectively and
impartially the existence of probable cause and thus justify judicial intervention in what is
essentially his province.
WHEREFORE, the petition for certiorari and prohibition is DISMISSED.
SO ORDERED.
Narvasa, C.J. (Chairman), Padilla, Regalado, Davide, Jr., Romero, Bellosillo, Melo, Puno,
Vitug, Kapunan, Francisco, Hermosisima, Jr., and Panganiban, JJ., concur.

Supreme Court
Manila
[G.R. No. 130240.February 5, 2002]
DE VENECIA, JR., et al., vs. SANDIGANBAYAN (1st DIV.)
EN BANC
Gentlemen:
Quoted hereunder, for your information, is a resolution of this Court dated FEB 5 2002.
G.R. No. 130240(Jose de Venecia, Jr., in his capacity as Speaker of the House of
Representatives; Roberto P. Nazareno, in his capacity as Secretary-General of the House of
Representatives; Jose Ma. Antonio B. Tuao, Cashier, House of Representatives; Antonio M.
Chan, Chief, Property Division, House of Representatives, petitioners, vs. The Honorable
Sandiganbayan (First Division), respondent.)
The principal issue in this petitioner for certiorari [1]cralaw is whether of not the Sandiganbayan
may cite in contempt of court the Speaker of the House of Representatives for refusing to
implement the preventive suspension order it issued in a criminal case against a member of the
House.
Petitioners seek the annulment of:
(1) the Order dated August 18, 1997 of the Sandiganbayan (First Division), [2]cralaw directing
Speaker Jose de Venecia of the House of Representatives, to implement the preventive
suspension of then Congressman Ceferino S. Paredes, Jr., in connection with Criminal Case No.
18857 entitled "People of the Philippines v. Ceferino S. Paredes, Jr. and Gregorio S.
Branzuela"; and
(2) the Resolution dated August 29, 1997,[3]cralaw also of the Sandiganbayan, declaring Speaker
de Venecia in contempt of court for refusing to implement the preventive suspension order.
The facts are as follows:

On March 12, 1993, an Information (docketed as Criminal Case No. 18857) was filed with the
Sandiganbayan (First Division) against then Congressman Ceferino S. Paredes, Jr., of Agusan del
Sur for violation of Section 3 (e) of Republic Act No. 3019 (The Anti-Graft and Corrupt
Practices Act, as amended).
After the accused pleaded not guilty, the prosecution filed a "Motion To Suspend The
AccusedPendente Lite."
In its Resolution dated June 6, 1997, the Sandiganbayan granted the motion and ordered
the Speaker to suspend the accused.But the Speaker did not comply.Thus, on August 12, 1997,
the Sandiganbayan issued a Resolution requiring him to appear before it, on August 18, 1997 at
8:00 o'clock in the morning, to show cause why he should not be held in contempt of court.
Unrelenting, the Speaker filed, through counsel, a motion for reconsideration, invoking the rule
on separation of powers and claiming that he can only act as may be dictated by the House as a
body pursuant to House Resolution No. 116 adopted on August 13, 1997.
On August 29, 1997, the Sandiganbayan rendered the now assailed Resolution [4]cralaw declaring
Speaker Jose C. de Venecia, Jr. in contempt of court and ordering him to pay a fine of P10,000.00
within 10 days from notice.
Hence, the instant recourse.
The issue before us had long been settled by this Court in Ceferino S. Paredes, Jr. v.
Sandiganbayanin G.R. No. 118354 (August 8, 1995).We ruled that the suspension provided for
in the Anti-Graft law ismandatory and is of different nature and purpose.It is imposed by the
court, not as a penalty, but as a precautionary measure resorted to upon the filing of a valid
Information.Its purpose is to prevent the accused public officer from frustrating his prosecution
by influencing witnesses or tampering with documentary evidence and from committing further
acts of malfeasance while in office.It is thus an incident to the criminal proceedings before the
court.On the other hand, the suspension or expulsion contemplated in the Constitution is a
House-imposed sanction against its members.It is, therefore, apenalty for disorderly behavior
to enforce discipline, maintain order in its proceedings, or vindicate its honor and integrity.
Just recently, in Miriam Defensor Santiago v. Sandiganbayan, et al., this Court en banc, through
Justice Jose C. Vitug, held that the doctrine of separation of powers does not exclude the
members of Congress from the mandate of R.A. 3019, thus:
"The order of suspension prescribed by Republic Act No. 3019 is
distinct from the power of Congress to discipline its own ranks under the
Constitution. x x x.
"The suspension contemplated in the above constitutional provision is a
punitive measure that is imposed upon a determination by the Senate or the House
of Representatives, as the case may be, upon an erring member. x x x.
"The doctrine of separation of powers by itself may not be deemed to
have effectively excluded members of Congress from Republic Act No. 3019
nor from its sanctions.The maxim simply recognizes that each of the three coequal and independent, albeit coordinate, branches of the government - the
Legislative, the Executive and the Judiciary - has exclusive prerogatives and
cognizance within its own sphere of influence and effectively prevents one
branch from unduly intruding into the internal affairs of either
branch."(Emphasis ours)
We note that the term of then Congressman Ceferino Paredes, Jr. expired on June 30, 1988.This
rendered moot and academic the instant case.
WHEREFORE, for being moot, this case is deemed CLOSED and TERMINATED.
(Quisumbing, J., no part.Quisumbing and Carpio, JJ., abroad on official business)

SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-11530
August 12, 1916

vs.
JUAN PONS, defendant-appellant.
Jose Varela y Calderon for appellant.
Attorney-General Avancea for appellee.
TRENT, J.:
The information in this case reads:
The undersigned charges Gabino Beliso, Juan Pons, and Jacinto Lasarte with the crime of
illegal importation of opium, committed as follows:
That on or about the 10th day of April, 1915, the said accused, conspiring together and
plotting among themselves, did, knowingly, willfully, unlawfully, feloniously and
fraudulently, bring from a foreign country, to wit, that of Spain, on board the
steamer Lopez y Lopez, and import and introduce into the city of Manila, Philippine
Islands, and within the jurisdiction of the court, 520 tins containing 125 kilograms of
opium of the value of P62,400, Philippine currency; and that, then and there, the said
accused, also conspiring together and plotting among themselves, did receive and conceal
the said quantity of opium and aided each other in the transportation, receipt and
concealment of the same after the said opium had been imported, knowing that said drug
had been unlawfully brought, imported and illegally introduced into the Philippine
Islands from a foreign country; an act committed in violation of law."
On motion of counsel Juan Pons and Gabino Beliso were tried separately. (Jacinto Lasarte had
not yet been arrested.) Each were found guilty of the crime charged and sentenced accordingly,
the former to be confined in Bilibid Prison for the period of two years, to pay a fine of P1,000, to
suffer the corresponding subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency, and to the payment of
one-half of the costs. The same penalties were imposed upon the latter, except that he was
sentenced to pay a fine of P3,000. Both appealed. Beliso later withdrew his appeal and the
judgment as to him has become final.
The contentions for reversal are numerous (twenty-five assignments of error) and are greatly
multiplied by their reiteration in a somewhat changed form of statement under the many
propositions embraced in the elaborate printed brief, but their essence, when correctly
understood, are these: The court erred (a) in denying this appellant's motion, dated May 6, 1915,
and reproduced on July 27, 1915, and (b) in finding that the legal evidence of record establishes
the guilt of the appellant, Juan Pons, beyond a reasonable doubt.
In his motion above mentioned, counsel alleged and offered to prove that the last day of the
special session of the Philippine Legislature for 1914 was the 28th day of February; that Act No.
2381, under which Pons must be punished if found guilty, was not passed or approved on the
28th of February but on March 1 of that year; and that, therefore, the same is null and void. The
validity of the Act is not otherwise questioned. As it is admitted that the last day of the special
session was, under the Governor-General's proclamation, February 28 and that the appellant is
charged with having violated the provisions of Act No. 2381, the vital question is the date of
adjournment of the Legislature, and this reduces itself to two others, namely, (1) how that is to be
proved, whether by the legislative journals or extraneous evidence and (2) whether the court can
take judicial notice of the journals. These questions will be considered in the reversed order.
Act No. 1679 provides that the Secretary of the Commission shall perform the duties which
would properly be required of the Recorder of the Commission under the existing law. And rules
15 and 16 of the Legislative Procedure of the Philippine Commission provides, among other
things, "that the proceedings of the Commission shall be briefly and accurately stated on the
journal," and that it shall be the duty of the Secretary "to keep a correct journal of the
proceedings of the Commission." On page 793 of volume 7 of the Commission Journal for the
ordinary and special sessions of the Third Philippine Legislature, the following appears:
The Journal for Saturday, February 28, 1914, was approved. Adjournment sine die of the
Commission as a Chamber of the Philippine Legislature. The hour of midnight having
arrived, on motion of Commissioner Palma, the Commission, as a Chamber of the
Philippine Legislature, adjourned sine die.
The Act of Congress, approved July 1, 1902, provides, among other things, in section 7, that the
Philippine Assembly "shall keep in journal of its proceedings, which shall be published . . . ." In
obedience to this mandate, the journal of the Assembly's proceedings for the sessions of 1914
was duly published and it appears therein (vol. 9, p. 1029), that the Assembly adjourned sine
die at 12 o'clock midnight on February 28, 1914.
Section 275 of the Code of Civil Procedure provides that the existence of the "official acts of the
legislative, executive, and judicial departments of the United States and of the Philippine
Islands ... shall be judicially recognized by the court without the introduction of proof; but the
court may receive evidence upon any of the subjects in this section states, when it shall find it
necessary for its own information, and may resort for its aid to appropriate books, documents, or
evidence." And section 313 [as amended by sec. 1 of Act No. 2210], of the same Code also
provides that:
Official documents may be proved as follows: . . . .
(2) The proceedings of the Philippine Commission, or of any legislative body that may be
provided for the Philippine Islands, or of Congress, by the journals of those bodies or of
either house thereof, or by published statutes or resolutions, or by copies certified by the
clerk or secretary or printed by their order:Provided, That in the case of Acts of the
Philippine Commission or the Philippine Legislature when there is in existence a copy
signed by the presiding officers and the secretaries of said bodies, it shall be conclusive
proof of the provisions of such Act and of the due enactment thereof.
While there are no adjudicated cases in this jurisdiction upon the exact question whether the
courts may take judicial notice of the legislative journals, it is well settled in the United States
that such journals may be noticed by the courts in determining the question whether a particular
bill became a law or not. (The State ex rel. Herron vs. Smith, 44 Ohio, 348, and cases cited
therein.) The result is that the law and the adjudicated cases make it our duty to take judicial
notice of the legislative journals of the special session of the Philippine Legislature of 1914.
These journals are not ambiguous or contradictory as to the actual time of the adjournment. They
show, with absolute certainty, that the Legislature adjourned sine die at 12 o'clock midnight on
February 28, 1914.
Passing over the question whether the printed Act (No. 2381), published by authority of law, is
conclusive evidence as to the date when it was passed, we will inquire whether the courts may go
behind the legislative journals for the purpose of determining the date of adjournment when such
journals are clear and explicit. From the foregoing it is clear that this investigation belongs
entirely to that branch of legal science which embraces and illustrates the laws of evidence. On
the one hand, it is maintained that the Legislature did not, as we have indicated, adjourn at
midnight on February 28, 1914, but on March 1st, and that this allegation or alleged fact may be
established by extraneous evidence; while, on the other hand, it is urged that the contents of the
legislative journals are conclusive evidence as to the date of adjournment. In order to understand
these opposing positions, it is necessary to consider the nature and character of the evidence thus
involved. Evidence is understood to be that which proves or disproves "any matter in question or
to influence the belief respecting it," and "conclusive evidence is that which establishes the fact,
as in the instance of conclusive presumptions." (Bouvier's Law Dictionary, vol. 1, p. 701 et seq.)
Counsel for the appellant, in order to establish his contention, must necessarily depend upon the
memory or recollection of witnesses, while the legislative journals are the acts of the
Government or sovereign itself. From their very nature and object the records of the Legislature
are as important as those of the judiciary, and to inquiry into the veracity of the journals of the
Philippine Legislature, when they are, as we have said, clear and explicit, would be to violate
both the letter and the spirit of the organic laws by which the Philippine Government was
brought into existence, to invade a coordinate and independent department of the Government,
and to interfere with the legitimate powers and functions of the Legislature. But counsel in his
argument says that the public knows that the Assembly's clock was stopped on February 28,
1914, at midnight and left so until the determination of the discussion of all pending matters. Or,
in other words, the hands of the clock were stayed in order to enable the Assembly to effect an
adjournment apparently within the time fixed by the Governor's proclamation for the expiration
of the special session, in direct violation of the Act of Congress of July 1, 1902. If the clock was,
in fact, stopped, as here suggested, "the resultant evil might be slight as compared with that of
altering the probative force and character of legislative records, and making the proof of
legislative action depend upon uncertain oral evidence, liable to loss by death or absence, and so
imperfect on account of the treachery of memory. Long, long centuries ago, these considerations
of public policy led to the adoption of the rule giving verity and unimpeachability to legislative
records. If that character is to be taken away for one purpose, it must be taken away for all, and
the evidence of the laws of the state must rest upon a foundation less certain and durable than
that afforded by the law to many contracts between private individuals concerning comparatively
trifling matters." (Capito vs. Topping, W. Va., 22 L. R. A. [N. S.], 1089.) Upon the same point the
court, in the State ex rel. Herron vs. Smith (44 Ohio, 348), decided in 1886, said:
Counsel have exhibited unusual industry in looking up the various cases upon this
question; and, out of a multitude of citations, not one is found in which any court has
assumed to go beyond the proceedings of the legislature, as recorded in the journals
required to be kept in each of its branches, on the question whether a law has been
adopted. And if reasons for the limitation upon judicial inquiry in such matters have not
generally been stated, in doubtless arises from the fact that they are apparent. Imperative
reasons of public policy require that the authenticity of laws should rest upon public
memorials of the most permanent character. They should be public, because all are
required to conform to them; they should be permanent, that right acquired to-day upon
the faith of what has been declared to be law shall not be destroyed to-morrow, or at some
remote period of time, by facts resting only in the memory of individuals.
In the case from which this last quotation is taken, the court cited numerous decisions of the
various states in the American Union in support of the rule therein laid down, and we have been
unable to find a single case of a later date where the rule has been in the least changed or
modified when the legislative journals cover the point. As the Constitution of the Philippine
Government is modeled after those of the Federal Government and the various states, we do not
hesitate to follow the courts in that country in the matter now before us. The journals say that the
Legislature adjourned at 12 midnight on February 28, 1914. This settles the question, and the
court did not err in declining to go behind these journals.
On or about the 5th or 6th of April, 1915, the Spanish mail steamer Lopez y Lopez arrived at
Manila from Spain, bringing, among other cargo, twenty-five barrels which were manifested as
"wine" and consigned to Jacinto Lasarte. Gabino Beliso had been, prior to the arrival of this
cargo, engaged in the business of a wine merchant, with an office and warehouse located at 203
Calle San Anton in this city. The shipper's invoice and bill of lading for the twenty-five barrels
were delivered to Gregorio Cansipit, a customs broker, by Beliso. These documents were
indorsed as follows: "Deliver to Don Gabino Beliso" and signed "Jacinto Lasarte." Cansipit
conducted the negotiations incident to the release of the merchandise from the customhouse and
the twenty-five barrels were delivered in due course to the warehouse of Beliso at the
aforementioned street and number. Beliso signed the paper acknowledging delivery. Shortly
thereafter the custom authorities, having noticed that shipments of merchandise manifested as
"wine" had been arriving in Manila from Spain, consigned to persons whose names were not
listed as merchants, and having some doubt as to the nature of the merchandise so consigned,
instituted an investigation and traced on the 10th of April, 1915, the twenty-five barrels to
Beliso's warehouse, being aided by the customs registry number of the shipment, the entry
number, and the serial number of each barrel. It was found that the twenty-five barrels began to
arrive on bull carts at Beliso's warehouse about 11 o'clock on the morning of April 9. Before the
merchandise arrived at that place, the appellant, Juan Pons, went to Beliso's warehouse and
joined Beliso in the latter's office, where the two engaged in conversation. Pons then left and
shortly thereafter several of the barrels arrived and were unloaded in Beliso's bodega. He called
one of his employees, Cornelius Sese, and directed him to go out and get a bull cart. This Sese
did and returned with the vehicle. Beliso then carefully selected five barrels out of the shipment
of twenty-five and told Sese to load these five on the cart and to deliver them to Juan Pons at No.
144 Calle General Solano. This order was complied with by Sese and the barrels delivered to
Pons at the place designated. Pursuing their investigation, which started on the 10th, the customs
secret service agents entered Beliso's bodega on that date before the office was opened and
awaited the arrival of Beliso. Sese was found in the bodega and placed under arrest. The agents
then proceeded to separate the recent shipment from the other merchandise stored in the
warehouse, identifying the barrels by the customs registry and entry numbers. Only twenty of the
twenty-five barrels could be found on Beliso's premises. Upon being questioned or interrogated,
Sese informed the customs agents that the five missing barrels had been delivered by him to Pons
at 144 Calle General Solano by order of Beliso. The agents, accompanied by Sese, proceeded to
144 Calle General Solano and here found the five missing barrels, which were identified by the
registry and entry numbers as well as by the serial numbers. The five barrels were empty, the
staves having been sprung and the iron hoops removed. Five empty tins, each corresponding in
size to the heads of the five barrels, were found on the floor nearby. The customs officers noticed
several baskets of lime scattered about the basement of the house and on further search they
found 77 tins of opium in one of these baskets. There was no one in the house when this search
was made, but some clothing was discovered which bore the initials "J. P." It then became
important to the customs agents to ascertain the owner and occupant of house No. 144 on Calle
General Solano where the five barrels were delivered. The owner was found, upon investigation,
to be Mariano Limjap, and from the latter's agent it was learned that the house was rented by one
F. C. Garcia. When the lease of the house was produced by the agent of the owner, the agents
saw that the same was signed "F. C. Garcia, by Juan Pons." After discovering these facts they
returned to the house of Beliso and selected three of the twenty barrels and ordered them
returned to the customhouse. Upon opening these three barrels each was found to contain a large
tin fitted into the head of the barrel with wooden cleats and securely nailed. Each large tin
contained 75 small tins of opium. A comparison of the large tins taken out of the three barrels
with the empty ones found at 144 Calle General Solano show, says the trial court, "that they were
in every way identical in size, form, etc."
While the customs officers were still at the office and warehouse of Beliso on the morning of
April 10, Pons, apparently unaware that anything unusual was going on, arrived there and was
placed under arrest, and taken to the office of Captain Hawkins, chief of the customs secret
service, and according to Hawkins, voluntarily confessed his participation in the smuggling of
the opium. He maintained, however, that the 77 tins of opium found at 144 Calle General Solano
represented the entire importation. Pons, being at the customhouse under arrest at the time the
three barrels were opened and the customs officers appearing to be no doubt as to which end of
the barrels contained the opium, Pons showed the officers how to open the barrels and pointed
out that the end of the barrel, which had the impression of a bottle stamped in the wood,
contained the opium. On seeing the 195 tins of opium taken from the three barrels, Pons further
stated that he had delivered some 250 tins of opium of this shipment to a Chinaman at 7.30 a. m.
on the morning of April 10, following the instructions given him by Beliso. On being further
questioned, Pons stated that he and Beliso had been partners in several opium transactions; that
the house at No. 144 Calle General Solano had been leased by him at the suggestion of Beliso for
the purpose of handling the prohibited drug; and that he and Beliso had shared the profits of a
previous importation of opium. Sese testified that he had delivered a previous shipment to 144
Calle General Solano. The customs agents then went with Pons to his house and found in his
yard several large tin receptacles, in every way similar to those found at 144 Calle General
Solano and those taken from the barrels at the customhouse. At first Pons stated that F. C. Garcia
was a tobacco merchant traveling in the between the Provinces of Isabela and Cagayan, and later
he retracted this statement and admitted that Garcia was a fictitious person. But during the trial
of this case in the court below Pons testified that Garcia was a wine merchant and a resident of
Spain, and that Garcia had written him a letter directing him to rent a house for him (Garcia) and
retain it until the arrival in the Philippine Islands of Garcia. According to Pons this letter arrived
on the same steamer which brought the 25 barrels of "wine," but that he had destroyed it because
he feared that it would compromise him. On being asked during the trial why he insisted, in
purchasing wine from Beliso, in receiving a part of the wine which had just arrived on the Lopez
y Lopez, answered, "Naturally because F. C. Garcia told me in this letter that this opium was
coming in barrels of wine sent to Beliso by a man the name of Jacinto Lasarte, and that is the
reason I wanted to get these barrels of wine."
The foregoing are substantially the fats found by the trial court and these fats establish the guilt
of the appellant beyond any question of a doubt, notwithstanding his feeble attempt to show that
the opium as shipped to him from Spain by a childhood fried named Garcia. The appellant took a
direct part in this huge smuggling transaction and profited thereby. The penalty imposed by the
trial court is in accordance with la and the decisions of this court in similar cases.
For the foregoing reasons, the judgment appealed from is affirmed, with costs.
So ordered.
Torres, Johnson, Moreland, and Araullo, JJ., concur.
EN BANC
[G.R. No. 108251. January 31, 1996]
CEFERINO S. PAREDES, JR. and MANSUETO J. HONRADA, petitioners, vs. THE

HONORABLE SANDIGANBAYAN, Second Division; HONORABLE ANIANO
DESIERTO, in his official capacity as Special Prosecutor; HONORABLE
CONRADO M. VASQUEZ, in his official capacity as Ombudsman; and TEOFILO
GELACIO, respondents.
SYLLABUS
1. REMEDIAL LAW; CRIMINAL PROCEDURE; PRELIMINARY INVESTIGATION;
MAY BE INITIATED AND CONCLUDED BY DIFFERENT INVESTIGATORS.
- Petitioners contend that the filing of charges against them was not recommended by the
prosecutor who conducted the preliminary investigation, but by another one who, it is
alleged, had no part at all in the investigation. There is no basis for petitioners claim that the
resolution was prepared by one who did not take any part in the investigation. What
happened here is similar to the trial of a case by one judge who, without being able to finish
the hearing, ceases from office for one reason or another and by necessity the decision is
rendered by another judge who has taken over the conduct of the case. Such an arrangement
has never been thought to raise any question of due process. For what is important is that the
judge who decides does so on the basis of the evidence in record. It does not matter that he
did not conduct the hearing of that case from the beginning.
2. ID.; EVIDENCE; WEIGHT AND SUFFICIENCY; CERTIFICATE; VALUE NOT
DIMINISHED BY FAILURE TO ANTICIPATE THAT HIS CERTIFICATE WOULD
BE USED IN EVIDENCE. - That Violan gave credence to the Certification of Judge Ario
in concluding that no arraignment had been held in Criminal Case No. 1393 is not proof that
Violan was biased against petitioners. Although Judge Ario subsequently gave an Affidavit,
he never in that Affidavit repudiated what he had earlier stated. Judge Ario never denied his
earlier Certification that Criminal Case No. 1393 never reached the arraignment stave,
because having learned that Paredes, Jr. had petitioned the Ministry of Justice for a review of
the fiscals resolution, Judge Ario suspended action until March 17, 1986 and in fact the
fiscal later moved for the dismissal of the case. The fact that Judge Ario did not anticipate
that his certificate might be used in evidence, much less in the criminal cases now pending
in the Sandiganbayan, is not a reason to disregard it. The fact is that Judge Ario did not
retract his previous Certification that there was no arraignment held in Criminal Case No.
1393. If that is the truth, then the fact that he now says he did not anticipate that his
certificate would be used in evidence in any case would not diminish a whit the value of the
certificate.
3. ID.; EVIDENCE; ADMISSIBILITY; RETRACTION OF AFFIDAVIT MADE IN
VIOLATION OF ATTORNEY-CLIENT PRIVILEGE, INADMISSIBLE. - There is
nothing in the resolution of Violan which shows that she based her conclusion (that
petitioners were probably guilty of falsification of public documents) on Atty. Sansaets
retraction. In her resolution, all that she stated is that the confession of Atty. Sansaet has
falsification of public documents. To the contrary, Violan thought that the retraction was
made in violation of attorney-client privilege and therefore, would be inadmissible in
evidence. Violan could not, therefore, have relied on the affidavit of retraction.
4. ID.; DISQUALIFICATION OF JUDGES; DIVERGENCE OF OPINIONS BETWEEN A
JUDGE AND A PARTYS COUNSEL, NOT A GROUND. - Mere divergence of opinions
between a judge and a partys counsel as to applicable laws and jurisprudence is not
sufficient ground for disqualifying the judge from hearing the case on the ground of bias and
partiality.
5. ID.; ACTIONS; MERE FILING OF SEVERAL CASES BASED ON THE SAME
INCIDENT, NOT FORUM-SHOPPING; TEST. - The mere filing of several cases based
on the same incident does not necessarily constitute forum-shopping. The test is whether the
several actions filed involve the same transactions, essential facts, and circumstances.
6. ID.;
ID.;
ID.;
CASES
INVOLVING
SUBSTANTIALLY
DIFFERENT
TRANSACTIONS, FACTS AND CIRCUMSTANCES, NOT FORUM SHOPPING;
CASE AT BAR. - Here, although several cases were filed by the same complainant against
the same defendant and the subject matter of the actions of two of the cases was the same
incident (i.e., the application for free patent of petitioner Ceferino Paredes, Jr.), the fact is
that the several cases involve essentially different facts, circumstances and causes of action.
Thus, Criminal Case No. 1393, which was filed in the MCTC of San Francisco,. Agusan del
Sur, was for perjury, based on false statements allegedly made in 1975 by petitioner Paredes,
Jr. in connection with his free patent application. Criminal Case No. 13800, which was filed
in the Sandiganbayan, although based on the filing of the same application for free patent,
was for violation of the Anti-graft and Corrupt Practices Act, on the allegation that
petitioner, as Provincial Attorney, had unduly influenced the Public Land Inspector to secure
the approval of his free patent application. On the other hand, as already stated, the present
cases (Criminal Case Nos. 17791, 17792 and 17793) are for falsification of court records
pertaining to Criminal Case No. 1393. A.P. Case No. P-90-396 is an administrative case
against petitioner Honrada based on the same incident and facts that are subject of the
preceding criminal cases. The rest are incidents of these cases, being the petition for review
and motions for reconsideration ifl Criminal Case No. 13800 and A.P. Case No. P-90-396.
incident, i.e., petitioners public land application, they involve different issues. It is well
settled that a single act may offend against two or more distinct and related provisions of law
or that the same act may give rise to criminal as well as administrative liability. As such,
they may be prosecuted simultaneously or one after another, so long as they do not place the
accused in double jeopardy of being punished for the same offense.
7. ID.; CRIMINAL PROCEDURE; DISMISSAL OF ADMINISTRATIVE COMPLAINT
DOES NOT NECESSARILY BAR FILING OF CRIMINAL PROSECUTION.
- Petitioners call attention to the fact that the administrative complaint against petitioner
Honrada was dismissed. They invoke our ruling in Maceda v. Vasquez that only this Court
has the power to oversee court personnels compliance with laws and take the appropriate
powers. But one thing is administrative liability. Quite another thing is the criminal liability
for the same act. Our determination of the administrative liability for falsification of public
documents is in no way conclusive of his lack of criminal liability. As we have held in Tan v.
Comelec, the dismissal of an administrative case does not necessarily bar the filing of a
criminal prosecution for the same or similar acts which were the subject of the
administrative complaint.
8. ID.; ID.; POLITICALLY MOTIVATED FILING OF CRIMINAL CHARGE CANNOT
JUSTIFY PROHIBITION OF CRIMINAL PROSECUTION IF THERE IS
EVIDENCE TO SUPPORT IT. - That the filing of the charges is politically motivated
cannot justify the prohibition of a criminal prosecution if there is otherwise evidence to
support them. Here a preliminary investigation of the complaint against petitioners was held
during which petitioners were heard. Their evidence, as well as that of private respondent
Gelacio, was considered in great detail in the resolution of GIO II Violan. Violans resolution
was reviewed by Special Prosecutor Erdulfo Querubin who made his own detailed
resolution concurring in the finding of Violan. We cannot say that, in approving the
resolutions of two investigators, the respondent Ombudsman and Special Prosecutor
committed an abuse of their discretion.
9. ID.; ID.; PRELIMINARY INVESTIGATION; PURPOSE. - A preliminary investigation is
not a trial. The function of the government prosecutor during the preliminary investigation is
merely to determine the existence of probable cause.
10. ID.; ID.; POLITICAL HARASSMENT; REQUISITES; CASE AT BAR. - To warrant a

finding of political harassment so as to justify the grant of the extraordinary writs of
certiorari and prohibition, it must be shown that the complainant possesses the power and
the influence to control the prosecution of cases. Here, the prosecution is handled by the
Office of the Ombudsman. Although it is intimated that petitioner Ceferino S. Paredes, Jr. is
the subject of persecution by his political enemies in Agusan del Sur, it has not been alleged,
service. To show political harassment petitioners must prove that public prosecutor, and not
just the private complainant, is acting in bad faith in prosecuting the case or has lent himself
to a scheme that could have no other purpose than to place the accused in contempt and
disrepute. For it is only if he does so may the prosecutor, in conducting the preliminary
investigation, be said to have deserted the performance of his office to determine objectively
and impartially the existence of probable cause and thus justify judicial intervention in what
is essentially his province.
APPEARANCES OF COUNSEL
Rolando A. Suarez & Associates for petitioners.
Esmeraldo I. Guloy for private respondent.
DECISION
MENDOZA, J.:
This is a petition for certiorari, prohibition and injunction, seeking to set aside the resolution
dated December 9, 1992 of the Office of the Ombudsman, denying petitioners motion for the
reinvestigation of three cases of falsification of public documents which had been filed against
petitioners and to restrain the Second Division of the Sandiganbayan from hearing the cases.
The cases originated in a complaint filed on January 23, 1990 by Teofilo Gelacio, then vice
mayor of San Francisco, Agusan del Sur. Charged with petitioner Paredes, Jr., who was then the
provincial governor, were petitioner Mansueto J. Honrada, clerk of court of the Municipal
Circuit Trial Court of San Francisco, Agusan del Sur, and Atty. Generoso Sansaet, counsel of
petitioner Paredes, Jr. in Criminal Case No. 1393 of the MCTC.
In his complaint Gelacio alleged that MCTC clerk of court Honrada, in conspiracy with
petitioner Paredes, Jr. and the latters counsel Atty. Sansaet, certified as true a copy of a Notice of
Arraignment dated July 1, 1985 and of the Transcript of Stenographic Notes on July 9, 1985,
showing that an arraignment had been held in Criminal Case No. 1393 and issued a certification
dated March 24, 1986 to that effect when in truth no arraignment had been held in that case. In
support of his allegation, Gelacio submitted a Certification issued by Judge Ciriaco C. Ario of
the MCTC to the effect that Criminal Case No. 1393 had never reached the arraignment stage
before it was dismissed on motion of the prosecution.1
A preliminary investigation of the complaint was conducted by Public Prosecutor Albert
Axalan who had been deputized to assist the Deputy Ombudsman for Mindanao. Petitioners and
Atty. Sansaet, as respondents in the case, filed their respective counter-affidavits. Paredes, Jr.
denied the charges. He alleged that their filing was politically motivated and that the
complainant, Teofilo Gelacio, was being used by his political enemies to harass him. For his part,
Honrada maintained that an arraignment had indeed been held in Criminal Case No. 1393 as
certified by him. His claim was corroborated by Atty. Generoso Sansaet, who stated in an
affidavit that he was present during the arraignment, being the counsel of Paredes, Jr. Sansaet
called Judge Arios Certification, denying that there was an arraignment, the product of a faltering
mind.2
Prosecutor Axalan submitted his resolution to the Deputy Ombudsman for Mindanao, but
before it could be acted upon, Atty. Sansaet, one of the respondents, retracted his earlier
statement to the effect that Paredes, Jr. had been arraigned before the case against him was
dismissed. In an Affidavit of Explanations and Rectifications dated July 29, 1991, Sansaet
claimed that there was really no arraignment held in Criminal Case No. 1393 and that Honrada
made false certifications which were used to support the dismissal (on the ground of double
jeopardy) of Criminal Case No. 13800 which was then pending against Paredes, Jr. in the
Sandiganbayan.3
As a result of this development, Paredes, Jr. and Honrada, were required to comment.
Paredes, Jr. claimed that the Sansaets aboutface was the result of their political
estrangement.4 For his part Honrada insisted that an arraignment in Criminal Case No. 1393 had
indeed been held and that in making the certifications in question he stated the truth.
On the basis of the evidence of the parties, Gay Maggie Balajadia-Violan, Graft
Investigation Officer of the Office of the Deputy Ombudsman, recommended on February 24,
1992 that petitioners and Atty. Sansaet be charged with Falsification of Public Documents. Her
recommendation was indorsed by Deputy Ombudsman Cesar Nitorreda to Ombudsman Conrado
Vasquez, Who, upon the recommendation of Erdulfo Querubin of the Office of the Special
Prosecutor, approved the filing of three informations for falsification of public documents against
Paredes, Jr., Honrada and Sansaet with the Sandiganbayan.5 The cases were docketed as Criminal
Case Nos. 17791, 17792 and 17793.
On July 9, 1992, petitioners moved to quash the informations. Their motion was denied by
the Sandiganbayan in its resolution of August 25, 1992, as was the motion for reconsideration
they subsequently filed.
Petitioners next moved for a reinvestigation of the cases. They complained (1) that the
resolution, recommending the filing of the cases, was not prepared by Public Prosecutor Axalan,
who had conducted the preliminary investigation, but by GIO II Gay Maggie Balajadia-Violan,
who allegedly had no hand in the investigation; (2) that Violan relied solely on the retraction of
Atty. Generoso Sansaet and the Certification of Judge Ciriaco C. Ario and disregarded evidence
in favor of petitioners; and (3) that Prosecutor Erdulfo Q. Querubin, who reviewed Violans
recommendation, could not be expected to act fairly because he was the prosecutor in Criminal
Case No. 13800 in connection with which the allegedly falsified records were used and in fact
appealed the dismissal of the case to this Court.6
Although these grounds were the same ones invoked by petitioners in their motion to quash,
which the Sandiganbayan had denied, the Sandiganbayan nonetheless directed the prosecution to
conduct a reinvestigation of the cases. Accordingly, the Office of the Ombudsman required
complainant, the herein respondent Teofilo Gelacio, to comment on petitioners Motion for
Reinvestigation.
In a resolution dated December 9, 1992, Special Prosecution Officer Carlos D. Montemayor
recommended denial of petitioners motion. He noted that the matters raised in the motion were
the same ones contained in petitioners motion to quash which had already been denied and that
in fact a cursory examination of the resolution of GIO II Gay Maggie Balajadia-Violan shows
that the existence of a prima facie case has been duly established and the same was reviewed by
SPO III Erdulfo Querubin and also the approval of Honorable Conrado M. Vasquez. He held that
as no newly-discovered evidence or denial of due process had been shown, there was no basis for
petitioners request for a reinvestigation.
Montemayors recommendation was approved by Special Prosecutor Aniano Desierto and
Ombudsman Conrado Vasquez. Accordingly the Sandiganbayan set the cases for trial.
The present petition for certiorari, prohibition and injunction was then filed to enjoin the
trial of the criminal cases. Petitioners pray that:
(1) Upon the filing of this petition and before its final resolution, to issue a temporary restraining
order immediately ordering the Sandiganbayan, Second Division, to cease and desist from
proceeding with the scheduled hearing of this case;
(2) After due hearing, to adjudge that respondents Honorable Special Prosecutor Aniano A.
Desierto and Honorable Ombudsman Conrado M. Vasquez have committed grave abuse of
discretion, amounting to lack of jurisdiction, in issuing and approving the questioned resolution
dated December 9, 1992 and ordering said resolution denying petitioners motion for
reinvestigation be annulled and set aside;
(3) To adjudge that the Sandiganbayan, Second Division, is without jurisdiction to try Criminal
Case Nos. 17791, 17792, and 17793 all of which are apparently intended as political harassments
against the herein petitioners, particularly as against Ceferino S. Paredes, Jr., and prohibiting the
said court from proceeding (with) the hearing of the said cases on January 15, 1993, and likewise
ordering the said court to dismiss the said cases, with costs against respondents and Teofilo
Gelacio; and
(4) To issue a writ of injunction, thereby making the restraining order permanent, and prohibiting
the respondents and complainant Teofilo Gelacio from committing any act or acts tending to
harass and to inflict further damage and injury to petitioners, such as but not limited to the
continuation and further prosecution of said Criminal Cases Nos. 17791, 17792, and 17793.
Petitioners contend (1) that their constitutional right to due process was violated at various
stages of the preliminary investigation; (2) that the prosecutors closed their eyes to the fact that
in filing the cases private respondent Teofilo Gelacio engaged in forum-shopping; and (3) that
the cases were filed for political harassment and there is in fact no prima facie evidence to hold
them answerable for falsification of public documents.7
I.
Anent the first ground, petitioners contend that the filing of charges against them was not
recommended by the prosecutor who conducted the preliminary investigation, but by another one
who, it is alleged, had no part at all in the investigation.
Petitioners contention has no basis in fact. It appears that the preliminary investigation of the
complaint filed by Teofilo Gelacio was initially conducted by Public Prosecutor Albert Axalan
who had been deputized to assist the Deputy Ombudsman for Mindanao in the investigation of
graft cases. Axalan prepared a resolution. The records do not show what his recommendation
was. What is clear, however, is that no action had been taken on his recommendation in view of
the fact that Atty. Generoso Sansaet, one of the respondents in the cases, retracted an earlier
statement he had given to the effect that petitioner Ceferino S. Paredes, Jr. had been arraigned in
Criminal Case No. 1393 before the case was dismissed. Atty. Sansaet now claimed that no
arraignment had been held after all. This new development required the reopening of the
investigation (in fact Paredes, Jr. and Honrada were required to comment on the retraction), the
reevaluation of the evidence, and the preparation of a new resolution. Gay Maggie BalajadiaViolan, Graft Investigation Officer II of the Office of the Deputy Ombudsman for Mindanao,
was designated to conduct the investigation and prepare a report, which she did.
Violans recommendation was indorsed by Deputy Ombudsman Cesar Nitorreda to
Ombudsman Conrado Vasquez, who then referred the matter to Special Prosecution Officer Ill
Erdulfo Querubin for review. Querubin concurred in the recommendation of Violan but
suggested that, instead of one, three separate informations for falsification of public documents
be filed against respondents (Paredes, Jr., Honrada and Sansaet), considering that three
documents were involved.
On June 26, 1992, Ombudsman Conrado Vasquez approved the recommendations of Violan
and Querubin. Accordingly three cases were filed against petitioners with the Sandiganbayan,
where they were docketed as Criminal Case Nos. 17791, 17792 and 17793.
There is thus no basis for petitioners claim that the resolution was prepared by one who did
not take any part in the investigation. What happened here is similar to the trial of a case by one
judge who, without being able to finish the hearing, ceases from office for one reason or another
and by necessity the decision is rendered by another judge who has taken over the conduct of the
case. Such an arrangement has never been thought to raise any question of due process. For what
is important is that the judge who decides does so on the basis of the evidence in record. It does
not matter that he did not conduct the hearing of that case from the beginning.
Petitioners nonetheless charge that GIO II Violan and Prosecutor Querubin did not have such
cold neutrality of an impartial judge to be trusted to conduct a fair investigation. According to
petitioners, Violan gave credence to the Certification issued by Judge Ciriaco C. Ario when the
fact is that Judge Ario subsequently executed an affidavit, dated November 5, 1990, in which he
explained that he issued the said certificate without expectation that the same would be used as
evidence in any case and that the use of said certificate . . . is against [his] conscience. Worse, it
is contended, Violan considered the Affidavit of Explanations and Rectifications executed by
Atty. Sansaet, which she should have disregarded because it was made in violation of the
confidentiality of attorney-client communication under Rule 130, 24 (b) of the Rules of Court.
As for Prosecutor Querubin, they claim that he is the same prosecutor who had handled the
prosecution of Criminal Case No. 13800 against petitioner Paredes, Jr. in the Sandiganbayan and
after its dismissal, sought review in this Court and, therefore, he was biased against petitioners.
That Violan gave credence to the Certification of Judge Ario in concluding that no
arraignment had been held in Criminal Case No. 1393 is not proof that Violan was biased against
petitioners. Although Judge Ario subsequently gave an Affidavit, he never in that Affidavit
repudiated what he had earlier stated. In his Affidavit he merely stated:
1. That I am the incumbent Municipal Circuit Trial Court Judge in the First Municipal
Circuit Trial Court of San Francisco-Rosario-Bunawan, Agusan del Sur;
2. That I am the same Ciriaco C. Ario who issued a certificate in Criminal Case No.
1393 entitled Pp. vs. Ceferino S. Paredes, Jr. which certificate was used as evidence
in administrative complaint against Mansueto J. Honrada, in the Administrative
Complaint No. A.M. P-90-396 and Criminal Complaint against Mansueto J.
Honrada, incumbent Governor Ceferino S. Paredes, Jr. and Atty. Generoso S. Sansaet
before the Ombudsman under Criminal Case No. OBM-MIN-90-0053 (sic) entitled
Teofilo Gelacio vs. Mansueto J. Honrada, et. al.;
3. That honestly, the said certificate was issued without my expectation that the same be
used as evidence in any case and I be a witness;
4. That the use of said certificate as evidence in the above-mentioned cases is against
my conscience, more so upon discovery that the cases aforesaid are known to me to
be politically motivated and involves [sic] big time politicians in Agusan del Sur
about whom I am not at liberty to name names for security reason;
5. That in view of all the foregoing, I am not interested to testify in any investigation to
be conducted in connection thereof, either in the administrative or criminal
proceedings.
Thus, Judge Ario never denied his earlier Certification that Criminal Case No. 1393 never
reached the arraignment stage, because having learned that Paredes, Jr. had petitioned the
Ministry of Justice for a review of the fiscals resolution, Judge Ario suspended action until
March 17, 1986 and in fact the fiscal later moved for the dismissal of the case.
The fact that Judge Ario did not anticipate that his certificate might be used in evidence,
much less in the criminal cases now pending in the Sandiganbayan, is not a reason to disregard
it. The fact is that Judge Ario did not retract his previous Certification that there was no
arraignment held in Criminal Case No. 1393. If that is the truth, then the fact that he now says he
did not anticipate that his certificate would be used in evidence in any case would not diminish a
whit the value of the certificate.
Nor was consideration of the retraction of Atty. Sansaet proof that GIO II Violan was biased
against petitioners. Petitioners contend that Sansaets confession was privileged and that Violan
herself acknowledged that the affidavit of retraction might be inadmissible in court.
In the first place, there is nothing in the resolution of Violan which shows that she based her
conclusion (that petitioners were probably guilty of falsification of public documents) on Atty.
Sansaets retraction. In her resolution, all that she stated is that the confession of Atty. Sansaet has
falsification of public documents. To the contrary, Violan thought that the retraction was made in
violation of attorney-client privilege and therefore, would be inadmissible in evidence. Violan
could not, therefore, have relied on the affidavit of retraction.
Moreover, the admissibility of this piece of evidence is a question for the Sandiganbayan to
determine in the event it is used by the prosecution. It is untenable to ascribe bias and partiality
to the investigator because she considered this retraction in her resolution of the case. Even if she
relied on it mere divergence of opinions between a judge and a partys counsel as to applicable
laws and jurisprudence is not sufficient ground for disqualifying the judge from hearing the case
on the ground of bias and partiality.8
As for Prosecutor Querubin, simply because he was the one who handled the prosecution of
Criminal Case No. 13800, in connection with which the documents allegedly falsified were used
by petitioners, is not a reason for supposing he could not act fairly. As any other counsel in a
case, it was his duty to act with full devotion to [his clients] genuine interests, warm zeal in the
maintenance and defense of his rights, and the exertion of his utmost learning and ability. 9 It
cannot be casually assumed that because of his engagement in that case he had lost his
objectivity to such an extent that he forsook his duty to see to it that justice was done and not to
act out of vindictiveness.
Indeed, Querubin is a public prosecutor, not a private attorney. In the familiar terminology,
he is the representative not of an ordinary party to a controversy but of a sovereignty whose
obligation to govern impartially is as compelling as its obligation to govern at all and whose
interest, therefore, in a criminal prosecution is not that it shall win a case but that justice shall be
done.10 It may therefore be assumed that he was merely performing an official duty and that
nothing personal was involved in his recommendation to prosecute the cases.
Above all, it should be stressed that the decision to charge petitioners in the Sandiganbayan
was the decision not only of one person but of all those who in one way or another were called
upon to act in the cases, namely: Graft Investigation Officer Gay Maggie Balajadia-Violan,
Deputy Ombudsman Cesar Nitorreda, Ombudsman Conrado Vasquez, and Special Prosecutor
Aniano Desierto. Indeed, Querubins only contribution to the process was to suggest the filing of
three separate informations of falsification of public documents against petitioners.
II.
The second ground for the petition is that the Office of the Ombudsman closed its eyes to
the fact that in filing these cases, complainant Teofilo Gelacio is guilty of forum-shopping and
that his purpose for the filing of the cases is simply political harassment. To buttress their
contention, petitioners call attention to the factual background of the cases.11
According to petitioners, way back in 1984 private respondent Teofilo Gelacio charged
petitioner Paredes, Jr. with perjury on the ground that in 1975 Paredes, Jr. made false statements
in an affidavit which he used in support of his application for a free patent. As already noted, the
case which was filed with the Municipal Trial Court of San Francisco, Agusan del Sur, and
docketed there as Criminal Case No. 1393, was dismissed onMarch 24, 1986 upon motion of the
prosecution.
On October 28, 1986, Teofilo Gelacio filed another complaint against petitioner Paredes, Jr.,
then the acting governor of the province. The complaint was for violation of 3 (a) of Republic
Act 3019, otherwise known as Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act. Allegedly, in 1976
petitioner Paredes, Jr., then the Provincial Attorney of Agusan del Sur, unduly persuaded,
induced and influenced the Public Land Inspector to approve his (Paredes, Jrs) application for a
free patent. According to petitioners, this case involved the same application for a free patent of
petitioner Paredes, Jr., which was the subject of Criminal Case No. 1393.
The information was filed by Special Prosecutor Erdulfo Querubin in the Sandiganbayan
where it was docketed as Criminal Case No. 13800. Petitioner Paredes, Jr. moved to quash the
information, but the court denied his motion. He then filed a motion for reconsideration. It was in
connection with this motion that the procurement of allegedly falsified documents, now the
subject of prosecution, was made by petitioner Paredes, Jr. The documents were used to support
his motion for reconsideration.
On August 1, 1991, the Sandiganbayan reconsidered its previous resolution and dismissed
Criminal Case No. 13800, although on the ground of prescription. The Office of the Ombudsman
sought a review of the action of the Sandiganbayan, but its petition was dismissed by this Court
on July 3, 1992 in G.R. No. 101724. The motion for reconsideration filed by the prosecution was
likewise denied.
As an offshoot of the execution of these documents, two cases were filed by Teofilo Gelacio:
(1) an administrative complaint (A.P. Case No. P-90-3 96) for falsification of public documents
which was filed with this Court against Mansueto Honrada, the clerk of the MCTC who made
certifications and (2) a complaint for falsification of public documents, initially filed as OMBMIN-90-0053 with the Office of the Ombudsman and eventually as Criminal Case Nos. 17791,
17792, and 17793 in the Sandiganbayan, against the petitioners and Atty. Generoso Sansaet.
The first case was dismissed for insufficiency of the evidence. But with respect to the second
complaint, Graft Investigation Officer Violan found probable cause to proceed against petitioners
and against Atty. Sansaet and so recommended the filing of a case against them. Her
recommendation was approved by the Ombudsman on June 26, 1992, although upon the
recommendation of Special Prosecutor Querubin three separate informations were filed with the
Sandiganbayan. Earlier on July 29, 1991, Atty. Sansaet, one of the respondents, executed an
Affidavit of Explanations and Rectifications in which he stated that, contrary to his previous
affidavit, there was no arraignment held in Criminal Case No. 1393.
A. Petitioners contend that these cases should be dismissed, being merely the latest in a
series of cases which arose out of the same alleged incident - i.e. that of allegedly having induced
the land inspector to approve his (Paredes, Jr.s) land application, 12 for having been filed in
violation of the rules on forum-shopping. Petitioners cite the following statement in Crisostomo
v. Securities and Exchange Commission:13
There is forum-shopping whenever as a result of an adverse opinion in one forum, a party seeks a
favorable opinion (other than by appeal or certiorari) in another. The principle applies not only
with respect to suits filed in the courts while an administrative proceeding is pending as in this
case, in order to defeat administrative processes and in anticipation of an unfavorable
administrative ruling and a favorable court ruling. . . A violation of this rule shall constitute
contempt of court and shall be a cause for summary dismissal of both petitions, without prejudice
to the taking of appropriate action against the counsel or the party concerned.
The mere filing of several cases based on the same incident does not necessarily constitute
forum-shopping. The test is whether the several actions filed involve the same transactions,
essential facts, and circumstances.14 Here, although several cases were filed by the same
complainant against the same defendant and the subject matter of the actions of two of the cases
was the same incident (i.e., the application for free patent of petitioner Ceferino Paredes, Jr.), the
fact is that the several cases involve essentially different facts, circumstances and causes of
action.
Thus, Criminal Case No. 1393, which was filed in the MCTC of San Francisco, Agusan del
Sur, was for perjury, based on false statements allegedly made in 1975 by petitioner Paredes, Jr.
in connection with his free patent application. Criminal Case No. 13800, which was filed in the
Sandiganbayan, although based on the filing of the same application for free patent, was for
violation of the Anti-graft and Corrupt Practices Act, on the allegation that petitioner, as
Provincial Attorney, had unduly influenced the Public Land Inspector to secure the approval of
his free patent application. On the other hand, as already stated, the present cases (Criminal Case
Nos. 17791, 17792 and 17793) are for falsification of court records pertaining to Criminal Case
No. 1393. A.P. Case No. P-90-396 is an administrative case against petitioner Honrada based on
the same incident and facts that are subject of the preceding criminal cases. The rest are incidents
of these cases, being the petition for review and motions for reconsideration in Criminal Case
No. 13800 and A.P. Case No. P-90-396.
incident, i.e., petitioners public land application, they involve different issues. It is well settled
that a single act may offend against two or more distinct and related provisions of law 15 or that
the same act may give rise to criminal as well as administrative liability.16 As such, they may be
prosecuted simultaneously or one after another, so long as they do not place the accused in
double jeopardy of being punished for the same offense.
Petitioners call attention to the fact that the administrative complaint against petitioner
Honrada was dismissed. They invoke our ruling in Maceda v. Vasquez17 that only this Court has
the power to oversee court personnels compliance with laws and take the appropriate
powers.
But one thing is administrative liability. Quite another thing is the criminal liability for the
same act. Our determination of the administrative liability for falsification of public documents is
in no way conclusive of his lack of criminal liability. As we have held in Tan v. Comelec,18 the
dismissal of an administrative case does not necessarily bar the filing of a criminal prosecution
for the same or similar acts which were the subject of the administrative complaint.
Petitioners assertion that private respondent Alterado has resorted to forum-shopping is
unacceptable. The investigation then being conducted by the Ombudsman on the criminal case
for falsification and violation of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, on the one hand, and
the inquiry into the administrative charges by the COMELEC, on the other hand, are entirely
independent proceedings. Neither would the results in one conclude the other. Thus an
absolution from a criminal charge is not a bar to an administrative prosecution (Office of the
Court administrator v. Enriquez, 218 SCRA 1) or vice versa.19
B. As final argument, petitioners allege that the complaint in Criminal Case Nos. 17791,
17792 and 17793 was filed by political enemies of petitioner Paredes, Jr. merely to harass him
and that there is in fact no probable cause to support the prosecution of these cases. Petitioners
cite the following which allegedly indicate that the charges below have merely been trumped up:
(1) The affidavit of Agusan del Sur District Citizens Attorney Lou Nueva, stating that then
Congressman Democrito O. Plaza instructed Atty. Leonardo Cadiz to secure a certification from
Judge Ciriaco C. Ario that no arraignment had been held in Criminal Case No. 1393, threatening
that if the judge refused to give the certification, he (Congressman Plaza) would do everything
against
Judge Ciriaco C. Ario, including reviving certain cases against Judge Ario; 20 and (2) The
affidavit, dated November 5, 1990, of Judge Ario in which he stated that he did not expect that
the certificate which he had previously issued would be used in evidence and that the use of the
certificate in the cases below was against his conscience, because the cases were politically
motivated and he was not going to testify in any investigation concerning such certificate. 21 At
the same time petitioners seek to minimize the retraction of Atty. Sansaet by ascribing political
motivation for its execution. Petitioner Ceferino Paredes, Jr. claims that Sansaets obsession has
been to win in an election and that his loss to petitioner Paredes, Jr. in the May 11,
1992 congressional elections was Sansaets sixth defeat. As for private respondent Teofilo
Gelacio, petitioners say he is a political leader of Democrito Plaza. They claim that in 1991 Atty.
Sansaet changed political affiliation and allied himself with Democrito Plaza and Teofilo
Gelacio.
Petitioners argue that the certifications made by the clerk of court with respect to an
arraignment allegedly held on July 9, 1985 in Criminal Case No. 1393 is conclusive and cannot
be altered by Atty. Sansaets claim to the contrary. They cite what is now Rule 132, 23 of the
Revised Rules on Evidence, which provides that public instruments are evidence, even against a
third person, of the fact which gave rise to their execution and of the date of the latter.
We find the foregoing averments to be unpersuasive. First of all, that the filing of the
charges is politically motivated cannot justify the prohibition of a criminal prosecution if there is
otherwise evidence to support them. Here a preliminary investigation of the complaint against
petitioners was held during which petitioners were heard. Their evidence, as well as that of
private respondent Gelacio, was considered in great detail in the resolution of GIO II Violan.
Violans resolution was reviewed by Special Prosecutor Erdulfo Querubin who made his own
detailed resolution concurring in the finding of Violn. We cannot say that, in approving the
resolutions of two investigators, the respondent Ombudsman and Special Prosecutor committed
an abuse of their discretion.
Indeed, this Court is loath to interfere with the discretion of the Ombudsman unless such
discretion is clearly shown to have been abused. As explained in Young v. Office of the
Ombudsman:22
The rule is based not only upon respect for the investigatory and prosecutory powers granted by
the Constitution to the Office of the Ombudsman but upon practicality as well. Otherwise, the
functions of the courts will be grievously hampered by innumerable petitions assailing the
dismissal of investigatory proceedings conducted by the Office of the Ombudsman with regard to
complaints filed before it, in much the same way that the courts would be extremely swamped if
they could be compelled to review the exercise of discretion on the part of the fiscals or
prosecuting attorneys each time they decide to file an information in court or dismiss a complaint
by a private complainant.
There are instances, constituting exceptions to the general rule, when this Court will
intervene in the prosecution of cases. Some of these instances were enumerated in Brocka v.
Enrile,23 as follows:
a. Where injunction is justified by the necessity to afford protection to the constitutional
rights of the accused; (Hernandez vs. Albano, et al., L-19272, January 25, 1967, 19
SCRA 95)
b. When necessary for the orderly administration of justice or to avoid oppression or
multiplicity of actions; (Dimayuga, et al. vs. Fernandez, 43 Phil. 304; Hernandez vs.
Albano, supra; Fortun vs. Labang, et al. L-38383, May 27 1981, 104 SCRA 607)
c. When there is a prejudicial question which is sub judice;. (De Leon vs. Mabanag, 70
Phil. 202)
d. When the acts of the officer are without or in excess of authority; (Planas vs. Gil, 67
Phil 62)
e. Where the prosecution is under an invalid law, ordinance or regulation; (Young vs.
Rafferty, 33 Phil 556; Yu Co Eng vs. Trinidad, 47 Phil. 385, 389)
f. When double jeopardy is clearly apparent; (Sangalang vs. People and Avendia, 109
Phil. 1140)
g. Where the court has no jurisdiction over the offense; (Lopez vs. City Judge, L-25795,
October 29, 1966, 18 SCRA 616).
h. Where it is a case of persecution rather than prosecution; (Rustia vs. Ocampo, CAG.R. No. 4760, March 25, 1960)
i. Where the charges are manifestly false and motivated by the lust for vengeance;
(Recto vs. Castelo, 18 L.J. (1953), cited in Ranoa vs. Alvendia, CA G.R. No. 30720R, October 8, 1962; cf Guingona, et al. vs. City Fiscal, L-60033, April 4, 1984, 128
SCRA 577).
j. When there is clearly no prima facie case against the accused and motion to quash on
that ground has been denied; (Salonga vs. Pano, et al., L-59524, February 18, 1985,
134 SCRA 438); and
k. Preliminary injunction has been issued by the Supreme Court to prevent the
threatened unlawful arrest of petitioners. (Rodriguez vs. Castelo, L-6374, August 1,
1953) (cited in Regalado, REMEDIAL LAW COMPENDIUM, p. 188 1988 Ed).
But none of these instances is present here.
What petitioners raise are questions which go to the weight to be given to the affidavits by
Atty. Nueva and Judge Ario. These are matters for the trial courts appreciation. A preliminary
investigation is not a trial. The function of the government prosecutor during the preliminary
investigation is merely to determine the existence of probable cause. 24 As we explained in Pilapil
vs. Sandiganbayan,25 this function involves only the following:
Probable cause is a reasonable ground of presumption that a matter is, or may be, well-founded,
such a state of facts in the mind of the prosecutor as would lead a person of ordinary caution and
prudence to believe, or entertain an honest or strong suspicion, that a thing is so. (Words and
Phrases, Probable Cause v. 34, p. 12) The term does not mean actual and positive cause nor does
it import absolute certainty. It is merely based on opinion and reasonable belief. Thus a finding
of probable cause does not require an inquiry into whether there is sufficient evidence to procure
a conviction. It is enough that it is believed that the act or omission complained of constitutes the
offense charged. Precisely, there is a trial for the reception of evidence of the prosecution in
support of the charge.
Secondly, to warrant a finding of political harassment so as to justify the grant of the
extraordinary writs of certiorari and prohibition, it must be shown that the complainant possesses
the power and the influence to control the prosecution of cases. Here, the prosecution is handled
by the Office of the Ombudsman. Although it is intimated that Petitioner Ceferino S. Paredes, Jr.
is the subject of persecution by his political enemies in Agusan del Sur, it has not been alleged,
service.
To show political harassment petitioners must prove that public prosecutor, and not just the
private complainant, is acting in bad faith in prosecuting the case 26 or has lent himself to a
scheme that could have no other purpose than to place the accused in contempt and
disrepute.27 For it is only if he does so may the prosecutor, in conducting the preliminary
investigation, be said to have deserted the performance of his office to determine objectively and
impartially the existence of probable cause and thus justify judicial intervention in what is
essentially his province.
WHEREFORE, the petition for certiorari and prohibition is DISMISSED.
SO ORDERED.
Narvasa, C.J. (Chairman), Padilla, Regalado, Davide, Jr., Romero, Bellosillo, Melo, Puno,
Vitug, Kapunan, Francisco, Hermosisima, Jr., and Panganiban, JJ., concur.

Supreme Court
Manila
[G.R. No. 130240.February 5, 2002]
DE VENECIA, JR., et al., vs. SANDIGANBAYAN (1st DIV.)
EN BANC
Gentlemen:
Quoted hereunder, for your information, is a resolution of this Court dated FEB 5 2002.
G.R. No. 130240(Jose de Venecia, Jr., in his capacity as Speaker of the House of
Representatives; Roberto P. Nazareno, in his capacity as Secretary-General of the House of
Representatives; Jose Ma. Antonio B. Tuao, Cashier, House of Representatives; Antonio M.
Chan, Chief, Property Division, House of Representatives, petitioners, vs. The Honorable
Sandiganbayan (First Division), respondent.)
The principal issue in this petitioner for certiorari [1]cralaw is whether of not the Sandiganbayan
may cite in contempt of court the Speaker of the House of Representatives for refusing to
implement the preventive suspension order it issued in a criminal case against a member of the
House.
Petitioners seek the annulment of:
(1) the Order dated August 18, 1997 of the Sandiganbayan (First Division), [2]cralaw directing
Speaker Jose de Venecia of the House of Representatives, to implement the preventive
suspension of then Congressman Ceferino S. Paredes, Jr., in connection with Criminal Case No.
18857 entitled "People of the Philippines v. Ceferino S. Paredes, Jr. and Gregorio S.
Branzuela"; and
(2) the Resolution dated August 29, 1997,[3]cralaw also of the Sandiganbayan, declaring Speaker
de Venecia in contempt of court for refusing to implement the preventive suspension order.
On March 12, 1993, an Information (docketed as Criminal Case No. 18857) was filed with the
Sandiganbayan (First Division) against then Congressman Ceferino S. Paredes, Jr., of Agusan del
Sur for violation of Section 3 (e) of Republic Act No. 3019 (The Anti-Graft and Corrupt
Practices Act, as amended).
After the accused pleaded not guilty, the prosecution filed a "Motion To Suspend The
AccusedPendente Lite."
In its Resolution dated June 6, 1997, the Sandiganbayan granted the motion and ordered
the Speaker to suspend the accused.But the Speaker did not comply.Thus, on August 12, 1997,
the Sandiganbayan issued a Resolution requiring him to appear before it, on August 18, 1997 at
8:00 o'clock in the morning, to show cause why he should not be held in contempt of court.
Unrelenting, the Speaker filed, through counsel, a motion for reconsideration, invoking the rule
on separation of powers and claiming that he can only act as may be dictated by the House as a
body pursuant to House Resolution No. 116 adopted on August 13, 1997.
On August 29, 1997, the Sandiganbayan rendered the now assailed Resolution [4]cralaw declaring
Speaker Jose C. de Venecia, Jr. in contempt of court and ordering him to pay a fine of P10,000.00
within 10 days from notice.
Hence, the instant recourse.

The issue before us had long been settled by this Court in Ceferino S. Paredes, Jr. v.
Sandiganbayanin G.R. No. 118354 (August 8, 1995).We ruled that the suspension provided for
in the Anti-Graft law ismandatory and is of different nature and purpose.It is imposed by the
court, not as a penalty, but as a precautionary measure resorted to upon the filing of a valid
Information.Its purpose is to prevent the accused public officer from frustrating his prosecution
by influencing witnesses or tampering with documentary evidence and from committing further
acts of malfeasance while in office.It is thus an incident to the criminal proceedings before the
court.On the other hand, the suspension or expulsion contemplated in the Constitution is a
House-imposed sanction against its members.It is, therefore, apenalty for disorderly behavior
to enforce discipline, maintain order in its proceedings, or vindicate its honor and integrity.
Just recently, in Miriam Defensor Santiago v. Sandiganbayan, et al., this Court en banc, through
Justice Jose C. Vitug, held that the doctrine of separation of powers does not exclude the
members of Congress from the mandate of R.A. 3019, thus:
"The order of suspension prescribed by Republic Act No. 3019 is
distinct from the power of Congress to discipline its own ranks under the
"The suspension contemplated in the above constitutional provision is a
punitive measure that is imposed upon a determination by the Senate or the House
of Representatives, as the case may be, upon an erring member. x x x.
"The doctrine of separation of powers by itself may not be deemed to
have effectively excluded members of Congress from Republic Act No. 3019
nor from its sanctions.The maxim simply recognizes that each of the three coequal and independent, albeit coordinate, branches of the government - the
Legislative, the Executive and the Judiciary - has exclusive prerogatives and
cognizance within its own sphere of influence and effectively prevents one
branch from unduly intruding into the internal affairs of either
branch."(Emphasis ours)
We note that the term of then Congressman Ceferino Paredes, Jr. expired on June 30, 1988.This
rendered moot and academic the instant case.
WHEREFORE, for being moot, this case is deemed CLOSED and TERMINATED.
(Quisumbing, J., no part.Quisumbing and Carpio, JJ., abroad on official business)

SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-11530
August 12, 1916

vs.
JUAN PONS, defendant-appellant.
Jose Varela y Calderon for appellant.
Attorney-General Avancea for appellee.
TRENT, J.:
The information in this case reads:
The undersigned charges Gabino Beliso, Juan Pons, and Jacinto Lasarte with the crime of
illegal importation of opium, committed as follows:
That on or about the 10th day of April, 1915, the said accused, conspiring together and
plotting among themselves, did, knowingly, willfully, unlawfully, feloniously and
fraudulently, bring from a foreign country, to wit, that of Spain, on board the
steamer Lopez y Lopez, and import and introduce into the city of Manila, Philippine
Islands, and within the jurisdiction of the court, 520 tins containing 125 kilograms of
opium of the value of P62,400, Philippine currency; and that, then and there, the said
accused, also conspiring together and plotting among themselves, did receive and conceal
the said quantity of opium and aided each other in the transportation, receipt and
concealment of the same after the said opium had been imported, knowing that said drug
had been unlawfully brought, imported and illegally introduced into the Philippine
Islands from a foreign country; an act committed in violation of law."
On motion of counsel Juan Pons and Gabino Beliso were tried separately. (Jacinto Lasarte had
not yet been arrested.) Each were found guilty of the crime charged and sentenced accordingly,
the former to be confined in Bilibid Prison for the period of two years, to pay a fine of P1,000, to
suffer the corresponding subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency, and to the payment of
one-half of the costs. The same penalties were imposed upon the latter, except that he was
sentenced to pay a fine of P3,000. Both appealed. Beliso later withdrew his appeal and the
judgment as to him has become final.
The contentions for reversal are numerous (twenty-five assignments of error) and are greatly
multiplied by their reiteration in a somewhat changed form of statement under the many
propositions embraced in the elaborate printed brief, but their essence, when correctly
understood, are these: The court erred (a) in denying this appellant's motion, dated May 6, 1915,
and reproduced on July 27, 1915, and (b) in finding that the legal evidence of record establishes
the guilt of the appellant, Juan Pons, beyond a reasonable doubt.
In his motion above mentioned, counsel alleged and offered to prove that the last day of the
special session of the Philippine Legislature for 1914 was the 28th day of February; that Act No.
2381, under which Pons must be punished if found guilty, was not passed or approved on the
28th of February but on March 1 of that year; and that, therefore, the same is null and void. The
validity of the Act is not otherwise questioned. As it is admitted that the last day of the special
session was, under the Governor-General's proclamation, February 28 and that the appellant is
charged with having violated the provisions of Act No. 2381, the vital question is the date of
adjournment of the Legislature, and this reduces itself to two others, namely, (1) how that is to be
proved, whether by the legislative journals or extraneous evidence and (2) whether the court can
take judicial notice of the journals. These questions will be considered in the reversed order.
Act No. 1679 provides that the Secretary of the Commission shall perform the duties which
would properly be required of the Recorder of the Commission under the existing law. And rules
15 and 16 of the Legislative Procedure of the Philippine Commission provides, among other
things, "that the proceedings of the Commission shall be briefly and accurately stated on the
journal," and that it shall be the duty of the Secretary "to keep a correct journal of the
proceedings of the Commission." On page 793 of volume 7 of the Commission Journal for the
ordinary and special sessions of the Third Philippine Legislature, the following appears:
The Journal for Saturday, February 28, 1914, was approved. Adjournment sine die of the
Commission as a Chamber of the Philippine Legislature. The hour of midnight having
arrived, on motion of Commissioner Palma, the Commission, as a Chamber of the
Philippine Legislature, adjourned sine die.
The Act of Congress, approved July 1, 1902, provides, among other things, in section 7, that the
Philippine Assembly "shall keep in journal of its proceedings, which shall be published . . . ." In
obedience to this mandate, the journal of the Assembly's proceedings for the sessions of 1914
was duly published and it appears therein (vol. 9, p. 1029), that the Assembly adjourned sine
die at 12 o'clock midnight on February 28, 1914.
Section 275 of the Code of Civil Procedure provides that the existence of the "official acts of the
legislative, executive, and judicial departments of the United States and of the Philippine
Islands ... shall be judicially recognized by the court without the introduction of proof; but the
court may receive evidence upon any of the subjects in this section states, when it shall find it
necessary for its own information, and may resort for its aid to appropriate books, documents, or
evidence." And section 313 [as amended by sec. 1 of Act No. 2210], of the same Code also
provides that:
Official documents may be proved as follows: . . . .
(2) The proceedings of the Philippine Commission, or of any legislative body that may be
provided for the Philippine Islands, or of Congress, by the journals of those bodies or of
either house thereof, or by published statutes or resolutions, or by copies certified by the
clerk or secretary or printed by their order:Provided, That in the case of Acts of the
Philippine Commission or the Philippine Legislature when there is in existence a copy
signed by the presiding officers and the secretaries of said bodies, it shall be conclusive
proof of the provisions of such Act and of the due enactment thereof.
While there are no adjudicated cases in this jurisdiction upon the exact question whether the
courts may take judicial notice of the legislative journals, it is well settled in the United States
that such journals may be noticed by the courts in determining the question whether a particular
bill became a law or not. (The State ex rel. Herron vs. Smith, 44 Ohio, 348, and cases cited
therein.) The result is that the law and the adjudicated cases make it our duty to take judicial
notice of the legislative journals of the special session of the Philippine Legislature of 1914.
These journals are not ambiguous or contradictory as to the actual time of the adjournment. They
show, with absolute certainty, that the Legislature adjourned sine die at 12 o'clock midnight on
February 28, 1914.
Passing over the question whether the printed Act (No. 2381), published by authority of law, is
conclusive evidence as to the date when it was passed, we will inquire whether the courts may go
behind the legislative journals for the purpose of determining the date of adjournment when such
journals are clear and explicit. From the foregoing it is clear that this investigation belongs
entirely to that branch of legal science which embraces and illustrates the laws of evidence. On
the one hand, it is maintained that the Legislature did not, as we have indicated, adjourn at
midnight on February 28, 1914, but on March 1st, and that this allegation or alleged fact may be
established by extraneous evidence; while, on the other hand, it is urged that the contents of the
legislative journals are conclusive evidence as to the date of adjournment. In order to understand
these opposing positions, it is necessary to consider the nature and character of the evidence thus
involved. Evidence is understood to be that which proves or disproves "any matter in question or
to influence the belief respecting it," and "conclusive evidence is that which establishes the fact,
as in the instance of conclusive presumptions." (Bouvier's Law Dictionary, vol. 1, p. 701 et seq.)
Counsel for the appellant, in order to establish his contention, must necessarily depend upon the
memory or recollection of witnesses, while the legislative journals are the acts of the
Government or sovereign itself. From their very nature and object the records of the Legislature
are as important as those of the judiciary, and to inquiry into the veracity of the journals of the
Philippine Legislature, when they are, as we have said, clear and explicit, would be to violate
both the letter and the spirit of the organic laws by which the Philippine Government was
brought into existence, to invade a coordinate and independent department of the Government,
and to interfere with the legitimate powers and functions of the Legislature. But counsel in his
argument says that the public knows that the Assembly's clock was stopped on February 28,
1914, at midnight and left so until the determination of the discussion of all pending matters. Or,
in other words, the hands of the clock were stayed in order to enable the Assembly to effect an
adjournment apparently within the time fixed by the Governor's proclamation for the expiration
of the special session, in direct violation of the Act of Congress of July 1, 1902. If the clock was,
in fact, stopped, as here suggested, "the resultant evil might be slight as compared with that of
altering the probative force and character of legislative records, and making the proof of
legislative action depend upon uncertain oral evidence, liable to loss by death or absence, and so
imperfect on account of the treachery of memory. Long, long centuries ago, these considerations
of public policy led to the adoption of the rule giving verity and unimpeachability to legislative
records. If that character is to be taken away for one purpose, it must be taken away for all, and
the evidence of the laws of the state must rest upon a foundation less certain and durable than
that afforded by the law to many contracts between private individuals concerning comparatively
trifling matters." (Capito vs. Topping, W. Va., 22 L. R. A. [N. S.], 1089.) Upon the same point the
court, in the State ex rel. Herron vs. Smith (44 Ohio, 348), decided in 1886, said:
Counsel have exhibited unusual industry in looking up the various cases upon this
question; and, out of a multitude of citations, not one is found in which any court has
assumed to go beyond the proceedings of the legislature, as recorded in the journals
required to be kept in each of its branches, on the question whether a law has been
adopted. And if reasons for the limitation upon judicial inquiry in such matters have not
generally been stated, in doubtless arises from the fact that they are apparent. Imperative
reasons of public policy require that the authenticity of laws should rest upon public
memorials of the most permanent character. They should be public, because all are
required to conform to them; they should be permanent, that right acquired to-day upon
the faith of what has been declared to be law shall not be destroyed to-morrow, or at some
remote period of time, by facts resting only in the memory of individuals.
In the case from which this last quotation is taken, the court cited numerous decisions of the
various states in the American Union in support of the rule therein laid down, and we have been
unable to find a single case of a later date where the rule has been in the least changed or
modified when the legislative journals cover the point. As the Constitution of the Philippine
Government is modeled after those of the Federal Government and the various states, we do not
hesitate to follow the courts in that country in the matter now before us. The journals say that the
Legislature adjourned at 12 midnight on February 28, 1914. This settles the question, and the
court did not err in declining to go behind these journals.
On or about the 5th or 6th of April, 1915, the Spanish mail steamer Lopez y Lopez arrived at
Manila from Spain, bringing, among other cargo, twenty-five barrels which were manifested as
"wine" and consigned to Jacinto Lasarte. Gabino Beliso had been, prior to the arrival of this
cargo, engaged in the business of a wine merchant, with an office and warehouse located at 203
Calle San Anton in this city. The shipper's invoice and bill of lading for the twenty-five barrels
were delivered to Gregorio Cansipit, a customs broker, by Beliso. These documents were
indorsed as follows: "Deliver to Don Gabino Beliso" and signed "Jacinto Lasarte." Cansipit
conducted the negotiations incident to the release of the merchandise from the customhouse and
the twenty-five barrels were delivered in due course to the warehouse of Beliso at the
aforementioned street and number. Beliso signed the paper acknowledging delivery. Shortly
thereafter the custom authorities, having noticed that shipments of merchandise manifested as
"wine" had been arriving in Manila from Spain, consigned to persons whose names were not
listed as merchants, and having some doubt as to the nature of the merchandise so consigned,
instituted an investigation and traced on the 10th of April, 1915, the twenty-five barrels to
Beliso's warehouse, being aided by the customs registry number of the shipment, the entry
number, and the serial number of each barrel. It was found that the twenty-five barrels began to
arrive on bull carts at Beliso's warehouse about 11 o'clock on the morning of April 9. Before the
merchandise arrived at that place, the appellant, Juan Pons, went to Beliso's warehouse and
joined Beliso in the latter's office, where the two engaged in conversation. Pons then left and
shortly thereafter several of the barrels arrived and were unloaded in Beliso's bodega. He called
one of his employees, Cornelius Sese, and directed him to go out and get a bull cart. This Sese
did and returned with the vehicle. Beliso then carefully selected five barrels out of the shipment
of twenty-five and told Sese to load these five on the cart and to deliver them to Juan Pons at No.
144 Calle General Solano. This order was complied with by Sese and the barrels delivered to
Pons at the place designated. Pursuing their investigation, which started on the 10th, the customs
secret service agents entered Beliso's bodega on that date before the office was opened and
awaited the arrival of Beliso. Sese was found in the bodega and placed under arrest. The agents
then proceeded to separate the recent shipment from the other merchandise stored in the
warehouse, identifying the barrels by the customs registry and entry numbers. Only twenty of the
twenty-five barrels could be found on Beliso's premises. Upon being questioned or interrogated,
Sese informed the customs agents that the five missing barrels had been delivered by him to Pons
at 144 Calle General Solano by order of Beliso. The agents, accompanied by Sese, proceeded to
144 Calle General Solano and here found the five missing barrels, which were identified by the
registry and entry numbers as well as by the serial numbers. The five barrels were empty, the
staves having been sprung and the iron hoops removed. Five empty tins, each corresponding in
size to the heads of the five barrels, were found on the floor nearby. The customs officers noticed
several baskets of lime scattered about the basement of the house and on further search they
found 77 tins of opium in one of these baskets. There was no one in the house when this search
was made, but some clothing was discovered which bore the initials "J. P." It then became
important to the customs agents to ascertain the owner and occupant of house No. 144 on Calle
General Solano where the five barrels were delivered. The owner was found, upon investigation,
to be Mariano Limjap, and from the latter's agent it was learned that the house was rented by one
F. C. Garcia. When the lease of the house was produced by the agent of the owner, the agents
saw that the same was signed "F. C. Garcia, by Juan Pons." After discovering these facts they
returned to the house of Beliso and selected three of the twenty barrels and ordered them
returned to the customhouse. Upon opening these three barrels each was found to contain a large
tin fitted into the head of the barrel with wooden cleats and securely nailed. Each large tin
contained 75 small tins of opium. A comparison of the large tins taken out of the three barrels
with the empty ones found at 144 Calle General Solano show, says the trial court, "that they were
in every way identical in size, form, etc."
While the customs officers were still at the office and warehouse of Beliso on the morning of
April 10, Pons, apparently unaware that anything unusual was going on, arrived there and was
placed under arrest, and taken to the office of Captain Hawkins, chief of the customs secret
service, and according to Hawkins, voluntarily confessed his participation in the smuggling of
the opium. He maintained, however, that the 77 tins of opium found at 144 Calle General Solano
represented the entire importation. Pons, being at the customhouse under arrest at the time the
three barrels were opened and the customs officers appearing to be no doubt as to which end of
the barrels contained the opium, Pons showed the officers how to open the barrels and pointed
out that the end of the barrel, which had the impression of a bottle stamped in the wood,
contained the opium. On seeing the 195 tins of opium taken from the three barrels, Pons further
stated that he had delivered some 250 tins of opium of this shipment to a Chinaman at 7.30 a. m.
on the morning of April 10, following the instructions given him by Beliso. On being further
questioned, Pons stated that he and Beliso had been partners in several opium transactions; that
the house at No. 144 Calle General Solano had been leased by him at the suggestion of Beliso for
the purpose of handling the prohibited drug; and that he and Beliso had shared the profits of a
previous importation of opium. Sese testified that he had delivered a previous shipment to 144
Calle General Solano. The customs agents then went with Pons to his house and found in his
yard several large tin receptacles, in every way similar to those found at 144 Calle General
Solano and those taken from the barrels at the customhouse. At first Pons stated that F. C. Garcia
was a tobacco merchant traveling in the between the Provinces of Isabela and Cagayan, and later
he retracted this statement and admitted that Garcia was a fictitious person. But during the trial
of this case in the court below Pons testified that Garcia was a wine merchant and a resident of
Spain, and that Garcia had written him a letter directing him to rent a house for him (Garcia) and
retain it until the arrival in the Philippine Islands of Garcia. According to Pons this letter arrived
on the same steamer which brought the 25 barrels of "wine," but that he had destroyed it because
he feared that it would compromise him. On being asked during the trial why he insisted, in
purchasing wine from Beliso, in receiving a part of the wine which had just arrived on the Lopez
y Lopez, answered, "Naturally because F. C. Garcia told me in this letter that this opium was
coming in barrels of wine sent to Beliso by a man the name of Jacinto Lasarte, and that is the
reason I wanted to get these barrels of wine."
The foregoing are substantially the fats found by the trial court and these fats establish the guilt
of the appellant beyond any question of a doubt, notwithstanding his feeble attempt to show that
the opium as shipped to him from Spain by a childhood fried named Garcia. The appellant took a
direct part in this huge smuggling transaction and profited thereby. The penalty imposed by the
trial court is in accordance with la and the decisions of this court in similar cases.
For the foregoing reasons, the judgment appealed from is affirmed, with costs. So ordered.
Torres, Johnson, Moreland, and Araullo, JJ., concur.
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. 105371 November 11, 1993

THE PHILIPPINE JUDGES ASSOCIATION, duly rep. by its President, BERNARDO P.
ABESAMIS, Vice-President for Legal Affairs, MARIANO M. UMALI, Director for Pasig,
Makati, and Pasay, Metro Manila, ALFREDO C. FLORES, and Chairman of the
Committee on Legal Aid, JESUS G. BERSAMIRA, Presiding Judges of the Regional Trial
Court, Branch 85, Quezon City and Branches 160, 167 and 166, Pasig, Metro Manila,
respectively: the NATIONAL CONFEDERATION OF THE JUDGES ASSOCIATION OF
THE PHILIPPINES, composed of the METROPOLITAN TRIAL COURT JUDGES
ASSOCIATION rep. by its President. REINATO QUILALA of the MUNICIPAL TRIAL
CIRCUIT COURT, Manila; THE MUNICIPAL JUDGES LEAGUE OF THE
PHILIPPINES rep. by its President, TOMAS G. TALAVERA; by themselves and in behalf
of all the Judges of the Regional Trial and Shari'a Courts, Metropolitan Trial Courts and
Municipal Courts throughout the Country, petitioners,
vs.
HON. PETE PRADO, in his capacity as Secretary of the Department of Transportation
and Communications, JORGE V. SARMIENTO, in his capacity as Postmaster General,
and the PHILIPPINE POSTAL CORP., respondents.
CRUZ, J.:
The basic issue raised in this petition is the independence of the Judiciary. It is asserted by the
petitioners that this hallmark of republicanism is impaired by the statute and circular they are
here challenging. The Supreme Court is itself affected by these measures and is thus an
interested party that should ordinarily not also be a judge at the same time. Under our system of
government, however, it cannot inhibit itself and must rule upon the challenge, because no other
office has the authority to do so. We shall therefore act upon this matter not with officiousness
but in the discharge of an unavoidable duty and, as always, with detachment and fairness.
The main target of this petition is Section 35 of R.A. No. 7354 as implemented by the Philippine
Postal Corporation through its Circular No.
92-28. These measures withdraw the franking privilege from the Supreme Court, the Court of
Appeals, the Regional Trial Courts, the Metropolitan Trial Courts, the Municipal Trial Courts,
and the Land Registration Commission and its Registers of Deeds, along with certain other
government offices.
The petitioners are members of the lower courts who feel that their official functions as judges
will be prejudiced by the above-named measures. The National Land Registration Authority has
taken common cause with them insofar as its own activities, such as sending of requisite notices
in registration cases, affect judicial proceedings. On its motion, it has been allowed to intervene.
The petition assails the constitutionality of R.A. No. 7354 on the grounds that: (1) its title
embraces more than one subject and does not express its purposes; (2) it did not pass the required
readings in both Houses of Congress and printed copies of the bill in its final form were not
distributed among the members before its passage; and (3) it is discriminatory and encroaches on
the independence of the Judiciary.
We approach these issues with one important principle in mind, to wit, the presumption of the
constitutionality of statutes. The theory is that as the joint act of the Legislature and the
Executive, every statute is supposed to have first been carefully studied and determined to be
constitutional before it was finally enacted. Hence, unless it is clearly shown that it is
constitutionally flawed, the attack against its validity must be rejected and the law itself upheld.
To doubt is to sustain.
I
We consider first the objection based on Article VI, Sec. 26(l), of the Constitution providing that
"Every bill passed by the Congress shall embrace only one subject which shall be expressed in
the title thereof."
The purposes of this rule are: (1) to prevent hodge-podge or "log-rolling" legislation; (2) to
prevent surprise or fraud upon the legislature by means of provisions in bills of which the title
gives no intimation, and which might therefore be overlooked and carelessly and unintentionally
adopted; and (3) to fairly apprise the people, through such publication of legislative proceedings
as is usually made, of the subject of legislation that is being considered, in order that they may
have opportunity of being heard thereon, by petition or otherwise, if they shall so desire. 1
It is the submission of the petitioners that Section 35 of R.A. No. 7354 which withdrew the
franking privilege from the Judiciary is not expressed in the title of the law, nor does it reflect its
purposes.
R.A. No. 7354 is entitled "An Act Creating the Philippine Postal Corporation, Defining its
Powers, Functions and Responsibilities, Providing for Regulation of the Industry and for Other
Purposes Connected Therewith."
The objectives of the law are enumerated in Section 3, which provides:
The State shall pursue the following objectives of a nationwide postal system:
a) to enable the economical and speedy transfer of mail and other postal matters,
from sender to addressee, with full recognition of their privacy or confidentiality;
b) to promote international interchange, cooperation and understanding through
the unhampered flow or exchange of postal matters between nations;
c) to cause or effect a wide range of postal services to cater to different users and
changing needs, including but not limited to, philately, transfer of monies and
valuables, and the like;
d) to ensure that sufficient revenues are generated by and within the industry to
finance the overall cost of providing the varied range of postal delivery and
messengerial services as well as the expansion and continuous upgrading of
service standards by the same.
Sec. 35 of R.A. No. 7354, which is the principal target of the petition, reads as follows:
Sec. 35. Repealing Clause. All acts, decrees, orders, executive orders,
instructions, rules and regulations or parts thereof inconsistent with the provisions
of this Act are repealed or modified accordingly.
All franking privileges authorized by law are hereby repealed, except those
provided for under Commonwealth Act No. 265, Republic Acts Numbered 69,
180, 1414, 2087 and 5059. The Corporation may continue the franking privilege
under Circular No. 35 dated October 24, 1977 and that of the Vice President,
under such arrangements and conditions as may obviate abuse or unauthorized
use thereof.
The petitioners' contention is untenable. We do not agree that the title of the challenged act
violates the Constitution.
The title of the bill is not required to be an index to the body of the act, or to be as
comprehensive as to cover every single detail of the measure. It has been held that if the title
fairly indicates the general subject, and reasonably covers all the provisions of the act, and is not
calculated to mislead the legislature or the people, there is sufficient compliance with the
constitutional requirement. 2
To require every end and means necessary for the accomplishment of the general objectives of
the statute to be expressed in its title would not only be unreasonable but would actually render
legislation impossible. 3 As has been correctly explained:
The details of a legislative act need not be specifically stated in its title, but matter
germane to the subject as expressed in the title, and adopted to the
accomplishment of the object in view, may properly be included in the act. Thus,
it is proper to create in the same act the machinery by which the act is to be
enforced, to prescribe the penalties for its infraction, and to remove obstacles in
the way of its execution. If such matters are properly connected with the subject
as expressed in the title, it is unnecessary that they should also have special
mention in the title (Southern Pac. Co. v. Bartine, 170 Fed. 725).
This is particularly true of the repealing clause, on which Cooley writes: "The repeal of a statute
on a given subject is properly connected with the subject matter of a new statute on the same
subject; and therefore a repealing section in the new statute is valid, notwithstanding that the title
is silent on the subject. It would be difficult to conceive of a matter more germane to an act and
to the object to be accomplished thereby than the repeal of previous legislations connected
therewith." 4
The reason is that where a statute repeals a former law, such repeal is the effect and not the
subject of the statute; and it is the subject, not the effect of a law, which is required to be briefly
expressed in its title. 5 As observed in one case, 6 if the title of an act embraces only one subject,
we apprehend it was never claimed that every other act which repeals it or alters by implication
must be mentioned in the title of the new act. Any such rule would be neither within the reason
of the Constitution, nor practicable.
We are convinced that the withdrawal of the franking privilege from some agencies is germane to
the accomplishment of the principal objective of R.A. No. 7354, which is the creation of a more
efficient and effective postal service system. Our ruling is that, by virtue of its nature as a
repealing clause, Section 35 did not have to be expressly included in the title of the said law.
II
The petitioners maintain that the second paragraph of Sec. 35 covering the repeal of the franking
privilege from the petitioners and this Court under E.O. 207, PD 1882 and PD 26 was not
included in the original version of Senate Bill No. 720 or House Bill No. 4200. As this paragraph
appeared only in the Conference Committee Report, its addition, violates Article VI, Sec. 26(2)
of the Constitution, reading as follows:
(2) No bill passed by either House shall become a law unless it has passed three
readings on separate days, and printed copies thereof in its final form have been
distributed to its Members three days before its passage, except when the
President certifies to the necessity of its immediate enactment to meet a public
calamity or emergency. Upon the last reading of a bill, no amendment thereto
shall be allowed, and the vote thereon shall be taken immediately thereafter, and
the yeasand nays entered in the Journal.
The petitioners also invoke Sec. 74 of the Rules of the House of Representatives, requiring that
amendment to any bill when the House and the Senate shall have differences thereon may be
settled by a conference committee of both chambers. They stress that Sec. 35 was never a subject
of any disagreement between both Houses and so the second paragraph could not have been
validly added as an amendment.
These argument are unacceptable.
While it is true that a conference committee is the mechanism for compromising differences
between the Senate and the House, it is not limited in its jurisdiction to this question. Its broader
function is described thus:
A conference committee may, deal generally with the subject matter or it may be
limited to resolving the precise differences between the two houses. Even where
the conference committee is not by rule limited in its jurisdiction, legislative
custom severely limits the freedom with which new subject matter can be inserted
into the conference bill. But occasionally a conference committee produces
unexpected results, results beyond its mandate, These excursions occur even
where the rules impose strict limitations on conference committee jurisdiction.
This is symptomatic of the authoritarian power of conference committee (Davies,
Legislative Law and Process: In a Nutshell, 1986 Ed., p.81).
It is a matter of record that the conference Committee Report on the bill in question was returned
to and duly approved by both the Senate and the House of Representatives. Thereafter, the bill
was enrolled with its certification by Senate President Neptali A. Gonzales and Speaker Ramon
V. Mitra of the House of Representatives as having been duly passed by both Houses of
Congress. It was then presented to and approved by President Corazon C. Aquino on April 3,
1992.
Under the doctrine of separation powers, the Court may not inquire beyond the certification of
the approval of a bill from the presiding officers of Congress. Casco Philippine Chemical Co. v.
Gimenez 7 laid down the rule that the enrolled bill, is conclusive upon the Judiciary (except in
matters that have to be entered in the journals like the yeas andnays on the final reading of the
bill). 8 The journals are themselves also binding on the Supreme Court, as we held in the old (but
still valid) case of U.S. vs. Pons, 9 where we explained the reason thus:
To inquire into the veracity of the journals of the Philippine legislature when they
are, as we have said, clear and explicit, would be to violate both the, letter and
spirit of the organic laws by which the Philippine Government was brought into
existence, to invade a coordinate and independent department of the Government,
and to interfere with the legitimate powers and functions, of the Legislature.
Applying these principles, we shall decline to look into the petitioners' charges that an
amendment was made upon the last reading of the bill that eventually became R.A. No. 7354 and
that copies thereof in its final form were not distributed among the members of each House. Both
the enrolled bill and the legislative journals certify that the measure was duly enacted i.e., in
accordance with Article VI, Sec. 26(2) of the Constitution. We are bound by such official
assurances from a coordinate department of the government, to which we owe, at the very least,
a becoming courtesy.
III
The third and most serious challenge of the petitioners is based on the equal protection clause.
It is alleged that R.A. No. 7354 is discriminatory because while withdrawing the franking
privilege from the Judiciary, it retains the same for the President of the Philippines, the Vice
President of the Philippines; Senators and Members of the House of Representatives, the
Commission on Elections; former Presidents of the Philippines; the National Census and
Statistics Office; and the general public in the filing of complaints against public offices and
officers. 10
The respondents counter that there is no discrimination because the law is based on a valid
classification in accordance with the equal protection clause. In fact, the franking privilege has
been withdrawn not only from the Judiciary but also the Office of Adult Education, the Institute
of National Language; the Telecommunications Office; the Philippine Deposit Insurance
Corporation; the National Historical Commission; the Armed Forces of the Philippines; the
Armed Forces of the Philippines Ladies Steering Committee; the City and Provincial
Prosecutors; the Tanodbayan (Office of Special Prosecutor); the Kabataang Barangay; the
Commission on the Filipino Language; the Provincial and City Assessors; and the National
Council for the Welfare of Disabled Persons. 11
The equal protection of the laws is embraced in the concept of due process, as every unfair
discrimination offends the requirements of justice and fair play. It has nonetheless been
embodied in a separate clause in Article III Sec. 1., of the Constitution to provide for a more,
specific guaranty against any form of undue favoritism or hostility from the government.
Arbitrariness in general may be challenged on the basis of the due process clause. But if the
particular act assailed partakes of an unwarranted partiality or prejudice, the sharper weapon to
cut it down is the equal protection clause.
According to a long line of decisions, equal protection simply requires that all persons or things
similarly situated should be treated alike, both as to rights conferred and responsibilities
imposed, 12 Similar subjects, in other words, should not be treated differently, so as to give undue
favor to some and unjustly discriminate against others.
The equal protection clause does not require the universal application of the laws on all persons
or things without distinction. This might in fact sometimes result in unequal protection, as where,
for example, a law prohibiting mature books to all persons, regardless of age, would benefit the
morals of the youth but violate the liberty of adults. What the clause requires is equality among
equals as determined according to a valid classification. By classification is meant the grouping
of persons or things similar to each other in certain particulars and different from all others in
these same particulars. 13
What is the reason for the grant of the franking privilege in the first place? Is the franking
privilege extended to the President of the Philippines or the Commission on Elections or to
former Presidents of the Philippines purely as acourtesy from the lawmaking body? Is it offered
because of the importance or status of the grantee or because of its need for the privilege? Or
have the grantees been chosen pell-mell, as it were, without any basis at all for the selection?
We reject outright the last conjecture as there is no doubt that the statute as a whole was carefully
deliberated upon, by the political departments before it was finally enacted. There is reason to
suspect, however, that not enough care or attention was given to its repealing clause, resulting in
the unwitting withdrawal of the franking privilege from the Judiciary.
We also do not believe that the basis of the classification was mere courtesy, for it is
unimaginable that the political departments would have intended this serious slight to the
Judiciary as the third of the major and equal departments the government. The same observations
are made if the importance or status of the grantee was the criterion used for the extension of the
franking privilege, which is enjoyed by the National Census and Statistics Office and even some
private individuals but not the courts of justice.
In our view, the only acceptable reason for the grant of the franking privilege was the
perceived need of the grantee for the accommodation, which would justify a waiver of
substantial revenue by the Corporation in the interest of providing for a smoother flow of
communication between the government and the people.
Assuming that basis, we cannot understand why, of all the departments of the government, it is
the Judiciary, that has been denied the franking privilege. There is no question that if there is any
major branch of the government that needs the privilege, it is the Judicial Department, as the
respondents themselves point out. Curiously, the respondents would justify the distinction on the
basis precisely of this need and, on this basis, deny the Judiciary the franking privilege while
extending it to others less deserving.
In their Comment, the respondents point out that available data from the Postal Service Office
show that from January 1988 to June 1992, the total volume of frank mails amounted to
P90,424,175.00. Of this amount, frank mails from the Judiciary and other agencies whose
functions include the service of judicial processes, such as the intervenor, the Department of
Justice and the Office of the Ombudsman, amounted to P86,481,759. Frank mails coming
fromthe Judiciary amounted to P73,574,864.00, and those coming from the petitioners reached
the total amount of P60,991,431.00. The respondents' conclusion is that because of this
considerable volume of mail from the Judiciary, the franking privilege must be withdrawn from
it.
The argument is self-defeating. The respondents are in effect saying that the franking privilege
should be extended only to those who do not need it very much, if at all, (like the widows of
former Presidents) but not to those who need it badly (especially the courts of justice). It is like
saying that a person may be allowed cosmetic surgery although it is not really necessary but not
an operation that can save his life.
If the problem of the respondents is the loss of revenues from the franking privilege, the remedy,
it seems to us, is to withdraw it altogether from all agencies of government, including those who
do not need it. The problem is not solved by retaining it for some and withdrawing it from others,
especially where there is no substantial distinction between those favored, which may or may not
need it at all, and the Judiciary, which definitely needs it. The problem is not solved by violating
the Constitution.
In lumping the Judiciary with the other offices from which the franking privilege has been
withdrawn, Section 35 has placed the courts of justice in a category to which it does not belong.
If it recognizes the need of the President of the Philippines and the members of Congress for the
franking privilege, there is no reason why it should not recognize a similar and in fact greater
need on the part of the Judiciary for such privilege. While we may appreciate the withdrawal of
the franking privilege from the Armed Forces of the Philippines Ladies Steering Committee, we
fail to understand why the Supreme Court should be similarly treated as that Committee. And
while we may concede the need of the National Census and Statistics Office for the franking
privilege, we are intrigued that a similar if not greater need is not recognized in the courts of
justice.
(On second thought, there does not seem to be any justifiable need for withdrawing the privilege
from the Armed Forces of the Philippines Ladies Steering Committee, which, like former
Presidents of the Philippines or their widows, does not send as much frank mail as the Judiciary.)
It is worth observing that the Philippine Postal Corporation, as a government-controlled
corporation, was created and is expected to operate for the purpose of promoting the public
service. While it may have been established primarily for private gain, it cannot excuse itself
from performing certain functions for the benefit of the public in exchange for the franchise
extended to it by the government and the many advantages it enjoys under its charter.14 Among
the services it should be prepared to extend is free carriage of mail for certain offices of the
government that need the franking privilege in the discharge of their own public functions.
We also note that under Section 9 of the law, the Corporation is capitalized at P10 billion pesos,
55% of which is supplied by the Government, and that it derives substantial revenues from the
sources enumerated in Section 10, on top of the exemptions it enjoys. It is not likely that the
retention of the franking privilege of the Judiciary will cripple the Corporation.
At this time when the Judiciary is being faulted for the delay in the administration of justice, the
withdrawal from it of the franking privilege can only further deepen this serious problem. The
volume of judicial mail, as emphasized by the respondents themselves, should stress the
dependence of the courts of justice on the postal service for communicating with lawyers and
litigants as part of the judicial process. The Judiciary has the lowest appropriation in the national
budget compared to the Legislative and Executive Departments; of the P309 billion budgeted for
1993, only .84%, or less than 1%, is alloted for the judiciary. It should not be hard to imagine the
increased difficulties of our courts if they have to affix a purchased stamp to every process they
send in the discharge of their judicial functions.
We are unable to agree with the respondents that Section 35 of R.A. No. 7354 represents a valid
exercise of discretion by the Legislature under the police power. On the contrary, we find its
repealing clause to be a discriminatory provision that denies the Judiciary the equal protection of
the laws guaranteed for all persons or things similarly situated. The distinction made by the law
is superficial. It is not based on substantial distinctions that make real differences between the
Judiciary and the grantees of the franking privilege.
This is not a question of wisdom or power into which the Judiciary may not intrude. It is a matter
of arbitrariness that this Court has the duty and power to correct.
IV
In sum, we sustain R.A. No. 7354 against the attack that its subject is not expressed in its title
and that it was not passed in accordance with the prescribed procedure. However, we annul
Section 35 of the law as violative of Article 3, Sec. 1, of the Constitution providing that no
person shall "be deprived of the equal protection of laws."
We arrive at these conclusions with a full awareness of the criticism it is certain to provoke.
While ruling against the discrimination in this case, we may ourselves be accused of similar
discrimination through the exercise of our ultimate power in our own favor. This is inevitable.
Criticism of judicial conduct, however undeserved, is a fact of life in the political system that we
are prepared to accept.. As judges, we cannot debate with our detractors. We can only decide the
cases before us as law imposes on us the duty to be fair and our own conscience gives us the
light to be right.
ACCORDINGLY, the petition is partially GRANTED and Section 35 of R.A. No. 7354 is
declared UNCONSTITUTIONAL. Circular No. 92-28 is SET ASIDE insofar as it withdraws the
franking privilege from the Supreme Court, the Court of Appeals, the Regional trail Courts, the
Municipal trial Courts, and the National Land Registration Authority and its Register of Deeds to
all of which offices the said privilege shall be RESTORED. The temporary restraining order
dated June 2, 1992, is made permanent.
SO ORDERED.
Narvasa, C.J., Feliciano, Padilla, Bidin, Regalado, Davide, Jr., Romero, Nocon, Melo, Quiason,
Puno and Vitug, JJ., concur.
Bellosillo, J., is on leave.

SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. 86647 February 5, 1990

REP. VIRGILIO P. ROBLES, petitioner,
vs.
HON. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES ELECTORAL TRIBUNAL and ROMEO L.
SANTOS, respondents.
Virgilio P. Robles for and in his own behalf.
Brillantes, Nachura, Navarro & Arcilla Law Offices for private respondent.
MEDIALDEA, J.:
This is a petition for certiorari with prayer for a temporary restraining order assailing the
resolutions of the House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal (HRET): 1) dated September 19,
1988 granting herein private respondent's Urgent Motion to Recall and Disregard Withdrawal of
Protest, and 2) dated January 26, 1989, denying petitioner's Motion for Reconsideration.
Petitioner Virgilio Robles and private respondent Romeo Santos were candidates for the position
of Congressman of the 1st district of Caloocan City in the last May 11, 1987 congressional
elections. Petitioner Robles was proclaimed the winner on December 23, 1987.
On January 5, 1988, Santos filed an election protest with respondent HRET. He alleged, among
others, that the elections in the 1st District of Caloocan City held last May 11, 1987 were
characterized by the commission of electoral frauds and irregularities in various forms, on the
day of elections, during the counting of votes and during the canvassing of the election returns.
He likewise prayed for the recounting of the genuine ballots in all the 320 contested precincts
(pp. 16-20, Rollo).
On January 14, 1988, petitioner filed his Answer (pp. 22-26, Rollo) to the protest. He alleged as
among his affirmative defenses, the lack of residence of protestant and the late filing of his
protest.
On August 15, 1988, respondent HRET issued an order setting the commencement of the
revision of contested ballots on September 1, 1988 and directed protestant Santos to identify
25% of the total contested precincts which he desires to be revised first in accordance with
Section 18 of the Rules of the House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal (pp. 76-77, Rollo).
On September 7, 1988, the revision of the ballots for 75 precincts, representing the initial 25% of
all the contested precincts, was terminated.
On September 8, 1988, Robles filed an Urgent Motion to Suspend Revision and on September
12, 1988, Santos filed a Motion to Withdraw Protest on the unrevised precincts (pp. 7880, Rollo).
No action on Robles' motion to suspend revision and Santos' motion to withdraw protest on
unrevised precincts were yet taken by respondent HRET when on September 14,1988, Santos
filed an Urgent Motion to Recall and Disregard Withdrawal of Protest (pp. 81-85, Rollo). On
September 19, 1988, Robles opposed Santos' motion to Recall and Disregard Withdrawal of
Protest in an Urgent Motion to Cancel Continuation of Revision with Opposition to Motion to
Recall Withdrawal (pp. 86-91, Rollo). On the same day, respondent HRET issued a resolution
which, among others, granted Santos' urgent Motion to Recall and Disregard Withdrawal of
Protest. The said resolution states:
House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal Case No. 43 (Romeo L. Santos vs.
Virgilio P. Robles). Three pleadings are submitted for consideration by the
Tribunal: (a) Protestee's "Urgent Motion to Suspend Revision," dated September
8, 1988; (b) Protestant's "Motion to Withdraw Protest on Unrevised Precincts and
Motion to Set Case for Hearing," dated September 12, 1988; and (c) Protestant's
Urgent Motion to Recall and Disregard Withdrawal of Protest, dated September
14, 1988.
Upon the filing of Protestant's Motion to Withdraw Protest, the revision of ballots
was stopped and such revision remains suspended until now. In view of such
suspension, there is no need to act on Protestee's Motion.
The "Motion to Withdraw Protest," has been withdrawn by Protestant's later
motion, and therefore need not be acted upon.
WHEREFORE, Protestee's "Urgent Motion to Suspend Revision" and Protestant's

'Motion to Withdraw Protest' are NOTED. The 'Urgent Motion to Recall and
Disregard Withdrawal of Protest' is GRANTED.
The Secretary of the Tribunal is directed to schedule the resumption of the
revision on September 26, 1988 and to send out the necessary notices for this
purpose. (p. 84, Rollo).
On September 20,1988, Robles filed an Urgent Motion and Manifestation praying that his Urgent
Motion to Cancel Revision with Opposition to Motion to Recall dated September 19, 1988 be
treated as a Motion for Reconsideration of the HRET resolution of September 19, 1988 (pp. 9294, Rollo).
On September 22, 1988, respondent HRET directed Santos to comment on Robles' "Urgent
Motion to Cancel Continuation of Revision with Opposition to Motion to Recall Withdrawal"
and ordered the suspension of the resumption of revision scheduled for September 26, 1988.
On January 26,1989, the House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal denied Robles' Motion for
Reconsideration (pp. 109-111, Rollo). Hence, the instant petition was filed on February 1, 1989
(pp. 1-14, Rollo).
On February 2, 1989, We required the respondent to comment within ten (10) days from notice
of the petition (p. 118, Rollo). On February 9, 1989, petitioner Robles filed an Urgent Motion
Reiterating Prayer for Injunction or Restraining Order (pp. 119-120, Rollo) which We Noted on
February 16, 1989. Petitioner's Motion for Leave to File Reply to Comment was granted in the
same resolution of February 16,1989. On February 22, 1989, petitioner filed a Supplemental
Petition (p. 129, Rollo), this time questioning respondent HRET's February 16, 1989 resolution
denying petitioner's motion to defer or reset revision until this Court has finally disposed of the
instant petition and declaring that a partial determination pursuant to Section 18 of the House of
Representatives Electoral Tribunal Rules was had with private respondent Santos making a
recovery of 267 votes (see Annex "C" of Supplemental Petition, p. 138, Rollo).
It is petitioner's main contention in this petition that when private respondent Santos filed the
Motion to Withdraw Protest on Unrevised Precincts and Motion to Set Case for Hearing dated
September 12, 1988, respondent HRET lost its jurisdiction over the case, hence, when
respondent HRET subsequently ordered the revision of the unrevised protested ballots,
notwithstanding the withdrawal of the protest, it acted without jurisdiction or with grave abuse of
discretion.
We do not agree with petitioner.
It is noted that upon Santos' filing of his Motion to Withdraw Protest on Unrevised Precincts on
September 12, 1988, no action thereon was taken by respondent HRET Contrary to petitioner's
claim that the motion to withdraw was favorably acted upon, the records show that it was only on
September 19, 1988 when respondent HRET resolved said motion together with two other
motions. The questioned resolution of September 19, 1988 resolved three (3) motions, namely: a)
Protestee's Urgent Motion to Suspend Revision dated September 8, 1988; b) Protestant's Motion
to Withdraw Protest on Unrevised Precincts and Motion to Set Case for Hearing dated September
12, 1988; and c) Protestant's "Urgent Motion to Recall and Disregard Withdrawal of Protest,"
dated September 14, 1988. The resolution resolved the three (3) motions as follows:
xxx xxx xxx

WHEREFORE, Protestee's "Urgent Motion to Suspend Revision" and Protestant's
'Motion to Withdraw Protest' are NOTED. The "Urgent Motion to Recall and
Disregard Withdrawal of Protest" is GRANTED.
xxx xxx xxx
The mere filing of the motion to withdraw protest on the remaining uncontested precincts,
without any action on the part of respondent tribunal, does not by itself divest the tribunal of its
jurisdiction over the case. Jurisdiction, once acquired, is not lost upon the instance of the parties
but continues until the case is terminated (Jimenez v. Nazareno, G.R. No. L-37933, April 15,
1988, 160 SCRA 1).
We agree with respondent House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal when it held:
We cannot agree with Protestee's contention that Protestant's "Motion to
Withdraw Protest on Unrevised Precincts" effectively withdrew the precincts
referred to therein from the protest even before the Tribunal has acted thereon.
Certainly, the Tribunal retains the authority to grant or deny the Motion, and the
withdrawal becomes effective only when the Motion is granted. To hold otherwise
would permit a party to deprive the Tribunal of jurisdiction already acquired.
We hold therefore that this Tribunal retains the power and the authority to grant or
deny Protestant's Motion to Withdraw, if only to insure that the Tribunal retains
sufficient authority to see to it that the will of the electorate is ascertained.
Since Protestant's "Motion to Withdraw Protest on the Unrevised Precincts" had
not been acted upon by this Tribunal before it was recalled by the Protestant, it did
not have the effect of removing the precincts covered thereby from the protest. If
these precincts were not withdrawn from the protest, then the granting of
Protestant's "Urgent Motion to Recall and Disregard Withdrawal of Protest" did
not amount to allowing the refiling of protest beyond the reglementary period.
Where the court has jurisdiction over the subject matter, its orders upon all questions pertaining
to the cause are orders within its jurisdiction, and however erroneous they may be, they cannot
be corrected by certiorari (Santos v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 56614, July 28,1987,152 SCRA
378; Paramount Insurance Corp. v. Luna, G.R. No. 61404, March 16,1987,148 SCRA 564). This
rule more appropriately applies to respondent HRET whose independence as a constitutional
body has time and again been upheld by Us in many cases. As explained in the case of Lazatin
v. The House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal and Timbol, G.R. No. 84297, December 8,
1988, thus:
The use of the word "sole" emphasizes the exclusive character of the jurisdiction
conferred [Angara v. Electoral Commission, supra ,at 162]. The exercise of the
Power by the Electoral Commission under the 1935 Constitution has been
described as "intended to be complete and unimpaired as if it had remained
originally in the legislature" [Id. at 175]. Earlier, this grant of power to the
legislature was characterized by Justice Malcolm as "full, clear and complete"
[Veloso v. Board of Canvassers of Leyte and Samar, 39 Phil. 886 (1919)]. Under
the amended 1935 Constitution, the power was unqualifiedly reposed upon the
Electoral Tribunal [Suanes v. Chief Accountant of the Senate, 81 Phil. 818 (1948)]
and it remained as full, clear and complete as that previously granted the
legislature and the Electoral Commission [ Lachica v. Yap, G.R. No. L-25379,
September 25, 1968, 25 SCRA 140]. The same may be said with regard to the
jurisdiction of the Electoral Tribunals under the 1987 Constitution. Thus, "judicial
review of decisions or final resolutions of the House Electoral Tribunal is (thus)
possible only in the exercise of this Court's so-called extraordinary jurisdiction, . .
. upon a determination that the tribunal's decision or resolution was rendered
without or in excess of its jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion or,
paraphrasing Morrera, upon a clear showing of such arbitrary and improvident
use by the Tribunal of its power as constitutes a denial of due process of law, or
upon a demonstration of a very clear unmitigated ERROR, manifestly constituting
such a GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION that there has to be a remedy for such
abuse.
In the absence of any clear showing of abuse of discretion on the part of respondent tribunal in
promulgating the assailed resolutions, a writ of certiorari will not issue.
Further, petitioner's objections to the resolutions issued by respondent tribunal center mainly on
procedural technicalities, i.e., that the motion to withdraw, in effect, divested the HRET of
jurisdiction over the electoral protest. This argument aside from being irrelevant and baseless,
overlooks the essence of a public office as a public trust. The right to hold an elective office is
rooted on electoral mandate, not perceived entitlement to the office. This is the reason why an
electoral tribunal has been set up in order that any doubt as to right/mandate to a public office
may be fully resolved vis-a-vis the popular/public will. To this end, it is important that the
tribunal be allowed to perform its functions as a constitutional body, unhampered by
technicalities or procedural play of words.
The case of Dimaporo v. Estipona (G.R. No. L-17358, May 30, 1961, 2 SCRA 282) relied upon
by petitioner does not help to bolster his case because the facts attendant therein are different
from the case at bar. In the said case, the motion to withdraw was favorably acted upon before
the resolution thereon was questioned.
As regards petitioner's Supplemental Petition questioning respondent tribunal's resolution
denying his motion to defer or reset revision of the remaining seventy-five (75) per cent of the
contested precincts, the same has become academic in view of the fact that the revision was
resumed on February 20, 1989 and was terminated on March 2, 1989 (Private Respondent's
Memorandum, p. 208, Rollo). This fact was not rebutted by petitioner.
The allegation of petitioner that he was deprived of due process when respondent tribunal
rendered a partial determination pursuant to Section 18 of the HRET rules and found that Santos
made a recovery of 267 votes after the revision of the first twenty-five per cent of the contested
precincts has likewise, no basis. The partial determination was arrived at only by a simple
addition of the votes adjudicated to each party in the revision of which both parties were properly
represented.
It would not be amiss to state at this point that "an election protest is impressed with public
interest in the sense that the public is interested in knowing what happened in the elections"
(Dimaporo v. Estipona, supra.), for this reason, private interests must yield to what is for the
common good.
ACCORDINGLY, finding no grave abuse of discretion on the part of respondent House of

Representatives Electoral Tribunal in issuing the assailed resolutions, the instant petition is
DISMISSED.
SO ORDERED.
Narvasa, Paras, Gancayco, Padilla, Bidin, Sarmiento, Corts, Grio-Aquino and Regalado, JJ.,
concur.
Fernan, C.J., Gutierrez, Jr., Melencio-Herrera, Cruz, and Felicano, JJ., took no part.
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. 84297 December 8, 1988
CARMELO F. LAZATIN, petitioner,
vs.
THE HOUSE ELECTORAL TRIBUNAL and LORENZO G. TIMBOL, respondents.
Angara, Abello, Concepcion, Regala & Cruz for petitioner.
The Solicitor General for respondents.
CORTES, J.:
Petitioner and private respondent were among the candidates for Representative of the first
district of Pampanga during the elections of May 11, 1987. During the canvassing of the votes,
private respondent objected to the inclusion of certain election returns. But since the Municipal
Board of Canvassers did not rule on his objections, he brought his case to the Commission on
Elections. On May 19, 1987, the COMELEC ordered the Provincial Board of Canvassers to
suspend the proclamation of the winning candidate for the first district of Pampanga. However,
on May 26, 1987, the COMELEC ordered the Provincial Board of Canvassers to proceed with
the canvassing of votes and to proclaim the winner. On May 27, 1987, petitioner was proclaimed
as Congressman-elect. Private respondent thus filed in the COMELEC a petition to declare
petitioners proclamation void ab initio. Later, private respondent also filed a petition to prohibit
petitioner from assuming office. The COMELEC failed to act on the second petition so petitioner
was able to assume office on June 30, 1987. On September 15, 1987, the COMELEC declared
petitioner's proclamation void ab initio. Petitioner challenged the COMELEC resolution before
this Court in a petition entitled "Carmelo F. Lazatin v. The Commission on Elections, Francisco
R. Buan, Jr. and Lorenzo G. Timbol," docketed as G.R. No. 80007. In a decision promulgated on
January 25, 1988, the Court set aside the COMELEC's revocation of petitioner's proclamation.
On February 8, 1988, private respondent filed in the House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal
(hereinafter referred to as HRET an election protest, docketed as Case No. 46.
Petitioner moved to dismiss private respondent's protest on the ground that it had been filed late,
citing Sec. 250 of the Omnibus Election Code (B.P. Blg. 881). However, the HRET filed that the
protest had been filed on time in accordance with Sec. 9 of the HRET Rules. Petitioner's motion
for reconsideration was also denied. Hence, petitioner has come to this Court, challenging the
jurisdiction of the HRET over the protest filed by private respondent.
A. The Main Case
This special civil action for certiorari and prohibition with prayer for the issuance of a writ of
preliminary injunction and/or restraining order seeks the annulment and setting aside of (1) the
resolution of the HRET, dated May 2, 1988, in Case No. 46, holding that the protest filed by
private respondent had been filed on time, and (2) its July 29, 1988 resolution denying the
motion for reconsideration.
Without giving due course to the petition, the Court required the respondents to comment on the
petition. The Solicitor General filed a comment in behalf of the HRET while the private
respondent filed his comment with a motion to admit counter/cross petition and the petitioner
filed his consolidated reply. Thereafter, the Court resolved to give due course to the petition,
taking the comments filed as the answers to the petition, and considered the case submitted for
decision.
Resolution of the instant controversy hinges on which provision governs the period for filing
protests in the HRET. Should Sec. 250 of the Omnibus Election Code be held applicable, private
respondent's election protest would have been filed out of time. On the other hand, if Sec. 9 of
the HRET Rules is applicable, the filing of the protest would be timely. Succinctly stated, the
basic issue is whether or not private respondent's protest had been seasonably filed.
To support his contention that private respondent's protest had been filed out of time and,
therefore, the HRET did not acquire jurisdiction over it, petitioner relies on Sec. 250 of the
Omnibus Election Code, which provides:
Sec. 250. Election contests for Batasang Pambansa, regional, provincial and city
offices. A sworn petition contesting the election of any Member of the
Batasang Pambansa or any regional, provincial or city official shall be filed with
the Commission by any candidate who has duly filed a certificate of candidacy
and has been voted for the same office, within ten days after the proclamation of
the results of the election. [Emphasis supplied.]
Petitioner argues that even assuming that the period to file an election protest was suspended by
the pendency of the petition to annul his proclamation, the petition was filed out of time,
considering that he was proclaimed on May 27, 1987 and therefore private respondent had only
until June 6, 1987 to file a protest; that private respondent filed a petition to annul the
proclamation on May 28, 1987 and the period was suspended and began to run again on January
28, 1988 when private respondent was served with a copy of the decision of the Court in G.R,
No. 80007; that private respondent therefore only had nine (9) days left or until February 6, 1988
within which to file his protest; but that private respondent filed his protest with the HRET only
on February 8, 1988.
On the other hand, in finding that the protest was flied on time, the HRET relied on Sec. 9 of its
Rules, to wit:
Election contests arising from the 1987 Congressional elections shall be filed with
the Office of the Secretary of the Tribunal or mailed at the post office as
registered matter addressed to the Secretary of the Tribunal, together with twelve
(12) legible copies thereof plus one (1) copy for each protestee,within fifteen (15)
days from the effectivity of these Rules on November 22, 1987 where the
proclamation has been made prior to the effectivity of these Rules, otherwise, the
same may be filed within fifteen (15) days from the date of the proclamation.
Election contests arising from the 1987 Congressional elections filed with the
Secretary of the House of Representatives and transmitted by him to the Chairman
of the Tribunal shall be deemed filed with the tribunal as of the date of effectivity
of these Rules, subject to payment of filing fees as prescribed in Section 15
hereof. [Emphasis supplied.]
Thus, ruled the HRET:
On the basis of the foregoing Rule, the protest should have been filed within
fifteen (15) days from November 22, 1987, or not later than December 7, 1987.
However, on September 15, 1987, the COMELEC acting upon a petition filed by
the Protestant (private respondent herein), promulgated a Resolution declaring the
proclamation void ab initio. This resolution had the effect of nullifying the
proclamation, and such proclamation was not reinstated until Protestant received a
copy of the Supreme Court's decision annulling the COMELEC Resolution on
January 28, 1988. For all intents and purposes, therefore, Protestee's (petitioner
herein) proclamation became effective only on January 28, 1988, and the fifteenday period for Protestant to file his protest must be reckoned from that date.
Protestant filed his protest on February 8, 1988, or eleven (11) days after January
28. The protest, therefore, was filed well within the reglementary period provided
by the Rules of this Tribunal. (Rollo, p. 129.]
The Court is of the view that the protest had been filed on time and, hence, the HRET acquired
jurisdiction over it.
Petitioner's reliance on Sec. 250 of the Omnibus Election Code is misplaced. Sec. 250 is couched
in unambiguous terms and needs no interpretation. It applies only to petitions filed before the
COMELEC contesting the election ofany Member of the Batasang Pambansa, or any regional,
provincial or city official. Furthermore, Sec. 250 should be read together with Sec. 249 of the
same code which provides that the COMELEC "shall be the sole judge of all contests relating to
the elections, returns and qualifications of all Members of the Batasang Pambansa, elective
regional, provincial and city officials," reiterating Art. XII-C, Sec. 2(2) of the 1973 Constitution.
It must be emphasized that under the 1973 Constitution there was no provision for an Electoral
Tribunal, the jurisdiction over election contests involving Members of the Batasang Pambansa
having been vested in the COMELEC.
That Sec. 250 of the Omnibus Election Code, as far as contests regarding the election, returns
and qualifications of Members of the Batasang Pambansa is concerned, had ceased to be
effective under the 1987 Constitution is readily apparent. First, the Batasang Pambansa has
already been abolished and the legislative power is now vested in a bicameral Congress. Second,
the Constitution vests exclusive jurisdiction over all contests relating to the election, returns and
qualifications of the Members of the Senate and the House of Representatives in the respective
Electoral Tribunals [Art. VI, Sec. 171. The exclusive original jurisdiction of the COMELEC is
limited by constitutional fiat to election contests pertaining to election regional, provincial and
city offices and its appellate jurisdiction to those involving municipal and barangay offices [Art.
IX-C, Sec. 2(2)].
Petitioner makes much of the fact that the provisions of the Omnibus Election Code on the
conduct of the election were generally made applicable to the congressional elections of May 11,
1987. It must be emphasized, however, that such does not necessarily imply the application of all
the provisions of said code to each and every aspect of that particular electoral exercise, as
petitioner contends. On the contrary, the Omnibus Election Code was only one of several laws
governing said elections. *
An examination of the Omnibus Election Code and the executive orders specifically applicable
to the May 11, 1987 congressional elections reveals that there is no provision for the period
within which to file election protests in the respective Electoral Tribunals. Thus, the question
may well be asked whether the rules governing the exercise of the Tribunals' constitutional
functions may be prescribed by statute.
The Court is of the considered view that it may not.
The power of the HRET, as the sole judge of all contests relating to the election, returns and
qualifications of the Members of the House of Representatives, to promulgate rules and
regulations relative to matters within its jurisdiction, including the period for filing election
protests before it, is beyond dispute. Its rule-making power necessarily flows from the general
power granted it by the Constitution. This is the import of the ruling in the landmark case
of Angara v. Electoral Commission [63 Phil. 139 (1936)], where the Court, speaking through
Justice Laurel, declared in no uncertain terms:
... [The creation of the Electoral Commission carried with it ex necessitate rei the
power regulative in character to limit the time within which protests entrusted to
its cognizance should be filed. It is a settled rule of construction that where a
general power is conferred or duly enjoined, every particular power necessary for
the exercise of the one or the performance of the other is also conferred (Cooley,
Constitutional Limitations, eighth ed., vol. 1, pp. 138, 139). In the absence of any
further constitutional provision relating to the procedure to be followed in filing
protests before the Electoral Commission, therefore, the incidental power to
promulgate such rules necessary for the proper exercise of its exclusive power to
judge all contests relating to the election, returns and qualifications of members
of the National Assembly, must be deemed by necessary implication to have been
lodged also in the Electoral Commission. [At p. 177; emphasis supplied.]
A short review of our constitutional history reveals that, except under the 1973 Constitution, the
power to judge all contests relating to the election, returns and qualifications of the members of
the legislative branch has been exclusively granted either to the legislative body itself [i.e., the
Philippine Assembly under the Philippine Bill of 1902 and the Senate and the House of
Representatives under the Philippine Autonomy Act (Jones Law)] or to an independent, impartial
and non-partisan body attached to the legislature [i.e., the Electoral Commission under the 1935
Constitution and the Electoral Tribunals under the amended 1935 and the 1987 Constitutions].
Except under the 1973 Constitution, the power granted is that of being the sole judge of all
contests relating to the election, returns and qualifications of the members of the legislative body.
Article VI of the 1987 Constitution states it in this wise:
See. 17. The Senate and the House of Representatives shall each have an Electoral
returns, and qualifications of their respective Members. Each Electoral tribunal
Chairman.
The use of the word "sole" emphasizes the exclusive character of the jurisdiction conferred
[Angara v. Electoral Commission, supra, at 1621. The exercise of the power by the Electoral
Commission under the 1935 Constitution has been described as "intended to be as complete and
unimpaired as if it had remained originally in the legislature" [Id. at 175]. Earlier, this grant of
power to the legislature was characterized by Justice Malcolm as "full, clear and complete"
[Veloso v. Board of Canvassers of Leyte and Samar, 39 Phil. 886 (1919)]. Under the amended
1935 Constitution, the power was unqualifiedly reposed upon the Electoral Tribunal Suanes v.
Chief Accountant of the Senate, 81 Phil. 818 (1948)] and it remained as full, clear and complete
as that previously granted the legislature and the Electoral Commission Lachica v. Yap, G.R. No.
L25379, September 25, 1968, 25 SCRA 1401. The same may be said with regard to the
jurisdiction of the Electoral Tribunals under the 1987 Constitution.
The 1935 and 1987 Constitutions, which separate and distinctly apportion the powers of the three
branches of government, lodge the power to judge contests relating to the election, returns and
qualifications of members of the legislature in an independent, impartial and non-partisan body
attached to the legislature and specially created for that singular purpose (i.e., the Electoral
Commission and the Electoral Tribunals) [see Suanes v. Chief Accountant of the Senate, supra].
It was only under the 1973 Constitution where the delineation between the powers of the
Executive and the Legislature was blurred by constitutional experimentation that the jurisdiction
over election contests involving members of the Legislature was vested in the COMELEC, an
agency with general jurisdiction over the conduct of elections for all elective national and local
officials.
That the framers of the 1987 Constitution intended to restore fully to the Electoral Tribunals
exclusive jurisdiction over all contests relating to the election, returns and qualifications of its
Members, consonant with the return to the separation of powers of the three branches of
government under the presidential system, is too evident to escape attention. The new
Constitution has substantially retained the COMELEC's purely administrative powers, namely,
the exclusive authority to enforce and administer all laws and regulations relative to the conduct
of an election, plebiscite, initiative, referendum, and recall; to decide, except those involving the
right to vote, all questions affecting elections; to deputize law enforcement agencies and
government instrumentalities for election purposes; to register political parties and accredit
citizens' arms; to file in court petitions for inclusion and exclusion of voters and prosecute, where
appropriate, violations of election laws [Art. IX(C), Sec. 2(1), (3)-(6)], as well as its rule-making
power. In this sense, and with regard to these areas of election law, the provisions of the
Omnibus Election Code are fully applicable, except where specific legislation provides
otherwise. But the same cannot be said with regard to the jurisdiction of the COMELEC to hear
and decide election contests. This has been trimmed down under the 1987 Constitution. Whereas
the 1973 Constitution vested the COMELEC with jurisdiction to be the sole judge of all contests
relating to the elections, returns and qualifications of all Members of the Batasang Pambansa and
elective provincial and city officials [Art. XII(C), Sec. 2(2)], the 1987 Constitution, while
lodging in the COMELEC exclusive original jurisdiction over all contests relating to the
elections, returns and qualifications of all elective regional, provincial and city officials and
appellate jurisdiction over contests relating to the election of municipal and barangay officials
[Art. IX(C), Sec. 2(2)]. expressly makes the Electoral Tribunals of the Senate and the House of
Representatives the sole judge of all contests relating to the election, returns and qualifications of
their respective Members [Art. VI, Sec. 17].
The inescapable conclusion from the foregoing is that it is well within the power of the HRET to
prescribe the period within which protests may be filed before it. This is founded not only on
historical precedents and jurisprudence but, more importantly, on the clear language of the
Constitution itself.
Consequently, private respondent's election protest having been filed within the period prescribed
by the HRET, the latter cannot be charged with lack of jurisdiction to hear the case.
B. Private-Respondent's Counter/Cross Petition
Private respondent in HRET Case No. 46 prayed for the issuance of a temporary restraining
order and/or writ of preliminary injunction to enjoin petitioner herein from discharging his
functions and duties as the Representative of the first district of Pampanga during the pendency
of the protest. However, on May 5, 1988, the HRET resolved to defer action on said prayer after
finding that the grounds therefor did not appear to be indubitable. Private respondent moved for
reconsideration, but this was denied by the HRET on May 30, 1988. Thus, private respondent
now seeks to have the Court annul and set aside these two resolutions and to issue a temporary
restraining order and/or writ of preliminary injunction on the premise that the grounds therefor
are too evident to be doubted.
The relief prayed for in private respondent's counter/cross petition is not forthcoming.
The matter of whether or not to issue a restraining order or a writ of preliminary injunction
during the pendency of a protest lies within the sound discretion of the HRET as sole judge of all
contests relating to the election, returns and qualifications of the Members of the House of
Representatives. Necessarily, the determination of whether or not there are indubitable grounds
to support the prayer for the aforementioned ancilliary remedies also lies within the HRETs
sound judgment. Thus, in G.R. No. 80007, where the Court declined to take cognizance of the
private respondent's electoral protest, this Court said:
The alleged invalidity of the proclamation (which had been previously ordered by
the COMELEC itself) despite alleged irregularities in connection therewith, and
despite the pendency of the protests of the rival candidates, is a matter that is also
addressed, considering the premises, to the sound judgment of the Electoral
Tribunal.
Moreover, private respondent's attempt to have the Court set aside the HRET's resolution to defer
action on his prayer for provisional relief is undeniably premature, considering that the HRET
had not yet taken any final action with regard to his prayer. Hence, there is actually nothing to
review or and and set aside. But then again, so long as the Constitution grants the HRET the
power to be the sole judge of all contests relating to the election, returns and qualifications of
Members of the House of Representatives, any final action taken by the HRET on a matter
within its jurisdiction shall, as a rule, not be reviewed by this Court. As stated earlier, the power
granted to the Electoral Tribunal is full, clear and complete and "excludes the exercise of any
authority on the part of this Court that would in any wise restrict or curtail it or even affect the
same." (Lachica v. Yap, supra, at 143.] As early as 1938 in Morrero v. Bocar (66 Phil. 429, 431
(1938)), the Court declared that '[the judgment rendered by the [Electoral] Commission in the
exercise of such an acknowledged power is beyond judicial interference, except, in any event,
upon a clear showing of such arbitrary and improvident use of the power as will constitute a
denial of due process of law." Under the 1987 Constitution, the scope of the Court's authority is
made explicit. The power granted to the Court includes the duty "to determine whether or not
there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part
of any branch or instrumentality of the Government (Art. VIII, Sec. 11. Thus, only where such
grave abuse of discretion is clearly shown shall the Court interfere with the HRET's judgment. In
the instant case, there is no occasion for the exercise of the Court's collective power, since no
grave abuse of discretion that would amount to lack or excess of jurisdiction and would warrant
the issuance of the writs prayed for has been clearly shown.
WHEREFORE, the instant Petition is hereby DISMISSED. Private respondent's Counter/Cross
Petition is likewise DISMISSED.
SO ORDERED.
Paras, Gancayco, Padilla, Bidin, Grio-Aquino, Medialdea and Regalado, JJ., concur.
Fernan, C.J., Melencio-Herrera, Gutierrez, Jr., Sarmiento, Cruz and Feliciano, JJ., took no part.
Narvasa, J., is on leave.

SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. 83767 October 27, 1988
FIRDAUSI SMAIL ABBAS, HOMOBONO A. ADAZA, ALEJANDRO D. ALMENDRAS,
ABUL KAHYR D. ALONTO, JUAN PONCE ENRILE, RENE G. ESPINA, WILSON P.
GAMBOA, ROILO S. GOLEZ, ROMEO G. JALOSJOS EVA R. ESTRADA-KALAW,
WENCESLAO R. LAGUMBAY, VICENTE P. MAGSAYSAY, JEREMIAS U.
MONTEMAYOR, BLAS F. OPLE, RAFAEL P. PALMARES, ZOSIMO JESUS M.
PAREDES, JR., VICENTE G. PUYAT, EDITH N. RABAT, ISIDRO S. RODRIGUEZ,
FRANCISCO S. TATAD, LORENZO G. TEVES, ARTURO M. TOLENTINO, and

FERNANDO R. VELOSO, petitioners,
vs.
THE SENATE ELECTORAL TRIBUNAL, respondent.
GANCAYCO, J.:
This is a Special Civil Action for certiorari to nullify and set aside the Resolutions of the Senate
Electoral Tribunal dated February 12, 1988 and May 27, 1988, denying, respectively, the
petitioners' Motion for Disqualification or Inhibition and their Motion for Reconsideration
thereafter filed.
On October 9, 1987, the petitioners filed before the respondent Tribunal an election contest
docketed as SET Case No. 002-87 against 22 candidates of the LABAN coalition who were
proclaimed senators-elect in the May 11, 1987 congressional elections by the Commission on
Elections. The respondent Tribunal was at the time composed of three (3) Justices of the
Supreme Court and six (6) Senators, namely: Senior Associate Justice Pedro L. Yap (Chairman).
Associate Justices Andres R. Narvasa and Hugo E. Gutierrez, Jr., and Senators Joseph E. Estrada,
Neptali A. Gonzales, Teofisto T. Guingona, Jose Lina, Jr., Mamintal A.J. Tamano and Victor S.
Ziga.
On November 17, 1987, the petitioners, with the exception of Senator Estrada but including
Senator Juan Ponce Enrile (who had been designated Member of the Tribunal replacing Senator
Estrada, the latter having affiliated with the Liberal Party and resigned as the Opposition's
representative in the Tribunal) filed with the respondent Tribunal a Motion for Disqualification
or Inhibition of the Senators-Members thereof from the hearing and resolution of SET Case No.
002-87 on the ground that all of them are interested parties to said case, as respondents therein.
Before that, Senator Rene A.V. Saguisag, one of the respondents in the same case, had filed a
Petition to Recuse and later a Supplemental Petition to Recuse the same Senators-Members of
the Tribunal on essentially the same ground. Senator Vicente T. Paterno, another respondent in
the same contest, thereafter filed his comments on both the petitions to recuse and the motion for
disqualification or inhibition. Memoranda on the subject were also filed and oral arguments were
heard by the respondent Tribunal, with the latter afterwards issuing the Resolutions now
complained of.
Senator Juan Ponce Enrile in the meantime had voluntarily inhibited himself from participating
in the hearings and deliberations of the respondent tribunal in both SET Case No. 00287 and SET
Case No. 001-87, the latter being another contest filed by Augusto's Sanchez against him and
Senator Santanina T. Rasul as alternative respondents, citing his personal involvement as a party
in the two cases.
The petitioners, in essence, argue that considerations of public policy and the norms of fair play
and due process imperatively require the mass disqualification sought and that the doctrine of
necessity which they perceive to be the foundation petition of the questioned Resolutions does
not rule out a solution both practicable and constitutionally unobjectionable, namely; the
amendment of the respondent Tribunal's Rules of procedure so as to permit the contest being
decided by only three Members of the Tribunal.
The proposed amendment to the Tribunal's Rules (Section 24)requiring the concurrence of five
(5) members for the adoption of resolutions of whatever nature is a proviso that where more than
four (4) members are disqualified, the remaining members shall constitute a quorum, if not less
than three (3) including one (1) Justice, and may adopt resolutions by majority vote with no
abstentions. Obviously tailored to fit the situation created by the petition for disqualification, this
would, in the context of that situation, leave the resolution of the contest to the only three
Members who would remain, all Justices of this Court, whose disqualification is not sought.
We do not agree with petitioners' thesis that the suggested device is neither unfeasible nor
repugnant to the Constitution. We opine that in fact the most fundamental objection to such
proposal lies in the plain terms and intent of the Constitution itself which, in its Article VI,
Section 17, creates the Senate Electoral Tribunal, ordains its composition and defines its
jurisdiction and powers.
represented therein. The senior Justice in the Electoral Tribunal hall be its
Chairman.
It seems quite clear to us that in thus providing for a Tribunal to be staffed by both Justices of the
Supreme Court and Members of the Senate, the Constitution intended that both those "judicial'
and 'legislative' components commonly share the duty and authority of deciding all contests
relating to the election, returns and qualifications of Senators. The respondent Tribunal correctly
stated one part of this proposition when it held that said provision "... is a clear expression of an
intent that all (such) contests ... shall be resolved by a panel or body in which their (the Senators')
peers in that Chamber are represented." 1 The other part, of course, is that the constitutional
provision just as clearly mandates the participation in the same process of decision of a
representative or representatives of the Supreme Court.
Said intent is even more clearly signalled by the fact that the proportion of Senators to Justices in
the prescribed membership of the Senate Electoral Tribunal is 2 to 1-an unmistakable indication
that the "legislative component" cannot be totally excluded from participation in the resolution of
senatorial election contests, without doing violence to the spirit and intent of the Constitution.
Where, as here, a situation is created which precludes the substitution of any Senator sitting in
the Tribunal by any of his other colleagues in the Senate without inviting the same objections to
the substitute's competence, the proposed mass disqualification, if sanctioned and ordered, would
leave the Tribunal no alternative but to abandon a duty that no other court or body can perform,
but which it cannot lawfully discharge if shorn of the participation of its entire membership of
Senators.
To our mind, this is the overriding considerationthat the Tribunal be not prevented from
discharging a duty which it alone has the power to perform, the performance of which is in the
highest public interest as evidenced by its being expressly imposed by no less than the
fundamental law.
It is aptly noted in the first of the questioned Resolutions that the framers of the Constitution
could not have been unaware of the possibility of an election contest that would involve all 24
Senators-elect, six of whom would inevitably have to sit in judgment thereon. Indeed, such
possibility might surface again in the wake of the 1992 elections when once more, but for the last
time, all 24 seats in the Senate will be at stake. Yet the Constitution provides no scheme or mode
for settling such unusual situations or for the substitution of Senators designated to the Tribunal
whose disqualification may be sought. Litigants in such situations must simply place their trust
and hopes of vindication in the fairness and sense of justice of the Members of the Tribunal.
Justices and Senators, singly and collectively.
Let us not be misunderstood as saying that no Senator-Member of the Senate Electoral Tribunal
may inhibit or disqualify himself from sitting in judgment on any case before said Tribunal.
Every Member of the Tribunal may, as his conscience dictates, refrain from participating in the
resolution of a case where he sincerely feels that his personal interests or biases would stand in
the way of an objective and impartial judgment. What we are merely saying is that in the light of
the Constitution, the Senate Electoral Tribunal cannot legally function as such, absent its entire
membership of Senators and that no amendment of its Rules can confer on the three JusticesMembers alone the power of valid adjudication of a senatorial election contest.
The charge that the respondent Tribunal gravely abused its discretion in its disposition of the
incidents referred to must therefore fail. In the circumstances, it acted well within law and
principle in dismissing the petition for disqualification or inhibition filed by herein petitioners.
The instant petition for certiorari is DISMISSED for lack of merit.
SO ORDERED.
Fernandez, C.J., Melencio-Herrera, Cruz, Padilla, Bidin, Sarmiento, Cortes, Grio-Aquino,
Medialdea and Regalado JJ., concur.
Narvasa, Gutierrez, Jr. and Paras, JJ., took no part.
Separate Opinions
FELICIANO, J.:, concurring:

I quite agree with what Mr. Justice Gancayco has written into his opinion for the Court. I would
merely like to carry forward however slightly the analysis found in the penultimate paragraph of
his opinion.
Should any three (3) Senator-Members of the Senate Electoral Tribunal voluntarily inhibit or
disqualify themselves from participating in the proceedings in SET Case No. 002-87, a Tribunal
would result that would be balanced between the three (3) Justice-Members and the three (3)
Senator-Members and still constitute more than a bare quorum. In such a Tribunal, both the
considerations of public policy and fair play raised by petitioners and the constitutional intent
above noted concerning the mixed "judicial" and "legislative" composition of the Electoral
Tribunals would appear to be substantially met and served. This denouement, however, must be
voluntarily reached and not compelled by certiorari.
Separate Opinions
FELICIANO, J.:, concurring:
I quite agree with what Mr. Justice Gancayco has written into his opinion for the Court. I would
merely like to carry forward however slightly the analysis found in the penultimate paragraph of
his opinion.
Should any three (3) Senator-Members of the Senate Electoral Tribunal voluntarily inhibit or
disqualify themselves from participating in the proceedings in SET Case No. 002-87, a Tribunal
would result that would be balanced between the three (3) Justice-Members and the three (3)
Senator-Members and still constitute more than a bare quorum. In such a Tribunal, both the
considerations of public policy and fair play raised by petitioners and the constitutional intent
above noted concerning the mixed "judicial" and "legislative" composition of the Electoral
Tribunals would appear to be substantially met and served. This denouement, however, must be
voluntarily reached and not compelled by certiorari.

SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. 97710 September 26, 1991
DR. EMIGDIO A. BONDOC, petitioner,
vs.
REPRESENTATIVES MARCIANO M. PINEDA, MAGDALENO M. PALACOL, COL.
JUANITO G. CAMASURA, JR., or any other representative who may be appointed vice
representative Juanita G. Camasura, Jr., and THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
ELECTORAL TRIBUNAL, respondents.
Estelito P. Mendoza, Romulo C. Felixmera and Horacio S.J. Apostol for petitioner.
Nicanor S. Bautista for respondent Marciano M. Pineda.
Benedicto R. Palacol for respondent M.M. Palacol.
GRIO-AQUIO, J.:p
This case involves a question of power. May the House of Representatives, at the request of the
dominant political party therein, change that party's representation in the House Electoral
Tribunal to thwart the promulgation of a decision freely reached by the tribunal in an election
contest pending therein? May the Supreme Court review and annul that action of the House?
Even the Supreme Court of the United States over a century ago, in Marbury vs. Madison, 2 L.
ed. 60 (1803), had hesitated to embark upon a legal investigation of the acts of the other two
branches of the Government, finding it "peculiarly irksome as well as delicate" because it could
be considered by some as "an attempt to intrude" into the affairs of the other two and to
intermeddle with their prerogatives.
In the past, the Supreme Court, as head of the third and weakest branch of our Government, was
all too willing to avoid a political confrontation with the other two branches by burying its head
ostrich-like in the sands of the "political question" doctrine, the accepted meaning of which is
that 'where the matter involved is left to a decision by the people acting in their sovereign
capacity or to the sole determination by either or both the legislative or executive branch of the
government, it is beyond judicial cognizance. Thus it was that in suits where the party proceeded
against was either the President or Congress, or any of its branches for that matter, the courts
refused to act." (Aquino vs. Ponce Enrile, 59 SCRA 183, 196.)
In time, however, the duty of the courts to look into the constitutionality and validity of
legislative or executive action, especially when private rights are affected came to be recognized.
As we pointed out in the celebrated Aquino case, a showing that plenary power is granted either
department of government may not be an obstacle to judicial inquiry, for the improvident
exercise or the abuse thereof may give rise to a justiciable controversy. Since "a constitutional
grant of authority is not usually unrestricted, limitations being provided for as to what may be
done and how it is to be accomplished, necessarily then, it becomes the responsibility of the
courts to ascertain whether the two coordinate branches have adhered to the mandate of the
fundamental law. The question thus posed is judicial rather than political. The duty remains to
assure that the supremacy of the Constitution is upheld" (Aquino vs. Ponce Enrile, 59 SCRA
183, 196).
That duty is a part of the judicial power vested in the courts by an express grant under Section 1,
Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution of the Philippines which defines judicial power as
both authority and duty of the courts 'to settle actual controversies involving rights which are
legally demandable and enforceable, and to determine whether or not there has been a grave
abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or
instrumentality of the Government."
The power and duty of the courts to nullify in appropriate cases, the actions of the executive and
legislative branches of the Government, does not mean that the courts are superior to the
President and the Legislature. It does mean though that the judiciary may not shirk "the irksome
task" of inquiring into the constitutionality and legality of legislative or executive action when a
justiciable controversy is brought before the courts by someone who has been aggrieved or
prejudiced by such action, as in this case. It is
a plain exercise of the judicial power, that power vested in courts to enable them
to administer justice according to law. ... It is simply a necessary concomitant of
the power to hear and dispose of a case or controversy properly before the court,
to the determination of which must be brought the test and measure of the law.
(Vera vs. Avelino, 77 Phil. 192, 203.)
In the local and congressional elections held on May 11, 1987, Marciano M. Pineda of the Laban
ng Demokratikong Pilipino (LDP) and Dr. Emigdio A. Bondoc of the Nacionalista Party (NP)
were rival candidates for the position of Representative for the Fourth District of the province of
Pampanga. Each received the following votes in the canvass made by the Provincial Board of
Canvassers of Pampanga:
Marciano M. Pineda.................... 31,700 votes

Emigdio A. Bondoc..................... 28,400 votes
Difference...................................... 3,300 votes
On May 19, 1987, Pineda was proclaimed winner in the election. In due time, Bondoc filed a
protest (HRET Case No. 25) in the House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal ( for short)
which is composed of nine (9) members, three of whom are Justices of the Supreme Court and
the remaining six are members of the House of Representatives chosen on the basis of
proportional representation from the political parties and the parties or organizations registered
under the party-list system represented therein (Sec. 17, Art. VI, 1987 Constitution) as follows:
AMEURFINA M. HERRERA
Chairman
Associate Justice
Supreme Court
ISAGANI A. CRUZ
Member
Associate Justice
Supreme Court
FLORENTINO P. FELICIANO
Member
Associate Justice
Supreme Court
HONORATO Y. AQUINO
Congressman
Member
1st District
Benguet LDP
DAVID A. PONCE DE LEON
Member
Congressman
1st District Palawan
LDP
SIMEON E. GARCIA, JR.
Member
Congressman
2nd District Nueva Ecija
LDP
JUANITO G. CAMASURA, JR.
Member
Congressman
1st District Davao del Sur
LDP
JOSE E. CALINGASAN
Member
Congressman
4th District Batangas
LDP
ANTONIO H. CERILLES
Member
Congressman
2nd District Zamboanga del Sur
(formerly GAD, now NP)
After the revision of the ballots, the presentation of evidence, and submission of memoranda,
Bondoc's protest was submitted for decision in July, 1989.
By October 1990, a decision had been reached in which Bondoc won over Pineda by a margin of
twenty-three (23) votes. At that point, the LDP members in the Tribunal insisted on a
reappreciation and recount of the ballots cast in some precincts, thereby delaying by at least four
(4) months the finalization of the decision in the case.
The reexamination and re-appreciation of the ballots resulted in increasing Bondoc's lead over
Pineda to 107 votes. Congressman Camasura voted with the Supreme Court Justices and
Congressman Cerilles to proclaim Bondoc the winner of the contest.
Moved by candor and honesty, Congressman Camasura revealed on March 4, 1991, to his
'Chief," Congressman Jose S. Cojuangco, Jr., LDP Secretary General, not only the final tally in
the Bondoc case but also that he voted for Bondoc "consistent with truth and justice and selfrespect," and to honor a "gentlemen's agreement" among the members of the HRET that they
would "abide by the result of the appreciation of the contested ballot 1Congressman Camasura's
revelation stirred a hornets' nest in the LDP which went into a flurry of plotting appropriate
moves to neutralize the pro-Bondoc majority in the Tribunal.
On March 5, 1991, the HRET issued a Notice of Promulgation of Decision on March 14, 1991 at
2:30 P.M. in HRET Case No. 25. A copy of the notice was received by Bondoc's counsel on
March 6, 1991.
On March 13, 1991, the eve of the promulgation of the Bondoc decision, Congressman
Cojuangco informed Congressman Camasura by letter 2 that on February 28, 1991 yet, the LDP
Davao del Sur Chapter at Digos, Davao del Sur, by Resolution No. 03-91 had already expelled
him and Congressman Benjamin Bautista from the LDP for having allegedly helped to organize
the Partido Pilipino of Eduardo "Danding" Cojuangco, and for allegedly having invited LDP
members in Davao del Sur to join said political party; and that as those acts are "not only
inimical uncalled for, unethical and immoral, but also a complete betrayal to (sic) the cause and
objectives, and loyalty to LDP," in a meeting on March 12, 1991, the LDP Executive Committee
unanimously confirmed the expulsions. 3
At the same time, Congressman Cojuangco notified Speaker Ramon V. Mitra about the ouster of
the two congressmen from the LDP, and asked the House of Representatives, through the
Speaker, to take note of it 'especially in matters where party membership is a prerequisite. 4
At 9:45 in the morning of March 4, 1991, the Chairman of the Tribunal, Mme. Justice
Armeurfina M. Herrera, received the following letter dated March 13, 1991, from the Office of
the Secretary General of the House of Representatives, informing the Tribunal that on the basis
of the letter from the LDP, the House of Representatives, during its plenary session on March 13,
1991, decided to withdraw the nomination and rescind the election of Congressman Camasura,
Jr. to the House of Electoral Tribunal. The letter reads as follows:
13 March 1991
Honorable Justice Ameurfina Melencio-Herrera Chairman
House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal Constitution Hills Quezon City
Dear Honorable Justice Melencio-Herrera:
I have the honor to notify the House of Electoral Tribunal of the decision of the
House of Representatives during its plenary session on 13 March 1991, to
withdraw the nomination and to rescind the election of the Honorable Juanito G.
Camasura, Jr. to the House Electoral Tribunal on the basis of an LDP
communication which is self-explanatory and copies of which are hereto attached.
Thank you.
For the Secretary-General
(SGD.) Josefina D. Azarcon Officer-in-charge Operations Department (p. 10,
Rollo.)
Justices Herrera, Cruz, and Feliciano promptly apprised the Chief Justice and Associate Justices
of the Supreme Court in writing, of this "distressing development' and asked to be relieved from
their assignments in the HRET because
By the above action (of the House) the promulgation of the decision of the
Tribunal in the electoral protest entitled "Bondoc v. Pineda" (HRET Case No. 25),
previously scheduled for 14 March 1991, is sought to be aborted (See the
Consolidated Bank and Trust Corporation v. Hon. Intermediate Appellate Court,
G.R. No. 73777-78 promulgated 12 September 1990). Even if there were no legal
impediment to its promulgation, the decision which was reached on a 5 to 4 vote
may now be confidently expected to be overturned on a motion for
reconsideration by the party-litigant which would have been defeated.
The decision in Bondoc v. Pineda was ready as early as October 1990 with a
margin of 23 votes in favor of protestant Bondoc. Because some members of the
Tribunal requested re-appreciation of some ballots, the finalization of the decision
had to be deferred by at least 4 months.
With the re-appreciation completed, the decision, now with a margin of 107 votes
in favor of protestant Bondoc, and concurred in by Justices Ameurfina A.
Melencio-Herrera, Isagani A. Cruz and Florentino P. Feliciano, and Congressmen

Juanita G. Camasura and Antonio H. Cerilles, is set for promulgation on 14 March
1991, with Congressmen Honorato Y. Aquino, David A. Ponce de Leon Simeon E.
Garcia, Jr. and Jose E. Calingasan, dissenting.
Congressman Casamura's vote in the Bondoc v. Pineda case was, in our view, a
conscience vote, for which he earned the respect of the Tribunal but also the loss
of the confidence of the leader of his party.
Under the above circumstances an untenable situation has come about. It is
extremely difficult to continue with membership in the Tribunal and for the
Tribunal to preserve it. 8 integrity and credibility as a constitutional body charged
with a judicial task. It is clear to us that the unseating of an incumbent member of
Congress is being prevented at all costs. We believe that the Tribunal should not
be hampered in the performance of its constitutional function by factors which
have nothing to do with the merits of the cases before it.
In this connection, our own experience teaches that the provision for proportional
representation in the Tribunal found in Article VI, Section 17 of the 1987
Constitution, should be amended to provide instead for a return to the
composition mandated in the 1935 Constitution, that is: three (3) members chosen
by the House or Senate upon nomination of the party having the largest number of
votes and three (3) of the party having the second largest number of votes: and a
judicial component consisting of three (3) justices from the Supreme Court.
Thereby, no party or coalition of parties can dominate the legislative component
in the Tribunal.
In the alternative, the Senate Electoral Tribunal could perhaps sit as the sole judge
of all contests relating to the election, returns and qualifications of members of the
House of Representatives. Similarly, the House of Representatives Electoral
Tribunal could sit as the sole judge of all such contests involving members of the
Senate. In this way, there should be lesser chances of non-judicial elements
playing a decisive role in the resolution of election contests.
We suggest that there should also be a provision in the Constitution that upon
designation to membership in the Electoral Tribunal, those so designated should
divest themselves of affiliation with their respective political parties, to insure
their independence and objectivity as they sit in Tribunal deliberations.
There are only three (3) remaining cases for decision by the Tribunal. Bondoc
should have been promulgated today, 14 March 1991. Cabrera v. Apacible (HRET
Case No. 21) is scheduled for promulgation on 31 March 1991 and Lucman v.
Dimaporo (HRET Case No. 45), after the Holy Week recess.
But political factors are blocking the accomplishment of the constitutionally
mandated task of the Tribunal well ahead of the completion of the present
congressional term.
Under these circumstances, we are compelled to ask to be relieved from the
chairmanship and membership in the Tribunal.
xxx xxx xxx
At the open session of the HRET in the afternoon of the same day, the Tribunal issued Resolution
No. 91-0018 cancelling the promulgation of the decision in HRET Case No. 25. The resolution
reads:
In view of the formal notice the Tribunal has received at 9:45 tills morning from
the House of Representatives that at its plenary session held on March 13, 1991, it
had voted to withdraw the nomination and rescind the election of Congressman
Camasura to the House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal,' the Tribunal
Resolved to cancel the promulgation of its Decision in Bondoc vs. Pineda (HRET
Case No. 25) scheduled for this afternoon. This is because, without Congressman
Camasura's vote, the decision lacks the concurrence of five members as required
by Section 24 of the Rules of the Tribunal and, therefore, cannot be validly
promulgated.
The Tribunal noted that the three (3) Justices-members of the Supreme Court,
being of the opinion that this development undermines the independence of the
Tribunal and derails the orderly adjudication of electoral cases, they have asked
the Chief Justice, in a letter of even date, for their relief from membership in the
Tribunal.
The Tribunal further Noted that Congressman Cerilles also manifested his
intention to resign as a member of the Tribunal.
The Tribunal further Noted that Congressmen Aquino, Ponce de Leon, Garcia, Jr.,
and Calingasan also manifested a similar intention. (p. 37, Rollo.)
On March 19, 1991, this Court, after deliberating on the request for relief of Justices Herrera,
Cruz and Feliciano, resolved to direct them to return to their duties in the Tribunal. The Court
observed that:
... in view of the sensitive constitutional functions of the Electoral Tribunals as the
'sole judge' of all contests relationship to the election, returns and qualifications of
the members of Congress, all members of these bodies are appropriately guided
only by purely legal considerations in the decision of the cases before them and
that in the contemplation of the Constitution the members-legislators, thereof,
upon assumption of their duties therein, sit in the Tribunal no longer as
representatives of their respective political parties but as impartial judges. The
view was also submitted that, to further bolster the independence of the Tribunals,
the term of office of every member thereof should be considered co-extensive
with the corresponding legislative term and may not be legally terminated except
only by death, resignation, permanent disability, or removal for valid cause, not
including political disloyalty.
ACCORDINGLY, the Court Resolved: a) to DECLINE the request of justices
Herrera, Cruz, and Feliciano to be relieved from their membership in the House of
Representatives Electoral Tribunal and instead to DIRECT them to resume their
duties therein: b) to EXPRESS its concern over the intrusion of non-judicial
factors in the proceedings of the House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal,
which performs functions purely judicial in character despite the inclusion of
legislators in its membership; and c) to NOTE the view that the term of all the
members of the Electoral Tribunals, including those from the legislature, is coextensive with the corresponding legislative term and cannot be terminated at will
but only for valid legal cause, and to REQUIRE the Justices-members of the
Tribunal to submit the issue to the said Tribunal in the first instance.
Paras J. filed this separate concurring opinion: 'I concur, but I wish to add that
Rep. Camasura should be allowed to cast his original vote in favor of protestant
Bondoc, otherwise a political and judicial travesty will take place.' MelencioHerrera, Cruz and Feliciano, JJ., took no part. Gancayco,J., is on leave.
On March 21, 1991, a petition for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus was filed by Dr.
Emigdio A. Bondoc against Representatives Marciano M. Pineda, Magdaleno M. Palacol, Juanita
G. Camasura, Jr., or any other representative who may be appointed Vice Representative Juanita
G. Camasura, Jr., and the House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal, praying this Court to:
1. Annul the decision of the House of Representatives of March 13, 1991, 'to
withdraw the nomination and to rescind the nomination of Representative Juanita
G. Camasura, Jr. to the House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal;"
2. Issue a wilt of prohibition restraining respondent Palacol or whomsoever may
be designated in place of respondent Camasura from assuming, occupying and
discharging functions as a member of the House of Representatives Electoral
Tribunal;
3. Issue a writ of mandamus ordering respondent Camasura to immediately
reassume and discharge his functions as a member of the House of
Representatives Electoral Tribunal; and
4. Grant such other relief as may be just and equitable.
Upon receipt of the petition, the Court, without giving it due course, required the respondents to
comment 5 on the petition within ten days from notice and to enjoin the HRET 'from reorganizing
and allowing participation in its proceedings of Honorable Magdaleno M. Palacol or whoever is
designated to replace Honorable Juanita G. Camasura in said House of Representatives Electoral
Tribunal, until the issue of the withdrawal of the nomination and rescission of the election of said
Congressman Camasura as member of the HRET by the House of Representatives is resolved by
this Court, or until otherwise ordered by the Court." (p. 39, Rollo.)
Congressman Juanito G. Camasura, Jr. did not oppose the petition.
Congressman Marciano M. Pineda's plea for the dismissal of the petition is centered on
Congress' being the sole authority that nominates and elects from its members. Upon
recommendation by the political parties therein, those who are to sit in the House of
Representatives Electoral Tribunal (and in the Commission on Appointments as well), hence, it
allegedly has the sole power to remove any of them whenever the ratio in the representation of
the political parties in the House or Senate is materially changed on account of death,
incapacity, removal or expulsion from the political party; 6 that a Tribunal member's term of
office is not co-extensive with his legislative term, 7for if a member of the Tribunal who changes
his party affiliation is not removed from the Tribunal, the constitutional provision mandating
representation based on political affiliation would be completely nullified; 8 and that the
expulsion of Congressman Camasura from the LDP, is "purely a party affair" of the LDP 9 and
the decision to rescind his membership in the House Electoral Tribunal is the sole prerogative of
the House-of-Representative Representatives, hence, it is a purely political question beyond the
reach of judicial review. 10
In his comment, respondent Congressman Magdaleno M. Palacol alleged that the petitioner has
no cause of action against him because he has not yet been nominated by the LDP for
membership in the HRET. 11 Moreover, the petition failed to implead the House of
Representatives as an indispensable party for it was the House, not the HRET that withdrew and
rescinded Congressman Camasura's membership in the HRET. 12
The Solicitor General, as counsel for the Tribunal, argued in a similar vein; that the inclusion of
the HETH as a party respondent is erroneous because the petition states no cause of action
against the Tribunal. The petitioner does not question any act or order of the HRET in violation
of his rights. What he assails is the act of the House of Representatives of withdrawing the
nomination, and rescinding the election, of Congressman Juanita nito Camasura as a member of
the HRET. 13
Replying to the Solicitor General's Manifestation, the petitioner argued that while the Tribunal
indeed had nothing to do with the assailed decision of the House of Representatives, it
acknowledged that decision by cancelling the promulgation of its decision in HRET Case No. 25
to his (Bondoc's) prejudice. 14 Hence, although the Tribunal may not be an indispensable party, it
is a necessary party to the suit, to assure that complete relief is accorded to the petitioner for "in
the ultimate, the Tribunal would have to acknowledge, give recognition, and implement the
Supreme Court's decision as to whether the relief of respondent Congressman Camasura from the
Office of the Electoral Tribunal is valid." 15
In his reply to Congressman Palacol's Comment, the petitioner explained that Congressman
Palacol was impleaded as one of the respondents in this case because after the House of
Representatives had announced the termination of Congressman Camasura's membership in the
HETH several newspapers of general circulation reported that the House of Representatives
would nominate and elect Congressman Palacol to take Congressman Camasura's seat in the
Tribunal. 16
Now, is the House of Representatives empowered by the Constitution to do that, i.e., to interfere
with the disposition of an election contest in the House Electoral Tribunal through the ruse of
"reorganizing" the representation in the tribunal of the majority party?
Section 17, Article VI of the 1987 Constitution supplies the answer to that question. It provides:
Section 17. The Senate and the House of Representatives shall each have an
Electoral Tribunal which shall be the sole judge of all contests relating to the
election, returns and qualifications of their respective members, Each Electoral
Tribunal shall be composed of nine Members, three of whom shall be Justices of
the Supreme Court to be designated by the Chief Justice, and the remaining six
shall be Members of the Senate or House of Representatives, as the case may be,
parties and the parties or organizations registered under the party list system
Chairman.
Section 17 reechoes Section 11, Article VI of the 1935 Constitution, except the provision on the
representation of the main political parties in the tribunal which is now based
on proportional representation from all the political parties, instead of equal representation of
three members from each of the first and second largest political aggrupations in the Legislature.
The 1935 constitutional provision reads as follows:
Sec. 11. The Senate and the House of Representatives shall have an Electoral
be Members of the Senate or of the House of Representatives, as the case may be,
who shall be chosen by each House, three upon nomination of the party having
the largest number of votes and three of the party having the second largest
member of votes therein. The senior Justice in each Electoral Tribunal shall be its
Chairman. (1 935 Constitution of the Philippines.)
Under the above provision, the Justices held the deciding votes, aid it was impossible for any
political party to control the voting in the tribunal.
The 1973 Constitution did not provide for an electoral tribunal in the Batasang Pambansa.
The use of the word "sole" in both Section 17 of the 1987 Constitution and Section 11 of the
1935 Constitution underscores the exclusive jurisdiction of the House Electoral Tribunal as judge
of contests relating to the election, returns and qualifications of the members of the House of
Representatives (Robles vs. House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal, G.R. No. 86647,
February 5, 1990). The tribunal was created to function as a nonpartisancourt although twothirds of its members are politicians. It is a non-political body in a sea of politicians. What this
Court had earlier said about the Electoral Commission applies as well to the electoral tribunals of
the Senate and House of Representatives:
The purpose of the constitutional convention creating the Electoral Commission
was to provide an independent and impartial tribunal for the determination of
contests to legislative office, devoid of partisan consideration, and to transfer to
that tribunal all the powers previously exercised by the legislature in matters
pertaining to contested elections of its members.
The power granted to the electoral Commission to judge contests relating to the
election and qualification of members of the National Assembly is intended to be
as complete and unimpaired as if it had remained in the legislature.
The Electoral Tribunals of the Senate and the House were created by the
Constitution as special tribunals to be the sole judge of all contests relating to
election returns and qualifications of members of the legislative houses, and, as
such, are independent bodies which must be permitted to select their own
employees, and to supervise and control them, without any legislative
interference. (Suanes vs. Chief Accountant of the Senate, 81 Phil. 818.)
To be able to exercise exclusive jurisdiction, the House Electoral Tribunal must be independent.
Its jurisdiction to hear and decide congressional election contests is not to be shared by it with
the Legislature nor with the Courts.
The Electoral Commission is a body separate from and independent of the
legislature and though not a power in the tripartite scheme of government, it is to
all intents and purposes, when acting within the limits of its authority, an
independent organ; while composed of a majority of members of the legislature it
is a body separate from and independent of the legislature.
xxx xxx xxx
The Electoral Commission, a constitutional organ created for the specific purpose
of determining contests relating to election returns and qualifications of members
of the National Assembly may not be interfered with by the judiciary when and
while acting within the limits of its authority, but the Supreme Court has
jurisdiction over the Electoral Commission for the purpose of determining the
character, scope and extent of the constitutional grant to the commission as sole
judge of all contests relating to the election and qualifications of the members of
the National Assembly. (Angara vs. Electoral Commission, 63 Phil. 139.)
The independence of the electoral tribunal was preserved undiminished in the 1987 Constitution
as the following exchanges on the subject between Commissioners Maambong and Azcuna in the
1986 Constitutional Commission, attest:
MR. MAAMBONG. Thank you.
My questions will be very basic so we can go as fast as we can. In
the case of the electoral tribunal, either of the House or of the
Senate, is it correct to say that these tribunals are constitutional
creations? I will distinguish these with the case of the Tanodbayan
and the Sandiganbayan which are created by mandate of the
Constitution but they are not constitutional creations. Is that a good

distinction?
MR. AZCUNA. That is an excellent statement.
MR. MAAMBONG. Could we, therefore, say that either the
Senate Electoral Tribunal or the House Electoral Tribunal is a
constitutional body.?
MR. AZCUNA. It is, Madam President.
MR. MAAMBONG. If it is a constitutional body, is it then subject
to constitutional restrictions?
MR. AZCUNA It would be subject to constitutional restrictions
intended for that body.
MR. MAAMBONG. I see. But I want to find out if the ruling in
the case of Vera vs. Avelino, 77 Phil. 192, will still be applicable to
the present bodies we are creating since it ruled that the electoral
tribunals are not separate departments of the government. Would
that ruling still be valid?
MR. AZCUNA. Yes, they are not separate departments because the
separate departments are the legislative, the executive and the
judiciary; but they are constitutional bodies.
MR. MAAMBONG. Although they are not separate departments
of government, I would like to know again if the ruling in Angara
vs. Electoral Commission, 53 Phil. 139, would still be applicable
to the present bodies we are deciding on, when the Supreme court
said that these electoral tribunals are independent from Congress,
devoid of partisan influence or consideration and, therefore,
Congress has no power to regulate proceedings of these electoral
tribunals.
MR. AZCUNA. I think that is correct. They are independent
although they are not a separate branch of government.
MR. MAAMBONG. There is a statement that in all parliaments of
the world, the invariable rule is to leave unto themselves the
determination of controversies with respect to the election and
qualifications of their members, and precisely they have this
Committee on Privileges which takes care of this particular
controversy.
Would the Gentleman say that the creation of electoral tribunals is
an exception to this rule because apparently we have an
independent electoral tribunal?
MR. AZCUNA. To the extent that the electoral tribunals are
independent, but the Gentleman will notice that the wordings say:
'The Senate and the House of Representatives shall each have an
Electoral Tribunal. 'It is still the Senate Electoral Tribunal and the
House Electoral Tribunal. So, technically, it is the tribunal of the
House and tribunal of the Senate although they are independent.
MR. MAAMBONG. But both of them, as we have agreed on, are

independent from both bodies?
MR. AZCUNA. That is correct.
MR. MAAMBONG. This is the bottom line of my question. How
can we say that these bodies are independent when we still have
six politicians sitting in both tribunals?
MR. AZCUNA. Politicians can be independent, Madam President.
MR. MAAMBONG. Madam President, when we discussed a
portion of this in the Committee on the Executive, there was a
comment by Chief Justice Concepcion-Commissioner Concepcionthat there seems to be some incongruity in these electoral tribunals,
considering that politicians still sit in the tribunals in spite of the
fact that in the ruling in the case of Sanidad vs. Vera, Senate
Electoral tribunal Case No. 1, they are supposed to act in
accordance with law and justice with complete detachment from an
political considerations. That is why I am asking now for the
record how we could achieve such detachment when there are six
politicians sitting there.
MR. AZCUNA. The same reason that the Gentleman, while chosen
on behalf of the opposition, has, with sterling competence, shown
independence in the proceedings of this Commission. I think we
can also trust that the members of the tribunals will be
independent. (pp. 111-112, Journal, Tuesday, July 22, 1986,
Emphasis supplied.)
Resolution of the House of Representatives violates the independence of the HRET.
The independence of the House Electoral Tribunal so zealously guarded by the framers of our
Constitution, would, however, by a myth and its proceedings a farce if the House of
Representatives, or the majority party therein, may shuffle and manipulate the political (as
distinguished from the judicial) component of the electoral tribunal, to serve the interests of the
party in power.
The resolution of the House of Representatives removing Congressman Camasura from the
House Electoral Tribunal for disloyalty to the LDP, because he cast his vote in favor of the
Nacionalista Party's candidate, Bondoc, is a clear impairment of the constitutional prerogative of
the House Electoral Tribunal to be the sole judge of the election contest between Pineda and
Bondoc.
To sanction such interference by the House of Representatives in the work of the House Electoral
Tribunal would reduce the tribunal to a mere tool for the aggrandizement of the party in power
(LDP) which the three justices of the Supreme Court and the lone NP member would be
powerless to stop. A minority party candidate may as well abandon all hope at the threshold of
the tribunal.
Disloyalty to party is not a valid cause for termination of membership in the HRET.
As judges, the members of the tribunal must be non-partisan. They must discharge their
functions with complete detachment, impartiality, and independence even independence from the
political party to which they belong. Hence, "disloyalty to party" and "breach of party
discipline," are not valid grounds for the expulsion of a member of the tribunal. In expelling
Congressman Camasura from the HRET for having cast a conscience vote" in favor of Bondoc,
based strictly on the result of the examination and appreciation of the ballots and the recount of
the votes by the tribunal, the House of Representatives committed a grave abuse of discretion, an
injustice, and a violation of the Constitution. Its resolution of expulsion against Congressman
Camasura is, therefore, null and void.
Expulsion of Congressman Camasura violates his right to security of tenure.
Another reason for the nullity of the expulsion resolution of the House of Representatives is that
it violates Congressman Camasura's right to security of tenure. Members of the HRET as "sole
judge" of congressional election contests, are entitled to security of tenure just as members of the
judiciary enjoy security of tenure under our Constitution (Sec. 2, Art. VIII, 1987 Constitution).
Therefore, membership in the House Electoral Tribunal may not be terminated except for a just
cause, such as, the expiration of the member's congressional term of office, his death, permanent
disability, resignation from the political party he represents in the tribunal, formal affiliation with
another political party, or removal for other valid cause. A member may not be expelled by the
House of Representatives for "party disloyalty" short of proof that he has formally affiliated with
another political group. As the records of this case fail to show that Congressman Camasura has
become a registered member of another political party, his expulsion from the LDP and from the
HRET was not for a valid cause, hence, it violated his right to security of tenure.
There is nothing to the argument of respondent Pineda that members of the House Electoral
Tribunal are not entitled to security of tenure because, as a matter of fact, two Supreme Court
Justices in the Tribunal were changed before the end of the congressional term, namely: Chief
Justice Marcelo B. Fernan who, upon his elevation to the office of Chief Justice, was replaced by
Justice Florentino P. Feliciano, and the latter, who was temporarily replaced by Justice Emilio A.
Gancayco, when he (J. Feliciano) took a leave of absence to deliver a lecture in Yale University.
It should be stressed, however, that those changes in the judicial composition to the HRET had
no political implications at all unlike the present attempt to remove Congressman Camasura. No
coercion was applied on Chief Justice Fernan to resign from the tribunal, nor on Justice Feliciano
to go on a leave of absence. They acted on their own free will, for valid reasons, and with no
covert design to derail the disposition of a pending case in the HRET.
The case of Congressman Camasura is different. He was expelled from, and by, the LDP to
punish him for "party disloyalty" after he had revealed to the Secretary-General of the party how
he voted in the Bondoc case. The purpose of the expulsion of Congressman Camasura was to
nullify his vote in the Bondoc case so that the HRET's decision may not be promulgated, and so
that the way could be cleared for the LDP to nominate a replacement for Congressman Camasura
in the Tribunal. That stratagem of the LDP and the House of Representatives is clearly aimed to
substitute Congressman Camasura's vote and, in effect, to change the judgment of the HRET in
the Bondoc case.
The judicial power of this Court has been invoked by Bondoc for the protection of his rights
against the strong arm of the majority party in the House of Representatives. The Court cannot be
deaf to his plea for relief, nor indifferent to his charge that the House of Representatives had
acted with grave abuse of discretion in removing Congressman Camasura from the House
Electoral Tribunal. He calls upon the Court, as guardian of the Constitution, to exercise its
judicial power and discharge its duty to protect his rights as the party aggrieved by the action of
the House. The Court must perform its duty under the Constitution "even when the violator be
the highest official of the land or the Government itself" (Concurring opinion of J. Antonio
Barredo in Aquino vs. Ponce-Enrile, 59 SCRA 183, 207).
Since the expulsion of Congressman Camasura from the House Electoral Tribunal by the House
of Representatives was not for a lawful and valid cause, but to unjustly interfere with the
tribunal's disposition of the Bondoc case and to deprive Bondoc of the fruits of the Tribunal's
decision in his favor, the action of the House of Representatives is clearly violative of the
constitutional mandate (Sec. 17, Art. VI, 1987 Constitution) which created the House Electoral
Tribunal to be the "sole judge" of the election contest between Pineda and Bondoc. We,
therefore, declare null and void the resolution dated March 13, 1991 of the House of
Representatives withdrawing the nomination, and rescinding the election, of Congressman
Camasura as a member of the House Electoral Tribunal. The petitioner, Dr. Emigdio Bondoc, is
entitled to the reliefs he prays for in this case.
WHEREFORE, the petition for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus is granted. The decision of
the House of Representatives withdrawing the nomination and rescinding the election of
Congressman Juanita G. Camasura, Jr. as a member of the House Electoral Tribunal is hereby
declared null and void ab initio for being violative of the Constitution, and Congressman Juanita
G. Camasura, Jr. is ordered reinstated to his position as a member of the House of
Representatives Electoral Tribunal. The HRET Resolution No. 91-0018 dated March 14, 1991,
cancelling the promulgation of the decision in HRET Case No. 25 ("Dr. Emigdio Bondoc vs.
Marciano A. Pineda") is also set aside. Considering the unconscionable delay incurred in the
promulgation of that decision to the prejudice of the speedy resolution of electoral cases, the
Court, in the exercise of its equity jurisdiction, and in the interest of justice, hereby declares the
said decision DULY PROMULGATED, effective upon service of copies thereof on the parties, to
be done immediately by the Tribunal. Costs against respondent Marciano A. Pineda.
SO ORDERED.
Narvasa, Paras, Bidin, Medialdea, Regalado and Davide, Jr., JJ., concur.
Gutierrez, Jr., J., concurs as certified to by the Chief Justice.
Fernan, C.J., Melencio-Herrera, Cruz and Feliciano, JJ., took no part.
EN BANC
[G.R. No. 162777. August 31, 2004]
FRANCISCO I. CHAVEZ, petitioner, vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, represented by

its Chairman, BENJAMIN S. ABALOS, ESMERALDA AMORA-LADRA, in her
capacity as Acting Director IV, National Capital Judicial Region, Commission on
Elections, and the SOLICITOR GENERAL, respondents.
DECISION
AZCUNA, J.:
In this petition for prohibition with prayer for the issuance of a writ of preliminary
injunction, Francisco I. Chavez stands as a taxpayer and a citizen asking this Court to enjoin the
Commission on Elections (COMELEC) from enforcing Section 32 of its Resolution No. 6520,
dated January 6, 2004. The assailed provision is, as follows:
Section 32. All propaganda materials such as posters, streamers, stickers or paintings on walls
and other materials showing the picture, image, or name of a person, and all advertisements on
print, in radio or on television showing the image or mentioning the name of a person, who
subsequent to the placement or display thereof becomes a candidate for public office shall be
immediately removed by said candidate and radio station, print media or television station within
3 days after the effectivity of these implementing rules; otherwise, he and said radio station, print
media or television station shall be presumed to have conducted premature campaigning in
violation of Section 80 of the Omnibus Election Code.
Petitioner Chavez, on various dates, entered into formal agreements with certain
establishments to endorse their products. On August 18, 2003, he authorized a certain Andrew So
to use his name and image for 96 North, a clothing company. Petitioner also signed Endorsement
Agreements with Konka International Plastics Manufacturing Corporation and another
corporation involved in the amusement and video games business, G-Box. These last two
agreements were entered into on October 14, 2003 and November 10, 2003,
respectively. Pursuant to these agreements, three billboards were set up along the Balintawak
Interchange of the North Expressway. One billboard showed petitioner promoting the plastic
products of Konka International Plastics Manufacturing Corporation, and the other two showed
petitioner endorsing the clothes of 96 North. One more billboard was set up along Roxas
Boulevard showing petitioner promoting the game and amusement parlors of G-Box.
On December 30, 2003, however, petitioner filed his certificate of candidacy for the position
of Senator under Alyansa ng Pag-asa, a tripartite alliance of three political parties: PROMDI,
REPORMA, and Aksyon Demokratiko.
On January 6, 2004, respondent COMELEC issued Resolution No. 6520, which contained
Section 32, the provision assailed herein. On January 21, 2004, petitioner was directed to comply
with the said provision by the COMELECs Law Department. He replied, on January 29, 2004,
by requesting the COMELEC that he be informed as to how he may have violated the assailed
provision. He sent another letter dated February 23, 2004, this time asking the COMELEC that
he be exempted from the application of Section 32, considering that the billboards adverted to
are mere product endorsements and cannot be construed as paraphernalia for premature
campaigning under the rules.
The COMELEC answered petitioners request by issuing another letter, dated February 27,
2004, wherein it ordered him to remove or cause the removal of the billboards, or to cover them
from public view pending the approval of his request.
Feeling aggrieved, petitioner Chavez asks this Court that the COMELEC be enjoined from
enforcing the assailed provision. He urges this Court to declare the assailed provision
unconstitutional as the same is allegedly (1) a gross violation of the non-impairment clause; (2)
an invalid exercise of police power; (3) in the nature of an ex-post facto law; (4) contrary to the
Fair Elections Act; and (5) invalid due to overbreadth.
Is Section 32 of COMELEC Resolution No. 6520 an invalid exercise of police
power? Petitioner argues that the billboards, while they exhibit his name and image, do not at all
announce his candidacy for any public office nor solicit support for such candidacy from the
electorate. They are, he claims, mere product endorsements and not election
propaganda. Prohibiting, therefore, their exhibition to the public is not within the scope of the
powers of the COMELEC, he concludes.
This Court takes a contrary view. Police power, as an inherent attribute of sovereignty, is the
power to prescribe regulations to promote the health, morals, peace, education, good order, or
safety, and the general welfare of the people.[1] To determine the validity of a police measure, two
questions must be asked: (1) Does the interest of the public in general, as distinguished from
those of a particular class, require the exercise of police power? and (2) Are the means employed
reasonably necessary for the accomplishment of the purpose and not unduly oppressive upon
individuals?
A close examination of the assailed provision reveals that its primary objectives are to
prohibit premature campaigning and to level the playing field for candidates of public office, to
equalize the situation between popular or rich candidates, on one hand, and lesser-known or
poorer candidates, on the other, by preventing the former from enjoying undue advantage in
exposure and publicity on account of their resources and popularity. The latter is a valid reason
for the exercise of police power as held in National Press Club v. COMELEC, [2] wherein the
petitioners questioned the constitutionality of Section 11(b) of Republic Act No. 6646, which
prohibited the sale or donation of print space and air time for campaigning or other political
purposes, except to the COMELEC. The obvious intention of this provision is to equalize, as far
as practicable, the situations of rich and poor candidates by preventing the former from enjoying
the undue advantage offered by huge campaign war chests. This Court ruled therein that this
objective is of special importance and urgency in a country which, like ours, is characterized by
extreme disparity in income distribution between the economic elite and the rest of society, and
by the prevalence of poverty, with so many of our population falling below the poverty line.
Moreover, petitioner cannot claim that the subject billboards are purely product
endorsements and do not announce nor solicit any support for his candidacy. Under the Omnibus
Election Code, election campaign or partisan political activity is defined as an act designed to
promote the election or defeat of a particular candidate or candidates to a public office. Activities
included under this definition are:
(1) Forming organizations, associations, clubs, committees, or other groups of persons for the
purpose of soliciting votes and/or undertaking any campaign for or against a candidate
(2) Holding political caucuses, conferences, meetings, rallies, parades, or other similar
assemblies, for the purpose of soliciting votes and/or undertaking any campaign or propaganda
for or against a candidate;
(3) Making speeches, announcements or commentaries, or holding interviews for or against the
election of any candidate for public office;
(4) Publishing or distributing campaign literature or materials designed to support or oppose the
election of any candidate; or
(5) Directly or indirectly soliciting votes, pledges or support for or against a candidate.
[3]
(underscoring ours)
It is true that when petitioner entered into the contracts or agreements to endorse certain
products, he acted as a private individual and had all the right to lend his name and image to
these products. However, when he filed his certificate of candidacy for Senator, the billboards
featuring his name and image assumed partisan political character because the same indirectly
promoted his candidacy. Therefore, the COMELEC was acting well within its scope of powers
when it required petitioner to discontinue the display of the subject billboards. If the subject
billboards were to be allowed, candidates for public office whose name and image are used to
advertise commercial products would have more opportunity to make themselves known to the
electorate, to the disadvantage of other candidates who do not have the same chance of lending
their faces and names to endorse popular commercial products as image models. Similarly, an
individual intending to run for public office within the next few months, could pay private
corporations to use him as their image model with the intention of familiarizing the public with
his name and image even before the start of the campaign period. This, without a doubt, would
be a circumvention of the rule against premature campaigning:
Sec. 80. Election campaign or partisan political activity outside campaign period. It shall be
unlawful for any person, whether or not a voter or candidate, or for any party, or association of
persons, to engage in an election campaign or partisan political activity except during the
campaign period. x x x [4]
Article IX (C) (4) of the Constitution provides:
Sec. 4. The Commission may, during the election period, supervise or regulate the enjoyment or
utilization of all franchises or permits for the operation of transportation and other public
utilities, media of communication or information, all grants, special privileges, or concessions
granted by the Government or any subdivision, agency, or instrumentality thereof, including any
government-owned or controlled corporation or its subsidiary. Such supervision or regulation
shall aim to ensure equal opportunity, time, and space, and the right to reply, including
reasonable, equal rates therefor, for public information campaigns and forums among candidates
in connection with the objective of holding free, orderly, honest, peaceful, and credible elections.
Under the abovementioned Constitutional provision, the COMELEC is expressly authorized

to supervise or regulate the enjoyment or utilization of all media communication or information
to ensure equal opportunity, time, and space. All these are aimed at the holding of free, orderly,
honest, peaceful, and credible elections.
Neither is Section 32 of Resolution No. 6520 a gross violation of the non-impairment
clause. The non-impairment clause of the Constitution must yield to the loftier purposes targeted
by the Government.[5] Equal opportunity to proffer oneself for public office, without regard to the
level of financial resources one may have at his disposal, is indeed of vital interest to the
public. The State has the duty to enact and implement rules to safeguard this interest. Time and
again, this Court has said that contracts affecting public interest contain an implied reservation of
the police power as a postulate of the existing legal order. This power can be activated at anytime
to change the provisions of the contract, or even abrogate it entirely, for the promotion or
protection of the general welfare. Such an act will not militate against the impairment clause,
which is subject to and limited by the paramount police power.[6]
Furthermore, this Court notes that the very contracts entered into by petitioner provide that
the endorsers photograph and image shall be utilized in whatever form, mode and manner in
keeping with norms of decency, reasonableness, morals and law;[7] and in whatever form, mode
and manner not contrary to law and norms of decency,[8] and in whatever form, mode and manner
in keeping with norms of decency, reasonableness, moralsand law.[9]
Petitioner also claims that Section 32 of Resolution No. 6520 is in the nature of an ex post
facto law. He urges this Court to believe that the assailed provision makes an individual
criminally liable for an election offense for not removing such advertisement, even if at the time
the said advertisement was exhibited, the same was clearly legal. Hence, it makes a person,
whose name or image is featured in any such advertisement, liable for premature campaigning
under the Omnibus Election Code.[10] A close scrutiny of this rationale, however, demonstrates its
lack of persuasiveness. Section 32, although not penal in nature, defines an offense and
prescribes a penalty for said offense. Laws of this nature must operate prospectively, except
when they are favorable to the accused. It should be noted, however, that the offense defined in
the assailed provision is not the putting up of propaganda materials such as posters, streamers,
stickers or paintings on walls and other materials showing the picture, image or name of a
person, and all advertisements on print, in radio or on television showing the image or
mentioning the name of a person, who subsequent to the placement or display thereof becomes a
candidate for public office. Nor does it prohibit or consider an offense the entering of
contracts for such propaganda materials by an individual who subsequently becomes a candidate
for public office. One definitely does not commit an offense by entering into a contract with
private parties to use his name and image to endorse certain products prior to his becoming a
candidate for public office. The offense, as expressly prescribed in the assailed provision, is the
non-removal of the described propaganda materials three (3) days after the effectivity of
COMELEC Resolution No. 6520. If the candidate for public office fails to remove such
propaganda materials after the given period, he shall be liable under Section 80 of the Omnibus
Election Code for premature campaigning. Indeed, nowhere is it indicated in the assailed
provision that it shall operate retroactively. There is, therefore, no ex post facto law in this case.
Next, petitioner urges that Section 32 is a violation of the Fair Elections Act. According to
him, under this law, billboards are already permitted as lawful election propaganda. He claims,
therefore, that the COMELEC, in effectively prohibiting the use of billboards as a form of
election propaganda through the assailed provision, violated the Fair Elections Act. Petitioners
argument is not tenable. The Solicitor General rightly points out that the assailed provision does
not prohibit billboards as lawful election propaganda. It only regulates their use to prevent
premature campaigning and to equalize, as much as practicable, the situation of all candidates by
preventing popular and rich candidates from gaining undue advantage in exposure and publicity
on account of their resources and popularity.[11] Moreover, by regulating the use of such election
propaganda materials, the COMELEC is merely doing its duty under the law. Under Sections 3
and 13 of the Fair Elections Act, all election propaganda are subject to the supervision and
regulation by the COMELEC:
SECTION 3. Lawful Election Propaganda. -- Election propaganda, whether on television, cable

television radio, newspapers or any other medium is hereby allowed for all registered political
parties, national, regional, sectoral parties or organizations participating under the party list
elections and for all bona fide candidates seeking national and local elective positions subject to
the limitation on authorized expenses of candidates and political parties observance of truth in
advertising and to the supervision and regulation by the Commission on Elections (COMELEC).
For the purpose of this Act, lawful election propaganda shall include:
3.1. Pamphlets, leaflets, cards, decals, stickers or other written or printed materials the
size of which does not exceed eight and one half inches in width and fourteen
inches in length;
3.2. Handwritten or printed letters urging voters to vote for or against any particular
political party or candidate for public office;
3.3. Cloth, paper or cardboard posters whether framed or posted, with an area not
exceeding two(2) feet by three (3) feet, except that, at the site and on the occasion
of a public meeting or rally, or in announcing the holding of said meeting or rally,
streamers not exceeding three (3) feet by eight (8) feet in size, shall be
allowed: Provided, That said streamers may be displayed five (5) days before the
date of the meeting or rally and shall be removed within twenty-four (24) hours
after said meeting or rally;
3.4. Paid advertisements in print or broadcast media: Provided, That the advertisements
shall follow the requirements set forth in Section 4 of this Act; and
3.5. All other forms of election propaganda not prohibited by the Omnibus Election
Code or this Act.
xxx
SECTION 13. Authority of the COMELEC to Promulgate Rules; Election Offenses. - The
COMELEC shall promulgate and furnish all political parties and candidates and the mass media
entities the rules and regulations for the implementation of this Act, consistent with the criteria
established in Article IX-C, Section 4 of the Constitution and Section 86 of the Omnibus Election
Code (Batas Pambansa Blg. 881).
Rules and regulations promulgated by the COMELEC under and by authority of this Section
shall take effect on the seventh day after their publication in at least two (2) daily newspapers of
general circulation. Prior to effectivity of said rules and regulations, no political advertisement or
propaganda for or against any candidate or political party shall be published or broadcast through
mass media.
Violation of this Act and the rules and regulations of the COMELEC issued to implement this
Act shall be an election offense punishable under the first and second paragraphs of Section 264
of the Omnibus Election Code (Batas Pambansa Blg. 881).
Finally, petitioner contends that Section 32 of COMELEC Resolution No. 6520 is invalid
because of overbreadth.
A statute or regulation is considered void for overbreadth when it offends the constitutional
principle that a governmental purpose to control or prevent activities constitutionally subject to
State regulations may not be achieved by means that sweep unnecessarily broadly and thereby
invade the area of protected freedoms.[12]
The provision in question is limited in its operation both as to time and scope. It only
disallows the continued display of a persons propaganda materials and advertisements after he
has filed a certificate of candidacy and before the start of the campaign period. Said materials
and advertisements must also show his name and image.
There is no blanket prohibition of the use of propaganda materials and
advertisements. During the campaign period, these may be used subject only to reasonable
limitations necessary and incidental to achieving the purpose of preventing premature
campaigning and promoting equality of opportunities among all candidates.
The provision, therefore, is not invalid on the ground of overbreadth.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED and Section 32 of COMELEC Resolution No.
6520 is declared valid and constitutional. The prayer for a Temporary Restraining Order and/or a
Writ of Preliminary Injunction is hereby DENIED. No costs.
SO ORDERED.
Davide, Jr., C.J., Quisumbing, Ynares-Santiago, Austria-Martinez, Corona, CarpioMorales, Callejo, Sr., Tinga, and Chico-Nazario, JJ., concur.
.
EN BANC
[G.R. No. 141489. November 29, 2002]
SENATOR AQUILINO Q. PIMENTEL, JR., REPRESENTATIVES MELVYN D.

EBALLE, LEONARDO Q. MONTEMAYOR, CRESENTE C. PAEZ, LORETTA
ANN P. ROSALES and PATRICIA M. SARENAS, petitioners, vs. HOUSE OF
REPRESENTATIVES ELECTORAL TRIBUNAL, JUSTICES JOSE A.R. MELO,
VICENTE V. MENDOZA and JOSE C. VITUG, and REPRESENTATIVES ASANI
S. TAMMANG, RAUL M. GONZALES, DIDAGEN P. DILANGALEN, DANTON
Q. BUESER,[1] NAPOLEON R. BERATIO, SIMEON E. GARCIA and SPEAKER
MANUEL B. VILLAR, JR., respondents.
[G.R. No. 141490 November 29, 2002]
SENATOR AQUILINO Q. PIMENTEL, JR. REPRESENTATIVES MELVYN D.

EBALLE, LEONARDO Q. MONTEMAYOR, CRESENTE C. PAEZ, LORETTA
ANN P. ROSALES and PATRICIA M. SARENAS, petitioners, vs. COMMISSION
ON APPOINTMENTS, its Chair, SENATE PRESIDENT BLAS F. OPLE, and
Members, namely: SENATORS FRANKLIN M. DRILON, RENATO L.
CAYETANO, LOREN LEGARDA-LEVISTE, ROBERT Z. BARBERS, ANNA
DOMINIQUE M.L. COSETENG, GREGORIO HONASAN, RAMON B.
MAGSAYSAY, JR., TERESA AQUINO-ORETA, RAUL S. ROCO, FRANCISCO S.
TATAD, VICENTE C. SOTTO III and REPRESENTATIVES LUIS A. ASISTIO,
EMILIO R. ESPINOSA, JR., WIGBERTO E. TAADA, MANUEL M. GARCIA,
SIMEON A. DATUMANONG, ANTONIO M. DIAZ, FAUSTINO S. DY, JR.,
PACIFICO M. FAJARDO, ERNESTO F. HERRERA, NUR G. JAAFAR, CARLOS
M. PADILLA, ROGELIO M. SARMIENTO and SPEAKER MANUEL B. VILLAR,
JR., respondents.
DECISION
CARPIO, J.:
The Case
Before this Court are two original petitions for prohibition and mandamus with prayer for
writ of preliminary injunction. Petitioners assail the composition of the House of Representatives
Electoral Tribunal (HRET for brevity) [2] and the Commission on Appointments (CA for brevity).
[3]
Petitioners pray that respondents be ordered to alter, reorganize, reconstitute and reconfigure
the composition of the HRET and the CA to include party-list representatives in accordance with
Sections 17 and 18, Article VI of the 1987 Constitution and Republic Act No. 7941, otherwise
known as the Party-List System Act. Petitioners further pray that the HRET and the CA be
enjoined from exercising their functions until they have been reorganized.
Antecedent Facts
Section 5, Article VI of the 1987 Constitution provides for a party-list system in the House of
Representatives (House for brevity), as follows:
Sec. 5. (1) The House of Representatives shall be composed of not more than two hundred and
national, regional and sectoral parties or organizations.
ratification of this Constitution, one-half of the seats allocated to party-list representatives shall
indigenous cultural communities, women, youth and such other sectors as may be provided by
law except the religious sector.
On March 3, 1995, the Party-List System Act took effect. The Act sought to promote
proportional representation in the election of representatives, to the House of Representatives
through a party-list system of registered national, regional and sectoral parties or organizations or
coalitions thereof, which will enable Filipino citizens belonging to marginalized and
underrepresented sectors, organizations and parties, and who lack well-defined political
constituencies but who could contribute to the formulation and enactment of appropriate
legislation that will benefit the nation as a whole, to become members of the House of
Representatives.[4]
On May 11, 1998, in accordance with the Party-List System Act, national elections were
held which included, for the first time, the election through popular vote of party-list groups and
organizations whose nominees would become members of the House. Proclaimed winners were
14 party-list representatives from 13 organizations, including petitioners from party-list groups
Association of Philippine Electric Cooperatives[5] (APEC), Alyansang Bayanihan ng mga
Magsasaka, Manggagawang Bukid at Mangingisda (ABA), NATCO Network Party (COOPNATCCO), Akbayan! Citizens Action Party (AKBAYAN), and Abanse! Pinay (ABANSE). Due
to the votes it garnered, APEC was able to send 2 representatives to the House, while the 12
other party-list groups had one representative each. Also elected were district representatives
belonging to various political parties.
Subsequently, the House constituted its HRET and CA contingent [6] by electing its
representatives to these two constitutional bodies. In practice, the procedure involves the
nomination by the political parties of House members who are to occupy seats in the HRET and
the CA.[7] From available records, it does not appear that after the May 11, 1998 elections the
party-list groups in the House nominated any of their representatives to the HRET or the CA. As
of the date of filing of the instant petitions, the House contingents to the HRET and the CA were
composed solely of district representatives belonging to the different political parties.
On January 18, 2000, Senator Aquilino Q. Pimentel, Jr. wrote two letters addressed to then
Senate President Blas F. Ople,[8] as Chairman of the CA, and to Associate Justice of the Supreme
Court Jose A. R. Melo (now retired),[9] as Chairman of the HRET. The letters requested Senate
President Ople and Justice Melo to cause the restructuring of the CA and the HRET, respectively,
to include party-list representatives to conform to Sections 17 and 18, Article VI of the 1987
Constitution.
In its meeting of January 20, 2000, the HRET resolved to direct the Secretary of the Tribunal
to refer Senator Pimentels letter to the Secretary-General of the House of Representatives. [10] On
the same day, HRET Secretary Daisy B. Panga-Vega, in an Indorsement [11] of even date, referred
the letter to House of Representatives Secretary General Roberto P. Nazareno.
On February 2, 2000, petitioners filed with this Court their Petitions for Prohibition,
Mandamus and Preliminary Injunction (with Prayer for Temporary Restraining Order) against
the HRET, its Chairman and Members, [12]and against the CA, its Chairman and Members.
[13]
Petitioners contend that, under the Constitution and the Party-List System Act, party-list
representatives should have 1.2 or at least 1 seat in the HRET,[14] and 2.4 seats in the CA.
[15]
Petitioners charge that respondents committed grave abuse of discretion in refusing to act
positively on the letter of Senator Pimentel. In its Resolution of February 8, 2000, [16] the Court en
banc directed the consolidation of G.R. No. 141490 with G.R. No. 141489.
On February 11, 2000, petitioners filed in both cases a motion[17] to amend their petitions to
implead then Speaker Manuel B. Villar, Jr. as an additional respondent, in his capacity as
Speaker of the House and as one of the members of the CA. The Court granted both motions and
admitted the amended petitions.
Senator Pimentel filed the instant petitions on the strength of his oath to protect, defend and
uphold the Constitution and in his capacity as taxpayer and as a member of the CA. He was
joined by 5 party-list representatives from APEC, ABA, ABANSE, AKBAYAN and COOPNATCCO as co-petitioners.
Petitioners cite as basis Sections 17 and 18, Article VI of the 1987 Constitution, to wit:
Sec. 17. The Senate and the House of Representatives shall each have an Electoral Tribunal
which shall be the sole judge of all contests relating to the election, returns and qualifications of
their respective Members. Each Electoral Tribunal shall be composed of nine Members, three of
remaining six shall be Members of the Senate or the House of Representatives, as the case may
be, who shall be chosen on the basis of proportional representation from the political parties and
the parties or organizations registered under the party-list system represented therein. The senior
Justice in the Electoral Tribunal shall be its Chairman.
Sec. 18. There shall be a Commission on Appointments consisting of the President of the Senate,
as ex officio Chairman, twelve Senators and twelve Members of the House of Representatives,
elected by each House on the basis of proportional representation from the political parties and
parties or organizations registered under the party-list system represented therein. The Chairman
of the Commission shall not vote, except in case of a tie. The Commission shall act on all
appointments submitted to it within thirty session days of the Congress from their submission.
The Commission shall rule by a majority vote of all the Members,[18] (Emphasis supplied)
Petitioners also invoke the following provision of Section 11 of Republic Act No. 7941:
Sec. 11. Number of Party-List Representatives. - The party-list representatives shall constitute
including those under the party-list. xxx[19]
According to the Solicitor Generals Consolidated Comment, [20] at the time petitioners filed
the instant petitions the House had 220 members, 14 of whom were party-list representatives,
constituting 6.3636% of the House. Of the remaining 206 district representatives affiliated with
different political parties, 151 belonged to LAMP (68.6354%), 36 belonged to
LAKAS (16.3636%), 13 to the Liberal Party (5.9090%), 1 member (0.4545%)each to KBL,
PDRLM, Aksyon Demokratiko, Reporma and PROMDI, and 1 representative was an
independent.
In their Reply to Consolidated Comment, [21] petitioners alleged that, following the Solicitor
Generals computation, the LP and LAKAS were over-represented in the HRET and the CA.
Petitioners particularly assail the presence of one LP representative each in the HRET and the
CA, and maintain that the LP representatives should be ousted and replaced with nominees of the
14 party-list representatives.
The Issues
Petitioners raise the following issues:
1. WHETHER THE PRESENT COMPOSITION OF THE HOUSE ELECTORAL
TRIBUNAL VIOLATES THE CONSTITUTIONAL REQUIREMENT OF
PROPORTIONAL REPRESENTATION BECAUSE THERE ARE NO PARTY-LIST
REPRESENTATIVES IN THE HRET.
2. WHETHER THE PRESENT MEMBERSHIP OF THE HOUSE IN THE
COMMISSION ON APPOINTMENTS VIOLATES THE CONSTITUTIONAL
REQUIREMENT OF PROPORTIONAL REPRESENTATION BECAUSE THERE
ARE NO PARTY-LIST REPRESENTATIVES IN THE CA.
3. WHETHER THE REFUSAL OF THE HRET AND THE CA TO RECONSTITUTE
THEMSELVES
TO
INCLUDE
PARTY-LIST
REPRESENTATIVES
CONSTITUTES GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION.
On the other hand, the Solicitor General argues that the instant petitions are procedurally
defective and substantially lacking in merit for having been filed prematurely, thus:
It is a generally accepted principle that the averments in the pleading determine the existence of a
cause of action. In the instant petitions, petitioners failed to aver that they or any one of them was
elected by a party or organization registered under the party-list system as a Member of the
HRET or CA to represent said party or organization under the party-list system of the House of
Representatives.[22]
The Ruling of the Court
Petitioners urge the Court to rule on the issues raised in the petitions under review, citing the
following pronouncement in Guingona Jr. v. Gonzales :[23]
Where constitutional issues are properly raised in the context of the alleged facts, procedural
questions acquire a relatively minor significance, and the transcendental importance to the public
of the case demands that they be settled promptly and definitely brushing aside xxx technicalities
of procedure.
Petitioners reliance on Guingona, Jr. v. Gonzales is misplaced. The procedural questions
that petitioners want the Court to brush aside are not mere technicalities but substantive matters
that are specifically provided for in the constitutional provisions cited by petitioners.
The Constitution expressly grants to the House of Representatives the prerogative, within
constitutionally defined limits, to choose from among its district and party-list representatives
those who may occupy the seats allotted to the House in the HRET and the CA. Section 18,
Article VI of the Constitution[24] explicitly confers on the Senate and on the House the authority
to elect among their members those who would fill the 12 seats for Senators and 12 seats for
House members in the Commission on Appointments. Under Section 17, Article VI of the
Constitution,[25] each chamber of Congress exercises the power to choose, within constitutionally
defined limits, who among their members would occupy the allotted 6 seats of each chambers
respective electoral tribunal.
These constitutional provisions are reiterated in Rules 3 and 4 (a) of the 1998 Rules of the
House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal, to wit:
Rule 3. Composition. - The Tribunal shall be composed of nine Members, three of whom shall be
Justices of the Supreme Court to be designated by the Chief Justice, and the remaining six shall
be Members of the House of Representatives who shall be chosen on the basis of proportional
representation from the political parties and the parties or organizations registered under the
party-list system represented therein. The Senior Justice in the Tribunal shall be its Chairman.
Rule 4. Organization. - (a) Upon the designation of the Justices of the Supreme Court and the
election of the Members of the House of Representatives who are to compose the House of
Representatives Electoral Tribunal pursuant to Sections 17 and 19 of Article VI of the
Constitution, the Tribunal shall meet for its organization and adoption of such resolutions as it
may deem proper. (Emphasis supplied)
Likewise, Section 1 of the Rules of the Commission on Appointments provides:
Section 1. Composition of the Commission On Appointments. Within thirty (30) days after both
Houses of Congress shall have organized themselves with the election of the Senate President
and the Speaker of the House of Representatives, the Commission on Appointments shall be
constituted. It shall be composed of twelve (12) Senators and twelve (12) members of the House
of Representatives, elected by each House on the basis of proportional representation from the
political parties and parties or organizations registered under the party-list system represented
herein.
(Emphasis supplied)
Thus, even assuming that party-list representatives comprise a sufficient number and have
agreed to designate common nominees to the HRET and the CA, their primary recourse clearly
rests with the House of Representatives and not with this Court. Under Sections 17 and 18,
Article VI of the Constitution, party-list representatives must first show to the House that they
possess the required numerical strength to be entitled to seats in the HRET and the CA. Only if
the House fails to comply with the directive of the Constitution on proportional representation of
political parties in the HRET and the CA can the party-list representatives seek recourse to this
Court under its power of judicial review. Under the doctrine of primary jurisdiction, prior
recourse to the House is necessary before petitioners may bring the instant case to the court.
Consequently, petitioners direct recourse to this Court is premature.
The discretion of the House to choose its members to the HRET and the CA is not absolute,
being subject to the mandatory constitutional rule on proportional representation. [26] However,
under the doctrine of separation of powers, the Court may not interfere with the exercise by the
House of this constitutionally mandated duty, absent a clear violation of the Constitution or grave
abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction. [27] Otherwise, the doctrine of
separation of powers calls for each branch of government to be left alone to discharge its duties
as it sees fit.[28] Neither can the Court speculate on what action the House may take if party-list
representatives are duly nominated for membership in the HRET and the CA.
The instant petitions are bereft of any allegation that respondents prevented the party-list
groups in the House from participating in the election of members of the HRET and the CA.
Neither does it appear that after the May 11, 1998 elections, the House barred the party-list
representatives from seeking membership in the HRET or the CA. Rather, it appears from the
available facts that the party-list groups in the House at that time simply refrained from
participating in the election process. The party-list representatives did not designate their
nominees even up to the time they filed the instant petitions, with the predictable result that the
House did not consider any party-list representative for election to the HRET or the CA. As the
primary recourse of the party-list representatives lies with the House of Representatives, the
Court cannot resolve the issues presented by petitioners at this time.
Moreover, it is a well-settled rule that a constitutional question will not be heard and
resolved by the courts unless the following requirements of judicial inquiry concur: (1) there
must be an actual controversy; (2) the person or party raising the constitutional issue must have a
personal and substantial interest in the resolution of the controversy; (3) the controversy must be
raised at the earliest reasonable opportunity; and (4) the resolution of the constitutional issue
must be indispensable to the final determination of the controversy.[29]
The five party-list representatives who are petitioners in the instant case have not alleged
that they are entitled to, and have been unlawfully deprived of, seats in the HRET or the CA.
Neither have they claimed that they have been nominated by the party-list groups in the House to
the HRET or the CA. As such, they do not possess the personal and substantial interest required
to confer them with locus standi. The party raising the constitutional issue must have
such personal stake in the outcome of the controversy as to assure that concrete adverseness
which sharpens the presentation of issues upon which the court depends for illumination of
difficult constitutional questions.[30]
We likewise find no grave abuse in the action or lack of action by the HRET and the CA in
response to the letters of Senator Pimentel. Under Sections 17 and 18 of Article VI of the 1987
Constitution and their internal rules, the HRET and the CA are bereft of any power to
reconstitute themselves.
Finally, the issues raised in the petitions have been rendered academic by subsequent events.
On May 14, 2001, a new set of district and party-list representatives were elected to the House.
The Court cannot now resolve the issue of proportional representation in the HRET and the CA
based on the present composition of the House of Representatives as presented by petitioners and
the Solicitor General. With the May 14, 2001 elections, it is certain that the composition of the
House has changed. In the absence of a proper petition assailing the present composition of the
HRET and the CA, the instant petitions must fail. Otherwise, for the Court to rule on the instant
petitions at this time would be tantamount to rendering an advisory opinion, which is outside our
jurisdiction.[31]
WHEREFORE, the consolidated petitions for prohibition and mandamus are DISMISSED.
SO ORDERED.
Davide, Jr., C.J., Bellosillo, Puno, Panganiban, Quisumbing, Ynares-Santiago, SandovalGutierrez, Corona, Carpio-Morales, Callejo, Sr., and Azcuna, JJ., concur.
Vitug and Mendoza, J., no part; a respondent in G.R. No. 141489.
Austria-Martinez,J., on leave.
EN BANC
DARYL GRACE J. ABAYON, G.R. No. 189466
Petitioner,
Present:
Puno, C.J.,
Carpio,
Corona,
Carpio Morales,
Velasco, Jr.,
Nachura,
- versus - Leonardo-De Castro,
Brion,
Peralta,
Bersamin,
Del Castillo,
Abad,
Villarama, Jr.,
Perez, and
Mendoza, JJ.
THE HONORABLE HOUSE OF
REPRESENTATIVES ELECTORAL
TRIBUNAL, PERFECTO C. LUCABAN,
JR., RONYL S. DE LA CRUZ
and AGUSTIN C. DOROGA,
Respondents.
x ---------------------------------------------- x
CONGRESSMAN JOVITO S. G.R. No. 189506
PALPARAN, JR.,
Petitioner,
- versus HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
ELECTORAL TRIBUNAL (HRET),
DR. REYNALDO LESACA, JR.,
CRISTINA PALABAY, RENATO M.
REYES, JR., ERLINDA CADAPAN,
ANTONIO FLORES and Promulgated:
JOSELITO USTAREZ,
Respondents. February 11, 2010
x ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- x
DECISION
ABAD, J.:
These two cases are about the authority of the House of Representatives Electoral
Tribunal (HRET) to pass upon the eligibilities of the nominees of the party-list groups that won
seats in the lower house of Congress.
The Facts and the Case
In G.R. 189466, petitioner Daryl Grace J. Abayon is the first nominee of the Aangat Tayo partylist organization that won a seat in the House of Representatives during the 2007 elections.
Respondents Perfecto C. Lucaban, Jr., Ronyl S. Dela Cruz, and Agustin C. Doroga, all
registered voters, filed a petition for quo warranto with respondent HRET against Aangat
Tayo and its nominee, petitioner Abayon, in HRET Case 07-041. They claimed that Aangat
Tayo was not eligible for a party-list seat in the House of Representatives, since it did not
represent the marginalized and underrepresented sectors.
Respondent Lucaban and the others with him further pointed out that petitioner Abayon
herself was not qualified to sit in the House as a party-list nominee since she did not belong to
the marginalized and underrepresented sectors, she being the wife of an incumbent congressional
district representative. She moreover lost her bid as party-list representative of the party-list
organization called An Waray in the immediately preceding elections of May 10, 2004.
Petitioner Abayon countered that the Commission on Elections (COMELEC) had already
confirmed the status of Aangat Tayo as a national multi-sectoral party-list organization
representing the workers, women, youth, urban poor, and elderly and that she belonged to the
women sector. Abayon also claimed that although she was the second nominee of An
Waray party-list organization during the 2004 elections, she could not be regarded as having lost
a bid for an elective office.
Finally, petitioner Abayon pointed out that respondent HRET had no jurisdiction over the
petition for quo warranto since respondent Lucaban and the others with him collaterally attacked
the registration of Aangat Tayo as a party-list organization, a matter that fell within the
jurisdiction of the COMELEC. It was Aangat Tayo that was taking a seat in the House of
Representatives, and not Abayon who was just its nominee. All questions involving her
eligibility as first nominee, said Abayon, were internal concerns of Aangat Tayo.
On July 16, 2009 respondent HRET issued an order, dismissing the petition as against Aangat
Tayo but upholding its jurisdiction over the qualifications of petitioner Abayon. [1] The latter
moved for reconsideration but the HRET denied the same on September 17, 2009,[2] prompting
Abayon to file the present petition for special civil action of certiorari.
In G.R. 189506, petitioner Jovito S. Palparan, Jr. is the first nominee of the Bantay partylist group that won a seat in the 2007 elections for the members of the House of
Representatives. Respondents Reynaldo Lesaca, Jr., Cristina Palabay, Renato M. Reyes, Jr.,
Erlinda Cadapan, Antonio Flores, and Joselito Ustarez are members of some other party-list
groups.
Shortly after the elections, respondent Lesaca and the others with him filed with respondent
HRET a petition for quo warranto against Bantay and its nominee, petitioner Palparan, in HRET
Case 07-040.Lesaca and the others alleged that Palparan was ineligible to sit in the House of
Representatives as party-list nominee because he did not belong to the marginalized and
underrepresented sectors that Bantayrepresented, namely, the victims of communist rebels,

Civilian Armed Forces Geographical Units (CAFGUs), former rebels, and security
guards. Lesaca and the others said that Palparan committed gross human rights violations against
marginalized and underrepresented sectors and organizations.
Petitioner Palparan countered that the HRET had no jurisdiction over his person since it was
actually the party-list Bantay, not he, that was elected to and assumed membership in the House
of Representatives.Palparan claimed that he was just Bantays nominee. Consequently, any
question involving his eligibility as first nominee was an internal concern of Bantay. Such
question must be brought, he said, before that party-list group, not before the HRET.
On July 23, 2009 respondent HRET issued an order dismissing the petition
against Bantay for the reason that the issue of the ineligibility or qualification of the party-list
group fell within the jurisdiction of the COMELEC pursuant to the Party-List System
Act. HRET, however, defended its jurisdiction over the question of petitioner Palparans
qualifications.[3] Palparan moved for reconsideration but the HRET denied it by a resolution
dated September 10, 2009,[4] hence, the recourse to this Court through this petition for special
civil action of certiorari and prohibition.
Since the two cases raise a common issue, the Court has caused their consolidation.
The Issue Presented
The common issue presented in these two cases is:
Whether or not respondent HRET has jurisdiction over the question of qualifications
of petitioners Abayon and Palparan as nominees of Aangat Tayo and Bantay party-list
organizations, respectively,who took the seats at the House of Representatives that such
organizations won in the 2007 elections.
The Courts Ruling
Petitioners Abayon and Palparan have a common theory: Republic Act (R.A.) 7941, the
Party-List System Act, vests in the COMELEC the authority to determine which parties or
organizations have the qualifications to seek party-list seats in the House of Representatives
during the elections. Indeed, the HRET dismissed the petitions for quo warranto filed with it
insofar as they sought the disqualifications ofAangat Tayo and Bantay. Since petitioners Abayon
and Palparan were not elected into office but were chosen by their respective organizations under
their internal rules, the HRET has no jurisdiction to inquire into and adjudicate their
qualifications as nominees.
If at all, says petitioner Abayon, such authority belongs to the COMELEC which already
upheld her qualification as nominee of Aangat Tayo for the women sector. For Palparan, Bantays
personality is so inseparable and intertwined with his own person as its nominee so that the
HRET cannot dismiss the quo warranto action against Bantay without dismissing the action
against him.
But, although it is the party-list organization that is voted for in the elections, it is not the
organization that sits as and becomes a member of the House of Representatives. Section 5,
Article VI of the Constitution,[5] identifies who the members of that House are:
Sec. 5. (1). The House of Representatives shall be composed of not more than
elected from legislative districts apportioned among the provinces, cities, and
the Metropolitan Manila area in accordance with the number of their
respective inhabitants, and on the basis of a uniform and progressive
ratio, and those who, as provided by law, shall be elected through a party -list
system of registered national, regional, and sectoral parties or
organizations. (Underscoring supplied)
Clearly, the members of the House of Representatives are of two kinds: members x x x
who shall be elected from legislative districts and those who x x x shall be elected through a
party-list system of registered national, regional, and sectoral parties or organizations. This
means that, from the Constitutions point of view, it is the party-list representatives who are
elected into office, not their parties or organizations. These representatives are elected, however,
through that peculiar party-list system that the Constitution authorized and that Congress by law
established where the voters cast their votes for the organizations or parties to which such partylist representatives belong.
Once elected, both the district representatives and the party-list representatives are treated
in like manner. They have the same deliberative rights, salaries, and emoluments. They can
participate in the making of laws that will directly benefit their legislative districts or
sectors. They are also subject to the same term limitation of three years for a maximum of three
consecutive terms.
It may not be amiss to point out that the Party-List System Act itself recognizes party-list
nominees as members of the House of Representatives, thus:
Sec. 2. Declaration of Policy. - The State shall promote proportional
representation in the election of representatives to the House of
Representatives through a party-list system of registered national, regional
and sectoral parties or organizations or coalitions thereof, which will enable
Filipino citizens belonging to the marginalized and underrepresented sectors,
organizations and parties, and who lack well-defined political constituencies
but who could contribute to the formulation and enactment of appropriate
legislation that will benefit the nation as a whole, to become members of the
House of Representatives. Towards this end, the State shall develop and
guarantee a full, free and open party system in order to attain the broadest
possible representation of party, sectoral or group interests in the House of
Representatives by enhancing their chances to compete for and win seats in
the legislature, and shall provide the simplest scheme possible. (Underscoring
supplied)
As this Court also held in Bantay Republic Act or BA-RA 7941 v. Commission on
Elections,[6] a party-list representative is in every sense an elected member of the House of
Representatives. Although the vote cast in a party-list election is a vote for a party, such vote, in
the end, would be a vote for its nominees, who, in appropriate cases, would eventually sit in the
House of Representatives.
Both the Constitution and the Party-List System Act set the qualifications and grounds for
disqualification of party-list nominees. Section 9 of R.A. 7941, echoing the Constitution, states:
Sec. 9. Qualification of Party-List Nominees. No person shall be
nominated as party-list representative unless he is a natural-born citizen of
the Philippines, a registered voter, a resident of the Philippines for a period of
not less than one (1) year immediately preceding the day of the election, able
to read and write, bona fide member of the party or organization which he
seeks to represent for at least ninety (90) days preceding the day of the
election, and is at least twenty-five (25) years of age on the day of the election.
In case of a nominee of the youth sector, he must at least be twentyfive (25) but not more than thirty (30) years of age on the day of the
election. Any youth sectoral representative who attains the age of thirty (30)
during his term shall be allowed to continue until the expiration of his term.
In the cases before the Court, those who challenged the qualifications of petitioners
Abayon and Palparan claim that the two do not belong to the marginalized and underrepresented
sectors that they ought to represent. The Party-List System Act provides that a nominee must be
a bona fide member of the party or organization which he seeks to represent.[7]
It is for the HRET to interpret the meaning of this particular qualification of a nomineethe
need for him or her to be a bona fide member or a representative of his party-list organizationin
the context of the facts that characterize petitioners Abayon and Palparans relation to Aangat
Tayo and Bantay, respectively, and the marginalized and underrepresented interests that they
presumably embody.
Petitioners Abayon and Palparan of course point out that the authority to determine the
qualifications of a party-list nominee belongs to the party or organization that nominated
him. This is true, initially.The right to examine the fitness of aspiring nominees and, eventually,
to choose five from among them after all belongs to the party or organization that nominates
them.[8] But where an allegation is made that the party or organization had chosen and allowed a
disqualified nominee to become its party-list representative in the lower House and enjoy the
secured tenure that goes with the position, the resolution of the dispute is taken out of its hand.
Parenthetically, although the Party-List System Act does not so state, the COMELEC
seems to believe, when it resolved the challenge to petitioner Abayon, that it has the power to do
so as an incident of its authority to approve the registration of party-list organizations. But the
Court need not resolve this question since it is not raised here and has not been argued by the
parties.
What is inevitable is that Section 17, Article VI of the Constitution [9] provides that the
HRET shall be the sole judge of all contests relating to, among other things, the qualifications of
the members of the House of Representatives. Since, as pointed out above, party-list nominees
are elected members of the House of Representatives no less than the district representatives
are, the HRET has jurisdiction to hear and pass upon their qualifications. By analogy with the
cases of district representatives, once the party or organization of the party-list nominee has been
proclaimed and the nominee has taken his oath and assumed office as member of the House of
Representatives, the COMELECs jurisdiction over election contests relating to his qualifications
ends and the HRETs own jurisdiction begins.[10]
The Court holds that respondent HRET did not gravely abuse its discretion when it
dismissed the petitions for quo warranto against Aangat Tayo party-list and Bantay party-list but
upheld its jurisdiction over the question of the qualifications of petitioners Abayon and Palparan.
WHEREFORE, the
Court DISMISSES the
consolidated
petitions
and AFFIRMS the Order dated July 16, 2009 and Resolution 09-183 dated September 17, 2009
in HRET Case 07-041 of the House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal as well as its Order
dated July 23, 2009 and Resolution 09-178 dated September 10, 2009 in HRET Case 07-040.
SO ORDERED.

SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. 207264
October 22, 2013
REGINA ONGSIAKO REYES, Petitioner,

vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS and JOSEPH SOCORRO B. TAN, Respondents.
RESOLUTION
PEREZ, J.:
This is a Motion for Reconsideration of the En Bane Resolution of 25 June 2013 which stated
that: IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the instant petition is DISMISSED, finding no grave
abuse of discretion on the part of the Commission on Elections. The 14 May 2013 Resolution of
the COMELEC En Banc affirming the 27 March 2013 Resolution of the COMELEC First
Division is upheld."
In her Motion for Reconsideration, petitioner summarizes her submission, thus:
"81. Stated differently, the Petitioner x x x is not asking the Honorable Court to make a
determination as regards her qualifications, she is merely asking the Honorable Court to affirm
the jurisdiction of the HRET to solely and exclusively pass upon such qualifications and to set
aside the COMELEC Resolutions for having denied Petitioner her right to due process and for
unconstitutionally adding a qualification not otherwise required by the constitution." 1 (as
originally underscored)
The first part of the summary refers to the issue raised in the petition, which is:
"31. Whether or not Respondent Comelec is without jurisdiction over Petitioner who is duly
proclaimed winner and who has already taken her oath of office for the position of Member of
the House of Representatives for the lone congressional district of Marinduque."2
Tied up and neatened the propositions on the COMELEC-or-HRET jurisdiction go thus:
petitioner is a duly proclaimed winner and having taken her oath of office as member of the
House of Representatives, all questions regarding her qualifications are outside the jurisdiction
of the COMELEC and are within the HRET exclusive jurisdiction.
The averred proclamation is the critical pointer to the correctness of petitioner's submission. The
crucial question is whether or not petitioner could be proclaimed on 18 May 2013. Differently
stated, was there basis for the proclamation of petitioner on 18 May 2013?
Dates and events indicate that there was no basis for the proclamation of petitioner on 18 May
2013. Without the proclamation, the petitioner's oath of office is likewise baseless, and without a
precedent oath of office, there can be no valid and effective assumption of office.
We have clearly stated in our Resolution of 5 June 2013 that:
"More importantly, we cannot disregard a fact basic in this controversy that before the
proclamation of petitioner on 18 May 2013, the COMELEC En Banc had already finally
disposed of the issue of petitioner's lack of Filipino citizenship and residency via its Resolution
dated 14 May 2013. After 14 May 2013, there was, before the COMELEC, no longer any
pending case on petitioner's qualifications to run for the position of Member of the House of
Representatives. x x x As the point has obviously been missed by the petitioner who continues to
argue on the basis of her due proclamation, the instant motion gives us the opportunity to
highlight the undeniable fact we here repeat that the proclamation which petitioner secured on 18
May 2013 was WITHOUT ANY BASIS.
1. Four (4) days BEFORE the 18 May 2013 proclamation, or on 14 May 2013, the
COMELEC En Banc has already denied for lack o merit the petitioner's motion to
reconsider the decision o the COMELEC First Division that CANCELLED petitioner's
certificate of candidacy.
2. On 18 May 2013, there was already a standing and unquestioned cancellation of
petitioner's certificate o candidacy which cancellation is a definite bar to her
proclamation. On 18 May 2003, that bar has not been removed, there was not even any
attempt to remove it.
3. The COMELEC Rules indicate the manner by which the impediment to proclamation
may be removed. Rule 18, Section 13 (b) provides:
"(b) In Special Actions and Special Cases a decision or resolution of the Commission En
Bane shall become final and executory after five (5) days from its promulgation unless
restrained by the Supreme Court."
Within that five (5 days, petitioner had the opportunity to go to the Supreme Court for a
restraining order that will remove the immediate effect of the En Banc cancellation of her
certificate of candidacy. Within the five (5) days the Supreme Court may remove the
barrier to, and thus allow, the proclamation of petitioner. That did not happen. Petitioner
did not move to have it happen.
It is error to argue that the five days should pass before the petitioner is barred from being
proclaimed. Petitioner lost in the COMELEC as of respondent. Her certificate of
candidacy has been ordered cancelled. She could not be proclaimed because there was a
final finding against her by the COMELEC.3 She needed a restraining order from the
Supreme Court to avoid the final finding. After the five days when the decision adverse to
her became executory, the need for Supreme Court intervention became even more
imperative. She would have to base her recourse on the position that the COMELEC
committed grave abuse of discretion in cancelling her certificate of candidacy and that a
restraining order, which would allow her proclamation, will have to be based on
irreparable injury and demonstrated possibility of grave abuse of discretion on the part of
the COMELEC. In this case, before and after the 18 May 2013 proclamation, there was
not even an attempt at the legal remedy, clearly available to her, to permit her
proclamation. What petitioner did was to "take the law into her hands" and secure a
proclamation in complete disregard of the COMELEC En Bane decision that was final on
14 May 2013 and final and executory five days thereafter.
4. There is a reason why no mention about notice was made in Section 13(b) of Rule 18
in the provision that the COMELEC En Bane or decision "SHALL become FINAL AND
EXECUTORY after five days from its promulgation unless restrained by the Supreme
Court." On its own the COMELEC En Bane decision, unrestrained, moves from
promulgation into becoming final and executory. This is so because in Section 5 of Rule
18 it is stated:
Section 5. Promulgation. -The promulgation of a decision or resolutions of the Commission or a
division shall be made on a date previously fixed, of which notice shall be served in advance
upon the parties or their attorneys personally or by registered mail or by telegram.
5. Apart from the presumed notice of the COMELEC En Bane decision on the very date
of its promulgation on 14 May 2013, petitioner admitted in her petition before us that she
in fact received a copy of the decision on 16 May 20 13. 4 On that date, she had absolutely
no reason why she would disregard the available legal way to remove the restraint on her
proclamation, and, more than that, to in fact secure a proclamation two days thereafter.
The utter disregard of a final COMELEC En Bane decision and of the Rule stating that
her proclamation at that point MUST be on permission by the Supreme Court is even
indicative of bad faith on the part of the petitioner.
6. The indicant is magnified by the fact that petitioner would use her tainted proclamation
as the very reason to support her argument that she could no longer be reached by the
jurisdiction of the COMELEC; and that it is the HRET that has exclusive jurisdiction
over the issue of her qualifications for office.
7. The suggestions of bad faith aside, petitioner is in error in the conclusion at which she
directs, as well as in her objective quite obvious from such conclusion. It is with her
procured proclamation that petitioner nullifies the COMELEC's decision, by Division and
then En Banc and pre-empts any Supreme Court action on the COMELEC decision. In
other words, petitioner repudiates by her proclamation all administrative and judicial
actions thereon, past and present. And by her proclamation, she claims as acquired the
congressional seat that she sought to be a candidate for. As already shown, the reasons
that lead to the impermissibility of the objective are clear. She cannot sit as Member of
the House of Representatives by virtue of a baseless proclamation knowingly taken, with
knowledge of the existing legal impediment.
8. Petitioner, therefore, is in error when she posits that at present it is the HRET which
has exclusive jurisdiction over her qualifications as a Member of the House of
Representatives. That the HRET is the sole judge of all contests relating to the election,
returns and qualifications of the Members of the House of Representatives is a written
constitutional provision. It is, however unavailable to petitioner because she is NOT a
Member of the House at present. The COMELEC never ordered her proclamation as the
rightful winner in the election for such membership. 5 Indeed, the action for cancellation
of petitioner's certificate of candidacy, the decision in which is the indispensable
determinant of the right of petitioner to proclamation, was correctly lodged in the
COMELEC, was completely and fully litigated in the COMELEC and was finally
decided by the COMELEC. On and after 14 May 2013, there was nothing left for the
COMELEC to do to decide the case. The decision sealed the proceedings in the
COMELEC regarding petitioner's ineligibility as a candidate for Representative of
Marinduque. The decision erected the bar to petitioner's proclamation. The bar remained
when no restraining order was obtained by petitioner from the Supreme Court within five
days from 14 May 2013.
9. When petitioner finally went to the Supreme Court on 10 June 2013 questioning the
COMELEC First Division ruling and the 14 May 2013 COMELEC En Bane decision, her
baseless proclamation on 18 May 2013 did not by that fact of promulgation alone become
valid and legal. A decision favorable to her by the Supreme Court regarding the decision
of the COMELEC En Bane on her certificate of candidacy was indispensably needed, not
to legalize her proclamation on 18 May 2013 but to authorize a proclamation with the
Supreme Court decision as basis.
10. The recourse taken on 25 June 2013 in the form of an original and special civil action
for a writ of Certiorari through Rule 64 of the Rules of Court is circumscribed by set
rules and principles.
a) The special action before the COMELEC which was a Petition to Cancel
Certificate of Candidacy was a SUMMARY PROCEEDING or one heard
summarily. The nature of the proceedings is best indicated by the COMELEC
Rule on Special Actions, Rule 23, Section 4 of which states that the Commission
may designate any of its officials who are members of the Philippine Bar to hear
the case and to receive evidence. COMELEC Rule 17 further provides in Section
3 that when the proceedings are authorized to be summary, in lieu of oral
testimonies, the parties may, after due notice, be required to submit their position
paper together with affidavits, counter-affidavits and other documentary evidence;
x x x and that this provision shall likewise apply to cases where the hearing and
reception of evidence are delegated by the Commission or the Division to any of
its officials x x x.
b) The special and civil action of Certiorari is defined in the Rules of Court thus:
When any tribunal, board or officer exercising judicial or quasi-judicial functions has acted
without or in excess of its or his jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack
or excess of jurisdiction, and there is no appeal, or any plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the
ordinary course of law, a person aggrieved thereby may file a verified petition in the proper
court, alleging the facts with certainty and praying that judgment be rendered annulling or
modifying the proceedings of such tribunal, board or officer, and granting such incidental reliefs
as law and justice may require.
The accepted definition of grave abuse of discretion is: a capricious and whimsical exercise of
judgment so patent and gross as to amount to an evasion of a positive duty or a virtual refusal to
perform a duty enjoined by law, as where the power is exercised in an arbitrary and despotic
manner because of passion or hostility.6
It is the category of the special action below providing the procedural leeway in the exercise of
the COMELEC summary jurisdiction over the case, in conjunction with the limits of the
Supreme Court's authority over the FINAL COMELEC ruling that is brought before it, that
defines the way petitioner's submission before the Court should be adjudicated. Thus further
explained, the disposition of 25 June 2013 is here repeated for affirmation:
Petitioner alleges that the COMELEC gravely abused its discretion when it took cognizance of
"newly-discovered evidence" without the same having been testified on and offered and admitted
in evidence. She assails the admission of the blog article of Eli Obligacion as hearsay and the
photocopy of the Certification from the Bureau of Immigration. She likewise contends that there
was a violation of her right to due process of law because she was not given the opportunity to
question and present controverting evidence.
Her contentions are incorrect.
It must be emphasized that the COMELEC is not bound to strictly adhere to the technical rules
of procedure in the presentation of evidence. Under Section 2 of Rule I the COMELEC Rules of
Procedure shall be liberally construed in order x x x to achieve just, expeditious and inexpensive
determination and disposition of every action and proceeding brought before the Commission. In
view of the fact that the proceedings in a petition to deny due course or to cancel certificate of
candidacy are summary in nature, then the newly discovered evidence was properly admitted by
respondent COMELEC.
Furthermore, there was no denial of due process in the case at bar as petitioner was given every
opportunity to argue her case before the COMELEC. From 10 October 2012 when Tan's petition
was filed up to 27 March 2013 when the First Division rendered its resolution, petitioner had a
period of five (5) months to adduce evidence. Unfortunately, she did not avail herself of the
opportunity given her.
Also, in administrative proceedings, procedural due process only requires that the party be given
the opportunity or right to be heard. As held in the case of Sahali v. COMELEC:
The petitioners should be reminded that due process does not necessarily mean or require a
hearing, but simply an opportunity or right to be heard. One may be heard, not solely by verbal
presentation but also, and perhaps many times more creditably and predictable than oral
argument, through pleadings. In administrative proceedings moreover, technical rules of
procedure and evidence are not strictly applied; administrative process cannot be fully equated
with due process in its strict judicial sense. Indeed, deprivation of due process cannot be
successfully invoked where a party was given the chance to be he rd on his motion for
reconsideration. (Emphasis supplied)
As to the ruling that petitioner s ineligible to run for office on the ground of citizenship, the
COMELEC First Division, discoursed as follows:
"x x x for respondent to reacquire her Filipino citizenship and become eligible for public office
the law requires that she must have accomplished the following acts: (1) take the oath of
allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines before the Consul-General of the Philippine
Consulate in the USA; and (2) make a personal and sworn renunciation of her American
citizenship before any public officer authorized to administer an oath.
In the case at bar, there s no showing that respondent complied with the aforesaid requirements.
Early on in the proceeding, respondent hammered on petitioner's lack of proof regarding her
American citizenship, contending that it is petitioner's burden to present a case. She, however,
specifically denied that she has become either a permanent resident or naturalized citizen of the
USA.
Due to petitioner's submission of newly-discovered evidence thru a Manifestation dated February
7, 2013, however, establishing the fact that respondent is a holder of an American passport which
she continues to use until June 30 2012 petitioner was able to substantiate his allegations. The
burden now shifts to respondent to present substantial evidence to prove otherwise. This, the
respondent utterly failed to do, leading to the conclusion inevitable that respondent falsely
misrepresented in her COC that she is a natural-born Filipino citizen. Unless and until she can
establish that she had availed of the privileges of RA 9225 by becoming a dual FilipinoAmerican citizen, and thereafter, made a valid sworn renunciation of her American citizenship,
she remains to be an American citizen and is, therefore, ineligible to run for and hold any
elective public office in the Philippines." (Emphasis in the original.)
Let us look into the events that led to this petition: In moving for the cancellation of petitioner's
COC, respondent submitted records of the Bureau of Immigration showing that petitioner is a
holder of a US passport, and that her status is that of a balikbayan. At this point, the burden of
proof shifted to petitioner, imposing upon her the duty to prove that she is a natural-born Filipino
citizen and has not lost the same, or that she has re-acquired such status in accordance with the
provisions of R.A. No. 9225. Aside from the bare allegation that she is a natural-born citizen,
however, petitioner submitted no proof to support such contention. Neither did she submit any
proof as to the inapplicability of R.A. No. 9225 to her.
Notably, in her Motion for Reconsideration before the COMELEC En Bane, petitioner admitted
that she is a holder of a US passport, but she averred that she is only a dual Filipino-American
citizen, thus the requirements of R.A. No. 9225 do not apply to her. Still, attached to the said
motion is an Affidavit of Renunciation of Foreign Citizenship dated 24 September 2012.
Petitioner explains that she attached said Affidavit if only to show her desire and zeal to serve the
people and to comply with rules, even as a superfluity. We cannot, however, subscribe to
petitioner's explanation. If petitioner executed said Affidavit if only to comply with the rules,
then it is an admission that R.A. No. 9225 applies to her. Petitioner cannot claim that she
executed it to address the observations by the COMELEC as the assailed Resolutions were
promulgated only in 2013, while the Affidavit was executed in September 2012.1wphi1
Moreover, in the present petition, petitioner added a footnote to her oath of office as Provincial
Administrator, to this effect: This does not mean that Petitioner did not, prior to her taking her
oath of office as Provincial Administrator, take her oath of allegiance for purposes of reacquisition of natural-born Filipino status, which she reserves to present in the proper
proceeding. The reference to the taking of oath of office is in order to make reference to what is
already part of the records and evidence in the present case and to avoid injecting into the
records evidence on matters of fact that was not previously passed upon by Respondent
COMELEC. This statement raises a lot of questions -Did petitioner execute an oath of allegiance
for re-acquisition of natural-born Filipino status? If she did, why did she not present it at the
earliest opportunity before the COMELEC? And is this an admission that she has indeed lost her
natural-born Filipino status?
To cover-up her apparent lack of an oath of allegiance as required by R.A. No. 9225, petitioner
contends that, since she took her oath of allegiance in connection with her appointment as
Provincial Administrator of Marinduque, she is deemed to have reacquired her status as a
natural-born Filipino citizen.
This contention is misplaced. For one, this issue is being presented for the first time before this
Court, as it was never raised before the COMELEC. For another, said oath of allegiance cannot
be considered compliance with Sec. 3 of R.A. No. 9225 as certain requirements have to be met
as prescribed by Memorandum Circular No. AFF-04-01, otherwise known as the Rules
Governing Philippine Citizenship under R.A. No. 9225 and Memorandum Circular No. AFF-05002 (Revised Rules) and Administrative Order No. 91, Series of 2004 issued by the Bureau of
Immigration. Thus, petitioner s oath of office as Provincial Administrator cannot be considered
as the oath of allegiance in compliance with R.A. No. 9225.
These circumstances, taken together, show that a doubt was clearly cast on petitioner s
citizenship. Petitioner, however, failed to clear such doubt.7
11. It may need pointing out that there is no conflict between the COMELEC and the
HRET insofar as the petitioner s being a Representative of Marinduque is concerned. The
COMELEC covers the matter of petitioner s certificate of candidacy, and its due course
or its cancellation, which are the pivotal conclusions that determines who can be legally
proclaimed. The matter can go to the Supreme Court but not as a continuation of the
proceedings in the COMELEC, which has in fact ended, but on an original action before
the Court grounded on more than mere error of judgment but on error of jurisdiction for
grave abuse of discretion. At and after the COMELEC En Bane decision, there is no
longer any certificate cancellation matter than can go to the HRET. In that sense, the
HRET s constitutional authority opens, over the qualification of its MEMBER, who
becomes so only upon a duly and legally based proclamation, the first and unavoidable
step towards such membership. The HRET jurisdiction over the qualification of the
Member of the House of Representatives is original and exclusive, and as such, proceeds
de novo unhampered by the proceedings in the COMELEC which, as just stated has been
terminated. The HRET proceedings is a regular, not summary, proceeding. It will
determine who should be the Member of the House. It must be made clear though, at the
risk of repetitiveness, that no hiatus occurs in the representation of Marinduque in the
House because there is such a representative who shall sit as the HRET proceedings are
had till termination. Such representative is the duly proclaimed winner resulting from the
terminated case of cancellation of certificate of candidacy of petitioner. The petitioner is
not, cannot, be that representative. And this, all in all, is the crux of the dispute between
the parties: who shall sit in the House in representation of Marinduque, while there is yet
no HRET decision on the qualifications of the Member.
12. As finale, and as explained in the discussion just done, no unwarranted haste can be
attributed, as the dissent does so, to the resolution of this petition promulgated on 25 June
2013. It was not done to prevent the exercise by the HRET of its constitutional duty.
Quite the contrary, the speedy resolution of the petition was done to pave the way for the
unimpeded performance by the HRET of its constitutional role. The petitioner can very
well invoke the authority of the HRET, but not as a sitting member of the House of
Representatives.8
The inhibition of this ponente was moved for. The reason for the denial of the motion was
contained in a letter to the members of the Court on the understanding that the matter was
internal to the Court. The ponente now seeks the Courts approval to have the explanation
published as it is now appended to this Resolution.
The motion to withdraw petition filed AFTER the Court has acted thereon, is noted. It may well
be in order to remind petitioner that jurisdiction, once acquired, is not lost upon the instance of
the parties, but continues until the case is terminated.9 When petitioner filed her Petition for
Certiorari jurisdiction vested in the Court and, in fact, the Court exercised such jurisdiction when
it acted on the petition. Such jurisdiction cannot be lost by the unilateral withdrawal of the
petition by petitioner.
More importantly, the Resolution dated 25 June 2013, being a valid court issuance, undoubtedly
has legal consequences. Petitioner cannot, by the mere expediency of withdrawing the petition,
negative and nullify the Court's Resolution and its legal effects. At this point, we counsel
petitioner against trifling with court processes. Having sought the jurisdiction of the Supreme
Court, petitioner cannot withdraw her petition to erase the ruling adverse to her interests.
Obviously, she cannot, as she designed below, subject to her predilections the supremacy of the
law.
WHEREFORE, The Motion for Reconsideration is DENIED. The dismissal of the petition is
affirmed. Entry of Judgment is ordered.
SO ORDERED.
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. 86649 July 12, 1990
ANNA DOMINIQUE M.L. COSETENG and KABABAIHAN PARA SA INANG
BAYAN, petitioners,
vs.
HON. RAMON V. MITRA, JR., as speaker of the House of Representatives of the Congress
of the Philippines; HON. FRANCISCO SUMULONG, as Majority Floor Leader of the
House of Representatives of the Congress of the Philippines; HON. JOVITO SALONGA,
as Ex-Oficio Chairman of the Commission on Appointments; HON. ROQUE R. ABLAN,
JR., HON. LORNA L. VERANO-YAP, HON. MIGUEL ROMERO, HON. ANTONIO V.
CUENCO, HON. ROGACIANO M. MERCADO, HON. ALAWADIN T. BANDON, JR.,
HON. JOSE L. CABOCHAN, HON. CARLOS R. IMPERIAL, HON. MA. CLARA L.
LOBREGAT, HON. NATALIO M. BELTRAN, JR., HON. CARMELO J. LOCSIN &
HON. LUIS C. SINGSON, as Members of the Commission on Appointments for the House
of Representatives of the CONGRESS OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondents.
Perfecto V. Fernandez, Jose P. Fernandez and Cristobal P. Fernandez for petitioners.
Panganiban, Benitez, Barinaga & Bautista Law Offices for Lorna L. Verano-Yap.
GRIO-AQUINO, J.:
The congressional elections of May 11, 1987 resulted in the election to the House of
Representatives of the candidates of diverse political parties such as the PDP-Laban, Lakas ng
Bansa (LB), Liberal Party (LP), NP-Unido, Kilusan ng Bagong Lipunan (KBL), Panaghiusa,
Kababaihan Para sa Inang Bayan (KAIBA), and some independents. Petitioner Anna Dominique
M.L. Coseteng was the only candidate elected under the banner of KAIBA.
On August 26, 1987, the House of Representatives, upon nomination by the Majority Floor
Leader, Cong. Francisco Sumulong, elected from the Coalesced Majority, eleven (11) out of
twelve (12) congressmen to represent the House in the Commission on Appointments. They
were:
1. Hon. Miguel Romero LP (Liberal Party)
2. Hon. Antonio V. Cuenco LB-Panaghiusa
3. Hon. Rogaciano Mercado LB (Lakas ng Bayan)
4. Hon. Raul Daza LP
5. Hon. Alawadin T. Bandon Jr. PDP-Laban
6. Hon. Jose Cabochan PDP-Laban
7. Hon. Lorna L. Verano-Yap LP
8. Hon. Carlos R. Imperial IND
9. Hon. Ma. Clara L. Lobregat IND
10. Hon Natalio M. Beltran, Jr. LB/Unido/NP
11. Hon. Carmelo J. Locsin PDP-Laban/LB
On September 22, 1987, upon nomination of the Minority Floor Leader, the House elected
Honorable Roque Ablan, Jr., KBL, as the twelfth member of the Commission on Appointments,
representing the Coalesced Minority in the House.
A year later, on September 16, 1988, the "Laban ng Demokratikong Pilipino" (LDP, for brevity)
was organized as a political party. As 158 out of 202 members of the House of Representatives
formally affiliated with the LDP, the House committees, including the House representation in
the Commission on Appointments, had to be reorganized.
On October 8, 1988, petitioner Coseteng wrote a letter to Speaker Ramon Mitra requesting that
as representative of KAIBA, she be appointed as a member of the Commission on Appointments
and House Electoral Tribunal (p. 15, Rollo). Her request was endorsed by nine (9) congressmen,
namely, Hon. Lally Laurel-Trinidad, Bonifacio Gillego, Luz Reyes Bakunawa, Gerardo
Cabochan, Jose D. Aspiras, Oscar Santos, Eduardo N. Joson, Antonio H. Cerilles and Isacio
Pelaez.
On December 5, 1988, the House of Representatives, on motion of the Majority Floor Leader
and over the objection of Cong. Raul A. Daza, LP, revised the House majority membership in the
Commission on Appointments to conform with the new political alignments by replacing Rep.
Raul A. Daza, LP, with Rep. Luis C. Singson, LDP, as follows:
1. Hon. Miguel L. Romero LDP
2. Hon. Antonio V. Cuenco LDP
3. Hon. Rogaciano M. Mercado LDP
4. Hon. Alawadin T. Bandon, Jr. LDP
5. Hon. Jose L. Cabochan LDP
6. Hon. Carlos R. Imperial LDP
7. Hon. Maria Clara L. Lobregat LDP

8. Hon. Natalio M. Beltran, Jr. LDP
9. Hon. Carmelo J. Locsin LDP
10. Hon. Luis C. Singson LDP
11. Hon. Lorna L. Verano-Yap LP
Congressman Ablan, KBL, was retained as the 12th member representing the House minority.
On February 1, 1989, Congresswoman Coseteng and her party, the KAIBA, filed this Petition for
Extraordinary Legal Writs (which may be considered as a petition for quo warranto and
injunction) praying this Court to declare as null and void the election of respondent Ablan,
Verano-Yap, Romero, Cuenco, Mercado, Bandon, Cabochan, Imperial, Lobregat, Beltran,
Locsin, and Singson, as members of the Commission on Appointments, to enjoin them from
acting as such and to enjoin also the other respondents from recognizing them as members of the
Commission on Appointments on the theory that their election to that Commission violated the
constitutional mandate of proportional representation because:
1) the New Majority (158 LDP members out of the 202 members of the House) is entitled to only
nine (9) seats out of the twelve to be filled by the House (p. 29, Rollo);
2) the members representing the political parties, or coalitions thereof, must be nominated by
their respective political parties or coalitions;
3) the nomination and election of respondent Verano-Yap by the respondents as representative of
the minority was clearly invalid (p. 31, Rollo); and
4) that similarly invalid was the retention of respondent Ablan as Minority member in the
Commission because he was neither nominated nor elected as such by the minority party or
parties in the House (p. 31, Rollo).
Petitioner Coseteng further alleged that she is qualified to sit in the Commission on
Appointments as a representative of the Minority because she has the support of nine (9) other
congressmen and congresswomen of the Minority (p. 31, Rollo).
In their collective Comment, the respondents House of Representatives, the Speaker, the
Majority Floor Leader, the members of the Commission on Appointments including
Congressman Roque R. Ablan, but excluding Congresswoman Lorna Verano-Yap (who filed a
separate Comment), alleged: (1) that the legality of the reorganization of the Commission on
Appointments is a political question, hence, outside the jurisdiction of this Court to decide, and
(2) that in any case, the reorganization was "strictly in consonance with Section 18, Article VI of
the 1987 Constitution" i.e., on the basis of proportional representation of the political parties,
considering the majority coalition "as a form of a political party" (pp. 115, 118, Rollo). They
further alleged that as of March 3, 1989, 160 members of the House (including 26 former
Liberals) had expressly renounced in writing their respective political party affiliations and
formally affiliated with the LDP leaving only 15 Liberals in the House (p. 119, Rollo).itcasl After its petition for registration as a political party was granted on August 28, 1989 by the
First Division of the COMELEC) and affirmed on November 23, 1989 by the COMELEC en
banc, the LDP become the new Majority in the House. They finally argued that as KAIBA is part
of the Coalesced Majority which supports the administration of President Corazon C. Aquino,
not of the minority, petitioner is bound by the choice of the Coalesced Majority of the members
who would sit in the Commission on Appointments.
Representative Lorna Verano-Yap, in her comment alleged that the petitioner has no better light
than those already selected, to be chosen as a member of the Commission on Appointments
because: (1) the Constitution was not violated in electing Yap and eleven (11) other House
members to the Commission on Appointments; (2) respondent Yap is a rightful incumbent; and
(3) petitioner's claim to a seat on the Commission on Appointments is without legal and factual
basis (pp. 217-218, Rollo).
The Commission on Appointments took a neutral stand on the petition as the issues involved
may touch on the validity of its organization and the legality of the entitlement of the LDP or the
LP to representation, which are raised in the case of Daza vs. Singson, G.R. No. 86344, then
pending before this Court (pp. 195-198, Rollo).
The issue here is whether the members of the House in the Commission on Appointments were
chosen on the basis of proportional representation from the political parties therein as provided in
Section 18, Article VI of the 1987 Constitution which reads:
Sec. 18. There shall be a Commission on Appointments consisting of the
President of the Senate, asex oficio Chairman, twelve Senators, and twelve
Members of the House of Representatives elected by each House on the basis
of proportional representation from the political parties and parties or
organizations registered under the party-list system represented therein. The
chairman of the Commission shall not vote, except in case of a tie. The
Commission shall act on all appointments submitted to it within thirty session
days of the Congress from their submission. The commission shall rule by a
majority vote of all the Members. (Art. VI, 1987 Constitution.)
After deliberating on the petition and the comments of the respondents, we hold that the petition
should be dismissed, not because it raises a political question, which it does not, but because the
revision of the House representation in the Commission on Appointments is based on
proportional representation of the political parties therein as provided in Section 18, Article VI of
the 1987 Constitution.
The "political question" issue was settled in Daza vs. Singson, G.R. No. 86344, December 21,
1989, where this Court ruled that "the legality, and not the wisdom, of the manner of filling the
Commission on Appointments as prescribed by the Constitution" is justiciable, and, "even if the
question were political in nature, it would still come within our powers of review under the
expanded jurisdiction conferred upon us by Article VIII, Section 1, of the Constitution, which
includes the authority to determine whether grave abuse of discretion amounting to excess or
lack of jurisdiction has been committed by any branch or instrumentality of the government."
The composition of the House membership in the Commission on Appointments was based on
proportional representation of the political parties in the House. There are 160 members of the
LDP in the House. They represent 79% of the House membership (which may be rounded out to
80%). Eighty percent (80%) of 12 members in the Commission on Appointments would equal
9.6 members, which may be rounded out to ten (10) members from the LDP. The remaining two
seats were apportioned to the LP (respondent Lorna Verano-Yap) as the next largest party in the
Coalesced Majority and the KBL (respondent Roque Ablan) as the principal opposition party in
the House. There is no doubt that this apportionment of the House membership in the
Commission on Appointments was done "on the basis of proportional representation of the
political parties therein."
The other political parties or groups in the House, such as petitioner's KAIBA (which is
presumably a member also of the Coalesced Majority), are bound by the majority's choices. Even
if KAIBA were to be considered as an opposition party, its lone member (petitioner Coseteng)
represents only .4% or less than 1% of the House membership, hence, she is not entitled to one
of the 12 House seats in the Commission on Appointments. To be able to claim proportional
membership in the Commission on Appointments, a political party should represent at least 8.4%
of the House membership, i.e., it should have been able to elect at least 17 congressmen or
congresswomen.
The indorsements of the nine (9) congressmen and congresswomen in favor of the petitioner's
election to the Commission are inconsequential because they are not members of her party and
they signed identical indorsements in favor of her rival, respondent Congresswoman Verano-Yap.
There is no merit in the petitioner's contention that the House members in the Commission on
Appointments should have been nominated and elected by their respective political parties. The
petition itself shows that they were nominated by their respective floor leaders in the House.
They were elected by the House (not by their party) as provided in Section 18, Article VI of the
Constitution. The validity of their election to the Commission on Appointments eleven (11)
from the Coalesced Majority and one from the minority is unassailable.
WHEREFORE, the petition is dismissed for lack of merit. Costs against the petitioner.
SO ORDERED.
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. 106971 March 1, 1993

TEOFISTO T. GUINGONA, JR. and LAKAS-NATIONAL UNION OF CHRISTIAN
DEMOCRATS (LAKAS-NUCD),petitioners,
vs.
NEPTALI A. GONZALES, ALBERTO ROMULO and WIGBERTO E.
TAADA, respondents.
NATIONALIST PEOPLE'S COALITION, petitioner-in-intervention.
Ricardo G. Nepomuceno for petitioners.
Gonzales, Batiller, Bilog & Associates for respondents.
RESOLUTION
CAMPOS, JR., J.:

In motions separately filed by respondent Senator Wigberto E. Taada on October 27, 1992 and
respondents Senate President Neptali A. Gonzales and Senator Alberto Romulo on October 30,
1992, said respondents moved for a reconsideration of our decision dated October 20, 1992, on
the following grounds:
Senator Taada alleges that:
1) The decision was premised on an erroneous appreciation of relevant factual precedents;
2) The decision ignored the reality of the multi-party system recognized both by the letter and
spirit of the 1935 and 1987 Constitutions;
3) It is mandatory to fill up twelve (12) seats in the Commission on Appointments;
4) The Senate did not act with grave abuse of discretion when it elected respondent Taada to the
Commission on Appointments.
In their Motion for Reconsideration/Clarification, Senators Gonzales and Romulo allege:
1) That the decision is inconsistent with the Supreme Court's ruling in the two cases of Coseteng
vs. Mitra, Jr. 1and Daza vs. Singson. 2
2) It is mandatory to have twelve (12) members of the Commission of Appointments to enable it
to function as a constitutional body.
3) The Tolentino Compromise Formula was adopted by the Senate and accepted by all political
parties and must govern the selection of respondent Senators to the Commission on
Appointments.
4) The election of the respondents Senators is in compliance with the multi-party system which
contemplates a realignment of political parties to remove fractional membership of any party in
the Commission.
On December 16, 1992, the petitioner-in intervention Nationalist People's Coalition (NPC) filed
its separate Comments to the Motions of respondents Senators while the petitioners filed on
January 7, 1993 their separate Comments on the Motion of the respondents.
Considering the grounds set forth in the Motions of the respondents and in the light of the
reasons/arguments submitted in refutation thereof, We deny both Motions for Reconsideration on
the following grounds:
1) The decision is based on a simple interpretation and application of Article VI, Section 18 of
the 1987 Constitution and We quote pertinent portions thereof.
It is an established fact to which all the parties agree that the mathematical
representation of each of the political parties represented in the Senate is as
follows:
LDP 7.5
LP-PDP-LABAN .5
NPC 2.5
LAKAS-NUCD 1.5
It is also a fact accepted by all such parties that each of them is entitled to a
fractional membership on the basis of the rule on proportional representation of
each of the political parties. A literal interpretation of Section 18 of Article VI of
the Constitution leads to no other manner of application than as above. The
problem is what to do with the fraction of .5 or 1/2 to which each of the parties is
entitled. The LDP majority in the Senate converted a fractional half membership
into a whole membership of one senator by adding one half or .5 to 7.5 to be able
to elect Senator Romulo. In so doing one other party's fractional membership was
correspondingly reduced leaving the latter's representation in the Commission on
Appointments to less than their proportional representation in the Senate. This is a
clearly a violation of Section 18 because it is no longer in compliance with its
mandate that membership in the Commission be based on the proportional
representation of the political parties. The election of Senator Romulo gave more
representation to the LDP and reduced the representation of one political party
either the LAKAS-NUCD or the NPC.
xxx xxx xxx
We find the respondent's claim to membership in the Commission on
Appointments by nomination and election of the LDP majority in the Senate as
not in accordance with Section 18 of Article VI of the 1987 Constitution and
therefore violative of the same because it is not in compliance with the
requirement that twelve senators shall be elected on the basis of proportional
representation of the political parties represented therein. To disturb the resulting
fractional membership of the political parties in the Commission on Appointments
by adding together two halves to make a whole is a breach of the rule on
proportional representation because it will give the LDP an added member in the
Commission by utilizing the fractional membership of the minority political party,
who is deprived of half a representation.
The provision of Section 18 on proportional representation is mandatory in
character and does not leave any discretion to the majority party in the Senate to
disobey or disregard the rule on proportional representation; otherwise, the party
with a majority representation in the Senate or the House of Representatives can
by sheer force of numbers impose its will on the hapless minority. By requiring a
proportional representation in the Commission on Appointments, Section 18 in
effect works as a check on the majority party in the Senate and helps to maintain
the balance of power. No party can claim more than what is entitled to under such
rule. To allow it to elect more than its proportional share of members is to confer
upon such a party a greater share in the membership in the Commission on
Appointments and more power to impose its will on the minority, who by the
same token, suffers a diminution of its rightful membership in the Commission. 3
The membership of the late Senator Lorenzo Taada in the Commission on Appointments for the
year alluded to by respondents is not disputed. The questioned decision however refers to the
former Senator's Membership in the Commission during his first election as Senator in 19531954. 4 In the following years the composition of the Commission on Appointments showed
varying membership from the Nacionalista Party and Liberal Party, not discounting the various
coalitions of the rival groups within their own ranks. During this period, his membership in the
Commission was acquiesced to by the other members of the Senate, including the Nationalista
Party which had a fractional vote. His membership in the Commission was never contested nor
disputed by any party nor member of the Senate so that the question of whether his sitting as
member of the Commission was constitutionality valid or not never reached the Court. The older
Taada's membership in the Commission on Appointments cannot thus be considered by
respondent Senator Taada as a precedent sufficient to overrule the clear mandate of Article VI,
Section 18 of the Constitution.
It is a matter of record that in the political ventures of the late Senator Lorenzo Taada, he had
his Citizens Party coalesce with the Nationalista Party and got himself elected as Senator under
the banner of the latter party. His election to the Commission was principally due to the alliance
of his Citizens Party with the Nationalista Party and not because he was elected thereto on the
strength of his being the lone representative of the Citizens' Party. 5Senator Taada was included
in the Nationalista Party ticket in 1953 until he parted ways temporarily with the same before the
end of 1955. In 1959 he ran as a guest candidate of the Nationalista Party for a term of 6 years
and
again
got
re-elected in 1965 for another 6-year term under the Nationalista Party. The Nationalista-Citizens
Party
coalition
of
12
Senators
in
the
Senate
from
1965-1967 gave the coalition 6 members in the Commission on Appointments, including the late
Senator Lorenzo Taada. As early as those years, the Senate recognized the rule on proportional
representation in the Commission by resorting to a coalition of political parties in order to
resolve and avoid fractional membership in the Commission. This practice was repeated in
1968-1970 where the lone elected Senator of the Citizens Party was nominated and elected to the
Commission on Appointments as the Senator to complete a whole number in the proportional
representation to the Commission, with the late Senator Taada becoming the 16th Senator of the
Coalition, enabling it to put 8 members in the Commission. Likewise, in 1970, the late Senator
Taada filled up the 18th membership of the Coalition to become the 9th member representing
the Coalition in the Commission.
The election of the late Senator Lorenzo Taada to the Commission on Appointments does not
reflect any practice or tradition in the Senate which can be considered as a precedent in the
interpretation of the constitutional provision on proportional representation in the Commission
on Appointments. No practice or tradition, established by a mere tolerance, can, without judicial
acquiescence, ripen into a doctrine of practical construction of the fundamental law. In the
absence of judicial confirmation of the constitutionality of the challenged legislative practice the
repeated erroneous legislative interpretation of a constitutional provision, does not vest power on
the legislature. 6
2) We take note of an erroneous reference in our decision to the listing of the party affiliation of
the Senators based on the result of the election on May 11, 1992, giving the LDP only 15
members and including Senator Teofisto Guingona as a member of the Lakas-NUCDP.
Respondents, however, accepted the fact that for purposes of determining the proportional
representatives of each political party to the Commission on Appointments, the basis thereof is
the actual number of members of each political party at the time of election of the members of
the Commission on Appointments in the Senate. 7 In fact, respondents affirmed that the affiliation
of Senator Guingona with the Lakas-NUCDP upheld the doctrine enunciated in Daza vs.
Singson, 8 recognizing changes in alignments of membership in the Commission based on
changing political alignments at the time of the organization of the Commission on

Appointments. The issue therefore has no significance as an argument to set aside our decision.
3) Senator Taada was actually nominated by the LP because the house rules require that the
party must make the nomination. In fact he nominated himself as representative of the LP-LDPLABAN. It was the Majority Leader, an LDP Senator, (Senator Romulo) who presented the
motion to elect respondent Senator Taada (along with the Senators belonging to the other
Minority parties NPC and LAKAS-NUCD) as part of his function or duty to present for
election and votation those previously nominated by the various political parties. In nominating
the twelve (12) Senators to the membership in the Commission on Appointments, Senator
Romulo moved:
Mr. President, pursuant to the Motion just approved, I have the honor to submit
for election to the Commission on Appointments the 12 Senators to compose its
membership : Senators Angara, Herrera, Alvarez, Aquino, Mercado, Ople, Sotto
and Romulo for the LDP; Senators Tolentino and Osmea for NPC; Senator
Rasul, for Lakas-NUCD; and Senator Taada for LP-PDP, Mr. President. 9
4) This Court has ruled that, under Article VI, Section 18 of the Constitution providing for a
multi-party system, entitlement to proportional representation in the Commission on
Appointments requires a minimum membership in each house. 10 The statement of this Court
in Daza vs. Singson 11 to the effect that "under the Constitutional provision on membership of the
Commission on Appointments, the members thereof are NOT limited to the majority and
minority parties therein but extends to all the political parties represented in each house of
Congress", does not and should not be construed to mean that all political parties, irrespective of
numerical representation in the Senate, are entitled by Constitutional fiat to at least one
representation in the Commission. The Supreme Court in the subsequent case of Coseteng vs.
Mitra, Jr. 12 made this clear where it ruled that proportional representation in the Commission on
Appointments requires a minimum membership of a party in each house. The mere presence of
one Senator belonging to a political party does notipso facto entitle such a party to membership
in the Commission on Appointments.
5) We have declared that the Constitution does not require that the full complement of 12
Senators be elected to the membership in the Commission on Appointments before it can
discharge its functions and that it is not mandatory to elect 12 Senators to the Commission. The
overriding directive of Article VI, Section 18 is that there must be a proportional representation
of the political parties in the membership of the Commission on Appointments and that the
specification of 12 members to constitute its membership is merely an indication of the
maximum complement allowable under the Constitution. The act of filling up the membership
thereof cannot disregard the mandate of proportional representation of the parties even if it
results in fractional membership in unusual situations like the case at bar.
Section 18 provides, in part, as follows:
There shall be a Commission on Appointments consisting of the President of the
Senate as ex-officioChairman, twelve Senators, and . . . , elected by each house on
the basis of proportional representation . . . .
The respondent's contention that the use of the word "shall" in Section 18 indicating the
composition of the Commission on Appointments makes the election of the Senators mandatory,
omitting that part of Section 18 which provides that (they shall be) elected by each house on the
basis of proportional representation. This interpretation finds support in the case of Taada vs.
Cuenco, 13 where this Court held that the constitutional provision makes mandatory the election
of the specified number of Senators to the Commission on Appointments but also ruled that they
should be elected on the basis of proportional representation of the political parties. In case of
conflict in interpretation, the latter mandate requiring proportional representation must prevail.
Such interpretation is the only correct and rational interpretation which the court can adopt in
consonance with its solemn duty to uphold the Constitution and give effect the meaning intended
by its framers to every clause and word thereof.
The Constitution does not require the election and presence of twelve Senators and twelve
Representatives in order that the Commission may function. Article VI, Section 18 which deals
with the Commission on Appointments, provides that "the Commission shall rule by majority
vote of all the members", and in Section 19 of the same Article, it is provided that the
Commission "shall meet only while Congress is in session, at the call of its Chairman or a
majority of all its Members, to discharge such powers and functions as are herein conferred upon
it". In implementing these provisions, the Rules of the Commission on Appointments provide
that the presence of at least thirteen (13) members is necessary to constitute a quorum, "Provided
however, that at least four (4) of the members constituting the quorum should come from either
house". 14 Even if the composition of the Commission is fixed by the Constitution, it can perform
its functions even if not fully constituted, so long as it has the required quorum, which is less
than the full complement fixed by the Constitution. And the Commission can validly perform its
functions and transact its business even if only ten (10) Senators are elected thereto. Even if
respondent Senator Taada is excluded from the Commission on Appointments for violation of
the rule on proportional representation, the party he represents still has representation in the
Commission in the presence of house members from the LP-LDP-LABAN such as Congressman
Juan Ponce Enrile.
Respondents ask for a clarification of our statement which suggested a practical solution to break
the impasse in the membership of the Senate in the Commission on Appointments, which we
quote:
. . . On the other hand, there is nothing to stop any of the political parties from
forming a coalition with another political party in order to fill up the two
vacancies resulting from this decision. 15
The statement is merely a suggestion but not an exclusive solution. It is not part of the
disposition of the case. It does not contemplate a realignment of political parties, as otherwise
this Court would have explicitly said so. What we intimated is merely this: That those entitled to
fractional memberships may join their half-memberships to form a full membership and together
nominate one from their coalition to the Commission on Appointments. For example, the NPC
and the LAKAS-NUCD may join their half-memberships and jointly nominate one of their own
Senators to the Commission. In the same way the LDP and the LP-PDP-LABAN may nominate
Senator Wigberto Taada to fill up the other slot to complete the membership to twelve. But the
latter, as a coalition, may not insist in electing both Senator Taada and Senator Romulo to fill up
two slots because this is certainly a violation of the rule on proportional representation.
Who decides the question of proportionality? The power to choose who among them will sit as
members of the Commission on Appointments belongs to the Senate. The number of senators is
fixed by the Constitution to twelve, but the numbers of senators to be chosen must comply with
the rule on proportional representation. The question of who interprets what is meant by
proportional representation has been a settled rule that it belongs to this Court.
The acceptance by the Senate of Senator Tolentino's formula to settle temporarily the impasse
concerning the membership in the Commission on Appointments by leaving the final decision to
the Supreme Court is a Senate recognition that the determination of proportional representation
under Article VI, Section 18 of the Constitution is a function of this Court.
Once a controversy as to the application or interpretation of a constitutional provision is raised
before this Court, it becomes a legal issue which the Court is bound by Constitutional mandate to
decide. The framers of our Constitution, in borrowing from constitutions of other states, thought
it wise to vest in the Supreme Court the role in final arbiter in cases of conflicts in the
interpretation of the fundamental law. In this role, the Court serves as a check on the unbridled
use of power by the legislative majority to silence the minority. Democracy may breed but it will
not sanction tyranny by force of numbers.
The election of respondents Senators Taada and Romulo is a clear disregard of the
constitutional provision and when done over the objections of their colleagues in the Senate,
constitutes a grave abuse of discretion. We quote from our decision:
. . . The election of Senator Romulo and Senator Taada as members of the
Commission on Appointments by the LDP Majority in the Senate was clearly a
violation of Section 18 Article VI of the 1987 Constitution. Their nomination and
election by the LDP Majority by sheer force of superiority in numbers during the
Senate organization meeting of August 27, 1992 was done in grave abuse of
discretion. Where power is exercised in a manner inconsistent with the command
of the Constitution, and by reason of numerical strength, knowingly and not
merely inadvertently, said exercise amounts to abuse of authority granted by law
and grave abuse of discretion is properly found to exist. 16
For lack of merit, the Motions for Reconsideration are DENIED with FINALITY.
SO ORDERED.
Narvasa, C.J., Cruz, Feliciano, Padilla, Bidin, Grio-Aquino, Regalado, Davide, Jr., Romero,
Nocon, Bellosillo, Melo and Quiason, JJ., concur.
Gutierrez, Jr., J., is on leave.
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. 89914 November 20, 1991

JOSE F.S. BENGZON JR., ABELARDO TERMULO, JOSE MANTECON, VICENTE
MILLS JR., LEONARDO GAMBOA, KURT BACHMANN JR., JOSE V.E. JIMENEZ,
ERNESTO CALUYA, AGERICO UNGSON, SUSAN ROXAS, ELVIE CASTILLO, and

CYNTHIA SABIDO LIMJAP, petitioners,
vs.
THE SENATE BLUE RIBBON COMMITTEE AND ITS MEMBERS, represented by and
through the CHAIRMAN, HON. WIGBERTO TAADA, respondents, JOSE S.
SANDEJAS, intervenor.
Bengzon, Zarraga, Narciso, Cudala, Pecson & Bengson for petitioners.
Balgos & Perez for intervening petitioner.
Eddie Tamondong and Antonio T. Tagaro for respondents.
PADILLA, J.:p
This is a petition for prohibition with prayer for the issuance of a temporary restraining order
and/or injuective relief, to enjoin the respondent Senate Blue Ribbon committee from requiring
the petitioners to testify and produce evidence at its inquiry into the alleged sale of the equity of
Benjamin "Kokoy" Romualdez to the Lopa Group in thirty-six (36) or thirty-nine (39)
corporations.
On 30 July 1987, the Republic of the Philippines, represented by the Presidential Commission on
Good Government (PCGG), assisted by the Solicitor General, filed with the Sandiganbayan Civil
Case No. 0035 (PCGG Case No. 35) entitled "Republic of the Philippines vs. Benjamin "Kokoy"
Romualdez, et al.", for reconveyance, reversion, accounting, restitution and damages.
The complaint was amended several times by impleading new defendants and/or amplifying the
allegations therein. Under the Second Amended Complaint, 1 the herein petitioners were
impleaded as party defendants.
The complaint insofar as pertinent to herein petitioners, as defendants, alleges among others that:
14. Defendants Benjamin (Kokoy) Romualdez and Juliette Gomez Romualdez,
acting by themselves and/or in unlawful concert with Defendants Ferdinand E.
Marcos and Imelda R. Marcos, and taking undue advantage of their relationship,
influence and connection with the latter Defendant spouses, engaged in devices,
schemes and strategems to unjuestly enrigh themselves at the expense of Plaintiff
and the Filipino people, among others:
(a) Obatained, with the active collaboration of Defendants Sene J.
Gabaldon, Mario D. Camacho, Mamerto Nepomuceno, Carlos J.
Valdez, Cesar C. Zalamea and Francisco Tantuico, Atty. Jose
Bengzon, Jr. and his law partners, namely: Edilberto S. Narciso,
Jr., Jose Vicente E. Jimenez, Amando V. Faustino, Jr., and
Leonardo C. Cruz; Jose S. Sandejas and his fellow senior managers
of FMMC/PNI Holdings groups of companies such as Leonardo
Gamboa, Vicente T. Mills, Jr., Jose M. Mantecon, Abelardo S.
Termulo, Rex C. Drilon II and Kurt Bachmann, Jr., control of some
of the biggest business enterprises in the Philippines, such as the
Manila Corporation (MERALCO), Benguet Consolidated and the

Philippine Commercial International Bank (PCI Bank) by
employing devious financial schemes and techniques calculated to
require the massive infusion and hemorrhage of government funds
with minimum or negligible "cashout" from Defendant Benjamin
Romualdez...
xxx xxx xxx
(m) manipulated, with the support, assistance and collaboration of
Philgurantee officials led by chairman Cesar E.A. Virata and the
Senior managers of FMMC/PNI Holdings, Inc. led by Jose S.
Sandejas, Jr., Jose M. Mantecom and Kurt S. Bachmann, Jr.,
among others, the formation of Erectors Holdings, Inc. without
infusing additional capital solely for the purpose of Erectors
Incorporated with Philguarantee in the amount of P527,387,440.71
with insufficient securities/collaterals just to enable Erectors Inc, to
appear viable and to borrow more capitals, so much so that its
obligation with Philgurantee has reached a total of more than P2
Billion as of June 30, 1987.
(n) at the onset of the present Administration and/or within the
week following the February 1986 People's Revolution, in
conspiracy with, supoort, assistance and collaboration of the
abovenamed lawyers of the Bengzon Law Offices, or specifically
Defendants Jose F.S. Bengzon, Jr., V.E. Jimenez, Amando V.
Faustino, Jr., and Edilberto S. Narciso, Jr., manipulated, shcemed,
and/or executed a series of devices intended to conceal and place,
and/or for the purpose of concealing and placing, beyond the
inquiry and jurisdiction of the Presidential Commission on Good
Government (PCGG) herein Defendant's individual and collective
funds, properties, and assets subject of and/or suited int he instant
Complaint.
(o) manuevered, with the technical know-how and legalitic talents
of the FMMC senior manager and some of the Bengzon law
partners, such as Attys. Jose F.S. Bengzon, Jr., Edilberto S.
Narciso, Jr., Amando V. Faustino, Jose Vicente E. Jimenez and
Leonardo C. Cruz, the purported sale of defendant Benjamin
Romualdez's interests in the (i) Professional Managers, (ii) A & E
International Corporation (A & E), (iii) First Manila Managerment
Corporation (FMMC), (iv) Philippine World Travel Inc. (PWTI)
and its subsidiaries consisting of 36 corporations in all, to PNI
Holdings, Inc. (wjose purported incorporations are all members of
Atty. Jose F.S. Bengzon's law firm) for only P5 million on March
3, 1986 or three days after the creation of the Presidential
Commission on Good Government on February 28, 1986, for the
sole purpose of deceiving and preempting the Government,
particularly the PCGG, and making it appear that defendant
Benjamin Romualdez had already divested himself of his
ownership of the same when in truth and in fact, his interests are
well intact and being protected by Atty. Jose F.S. Bengzon, Jr. and
some of his law partners, together with the FMMC senior
managers who still control and run the affiars of said corporations,
and in order to entice the PCGG to approve the said fictitious sale,
the above-named defendants offered P20 million as "donation" to
the Government;
(p) misused, with the connivance, support and technical assitance
of the Bengzon law firm represented by Atty. Jose F.S. Bengzon,
Jr. as legal counsel, together with defendants Cesar Zalamea,
Antonio Ozaeta, Mario D. Camacho amd Senen J. Gabaldon as
members of the Board of Directors of the Philippine Commercial
International bank (PCIB), the Meralco Pension Fund (Fund, for
short) in the amount of P25 million by cuasing it to be invested in
the PCIB and through the Bank's TSG, assigned to PCI
Development and PCI Equity at 50% each, the Fund's (a)
8,028.011 common shares in the Bank and (b) "Deposit in
Subscription" in the amount of P4,929.972.50 but of the agreed
consideration of P28 million for the said assignment, PCI
Development and PCI Equity were able to pay only P5,500.00
downpayment and the first amortization of P3,937,500.00 thus
prompting the Fund to rescind its assignment, and the consequent
reversion of the assigned brought the total shareholding of the
Fund to 11,470,555 voting shares or 36.8% of the voting stock of
the PCIB, and this development (which the defendants themselves
orchestrated or allowed to happen) was used by them as an excuse
for the unlawful dismantling or cancellation of the Fund's 10
million shares for allegedly exceeding the 30-percent ceiling
prescribed by Section 12-B of the General Banking Act, although
they know for a fact that what the law declares as unlawful and
void ab initio are the subscriptions in excess of the 30% ceiling "to
the extent of the excess over any of the ceilings prescribed ..." and
not the whole or entire stockholding which they allowed to stay for
six years (from June 30, 1980 to March 24, 1986);
(q) cleverly hid behind the veil of corporate entity, through the use
of the names and managerial expertise of the FMMC senior
manager and lawyers identified as Jose B. Sandejas, Leonardo
Gamboa, Vicente T. Mills, Abelardo S, Termulo, Edilberto S.
Narciso, Jr., Jose M. Mantecon, Rex C. Drilon II, Kurt Bachmann,
Jr. together with the legal talents of corporate lawyers, such as
Attys. Jose F.S. Bengzon, Jr., Jose V.E. Jimenez, Amando V.
Faustino, Jr., and Leonardo C. Cruz, the ill-gotten wealth of
Benjamin T. Romualdez including, among others, the 6,229,177
shares in PCIB registered in the names of Trans Middle East Phils.
Equities, Inc. and Edilberto S. Narciso, Jr. which they refused to
surrender to PCGG despite their disclosure as they tried and
continue to exert efforts in getting hold of the same as well as the
shares in Benguet registered in the names of Palm Avenue
Holdings and Palm Avenue Realty Development Corp. purportedly

to be applied as payment for the claim of P70 million of a "merger
company of the First Manila Managerment Corp. group"
supposedly owned by them although the truth is that all the said
firms are still beneficially owned by defendants Benjamin
Romualdez.
xxx xxx xxx
On 28 September 1988, petitioner (as defendants) filed their respective answers. 2 Meanwhile,
from 2 to 6 August 1988, conflicting reports on the disposition by the PCGG of the "Romualdez
corporations" were carried in various metropolitan newspapers. Thus, one newspaper reported
that the Romuladez firms had not been sequestered because of the opposition of certain PCGG
officials who "had worked prviously as lawyers of the Marcos crony firms." Another daily
reported otherwise, while others declared that on 3 March 1986, or shortly after the EDSA
February 1986 revolution, the Romualdez companies" were sold for P5 million, without PCGG
approval, to a holding company controlled by Romualdez, and that Ricardo Lopa, the President's
brother-in-law, had effectively taken over the firms, even pending negotiations for the purchase
of the corporations, for the same price of P5 million which was reportedly way below the fair
value of their assets. 3
On 13 September 1988, the Senate Minority Floor Leader, Hon. Juan Ponce Enrile delivered a
speech "on a matter of personal privilege" before the Senate on the alleged "take-over personal
privilege" before the Senate on the alleged "take-over of SOLOIL Incorporated, the flaship of the
First Manila Management of Companies (FMMC) by Ricardo Lopa" and called upon "the Senate
to look into the possible violation of the law in the case, particularly with regard to Republic Act
No. 3019, the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act." 4
On motion of Senator Orlando Mercado, the matter was referred by the Senate to the Committee
on Accountability of Public Officers (Blue Ribbon Committee). 5 Thereafter, the Senate Blue
Ribbon Committee started its investigation on the matter. Petitioners and Ricardo Lopa were
subpoenaed by the Committee to appear before it and testify on "what they know" regarding the
"sale of thirty-six (36) corporations belonging to Benjamin "Kokoy" Romualdez."
At the hearing held on 23 May 1989, Ricardo Lopa declined to testify on the ground that his
testimony may "unduly prejudice" the defendants in Civil Case No. 0035 before the
Sandiganbayan. Petitioner Jose F.S. Bengzon, Jr. likewise refused to testify involing his
constitutional right to due process, and averring that the publicity generated by respondents
Committee's inquiry could adversely affect his rights as well as those of the other petitioners who
are his co-defendants in Civil Case No. 0035 before the Sandiganbayan.
The Senate Blue Ribbon Committee, thereupon, suspended its inquiry and directed the
petitioners to file their memorandum on the constitutional issues raised, after which, it issued a
resolution 6 dated 5 June 1989 rejecting the petitioner's plea to be excused from testifying, and
the Committee voted to pursue and continue its investigation of the matter. Senator Neptali
Gonzales dissented. 7
Claiming that the Senate Blue Ribbon Committee is poised to subpoena them and required their
attendance and testimony in proceedings before the Committee, in excess of its jurisdiction and
legislative purpose, in clear and blatant disregard of their constitutional rights, and to their grave
and irreparable damager, prejudice and injury, and that there is no appeal nor any other plain,
speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law, the petitioners filed the present
petition for prohibition with a prayer for temporary restraning order and/or injunctive relief.
Meanwhile, one of the defendants in Civil Case No. 0035 before the Sandiganbayan, Jose S.
Sandejas, filed with the Court of motion for intervention, 8 which the Court granted in the
resolution 9 of 21 December 1989, and required the respondent Senate Blue Ribbon Committee
to comment on the petition in intervention. In compliance, therewith, respondent Senate Blue
Ribbon Committee filed its comment10 thereon.
Before discussing the issues raised by petitioner and intervenor, we will first tackle the
jurisdictional question raised by the respondent Committee.
In its comment, respondent Committee claims that this court cannot properly inquire into the
motives of the lawmakers in conducting legislative investigations, much less cna it enjoin the
Congress or any its regular and special commitees like what petitioners seek from making
inquiries in aid of legislation, under the doctrine of separation of powers, which obtaines in our
present system of government.
The contention is untenable. In Angara vs. Electoral Commission, 11 the Court held:
The separation of powers is a fundamental principle in our system of government.
It obtains not hrough express provision but by actual division in our Constitution.
Each department of the government has exclusive cognizance of matters wihtin its
jurisdiction, and is supreme within its own sphere. But it does not follow from the
fact that the three powers are to be kept separate and distinct that the Constitution
intended them to be absolutely unrestrained and independent of each other. The
Constitution has provided for an elaborate system of checks and balances to
secure coordination in the workings of the various departments of the
government...
xxx xxx xxx
But in the main, the Constitution has blocked out with deft strokes and in bold
lines, allotment of power to the executive, the legislative and the judicial
departments of the government. The ovelapping and interlacing of funcstions and
duties between the several deaprtments, however, sometimes makes it hard to say
just where the political excitement, the great landmarks of the Constitution are apt
to be forgotten or marred, if not entirely obliterated, in cases of conflict, the
judicial departments is the only constitutional organ which can be called upon to
determine the proper allocation of powers between the several departments and
among the integral or constituent units thereof.
xxx xxx xxx
The Constitution is a definition of the powers of government. Who is to determine
the nature, scope and extent of such powers? The Constitution itself has provided
for the instrumentality of the judiciary as the rational way. And when the judiciary
mediates to allocate constitutional boundaries; it does not assert any superiority
over the other departments; it does not inr eality nullify or invalidate an act of the
legislature, but only asserts the solemn and sacred obligation assigned to it by
tyhe Constitution to determine conflicting claims of authority under the

Constitution and to established for the parties in an actual controversy the rights
which that instrument secures and guarantess to them. This is in thruth all that is
involved in what is termed "judicial supremacy" which properly is the power of
judicial review under the Constitution. Even the, this power of judicial review is
limited to actual cases and controversies to be exercised after full opportunity of
argument by the parties, and limited further to the constitutional question raised or
the very lis mota presented. Any attempt at abstraction could only lead to
dialectics and barren legal questions and to sterile conclusions unrelated to
actualities. Narrowed as its function is in this manner, the judiciary does not pass
upon questions of wisdom, justice or expediency of legislation. More thatn that,
courts accord the presumption of constitutionality to legislative enactments, not
only because the legislature is presumed to abide by the Constitution but also
becuase the judiciary in the determination of actual cases and controversies must
reflect the wisdom and justice of the people as expressed through their
representatives in the executive and legislative departments of the government.
The "allocation of constituional boundaries" is a task that this Court must perfomr under the
Constitution. Moreowever, as held in a recent case, 12 "(t)he political question doctrine neither
interposes an obstacle to judicial determination of the rival claims. The jurisdiction to delimit
constitutional boundaries has been given to this Court. It cannot abdicate that obligation
mandated by the 1987 Constitution, although said provision by no means does away with kthe
applicability of the principle in appropriate cases." 13
The Court is thus of the considered view that it has jurisdiction over the present controversy for
the purpose of determining the scope and extent of the power of the Senate Blue Ribbon
Committee to conduct inquiries into private affirs in purported aid of legislation.
Coming to the specific issues raised in this case, petitioners contend that (1) the Senate Blue
Ribbon Committee's inquiry has no valid legislative purpose, i.e., it is not done in aid of
legislation; (2) the sale or disposition of hte Romualdez corporations is a "purely private
transaction" which is beyond the power of the Senate Blue Ribbon Committee to inquire into;
and (3) the inquiry violates their right to due process.
The 1987 Constition expressly recognizes the power of both houses of Congress to conduct
inquiries in aid of legislation. 14 Thus, Section 21, Article VI thereof provides:
The Senate or the House of Representatives or any of its respective committee
may conduct inquiries in aid of legislation in accordance with its duly published
rules of procedure. The rights of persons appearing in or affected by such
inquiries shall be respected. 15
The power of both houses of Congress to conduct inquiries in aid of legislation is not, therefore,
absolute or unlimited. Its exercise is circumscribed by the afore-quoted provision of the
Constitution. Thus, as provided therein, the investigation must be "in aid of legislation in
accordance with its duly published rules of procedure" and that "the rights of persons appearing
in or affected by such inquiries shall be respected." It follows then that the rights of persons
under the Bill of Rights must be respected, including the right to due process and the right not to
be compelled to testify against one's self.
The power to conduct formal inquiries or investigations in specifically provided for in Sec. 1 of
the Senate Rules of Procedure Governing Inquiries in Aid of Legislation. Such inquiries may
refer to the implementation or re-examination of any law or in connection with any proposed
legislation or the formulation of future legislation. They may also extend to any and all matters
vested by the Constitution in Congress and/or in the Seante alone.
As held in Jean L. Arnault vs. Leon Nazareno, et al., 16 the inquiry, to be within the jurisdiction
of the legislative body making it, must be material or necessary to the exervise of a power in it
vested by the Constitution, such as to legislate or to expel a member.
Under Sec. 4 of the aforementioned Rules, the Senate may refer to any committee or committees
any speech or resolution filed by any Senator which in tis judgment requires an appropriate
inquiry in aid of legislation. In order therefore to ascertain the character or nature of an inquiry,
resort must be had to the speech or resolution under which such an inquiry is proposed to be
made.
A perusal of the speech of Senator Enrile reveals that he (Senator Enrile) made a statement which
was published in various newspapers on 2 September 1988 accusing Mr. Ricardo "Baby" Lopa
of "having taken over the FMMC Group of Companies." As a consequence thereof, Mr. Lopa
wrote a letter to Senator Enrile on 4 September 1988 categorically denying that he had "taken
over " the FMMC Group of Companies; that former PCGG Chairman Ramon Diaz himself
categorically stated in a telecast interview by Mr. Luis Beltran on Channel 7 on 31 August 1988
that there has been no takeover by him (Lopa); and that theses repeated allegations of a
"takeover" on his (Lopa's) part of FMMC are baseless as they are malicious.
The Lopa reply prompted Senator Enrile, during the session of the Senate on 13 September 1988,
to avail of the privilege hour, 17 so that he could repond to the said Lopa letter, and also to
vindicate his reputation as a Member of the Senate of the Philippines, considering the claim of
Mr. Lopa that his (Enrile's) charges that he (Lopa) had taken over the FMMC Group of
Companies are "baseless" and "malicious." Thus, in his speech, 18 Senator Enrile said, among
others, as follows:
Mr. President, I rise this afternnon on a matter of personal privilege; the privilege
being that I received, Mr. President, a letter dated September 4, 1988, signed by
Mr. ricardo A. Lopa, a.k.a. or Baby Lopa, wherein he denied categorically that he
has taken over the First Manila Management Group of Companies which includes
SOLOIL Incorporated.
xxx xxxx xxx
In answer to Mr. Lopa, I will quote pertinent portions from an Official
Memorandum to the Presidential Commission of Good Government written and
signed by former Governor, now Congressman Jose Ramirez, in his capacity as
head of the PCGG Task Force for Region VIII. In his memorandum dated July 3,
1986, then Governor Ramirez stated that when he and the members of his task
force sought to serve a sequestration order on the management of SOLOIL in
Tanauan, Leyte, management officials assured him that relatives of the President
of the Philippines were personally discussing and representing SOLOIL so that
the order of sequestration would be lifted and that the new owner was Mr. Ricardo
A. Lopa.
I will quote the pertinent portions in the Ramire's memorandum.

The first paragraph of the memorandum reads as follows and I quote, Mr.
President:
"Our sequestration work of SOLOIL in Tanauan, Leyte was not
heeded by management because they said another representation
was being made to this Commission for the ventual lifting of our
sequestrationorder. They even assured us that Mr. Ricardo Lopa
and Peping Cojunangco were personally discussing and
representing SOLOIL, so the order of sequestration will finally be
lifted. While we attempted to carry on our order, management
refused to cooperate and vehemently turned down our request to
make available to us the records of the company. In fact it was
obviously clear that they will meet us with forcethe moment we
insist on doing normally our assigned task. In view of the
impending threat, and to avoid any untoward incident we decided
to temporarily suspend our work until there is a more categorical
stand of this Commission in view of the seemingly influential
represetation being made by SOLOIL for us not to continue our
work."
Another pertinent portion of the same memorandum is paragraph five, which
reads as follows, and I quote Mr. President:
"The President, Mr. Gamboa, this is, I understand, the President of
SOLOIL, and the Plant Superintendent, Mr. Jimenez including
their chief counsel, Atty. Mandong Mendiola are now saying that
there have been divestment, and that the new owner is now Mr.
Ricardo Lopa who according to them, is the brother-in-law of the
President. They even went further by telling us that even Peping
Cojuangco who we know is the brother of her excellency is also
interested in the ownership and management of SOLOIL. When he
demanded for supporting papers which will indicate aforesaid
divestment, Messrs. Gamboa, Jimenez and Mendiola refused
vehemently to submit these papers to us, instead they said it will be
submitted directly to this Commission. To our mind their
continuous dropping of names is not good for this Commission and
even to the President if our dersire is to achieve respectability and
stability of the government."
The contents of the memorandum of then Governor and now Congressman Jose
Ramirez were personally confirmed by him in a news interview last September 7,
1988.
xxx xxxx xxx
Also relevant to this case, Mr. President, is a letter of Mr. Ricardo Lopa himself in
August 11, 1988 issue of the newspaper Malaya headlined "On Alleged Takeover
of Romualdez Firms."
Mr. Lopa states in the last paragraph of the published letter and I quote him:
12. As of this writing, the sales agreement is under review by the
PCGG solely to determine the appropriate price. The sale of these
companies and our prior rigtht to requires them have never been at
issue.
Perhaps I could not make it any clearer to Mr. Lopa that I was not really making
baseless and malicious statements.
Senator Enrile concluded his privilege speech in the following tenor:
Mr. President, it may be worthwhile for the Senate to look into the possible
violation of the law in the case particularly with regard to Republic Act No. 3019,
the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, Section 5 of which reads as follows and
I quote:
Sec. 5. Prohibition on certain relatives. It shall be unlawful for
the spouse or for nay relative, by consanguinity or affinity, within
the third civil degree, of the President of the Philippines, the VicePresident of the Philippines, the President of the Senate, or the
Speaker of the House of Representatives, to intervene directly or
indirectly, in any business, transaction, contract or application with
the Government: Provided, that this section shall not apply to any
person who prior to the assumption of office of any of the above
officials to whom he is related, has been already dealing with the
Government along the same line of business, nor to any
transaction, contract or application filed by him for approval of
which is not discretionary on the part of the officials concerned but
depends upon compliance with requisites provided by law, nor to
any act lawfully performed in an official capacity or in the exercise
of a profession.
Mr. President, I have done duty to this Senate and to myself. I leave it to this
august Body to make its own conclusion.
Verily, the speech of Senator Enrile contained no suggestion of contemplated legislation; he
merely called upon the Senate to look into a possible violation of Sec. 5 of RA No. 3019,
otherwise known as "The Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act." I other words, the purpose of
the inquiry to be conducted by respondent Blue Ribbon commitee was to find out whether or not
the relatives of President Aquino, particularly Mr. ricardo Lopa, had violated the law in
connection with the alleged sale of the 36 or 39 corporations belonging to Benjamin "Kokoy"
Romualdez to the Lopaa Group. There appears to be, therefore, no intended legislation involved.
The Court is also not impressed with the respondent Committee's argument that the questioned
inquiry is to be conducted pursuant to Senate Resolution No. 212. The said resolution was
introduced by Senator Jose D. Lina in view of the representaions made by leaders of school
youth, community groups and youth of non-governmental organizations to the Senate Committee
on Youth and Sports Development, to look into the charges against the PCGG filed by three (3)
stockholders of Oriental petroleum, i.e., that it has adopted a "get-rich-quick scheme" for its
nominee-directors in a sequestered oil exploration firm.The pertinent portion of Senate

Resolution No. 212 reads as follows:
xxx xxx xxx
WHEREAS, recent developments have shown that no less than the SolicitorGeneral has stated that the PCGG Chairman and at least three Commissioners
should resign and that the agency should rid itself of "ineptness, incompetence
and corruption" and that the Sandiganbayan has reportedly ordered the PCGG to
answer charges filed by three stockholders of Oriental Petroleum that it has
adopted a "get-rich-quick scheme" for its nominee-directors in a sequestered oil
exploration firm;
WHEREAS, leaders of school youth, community groups and youth of nongovernmental organization had made representations to the Senate Committee on
Youth and Sports Development to look into the charges against the PCGG since
said agency is a symbol of the changes expected by the people when the EDSA
revolution took place and that the ill-gotten wealth to be recovered will fund
priority projects which will benefit our people such as CARP, free education in
the elementary and secondary levels reforestration, and employment generation
for rural and urban workers;
WHEREAS, the government and the present leadeship must demonstrate in their
public and private lives integrity, honor and efficient management of government
services lest our youth become disillusioned and lose hope and return to an
Idelogy and form of government which is repugnant to true freedom, democratic
participation and human rights: Now, therefore, be it.
Resolved by the Senate, That the activities of the Presidential Commission on
Good Government be investigated by the appropriate Committee in connection
with the implementation of Section 26, Article XVIII of the Constitution. 19
Thus, the inquiry under Senate Resolution No. 212 is to look into the charges against the PCGG
filed by the three (3) stockholders of Oriental Petroleum in connection with the implementation
of Section 26, Article XVIII of the Constitution.
It cannot, therefore, be said that the contemplated inquiry on the subject of the privilege speech
of Senator Juan Ponce Enrile, i.e., the alleged sale of the 36 (or 39) corporations belonging to
Benjamin "Kokoy" Romualdez to the Lopa Group is to be conducted pursuant to Senate
Resolution No. 212 because, firstly, Senator Enrile did not indict the PCGG, and, secondly,
neither Mr. Ricardo Lopa nor the herein petitioners are connected with the government but are
private citizens.
It appeals, therefore, that the contemplated inquiry by respondent Committee is not really "in aid
of legislation" becuase it is not related to a purpose within the jurisdiction of Congress, since the
aim of the investigation is to find out whether or not the ralatives of the President or Mr. Ricardo
Lopa had violated Section 5 RA No. 3019, the "Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act", a matter
that appears more within the province of the courts rather than of the legislature. Besides, the
Court may take judicial notice that Mr. Ricardo Lopa died during the pendency of this case.
In John T. Watkins vs. United States, 20 it was held held:
... The power of congress to conduct investigations in inherent in the legislative

process. That power is broad. it encompasses inquiries concerning the
administration of existing laws as well as proposed, or possibly needed statutes. It
includes surveys of defects in our social,economic, or political system for the
purpose of enabling Congress to remedy them. It comprehends probes into
departments of the Federal Government to expose corruption, inefficiency or
waste. But broad asis this power ofinquiry, it is not unlimited. There is no general
authority to expose the private affairs ofindividuals without justification in terms
of the functions of congress. This was freely conceded by Solicitor General in his
argument in this case. Nor is the Congress a law enforcement or trial agency.
These are functions of the executive and judicial departments of government. No
inquiry is an end in itself; it must be related to and in furtherance of a legitimate
task of Congress. Investigations conducted soly for the personal aggrandizement
of the investigators or to "punish" those investigated are indefensible. (emphasis
supplied)
It can not be overlooked that when respondent Committee decide to conduct its investigation of
the petitioners, the complaint in Civil No. 0035 had already been filed with the Sandiganbayan.
A perusal of that complaint shows that one of its principal causes of action against herein
petitioners, as defendants therein, is the alleged sale of the 36 (or 39) corporations belonging to
Benjamin "Kokoy" Romualdez. Since the issues in said complaint had long been joined by the
filing of petitioner's respective answers thereto, the issue sought to be investigated by the
respondent Commitee is one over which jurisdiction had been acquired by the Sandiganbayan. In
short, the issue had been pre-empted by that court. To allow the respondent Committee to
conduct its own investigation of an issue already before the Sandiganbayan would not only pose
the possibility of conflicting judgments betweena legislative commitee and a judicial tribunal,
but if the Committee's judgment were to be reached before that of the Sandiganbayan, the
possibility of its influence being made to bear on the ultimate judgment of the Sandiganbayan
can not be discounted.
In fine, for the rspondent Committee to probe and inquire into the same justiciable controversy
already before the Sandiganbayan, would be an encroachment into the exclusive domain of
judicial jurisdiction that had much earlier set in. In Baremblatt vs. United States, 21 it was held
that:
Broad as it is, the power is not, howevern, without limitations. Since congress
may only investigate into those areas in which it may potentially legislate or
appropriate, it cannot inquire into matters which are within the exclusive province
of one of the other branches of the government. Lacking the judicial power given
to the Judiciary, it cannot inquire into mattes that are exclusively the concern of
the Judiciary. Neither can it suplant the Executive in what exclusively belongs to
the Executive. ...
Now to another matter. It has been held that "a congressional committee's right to inquire is
'subject to all relevant limitations placed by the Constitution on governmental action,' including
"'the relevant limitations of the Bill of Rights'." 22
In another case
... the mere semblance of legislative purpose would not justify an inquiry in the
face of the Bill of Rights. The critical element is the exeistence of, and the weight
to be ascribed to, the interest of the Congress in demanding disclosures from an
unwilling witness. We cannot simply assume, however, that every congressional
investigation is justified by a public need that over-balances any private rights
affected. To do so would be to abdicate the responsibility placed by the
Constitution upon the judiciary to insure that the Congress does not unjustifiably
encroah upon an individual's right to privacy nor abridge his liberty of speech,
press, religion or assembly. 23
One of the basic rights guaranteed by the Constitution to an individual is the right against selfincrimination. 24 Thir right constured as the right to remain completely silent may be availed of
by the accused in a criminal case; but kit may be invoked by other witnesses only as questions
are asked of them.
This distinction was enunciated by the Court in Romeo Chavez vs. The Honorable Court of
Appeals, et al. 25 thus
Petitioner, as accused, occupies a different tier of protection from an ordinary
witness. Whereas an ordinary witness may be compelled to take the witness stand
and claim the privilege as each question requiring an incriminating answer is hot
at him, an accused may altother refuse to take the witness stand and refuse to
answer any all questions.
Moreover, this right of the accused is extended to respondents in administrative investigations
but only if they partake of the nature of a criminal proceeding or analogous to a criminal
proceeding. In Galman vs. Pamaran, 26the Court reiterated the doctrine in Cabal vs.
Kapuanan (6 SCRA 1059) to illustrate the right of witnesses to invoke the right against selfincrimination not only in criminal proceedings but also in all other types of suit
It was held that:
We did not therein state that since he is not an accused and the case is not a
criminal case, Cabal cannot refuse to take the witness stand and testify, and that
he can invoke his right against self-incrimination only when a question which
tends to elicit an answer that will incriminate him is propounded to him. Clearly
then, it is not the characeter of the suit involved but the nature of the proceedings
that controls. The privilege has consistenly been held to extend to all proceedings
sanctioned by law and to all cases in which punishment is sought to be visited
upon a witness, whether a party or not.
We do not here modify these doctrines. If we presently rule that petitioners may not be
compelled by the respondent Committee to appear, testify and produce evidenc before it, it is
only becuase we hold that the questioned inquiry is not in aid of legislation and, if pursued,
would be violative of the principle of separation of powers between the legislative and the
judicial departments of government, ordained by the Constitution.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The Court holds that, under the facts, including the
circumtance that petitioners are presently impleaded as defendants in a case before the
Sandiganbayan, which involves issues intimately related to the subject of contemplated inquiry
before the respondet Committee, the respondent Senate Blue Ribbon Committee is hereby
enjoined from compelling the petitioners and intervenor to testify before it and produce evidence
at the said inquiry.
SO ORDERED.
Fernan, C.J., Melencio-Herrera, Feliciano, Bidin, Grio-Aquino, Medialdea, Regalado, Davide,
Jr. and Romero, JJ., concur.
EN BANC
STANDARD CHARTERED BANK

(Philippine Branch), PAUL SIMON
MORRIS, SUNDARA RAMESH,
OWEN BELMAN, SANJAY
AGGARWAL, RAJAMANI
CHANDRASHEKAR, MARIVEL
GONZALES, MA. ELLEN
VICTOR, CHONA G. REYES,
ZENAIDA IGLESIAS, RAMONA
BERNAD, MICHAELANGELO
AGUILAR, and FERNAND
TANSINGCO,
Petitioners,
- versus -
SENATE COMMITTEE ON BANKS,

FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS AND
CURRENCIES, as represented by its
Chairperson, HON. EDGARDO J.
ANGARA,
Respondent.
G.R. No. 167173
Present:
PUNO, C.J.,
QUISUMBING,
YNARES-SANTIAGO,
SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ,
CARPIO,
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ,
CORONA,
CARPIO MORALES,
AZCUNA,
TINGA,
CHICO-NAZARIO,
VELASCO, JR.,
NACHURA,
REYES, and
LEONARDO-DE CASTRO,JJ.
Promulgated:
December 27, 2007
x-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------x
DECISION
NACHURA, J.:
Before us is a Petition for Prohibition (With Prayer for Issuance of Temporary Restraining Order
and/or Injunction) dated and filed on March 11, 2005 by petitioners against respondent Senate
Committee on Banks, Financial Institutions and Currencies, as represented by its Chairperson

Edgardo J. Angara (respondent).
Petitioner Standard Chartered Bank (SCB)-Philippines is an institution incorporated

in England with limited liability and is licensed to engage in banking, trust, and
other related operations in the Philippines.Petitioners Paul Simon Morris, Sundara
Ramesh, Owen Belman, Sanjay Aggarwal, Rajamani Chandrashekar, Marivel
Gonzales, Ma. Ellen Victor, Chona G. Reyes, Zenaida Iglesias, Ramona Bernad,
Michaelangelo Aguilar, and Fernand Tansingco are the Chief Executive Officer, Chief
Operations Officer, Country Head of Consumer Banking, General Manager for Credit
Card and Personal Loans, Chief Financial Officer, Legal and Compliance Officer,
former Trust and Investment Services Head, Country Tax Officer, Head of Corporate
Affairs, Head of Banking Services, Head of Client Relationships, and the Head of
Global Markets of SCB-Philippines, respectively. Respondent, on the other hand, is
one of the permanent committees of the Senate of the Philippines.
The petition seeks the issuance of a temporary restraining order (TRO) to enjoin
respondent from (1) proceeding with its inquiry pursuant to Philippine Senate (P.S.)
Resolution No. 166; (2) compelling petitioners who are officers of petitioner SCBPhilippines to attend and testify before any further hearing to be conducted by
respondent, particularly that set on March 15, 2005; and (3) enforcing any holddeparture order (HDO) and/or putting the petitioners on the Watch List. It also prays
that judgment be rendered (1) annulling the subpoenae ad testificandum and duces
tecum issued to petitioners, and (2) prohibiting the respondent from compelling
petitioners to appear and testify in the inquiry being conducted pursuant to P.S.
Resolution No. 166.
On February 1, 2005, Senator Juan Ponce Enrile, Vice Chairperson of respondent,

delivered a privilege speech entitled Arrogance of Wealth[1] before the Senate based
on a letter from Atty. Mark R. Bocobo denouncing SCB-Philippines for selling
unregistered foreign securities in violation of the Securities Regulation Code (R.A.

No. 8799) and urging the Senate to immediately conduct an inquiry, in aid of
legislation, to prevent the occurrence of a similar fraudulent activity in the
future. Upon motion of Senator Francis Pangilinan, the speech was referred to
respondent. Prior to the privilege speech, Senator Enrile had introduced P.S.
Resolution No. 166,[2] to wit:
RESOLUTION
DIRECTING
THE
COMMITTEE
ON
BANKS,
FINANCIAL
INSTITUTIONS AND CURRENCIES, TO CONDUCT AN INQUIRY, IN
AID
OF
LEGISLATION,
INTO
THE
ILLEGAL SALE OF
UNREGISTERED AND HIGH-RISK SECURITIES BY STANDARD
CHARTERED BANK, WHICH RESULTED IN BILLIONS OF PESOS OF
LOSSES TO THE INVESTING PUBLIC
WHEREAS, Republic Act No. 7721, otherwise known as the "Law

Liberalizing the Entry and Scope of Operations of Foreign Banks in the
Philippines, was approved on May 18, 1994 to promote greater
participation of foreign banks in the Philippine Banking Industry that
will stimulate economic growth and serve as a channel for the flow of
funds into the economy;
WHEREAS, to promote greater competition in the Philippine Banking

Industry, foreign banks were accorded the same privileges, allowed to
perform the same functions and subjected to the same limitations
under relevant banking laws imposed upon domestic banks;
WHEREAS, Standard Chartered Bank was among the foreign banks

granted the privilege to do business in our country under Republic Act
No. 7721;
WHEREAS, there are complaints against Standard Chartered Bank

whose actions have reportedly defrauded hundreds of Filipino investors
of billions of pesos through the sale of unregistered securities in the
form of high-risk mutual funds falsely advertised and marketed as safe
investment havens;
WHEREAS, there are reports that Standard Chartered Bank clearly

knew that its actions were violative of Philippine banking and securities
laws but cleverly disguised its illegal acts through the use of pro-forma
agreements containing waivers of liability in favor of the bank;
WHEREAS, there are reports that in the early stages of conducting

these questionable activities, the Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas warned
and eventually fined Standard Chartered Bank a measly P30,000 for
violating Philippine banking laws;
WHEREAS, the particular operations of Standard Chartered Bank may

constitute "conducting business in an unsafe and unsound
manner, punishable under Section 37 of Republic Act No. 7653 and
should have drawn the higher penalty of revocation of its quasibanking license;
WHEREAS, Republic Act No. 8791 or the "General Banking Act of

2000" deems a particular act or omission as conducting business in an
unsafe and unsound manner as follows:
"Section 56.2 The act or omission has resulted or may

result in material loss or damage or abnormal risk to the
institution's depositors, creditors, investors, stockholders
or to the Bangko Sentral or to the public in general."
WHEREAS, the sale of unregistered securities is also a clear violation of

Republic Act No. 8799 or "The Securities Regulation Code of
2000" which states:
"Section 8.1 Securities shall not be sold or offered for sale

or
distribution
within
the Philippines,
without
a
registration statement duly filed with and approved by
the Commission. Prior to such sale, information on the
securities, in such form and with such substance as the
Commission may prescribe, shall be made available to
each prospective purchaser."
WHEREAS, the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) reportedly

issued a Cease-and-Desist Order (CDO) against Standard Chartered
Bank for the sale of these unregistered securities but the case was
reportedly settled administratively and dismissed after Standard
Chartered Bank paid a fine of P7 Million;
WHEREAS, the SEC reportedly made an official finding that Standard

Chartered Bank actively engaged in promoting and marketing the socalled "Global Third Party Mutual Funds to the investing public and
even set revenue quotas for the sale of these funds;
WHEREAS, existing laws including the Securities Regulation Code seem

to be inadequate in preventing the sale of unregistered securities and
in effectively enforcing the registration rules intended to protect the
investing public from fraudulent practices;
WHEREAS, the regulatory intervention by the SEC and BSP likewise

appears inadequate in preventing the conduct of proscribed activities
in a manner that would protect the investing public;
WHEREAS, there is a need for remedial legislation to address the

situation, having in mind the imposition of proportionate penalties to
offending entities and their directors, officers and representatives
among other additional regulatory measures;
Now, therefore, BE IT RESOLVED, AS IT IS HEREBY RESOLVED, to

direct the Committee on Banks, Currencies, and Financial Institutions,
to conduct an inquiry, in aid of legislation, into the reported sale of
unregistered and high-risk securities by Standard Chartered Bank
which resulted in billions of losses to the investing public.
Acting on the referral, respondent, through its Chairperson, Senator Edgardo

J. Angara, set the initial hearing on February 28, 2005 to investigate, in aid of
legislation, the subject matter of the speech and resolution filed by Senator Enrile.
Respondent invited petitioners, among others, to attend the hearing, requesting

them to submit their written position paper. Petitioners, through counsel, submitted
to
respondent
letter[3] dated February
24,
2005 presenting
their
position,
particularly stressing that there were cases pending in court allegedly involving the
same issues subject of the legislative inquiry, thereby posing a challenge to the
jurisdiction of respondent to continue with the inquiry.
On February 28, 2005, respondent commenced the investigation. Senator Enrile

inquired who among those invited as resource persons were present and who were
absent. Thereafter, Senator Enrile moved that subpoenae be issued to those who
did not attend the hearing and that the Senate request the Department of Justice,
through the Bureau of Immigration and Deportation, to issue an HDO against them
and/or include them in the Bureaus Watch List. Senator Juan Flavier seconded the
motion and the motion was approved.
Respondent then proceeded with the investigation proper. Towards the end of the
hearing, petitioners, through counsel, made an Opening Statement [4] that brought to
the attention of respondent the lack of proper authorization from affected clients for
the bank to make disclosures of their accounts and the lack of copies of the
accusing documents mentioned in Senator Enrile's privilege speech, and reiterated
that there were pending court cases regarding the alleged sale in the Philippines by
SCB-Philippines of unregistered foreign securities.
The February 28, 2005 hearing was adjourned without the setting of the next
hearing
date. However,
petitioners
were
later
served
by
respondent
with subpoenae ad testificandum and duces tecum to compel them to attend and
testify at the hearing set on March 15, 2005. Hence, this petition.
The grounds relied upon by petitioners are as follows:
I.
THE COMMITTEE ACTED WITHOUT JURISDICTION AND/OR ACTED WITH

GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO LACK OF JURISDICTION
IN CONDUCTING AN INVESTIGATION, PURPORTEDLY IN AID OF
LEGISLATION, BUT IN REALITY PROBING INTO THE ISSUE OF WHETHER
THE STANDARD CHARTERED BANK HAD SOLD UNREGISTERED FOREIGN
SECURITIES IN THE PHILIPPINES. SAID ISSUE HAS LONG BEEN THE
SUBJECT OF CRIMINAL AND CIVIL ACTIONS NOW PENDING BEFORE THE
COURT
OF
APPEALS, REGIONAL TRIAL COURT OF PASIG CITY,METROPOLITAN TRIAL
COURT OF MAKATI CITY AND
THE
PROSECUTOR'S
OFFICE
OF MAKATI CITY.
II.
THE COMMITTEE ACTED IN GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION AMOUNTING

TO LACK OF JURISDICTION BY CONDUCTING AN INVESTIGATION,
PURPORTEDLY IN AID OF LEGISLATION, BUT IN REALITY IN AID OF
COLLECTION BY A HANDFUL OF TWO (2) CLIENTS OF STANDARD
CHARTERED BANK OF LOSSES WHICH WERE FOR THEIR ACCOUNT AND
RISK. AT ANY RATE, SUCH COLLECTION IS WITHIN THE PROVINCE OF
THE COURT RATHER THAN OF THE LEGISLATURE.
III.
THE COMMITTEE ACTED WITHOUT JURISDICTION AND/OR ACTED WITH

GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO LACK OF JURISDICTION
IN COMPELLING PETITIONERS, SOME OF WHOM ARE RESPONDENTS IN
THE PENDING CRIMINAL AND CIVIL ACTIONS BROUGHT BY SAID
CLIENTS, IN VIOLATION OF PETITIONERS RIGHT AGAINST SELFINCRIMINATION AND RIGHT TO PURSUE AND DEFEND THEIR CAUSE IN
COURT RATHER THAN ENGAGE IN TRIAL BY PUBLICITY A CLEAR
VIOLATION OF DUE PROCESS, RIGHT TO PRIVACY AND TO TRAVEL.
IV.
THE COMMITTEE ACTED IN GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION AMOUNTING

TO LACK OF JURISDICTION BY DISREGARDING ITS OWN RULES. [5]
Petitioners argue that respondent has no jurisdiction to conduct the inquiry because
its subject matter is the very same subject matter of the following cases, to wit:
(a) CA-G.R. SP No. 85078, entitled Manuel V. Baviera vs. Hon.

Esperanza P. Rosario, et al., pending before the 9th Division of the Court
of Appeals. In the petition, Mr. Baviera seeks to annul and set aside the
dismissal by the Department of Justice of his complaint against
Standard Chartered Bank and its officers accusing them of SELLING
UNREGISTERED FOREIGN SECURITIES IN VIOLATION OF P.D. NO.
1869 (SYNDICATED ESTAFA) AND ARTICLE 315 OF THE REVISED
PENAL CODE.
(b) CA-G.R. SP No. 86200, entitled Manuel V. Baviera vs. Hon. Rafael
Buenaventura, et al., pending before the 15th Division of the Court of
Appeals. In the petition, Mr. Baviera seeks to annul and set aside the
termination for lack of probable cause by the Anti-Money Laundering
Council (AMLC) of the investigation of Standard Chartered Bank for
money laundering activities BY SELLING UNREGISTERED FOREIGN
SECURITIES.
(c) CA-G.R. SP No. 87328, entitled Manuel V. Baviera vs. Hon.

Esperanza Paglinawan Rozario, et al., pending before the 16th Division
of the Court of Appeals. The petition seeks to annul and set aside the
dismissal by the Department of Justice of Mr. Baviera's complaint
accusing SCB and its officers of violation of the Securities Regulation
Code by SELLING UNREGISTERED FOREIGN SECURITIES.
(d) Civil Case No. 70173, entitled Mr. Noel G. Sanchez, et al. vs.
Standard
Chartered
Bank, pending
before
Branch
155
of
the Regional Trial Court of Pasig City. Plaintiff seeks damages and
recovery of their investment accusing the bank of SELLING
UNREGISTERED FOREIGN SECURITIES.
(e) Criminal Case No. 332034, entitled People of the Philippines vs.
Manuel
V.
Baviera, pending
before
Branch
64
of
the Metropolitan Trial Court of Makati City. Petitioner Morris is the
private complainant in this information for extortion or blackmail
against Mr. Baviera for demanding the payment of US$2 Million with
the threat to EXPOSE THE BANK'S LARGE SCALE SCAM
CONSISTING [OF] ILLEGAL SELLING OF UNREGISTERED FOREIGN
SECURITIES BY THE BANK, before various government offices, such
as the Department of Justice, the BIR, Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas,
Regional Trial Courts, and both houses of Congress.
(f) Criminal Case No. 331395, entitled People of the Philippines vs.
Manuel
V.
Baviera, pending
before
Branch
64
of
the Metropolitan Trial Court of Makati City. Petitioners Victor and Chona
Reyes are the private complainants in this information for perjury
committed by Mr. Baviera in securing a hold departure order against
the petitioners herein from the Department of Justice for their alleged
involvement in syndicated estafa and swindling BY SELLING
UNREGISTERED FOREIGN SECURITIES.
(g) I.S. No. 2004-B-2279-80, entitled Aurelio Litonjua III and Aurelio
Litonjua, Jr. vs. Antonette de los Reyes, et al., pending before the Office
of the Prosecutor, Makati City. This is a criminal complaint accusing
SCB and its officers of estafa for SELLING UNREGISTERED FOREIGN
SECURITIES.[6]
Citing Bengzon, Jr. v. Senate Blue Ribbon Committee, [7] the petitioners
claim that since the issue of whether or not SCB-Philippines illegally sold
unregistered foreign securities is already preempted by the courts that took
cognizance of the foregoing cases, the respondent, by this investigation, would
encroach upon the judicial powers vested solely in these courts.
The argument is misplaced. Bengzon does not apply squarely to petitioners case.
It is true that in Bengzon, the Court declared that the issue to be investigated was
one over which jurisdiction had already been acquired by the Sandiganbayan, and
to allow the [Senate Blue Ribbon] Committee to investigate the matter would create
the possibility of conflicting judgments; and that the inquiry into the same
justiciable controversy would be an encroachment on the exclusive domain of

judicial jurisdiction that had set in much earlier.
To the extent that, in the case at bench, there are a number of cases already
pending in various courts and administrative bodies involving the petitioners,
relative to the alleged sale of unregistered foreign securities, there is a resemblance
between this case and Bengzon. However, the similarity ends there.
Central to the Courts ruling in Bengzon -- that the Senate Blue Ribbon Committee
was without any constitutional mooring to conduct the legislative investigation -was the Courts determination that the intended inquiry was not in aid of
legislation. The Court found that the speech of Senator Enrile, which sought such
investigation contained no suggestion of any contemplated legislation; it merely
called upon the Senate to look into possible violations of Section 5, Republic Act No.
3019. Thus, the Court held that the requested probe failed to comply with a
fundamental requirement of Section 21, Article VI of theConstitution, which states:
The Senate or the House of Representatives or any of

respective committees may conduct inquiries in aid
legislation in accordance with its duly published rules
procedure. The rights of persons appearing in or affected
such inquiries shall be respected.
its
of
of
by
Accordingly, we stopped the Senate Blue Ribbon Committee from proceeding with
the legislative investigation in that case.
Unfortunately for the petitioners, this distinguishing factual milieu in Bengzon does
not obtain in the instant case. P.S. Resolution No. 166 is explicit on the subject and
nature of the inquiry to be (and already being) conducted by the respondent
Committee, as found in the last three Whereas clauses thereof, viz.:
WHEREAS, existing laws including the Securities Regulation

Code seem to be inadequate in preventing the sale of unregistered
securities and in effectively enforcing the registration rules intended to
protect the investing public from fraudulent practices;
WHEREAS, the regulatory intervention by the SEC and BSP

likewise appears inadequate in preventing the conduct of
proscribed activities in a manner that would protect the investing
public;
WHEREAS, there is a need for remedial legislation to address

the situation, having in mind the imposition of proportionate
penalties to offending entities and their directors, officers and
representatives among other additional regulatory measures;
(emphasis supplied)
The unmistakable objective of the investigation, as set forth in the said

resolution, exposes the error in petitioners allegation that the inquiry, as initiated in
a privilege speech by the very same Senator Enrile, was simply to denounce the
illegal practice committed by a foreign bank in selling unregistered foreign
securities x x x. This fallacy is made more glaring when we consider that, at the
conclusion of his privilege speech, Senator Enrile urged the Senate to immediately
conduct an inquiry, in aid of legislation, so as to prevent the occurrence of
a similar fraudulent activity in the future.
Indeed, the mere filing of a criminal or an administrative complaint before a

court or a quasi-judicial body should not automatically bar the conduct of legislative
investigation. Otherwise, it would be extremely easy to subvert any intended inquiry
by Congress through the convenient ploy of instituting a criminal or an
administrative complaint. Surely, the exercise of sovereign legislative authority, of
which the power of legislative inquiry is an essential component, cannot be made
subordinate to a criminal or an administrative investigation.
As succinctly stated in the landmark case Arnault v. Nazareno[8]
[T]he power of inquiry with process to enforce it is an essential and

appropriate auxiliary to the legislative function. A legislative body
cannot legislate wisely or effectively in the absence of information
respecting the conditions which the legislation is intended to affect or
change; and where the legislative body does not itself possess the
requisite information which is not infrequently true recourse must be
had to others who possess it.
Neither can the petitioners claim that they were singled out by the
respondent Committee. The Court notes that among those invited as resource
persons were officials of the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) and the
Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas (BSP). These officials were subjected to the same critical
scrutiny by the respondent relative to their separate findings on the illegal sale of
unregistered foreign securities by SCB-Philippines. It is obvious that the objective of
the investigation was the quest for remedies, in terms of legislation, to prevent the
recurrence of the allegedly fraudulent activity.
Still, petitioners insist that the inquiry conducted by respondent was, in fact,
in aid of collection. They claim that Atty. Bocobo and Manuel Baviera, the latter a
party to the pending court cases cited by petitioners, were only seeking a friendly
forum so that they could recover their investments from SCB-Philippines; and that
the respondent has allowed itself to be used as the conveniently available vehicle to
effect this purpose.
However, as correctly pointed out by respondent in its Comment on the

petition, Atty. Bocobo did not file a complaint before the Senate for the purpose of
recovering his investment. On the contrary, and as confirmed during the initial
hearing on February 28, 2005, his letter-complaint humbly requested the Senate to
conduct an inquiry into the purportedly illegal activities of SCB-Philippines, with the
end view of preventing the future occurrence of any similar fraudulent activity by
the banks in general.[9] Baviera, on the other hand, was not a complainant but
merely a witness in the investigation, invited to testify on the alleged illegal sale of
unregistered foreign securities by SCB-Philippines, being one of the supposed
victims thereof.
The Court further notes that when it denied petitioners prayer for the
issuance of a TRO to restrain the hearing set on March 15, 2005,[10] respondent
proceeded with the investigation. On the said date, outraged by petitioners
imputation that it was conducting the investigation in aid of collection, respondent
held petitioners, together with their counsel, Atty. Reynaldo Geronimo, in contempt
and ordered their detention for six hours.
Petitioners filed a Motion for Partial Reconsideration of this Courts Resolution

dated March 14, 2005 only with respect to the denial of the prayer for the issuance
of a TRO and/or writ of preliminary injunction, alleging that their being held in
contempt was without legal basis, as the phrase in aid of collection partakes of an
absolutely privileged allegation in the petition.
We do not agree. The Court has already expounded on the essence of the
contempt power of Congress and its committees in this wise
The principle that Congress or any of its bodies has the power to
punish recalcitrant witnesses is founded upon reason and policy. Said
power must be considered implied or incidental to the exercise of
legislative power.How could a legislative body obtain the knowledge
and information on which to base intended legislation if it cannot
require and compel the disclosure of such knowledge and information,
if it is impotent to punish a defiance of its power and authority? When
the framers of the Constitution adopted the principle of separation of
powers, making each branch supreme within the realm of its
respective authority, it must have intended each departments
authority to be full and complete, independently of each others
authority or power. And how could the authority and power become
complete if for every act of refusal, every act of defiance, every act of
contumacy against it, the legislative body must resort to the judicial
department for the appropriate remedy, because it is impotent by itself

to punish or deal therewith, with affronts committed against its
authority or dignity.[11]
The exercise by Congress or by any of its committees of the power to punish

contempt is based on the principle of self-preservation. As the branch of the
government vested with the legislative power, independently of the judicial branch,
it can assert its authority and punish contumacious acts against it. Such power
is sui generis, as it attaches not to the discharge of legislative functions per se, but
to the sovereign character of the legislature as one of the three independent and
coordinate branches of government.[12]
In this case, petitioners imputation that the investigation was in aid of

collection is a direct challenge against the authority of the Senate Committee, as it
ascribes ill motive to the latter. In this light, we find the contempt citation against
the petitioners reasonable and justified.
Furthermore, it is axiomatic that the power of legislative investigation

includes the power to compel the attendance of witnesses. Corollary to the power to
compel the attendance of witnesses is the power to ensure that said witnesses
would be available to testify in the legislative investigation. In the case at bench,
considering that most of the officers of SCB-Philippines are not Filipino nationals
who may easily evade the compulsive character of respondents summons by
leaving the country, it was reasonable for the respondent to request the assistance
of the Bureau of Immigration and Deportation to prevent said witnesses from
evading the inquiry and defeating its purpose. In any event, no HDO was issued by
a court. The BID instead included them only in the Watch List, which had the effect
of merely delaying petitioners intended travel abroad for five (5) days, provided no
HDO is issued against them.[13]
With respect to the right of privacy which petitioners claim respondent has
violated, suffice it to state that privacy is not an absolute right. While it is true that
Section 21, Article VI of the Constitution, guarantees respect for the rights of
persons affected by the legislative investigation, not every invocation of the right to
privacy should be allowed to thwart a legitimate congressional inquiry. In Sabio v.
Gordon,[14] we have held that the right of the people to access information on
matters of public concern generally prevails over the right to privacy of ordinary
financial transactions. In that case, we declared that the right to privacy is not
absolute where there is an overriding compelling state interest. Employing
the rational basis relationship test, as laid down in Morfe v. Mutuc,[15] there is no
infringement of the individuals right to privacy as the requirement to disclosure
information is for a valid purpose, in this case, to ensure that the government
agencies involved in regulating banking transactions adequately protect the public
who invest in foreign securities. Suffice it to state that this purpose constitutes a
reason compelling enough to proceed with the assailed legislative investigation. [16]
As regards the issue of self-incrimination, the petitioners, officers of SCBPhilippines, are not being indicted as accused in a criminal proceeding. They were
summoned by respondent merely as resource persons, or as witnesses, in a
legislative inquiry. As distinguished by this Court
[An] accused occupies a different tier of protection from an

ordinary witness. Whereas an ordinary witness may be compelled to
take the witness stand and claim the privilege as each question
requiring an incriminating answer is shot at him, an accused may
altogether refuse to take the witness stand and refuse to answer any
and all questions.[17]
Concededly, this right of the accused against self-incrimination is extended to

respondents in administrative investigations that partake of the nature of or are
analogous to criminal proceedings. The privilege has consistently been held to
extend to all proceedings sanctioned by law; and to all cases in which punishment is
sought to be visited upon a witness, whether a party or not. [18]
However, in this case, petitioners neither stand as accused in a criminal case

nor will they be subjected by the respondent to any penalty by reason of their
testimonies. Hence, they cannot altogether decline appearing before respondent,
although they may invoke the privilege when a question calling for an incriminating
answer is propounded.[19]
Petitioners argument, that the investigation before respondent may result in a

recommendation for their prosecution by the appropriate government agencies,
such as the Department of Justice or the Office of the Ombudsman, does not
persuade.
As held in Sinclair v. United States[20] --
It may be conceded that Congress is without authority to compel

disclosures for the purpose of aiding the prosecution of pending suits;
but the authority of that body, directly or through its Committees, to
require pertinent disclosures in aid of its own constitutional power is
not abridged because the information sought to be elicited may also be
of use in such suits. x x x It is plain that investigation of the matters
involved in suits brought or to be commenced under the Senate
resolution directing the institution of suits for the cancellation of the
leases might directly aid in respect of legislative action.
The prosecution of offenders by the prosecutorial agencies and the trial before the
courts is for the punishment of persons who transgress the law. The intent of
legislative inquiries, on the other hand, is to arrive at a policy determination, which
may or may not be enacted into law.
Except only when it exercises the power to punish for contempt, the respondent, as
with the other Committees of the Senate or of the House of Representatives, cannot
penalize
violators
even
if
there
is
overwhelming
evidence
of
criminal
culpability. Other than proposing or initiating amendatory or remedial legislation,

respondent can only recommend measures to address or remedy whatever

irregularities may be unearthed during the investigation, although it may include in
its Report a recommendation for the criminal indictment of persons who may
appear liable. At best, the recommendation, along with the evidence, contained in
such a Report would be persuasive, but it is still up to the prosecutorial agencies
and the courts to determine the liabilities of the offender.
Finally,
petitioners
sought
anew,
in
their
Manifestation
and
Motion[21] dated June 21, 2006, the issuance by this Court of a TRO and/or writ of
preliminary injunction to prevent respondent from submitting its Committee Report
No. 75 to the Senate in plenary for approval. However, 16 days prior to the filing of
the Manifestation and Motion, or on June 5, 2006, respondent had already submitted
the report to the Senate in plenary. While there is no showing that the said report
has been approved by the Senate, the subject of the Manifestation and Motion has
inescapably become moot and academic.
WHEREFORE, the Petition for Prohibition is DENIED for lack of merit. The
Manifestation and Motion dated June 21, 2006 is, likewise, DENIED for being moot
and academic.
SO ORDERED.
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-3820
July 18, 1950
JEAN L. ARNAULT, petitioner,

vs.
LEON NAZARENO, Sergeant-at-arms, Philippine Senate, and EUSTAQUIO BALAGTAS,
Director of Prisons,respondents.
J.C. Orendain, Augusto Revilla, and Eduardo Arboleda for petitioner.
Office of the Solicitor General Felix Bautista Angelo, Lorenzo Sumulong, Lorenzo Taada, and
Vicente J. Francisco for respondents.
OZAETA, J.:
This is an original petition for habeas corpus to relieve the petitioner from his confinement in the
New Bilibid Prison to which he has been committed by virtue of a resolution adopted by the
Senate on May 15, 1950, which reads as follows:
Whereas, Jean L. Arnault refused to reveal the name of the person to whom he gave the
P440,000, as well as answer other pertinent questions related to the said amount; Now,
therefore, be it.
Resolved, that for his refusal to reveal the name of the person to whom he gave the
P440,000 Jean L. Arnault be committed to the custody of the Sergeant-at-Arms and
imprisoned in the New Bilibid Prison, Muntinlupa, Rizal, until discharged by further
order of the Senate or by the special committee created by Senate Resolution No. 8, such
discharge to be ordered when he shall have purged the contempt by revealing to the
Senate or to the said special committee the name of the person to whom he gave the
P440,000, as well as answer other pertinent questions in connection therewith.
The facts that gave rise to the adoption of said resolution, insofar as pertinent here, may be
briefly stated as follows:
In the latter part of October, 1949, the Philippine Government, through the Rural Progress
Administration, bought two estates known as Buenavista and Tambobong for the sums of
P4,500,000 and P500,000, respectively. Of the first sum, P1,000,000 was paid to Ernest H. Burt,
a nonresident American, thru his attorney-in-fact in the Philippines, the Associated Estates, Inc.,
represented by Jean L. Arnault, for alleged interest of the said Burt in the Buenavista Estate. The
second sum of P500,000 was all paid to the same Ernest H. Burt through his other attorney-infact, the North Manila Development Co., Inc., also represented by Jean L. Arnault, for the
alleged interest of the said Burt in the Tambobong Estate.
The original owner of the Buenavista Estate was the San Juan de Dios Hospital. The Philippine
Government held a 25-year lease contract on said estate, with an option to purchase it for
P3,000,000 within the same period of 25 years counted from January 1, 1939. The occupation
Republic of the Philippines purported to exercise that option by tendering to the owner the sum
of P3,000,000 and, upon its rejection, by depositing it in court on June 21, 1944, together with
the accrued rentals amounting to P3224,000. Since 1939 the Government has remained in
possession of the estate.
On June 29, 1946, the San Juan de Dios Hospital sold the Buenavista Estate for P5,000,000 to
Ernest H. Burt, who made a down payment of P10,000 only and agreed to pay P5000,000 within
one year and the remainder in annual installments of P500,000 each, with the stipulation that
failure on his part to make any of said payments would cause the forfeiture of his down payment
of P10,000 and would entitle the Hospital to rescind to sale to him. Aside from the down
payment of P10,000, Burt has made no other payment on account of the purchase price of said
estate.
The original owner of the Tambobong Estate was the Philippine Trust Company. On May 14,
1946, the Philippine Trust Company sold estate for the sum of P1,200,000 to Ernest H. Burt, who
paid P10,000 down and promise to pay P90,000 within nine months and the balance of
P1,100,000 in ten successive installments of P110,000 each. The nine-month period within which
to pay the first installment of P90,000 expired on February 14, 1947, without Burt's having paid
the said or any other amount then or afterwards. On September 4, 1947, the Philippine Trust
Company sold, conveyed, and delivered the Tambobong Estate to the Rural Progress
Administration by an absolute deed of sale in consideration of the sum of P750,000. On February
5, 1948, the Rural Progress Administration made, under article 1504 of the Civil Code, a notarial
demand upon Burt for the resolution and cancellation of his contract of purchase with the
Philippine Trust Company due to his failure to pay the installment of P90,000 within the period
of nine months. Subsequently the Court of First Instance of Rizal ordered the cancellation of
Burt's certificate of title and the issuance of a new one in the name of the Rural Progress
Administration, from which order he appealed to the Supreme Court.1
It was in the face of the antecedents sketched in the last three preceding paragraphs that the
Philippine Government, through the Secretary of Justice as Chairman of the Board of Directors
of the Rural Progress Administration and as Chairman of the Board of Directors of the Philippine
National Bank, from which the money was borrowed, accomplished the purchase of the two
estates in the latter part of October, 1949, as stated at the outset.
On February 27, 1950, the Senate adopted its Resolution No. 8, which reads as follows:
RESOLUTION CREATING A SPECIAL COMMITTEE TO INVESTIGATE THE
BUENAVISTA AND THE TAMBOBONG ESTATES DEAL.
WHEREAS, it is reported that the Philippine government, through the Rural Progress
Administration, has bought the Buenavista and the Tambobong Estates for the aggregate
sum of five million pesos;
WHEREAS, it is reported that under the decision of the Supreme Court dated October 31,
1949, the Buenavista Estate could have been bought for three million pesos by virtue of a
contract entered into between the San Juan de Dios Hospital and Philippine Government
in 1939;
WHEREAS, it is even alleged that the Philippine Government did not have to purchase
the Buenavista Estate because the occupation government had made tender of payment in
the amount of three million pesos, Japanese currency, which fact is believed sufficient to
vest title of Ownership in the Republic of the Philippines pursuant to decisions of the
Supreme Court sustaining the validity of payments made in Japanese military notes
during the occupation;
WHEREAS, it is reported that the Philippine Government did not have to pay a single
centavo for the Tambobong Estate as it was already practically owned by virtue of a deed
of sale from the Philippine Trust Company dated September 3, 194, for seven hundred
and fifty thousand pesos, and by virtue of the recission of the contract through which
Ernest H. Burt had an interest in the estate; Now, therefore, be it.
RESOLVED, That a Special Committee, be, as it hereby is, created, composed of five
members to be appointed by the President of the Senate to investigate the Buenavista and
Tambobong Estate deals. It shall be the duty of the said Committee to determine whether
the said purchase was honest, valid, and proper and whether the price involved in the deal
was fair and just, the parties responsible therefor, and any other facts the Committee may
deem proper in the premises. Said Committee shall have the power to conduct public
hearings; issue subpoena or subpoena duces tecum to compel the attendance of witnesses
or the production of documents before it; and may require any official or employee of any
bureau, office, branch, subdivision, agency, or instrumentality of the Government to

assist or otherwise cooperate with the Special Committee in the performance of its
functions and duties. Said Committee shall submit its report of findings and
recommendations within two weeks from the adoption of this Resolution.
The special committee created by the above resolution called and examined various witnesses,
among the most important of whom was the herein petitioner, Jean L. Arnault. An intriguing
question which the committee sought to resolve was that involved in the apparent
unnecessariness and irregularity of the Government's paying to Burt the total sum of P1,500,000
for his alleged interest of only P20,000 in the two estates, which he seemed to have forfeited
anyway long before October, 1949. The committee sought to determine who were responsible for
and who benefited from the transaction at the expense of the Government.
Arnault testified that two checks payable to Burt aggregating P1,500,000 were delivered to him
on the afternoon of October 29, 1949; that on the same date he opened a new account in the
name of Ernest H. Burt with the Philippine National Bank in which he deposited the two checks
aggregating P1,500,000; and that on the same occasion he draw on said account two checks; one
for P500,000, which he transferred to the account of the Associated Agencies, Inc., with the
Philippine National Bank, and another for P440,000 payable to cash, which he himself cashed. It
was the desire of the committee to determine the ultimate recipient of this sum of P440,000 that
gave rise to the present case.
At first the petitioner claimed before the Committee:
Mr. ARNAULT (reading from a note). Mr. Chairman, for questions involving the
disposition of funds, I take the position that the transactions were legal, that no laws were
being violated, and that all requisites had been complied with. Here also I acted in a
purely functional capacity of representative. I beg to be excused from making answer
which might later be used against me. I have been assured that it is my constitutional
right to refuse to incriminate myself, and I am certain that the Honorable Members of this
Committee, who, I understand, are lawyers, will see the justness of my position.
At as subsequent session of the committee (March 16) Senator De Vera, a member of the
committee, interrogated him as follows:
Senator DE VERA. Now these transactions, according to your own typewritten
statement, were legal?
Mr. ARNAULT. I believe so.
Senator DE VERA. And the disposition of that fund involved, according to your own
statement, did not violate any law?
Mr. ARNAULT. I believe so.
xxx
xxx
xxx
Senator DE VERA. So that if the funds were disposed of in such a manner that no laws
were violated, how is it that when you were asked by the Committee to tell what steps
you took to have this money delivered to Burt, you refused to answer the questions,
saying that it would incriminate you?
Mr. ARNAULT. Because it violates the rights of a citizen to privacy in his dealings with
other people.
xxx
xxx
xxx
Senator DE VERA. Are you afraid to state how the money was disposed of because you
would be incriminated, or you would be incriminating somebody?
Mr. ARNAULT. I am not afraid; I simply stand on the privilege to dispose of the money
that has been paid to me as a result of a legal transaction without having to account for
any use of it.
But when in the same session the chairman of the committee, Senator Sumulong, interrogated the
petitioner, the latter testified as follows:
The CHAIRMAN. The other check of P440,000 which you also made on October 29,
1949, is payable to cash; and upon cashing this P440,000 on October 29, 1949, what did
you do with that amount?
Mr. ARNAULT. I turned it over to a certain person.
The CHAIRMAN. The whole amount of P440,000?
Mr. ARNAULT. Yes.
The CHAIRMAN. Who was that certain person to whom you delivered these P440,000
which you cashed on October 29, 1949?
Mr. ARNAULT. I don't remember the name; he was a representative of Burt.
The CHAIRMAN. That representative of Burt to whom you delivered the P440,000 was
a Filipino?
Mr. ARNAULT. I don't know.
The CHAIRMAN. You do not remember the name of that representative of Burt to whom
you delivered this big amount of P440,000?
Mr. ARNAULT. I am not sure; I do not remember the name.
The CHAIRMAN. That certain person who represented Burt to whom you delivered the
big amount on October 29, 1949, gave you a receipt for the amount?
Mr. ARNAULT. No.
The CHAIRMAN. Neither did you ask a receipt?
Mr. ARNAULT. I didn't ask.
The CHAIRMAN. And why did you give that certain person, representative of Burt, this
big amount of P440,000 which forms part of the P1- million paid to Burt?
Mr. ARNAULT. Because I have instructions to that effect.

The CHAIRMAN. Who gave you the instruction?
Mr. ARNAULT. Burt.
The CHAIRMAN. Where is the instruction; was that in writing?
Mr. ARNAULT. No.
The CHAIRMAN. By cable?
Mr. ARNAULT. No.
The CHAIRMAN. In what form did you receive that instruction?
Mr. ARNAULT. Verbal instruction.
The CHAIRMAN. When did you receive this verbal instruction from Burt to deliver
these P440,000 to a certain person whose name you do not like to reveal?
Mr. ARNAULT. I have instruction to comply with the request of the person.
The CHAIRMAN. Now, you said that instruction given to you by Burt was verbal?
Mr. ARNAULT. Yes.
The CHAIRMAN. When was that instruction given to you by Burt?
Mr. ARNAULT. Long time ago.
The CHAIRMAN. In what year did Burt give you that verbal instruction; when Burt was
still here in the Philippines?
Mr. ARNAULT. Yes.
The CHAIRMAN. But at that time Burt already knew that he would receive the money?
Mr. ARNAULT. No.
The CHAIRMAN. In what year was that when Burt while he was here in the Philippines
gave you the verbal instruction?
Mr. ARNAULT. In 1946.
The CHAIRMAN. And what has that certain person done for Burt to merit receiving
these P440,000?
Mr. ARNAULT. I absolutely do not know.
The CHAIRMAN. You do not know?
Mr. ARNAULT. I do not know.

The CHAIRMAN. Burt did not tell you when he gave you the verbal instruction why that
certain person should receive these P440,000?
Mr. ARNAULT. He did not tell me.
The CHAIRMAN. And Burt also authorized you to give this big amount to that certain
person without receipt?
Mr. ARNAULT. He told me that a certain person would represent him and where could I
meet him.
The CHAIRMAN. Did Burt know already that certain person as early as 1946?
Mr. ARNAULT. I presume much before that.
The CHAIRMAN. Did that certain person have any intervention in the prosecution of the
two cases involving the Buenavista and Tambobong estates?
Mr. ARNAULT. Not that I know of.
The CHAIRMAN. Is that certain person related to any high government official?
Mr. ARNAULT. No, I do not know.
The CHAIRMAN. Why can you not tell us the name of that certain person?
Mr. ARNAULT. Because I am not sure of his name; I cannot remember the name.
The CHAIRMAN. When gave that certain person that P440,000 on October 29, 1949,
you knew already that person?
Mr. ARNAULT. Yes, I have seen him several times.
The CHAIRMAN. And the name of that certain person is a Filipino name?
Mr. ARNAULT. I would say Spanish name.
The CHAIRMAN. And how about his Christian name; is it also a Spanish name?
Mr. ARNAULT. I am not sure; I think the initial is J.
The CHAIRMAN. Did he have a middle name?
Mr. ARNAULT. I never knew it.
The CHAIRMAN. And how about his family name which according to your recollection
is Spanish; can you remember the first letter with which that family name begins?
Mr. ARNAULT. S, D or F.
The CHAIRMAN. And what was the last letter of the family name?
Mr. ARNAULT. I do not know.
The CHAIRMAN. Have you seen that person again after you have delivered this
P440,000?
Mr. ARNAULT. Yes.
The CHAIRMAN. Several times?
Mr. ARNAULT. Two or three times.
The CHAIRMAN. Here in Manila?
Mr. ARNAULT. Yes.
The CHAIRMAN. And in spite of the fact that you met that person two or three times,
you never were able to find out what was his name?
Mr. ARNAULT. If I knew, I would [have] taken it down. Mr. Peralta knows my name; of
course, we have not done business. Lots of people in Manila know me, but they don't
know my name, and I don't know them. They sa{ I am "chiflado" because I don't know
their names.
The CHAIRMAN. That certain person is a male or female?
Mr. ARNAULT. He is a male.
The CHAIRMAN. You are sure that he is a male at least?
Mr. ARNAULT. Let us say 38 or 40 years, more or less.
The CHAIRMAN. Can you give us, more or less, a description of that certain person?
What is his complexion: light, dark or light brown?
Mr. ARNAULT. He is like the gentleman there (pointing to Senator Cabili), but smaller.
He walks very straight, with military bearing.
The CHAIRMAN. Do you know the residence of that certain person to whom you gave
the P440,000?
Mr. ARNAULT. No.
The CHAIRMAN. During these frequent times that you met that certain person, you
never came to know his residence?
Mr. ARNAULT. No, because he was coming to the office.
The CHAIRMAN. How tall is that certain person?
Mr. ARNAULT. Between 5-2 and 5-6.
On May 15, 1950, the petitioner was haled before the bar of the Senate, which approved and read
to him the following resolution:
Be it resolved by the Senate of the Philippines in Session assembled:
That Jean L. Arnault, now at the bar of the Senate, be arraigned for contempt consisting
of contumacious acts committed by him during the investigation conducted by the
Special Committee created by Senate Resolution No. 8 to probe the Tambobong and
Buenavista estates deal of October 21, 1949, and that the President of the Senate
propounded to him the following interrogatories:
1. What excuse have you for persistently refusing to reveal the name of the person to
whom you gave the P440,000 on October 29, 1949, a person whose name it is impossible
for you not to remember not only because of the big amount of money you gave to him
without receipt, but also by your own statements you knew him as early as 1946 when
General Ernest H. Burt was still in the Philippines, you made two other deliveries of
money to him without receipt, and the last time you saw him was in December 1949?
Thereupon petitioner's attorney, Mr. Orendain, submitted for him a written answer alleging that
the questions were incriminatory in nature and begging leave to be allowed to stand on his
constitutional right not to be compelled to be a witness against himself. Not satisfied with that
written answer Senator Sumulong, over the objection of counsel for the petitioner, propounded to
the latter the following question:
Sen. SUMULONG. During the investigation, when the Committee asked you for the
name of that person to whom you gave the P440,000, you said that you can [could] not
remember his name. That was the reason then for refusing to reveal the name of the
person. Now, in the answer that you have just cited, you are refusing to reveal the name
of that person to whom you gave the P440,000 on the ground that your answer will be
self-incriminating. Now, do I understand from you that you are abandoning your former
claim that you cannot remember the name of that person, and that your reason now for
your refusal to reveal the name of that person is that your answer might be selfincriminating? In other words, the question is this: What is your real reason for refusing
to reveal the name of that person to whom you gave the P440,000: that you do not
remember his name or that your answer would be self-incriminating?
xxx
xxx
xxx
Mr. ORENDAIN. Mr. President, we are begging for the rules of procedure that the
accused should not be required to testify unless he so desires.
The PRESIDENT. It is the duty of the respondent to answer the question. The question is
very clear. It does not incriminate him.
xxx
xxx
xxx
Mr. ARNAULT. I stand by every statement that I have made before the Senate Committee
on the first, second, and third hearings to which I was made in my letter to this Senate of
May 2, 1950, in which I gave all the reasons that were in my powers to give, as
requested. I cannot change anything in those statements that I made because they
represent the best that I can do , to the best of my ability.
The PRESIDENT. You are not answering the question. The answer has nothing to do with
the question.
Sen. SUMULONG. I would like to remind you , Mr. Arnault, that the reason that you
gave during the investigation for not revealing the name of the person to whom you gave
the P440,000 is not the same reason that you are now alleging because during the
investigation you told us: "I do not remember his name." But, now, you are now saying:
"My answer might incriminate me." What is your real position?
Mr. ARNAULT. I have just stated that I stand by my statements that I made at the first,
second, and third hearings. I said that I wanted to be excused from answering the
question. I beg to be excused from making any answer that might be incriminating in
nature. However, in this answer, if the detail of not remembering the name of the person
has not been included, it is an oversight.
Sen. SUMULONG. Mr. Arnault, will you kindly answer a simple question: Do you
remember or not the name of the person to whom you gave the P440,000?
Mr. ARNAULT. I do not remember .
Sen. SUMULONG. Now, if you do not remember the name of that person, how can you
say that your answer might be incriminating? If you do not remember his name, you
cannot answer the question; so how could your answer be self-incriminating? What do
you say to that?
Mr. ARNAULT. This is too complicated for me to explain. Please, I do not see how to
answer those questions. That is why I asked for a lawyer, so he can help me. I have no
means of knowing what the situation is about. I have been in jail 13 days without
communication with the outside. How could I answer the question? I have no knowledge
of legal procedure or rule, of which I am completely ignorant.
xxx
xxx
xxx
Sen. SUMULONG. Mr. President, I ask that the question be answered.

The PRESIDENT. The witness is ordered to answer the question. It is very clear. It does
not incriminate the witness.
xxx
xxx
xxx
Mr. ARNAULT. I do not remember. I stand on my constitutional rights. I beg to be

excused from making further answer, please.
Sen. SUMULONG. In that mimeographed letter that you sent addressed to the President
of the Senate, dated May 2, 1950, you stated there that you cannot reveal the name of the
person to whom you gave the P440,000 because if he is a public official you might render
yourself liable for prosecution for bribery, and that if he is a private individual you might
render yourself liable for prosecution for slander. Why did you make those statements
when you cannot even tell us whether that person to whom you gave the P440,000 is a
public official or a private individual ? We are giving you this chance to convince the
Senate that all these allegations of yours that your answers might incriminate you are
given by you honestly or you are just trying to make a pretext for not revealing the
information desired by the Senate.
The PRESIDENT. You are ordered to answer the question.
Mr. ARNAULT. I do not even understand the question. (The question is restated and
explained.)
Mr. ARNAULT. That letter of May 2, was prepared by a lawyer for me and signed it.
That is all I can say how I stand about this letter. I have no knowledge myself enough to
write such a letter, so I had to secure the help of a lawyer to help me in my period of
distress.
In that same session of the Senate before which the petitioner was called to show cause why he
should not be adjudged guilty of contempt of the Senate, Senator Sumulong propounded to the
petitioner questions tending to elicit information from him as to the identity of the person to
whom he delivered the P440,000; but the petitioner refused to reveal it by saying that he did not
remember. The President of the Senate then propounded to him various questions concerning his
past activities dating as far back as when witness was seven years of age and ending as recently
as the post liberation period, all of which questions the witness answered satisfactorily. In view
thereof, the President of the Senate also made an attempt to illicit the desired information from
the witness, as follows:
The PRESIDENT. Now I am convinced that you have a good memory. Answer: Did you
deliver the P440,000 as a gift, or of any consideration?
Mr. ARNAULT. I have said that I had instructions to deliver it to that person, that is all.
The PRESIDENT. Was it the first time you saw that person?
Mr. ARNAULT. I saw him various times, I have already said.
The PRESIDENT. In spite of that, you do not have the least remembrance of the name of
that person?
Mr. ARNAULT. I cannot remember.
The PRESIDENT. How is it that you do not remember events that happened a short time
ago and, on the other hand, you remember events that occurred during your childhood?
Mr. ARNAULT. I cannot explain.
The Senate then deliberated and adopted the resolution of May 15 hereinabove quoted whereby
the petitioner was committed to the custody of the Sergeant-at-Arms and imprisoned until "he
shall have purged the contempt by revealing to the Senate or to the aforesaid Special Committee
the name of the person to whom he gave the P440,000, as well as answer other pertinent
questions in connection therewith."
The Senate also adopted on the same date another resolution (No. 16) , to wit:
That the Special Committee created by Senate Resolution No. 8 be empowered and
directed to continue its investigation of the Tambobong and Buenavista Estates deal of
October 21, 1949, more particularly to continue the examination of Jean L. Arnault
regarding the name of the person to whom he gave the P440,000 and other matters related
therewith.
The first session of the Second Congress was adjourned at midnight on May 18, 1950.
The case was argued twice before us. We have given its earnest and prolonged consideration
because it is the first of its kind to arise since the Constitution of the Republic of the Philippines
was adopted. For the first time this Court is called upon to define the power of either House of
Congress to punish a person not a member for contempt; and we are fully conscious that our
pronouncements here will set an important precedent for the future guidance of all concerned.
Before discussing the specific issues raised by the parties, we deem it necessary to lay down the
general principles of law which form the background of those issues.
Patterned after the American system, our Constitution vests the powers of the Government in
three independent but coordinate Departments Legislative, Executive, and Judicial. The
legislative power is vested in the Congress, which consists of the Senate and the House of
Representatives. (Section 1, Article VI.) Each house may determine the rules of its proceedings,
punish its Members for disorderly behavior, and, with the concurrence of two-thirds of all its
Members, expel a Member. (Section 10, Article VI.) The judicial power is vested in the Supreme
Court and in such inferior courts as may be established by law. (Section 1, Article VIII.) Like the
Constitution of the United States, ours does not contain an express provision empowering either
of the two Houses of Congress to punish nonmembers for contempt. It may also be noted that
whereas in the United States the legislative power is shared by and between the Congress of the
United States, on the one hand, and the respective legislatures of the different States, on the other
the powers not delegated to the United States by the Constitution nor prohibited by it to States
being reserved to the States, respectively, or to the people in the Philippines, the legislative
power is vested in the Congress of the Philippines alone. It may therefore be said that the
Congress of the Philippines has a wider range of legislative field than the Congress of the United
States or any State Legislature. Our form of Government being patterned after the American
system the framers of our Constitution having drawn largely from American institutions and
practices we can, in this case, properly draw also from American precedents in interpreting
analogous provisions of our Constitution, as we have done in other cases in the past. Although
there is no provision in the Constitution expressly investing either House of Congress with power
to make investigations and exact testimony to the end that it may exercise its legislative
functions as to be implied. In other words, the power of inquiry with process to enforce it
is an essential and appropriate auxiliary to the legislative function. A legislative body cannot
legislate wisely or effectively in the absence of information respecting the conditions which the
legislation is intended to effect or change; and where the legislative body does not itself possess
the requisite information which is not infrequently true recourse must be had to others who
do possess it. Experience has shown that mere requests for such information are often unavailing,
and also that information which is volunteered is not always accurate or complete; so some
means of compulsion is essential to obtain what is needed. (McGrain vs. Daugherty, 273 U.S.,
135; 71 L. ed., 580; 50 A.L R., 1.) The fact that the Constitution expressly gives to Congress the
power to punish its Members for disorderly behavior, does not by necessary implication exclude
the power to punish for contempt any other person. (Anderson vs. Dunn, 6, Wheaton, 204; 5 L.
ed., 242.) But no person can be punished for contumacy as a witness before either House, unless
his testimony is required in a matter into which that House has jurisdiction to inquire.
(Kilbourn vs. Thompson, 26 L. ed., 377.).
Since, as we have noted, the Congress of the Philippines has a wider range of legislative field
than either the Congress of the United States or a State Legislature, we think it is correct to say
that the field of inquiry into which it may enter is also wider. It would be difficult to define any
limits by which the subject matter of its inquiry can be bounded. It is not necessary to do so in
this case. Suffice it to say that it must be coextensive with the range of the legislative power.
In the present case the jurisdiction of the Senate, thru the Special Committee created by it, to
investigate the Buenavista and Tambobong Estates deal is not challenged by the petitioner; and
we entertain no doubt as to the Senate's authority to do so and as to the validity of Resolution
No. 8 hereinabove quoted. The transaction involved a questionable and allegedly unnecessary
and irregular expenditure of no less than P5,000,000 of public funds, of which Congress is the
constitutional guardian. It also involved government agencies created by Congress to regulate or
even abolish. As a result of the yet uncompleted investigation, the investigating committee has
recommended and the Senate approved three bills (1) prohibiting the Secretary of Justice or any
other department head from discharging functions and exercising powers other than those
attached to his own office, without ]previous congressional authorization; (2) prohibiting
brothers and near relatives of any President of the Philippines from intervening directly or
indirectly and in whatever capacity in transactions in which the Government is a party, more
particularly where the decision lies in the hands of executive or administrative officers who are
appointees of the President; and (3) providing that purchases of the Rural Progress
Administration of big landed estates at a price of P100,000 or more, shall not become effective
without previous congressional confirmation.2
We shall now consider and pass upon each of the questions raised by the petitioner in support of
his contention that his commitment is unlawful.
First He contends that the Senate has no power to punish him for contempt for refusing to reveal
the name of the person to whom he gave the P440,000, because such information is immaterial
to, and will not serve, any intended or purported legislation and his refusal to answer the question
has not embarrassed, obstructed, or impeded the legislative process. It is argued that since the
investigating committee has already rendered its report and has made all its recommendations as
to what legislative measures should be taken pursuant to its findings, there is no necessity to
force the petitioner to give the information desired other than that mentioned in its report, to wit:
"In justice to Judge Quirino and to Secretary Nepomuceno, this atmosphere of suspicion that
now pervades the public mind must be dissipated, and it can only be done if appropriate steps are
taken by the Senate to compel Arnault to stop pretending that he cannot remember the name of
the person to whom he gave the P440,000 and answer the questions which will definitely
establish the identity of that person . . ." Senator Sumulong, Chairman of the Committee, who
appeared and argued the case for the respondents, denied that that was the only purpose of the
Senate in seeking the information from the witness. He said that the investigation had not been
completed, because, due to the contumacy of the witness, his committee had not yet determined
the parties responsible for the anomalous transaction as required by Resolution No. 8; that, by
Resolution No. 16, his committee was empowered and directed to continue its investigation,
more particularly to continue its examination of the witness regarding the name of the person to
whom he gave the P440,000 and other matters related therewith; that the bills recommended by
his committee had not been approved by the House and might not be approved pending the
completion of the investigation; and that those bills were not necessarily all the measures that
Congress might deem it necessary to pass after the investigation is finished.
Once an inquiry is admitted or established to be within the jurisdiction of a legislative body to
make, we think the investigating committee has the power to require a witness to answer any
question pertinent to that inquiry, subject of course to his constitutional right against selfincrimination. The inquiry, to be within the jurisdiction of the legislative body to make, must be
material or necessary to the exercise of a power in it vested by the Constitution, such as to
legislate, or to expel a Member; and every question which the investigator is empowered to
coerce a witness to answer must be material or pertinent to the subject of the inquiry or
investigation. So a witness may not be coerced to answer a question that obviously has no
relation to the subject of the inquiry. But from this it does not follow that every question that may
be propounded to a witness must be material to any proposed or possible legislation. In other
words, the materiality of the question must be determined by its direct relation to any proposed
or possible legislation. The reason is, that the necessity or lack of necessity for legislative action
and the form and character of the action itself are determined by the sum total of the information
to be gathered as a result of the investigation, and not by a fraction of such information elicited
from a single question.
In this connection, it is suggested by counsel for the respondents that the power of the Court is
limited to determining whether the legislative body has jurisdiction to institute the inquiry or
investigation; that once that jurisdiction is conceded, this Court cannot control the exercise of
that jurisdiction; and it is insinuated, that the ruling of the Senate on the materiality of the
question propounded to the witness is not subject to review by this Court under the principle of
the separation of powers. We have to qualify this proposition. As was said by the Court of
Appeals of New York: "We are bound to presume that the action of the legislative body was with
a legitimate object if it is capable of being so construed, and we have no right to assume that the
contrary was intended." (People ex rel. McDonald vs. Keeler, 99 N.Y., 463; 52 Am. Rep., 49; 2
N.E., 615, quoted with approval by the Supreme Court of the United States in the said case of
McGrain vs. Daugherty, it is necessary deduction from the decision in Re Chapman, 41 L. ed.,
1154, that where the questions are not pertinent to the matter under inquiry a witness rightfully
may refuse to answer. So we are of the opinion that where the alleged immateriality of the
information sought by the legislative body from a witness is relied upon to contest its
jurisdiction, the court is in duty bound to pass upon the contention. The fact that the legislative
body has jurisdiction or the power to make the inquiry would not preclude judicial intervention
to correct a clear abuse of discretion in the exercise of that power.
Applying the criterion laid down in the last two preceding paragraphs to the resolution of the
issue under consideration, we find that the question for the refusal to answer which the petitioner
was held in contempt by the Senate is pertinent to the matter under inquiry. In fact, this is not and
cannot be disputed. Senate Resolution No. 8, the validity of which is not challenged by the
petitioner, requires the Special Committee, among other things, to determine the parties
responsible for the Buenavista and Tambobong estates deal, and it is obvious that the name of the
person to whom the witness gave the P440,000 involved in said deal is pertinent to that
determination it is in fact the very thing sought to be determined. The contention is not that
the question is impertinent to the subject of the inquiry but that it has no relation or materiality to
any proposed legislation. We have already indicated that it is not necessary for the legislative
body to show that every question propounded to a witness is material to any proposed or possible
legislation; what is required is that is that it be pertinent to the matter under inquiry.
It is said that the Senate has already approved the three bills recommended by the Committee as
a result of the uncompleted investigation and that there is no need for it to know the name of the
person to whom the witness gave the P440,000. But aside from the fact that those bills have not
yet been approved by the lower house and by the President and that they may be withdrawn or
modified if after the inquiry is completed they should be found unnecessary or inadequate, there
is nothing to prevent the Congress from approving other measures it may deem necessary after
completing the investigation. We are not called upon, nor is it within our province, to determine
or imagine what those measures may be. And our inability to do so is no reason for overruling
the question propounded by the Senate to the witness.
The case of Re Chapman , 166 U.S., 661; 41 L. ed., 1154, is in point here. The inquiry there in
question was conducted under a resolution of the Senate and related to charges, published in the
press, that senators were yielding to corrupt influences in considering a tariff bill then before the
Senate and were speculating in stocks the value of which would be affected by pending
amendments to the bill. Chapman, a member of a firm of stock brokers dealing in the stock of the
American Sugar Refining Company, appeared before the committee in response to a subpoena
and asked, among others, the following questions:
Had the firm, during the month of March, 1894, bought or sold any stock or securities,
known as sugar stocks, for or in the interest, directly or indirectly, of any United Senate
senator?
Was the said firm at that time carrying any sugar stock for the benefit of, or in the
interest, directly or indirectly, of any United Senate senator?
He refused to answer the questions and was prosecuted under an Act of Congress for contempt of
the Senate. Upon being convicted and sent to jail he petitioned the Supreme Court of the United
States for a writ of habeas corpus. One of the questions decided by the Supreme Court of the
United States in that case was whether the committee had the right to compel the witness to
answer said questions, and the Court held that the committee did have such right, saying:
The questions were undoubtedly pertinent to the subject-matter of the inquiry. The
resolution directed the committee to inquire whether any senator has been, or is,
speculating in what are known as sugar stocks during the consideration of the tariff bill
now before the Senate." What the Senate might or might not do upon the facts when
ascertained, we cannot say, nor are we called upon to inquire whether such ventures
might be defensible, as contended in argument, but is plain that negative answers would
have cleared that body of what the Senate regarded as offensive imputations, while
affirmative answers might have led to further action on the part of the Senate within its
constitutional powers. (Emphasis supplied.)
It may be contended that the determination of the parties responsible for the deal is incumbent
upon the judicial rather than upon the legislative branch. But we think there is no basis in fact or
in law for such assumption. The petitioner has not challenged the validity of Senate Resolution
No. 8, and that resolution expressly requires the committee to determine the parties responsible
for the deal. We are bound to presume that the Senate has acted in the due performance of its
constitutional function in instituting the inquiry, if the act is capable of being so construed. On
the other hand, there is no suggestion that the judiciary has instituted an inquiry to determine the
parties responsible for the deal. Under the circumstances of the case, it appearing that the
questioned transaction was affected by the head of the Department of Justice himself, it is not
reasonable to expect that the Fiscal or the Court of First Instance of Manila will take the
initiative to investigate and prosecute the parties responsible for the deal until and unless the
Senate shall determined those parties are and shall taken such measures as may be within its
competence to take the redress the wrong that may have been committed against the people as a
result of the transaction. As we have said, the transaction involved no less than P5,000,000 of
public funds. That certainly is a matter of a public concern which it is the duty of the
constitutional guardian of the treasury to investigate.
If the subject of investigation before the committee is within the range of legitimate legislative
inquiry and the proposed testimony of the witness called relates to that subject, obedience, to its
process may be enforced by the committee by imprisonment. (Sullivan vs. Hill, 73 W. Va., 49; 79
S.E., 670; 40 Ann. Cas. [1916 B.], 1115.)
The decision in the case of Kilbourn vs. Thompson, 26 L. ed., 377, relied upon by the petitioner,
is not applicable here. In that case the inquiry instituted by the House of Representatives of the
United States related to a private real-estate pool or partnership in the District of Columbia. Jay
Cook and Company had had an interest in the pool but become bankrupts, and their estate was in
course of administration in a federal bankruptcy court in Pennsylvania. The United States was
one of their creditors. The trustee in the bankruptcy proceeding had effected a settlement of the
bankrupts' interest in the pool, and of course his action was subject to examination and approval
or disapproval by the bankruptcy court. Some of the creditors, including the United States, were
dissatisfied with the settlement. The resolution of the House directed the Committee "to inquire
into the nature and history of said real-estate pool and the character of said settlement, with the
amount of property involve, in which Jay Cooke and Co. were interested, and the amount paid or
to be paid in said settlement, with power to send for persons and papers, and report to this
House." The Supreme Court of the United States, speaking thru Mr. Justice Miller, pointed out
that the resolution contained no suggestion of contemplated legislation; that the matter was one
in respect of which no valid legislation could be had; that the bankrupts' estate and the trustee's
settlement were still pending in the bankruptcy court; and that the United States and other
creditors were free to press their claims in that proceeding. And on these grounds the court held
that in undertaking the investigation "the House of Representatives not only exceeded the limit
of its own authority, but assumed a power which could only be properly exercised by another
branch of the government, because the power was in its nature clearly judicial." The principles
announced and applied in that case are: that neither House of Congress possesses a "general
power of making inquiry into the private affairs of the citizen"; that the power actually possessed
is limited to inquires relating to matters of which the particular House has jurisdiction, and in
respect of which it rightfully may take other action; that if the inquiry relates to a matter wherein
relief or redress could be had only by judicial proceeding, it is not within the range of this
power , but must be left to the court, conformably to the constitutional separation of government
powers.
That case differs from the present case in two important respects: (1) There the court found that
the subject of the inquiry, which related to a private real-estate pool or partnership, was not
within the jurisdiction of either House of Congress; while here if it is not disputed that the
subject of the inquiry, which relates to a transaction involving a questionable expenditure by the
Government of P5,000,000 of public funds, is within the jurisdiction of the Senate, (2) There the
claim of the Government as a creditor of Jay Cooke and Company, which had had an interest in
the pool, was pending adjudication by the court; while here the interposition of the judicial
power on the subject of the inquiry cannot be expected, as we have pointed out above, until after
the Senate shall have determined who the parties responsible are and shall have taken such
measures as may be within its competence to take to redress the wrong that may have been
committed against the people as a result of the transaction.
It is interesting to note that the decision in the case of Killbourn vs. Thompson has evoked strong
criticisms from legal scholars. (See Potts, Power of Legislative Bodies to Punish for
Contempt [1926], 74 U. Pa. L. Rev., 692-699; James L. Land is, Constitutional Limitations on
the Congressional Power of Investigation [1926], 40 Harvard L. Rev., 153, 154, 214-220.) We
quoted the following from Professor Land is' criticism: "Mr. Justice Miller saw the case purely as
an attempt by the House to secure to the Government certain priority rights as creditor of the
bankrupt concern. To him it assumed the character of a lawsuit between the Government and Jay
Cooke and Co., with the Government, acting through the House, attempting to override the
orderliness of established procedure and thereby prefer a creditors' bill not before the courts but
before Congress. That bankruptcy proceedings had already been instituted against Jay Cooke and
Co., in a federal court gave added impetus to such a conception. The House was seeking to oust a
court of prior acquired jurisdiction by an extraordinary and unwarranted assumption of "judicial
power"! The broader aspect of the investigation had not been disclosed to the Court. That Jay
Cooke and Co.'s indebtedness and the particular funds in question were only part of the great
administrative problem connected with the use and disposition of public monies, that the
particular failure was of consequence mainly in relation to the security demanded for all
government deposits, that the facts connected with one such default revealed the possibility of
other and greater maladministration, such considerations had not been put before the Court. Nor
had it been acquainted with the every-day nature of the particular investigation and the powers
there exerted by the House, powers whose exercise was customary and familiar in legislative
practice. Instead of assuming the character of an extraordinary judicial proceeding, the inquiry,
place in its proper background, should have been regarded as a normal and customary part of the
legislative process. Detailed definiteness of legislative purpose was thus made the demand of the
court in Killbourn vs. Thompson. But investigators cannot foretell the results that may be
achieved. The power of Congress to exercise control over a real-estate pool is not a matter for
abstract speculation but one to be determined only after an exhaustive examination of the
problem. Relationship, and not their possibilities, determine the extent of congressional power.
Constitutionality depends upon such disclosures. Their presence, whether determinative of
legislative or judicial power, cannot be relegated to guesswork. Neither Congress nor the Court
can predict, prior to the event, the result of the investigation."
The other case relied upon by the petitioner is Marshall vs. Gordon, 243 U.S., 521; 61. ed., 881.
The question there was whether the House of Representatives exceeded its power in punishing,
as for contempt of its authority, the District Attorney of the Southern District of New York, who
had written, published, and sent to the chairman of one of its committees an ill-tempered and
irritating letter respecting the action and purposes of the committee in interfering with the
investigation by the grand jury of alleged illegal activities of a member of the House of
Representatives. Power to make inquires and obtain evidence by compulsory process was not
involved. The court recognized distinctly that the House of Representatives had implied power to
punish a person not a member for contempt, but held that its action in this instance was without
constitutional justification. The decision was put on the ground that the letter, while offensive
and vexatious, was not calculated or likely to affect the House in any of its proceedings or in the
exercise of any of its functions. This brief statement of the facts and the issues decided in that
case is sufficient to show the inapplicability thereof to the present case. There the contempt
involved consisted in the district attorney's writing to the chairman of the committee an offensive
and vexatious letter, while here the contempt involved consists in the refusal of the witness to
answer questions pertinent to the subject of an inquiry which the Senate has the power and
jurisdiction to make . But in that case, it was recognized that the House of Representatives has
implied power to punish a person not a member of contempt. In that respect the case is
applicable here in favor of the Senate's (and not of the Petitioner's ) contention.
Second. It is next contended for the petitioner that the Senate lacks authority to commit him for
contempt for a term beyond its period of legislative session, which ended on May 18, 1950. This
contention is based on the opinion of Mr. Justice Malcolm, concurred in by Justices Street and
Villa-Real, in the case of Lopez vs. De los Reyes (1930), 55 Phil., 170. In that case it appears that
on October 23, 1929, Candido Lopez assaulted a member of the House of Representatives while
the latter was going to the hall of the House of Representatives to attend the session which was
then about to begin, as a result of which assault said representative was unable to attend the
sessions on that day and those of the two days next following by reason of the threats which
Candido Lopez made against him. By the resolution of the House adopted November 6, 1929,
Lopez was declared guilty of contempt of the House of Representatives and ordered punished by
confinement in Bilibid Prison for a period of twenty-four hours. That resolution was not
complied with because the session of the House of Representatives adjourned at midnight on
November 8, 1929, and was reiterated at the next session on September 16, 1930. Lopez was
subsequently arrested, whereupon he applied for the writ of habeas corpus in the Court of First
Instance of Manila, which denied the application. Upon appeal to the Supreme Court, six justices
voted to grant the writ: Justice Malcolm, Street, and Villa-real, on the ground that the term of
imprisonment meted out to the petitioner could not legally be extended beyond the session of the
body in which the contempt occurred; and Justices Johns, Villamor, and Ostrand, on the ground
that the Philippine Legislature had no power to punish for contempt because it was a creature
merely of an Act of the Congress of the United States and not of a Constitution adopted by the
people. Chief Justice Avancea, Justice Johnson, and Justice Romualdez wrote separate opinions,
concurring with Justice Malcolm, Street, and Villa-Real, that the Legislature had inherent power
to punish for contempt but dissenting from the opinion that the order of commitment could only
be executed during the particular session in which the act of contempt was committed.
Thus, on the question under consideration, the Court was equally divided and no decisive
pronouncement was made. The opinion of Mr. Justice Malcolm is based mainly on the following
passage in the case of Anderson vs.Dunn, supra:
And although the legislative power continues perpetual, the legislative body ceases to
exist on the moment of its adjournment or periodical dissolution. It follows that
imprisonment must terminate with that adjournment.
as well as on the following quotation from Marshall vs. Gordon, supra:
And the essential nature of the power also makes clear the cogency and application of the
two limitations which were expressly pointed out in Anderson vs. Dunn, supra, that is,
that the power even when applied to subjects which justified its exercise is limited to
imprisonment and such imprisonment may not be extended beyond the session of the
body in which the contempt occurred.
Interpreting the above quotations, Chief Justice Avancea held:
From this doctrine it follows, in my judgement, that the imposition of the penalty is
limited to the existence of the legislative body, which ceases to function upon its final
periodical dissolution. The doctrine refers to its existence and not to any particular
session thereof. This must be so, inasmuch as the basis of the power to impose such
penalty is the right which the Legislature has to self-preservation, and which right is
enforceable during the existence of the legislative body. Many causes might be conceived
to constitute contempt to the Legislature, which would continue to be a menace to its
preservation during the existence of the legislative body against which contempt was
committed.
If the basis of the power of the legislature to punish for contempt exists while the
legislative body exercising it is in session, then that power and the exercise thereof must
perforce continue until the final adjournment and the election of its successor.
Mr. Justice Johnson's more elaborate opinion, supported by quotations from
Cooley's Constitutional Limitationsand from Jefferson's Manual, is to the same effect. Mr.
Justice Romualdez said: "In my opinion, where as in the case before us, the members composing
the legislative body against which the contempt was committed have not yet completed their
three-year term, the House may take action against the petitioner herein."
We note that the quotations from Anderson vs. Dunn and Marshall vs. Gordon relied upon by
Justice Malcolm areobiter dicta. Anderson vs. Dunn was an action of trespass against the
Sergeant-at-Arms of the House of Representatives of the United States for assault and battery
and false imprisonment. The plaintiff had been arrested for contempt of the House, brought
before the bar of the House, and reprimanded by the Speaker, and then discharged from custody.
The question as to the duration of the penalty was not involved in that case. The question there
was "whether the House of Representatives can take cognizance of contempt committed against
themselves, under any circumstances." The court there held that the House of Representatives
had the power to punish for contempt, and affirmed the judgment of the lower court in favor of
the defendant. In Marshall vs.Gordon, the question presented was whether the House had the
power under the Constitution to deal with the conduct of the district attorney in writing a
vexatious letter as a contempt of its authority, and to inflict punishment upon the writer for such
contempt as a matter of legislative power. The court held that the House had no such power
because the writing of the letter did not obstruct the performance of legislative duty and did not
endanger the preservation of the power of the House to carry out its legislative authority. Upon
that ground alone, and not because the House had adjourned, the court ordered the discharge of
the petitioner from custody.
The case where the question was squarely decided is McGrain vs. Daugherty, supra. There it
appears that the Senate had adopted a resolution authorizing and directing a select committee of
five senators to investigate various charges of misfeasance and nonfeasance in the Department of
Justice after Attorney General Harry M. Daugherty became its supervising head. In the course of
the investigation the committee caused to be served on Mally S. Daugherty, brother of Harry M.
Daugherty and president of the Midland National Bank of Washington Court House, Ohio, a
subpoena commanding him to appear before it for the purpose of giving testimony relating to the
subject under consideration. The witness failed to appear without offering any excuse for his
failure. The committee reported the matter to the Senate and the latter adopted a resolution, "That
the President of the Senate pro tempore issue his warrant commanding the Sergeant-at-Arms or
his deputy to take into custody the body of the said M.S. Daugherty wherever found, and to bring
the said M.S. Daugherty before the bar of the Senate, then and there to answer such questions
pertinent to the matter under inquiry as the Senate may order the President of the Senate pro
tempore to propound; and to keep the said M.S. Daugherty in custody to await the further order
of the Senate." Upon being arrested, the witness petitioned the federal court in Cincinnati for a
writ of habeas corpus. The federal court granted the writ and discharged the witness on the
ground that the Senate, in directing the investigation and in ordering the arrest, exceeded its
power under the Constitution. Upon appeal to the Supreme Court of the United States, one of the
contentions of the witness was that the case ha become moot because the investigation was
ordered and the committee was appointed during the Sixty-eighth Congress, which expired on
March 4, 1926. In overruling the contention, the court said:
. . . The resolution ordering the investigation in terms limited the committee's authority to
the period of the Sixty-eighth Congress; but this apparently was changed by a later and
amendatory resolution authorizing the committee to sit at such times and places as it
might deem advisable or necessary. It is said in Jefferson's Manual: "Neither House can
continue any portion of itself in any parliamentary function beyond the end of the session
without the consent of the other two branches. When done, it is by a bill constituting
them commissioners for the particular purpose." But the context shows that the reference
is to the two houses of Parliament when adjourned by prorogation or dissolution by the
King. The rule may be the same with the House of Representatives whose members are
all elected for the period of a single Congress: but it cannot well be the same with the
Senate, which is a continuing body whose members are elected for a term of six years
and so divided into classes that the seats of one third only become vacant at the end of
each Congress, two thirds always continuing into the next Congress, save as vacancies
may occur through death or resignation.
Mr. Hinds in his collection of precedents, says: "The Senate, as a continuing body, may
continue its committees through the recess following the expiration of a Congress;" and,
after quoting the above statement from Jefferson's Manual, he says: "The Senate,
however being a continuing body, gives authority to its committees during the recess after
the expiration of a Congress." So far as we are advised the select committee having this
investigation in charge has neither made a final report nor been discharged; nor has been
continued by an affirmative order. Apparently its activities have been suspended pending
the decision of this case. But, be this as it may, it is certain that the committee may be
continued or revived now by motion to that effect, and if, continued or revived, will have
all its original powers. This being so, and the Senate being a continuing body, the case
cannot be said to have become moot in the ordinary sense. The situation is measurably
like that in Southern P. Terminal Co. vs. Interstate Commerce Commission, 219 U. S.,
498, 514-516; 55 L. ed., 310, 315, 316; 31 Sup. Ct. Rep., 279, where it was held that a
suit to enjoin the enforcement of an order of the Interstate Commerce Commission did
not become moot through the expiration of the order where it was capable of repetition
by the Commission and was a matter of public interest. Our judgment may yet be carried
into effect and the investigation proceeded with from the point at which it apparently was
interrupted by reason of the habeas corpus proceedings. In these circumstances we think
a judgment should be rendered as was done in the case cited.
What has been said requires that the final order in the District Court discharging the
witness from custody be reversed.
Like the Senate of the United States , the Senate of the Philippines is a continuing body whose
members are elected for a term of six years and so divided that the seats of only one-third
become vacant every two years, two-thirds always continuing into the next Congress save as
vacancies may occur thru death or resignation. Members of the House of Representatives are all
elected for a term of four years; so that the term of every Congress is four years. The Second
Congress of the Philippines was constituted on December 30, 1949, and will expire on December
30, 1953. The resolution of the Senate committing the Petitioner was adopted during the first
session of the Second Congress, which began on the fourth Monday of January and ended in
May 18, 1950.
Had said resolution of commitment been adopted by the House of Representatives, we think it
could be enforced until the final adjournment of the last session of the Second Congress in 1953.
We find no sound reason to limit the power of the legislative body to punish for contempt to the
end of every session and not to the end of the last session terminating the existence of that body.
The very reason for the exercise of the power to punish for contempt is to enable the legislative
body to perform its constitutional function without impediment or obstruction. Legislative
functions may be and in practice are performed during recess by duly constituted committees
charged with the duty of performing investigations or conducting hearing relative to any
proposed legislation. To deny to such committees the power of inquiry with process to enforce it
would be to defeat the very purpose for which that the power is recognized in the legislative
body as an essential and appropriate auxiliary to is legislative function. It is but logical to say
that the power of self-preservation is coexistent with the life to be preserved.
But the resolution of commitment here in question was adopted by the Senate, which is a
continuing body and which does not cease exist upon the periodical dissolution of the Congress
or of the House of Representatives. There is no limit as to time to the Senate's power to punish
for contempt in cases where that power may constitutionally be exerted as in the present case.
Mere reflection upon the situation at hand convinces us of the soundness of this proposition. The
Senate has ordered an investigation of the Buenavista and Tambobong estates deal, which we
have found it is within its competence to make. That investigation has not been completed
because of the refusal of the petitioner as a witness to answer certain questions pertinent to the
subject of the inquiry. The Senate has empowered the committee to continue the investigation
during the recess. By refusing to answer the questions, the witness has obstructed the
performance by the Senate of its legislative function, and the Senate has the power to remove the
obstruction by compelling the witness to answer the questions thru restraint of his liberty until he
shall have answered them. That power subsists as long as the Senate, which is a continuing body,
persists in performing the particular legislative function involved. To hold that it may punish the
witness for contempt only during the session in which investigation was begun, would be to
recognize the right of the Senate to perform its function but at the same time to deny to it an
essential and appropriate means for its performance. Aside from this, if we should hold that the
power to punish for contempt terminates upon the adjournment of the session, the Senate would
have to resume the investigation at the next and succeeding sessions and repeat the contempt
proceedings against the witness until the investigation is completed-an absurd, unnecessary, and
vexatious procedure, which should be avoided.
As against the foregoing conclusion it is argued for the petitioner that the power may be
abusively and oppressively exerted by the Senate which might keep the witness in prison for life.
But we must assume that the Senate will not be disposed to exert the power beyond its proper
bounds. And if, contrary to this assumption, proper limitations are disregarded, the portals of this
Court are always open to those whose rights might thus be transgressed.
Third. Lastly, the petitioner invokes the privilege against self-incrimination. He contends that he
would incriminate himself if he should reveal the name of the person to whom he gave the
P440,000 if that person be a public official be (witness) might be accused of bribery, and if that
person be a private individual the latter might accuse him of oral defamation.
The ground upon which the witness' claim is based is too shaky, in firm, and slippery to afford
him safety. At first he told the Committee that the transactions were legal, that no laws were
violated, and that all requisites had been replied with; but at the time he begged to be excused
from making answers "which might later be used against me." A little later he explained that
although the transactions were legal he refused to answer questions concerning them "because it
violates the right of a citizen to privacy in his dealings with other people . . . I simply stand on
my privilege to dispose of the money that has been paid to me as a result of a legal transaction
without having to account for the use of it." But after being apparently convinced by the
Committee that his position was untenable, the witness testified that, without securing any
receipt, he turned over the P440,000 to a certain person, a representative of Burt, in compliance
with Burt's verbal instruction made in 1946; that as far as he know, that certain person had
nothing to do with the negotiations for the settlement of the Buenavista and Tambobong cases;
that he had seen that person several times before he gave him the P440,000 on October 29, 1949,
and that since then he had seen him again two or three times, the last time being in December,
1949, in Manila; that the person was a male, 39 to 40 years of age, between 5 feet, 2 inches and 5
feet, 6 inches in height. Butt the witness would not reveal the name of that person on these
pretexts: " I don't remember the name; he was a representative of Burt." "I am not sure; I don't
remember the name."
We are satisfied that those answers of the witness to the important question, what is the name of
that person to whom you gave the P440,000? were obviously false. His insistent claim before the
bar of the Senate that if he should reveal the name he would incriminate himself, necessarily
implied that he knew the name. Moreover, it is unbelievable that he gave the P440,000 to a
person to him unknown.
"Testimony which is obviously false or evasive is equivalent to a refusal to testify and is
punishable as contempt, assuming that a refusal to testify would be so punishable." (12 Am. Jur.,
sec. 15, Contempt, pp. 399-400.) In the case of Mason vs. U.S., 61 L. ed., 1198, it appears that
Mason was called to testify before a grand jury engaged in investigating a charge of gambling
against six other men. After stating that he was sitting at a table with said men when they were
arrested, he refused to answer two questions, claiming so to do might tend to incriminate him: (1)
"Was there a game of cards being played on this particular evening at the table at which you are
sitting?" (2) "Was there a game of cards being played at another table at this time?" The foreman
of the grand jury reported the matter to the judge, who ruled "that each and all of said questions
are proper and that the answers thereto would not tend to incriminate the witness." Mason was
again called and refused to answer the first question propounded to him, but, half yielding to
frustration, he said in response to the second question: "I don't know." In affirming the conviction
for contempt, the Supreme Court of the United States among other things said:
In the present case, the witness certainly were not relieved from answering merely
because they declared that so to do might incriminate them. The wisdom of the rule in
this regard is well illustrated by the enforced answer, "I don't know ," given by Mason to
the second question, after he had refused to reply under a claim of constitutional
privilege.
Since according to the witness himself the transaction was legal, and that he gave the P440,000
to a representative of Burt in compliance with the latter's verbal instruction, we find no basis
upon which to sustain his claim that to reveal the name of that person might incriminate him.
There is no conflict of authorities on the applicable rule, to wit:
Generally, the question whether testimony is privileged is for the determination of the
Court. At least, it is not enough for the witness to say that the answer will incriminate
him. as he is not the sole judge of his liability. The danger of self-incrimination must
appear reasonable and real to the court, from all the circumstances, and from the whole
case, as well as from his general conception of the relations of the witness. Upon the facts
thus developed, it is the province of the court to determine whether a direct answer to a
question may criminate or not. . . . The fact that the testimony of a witness may tend to
show that he has violated the law is not sufficient to entitle him to claim the protection of
the constitutional provision against self-incrimination, unless he is at the same time liable
to prosecution and punishment for such violation. The witness cannot assert his privilege
by reason of some fanciful excuse, for protection against an imaginary danger, or to
secure immunity to a third person. ( 3 Wharton's Criminal Evidence, 11th ed., secs.
1135,1136.)
It is the province of the trial judge to determine from all the facts and circumstances of
the case whether the witness is justified in refusing to answer. (People vs. Gonzo, 23 N.E.
[2d], 210 [Ill. App., 1939].) A witness is not relieved from answering merely on his own
declaration that an answer might incriminate him, but rather it is for the trial judge to
decide that question. (Mason vs. U.S., 244 U. S., 362; 61 L. ed., 1193, 1200.)
As against witness's inconsistent and unjustified claim to a constitutional right, is his clear duty
as a citizen to give frank, sincere, and truthful testimony before a competent authority. The state
has the right to exact fulfillment of a citizen's obligation, consistent of course with his right under
the Constitution. The witness in this case has been vociferous and militant in claiming
constitutional rights and privileges but patently recreant to his duties and obligations to the
Government which protects those rights under the law. When a specific right and a specific
obligation conflict with each other, and one is doubtful or uncertain while the other is clear and
imperative, the former must give way to the latter. The right to life is one of the most sacred that
the citizen may claim, and yet the state may deprive him of it if he violates his corresponding
obligation to respect the life of others. As Mr. Justice Johnson said in Anderson vs. Dunn: "The
wretch beneath the gallows may repine at the fate which awaits him, and yet it is not certain that
the laws under which he suffers were made for the security." Paraphrasing and applying that
pronouncement here, the petitioner may not relish the restraint of his liberty pending the
fulfillment by him of his duty, but it is no less certain that the laws under which his liberty is
restrained were made for his welfare.
From all the foregoing, it follows that the petition must be denied, and it is so ordered, with
costs.
Paras, Pablo, Bengzon, Montemayor, and Reyes, JJ., concur.
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. 169777*
April 20, 2006
SENATE OF THE PHILIPPINES, represented by FRANKLIN M. DRILON, in his

capacity as Senate President, JUAN M. FLAVIER, in his capacity as Senate President Pro
Tempore, FRANCIS N. PANGILINAN, in his capacity as Majority Leader, AQUILINO Q.
PIMENTEL, JR., in his capacity as Minority Leader, SENATORS RODOLFO G.
BIAZON, "COMPANERA" PIA S. CAYETANO, JINGGOY EJERCITO ESTRADA,
LUISA "LOI" EJERCITO ESTRADA, JUAN PONCE ENRILE, RICHARD J. GORDON,
PANFILO M. LACSON, ALFREDO S.LIM, M. A. MADRIGAL, SERGIO OSMENA III,
RALPH G. RECTO, and MAR ROXAS, Petitioners,
vs.
EDUARDO R. ERMITA, in his capacity as Executive Secretary and alter-ego of President
Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo, and anyone acting in his stead and in behalf of the President of
the Philippines,Respondents.
x-------------------------x
G.R. No. 169659
April 20, 2006
BAYAN MUNA represented by DR. REYNALDO LESACA, JR., Rep. SATUR OCAMPO,
Rep. CRISPIN BELTRAN, Rep. RAFAEL MARIANO, Rep. LIZA MAZA, Rep.
TEODORO CASINO, Rep. JOEL VIRADOR, COURAGE represented by FERDINAND
GAITE, and COUNSELS FOR THE DEFENSE OF LIBERTIES (CODAL) represented by
ATTY. REMEDIOS BALBIN, Petitioners,
vs.
EDUARDO ERMITA, in his capacity as Executive Secretary and alter-ego of President
Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo, Respondent.
x-------------------------x
G.R. No. 169660
April 20, 2006
FRANCISCO I. CHAVEZ, Petitioner,

vs.
EDUARDO R. ERMITA, in his capacity as Executive Secretary, AVELINO J. CRUZ, JR.,
in his capacity as Secretary of Defense, and GENEROSO S. SENGA, in his capacity as AFP
Chief of Staff, Respondents.
x-------------------------x
G.R. No. 169667
April 20, 2006
ALTERNATIVE LAW GROUPS, INC. (ALG), Petitioner,

vs.
HON. EDUARDO R. ERMITA, in his capacity as Executive Secretary, Respondent.
x-------------------------x
G.R. No. 169834
April 20, 2006
PDP- LABAN, Petitioner,

vs.
EXECUTIVE SECRETARY EDUARDO R. ERMITA, Respondent.
x-------------------------x
G.R. No. 171246
April 20, 2006
JOSE ANSELMO I. CADIZ, FELICIANO M. BAUTISTA, ROMULO R. RIVERA, JOSE

AMOR AMORANDO, ALICIA A. RISOS-VIDAL, FILEMON C. ABELITA III, MANUEL
P. LEGASPI, J. B. JOVY C. BERNABE, BERNARD L. DAGCUTA, ROGELIO V.
GARCIA, and the INTEGRATED BAR FOR THE PHILIPPINES,Petitioners,
vs.
HON. EXECUTIVE SECRETARY EDUARDO R. ERMITA, Respondent.
DECISION
CARPIO MORALES, J.:
A transparent government is one of the hallmarks of a truly republican state. Even in the early
history of republican thought, however, it has been recognized that the head of government may
keep certain information confidential in pursuit of the public interest. Explaining the reason for
vesting executive power in only one magistrate, a distinguished delegate to the U.S.
Constitutional Convention said: "Decision, activity, secrecy, and dispatch will generally
characterize the proceedings of one man, in a much more eminent degree than the proceedings of
any greater number; and in proportion as the number is increased, these qualities will be
diminished."1
History has been witness, however, to the fact that the power to withhold information lends itself
to abuse, hence, the necessity to guard it zealously.
The present consolidated petitions for certiorari and prohibition proffer that the President has
abused such power by issuing Executive Order No. 464 (E.O. 464) last September 28, 2005.
They thus pray for its declaration as null and void for being unconstitutional.
In resolving the controversy, this Court shall proceed with the recognition that the issuance under
review has come from a co-equal branch of government, which thus entitles it to a strong
presumption of constitutionality. Once the challenged order is found to be indeed violative of the
Constitution, it is duty-bound to declare it so. For the Constitution, being the highest expression
of the sovereign will of the Filipino people, must prevail over any issuance of the government
that contravenes its mandates.
In the exercise of its legislative power, the Senate of the Philippines, through its various Senate
Committees, conducts inquiries or investigations in aid of legislation which call for, inter alia,
the attendance of officials and employees of the executive department, bureaus, and offices
including those employed in Government Owned and Controlled Corporations, the Armed
Forces of the Philippines (AFP), and the Philippine National Police (PNP).
On September 21 to 23, 2005, the Committee of the Senate as a whole issued invitations to
various officials of the Executive Department for them to appear on September 29, 2005 as
resource speakers in a public hearing on the railway project of the North Luzon Railways
Corporation with the China National Machinery and Equipment Group (hereinafter North Rail
Project). The public hearing was sparked by a privilege speech of Senator Juan Ponce Enrile
urging the Senate to investigate the alleged overpricing and other unlawful provisions of the
contract covering the North Rail Project.
The Senate Committee on National Defense and Security likewise issued invitations 2 dated
September 22, 2005 to the following officials of the AFP: the Commanding General of the
Philippine Army, Lt. Gen. Hermogenes C. Esperon; Inspector General of the AFP Vice Admiral
Mateo M. Mayuga; Deputy Chief of Staff for Intelligence of the AFP Rear Admiral Tirso R.
Danga; Chief of the Intelligence Service of the AFP Brig. Gen. Marlu Q. Quevedo; Assistant
Superintendent of the Philippine Military Academy (PMA) Brig. Gen. Francisco V. Gudani; and
Assistant Commandant, Corps of Cadets of the PMA, Col. Alexander F. Balutan, for them to
attend as resource persons in a public hearing scheduled on September 28, 2005 on the
following: (1) Privilege Speech of Senator Aquilino Q. Pimentel Jr., delivered on June 6, 2005
entitled "Bunye has Provided Smoking Gun or has Opened a Can of Worms that Show Massive
Electoral Fraud in the Presidential Election of May 2005"; (2) Privilege Speech of Senator
Jinggoy E. Estrada delivered on July 26, 2005 entitled "The Philippines as the Wire-Tapping
Capital of the World"; (3) Privilege Speech of Senator Rodolfo Biazon delivered on August 1,
2005 entitled "Clear and Present Danger"; (4) Senate Resolution No. 285 filed by Senator Maria
Ana Consuelo Madrigal Resolution Directing the Committee on National Defense and Security
to Conduct an Inquiry, in Aid of Legislation, and in the National Interest, on the Role of the
Military in the So-called "Gloriagate Scandal"; and (5) Senate Resolution No. 295 filed by
Senator Biazon Resolution Directing the Committee on National Defense and Security to
Conduct an Inquiry, in Aid of Legislation, on the Wire-Tapping of the President of the
Philippines.
Also invited to the above-said hearing scheduled on September 28 2005 was the AFP Chief of
Staff, General Generoso S. Senga who, by letter 3 dated September 27, 2005, requested for its
postponement "due to a pressing operational situation that demands [his utmost personal
attention" while "some of the invited AFP officers are currently attending to other urgent
operational matters."
On September 28, 2005, Senate President Franklin M. Drilon received from Executive Secretary
Eduardo R. Ermita a letter4 dated September 27, 2005 "respectfully request[ing] for the
postponement of the hearing [regarding the NorthRail project] to which various officials of the
Executive Department have been invited" in order to "afford said officials ample time and
opportunity to study and prepare for the various issues so that they may better enlighten the
Senate Committee on its investigation."
Senate President Drilon, however, wrote 5 Executive Secretary Ermita that the Senators "are
unable to accede to [his request]" as it "was sent belatedly" and "[a]ll preparations and
arrangements as well as notices to all resource persons were completed [the previous] week."
Senate President Drilon likewise received on September 28, 2005 a letter 6 from the President of
the North Luzon Railways Corporation Jose L. Cortes, Jr. requesting that the hearing on the
NorthRail project be postponed or cancelled until a copy of the report of the UP Law Center on
the contract agreements relative to the project had been secured.
On September 28, 2005, the President issued E.O. 464, "Ensuring Observance of the Principle of
Separation of Powers, Adherence to the Rule on Executive Privilege and Respect for the Rights
of Public Officials Appearing in Legislative Inquiries in Aid of Legislation Under the
Constitution, and For Other Purposes,"7 which, pursuant to Section 6 thereof, took effect
immediately. The salient provisions of the Order are as follows:
SECTION 1. Appearance by Heads of Departments Before Congress. In accordance with

Article VI, Section 22 of the Constitution and to implement the Constitutional provisions on the
separation of powers between co-equal branches of the government, all heads of departments of
the Executive Branch of the government shall secure the consent of the President prior to
appearing before either House of Congress.
When the security of the State or the public interest so requires and the President so states in
writing, the appearance shall only be conducted in executive session.
SECTION. 2. Nature, Scope and Coverage of Executive Privilege.
(a) Nature and Scope. - The rule of confidentiality based on executive privilege is fundamental to
the operation of government and rooted in the separation of powers under the Constitution
(Almonte vs. Vasquez, G.R. No. 95367, 23 May 1995). Further, Republic Act No. 6713 or the
Code of Conduct and Ethical Standards for Public Officials and Employees provides that Public
Officials and Employees shall not use or divulge confidential or classified information officially
known to them by reason of their office and not made available to the public to prejudice the
public interest.
Executive privilege covers all confidential or classified information between the President and
the public officers covered by this executive order, including:
Conversations and correspondence between the President and the public official covered by this
executive order (Almonte vs. Vasquez G.R. No. 95367, 23 May 1995; Chavez v. Public Estates
Authority, G.R. No. 133250, 9 July 2002);
Military, diplomatic and other national security matters which in the interest of national security
should not be divulged (Almonte vs. Vasquez, G.R. No. 95367, 23 May 1995; Chavez v.
Presidential Commission on Good Government, G.R. No. 130716, 9 December 1998).
Information between inter-government agencies prior to the conclusion of treaties and executive
agreements (Chavez v. Presidential Commission on Good Government, G.R. No. 130716, 9
December 1998);
Discussion in close-door Cabinet meetings (Chavez v. Presidential Commission on Good
Government, G.R. No. 130716, 9 December 1998);
Matters affecting national security and public order (Chavez v. Public Estates Authority, G.R.
No. 133250, 9 July 2002).
(b) Who are covered. The following are covered by this executive order:
Senior officials of executive departments who in the judgment of the department heads are
covered by the executive privilege;
Generals and flag officers of the Armed Forces of the Philippines and such other officers who in
the judgment of the Chief of Staff are covered by the executive privilege;
Philippine National Police (PNP) officers with rank of chief superintendent or higher and such
other officers who in the judgment of the Chief of the PNP are covered by the executive
privilege;
Senior national security officials who in the judgment of the National Security Adviser are
covered by the executive privilege; and
Such other officers as may be determined by the President.
SECTION 3. Appearance of Other Public Officials Before Congress. All public officials
enumerated in Section 2 (b) hereof shall secure prior consent of the President prior to appearing
before either House of Congress to ensure the observance of the principle of separation of
powers, adherence to the rule on executive privilege and respect for the rights of public officials
appearing in inquiries in aid of legislation. (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
Also on September 28, 2005, Senate President Drilon received from Executive Secretary Ermita
a copy of E.O. 464, and another letter 8 informing him "that officials of the Executive Department
invited to appear at the meeting [regarding the NorthRail project] will not be able to attend the
same without the consent of the President, pursuant to [E.O. 464]" and that "said officials have
not secured the required consent from the President." On even date which was also the scheduled
date of the hearing on the alleged wiretapping, Gen. Senga sent a letter 9 to Senator Biazon,
Chairperson of the Committee on National Defense and Security, informing him "that per
instruction of [President Arroyo], thru the Secretary of National Defense, no officer of the [AFP]
is authorized to appear before any Senate or Congressional hearings without seeking a written
approval from the President" and "that no approval has been granted by the President to any AFP
officer to appear before the public hearing of the Senate Committee on National Defense and
Security scheduled [on] 28 September 2005."
Despite the communications received from Executive Secretary Ermita and Gen. Senga, the
investigation scheduled by the Committee on National Defense and Security pushed through,
with only Col. Balutan and Brig. Gen. Gudani among all the AFP officials invited attending.
For defying President Arroyos order barring military personnel from testifying before legislative
inquiries without her approval, Brig. Gen. Gudani and Col. Balutan were relieved from their
military posts and were made to face court martial proceedings.
As to the NorthRail project hearing scheduled on September 29, 2005, Executive Secretary
Ermita, citing E.O. 464, sent letter of regrets, in response to the invitations sent to the following
government officials: Light Railway Transit Authority Administrator Melquiades Robles, Metro
Rail Transit Authority Administrator Roberto Lastimoso, Department of Justice (DOJ) Chief
State Counsel Ricardo V. Perez, then Presidential Legal Counsel Merceditas Gutierrez,
Department of Transportation and Communication (DOTC) Undersecretary Guiling Mamonding,
DOTC Secretary Leandro Mendoza, Philippine National Railways General Manager Jose Serase
II, Monetary Board Member Juanita Amatong, Bases Conversion Development Authority
Chairperson Gen. Narciso Abaya and Secretary Romulo L. Neri.10 NorthRail President Cortes
sent personal regrets likewise citing E.O. 464.11
On October 3, 2005, three petitions, docketed as G.R. Nos. 169659, 169660, and 169667, for
certiorari and prohibition, were filed before this Court challenging the constitutionality of E.O.
464.
In G.R. No. 169659, petitioners party-list Bayan Muna, House of Representatives Members
Satur Ocampo, Crispin Beltran, Rafael Mariano, Liza Maza, Joel Virador and Teodoro Casino,
Courage, an organization of government employees, and Counsels for the Defense of Liberties
(CODAL), a group of lawyers dedicated to the promotion of justice, democracy and peace, all
claiming to have standing to file the suit because of the transcendental importance of the issues
they posed, pray, in their petition that E.O. 464 be declared null and void for being
unconstitutional; that respondent Executive Secretary Ermita, in his capacity as Executive
Secretary and alter-ego of President Arroyo, be prohibited from imposing, and threatening to
impose sanctions on officials who appear before Congress due to congressional summons.
Additionally, petitioners claim that E.O. 464 infringes on their rights and impedes them from
fulfilling their respective obligations. Thus, Bayan Muna alleges that E.O. 464 infringes on its
right as a political party entitled to participate in governance; Satur Ocampo, et al. allege that
E.O. 464 infringes on their rights and duties as members of Congress to conduct investigation in
aid of legislation and conduct oversight functions in the implementation of laws; Courage alleges
that the tenure of its members in public office is predicated on, and threatened by, their
submission to the requirements of E.O. 464 should they be summoned by Congress; and CODAL
alleges that its members have a sworn duty to uphold the rule of law, and their rights to
information and to transparent governance are threatened by the imposition of E.O. 464.
In G.R. No. 169660, petitioner Francisco I. Chavez, claiming that his constitutional rights as a
citizen, taxpayer and law practitioner, are affected by the enforcement of E.O. 464, prays in his
petition that E.O. 464 be declared null and void for being unconstitutional.
In G.R. No. 169667, petitioner Alternative Law Groups, Inc. 12 (ALG), alleging that as a coalition
of 17 legal resource non-governmental organizations engaged in developmental lawyering and
work with the poor and marginalized sectors in different parts of the country, and as an
organization of citizens of the Philippines and a part of the general public, it has legal standing to
institute the petition to enforce its constitutional right to information on matters of public
concern, a right which was denied to the public by E.O. 464, 13 prays, that said order be declared
null and void for being unconstitutional and that respondent Executive Secretary Ermita be
ordered to cease from implementing it.
On October 11, 2005, Petitioner Senate of the Philippines, alleging that it has a vital interest in
the resolution of the issue of the validity of E.O. 464 for it stands to suffer imminent and material
injury, as it has already sustained the same with its continued enforcement since it directly
interferes with and impedes the valid exercise of the Senates powers and functions and conceals
information of great public interest and concern, filed its petition for certiorari and prohibition,
docketed as G.R. No. 169777 and prays that E.O. 464 be declared unconstitutional.
On October 14, 2005, PDP-Laban, a registered political party with members duly elected into the
Philippine Senate and House of Representatives, filed a similar petition for certiorari and
prohibition, docketed as G.R. No. 169834, alleging that it is affected by the challenged E.O. 464
because it hampers its legislative agenda to be implemented through its members in Congress,
particularly in the conduct of inquiries in aid of legislation and transcendental issues need to be
resolved to avert a constitutional crisis between the executive and legislative branches of the
government.
Meanwhile, by letter14 dated February 6, 2006, Senator Biazon reiterated his invitation to Gen.
Senga for him and other military officers to attend the hearing on the alleged wiretapping
scheduled on February 10, 2005. Gen. Senga replied, however, by letter 15 dated February 8,
2006, that "[p]ursuant to Executive Order No. 464, th[e] Headquarters requested for a clearance
from the President to allow [them] to appear before the public hearing" and that "they will attend
once [their] request is approved by the President." As none of those invited appeared, the hearing
on February 10, 2006 was cancelled.16
In another investigation conducted jointly by the Senate Committee on Agriculture and Food and
the Blue Ribbon Committee on the alleged mismanagement and use of the fertilizer fund under
the Ginintuang Masaganang Ani program of the Department of Agriculture (DA), several
Cabinet officials were invited to the hearings scheduled on October 5 and 26, November 24 and
December 12, 2005 but most of them failed to attend, DA Undersecretary Belinda Gonzales, DA
Assistant Secretary Felix Jose Montes, Fertilizer and Pesticide Authority Executive Director
Norlito R. Gicana,17 and those from the Department of Budget and Management 18 having
invoked E.O. 464.
In the budget hearings set by the Senate on February 8 and 13, 2006, Press Secretary and
Presidential Spokesperson Ignacio R. Bunye,19 DOJ Secretary Raul M. Gonzalez20 and
Department of Interior and Local Government Undersecretary Marius P. Corpus 21 communicated
their inability to attend due to lack of appropriate clearance from the President pursuant to E.O.
464. During the February 13, 2005 budget hearing, however, Secretary Bunye was allowed to
attend by Executive Secretary Ermita.
On February 13, 2006, Jose Anselmo I. Cadiz and the incumbent members of the Board of
Governors of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines, as taxpayers, and the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines as the official organization of all Philippine lawyers, all invoking their constitutional
right to be informed on matters of public interest, filed their petition for certiorari and
prohibition, docketed as G.R. No. 171246, and pray that E.O. 464 be declared null and void.
All the petitions pray for the issuance of a Temporary Restraining Order enjoining respondents
from implementing, enforcing, and observing E.O. 464.
In the oral arguments on the petitions conducted on February 21, 2006, the following substantive
issues were ventilated: (1) whether respondents committed grave abuse of discretion in
implementing E.O. 464 prior to its publication in the Official Gazette or in a newspaper of
general circulation; and (2) whether E.O. 464 violates the following provisions of the
Constitution: Art. II, Sec. 28, Art. III, Sec. 4, Art. III, Sec. 7, Art. IV. Sec. 1, Art. VI, Sec. 21, Art.
VI, Sec. 22, Art. XI, Sec. 1, and Art. XIII, Sec. 16. The procedural issue of whether there is an
actual case or controversy that calls for judicial review was not taken up; instead, the parties
were instructed to discuss it in their respective memoranda.
After the conclusion of the oral arguments, the parties were directed to submit their respective
memoranda, paying particular attention to the following propositions: (1) that E.O. 464 is, on its
face, unconstitutional; and (2) assuming that it is not, it is unconstitutional as applied in four
instances, namely: (a) the so called Fertilizer scam; (b) the NorthRail investigation (c) the
Wiretapping activity of the ISAFP; and (d) the investigation on the Venable contract.22
Petitioners in G.R. No. 16966023 and G.R. No. 16977724 filed their memoranda on March 7,
2006, while those in G.R. No. 169667 25 and G.R. No. 16983426 filed theirs the next day or on
March 8, 2006. Petitioners in G.R. No. 171246 did not file any memorandum.
Petitioners Bayan Muna et al. in G.R. No. 169659, after their motion for extension to file
memorandum27 was granted, subsequently filed a manifestation28 dated March 14, 2006 that it
would no longer file its memorandum in the interest of having the issues resolved soonest,
prompting this Court to issue a Resolution reprimanding them.29
Petitioners submit that E.O. 464 violates the following constitutional provisions:
Art. VI, Sec. 2130

Art. VI, Sec. 2231
Art. VI, Sec. 132
Art. XI, Sec. 133
Art. III, Sec. 734
Art. III, Sec. 435
Art. XIII, Sec. 16 36
Art. II, Sec. 2837
Respondents Executive Secretary Ermita et al., on the other hand, pray in their consolidated
memorandum38 on March 13, 2006 for the dismissal of the petitions for lack of merit.
The Court synthesizes the issues to be resolved as follows:
1. Whether E.O. 464 contravenes the power of inquiry vested in Congress;
2. Whether E.O. 464 violates the right of the people to information on matters of public
concern; and
3. Whether respondents have committed grave abuse of discretion when they
implemented E.O. 464 prior to its publication in a newspaper of general circulation.
Essential requisites for judicial review
Before proceeding to resolve the issue of the constitutionality of E.O. 464, ascertainment of
whether the requisites for a valid exercise of the Courts power of judicial review are present is
in order.
Like almost all powers conferred by the Constitution, the power of judicial review is subject to
limitations, to wit: (1) there must be an actual case or controversy calling for the exercise of
judicial power; (2) the person challenging the act must have standing to challenge the validity of
the subject act or issuance; otherwise stated, he must have a personal and substantial interest in
the case such that he has sustained, or will sustain, direct injury as a result of its enforcement; (3)
the question of constitutionality must be raised at the earliest opportunity; and (4) the issue of
constitutionality must be the very lis mota of the case.39
Except with respect to the requisites of standing and existence of an actual case or controversy
where the disagreement between the parties lies, discussion of the rest of the requisites shall be
omitted.
Standing
Respondents, through the Solicitor General, assert that the allegations in G.R. Nos. 169659,
169660 and 169667 make it clear that they, adverting to the non-appearance of several officials
of the executive department in the investigations called by the different committees of the
Senate, were brought to vindicate the constitutional duty of the Senate or its different committees
to conduct inquiry in aid of legislation or in the exercise of its oversight functions. They maintain
that Representatives Ocampo et al. have not shown any specific prerogative, power, and privilege
of the House of Representatives which had been effectively impaired by E.O. 464, there being no
mention of any investigation called by the House of Representatives or any of its committees
which was aborted due to the implementation of E.O. 464.
As for Bayan Munas alleged interest as a party-list representing the marginalized and
underrepresented, and that of the other petitioner groups and individuals who profess to have
standing as advocates and defenders of the Constitution, respondents contend that such interest
falls short of that required to confer standing on them as parties "injured-in-fact."40
Respecting petitioner Chavez, respondents contend that Chavez may not claim an interest as a
taxpayer for the implementation of E.O. 464 does not involve the exercise of taxing or spending
power.41
With regard to the petition filed by the Senate, respondents argue that in the absence of a
personal or direct injury by reason of the issuance of E.O. 464, the Senate and its individual
members are not the proper parties to assail the constitutionality of E.O. 464.
Invoking this Courts ruling in National Economic Protectionism Association v. Ongpin 42 and
Valmonte v. Philippine Charity Sweepstakes Office, 43 respondents assert that to be considered a
proper party, one must have a personal and substantial interest in the case, such that he has
sustained or will sustain direct injury due to the enforcement of E.O. 464.44
That the Senate of the Philippines has a fundamental right essential not only for intelligent public
decision-making in a democratic system, but more especially for sound legislation 45 is not
disputed. E.O. 464, however, allegedly stifles the ability of the members of Congress to access
information that is crucial to law-making.46 Verily, the Senate, including its individual members,
has a substantial and direct interest over the outcome of the controversy and is the proper party to
assail the constitutionality of E.O. 464. Indeed, legislators have standing to maintain inviolate the
prerogative, powers and privileges vested by the Constitution in their office and are allowed to
sue to question the validity of any official action which they claim infringes their prerogatives as
legislators.47
In the same vein, party-list representatives Satur Ocampo (Bayan Muna), Teodoro Casino (Bayan
Muna), Joel Virador (Bayan Muna), Crispin Beltran (Anakpawis), Rafael Mariano (Anakpawis),
and Liza Maza (Gabriela) are allowed to sue to question the constitutionality of E.O. 464, the
absence of any claim that an investigation called by the House of Representatives or any of its
committees was aborted due to the implementation of E.O. 464 notwithstanding, it being
sufficient that a claim is made that E.O. 464 infringes on their constitutional rights and duties as
members of Congress to conduct investigation in aid of legislation and conduct oversight
functions in the implementation of laws.
The national political party, Bayan Muna, likewise meets the standing requirement as it obtained
three seats in the House of Representatives in the 2004 elections and is, therefore, entitled to
participate in the legislative process consonant with the declared policy underlying the party list
system of affording citizens belonging to marginalized and underrepresented sectors,
organizations and parties who lack well-defined political constituencies to contribute to the
formulation and enactment of legislation that will benefit the nation.48
As Bayan Muna and Representatives Ocampo et al. have the standing to file their petitions,
passing on the standing of their co-petitioners Courage and Codal is rendered unnecessary.49
In filing their respective petitions, Chavez, the ALG which claims to be an organization of
citizens, and the incumbent members of the IBP Board of Governors and the IBP in behalf of its
lawyer members,50 invoke their constitutional right to information on matters of public concern,
asserting that the right to information, curtailed and violated by E.O. 464, is essential to the
effective exercise of other constitutional rights51 and to the maintenance of the balance of power
among the three branches of the government through the principle of checks and balances.52
It is well-settled that when suing as a citizen, the interest of the petitioner in assailing the
constitutionality of laws, presidential decrees, orders, and other regulations, must be direct and
personal. In Franciso v. House of Representatives, 53 this Court held that when the proceeding
involves the assertion of a public right, the mere fact that he is a citizen satisfies the requirement
of personal interest.
As for petitioner PDP-Laban, it asseverates that it is clothed with legal standing in view of the
transcendental issues raised in its petition which this Court needs to resolve in order to avert a
constitutional crisis. For it to be accorded standing on the ground of transcendental importance,
however, it must establish (1) the character of the funds (that it is public) or other assets involved
in the case, (2) the presence of a clear case of disregard of a constitutional or statutory
prohibition by the public respondent agency or instrumentality of the government, and (3) the
lack of any party with a more direct and specific interest in raising the questions being
raised.54 The first and last determinants not being present as no public funds or assets are
involved and petitioners in G.R. Nos. 169777 and 169659 have direct and specific interests in the
resolution of the controversy, petitioner PDP-Laban is bereft of standing to file its petition. Its
allegation that E.O. 464 hampers its legislative agenda is vague and uncertain, and at best is only
a "generalized interest" which it shares with the rest of the political parties. Concrete injury,
whether actual or threatened, is that indispensable element of a dispute which serves in part to
cast it in a form traditionally capable of judicial resolution. 55 In fine, PDP-Labans alleged
interest as a political party does not suffice to clothe it with legal standing.
Actual Case or Controversy
Petitioners assert that an actual case exists, they citing the absence of the executive officials
invited by the Senate to its hearings after the issuance of E.O. 464, particularly those on the
NorthRail project and the wiretapping controversy.
Respondents counter that there is no case or controversy, there being no showing that President
Arroyo has actually withheld her consent or prohibited the appearance of the invited
officials.56 These officials, they claim, merely communicated to the Senate that they have not yet
secured the consent of the President, not that the President prohibited their
attendance.57 Specifically with regard to the AFP officers who did not attend the hearing on
September 28, 2005, respondents claim that the instruction not to attend without the Presidents
consent was based on its role as Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces, not on E.O. 464.
Respondents thus conclude that the petitions merely rest on an unfounded apprehension that the
President will abuse its power of preventing the appearance of officials before Congress, and that
such apprehension is not sufficient for challenging the validity of E.O. 464.
The Court finds respondents assertion that the President has not withheld her consent or
prohibited the appearance of the officials concerned immaterial in determining the existence of
an actual case or controversy insofar as E.O. 464 is concerned. For E.O. 464 does not require
either a deliberate withholding of consent or an express prohibition issuing from the President in
order to bar officials from appearing before Congress.
As the implementation of the challenged order has already resulted in the absence of officials
invited to the hearings of petitioner Senate of the Philippines, it would make no sense to wait for
any further event before considering the present case ripe for adjudication. Indeed, it would be
sheer abandonment of duty if this Court would now refrain from passing on the constitutionality
of E.O. 464.
Constitutionality of E.O. 464
E.O. 464, to the extent that it bars the appearance of executive officials before Congress,
deprives Congress of the information in the possession of these officials. To resolve the question
of whether such withholding of information violates the Constitution, consideration of the
general power of Congress to obtain information, otherwise known as the power of inquiry, is in
order.
The power of inquiry
The Congress power of inquiry is expressly recognized in Section 21 of Article VI of the
SECTION 21. The Senate or the House of Representatives or any of its respective committees
may conduct inquiries in aid of legislation in accordance with its duly published rules of
procedure. The rights of persons appearing in or affected by such inquiries shall be respected.
(Underscoring supplied)
This provision is worded exactly as Section 8 of Article VIII of the 1973 Constitution except
that, in the latter, it vests the power of inquiry in the unicameral legislature established therein
the Batasang Pambansa and its committees.
The 1935 Constitution did not contain a similar provision. Nonetheless, in Arnault v.
Nazareno,58 a case decided in 1950 under that Constitution, the Court already recognized that the
power of inquiry is inherent in the power to legislate.
Arnault involved a Senate investigation of the reportedly anomalous purchase of the Buenavista
and Tambobong Estates by the Rural Progress Administration. Arnault, who was considered a
leading witness in the controversy, was called to testify thereon by the Senate. On account of his
refusal to answer the questions of the senators on an important point, he was, by resolution of the
Senate, detained for contempt. Upholding the Senates power to punish Arnault for contempt,
this Court held:
Although there is no provision in the Constitution expressly investing either House of Congress
with power to make investigations and exact testimony to the end that it may exercise its
legislative functions advisedly and effectively, such power is so far incidental to the legislative
function as to be implied. In other words, the power of inquiry with process to enforce it is an
essential and appropriate auxiliary to the legislative function. A legislative body cannot legislate
wisely or effectively in the absence of information respecting the conditions which the legislation
is intended to affect or change; and where the legislative body does not itself possess the
requisite information which is not infrequently true recourse must be had to others who do
possess it. Experience has shown that mere requests for such information are often unavailing,
and also that information which is volunteered is not always accurate or complete; so some
means of compulsion is essential to obtain what is needed. 59 . . . (Emphasis and underscoring
supplied)
That this power of inquiry is broad enough to cover officials of the executive branch may be
deduced from the same case. The power of inquiry, the Court therein ruled, is co-extensive with
the power to legislate.60 The matters which may be a proper subject of legislation and those
which may be a proper subject of investigation are one. It follows that the operation of
government, being a legitimate subject for legislation, is a proper subject for investigation.
Thus, the Court found that the Senate investigation of the government transaction involved in
Arnault was a proper exercise of the power of inquiry. Besides being related to the expenditure
of public funds of which Congress is the guardian, the transaction, the Court held, "also involved
government agencies created by Congress and officers whose positions it is within the power of
Congress to regulate or even abolish."
Since Congress has authority to inquire into the operations of the executive branch, it would be
incongruous to hold that the power of inquiry does not extend to executive officials who are the
most familiar with and informed on executive operations.
As discussed in Arnault, the power of inquiry, "with process to enforce it," is grounded on the
necessity of information in the legislative process. If the information possessed by executive
officials on the operation of their offices is necessary for wise legislation on that subject, by
parity of reasoning, Congress has the right to that information and the power to compel the
disclosure thereof.
As evidenced by the American experience during the so-called "McCarthy era," however, the
right of Congress to conduct inquiries in aid of legislation is, in theory, no less susceptible to
abuse than executive or judicial power. It may thus be subjected to judicial review pursuant to
the Courts certiorari powers under Section 1, Article VIII of the Constitution.
For one, as noted in Bengzon v. Senate Blue Ribbon Committee, 61 the inquiry itself might not
properly be in aid of legislation, and thus beyond the constitutional power of Congress. Such
inquiry could not usurp judicial functions. Parenthetically, one possible way for Congress to
avoid such a result as occurred in Bengzon is to indicate in its invitations to the public officials
concerned, or to any person for that matter, the possible needed statute which prompted the need
for the inquiry. Given such statement in its invitations, along with the usual indication of the
subject of inquiry and the questions relative to and in furtherance thereof, there would be less
room for speculation on the part of the person invited on whether the inquiry is in aid of
legislation.
Section 21, Article VI likewise establishes crucial safeguards that proscribe the legislative power
of inquiry. The provision requires that the inquiry be done in accordance with the Senate or
Houses duly published rules of procedure, necessarily implying the constitutional infirmity of an
inquiry conducted without duly published rules of procedure. Section 21 also mandates that the
rights of persons appearing in or affected by such inquiries be respected, an imposition that
obligates Congress to adhere to the guarantees in the Bill of Rights.
These abuses are, of course, remediable before the courts, upon the proper suit filed by the
persons affected, even if they belong to the executive branch. Nonetheless, there may be
exceptional circumstances, none appearing to obtain at present, wherein a clear pattern of abuse
of the legislative power of inquiry might be established, resulting in palpable violations of the
rights guaranteed to members of the executive department under the Bill of Rights. In such
instances, depending on the particulars of each case, attempts by the Executive Branch to
forestall these abuses may be accorded judicial sanction.
Even where the inquiry is in aid of legislation, there are still recognized exemptions to the power
of inquiry, which exemptions fall under the rubric of "executive privilege." Since this term
figures prominently in the challenged order, it being mentioned in its provisions, its preambular
clauses,62 and in its very title, a discussion of executive privilege is crucial for determining the
constitutionality of E.O. 464.
Executive privilege
The phrase "executive privilege" is not new in this jurisdiction. It has been used even prior to the
promulgation of the 1986 Constitution.63 Being of American origin, it is best understood in light
of how it has been defined and used in the legal literature of the United States.
Schwartz defines executive privilege as "the power of the Government to withhold information
from the public, the courts, and the Congress." 64 Similarly, Rozell defines it as "the right of the
President and high-level executive branch officers to withhold information from Congress, the
courts, and ultimately the public."65
Executive privilege is, nonetheless, not a clear or unitary concept. 66 It has encompassed claims
of varying kinds.67 Tribe, in fact, comments that while it is customary to employ the phrase
"executive privilege," it may be more accurate to speak of executive privileges "since
presidential refusals to furnish information may be actuated by any of at least three distinct kinds
of considerations, and may be asserted, with differing degrees of success, in the context of either
judicial or legislative investigations."
One variety of the privilege, Tribe explains, is the state secrets privilege invoked by U.S.
Presidents, beginning with Washington, on the ground that the information is of such nature that
its disclosure would subvert crucial military or diplomatic objectives. Another variety is the
informers privilege, or the privilege of the Government not to disclose the identity of persons
who furnish information of violations of law to officers charged with the enforcement of that law.
Finally, a generic privilege for internal deliberations has been said to attach to intragovernmental
documents reflecting advisory opinions, recommendations and deliberations comprising part of a
process by which governmental decisions and policies are formulated. 68
Tribes comment is supported by the ruling in In re Sealed Case, thus:
Since the beginnings of our nation, executive officials have claimed a variety of privileges to
resist disclosure of information the confidentiality of which they felt was crucial to fulfillment of
the unique role and responsibilities of the executive branch of our government. Courts ruled
early that the executive had a right to withhold documents that might reveal military or state
secrets. The courts have also granted the executive a right to withhold the identity of government
informers in some circumstances and a qualified right to withhold information related to pending
investigations. x x x"69 (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
The entry in Blacks Law Dictionary on "executive privilege" is similarly instructive regarding
the scope of the doctrine.
This privilege, based on the constitutional doctrine of separation of powers, exempts the
executive from disclosure requirements applicable to the ordinary citizen or organization where
such exemption is necessary to the discharge of highly important executive responsibilities
involved in maintaining governmental operations, and extends not only to military and
diplomatic secrets but also to documents integral to an appropriate exercise of the executive
domestic decisional and policy making functions, that is, those documents reflecting the frank
expression
necessary
in
intra-governmental
advisory
and
deliberative
communications.70 (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
That a type of information is recognized as privileged does not, however, necessarily mean that it
would be considered privileged in all instances. For in determining the validity of a claim of
privilege, the question that must be asked is not only whether the requested information falls
within one of the traditional privileges, but also whether that privilege should be honored in a
given procedural setting.71
The leading case on executive privilege in the United States is U.S. v. Nixon, 72 decided in 1974.
In issue in that case was the validity of President Nixons claim of executive privilege against a
subpoena issued by a district court requiring the production of certain tapes and documents
relating to the Watergate investigations. The claim of privilege was based on the Presidents
general interest in the confidentiality of his conversations and correspondence. The U.S. Court
held that while there is no explicit reference to a privilege of confidentiality in the U.S.
Constitution, it is constitutionally based to the extent that it relates to the effective discharge of a
Presidents powers. The Court, nonetheless, rejected the Presidents claim of privilege, ruling
that the privilege must be balanced against the public interest in the fair administration of
criminal justice. Notably, the Court was careful to clarify that it was not there addressing the
issue of claims of privilege in a civil litigation or against congressional demands for information.
Cases in the U.S. which involve claims of executive privilege against Congress are
rare.73 Despite frequent assertion of the privilege to deny information to Congress, beginning
with President Washingtons refusal to turn over treaty negotiation records to the House of
Representatives, the U.S. Supreme Court has never adjudicated the issue. 74 However, the U.S.
Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit, in a case decided earlier in the same year
as Nixon, recognized the Presidents privilege over his conversations against a congressional
subpoena.75 Anticipating the balancing approach adopted by the U.S. Supreme Court in Nixon,
the Court of Appeals weighed the public interest protected by the claim of privilege against the
interest that would be served by disclosure to the Committee. Ruling that the balance favored the
President, the Court declined to enforce the subpoena. 76
In this jurisdiction, the doctrine of executive privilege was recognized by this Court in Almonte
v. Vasquez.77Almonte used the term in reference to the same privilege subject of Nixon. It quoted
the following portion of the Nixon decision which explains the basis for the privilege:
"The expectation of a President to the confidentiality of his conversations and correspondences,
like the claim of confidentiality of judicial deliberations, for example, has all the values to which
we accord deference for the privacy of all citizens and, added to those values, is the necessity for
protection of the public interest in candid, objective, and even blunt or harsh opinions in
Presidential decision-making. A President and those who assist him must be free to explore
alternatives in the process of shaping policies and making decisions and to do so in a way many
would be unwilling to express except privately. These are the considerations justifying a
presumptive privilege for Presidential communications. The privilege is fundamental to the
operation of government and inextricably rooted in the separation of powers under the
Constitution x x x " (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
Almonte involved a subpoena duces tecum issued by the Ombudsman against the therein
petitioners. It did not involve, as expressly stated in the decision, the right of the people to
information.78 Nonetheless, the Court recognized that there are certain types of information
which the government may withhold from the public, thus acknowledging, in substance if not in
name, that executive privilege may be claimed against citizens demands for information.
In Chavez v. PCGG,79 the Court held that this jurisdiction recognizes the common law holding
that there is a "governmental privilege against public disclosure with respect to state secrets
regarding military, diplomatic and other national security matters."80 The same case held that
closed-door Cabinet meetings are also a recognized limitation on the right to information.
Similarly, in Chavez v. Public Estates Authority,81 the Court ruled that the right to information
does not extend to matters recognized as "privileged information under the separation of
powers,"82 by which the Court meant Presidential conversations, correspondences, and
discussions in closed-door Cabinet meetings. It also held that information on military and
diplomatic secrets and those affecting national security, and information on investigations of
crimes by law enforcement agencies before the prosecution of the accused were exempted from
the right to information.
From the above discussion on the meaning and scope of executive privilege, both in the United
States and in this jurisdiction, a clear principle emerges. Executive privilege, whether asserted
against Congress, the courts, or the public, is recognized only in relation to certain types of
information of a sensitive character. While executive privilege is a constitutional concept, a claim
thereof may be valid or not depending on the ground invoked to justify it and the context in
which it is made. Noticeably absent is any recognition that executive officials are exempt from
the duty to disclose information by the mere fact of being executive officials. Indeed, the
extraordinary character of the exemptions indicates that the presumption inclines heavily against
executive secrecy and in favor of disclosure.
Validity of Section 1
Section 1 is similar to Section 3 in that both require the officials covered by them to secure the
consent of the President prior to appearing before Congress. There are significant differences
between the two provisions, however, which constrain this Court to discuss the validity of these
provisions separately.
Section 1 specifically applies to department heads. It does not, unlike Section 3, require a prior
determination by any official whether they are covered by E.O. 464. The President herself has,
through the challenged order, made the determination that they are. Further, unlike also Section
3, the coverage of department heads under Section 1 is not made to depend on the department
heads possession of any information which might be covered by executive privilege. In fact, in
marked contrast to Section 3 vis--vis Section 2, there is no reference to executive privilege at
all. Rather, the required prior consent under Section 1 is grounded on Article VI, Section 22 of
the Constitution on what has been referred to as the question hour.
SECTION 22. The heads of departments may upon their own initiative, with the consent of the
President, or upon the request of either House, as the rules of each House shall provide, appear
before and be heard by such House on any matter pertaining to their departments. Written
questions shall be submitted to the President of the Senate or the Speaker of the House of
Representatives at least three days before their scheduled appearance. Interpellations shall not be
limited to written questions, but may cover matters related thereto. When the security of the State
or the public interest so requires and the President so states in writing, the appearance shall be
conducted in executive session.
Determining the validity of Section 1 thus requires an examination of the meaning of Section 22
of Article VI. Section 22 which provides for the question hour must be interpreted vis--vis
Section 21 which provides for the power of either House of Congress to "conduct inquiries in aid
of legislation." As the following excerpt of the deliberations of the Constitutional Commission
shows, the framers were aware that these two provisions involved distinct functions of Congress.
MR. MAAMBONG. x x x When we amended Section 20 [now Section 22 on the Question
Hour] yesterday, I noticed that members of the Cabinet cannot be compelled anymore to appear
before the House of Representatives or before the Senate. I have a particular problem in this
regard, Madam President, because in our experience in the Regular Batasang Pambansa as the
Gentleman himself has experienced in the interim Batasang Pambansa one of the most
competent inputs that we can put in our committee deliberations, either in aid of legislation or in
congressional investigations, is the testimonies of Cabinet ministers. We usually invite them, but
if they do not come and it is a congressional investigation, we usually issue subpoenas.
I want to be clarified on a statement made by Commissioner Suarez when he said that the fact
that the Cabinet ministers may refuse to come to the House of Representatives or the Senate
[when requested under Section 22] does not mean that they need not come when they are invited
or subpoenaed by the committee of either House when it comes to inquiries in aid of legislation
or congressional investigation. According to Commissioner Suarez, that is allowed and their
presence can be had under Section 21. Does the gentleman confirm this, Madam President?
MR. DAVIDE. We confirm that, Madam President, because Section 20 refers only to what was
originally the Question Hour, whereas, Section 21 would refer specifically to inquiries in aid of
legislation, under which anybody for that matter, may be summoned and if he refuses, he can be
held in contempt of the House.83 (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
A distinction was thus made between inquiries in aid of legislation and the question hour. While
attendance was meant to be discretionary in the question hour, it was compulsory in inquiries in
aid of legislation. The reference to Commissioner Suarez bears noting, he being one of the
proponents of the amendment to make the appearance of department heads discretionary in the
question hour.
So clearly was this distinction conveyed to the members of the Commission that the Committee
on Style, precisely in recognition of this distinction, later moved the provision on question hour
from its original position as Section 20 in the original draft down to Section 31, far from the
provision on inquiries in aid of legislation. This gave rise to the following exchange during the
deliberations:
MR. GUINGONA. [speaking in his capacity as Chairman of the Committee on Style] We now
go, Mr. Presiding Officer, to the Article on Legislative and may I request the chairperson of the
Legislative Department, Commissioner Davide, to give his reaction.
THE PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. Jamir). Commissioner Davide is recognized.|avvphi|.net
MR. DAVIDE. Thank you, Mr. Presiding Officer. I have only one reaction to the Question Hour.
I propose that instead of putting it as Section 31, it should follow Legislative Inquiries.
THE PRESIDING OFFICER. What does the committee say?
MR. GUINGONA. I ask Commissioner Maambong to reply, Mr. Presiding Officer.
MR. MAAMBONG. Actually, we considered that previously when we sequenced this but we
reasoned that in Section 21, which is Legislative Inquiry, it is actually a power of Congress in
terms of its own lawmaking; whereas, a Question Hour is not actually a power in terms of its
own lawmaking power because in Legislative Inquiry, it is in aid of legislation. And so we put
Question Hour as Section 31. I hope Commissioner Davide will consider this.
MR. DAVIDE. The Question Hour is closely related with the legislative power, and it is
precisely as a complement to or a supplement of the Legislative Inquiry. The appearance of the
members of Cabinet would be very, very essential not only in the application of check and
balance but also, in effect, in aid of legislation.
MR. MAAMBONG. After conferring with the committee, we find merit in the suggestion of
Commissioner Davide. In other words, we are accepting that and so this Section 31 would now
become Section 22. Would it be, Commissioner Davide?
MR. DAVIDE. Yes.84 (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
Consistent with their statements earlier in the deliberations, Commissioners Davide and
Maambong proceeded from the same assumption that these provisions pertained to two different
functions of the legislature. Both Commissioners understood that the power to conduct inquiries
in aid of legislation is different from the power to conduct inquiries during the question hour.
Commissioner Davides only concern was that the two provisions on these distinct powers be
placed closely together, they being complementary to each other. Neither Commissioner
considered them as identical functions of Congress.
The foregoing opinion was not the two Commissioners alone. From the above-quoted exchange,
Commissioner Maambongs committee the Committee on Style shared the view that the two
provisions reflected distinct functions of Congress. Commissioner Davide, on the other hand,
was speaking in his capacity as Chairman of the Committee on the Legislative Department. His
views may thus be presumed as representing that of his Committee.
In the context of a parliamentary system of government, the "question hour" has a definite
meaning. It is a period of confrontation initiated by Parliament to hold the Prime Minister and
the other ministers accountable for their acts and the operation of the
government,85 corresponding to what is known in Britain as the question period. There was a
specific provision for a question hour in the 1973 Constitution 86 which made the appearance of
ministers mandatory. The same perfectly conformed to the parliamentary system established by
that Constitution, where the ministers are also members of the legislature and are directly
accountable to it.
An essential feature of the parliamentary system of government is the immediate accountability
of the Prime Minister and the Cabinet to the National Assembly. They shall be responsible to the
National Assembly for the program of government and shall determine the guidelines of national
policy. Unlike in the presidential system where the tenure of office of all elected officials cannot
be terminated before their term expired, the Prime Minister and the Cabinet remain in office only
as long as they enjoy the confidence of the National Assembly. The moment this confidence is
lost the Prime Minister and the Cabinet may be changed.87
The framers of the 1987 Constitution removed the mandatory nature of such appearance during
the question hour in the present Constitution so as to conform more fully to a system of
separation of powers.88 To that extent, the question hour, as it is presently understood in this
jurisdiction, departs from the question period of the parliamentary system. That department
heads may not be required to appear in a question hour does not, however, mean that the
legislature is rendered powerless to elicit information from them in all circumstances. In fact, in
light of the absence of a mandatory question period, the need to enforce Congress right to
executive information in the performance of its legislative function becomes more imperative. As
Schwartz observes:
Indeed, if the separation of powers has anything to tell us on the subject under discussion, it is
that the Congress has the right to obtain information from any source even from officials of
departments and agencies in the executive branch. In the United States there is, unlike the
situation which prevails in a parliamentary system such as that in Britain, a clear separation
between the legislative and executive branches. It is this very separation that makes the
congressional right to obtain information from the executive so essential, if the functions of the
Congress as the elected representatives of the people are adequately to be carried out. The
absence of close rapport between the legislative and executive branches in this country,
comparable to those which exist under a parliamentary system, and the nonexistence in the
Congress of an institution such as the British question period have perforce made reliance by the
Congress upon its right to obtain information from the executive essential, if it is intelligently to
perform its legislative tasks. Unless the Congress possesses the right to obtain executive
information, its power of oversight of administration in a system such as ours becomes a power
devoid of most of its practical content, since it depends for its effectiveness solely upon
information parceled out ex gratia by the executive.89 (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
Sections 21 and 22, therefore, while closely related and complementary to each other, should not
be considered as pertaining to the same power of Congress. One specifically relates to the power
to conduct inquiries in aid of legislation, the aim of which is to elicit information that may be
used for legislation, while the other pertains to the power to conduct a question hour, the
objective of which is to obtain information in pursuit of Congress oversight function.
When Congress merely seeks to be informed on how department heads are implementing the
statutes which it has issued, its right to such information is not as imperative as that of the
President to whom, as Chief Executive, such department heads must give a report of their
performance as a matter of duty. In such instances, Section 22, in keeping with the separation of
powers, states that Congress may only request their appearance. Nonetheless, when the inquiry in
which Congress requires their appearance is "in aid of legislation" under Section 21, the
appearance is mandatory for the same reasons stated in Arnault.90
In fine, the oversight function of Congress may be facilitated by compulsory process only to the
extent that it is performed in pursuit of legislation. This is consistent with the intent discerned
from the deliberations of the Constitutional Commission.
Ultimately, the power of Congress to compel the appearance of executive officials under Section
21 and the lack of it under Section 22 find their basis in the principle of separation of powers.
While the executive branch is a co-equal branch of the legislature, it cannot frustrate the power
of Congress to legislate by refusing to comply with its demands for information.
When Congress exercises its power of inquiry, the only way for department heads to exempt
themselves therefrom is by a valid claim of privilege. They are not exempt by the mere fact that
they are department heads. Only one executive official may be exempted from this power the
President on whom executive power is vested, hence, beyond the reach of Congress except
through the power of impeachment. It is based on her being the highest official of the executive
branch, and the due respect accorded to a co-equal branch of government which is sanctioned by
a long-standing custom.
By the same token, members of the Supreme Court are also exempt from this power of inquiry.
Unlike the Presidency, judicial power is vested in a collegial body; hence, each member thereof
is exempt on the basis not only of separation of powers but also on the fiscal autonomy and the
constitutional independence of the judiciary. This point is not in dispute, as even counsel for the
Senate, Sen. Joker Arroyo, admitted it during the oral argument upon interpellation of the Chief
Justice.
Having established the proper interpretation of Section 22, Article VI of the Constitution, the
Court now proceeds to pass on the constitutionality of Section 1 of E.O. 464.
Section 1, in view of its specific reference to Section 22 of Article VI of the Constitution and the
absence of any reference to inquiries in aid of legislation, must be construed as limited in its
application to appearances of department heads in the question hour contemplated in the
provision of said Section 22 of Article VI. The reading is dictated by the basic rule of
construction that issuances must be interpreted, as much as possible, in a way that will render it
constitutional.
The requirement then to secure presidential consent under Section 1, limited as it is only to
appearances in the question hour, is valid on its face. For under Section 22, Article VI of the
Constitution, the appearance of department heads in the question hour is discretionary on their
part.
Section 1 cannot, however, be applied to appearances of department heads in inquiries in aid of
legislation. Congress is not bound in such instances to respect the refusal of the department head
to appear in such inquiry, unless a valid claim of privilege is subsequently made, either by the
President herself or by the Executive Secretary.
Validity of Sections 2 and 3
Section 3 of E.O. 464 requires all the public officials enumerated in Section 2(b) to secure the
consent of the President prior to appearing before either house of Congress. The enumeration is
broad. It covers all senior officials of executive departments, all officers of the AFP and the PNP,
and all senior national security officials who, in the judgment of the heads of offices designated
in the same section (i.e. department heads, Chief of Staff of the AFP, Chief of the PNP, and the
National Security Adviser), are "covered by the executive privilege."
The enumeration also includes such other officers as may be determined by the President. Given
the title of Section 2 "Nature, Scope and Coverage of Executive Privilege" , it is evident
that under the rule of ejusdem generis, the determination by the President under this provision is
intended to be based on a similar finding of coverage under executive privilege.
En passant, the Court notes that Section 2(b) of E.O. 464 virtually states that executive privilege
actually covers persons. Such is a misuse of the doctrine. Executive privilege, as discussed
above, is properly invoked in relation to specific categories of information and not to categories
of persons.
In light, however, of Sec 2(a) of E.O. 464 which deals with the nature, scope and coverage of
executive privilege, the reference to persons being "covered by the executive privilege" may be
read as an abbreviated way of saying that the person is in possession of information which is, in
the judgment of the head of office concerned, privileged as defined in Section 2(a). The Court
shall thus proceed on the assumption that this is the intention of the challenged order.
Upon a determination by the designated head of office or by the President that an official is
"covered by the executive privilege," such official is subjected to the requirement that he first
secure the consent of the President prior to appearing before Congress. This requirement
effectively bars the appearance of the official concerned unless the same is permitted by the
President. The proviso allowing the President to give its consent means nothing more than that
the President may reverse a prohibition which already exists by virtue of E.O. 464.
Thus, underlying this requirement of prior consent is the determination by a head of office,
authorized by the President under E.O. 464, or by the President herself, that such official is in
possession of information that is covered by executive privilege. This determination then
becomes the basis for the officials not showing up in the legislative investigation.
In view thereof, whenever an official invokes E.O. 464 to justify his failure to be present, such
invocation must be construed as a declaration to Congress that the President, or a head of office
authorized by the President, has determined that the requested information is privileged, and that
the President has not reversed such determination. Such declaration, however, even without
mentioning the term "executive privilege," amounts to an implied claim that the information is
being withheld by the executive branch, by authority of the President, on the basis of executive
privilege. Verily, there is an implied claim of privilege.
The letter dated September 28, 2005 of respondent Executive Secretary Ermita to Senate
President Drilon illustrates the implied nature of the claim of privilege authorized by E.O. 464. It
reads:
In connection with the inquiry to be conducted by the Committee of the Whole regarding the
Northrail Project of the North Luzon Railways Corporation on 29 September 2005 at 10:00 a.m.,
please be informed that officials of the Executive Department invited to appear at the meeting
will not be able to attend the same without the consent of the President, pursuant to Executive
Order No. 464 (s. 2005), entitled "Ensuring Observance Of The Principle Of Separation Of
Powers, Adherence To The Rule On Executive Privilege And Respect For The Rights Of Public
Officials Appearing In Legislative Inquiries In Aid Of Legislation Under The Constitution, And
For Other Purposes". Said officials have not secured the required consent from the President.
(Underscoring supplied)
The letter does not explicitly invoke executive privilege or that the matter on which these
officials are being requested to be resource persons falls under the recognized grounds of the
privilege to justify their absence. Nor does it expressly state that in view of the lack of consent
from the President under E.O. 464, they cannot attend the hearing.
Significant premises in this letter, however, are left unstated, deliberately or not. The letter
assumes that the invited officials are covered by E.O. 464. As explained earlier, however, to be
covered by the order means that a determination has been made, by the designated head of office
or the President, that the invited official possesses information that is covered by executive
privilege. Thus, although it is not stated in the letter that such determination has been made, the
same must be deemed implied. Respecting the statement that the invited officials have not
secured the consent of the President, it only means that the President has not reversed the
standing prohibition against their appearance before Congress.
Inevitably, Executive Secretary Ermitas letter leads to the conclusion that the executive branch,
either through the President or the heads of offices authorized under E.O. 464, has made a
determination that the information required by the Senate is privileged, and that, at the time of
writing, there has been no contrary pronouncement from the President. In fine, an implied claim
of privilege has been made by the executive.
While there is no Philippine case that directly addresses the issue of whether executive privilege
may be invoked against Congress, it is gathered from Chavez v. PEA that certain information in
the possession of the executive may validly be claimed as privileged even against Congress.
Thus, the case holds:
There is no claim by PEA that the information demanded by petitioner is privileged information
rooted in the separation of powers. The information does not cover Presidential conversations,
correspondences, or discussions during closed-door Cabinet meetings which, like internaldeliberations of the Supreme Court and other collegiate courts, or executive sessions of either
house of Congress, are recognized as confidential. This kind of information cannot be pried open
by a co-equal branch of government. A frank exchange of exploratory ideas and assessments,
free from the glare of publicity and pressure by interested parties, is essential to protect the
independence of decision-making of those tasked to exercise Presidential, Legislative and
Judicial power. This is not the situation in the instant case. 91 (Emphasis and underscoring
supplied)
Section 3 of E.O. 464, therefore, cannot be dismissed outright as invalid by the mere fact that it
sanctions claims of executive privilege. This Court must look further and assess the claim of
privilege authorized by the Order to determine whether it is valid.
While the validity of claims of privilege must be assessed on a case to case basis, examining the
ground invoked therefor and the particular circumstances surrounding it, there is, in an implied
claim of privilege, a defect that renders it invalid per se. By its very nature, and as demonstrated
by the letter of respondent Executive Secretary quoted above, the implied claim authorized by
Section 3 of E.O. 464 is not accompanied by any specific allegation of the basis thereof (e.g.,
whether the information demanded involves military or diplomatic secrets, closed-door Cabinet
meetings, etc.). While Section 2(a) enumerates the types of information that are covered by the
privilege under the challenged order, Congress is left to speculate as to which among them is
being referred to by the executive. The enumeration is not even intended to be comprehensive,
but a mere statement of what is included in the phrase "confidential or classified information
between the President and the public officers covered by this executive order."
Certainly, Congress has the right to know why the executive considers the requested information
privileged. It does not suffice to merely declare that the President, or an authorized head of
office, has determined that it is so, and that the President has not overturned that determination.
Such declaration leaves Congress in the dark on how the requested information could be
classified as privileged. That the message is couched in terms that, on first impression, do not
seem like a claim of privilege only makes it more pernicious. It threatens to make Congress
doubly blind to the question of why the executive branch is not providing it with the information
that it has requested.
A claim of privilege, being a claim of exemption from an obligation to disclose information,
must, therefore, be clearly asserted. As U.S. v. Reynolds teaches:
The privilege belongs to the government and must be asserted by it; it can neither be claimed nor
waived by a private party. It is not to be lightly invoked. There must be a formal claim of
privilege, lodged by the head of the department which has control over the matter, after actual
personal consideration by that officer. The court itself must determine whether the circumstances
are appropriate for the claim of privilege, and yet do so without forcing a disclosure of the very
thing the privilege is designed to protect.92 (Underscoring supplied)
Absent then a statement of the specific basis of a claim of executive privilege, there is no way of
determining whether it falls under one of the traditional privileges, or whether, given the
circumstances in which it is made, it should be respected. 93 These, in substance, were the same
criteria in assessing the claim of privilege asserted against the Ombudsman in Almonte v.
Vasquez94 and, more in point, against a committee of the Senate in Senate Select Committee on
Presidential Campaign Activities v. Nixon.95
A.O. Smith v. Federal Trade Commission is enlightening:
[T]he lack of specificity renders an assessment of the potential harm resulting from disclosure
impossible, thereby preventing the Court from balancing such harm against plaintiffs needs to
determine whether to override any claims of privilege.96 (Underscoring supplied)
And so is U.S. v. Article of Drug:97
On the present state of the record, this Court is not called upon to perform this balancing
operation. In stating its objection to claimants interrogatories, government asserts, and nothing
more, that the disclosures sought by claimant would inhibit the free expression of opinion that
non-disclosure is designed to protect. The government has not shown nor even alleged that
those who evaluated claimants product were involved in internal policymaking, generally, or in
this particular instance. Privilege cannot be set up by an unsupported claim. The facts upon
which the privilege is based must be established. To find these interrogatories objectionable, this
Court would have to assume that the evaluation and classification of claimants products was a
matter of internal policy formulation, an assumption in which this Court is unwilling to indulge
sua sponte.98 (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
Mobil Oil Corp. v. Department of Energy99 similarly emphasizes that "an agency must provide
precise and certain reasons for preserving the confidentiality of requested information."
Black v. Sheraton Corp. of America100 amplifies, thus:
A formal and proper claim of executive privilege requires a specific designation and description
of the documents within its scope as well as precise and certain reasons for preserving their
confidentiality. Without this specificity, it is impossible for a court to analyze the claim short of
disclosure of the very thing sought to be protected. As the affidavit now stands, the Court has
little more than its sua sponte speculation with which to weigh the applicability of the claim. An
improperly asserted claim of privilege is no claim of privilege. Therefore, despite the fact that a
claim was made by the proper executive as Reynolds requires, the Court can not recognize the
claim in the instant case because it is legally insufficient to allow the Court to make a just and
reasonable determination as to its applicability. To recognize such a broad claim in which the
Defendant has given no precise or compelling reasons to shield these documents from outside
scrutiny, would make a farce of the whole procedure.101(Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
Due respect for a co-equal branch of government, moreover, demands no less than a claim of
privilege clearly stating the grounds therefor. Apropos is the following ruling in McPhaul v.
U.S:102
We think the Courts decision in United States v. Bryan, 339 U.S. 323, 70 S. Ct. 724, is highly
relevant to these questions. For it is as true here as it was there, that if (petitioner) had legitimate
reasons for failing to produce the records of the association, a decent respect for the House of
Representatives, by whose authority the subpoenas issued, would have required that (he) state
(his) reasons for noncompliance upon the return of the writ. Such a statement would have given
the Subcommittee an opportunity to avoid the blocking of its inquiry by taking other appropriate
steps to obtain the records. To deny the Committee the opportunity to consider the objection or
remedy is in itself a contempt of its authority and an obstruction of its processes. His failure to
make any such statement was "a patent evasion of the duty of one summoned to produce papers
before a congressional committee[, and] cannot be condoned." (Emphasis and underscoring
supplied; citations omitted)
Upon the other hand, Congress must not require the executive to state the reasons for the claim
with such particularity as to compel disclosure of the information which the privilege is meant to
protect.103 A useful analogy in determining the requisite degree of particularity would be the
privilege against self-incrimination. Thus, Hoffman v. U.S.104 declares:
The witness is not exonerated from answering merely because he declares that in so doing he
would incriminate himself his say-so does not of itself establish the hazard of incrimination. It
is for the court to say whether his silence is justified, and to require him to answer if it clearly
appears to the court that he is mistaken. However, if the witness, upon interposing his claim,
were required to prove the hazard in the sense in which a claim is usually required to be
established in court, he would be compelled to surrender the very protection which the privilege
is designed to guarantee. To sustain the privilege, it need only be evident from the implications
of the question, in the setting in which it is asked, that a responsive answer to the question or an
explanation of why it cannot be answered might be dangerous because injurious disclosure could
result." x x x (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
The claim of privilege under Section 3 of E.O. 464 in relation to Section 2(b) is thus invalid per
se. It is not asserted. It is merely implied. Instead of providing precise and certain reasons for the
claim, it merely invokes E.O. 464, coupled with an announcement that the President has not
given her consent. It is woefully insufficient for Congress to determine whether the withholding
of information is justified under the circumstances of each case. It severely frustrates the power
of inquiry of Congress.
In fine, Section 3 and Section 2(b) of E.O. 464 must be invalidated.
No infirmity, however, can be imputed to Section 2(a) as it merely provides guidelines, binding
only on the heads of office mentioned in Section 2(b), on what is covered by executive privilege.
It does not purport to be conclusive on the other branches of government. It may thus be
construed as a mere expression of opinion by the President regarding the nature and scope of
executive privilege.
Petitioners, however, assert as another ground for invalidating the challenged order the alleged
unlawful delegation of authority to the heads of offices in Section 2(b). Petitioner Senate of the
Philippines, in particular, cites the case of the United States where, so it claims, only the
President can assert executive privilege to withhold information from Congress.
Section 2(b) in relation to Section 3 virtually provides that, once the head of office determines
that a certain information is privileged, such determination is presumed to bear the Presidents
authority and has the effect of prohibiting the official from appearing before Congress, subject
only to the express pronouncement of the President that it is allowing the appearance of such
official. These provisions thus allow the President to authorize claims of privilege by mere
silence.
Such presumptive authorization, however, is contrary to the exceptional nature of the privilege.
Executive privilege, as already discussed, is recognized with respect to information the
confidential nature of which is crucial to the fulfillment of the unique role and responsibilities of
the executive branch,105 or in those instances where exemption from disclosure is necessary to the
discharge of highly important executive responsibilities. 106 The doctrine of executive privilege is
thus premised on the fact that certain informations must, as a matter of necessity, be kept
confidential in pursuit of the public interest. The privilege being, by definition, an exemption
from the obligation to disclose information, in this case to Congress, the necessity must be of
such high degree as to outweigh the public interest in enforcing that obligation in a particular
case.
In light of this highly exceptional nature of the privilege, the Court finds it essential to limit to
the President the power to invoke the privilege. She may of course authorize the Executive
Secretary to invoke the privilege on her behalf, in which case the Executive Secretary must state
that the authority is "By order of the President," which means that he personally consulted with
her. The privilege being an extraordinary power, it must be wielded only by the highest official in
the executive hierarchy. In other words, the President may not authorize her subordinates to
exercise such power. There is even less reason to uphold such authorization in the instant case
where the authorization is not explicit but by mere silence. Section 3, in relation to Section 2(b),
is further invalid on this score.
It follows, therefore, that when an official is being summoned by Congress on a matter which, in
his own judgment, might be covered by executive privilege, he must be afforded reasonable time
to inform the President or the Executive Secretary of the possible need for invoking the privilege.
This is necessary in order to provide the President or the Executive Secretary with fair
opportunity to consider whether the matter indeed calls for a claim of executive privilege. If,
after the lapse of that reasonable time, neither the President nor the Executive Secretary invokes
the privilege, Congress is no longer bound to respect the failure of the official to appear before
Congress and may then opt to avail of the necessary legal means to compel his appearance.
The Court notes that one of the expressed purposes for requiring officials to secure the consent of
the President under Section 3 of E.O. 464 is to ensure "respect for the rights of public officials
appearing in inquiries in aid of legislation." That such rights must indeed be respected by
Congress is an echo from Article VI Section 21 of the Constitution mandating that "[t]he rights
of persons appearing in or affected by such inquiries shall be respected."
In light of the above discussion of Section 3, it is clear that it is essentially an authorization for
implied claims of executive privilege, for which reason it must be invalidated. That such
authorization is partly motivated by the need to ensure respect for such officials does not change
the infirm nature of the authorization itself.
Right to Information
E.O 464 is concerned only with the demands of Congress for the appearance of executive
officials in the hearings conducted by it, and not with the demands of citizens for information
pursuant to their right to information on matters of public concern. Petitioners are not amiss in
claiming, however, that what is involved in the present controversy is not merely the legislative
power of inquiry, but the right of the people to information.
There are, it bears noting, clear distinctions between the right of Congress to information which
underlies the power of inquiry and the right of the people to information on matters of public
concern. For one, the demand of a citizen for the production of documents pursuant to his right
to information does not have the same obligatory force as a subpoena duces tecum issued by
Congress. Neither does the right to information grant a citizen the power to exact testimony from
government officials. These powers belong only to Congress and not to an individual citizen.
Thus, while Congress is composed of representatives elected by the people, it does not follow,
except in a highly qualified sense, that in every exercise of its power of inquiry, the people are
exercising their right to information.
To the extent that investigations in aid of legislation are generally conducted in public, however,
any executive issuance tending to unduly limit disclosures of information in such investigations
necessarily deprives the people of information which, being presumed to be in aid of legislation,
is presumed to be a matter of public concern. The citizens are thereby denied access to
information which they can use in formulating their own opinions on the matter before Congress
opinions which they can then communicate to their representatives and other government
officials through the various legal means allowed by their freedom of expression. Thus holds
Valmonte v. Belmonte:
It is in the interest of the State that the channels for free political discussion be maintained to the
end that the government may perceive and be responsive to the peoples will. Yet, this open
dialogue can be effective only to the extent that the citizenry is informed and thus able to
formulate its will intelligently. Only when the participants in the discussion are aware of the
issues and have access to information relating thereto can such bear fruit. 107(Emphasis and
underscoring supplied)
The impairment of the right of the people to information as a consequence of E.O. 464 is,
therefore, in the sense explained above, just as direct as its violation of the legislatures power of
inquiry.
Implementation of E.O. 464 prior to its publication
While E.O. 464 applies only to officials of the executive branch, it does not follow that the same
is exempt from the need for publication. On the need for publishing even those statutes that do
not directly apply to people in general, Taada v. Tuvera states:
The term "laws" should refer to all laws and not only to those of general application, for strictly
speaking all laws relate to the people in general albeit there are some that do not apply to them
directly. An example is a law granting citizenship to a particular individual, like a relative of
President Marcos who was decreed instant naturalization. It surely cannot be said that such a law
does not affect the public although it unquestionably does not apply directly to all the people.
The subject of such law is a matter of public interest which any member of the body politic may
question in the political forums or, if he is a proper party, even in courts of justice. 108 (Emphasis
and underscoring supplied)
Although the above statement was made in reference to statutes, logic dictates that the
challenged order must be covered by the publication requirement. As explained above, E.O. 464
has a direct effect on the right of the people to information on matters of public concern. It is,
therefore, a matter of public interest which members of the body politic may question before this
Court. Due process thus requires that the people should have been apprised of this issuance
before it was implemented.
Conclusion
Congress undoubtedly has a right to information from the executive branch whenever it is sought
in aid of legislation. If the executive branch withholds such information on the ground that it is
privileged, it must so assert it and state the reason therefor and why it must be respected.
The infirm provisions of E.O. 464, however, allow the executive branch to evade congressional
requests for information without need of clearly asserting a right to do so and/or proffering its
reasons therefor. By the mere expedient of invoking said provisions, the power of Congress to
conduct inquiries in aid of legislation is frustrated. That is impermissible. For
[w]hat republican theory did accomplishwas to reverse the old presumption in favor of
secrecy, based on the divine right of kings and nobles, and replace it with a presumption in favor
of publicity, based on the doctrine of popular sovereignty. (Underscoring supplied)109
Resort to any means then by which officials of the executive branch could refuse to divulge
information cannot be presumed valid. Otherwise, we shall not have merely nullified the power
of our legislature to inquire into the operations of government, but we shall have given up
something of much greater value our right as a people to take part in government.
WHEREFORE, the petitions are PARTLY GRANTED. Sections 2(b) and 3 of Executive Order
No. 464 (series of 2005), "Ensuring Observance of the Principle of Separation of Powers,
Adherence to the Rule on Executive
Privilege and Respect for the Rights of Public Officials Appearing in Legislative Inquiries in Aid
of Legislation Under the Constitution, and For Other Purposes," are declared VOID. Sections 1
and 2(a) are, however, VALID.
SO ORDERED.
EN BANC
B/GEN. (RET.) FRANCISCO V. G.R. No. 170165
GUDANI AND LT. COL.
ALEXANDER F. BALUTAN
Petitioners, Present:
PANGANIBAN, C.J.,
PUNO,
- versus - QUISUMBING,
YNARES-SANTIAGO,
SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ,
CARPIO,
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ,
LT./GEN. GENEROSO S. SENGA CORONA,
AS CHIEF OF STAFF OF THE CARPIO-MORALES,
ARMED FORCES OF THE CALLEJO, SR.,
PHILIPPINES, COL. GILBERTO AZCUNA,
JOSE C. ROA AS THE PRE-TRIAL TINGA,
INVESTIGATING OFFICER, THE CHICO-NAZARIO,
PROVOST MARSHALL GENERAL GARCIA, and
OF THE ARMED FORCES OF THE VELASCO, JR., JJ.
PHILIPPINES AND THE GENERAL
COURT-MARTIAL,
Respondents.
Promulgated:
August 15, 2006
x--------------------------------------------------------------------------- x
DECISION
TINGA, J.:
A
most
dangerous
general
proposition
is
foisted
on
the
Court
that soldiers who defy orders of their superior officers are exempt from the strictures of military
law and discipline if such defiance is predicated on an act otherwise valid under civilian law.
Obedience and deference to the military chain of command and the President as commander-inchief are the cornerstones of a professional military in the firm cusp of civilian control. These
values of obedience and deference expected of military officers are content-neutral, beyond the
sway of the officers own sense of what is prudent or rash, or more elementally, of right or wrong.
A self-righteous military invites itself as the scoundrels activist solution to the ills of
participatory democracy.
Petitioners seek the annulment of a directive from President Gloria MacapagalArroyo[1] enjoining them and other military officers from testifying before Congress without the
Presidents consent. Petitioners also pray for injunctive relief against a pending preliminary
investigation against them, in preparation for possible court-martial proceedings, initiated within
the military justice system in connection with petitioners violation of the aforementioned
directive.
The Court is cognizant that petitioners, in their defense, invoke weighty constitutional
principles that center on fundamental freedoms enshrined in the Bill of Rights. Although these
concerns will not be addressed to the satisfaction of petitioners, the Court recognizes these
values as of paramount importance to our civil society, even if not determinative of the resolution
of this petition. Had the relevant issue before us been the right of the Senate to compel the
testimony of petitioners, the constitutional questions raised by them would have come to fore.
Such a scenario could have very well been presented to the Court in such manner, without the
petitioners having had to violate a direct order from their commanding officer. Instead, the Court
has to resolve whether petitioners may be subjected to military discipline on account of their
defiance of a direct order of the AFP Chief of Staff.
The solicited writs of certiorari and prohibition do not avail; the petition must be denied.
I.
The petitioners are high-ranking officers of the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP). Both
petitioners, Brigadier General Francisco Gudani (Gen. Gudani) and Lieutenant Colonel
Alexander Balutan (Col. Balutan), belonged to the Philippine Marines. At the time of the subject
incidents, both Gen. Gudani and Col. Balutan were assigned to the Philippine Military Academy
(PMA) in Baguio City, the former as the PMA Assistant Superintendent, and the latter as the
Assistant Commandant of Cadets.
On 22 September 2005, Senator Rodolfo Biazon (Sen. Biazon) invited several senior officers of
the AFP to appear at a public hearing before the Senate Committee on National Defense and
Security (Senate Committee) scheduled on 28 September 2005. The hearing was scheduled after
topics concerning the conduct of the 2004 elections emerged in the public eye, particularly
allegations of massive cheating and the surfacing of copies of an audio excerpt purportedly of a
phone conversation between President Gloria Macapagal Arroyo and an official of the
Commission on Elections (COMELEC) widely reputed as then COMELEC Commissioner
Virgilio Garcillano. At the time of the 2004 elections, Gen. Gudani had been designated as
commander, and Col. Balutan a member, of Joint Task Force Ranao by the AFP Southern
Command. Joint Task Force Ranao was tasked with the maintenance of peace and order during
the 2004 elections in the provinces of Lanao del Norte and Lanao del Sur.[3] `
Gen. Gudani, Col. Balutan, and AFP Chief of Staff Lieutenant General Generoso Senga (Gen.
Senga) were among the several AFP officers who received a letter invitation from Sen. Biazon to
attend the 28 September 2005 hearing. On 23 September 2005, Gen. Senga replied through a
letter to Sen. Biazon that he would be unable to attend the hearing due to a previous commitment
in Brunei, but he nonetheless directed other officers from the AFP who were invited to attend the
hearing.[4]
On 26 September 2005, the Office of the Chief of Staff of the AFP issued a Memorandum
addressed to the Superintendent of the PMA Gen. Cristolito P. Baloing (Gen. Baloing). It was
signed by Lt. Col. Hernando DCA Iriberri in behalf of Gen. Senga. [5] Noting that Gen. Gudani
and Col. Balutan had been invited to attend the Senate Committee hearing on 28 September
2005, the Memorandum directed the two officers to attend the hearing. [6] Conformably, Gen.
Gudani and Col. Balutan filed their respective requests for travel authority addressed to the PMA
Superintendent.
On 27 September 2005, Gen. Senga wrote a letter to Sen. Biazon, requesting the postponement
of the hearing scheduled for the following day, since the AFP Chief of Staff was himself unable
to attend said hearing, and that some of the invited officers also could not attend as they were
attending to other urgent operational matters. By this time, both Gen. Gudani and Col. Balutan
had already departed Baguio forManila to attend the hearing.
Then on the evening of 27 September 2005, at around 10:10 p.m., a message was transmitted to
the PMA Superintendent from the office of Gen. Senga, stating as follows:
PER INSTRUCTION OF HER EXCELLENCY PGMA, NO AFP PERSONNEL SHALL
APPEAR BEFORE ANY CONGRESSIONAL OR SENATE HEARING WITHOUT HER
APPROVAL. INFORM BGEN FRANCISCO F GUDANI AFP AND LTC ALEXANDER
BALUTAN PA (GSC) ACCORDINGLY.[7]
The following day, Gen. Senga sent another letter to Sen. Biazon, this time informing the
senator that no approval has been granted by the President to any AFP officer to appear before
the hearing scheduled on that day. Nonetheless, both Gen. Gudani and Col. Balutan were present
as the hearing started, and they both testified as to the conduct of the 2004 elections.
The Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), representing the respondents before this Court, has
offered additional information surrounding the testimony of Gen. Gudani and Col. Balutan. The
OSG manifests that the couriers of the AFP Command Center had attempted to deliver the radio
message to Gen. Gudanis residence in a subdivision in Paraaque City late in the night of 27
September 2005, but they were not permitted entry by the subdivision guards. The next day, 28
September 2005, shortly before the start of the hearing, a copy of Gen. Sengas letter to Sen.
Biazon sent earlier that day was handed at the Senate by Commodore Amable B. Tolentino of the
AFP Office for Legislative Affairs to Gen. Gudani, who replied that he already had a
copy. Further, Gen. Senga called Commodore Tolentino on the latters cell phone and asked to
talk to Gen. Gudani, but Gen. Gudani refused. In response, Gen. Senga instructed Commodore
Tolentino to inform Gen. Gudani that it was an order, yet Gen. Gudani still refused to take Gen.
Sengas call.[8]
A few hours after Gen. Gudani and Col. Balutan had concluded their testimony, the office of
Gen. Senga issued a statement which noted that the two had appeared before the Senate
Committee in spite of the fact that a guidance has been given that a Presidential approval should
be sought prior to such an appearance; that such directive was in keeping with the
time[-]honored principle of the Chain of Command; and that the two officers disobeyed a legal
order, in violation of A[rticles of] W[ar] 65 (Willfully Disobeying Superior Officer), hence they
will be subjected to General Court Martial proceedings x x x Both Gen. Gudani and Col. Balutan
were likewise relieved of their assignments then.[9]
On the very day of the hearing, 28 September 2005, President Gloria-Macapagal-Arroyo issued
Executive Order No. 464 (E.O. 464). The OSG notes that the E.O. enjoined officials of the
executive department including the military establishment from appearing in any legislative
inquiry without her approval.[10] This Court subsequently ruled on the constitutionality of the said
executive order in Senate v. Ermita.[11]The relevance of E.O. 464 and Senate to the present
petition shall be discussed forthwith.
In the meantime, on 30 September 2005, petitioners were directed by General Senga, through
Col. Henry A. Galarpe of the AFP Provost Marshal General, to appear before the Office of the
Provost Marshal General (OPMG) on 3 October 2005 for investigation. During their appearance
before Col. Galarpe, both petitioners invoked their right to remain silent. [12] The following day,
Gen. Gudani was compulsorily retired from military service, having reached the age of 56.[13]
In an Investigation Report dated 6 October 2005, the OPMG recommended that
petitioners be charged with violation of Article of War 65, on willfully disobeying a superior
officer, in relation to Article of War 97, on conduct prejudicial to the good order and military
discipline.[14] As recommended, the case was referred to a Pre-Trial Investigation Officer (PTIO)
preparatory to trial by the General Court Martial (GCM).[15] Consequently, on 24 October 2005,
petitioners were separately served with Orders respectively addressed to them and signed by
respondent Col. Gilbert Jose C. Roa, the Pre-Trial Investigating Officer of the PTIO. The Orders
directed petitioners to appear in person before Col. Roa at the Pre-Trial Investigation of the
Charges for violation of Articles 65[16] and 97[17] of Commonwealth Act No. 408,[18] and to submit
their counter-affidavits and affidavits of witnesses at the Office of the Judge Advocate General.
[19]
The Orders were accompanied by respective charge sheets against petitioners, accusing them
of violating Articles of War 65 and 97.
It was from these premises that the present petition for certiorari and prohibition was
filed, particularly seeking that (1) the order of President Arroyo coursed through Gen. Senga
preventing petitioners from testifying before Congress without her prior approval be declared
unconstitutional; (2) the charges stated in the charge sheets against petitioners be quashed; and
(3) Gen. Senga, Col. Galarpe, Col. Roa, and their successors-in-interest or persons acting for and
on their behalf or orders, be permanently enjoined from proceeding against petitioners, as a

consequence of their having testified before the Senate on 28 September 2005.[20]
Petitioners characterize the directive from President Arroyo requiring her prior approval before
any AFP personnel appear before Congress as a gag order, which violates the principle of
separation of powers in government as it interferes with the investigation of the Senate
Committee conducted in aid of legislation. They also equate the gag order with culpable
violation of the Constitution, particularly in relation to the publics constitutional right to
information and transparency in matters of public concern. Plaintively, petitioners claim that the
Filipino people have every right to hear the [petitioners] testimonies, and even if the gag order
were unconstitutional, it still was tantamount to the crime of obstruction of justice. Petitioners
further argue that there was no law prohibiting them from testifying before the Senate, and in
fact, they were appearing in obeisance to the authority of Congress to conduct inquiries in aid of
legislation.
Finally, it is stressed in the petition that Gen. Gudani was no longer subject to military
jurisdiction on account of his compulsory retirement on 4 October 2005. It is pointed out that
Article 2, Title I of the Articles of War defines persons subject to military law as all officers and
soldiers in the active service of the AFP.
II.
We first proceed to define the proper litigable issues. Notably, the guilt or innocence of
petitioners in violating Articles 65 and 97 of the Articles of War is not an issue before this Court,
especially considering that per records, petitioners have not yet been subjected to court martial
proceedings. Owing to the absence of such proceedings, the correct inquiry should be limited to
whether respondents could properly initiate such proceedings preparatory to a formal courtmartial, such as the aforementioned preliminary investigation, on the basis of petitioners acts
surrounding their testimony before the Senate on 28 September 2005. Yet this Court, consistent
with the principle that it is not a trier of facts at first instance, [21] is averse to making any
authoritative findings of fact, for that function is first for the court-martial court to fulfill.
Thus, we limit ourselves to those facts that are not controverted before the Court, having been
commonly alleged by petitioners and the OSG (for respondents). Petitioners were called by the
Senate Committee to testify in its 28 September 2005 hearing. Petitioners attended such hearing
and testified before the Committee, despite the fact that the day before, there was an order from
Gen. Senga (which in turn was sourced per instruction from President Arroyo) prohibiting them
from testifying without the prior approval of the President. Petitioners do not precisely admit
before this Court that they had learned of such order prior to their testimony, although the OSG
asserts that at the very least, Gen. Gudani already knew of such order before he testified. [22] Yet
while this fact may be ultimately material in the court-martial proceedings, it is not determinative
of this petition, which as stated earlier, does not proffer as an issue whether petitioners are guilty
of violating the Articles of War.
What the Court has to consider though is whether the violation of the aforementioned order of
Gen. Senga, which emanated from the President, could lead to any investigation for court-martial
of petitioners. It has to be acknowledged as a general principle [23] that AFP personnel of whatever
rank are liable under military law for violating a direct order of an officer superior in rank.
Whether petitioners did violate such an order is not for the Court to decide, but it will be
necessary to assume, for the purposes of this petition, that petitioners did so.
III.
Preliminarily, we must discuss the effect of E.O. 464 and the Courts ruling in Senate on the
present petition. Notably, it is not alleged that petitioners were in any way called to task for
violating E.O. 464, but instead, they were charged for violating the direct order of Gen.
Senga not to appear before the Senate Committee, an order that stands independent of the
executive order. Distinctions are called for, since Section 2(b) of E.O. 464 listed generals and
flag officers of the Armed Forces of the Philippines and such other officers who in the judgment
of the Chief of Staff are covered by the executive privilege, as among those public officials
required in Section 3 of E.O. 464 to secure prior consent of the President prior to appearing
before either House of Congress. The Court in Senate declared both Section 2(b) and Section 3
void,[24] and the impression may have been left following Senate that it settled as doctrine, that
the President is prohibited from requiring military personnel from attending congressional
hearings without having first secured prior presidential consent. That impression is wrong.
Senate turned on the nature of executive privilege, a presidential prerogative which is
encumbered by significant limitations. Insofar as E.O. 464 compelled officials of the executive
branch to seek prior presidential approval before appearing before Congress, the notion of
executive control also comes into consideration.[25] However, the ability of the President to
require a military official to secure prior consent before appearing before Congress pertains to a
wholly different and independent specie of presidential authoritythe commander-in-chief powers
of the President. By tradition and jurisprudence, the commander-in-chief powers of the President
are not encumbered by the same degree of restriction as that which may attach to executive
privilege or executive control.
During the deliberations in Senate, the Court was very well aware of the pendency of this
petition as well as the issues raised herein. The decision in Senate was rendered with the comfort
that the nullification of portions of E.O. 464 would bear no impact on the present petition since
petitioners herein were not called to task for violating the executive order. Moreover, the Court
was then cognizant that Senate and this case would ultimately hinge on disparate legal issues.
Relevantly, Senate purposely did not touch upon or rule on the faculty of the President, under the
aegis of the commander-in-chief powers[26] to require military officials from securing prior
consent before appearing before Congress. The pertinent factors in considering that question are
markedly outside of those which did become relevant in adjudicating the issues raised in Senate.
It is in this petition that those factors come into play.
At this point, we wish to dispose of another peripheral issue before we strike at the heart of the
matter. General Gudani argues that he can no longer fall within the jurisdiction of the courtmartial, considering his retirement last 4 October 2005. He cites Article 2, Title I of
Commonwealth Act No. 408, which defines persons subject to military law as, among others, all
officers and soldiers in the active service of the [AFP], and points out that he is no longer in the
active service.
This point was settled against Gen. Gudanis position in Abadilla v. Ramos,[27] where the
Court declared that an officer whose name was dropped from the roll of officers cannot be
considered to be outside the jurisdiction of military authorities when military justice proceedings
were initiated against him before the termination of his service. Once jurisdiction has been
acquired over the officer, it continues until his case is terminated. Thus, the Court held:
The military authorities had jurisdiction over the person of Colonel
Abadilla at the time of the alleged offenses. This jurisdiction having been vested
in the military authorities, it is retained up to the end of the proceedings against
Colonel Abadilla. Well-settled is the rule that jurisdiction once acquired is not lost
upon the instance of the parties but continues until the case is terminated.[28]
Citing Colonel Winthrops treatise on Military Law, the Court further stated:
We have gone through the treatise of Colonel Winthrop and We find the
following passage which goes against the contention of the petitioners, viz
3. Offenders in general Attaching of jurisdiction. It has
further been held, and is now settled law, in regard to military
offenders in general, that if the military jurisdiction has once
duly attached to them previous to the date of the termination of
their legal period of service, they may be brought to trial by courtmartial after that date, their discharge being meanwhile withheld.
This principle has mostly been applied to cases where the offense
was committed just prior to the end of the term. In such cases the
interests of discipline clearly forbid that the offender should go
unpunished. It is held therefore that if before the day on which
his service legally terminates and his right to a discharge is
complete, proceedings with a view to trial are commenced
against him as by arrest or the service of charges, the military
jurisdiction will fully attach and once attached may be
continued by a trial by court-martial ordered and held after
the end of the term of the enlistment of the accused x x x [29]
Thus, military jurisdiction has fully attached to Gen. Gudani inasmuch as both the acts
complained of and the initiation of the proceedings against him occurred before he compulsorily
retired on 4 October 2005. We see no reason to unsettle the Abadilla doctrine. The OSG also
points out that under Section 28 of Presidential Decree No. 1638, as amended, [a]n officer or
enlisted man carried in the retired list [of the Armed Forces of the Philippines] shall be subject to
the Articles of War x x x[30] To this citation, petitioners do not offer any response, and in fact have
excluded the matter of Gen. Gudanis retirement as an issue in their subsequent memorandum.
IV.
We now turn to the central issues.
Petitioners wish to see annulled the gag order that required them to secure presidential consent
prior to their appearance before the Senate, claiming that it violates the constitutional right to
information and transparency in matters of public concern; or if not, is tantamount at least to the
criminal acts of obstruction of justice and grave coercion. However, the proper perspective from
which to consider this issue entails the examination of the basis and authority of the President to
issue such an order in the first place to members of the AFP and the determination of whether
such an order is subject to any limitations.
The vitality of the tenet that the President is the commander-in-chief of the Armed Forces is most
crucial to the democratic way of life, to civilian supremacy over the military, and to the general
stability of our representative system of government. The Constitution reposes final authority,
control and supervision of the AFP to the President, a civilian who is not a member of the armed
forces, and whose duties as commander-in-chief represent only a part of the organic duties
imposed upon the office, the other functions being clearly civil in nature. [31] Civilian supremacy
over the military also countermands the notion that the military may bypass civilian authorities,
such as civil courts, on matters such as conducting warrantless searches and seizures.[32]
Pursuant to the maintenance of civilian supremacy over the military, the Constitution has
allocated specific roles to the legislative and executive branches of government in relation to
military affairs. Military appropriations, as with all other appropriations, are determined by
Congress, as is the power to declare the existence of a state of war. [33] Congress is also
empowered to revoke a proclamation of martial law or the suspension of the writ of habeas
corpus.[34] The approval of the Commission on Appointments is also required before the
President can promote military officers from the rank of colonel or naval captain. [35] Otherwise,
on the particulars of civilian dominance and administration over the military, the Constitution is
silent, except for the commander-in-chief clause which is fertile in meaning and implication as to
whatever inherent martial authority the President may possess.[36]
The commander-in-chief provision in the Constitution is denominated as Section 18,
Article VII, which begins with the simple declaration that [t]he President shall be the
Commander-in-Chief of all armed forces of the Philippines x x x [37] Outside explicit
constitutional limitations, such as those found in Section 5, Article XVI, the commander-in-chief
clause vests on the President, as commander-in-chief, absolute authority over the persons and
actions of the members of the armed forces. Such authority includes the ability of the President
to restrict the travel, movement and speech of military officers, activities which may otherwise
be sanctioned under civilian law.
Reference to Kapunan, Jr. v. De Villa[38] is useful in this regard. Lt. Col. Kapunan was
ordered confined under house arrest by then Chief of Staff (later President) Gen. Fidel Ramos.
Kapunan was also ordered, as a condition for his house arrest, that he may not issue any press
statements or give any press conference during his period of detention. The Court unanimously
upheld such restrictions, noting:
[T]he Court is of the view that such is justified by the requirements of military
discipline. It cannot be gainsaid that certain liberties of persons in the military service,
including the freedom of speech, may be circumscribed by rules of military discipline.
Thus, to a certain degree, individual rights may be curtailed, because the effectiveness of
the military in fulfilling its duties under the law depends to a large extent on the
maintenance of discipline within its ranks. Hence, lawful orders must be followed without
question and rules must be faithfully complied with, irrespective of a soldier's personal
views on the matter. It is from this viewpoint that the restrictions imposed on petitioner
Kapunan, an officer in the AFP, have to be considered.[39]
Any good soldier, or indeed any ROTC cadet, can attest to the fact that the military way of life
circumscribes several of the cherished freedoms of civilian life. It is part and parcel of the
military package. Those who cannot abide by these limitations normally do not pursue a military
career and instead find satisfaction in other fields; and in fact many of those discharged from the
service are inspired in their later careers precisely by their rebellion against the regimentation of
military life. Inability or unwillingness to cope with military discipline is not a stain on character,
for the military mode is a highly idiosyncratic path which persons are not generally conscripted
into, but volunteer themselves to be part of. But for those who do make the choice to be a soldier,
significant concessions to personal freedoms are expected. After all, if need be, the men and
women of the armed forces may be commanded upon to die for country, even against their
personal inclinations.
It may be so that military culture is a remnant of a less democratic era, yet it has been fully
integrated into the democratic system of governance. The constitutional role of the armed forces
is as protector of the people and of the State.[40] Towards this end, the military must insist upon a
respect for duty and a discipline without counterpart in civilian life. [41] The laws and traditions
governing that discipline have a long history; but they are founded on unique military exigencies
as powerful now as in the past.[42] In the end, it must be borne in mind that the armed forces has a
distinct subculture with unique needs, a specialized society separate from civilian society. [43] In
the elegant prose of the eminent British military historian, John Keegan:
[Warriors who fight wars have] values and skills [which] are not those of
politicians and diplomats. They are those of a world apart, a very ancient world,
which exists in parallel with the everyday world but does not belong to it. Both
worlds change over time, and the warrior world adopts in step to the civilian. It
follows it, however, at a distance. The distance can never be closed, for the
culture of the warrior can never be that of civilization itself.[44]
Critical to military discipline is obeisance to the military chain of command. Willful
disobedience of a superior officer is punishable by court-martial under Article 65 of the Articles
of War.[45] An individual soldier is not free to ignore the lawful orders or duties assigned by his
immediate superiors. For there would be an end of all discipline if the seaman and marines on
board a ship of war [or soldiers deployed in the field], on a distant service, were permitted to
act upon their own opinion of their rights [or their opinion of the Presidents intent], and to throw
off the authority of the commander whenever they supposed it to be unlawfully exercised.[46]
Further traditional restrictions on members of the armed forces are those imposed on free speech
and mobility. Kapunan is ample precedent in justifying that a soldier may be restrained by a
superior officer from speaking out on certain matters. As a general rule, the discretion of a
military officer to restrain the speech of a soldier under his/her command will be accorded
deference, with minimal regard if at all to the reason for such restraint. It is integral to military
discipline that the soldiers speech be with the consent and approval of the military commander.
The necessity of upholding the ability to restrain speech becomes even more imperative if the
soldier desires to speak freely on political matters. The Constitution requires that [t]he armed
forces shall be insulated from partisan politics, and that [n]o member of the military shall engage
directly or indirectly in any partisan political activity, except to vote. [47] Certainly, no
constitutional provision or military indoctrination will eliminate a soldiers ability to form a
personal political opinion, yet it is vital that such opinions be kept out of the public eye. For one,
political belief is a potential source of discord among people, and a military torn by political
strife is incapable of fulfilling its constitutional function as protectors of the people and of the
State. For another, it is ruinous to military discipline to foment an atmosphere that promotes an
active dislike of or dissent against the President, the commander-in-chief of the armed forces.
Soldiers are constitutionally obliged to obey a President they may dislike or distrust. This
fundamental principle averts the country from going the way of banana republics.
Parenthetically, it must be said that the Court is well aware that our countrys recent past is
marked by regime changes wherein active military dissent from the chain of command formed a
key, though not exclusive, element. The Court is not blind to history, yet it is a judge not of
history but of the Constitution. The Constitution, and indeed our modern democratic order, frown
in no uncertain terms on a politicized military, informed as they are on the trauma of absolute
martial rule. Our history might imply that a political military is part of the natural order, but this
view cannot be affirmed by the legal order. The evolutionary path of our young democracy
necessitates a reorientation from this view, reliant as our socio-political culture has become on it.
At the same time, evolution mandates a similar demand that our system of governance be more
responsive to the needs and aspirations of the citizenry, so as to avoid an environment vulnerable
to a military apparatus able at will to exert an undue influence in our polity.
Of possibly less gravitas, but of equal importance, is the principle that mobility of travel is
another necessary restriction on members of the military. A soldier cannot leave his/her post
without the consent of the commanding officer. The reasons are self-evident. The commanding
officer has to be aware at all times of the location of the troops under command, so as to be able
to appropriately respond to any exigencies. For the same reason, commanding officers have to be
able to restrict the movement or travel of their soldiers, if in their judgment, their presence at
place of call of duty is necessary. At times, this may lead to unsentimental, painful consequences,
such as a soldier being denied permission to witness the birth of his first-born, or to attend the
funeral of a parent. Yet again, military life calls for considerable personal sacrifices during the
period of conscription, wherein the higher duty is not to self but to country.
Indeed, the military practice is to require a soldier to obtain permission from the commanding
officer before he/she may leave his destination. A soldier who goes from the properly appointed
place of duty or absents from his/her command, guard, quarters, station, or camp without proper
leave is subject to punishment by court-martial. [48] It is even clear from the record that petitioners
had actually requested for travel authority from the PMA in Baguio City to Manila, to attend the
Senate Hearing.[49] Even petitioners are well aware that it was necessary for them to obtain
permission from their superiors before they could travel to Manila to attend the Senate Hearing.
It is clear that the basic position of petitioners impinges on these fundamental principles we have
discussed. They seek to be exempted from military justice for having traveled to the Senate to
testify before the Senate Committee against the express orders of Gen. Senga, the AFP Chief of
Staff. If petitioners position is affirmed, a considerable exception would be carved from the
unimpeachable right of military officers to restrict the speech and movement of their juniors. The
ruinous consequences to the chain of command and military discipline simply cannot warrant the
Courts imprimatur on petitioners position.
V.
Still, it would be highly myopic on our part to resolve the issue solely on generalities
surrounding military discipline. After all, petitioners seek to impress on us that their acts are
justified as they were responding to an invitation from the Philippine Senate, a component of the
legislative branch of government. At the same time, the order for them not to testify ultimately
came from the President, the head of the executive branch of government and the commander-inchief of the armed forces.
Thus, we have to consider the question: may the President prevent a member of the armed forces
from testifying before a legislative inquiry? We hold that the President has constitutional
authority to do so, by virtue of her power as commander-in-chief, and that as a consequence a
military officer who defies such injunction is liable under military justice. At the same time, we
also hold that any chamber of Congress which seeks the appearance before it of a military officer
against the consent of the President has adequate remedies under law to compel such attendance.
Any military official whom Congress summons to testify before it may be compelled to do so by
the President. If the President is not so inclined, the President may be commanded by judicial
order to compel the attendance of the military officer. Final judicial orders have the force of the
law of the land which the President has the duty to faithfully execute.[50]
Explication of these principles is in order.
As earlier noted, we ruled in Senate that the President may not issue a blanket requirement of
prior consent on executive officials summoned by the legislature to attend a congressional
hearing. In doing so, the Court recognized the considerable limitations on executive privilege,
and affirmed that the privilege must be formally invoked on specified grounds. However, the
ability of the President to prevent military officers from testifying before Congress does not
turn on executive privilege, but on the Chief Executives power as commander-in-chief to
control the actions and speech of members of the armed forces. The Presidents prerogatives
as commander-in-chief are not hampered by the same limitations as in executive privilege.
Our ruling that the President could, as a general rule, require military officers to seek presidential
approval before appearing before Congress is based foremost on the notion that a contrary rule
unduly diminishes the prerogatives of the President as commander-in-chief. Congress holds
significant control over the armed forces in matters such as budget appropriations and the
approval of higher-rank promotions,[51] yet it is on the President that the Constitution vests the
title as commander-in-chief and all the prerogatives and functions appertaining to the position.
Again, the exigencies of military discipline and the chain of command mandate that the
Presidents ability to control the individual members of the armed forces be accorded the utmost
respect. Where a military officer is torn between obeying the President and obeying the Senate,
the Court will without hesitation affirm that the officer has to choose the President. After all, the
Constitution prescribes that it is the President, and not the Senate, who is the commander-inchief of the armed forces.[52]
At the same time, the refusal of the President to allow members of the military to appear before
Congress is still subject to judicial relief. The Constitution itself recognizes as one of the
legislatures functions is the conduct of inquiries in aid of legislation. [53] Inasmuch as it is illadvised for Congress to interfere with the Presidents power as commander-in-chief, it is similarly
detrimental for the President to unduly interfere with Congresss right to conduct legislative
inquiries. The impasse did not come to pass in this petition, since petitioners testified anyway
despite the presidential prohibition. Yet the Court is aware that with its pronouncement today that
the President has the right to require prior consent from members of the armed forces, the clash
may soon loom or actualize.
We believe and hold that our constitutional and legal order sanctions a modality by which
members of the military may be compelled to attend legislative inquiries even if the President
desires otherwise, a modality which does not offend the Chief Executives prerogatives as
commander-in-chief. The remedy lies with the courts.
The fact that the executive branch is an equal, coordinate branch of government to the
legislative creates a wrinkle to any basic rule that persons summoned to testify before Congress
must do so. There is considerable interplay between the legislative and executive branches,
informed by due deference and respect as to their various constitutional functions. Reciprocal
courtesy idealizes this relationship; hence, it is only as a last resort that one branch seeks to
compel the other to a particular mode of behavior. The judiciary, the third coordinate branch of
government, does not enjoy a similar dynamic with either the legislative or executive branches.
Whatever weakness inheres on judicial power due to its inability to originate national policies
and legislation, such is balanced by the fact that it is the branch empowered by the Constitution
to compel obeisance to its rulings by the other branches of government.
As evidenced by Arnault v. Nazareno[54] and Bengzon v. Senate Blue Ribbon Committee,
[55]
among others, the Court has not shirked from reviewing the exercise by Congress of its power
of legislative inquiry.[56] Arnault recognized that the legislative power of inquiry and the process
to enforce it, is an essential and appropriate auxiliary to the legislative function. [57] On the other
hand, Bengzonacknowledged that the power of both houses of Congress to conduct inquiries in
aid of legislation is not absolute or unlimited, and its exercise is circumscribed by Section 21,
Article VI of the Constitution.[58]From these premises, the Court enjoined the Senate Blue Ribbon
Committee from requiring the petitioners in Bengzon from testifying and producing evidence
before the committee, holding that the inquiry in question did not involve any intended
legislation.
Senate affirmed both the Arnault and Bengzon rulings. It elucidated on the constitutional scope
and limitations on the constitutional power of congressional inquiry. Thus:
As discussed in Arnault, the power of inquiry, with process to enforce it, is
grounded on the necessity of information in the legislative process. If the
information possessed by executive officials on the operation of their offices is
necessary for wise legislation on that subject, by parity of reasoning, Congress has
the right to that information and the power to compel the disclosure thereof.
As evidenced by the American experience during the so-called McCarthy era,
however, the right of Congress to conduct inquirites in aid of legislation is, in
theory, no less susceptible to abuse than executive or judicial power. It may thus
be subjected to judicial review pursuant to the Courts certiorari powers under
Section 1, Article VIII of the Constitution.
For one, as noted in Bengzon v. Senate Blue Ribbon Committee, the inquiry itself
might not properly be in aid of legislation, and thus beyond the constitutional
power of Congress. Such inquiry could not usurp judicial functions.
Parenthetically, one possible way for Congress to avoid such result as occurred
in Bengzon is to indicate in its invitations to the public officials concerned, or to
any person for that matter, the possible needed statute which prompted the need
for the inquiry. Given such statement in its invitations, along with the usual
indication of the subject of inquiry and the questions relative to and in furtherance
thereof, there would be less room for speculation on the part of the person invited
on whether the inquiry is in aid of legislation.
Section 21, Article VI likewise establishes critical safeguards that proscribe the
legislative power of inquiry. The provision requires that the inquiry be done in
accordance with the Senate or Houses duly published rules of procedure,
necessarily implying the constitutional infirmity of an inquiry conducted without
duly published rules of procedure. Section 21 also mandates that the rights of
persons appearing in or affected by such inquiries be respected, an imposition that
obligates Congress to adhere to the guarantees in the Bill of Rights.
These abuses are, of course, remediable before the courts, upon the proper suit
filed by the persons affected, even if they belong to the executive branch.
Nonetheless, there may be exceptional circumstances wherein a clear pattern of
abuse of the legislative power of inquiry might be established, resulting in
palpable violations of the rights guaranteed to members of the executive
department under the Bill of Rights. In such instances, depending on the
particulars of each case, attempts by the Executive Branch to forestall these
abuses may be accorded judicial sanction[59].
In Senate, the Court ruled that the President could not impose a blanket prohibition barring
executive officials from testifying before Congress without the Presidents consent
notwithstanding the invocation of executive privilege to justify such prohibition. The Court did
not rule that the power to conduct legislative inquiry ipso facto superseded the claim of executive
privilege, acknowledging instead that the viability of executive privilege stood on a case to case
basis. Should neither branch yield to the other branchs assertion, the constitutional recourse is to
the courts, as the final arbiter if the dispute. It is only the courts that can compel, with
conclusiveness, attendance or non-attendance in legislative inquiries.
Following these principles, it is clear that if the President or the Chief of Staff refuses to
allow a member of the AFP to appear before Congress, the legislative body seeking such
testimony may seek judicial relief to compel the attendance. Such judicial action should be
directed at the heads of the executive branch or the armed forces, the persons who wield
authority and control over the actions of the officers concerned. The legislative purpose of such
testimony, as well as any defenses against the same whether grounded on executive privilege,
national security or similar concerns would be accorded due judicial evaluation. All the
constitutional considerations pertinent to either branch of government may be raised, assessed,
and ultimately weighed against each other. And once the courts speak with finality, both branches
of government have no option but to comply with the decision of the courts, whether the effect of
the decision is to their liking or disfavor.
Courts are empowered, under the constitutional principle of judicial review, to arbitrate
disputes between the legislative and executive branches of government on the proper
constitutional parameters of power.[60] This is the fair and workable solution implicit in the
constitutional allocation of powers among the three branches of government. The judicial filter
helps assure that the particularities of each case would ultimately govern, rather than any
overarching principle unduly inclined towards one branch of government at the expense of the
other. The procedure may not move as expeditiously as some may desire, yet it ensures thorough
deliberation of all relevant and cognizable issues before one branch is compelled to yield to the
other. Moreover, judicial review does not preclude the legislative and executive branches from
negotiating a mutually acceptable solution to the impasse. After all, the two branches, exercising
as they do functions and responsibilities that are political in nature, are free to smooth over the
thorns in their relationship with a salve of their own choosing.
And if emphasis be needed, if the courts so rule, the duty falls on the shoulders of
the President, as commander-in-chief, to authorize the appearance of the military officers
before Congress. Even if the President has earlier disagreed with the notion of officers
appearing before the legislature to testify, the Chief Executive is nonetheless obliged to
comply with the final orders of the courts.
Petitioners have presented several issues relating to the tenability or wisdom of the
Presidents order on them and other military officers not to testify before Congress without the
Presidents consent. Yet these issues ultimately detract from the main point that they testified
before the Senate despite an order from their commanding officer and their commander-in-chief
for them not to do so,[61] in contravention of the traditions of military discipline which we affirm
today. The issues raised by petitioners could have very well been raised and properly adjudicated
if the proper procedure was observed. Petitioners could have been appropriately allowed to
testify before the Senate without having to countermand their Commander-in-chief and superior
officer under the setup we have prescribed.
We consider the other issues raised by petitioners unnecessary to the resolution of this
petition.
Petitioners may have been of the honest belief that they were defying a direct order of their
Commander-in-Chief and Commanding General in obeisance to a paramount idea formed within
their consciences, which could not be lightly ignored. Still, the Court, in turn, is guided by the
superlative principle that is the Constitution, the embodiment of the national conscience. The
Constitution simply does not permit the infraction which petitioners have allegedly committed,
and moreover, provides for an orderly manner by which the same result could have been
achieved without offending constitutional principles.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.

SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BAN
G.R. No. 174340
October 17, 2006
IN THE MATTER OF THE PETITION FOR ISSUANCE OF WRIT OF HABEAS

CORPUS OF CAMILO L. SABIO,petitioner,
J. ERMIN ERNEST LOUIE R. MIGUEL, petitioner-relator,
vs.
HONORABLE SENATOR RICHARD GORDON, in his capacity as Chairman, and the
HONORABLE MEMBERS OF THE COMMITTEE ON GOVERNMENT
CORPORATIONS AND PUBLIC ENTERPRISES and THE COMMITTEE ON PUBLIC
SERVICES of the Senate, HONORABLE SENATOR JUAN PONCE-ENRILE, in his
official capacity as Member, HONORABLE MANUEL VILLAR, Senate President,
SENATE SERGEANT-AT-ARMS, and the SENATE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondents.
x --------------------------------------------------------------------------- x
G.R. No. 174318
October 17, 2006
PRESIDENTIAL COMMISSION ON GOOD GOVERNMENT (PCGG) and CAMILO L.

SABIO, Chairman, NARCISO S. NARIO, RICARDO M. ABCEDE, TERESO L. JAVIER
and NICASIO A. CONTI, Commissioners, MANUEL ANDAL and JULIO JALANDONI,
PCGG nominees to Philcomsat Holdings Corporation,petitioners,
vs.
RICHARD GORDON, in his capacity as Chairman, and MEMBERS OF THE
COMMITTEE ON GOVERNMENT CORPORATIONS AND PUBLIC ENTERPRISES,
MEMBERS OF THE COMMITTEE ON PUBLIC SERVICES, SENATOR JUAN
PONCE-ENRILE, in his capacity as member of both said Committees, MANUEL
VILLAR, Senate President, THE SENATE SERGEANT-AT-ARMS, and SENATE OF
THE PHILIPPINES, respondents.
x --------------------------------------------------------------------------- x
G.R. No. 174177
October 17, 2006
PHILCOMSAT HOLDINGS CORPORATIONS, PHILIP G. BRODETT, LUIS K. LOKIN,

JR., ROBERTO V. SAN JOSE, DELFIN P. ANGCAO, ROBERTO L. ABAD, ALMA
KRISTINA ALOBBA, and JOHNNY TAN, petitioners,
vs.
SENATE COMMITTEE ON GOVERNMENT CORPORATIONS and PUBLIC
ENTERPRISES, its MEMBERS and CHAIRMAN, the HONORABLE SENATOR
RICHARD GORDON and SENATE COMMITTEE ON PUBLIC SERVICES, its
Members and Chairman, the HONORABLE SENATOR JOKER P.
ARROYO, respondents.
DECISION
SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ, J.:
Two decades ago, on February 28, 1986, former President Corazon C. Aquino installed her
regime by issuing Executive Order (E.O.) No. 1,1 creating the Presidential Commission on Good
Government (PCGG). She entrusted upon this Commission the herculean task of recovering the
ill-gotten wealth accumulated by the deposed President Ferdinand E. Marcos, his family,
relatives, subordinates and close associates.2 Section 4 (b) of E.O. No. 1 provides that: "No
member or staff of the Commission shall be required to testify or produce evidence in any
judicial, legislative or administrative proceeding concerning matters within its official
cognizance." Apparently, the purpose is to ensure PCGG's unhampered performance of its task.3
Today, the constitutionality of Section 4(b) is being questioned on the ground that it tramples
upon the Senate's power to conduct legislative inquiry under Article VI, Section 21 of the 1987
Constitution, which reads:
The Senate or the House of Representatives or any of its respective committees may
conduct inquiries in aid of legislation in accordance with its duly published rules of
procedure. The rights of persons appearing in or affected by such inquiries shall be
respected.
The facts are undisputed.
On February 20, 2006, Senator Miriam Defensor Santiago introduced Philippine Senate
Resolution No. 455 (Senate Res. No. 455),4 "directing an inquiry in aid of legislation on the
anomalous losses incurred by the Philippines Overseas Telecommunications Corporation
(POTC), Philippine Communications Satellite Corporation (PHILCOMSAT), and
PHILCOMSAT Holdings Corporation (PHC) due to the alleged improprieties in their operations
by their respective Board of Directors."
The pertinent portions of the Resolution read:
WHEREAS, in the last quarter of 2005, the representation and entertainment expense of
the PHC skyrocketed to P4.3 million, as compared to the previous year's mere P106
thousand;
WHEREAS, some board members established wholly owned PHC subsidiary called
Telecommunications Center, Inc. (TCI), where PHC funds are allegedly siphoned; in 18
months, over P73 million had been allegedly advanced to TCI without any accountability
report given to PHC and PHILCOMSAT;
WHEREAS, the Philippine Star, in its 12 February 2002 issue reported that the executive
committee of Philcomsat has precipitately released P265 million and granted P125
million loan to a relative of an executive committee member; to date there have been no
payments given, subjecting the company to an estimated interest income loss of P11.25
million in 2004;
WHEREAS, there is an urgent need to protect the interest of the Republic of the
Philippines in the PHC, PHILCOMSAT, and POTC from any anomalous transaction, and
to conserve or salvage any remaining value of the government's equity position in these
corporations from any abuses of power done by their respective board of directors;
WHEREFORE, be it resolved that the proper Senate Committee shall conduct an
inquiry in aid of legislation, on the anomalous losses incurred by the Philippine
Overseas Telecommunications Corporation (POTC), Philippine Communications
Satellite Corporation (PHILCOMSAT), and Philcomsat Holdings Corporations
(PHC) due to the alleged improprieties in the operations by their respective board of
directors.
Adopted.
(Sgd) MIRIAM DEFENSOR SANTIAGO
On the same date, February 20, 2006, Senate Res. No. 455 was submitted to the Senate and
referred to theCommittee on Accountability of Public Officers and Investigations and Committee
on Public Services. However, on March 28, 2006, upon motion of Senator Francis N. Pangilinan,
it was transferred to the Committee on Government Corporations and Public Enterprises.5
On May 8, 2006, Chief of Staff Rio C. Inocencio, under the authority of Senator Richard J.
Gordon, wrote Chairman Camilo L. Sabio of the PCGG, one of the herein petitioners, inviting
him to be one of the resource persons in the public meeting jointly conducted by the Committee
on Government Corporations and Public Enterprises and Committee on Public Services. The
purpose of the public meeting was to deliberate on Senate Res. No. 455.6
On May 9, 2006, Chairman Sabio declined the invitation because of prior commitment. 7 At the
same time, he invoked Section 4(b) of E.O. No. 1 earlier quoted.
On August 10, 2006, Senator Gordon issued a Subpoena Ad Testificandum,8 approved by Senate
President Manuel Villar, requiring Chairman Sabio and PCGG Commissioners Ricardo
Abcede, Nicasio Conti, Tereso Javier and Narciso Nario to appear in the public hearing
scheduled on August 23, 2006 and testify on what they know relative to the matters specified in
Senate Res. No. 455. Similar subpoenae were issued against the directors and officers of
Philcomsat Holdings Corporation, namely: Benito V. Araneta, Philip J. Brodett, Enrique L.
Locsin, Manuel D. Andal, Roberto L. Abad, Luis K. Lokin, Jr., Julio J. Jalandoni, Roberto V. San
Jose, Delfin P. Angcao, Alma Kristina Alloba and Johnny Tan.9
Again, Chairman Sabio refused to appear. In his letter to Senator Gordon dated August 18, 2006,
he reiterated his earlier position, invoking Section 4(b) of E.O. No. 1. On the other hand, the
directors and officers of Philcomsat Holdings Corporation relied on the position paper they
previously filed, which raised issues on the propriety of legislative inquiry.
Thereafter, Chief of Staff Ma. Carissa O. Coscolluela, under the authority of Senator Gordon,
sent another notice10 to Chairman Sabio requiring him to appear and testify on the same subject
matter set on September 6, 2006. The notice was issued "under the same authority of
the Subpoena Ad Testificandum previously served upon (him) last 16 August 2006."
Once more, Chairman Sabio did not comply with the notice. He sent a letter 11 dated September 4,
2006 to Senator Gordon reiterating his reason for declining to appear in the public hearing.
This prompted Senator Gordon to issue an Order dated September 7, 2006 requiring Chairman
Sabio and Commissioners Abcede, Conti, Javier and Nario to show cause why they should not be
cited in contempt of the Senate. On September 11, 2006, they submitted to the Senate their
Compliance and Explanation,12 which partly reads:
Doubtless, there are laudable intentions of the subject inquiry in aid of legislation.
But the rule of law requires that even the best intentions must be carried out within the
parameters of the Constitution and the law. Verily, laudable purposes must be carried out
by legal methods. (Brillantes, Jr., et al. v. Commission on Elections, En Banc [G.R. No.
163193, June 15, 2004])
On this score, Section 4(b) of E.O. No. 1 should not be ignored as it explicitly provides:
No member or staff of the Commission shall be required to testify or produce
evidence in any judicial legislative or administrative proceeding concerning
matters within its official cognizance.
With all due respect, Section 4(b) of E.O. No. 1 constitutes a limitation on the power of
legislative inquiry, and a recognition by the State of the need to provide protection to the
PCGG in order to ensure the unhampered performance of its duties under its charter. E.O.
No. 1 is a law, Section 4(b) of which had not been amended, repealed or revised in any
way.
To say the least, it would require both Houses of Congress and Presidential fiat to amend
or repeal the provision in controversy. Until then, it stands to be respected as part of the
legal system in this jurisdiction. (As held in People v. Veneracion, G.R. Nos. 119987-88,
October 12, 1995: Obedience to the rule of law forms the bedrock of our system of
justice. If judges, under the guise of religious or political beliefs were allowed to roam
unrestricted beyond boundaries within which they are required by law to exercise the
duties of their office, then law becomes meaningless. A government of laws, not of men
excludes the exercise of broad discretionary powers by those acting under its authority.
Under this system, judges are guided by the Rule of Law, and ought to 'protect and
enforce it without fear or favor,' 4 [Act of Athens (1955)] resist encroachments by
governments, political parties, or even the interference of their own personal beliefs.)
xxxxxx
Relevantly, Chairman Sabio's letter to Sen. Gordon dated August 19, 2006 pointed out
that the anomalous transactions referred to in the P.S. Resolution No. 455 are subject of
pending cases before the regular courts, the Sandiganbayan and the Supreme Court
(Pending cases include: a. Samuel Divina v. Manuel Nieto, Jr., et al., CA-G.R. No. 89102;
b. Philippine Communications Satellite Corporation v. Manuel Nieto, et al.; c. Philippine
Communications Satellite Corporation v. Manuel D. Andal, Civil Case No. 06-095, RTC,
Branch 61, Makati City; d. Philippine Communications Satellite Corporation v.
PHILCOMSAT Holdings Corporation, et al., Civil Case No. 04-1049) for which reason
they may not be able to testify thereon under the principle of sub judice. The laudable
objectives of the PCGG's functions, recognized in several cases decided by the Supreme
Court, of the PCGG will be put to naught if its recovery efforts will be unduly impeded
by a legislative investigation of cases that are already pending before the Sandiganbayan
and trial courts.
In Bengzon v. Senate Blue Ribbon Committee, (203 SCRA 767, 784 [1991]) the
Honorable Supreme Court held:
"[T]he issues sought to be investigated by the respondent Committee is one
over which jurisdiction had been acquired by the Sandiganbayan. In short, the
issue has been pre-empted by that court. To allow the respondent Committee to
conduct its own investigation of an issue already before the Sandigabayan would
not only pose the possibility of conflicting judgments between a legislative
committee and a judicial tribunal, but if the Committee's judgment were to be
reached before that of the Sandiganbayan, the possibility of its influence being
made to bear on the ultimate judgment of the Sandiganbayan can not be

discounted.
xxxxxx
IT IS IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING CONSIDERATIONS that the Commission
decided not to attend the Senate inquiry to testify and produce evidence thereat.
Unconvinced with the above Compliance and Explanation, the Committee on Government
Corporations and Public Enterprises and the Committee on Public Services issued an
Order13 directing Major General Jose Balajadia (Ret.), Senate Sergeant-At-Arms, to place
Chairman Sabio and his Commissioners under arrest for contempt of the Senate. The Order
bears the approval of Senate President Villar and the majority of the Committees'
members.
On September 12, 2006, at around 10:45 a.m., Major General Balajadia arrested Chairman Sabio
in his office at IRC Building, No. 82 EDSA, Mandaluyong City and brought him to the Senate
premises where he was detained.
Hence, Chairman Sabio filed with this Court a petition for habeas corpus against the
Senate Committee on Government Corporations and Public Enterprises and Committee on
Public Services, their Chairmen, Senators Richard Gordon and Joker P. Arroyo and Members.
The case was docketed as G.R. No. 174340.
Chairman Sabio, Commissioners Abcede, Conti, Nario, and Javier, and the PCGG's nominees to
Philcomsat Holdings Corporation, Manuel Andal and Julio Jalandoni, likewise filed a petition for
certiorari and prohibition against the same respondents, and also against Senate President
Manuel Villar, Senator Juan Ponce Enrile, the Sergeant-at-Arms, and the entire Senate. The case
was docketed as G.R. No. 174318.
Meanwhile, Philcomsat Holdings Corporation and its officers and directors, namely: Philip G.
Brodett, Luis K. Lokin, Jr., Roberto V. San Jose, Delfin P. Angcao, Roberto L. Abad, Alma
Kristina Alobba and Johnny Tan filed a petition for certiorari and prohibition against the
Senate Committees on Government Corporations and Public Enterprises and Public Services,
their Chairmen, Senators Gordon and Arroyo, and Members. The case was docketed as G.R. No.
174177.
In G.R. No. 174340 (for habeas corpus) and G.R. No. 174318 (for certiorari and prohibition)
Chairman Sabio, Commissioners Abcede, Conti, Nario, and Javier; and the PCGG's nominees
Andal and Jalandoni alleged: first, respondent Senate Committees disregarded Section 4(b) of
E.O. No. 1 without any justifiable reason; second, the inquiries conducted by respondent Senate
Committees are not in aid of legislation; third, the inquiries were conducted in the absence of
duly published Senate Rules of Procedure Governing Inquiries in Aid of Legislation; and fourth,
respondent Senate Committees are not vested with the power of contempt.
In G.R. No. 174177, petitioners Philcomsat Holdings Corporation and its directors and officers
alleged: first, respondent Senate Committees have no jurisdiction over the subject matter stated
in Senate Res. No. 455;second, the same inquiry is not in accordance with the Senate's Rules of
Procedure Governing Inquiries in Aid of Legislation; third, the subpoenae against the individual
petitioners are void for having been issued without authority; fourth, the conduct of legislative
inquiry pursuant to Senate Res. No. 455 constitutes undue encroachment by respondents into
justiciable controversies over which several courts and tribunals have already acquired
jurisdiction; and fifth, the subpoenae violated petitioners' rights to privacy and against selfincrimination.
In their Consolidated Comment, the above-named respondents countered: first, the issues raised
in the petitions involve political questions over which this Court has no jurisdiction; second,
Section 4(b) has been repealed by the Constitution; third, respondent Senate Committees are
vested with contempt power; fourth, Senate's Rules of Procedure Governing Inquiries in Aid of
Legislation have been duly published; fifth, respondents have not violated any civil right of the
individual petitioners, such as their (a) right to privacy; and (b) right against self-incrimination;
and sixth, the inquiry does not constitute undue encroachment into justiciable controversies.
During the oral arguments held on September 21, 2006, the parties were directed to submit
simultaneously their respective memoranda within a non-extendible period of fifteen (15) days
from date. In the meantime, per agreement of the parties, petitioner Chairman Sabio was allowed
to go home. Thus, his petition for habeas corpus has become moot. The parties also agreed that
the service of the arrest warrants issued against all petitioners and the proceedings before the
respondent Senate Committees are suspended during the pendency of the instant cases.14
Crucial to the resolution of the present petitions is the fundamental issue of whether Section 4(b)
of E.O. No. 1 is repealed by the 1987 Constitution. On this lone issue hinges the merit of the
contention of Chairman Sabio and his Commissioners that their refusal to appear before
respondent Senate Committees is justified. With the resolution of this issue, all the other issues
raised by the parties have become inconsequential.
Perched on one arm of the scale of justice is Article VI, Section 21 of the 1987 Constitution
granting respondent Senate Committees the power of legislative inquiry. It reads:
respected.
On the other arm of the scale is Section 4(b) of E.O. No.1 limiting such power of legislative
inquiry by exempting all PCGG members or staff from testifying in any judicial, legislative or
administrative proceeding, thus:
No member or staff of the Commission shall be required to testify or produce
evidence in any judicial, legislative or administrative proceeding concerning matters
within its official cognizance.
To determine whether there exists a clear and unequivocal repugnancy between the two quoted
provisions that warrants a declaration that Section 4(b) has been repealed by the 1987
Constitution, a brief consideration of the Congress' power of inquiry is imperative.
The Congress' power of inquiry has been recognized in foreign jurisdictions long before it
reached our shores through McGrain v. Daugherty,15 cited in Arnault v. Nazareno.16 In those
earlier days, American courts considered the power of inquiry as inherent in the power to
legislate. The 1864 case of Briggs v. MacKellar17explains the breath and basis of the power, thus:
Where no constitutional limitation or restriction exists, it is competent for either of the
two bodies composing the legislature to do, in their separate capacity, whatever may be
essential to enable them to legislate.It is well-established principle of this
parliamentary law, that either house may institute any investigationhaving reference to
its own organization, the conduct or qualification of its members, its proceedings, rights,
or privileges or any matter affecting the public interest upon which it may be
important that it should have exact information, and in respect to which it would be
competent for it to legislate. The right to pass laws, necessarily implies the right to
obtain information upon any matter which may become the subject of a law. It is
essential to the full and intelligent exercise of the legislative function.In American
legislatures the investigation of public matters before committees, preliminary to
legislation, or with the view of advising the house appointing the committee is, as a
parliamentary usage, well established as it is in England, and the right of either house
to compel witnesses to appear and testify before its committee, and to punish for
disobedience has been frequently enforced.The right of inquiry, I think, extends to
other matters, in respect to which it may be necessary, or may be deemed advisable to
apply for legislative aid.
Remarkably, in Arnault, this Court adhered to a similar theory. Citing McGrain, it recognized
that the power of inquiry is "an essential and appropriate auxiliary to the legislative
function," thus:
Although there is no provision in the "Constitution expressly investing either House of
Congress with power to make investigations and exact testimony to the end that it may
exercise its legislative functions advisedly and effectively, such power is so far incidental
to the legislative function as to be implied. In other words,the power of inquiry with
process to enforce it is an essential and appropriate auxiliary to the legislative
function. A legislative body cannot legislate wisely or effectively in the absence of
information respecting the conditions which the legislation is intended to affect or
change; and where the legislation body does not itself possess the requisite
information which is not infrequently true recourse must be had to others who
possess it."
Dispelling any doubt as to the Philippine Congress' power of inquiry, provisions on such power
made their maiden appearance in Article VIII, Section 12 of the 1973 Constitution. 18 Then came
the 1987 Constitution incorporating the present Article VI, Section 12. What was therefore
implicit under the 1935 Constitution, as influenced by American jurisprudence, became explicit
under the 1973 and 1987 Constitutions.19
Notably, the 1987 Constitution recognizes the power of investigation, not just of Congress, but
also of "any of its committee." This is significant because it constitutes a direct conferral of
investigatory power upon the committees and it means that the mechanisms which the Houses
can take in order to effectively perform its investigative function are also available to the
committees.20
It can be said that the Congress' power of inquiry has gained more solid existence and expansive
construal. The Court's high regard to such power is rendered more evident in Senate v.
Ermita,21 where it categorically ruled that"the power of inquiry is broad enough to cover
officials of the executive branch." Verily, the Court reinforced the doctrine in Arnault that "the
operation of government, being a legitimate subject for legislation, is a proper subject for
investigation" and that "the power of inquiry is co-extensive with the power to legislate."
Considering these jurisprudential instructions, we find Section 4(b) directly repugnant with
Article VI, Section 21. Section 4(b) exempts the PCGG members and staff from the
Congress' power of inquiry. This cannot be countenanced. Nowhere in the Constitution is any
provision granting such exemption. The Congress' power of inquiry, being broad, encompasses
everything that concerns the administration of existing laws as well as proposed or possibly
needed statutes.22 It even extends "to government agencies created by Congress and officers
whose positions are within the power of Congress to regulate or even abolish."23 PCGG
belongs to this class.
Certainly, a mere provision of law cannot pose a limitation to the broad power of Congress, in
the absence of any constitutional basis.
Furthermore, Section 4(b) is also inconsistent with Article XI, Section 1 of the Constitution
stating that: "Public office is a public trust. Public officers and employees must at all times be
accountable to the people, serve them with utmost responsibility, integrity, loyalty, and efficiency,
act with patriotism and justice, and lead modest lives."
The provision presupposes that since an incumbent of a public office is invested with certain
powers and charged with certain duties pertinent to sovereignty, the powers so delegated to the
officer are held in trust for the people and are to be exercised in behalf of the government or
of all citizens who may need the intervention of the officers. Such trust extends to all
matters within the range of duties pertaining to the office. In other words, public officers
are but the servants of the people, and not their rulers.24
Section 4(b), being in the nature of an immunity, is inconsistent with the principle of public
accountability. It places the PCGG members and staff beyond the reach of courts, Congress and
other administrative bodies. Instead of encouraging public accountability, the same provision
only institutionalizes irresponsibility and non-accountability. In Presidential Commission on
Good Government v. Pea,25 Justice Florentino P. Feliciano characterized as "obiter" the portion
of the majority opinion barring, on the basis of Sections 4(a) and (b) of E.O. No. 1, a civil case
for damages filed against the PCGG and its Commissioners. He eloquently opined:
The above underscored portions are, it is respectfully submitted, clearly obiter. It is
important to make clear that the Court is not here interpreting, much less
upholding as valid and constitutional, the literal terms of Section 4 (a), (b) of
Executive Order No.1. If Section 4 (a) were given its literal import as immunizing the
PCGG or any member thereof from civil liability "for anything done or omitted in the
discharge of the task contemplated by this Order," the constitutionality of Section 4 (a)
would, in my submission, be open to most serious doubt. For so viewed, Section 4 (a)
would institutionalize the irresponsibility and non-accountability of members and staff of
the PCGG, a notion that is clearly repugnant to both the 1973 and 1987 Constitution and
a privileged status not claimed by any other official of the Republic under the 1987
xxxxxx
It would seem constitutionally offensive to suppose that a member or staff member
of the PCGG could not be required to testify before the Sandiganbayan or that such
members were exempted from complying with orders of this Court.
Chavez v. Sandiganbayan26 reiterates the same view. Indeed, Section 4(b) has been frowned upon
by this Court even before the filing of the present petitions.
Corollarily, Section 4(b) also runs counter to the following constitutional provisions ensuring the
people's access to information:
Article II, Section 28
Subject to reasonable conditions prescribed by law, the State adopts and
implements a policy of full public disclosure of all its transactions involving
public interest.
Article III, Section 7
limitations as may be provided by law.
These twin provisions of the Constitution seek to promote transparency in policy-making and in
the operations of the government, as well as provide the people sufficient information to enable
them to exercise effectively their constitutional rights. Armed with the right information, citizens
can participate in public discussions leading to the formulation of government policies and their
effective implementation. In Valmonte v. Belmonte, Jr.27 the Court explained that an informed
citizenry is essential to the existence and proper functioning of any democracy, thus:
An essential element of these freedoms is to keep open a continuing dialogue or process
of communication between the government and the people. It is in the interest of the State
that the channels for free political discussion be maintained to the end that the
government may perceive and be responsive to the people's will. Yet, this open dialogue
can be effective only to the extent that the citizenry is informed and thus able to
formulate its will intelligently. Only when the participants in the discussion are aware of
the issues and have access to information relating thereto can such bear fruit.
Consequently, the conduct of inquiries in aid of legislation is not only intended to benefit
Congress but also the citizenry. The people are equally concerned with this proceeding and have
the right to participate therein in order to protect their interests. The extent of their participation
will largely depend on the information gathered and made known to them. In other words, the
right to information really goes hand-in-hand with the constitutional policies of full public
disclosure and honesty in the public service. It is meant to enhance the widening role of the
citizenry in governmental decision-making as well as in checking abuse in the government. 28 The
cases ofTaada v. Tuvera29 and Legaspi v. Civil Service Commission30 have recognized a citizen's
interest and personality to enforce a public duty and to bring an action to compel public officials
and employees to perform that duty.
Section 4(b) limits or obstructs the power of Congress to secure from PCGG members and staff
information and other data in aid of its power to legislate. Again, this must not be countenanced.
In Senate v. Ermita,31 this Court stressed:
To the extent that investigations in aid of legislation are generally conducted in
public, however, any executive issuance tending to unduly limit disclosures of
information in such investigations necessarily deprives the people of information
which, being presumed to be in aid of legislation, is presumed to be a matter of
public concern. The citizens are thereby denied access to information which they can use
in formulating their own opinions on the matter before Congress opinions which they
can then communicate to their representatives and other government officials through the
various legal means allowed by their freedom of expression.
A statute may be declared unconstitutional because it is not within the legislative power to
enact; or it creates or establishes methods or forms that infringe constitutional principles; or its
purpose or effect violates the Constitution or its basic principles. 32 As shown in the above
discussion, Section 4(b) is inconsistent withArticle VI, Section 21 (Congress' power of
inquiry), Article XI, Section 1 (principle of public accountability),Article II, Section 28 (policy
of full disclosure) and Article III, Section 7 (right to public information).
Significantly, Article XVIII, Section 3 of the Constitution provides:
All existing laws, decrees, executive orders, proclamations, letters of instructions, and
other executive issuances not inconsistent with this Constitution shall remain operative
until amended, repealed, or revoked.
The clear import of this provision is that all existing laws, executive orders, proclamations,
letters of instructions and other executive issuances inconsistent or repugnant to the Constitution
are repealed.
Jurisprudence is replete with decisions invalidating laws, decrees, executive orders,
proclamations, letters of instructions and other executive issuances inconsistent with the
Constitution. In Pelaez v. Auditor General,33 the Court considered repealed Section 68 of the
Revised Administrative Code of 1917 authorizing the Executive to change the seat of the
government of any subdivision of local governments, upon the approval of the 1935
Constitution. Section 68 was adjudged incompatible and inconsistent with the Constitutional
grant of limited executive supervision over local governments. In Islamic Da'wah Council of the
Philippines, Inc., v. Office of the Executive Secretary,34 the Court declared Executive Order No.
46, entitled "Authorizing the Office on Muslim Affairs to Undertake Philippine Halal
Certification," void for encroaching on the religious freedom of Muslims. InThe Province of
Batangas v. Romulo,35 the Court declared some provisions of the General Appropriations Acts of
1999, 2000 and 2001 unconstitutional for violating the Constitutional precept on local autonomy.
And in Ople v. Torres,36 the Court likewise declared unconstitutional Administrative Order No.
308, entitled "Adoption of a National Computerized Identification Reference System," for being
violative of the right to privacy protected by the Constitution.
These Decisions, and many others, highlight that the Constitution is the highest law of the land.
It is "the basic and paramount law to which all other laws must conform and to which all
persons, including the highest officials of the land, must defer. No act shall be valid,
however noble its intentions, if it conflicts with the Constitution."37 Consequently, this Court
has no recourse but to declare Section 4(b) of E.O. No. 1 repealed by the 1987 Constitution.
Significantly, during the oral arguments on September 21, 2006, Chairman Sabio admitted that
should this Court rule that Section 4(b) is unconstitutional or that it does not apply to the Senate,
he will answer the questions of the Senators, thus:
CHIEF JUSTICE PANGANIBAN:
Okay. Now, if the Supreme Court rules that Sec. 4(b) is unconstitutional or that it
does not apply to the Senate, will you answer the questions of the Senators?
CHAIRMAN SABIO:
Your Honor, my father was a judge, died being a judge. I was here in the Supreme
Court as Chief of Staff of Justice Feria. I would definitely honor the Supreme
Court and the rule of law.
CHIEF JUSTICE PANGANIBAN:
You will answer the questions of the Senators if we say that?
CHAIRMAN SABIO:
Yes, Your Honor. That is the law already as far as I am concerned.
With his admission, Chairman Sabio is not fully convinced that he and his Commissioners are
shielded from testifying before respondent Senate Committees by Section 4(b) of E.O. No. 1. In
effect, his argument that the said provision exempts him and his co-respondent Commissioners
from testifying before respondent Senate Committees concerning Senate Res. No. 455 utterly
lacks merit.
Incidentally, an argument repeated by Chairman Sabio is that respondent Senate Committees
have no power to punish him and his Commissioners for contempt of the Senate.
The argument is misleading.
Article VI, Section 21 provides:
respected.
It must be stressed that the Order of Arrest for "contempt of Senate Committees and the
Philippine Senate" wasapproved by Senate President Villar and signed by fifteen (15)
Senators. From this, it can be concluded that the Order is under the authority, not only of the
respondent Senate Committees, but of the entire Senate.
At any rate, Article VI, Section 21 grants the power of inquiry not only to the Senate and the
House of Representatives, but also to any of their respective committees. Clearly, there is
a direct conferral of powerto the committees. Father Bernas, in his Commentary on the 1987
Constitution, correctly pointed out its significance:
It should also be noted that the Constitution explicitly recognizes the power of
investigation not just of Congress but also of "any of its committees." This is significant
because it constitutes a direct conferral of investigatory power upon the committees
and it means that the means which the Houses can take in order to effectively
perform its investigative function are also available to the Committees.38
This is a reasonable conclusion. The conferral of the legislative power of inquiry upon any
committee of Congress must carry with it all powers necessary and proper for its effective
discharge. Otherwise, Article VI, Section 21 will be meaningless. The indispensability and
usefulness of the power of contempt in a legislative inquiry is underscored in a catena of cases,
foreign and local.
In the 1821 case of Anderson v. Dunn,39 the function of the Houses of Congress with respect to
the contempt power was likened to that of a court, thus:
But the court in its reasoning goes beyond this, and though the grounds of the decision
are not very clearly stated, we take them to be: that there is in some cases a power in
each House of Congress to punish for contempt; that this power is analogous to that
exercised by courts of justice, and that it being the well established doctrine that
when it appears that a prisoner is held under the order of a court of general
jurisdiction for a contempt of its authority, no other court will discharge the
prisoner or make further inquiry into the cause of his commitment. That this is the
general ruleas regards the relation of one court to another must be conceded.
In McGrain,40 the U.S. Supreme Court held: "Experience has shown that mere requests for
such information are often unavailing, and also that information which is volunteered is
not always accurate or complete; so some means of compulsion is essential to obtain what is
needed." The Court, in Arnault v. Nazareno,41sustained the Congress' power of contempt on the
basis of this observation.
In Arnault v. Balagtas,42 the Court further explained that the contempt power of Congress is
founded upon reason and policy and that the power of inquiry will not be complete if for every
contumacious act, Congress has to resort to judicial interference, thus:
The principle that Congress or any of its bodies has the power to punish recalcitrant
witnesses is founded upon reason and policy. Said power must be considered implied or
incidental to the exercise of legislative power. How could a legislative body obtain the
knowledge and information on which to base intended legislation if it cannot require
and compel the disclosure of such knowledge and information if it is impotent to
punish a defiance of its power and authority? When the framers of the Constitution
adopted the principle of separation of powers, making each branch supreme within
the realm of its respective authority, it must have intended each department's
authority to be full and complete, independently of the other's authority or power.
And how could the authority and power become complete if for every act of refusal,
every act of defiance, every act of contumacy against it, the legislative body must
resort to the judicial department for the appropriate remedy, because it is impotent
by itself to punish or deal therewith, with the affronts committed against its
authority or dignity.43
In Negros Oriental II Electric Cooperative, Inc. v. Sangguniang Panlungsod of Dumaguete,44 the
Court characterized contempt power as a matter of self-preservation, thus:
The exercise by the legislature of the contempt power is a matter of self-preservation as
that branch of the government vested with the legislative power, independently of the
judicial branch, asserts its authority and punishes contempts thereof. The contempt power
of the legislature is, therefore, sui generis x x x.
Meanwhile, with respect to G.R. No. 174177, the petition of Philcomsat Holdings Corporation
and its directors and officers, this Court holds that the respondent Senate Committees' inquiry
does not violate their right to privacy and right against self-incrimination.
One important limitation on the Congress' power of inquiry is that "the rights of persons
appearing in or affected by such inquiries shall be respected." This is just another way of
saying that the power of inquiry must be "subject to the limitations placed by the Constitution on
government action." As held in Barenblatt v. United States,45 "the Congress, in common with
all the other branches of the Government, must exercise its powers subject to the
limitations placed by the Constitution on governmental action, more particularly in the
context of this case, the relevant limitations of the Bill of Rights."
First is the right to privacy.
Zones of privacy are recognized and protected in our laws. 46 Within these zones, any form of
intrusion is impermissible unless excused by law and in accordance with customary legal
process. The meticulous regard we accord to these zones arises not only from our conviction that
the right to privacy is a "constitutional right" and "the right most valued by civilized men,"47 but
also from our adherence to the Universal Declaration of Human Rights which mandates that, "no
one shall be subjected to arbitrary interference with his privacy" and "everyone has the right to
the protection of the law against such interference or attacks."48
Our Bill of Rights, enshrined in Article III of the Constitution, provides at least two guarantees
that explicitly create zones of privacy. It highlights a person's "right to be let alone" or the "right
to determine what, how much, to whom and when information about himself shall be
disclosed."49 Section 2 guarantees "the right of the people to be secure in their persons,
houses, papers and effects against unreasonable searches and seizures of whatever nature
and for any purpose." Section 3 renders inviolable the "privacy of communication and
correspondence" and further cautions that "any evidence obtained in violation of this or the
preceding section shall be inadmissible for any purpose in any proceeding."
In evaluating a claim for violation of the right to privacy, a court must determine whether a
person has exhibited a reasonable expectation of privacy and, if so, whether that expectation has
been violated by unreasonable government intrusion. 50 Applying this determination to these
cases, the important inquiries are: first, did the directors and officers of Philcomsat Holdings
Corporation exhibit a reasonable expectation of privacy?; andsecond, did the government
violate such expectation?
The answers are in the negative. Petitioners were invited in the Senate's public hearing to
deliberate on Senate Res. No. 455, particularly "on the anomalous losses incurred by the
Philippine
Overseas
Telecommunications
Corporation
(POTC),
Philippine
Communications Satellite Corporation (PHILCOMSAT), and Philcomsat Holdings
Corporations (PHC) due to the alleged improprieties in the operations by their respective
board of directors." Obviously, the inquiry focus on petitioners' acts committed in the discharge
of their duties as officers and directors of the said corporations, particularly Philcomsat Holdings
Corporation. Consequently, they have no reasonable expectation of privacy over matters
involving their offices in a corporation where the government has interest. Certainly, such
matters are of public concern and over which the people have the right to information.
This goes to show that the right to privacy is not absolute where there is an
overriding compelling state interest. In Morfe v. Mutuc,51 the Court, in line with Whalen v.
Roe,52 employed the rational basis relationship test when it held that there was no infringement of
the individual's right to privacy as the requirement to disclosure information is for a valid
purpose, i.e., to curtail and minimize the opportunities for official corruption, maintain a standard
of honesty in public service, and promote morality in public administration. 53 In Valmonte v.
Belmonte,54 the Court remarked that as public figures, the Members of the former Batasang
Pambansa enjoy a more limited right to privacy as compared to ordinary individuals, and their
actions are subject to closer scrutiny. Taking this into consideration, the Court ruled that the right
of the people to access information on matters of public concern prevails over the right to
privacy of financial transactions.
Under the present circumstances, the alleged anomalies in the PHILCOMSAT, PHC and POTC,
ranging in millions of pesos, and the conspiratorial participation of the PCGG and its officials
are compelling reasons for the Senate to exact vital information from the directors and officers
of Philcomsat Holdings Corporations, as well as from Chairman Sabio and his Commissioners to
aid it in crafting the necessary legislation to prevent corruption and formulate remedial measures
and policy determination regarding PCGG's efficacy. There being no reasonable expectation of
privacy on the part of those directors and officers over the subject covered by Senate Res. No.
455, it follows that their right to privacy has not been violated by respondent Senate Committees.
Anent the right against self-incrimination, it must be emphasized that this right maybe invoked
by the said directors and officers of Philcomsat Holdings Corporation only when the
incriminating question is being asked, since they have no way of knowing in advance the
nature or effect of the questions to be asked of them."55 That this right may possibly be
violated or abused is no ground for denying respondent Senate Committees their power of
inquiry. The consolation is that when this power is abused, such issue may be presented before
the courts. At this juncture, what is important is that respondent Senate Committees have
sufficient Rules to guide them when the right against self-incrimination is invoked. Sec. 19 reads:
Sec. 19. Privilege Against Self-Incrimination
A witness can invoke his right against self-incrimination only when a question tends to
elicit an answer that will incriminate him is propounded to him. However, he may offer to
answer any question in an executive session.
No person can refuse to testify or be placed under oath or affirmation or answer questions
before an incriminatory question is asked. His invocation of such right does not by itself
excuse him from his duty to give testimony.
In such a case, the Committee, by a majority vote of the members present there being a
quorum, shall determine whether the right has been properly invoked. If the Committee
decides otherwise, it shall resume its investigation and the question or questions
previously refused to be answered shall be repeated to the witness. If the latter continues
to refuse to answer the question, the Committee may punish him for contempt for
contumacious conduct.
The same directors and officers contend that the Senate is barred from inquiring into the same
issues being litigated before the Court of Appeals and the Sandiganbayan. Suffice it to state that
the Senate Rules of Procedure Governing Inquiries in Aid of Legislation provide that the filing or
pendency of any prosecution of criminal or administrative action should not stop or abate any
inquiry to carry out a legislative purpose.
Let it be stressed at this point that so long as the constitutional rights of witnesses, like Chairman
Sabio and his Commissioners, will be respected by respondent Senate Committees, it their duty
to cooperate with them in their efforts to obtain the facts needed for intelligent legislative action.
The unremitting obligation of every citizen is to respond to subpoenae, to respect the dignity of
the Congress and its Committees, and to testify fully with respect to matters within the realm of
proper investigation.
In fine, PCGG Chairman Camilo Sabio and Commissioners Ricardo Abcede, Narciso Nario,
Nicasio Conti, and Tereso Javier; and Manuel Andal and Julio Jalandoni, PCGG's nominees to
Philcomsat Holdings Corporation, as well as its directors and officers, must comply with
the Subpoenae Ad Testificandum issued by respondent Senate Committees directing them to
appear and testify in public hearings relative to Senate Resolution No. 455.
WHEREFORE, the petition in G.R. No. 174340 for habeas corpus is DISMISSED, for being
moot. The petitions in G.R Nos. 174318 and 174177 are likewise DISMISSED.
Section 4(b) of E.O. No. 1 is declared REPEALED by the 1987 Constitution. Respondent
Senate Committees' power of inquiry relative to Senate Resolution 455 is upheld. PCGG
Chairman Camilo L. Sabio and Commissioners Ricardo Abcede, Narciso Nario, Nicasio Conti
and Tereso Javier; and Manuel Andal and Julio Jalandoni, PCGG's nominees to Philcomsat
Holdings Corporation, as well as its directors and officers, petitioners in G.R. No. 174177, are
ordered to comply with the Subpoenae Ad Testificandum issued by respondent Senate
Committees directing them to appear and testify in public hearings relative to Senate Resolution
No. 455.
SO ORDERED.
Republic
SUPREME
Manila
of
the
Philippines
COURT
EN BANC
G.R. No. 180643
March 25, 2008
ROMULO
L.
NERI, petitioner,
vs.
SENATE COMMITTEE ON ACCOUNTABILITY OF PUBLIC OFFICERS AND
INVESTIGATIONS, SENATE COMMITTEE ON TRADE AND COMMERCE, AND
SENATE COMMITTEE ON NATIONAL DEFENSE AND SECURITY, respondents.
DECISION
LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, J.:
At bar is a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court assailing the show
cause Letter1 dated November 22, 2007 and contempt Order2 dated January 30, 2008
concurrently issued by respondent
Senate Committees on Accountability of Public Officers and Investigations, 3 Trade and
Commerce,4 and National Defense and Security5 against petitioner Romulo L. Neri, former
Director General of the National Economic and Development Authority (NEDA).
The facts, as culled from the pleadings, are as follows:
On April 21, 2007, the Department of Transportation and Communication (DOTC) entered into a
contract with Zhong Xing Telecommunications Equipment (ZTE) for the supply of equipment
and services for the National Broadband Network (NBN) Project in the amount of U.S. $
329,481,290 (approximately P16 Billion Pesos). The Project was to be financed by the People's
Republic of China.
In connection with this NBN Project, various Resolutions were introduced in the Senate, as
follows:
(1) P.S. Res. No. 127, introduced by Senator Aquilino Q. Pimentel, Jr., entitled
RESOLUTION DIRECTING THE BLUE RIBBON COMMITTEE AND THE
COMMITTEE ON TRADE AND INDUSTRY TO INVESTIGATE, IN AID OF
LEGISLATION, THE CIRCUMSTANCES LEADING TO THE APPROVAL OF THE
BROADBAND CONTRACT WITH ZTE AND THE ROLE PLAYED BY THE
OFFICIALS CONCERNED IN GETTING IT CONSUMMATED AND TO MAKE
RECOMMENDATIONS TO HALE TO THE COURTS OF LAW THE PERSONS
RESPONSIBLE FOR ANY ANOMALY IN CONNECTION THEREWITH AND TO
PLUG THE LOOPHOLES, IF ANY IN THE BOT LAW AND OTHER PERTINENT
LEGISLATIONS.
(2) P.S. Res. No. 144, introduced by Senator Mar Roxas, entitled RESOLUTION
URGING PRESIDENT GLORIA MACAPAGAL ARROYO TO DIRECT THE
CANCELLATION OF THE ZTE CONTRACT
(3) P.S. Res. No. 129, introduced by Senator Panfilo M. Lacson, entitled RESOLUTION
DIRECTING THE COMMITTEE ON NATIONAL DEFENSE AND SECURITY TO
CONDUCT AN INQUIRY IN AID OF LEGISLATION INTO THE NATIONAL
SECURITY IMPLICATIONS OF AWARDING THE NATIONAL BROADBAND
NETWORK CONTRACT TO THE CHINESE FIRM ZHONG XING
TELECOMMUNICATIONS
EQUIPMENT
COMPANY
LIMITED
(ZTE
CORPORATION) WITH THE END IN VIEW OF PROVIDING REMEDIAL
LEGISLATION THAT WILL PROTECT OUR NATIONAL SOVEREIGNTY,
SECURITY AND TERRITORIAL INTEGRITY.
(4) P.S. Res. No. 136, introduced by Senator Miriam Defensor Santiago, entitled
RESOLUTION DIRECTING THE PROPER SENATE COMMITTEE TO CONDUCT
AN INQUIRY, IN AID OF LEGISLATION, ON THE LEGAL AND ECONOMIC
JUSTIFICATION OF THE NATIONAL BROADBAND NETWORK (NBN) PROJECT
OF THE NATIONAL GOVERNMENT.
At the same time, the investigation was claimed to be relevant to the consideration of three (3)
pending bills in the Senate, to wit:
1. Senate Bill No. 1793, introduced by Senator Mar Roxas, entitled AN ACT
SUBJECTING TREATIES, INTERNATIONAL OR EXECUTIVE AGREEMENTS
INVOLVING FUNDING IN THE PROCUREMENT OF INFRASTRUCTURE
PROJECTS, GOODS, AND CONSULTING SERVICES TO BE INCLUDED IN THE
SCOPE AND APPLICATION OF PHILIPPINE PROCUREMENT LAWS, AMENDING
FOR THE PURPOSE REPUBLIC ACT NO. 9184, OTHERWISE KNOWN AS THE
GOVERNMENT PROCUREMENT REFORM ACT, AND FOR OTHER PURPOSES;
2. Senate Bill No. 1794, introduced by Senator Mar Roxas, entitled AN ACT IMPOSING
SAFEGUARDS IN CONTRACTING LOANS CLASSIFIED AS OFFICIAL
DEVELOPMENT ASSISTANCE, AMENDING FOR THE PURPOSE REPUBLIC ACT
NO. 8182, AS AMENDED BY REPUBLIC ACT NO. 8555, OTHERWISE KNOWN AS
THE OFFICIAL DEVELOPMENT ASSISTANCE ACT OF 1996, AND FOR OTHER
PURPOSES; and
3. Senate Bill No. 1317, introduced by Senator Miriam Defensor Santiago, entitled AN
ACT MANDATING CONCURRENCE TO INTERNATIONAL AGREEMENTS AND
EXECUTIVE AGREEMENTS.
Respondent Committees initiated the investigation by sending invitations to certain personalities
and cabinet officials involved in the NBN Project. Petitioner was among those invited. He was
summoned to appear and testify on September 18, 20, and 26 and October 25, 2007. However, he
attended only the September 26 hearing, claiming he was "out of town" during the other dates.
In the September 18, 2007 hearing, businessman Jose de Venecia III testified that several high
executive officials and power brokers were using their influence to push the approval of the NBN
Project by the NEDA. It appeared that the Project was initially approved as a Build-OperateTransfer (BOT) project but, on March 29, 2007, the NEDA acquiesced to convert it into a
government-to-government project, to be financed through a loan from the Chinese Government.
On September 26, 2007, petitioner testified before respondent Committees for eleven (11) hours.
He disclosed that then Commission on Elections (COMELEC) Chairman Benjamin Abalos
offered him P200 Million in exchange for his approval of the NBN Project. He further narrated
that he informed President Arroyo about the bribery attempt and that she instructed him not to
accept the bribe. However, when probed further on what they discussed about the NBN Project,
petitioner refused to answer, invoking "executive privilege". In particular, he refused to answer
the questions on (a) whether or not President Arroyo followed up the NBN Project, 6 (b) whether
or not she directed him to prioritize it,7 and (c) whether or not she directed him to approve.8
Unrelenting, respondent Committees issued a Subpoena Ad Testificandum to petitioner, requiring
him to appear and testify on November 20, 2007.
However, in the Letter dated November 15, 2007, Executive Secretary Eduardo R. Ermita
requested respondent Committees to dispense with petitioner's testimony on the ground of
executive privilege. The pertinent portion of the letter reads:
With reference to the subpoena ad testificandum issued to Secretary Romulo Neri to
appear and testify again on 20 November 2007 before the Joint Committees you chair, it
will be recalled that Sec. Neri had already testified and exhaustively discussed the ZTE /
NBN project, including his conversation with the President thereon last 26 September
2007.
Asked to elaborate further on his conversation with the President, Sec. Neri asked for
time to consult with his superiors in line with the ruling of the Supreme Court in Senate
v. Ermita, 488 SCRA 1 (2006).
Specifically, Sec. Neri sought guidance on the possible invocation of executive privilege
on the following questions, to wit:
a) Whether the President followed up the (NBN) project?
b) Were you dictated to prioritize the ZTE?
c) Whether the President said to go ahead and approve the project after
being told about the alleged bribe?
Following the ruling in Senate v. Ermita, the foregoing questions fall under conversations
and correspondence between the President and public officials which are considered
executive privilege (Almonte v. Vasquez, G.R. 95637, 23 May 1995; Chavez v. PEA, G.R.
133250, July 9, 2002). Maintaining the confidentiality of conversations of the President is
necessary in the exercise of her executive and policy decision making process. The
expectation of a President to the confidentiality of her conversations and
correspondences, like the value which we accord deference for the privacy of all citizens,
is the necessity for protection of the public interest in candid, objective, and even blunt or
harsh opinions in Presidential decision-making. Disclosure of conversations of the
President will have a chilling effect on the President, and will hamper her in the effective
discharge of her duties and responsibilities, if she is not protected by the confidentiality
of her conversations.
The context in which executive privilege is being invoked is that the information sought
to be disclosed might impair our diplomatic as well as economic relations with the
People's Republic of China. Given the confidential nature in which these information
were conveyed to the President, he cannot provide the Committee any further details of
these conversations, without disclosing the very thing the privilege is designed to protect.
In light of the above considerations, this Office is constrained to invoke the settled
doctrine of executive privilege as refined in Senate v. Ermita, and has advised Secretary
Neri accordingly.
Considering that Sec. Neri has been lengthily interrogated on the subject in an
unprecedented 11-hour hearing, wherein he has answered all questions propounded to
him except the foregoing questions involving executive privilege, we therefore request
that his testimony on 20 November 2007 on the ZTE / NBN project be dispensed with.
On November 20, 2007, petitioner did not appear before respondent Committees. Thus, on
November 22, 2007, the latter issued the show cause Letter requiring him to explain why he
should not be cited in contempt. The Letter reads:
Since you have failed to appear in the said hearing, the Committees on Accountability of
Public Officers and Investigations (Blue Ribbon), Trade and Commerce and National
Defense and Security require you to show cause why you should not be cited in contempt
under Section 6, Article 6 of the Rules of the Committee on Accountability of Public
Officers and Investigations (Blue Ribbon).
The Senate expects your explanation on or before 2 December 2007.
On November 29, 2007, petitioner replied to respondent Committees, manifesting that it was not
his intention to ignore the Senate hearing and that he thought the only remaining questions were
those he claimed to be covered by executive privilege, thus:
It was not my intention to snub the last Senate hearing. In fact, I have cooperated with the
task of the Senate in its inquiry in aid of legislation as shown by my almost 11 hours stay
during the hearing on 26 September 2007. During said hearing, I answered all the
questions that were asked of me, save for those which I thought was covered by executive
privilege, and which was confirmed by the Executive Secretary in his Letter 15
November 2007. In good faith, after that exhaustive testimony, I thought that what
remained were only the three questions, where the Executive Secretary claimed executive
privilege. Hence, his request that my presence be dispensed with.
Be that as it may, should there be new matters that were not yet taken up during the 26
September 2007 hearing, may I be furnished in advance as to what else I need to clarify,
so that as a resource person, I may adequately prepare myself.
In addition, petitioner submitted a letter prepared by his counsel, Atty. Antonio R. Bautista,
stating, among others that: (1) his (petitioner) non-appearance was upon the order of the
President; and (2) his conversation with President Arroyo dealt with delicate and sensitive
national security and diplomatic matters relating to the impact of the bribery scandal involving
high government officials and the possible loss of confidence of foreign investors and lenders in
the Philippines. The letter ended with a reiteration of petitioner's request that he "be furnished in
advance" as to what else he needs to clarify so that he may adequately prepare for the hearing.
In the interim, on December 7, 2007, petitioner filed with this Court the present petition
for certiorari assailing the show cause Letter dated November 22, 2007.
Respondent Committees found petitioner's explanations unsatisfactory. Without responding to his
request for advance notice of the matters that he should still clarify, they issued the Order dated
January 30, 2008, citing him in contempt of respondent Committees and ordering his arrest and
detention at the Office of the Senate Sergeant-At-Arms until such time that he would appear and
give his testimony. The said Order states:
ORDER
For failure to appear and testify in the Committee's hearing on Tuesday, September 18,
2007; Thursday, September 20, 2007; Thursday, October 25, 2007; and Tuesday,
November 20, 2007, despite personal notice and Subpoenas Ad Testificandum sent to and
received by him, which thereby delays, impedes and obstructs, as it has in fact delayed,
impeded and obstructed the inquiry into the subject reported irregularities, AND for
failure to explain satisfactorily why he should not be cited for contempt (Neri letter of 29
November 2007), herein attached) ROMULO L. NERI is hereby cited in contempt of
this (sic) Committees and ordered arrested and detained in the Office of the Senate
Sergeant-At-Arms until such time that he will appear and give his testimony.
The Sergeant-At-Arms is hereby directed to carry out and implement this Order and make
a return hereof within twenty four (24) hours from its enforcement.
SO ORDERED.
On the same date, petitioner moved for the reconsideration of the above Order. 9 He insisted that
he has not shown "any contemptible conduct worthy of contempt and arrest." He emphasized his
willingness to testify on new matters, however, respondent Committees did not respond to his
request for advance notice of questions. He also mentioned the petition for certiorari he filed on
December 7, 2007. According to him, this should restrain respondent Committees from enforcing
the show cause Letter "through the issuance of declaration of contempt" and arrest.
In view of respondent Committees' issuance of the contempt Order, petitioner filed on February
1, 2008 aSupplemental Petition for Certiorari (With Urgent Application for TRO/Preliminary
Injunction), seeking to restrain the implementation of the said contempt Order.
On February 5, 2008, the Court issued a Status Quo Ante Order (a) enjoining respondent
Committees from implementing their contempt Order, (b) requiring the parties to observe the
status quo prevailing prior to the issuance of the assailed order, and (c) requiring respondent
Committees to file their comment.
Petitioner contends that respondent Committees' show cause Letter and contempt Order were
issued with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction. He stresses that
his conversations with President Arroyo are "candid discussions meant to explore options in
making policy decisions." According to him, these discussions "dwelt on the impact of the
bribery scandal involving high government officials on the country's diplomatic relations
and economic and military affairs and the possible loss of confidence of foreign investors
and lenders in the Philippines." He also emphasizes that his claim of executive privilege is
upon the order of the President and within the parameters laid down in Senate v.
Ermita10 and United States v. Reynolds.11 Lastly, he argues that he is precluded from disclosing
communications made
to him in official confidence under Section 712 of Republic Act No. 6713, otherwise known
as Code of Conduct and Ethical Standards for Public Officials and Employees, and Section
2413 (e) of Rule 130 of the Rules of Court.
Respondent Committees assert the contrary. They argue that (1) petitioner's testimony is material
and pertinent in the investigation conducted in aid of legislation; (2) there is no valid justification
for petitioner to claim executive privilege; (3) there is no abuse of their authority to order
petitioner's arrest; and (4) petitioner has not come to court with clean hands.
In the oral argument held last March 4, 2008, the following issues were ventilated:
1. What communications between the President and petitioner Neri are covered by the
principle of 'executive privilege'?
1.a Did Executive Secretary Ermita correctly invoke the principle of executive
privilege, by order of the President, to cover (i) conversations of the President in
the exercise of her executive and policy decision-making and (ii) information,
which might impair our diplomatic as well as economic relations with the
People's Republic of China?
1.b. Did petitioner Neri correctly invoke executive privilege to avoid testifying on
his conversations with the President on the NBN contract on his assertions that
the said conversations "dealt with delicate and sensitive national security and
diplomatic matters relating to the impact of bribery scandal involving high
government officials and the possible loss of confidence of foreign investors
and lenders in the Philippines" x x x within the principles laid down in Senate
v. Ermita (488 SCRA 1 [2006])?
1.c Will the claim of executive privilege in this case violate the following
provisions of the Constitution:
Sec. 28, Art. II (Full public disclosure of all transactions involving public
interest)
Sec. 7, Art. III (The right of the people to information on matters of
public concern)
Sec. 1, Art. XI (Public office is a public trust)
Sec. 17, Art. VII (The President shall ensure that the laws be faithfully
executed)
and the due process clause and the principle of separation of powers?
2. What is the proper procedure to be followed in invoking executive privilege?
3. Did the Senate Committees gravely abuse their discretion in ordering the arrest of
petitioner for non-compliance with the subpoena?
After the oral argument, the parties were directed to manifest to the Court within twenty-four
(24) hours if they are amenable to the Court's proposal of allowing petitioner to immediately
resume his testimony before the Senate Committees to answer the other questions of the Senators
without prejudice to the decision on the merits of this pending petition. It was understood that
petitioner may invoke executive privilege in the course of the Senate Committees proceedings,
and if the respondent Committees disagree thereto, the unanswered questions will be the subject
of a supplemental pleading to be resolved along with the three (3) questions subject of the
present petition.14 At the same time, respondent Committees were directed to submit several
pertinent documents.15
The Senate did not agree with the proposal for the reasons stated in the Manifestation dated
March 5, 2008. As to the required documents, the Senate and respondent Committees manifested
that they would not be able to submit the latter's "Minutes of all meetings" and the "Minute
Book" because it has never been the "historical and traditional legislative practice to keep
them."16 They instead submitted the Transcript of Stenographic Notes of respondent Committees'
joint public hearings.
On March 17, 2008, the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) filed a Motion for Leave to
Intervene and to Admit Attached Memorandum, founded on the following arguments:
(1) The communications between petitioner and the President are covered by the
principle of "executive privilege."
(2) Petitioner was not summoned by respondent Senate Committees in accordance with
the law-making body's power to conduct inquiries in aid of legislation as laid down in
Section 21, Article VI of the Constitution and Senate v. Ermita.
(3) Respondent Senate Committees gravely abused its discretion for alleged noncompliance with theSubpoena dated November 13, 2007.
The Court granted the OSG's motion the next day, March 18, 2008.
As the foregoing facts unfold, related events transpired.
On March 6, 2008, President Arroyo issued Memorandum Circular No. 151, revoking Executive
Order No. 464 and Memorandum Circular No. 108. She advised executive officials and
employees to follow and abide by the Constitution, existing laws and jurisprudence, including,
among others, the case of Senate v. Ermita17 when they are invited to legislative inquiries in aid
of legislation.
At the core of this controversy are the two (2) crucial queries, to wit:
First, are the communications elicited by the subject three (3) questions covered by
executive privilege?
And second, did respondent Committees commit grave abuse of discretion in issuing the
contempt Order?
We grant the petition.
At the outset, a glimpse at the landmark case of Senate v. Ermita18 becomes
imperative. Senate draws
in
bold
strokes
the
distinction
between
the legislative and oversight powers of the Congress, as embodied under Sections 21 and 22,
respectively, of Article VI of the Constitution, to wit:
SECTION 21. The Senate or the House of Representatives or any of its respective
committees may conduct inquiries in aid of legislation in accordance with its duly
published rules of procedure. The rights of persons appearing in or affected by such
inquiries shall be respected.
SECTION 22. The heads of department may upon their own initiative, with the consent
of the President, or upon the request of either House, or as the rules of each House shall
provide, appear before and be heard by such House on any matter pertaining to their
departments. Written questions shall be submitted to the President of the Senate or the
Speaker of the House of Representatives at least three days before their scheduled
appearance. Interpellations shall not be limited to written questions, but may cover
matters related thereto. When the security of the state or the public interest so requires
and the President so states in writing, the appearance shall be conducted in executive
session.
Senate cautions that while the above provisions are closely related and complementary to each
other, they should not be considered as pertaining to the same power of Congress. Section 21
relates to the power to conduct inquiries in aid of legislation. Its aim is to elicit information that
may be used for legislation. On the other hand, Section 22 pertains to the power to conduct a
question hour, the objective of which is to obtain information in pursuit of Congress' oversight
function.19 Simply stated, while both powers allow Congress or any of its committees to conduct
inquiry, their objectives are different.
This distinction gives birth to another distinction with regard to the use of compulsory process.
Unlike in Section 21, Congress cannot compel the appearance of executive officials under
Section 22. The Court's pronouncement in Senate v. Ermita20 is clear:
When Congress merely seeks to be informed on how department heads are implementing
the statutes which it has issued, its right to such information is not as imperative as that of
the President to whom, as Chief Executive, such department heads must give a report of
their performance as a matter of duty. In such instances, Section 22, in keeping with the
separation of powers, states that Congress may onlyrequest their appearance.
Nonetheless, when the inquiry in which Congress requires their appearance is 'in aid of
legislation' under Section 21, the appearance is mandatory for the same reasons stated
in Arnault.
In fine, the oversight function of Congress may be facilitated by compulsory process
only to the extent that it is performed in pursuit of legislation. This is consistent with
the intent discerned from the deliberations of the Constitutional Commission
Ultimately, the power of Congress to compel the appearance of executive officials under
section 21 and the lack of it under Section 22 find their basis in the principle of
separation of powers. While the executive branch is a co-equal branch of the legislature,
it cannot frustrate the power of Congress to legislate by refusing to comply with its
demands for information. (Emphasis supplied.)
The availability of the power of judicial review to resolve the issues raised in this case has also
been settled inSenate v. Ermita, when it held:
As evidenced by the American experience during the so-called "McCarthy era," however,
the right of Congress to conduct inquiries in aid of legislation is, in theory, no less
susceptible to abuse than executive or judicial power. It may thus be subjected to judicial
review pursuant to the Court's certiorari powers under Section 1, Article VIII of the
Constitution.
Hence, this decision.
I
The Communications Elicited by the Three (3) Questions are Covered by Executive Privilege
We start with the basic premises where the parties have conceded.
The power of Congress to conduct inquiries in aid of legislation is broad. This is based on the
proposition that a legislative body cannot legislate wisely or effectively in the absence of
information respecting the conditions which the legislation is intended to affect or
change.21 Inevitably, adjunct thereto is the compulsory process to enforce it. But, the power,
broad as it is, has limitations. To be valid, it is imperative that it is done in accordance with the
Senate or House duly published rules of procedure and that the rights of the persons appearing in
or affected by such inquiries be respected.
The power extends even to executive officials and the only way for them to be exempted is
through a valid claim of executive privilege. 22 This directs us to the consideration of the question
-- is there a recognized claim of executive privilege despite the revocation of E.O. 464?
A- There is a Recognized Claim
of Executive Privilege Despite the
Revocation of E.O. 464
At this juncture, it must be stressed that the revocation of E.O. 464 does not in any way diminish
our concept of executive privilege. This is because this concept has Constitutional
underpinnings. Unlike the United States which has further accorded the concept with statutory
status by enacting the Freedom of Information Act23 and theFederal Advisory Committee
Act,24 the Philippines has retained its constitutional origination, occasionally interpreted only by
this Court in various cases. The most recent of these is the case of Senate v. Ermita where this
Court declared unconstitutional substantial portions of E.O. 464. In this regard, it is worthy to
note that Executive Ermita's Letter dated November 15, 2007 limits its bases for the claim of
executive privilege to Senate v. Ermita, Almonte v. Vasquez,25 and Chavez v. PEA.26 There was
never a mention of E.O. 464.
While these cases, especially Senate v. Ermita,27 have comprehensively discussed the concept of
executive privilege, we deem it imperative to explore it once more in view of the clamor for this
Court to clearly define the communications covered by executive privilege.
The Nixon and post-Watergate cases established the broad contours of the presidential
communications privilege.28 In United States v. Nixon,29 the U.S. Court recognized a great
public interest in preserving "the confidentiality of conversations that take place in the
President's performance of his official duties." It thus considered presidential communications
as "presumptively privileged." Apparently, the presumption is founded on the "President's
generalized interest in confidentiality." The privilege is said to be necessary to guarantee the
candor of presidential advisors and to provide "the President and those who assist him with
freedom to explore alternatives in the process of shaping policies and making decisions and
to do so in a way many would be unwilling to express except privately."
In In Re: Sealed Case,30 the U.S. Court of Appeals delved deeper. It ruled that there are two (2)
kinds of executive privilege; one is the presidential communications privilege and, the other
is the deliberative process privilege. The former pertains to "communications, documents or
other materials that reflect presidential decision-making and deliberations and that the
President believes should remain confidential." The latter includes 'advisory opinions,
recommendations and deliberations comprising part of a process by which governmental
decisions and policies are formulated."
Accordingly, they are characterized by marked distinctions. Presidential communications
privilege applies todecision-making of the President while, the deliberative process privilege,
to decision-making of executive officials. The first is rooted in the constitutional principle of
separation of power and the President's unique constitutional role; the second on common law
privilege. Unlike the deliberative process privilege, thepresidential communications
privilege applies to documents in their entirety, and covers final and post-decisional
materials as well as pre-deliberative ones 31 As a consequence, congressional or judicial
negation of the presidential communications privilege is always subject to greater scrutiny
than denial of thedeliberative process privilege.
Turning on who are the officials covered by the presidential communications privilege, In Re:
Sealed Caseconfines the privilege only to White House Staff that has "operational proximity" to
direct presidential decision-making. Thus, the privilege is meant to encompass only those
functions that form the core of presidential authority, involving what the court characterized as
"quintessential and non-delegable Presidential power," such as commander-in-chief power,
appointment and removal power, the power to grant pardons and reprieves, the sole-authority to
receive ambassadors and other public officers, the power to negotiate treaties, etc.32
The situation in Judicial Watch, Inc. v. Department of Justice 33 tested the In Re: Sealed
Case principles. There, while the presidential decision involved is the exercise of the President's
pardon power, a non-delegable, core-presidential function, the Deputy Attorney General and the
Pardon Attorney were deemed to be too remote from the President and his senior White House
advisors to be protected. The Court conceded that
functionally those officials were performing a task directly related to the President's pardon
power, but concluded that an organizational test was more appropriate for confining the
potentially broad sweep that would result from the In Re: Sealed Case's functional test. The
majority concluded that, the lesser protections of the deliberative process privilege would suffice.
That privilege was, however, found insufficient to justify the confidentiality of the 4,341
withheld documents.
But more specific classifications of communications covered by executive privilege are made in
older cases. Courts ruled early that the Executive has a right to withhold documents that might
reveal military or state secrets,34 identity of government informers in some
circumstances,,35 and information related to pending investigations.36 An area where the
privilege is highly revered is in foreign relations. In United States v. Curtiss-Wright Export
Corp.37 the U.S. Court, citing President George Washington, pronounced:
The nature of foreign negotiations requires caution, and their success must often depend
on secrecy, and even when brought to a conclusion, a full disclosure of all the measures,
demands, or eventual concessions which may have been proposed or contemplated would
be extremely impolitic, for this might have a pernicious influence on future negotiations
or produce immediate inconveniences, perhaps danger and mischief, in relation to other
powers. The necessity of such caution and secrecy was one cogent reason for vesting the
power of making treaties in the President, with the advice and consent of the Senate, the
principle on which the body was formed confining it to a small number of members. To
admit, then, a right in the House of Representatives to demand and to have as a matter of
course all the papers respecting a negotiation with a foreign power would be to establish
a dangerous precedent.
Majority of the above jurisprudence have found their way in our jurisdiction. In Chavez v.
PCGG38, this Court held that there is a "governmental privilege against public disclosure with
respect to state secrets regarding military, diplomatic and other security matters." In Chavez v.
PEA,39 there is also a recognition of the confidentiality of Presidential conversations,
correspondences, and discussions in closed-door Cabinet meetings. In Senate v. Ermita, the
concept of presidential communications privilege is fully discussed.
As may be gleaned from the above discussion, the claim of executive privilege is highly
recognized in cases where the subject of inquiry relates to a power textually committed by the
Constitution to the President, such as the area of military and foreign relations. Under our
Constitution,
the
President
is
the
repository
of
the
commander-in40
41
42
43
chief, appointing, pardoning, and diplomatic powers. Consistent with the doctrine of
separation of powers, the information relating to these powers may enjoy greater confidentiality
than others.
The above cases, especially, Nixon, In Re Sealed Case and Judicial Watch, somehow provide the
elements ofpresidential communications privilege, to wit:
1) The protected communication must relate to a "quintessential and non-delegable

presidential power."
2) The communication must be authored or "solicited and received" by a close advisor of
the President or the President himself. The judicial test is that an advisor must be in
"operational proximity" with the President.
3) The presidential communications privilege remains a qualified privilege that may be
overcome by a showing of adequate need, such that the information sought "likely
contains important evidence" and by the unavailability of the information elsewhere by
an appropriate investigating authority.44
In the case at bar, Executive Secretary Ermita premised his claim of executive privilege on the
ground that the communications elicited by the three (3) questions "fall under conversation and
correspondence between the President and public officials" necessary in "her executive and
policy decision-making process" and, that "the information sought to be disclosed might impair
our diplomatic as well as economic relations with the People's Republic of China." Simply put,
the bases are presidential communications privilege and executive privilege on matters relating
to diplomacy or foreign relations.
Using the above elements, we are convinced that, indeed, the communications elicited by the
three (3) questions are covered by the presidential communications privilege. First, the
communications relate to a "quintessential and non-delegable power" of the President, i.e. the
power to enter into an executive agreement with other countries. This authority of the President
to enter into executive agreements without the concurrence of the Legislature has traditionally
been recognized in Philippine jurisprudence.45 Second, the communications are "received" by a
close advisor of the President. Under the "operational proximity" test, petitioner can be
considered a close advisor, being a member of President Arroyo's cabinet. And third, there is no
adequate showing of a compelling need that would justify the limitation of the privilege and of
the unavailability of the information elsewhere by an appropriate investigating authority.
The third element deserves a lengthy discussion.
United States v. Nixon held that a claim of executive privilege is subject to balancing against
other interest. In other words, confidentiality in executive privilege is not absolutely protected
by the Constitution. The U.S. Court held:
[N]either the doctrine of separation of powers, nor the need for confidentiality of highlevel communications, without more, can sustain an absolute, unqualified Presidential
privilege of immunity from judicial process under all circumstances.
The foregoing is consistent with the earlier case of Nixon v. Sirica,46 where it was held
that presidential communications are presumptively privileged and that the presumption can be
overcome only by mere showing of public need by the branch seeking access to conversations.
The courts are enjoined to resolve the competing interests of the political branches of the
government "in the manner that preserves the essential functions of each Branch." 47 Here, the
record is bereft of any categorical explanation from respondent Committees to show a
compelling or citical need for the answers to the three (3) questions in the enactment of a law.
Instead, the questions veer more towards the exercise of the legislative oversight function under
Section 22 of Article VI rather than Section 21 of the same Article. Senate v. Ermita ruled that
the "the oversight function of Congress may be facilitated by compulsory process only to
the extent that it is performed in pursuit of legislation." It is conceded that it is difficult to
draw the line between an inquiry in aid of legislation and an inquiry in the exercise of oversight
function of Congress. In this regard, much will depend on the content of the questions and the
manner the inquiry is conducted.
Respondent Committees argue that a claim of executive privilege does not guard against a
possible disclosure of a crime or wrongdoing. We see no dispute on this. It is settled in United
States v. Nixon48 that "demonstrated, specific need for evidence in pending criminal trial"
outweighs the President's "generalized interest in confidentiality." However, the present case's
distinction with the Nixon case is very evident. In Nixon, there is a pending criminal proceeding
where the information is requested and it is the demands of due process of law and the fair
administration of criminal justice that the information be disclosed. This is the reason why the
U.S. Court was quick to "limit the scope of its decision." It stressed that it is "not concerned
here with the balance between the President's generalized interest in confidentiality x x x
and congressional demands for information." Unlike in Nixon, the information here is
elicited, not in a criminal proceeding, but in a legislative inquiry. In this regard, Senate v. Ermita
stressed that the validity of the claim of executive privilege depends not only on the ground
invoked but, also, on the procedural setting or the context in which the claim is made.
Furthermore, in Nixon, the President did not interpose any claim of need to protect military,
diplomatic or sensitive national security secrets. In the present case, Executive Secretary Ermita
categorically claims executive privilege on the grounds of presidential communications
privilege in relation to her executive and policy decision-making process and diplomatic secrets.
The respondent Committees should cautiously tread into the investigation of matters which may
present a conflict of interest that may provide a ground to inhibit the Senators participating in the
inquiry if later on an impeachment proceeding is initiated on the same subject matter of the
present Senate inquiry. Pertinently, in Senate Select Committee on Presidential Campaign
Activities v. Nixon,49 it was held that since an impeachment proceeding had been initiated by a
House Committee, the Senate Select Committee's immediate oversight need for five presidential
tapes should give way to the House Judiciary Committee which has the constitutional authority
to inquire into presidential impeachment. The Court expounded on this issue in this wise:
It is true, of course, that the Executive cannot, any more than the other branches of
government, invoke a general confidentiality privilege to shield its officials and
employees from investigations by the proper governmental institutions into possible
criminal wrongdoing. The Congress learned this as to its own privileges in Gravel v.
United States, as did the judicial branch, in a sense, in Clark v. United States, and the
executive branch itself in Nixon v. Sirica. But under Nixon v. Sirica, the showing
required to overcome the presumption favoring confidentiality turned, not on the
nature of the presidential conduct that the subpoenaed material might reveal, but,
instead, on the nature and appropriateness of the function in the performance of
which the material was sought, and the degree to which the material was necessary
to its fulfillment. Here also our task requires and our decision implies no judgment
whatever concerning possible presidential involvement in culpable activity. On the
contrary, we think the sufficiency of the Committee's showing must depend solely on
whether the subpoenaed evidence is demonstrably critical to the responsible
fulfillment of the Committee's functions.
In its initial briefs here, the Committee argued that it has shown exactly this. It contended
that resolution, on the basis of the subpoenaed tapes, of the conflicts in the testimony
before it 'would aid in a determination whether legislative involvement in political
campaigns is necessary' and 'could help engender the public support needed for basic
reforms in our electoral system.' Moreover, Congress has, according to the Committee,
power to oversee the operations of the executive branch, to investigate instances of
possible corruption and malfeasance in office, and to expose the results of its
investigations to public view. The Committee says that with respect to Watergate-related
matters, this power has been delegated to it by the Senate, and that to exercise its power
responsibly, it must have access to the subpoenaed tapes.
We turn first to the latter contention. In the circumstances of this case, we need neither
deny that the Congress may have, quite apart from its legislative responsibilities, a
general oversight power, nor explore what the lawful reach of that power might be under
the Committee's constituent resolution. Since passage of that resolution, the House
Committee on the Judiciary has begun an inquiry into presidential impeachment. The
investigative authority of the Judiciary Committee with respect to presidential conduct
has an express constitutional source. x x x We have been shown no evidence indicating
that Congress itself attaches any particular value to this interest. In these
circumstances, we think the need for the tapes premised solely on an asserted power
to investigate and inform cannot justify enforcement of the Committee's subpoena.
The sufficiency of the Committee's showing of need has come to depend, therefore,
entirely on whether the subpoenaed materials are critical to the performance of its
legislative functions. There is a clear difference between Congress' legislative tasks and
the responsibility of a grand jury, or any institution engaged in like functions. While factfinding by a legislative committee is undeniably a part of its task, legislative
judgments normally depend more on the predicted consequences of proposed
legislative actions and their political acceptability, than on precise reconstruction of
past events; Congress frequently legislates on the basis of conflicting information
provided in its hearings. In contrast, the responsibility of the grand jury turns entirely on
its ability to determine whether there is probable cause to believe that certain named
individuals did or did not commit specific crimes. If, for example, as in Nixon v. Sirica,
one of those crimes is perjury concerning the content of certain conversations, the grand
jury's need for the most precise evidence, the exact text of oral statements recorded in
their original form, is undeniable. We see no comparable need in the legislative
process, at least not in the circumstances of this case. Indeed, whatever force there
might once have been in the Committee's argument that the subpoenaed materials are
necessary to its legislative judgments has been substantially undermined by subsequent
events. (Emphasis supplied)
Respondent Committees further contend that the grant of petitioner's claim of executive privilege
violates the constitutional provisions on the right of the people to information on matters of
public concern.50 We might have agreed with such contention if petitioner did not appear before
them at all. But petitioner made himself available to them during the September 26 hearing,
where he was questioned for eleven (11) hours. Not only that, he expressly manifested his
willingness to answer more questions from the Senators, with the exception only of those
covered by his claim of executive privilege.
The right to public information, like any other right, is subject to limitation. Section 7 of Article
III provides:
The right of the people to information on matters of public concern shall be recognized.
Access to official records, and to documents, and papers pertaining to official acts,
transactions, or decisions, as well as to government research data used as basis for policy
development, shall be afforded the citizen, subject to such limitations as may be
provided by law.
The provision itself expressly provides the limitation, i.e. as may be provided by law. Some of
these laws are Section 7 of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 6713, 51 Article 22952 of the Revised Penal
Code, Section 3 (k)53 of R.A. No. 3019, and Section 24(e)54 of Rule 130 of the Rules of Court.
These are in addition to what our body of jurisprudence classifies as confidential 55 and what our
Constitution considers as belonging to the larger concept of executive privilege. Clearly, there is
a recognized public interest in the confidentiality of certain information. We find the information
subject of this case belonging to such kind.
More than anything else, though, the right of Congress or any of its Committees to obtain
information in aid of legislation cannot be equated with the people's right to public information.
The former cannot claim that every legislative inquiry is an exercise of the people's right to
information. The distinction between such rights is laid down in Senate v. Ermita:
There are, it bears noting, clear distinctions between the right of Congress to information
which underlies the power of inquiry and the right of people to information on matters of
public concern. For one, the demand of a citizen for the production of documents
pursuant to his right to information does not have the same obligatory force as
a subpoena duces tecum issued by Congress. Neither does the right to information grant a
citizen the power to exact testimony from government officials. These powers belong
only to Congress, not to an individual citizen.
Thus, while Congress is composed of representatives elected by the people, it does
not follow, except in a highly qualified sense, that in every exercise of its power of
inquiry, the people are exercising their right to information.
The members of respondent Committees should not invoke as justification in their exercise of
power a right properly belonging to the people in general. This is because when they discharge
their power, they do so as public officials and members of Congress. Be that as it may, the right
to information must be balanced with and should give way, in appropriate cases, to constitutional
precepts particularly those pertaining to delicate interplay of executive-legislative powers and
privileges which is the subject of careful review by numerous decided cases.
BThe
is Properly Invoked
Claim
of
Executive
Privilege
We now proceed to the issue -- whether the claim is properly invoked by the
President. Jurisprudence teaches that for the claim to be properly invoked, there must be a
formal claim of privilege, lodged by the head of the department which has control over the
matter."56 A formal and proper claim of executive privilege requires a "precise and certain
reason" for preserving their confidentiality.57
The Letter dated November 17, 2007 of Executive Secretary Ermita satisfies the requirement. It
serves as the formal claim of privilege. There, he expressly states that "this Office is
constrained to invoke the settled doctrine of executive privilege as refined in Senate v.
Ermita, and has advised Secretary Neri accordingly." Obviously, he is referring to the Office
of the President. That is more than enough compliance. InSenate v. Ermita, a less categorical
letter was even adjudged to be sufficient.
With regard to the existence of "precise and certain reason," we find the grounds relied upon by
Executive Secretary Ermita specific enough so as not "to leave respondent Committees in the
dark on how the requested information could be classified as privileged." The case of Senate v.
Ermita only requires that an allegation be made "whether the information demanded involves
military or diplomatic secrets, closed-door Cabinet meetings, etc." The particular ground must
only be specified. The enumeration is not even intended to be comprehensive." 58 The following
statement of grounds satisfies the requirement:
The context in which executive privilege is being invoked is that the information sought
to be disclosed might impair our diplomatic as well as economic relations with the
People's Republic of China. Given the confidential nature in which these information
were conveyed to the President, he cannot provide the Committee any further details of
these conversations, without disclosing the very thing the privilege is designed to protect.
At any rate, as held further in Senate v. Ermita, 59 the Congress must not require the executive to
state the reasons for the claim with such particularity as to compel disclosure of the information
which the privilege is meant to protect. This is a matter of respect to a coordinate and co-equal
department.
II
Respondent Committees Committed Grave Abuse of Discretion

in Issuing the Contempt Order
Grave abuse of discretion means "such capricious and whimsical exercise of judgment as is
equivalent to lack of jurisdiction, or, in other words where the power is exercised in an arbitrary
or despotic manner by reason of passion or personal hostility and it must be so patent and gross
as to amount to an evasion of positive duty or to a virtual refusal to perform the duty enjoined or
to act at all in contemplation of law."60
It must be reiterated that when respondent Committees issued the show cause Letter dated
November 22, 2007, petitioner replied immediately, manifesting that it was not his intention to
ignore the Senate hearing and that he thought the only remaining questions were the three (3)
questions he claimed to be covered by executive privilege. In addition thereto, he submitted Atty.
Bautista's letter, stating that his non-appearance was upon the order of the President and
specifying the reasons why his conversations with President Arroyo are covered by executive
privilege. Both correspondences include an expression of his willingness to testify again,
provided he "be furnished in advance" copies of the questions. Without responding to his
request for advance list of questions, respondent Committees issued the Order dated January 30,
2008, citing him in contempt of respondent Committees and ordering his arrest and detention at
the Office of the Senate Sergeant-At-Arms until such time that he would appear and give his
testimony. Thereupon, petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration, informing respondent
Committees that he had filed the present petition for certiorari.
Respondent Committees committed grave abuse of discretion in issuing the contempt Order in
view of five (5) reasons.
First, there being a legitimate claim of executive privilege, the issuance of the contempt Order
suffers from constitutional infirmity.
Second, respondent Committees did not comply with the requirement laid down in Senate v.
Ermita that the invitations should contain the "possible needed statute which prompted the need
for the inquiry," along with "the usual indication of the subject of inquiry and
the questions relative to and in furtherance thereof." Compliance with this requirement is
imperative, both under Sections 21 and 22 of Article VI of the Constitution. This must be so to
ensure that the rights of both persons appearing in or affected by such inquiry are respected as
mandated by said Section 21 and by virtue of the express language of Section 22. Unfortunately,
despite petitioner's repeated demands, respondent Committees did not send him an advance list
of questions.
Third, a reading of the transcript of respondent Committees' January 30, 2008 proceeding reveals
that only a minority of the members of the Senate Blue Ribbon Committee was present during
the deliberation. 61 Section 18 of the Rules of Procedure Governing Inquiries in Aid of
Legislation provides that:
"The Committee, by a vote of majority of all its members, may punish for contempt any
witness before it who disobeys any order of the Committee or refuses to be sworn or to
testify or to answer proper questions by the Committee or any of its members."
Clearly, the needed vote is a majority of all the members of the Committee. Apparently,
members who did not actually participate in the deliberation were made to sign the contempt
Order. Thus, there is a cloud of doubt as to the validity of the contempt Order dated January 30,
2008. We quote the pertinent portion of the transcript, thus:
THE CHAIRMAN (SEN. CAYETANO, A). For clarification. x x x The Chair will
call either a caucus or will ask the Committee on Rules if there is a problem.
Meaning, if we do not have the sufficient numbers. But if we have a sufficient
number, we will just hold a caucus to be able to implement that right away
becauseAgain, our Rules provide that any one held in contempt and ordered
arrested, need the concurrence of a majority of all members of the said committee
and we have three committees conducting this.
So thank you very much to the members
SEN. PIMENTEL. Mr. Chairman.
THE CHAIRMAN (SEN. CAYETANO,A). May I recognize the Minority Leader
and give him the floor, Senator Pimentel.
SEN. PIMENTEL. Mr. Chairman, there is no problem, I think, with consulting the
other committees. But I am of the opinion that the Blue Ribbon Committee is the
lead committee, and therefore, it should have preference in enforcing its own
decisions. Meaning to say, it is not something that is subject to consultation with
other committees. I am not sure that is the right interpretation. I think that once we
decide here, we enforce what we decide, because otherwise, before we know it, our
determination is watered down by delay and, you know, the so-called "consultation"
that inevitably will have to take place if we follow the premise that has been
explained.
So my suggestion, Mr. Chairman, is the Blue Ribbon Committee should not forget it's the
lead committee here, and therefore, the will of the lead committee prevails over all the
other, you, know reservations that other committees might have who are only secondary
or even tertiary committees, Mr. Chairman.
THE CHAIRMAN (SEN. CAYETANO, A.) Thank you very much to the Minority
Leader. And I agree with the wisdom of his statements. I was merely mentioning that
under Section 6 of the Rules of the Committee and under Section 6, "The Committee by a
vote of a majority of all its members may punish for contempt any witness before it who
disobeys any order of the Committee."
So the Blue Ribbon Committee is more than willing to take that responsibility. But we
only have six members here today, I am the seventh as chair and so we have not met
that number. So I am merely stating that, sir, that when we will prepare the
documentation, if a majority of all members sign and I am following the Sabio v. Gordon
rule wherein I do believe, if I am not mistaken, Chairman Gordon prepared the
documentation and then either in caucus or in session asked the other members to sign.
And once the signatures are obtained, solely for the purpose that Secretary Neri or Mr.
Lozada will not be able to legally question our subpoena as being insufficient in
accordance with law.
SEN. PIMENTEL. Mr. Chairman, the caution that the chair is suggesting is very welltaken. But I'd like to advert to the fact that the quorum of the committee is only two as far
as I remember. Any two-member senators attending a Senate committee hearing provide
that quorum, and therefore there is more than a quorum demanded by our Rules as far as
we are concerned now, and acting as Blue Ribbon Committee, as Senator Enrile pointed
out. In any event, the signatures that will follow by the additional members will only tend
to strengthen the determination of this Committee to put its foot forward put down on
what is happening in this country, Mr. Chairman, because it really looks terrible if the
primary Committee of the Senate, which is the Blue Ribbon Committee, cannot even
sanction people who openly defy, you know, the summons of this Committee. I know that
the Chair is going through an agonizing moment here. I know that. But nonetheless, I
think we have to uphold, you know, the institution that we are representing because the
alternative will be a disaster for all of us, Mr. Chairman. So having said that, I'd like to
reiterate my point.
THE CHAIRMAN (SEN. CAYETANO, A.) First of all, I agree 100 percent with the
intentions of the Minority Leader. But let me very respectfully disagree with the legal
requirements. Because, yes, we can have a hearing if we are only two but both under
Section 18 of the Rules of the Senate and under Section 6 of the Rules of the Blue
Ribbon Committee, there is a need for a majority of all members if it is a case of
contempt and arrest. So, I am simply trying to avoid the court rebuking the Committee,
which will instead of strengthening will weaken us. But I do agree, Mr. Minority Leader,
that we should push for this and show the executive branch that the well-decided the
issue has been decided upon the Sabio versus Gordon case. And it's very clear that we are
all allowed to call witnesses. And if they refure or they disobey not only can we cite them
in contempt and have them arrested. x x x 62
Fourth, we find merit in the argument of the OSG that respondent Committees likewise violated
Section 21 of Article VI of the Constitution, requiring that the inquiry be in accordance with the
"duly published rules of procedure." We quote the OSG's explanation:
The phrase 'duly published rules of procedure' requires the Senate of every Congress to
publish its rules of procedure governing inquiries in aid of legislation because every
Senate is distinct from the one before it or after it. Since Senatorial elections are held
every three (3) years for one-half of the Senate's membership, the composition of the
Senate also changes by the end of each term. Each Senate may thus enact a different set
of rules as it may deem fit. Not having published its Rules of Procedure, the subject
hearings in aid of legislation conducted by the 14 th Senate, are therefore,
procedurally infirm.
And fifth, respondent Committees' issuance of the contempt Order is arbitrary and precipitate. It
must be pointed out that respondent Committees did not first pass upon the claim of executive
privilege and inform petitioner of their ruling. Instead, they curtly dismissed his explanation as
"unsatisfactory" and simultaneously issued the Order citing him in contempt and ordering his
immediate arrest and detention.
A fact worth highlighting is that petitioner is not an unwilling witness. He manifested several
times his readiness to testify before respondent Committees. He refused to answer the three (3)
questions because he was ordered by the President to claim executive privilege. It behooves
respondent Committees to first rule on the claim of executive privilege and inform petitioner of
their finding thereon, instead of peremptorily dismissing his explanation as "unsatisfactory."
Undoubtedly, respondent Committees' actions constitute grave abuse of discretion for being
arbitrary and for denying petitioner due process of law. The same quality afflicted their conduct
when they (a) disregarded petitioner's motion for reconsideration alleging that he had filed the
present petition before this Court and (b) ignored petitioner's repeated request for an advance list
of questions, if there be any aside from the three (3) questions as to which he claimed to be
covered by executive privilege.
Even the courts are repeatedly advised to exercise the power of contempt judiciously and
sparingly with utmost self-restraint with the end in view of utilizing the same for correction and
preservation of the dignity of the court, not for retaliation or vindication. 63 Respondent
Committees should have exercised the same restraint, after all petitioner is not even an ordinary
witness. He holds a high position in a co-equal branch of government.
In this regard, it is important to mention that many incidents of judicial review could have been
avoided if powers are discharged with circumspection and deference. Concomitant with the
doctrine of separation of powers is the mandate to observe respect to a co-equal branch of the
government.
One last word.
The Court was accused of attempting to abandon its constitutional duty when it required the
parties to consider a proposal that would lead to a possible compromise. The accusation is far
from the truth. The Court did so, only to test a tool that other jurisdictions find to be effective in
settling similar cases, to avoid a piecemeal consideration of the questions for review and to avert
a constitutional crisis between the executive and legislative branches of government.
In United States v. American Tel. & Tel Co.,64 the court refrained from deciding the case because
of its desire to avoid a resolution that might disturb the balance of power between the two
branches and inaccurately reflect their true needs. Instead, it remanded the record to the District
Court for further proceedings during which the parties are required to negotiate a settlement. In
the subsequent case of United States v. American Tel. &Tel Co.,65 it was held that "much of this
spirit of compromise is reflected in the generality of language found in the Constitution." It
proceeded to state:
Under this view, the coordinate branches do not exist in an exclusively adversary
relationship to one another when a conflict in authority arises. Rather each branch should
take cognizance of an implicit constitutional mandate to seek optimal accommodation
through a realistic evaluation of the needs of the conflicting branches in the particular fact
situation.
It thereafter concluded that: "The Separation of Powers often impairs efficiency, in terms of
dispatch and the immediate functioning of government. It is the long-term staying power of
government that is enhanced by the mutual accommodation required by the separation of
powers."
In rendering this decision, the Court emphasizes once more that the basic principles of
constitutional law cannot be subordinated to the needs of a particular situation. As magistrates,
our mandate is to rule objectively and dispassionately, always mindful of Mr. Justice Holmes'
warning on the dangers inherent in cases of this nature, thus:
"some accident of immediate and overwhelming interestappeals to the feelings and
distorts the judgment. These immediate interests exercise a kind of hydraulic pressure
which makes what previously was clear seem doubtful, and before which even well
settled principles of law will bend."66
In this present crusade to "search for truth," we should turn to the fundamental constitutional
principles which underlie our tripartite system of government, where the Legislature enacts the
law, the Judiciary interprets it and the Executive implements it. They are considered separate, coequal, coordinate and supreme within their respective spheres but, imbued with a system of
checks and balances to prevent unwarranted exercise of power. The Court's mandate is to
preserve these constitutional principles at all times to keep the political branches of government
within constitutional bounds in the exercise of their respective powers and prerogatives, even if it
be in the search for truth. This is the only way we can preserve the stability of our democratic
institutions and uphold the Rule of Law.
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby GRANTED. The subject Order dated January 30, 2008,
citing petitioner Romulo L. Neri in contempt of the Senate Committees and directing his arrest
and detention, is hereby nullified.
SO ORDERED.

SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. 170338
December 23, 2008
VIRGILIO O. GARCILLANO, petitioner,

vs.
THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES COMMITTEES ON PUBLIC INFORMATION,
PUBLIC ORDER AND SAFETY, NATIONAL DEFENSE AND SECURITY,
INFORMATION AND COMMUNICATIONS TECHNOLOGY, and SUFFRAGE AND
ELECTORAL REFORMS, respondents.
x----------------------x
G.R. No. 179275
December 23, 2008
SANTIAGO JAVIER RANADA and OSWALDO D. AGCAOILI, petitioners,

vs.
THE SENATE OF THE REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, REPRESENTED BY THE
SENATE PRESIDENT THE HONORABLE MANUEL VILLAR, respondents.
x----------------------x
MAJ. LINDSAY REX SAGGE, petitioner-in-intervention
x----------------------x
AQUILINO Q. PIMENTEL, JR., BENIGNO NOYNOY C. AQUINO, RODOLFO G.
BIAZON, PANFILO M. LACSON, LOREN B. LEGARDA, M.A. JAMBY A.S.
MADRIGAL, and ANTONIO F. TRILLANES, respondents-intervenors
DECISION
NACHURA, J.:
More than three years ago, tapes ostensibly containing a wiretapped conversation purportedly
between the President of the Philippines and a high-ranking official of the Commission on
Elections (COMELEC) surfaced. They captured unprecedented public attention and thrust the
country into a controversy that placed the legitimacy of the present administration on the line,
and resulted in the near-collapse of the Arroyo government. The tapes, notoriously referred to as
the "Hello Garci" tapes, allegedly contained the Presidents instructions to COMELEC
Commissioner Virgilio Garcillano to manipulate in her favor results of the 2004 presidential
elections. These recordings were to become the subject of heated legislative hearings conducted
separately by committees of both Houses of Congress.1
In the House of Representatives (House), on June 8, 2005, then Minority Floor Leader Francis G.
Escudero delivered a privilege speech, "Tale of Two Tapes," and set in motion a congressional
investigation jointly conducted by the Committees on Public Information, Public Order and
Safety, National Defense and Security, Information and Communications Technology, and
Suffrage and Electoral Reforms (respondent House Committees). During the inquiry, several
versions of the wiretapped conversation emerged. But on July 5, 2005, National Bureau of
Investigation (NBI) Director Reynaldo Wycoco, Atty. Alan Paguia and the lawyer of former NBI
Deputy Director Samuel Ong submitted to the respondent House Committees seven alleged
"original" tape recordings of the supposed three-hour taped conversation. After prolonged and
impassioned debate by the committee members on the admissibility and authenticity of the
recordings, the tapes were eventually played in the chambers of the House.2
On August 3, 2005, the respondent House Committees decided to suspend the hearings
indefinitely. Nevertheless, they decided to prepare committee reports based on the said
recordings and the testimonies of the resource persons.3
Alarmed by these developments, petitioner Virgilio O. Garcillano (Garcillano) filed with this
Court a Petition for Prohibition and Injunction, with Prayer for Temporary Restraining Order
and/or Writ of Preliminary Injunction4docketed as G.R. No. 170338. He prayed that the
respondent House Committees be restrained from using these tape recordings of the "illegally
obtained" wiretapped conversations in their committee reports and for any other purpose. He
further implored that the said recordings and any reference thereto be ordered stricken off the
records of the inquiry, and the respondent House Committees directed to desist from further
using the recordings in any of the House proceedings.5
Without reaching its denouement, the House discussion and debates on the "Garci tapes"
abruptly stopped.
After more than two years of quiescence, Senator Panfilo Lacson roused the slumbering issue
with a privilege speech, "The Lighthouse That Brought Darkness." In his discourse, Senator
Lacson promised to provide the public "the whole unvarnished truth the whats, whens,
wheres, whos and whys" of the alleged wiretap, and sought an inquiry into the perceived
willingness of telecommunications providers to participate in nefarious wiretapping activities.
On motion of Senator Francis Pangilinan, Senator Lacsons speech was referred to the Senate
Committee on National Defense and Security, chaired by Senator Rodolfo Biazon, who had
previously filed two bills6 seeking to regulate the sale, purchase and use of wiretapping
equipment and to prohibit the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP) from performing electoral
duties.7
In the Senates plenary session the following day, a lengthy debate ensued when Senator Richard
Gordon aired his concern on the possible transgression of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 4200 8 if the
body were to conduct a legislative inquiry on the matter. On August 28, 2007, Senator Miriam
Defensor-Santiago delivered a privilege speech, articulating her considered view that the
Constitution absolutely bans the use, possession, replay or communication of the contents of the
"Hello Garci" tapes. However, she recommended a legislative investigation into the role of the
Intelligence Service of the AFP (ISAFP), the Philippine National Police or other government
entities in the alleged illegal wiretapping of public officials.9
On September 6, 2007, petitioners Santiago Ranada and Oswaldo Agcaoili, retired justices of the
Court of Appeals, filed before this Court a Petition for Prohibition with Prayer for the Issuance of
a Temporary Restraining Order and/or Writ of Preliminary Injunction, 10 docketed as G.R. No.
179275, seeking to bar the Senate from conducting its scheduled legislative inquiry. They argued
in the main that the intended legislative inquiry violates R.A. No. 4200 and Section 3, Article III
of the Constitution.11
As the Court did not issue an injunctive writ, the Senate proceeded with its public hearings on
the "Hello Garci" tapes on September 7,12 1713 and October 1,14 2007.
Intervening as respondents,15 Senators Aquilino Q. Pimentel, Jr., Benigno Noynoy C. Aquino,

Rodolfo G. Biazon, Panfilo M. Lacson, Loren B. Legarda, M.A. Jamby A.S. Madrigal and
Antonio F. Trillanes filed their Comment16 on the petition on September 25, 2007.
The Court subsequently heard the case on oral argument.17
On October 26, 2007, Maj. Lindsay Rex Sagge, a member of the ISAFP and one of the resource
persons summoned by the Senate to appear and testify at its hearings, moved to intervene as
petitioner in G.R. No. 179275.18
On November 20, 2007, the Court resolved to consolidate G.R. Nos. 170338 and 179275.19
It may be noted that while both petitions involve the "Hello Garci" recordings, they have
different objectivesthe first is poised at preventing the playing of the tapes in the House and
their subsequent inclusion in the committee reports, and the second seeks to prohibit and stop the
conduct of the Senate inquiry on the wiretapped conversation.
The Court dismisses the first petition, G.R. No. 170338, and grants the second, G.R. No. 179275.
-IBefore delving into the merits of the case, the Court shall first resolve the issue on the parties
standing, argued at length in their pleadings.
In Tolentino v. COMELEC,20 we explained that "[l]egal standing or locus standi refers to a
personal and substantial interest in a case such that the party has sustained or will sustain direct
injury because of the challenged governmental act x x x," thus,
generally, a party will be allowed to litigate only when (1) he can show that he has
personally suffered some actual or threatened injury because of the allegedly illegal
conduct of the government; (2) the injury is fairly traceable to the challenged action; and
(3) the injury is likely to be redressed by a favorable action.21
The gist of the question of standing is whether a party has "alleged such a personal stake in the
outcome of the controversy as to assure that concrete adverseness which sharpens the
presentation of issues upon which the court so largely depends for illumination of difficult
constitutional questions."22
However, considering that locus standi is a mere procedural technicality, the Court, in recent
cases, has relaxed the stringent direct injury test. David v. Macapagal-Arroyo23 articulates that a
"liberal policy has been observed, allowing ordinary citizens, members of Congress, and civic
organizations to prosecute actions involving the constitutionality or validity of laws, regulations
and rulings."24 The fairly recent Chavez v. Gonzales25 even permitted a non-member of the
broadcast media, who failed to allege a personal stake in the outcome of the controversy, to
challenge the acts of the Secretary of Justice and the National Telecommunications Commission.
The majority, in the said case, echoed the current policy that "this Court has repeatedly and
consistently refused to wield procedural barriers as impediments to its addressing and resolving
serious legal questions that greatly impact on public interest, in keeping with the Courts duty
under the 1987 Constitution to determine whether or not other branches of government have kept
themselves within the limits of the Constitution and the laws, and that they have not abused the
discretion given to them."26
In G.R. No. 170338, petitioner Garcillano justifies his standing to initiate the petition by alleging
that he is the person alluded to in the "Hello Garci" tapes. Further, his was publicly identified by
the members of the respondent committees as one of the voices in the recordings. 27 Obviously,
therefore, petitioner Garcillano stands to be directly injured by the House committees actions
and charges of electoral fraud. The Court recognizes his standing to institute the petition for
prohibition.
In G.R. No. 179275, petitioners Ranada and Agcaoili justify their standing by alleging that they
are concerned citizens, taxpayers, and members of the IBP. They are of the firm conviction that
any attempt to use the "Hello Garci" tapes will further divide the country. They wish to see the
legal and proper use of public funds that will necessarily be defrayed in the ensuing public
hearings. They are worried by the continuous violation of the laws and individual rights, and the
blatant attempt to abuse constitutional processes through the conduct of legislative inquiries
purportedly in aid of legislation.28
Intervenor Sagge alleges violation of his right to due process considering that he is summoned to
attend the Senate hearings without being apprised not only of his rights therein through the
publication of the Senate Rules of Procedure Governing Inquiries in Aid of Legislation, but also
of the intended legislation which underpins the investigation. He further intervenes as a taxpayer
bewailing the useless and wasteful expenditure of public funds involved in the conduct of the
questioned hearings.29
Given that petitioners Ranada and Agcaoili allege an interest in the execution of the laws and that
intervenor Sagge asserts his constitutional right to due process, 30 they satisfy the requisite
personal stake in the outcome of the controversy by merely being citizens of the Republic.
Following the Courts ruling in Francisco, Jr. v. The House of Representatives,31 we find
sufficient petitioners Ranadas and Agcaoilis and intervenor Sagges allegation that the
continuous conduct by the Senate of the questioned legislative inquiry will necessarily involve
the expenditure of public funds.32 It should be noted that inFrancisco, rights personal to then
Chief Justice Hilario G. Davide, Jr. had been injured by the alleged unconstitutional acts of the
House of Representatives, yet the Court granted standing to the petitioners therein for, as in this
case, they invariably invoked the vindication of their own rightsas taxpayers, members of
Congress, citizens, individually or in a class suit, and members of the bar and of the legal
professionwhich were also supposedly violated by the therein assailed unconstitutional acts.33
Likewise, a reading of the petition in G.R. No. 179275 shows that the petitioners and intervenor
Sagge advance constitutional issues which deserve the attention of this Court in view of their
seriousness, novelty and weight as precedents. The issues are of transcendental and paramount
importance not only to the public but also to the Bench and the Bar, and should be resolved for
the guidance of all.34
Thus, in the exercise of its sound discretion and given the liberal attitude it has shown in prior
cases climaxing in the more recent case of Chavez, the Court recognizes the legal standing of
petitioners Ranada and Agcaoili and intervenor Sagge.
- II The Court, however, dismisses G.R. No. 170338 for being moot and academic. Repeatedly
stressed in our prior decisions is the principle that the exercise by this Court of judicial power is
limited to the determination and resolution of actual cases and controversies. 35 By actual cases,
we mean existing conflicts appropriate or ripe for judicial determination, not conjectural or
anticipatory, for otherwise the decision of the Court will amount to an advisory opinion. The
power of judicial inquiry does not extend to hypothetical questions because any attempt at
abstraction could only lead to dialectics and barren legal questions and to sterile conclusions
unrelated to actualities.36 Neither will the Court determine a moot question in a case in which no
practical relief can be granted. A case becomes moot when its purpose has become stale. 37 It is
unnecessary to indulge in academic discussion of a case presenting a moot question as a
judgment thereon cannot have any practical legal effect or, in the nature of things, cannot be
enforced.38
In G.R. No. 170338, petitioner Garcillano implores from the Court, as aforementioned, the
issuance of an injunctive writ to prohibit the respondent House Committees from playing the
tape recordings and from including the same in their committee report. He likewise prays that the
said tapes be stricken off the records of the House proceedings. But the Court notes that the
recordings were already played in the House and heard by its members.39 There is also the widely
publicized fact that the committee reports on the "Hello Garci" inquiry were completed and
submitted to the House in plenary by the respondent committees.40 Having been overtaken by
these events, the Garcillano petition has to be dismissed for being moot and academic. After all,
prohibition is a preventive remedy to restrain the doing of an act about to be done, and not
intended to provide a remedy for an act already accomplished.41
- III As to the petition in G.R. No. 179275, the Court grants the same. The Senate cannot be allowed
to continue with the conduct of the questioned legislative inquiry without duly published rules of
procedure, in clear derogation of the constitutional requirement.
Section 21, Article VI of the 1987 Constitution explicitly provides that "[t]he Senate or the
House of Representatives, or any of its respective committees may conduct inquiries in aid of
legislation in accordance with its duly published rules of procedure." The requisite of publication
of the rules is intended to satisfy the basic requirements of due process. 42 Publication is indeed
imperative, for it will be the height of injustice to punish or otherwise burden a citizen for the
transgression of a law or rule of which he had no notice whatsoever, not even a constructive
one.43 What constitutes publication is set forth in Article 2 of the Civil Code, which provides that
"[l]aws shall take effect after 15 days following the completion of their publication either in the
Official Gazette, or in a newspaper of general circulation in the Philippines."44
The respondents in G.R. No. 179275 admit in their pleadings and even on oral argument that the
Senate Rules of Procedure Governing Inquiries in Aid of Legislation had been published in
newspapers of general circulation only in 1995 and in 2006.45 With respect to the present Senate
of the 14th Congress, however, of which the term of half of its members commenced on June 30,
2007, no effort was undertaken for the publication of these rules when they first opened their
session.
Recently, the Court had occasion to rule on this very same question. In Neri v. Senate Committee
on Accountability of Public Officers and Investigations,46 we said:
Fourth, we find merit in the argument of the OSG that respondent Committees likewise
violated Section 21 of Article VI of the Constitution, requiring that the inquiry be in
accordance with the "duly published rules of procedure." We quote the OSGs
explanation:
The phrase "duly published rules of procedure" requires the Senate of every
Congress to publish its rules of procedure governing inquiries in aid of legislation
because every Senate is distinct from the one before it or after it. Since Senatorial
elections are held every three (3) years for one-half of the Senates membership,
the composition of the Senate also changes by the end of each term. Each Senate
may thus enact a different set of rules as it may deem fit. Not having published
its Rules of Procedure, the subject hearings in aid of legislation conducted by
the 14th Senate, are therefore, procedurally infirm.
Justice Antonio T. Carpio, in his Dissenting and Concurring Opinion, reinforces this ruling with
the following rationalization:
The present Senate under the 1987 Constitution is no longer a continuing legislative
body. The present Senate has twenty-four members, twelve of whom are elected every
three years for a term of six years each. Thus, the term of twelve Senators expires every
three years, leaving less than a majority of Senators to continue into the next
Congress. The 1987 Constitution, like the 1935 Constitution, requires a majority of
Senators to "constitute a quorum to do business." Applying the same reasoning inArnault
v. Nazareno, the Senate under the 1987 Constitution is not a continuing body because less
than majority of the Senators continue into the next Congress. The consequence is that
the Rules of Proceduremust be republished by the Senate after every expiry of the term of
twelve Senators.47
The subject was explained with greater lucidity in our Resolution48 (On the Motion for
Reconsideration) in the same case, viz.:
On the nature of the Senate as a "continuing body," this Court sees fit to issue a
clarification. Certainly, there is no debate that the Senate as an institution is
"continuing," as it is not dissolved as an entity with each national election or change in
the composition of its members. However, in the conduct of its day-to-day business the
Senate of each Congress acts separately and independently of the Senate of the Congress
before it. The Rules of the Senate itself confirms this when it states:
RULE
UNFINISHED BUSINESS
XLIV
SEC. 123. Unfinished business at the end of the session shall be taken up at the
next session in the same status.
All pending matters and proceedings shall terminate upon the expiration of
one (1) Congress, but may be taken by the succeeding Congress as if present for
the first time.
Undeniably from the foregoing, all pending matters and proceedings, i.e., unpassed bills
and even legislative investigations, of the Senate of a particular Congress are
considered terminated upon the expiration of that Congress and it is merely optional on
the Senate of the succeeding Congress to take up such unfinished matters, not in the
same status, but as if presented for the first time. The logic and practicality of such a
rule is readily apparent considering that the Senate of the succeeding Congress (which
will typically have a different composition as that of the previous Congress) should not
be bound by the acts and deliberations of the Senate of which they had no part. If the
Senate is a continuing body even with respect to the conduct of its business, then pending
matters will not be deemed terminated with the expiration of one Congress but will, as a
matter of course, continue into the next Congress with the same status.
This dichotomy of the continuity of the Senate as an institution and of the opposite nature
of the conduct of its business is reflected in its Rules. The Rules of the Senate (i.e. the
Senates main rules of procedure) states:
RULE
AMENDMENTS TO, OR REVISIONS OF, THE RULES
LI
SEC. 136. At the start of each session in which the Senators elected in the
preceding elections shall begin their term of office, the President may endorse the
Rules to the appropriate committee for amendment or revision.
The Rules may also be amended by means of a motion which should be presented
at least one day before its consideration, and the vote of the majority of the
Senators present in the session shall be required for its approval.
RULE
DATE OF TAKING EFFECT
LII
SEC. 137. These Rules shall take effect on the date of their adoption and shall
remain in force until they are amended or repealed.
Section 136 of the Senate Rules quoted above takes into account the new composition of
the Senate after an election and the possibility of the amendment or revision of the Rules
at the start of each session in which the newly elected Senators shall begin their term.
However, it is evident that the Senate has determined that its main rules are intended to
be valid from the date of their adoption until they are amended or repealed. Such
language is conspicuously absent from theRules. The Rules simply state "(t)hese Rules
shall take effect seven (7) days after publication in two (2) newspapers of general
circulation." The latter does not explicitly provide for the continued effectivity of such
rules until they are amended or repealed. In view of the difference in the language of the
two sets of Senate rules, it cannot be presumed that the Rules (on legislative inquiries)
would continue into the next Congress. The Senate of the next Congress may easily adopt
different rules for its legislative inquiries which come within the rule on unfinished
business.
The language of Section 21, Article VI of the Constitution requiring that the inquiry be
conducted in accordance with the duly published rules of procedure is categorical. It is
incumbent upon the Senate to publish the rules for its legislative inquiries in each
Congress or otherwise make the published rules clearly state that the same shall be
effective in subsequent Congresses or until they are amended or repealed to sufficiently
put public on notice.
If it was the intention of the Senate for its present rules on legislative inquiries to be
effective even in the next Congress, it could have easily adopted the same language it had
used in its main rules regarding effectivity.
Respondents justify their non-observance of the constitutionally mandated publication by
arguing that the rules have never been amended since 1995 and, despite that, they are published
in booklet form available to anyone for free, and accessible to the public at the Senates internet
web page.49
The Court does not agree. The absence of any amendment to the rules cannot justify the Senates
defiance of the clear and unambiguous language of Section 21, Article VI of the Constitution.
The organic law instructs, without more, that the Senate or its committees may conduct inquiries
in aid of legislation only in accordance with duly published rules of procedure, and does not
make any distinction whether or not these rules have undergone amendments or revision. The
constitutional mandate to publish the said rules prevails over any custom, practice or tradition
followed by the Senate.
Justice Carpios response to the same argument raised by the respondents is illuminating:
The publication of the Rules of Procedure in the website of the Senate, or in pamphlet
form available at the Senate, is not sufficient under the Taada v. Tuvera ruling which
requires publication either in the Official Gazette or in a newspaper of general
circulation. The Rules of Procedure even provide that the rules "shall take effect seven (7)
days after publication in two (2) newspapers of general circulation," precluding any other
form of publication. Publication in accordance with Taada is mandatory to comply with
the due process requirement because the Rules of Procedure put a persons liberty at risk.
A person who violates the Rules of Procedure could be arrested and detained by the
Senate.
The invocation by the respondents of the provisions of R.A. No. 8792, 50 otherwise known as the
Electronic Commerce Act of 2000, to support their claim of valid publication through the
internet is all the more incorrect. R.A. 8792 considers an electronic data message or an electronic
document as the functional equivalent of a written document only for evidentiary purposes.51 In
other words, the law merely recognizes the admissibility in evidence (for their being the original)
of electronic data messages and/or electronic documents. 52 It does not make the internet a
medium for publishing laws, rules and regulations.
Given this discussion, the respondent Senate Committees, therefore, could not, in violation of the
Constitution, use its unpublished rules in the legislative inquiry subject of these consolidated
cases. The conduct of inquiries in aid of legislation by the Senate has to be deferred until it shall
have caused the publication of the rules, because it can do so only "in accordance with its duly
published rules of procedure."
Very recently, the Senate caused the publication of the Senate Rules of Procedure Governing
Inquiries in Aid of Legislation in the October 31, 2008 issues of Manila Bulletin and Malaya.
While we take judicial notice of this fact, the recent publication does not cure the infirmity of the
inquiry sought to be prohibited by the instant petitions. Insofar as the consolidated cases are
concerned, the legislative investigation subject thereof still could not be undertaken by the
respondent Senate Committees, because no published rules governed it, in clear contravention of
the Constitution.
With the foregoing disquisition, the Court finds it unnecessary to discuss the other issues raised
in the consolidated petitions.
WHEREFORE, the petition in G.R. No. 170338 is DISMISSED, and the petition in G.R. No.
179275 is GRANTED. Let a writ of prohibition be issued enjoining the Senate of the Republic of
the Philippines and/or any of its committees from conducting any inquiry in aid of legislation
centered on the "Hello Garci" tapes.
SO ORDERED.
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. 115455 October 30, 1995

ARTURO M. TOLENTINO, petitioner,
vs.
THE SECRETARY OF FINANCE and THE COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL
REVENUE, respondents.
G.R. No. 115525 October 30, 1995
JUAN T. DAVID, petitioner,
vs.
TEOFISTO T. GUINGONA, JR., as Executive Secretary; ROBERTO DE OCAMPO, as
Secretary of Finance; LIWAYWAY VINZONS-CHATO, as Commissioner of Internal
Revenue; and their AUTHORIZED AGENTS OR REPRESENTATIVES, respondents.
G.R. No. 115543 October 30, 1995
RAUL S. ROCO and the INTEGRATED BAR OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioners,
vs.
THE SECRETARY OF THE DEPARTMENT OF FINANCE; THE COMMISSIONERS
OF THE BUREAU OF INTERNAL REVENUE AND BUREAU OF
CUSTOMS, respondents.
G.R. No. 115544 October 30, 1995
PHILIPPINE PRESS INSTITUTE, INC.; EGP PUBLISHING CO., INC.; KAMAHALAN
PUBLISHING CORPORATION; PHILIPPINE JOURNALISTS, INC.; JOSE L. PAVIA;
and OFELIA L. DIMALANTA, petitioners,
vs.
HON. LIWAYWAY V. CHATO, in her capacity as Commissioner of Internal Revenue;
HON. TEOFISTO T. GUINGONA, JR., in his capacity as Executive Secretary; and HON.
ROBERTO B. DE OCAMPO, in his capacity as Secretary of Finance, respondents.
G.R. No. 115754 October 30, 1995

CHAMBER OF REAL ESTATE AND BUILDERS ASSOCIATIONS, INC.,
(CREBA), petitioner,
vs.
THE COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE, respondent.
G.R. No. 115781 October 30, 1995
KILOSBAYAN, INC., JOVITO R. SALONGA, CIRILO A. RIGOS, ERME CAMBA,
EMILIO C. CAPULONG, JR., JOSE T. APOLO, EPHRAIM TENDERO, FERNANDO
SANTIAGO, JOSE ABCEDE, CHRISTINE TAN, FELIPE L. GOZON, RAFAEL G.
FERNANDO, RAOUL V. VICTORINO, JOSE CUNANAN, QUINTIN S. DOROMAL,
MOVEMENT OF ATTORNEYS FOR BROTHERHOOD, INTEGRITY AND
NATIONALISM, INC. ("MABINI"), FREEDOM FROM DEBT COALITION, INC., and
PHILIPPINE BIBLE SOCIETY, INC. and WIGBERTO TAADA,petitioners,
vs.
THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY, THE SECRETARY OF FINANCE, THE
COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE and THE COMMISSIONER OF
G.R. No. 115852 October 30, 1995
PHILIPPINE AIRLINES, INC., petitioner,
vs.
THE SECRETARY OF FINANCE and COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL
G.R. No. 115873 October 30, 1995
COOPERATIVE UNION OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner,
vs.
HON. LIWAYWAY V. CHATO, in her capacity as the Commissioner of Internal Revenue,
HON. TEOFISTO T. GUINGONA, JR., in his capacity as Executive Secretary, and HON.
G.R. No. 115931 October 30, 1995
PHILIPPINE EDUCATIONAL PUBLISHERS ASSOCIATION, INC. and ASSOCIATION
OF PHILIPPINE BOOK SELLERS, petitioners,
vs.
HON. ROBERTO B. DE OCAMPO, as the Secretary of Finance; HON. LIWAYWAY V.
CHATO, as the Commissioner of Internal Revenue; and HON. GUILLERMO PARAYNO,
JR., in his capacity as the Commissioner of Customs, respondents.
RESOLUTION
MENDOZA, J.:
These are motions seeking reconsideration of our decision dismissing the petitions filed in these
cases for the declaration of unconstitutionality of R.A. No. 7716, otherwise known as the
Expanded Value-Added Tax Law. The motions, of which there are 10 in all, have been filed by
the several petitioners in these cases, with the exception of the Philippine Educational Publishers
Association, Inc. and the Association of Philippine Booksellers, petitioners in G.R. No. 115931.
The Solicitor General, representing the respondents, filed a consolidated comment, to which the
Philippine Airlines, Inc., petitioner in G.R. No. 115852, and the Philippine Press Institute, Inc.,
petitioner in G.R. No. 115544, and Juan T. David, petitioner in G.R. No. 115525, each filed a
reply. In turn the Solicitor General filed on June 1, 1995 a rejoinder to the PPI's reply.
On June 27, 1995 the matter was submitted for resolution.
I. Power of the Senate to propose amendments to revenue bills. Some of the petitioners
(Tolentino, Kilosbayan, Inc., Philippine Airlines (PAL), Roco, and Chamber of Real Estate and
Builders Association (CREBA)) reiterate previous claims made by them that R.A. No. 7716 did
not "originate exclusively" in the House of Representatives as required by Art. VI, 24 of the
Constitution. Although they admit that H. No. 11197 was filed in the House of Representatives
where it passed three readings and that afterward it was sent to the Senate where after first
reading it was referred to the Senate Ways and Means Committee, they complain that the Senate
did not pass it on second and third readings. Instead what the Senate did was to pass its own
version (S. No. 1630) which it approved on May 24, 1994. Petitioner Tolentino adds that what
the Senate committee should have done was to amend H. No. 11197 by striking out the text of
the bill and substituting it with the text of S. No. 1630. That way, it is said, "the bill remains a
House bill and the Senate version just becomes the text (only the text) of the House bill."
The contention has no merit.
The enactment of S. No. 1630 is not the only instance in which the Senate proposed an
amendment to a House revenue bill by enacting its own version of a revenue bill. On at least two
occasions during the Eighth Congress, the Senate passed its own version of revenue bills, which,
in consolidation with House bills earlier passed, became the enrolled bills. These were:
R.A. No. 7369 (AN ACT TO AMEND THE OMNIBUS INVESTMENTS CODE OF 1987 BY
EXTENDING FROM FIVE (5) YEARS TO TEN YEARS THE PERIOD FOR TAX AND
DUTY EXEMPTION AND TAX CREDIT ON CAPITAL EQUIPMENT) which was approved
by the President on April 10, 1992. This Act is actually a consolidation of H. No. 34254, which
was approved by the House on January 29, 1992, and S. No. 1920, which was approved by the
Senate on February 3, 1992.
R.A. No. 7549 (AN ACT GRANTING TAX EXEMPTIONS TO WHOEVER SHALL GIVE
REWARD TO ANY FILIPINO ATHLETE WINNING A MEDAL IN OLYMPIC GAMES)
which was approved by the President on May 22, 1992. This Act is a consolidation of H. No.
22232, which was approved by the House of Representatives on August 2, 1989, and S. No. 807,
which was approved by the Senate on October 21, 1991.
On the other hand, the Ninth Congress passed revenue laws which were also the result of the
consolidation of House and Senate bills. These are the following, with indications of the dates on
which the laws were approved by the President and dates the separate bills of the two chambers
of Congress were respectively passed:
1. R.A. NO. 7642

AN ACT INCREASING THE PENALTIES FOR TAX EVASION, AMENDING
FOR THIS PURPOSE THE PERTINENT SECTIONS OF THE NATIONAL
INTERNAL REVENUE CODE (December 28, 1992).
House Bill No. 2165, October 5, 1992
Senate Bill No. 32, December 7, 1992
2. R.A. NO. 7643
AN ACT TO EMPOWER THE COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE
TO REQUIRE THE PAYMENT OF THE VALUE-ADDED TAX EVERY
MONTH AND TO ALLOW LOCAL GOVERNMENT UNITS TO SHARE IN
VAT REVENUE, AMENDING FOR THIS PURPOSE CERTAIN SECTIONS OF
THE NATIONAL INTERNAL REVENUE CODE (December 28, 1992)
House Bill No. 1503, September 3, 1992
3. R.A. NO. 7646
AN ACT AUTHORIZING THE COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE
TO PRESCRIBE THE PLACE FOR PAYMENT OF INTERNAL REVENUE
TAXES BY LARGE TAXPAYERS, AMENDING FOR THIS PURPOSE
CERTAIN PROVISIONS OF THE NATIONAL INTERNAL REVENUE CODE,
AS AMENDED (February 24, 1993)
Senate Bill No. 35, November 19, 1992
4. R.A. NO. 7649
AN ACT REQUIRING THE GOVERNMENT OR ANY OF ITS POLITICAL
SUBDIVISIONS, INSTRUMENTALITIES OR AGENCIES INCLUDING
GOVERNMENT-OWNED OR CONTROLLED CORPORATIONS (GOCCS)
TO DEDUCT AND WITHHOLD THE VALUE-ADDED TAX DUE AT THE
RATE OF THREE PERCENT (3%) ON GROSS PAYMENT FOR THE
PURCHASE OF GOODS AND SIX PERCENT (6%) ON GROSS RECEIPTS
FOR SERVICES RENDERED BY CONTRACTORS (April 6, 1993)
House Bill No. 5260, January 26, 1993
Senate Bill No. 1141, March 30, 1993
5. R.A. NO. 7656
AN ACT REQUIRING GOVERNMENT-OWNED
CORPORATIONS TO DECLARE DIVIDENDS
OR CONTROLLED
UNDER CERTAIN
CONDITIONS TO THE NATIONAL GOVERNMENT, AND FOR OTHER

PURPOSES (November 9, 1993)
House Bill No. 11024, November 3, 1993
6. R.A. NO. 7660
AN ACT RATIONALIZING FURTHER THE STRUCTURE AND
ADMINISTRATION OF THE DOCUMENTARY STAMP TAX, AMENDING
FOR THE PURPOSE CERTAIN PROVISIONS OF THE NATIONAL
INTERNAL REVENUE CODE, AS AMENDED, ALLOCATING FUNDS FOR
SPECIFIC PROGRAMS, AND FOR OTHER PURPOSES (December 23, 1993)
House Bill No. 7789, May 31, 1993
7. R.A. NO. 7717
AN ACT IMPOSING A TAX ON THE SALE, BARTER OR EXCHANGE OF
SHARES OF STOCK LISTED AND TRADED THROUGH THE LOCAL
STOCK EXCHANGE OR THROUGH INITIAL PUBLIC OFFERING,
AMENDING FOR THE PURPOSE THE NATIONAL INTERNAL REVENUE
CODE, AS AMENDED, BY INSERTING A NEW SECTION AND REPEALING
CERTAIN SUBSECTIONS THEREOF (May 5, 1994)
Thus, the enactment of S. No. 1630 is not the only instance in which the Senate, in the exercise
of its power to propose amendments to bills required to originate in the House, passed its own
version of a House revenue measure. It is noteworthy that, in the particular case of S. No. 1630,
petitioners Tolentino and Roco, as members of the Senate, voted to approve it on second and
third readings.
On the other hand, amendment by substitution, in the manner urged by petitioner Tolentino,
concerns a mere matter of form. Petitioner has not shown what substantial difference it would
make if, as the Senate actually did in this case, a separate bill like S. No. 1630 is instead enacted
as a substitute measure, "taking into Consideration . . . H.B. 11197."
Indeed, so far as pertinent, the Rules of the Senate only provide:
RULE XXIX
AMENDMENTS
xxx xxx xxx
68. Not more than one amendment to the original amendment shall be
considered.
No amendment by substitution shall be entertained unless the text thereof is
submitted in writing.
Any of said amendments may be withdrawn before a vote is taken thereon.
69. No amendment which seeks the inclusion of a legislative provision foreign to
the subject matter of a bill (rider) shall be entertained.
xxx xxx xxx
70-A. A bill or resolution shall not be amended by substituting it with another
which covers a subject distinct from that proposed in the original bill or
resolution. (emphasis added).
Nor is there merit in petitioners' contention that, with regard to revenue bills, the Philippine
Senate possesses less power than the U.S. Senate because of textual differences between
constitutional provisions giving them the power to propose or concur with amendments.
Art. I, 7, cl. 1 of the U.S. Constitution reads:
All Bills for raising Revenue shall originate in the House of Representatives; but
the Senate may propose or concur with amendments as on other Bills.
Art. VI, 24 of our Constitution reads:
All appropriation, revenue or tariff bills, bills authorizing increase of the public
debt, bills of local application, and private bills shall originate exclusively in the
House of Representatives, but the Senate may propose or concur with
amendments.
The addition of the word "exclusively" in the Philippine Constitution and the decision to drop the
phrase "as on other Bills" in the American version, according to petitioners, shows the intention
of the framers of our Constitution to restrict the Senate's power to propose amendments to
revenue bills. Petitioner Tolentino contends that the word "exclusively" was inserted to modify
"originate" and "the words 'as in any other bills' (sic) were eliminated so as to show that these
bills were not to be like other bills but must be treated as a special kind."
The history of this provision does not support this contention. The supposed indicia of
constitutional intent are nothing but the relics of an unsuccessful attempt to limit the power of the
Senate. It will be recalled that the 1935 Constitution originally provided for a unicameral
National Assembly. When it was decided in 1939 to change to a bicameral legislature, it became
necessary to provide for the procedure for lawmaking by the Senate and the House of
Representatives. The work of proposing amendments to the Constitution was done by the
National Assembly, acting as a constituent assembly, some of whose members, jealous of
preserving the Assembly's lawmaking powers, sought to curtail the powers of the proposed
Senate. Accordingly they proposed the following provision:
All bills appropriating public funds, revenue or tariff bills, bills of local
application, and private bills shall originate exclusively in the Assembly, but the
Senate may propose or concur with amendments. In case of disapproval by the
Senate of any such bills, the Assembly may repass the same by a two-thirds vote
of all its members, and thereupon, the bill so repassed shall be deemed enacted
and may be submitted to the President for corresponding action. In the event that
the Senate should fail to finally act on any such bills, the Assembly may, after
thirty days from the opening of the next regular session of the same legislative
term, reapprove the same with a vote of two-thirds of all the members of the
Assembly. And upon such reapproval, the bill shall be deemed enacted and may
be submitted to the President for corresponding action.
The special committee on the revision of laws of the Second National Assembly vetoed the
proposal. It deleted everything after the first sentence. As rewritten, the proposal was approved
by the National Assembly and embodied in Resolution No. 38, as amended by Resolution No.
73. (J. ARUEGO, KNOW YOUR CONSTITUTION 65-66 (1950)). The proposed amendment
was submitted to the people and ratified by them in the elections held on June 18, 1940.
This is the history of Art. VI, 18 (2) of the 1935 Constitution, from which Art. VI, 24 of the
present Constitution was derived. It explains why the word "exclusively" was added to the
American text from which the framers of the Philippine Constitution borrowed and why the
phrase "as on other Bills" was not copied. Considering the defeat of the proposal, the power of
the Senate to propose amendments must be understood to be full, plenary and complete "as on
other Bills." Thus, because revenue bills are required to originate exclusively in the House of
Representatives, the Senate cannot enact revenue measures of its own without such bills. After a
revenue bill is passed and sent over to it by the House, however, the Senate certainly can pass its
own version on the same subject matter. This follows from the coequality of the two chambers of
Congress.
That this is also the understanding of book authors of the scope of the Senate's power to concur
is clear from the following commentaries:
The power of the Senate to propose or concur with amendments is apparently
without restriction. It would seem that by virtue of this power, the Senate can
practically re-write a bill required to come from the House and leave only a trace
of the original bill. For example, a general revenue bill passed by the lower house
of the United States Congress contained provisions for the imposition of an
inheritance tax . This was changed by the Senate into a corporation tax. The
amending authority of the Senate was declared by the United States Supreme
Court to be sufficiently broad to enable it to make the alteration. [Flint v. Stone
Tracy Company, 220 U.S. 107, 55 L. ed. 389].
(L. TAADA AND F. CARREON, POLITICAL LAW OF THE PHILIPPINES
247 (1961))
The above-mentioned bills are supposed to be initiated by the House of
Representatives because it is more numerous in membership and therefore also
more representative of the people. Moreover, its members are presumed to be
more familiar with the needs of the country in regard to the enactment of the
legislation involved.
The Senate is, however, allowed much leeway in the exercise of its power to
propose or concur with amendments to the bills initiated by the House of
Representatives. Thus, in one case, a bill introduced in the U.S. House of
Representatives was changed by the Senate to make a proposed inheritance tax a
corporation tax. It is also accepted practice for the Senate to introduce what is
known as an amendment by substitution, which may entirely replace the bill
initiated in the House of Representatives.
(I. CRUZ, PHILIPPINE POLITICAL LAW 144-145 (1993)).
In sum, while Art. VI, 24 provides that all appropriation, revenue or tariff bills, bills authorizing
increase of the public debt, bills of local application, and private bills must "originate exclusively
in the House of Representatives," it also adds, "but the Senate may propose or concur with
amendments." In the exercise of this power, the Senate may propose an entirely new bill as a
substitute measure. As petitioner Tolentino states in a high school text, a committee to which a
bill is referred may do any of the following:
(1) to endorse the bill without changes; (2) to make changes in the bill omitting or
adding sections or altering its language; (3) to make and endorse an entirely new
bill as a substitute, in which case it will be known as a committee bill; or (4) to
make no report at all.
(A. TOLENTINO, THE GOVERNMENT OF THE PHILIPPINES 258 (1950))
To except from this procedure the amendment of bills which are required to originate in the
House by prescribing that the number of the House bill and its other parts up to the enacting
clause must be preserved although the text of the Senate amendment may be incorporated in
place of the original body of the bill is to insist on a mere technicality. At any rate there is no rule
prescribing this form. S. No. 1630, as a substitute measure, is therefore as much an amendment
of H. No. 11197 as any which the Senate could have made.
II. S. No. 1630 a mere amendment of H. No. 11197. Petitioners' basic error is that they assume
that S. No. 1630 is an independent and distinct bill. Hence their repeated references to its
certification that it was passed by the Senate "in substitution of S.B. No. 1129, taking into
consideration P.S. Res. No. 734 and H.B. No. 11197," implying that there is something
substantially different between the reference to S. No. 1129 and the reference to H. No. 11197.
From this premise, they conclude that R.A. No. 7716 originated both in the House and in the
Senate and that it is the product of two "half-baked bills because neither H. No. 11197 nor S. No.
1630 was passed by both houses of Congress."
In point of fact, in several instances the provisions of S. No. 1630, clearly appear to be mere
amendments of the corresponding provisions of H. No. 11197. The very tabular comparison of
the provisions of H. No. 11197 and S. No. 1630 attached as Supplement A to the basic petition of
petitioner Tolentino, while showing differences between the two bills, at the same time indicates
that the provisions of the Senate bill were precisely intended to be amendments to the House bill.
Without H. No. 11197, the Senate could not have enacted S. No. 1630. Because the Senate bill
was a mere amendment of the House bill, H. No. 11197 in its original form did not have to pass
the Senate on second and three readings. It was enough that after it was passed on first reading it
was referred to the Senate Committee on Ways and Means. Neither was it required that S. No.
1630 be passed by the House of Representatives before the two bills could be referred to the
Conference Committee.
There is legislative precedent for what was done in the case of H. No. 11197 and S. No. 1630.
When the House bill and Senate bill, which became R.A. No. 1405 (Act prohibiting the
disclosure of bank deposits), were referred to a conference committee, the question was raised
whether the two bills could be the subject of such conference, considering that the bill from one
house had not been passed by the other and vice versa. As Congressman Duran put the question:
MR. DURAN. Therefore, I raise this question of order as to procedure: If a House
bill is passed by the House but not passed by the Senate, and a Senate bill of a
similar nature is passed in the Senate but never passed in the House, can the two
bills be the subject of a conference, and can a law be enacted from these two
bills? I understand that the Senate bill in this particular instance does not refer to
investments in government securities, whereas the bill in the House, which was
introduced by the Speaker, covers two subject matters: not only investigation of
deposits in banks but also investigation of investments in government securities.
Now, since the two bills differ in their subject matter, I believe that no law can be
enacted.
Ruling on the point of order raised, the chair (Speaker Jose B. Laurel, Jr.) said:
THE SPEAKER. The report of the conference committee is in order. It is
precisely in cases like this where a conference should be had. If the House bill had
been approved by the Senate, there would have been no need of a conference; but
precisely because the Senate passed another bill on the same subject matter, the
conference committee had to be created, and we are now considering the report of
that committee.
(2 CONG. REC. NO. 13, July 27, 1955, pp. 3841-42 (emphasis added))
III. The President's certification. The fallacy in thinking that H. No. 11197 and S. No. 1630 are
distinct and unrelated measures also accounts for the petitioners' (Kilosbayan's and PAL's)
contention that because the President separately certified to the need for the immediate
enactment of these measures, his certification was ineffectual and void. The certification had to
be made of the version of the same revenue bill which at the momentwas being considered.
Otherwise, to follow petitioners' theory, it would be necessary for the President to certify as
many bills as are presented in a house of Congress even though the bills are merely versions of
the bill he has already certified. It is enough that he certifies the bill which, at the time he makes
the certification, is under consideration. Since on March 22, 1994 the Senate was considering S.
No. 1630, it was that bill which had to be certified. For that matter on June 1, 1993 the President
had earlier certified H. No. 9210 for immediate enactment because it was the one which at that
time was being considered by the House. This bill was later substituted, together with other bills,
by H. No. 11197.
As to what Presidential certification can accomplish, we have already explained in the main
decision that the phrase "except when the President certifies to the necessity of its immediate
enactment, etc." in Art. VI, 26 (2) qualifies not only the requirement that "printed copies [of a
bill] in its final form [must be] distributed to the members three days before its passage" but also
the requirement that before a bill can become a law it must have passed "three readings on
separate days." There is not only textual support for such construction but historical basis as
well.
Art. VI, 21 (2) of the 1935 Constitution originally provided:
(2) No bill shall be passed by either House unless it shall have been printed and
copies thereof in its final form furnished its Members at least three calendar days
prior to its passage, except when the President shall have certified to the necessity
of its immediate enactment. Upon the last reading of a bill, no amendment thereof
shall be allowed and the question upon its passage shall be taken immediately
thereafter, and the yeas and nays entered on the Journal.
When the 1973 Constitution was adopted, it was provided in Art. VIII, 19 (2):
(2) No bill shall become a law unless it has passed three readings on separate
days, and printed copies thereof in its final form have been distributed to the
Members three days before its passage, except when the Prime Minister certifies
to the necessity of its immediate enactment to meet a public calamity or
emergency. Upon the last reading of a bill, no amendment thereto shall be
allowed, and the vote thereon shall be taken immediately thereafter, and
the yeas and nays entered in the Journal.
This provision of the 1973 document, with slight modification, was adopted in Art. VI, 26 (2) of
the present Constitution, thus:
The exception is based on the prudential consideration that if in all cases three readings on
separate days are required and a bill has to be printed in final form before it can be passed, the
need for a law may be rendered academic by the occurrence of the very emergency or public
calamity which it is meant to address.
Petitioners further contend that a "growing budget deficit" is not an emergency, especially in a
country like the Philippines where budget deficit is a chronic condition. Even if this were the
case, an enormous budget deficit does not make the need for R.A. No. 7716 any less urgent or
the situation calling for its enactment any less an emergency.
Apparently, the members of the Senate (including some of the petitioners in these cases) believed
that there was an urgent need for consideration of S. No. 1630, because they responded to the
call of the President by voting on the bill on second and third readings on the same day. While
the judicial department is not bound by the Senate's acceptance of the President's certification,
the respect due coequal departments of the government in matters committed to them by the
Constitution and the absence of a clear showing of grave abuse of discretion caution a stay of the
judicial hand.
At any rate, we are satisfied that S. No. 1630 received thorough consideration in the Senate
where it was discussed for six days. Only its distribution in advance in its final printed form was
actually dispensed with by holding the voting on second and third readings on the same day
(March 24, 1994). Otherwise, sufficient time between the submission of the bill on February 8,
1994 on second reading and its approval on March 24, 1994 elapsed before it was finally voted
on by the Senate on third reading.
The purpose for which three readings on separate days is required is said to be two-fold: (1) to
inform the members of Congress of what they must vote on and (2) to give them notice that a
measure is progressing through the enacting process, thus enabling them and others interested in
the measure to prepare their positions with reference to it. (1 J. G. SUTHERLAND, STATUTES
AND STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION 10.04, p. 282 (1972)). These purposes were
substantially achieved in the case of R.A. No. 7716.
IV. Power of Conference Committee. It is contended (principally by Kilosbayan, Inc. and the
Movement of Attorneys for Brotherhood, Integrity and Nationalism, Inc. (MABINI)) that in
violation of the constitutional policy of full public disclosure and the people's right to know (Art.
II, 28 and Art. III, 7) the Conference Committee met for two days in executive session with
only the conferees present.
As pointed out in our main decision, even in the United States it was customary to hold such
sessions with only the conferees and their staffs in attendance and it was only in 1975 when a
new rule was adopted requiring open sessions. Unlike its American counterpart, the Philippine
Congress has not adopted a rule prescribing open hearings for conference committees.
It is nevertheless claimed that in the United States, before the adoption of the rule in 1975, at
least staff members were present. These were staff members of the Senators and Congressmen,
however, who may be presumed to be their confidential men, not stenographers as in this case
who on the last two days of the conference were excluded. There is no showing that the
conferees themselves did not take notes of their proceedings so as to give petitioner Kilosbayan
basis for claiming that even in secret diplomatic negotiations involving state interests, conferees
keep notes of their meetings. Above all, the public's right to know was fully served because the
Conference Committee in this case submitted a report showing the changes made on the differing
versions of the House and the Senate.
Petitioners cite the rules of both houses which provide that conference committee reports must
contain "a detailed, sufficiently explicit statement of the changes in or other amendments." These
changes are shown in the bill attached to the Conference Committee Report. The members of
both houses could thus ascertain what changes had been made in the original bills without the
need of a statement detailing the changes.
The same question now presented was raised when the bill which became R.A. No. 1400 (Land
Reform Act of 1955) was reported by the Conference Committee. Congressman Bengzon raised
a point of order. He said:
MR. BENGZON. My point of order is that it is out of order to consider the report
of the conference committee regarding House Bill No. 2557 by reason of the
provision of Section 11, Article XII, of the Rules of this House which provides
specifically that the conference report must be accompanied by a detailed
statement of the effects of the amendment on the bill of the House. This
conference committee report is not accompanied by that detailed statement, Mr.

Speaker. Therefore it is out of order to consider it.
Petitioner Tolentino, then the Majority Floor Leader, answered:
MR. TOLENTINO. Mr. Speaker, I should just like to say a few words in
connection with the point of order raised by the gentleman from Pangasinan.
There is no question about the provision of the Rule cited by the gentleman from
Pangasinan, butthis provision applies to those cases where only portions of the
bill have been amended. In this case before us an entire bill is
presented; therefore, it can be easily seen from the reading of the bill what the
provisions are. Besides, this procedure has been an established practice.
After some interruption, he continued:
MR. TOLENTINO. As I was saying, Mr. Speaker, we have to look into the reason
for the provisions of the Rules, and the reason for the requirement in the provision
cited by the gentleman from Pangasinan is when there are only certain words or
phrases inserted in or deleted from the provisions of the bill included in the
conference report, and we cannot understand what those words and phrases mean
and their relation to the bill. In that case, it is necessary to make a detailed
statement on how those words and phrases will affect the bill as a whole; but
when the entire bill itself is copied verbatim in the conference report, that is not
necessary. So when the reason for the Rule does not exist, the Rule does not exist.
(2 CONG. REC. NO. 2, p. 4056. (emphasis added))
Congressman Tolentino was sustained by the chair. The record shows that when the ruling was
appealed, it was upheld by viva voce and when a division of the House was called, it was
sustained
by
a
vote
of
48
to
5.
(Id.,
p. 4058)
Nor is there any doubt about the power of a conference committee to insert new provisions as
long as these are germane to the subject of the conference. As this Court held in Philippine
Judges Association v. Prado, 227 SCRA 703 (1993), in an opinion written by then Justice Cruz,
the jurisdiction of the conference committee is not limited to resolving differences between the
Senate and the House. It may propose an entirely new provision. What is important is that its
report is subsequently approved by the respective houses of Congress. This Court ruled that it
would not entertain allegations that, because new provisions had been added by the conference
committee, there was thereby a violation of the constitutional injunction that "upon the last
reading of a bill, no amendment thereto shall be allowed."
Applying these principles, we shall decline to look into the petitioners'
charges that an amendment was made upon the last reading of the bill that
eventually became R.A. No. 7354 and that copiesthereof in its final form were not
distributed among the members of each House. Both the enrolled bill and the
legislative journals certify that the measure was duly enacted i.e., in accordance
with Article VI, Sec. 26 (2) of the Constitution. We are bound by such official
assurances from a coordinate department of the government, to which we owe, at
the very least, a becoming courtesy.
(Id. at 710. (emphasis added))

It is interesting to note the following description of conference committees in the Philippines in a
1979 study:
Conference committees may be of two types: free or instructed. These committees
may be given instructions by their parent bodies or they may be left without
instructions. Normally the conference committees are without instructions, and
this is why they are often critically referred to as "the little legislatures." Once
bills have been sent to them, the conferees have almost unlimited authority to
change the clauses of the bills and in fact sometimes introduce new measures that
were not in the original legislation. No minutes are kept, and members' activities
on conference committees are difficult to determine. One congressman known for
his idealism put it this way: "I killed a bill on export incentives for my interest
group [copra] in the conference committee but I could not have done so anywhere
else." The conference committee submits a report to both houses, and usually it is
accepted. If the report is not accepted, then the committee is discharged and new
members are appointed.
(R. Jackson, Committees in the Philippine Congress, in COMMITTEES AND
LEGISLATURES: A COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS 163 (J. D. LEES AND M.
SHAW, eds.)).
In citing this study, we pass no judgment on the methods of conference committees. We cite it
only to say that conference committees here are no different from their counterparts in the United
States whose vast powers we noted in Philippine Judges Association v. Prado, supra. At all
events, under Art. VI, 16(3) each house has the power "to determine the rules of its
proceedings," including those of its committees. Any meaningful change in the method and
procedures of Congress or its committees must therefore be sought in that body itself.
V. The titles of S. No. 1630 and H. No. 11197. PAL maintains that R.A. No. 7716 violates Art. VI,
26 (1) of the Constitution which provides that "Every bill passed by Congress shall embrace
only one subject which shall be expressed in the title thereof." PAL contends that the amendment
of its franchise by the withdrawal of its exemption from the VAT is not expressed in the title of
the law.
Pursuant to 13 of P.D. No. 1590, PAL pays a franchise tax of 2% on its gross revenue "in lieu of
all other taxes, duties, royalties, registration, license and other fees and charges of any kind,
nature, or description, imposed, levied, established, assessed or collected by any municipal, city,
provincial or national authority or government agency, now or in the future."
PAL was exempted from the payment of the VAT along with other entities by 103 of the
National Internal Revenue Code, which provides as follows:
103. Exempt transactions. The following shall be exempt from the valueadded tax:
xxx xxx xxx
(q) Transactions which are exempt under special laws or international agreements
to which the Philippines is a signatory.
R.A. No. 7716 seeks to withdraw certain exemptions, including that granted to PAL, by
amending 103, as follows:
xxx xxx xxx
(q) Transactions which are exempt under special laws, except those granted under
Presidential Decree Nos. 66, 529, 972, 1491, 1590. . . .
The amendment of 103 is expressed in the title of R.A. No. 7716 which reads:
AN ACT RESTRUCTURING THE VALUE-ADDED TAX (VAT) SYSTEM,
WIDENING ITS TAX BASE AND ENHANCING ITS ADMINISTRATION,
AND FOR THESE PURPOSES AMENDING AND REPEALING THE
RELEVANT PROVISIONS OF THE NATIONAL INTERNAL REVENUE
CODE, AS AMENDED, AND FOR OTHER PURPOSES.
By stating that R.A. No. 7716 seeks to "[RESTRUCTURE] THE VALUE-ADDED TAX (VAT)
SYSTEM [BY] WIDENING ITS TAX BASE AND ENHANCING ITS ADMINISTRATION,
AND FOR THESE PURPOSES AMENDING AND REPEALING THE RELEVANT
PROVISIONS OF THE NATIONAL INTERNAL REVENUE CODE, AS AMENDED AND
FOR OTHER PURPOSES," Congress thereby clearly expresses its intention to amend any
provision of the NIRC which stands in the way of accomplishing the purpose of the law.
PAL asserts that the amendment of its franchise must be reflected in the title of the law by
specific reference to P.D. No. 1590. It is unnecessary to do this in order to comply with the
constitutional requirement, since it is already stated in the title that the law seeks to amend the
pertinent provisions of the NIRC, among which is 103(q), in order to widen the base of the
VAT. Actually, it is the bill which becomes a law that is required to express in its title the subject
of legislation. The titles of H. No. 11197 and S. No. 1630 in fact specifically referred to 103 of
the NIRC as among the provisions sought to be amended. We are satisfied that sufficient notice
had been given of the pendency of these bills in Congress before they were enacted into what is
now
R.A.
No. 7716.
In Philippine Judges Association v. Prado, supra, a similar argument as that now made by PAL
was rejected. R.A. No. 7354 is entitled AN ACT CREATING THE PHILIPPINE POSTAL
CORPORATION, DEFINING ITS POWERS, FUNCTIONS AND RESPONSIBILITIES,
PROVIDING FOR REGULATION OF THE INDUSTRY AND FOR OTHER PURPOSES
CONNECTED THEREWITH. It contained a provision repealing all franking privileges. It was
contended that the withdrawal of franking privileges was not expressed in the title of the law. In
holding that there was sufficient description of the subject of the law in its title, including the
repeal of franking privileges, this Court held:
To require every end and means necessary for the accomplishment of the general
objectives of the statute to be expressed in its title would not only be unreasonable
but would actually render legislation impossible. [Cooley, Constitutional
Limitations, 8th Ed., p. 297] As has been correctly explained:
The details of a legislative act need not be specifically stated in its

title, but matter germane to the subject as expressed in the title, and
adopted to the accomplishment of the object in view, may properly
be included in the act. Thus, it is proper to create in the same act
the machinery by which the act is to be enforced, to prescribe the
penalties for its infraction, and to remove obstacles in the way of
its execution. If such matters are properly connected with the
subject as expressed in the title, it is unnecessary that they should
also have special mention in the title. (Southern Pac. Co. v.
Bartine, 170 Fed. 725)
(227 SCRA at 707-708)
VI. Claims of press freedom and religious liberty. We have held that, as a general proposition, the
press is not exempt from the taxing power of the State and that what the constitutional guarantee
of free press prohibits are laws which single out the press or target a group belonging to the press
for special treatment or which in any way discriminate against the press on the basis of the
content of the publication, and R.A. No. 7716 is none of these.
Now it is contended by the PPI that by removing the exemption of the press from the VAT while
maintaining those granted to others, the law discriminates against the press. At any rate, it is
averred, "even nondiscriminatory taxation of constitutionally guaranteed freedom is
unconstitutional."
With respect to the first contention, it would suffice to say that since the law granted the press a
privilege, the law could take back the privilege anytime without offense to the Constitution. The
reason is simple: by granting exemptions, the State does not forever waive the exercise of its
sovereign prerogative.
Indeed, in withdrawing the exemption, the law merely subjects the press to the same tax burden
to which other businesses have long ago been subject. It is thus different from the tax involved in
the cases invoked by the PPI. The license tax in Grosjean v. American Press Co., 297 U.S. 233,
80 L. Ed. 660 (1936) was found to be discriminatory because it was laid on the gross advertising
receipts only of newspapers whose weekly circulation was over 20,000, with the result that the
tax applied only to 13 out of 124 publishers in Louisiana. These large papers were critical of
Senator Huey Long who controlled the state legislature which enacted the license tax. The
censorial motivation for the law was thus evident.
On the other hand, in Minneapolis Star & Tribune Co. v. Minnesota Comm'r of Revenue, 460
U.S. 575, 75 L. Ed. 2d 295 (1983), the tax was found to be discriminatory because although it
could have been made liable for the sales tax or, in lieu thereof, for the use tax on the privilege of
using, storing or consuming tangible goods, the press was not. Instead, the press was exempted
from both taxes. It was, however, later made to pay a specialuse tax on the cost of paper and ink
which made these items "the only items subject to the use tax that were component of goods to
be sold at retail." The U.S. Supreme Court held that the differential treatment of the press
"suggests that the goal of regulation is not related to suppression of expression, and such goal is
presumptively unconstitutional." It would therefore appear that even a law that favors the press is
constitutionally suspect. (See the dissent of Rehnquist, J. in that case)
Nor is it true that only two exemptions previously granted by E.O. No. 273 are withdrawn
"absolutely and unqualifiedly" by R.A. No. 7716. Other exemptions from the VAT, such as those
previously granted to PAL, petroleum concessionaires, enterprises registered with the Export
Processing Zone Authority, and many more are likewise totally withdrawn, in addition to
exemptions which are partially withdrawn, in an effort to broaden the base of the tax.
The PPI says that the discriminatory treatment of the press is highlighted by the fact that
transactions, which are profit oriented, continue to enjoy exemption under R.A. No. 7716. An
enumeration of some of these transactions will suffice to show that by and large this is not so and
that the exemptions are granted for a purpose. As the Solicitor General says, such exemptions are
granted, in some cases, to encourage agricultural production and, in other cases, for the personal
benefit of the end-user rather than for profit. The exempt transactions are:
(a) Goods for consumption or use which are in their original state (agricultural,
marine and forest products, cotton seeds in their original state, fertilizers, seeds,
seedlings, fingerlings, fish, prawn livestock and poultry feeds) and goods or
services to enhance agriculture (milling of palay, corn, sugar cane and raw sugar,
livestock, poultry feeds, fertilizer, ingredients used for the manufacture of feeds).
(b) Goods used for personal consumption or use (household and personal effects
of citizens returning to the Philippines) or for professional use, like professional
instruments and implements, by persons coming to the Philippines to settle here.
(c) Goods subject to excise tax such as petroleum products or to be used for
manufacture of petroleum products subject to excise tax and services subject to
percentage tax.
(d) Educational services, medical, dental, hospital and veterinary services, and
services rendered under employer-employee relationship.
(e) Works of art and similar creations sold by the artist himself.
(f) Transactions exempted under special laws, or international agreements.
(g) Export-sales by persons not VAT-registered.
(h) Goods or services
exceeding P500,000.00.
with
gross
annual
sale
or
receipt
not
(Respondents' Consolidated Comment on the Motions for Reconsideration, pp.

58-60)
The PPI asserts that it does not really matter that the law does not discriminate against the press
because "even nondiscriminatory taxation on constitutionally guaranteed freedom is
unconstitutional." PPI cites in support of this assertion the following statement in Murdock
v. Pennsylvania, 319 U.S. 105, 87 L. Ed. 1292 (1943):
The fact that the ordinance is "nondiscriminatory" is immaterial. The protection
afforded by the First Amendment is not so restricted. A license tax certainly does
not acquire constitutional validity because it classifies the privileges protected by
the First Amendment along with the wares and merchandise of hucksters and
peddlers and treats them all alike. Such equality in treatment does not save the
ordinance. Freedom of press, freedom of speech, freedom of religion are in
preferred position.
The Court was speaking in that case of a license tax, which, unlike an ordinary tax, is mainly for
regulation. Its imposition on the press is unconstitutional because it lays a prior restraint on the
exercise of its right. Hence, although its application to others, such those selling goods, is valid,
its application to the press or to religious groups, such as the Jehovah's Witnesses, in connection
with the latter's sale of religious books and pamphlets, is unconstitutional. As the U.S. Supreme
Court put it, "it is one thing to impose a tax on income or property of a preacher. It is quite
another thing to exact a tax on him for delivering a sermon."
A similar ruling was made by this Court in American Bible Society v. City of Manila, 101 Phil.
386 (1957) which invalidated a city ordinance requiring a business license fee on those engaged
in the sale of general merchandise. It was held that the tax could not be imposed on the sale of
bibles by the American Bible Society without restraining the free exercise of its right to
propagate.
The VAT is, however, different. It is not a license tax. It is not a tax on the exercise of a privilege,
much less a constitutional right. It is imposed on the sale, barter, lease or exchange of goods or
properties or the sale or exchange of services and the lease of properties purely for revenue
purposes. To subject the press to its payment is not to burden the exercise of its right any more
than to make the press pay income tax or subject it to general regulation is not to violate its
freedom under the Constitution.
Additionally, the Philippine Bible Society, Inc. claims that although it sells bibles, the proceeds
derived from the sales are used to subsidize the cost of printing copies which are given free to
those who cannot afford to pay so that to tax the sales would be to increase the price, while
reducing the volume of sale. Granting that to be the case, the resulting burden on the exercise of
religious freedom is so incidental as to make it difficult to differentiate it from any other
economic imposition that might make the right to disseminate religious doctrines costly.
Otherwise, to follow the petitioner's argument, to increase the tax on the sale of vestments would
be to lay an impermissible burden on the right of the preacher to make a sermon.
On the other hand the registration fee of P1,000.00 imposed by 107 of the NIRC, as amended
by 7 of R.A. No. 7716, although fixed in amount, is really just to pay for the expenses of
registration and enforcement of provisions such as those relating to accounting in 108 of the
NIRC. That the PBS distributes free bibles and therefore is not liable to pay the VAT does not
excuse it from the payment of this fee because it also sells some copies. At any rate whether the
PBS is liable for the VAT must be decided in concrete cases, in the event it is assessed this tax by
the Commissioner of Internal Revenue.
VII. Alleged violations of the due process, equal protection and contract clauses and the rule on
taxation. CREBA asserts that R.A. No. 7716 (1) impairs the obligations of contracts, (2)
classifies transactions as covered or exempt without reasonable basis and (3) violates the rule
that taxes should be uniform and equitable and that Congress shall "evolve a progressive system
of taxation."
With respect to the first contention, it is claimed that the application of the tax to existing
contracts of the sale of real property by installment or on deferred payment basis would result in
substantial increases in the monthly amortizations to be paid because of the 10% VAT. The
additional amount, it is pointed out, is something that the buyer did not anticipate at the time he
entered into the contract.
The short answer to this is the one given by this Court in an early case: "Authorities from
numerous sources are cited by the plaintiffs, but none of them show that a lawful tax on a new
subject, or an increased tax on an old one, interferes with a contract or impairs its obligation,
within the meaning of the Constitution. Even though such taxation may affect particular
contracts, as it may increase the debt of one person and lessen the security of another, or may
impose additional burdens upon one class and release the burdens of another, still the tax must be
paid unless prohibited by the Constitution, nor can it be said that it impairs the obligation of any
existing contract in its true legal sense." (La Insular v. Machuca Go-Tauco and Nubla Co-Siong,
39 Phil. 567, 574 (1919)). Indeed not only existing laws but also "the reservation of the essential
attributes of sovereignty, is . . . read into contracts as a postulate of the legal order." (PhilippineAmerican Life Ins. Co. v. Auditor General, 22 SCRA 135, 147 (1968)) Contracts must be
understood as having been made in reference to the possible exercise of the rightful authority of
the government and no obligation of contract can extend to the defeat of that authority. (Norman
v. Baltimore and Ohio R.R., 79 L. Ed. 885 (1935)).
It is next pointed out that while 4 of R.A. No. 7716 exempts such transactions as the sale of
agricultural products, food items, petroleum, and medical and veterinary services, it grants no
exemption on the sale of real property which is equally essential. The sale of real property for
socialized and low-cost housing is exempted from the tax, but CREBA claims that real estate
transactions of "the less poor," i.e., the middle class, who are equally homeless, should likewise
be exempted.
The sale of food items, petroleum, medical and veterinary services, etc., which are essential
goods and services was already exempt under 103, pars. (b) (d) (1) of the NIRC before the
enactment of R.A. No. 7716. Petitioner is in error in claiming that R.A. No. 7716 granted
exemption to these transactions, while subjecting those of petitioner to the payment of the VAT.
Moreover, there is a difference between the "homeless poor" and the "homeless less poor" in the
example given by petitioner, because the second group or middle class can afford to rent houses
in the meantime that they cannot yet buy their own homes. The two social classes are thus
differently situated in life. "It is inherent in the power to tax that the State be free to select the
subjects of taxation, and it has been repeatedly held that 'inequalities which result from a singling
out of one particular class for taxation, or exemption infringe no constitutional limitation.'" (Lutz
v. Araneta, 98 Phil. 148, 153 (1955). Accord, City of Baguio v. De Leon, 134 Phil. 912 (1968);
Sison, Jr. v. Ancheta, 130 SCRA 654, 663 (1984); Kapatiran ng mga Naglilingkod sa Pamahalaan
ng Pilipinas, Inc. v. Tan, 163 SCRA 371 (1988)).
Finally, it is contended, for the reasons already noted, that R.A. No. 7716 also violates Art. VI,
28(1) which provides that "The rule of taxation shall be uniform and equitable. The Congress
shall evolve a progressive system of taxation."
Equality and uniformity of taxation means that all taxable articles or kinds of property of the
same class be taxed at the same rate. The taxing power has the authority to make reasonable and
natural classifications for purposes of taxation. To satisfy this requirement it is enough that the
statute or ordinance applies equally to all persons, forms and corporations placed in similar
situation. (City of Baguio v. De Leon, supra; Sison, Jr. v. Ancheta, supra)
Indeed, the VAT was already provided in E.O. No. 273 long before R.A. No. 7716 was enacted.
R.A. No. 7716 merely expands the base of the tax. The validity of the original VAT Law was
questioned in Kapatiran ng Naglilingkod sa Pamahalaan ng Pilipinas, Inc. v. Tan, 163 SCRA
383 (1988) on grounds similar to those made in these cases, namely, that the law was
"oppressive, discriminatory, unjust and regressive in violation of Art. VI, 28(1) of the
Constitution." (At 382) Rejecting the challenge to the law, this Court held:
As the Court sees it, EO 273 satisfies all the requirements of a valid tax. It is
uniform. . . .
The sales tax adopted in EO 273 is applied similarly on all goods and services
sold to the public, which are not exempt, at the constant rate of 0% or 10%.
The disputed sales tax is also equitable. It is imposed only on sales of goods or
services by persons engaged in business with an aggregate gross annual sales
exceeding P200,000.00. Small corner sari-sari stores are consequently exempt
from its application. Likewise exempt from the tax are sales of farm and marine
products, so that the costs of basic food and other necessities, spared as they are
from the incidence of the VAT, are expected to be relatively lower and within the
reach of the general public.
(At 382-383)
The CREBA claims that the VAT is regressive. A similar claim is made by the Cooperative Union
of the Philippines, Inc. (CUP), while petitioner Juan T. David argues that the law contravenes the
mandate of Congress to provide for a progressive system of taxation because the law imposes a
flat rate of 10% and thus places the tax burden on all taxpayers without regard to their ability to
pay.
The Constitution does not really prohibit the imposition of indirect taxes which, like the VAT, are
regressive. What it simply provides is that Congress shall "evolve a progressive system of
taxation." The constitutional provision has been interpreted to mean simply that "direct taxes
are . . . to be preferred [and] as much as possible, indirect taxes should be minimized." (E.
FERNANDO, THE CONSTITUTION OF THE PHILIPPINES 221 (Second ed. (1977)). Indeed,
the mandate to Congress is not to prescribe, but to evolve, a progressive tax system. Otherwise,
sales taxes, which perhaps are the oldest form of indirect taxes, would have been prohibited with
the proclamation of Art. VIII, 17(1) of the 1973 Constitution from which the present Art. VI,
28(1) was taken. Sales taxes are also regressive.
Resort to indirect taxes should be minimized but not avoided entirely because it is difficult, if not
impossible, to avoid them by imposing such taxes according to the taxpayers' ability to pay. In
the case of the VAT, the law minimizes the regressive effects of this imposition by providing
for zero rating of certain transactions (R.A. No. 7716, 3, amending 102 (b) of the NIRC),
while granting exemptions to other transactions. (R.A. No. 7716, 4, amending 103 of the
NIRC).
Thus, the following transactions involving basic and essential goods and services are exempted
from the VAT:
services to enhance agriculture (milling of palay, corn sugar cane and raw sugar,
of citizens returning to the Philippines) and or professional use, like professional
percentage tax.
with
gross
annual
sale
or
receipt
not

58-60)
On the other hand, the transactions which are subject to the VAT are those which involve goods
and services which are used or availed of mainly by higher income groups. These include real
properties held primarily for sale to customers or for lease in the ordinary course of trade or
business, the right or privilege to use patent, copyright, and other similar property or right, the
right or privilege to use industrial, commercial or scientific equipment, motion picture films,
tapes and discs, radio, television, satellite transmission and cable television time, hotels,
restaurants and similar places, securities, lending investments, taxicabs, utility cars for rent,
tourist buses, and other common carriers, services of franchise grantees of telephone and
telegraph.
The problem with CREBA's petition is that it presents broad claims of constitutional violations
by tendering issues not at retail but at wholesale and in the abstract. There is no fully developed
record which can impart to adjudication the impact of actuality. There is no factual foundation to
show in the concrete the application of the law to actual contracts and exemplify its effect on
property rights. For the fact is that petitioner's members have not even been assessed the VAT.
Petitioner's case is not made concrete by a series of hypothetical questions asked which are no
different from those dealt with in advisory opinions.
The difficulty confronting petitioner is thus apparent. He alleges arbitrariness. A
mere allegation, as here, does not suffice. There must be a factual foundation of
such unconstitutional taint. Considering that petitioner here would condemn such
a provision as void on its face, he has not made out a case. This is merely to
adhere to the authoritative doctrine that where the due process and equal
protection clauses are invoked, considering that they are not fixed rules but rather
broad standards, there is a need for proof of such persuasive character as would
lead to such a conclusion. Absent such a showing, the presumption of validity
must prevail.
(Sison, Jr. v. Ancheta, 130 SCRA at 661)
Adjudication of these broad claims must await the development of a concrete case. It may be that
postponement of adjudication would result in a multiplicity of suits. This need not be the case,
however. Enforcement of the law may give rise to such a case. A test case, provided it is an
actual case and not an abstract or hypothetical one, may thus be presented.
Nor is hardship to taxpayers alone an adequate justification for adjudicating abstract issues.
Otherwise, adjudication would be no different from the giving of advisory opinion that does not
really settle legal issues.
We are told that it is our duty under Art. VIII, 1, 2 to decide whenever a claim is made that
"there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part
of any branch or instrumentality of the government." This duty can only arise if an actual case or
controversy is before us. Under Art . VIII, 5 our jurisdiction is defined in terms of "cases" and
all that Art. VIII, 1, 2 can plausibly mean is that in the exercise of that jurisdiction we have
the judicial power to determine questions of grave abuse of discretion by any branch or
instrumentality of the government.
Put in another way, what is granted in Art. VIII, 1, 2 is "judicial power," which is "the power
of a court to hear and decide cases pending between parties who have the right to sue and be
sued in the courts of law and equity" (Lamb v. Phipps, 22 Phil. 456, 559 (1912)), as
distinguished from legislative and executive power. This power cannot be directly appropriated
until it is apportioned among several courts either by the Constitution, as in the case of Art. VIII,
5, or by statute, as in the case of the Judiciary Act of 1948 (R.A. No. 296) and the Judiciary
Reorganization Act of 1980 (B.P. Blg. 129). The power thus apportioned constitutes the court's
"jurisdiction," defined as "the power conferred by law upon a court or judge to take cognizance
of a case, to the exclusion of all others." (United States v. Arceo, 6 Phil. 29 (1906)) Without an
actual case coming within its jurisdiction, this Court cannot inquire into any allegation of grave
abuse of discretion by the other departments of the government.
VIII. Alleged violation of policy towards cooperatives. On the other hand, the Cooperative Union
of the Philippines (CUP), after briefly surveying the course of legislation, argues that it was to
adopt a definite policy of granting tax exemption to cooperatives that the present Constitution
embodies provisions on cooperatives. To subject cooperatives to the VAT would therefore be to
infringe a constitutional policy. Petitioner claims that in 1973, P.D. No. 175 was promulgated
exempting cooperatives from the payment of income taxes and sales taxes but in 1984, because
of the crisis which menaced the national economy, this exemption was withdrawn by P.D. No.
1955; that in 1986, P.D. No. 2008 again granted cooperatives exemption from income and sales
taxes until December 31, 1991, but, in the same year, E.O. No. 93 revoked the exemption; and
that finally in 1987 the framers of the Constitution "repudiated the previous actions of the
government adverse to the interests of the cooperatives, that is, the repeated revocation of the tax
exemption to cooperatives and instead upheld the policy of strengthening the cooperatives by
way of the grant of tax exemptions," by providing the following in Art. XII:
1. The goals of the national economy are a more equitable distribution of

expanding productivity as the key to raising the quality of life for all, especially
country shall be given optimum opportunity to develop. Private enterprises,
including corporations, cooperatives, and similar collective organizations, shall be
encouraged to broaden the base of their ownership.
15. The Congress shall create an agency to promote the viability and growth of
cooperatives as instruments for social justice and economic development.
Petitioner's contention has no merit. In the first place, it is not true that P.D. No. 1955 singled out
cooperatives by withdrawing their exemption from income and sales taxes under P.D. No. 175,
5. What P.D. No. 1955, 1 did was to withdraw the exemptions and preferential treatments
theretofore granted to private business enterprises in general, in view of the economic crisis
which then beset the nation. It is true that after P.D. No. 2008, 2 had restored the tax exemptions
of cooperatives in 1986, the exemption was again repealed by E.O. No. 93, 1, but then again
cooperatives were not the only ones whose exemptions were withdrawn. The withdrawal of tax
incentives applied to all, including government and private entities. In the second place, the
Constitution does not really require that cooperatives be granted tax exemptions in order to
promote their growth and viability. Hence, there is no basis for petitioner's assertion that the
government's policy toward cooperatives had been one of vacillation, as far as the grant of tax
privileges was concerned, and that it was to put an end to this indecision that the constitutional
provisions cited were adopted. Perhaps as a matter of policy cooperatives should be granted tax
exemptions, but that is left to the discretion of Congress. If Congress does not grant exemption
and there is no discrimination to cooperatives, no violation of any constitutional policy can be
charged.
Indeed, petitioner's theory amounts to saying that under the Constitution cooperatives are
exempt from taxation. Such theory is contrary to the Constitution under which only the following
are exempt from taxation: charitable institutions, churches and parsonages, by reason of Art. VI,
28 (3), and non-stock, non-profit educational institutions by reason of Art. XIV, 4 (3).
CUP's further ground for seeking the invalidation of R.A. No. 7716 is that it denies cooperatives
the equal protection of the law because electric cooperatives are exempted from the VAT. The
classification between electric and other cooperatives (farmers cooperatives, producers
cooperatives, marketing cooperatives, etc.) apparently rests on a congressional determination that
there is greater need to provide cheaper electric power to as many people as possible, especially
those living in the rural areas, than there is to provide them with other necessities in life. We
cannot say that such classification is unreasonable.
We have carefully read the various arguments raised against the constitutional validity of R.A.
No. 7716. We have in fact taken the extraordinary step of enjoining its enforcement pending
resolution of these cases. We have now come to the conclusion that the law suffers from none of
the infirmities attributed to it by petitioners and that its enactment by the other branches of the
government does not constitute a grave abuse of discretion. Any question as to its necessity,
desirability or expediency must be addressed to Congress as the body which is electorally
responsible, remembering that, as Justice Holmes has said, "legislators are the ultimate guardians
of the liberties and welfare of the people in quite as great a degree as are the courts." (Missouri,
Kansas & Texas Ry. Co. v. May, 194 U.S. 267, 270, 48 L. Ed. 971, 973 (1904)). It is not right, as
petitioner in G.R. No. 115543 does in arguing that we should enforce the public accountability of
legislators, that those who took part in passing the law in question by voting for it in Congress
should later thrust to the courts the burden of reviewing measures in the flush of enactment. This
Court does not sit as a third branch of the legislature, much less exercise a veto power over
legislation.
WHEREFORE, the motions for reconsideration are denied with finality and the temporary
restraining order previously issued is hereby lifted.
SO ORDERED.
EN BANC
[G.R. No. 118303. January 31, 1996]
SENATOR HEHERSON T. ALVAREZ, SENATOR JOSE D. LINA, JR., MR. NICASIO B.
BAUTISTA, MR. JESUS P. GONZAGA, MR. SOLOMON D. MAYLEM,
LEONORA C. MEDINA, CASIANO S. ALIPON, petitioners, vs. HON. TEOFISTO
T. GUINGONA, JR., in his capacity as Executive Secretary, HON. RAFAEL
ALUNAN, in his capacity as Secretary of Local Government, HON. SALVADOR
ENRIQUEZ, in his capacity as Secretary of Budget, THE COMMISSION ON
AUDIT, HON. JOSE MIRANDA, in his capacity as Municipal Mayor
of Santiago and HON. CHARITO MANUBAY, HON. VICTORINO MIRANDA,
JR., HON. ARTEMIO ALVAREZ, HON. DANILO VERGARA, HON. PETER DE
JESUS, HON. NELIA NATIVIDAD, HON. CELSO CALEON and HON. ABEL
MUSNGI, in their capacity as SANGGUNIANG BAYAN MEMBERS, MR.
RODRIGO L. SANTOS, in his capacity as Municipal Treasurer, and ATTY.
ALFREDO S. DIRIGE, in his capacity as Municipal Administrator, respondents.
DECISION
HERMOSISIMA, JR., J.:
Of main concern to the petitioners is whether Republic Act No. 7720, just recently passed by
Congress and signed by the President into law, is constitutionally infirm.
Indeed, in this Petition for Prohibition with prayer for Temporary Restraining Order and
Preliminary Prohibitory Injunction, petitioners assail the validity of Republic Act No. 7720,
entitled, An Act Converting the Municipality of Santiago, Isabela into an Independent
Component City to be known as the City of Santiago, mainly because the Act allegedly did not
originate exclusively in the House of Representatives as mandated by Section 24, Article VI of
the 1987 Constitution.
Also, petitioners claim that the Municipality of Santiago has not met the minimum average
annual income required under Section 450 of the Local Government Code of 1991 in order to be
converted into a component city.
Undisputed is the following chronicle of the metamorphosis of House Bill No. 8817 into
Republic Act No. 7720:
On April
18,
1993,
HB
No.
8817,
entitled
An
Act
Converting
the Municipality of Santiago into an Independent Component City to be known as the City
of Santiago, was filed in the House of Representatives with Representative Antonio Abaya as
principal author. Other sponsors included Representatives Ciriaco Alfelor, Rodolfo Albano,
Santiago Respicio and Faustino Dy. The bill was referred to the House Committee on Local
Government and the House Committee on Appropriations on May 5, 1993.
On May 19, 1993, June 1, 1993, November 28, 1993, and December 1, 1993, public
hearings on HB No. 8817 were conducted by the House Committee on Local Government. The
committee submitted to the House a favorable report, with amendments, on December 9, 1993.
On December 13, 1993, HB No. 8817 was passed by the House of Representatives on
Second Reading and was approved on Third Reading on December 17, 1993. On January 28,
1994, HB No. 8817 was transmitted to the Senate.
Meanwhile, a counterpart of HB No. 8817, Senate Bill No. 1243, entitled, An Act
Converting the Municipality of Santiago into an Independent] Component City to be Known as
the City of Santiago, was filed in the Senate. It was introduced by Senator Vicente Sotto III, as
principal sponsor, on May 19, 1993. This was just after the House of Representatives had
conducted its first public hearing on HB No. 8817.
On February 23, 1994, or a little less than a month after HB No. 8817 was transmitted to the
Senate, the Senate Committee on Local Government conducted public hearings on SB No. 1243.
On March 1, 1994, the said committee submitted Committee Report No. 378 on HB No. 8817,
with the recommendation that it be approved without amendment, taking into consideration the
reality that H.B. No. 8817 was on all fours with SB No. 1243. Senator Heherson T. Alvarez, one
of the herein petitioners, indicated his approval thereto by signing said report as member of the
Committee on Local Government.
On March 3, 1994, Committee Report No. 378 was passed by the Senate on Second Reading
and was approved on Third Reading on March 14, 1994. On March 22, 1994, the House of
Representatives, upon being apprised of the action of the Senate, approved the amendments
proposed by the Senate.
The enrolled bill, submitted to the President on April 12, 1994, was signed by the Chief
Executive on May 5, 1994 as Republic Act No. 7720. When a plebiscite on the Act was held
on July 13, 1994, a great majority of the registered voters of Santiago voted in favor of the
conversion of Santiago into a city.
The question as to the validity of Republic Act No. 7720 hinges on the following twin
issues: (I) Whether or not the Internal Revenue Allotments (IRAs) are to be included in the
computation of the average annual income of a municipality for purposes of its conversion into
an independent component city, and (II) Whether or not, considering that the Senate passed SB
No. 1243, its own version of HB No. 8817, Republic Act No. 7720 can be said to have originated
in the House of Representatives.
I
The annual income of a local
government unit includes the IRAs
----------------------------------------------------------Petitioners claim that Santiago could not qualify into a component city because its average
annual income for the last two (2) consecutive years based on 1991 constant prices falls below
the required annual income of Twenty Million Pesos (P20,000,000.00) for its conversion into a
city, petitioners having computed Santiagos average annual income in the following manner:
Total income (at 1991 constant prices) for 1991 P20,379,057.07

Total income (at 1991 constant prices) for 1992 P21,570,106.87
Total income for 1991 and 1992 P41,949,163.94
Minus:
IRAs for 1991 and 1992 P15,730,043.00
Total income for 1991 and 1992 P26,219,120.94
Average Annual Income P13,109,960.47
By dividing the total income of Santiago for calendar years 1991 and 1992, after deducting
the IRAs, the average annual income arrived at would only be P13,109,560.47 based on the 1991
constant prices. Thus, petitioners claim that Santiagos income is far below the aforesaid Twenty
Million Pesos average annual income requirement.
The certification issued by the Bureau of Local Government Finance of the Department of
Finance, which indicates Santiagos average annual income to be P20,974,581.97, is allegedly not
accurate as the Internal Revenue Allotments were not excluded from the computation. Petitioners
asseverate that the IRAs are not actually income but transfers and! or budgetary aid from the
national government and that they fluctuate, increase or decrease, depending on factors like
population, land and equal sharing.
In this regard, we hold that petitioners asseverations are untenable because Internal Revenue
Allotments form part of the income of Local Government Units.
It is true that for a municipality to be converted into a component city, it must, among
others, have an average annual income of at least Twenty Million Pesos for the last two (2)
consecutive years based on 1991 constant prices.1 Such income must be duly certified by the
Department of Finance.2
Resolution of the controversy regarding compliance by the Municipality of Santiago with
the aforecited income requirement hinges on a correlative and contextual explication of the
meaning of internal revenue allotments (IRAs) vis-a-vis the notion of income of a local
government unit and the principles of local autonomy and decentralization underlying the
institutionalization and intensified empowerment of the local government system.
A Local Government Unit is a political subdivision of the State which is constituted by law
and possessed of substantial control over its own affairs. 3 Remaining to be an intra sovereign
subdivision of one sovereign nation, but not intended, however, to be an imperium in
imperio,4 the local government unit is autonomous in the sense that it is given more powers,
authority, responsibilities and resources.5 Power which used to be highly centralized in Manila, is
thereby deconcentrated, enabling especially the peripheral local government units to develop not
only at their own pace and discretion but also with their oWn resources and assets.6
The practical side to development through a decentralized local government system certainly
concerns the matter of financial resources. With its broadened powers and increased
responsibilities, a local government unit must now operate on a much wider scale. More
extensive operations, in turn, entail more expenses. Understandably, the vesting of duty,
responsibility and accountability in every local government unit is accompanied with a provision
for reasonably adequate resources to discharge its powers and effectively carry out its
functions.7 Availment of such resources is effectuated through the vesting in every local
government unit of (1) the right to create and broaden its own source of revenue; (2) the right to
be allocated a just share in national taxes, such share being in the form of internal revenue
allotments (IRAs); and (3) the right to be given its equitable share in the proceeds of the
utilization and development of the national wealth, if any, within its territorial boundaries.8.
The funds generated from local taxes, IRAs and national wealth utilization proceeds accrue
to the general fund of the local government and are used to finance its operations subject to
specified modes of spending the same as provided for in the Local Government Code and its
implementing rules and regulations. For instance, not less than twenty percent (20%) of the IRAs
must be set aside for local development projects.9 As such, for purposes of budget preparation,
which budget should reflect the estimates of the income of the local government unit, among
others, the IRAs and the share in the national wealth utilization proceeds are considered items of
income. This is as it should be, since income is defined in the Local Government Code to be all
revenues and receipts collected or received forming the gross accretions of funds of the local
government unit.10
The IRAs are items of income because they form part of the gross accretion of the funds of
the local government unit. The IRAs regularly and automatically accrue to the local treasury
without need of any further action on the part of the local government unit. 11 They thus constitute
income which the local government can invariably rely upon as the source of much needed
funds.
For purposes of converting the Municipality of Santiago into a city, the Department of
Finance certified, among others, that the municipality had an average annual income of at least
Twenty Million Pesos for the last two (2) consecutive years based on 1991 constant prices. This,
the Department of Finance did after including the IRAs in its computation of said average annual
income.
Furthermore, Section 450 (c) of the Local Government Code provides that the average
annual income shall include the income accruing to the general fund, exclusive of special funds,
transfers, and non-recurring income. To reiterate, IRAs are a regular, recurring item of income;
nil is there a basis, too, to classify the same as a special fund or transfer, since IRAs have a
technical definition and meaning all its own as used in the Local Government Code that
unequivocally makes it distinct from special funds or transfers referred to when the Code speaks
of funding support from the national government, its instrumentalities and government-ownedor-controlled corporations.12
Thus, Department of Finance Order No. 359313 correctly encapsulizes the full import of the
above disquisition when it defined ANNUAL INCOME to be revenues and receipts realized by
provinces, cities and municipalities from regular sources of the Local General Fund including
the internal revenue allotment and other shares provided for in Sections 284, 290 and 291 of the
Code, but exclusive of non-recurring receipts, such as other national aids, grants, financial
assistance, loan proceeds, sales of fixed assets, and similar others (Italics ours). 14 Such order,
constituting executive or contemporaneous construction of a statute by an administrative agency
charged with the task of interpreting and applying the same, is entitled to full respect and should
be accorded great weight by the courts, unless such construction is clearly shown to be in sharp
conflict with the Constitution, the governing statute, or other laws.15
II
In the enactment of RA No. 7720,
there was compliance with Section 24,
Article VI of the 1987 Constitution
----------------------------------------------------------Although a bill of local application like HB No. 8817 should, by constitutional
prescription,16 originate exclusively in the House of Representatives, the claim of petitioners that
Republic Act No. 7720 did not originate exclusively in the House of Representatives because a
bill of the same import, SB No. 1243, was passed in the Senate, is untenable because it cannot be
denied that HB No. 8817 was filed in the House of Representatives first before SB No. 1243 was
filed in the Senate. Petitioners themselves cannot disavow their own admission that HB No. 8817
was filed on April 18, 1993 while SB No. 1243 was filed on May 19, 1993. The filing of HB No.
8817 was thus precursive not only of the said Act in question but also of SB No. 1243. Thus, HB
No. 8817, was the bill that initiated the legislative process that culminated in the enactment of
Republic Act No. 7720. No violation of Section 24, Article VI, of the 1987 Constitution is
perceptible under the circumstances attending the instant controversy.
Furthermore, petitioners themselves acknowledge that HB No. 8817 was already approved
on Third Reading and duly transmitted to the Senate when the Senate Committee on Local
Government conducted its public hearing on HB No. 8817. HB No. 8817 was approved on the
Third Reading on December 17, 1993 and transmitted to the Senate on January 28, 1994; a little
less than a month thereafter, or on February 23, 1994, the Senate Committee on Local
Government conducted public hearings on SB No. 1243. Clearly, the Senate held in abeyance
any action on SB No. 1243 until it received HB No. 8817, already approved on the Third
Reading, from the House of Representatives. The filing in the Senate of a substitute bill in
anticipation of its receipt of the bill from the House, does not contravene the constitutional
requirement that a bill of local application should originate in the House of Representatives, for
as long as the Senate does not act thereupon until it receives the House bill.
We have already addressed this issue in the case of Tolentino vs. Secretary of
Finance.17 There, on the matter of the Expanded Value Added Tax (EVAT) Law, which, as a
revenue bill, is nonetheless constitutionally required to originate exclusively in the House of
Representatives, we explained:
x x x To begin with, it is not the law-but the revenue bill-which is required by the Constitution to
originate exclusively in the House of Representatives. It is important to emphasize this, because
a bill originating in the House may undergo such extensive changes in the Senate that the result
may be a rewriting of the whole. x x x as a result of the Senate action, a distinct bill may be
produced. To insist that a revenue statute-and not only the bill which initiated the legislative
process culminating in the enactment of the law-must substantially be the same as the House bill
would be to deny the Senates power not only to concur with amendments but also to propose
amendments. It would be to violate the coequality of legislative power of the two houses of
Congress and in fact make the House superior to the Senate.
xxx xxx xxx
It is insisted, however, that S. No. 1630 was passed not in substitution of H. No. 11197 but of
another Senate bill (S. No. 1129) earlier filed and that what the Senate did was merely to take [H.
No. 11197] into consideration in enacting S. No. 1630. There is really no difference between the
Senate preserving H. No. 11197 up to the enacting clause and then writing its own version
following the enacting clause (which, it would seem petitioners admit is an amendment by
substitution), and, on the other hand, separately presenting a bill of its own on the same subject
matter. In either case the result are two bills on the same subject.
Indeed, what the Constitution simply means is that the initiative for filing revenue, tariff, or tax
bills, bills authorizing an increase of the public debt, private bills and bills of local application
must come from the House of Representatives on the theory that, elected as they are from the
districts, the members of the House can be expected to be more sensitive to the local needs and
problems. On the other hand, the senators, who are elected at large, are expected to approach the
same problems from the national perspective. Both views are thereby made to bear on the
enactment of such laws.
Nor does the Constitution prohibit the filing in the Senate of a substitute bill in anticipation of its
receipt of the bill from the House, so long as action by the Senate as a body is withheld pending
receipt of the House bill. x x x18
III
Every law, including RA No. 7720,

has in its favor the presumption
of constitutionality
-------------------------------------------------------------------It is a well-entrenched jurisprudential rule that on the side of every law lies the presumption
of constitutionality.19 Consequently, for RA No. 7720 to be nullified, it must be shown that there
is a clear and unequivocal breach of the Constitution, not merely a doubtful and equivocal one;
in other words, the grounds for nullity must be clear and beyond reasonable doubt. 20 Those who
petition this court to declare a law to be unconstitutional must clearly and fully establish the basis
that will justify such a declaration; otherwise, their petition must fail. Taking into consideration
the justification of our stand on the immediately preceding ground raised by petitioners to
challenge the constitutionality of RA No. 7720, the Court stands on the holding that petitioners
have failed to overcome the presumption. The dismissal of this petition is, therefore, inevitable.
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is DISMISSED for lack of merit with costs against
petitioners.
SO ORDERED.
Narvasa, C.J., Padilla, Regalado, Davide, Jr., Romero, Bellosillo, Melo, Puno, Vitug,
Kapunan, Mendoza, Francisco, and Panganiban, JJ., concur.

Supreme Court
Baguio City
EN BANC
LAWYERS AGAINST MONOPOLY

AND POVERTY (LAMP
Petitioners,
- versus
THE SECRETARY OF BUDGET AND
MANAGEMENT, THE TREASURER OF
THE PHILIPPINES, THE COMMISSION
ON AUDIT, and THE PRESIDENT OF
THE SENATE and the SPEAKER OF THE
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES in
representation of the Members
of the Congress,
Respondents.
x ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- x
DECISION
MENDOZA, J.:
For consideration of the Court is an original action for certiorari assailing the
constitutionality and legality of the implementation of the Priority Development Assistance
Fund (PDAF) as provided for in Republic Act (R.A.) 9206 or the General Appropriations Act for
2004 (GAA of 2004). Petitioner Lawyers Against Monopoly and Poverty (LAMP), a group of
lawyers who have banded together with a mission of dismantling all forms of political, economic
or social monopoly in the country,[1] also sought the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction
or temporary restraining order to enjoin respondent Secretary of the Department of Budget and
Management (DBM) from making, and, thereafter, releasing budgetary allocations to individual
members of Congress as pork barrel funds out of PDAF. LAMP likewise aimed to stop the
National Treasurer and the Commission on Audit (COA) from enforcing the questioned
provision.
On September 14, 2004, the Court required respondents, including the President of the Senate
and the Speaker of the House of Representatives, to comment on the petition. On April 7, 2005,
petitioner filed a Reply thereto.[2] On April 26, 2005, both parties were required to submit their
respective memoranda.
The GAA of 2004 contains the following provision subject of this petition:
PRIORITY DEVELOPMENT ASSISTANCE FUND
For fund requirements of priority development programs and projects, as
indicated hereunder 8,327,000,000.00
Xxxxx
Special Provision
1. Use and Release of the Fund. The amount herein appropriated shall be used to
fund priority programs and projects or to fund the required counterpart for
foreign-assisted programs and projects: PROVIDED, That such amount shall be
released directly to the implementing agency or Local Government Unit
concerned: PROVIDED, FURTHER, That the allocations authorized herein may
be realigned to any expense class, if deemed necessary: PROVIDED
FURTHERMORE, That a maximum of ten percent (10%) of the authorized
allocations by district may be used for procurement of rice and other basic
commodities which shall be purchased from the National Food Authority.
Petitioners Position
According to LAMP, the above provision is silent and, therefore, prohibits an automatic
or direct allocation of lump sums to individual senators and congressmen for the funding of
projects. It does not empower individual Members of Congress to propose, select and identify
programs and projects to be funded out of PDAF. In previous GAAs, said allocation and
identification of projects were the main features of the pork barrel system technically known as
Countrywide Development Fund (CDF). Nothing of the sort is now seen in the present law (R.A.
No. 9206 of CY 2004).[3] In its memorandum, LAMP insists that [t]he silence in the law of direct
or even indirect participation by members of Congress betrays a deliberate intent on the part of
the Executive and the Congress to scrap and do away with the pork barrel system. [4] In other
words, [t]he omission of the PDAF provision to specify sums as allocations to individual
Members of Congress is a casus omissus signifying an omission intentionally made by Congress
that this Court is forbidden to supply.[5] Hence, LAMP is of the conclusion that the pork barrel
has become legally defunct under the present state of GAA 2004.[6]
LAMP further decries the supposed flaws in the implementation of the provision, namely:
1) the DBM illegally made and directly released budgetary allocations out of PDAF in favor of
individual Members of Congress; and 2) the latter do not possess the power to propose, select
and identify which projects are to be actually funded by PDAF.
For LAMP, this situation runs afoul against the principle of separation of powers because
in receiving and, thereafter, spending funds for their chosen projects, the Members of Congress
in effect intrude into an executive function. In other words, they cannot directly spend the funds,
the appropriation for which was made by them. In their individual capacities, the Members of
Congress cannot virtually tell or dictate upon the Executive Department how to spend taxpayers
money.[7] Further, the authority to propose and select projects does not pertain to legislation. It is,
in fact, a non-legislative function devoid of constitutional sanction, [8] and, therefore,
impermissible and must be considered nothing less than malfeasance. The proposal and
identification of the projects do not involve the making of laws or the repeal and amendment
thereof, which is the only function given to the Congress by the Constitution. Verily, the power
of appropriation granted to Congress as a collegial body, does not include the power of the
Members thereof to individually propose, select and identify which projects are to be actually
implemented and funded - a function which essentially and exclusively pertains to the Executive
Department.[9]By allowing the Members of Congress to receive direct allotment from the fund, to
propose and identify projects to be funded and to perform the actual spending of the fund, the
implementation of the PDAF provision becomes legally infirm and constitutionally repugnant.
Respondents Position
For their part, the respondents[10] contend that the petition miserably lacks legal and
factual grounds. Although they admit that PDAF traced its roots to CDF,[11] they argue that the
former should not be equated with pork barrel, which has gained a derogatory meaning referring
to government projects affording political opportunism. [12] In the petition, no proof of this was
offered. It cannot be gainsaid then that the petition cannot stand on inconclusive media reports,
assumptions and conjectures alone. Without probative value, media reports cited by the
petitioner deserve scant consideration especially the accusation that corrupt legislators have
allegedly proposed cuts or slashes from their pork barrel. Hence, the Court should decline the
petitioners plea to take judicial notice of the supposed iniquity of PDAF because there is no
concrete proof that PDAF, in the guise of pork barrel, is a source of dirty money for
unscrupulous lawmakers and other officials who tend to misuse their allocations. These facts
have no attributes of sufficient notoriety or general recognition accepted by the public without
qualification, to be subjected to judicial notice. This applies, a fortiori, to the claim that
Members of Congress are beneficiaries of commissions (kickbacks) taken out of the PDAF
allocations and releases and preferred by favored contractors representing from 20% to 50% of
the approved budget for a particular project. [13]Suffice it to say, the perceptions of LAMP on the
implementation of PDAF must not be based on mere speculations circulated in the news media
preaching the evils of pork barrel. Failing to present even an iota of proof that the DBM
Secretary has been releasing lump sums from PDAF directly or indirectly to individual Members
of Congress, the petition falls short of its cause.
Likewise admitting that CDF and PDAF are appropriations for substantially similar, if
not the same, beneficial purposes, [14] the respondents invoke Philconsa v. Enriquez,[15] where
CDF was described as an imaginative and innovative process or mechanism of implementing
priority programs/projects specified in the law. In Philconsa, the Court upheld the authority of
individual Members of Congress to propose and identify priority projects because this was
merely recommendatory in nature. In said case, it was also recognized that individual members
of Congress far more than the President and their congressional colleagues were likely to be
knowledgeable about the needs of their respective constituents and the priority to be given each
project.
The Issues
The respondents urge the Court to dismiss the petition for its failure to establish factual
and legal basis to support its claims, thereby lacking an essential requisite of judicial reviewan
actual case or controversy.
The Courts Ruling
To the Court, the case boils down to these issues: 1) whether or not the mandatory
requisites for the exercise of judicial review are met in this case; and 2) whether or not the
implementation of PDAF by the Members of Congress is unconstitutional and illegal.
Like almost all powers conferred by the Constitution, the power of judicial review is
subject to limitations, to wit: (1) there must be an actual case or controversy calling for the
exercise of judicial power; (2) the person challenging the act must have the standing to question
the validity of the subject act or issuance; otherwise stated, he must have a personal and
substantial interest in the case such that he has sustained, or will sustain, direct injury as a result
of its enforcement; (3) the question of constitutionality must be raised at the earliest opportunity;
and (4) the issue of constitutionality must be the very lis mota of the case.[16]
An aspect of the case-or-controversy requirement is the requisite of ripeness. In
the United States, courts are centrally concerned with whether a case involves uncertain
contingent future events that may not occur as anticipated, or indeed may not occur at all.
Another concern is the evaluation of the twofold aspect of ripeness: first, the fitness of the issues
for judicial decision; and second, the hardship to the parties entailed by withholding court
consideration. In our jurisdiction, the issue of ripeness is generally treated in terms of actual
injury to the plaintiff. Hence, a question is ripe for adjudication when the act being challenged
has had a direct adverse effect on the individual challenging it.[17]
In this case, the petitioner contested the implementation of an alleged unconstitutional
statute, as citizens and taxpayers. According to LAMP, the practice of direct allocation and
release of funds to the Members of Congress and the authority given to them to propose and
select projects is the core of the laws flawed execution resulting in a serious constitutional
transgression involving the expenditure of public funds. Undeniably, as taxpayers, LAMP would
somehow be adversely affected by this. A finding of unconstitutionality would necessarily be
tantamount to a misapplication of public funds which, in turn, cause injury or hardship to
taxpayers. This affords ripeness to the present controversy.
Further, the allegations in the petition do not aim to obtain sheer legal opinion in the
nature of advice concerning legislative or executive action. The possibility of constitutional
violations in the implementation of PDAF surely involves the interplay of legal rights susceptible
of judicial resolution. For LAMP, this is the right to recover public funds possibly misapplied by
no less than the Members of Congress. Hence, without prejudice to other recourse against
erring public officials, allegations of illegal expenditure of public funds reflect a concrete injury
that may have been committed by other branches of government before the court intervenes. The
possibility that this injury was indeed committed cannot be discounted. The petition complains of
illegal disbursement of public funds derived from taxation and this is sufficient reason to say that
there indeed exists a definite, concrete, real or substantial controversy before the Court.
Anent locus standi, the rule is that the person who impugns the validity of a statute must
have a personal and substantial interest in the case such that he has sustained, or will sustained,
direct injury as a result of its enforcement. [18] The gist of the question of standing is whether a
party alleges such a personal stake in the outcome of the controversy as to assure that concrete
adverseness which sharpens the presentation of issues upon which the court so largely depends
for illumination of difficult constitutional questions.[19] In public suits, the plaintiff, representing
the general public, asserts a public right in assailing an allegedly illegal official action. The
plaintiff may be a person who is affected no differently from any other person, and could be
suing as a stranger, or as a citizen or taxpayer.[20] Thus, taxpayers have been allowed to sue where
there is a claim that public funds are illegally disbursed or that public money is being deflected
to any improper purpose, or that public funds are wasted through the enforcement of an invalid
or unconstitutional law.[21] Of greater import than the damage caused by the illegal expenditure of
public funds is the mortal wound inflicted upon the fundamental law by the enforcement of an
invalid statute.[22]
Here, the sufficient interest preventing the illegal expenditure of money raised by taxation
required in taxpayers suits is established. Thus, in the claim that PDAF funds have been illegally
disbursed and wasted through the enforcement of an invalid or unconstitutional law, LAMP
should be allowed to sue. The case of Pascual v. Secretary of Public Works[23] is authority in
support of the petitioner:
In the determination of the degree of interest essential to give the requisite
standing to attack the constitutionality of a statute, the general rule is that not only
persons individually affected, but alsotaxpayers have sufficient interest in
preventing the illegal expenditures of moneys raised by taxation and may
therefore question the constitutionality of statutes requiring expenditure of
public moneys. [11 Am. Jur. 761, Emphasis supplied.]
Lastly, the Court is of the view that the petition poses issues impressed with paramount
public interest. The ramification of issues involving the unconstitutional spending of PDAF
deserves the consideration of the Court, warranting the assumption of jurisdiction over the
petition.
Now, on the substantive issue.
The powers of government are generally divided into three branches: the Legislative, the
Executive and the Judiciary. Each branch is supreme within its own sphere being independent
from one another and it is this supremacy which enables the courts to determine whether a law is
constitutional or unconstitutional.[24] The Judiciary is the final arbiter on the question of whether
or not a branch of government or any of its officials has acted without jurisdiction or in excess of
jurisdiction or so capriciously as to constitute an abuse of discretion amounting to excess of
jurisdiction. This is not only a judicial power but a duty to pass judgment on matters of this
nature.[25]
With these long-established precepts in mind, the Court now goes to the crucial question:
In allowing the direct allocation and release of PDAF funds to the Members of Congress based
on their own list of proposed projects, did the implementation of the PDAF provision under the
GAA of 2004 violate the Constitution or the laws?
The Court rules in the negative.
In determining whether or not a statute is unconstitutional, the Court does not lose sight
of the presumption of validity accorded to statutory acts of Congress. In Farias v. The Executive
Secretary,[26] the Court held that:
Every statute is presumed valid. The presumption is that the legislature

intended to enact a valid, sensible and just law and one which operates no further
than may be necessary to effectuate the specific purpose of the law.Every
presumption should be indulged in favor of the constitutionality and the
burden of proof is on the party alleging that there is a clear and unequivocal
breach of the Constitution.
To justify the nullification of the law or its implementation, there must be a clear and
unequivocal, not a doubtful, breach of the Constitution. In case of doubt in the sufficiency of
proof establishing unconstitutionality, the Court must sustain legislation because to invalidate [a
law] based on x x x baseless supposition is an affront to the wisdom not only of the legislature
that passed it but also of the executive which approved it. [27] This presumption of
constitutionality can be overcome only by the clearest showing that there was indeed an
infraction of the Constitution, and only when such a conclusion is reached by the required
majority may the Court pronounce, in the discharge of the duty it cannot escape, that the
challenged act must be struck down.[28]
The petition is miserably wanting in this regard. LAMP would have the Court declare the
unconstitutionality of the PDAFs enforcement based on the absence of express provision in the
GAA allocating PDAF funds to the Members of Congress and the latters encroachment on
executive power in proposing and selecting projects to be funded by PDAF. Regrettably, these
allegations lack substantiation. No convincing proof was presented showing that, indeed, there
were direct releases of funds to the Members of Congress, who actually spend them according to
their sole discretion. Not even a documentation of the disbursement of funds by the DBM in
favor of the Members of Congress was presented by the petitioner to convince the Court to probe
into the truth of their claims. Devoid of any pertinent evidentiary support that illegal misuse of
PDAF in the form of kickbacks has become a common exercise of unscrupulous Members of
Congress, the Court cannot indulge the petitioners request for rejection of a law which is
outwardly legal and capable of lawful enforcement. In a case like this, the Courts hands are tied
in deference to the presumption of constitutionality lest the Court commits unpardonable judicial
legislation.The Court is not endowed with the power of clairvoyance to divine from scanty
allegations in pleadings where justice and truth lie.[29] Again, newspaper or electronic
reports showing the appalling effects of PDAF cannot be appreciated by the Court, not because
of any issue as to their truth, accuracy, or impartiality, but for the simple reason that facts must be
established in accordance with the rules of evidence.[30]
Hence, absent a clear showing that an offense to the principle of separation of powers
was committed, much less tolerated by both the Legislative and Executive, the Court is
constrained to hold that a lawful and regular government budgeting and appropriation process
ensued during the enactment and all throughout the implementation of the GAA of 2004. The
process was explained in this wise, inGuingona v. Carague:[31]
1. Budget preparation. The first step is essentially tasked upon the

Executive Branch and covers the estimation of government revenues, the
determination of budgetary priorities and activities within the constraints imposed
by available revenues and by borrowing limits, and the translation of desired
priorities and activities into expenditure levels.
Budget preparation starts with the budget call issued by the Department of
Budget and Management. Each agency is required to submit agency budget
estimates in line with the requirements consistent with the general ceilings set by
the Development Budget Coordinating Council (DBCC).
With regard to debt servicing, the DBCC staff, based on the macroeconomic projections of interest rates (e.g. LIBOR rate) and estimated sources of
domestic and foreign financing, estimates debt service levels. Upon issuance of
budget call, the Bureau of Treasury computes for the interest and principal
payments for the year for all direct national government borrowings and other
liabilities assumed by the same.
2. Legislative authorization. At this stage, Congress enters the picture and
deliberates or acts on the budget proposals of the President, and Congress in the
exercise of its own judgment and wisdomformulates an appropriation act
precisely following the process established by the Constitution, which specifies
that no money may be paid from the Treasury except in accordance with an
appropriation made by law.
xxx
3. Budget Execution. Tasked on the Executive, the third phase of the
budget process covers the various operational aspects of budgeting. The
establishment of obligation authority ceilings, the evaluation of work and
financial plans for individual activities, the continuing review of government
fiscal position, the regulation of funds releases, the implementation of cash
payment schedules, and other related activities comprise this phase of the budget
cycle.
4. Budget accountability. The fourth phase refers to the evaluation of
actual performance and initially approved work targets, obligations incurred,
personnel hired and work accomplished are compared with the targets set at the
time the agency budgets were approved.
Under the Constitution, the power of appropriation is vested in the Legislature, subject to the
requirement that appropriation bills originate exclusively in the House of Representatives with
the option of the Senate to propose or concur with amendments. [32] While the budgetary process
commences from the proposal submitted by the President to Congress, it is the latter which
concludes the exercise by crafting an appropriation act it may deem beneficial to the nation,
based on its own judgment, wisdom and purposes. Like any other piece of legislation, the
appropriation act may then be susceptible to objection from the branch tasked to implement it, by
way of a Presidential veto. Thereafter, budget execution comes under the domain of the
Executive branch which deals with the operational aspects of the cycle including the allocation
and release of funds earmarked for various projects. Simply put, from the regulation of fund
releases, the implementation of payment schedules and up to the actual spending of the funds
specified in the law, the Executive takes the wheel. The DBM lays down the guidelines for the
disbursement of the fund. The Members of Congress are then requested by the President to
recommend projects and programs which may be funded from the PDAF. The list submitted by
the Members of Congress is endorsed by the Speaker of the House of Representatives to the
DBM, which reviews and determines whether such list of projects submitted are consistent with
the guidelines and the priorities set by the Executive. [33] This demonstrates the power given to the
President to execute appropriation laws and therefore, to exercise the spending per se of the
budget.
As applied to this case, the petition is seriously wanting in establishing that individual Members
of Congress receive and thereafter spend funds out of PDAF. Although the possibility of this
unscrupulous practice cannot be entirely discounted, surmises and conjectures are not sufficient
bases for the Court to strike down the practice for being offensive to the Constitution. Moreover,
the authority granted the Members of Congress to propose and select projects was already upheld
in Philconsa. This remains as valid case law. The Court sees no need to review or reverse the
standing pronouncements in the said case.So long as there is no showing of a direct participation
of legislators in the actual spending of the budget, the constitutional boundaries between the
Executive and the Legislative in the budgetary process remain intact.
While the Court is not unaware of the yoke caused by graft and corruption, the evils
propagated by a piece of valid legislation cannot be used as a tool to overstep constitutional
limits and arbitrarily annul acts of Congress. Again, all presumptions are indulged in favor of
constitutionality; one who attacks a statute, alleging unconstitutionality must prove its invalidity
beyond a reasonable doubt; that a law may work hardship does not render it unconstitutional;
that if any reasonable basis may be conceived which supports the statute, it will be upheld, and
the challenger must negate all possible bases; that the courts are not concerned with the wisdom,
justice, policy, or expediency of a statute; and that a liberal interpretation of the constitution in
favor of the constitutionality of legislation should be adopted.[34]
There can be no question as to the patriotism and good motive of the petitioner in filing
this petition. Unfortunately, the petition must fail based on the foregoing reasons.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED without pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-33713 July 30, 1975

EUSEBIO B. GARCIA, petitioner-appellant,
vs.
HON. ERNESTO S. MATA, Secretary of National Defense, and GENERAL MANUEL T.
YAN, Chief of Staff, Armed Forces of the Philippines, respondents-appellees.
Emilio Purugganan for petitioner-appellant.
Office of the Solicitor General Estelito P. Mendoza, Assistant Solicitor General Rosalio A. de
Leon and Solicitor Eulogio Raquel-Santos for respondents-appellees.
CASTRO, J.:
This is a petition for certiorari to review the decision of the Court of First Instance of Quezon
City, Branch IX, in civil case Q-13466, entitled "Eusebio B. Garcia, petitioner, versus Hon.
Ernesto Mata (Juan Ponce Enrile), et al., respondents," declaring paragraph 11 of the "Special
Provisions for the Armed Forces of the Philippines" of Republic Act No. 1600 1 unconstitutional
and therefore invalid and inoperative.
We affirm the judgment a quo.
The facts material to this case are embodied in the following stipulation submitted jointly by
both parties to the lower court:
Petitioner was a reserve officer on active duty with the Armed Forces of the
Philippines until his reversion to inactive status on 15 November 1960, pursuant
to the provisions of Republic Act No. 2332. At the time of reversion, Petitioner
held the rank of Captain with a monthly emolument of P478.00, comprising his
base and longevity pay, quarters and subsistence allowances;
On June 18, 1955, the date when Republic Act No. 1382 took effect, petitioner
had a total of 9 years, 4 months and 12 days of accumulated active commissioned
service in the Armed Forces of the Philippines;
On July 11, 1956, the date when Republic Act 1600 took effect, petitioner had an
accumulated active commissioned service of 10 years, 5 months and 5 days in the
Armed Forces of the Philippines;
Petitioner's reversion to inactive status on 15 November 1960 was pursuant to the
provisions of Republic Act 2334, and such reversion was neither for cause, at his
own request, nor after court-martial proceedings;
From 15 November 1960 up to the present, petitioner has been on inactive status
and as such, he has neither received any emoluments from the Armed Forces of
the Philippines, nor was he ever employed in the Government in any capacity;
As a consequence of his reversion to inactive status, petitioner filed the necessary
petitions with the offices of the AFP Chief of Staff, the Secretary of National
Defense, and the President, respectively, but received reply only from the Chief of
Staff through the AFP Adjutant General.
On September 17, 1969 the petitioner brought an action for "Mandamus and Recovery of a Sum
of Money" in the court a quo to compel the respondents Secretary of National Defense and Chief
of Staff of the Armed Forces of the Philippines 2 to reinstate him in the active commissioned
service of the Armed Forces of the Philippines, to readjust his rank, and to pay all the
emoluments and allowances due to him from the time of his reversion to inactive status. On
December 2, 1970 the trial court dismissed the petition. The court ruled that paragraph 11 of the
"Special Provisions for the Armed Forces of the Philippines" in Republic Act 1600 is "invalid,
unconstitutional and inoperative."
The petitioner had a total of 9 years, 4 months and 12 days of accumulated active commissioned
service in the AFP when Republic Act 1382 took effect on June 18, 1955. Section I of this law
provided:
Reserve officers with at least ten years of active accumulated commissioned
service who are still on active duty at the time of the approval of this Act shall not
be reverted into inactive status except for cause after proper court-martial
proceedings or upon their own request: Provided, That for purposes of computing
the length of service, six months or more of active service shall be considered one
year. (emphasis supplied)
The petitioner's accumulated active commissioned service was thus short of the minimum service
requirement prescribed in the aforequoted provision of R.A. 1382.
On July 11, 1956, 3 while the petitioner was yet in the active service, Republic Act 1600 was
enacted into law. Paragraph 11 of the SPECIAL PROVISIONS FOR THE ARMED FORCES OF
THE PHILIPPINES (on page 892 of the Act) provided as follows:
11. After the approval of this Act, and when there is no emergency, no reserve
officer of the Armed Forces of the Philippines may be called to a tour of active
duty for more than two years during any period of five consecutive years:
PROVIDED, That hereafter reserve officers of the Armed Forces of the
Philippines on active duty for more than two years on the date of the approval of
this Act except those whose military and educational training, experience and
qualifications are deemed essential to the needs of the service, shall be reverted to
inactive status within one year from the approval of this Act: PROVIDED,
FURTHER, That reserve officers with at least ten years of active accumulated
commissioned service who are still on active duty at the time of the approval of
this Act shall not be reverted to inactive status except for cause after proper
court-martial proceedings or upon their request; PROVIDED, FURTHER, That
any such reserve officer reverted to inactive status who has at least five of active
commissioned service shall be entitled to a gratuity equivalent to one month's
authorized base and longevity pay in the rank held at the time of such reversion
for every year of active commissioned service; PROVIDED, FURTHER, That
any reserve officer who receives a gratuity under the provisions of this Act shall
not except during a National emergency or mobilization, be called to a tour of
active duty within five years from the date of reversion: PROVIDED, FURTHER,
That the Secretary of National Defense is authorized to extend the tour of active
duty of reserve officers who are qualified military pilots and doctors;
PROVIDED, FURTHER, That any savings in the appropriations authorized in
this Act for the Department of National Defense notwithstanding any provision of
this Act to the contrary and any unexpended balance of certification to accounts
payable since 1 July 1949 regardless of purpose of the appropriation shall be
made available for the purpose of this paragraph: AND PROVIDED, FINALLY,
That the Secretary of National Defense shall render a quarterly report to Congress
as to the implementation of the provisions of this paragraph. ( pp. 892-893, RA
1600) (emphasis supplied)
The petitioner consequently argues that his reversion to inactive status on November 15, 1960
was in violation of the abovequoted provision which prohibits the reversion to inactive status of
reserve officers on active duty with at least ten years of accumulated active commissioned
service.
On the other hand, the respondents contend that the said provision has no relevance or pertinence
whatsoever to the budget in question or to any appropriation item contained therein, and is
therefore proscribed by Art. VI, Sec. 19, par. 2 4 of the 1935 Constitution of the Philippines,
which reads:
No provision or enactment shall be embraced in the general appropriation bill
unless it relates specifically to some particular appropriation therein; and any such
provision or enactment shall be limited in its operation to such appropriation.
A perusal of the challenged provision of R.A. 1600 fails to disclose its relevance or relation to
any appropriation item therein, or to the Appropriation Act as a whole. From the very first clause
of paragraph 11 itself, which reads,
After the approval of this Act, and when there is no emergency, no reserve officer
of the Armed Forces of the Philippines may be called to a tour of active duty for
more than two years during any period of five consecutive years:
the incongruity and irrelevancy are already evident. While R.A. 1600 appropriated money for the
operation of the Government for the fiscal year 1956-1957, the said paragraph 11 refers to the
fundamental government policy matters of the calling to active duty and the reversion to inactive
status of reserve officers in the AFP. The incongruity and irrelevancy continue throughout the
entire paragraph.
In the language of the respondents-appellees, "it was indeed a non-appropriation item inserted in
an appropriation measure in violation of the constitutional inhibition against "riders" to the
general appropriation act." It was indeed a new and completely unrelated provision attached to
the Appropriation Act.
The paragraph in question also violated Art. VI, Sec. 21, par. 1 5 of the 1935 Constitution of the
Philippines which provided that "No bill which may be enacted into law shall embrace more than
one subject which shall be expressed in the title of the bill." This constitutional requirement
nullified and rendered inoperative any provision contained in the body of an act that was not
fairly included in the subject expressed in the title or was not germane to or properly connected
with that subject.
In determining whether a provision contained in an act is embraced in the subject and is properly
connected therewith, the subject to be considered is the one expressed in the title of the act, and
every fair intendment and reasonable doubt should be indulged in favor of the validity of the
legislative enactment. But when an act contains provisions which are clearly not embraced in the
subject of the act, as expressed in the title, such provisions are inoperative and without effect.
We are mindful that the title of an act is not required to be an index to the body of the act. Thus,
in Sumulong vs. Comelec, 73 Phil. 288, 291, this Court held that it is "a sufficient compliance
with such requirement if the title expresses the general subject and all the provisions of the
statute are germane to that general subject." The constitutional provision was intended to
preclude the insertion of riders in legislation, a rider being a provision not germane to the
subject-matter of the bill. 6
The subject of R.A. 1600, as expressed in its title, is restricted to "appropriating funds for the
operation of the government." Any provision contained in the body of the act that is fairly
included in this restricted subject or any matter properly connected therewith is valid and
operative. But, if a provision in the body of the act is not fairly included in this restricted subject,
like the provision relating to the policy matters of calling to active duty and reversion to inactive
duty of reserve officers of the AFP, such provision is inoperative and of no effect.
To quote the respondents-appellees on this point:
It is obvious that the statutory provision in question refers to security of reserve
officers from reversion to inactive status, whereas the subject or title of the statute
from which it derives its existence refers to appropriations. Verily, it runs contrary
to or is repugnant to the above-quoted injunctive provision of the Constitution.
Where a conflict arises between a statute and the Constitution, the latter prevails.
It should be emphasized that a Constitution is superior to a statute and is precisely
called the "supreme law of the land" because it is the fundamental or organic law
which states the general principles and builds the substantial foundation and
general framework of law and government, and for that reason a statute contrary
to or in violation of the Constitution is null and void (Talabon vs. Iloilo Provincial
Warden, 78 Phil. 599).1wph1.t If a law, therefore, happens to infringe upon or
violate the fundamental law, courts of justice may step in to nullify its
effectiveness (Mabanag vs. Lopez Vito, 78 Phil. 1).
Upon the foregoing dissertation, we declare Paragraph 11 of the SPECIAL PROVISIONS FOR
THE ARMED FORCES OF THE PHILIPPINES as unconstitutional, invalid and inoperative.
Being unconstitutional, it confers no right and affords no protection. In legal contemplation it is
as though it has never been passed. 7
Verily, not having shown a clear legal right to the position to which he desires to be restored, the
petitioner cannot compel the respondents to reinstate and/or call him to active duty, promote or
readjust his rank, much less pay him back emoluments and allowances.
ACCORDINGLY, the instant petition is denied, and the decision of the lower court dismissing
the complaint is hereby affirmed. No pronouncement as to costs.
Makalintal, C.J., Fernando, Makasiar, Esquerra, Muoz Palma, Aquino, Concepcion, Jr. and
Martin, JJ., concur.
Antonio, J., took no part.
Teehankee, J., is on leave.
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. 71977 February 27, 1987

DEMETRIO G. DEMETRIA, M.P., AUGUSTO S. SANCHEZ, M.P., ORLANDO S.
MERCADO, M.P., HONORATO Y. AQUINO, M.P., ZAFIRO L. RESPICIO, M.P.,
DOUGLAS R. CAGAS, M.P., OSCAR F. SANTOS, M.P., ALBERTO G. ROMULO, M.P.,
CIRIACO R. ALFELOR, M.P., ISIDORO E. REAL, M.P., EMIGDIO L. LINGAD, M.P.,
ROLANDO C. MARCIAL, M.P., PEDRO M. MARCELLANA, M.P., VICTOR S. ZIGA,
M.P., and ROGELIO V. GARCIA. M.P., petitioners,
vs.
HON. MANUEL ALBA in his capacity as the MINISTER OF THE BUDGET and VICTOR
MACALINGCAG in his capacity as the TREASURER OF THE
PHILIPPINES, respondents.
FERNAN, J.:
Assailed in this petition for prohibition with prayer for a writ of preliminary injunction is the
constitutionality of the first paragraph of Section 44 of Presidential Decree No. 1177, otherwise
known as the "Budget Reform Decree of 1977."
Petitioners, who filed the instant petition as concerned citizens of this country, as members of the
National Assembly/Batasan Pambansa representing their millions of constituents, as parties with
general interest common to all the people of the Philippines, and as taxpayers whose vital
interests may be affected by the outcome of the reliefs prayed for" 1 listed the grounds relied
upon in this petition as follows:
A. SECTION 44 OF THE 'BUDGET REFORM DECREE OF 1977' INFRINGES
UPON THE FUNDAMENTAL LAW BY AUTHORIZING THE ILLEGAL
TRANSFER OF PUBLIC MONEYS.
B. SECTION 44 OF PRESIDENTIAL DECREE NO. 1177 IS REPUGNANT TO
THE CONSTITUTION AS IT FAILS TO SPECIFY THE OBJECTIVES AND
PURPOSES FOR WHICH THE PROPOSED TRANSFER OF FUNDS ARE TO
BE MADE.
C. SECTION 44 OF PRESIDENTIAL DECREE NO. 1177 ALLOWS THE
PRESIDENT TO OVERRIDE THE SAFEGUARDS, FORM AND
PROCEDURE PRESCRIBED BY THE CONSTITUTION IN APPROVING
APPROPRIATIONS.
D. SECTION 44 OF THE SAME DECREE AMOUNTS TO AN UNDUE
DELEGATION OF LEGISLATIVE POWERS TO THE EXECUTIVE.
E. THE THREATENED AND CONTINUING TRANSFER OF FUNDS BY THE
PRESIDENT AND THE IMPLEMENTATION THEREOF BY THE BUDGET
MINISTER AND THE TREASURER OF THE PHILIPPINES ARE WITHOUT
OR IN EXCESS OF THEIR AUTHORITY AND JURISDICTION. 2
Commenting on the petition in compliance with the Court resolution dated September 19, 1985,
the Solicitor General, for the public respondents, questioned the legal standing of petitioners,
who were allegedly merely begging an advisory opinion from the Court, there being no
justiciable controversy fit for resolution or determination. He further contended that the
provision under consideration was enacted pursuant to Section 16[5], Article VIII of the 1973
Constitution; and that at any rate, prohibition will not lie from one branch of the government to a
coordinate branch to enjoin the performance of duties within the latter's sphere of responsibility.
On February 27, 1986, the Court required the petitioners to file a Reply to the Comment. This,
they did, stating, among others, that as a result of the change in the administration, there is a need
to hold the resolution of the present case in abeyance "until developments arise to enable the
parties to concretize their respective stands." 3
Thereafter, We required public respondents to file a rejoinder. The Solicitor General filed a
rejoinder with a motion to dismiss, setting forth as grounds therefor the abrogation of Section
16[5], Article VIII of the 1973 Constitution by the Freedom Constitution of March 25, 1986,
which has allegedly rendered the instant petition moot and academic. He likewise cited the
"seven pillars" enunciated by Justice Brandeis in Ashwander v. TVA, 297 U.S. 288 (1936) 4 as
basis for the petition's dismissal.
In the case of Evelio B. Javier v. The Commission on Elections and Arturo F. Pacificador, G.R.
Nos. 68379-81, September 22, 1986, We stated that:
The abolition of the Batasang Pambansa and the disappearance of the office in
dispute between the petitioner and the private respondents both of whom have
gone their separate ways could be a convenient justification for dismissing the
case. But there are larger issues involved that must be resolved now, once and for
all, not only to dispel the legal ambiguities here raised. The more important
purpose is to manifest in the clearest possible terms that this Court will not
disregard and in effect condone wrong on the simplistic and tolerant pretext that
the case has become moot and academic.
The Supreme Court is not only the highest arbiter of legal questions but also the
conscience of the government. The citizen comes to us in quest of law but we
must also give him justice. The two are not always the same. There are times
when we cannot grant the latter because the issue has been settled and decision is
no longer possible according to the law. But there are also times when although
the dispute has disappeared, as in this case, it nevertheless cries out to be
resolved. Justice demands that we act then, not only for the vindication of the
outraged right, though gone, but also for the guidance of and as a restraint upon
the future.
It is in the discharge of our role in society, as above-quoted, as well as to avoid great disservice
to national interest that We take cognizance of this petition and thus deny public respondents'
motion to dismiss. Likewise noteworthy is the fact that the new Constitution, ratified by the
Filipino people in the plebiscite held on February 2, 1987, carries verbatim section 16[5], Article
VIII of the 1973 Constitution under Section 24[5], Article VI. And while Congress has not
officially reconvened, We see no cogent reason for further delaying the resolution of the case at
bar.
The exception taken to petitioners' legal standing deserves scant consideration. The case
of Pascual v. Secretary of Public Works, et al., 110 Phil. 331, is authority in support of
petitioners' locus standi. Thus:
Again, it is well-settled that the validity of a statute may be contested only by one
who will sustain a direct injury in consequence of its enforcement. Yet, there are
many decisions nullifying at the instance of taxpayers, laws providing for the
disbursement of public funds, upon the theory that the expenditure of public funds
by an officer of the state for the purpose of administering anunconstitutional
act constitutes a misapplication of such funds which may be enjoined at the
request of a taxpayer. Although there are some decisions to the contrary, the
prevailing view in the United States is stated in the American Jurisprudence as
follows:
In the determination of the degree of interest essential to give the
requisite standing to attack the constitutionality of a statute, the
general rule is that not only persons individually affected, but
also taxpayers have sufficient interest in preventing the illegal
expenditures of moneys raised by taxation and may therefore
question the constitutionality of statutes requiring expenditure of
public moneys. [ 11 Am. Jur. 761, Emphasis supplied. ]
Moreover, in Tan v. Macapagal, 43 SCRA 677 and Sanidad v. Comelec, 73 SCRA 333, We said
that as regards taxpayers' suits, this Court enjoys that open discretion to entertain the same or
not.
The conflict between paragraph 1 of Section 44 of Presidential Decree No. 1177 and Section
16[5], Article VIII of the 1973 Constitution is readily perceivable from a mere cursory reading
thereof. Said paragraph 1 of Section 44 provides:
The President shall have the authority to transfer any fund, appropriated for the
different departments, bureaus, offices and agencies of the Executive Department,
which are included in the General Appropriations Act, to any program, project or
activity of any department, bureau, or office included in the General
Appropriations Act or approved after its enactment.
On the other hand, the constitutional provision under consideration reads as follows:
Sec. 16[5]. No law shall be passed authorizing any transfer of appropriations,
however, the President, the Prime Minister, the Speaker, the Chief Justice of the
Supreme Court, and the heads of constitutional commis ions may by law be
authorized to augment any item in the general appropriations law for their
respective offices from savings in other items of their respective appropriations.
The prohibition to transfer an appropriation for one item to another was explicit and categorical
under the 1973 Constitution. However, to afford the heads of the different branches of the
government and those of the constitutional commissions considerable flexibility in the use of
public funds and resources, the constitution allowed the enactment of a law authorizing the
transfer of funds for the purpose of augmenting an item from savings in another item in the
appropriation of the government branch or constitutional body concerned. The leeway granted
was thus limited. The purpose and conditions for which funds may be transferred were specified,
i.e. transfer may be allowed for the purpose of augmenting an item and such transfer may be
made only if there are savings from another item in the appropriation of the government branch
or constitutional body.
Paragraph 1 of Section 44 of P.D. No. 1177 unduly over extends the privilege granted under said
Section 16[5]. It empowers the President to indiscriminately transfer funds from one department,
bureau, office or agency of the Executive Department to any program, project or activity of any
department, bureau or office included in the General Appropriations Act or approved after its
enactment, without regard as to whether or not the funds to be transferred are actually savings in
the item from which the same are to be taken, or whether or not the transfer is for the purpose of
augmenting the item to which said transfer is to be made. It does not only completely disregard
the standards set in the fundamental law, thereby amounting to an undue delegation of legislative
powers, but likewise goes beyond the tenor thereof. Indeed, such constitutional infirmities render
the provision in question null and void.
"For the love of money is the root of all evil: ..." and money belonging to no one in particular, i.e.
public funds, provide an even greater temptation for misappropriation and embezzlement. This,
evidently, was foremost in the minds of the framers of the constitution in meticulously
prescribing the rules regarding the appropriation and disposition of public funds as embodied in
Sections 16 and 18 of Article VIII of the 1973 Constitution. Hence, the conditions on the release
of money from the treasury [Sec. 18(1)]; the restrictions on the use of public funds for public
purpose [Sec. 18(2)]; the prohibition to transfer an appropriation for an item to another [See.
16(5) and the requirement of specifications [Sec. 16(2)], among others, were all safeguards
designed to forestall abuses in the expenditure of public funds. Paragraph 1 of Section 44 puts all
these safeguards to naught. For, as correctly observed by petitioners, in view of the unlimited
authority bestowed upon the President, "... Pres. Decree No. 1177 opens the floodgates for the
enactment of unfunded appropriations, results in uncontrolled executive expenditures, diffuses
accountability for budgetary performance and entrenches the pork barrel system as the ruling
party may well expand [sic] public money not on the basis of development priorities but on
political and personal expediency." 5 The contention of public respondents that paragraph 1 of
Section 44 of P.D. 1177 was enacted pursuant to Section 16(5) of Article VIII of the 1973
Constitution must perforce fall flat on its face.
Another theory advanced by public respondents is that prohibition will not lie from one branch
of the government against a coordinate branch to enjoin the performance of duties within the
latter's sphere of responsibility.
Thomas M. Cooley in his "A Treatise on the Constitutional Limitations," Vol. 1, Eight Edition,
Little, Brown and Company, Boston, explained:
... The legislative and judicial are coordinate departments of the government, of
equal dignity; each is alike supreme in the exercise of its proper functions, and
cannot directly or indirectly, while acting within the limits of its authority, be
subjected to the control or supervision of the other, without an unwarrantable
assumption by that other of power which, by the Constitution, is not conferred
upon it. The Constitution apportions the powers of government, but it does not
make any one of the three departments subordinate to another, when exercising
the trust committed to it. The courts may declare legislative enactments
unconstitutional and void in some cases, but not because the judicial power is
superior in degree or dignity to the legislative. Being required to declare what the
law is in the cases which come before them, they must enforce the Constitution,
as the paramount law, whenever a legislative enactment comes in conflict with it.
But the courts sit, not to review or revise the legislative action, but to enforce the
legislative will, and it is only where they find that the legislature has failed to
keep within its constitutional limits, that they are at liberty to disregard its action;
and in doing so, they only do what every private citizen may do in respect to the
mandates of the courts when the judges assumed to act and to render judgments or
decrees without jurisdiction. "In exercising this high authority, the judges claim
no judicial supremacy; they are only the administrators of the public will. If an act
of the legislature is held void, it is not because the judges have any control over
the legislative power, but because the act is forbidden by the Constitution, and
because the will of the people, which is therein declared, is paramount to that of
their representatives expressed in any law." [Lindsay v. Commissioners, & c., 2
Bay, 38, 61; People v. Rucker, 5 Col. 5; Russ v. Com., 210 Pa. St. 544; 60 Atl.
169, 1 L.R.A. [N.S.] 409, 105 Am. St. Rep. 825] (pp. 332-334).
Indeed, where the legislature or the executive branch is acting within the limits of its authority,
the judiciary cannot and ought not to interfere with the former. But where the legislature or the
executive acts beyond the scope of its constitutional powers, it becomes the duty of the judiciary
to declare what the other branches of the government had assumed to do as void. This is the
essence of judicial power conferred by the Constitution "in one Supreme Court and in such lower
courts as may be established by law" [Art. VIII, Section 1 of the 1935 Constitution; Art. X,
Section 1 of the 1973 Constitution and which was adopted as part of the Freedom Constitution,
and Art. VIII, Section 1 of the 1987 Constitution] and which power this Court has exercised in
many instances. *
Public respondents are being enjoined from acting under a provision of law which We have
earlier mentioned to be constitutionally infirm. The general principle relied upon cannot
therefore accord them the protection sought as they are not acting within their "sphere of
responsibility" but without it.
The nation has not recovered from the shock, and worst, the economic destitution brought about
by the plundering of the Treasury by the deposed dictator and his cohorts. A provision which
allows even the slightest possibility of a repetition of this sad experience cannot remain written
in our statute books.
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is granted. Paragraph 1 of Section 44 of Presidential Decree
No. 1177 is hereby declared null and void for being unconstitutional.
SO ORDER RED.
Teehankee, C.J., Yap, Narvasa, Melencio-Herrera, Alampay, Gutierrez, Jr., Cruz, Paras,
Feliciano, Gancayco, Padilla, Bidin, Sarmiento and Cortes, JJ., concur.
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. 113105 August 19, 1994

PHILIPPINE CONSTITUTION ASSOCIATION, EXEQUIEL B. GARCIA and A.
GONZALES, petitioners,
vs.
HON. SALVADOR ENRIQUEZ, as Secretary of Budget and Management; HON.
VICENTE T. TAN, as National Treasurer and COMMISSION ON AUDIT, respondents.
G.R. No. 113174 August 19, 1994
RAUL S. ROCO, as Member of the Philippine Senate, NEPTALI A. GONZALES,
Chairman of the Committee on Finance of the Philippine Senate, and EDGARDO J.
ANGARA, as President and Chief Executive of the Philippine Senate, all of whom also sue
as taxpayers, in their own behalf and in representation of Senators HEHERSON
ALVAREZ, AGAPITO A. AQUINO, RODOLFO G. BIAZON, JOSE D. LINA, JR.,
ERNESTO F. HERRERA, BLAS F. OPLE, JOHN H. OSMENA, GLORIA MACAPAGALARROYO, VICENTE C. SOTTO III, ARTURO M. TOLENTINO, FRANCISCO S.
TATAD, WIGBERTO E. TAADA and FREDDIE N. WEBB, petitioners,
vs.
THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY, THE DEPARTMENT OF BUDGET AND
MANAGEMENT, and THE NATIONAL TREASURER, THE COMMISSION ON AUDIT,
impleaded herein as an unwilling
co-petitioner, respondents.
G.R. No. 113766 August 19, 1994
WIGBERTO E. TAADA and ALBERTO G. ROMULO, as Members of the Senate and as
taxpayers, and FREEDOM FROM DEBT COALITION, petitioners,
vs.
HON. TEOFISTO T. GUINGONA, JR. in his capacity as Executive Secretary, HON.
SALVADOR ENRIQUEZ, JR., in his capacity as Secretary of the Department of Budget
and Management, HON. CARIDAD VALDEHUESA, in her capacity as National
Treasurer, and THE COMMISSION ON AUDIT, respondents.
G.R. No. 113888 August 19, 1994
WIGBERTO E. TAADA and ALBERTO G. ROMULO, as Members of the Senate and as
taxpayers,petitioners,
vs.
HON. TEOFISTO T. GUINGONA, JR., in his capacity as Executive Secretary, HON.
SALVADOR ENRIQUEZ, JR., in his capacity as Secretary of the Department of Budget
and Management, HON. CARIDAD VALDEHUESA, in her capacity as National
Treasurer, and THE COMMISSION ON AUDIT, respondents.
Ramon R. Gonzales for petitioners in G.R. No. 113105.
Eddie Tamondong for petitioners in G.R. Nos. 113766 & 113888.
Roco, Buag, Kapunan, Migallos & Jardeleza for petitioners Raul S. Roco, Neptali A. Gonzales
and Edgardo Angara.
Ceferino Padua Law Office fro intervenor Lawyers Against Monopoly and Poverty (Lamp).
QUIASON, J.:
Once again this Court is called upon to rule on the conflicting claims of authority between the
Legislative and the Executive in the clash of the powers of the purse and the sword. Providing
the focus for the contest between the President and the Congress over control of the national
budget are the four cases at bench. Judicial intervention is being sought by a group of concerned
taxpayers on the claim that Congress and the President have impermissibly exceeded their
respective authorities, and by several Senators on the claim that the President has committed
grave abuse of discretion or acted without jurisdiction in the exercise of his veto power.
I
House Bill No. 10900, the General Appropriation Bill of 1994 (GAB of 1994), was passed and
approved by both houses of Congress on December 17, 1993. As passed, it imposed conditions
and limitations on certain items of appropriations in the proposed budget previously submitted
by the President. It also authorized members of Congress to propose and identify projects in the
"pork barrels" allotted to them and to realign their respective operating budgets.
Pursuant to the procedure on the passage and enactment of bills as prescribed by the
Constitution, Congress presented the said bill to the President for consideration and approval.
On December 30, 1993, the President signed the bill into law, and declared the same to have
become Republic Act No. 7663, entitled "AN ACT APPROPRIATING FUNDS FOR THE
OPERATION OF THE GOVERNMENT OF THE PHILIPPINES FROM JANUARY ONE TO
DECEMBER THIRTY ONE, NINETEEN HUNDRED AND NINETY-FOUR, AND FOR
OTHER PURPOSES" (GAA of 1994). On the same day, the President delivered his Presidential
Veto Message, specifying the provisions of the bill he vetoed and on which he imposed certain
conditions.
No step was taken in either House of Congress to override the vetoes.
In G.R. No. 113105, the Philippine Constitution Association, Exequiel B. Garcia and Ramon A.
Gonzales as taxpayers, prayed for a writ of prohibition to declare as unconstitutional and void:
(a) Article XLI on the Countrywide Development Fund, the special provision in Article I entitled
Realignment of Allocation for Operational Expenses, and Article XLVIII on the Appropriation
for Debt Service or the amount appropriated under said Article XLVIII in excess of the P37.9
Billion allocated for the Department of Education, Culture and Sports; and (b) the veto of the
President
of
the
Special
Provision
of
Article XLVIII of the GAA of 1994 (Rollo, pp. 88-90, 104-105)
In G.R. No. 113174, sixteen members of the Senate led by Senate President Edgardo J. Angara,
Senator Neptali A. Gonzales, the Chairman of the Committee on Finance, and Senator Raul S.
Roco, sought the issuance of the writs of certiorari, prohibition and mandamus against the
Executive Secretary, the Secretary of the Department of Budget and Management, and the
National Treasurer.
Suing as members of the Senate and taxpayers, petitioners question: (1) the constitutionality of
the conditions imposed by the President in the items of the GAA of 1994: (a) for the Supreme
Court, (b) Commission on Audit (COA), (c) Ombudsman, (d) Commission on Human Rights
(CHR), (e) Citizen Armed Forces Geographical Units (CAFGU'S) and (f) State Universities and
Colleges (SUC's); and (2) the constitutionality of the veto of the special provision in the
appropriation for debt service.
In G.R. No. 113766, Senators Alberto G. Romulo and Wigberto Taada (a co-petitioner in G.R.
No. 113174), together with the Freedom from Debt Coalition, a non-stock domestic corporation,
sought the issuance of the writs of prohibition and mandamus against the Executive Secretary,
the Secretary of the Department of Budget and Management, the National Treasurer, and the
COA.
Petitioners Taada and Romulo sued as members of the Philippine Senate and taxpayers, while
petitioner Freedom from Debt Coalition sued as a taxpayer. They challenge the constitutionality
of the Presidential veto of the special provision in the appropriations for debt service and the
automatic appropriation of funds therefor.
In G.R. No. 11388, Senators Taada and Romulo sought the issuance of the writs of prohibition
and mandamus against the same respondents in G.R. No. 113766. In this petition, petitioners
contest the constitutionality of: (1) the veto on four special provision added to items in the GAA
of 1994 for the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP) and the Department of Public Works and
Highways (DPWH); and (2) the conditions imposed by the President in the implementation of
certain appropriations for the CAFGU's, the DPWH, and the National Housing Authority (NHA).
Petitioners also sought the issuance of temporary restraining orders to enjoin respondents
Secretary of Budget and Management, National Treasurer and COA from enforcing the
questioned provisions of the GAA of 1994, but the Court declined to grant said provisional
reliefs on the time- honored principle of according the presumption of validity to statutes and the
presumption of regularity to official acts.
In view of the importance and novelty of most of the issues raised in the four petitions, the Court
invited former Chief Justice Enrique M. Fernando and former Associate Justice Irene Cortes to
submit their respective memoranda as Amicus curiae, which they graciously did.
II
Locus Standi
When issues of constitutionality are raised, the Court can exercise its power of judicial review
only if the following requisites are compresent: (1) the existence of an actual and appropriate
case; (2) a personal and substantial interest of the party raising the constitutional question; (3) the
exercise of judicial review is pleaded at the earliest opportunity; and (4) the constitutional
question is the lis mota of the case (Luz Farms v. Secretary of the Department of Agrarian
Reform, 192 SCRA 51 [1990]; Dumlao v. Commission on Elections, 95 SCRA 392 [1980];
People v. Vera, 65 Phil. 56 [1937]).
While the Solicitor General did not question the locus standi of petitioners in G.R. No. 113105,
he claimed that the remedy of the Senators in the other petitions is political (i.e., to override the
vetoes) in effect saying that they do not have the requisite legal standing to bring the suits.
The legal standing of the Senate, as an institution, was recognized in Gonzales v. Macaraig,
Jr., 191 SCRA 452 (1990). In said case, 23 Senators, comprising the entire membership of the
Upper House of Congress, filed a petition to nullify the presidential veto of Section 55 of the
GAA of 1989. The filing of the suit was authorized by Senate Resolution No. 381, adopted on
February 2, 1989, and which reads as follows:
Authorizing and Directing the Committee on Finance to Bring in the Name of the
Senate of the Philippines the Proper Suit with the Supreme Court of the
Philippines contesting the Constitutionality of the Veto by the President of Special
and General Provisions, particularly Section 55, of the General Appropriation Bill
of 1989 (H.B. No. 19186) and For Other Purposes.
In the United States, the legal standing of a House of Congress to sue has been recognized
(United States v. American Tel. & Tel. Co., 551 F. 2d 384, 391 [1976]; Notes: Congressional
Access To The Federal Courts, 90 Harvard Law Review 1632 [1977]).
While the petition in G.R. No. 113174 was filed by 16 Senators, including the Senate President
and the Chairman of the Committee on Finance, the suit was not authorized by the Senate itself.
Likewise,
the
petitions
in
G.R. Nos. 113766 and 113888 were filed without an enabling resolution for the purpose.
Therefore, the question of the legal standing of petitioners in the three cases becomes a
preliminary issue before this Court can inquire into the validity of the presidential veto and the
conditions for the implementation of some items in the GAA of 1994.
We rule that a member of the Senate, and of the House of Representatives for that matter, has the
legal standing to question the validity of a presidential veto or a condition imposed on an item in
an appropriation bill.
Where the veto is claimed to have been made without or in excess of the authority vested on the
President by the Constitution, the issue of an impermissible intrusion of the Executive into the
domain of the Legislature arises (Notes: Congressional Standing To Challenge Executive
Action, 122 University of Pennsylvania Law Review 1366 [1974]).
To the extent the power of Congress are impaired, so is the power of each member thereof, since
his office confers a right to participate in the exercise of the powers of that institution (Coleman
v. Miller, 307 U.S. 433 [1939]; Holtzman v. Schlesinger, 484 F. 2d 1307 [1973]).
An act of the Executive which injures the institution of Congress causes a derivative but
nonetheless substantial injury, which can be questioned by a member of Congress (Kennedy v.
Jones, 412 F. Supp. 353 [1976]). In such a case, any member of Congress can have a resort to the
courts.
Former Chief Justice Enrique M. Fernando, as Amicus Curiae, noted:
This is, then, the clearest case of the Senate as a whole or individual Senators as
such having a substantial interest in the question at issue. It could likewise be said
that there was the requisite injury to their rights as Senators. It would then be
futile to raise any locus standi issue. Any intrusion into the domain appertaining
to the Senate is to be resisted. Similarly, if the situation were reversed, and it is
the Executive Branch that could allege a transgression, its officials could likewise
file the corresponding action. What cannot be denied is that a Senator has
standing to maintain inviolate the prerogatives, powers and privileges vested by
the Constitution in his office (Memorandum, p. 14).
It is true that the Constitution provides a mechanism for overriding a veto (Art. VI, Sec. 27 [1]).
Said remedy, however, is available only when the presidential veto is based on policy or political
considerations but not when the veto is claimed to be ultra vires. In the latter case, it becomes the
duty of the Court to draw the dividing line where the exercise of executive power ends and the
bounds of legislative jurisdiction begin.
III
G.R. No. 113105
1. Countrywide Development Fund
Article XLI of the GAA of 1994 sets up a Countrywide Development Fund of P2,977,000,000.00
to "be used for infrastructure, purchase of ambulances and computers and other priority projects
and activities and credit facilities to qualified beneficiaries." Said Article provides:
COUNTRYWIDE DEVELOPMENT FUND
For Fund requirements of countrywide
development projects P 2,977,000,000
New Appropriations, by Purpose

Current Operating Expenditures
A. PURPOSE
Personal Maintenance Capital Total
Services and Other Outlays
Operating
Expenses
1. For Countrywide
Developments Projects P250,000,000 P2,727,000,000 P2,977,000,000
TOTAL NEW
APPROPRIATIONS P250,000,000 P2,727,000,000 P2,977,000,000
Special Provisions
1. Use and Release of Funds. The amount herein appropriated shall be used for
infrastructure, purchase of ambulances and computers and other priority projects
and activities, and credit facilities to qualified beneficiaries as proposed and
identified by officials concerned according to the following allocations:
Representatives, P12,500,000 each; Senators, P18,000,000 each; Vice-President,
P20,000,000; PROVIDED, That, the said credit facilities shall be constituted as a
revolving fund to be administered by a government financial institution (GFI) as a
trust fund for lending operations. Prior years releases to local government units
and national government agencies for this purpose shall be turned over to the
government financial institution which shall be the sole administrator of credit
facilities released from this fund.
The fund shall be automatically released quarterly by way of Advice of

Allotments and Notice of Cash Allocation directly to the assigned implementing
agency not later than five (5) days after the beginning of each quarter upon
submission of the list of projects and activities by the officials concerned.
2. Submission of Quarterly Reports. The Department of Budget and Management
shall submit within thirty (30) days after the end of each quarter a report to the
Senate Committee on Finance and the House Committee on Appropriations on the
releases made from this Fund. The report shall include the listing of the projects,
locations, implementing agencies and the endorsing officials (GAA of 1994, p.
1245).
Petitioners claim that the power given to the members of Congress to propose and identify the
projects and activities to be funded by the Countrywide Development Fund is an encroachment
by the legislature on executive power, since said power in an appropriation act in implementation
of a law. They argue that the proposal and identification of the projects do not involve the
making of laws or the repeal and amendment thereof, the only function given to the Congress by
the Constitution (Rollo, pp. 78- 86).
Under the Constitution, the spending power called by James Madison as "the power of the
purse," belongs to Congress, subject only to the veto power of the President. The President may
propose the budget, but still the final say on the matter of appropriations is lodged in the
Congress.
The power of appropriation carries with it the power to specify the project or activity to be
funded under the appropriation law. It can be as detailed and as broad as Congress wants it to be.
The Countrywide Development Fund is explicit that it shall be used "for infrastructure, purchase
of ambulances and computers and other priority projects and activities and credit facilities to
qualified beneficiaries . . ." It was Congress itself that determined the purposes for the
appropriation.
Executive function under the Countrywide Development Fund involves implementation of the
priority projects specified in the law.
The authority given to the members of Congress is only to propose and identify projects to be
implemented by the President. Under Article XLI of the GAA of 1994, the President must
perforce examine whether the proposals submitted by the members of Congress fall within the
specific items of expenditures for which the Fund was set up, and if qualified, he next determines
whether they are in line with other projects planned for the locality. Thereafter, if the proposed
projects qualify for funding under the Funds, it is the President who shall implement them. In
short, the proposals and identifications made by the members of Congress are merely
recommendatory.
The procedure of proposing and identifying by members of Congress of particular projects or
activities under Article XLI of the GAA of 1994 is imaginative as it is innovative.
The Constitution is a framework of a workable government and its interpretation must take into
account the complexities, realities and politics attendant to the operation of the political branches
of government. Prior to the GAA of 1991, there was an uneven allocation of appropriations for
the constituents of the members of Congress, with the members close to the Congressional
leadership or who hold cards for "horse-trading," getting more than their less favored colleagues.
The members of Congress also had to reckon with an unsympathetic President, who could
exercise his veto power to cancel from the appropriation bill a pet project of a Representative or
Senator.
The Countrywide Development Fund attempts to make equal the unequal. It is also a recognition
that individual members of Congress, far more than the President and their congressional
colleagues are likely to be knowledgeable about the needs of their respective constituents and the
priority to be given each project.
2. Realignment of Operating Expenses
Under the GAA of 1994, the appropriation for the Senate is P472,000,000.00 of which
P464,447,000.00 is appropriated for current operating expenditures, while the appropriation for
the House of Representatives is P1,171,924,000.00 of which P1,165,297,000.00 is appropriated
for current operating expenditures (GAA of 1994, pp. 2, 4, 9, 12).
The 1994 operating expenditures for the Senate are as follows:
Personal Services
Salaries, Permanent 153,347
Salaries/Wage, Contractual/Emergency 6,870
Total Salaries and Wages 160,217

=======
Other Compensation
Step Increments 1,073

Honoraria and Commutable Allowances 3,731
Compensation Insurance Premiums 1,579
Pag-I.B.I.G. Contributions 1,184
Medicare Premiums 888
Bonus and Cash Gift 14,791
Terminal Leave Benefits 2,000
Personnel Economic Relief Allowance 10,266
Additional Compensation of P500 under A.O. 53 11,130
Others 57,173
Total Other Compensation 103,815
01 Total Personal Services 264,032

=======
Maintenance and Other Operating Expenses
02 Traveling Expenses 32,841
03 Communication Services 7,666
04 Repair and Maintenance of Government Facilities 1,220

05 Repair and Maintenance of Government Vehicles 318
06 Transportation Services 128
07 Supplies and Materials 20,189
08 Rents 24,584
14 Water/Illumination and Power 6,561
15 Social Security Benefits and Other Claims 3,270
17 Training and Seminars Expenses 2,225
18 Extraordinary and Miscellaneous Expenses 9,360
23 Advertising and Publication
24 Fidelity Bonds and Insurance Premiums 1,325
29 Other Services 89,778
Total Maintenance and Other Operating Expenditures 200,415
Total Current Operating Expenditures 464,447

=======
(GAA of 1994, pp. 3-4)
The 1994 operating expenditures for the House of Representatives are as follows:
Personal Services
Salaries, Permanent 261,557
Salaries/Wages, Contractual/Emergency 143,643
Total Salaries and Wages 405,200

=======
Other Compensation
Step Increments 4,312
Honoraria and Commutable
Allowances 4,764
Compensation Insurance
Premiums 1,159
Pag-I.B.I.G. Contributions 5,231
Medicare Premiums 2,281
Bonus and Cash Gift 35,669
Terminal Leave Benefits 29
Personnel Economic Relief
Allowance 21,150
Additional Compensation of P500 under A.O. 53
Others 106,140
Total Other Compensation 202,863
01 Total Personal Services 608,063

=======
Maintenance and Other Operating Expenses
02 Traveling Expenses 139,611
03 Communication Services 22,514
04 Repair and Maintenance of Government Facilities 5,116
05 Repair and Maintenance of Government Vehicles 1,863
06 Transportation Services 178
07 Supplies and Materials 55,248
10 Grants/Subsidies/Contributions 940
14 Water/Illumination and Power 14,458
15 Social Security Benefits and Other Claims 325
17 Training and Seminars Expenses 7,236
18 Extraordinary and Miscellaneous Expenses 14,474
20 Anti-Insurgency/Contingency Emergency Expenses 9,400
23 Advertising and Publication 242
24 Fidelity Bonds and Insurance Premiums 1,420
29 Other Services 284,209
Total Maintenance and Other Operating Expenditures 557,234
Total Current Operating Expenditures 1,165,297

=======
(GAA of 1994, pp. 11-12)
The Special Provision Applicable to the Congress of the Philippines provides:
4. Realignment of Allocation for Operational Expenses. A member of Congress
may realign his allocation for operational expenses to any other expenses category
provide the total of said allocation is not exceeded. (GAA of 1994, p. 14).
The appropriation for operating expenditures for each House is further divided into expenditures
for salaries, personal services, other compensation benefits, maintenance expenses and other
operating expenses. In turn, each member of Congress is allotted for his own operating
expenditure a proportionate share of the appropriation for the House to which he belongs. If he
does not spend for one items of expense, the provision in question allows him to transfer his
allocation in said item to another item of expense.
Petitioners assail the special provision allowing a member of Congress to realign his allocation
for operational expenses to any other expense category (Rollo, pp. 82-92), claiming that this
practice is prohibited by Section 25(5), Article VI of the Constitution. Said section provides:
No law shall be passed authorizing any transfer of appropriations: however, the
President, the President of the Senate, the Speaker of the House of
Representatives, the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court, and the heads of
Constitutional Commissions may, by law, be authorized to augment any item in
the general appropriations law for their respective offices from savings in other
items of their respective appropriations.
The proviso of said Article of the Constitution grants the President of the Senate and the Speaker
of the House of Representatives the power to augment items in an appropriation act for their
respective offices from savings in other items of their appropriations, whenever there is a law
authorizing such augmentation.
The special provision on realignment of the operating expenses of members of Congress is
authorized by Section 16 of the General Provisions of the GAA of 1994, which provides:
Expenditure Components. Except by act of the Congress of the Philippines, no
change or modification shall be made in the expenditure items authorized in this
Act
and
other
appropriation
laws
unless
in
cases
of augmentations from savings in appropriations as authorized under Section
25(5) of Article VI of the Constitution (GAA of 1994, p. 1273).
Petitioners argue that the Senate President and the Speaker of the House of Representatives, but
not the individual members of Congress are the ones authorized to realign the savings as
appropriated.
Under the Special Provisions applicable to the Congress of the Philippines, the members of
Congress only determine the necessity of the realignment of the savings in the allotments for
their operating expenses. They are in the best position to do so because they are the ones who
know whether there are savings available in some items and whether there are deficiencies in
other items of their operating expenses that need augmentation. However, it is the Senate
President and the Speaker of the House of Representatives, as the case may be, who shall
approve the realignment. Before giving their stamp of approval, these two officials will have to
see to it that:
(1) The funds to be realigned or transferred are actually savings in the items of expenditures from
which the same are to be taken; and
(2) The transfer or realignment is for the purposes of augmenting the items of expenditure to
which said transfer or realignment is to be made.
3. Highest Priority for Debt Service
While Congress appropriated P86,323,438,000.00 for debt service (Article XLVII of the GAA of
1994), it appropriated only P37,780,450,000.00 for the Department of Education Culture and
Sports. Petitioners urged that Congress cannot give debt service the highest priority in the GAA
of 1994 (Rollo, pp. 93-94) because under the Constitution it should be education that is entitled
to the highest funding. They invoke Section 5(5), Article XIV thereof, which provides:
(5) The State shall assign the highest budgetary priority to education and ensure
that teaching will attract and retain its rightful share of the best available talents
through adequate remuneration and other means of job satisfaction and
fulfillment.
This issue was raised in Guingona, Jr. v. Carague, 196 SCRA 221 (1991), where this Court held
that Section 5(5), Article XIV of the Constitution, is merely directory, thus:
While it is true that under Section 5(5), Article XIV of the Constitution, Congress
is mandated to "assign the highest budgetary priority to education" in order to
"insure that teaching will attract and retain its rightful share of the best available
talents through adequate remuneration and other means of job satisfaction and
fulfillment," it does not thereby follow that the hands of Congress are so
hamstrung as to deprive it the power to respond to the imperatives of the national
interest and for the attainment of other state policies or objectives.
As aptly observed by respondents, since 1985, the budget for education has tripled
to upgrade and improve the facility of the public school system. The
compensation of teachers has been doubled. The amount of P29,740,611,000.00
set aside for the Department of Education, Culture and Sports under the General
Appropriations Act (R.A. No. 6381), is the highest budgetary allocation among all
department budgets. This is a clear compliance with the aforesaid constitutional
mandate according highest priority to education.
Having faithfully complied therewith, Congress is certainly not without any
power, guided only by its good judgment, to provide an appropriation, that can
reasonably service our enormous debt, the greater portion of which was inherited
from the previous administration. It is not only a matter of honor and to protect
the credit standing of the country. More especially, the very survival of our
economy is at stake. Thus, if in the process Congress appropriated an amount for
debt service bigger than the share allocated to education, the Court finds and so
holds that said appropriation cannot be thereby assailed as unconstitutional.
G.R. No. 113105
G.R. No. 113174
Veto of Provision on Debt Ceiling
The Congress added a Special Provision to Article XLVIII (Appropriations for Debt Service) of
the GAA of 1994 which provides:
Special Provisions
1. Use of the Fund. The appropriation authorized herein shall be used for payment
of principal and interest of foreign and domestic indebtedness; PROVIDED, That
any payment in excess of the amount herein appropriated shall be subject to the
approval of the President of the Philippines with the concurrence of the Congress
of the Philippines; PROVIDED, FURTHER, That in no case shall this fund be
used to pay for the liabilities of the Central Bank Board of Liquidators.
2. Reporting Requirement. The Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas and the Department
of Finance shall submit a quarterly report of actual foreign and domestic debt
service payments to the House Committee on Appropriations and Senate Finance
Committee within one (1) month after each quarter (GAA of 1944, pp. 1266).
The President vetoed the first Special Provision, without vetoing the P86,323,438,000.00
appropriation for debt service in said Article. According to the President's Veto Message:
IV. APPROPRIATIONS FOR DEBT SERVICE
I would like to emphasize that I concur fully with the desire of Congress to reduce
the debt burden by decreasing the appropriation for debt service as well as the
inclusion of the Special Provision quoted below. Nevertheless, I believe that this
debt reduction scheme cannot be validly done through the 1994 GAA. This must
be addressed by revising our debt policy by way of innovative and comprehensive
debt reduction programs conceptualized within the ambit of the Medium-Term
Philippine Development Plan.
Appropriations for payment of public debt, whether foreign or domestic, are
automatically appropriated pursuant to the Foreign Borrowing Act and Section 31
of P.D. No. 1177 as reiterated under Section 26, Chapter 4, Book VI of E.O. No.
292, the Administrative Code of 1987. I wish to emphasize that the
constitutionality of such automatic provisions on debt servicing has been upheld
by the Supreme Court in the case of "Teofisto T. Guingona, Jr., and Aquilino Q.
Pimentel, Jr. v. Hon. Guillermo N. Carague, in his capacity as Secretary of Budget
and Management, et al.," G.R. No. 94571, dated April 22, 1991.
I am, therefore vetoing the following special provision for the reason that the
GAA is not the appropriate legislative measure to amend the provisions of the
Foreign Borrowing Act, P.D. No. 1177 and E.O. No. 292:
Use of the Fund. The appropriation authorized herein shall be used
for payment of principal and interest of foreign and domestic
indebtedness: PROVIDED, That any payment in excess of the
amount herein appropriated shall be subject to the approval of the
President of the Philippines with the concurrence of the Congress
of the Philippines:PROVIDED, FURTHER, That in no case shall
this fund be used to pay for the liabilities of the Central Bank
Board of Liquidators (GAA of 1994, p. 1290).
Petitioners claim that the President cannot veto the Special Provision on the appropriation for
debt service without vetoing the entire amount of P86,323,438.00 for said purpose (Rollo, G.R.
No. 113105, pp. 93-98; Rollo, G.R. No. 113174, pp. 16-18). The Solicitor General counterposed
that the Special Provision did not relate to the item of appropriation for debt service and could
therefore be the subject of an item veto (Rollo, G.R. No. 113105, pp. 54-60; Rollo, G.R. No.
113174, pp. 72-82).
This issue is a mere rehash of the one put to rest in Gonzales v. Macaraig, Jr., 191 SCRA 452
(1990). In that case, the issue was stated by the Court, thus:
The fundamental issue raised is whether or not the veto by the President of
Section
55
of
the
1989
Appropriations
Bill
(Section
55
FY '89), and subsequently of its counterpart Section 16 of the 1990
Appropriations Bill (Section 16 FY '90), is unconstitutional and without effect.
The Court re-stated the issue, just so there would not be any misunderstanding about it, thus:
The focal issue for resolution is whether or not the President exceeded the itemveto power accorded by the Constitution. Or differently put, has the President the
power to veto "provisions" of an Appropriations Bill?
The bases of the petition in Gonzales, which are similar to those invoked in the present case, are
stated as follows:
In essence, petitioners' cause is anchored on the following grounds: (1) the
President's line-veto power as regards appropriation bills is limited to item/s and
does not cover provision/s; therefore, she exceeded her authority when she vetoed
Section 55 (FY '89) and Section 16 (FY '90) which are provisions; (2) when the
President objects to a provision of an appropriation bill, she cannot exercise the
item-veto power but should veto the entire bill; (3) the item-veto power does not
carry with it the power to strike out conditions or restrictions for that would be
legislation, in violation of the doctrine of separation of powers; and (4) the power
of augmentation in Article VI, Section 25 [5] of the 1987 Constitution, has to be
provided for by law and, therefore, Congress is also vested with the prerogative to
impose restrictions on the exercise of that power.
The restrictive interpretation urged by petitioners that the President may not veto
a provision without vetoing the entire bill not only disregards the basic principle
that a distinct and severable part of a bill may be the subject of a separate veto but
also overlooks the Constitutional mandate that any provision in the general
appropriations bill shall relate specifically to some particular appropriation therein
and that any such provision shall be limited in its operation to the appropriation to
which it relates (1987 Constitution, Article VI, Section 25 [2]). In other words, in
the true sense of the term, a provision in an Appropriations Bill is limited in its
operation to some particular appropriation to which it relates, and does not relate
to the entire bill.
The Court went one step further and ruled that even assuming arguendo that "provisions" are
beyond
the
executive
power
to
veto,
and
Section
55
(FY '89) and Section 16 (FY '90) were not "provisions" in the budgetary sense of the term, they
are "inappropriate provisions" that should be treated as "items" for the purpose of the President's
veto power.
The Court, citing Henry v. Edwards, La., 346 So. 2d 153 (1977), said that Congress cannot
include in a general appropriations bill matters that should be more properly enacted in separate
legislation, and if it does that, the inappropriate provisions inserted by it must be treated as
"item", which can be vetoed by the President in the exercise of his item-veto power.
It is readily apparent that the Special Provision applicable to the appropriation for debt service
insofar as it refers to funds in excess of the amount appropriated in the bill, is an "inappropriate"
provision referring to funds other than the P86,323,438,000.00 appropriated in the General
Appropriations Act of 1991.
Likewise the vetoed provision is clearly an attempt to repeal Section 31 of P.D. No. 1177
(Foreign Borrowing Act) and E.O. No. 292, and to reverse the debt payment policy. As held by
the Court in Gonzales, the repeal of these laws should be done in a separate law, not in the
appropriations law.
The Court will indulge every intendment in favor of the constitutionality of a veto, the same as it
will presume the constitutionality of an act of Congress (Texas Co. v. State, 254 P. 1060; 31 Ariz,
485, 53 A.L.R. 258 [1927]).
The veto power, while exercisable by the President, is actually a part of the legislative process
(Memorandum of Justice Irene Cortes as Amicus Curiae, pp. 3-7). That is why it is found in
Article VI on the Legislative Department rather than in Article VII on the Executive Department
in the Constitution. There is, therefore, sound basis to indulge in the presumption of validity of a
veto. The burden shifts on those questioning the validity thereof to show that its use is a violation
of the Constitution.
Under his general veto power, the President has to veto the entire bill, not merely parts thereof
(1987 Constitution, Art. VI, Sec. 27[1]). The exception to the general veto power is the power
given to the President to veto any particular item or items in a general appropriations bill (1987
Constitution,
Art.
VI,
Sec. 27[2]). In so doing, the President must veto the entire item.
A general appropriations bill is a special type of legislation, whose content is limited to specified
sums of money dedicated to a specific purpose or a separate fiscal unit (Beckman, The Item Veto
Power
of
the
Executive,
31 Temple Law Quarterly 27 [1957]).
The item veto was first introduced by the Organic Act of the Philippines passed by the U.S.
Congress on August 29, 1916. The concept was adopted from some State Constitutions.
Cognizant of the legislative practice of inserting provisions, including conditions, restrictions
and limitations, to items in appropriations bills, the Constitutional Convention added the
following sentence to Section 20(2), Article VI of the 1935 Constitution:
. . . When a provision of an appropriation bill affect one or more items of the
same, the President cannot veto the provision without at the same time vetoing the
particular item or items to which it relates . . . .
In short, under the 1935 Constitution, the President was empowered to veto separately not only
items in an appropriations bill but also "provisions".
While the 1987 Constitution did not retain the aforementioned sentence added to Section 11(2)
of Article VI of the 1935 Constitution, it included the following provision:
No provision or enactment shall be embraced in the general appropriations bill
unless it relates specifically to some particular appropriation therein. Any such
provision or enactment shall be limited in its operation to the appropriation to
which it relates (Art. VI, Sec. 25[2]).
In Gonzales, we made it clear that the omission of that sentence of Section 16(2) of the 1935
Constitution in the 1987 Constitution should not be interpreted to mean the disallowance of the
power of the President to veto a "provision".
As the Constitution is explicit that the provision which Congress can include in an appropriations
bill must "relate specifically to some particular appropriation therein" and "be limited in its
operation to the appropriation to which it relates," it follows that any provision which does not
relate to any particular item, or which extends in its operation beyond an item of appropriation, is
considered "an inappropriate provision" which can be vetoed separately from an item. Also to be
included in the category of "inappropriate provisions" are unconstitutional provisions and
provisions which are intended to amend other laws, because clearly these kind of laws have no
place in an appropriations bill. These are matters of general legislation more appropriately dealt
with in separate enactments. Former Justice Irene Cortes, as Amicus Curiae, commented that
Congress cannot by law establish conditions for and regulate the exercise of powers of the
President given by the Constitution for that would be an unconstitutional intrusion into executive
prerogative.
The doctrine of "inappropriate provision" was well elucidated in Henry v. Edwards, supra., thus:
Just as the President may not use his item-veto to usurp constitutional powers
conferred on the legislature, neither can the legislature deprive the Governor of
the constitutional powers conferred on him as chief executive officer of the state
by including in a general appropriation bill matters more properly enacted in
separate legislation. The Governor's constitutional power to veto bills of general
legislation . . . cannot be abridged by the careful placement of such measures in a
general appropriation bill, thereby forcing the Governor to choose between
approving unacceptable substantive legislation or vetoing "items" of expenditures
essential to the operation of government.The legislature cannot by location of a
bill give it immunity from executive veto. Nor can it circumvent the Governor's
veto power over substantive legislation by artfully drafting general law measures
so that they appear to be true conditions or limitations on an item of
appropriation. Otherwise, the legislature would be permitted to impair the
constitutional responsibilities and functions of a co-equal branch of government in
contravention of the separation of powers doctrine . . . We are no more willing to
allow the legislature to use its appropriation power to infringe on the Governor's
constitutional right to veto matters of substantive legislation than we are to allow
the Governor to encroach on the Constitutional powers of the legislature. In order
to avoid this result, we hold that,when the legislature inserts inappropriate
provisions in a general appropriation bill, such provisions must be treated
as "items" for purposes of the Governor's item veto power over general
appropriation bills.
xxx xxx xxx
. . . Legislative control cannot be exercised in such a manner as to encumber the
general appropriation bill with veto-proof "logrolling measures", special interest
provisions which could not succeed if separately enacted, or "riders", substantive
pieces of legislation incorporated in a bill to insure passage without veto . . .
(Emphasis supplied).
Petitioners contend that granting arguendo that the veto of the Special Provision on the ceiling
for debt payment is valid, the President cannot automatically appropriate funds for debt payment
without complying with the conditions for automatic appropriation under the provisions of R.A.
No. 4860 as amended by P.D. No. 81 and the provisions of P.D. No. 1177 as amended by the
Administrative Code of 1987 and P.D. No. 1967 (Rollo, G.R. No. 113766, pp. 9-15).
Petitioners cannot anticipate that the President will not faithfully execute the laws. The writ of
prohibition will not issue on the fear that official actions will be done in contravention of the
laws.
The President vetoed the entire paragraph one of the Special Provision of the item on debt
service, including the provisions that the appropriation authorized in said item "shall be used for
payment of the principal and interest of foreign and domestic indebtedness" and that "in no case
shall this fund be used to pay for the liabilities of the Central Bank Board of Liquidators." These
provisions are germane to and have a direct connection with the item on debt service. Inherent in
the power of appropriation is the power to specify how the money shall be spent (Henry v.
Edwards, LA, 346 So., 2d., 153). The said provisos, being appropriate provisions, cannot be
vetoed separately. Hence the item veto of said provisions is void.
We reiterate, in order to obviate any misunderstanding, that we are sustaining the veto of the
Special Provision of the item on debt service only with respect to the proviso therein requiring
that "any payment in excess of the amount herein, appropriated shall be subject to the approval
of the President of the Philippines with the concurrence of the Congress of the Philippines . . ."
G.R. NO. 113174
G.R. NO. 113766
G.R. NO. 11388
1. Veto of provisions for revolving funds of SUC's.
In the appropriation for State Universities and Colleges (SUC's), the President vetoed special
provisions which authorize the use of income and the creation, operation and maintenance of
revolving funds. The Special Provisions vetoed are the following:
(H. 7) West Visayas State University
Equal Sharing of Income. Income earned by the University subject to Section 13
of the special provisions applicable to all State Universities and Colleges shall be
equally shared by the University and the University Hospital (GAA of 1994, p.
395).
xxx xxx xxx
(J. 3) Leyte State College
Revolving Fund for the Operation of LSC House and Human Resources
Development Center (HRDC). The income of Leyte State College derived from
the operation of its LSC House and HRDC shall be constituted into a Revolving
Fund to be deposited in an authorized government depository bank for the
operational expenses of these projects/services. The net income of the Revolving
Fund at the end of the year shall be remitted to the National Treasury and shall
accrue to the General Fund. The implementing guidelines shall be issued by the
Department of Budget and Management (GAA of 1994, p. 415).
The vetoed Special Provisions applicable to all SUC's are the following:
12. Use of Income from Extension Services. State Universities and Colleges are
authorized to use their income from their extension services. Subject to the
approval of the Board of Regents and the approval of a special budget pursuant to
Sec.
35,
Chapter
5,
Book
VI
of
E.O.
No. 292, such income shall be utilized solely for faculty development,
instructional materials and work study program (GAA of 1994, p. 490).
xxx xxx xxx
13. Income of State Universities and Colleges. The income of State Universities
and Colleges derived from tuition fees and other sources as may be imposed by
governing boards other than those accruing to revolving funds created under LOI
Nos. 872 and 1026 and those authorized to be recorded as trust receipts pursuant
to Section 40, Chapter 5, Book VI of E.O. No. 292 shall be deposited with the
National Treasury and recorded as a Special Account in the General Fund
pursuant to P.D. No. 1234 and P.D. No. 1437 for the use of the institution, subject
to Section 35, Chapter 5, Book VI of E.O. No. 292L PROVIDED, That
disbursements from the Special Account shall not exceed the amount actually
earned and deposited: PROVIDED, FURTHER, That a cash advance on such
income may be allowed State half of income actually realized during the
preceding year and this cash advance shall be charged against income actually
earned during the budget year: AND PROVIDED, FINALLY, That in no case shall
such funds be used to create positions, nor for payment of salaries, wages or
allowances, except as may be specifically approved by the Department of Budge
and Management for income-producing activities, or to purchase equipment or
books, without the prior approval of the President of the Philippines pursuant to
Letter of Implementation No. 29.
All collections of the State Universities and Colleges for fees, charges and
receipts intended for private recipient units, including private foundations
affiliated with these institutions shall be duly acknowledged with official receipts
and deposited as a trust receipt before said income shall be subject to Section 35,
Chapter
5,
Book
VI
of
E.O.
No.
292
(GAA of 1994, p. 490).
The President gave his reason for the veto thus:
Pursuant to Section 65 of the Government Auditing Code of the Philippines,
Section 44, Chapter 5, Book VI of E.O. No. 292, s. 1987 and Section 22, Article
VII of the Constitution, all income earned by all Government offices and agencies
shall accrue to the General Fund of the Government in line with the One Fund
Policy enunciated by Section 29 (1), Article VI and Section 22, Article VII of the
Constitution. Likewise, the creation and establishment of revolving funds shall be
authorized by substantive law pursuant to Section 66 of the Government Auditing
Code of the Philippines and Section 45, Chapter 5, Book VI of E.O. No. 292.
Notwithstanding the aforementioned provisions of the Constitution and existing
law, I have noted the proliferation of special provisions authorizing the use of
agency income as well as the creation, operation and maintenance of revolving
funds.
I would like to underscore the facts that such income were already considered as
integral part of the revenue and financing sources of the National Expenditure
Program which I previously submitted to Congress. Hence, the grant of new
special provisions authorizing the use of agency income and the establishment of
revolving funds over and above the agency appropriations authorized in this Act
shall effectively reduce the financing sources of the 1994 GAA and, at the same
time, increase the level of expenditures of some agencies beyond the wellcoordinated, rationalized levels for such agencies. This corresponding increases
the overall deficit of the National Government (Veto Message, p. 3).
Petitioners claim that the President acted with grave abuse of discretion when he disallowed by
his veto the "use of income" and the creation of "revolving fund" by the Western Visayas State
University and Leyte State Colleges when he allowed other government offices, like the National
Stud Farm, to use their income for their operating expenses (Rollo, G.R. No. 113174, pp. 15-16).
There was no undue discrimination when the President vetoed said special provisions while
allowing similar provisions in other government agencies. If some government agencies were
allowed to use their income and maintain a revolving fund for that purpose, it is because these
agencies have been enjoying such privilege before by virtue of the special laws authorizing such
practices as exceptions to the "one-fund policy" (e.g., R.A. No. 4618 for the National Stud Farm,
P.D. No. 902-A for the Securities and Exchange Commission; E.O. No. 359 for the Department
of Budget and Management's Procurement Service).
2. Veto of provision on 70% (administrative)/30% (contract) ratio for road maintenance.
In the appropriation for the Department of Public Works and Highways, the President vetoed the
second paragraph of Special Provision No. 2, specifying the 30% maximum ration of works to be
contracted for the maintenance of national roads and bridges. The said paragraph reads as
follows:
2. Release and Use of Road Maintenance Funds. Funds allotted for the
maintenance and repair of roads which are provided in this Act for the
Department of Public Works and Highways shall be released to the respective
Engineering District, subject to such rules and regulations as may be prescribed
by the Department of Budget and Management. Maintenance funds for roads and
bridges shall be exempt from budgetary reserve.
Of the amount herein appropriated for the maintenance of national roads and
bridges, a maximum of thirty percent (30%) shall be contracted out in accordance
with guidelines to be issued by the Department of Public Works and
Highways. The balance shall be used for maintenance by force account.
Five percent (5%) of the total road maintenance fund appropriated herein to be
applied across the board to the allocation of each region shall be set aside for the
maintenance of roads which may be converted to or taken over as national roads
during the current year and the same shall be released to the central office of the
said
department
for
eventual
sub-allotment to the concerned region and district: PROVIDED, That any balance
of the said five percent (5%) shall be restored to the regions on a pro-rata basis
for the maintenance of existing national roads.
No retention or deduction as reserves or overhead expenses shall be made, except
as authorized by law or upon direction of the President
(GAA of 1994, pp. 785-786; Emphasis supplied).
The President gave the following reason for the veto:

While I am cognizant of the well-intended desire of Congress to impose certain
restrictions contained in some special provisions, I am equally aware that many
programs, projects and activities of agencies would require some degree of
flexibility to ensure their successful implementation and therefore risk their
completion. Furthermore, not only could these restrictions and limitations derail
and impede program implementation but they may also result in a breach of
contractual obligations.
D.1.a. A study conducted by the Infrastructure Agencies show that for practical
intent and purposes, maintenance by contract could be undertaken to an optimum
of seventy percent (70%) and the remaining thirty percent (30%) by force
account. Moreover, the policy of maximizing implementation through contract
maintenance is a covenant of the Road and Road Transport Program Loan from
the Asian Development Bank (ADB Loan No. 1047-PHI-1990) and Overseas
Economic Cooperation Fund (OECF Loan No. PH-C17-199). The same is a
covenant under the World Bank (IBRD) Loan for the Highway Management
Project
(IBRD
Loan
No. PH-3430) obtained in 1992.
In the light of the foregoing and considering the policy of the government to
encourage and maximize private sector participation in the regular repair and
maintenance of infrastructure facilities, I am directly vetoing the underlined
second paragraph of Special Provision No. 2 of the Department of Public Works
and Highways (Veto Message, p. 11).
The second paragraph of Special Provision No. 2 brings to fore the divergence in policy of
Congress and the President. While Congress expressly laid down the condition that only 30% of
the total appropriation for road maintenance should be contracted out, the President, on the basis
of a comprehensive study, believed that contracting out road maintenance projects at an option of
70% would be more efficient, economical and practical.
The Special Provision in question is not an inappropriate provision which can be the subject of a
veto. It is not alien to the appropriation for road maintenance, and on the other hand, it specified
how the said item shall be expended 70% by administrative and 30% by contract.
The 1987 Constitution allows the addition by Congress of special provisions, conditions to items
in an expenditure bill, which cannot be vetoed separately from the items to which they relate so
long as they are "appropriate" in the budgetary sense (Art. VII, Sec. 25[2]).
The Solicitor General was hard put in justifying the veto of this special provision. He merely
argued that the provision is a complete turnabout from an entrenched practice of the government
to maximize contract maintenance (Rollo, G.R. No. 113888, pp. 85-86). That is not a ground to
veto a provision separate from the item to which it refers.
The veto of the second paragraph of Special Provision No. 2 of the item for the DPWH is
therefore unconstitutional.
3. Veto of provision on purchase of medicines by AFP.
In the appropriation for the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP), the President vetoed the
special provision on the purchase by the AFP of medicines in compliance with the Generics
Drugs Law (R.A. No. 6675). The vetoed provision reads:
12. Purchase of Medicines. The purchase of medicines by all Armed Forces of the
Philippines units, hospitals and clinics shall strictly comply with the formulary
embodied in the National Drug Policy of the Department of Health (GAA of
1994, p. 748).
According to the President, while it is desirable to subject the purchase of medicines to a
standard formulary, "it is believed more prudent to provide for a transition period for its adoption
and smooth implementation in the Armed Forces of the Philippines" (Veto Message, p. 12).
The Special Provision which requires that all purchases of medicines by the AFP should strictly
comply with the formulary embodied in the National Drug Policy of the Department of Health is
an "appropriate" provision. it is a mere advertence by Congress to the fact that there is an
existing law, the Generics Act of 1988, that requires "the extensive use of drugs with generic
names through a rational system of procurement and distribution." The President believes that it
is more prudent to provide for a transition period for the smooth implementation of the law in the
case of purchases by the Armed Forces of the Philippines, as implied by Section 11 (Education
Drive) of the law itself. This belief, however, cannot justify his veto of the provision on the
purchase of medicines by the AFP.
Being directly related to and inseparable from the appropriation item on purchases of medicines
by the AFP, the special provision cannot be vetoed by the President without also vetoing the said
item (Bolinao Electronics Corporation v. Valencia, 11 SCRA 486 [1964]).
4. Veto of provision on prior approval of Congress for purchase of military equipment.
In the appropriation for the modernization of the AFP, the President vetoed the underlined
proviso of Special Provision No. 2 on the "Use of Fund," which requires the prior approval of
Congress for the release of the corresponding modernization funds, as well as the entire Special
Provisions
No. 3 on the "Specific Prohibition":
2. Use of the Fund. Of the amount herein appropriated, priority shall be given for
the acquisition of AFP assets necessary for protecting marine, mineral, forest and
other resources within Philippine territorial borders and its economic zone,
detection, prevention or deterrence of air or surface intrusions and to support
diplomatic moves aimed at preserving national dignity, sovereignty and
patrimony: PROVIDED, That the said modernization fund shall not be released
until a Table of Organization and Equipment for FY 1994-2000 is submitted to
and approved by Congress.
3. Specific Prohibition. The said Modernization Fund shall not be used for
payment of six (6) additional S-211 Trainer planes, 18 SF-260 Trainer planes and
150 armored personnel carriers (GAA of 1994, p. 747).
As reason for the veto, the President stated that the said condition and prohibition violate the
Constitutional mandate of non-impairment of contractual obligations, and if allowed, "shall
effectively alter the original intent of the AFP Modernization Fund to cover all military
equipment deemed necessary to modernize the Armed Forces of the Philippines" (Veto Message,
p. 12).
Petitioners claim that Special Provision No. 2 on the "Use of Fund" and Special Provision No. 3
are conditions or limitations related to the item on the AFP modernization plan.
The requirement in Special Provision No. 2 on the "Use of Fund" for the AFP modernization
program that the President must submit all purchases of military equipment to Congress for its
approval, is an exercise of the "congressional or legislative veto." By way of definition, a
congressional veto is a means whereby the legislature can block or modify administrative action
taken under a statute. It is a form of legislative control in the implementation of particular
executive actions. The form may be either negative, that is requiring disapproval of the executive
action, or affirmative, requiring approval of the executive action. This device represents a
significant attempt by Congress to move from oversight of the executive to shared administration
(Dixon, The Congressional Veto and Separation of Powers: The Executive on a Leash,
56 North Carolina Law Review, 423 [1978]).
A congressional veto is subject to serious questions involving the principle of separation of
powers.
However the case at bench is not the proper occasion to resolve the issues of the validity of the
legislative veto as provided in Special Provisions Nos. 2 and 3 because the issues at hand can be
disposed of on other grounds. Any provision blocking an administrative action in implementing a
law or requiring legislative approval of executive acts must be incorporated in a separate and
substantive bill. Therefore, being "inappropriate" provisions, Special Provisions Nos. 2 and 3
were properly vetoed.
As commented by Justice Irene Cortes in her memorandum as Amicus Curiae: "What Congress
cannot do directly by law it cannot do indirectly by attaching conditions to the exercise of that
power (of the President as Commander-in-Chief) through provisions in the appropriation law."
Furthermore, Special Provision No. 3, prohibiting the use of the Modernization Funds for
payment of the trainer planes and armored personnel carriers, which have been contracted for by
the AFP, is violative of the Constitutional prohibition on the passage of laws that impair the
obligation of contracts (Art. III, Sec. 10), more so, contracts entered into by the Government
itself.
The veto of said special provision is therefore valid.
5. Veto of provision on use of savings to augment AFP pension funds.
In the appropriation for the AFP Pension and Gratuity Fund, the President vetoed the new
provision authorizing the Chief of Staff to use savings in the AFP to augment pension and
gratuity funds. The vetoed provision reads:
2. Use of Savings. The Chief of Staff, AFP, is authorized, subject to the approval
of the Secretary of National Defense, to use savings in the appropriations
provided herein to augment the pension fund being managed by the AFP
Retirement and Separation Benefits System as provided under Sections 2(a) and 3
of
P.D.
No.
361
(GAA
of
1994,
p. 746).
According to the President, the grant of retirement and separation benefits should be covered by
direct appropriations specifically approved for the purpose pursuant to Section 29(1) of Article
VI of the Constitution. Moreover, he stated that the authority to use savings is lodged in the
officials enumerated in Section 25(5) of Article VI of the Constitution (Veto Message, pp. 7-8).
Petitioners claim that the Special Provision on AFP Pension and Gratuity Fund is a condition or
limitation which is so intertwined with the item of appropriation that it could not be separated
therefrom.
The Special Provision, which allows the Chief of Staff to use savings to augment the pension
fund for the AFP being managed by the AFP Retirement and Separation Benefits System is
violative of Sections 25(5) and 29(1) of the Article VI of the Constitution.
Under Section 25(5), no law shall be passed authorizing any transfer of appropriations, and under
Section
29(1),
no
money
shall
be
paid
out
of
the Treasury except in pursuance of an appropriation made by law. While Section 25(5) allows as
an exception the realignment of savings to augment items in the general appropriations law for
the executive branch, such right must and can be exercised only by the President pursuant to a
specific law.
6. Condition on the deactivation of the CAFGU's.
Congress appropriated compensation for the CAFGU's, including the payment of separation
benefits but it added the following Special Provision:
1. CAFGU Compensation and Separation Benefit. The appropriation authorized
herein shall be used for the compensation of CAFGU's including the payment of
their separation benefit not exceeding one (1) year subsistence allowance for the
11,000 members who will be deactivated in 1994. The Chief of Staff, AFP, shall,
subject to the approval of the Secretary of National Defense, promulgate policies
and procedures for the payment of separation benefit (GAA of 1994, p. 740).
The President declared in his Veto Message that the implementation of this Special Provision to
the item on the CAFGU's shall be subject to prior Presidential approval pursuant to P.D. No.
1597 and R.A.. No. 6758. He gave the following reasons for imposing the condition:
I am well cognizant of the laudable intention of Congress in proposing the
amendment of Special Provision No. 1 of the CAFGU. However, it is premature
at this point in time of our peace process to earmark and declare through special
provision the actual number of CAFGU members to be deactivated in CY 1994. I
understand that the number to be deactivated would largely depend on the result
or degree of success of the on-going peace initiatives which are not yet precisely
determinable today. I have desisted, therefore, to directly veto said provisions
because this would mean the loss of the entire special provision to the prejudice of
its beneficient provisions. I therefore declare that the actual implementation of
this special provision shall be subject to prior Presidential approval pursuant to
the
provisions
of
P.D.
No.
1597
and
R.A. No. 6758 (Veto Message, p. 13).
Petitioners claim that the Congress has required the deactivation of the CAFGU's when it
appropriated the money for payment of the separation pay of the members of thereof. The
President, however, directed that the deactivation should be done in accordance to his timetable,
taking into consideration the peace and order situation in the affected localities.
Petitioners complain that the directive of the President was tantamount to an administrative
embargo of the congressional will to implement the Constitution's command to dissolve the
CAFGU's
(Rollo,
G.R.
No.
113174,
p. 14; G.R. No. 113888, pp. 9, 14-16). They argue that the President cannot impair or withhold
expenditures authorized and appropriated by Congress when neither the Appropriations Act nor
other legislation authorize such impounding (Rollo, G.R. No. 113888, pp. 15-16).
The Solicitor General contends that it is the President, as Commander-in-Chief of the Armed
Forces of the Philippines, who should determine when the services of the CAFGU's are no
longer
needed
(Rollo,
G.R.
No.
113888,
pp. 92-95.).
This is the first case before this Court where the power of the President to impound is put in
issue. Impoundment refers to a refusal by the President, for whatever reason, to spend funds
made available by Congress. It is the failure to spend or obligate budget authority of any type
(Notes: Impoundment of Funds, 86 Harvard Law Review 1505 [1973]).
Those who deny to the President the power to impound argue that once Congress has set aside
the fund for a specific purpose in an appropriations act, it becomes mandatory on the part of the
President to implement the project and to spend the money appropriated therefor. The President
has no discretion on the matter, for the Constitution imposes on him the duty to faithfully execute
the laws.
In refusing or deferring the implementation of an appropriation item, the President in effect
exercises a veto power that is not expressly granted by the Constitution. As a matter of fact, the
Constitution does not say anything about impounding. The source of the Executive authority
must be found elsewhere.
Proponents of impoundment have invoked at least three principal sources of the authority of the
President. Foremost is the authority to impound given to him either expressly or impliedly by
Congress. Second is the executive power drawn from the President's role as Commander-inChief. Third is the Faithful Execution Clause which ironically is the same provision invoked by
petitioners herein.
The proponents insist that a faithful execution of the laws requires that the President desist from
implementing the law if doing so would prejudice public interest. An example given is when
through efficient and prudent management of a project, substantial savings are made. In such a
case, it is sheer folly to expect the President to spend the entire amount budgeted in the law
(Notes: Presidential Impoundment: Constitutional Theories and Political Realities, 61
Georgetown Law Journal 1295 [1973]; Notes; Protecting the Fisc: Executive Impoundment and
Congressional Power, 82 Yale Law Journal 1686 [1973).
We do not find anything in the language used in the challenged Special Provision that would
imply that Congress intended to deny to the President the right to defer or reduce the spending,
much less to deactivate 11,000 CAFGU members all at once in 1994. But even if such is the
intention, the appropriation law is not the proper vehicle for such purpose. Such intention must
be embodied and manifested in another law considering that it abrades the powers of the
Commander-in-Chief and there are existing laws on the creation of the CAFGU's to be amended.
Again
we
state:
a
provision
in
an
appropriations
act
be used to repeal or amend other laws, in this case, P.D. No. 1597 and R.A. No. 6758.
cannot
7. Condition on the appropriation for the Supreme Court, etc.

(a) In the appropriations for the Supreme Court, Ombudsman, COA, and CHR, the Congress
added the following provisions:
The Judiciary
xxx xxx xxx
Special Provisions
1. Augmentation of any Item in the Court's Appropriations. Any savings in the
appropriations for the Supreme Court and the Lower Courts may be utilized by
the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court to augment any item of the Court's
appropriations for (a) printing of decisions and publication of "Philippine
Reports"; (b) Commutable terminal leaves of Justices and other personnel of the
Supreme Court and payment of adjusted pension rates to retired Justices entitled
thereto pursuant to Administrative Matter No. 91-8-225-C.A.; (c) repair,
maintenance, improvement and other operating expenses of the courts' libraries,
including purchase of books and periodicals; (d) purchase, maintenance and
improvement of printing equipment; (e) necessary expenses for the employment
of temporary employees, contractual and casual employees, for judicial
administration; (f) maintenance and improvement of the Court's Electronic Data
Processing System; (g) extraordinary expenses of the Chief Justice, attendance in
international conferences and conduct of training programs; (h) commutable
transportation and representation allowances and fringe benefits for Justices,
Clerks of Court, Court Administrator, Chiefs of Offices and other Court
personnel in accordance with the rates prescribed by law; and (i) compensation of
attorney-de-officio: PROVIDED, That as mandated by LOI No. 489 any increase
in salary and allowances shall be subject to the usual procedures and policies as
provided
for
under
P.D. No. 985 and other pertinent laws (GAA of 1994, p. 1128; Emphasis
supplied).
xxx xxx xxx
Commission on Audit
xxx xxx xxx
5. Use of Savings. The Chairman of the Commission on Audit is hereby
authorized, subject to appropriate accounting and auditing rules and regulations,
to use savings for the payment of fringe benefits as may be authorized by law for
officials and personnel of the Commission (GAA of 1994, p. 1161; Emphasis
supplied).
xxx xxx xxx
Office of the Ombudsman

xxx xxx xxx
6. Augmentation of Items in the appropriation of the Office of the Ombudsman.
The Ombudsman is hereby authorized, subject to appropriate accounting and
auditing rules and regulations to augment items of appropriation in the Office of
the Ombudsman from savings in other items of appropriation actually released,
for: (a) printing and/or publication of decisions, resolutions, training and
information materials; (b) repair, maintenance and improvement of OMB Central
and Area/Sectoral facilities; (c) purchase of books, journals, periodicals and
equipment;
(d) payment of commutable representation and transportation allowances of
officials and employees who by reason of their positions are entitled thereto and
fringe benefits as may be authorized specifically by law for officials and
personnel of OMB pursuant to Section 8 of Article IX-B of the Constitution; and
(e) for other official purposes subject to accounting and auditing rules and
regulations (GAA of 1994, p. 1174; Emphasis supplied).
xxx xxx xxx
Commission on Human Rights
xxx xxx xxx
1. Use of Savings. The Chairman of the Commission on Human Rights (CHR) is
hereby authorized, subject to appropriate accounting and auditing rules and
regulations, to augment any item of appropriation in the office of the CHR from
savings in other items of appropriations actually released, for: (a) printing and/or
publication of decisions, resolutions, training materials and educational
publications; (b) repair, maintenance and improvement of Commission's central
and regional facilities; (c) purchase of books, journals, periodicals and equipment,
(d) payment of commutable representation and transportation allowances of
officials and employees who by reason of their positions are entitled thereto and
fringe benefits, as may be authorized by law for officials and personnel of CHR,
subject to accounting and auditing rules and regulations (GAA of 1994, p. 1178;
Emphasis supplied).
In his Veto Message, the President expressed his approval of the conditions included in the GAA
of 1994. He noted that:
The said condition is consistent with the Constitutional injunction prescribed
under Section 8, Article IX-B of the Constitution which states that "no elective or
appointive public officer or employee shall receive additional, double, or indirect
compensation unless specifically authorized by law." I am, therefore, confident
that the heads of the said offices shall maintain fidelity to the law and faithfully
adhere to the well-established principle on compensation standardization (Veto
Message, p. 10).
Petitioners claim that the conditions imposed by the President violated the independence and
fiscal autonomy of the Supreme Court, the Ombudsman, the COA and the CHR.
In the first place, the conditions questioned by petitioners were placed in the GAB by Congress
itself, not by the President. The Veto Message merely highlighted the Constitutional mandate that
additional or indirect compensation can only be given pursuant to law.
In the second place, such statements are mere reminders that the disbursements of appropriations
must be made in accordance with law. Such statements may, at worse, be treated as superfluities.
(b) In the appropriation for the COA, the President imposed the condition that the
implementation of the budget of the COA be subject to "the guidelines to be issued by the
President."
The provisions subject to said condition reads:
xxx xxx xxx
3. Revolving Fund. The income of the Commission on Audit derived from sources
authorized by the Government Auditing Code of the Philippines (P.D. No. 1445)
not exceeding Ten Million Pesos (P10,000,000) shall be constituted into a
revolving fund which shall be used for maintenance, operating and other
incidental expenses to enhance audit services and audit-related activities. The
fund shall be deposited in an authorized government depository ban, and
withdrawals therefrom shall be made in accordance with the procedure prescribed
by law and implementing rules and regulations: PROVIDED, That any interests
earned on such deposit shall be remitted at the end of each quarter to the national
Treasury and shall accrue to the General Fund: PROVIDED FURTHER,That the
Commission on Audit shall submit to the Department of Budget and Management
a quarterly report of income and expenditures of said revolving fund (GAA of
1994, pp. 1160-1161).
The President cited the "imperative need to rationalize" the implementation, applicability and
operation of use of income and revolving funds. The Veto Message stated:
. . . I have observed that there are old and long existing special provisions
authorizing the use of income and the creation of revolving funds. As a rule, such
authorizations should be discouraged. However, I take it that these authorizations
have legal/statutory basis aside from being already a vested right to the agencies
concerned which should not be jeopardized through the Veto Message. There is,
however, imperative need to rationalize their implementation, applicability and
operation. Thus, in order to substantiate the purpose and intention of said
provisions, I hereby declare that the operationalization of the following provisions
during budget implementation shall be subject to theguidelines to be issued by the
President pursuant to Section 35, Chapter 5, Book VI of E.O. No. 292 and
Sections 65 and 66 of P.D. No. 1445 in relation to Sections 2 and 3 of the General
Provisions of this Act (Veto Message, p. 6; Emphasis Supplied.)
(c) In the appropriation for the DPWH, the President imposed the condition that in the
implementation of DPWH projects, the administrative and engineering overhead of 5% and 3%
"shall be subject to the necessary administrative guidelines to be formulated by the Executive
pursuant to existing laws." The condition was imposed because the provision "needs further
study" according to the President.
The following provision was made subject to said condition:

9. Engineering and Administrative Overhead. Not more than five percent (5%) of
the amount for infrastructure project released by the Department of Budget and
Management shall be deducted by DPWH for administrative overhead, detailed
engineering and construction supervision, testing and quality control, and the like,
thus insuring that at least ninety-five percent (95%) of the released fund is
available for direct implementation of the project. PROVIDED, HOWEVER, That
for school buildings, health centers, day-care centers and barangay halls, the
deductible amount shall not exceed three percent (3%).
Violation of, or non-compliance with, this provision shall subject the government
official or employee concerned to administrative, civil and/or criminal sanction
under
Sections
43
and
80,
Book
VI
of
E.O.
No. 292 (GAA of 1994, p. 786).
(d) In the appropriation for the National Housing Authority (NHA), the President imposed the
condition that allocations for specific projects shall be released and disbursed "in accordance
with the housing program of the government, subject to prior Executive approval."
The provision subject to the said condition reads:
3. Allocations for Specified Projects. The following allocations for the specified
projects shall be set aside for corollary works and used exclusively for the repair,
rehabilitation and construction of buildings, roads, pathwalks, drainage,
waterworks systems, facilities and amenities in the area:PROVIDED, That any
road to be constructed or rehabilitated shall conform with the specifications and
standards set by the Department of Public Works and Highways for such kind of
road:PROVIDED, FURTHER, That savings that may be available in the future
shall be used for road repair, rehabilitation and construction:
(1) Maharlika Village Road Not less than
P5,000,000
(2) Tenement Housing Project (Taguig) Not less
than P3,000,000
(3) Bagong Lipunan Condominium Project (Taguig)
Not less than P2,000,000
4. Allocation of Funds. Out of the amount appropriated for the implementation of
various projects in resettlement areas, Seven Million Five Hundred Thousand
Pesos (P7,500,000) shall be allocated to the Dasmarias Bagong Bayan
resettlement area, Eighteen Million Pesos (P18,000,000) to the Carmona
Relocation Center Area (Gen. Mariano Alvarez) and Three Million Pesos
(P3,000,000) to the Bulihan Sites and Services, all of which will be for the
cementing of roads in accordance with DPWH standards.
5. Allocation for Sapang Palay. An allocation of Eight Million Pesos (P8,000,000)
shall be set aside for the asphalting of seven (7) kilometer main road of Sapang
Palay,
San
(GAA of 1994, p. 1216).
Jose
Del
Monte,
Bulacan
The President imposed the conditions: (a) that the "operationalization" of the special provision
on revolving funds of the COA "shall be subject to guidelines to be issued by the President
pursuant
to
Section
35,
Chapter
5,
Book VI of E.O. 292 and Sections 65 and 66 of P.D. No. 1445 in relation to Sections 2 and 3 of
the
General
Provisions
of
this
Act"
(Rollo,
G.R.
No. 113174, pp. 5,7-8); (b) that the implementation of Special Provision No. 9 of the DPWH on
the mandatory retention of 5% and 3% of the amounts released by said Department "be subject
to the necessary administrative guidelines to be formulated by the Executive pursuant to existing
law" (Rollo, G.R. No. 113888; pp. 10, 14-16); and (c) that the appropriations authorized for the
NHA can be released only "in accordance with the housing program of the government subject to
prior
Executive
approval"
(Rollo,
G.R.
No.
113888,
pp.
10-11;
14-16).
The conditions objected to by petitioners are mere reminders that the implementation of the
items on which the said conditions were imposed, should be done in accordance with existing
laws, regulations or policies. They did not add anything to what was already in place at the time
of the approval of the GAA of 1994.
There is less basis to complain when the President said that the expenditures shall be subject to
guidelines he will issue. Until the guidelines are issued, it cannot be determined whether they are
proper or inappropriate. The issuance of administrative guidelines on the use of public funds
authorized by Congress is simply an exercise by the President of his constitutional duty to see
that the laws are faithfully executed (1987 Constitution, Art. VII, Sec. 17; Planas v. Gil 67 Phil.
62 [1939]). Under the Faithful Execution Clause, the President has the power to take "necessary
and proper steps" to carry into execution the law (Schwartz, On Constitutional Law, p. 147
[1977]). These steps are the ones to be embodied in the guidelines.
IV
Petitioners chose to avail of the special civil actions but those remedies can be used only when
respondents have acted "without or in excess" of jurisdiction, or "with grave abuse of discretion,"
(Revised
Rules
of
Court,
Rule 65, Section 2). How can we begrudge the President for vetoing the Special Provision on the
appropriation for debt payment when he merely followed our decision in Gonzales? How can we
say that Congress has abused its discretion when it appropriated a bigger sum for debt payment
than the amount appropriated for education, when it merely followed our dictum in Guingona?
Article 8 of the Civil Code of Philippines, provides:
Judicial decisions applying or interpreting the laws or the constitution shall from a
part of the legal system of the Philippines.
The Court's interpretation of the law is part of that law as of the date of its enactment since the
court's interpretation merely establishes the contemporary legislative intent that the construed
law purports to carry into effect (People v. Licera, 65 SCRA 270 [1975]). Decisions of the
Supreme Court assume the same authority as statutes (Floresca v. Philex Mining Corporation,
136 SCRA 141 [1985]).
Even if Guingona and Gonzales are considered hard cases that make bad laws and should be
reversed, such reversal cannot nullify prior acts done in reliance thereof.
WHEREFORE,
the
petitions
are
DISMISSED,
except
with
respect
to
(1) G.R. Nos. 113105 and 113766 only insofar as they pray for the annulment of the veto of the
special provision on debt service specifying that the fund therein appropriated "shall be used for
payment of the principal and interest of foreign and domestic indebtedness" prohibiting the use
of the said funds "to pay for the liabilities of the Central Bank Board of Liquidators", and (2)
G.R. No. 113888 only insofar as it prays for the annulment of the veto of: (a) the second
paragraph of Special Provision No. 2 of the item of appropriation for the Department of Public
Works and Highways (GAA of 1994, pp. 785-786); and (b) Special Provision No. 12 on the
purchase of medicines by the Armed Forces of the Philippines (GAA of 1994, p. 748), which is
GRANTED.
SO ORDERED.
Narvasa, C.J., Feliciano, Bidin, Regalado, Davide, Jr., Romero, Bellosillo, Melo, Puno,
Republic
SUPREME
Manila
of
the
Philippines
COURT
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-23326
December 18, 1965
PHILIPPINE CONSTITUTION ASSOCIATION, INC., JOSE E. ROMERO, SALVADOR

ARANETA, GUILLERMO B. GUEVARA, PIO PEDROSA, CONRADO BENITEZ, JOSE
M. ARUEGO, SOTERO H. LAUREL, FELIXBERTO M. SERRANO, and ROMAN
OZAETA, petitioners,
vs.
PEDRO M. GIMENEZ, JOSE VELASCO, ELADIO SALITA and JOSE
AVILES, respondents.
Roman Ozaeta, Guillermo B. Guevara, Jose M. Aruego, Sotero H. Laurel and Felixberto M.
Serrano
for
themselves
and
for
other
petitioners.
Office of the Solicitor General for respondents.
REGALA, J.:
We are called upon in this case to decide the grave and fundamental problem of the
constitutionality of Republic Act No. 3836 "insofar as the same allows retirement gratuity and
commutation of vacation and sick leave to Senators and Representatives, and to the elective
officials of both houses (of Congress)." The suit was instituted by the Philippine Constitution
Association, Inc. (Philconsa, for short), a non-profit civic organization, duly incorporated under
Philippine laws, by way of a petition for prohibition with preliminary injunction to restrain the
Auditor General of the Philippines and the disbursing officers of both Houses of Congress from
"passing in audit the vouchers, and from countersigning the checks or treasury warrants for the
payment to any former Senator or former Member of the House of Representatives of retirement
and vacation gratuities pursuant to Republic Act No. 3836; and likewise restraining the
respondent disbursing officers of the House and Senate, respectively, and their successors in
office from paying the said retirement and vacation gratuities."
It is argued that the above-numbered Republic Act, at least to the end that it provided for the
retirement of the members of Congress in the manner and terms that it did, is unconstitutional
and void. The challenge to the constitutionality of the law is centered on the following
propositions:
1. The provision for the retirement of the members and certain officers of Congress is not
expressed in the title of the bill, in violation of section 21 (1) of Article VI of the
Constitution.
2. The provision on retirement gratuity is an attempt to circumvent the Constitutional ban
on increase of salaries of the members of Congress during their term of office, contrary to
the provisions of Article VI, Section 14 of the Constitution.
3. The same provision constitutes "selfish class legislation" because it allows members
and officers of Congress to retire after twelve (12) years of service and gives them a
gratuity equivalent to one year salary for every four years of service, which is not
refundable in case of reinstatement or re-election of the retiree, while all other officers
and employees of the government can retire only after at least twenty (20) years of
service and are given a gratuity which is only equivalent to one month salary for every
year of service, which, in any case, cannot exceed 24 months.
4. The provision on vacation and sick leave, commutable at the highest rate received,
insofar as members of Congress are concerned, is another attempt of the legislators to
further increase their compensation in violation of the Constitution.
The text of Republic Act No. 3836
The text of Republic Act No. 3836 reads:
AN ACT AMENDING SUBSECTION (c), SECTION TWELVE OF
COMMONWEALTH ACT NUMBERED ONE HUNDRED EIGHTY-SIX, AS
AMENDED BY REPUBLIC ACT NUMBERED THIRTY HUNDRED NINETY-SIX:
Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the Philippines in Congress
assembled:
SECTION 1. Subsection (c), Section twelve of Commonwealth Act Numbered One
Hundred eighty-six, as amended by Republic Act Numbered Thirty hundred ninety-six, is
further amended to read as follows:
"(c) Retirement is likewise allowed to a member, regardless of age, who has rendered at
least twenty years of service. The benefit shall, in addition to the return of his personal
contributions plus interest and the payment of the corresponding employer's premiums
described in subsection (a) of Section five hereof, without interest, be only a gratuity
equivalent to one month's salary for every year of service, based on the highest rate
received, but not to exceed twenty-four months: Provided, That the retiring officer or
employee has been in the service of the said employer or office for at least four years
immediately preceding his retirement.
"Retirement is also allowed to a senator or a member of the House of Representatives and

to an elective officer of either House of the Congress, regardless of age, provided that in
the case of a Senator or Member, he must have served at least twelve years as a Senator
and/or as a member of the House of Representatives, and, in the case of an elective
officer of either House, he must have served the government for at least twelve years, not
less than four years of which must have been rendered as such elective officer: Provided,
That the gratuity payable to a retiring senator, member of the House of Representatives,
or elective officer, of either House, shall be equivalent to one year's salary for every four
years of service in the government and the same shall be exempt from any tax whatsoever
and shall be neither liable to attachment or execution nor refundable in case of
reinstatement or re-election of the retiree.
"This gratuity is payable by the employer or office concerned which is hereby authorized
to provide the necessary appropriation or pay the same from any unexpended items of
appropriations or savings in its appropriations or saving in its appropriations.
"Elective or appointive officials and employees paid gratuity under this subsection shall
be entitled to the commutation of the unused vacation and sick leave, based on the
highest rate received, which they may have to their credit at the time of retirement."
SECTION 2. This Act shall take effect upon its approval.
Approved, June 22, 1963.
The Solicitor General's Office, in representation of the respondent, filed its answer on September
8, 1964, and contends, by way of special and affirmative defenses that:
1. The grant of retirement or pension benefits under Republic Act No. 3836 to the officers
objected to by the petitioner does not constitute "forbidden compensation" within the
meaning of Section 14 of Article VI of the Philippine Constitution.
2. The title of the law in question sufficiently complies with the provisions of Section 21,
Article VI, of the Constitution that "no bill which may be enacted into law shall embrace
more than one subject which shall be expressed in the title of the bill.
3. The law in question does not constitute legislation.
4. Certain indispensable parties, specifically the elected officers of Congress who are
authorized to approve vouchers for payments for funds under the law in question, and the
claimants to the vouchers to be presented for payment under said items, were not
included in the petition.
5. The petitioner has no standing to institute this suit.
6. The payment of commutable vacation and sick leave benefits under the said Act is
merely "in the nature of a basis for computing the gratuity due each retiring member"
and, therefore, is not an indirect scheme to increase their salary.
A brief historical background of Republic Act No. 3836
Republic Act No. 3836 was originally House Bill No. 6051, which was introduced by
Congressmen Marcial R. Pimentel of Camarines Norte and Marcelino R. Veloso of the Third
District of Leyte, on May 6, 1963. On the same date, it was referred to the Committee on Civil
Service. which on the following May 8, submitted its REPORT No. 3129, recommending
approval of the bill with amendments, among others, that the word "TWENTY" in the bill as
filed representing the number of years that a senator or member must serve in Congress to
entitle him to retirement under the bill must be reduced to "TWELVE" years, and that the
following words were inserted, namely, "AND THE SAME (referring to gratuity) SHALL BE
EXEMPT FROM ANY TAX WHATSOEVER AND SHALL NOT BE LIABLE FROM
ATTACHMENT OR EXECUTION NOR REFUNDABLE IN CASE OF REINSTATEMENT
OR REELECTION OF THE RETIREE." On May 8, 1963, the bill with the proposed
amendments was approved on second reading. It was passed on third reading on May 13, 1963,
and on the same day was sent to the Senate, which, in turn, on May 23, 1963, passed it without
amendment. The bill was finally approved on June 22, 1963. As explained in the
EXPLANATORY NOTE attached to the bill, among others
The inclusion of members of Congress in subsection (c), Section 12 of C.A. 186, as
amended, will enable them to retire voluntarily, regardless of age, after serving a
minimum of twenty years as a Member of Congress. This gratuity will insure the security
of the family of the retiring member of Congress with the latter engaging in other
activities which may detract from his exalted position and usefulness as lawmaker. It is
expected that with this assurance of security for his loved ones, deserving and wellintentioned but poor men will be attracted to serve their people in Congress.
As finally approved, the law (Subsection [c], paragraph 2, Section 1, R.A. 3836) allows a
Senator or a Member of the House of Representatives and an elective officer of either House of
Congress to retire regardless of age. To be eligible for retirement, he must have served for at least
twelve years as such Senator and/or as member of the House of Representatives. For an elective
officer of either House, he must have served the government for at least twelve years, of which
not less than four years must have been rendered as such elective officer. The gratuity payable by
the employer or office concerned is equivalent to one year's salary for every four years of service
in the government. Said gratuity is exempt from taxation, not liable to attachment or execution,
and not refundable in case of reinstatement or re-election of the retiree.
First legal point personality of the Petitioner to bring suit.
The first point to be considered is whether petitioner Philconsa has a standing to institute this
action. This Court has not hesitated to examine past decisions involving this matter. This Court
has repeatedly held that when the petitioner, like in this case, is composed of substantial
taxpayers, and the outcome will affect their vital interests, they are allowed to bring this suit.
(Pascual v. Secretary, G.R. No. L-10405, December 29, 1960; and Gonzales v. Hechanova, 60
Off. Gaz. 802 [1963]).
The petitioner, Philconsa, is precisely a non-profit, civic organization composed of several
leaders from all walks of life whose main objective is to uphold the principles of the
Constitution.
In rejecting the motion to dismiss in the case of Pascual v. Secretary, supra, this Court stated,
among other things, that "there are many decisions nullifying, at the instance of the taxpayers,
laws providing the disbursement of public funds, upon the theory that the expenditure of public
funds by an officer of the State for the purpose of administering an unconstitutional act
constitutes a misappropriation of such funds, which may be enjoined at the request of the
taxpayers."1 This legislation (Republic Act 3836) involves the disbursement of public funds.
We are not, however, unmindful of the ruling laid down by the Supreme Court of the United
States in the case ofMassachusetts v. Mellon, 262 U.S. 447, holding that:
... the relation of a taxpayer of the United States to the Federal Government is very
different. His interest in the moneys of the Treasury partly realized from taxation and
partly from other sources is shared with millions of others; is comparatively minute
and indeterminable; and the effect upon future taxation of any payment out of the funds,
so remote, fluctuating and uncertain, that no basis is afforded for an appeal to the
preventive powers of equity.
The general view in the United States, which is followed here, is stated in the American
Jurisprudence, thus
In the determination of the degree of interest essential to give the requisite standing to
attack the constitutionality of a statute the general rule is that not only persons
individually affected, but also taxpayers have sufficient interest in preventing the illegal
expenditure of moneys raised by taxation and may therefore question the constitutionality
of statutes requiring expenditure of public moneys. (11 Am. Jur. 761; emphasis supplied.)
As far as the first point is concerned, We hold, therefore, that the contention of the Solicitor
General is untenable.
Second legal point Whether or not Republic Act No. 3836 falls within the prohibition
embodied in Art. VI, section 14 of the Constitution.
The first constitutional question is whether Republic Act 3836 violates Section 14, Article VI, of
the Constitution, which reads as follows:
The senators and the Members of the House of Representatives shall, unless otherwise
provided by law, receive an annual compensation of seven thousand two hundred pesos
each, including per diems andother emoluments or allowances, and exclusive only of
travelling expenses to and from their respective districts in the case of Members of the
House of Representative and to and from their places of residence in the case of Senators,
when attending sessions of the Congress. No increase in said compensation shall take
effect until after the expiration of the full term of all the Members of the Senate and of
the House of Representatives approving such increase. Until otherwise provided by law,
the President of the Senate and the Speaker of the House of Representatives shall each
receive an annual compensation of sixteen thousand pesos (emphasis supplied)
Before discussing this point, it is worthy to note that the Constitution embodies some limitations
and prohibitions upon the members of Congress, to wit:
1. They may not hold any other office or employment in the Government without
forfeiting their respective seats;
2. They shall not be appointed, during the time for which they are elected, to any civil
office which may have been created or the emoluments whereof shall have been
increased while they were members of Congress; (Section 16, Article VI, Constitution)
3. They cannot be financially interested in any franchise;
4. They cannot appear in any civil case wherein the Government is an adverse party;
5. They cannot appear as counsel before any Electoral Tribunal; and
6. They cannot appear as counsel in any criminal case where an officer or employee of
the Government is accused. (Section 17, Article VI, Constitution)
In addition to the above prohibitions, the Anti-Graft Law (Republic Act 3019) also prohibits
members of Congress to have any special interest in any specific business which will directly or
indirectly be favored by any law or resolution authored by them during their term of office.
It is thus clear that the Constitutional Convention wisely surrounded the Constitution with these
limitations and prohibitions upon Members of Congress. This is a practical demonstration or
application of the principle of the and balances which is one of the peculiar characteristics of our
Constitution. In the light of this background, can We conclude that Congress can validly enact
Republic Act 3836, providing retirement benefits to its members, without violating the
provisions in the aforementioned Article VI, Section 14, of the Constitution, regarding increase
of the compensation act including other emoluments?
It is worthy to note that the original salary for the members of the National Assembly
(unicameral body) was fixed at P5,000.00 per annum each. This was raised to P7,200 per annum
by the enactment of the 1940 Constitutional amendment, when the unicameral body, the National
Assembly, was changed to Congress, composed of two bodies, the Senate and the House of
Representatives. Again, in 1964, by the enactment of Republic Act 4143, the salary for the
Members of Congress was raised to P32,000.00 per annum for each of them; and for the
President of the Senate and the Speaker of the House of Representatives, to P40,000.00 per
annum each.
Likewise, it is significant that, as stated above, when the Constitutional Convention first
determined the compensation for the Members of Congress, the amount fixed by it was only
P5,000.00 per annum, but it embodies a special proviso which reads as follows: "No increase in
said compensation shall take effect until after the expiration of the full term of all the members of
the National Assembly elected subsequent to approval of such increase." In other words, under
the original constitutional provision regarding the power of the National Assembly to increase
the salaries of its members, no increase would take effect until after the expiration of the full
term of the members of the Assembly elected subsequent to the approval of such increase. (See
Aruego, The Framing of the Constitution, Vol. 1, pp. 296-300; Sinco, Philippine Government and
Political Law, 4th ed., p. 187)
This goes to show how zealous were the members of the Constitutional Convention in guarding
against the temptation for members of Congress to increase their salaries. However, the original
strict prohibition was modified by the subsequent provision when the Constitutional amendments
were approved in 19402
The Constitutional provision in the aforementioned Section 14, Article VI, includes in the term
compensation "other emoluments." This is the pivotal point on this fundamental question as to
whether the retirement benefits as provided for in Republic Act 3836 fall within the purview of
the term "other emoluments."
Most of the authorities and decided cases have regarded "emolument" as "the profit arising from
office or employment; that which is received as compensation for services or which is annexed to
the possession of an office, as salary, fees and perquisites.3
In another set of cases, "emolument" has been defined as "the profit arising from office or
employment; that which is received as compensation for services, or which is annexed to the
possession of office, as salary, fees and perquisites; advantage, gain, public or private." The gain,
profit or advantage which is contemplated in the definition or significance of the word
"emolument" as applied to public officers, clearly comprehends, We think, a gain, profit, or
advantage which is pecuniary in character. (citing Taxpayers' League of Cargon County v.
McPherson, 54 P. 2d. 897, 90l.: 49 Wy. 26; 106 A.L.R. 767)
In Schieffelin v. Berry, 216 N.Y.S. (citing Wright v. Craig, 202 App. Div. 684, 195 N.Y.S. 391,
affirmed 234 N.Y. 548, 138 N.E. 441), it has been established that pensions and retirement
allowances are part of compensation of public officials; otherwise their payment would be
unconstitutional.
In another case, State v. Schmahl, 145 N.W. 795, 125 Minn. 104, it is stated that "as used in
Article 4, section 9, of the Constitution of Minnesota, providing that no Senator or
Representative shall hold any office, the emoluments of which have been increased during the
session of the Legislature of which he was a member, until after the expiration of his term of
office in the Legislature, the word "emoluments" does not refer to the fixed salary alone, but
includes fees and compensation as the incumbent of the office is by law entitled to receive
because he holds such office and performed some service required of the occupant thereof."
From the decisions of these cases, it is evident that retirement benefit is a form or another species
of emolument, because it is a part of compensation for services of one possessing any office.
Republic Act No. 3836 provides for an increase in the emoluments of Senators and Members of
the House of Representatives, to take effect upon the approval of said Act, which was on June
22, 1963. Retirement benefits were immediately available thereunder, without awaiting the
expiration of the full term of all the Members of the Senate and the House of Representatives
approving such increase. Such provision clearly runs counter to the prohibition in Article VI,
Section 14 of the Constitution.
Third Legal Point Whether or not the law in question violates the equal protection clause of
the Constitution.
Another reason in support of the conclusion reached herein is that the features of said Republic
Act 3836 are patently discriminatory, and therefore violate the equal protection clause of the
Constitution. (Art. III, Sec. 1, part. 1.)
In the first place, while the said law grants retirement benefits to Senators and Members of the
House of Representatives who are elective officials, it does not include other elective officials
such as the governors of provinces and the members of the provincial boards, and the elective
officials of the municipalities and chartered cities.
The principle of equal protection of law embodied in our Constitution has been fully explained
by Us in the case ofPeople v. Vera, 65 Phil. 56, 126, where We stated that the classification to be
reasonable must be based upon substantial distinctions which make real differences and must be
germane to the purposes of the law.
As well stated by Willoughby on the Constitution of the United States (second edition), p. 1937,
the principle of the requirement of equal protection of law applies to all persons similarly
situated. Why limit the application of the benefits of Republic Act 3836 to the elected members
of Congress? We feel that the classification here is not reasonable. (See also Sinco, Philippine
Political Law, 11th ed. [1962]; Selected Essays on Constitutional Law [1938-62], p. 789; The
Equal Protection of the Laws, 37 Cal. Law Rev. 341.)
Secondly, all members of Congress under Republic Act 3836 are given retirement benefits after
serving twelve years, not necessarily continuous, whereas, most government officers and
employees are given retirement benefits after serving for at least twenty years. In fact, the
original bill of Act 3836 provided for twenty years of service.
In the third place, all government officers and employees are given only one retirement benefit
irrespective of their length of service in the government, whereas, under Republic Act 3836,
because of no age limitation, a Senator or Member of the House of Representatives upon being
elected for 24 years will be entitled to two retirement benefits or equivalent to six years' salary.
Also, while the payment of retirement benefits (annuity) to an employee who had been retired
and reappointed is suspended during his new employment (under Commonwealth Act 186, as
amended), this is not so under Republic Act 3836.
Lastly, it is peculiar that Republic Act 3836 grants retirement benefits to officials who are not
members of the Government Service Insurance System. Most grantees of retirement benefits
under the various retirement laws have to be members or must at least contribute a portion of
their monthly salaries to the System.4
The arguments advanced against the discriminatory features of Republic Act 3836, as far as
Members of Congress are concerned, apply with equal force to the elected officers of each
House, such as the Secretaries and the Sergeants-at-arms. Under Republic Act 3836, the
Secretaries and Sergeants-at-arms of each House are given the benefits of retirement without
having served for twenty years as required with other officers and employees of the Government.
Fourth Legal Point Whether or not the title of Republic Act No. 3836 is germane to the
subject matter expressed in the act.
Another Constitutional point to determine is whether the title of Republic Act 3836 complies
with the requirement of paragraph 1, section 21, Article VI of the Constitution, which reads as
follows:
No bill which may be enacted into law shall embrace more than one subject which shall
be expressed in the title of the bill.
We are not unmindful of the fact that there has been a general disposition in all courts to construe
the constitutional provision with reference to the subject and title of the Act, liberally.
It is the contention of petitioner that the said title of Republic Act 3836 gives no inkling or notice
whatsoever to the public regarding the retirement gratuities and commutable vacation and sick
leave privileges to members of Congress. It is claimed that petitioner learned of this law for the
first time only when Jose Velasco, disbursing officer of the House, testified on January 30, 1964,
before Justice Labrador, in connection with the hearing of the case, and he revealed that in 1963,
Congress enacted the retirement law for its members. In fact the Appropriation Act for the fiscal
year 1964-65, Republic Act No. 4164, provides:
13. For payment of retirement gratuities of members of the Senate pursuant to the
provisions of Republic Act No. 3836: PROVIDED, That no portion of this Appropriation
shall be transferred to any other item until all approved claims shall have been paid
P210,000.00.
In the appropriations for the House of Representatives the following items appear:
7. For government share of premiums on life insurance and retirement of Members and
employees of the House of Representatives, as provided for under Republic Act No. 1616
P300,000.00
8. For payment of the cash commutation of the accumulated vacation and sick leaves as
provided for under Republic Act No. 611, and retirement gratuities of Members and
employees of the House of Representatives under Republic Act No. 1616
P1,300,000.00.
In the Appropriations Act of 1965-1966 (Republic Act No. 4642), the following item appears in
the appropriations for the Senate:
13. For payment of retirement gratuities of Senate personnel pursuant to the provisions of
Republic Act No. 1616: PROVIDED, That no portion of this appropriation shall be
transferred to any other item until all approved claims shall have been paid
P100,000.00.
It is thus clear that in the Appropriations Act for 1965-1966, the item in the Senate for
P210,000.00 to implement Republic Act 3836 was eliminated.
In the appropriations for the House (1965-1966), the following items appear:
7. For government share of premiums on life insurance and retirement of Members and
employees of the House Of Representatives as provided for under Republic Act No. 1616
P1,200,000.00.
8. For payment of the cash commutation of the accumulated vacation and sick leaves as
provided for under Republic Act No. 611, and retirement gratuities of Members and
employees of the House of Representatives under Republic Act No. 1616
P1,700,000.00.
It is to be observed that under Republic Act 3836, amending the first paragraph of section 12,
subsection (c) of Commonwealth Act 186, as amended by Republic Acts Nos. 660 and. 3096, the
retirement benefits are granted to members of the Government Service Insurance System, who
have rendered at least twenty years of service regardless of age. This paragraph is related and
germane to the subject of Commonwealth Act No. 186.
On the other hand, the succeeding paragraph of Republic Act 3836 refers to members of
Congress and to elective officers thereof who are not members of the Government Service
Insurance System. To provide retirement benefits, therefore, for these officials, would relate to
subject matter which is not germane to Commonwealth Act No. 186. In other words, this portion
of the amendment (re retirement benefits for Members of Congress and elected officers, such as
the Secretary and Sergeants-at-arms for each House) is not related in any manner to the subject
of Commonwealth Act 186 establishing the Government Service Insurance System and which
provides for both retirement and insurance benefits to its members.
Parenthetically, it may be added that the purpose of the requirement that the subject of an Act
should be expressed in its title is fully explained by Cooley, thus: (1) to prevent surprise or fraud
upon the Legislature; and (2) to fairly apprise the people, through such publication of legislation
that are being considered, in order that they may have the opportunity of being heard thereon by
petition or otherwise, if they shall so desire (Cooley, Constitutional Limitations, 8th ed., Vol. 1,
p. 162; See also Martin, Political Law Reviewer, Book One [1965], p. 119)
With respect to sufficiency of title this Court has ruled in two cases:
The Constitutional requirement with respect to titles of statutes as sufficient to reflect
their contents is satisfied if all parts of a law relate to the subject expressed in its title, and
it is not necessary that the title be a complete index of the content. (People v. Carlos, 78
Phil. 535)
The Constitutional requirement that the subject of an act shall be expressed in its title
should be reasonably construed so as not to interfere unduly with the enactment of
necessary legislation. It should be given a practical, rather than technical, construction. It
should be a sufficient compliance with such requirement if the title expresses the general
subject and all the provisions of the statute are germane to that general subject.
(Sumulong v. The Commission on Elections, 73 Phil. 288, 291)
The requirement that the subject of an act shall be expressed in its title is wholly illustrated and
explained inCentral Capiz v. Ramirez, 40 Phil. 883. In this case, the question raised was whether
Commonwealth Act 2784, known as the Public Land Act, was limited in its application to lands
of the public domain or whether its provisions also extended to agricultural lands held in private
ownership. The Court held that the act was limited to lands of the public domain as indicated in
its title, and did not include private agricultural lands. The Court further stated that this provision
of the Constitution expressing the subject matter of an Act in its title is not a mere rule of
legislative procedure, directory to Congress, but it is mandatory. It is the duty of the Court to
declare void any statute not conforming to this constitutional provision. (See Walker v. State, 49
Alabama 329; Cooley, Constitutional Limitations, pp. 162-164; 5 See also Agcaoili v. Suguitan,
48 Phil. 676; Sutherland on Statutory Construction, Sec. 111.)
In the light of the history and analysis of Republic Act 3836, We conclude that the title of said
Republic Act 3836 is void as it is not germane to the subject matter and is a violation of the
aforementioned paragraph 1, section 21, Article VI of the Constitution.
In short, Republic Act 3836 violates three constitutional provisions, namely: first, the prohibition
regarding increase in the salaries of Members of Congress; second, the equal protection clause;
and third, the prohibition that the title of a bill shall not embrace more than one subject.
IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING CONSIDERATIONS, Republic Act No. 3836 is hereby

declared null and void, in so far as it refers to the retirement of Members of Congress and the
elected officials thereof, as being unconstitutional. The restraining order issued in our resolution
on December 6, 1965 is hereby made permanent. No costs.
Bengzon, C.J., Bautista Angelo, Concepcion, Reyes, J.B.L., Dizon, Makalintal, Bengzon, J.P. and
Zaldivar, JJ.,concur.
Barrera, J., took no part.
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-75697 June 18, 1987
VALENTIN TIO doing business under the name and style of OMI
ENTERPRISES, petitioner,
vs.
VIDEOGRAM REGULATORY BOARD, MINISTER OF FINANCE, METRO MANILA
COMMISSION, CITY MAYOR and CITY TREASURER OF MANILA, respondents.
Nelson Y. Ng for petitioner.
The City Legal Officer for respondents City Mayor and City Treasurer.
This petition was filed on September 1, 1986 by petitioner on his own behalf and purportedly on
behalf of other videogram operators adversely affected. It assails the constitutionality of
Presidential Decree No. 1987 entitled "An Act Creating the Videogram Regulatory Board" with
broad powers to regulate and supervise the videogram industry (hereinafter briefly referred to as
the BOARD). The Decree was promulgated on October 5, 1985 and took effect on April 10,
1986, fifteen (15) days after completion of its publication in the Official Gazette.
On November 5, 1985, a month after the promulgation of the abovementioned decree,
Presidential Decree No. 1994 amended the National Internal Revenue Code providing, inter alia:
SEC. 134. Video Tapes. There shall be collected on each processed video-tape
cassette, ready for playback, regardless of length, an annual tax of five pesos;
Provided, That locally manufactured or imported blank video tapes shall be
subject to sales tax.
On October 23, 1986, the Greater Manila Theaters Association, Integrated Movie Producers,
Importers and Distributors Association of the Philippines, and Philippine Motion Pictures
Producers Association, hereinafter collectively referred to as the Intervenors, were permitted by
the Court to intervene in the case, over petitioner's opposition, upon the allegations that
intervention was necessary for the complete protection of their rights and that their "survival and
very existence is threatened by the unregulated proliferation of film piracy." The Intervenors
were thereafter allowed to file their Comment in Intervention.
The rationale behind the enactment of the DECREE, is set out in its preambular clauses as
follows:
1. WHEREAS, the proliferation and unregulated circulation of videograms
including, among others, videotapes, discs, cassettes or any technical
improvement or variation thereof, have greatly prejudiced the operations of
moviehouses and theaters, and have caused a sharp decline in theatrical
attendance by at least forty percent (40%) and a tremendous drop in the collection
of sales, contractor's specific, amusement and other taxes, thereby resulting in
substantial losses estimated at P450 Million annually in government revenues;
2. WHEREAS, videogram(s) establishments collectively earn around P600
Million per annum from rentals, sales and disposition of videograms, and such
earnings have not been subjected to tax, thereby depriving the Government of
approximately P180 Million in taxes each year;
3. WHEREAS, the unregulated activities of videogram establishments have also
affected the viability of the movie industry, particularly the more than 1,200
movie houses and theaters throughout the country, and occasioned industry-wide
displacement and unemployment due to the shutdown of numerous moviehouses
and theaters;
4. "WHEREAS, in order to ensure national economic recovery, it is imperative for
the Government to create an environment conducive to growth and development
of all business industries, including the movie industry which has an accumulated
investment of about P3 Billion;
5. WHEREAS, proper taxation of the activities of videogram establishments will
not only alleviate the dire financial condition of the movie industry upon which
more than 75,000 families and 500,000 workers depend for their livelihood, but
also provide an additional source of revenue for the Government, and at the same
time rationalize the heretofore uncontrolled distribution of videograms;
6. WHEREAS, the rampant and unregulated showing of obscene videogram
features constitutes a clear and present danger to the moral and spiritual wellbeing of the youth, and impairs the mandate of the Constitution for the State to
support the rearing of the youth for civic efficiency and the development of moral
character and promote their physical, intellectual, and social well-being;
7. WHEREAS, civic-minded citizens and groups have called for remedial
measures to curb these blatant malpractices which have flaunted our censorship
and copyright laws;
8. WHEREAS, in the face of these grave emergencies corroding the moral values
of the people and betraying the national economic recovery program, bold
emergency measures must be adopted with dispatch; ... (Numbering of paragraphs
supplied).
Petitioner's attack on the constitutionality of the DECREE rests on the following grounds:
1. Section 10 thereof, which imposes a tax of 30% on the gross receipts payable to
the local government is a RIDER and the same is not germane to the subject
matter thereof;
2. The tax imposed is harsh, confiscatory, oppressive and/or in unlawful restraint
of trade in violation of the due process clause of the Constitution;
3. There is no factual nor legal basis for the exercise by the President of the vast
powers conferred upon him by Amendment No. 6;
4. There is undue delegation of power and authority;
5. The Decree is an ex-post facto law; and
6. There is over regulation of the video industry as if it were a nuisance, which it
is not.
We shall consider the foregoing objections in seriatim.
1. The Constitutional requirement that "every bill shall embrace only one subject which shall be
expressed in the title thereof" 1 is sufficiently complied with if the title be comprehensive
enough to include the general purpose which a statute seeks to achieve. It is not necessary that
the title express each and every end that the statute wishes to accomplish. The requirement is
satisfied if all the parts of the statute are related, and are germane to the subject matter expressed
in the title, or as long as they are not inconsistent with or foreign to the general subject and
title.2 An act having a single general subject, indicated in the title, may contain any number of
provisions, no matter how diverse they may be, so long as they are not inconsistent with or
foreign to the general subject, and may be considered in furtherance of such subject by providing
for the method and means of carrying out the general object." 3 The rule also is that the
constitutional requirement as to the title of a bill should not be so narrowly construed as to
cripple or impede the power of legislation. 4 It should be given practical rather than technical
construction. 5
Tested by the foregoing criteria, petitioner's contention that the tax provision of the DECREE is a
rider is without merit. That section reads, inter alia:
Section 10. Tax on Sale, Lease or Disposition of Videograms. Notwithstanding
any provision of law to the contrary, the province shall collect a tax of thirty
percent (30%) of the purchase price or rental rate, as the case may be, for every
sale, lease or disposition of a videogram containing a reproduction of any motion
picture or audiovisual program. Fifty percent (50%) of the proceeds of the tax
collected shall accrue to the province, and the other fifty percent (50%) shall
acrrue to the municipality where the tax is collected; PROVIDED, That in
Metropolitan Manila, the tax shall be shared equally by the City/Municipality and
the Metropolitan Manila Commission.
xxx xxx xxx
The foregoing provision is allied and germane to, and is reasonably necessary for the
accomplishment of, the general object of the DECREE, which is the regulation of the video
industry through the Videogram Regulatory Board as expressed in its title. The tax provision is
not inconsistent with, nor foreign to that general subject and title. As a tool for regulation 6 it is
simply one of the regulatory and control mechanisms scattered throughout the DECREE. The
express purpose of the DECREE to include taxation of the video industry in order to regulate and
rationalize the heretofore uncontrolled distribution of videograms is evident from Preambles 2
and 5, supra. Those preambles explain the motives of the lawmaker in presenting the measure.
The title of the DECREE, which is the creation of the Videogram Regulatory Board, is
comprehensive enough to include the purposes expressed in its Preamble and reasonably covers
all its provisions. It is unnecessary to express all those objectives in the title or that the latter be
an index to the body of the DECREE. 7
2. Petitioner also submits that the thirty percent (30%) tax imposed is harsh and oppressive,
confiscatory, and in restraint of trade. However, it is beyond serious question that a tax does not
cease to be valid merely because it regulates, discourages, or even definitely deters the activities
taxed. 8 The power to impose taxes is one so unlimited in force and so searching in extent, that
the courts scarcely venture to declare that it is subject to any restrictions whatever, except such as
rest in the discretion of the authority which exercises it. 9 In imposing a tax, the legislature acts
upon its constituents. This is, in general, a sufficient security against erroneous and oppressive
taxation. 10
The tax imposed by the DECREE is not only a regulatory but also a revenue measure prompted
by the realization that earnings of videogram establishments of around P600 million per annum
have not been subjected to tax, thereby depriving the Government of an additional source of
revenue. It is an end-user tax, imposed on retailers for every videogram they make available for
public viewing. It is similar to the 30% amusement tax imposed or borne by the movie industry
which the theater-owners pay to the government, but which is passed on to the entire cost of the
admission ticket, thus shifting the tax burden on the buying or the viewing public. It is a tax that
is imposed uniformly on all videogram operators.
The levy of the 30% tax is for a public purpose. It was imposed primarily to answer the need for
regulating the video industry, particularly because of the rampant film piracy, the flagrant
violation of intellectual property rights, and the proliferation of pornographic video tapes. And
while it was also an objective of the DECREE to protect the movie industry, the tax remains a
valid imposition.
The public purpose of a tax may legally exist even if the motive which impelled
the legislature to impose the tax was to favor one industry over another. 11
It is inherent in the power to tax that a state be free to select the subjects of
taxation, and it has been repeatedly held that "inequities which result from a
singling out of one particular class for taxation or exemption infringe no
constitutional limitation". 12 Taxation has been made the implement of the state's
police power. 13
At bottom, the rate of tax is a matter better addressed to the taxing legislature.
3. Petitioner argues that there was no legal nor factual basis for the promulgation of the DECREE
by the former President under Amendment No. 6 of the 1973 Constitution providing that
"whenever in the judgment of the President ... , there exists a grave emergency or a threat or
imminence thereof, or whenever the interim Batasang Pambansa or the regular National
Assembly fails or is unable to act adequately on any matter for any reason that in his judgment
requires immediate action, he may, in order to meet the exigency, issue the necessary decrees,
orders, or letters of instructions, which shall form part of the law of the land."
In refutation, the Intervenors and the Solicitor General's Office aver that the 8th "whereas" clause
sufficiently summarizes the justification in that grave emergencies corroding the moral values of
the people and betraying the national economic recovery program necessitated bold emergency
measures to be adopted with dispatch. Whatever the reasons "in the judgment" of the then
President, considering that the issue of the validity of the exercise of legislative power under the
said Amendment still pends resolution in several other cases, we reserve resolution of the
question raised at the proper time.
4. Neither can it be successfully argued that the DECREE contains an undue delegation of
legislative power. The grant in Section 11 of the DECREE of authority to the BOARD to "solicit
the direct assistance of other agencies and units of the government and deputize, for a fixed and
limited period, the heads or personnel of such agencies and units to perform enforcement
functions for the Board" is not a delegation of the power to legislate but merely a conferment of
authority or discretion as to its execution, enforcement, and implementation. "The true
distinction is between the delegation of power to make the law, which necessarily involves a
discretion as to what it shall be, and conferring authority or discretion as to its execution to be
exercised under and in pursuance of the law. The first cannot be done; to the latter, no valid
objection can be made." 14 Besides, in the very language of the decree, the authority of the
BOARD to solicit such assistance is for a "fixed and limited period" with the deputized agencies
concerned being "subject to the direction and control of the BOARD." That the grant of such
authority might be the source of graft and corruption would not stigmatize the DECREE as
unconstitutional. Should the eventuality occur, the aggrieved parties will not be without adequate
remedy in law.
5. The DECREE is not violative of the ex post facto principle. An ex post facto law is, among
other categories, one which "alters the legal rules of evidence, and authorizes conviction upon
less or different testimony than the law required at the time of the commission of the offense." It
is petitioner's position that Section 15 of the DECREE in providing that:
All videogram establishments in the Philippines are hereby given a period of
forty-five (45) days after the effectivity of this Decree within which to register
with and secure a permit from the BOARD to engage in the videogram business
and to register with the BOARD all their inventories of videograms, including
videotapes, discs, cassettes or other technical improvements or variations thereof,
before they could be sold, leased, or otherwise disposed of. Thereafter any
videogram found in the possession of any person engaged in the videogram
business without the required proof of registration by the BOARD, shall be prima
facie evidence of violation of the Decree, whether the possession of such
videogram be for private showing and/or public exhibition.
raises immediately a prima facie evidence of violation of the DECREE when the required proof
of registration of any videogram cannot be presented and thus partakes of the nature of an ex
post facto law.
The argument is untenable. As this Court held in the recent case of Vallarta vs. Court of Appeals,
et al. 15
... it is now well settled that "there is no constitutional objection to the passage of
a law providing that the presumption of innocence may be overcome by a
contrary presumption founded upon the experience of human conduct, and
enacting what evidence shall be sufficient to overcome such presumption of
innocence" (People vs. Mingoa 92 Phil. 856 [1953] at 858-59, citing 1 COOLEY,
A TREATISE ON THE CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS, 639-641). And the
"legislature may enact that when certain facts have been proved that they shall be
prima facie evidence of the existence of the guilt of the accused and shift the
burden of proof provided there be a rational connection between the facts proved
and the ultimate facts presumed so that the inference of the one from proof of the
others is not unreasonable and arbitrary because of lack of connection between the
two in common experience". 16
Applied to the challenged provision, there is no question that there is a rational connection
between the fact proved, which is non-registration, and the ultimate fact presumed which is
violation of the DECREE, besides the fact that the prima facie presumption of violation of the
DECREE attaches only after a forty-five-day period counted from its effectivity and is, therefore,
neither retrospective in character.
6. We do not share petitioner's fears that the video industry is being over-regulated and being
eased out of existence as if it were a nuisance. Being a relatively new industry, the need for its
regulation was apparent. While the underlying objective of the DECREE is to protect the
moribund movie industry, there is no question that public welfare is at bottom of its enactment,
considering "the unfair competition posed by rampant film piracy; the erosion of the moral fiber
of the viewing public brought about by the availability of unclassified and unreviewed video
tapes containing pornographic films and films with brutally violent sequences; and losses in
government revenues due to the drop in theatrical attendance, not to mention the fact that the
activities of video establishments are virtually untaxed since mere payment of Mayor's permit
and municipal license fees are required to engage in business. 17
The enactment of the Decree since April 10, 1986 has not brought about the "demise" of the
video industry. On the contrary, video establishments are seen to have proliferated in many
places notwithstanding the 30% tax imposed.
In the last analysis, what petitioner basically questions is the necessity, wisdom and expediency
of the DECREE. These considerations, however, are primarily and exclusively a matter of
legislative concern.
Only congressional power or competence, not the wisdom of the action taken,
may be the basis for declaring a statute invalid. This is as it ought to be. The
principle of separation of powers has in the main wisely allocated the respective
authority of each department and confined its jurisdiction to such a sphere. There
would then be intrusion not allowable under the Constitution if on a matter left to
the discretion of a coordinate branch, the judiciary would substitute its own. If
there be adherence to the rule of law, as there ought to be, the last offender should
be courts of justice, to which rightly litigants submit their controversy precisely to
maintain unimpaired the supremacy of legal norms and prescriptions. The attack
on the validity of the challenged provision likewise insofar as there may be

objections, even if valid and cogent on its wisdom cannot be sustained. 18
In fine, petitioner has not overcome the presumption of validity which attaches to a challenged
statute. We find no clear violation of the Constitution which would justify us in pronouncing
Presidential Decree No. 1987 as unconstitutional and void.
WHEREFORE, the instant Petition is hereby dismissed.
No costs.
SO ORDERED.
Teehankee, (C.J.), Yap, Fernan, Narvasa, Gutierrez, Jr., Cruz, Paras, Feliciano, Gancayco,
Padilla, Bidin, Sarmiento and Cortes, JJ., concur.
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. 208566
November 19, 2013
GRECO ANTONIOUS BEDA B. BELGICA JOSE M. VILLEGAS JR. JOSE L.

GONZALEZ REUBEN M. ABANTE and QUINTIN PAREDES SAN DIEGO, Petitioners,
vs.
HONORABLE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY PAQUITO N. OCHOA JR. SECRETARY OF
BUDGET AND MANAGEMENT FLORENCIO B. ABAD, NATIONAL TREASURER
ROSALIA V. DE LEON SENATE OF THE PHILIPPINES represented by FRANKLIN M.
DRILON m his capacity as SENATE PRESIDENT and HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
represented by FELICIANO S. BELMONTE, JR. in his capacity as SPEAKER OF THE
HOUSE, Respondents.
x-----------------------x
G.R. No. 208493
SOCIAL JUSTICE SOCIETY (SJS) PRESIDENT SAMSON S. ALCANTARA, Petitioner,
vs.
HONORABLE FRANKLIN M. DRILON in his capacity as SENATE PRESIDENT and
HONORABLE FELICIANO S. BELMONTE, JR., in his capacity as SPEAKER OF THE
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, Respondents.
x-----------------------x
G.R. No. 209251
PEDRITO M. NEPOMUCENO, Former Mayor-Boac, Marinduque Former Provincial
Board Member -Province of Marinduque, Petitioner,
vs.
PRESIDENT BENIGNO SIMEON C. AQUINO III* and SECRETARY FLORENCIO
BUTCH ABAD, DEPARTMENT OF BUDGET AND MANAGEMENT, Respondents.
DECISION
PERLAS-BERNABE, J.:
"Experience is the oracle of truth."1
-James Madison
Before the Court are consolidated petitions2 taken under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, all of
which assail the constitutionality of the Pork Barrel System. Due to the complexity of the subject
matter, the Court shall heretofore discuss the systems conceptual underpinnings before detailing
the particulars of the constitutional challenge.
The Facts
I. Pork Barrel: General Concept.
"Pork Barrel" is political parlance of American -English origin. 3 Historically, its usage
may be traced to the degrading ritual of rolling out a barrel stuffed with pork to a
multitude of black slaves who would cast their famished bodies into the porcine feast to
assuage their hunger with morsels coming from the generosity of their well-fed
master.4 This practice was later compared to the actions of American legislators in trying
to direct federal budgets in favor of their districts. 5 While the advent of refrigeration has
made the actual pork barrel obsolete, it persists in reference to political bills that "bring
home the bacon" to a legislators district and constituents. 6 In a more technical sense,
"Pork Barrel" refers to an appropriation of government spending meant for localized
projects and secured solely or primarily to bring money to a representative's
district.7 Some scholars on the subject further use it to refer to legislative control of local
appropriations.8
In the Philippines, "Pork Barrel" has been commonly referred to as lump-sum,
discretionary funds of Members of the Legislature,9 although, as will be later discussed,
its usage would evolve in reference to certain funds of the Executive.
II. History of Congressional Pork Barrel in the Philippines.
A. Pre-Martial Law Era (1922-1972).
Act 3044,10 or the Public Works Act of 1922, is considered11 as the earliest form of
"Congressional Pork Barrel" in the Philippines since the utilization of the funds
appropriated therein were subjected to post-enactment legislator approval.
Particularly, in the area of fund release, Section 3 12 provides that the sums
appropriated for certain public works projects 13"shall be distributed x x x subject
to the approval of a joint committee elected by the Senate and the House of
Representatives. "The committee from each House may also authorize one of its
members to approve the distribution made by the Secretary of Commerce and
Communications."14 Also, in the area of fund realignment, the same section
provides that the said secretary, "with the approval of said joint committee, or of
the authorized members thereof, may, for the purposes of said distribution,
transfer unexpended portions of any item of appropriation under this Act to any
other item hereunder."
In 1950, it has been documented15 that post-enactment legislator participation
broadened from the areas of fund release and realignment to the area of project
identification. During that year, the mechanics of the public works act was
modified to the extent that the discretion of choosing projects was transferred
from the Secretary of Commerce and Communications to legislators. "For the first
time, the law carried a list of projects selected by Members of Congress, they
being the representatives of the people, either on their own account or by
consultation with local officials or civil leaders." 16 During this period, the pork
barrel process commenced with local government councils, civil groups, and
individuals appealing to Congressmen or Senators for projects. Petitions that were
accommodated formed part of a legislators allocation, and the amount each
legislator would eventually get is determined in a caucus convened by the
majority. The amount was then integrated into the administration bill prepared by
the Department of Public Works and Communications. Thereafter, the Senate and
the House of Representatives added their own provisions to the bill until it was
signed into law by the President the Public Works Act. 17 In the 1960s, however,
pork barrel legislation reportedly ceased in view of the stalemate between the
House of Representatives and the Senate.18
B. Martial Law Era (1972-1986).
While the previous" Congressional Pork Barrel" was apparently discontinued in
1972 after Martial Law was declared, an era when "one man controlled the
legislature,"19 the reprieve was only temporary. By 1982, the Batasang Pambansa
had already introduced a new item in the General Appropriations Act (GAA)
called the" Support for Local Development Projects" (SLDP) under the article on
"National Aid to Local Government Units". Based on reports, 20 it was under the
SLDP that the practice of giving lump-sum allocations to individual legislators
began, with each assemblyman receiving P500,000.00. Thereafter, assemblymen
would communicate their project preferences to the Ministry of Budget and
Management for approval. Then, the said ministry would release the allocation
papers to the Ministry of Local Governments, which would, in turn, issue the
checks to the city or municipal treasurers in the assemblymans locality. It has
been further reported that "Congressional Pork Barrel" projects under the SLDP
also began to cover not only public works projects, or so- called "hard projects",
but also "soft projects",21 or non-public works projects such as those which would
fall under the categories of, among others, education, health and livelihood.22
C. Post-Martial Law Era:
Corazon Cojuangco Aquino Administration (1986-1992).
After the EDSA People Power Revolution in 1986 and the restoration of
Philippine democracy, "Congressional Pork Barrel" was revived in the form of the
"Mindanao Development Fund" and the "Visayas Development Fund" which were
created with lump-sum appropriations of P480 Million and P240 Million,
respectively, for the funding of development projects in the Mindanao and
Visayas areas in 1989. It has been documented23 that the clamor raised by the
Senators and the Luzon legislators for a similar funding, prompted the creation of
the "Countrywide Development Fund" (CDF) which was integrated into the 1990
GAA24 with an initial funding ofP2.3 Billion to cover "small local infrastructure
and other priority community projects."
Under the GAAs for the years 1991 and 1992,25 CDF funds were, with the
approval of the President, to be released directly to the implementing agencies but
"subject to the submission of the required list of projects and activities."Although
the GAAs from 1990 to 1992 were silent as to the amounts of allocations of the
individual legislators, as well as their participation in the identification of
projects, it has been reported26 that by 1992, Representatives were receivingP12.5
Million each in CDF funds, while Senators were receiving P18 Million each,
without any limitation or qualification, and that they could identify any kind of
project, from hard or infrastructure projects such as roads, bridges, and buildings
to "soft projects" such as textbooks, medicines, and scholarships.27
D. Fidel Valdez Ramos (Ramos) Administration (1992-1998).

The following year, or in 1993,28 the GAA explicitly stated that the release of
CDF funds was to be made upon the submission of the list of projects and
activities identified by, among others, individual legislators. For the first time, the
1993 CDF Article included an allocation for the Vice-President.29 As such,
Representatives were allocated P12.5 Million each in CDF funds, Senators, P18
Million each, and the Vice-President, P20 Million.
In 1994,30 1995,31 and 1996,32 the GAAs contained the same provisions on project
identification and fund release as found in the 1993 CDF Article. In addition,
however, the Department of Budget and Management (DBM) was directed to
submit reports to the Senate Committee on Finance and the House Committee on
Appropriations on the releases made from the funds.33
Under the 199734 CDF Article, Members of Congress and the Vice-President, in
consultation with the implementing agency concerned, were directed to submit to
the DBM the list of 50% of projects to be funded from their respective CDF
allocations which shall be duly endorsed by (a) the Senate President and the
Chairman of the Committee on Finance, in the case of the Senate, and (b) the
Speaker of the House of Representatives and the Chairman of the Committee on
Appropriations, in the case of the House of Representatives; while the list for the
remaining 50% was to be submitted within six (6) months thereafter. The same
article also stated that the project list, which would be published by the
DBM,35 "shall be the basis for the release of funds" and that "no funds
appropriated herein shall be disbursed for projects not included in the list herein
required."
The following year, or in 1998, 36 the foregoing provisions regarding the required
lists and endorsements were reproduced, except that the publication of the project
list was no longer required as the list itself sufficed for the release of CDF Funds.
The CDF was not, however, the lone form of "Congressional Pork Barrel" at that
time. Other forms of "Congressional Pork Barrel" were reportedly fashioned and
inserted into the GAA (called "Congressional Insertions" or "CIs") in order to
perpetuate the ad ministrations political agenda.37 It has been articulated that
since CIs "formed part and parcel of the budgets of executive departments, they
were not easily identifiable and were thus harder to monitor." Nonetheless, the
lawmakers themselves as well as the finance and budget officials of the
implementing agencies, as well as the DBM, purportedly knew about the
insertions.38Examples of these CIs are the Department of Education (DepEd)
School Building Fund, the Congressional Initiative Allocations, the Public Works
Fund, the El Nio Fund, and the Poverty Alleviation Fund. 39 The allocations for
the School Building Fund, particularly, shall be made upon prior consultation
with the representative of the legislative district concerned. 40 Similarly, the
legislators had the power to direct how, where and when these appropriations
were to be spent.41
E. Joseph Ejercito Estrada (Estrada) Administration (1998-2001).
In 1999,42 the CDF was removed in the GAA and replaced by three (3) separate
forms of CIs, namely, the "Food Security Program Fund," 43 the "Lingap Para Sa
Mahihirap Program Fund,"44and the "Rural/Urban Development Infrastructure
Program Fund,"45 all of which contained a special provision requiring "prior
consultation" with the Member s of Congress for the release of the funds.
It was in the year 200046 that the "Priority Development Assistance Fund" (PDAF)
appeared in the GAA. The requirement of "prior consultation with the respective
Representative of the District" before PDAF funds were directly released to the
implementing agency concerned was explicitly stated in the 2000 PDAF Article.
Moreover, realignment of funds to any expense category was expressly allowed,
with the sole condition that no amount shall be used to fund personal services and
other personnel benefits.47 The succeeding PDAF provisions remained the same in
view of the re-enactment48 of the 2000 GAA for the year 2001.
F. Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo (Arroyo) Administration (2001-2010).
The 200249 PDAF Article was brief and straightforward as it merely contained a
single special provision ordering the release of the funds directly to the
implementing agency or local government unit concerned, without further
qualifications. The following year, 2003,50 the same single provision was present,
with simply an expansion of purpose and express authority to realign.
Nevertheless, the provisions in the 2003 budgets of the Department of Public
Works and Highways51 (DPWH) and the DepEd52 required prior consultation with
Members of Congress on the aspects of implementation delegation and project list
submission, respectively. In 2004, the 2003 GAA was re-enacted.53
In 2005,54 the PDAF Article provided that the PDAF shall be used "to fund
priority programs and projects under the ten point agenda of the national
government and shall be released directly to the implementing agencies." It also
introduced the program menu concept,55 which is essentially a list of general
programs and implementing agencies from which a particular PDAF project may
be subsequently chosen by the identifying authority. The 2005 GAA was reenacted56 in 2006 and hence, operated on the same bases. In similar regard, the
program
menu
concept
was
consistently
integrated
into
the
57
58
59
60
2007, 2008, 2009, and 2010 GAAs.
Textually, the PDAF Articles from 2002 to 2010 were silent with respect to the
specific amounts allocated for the individual legislators, as well as their
participation in the proposal and identification of PDAF projects to be funded. In
contrast to the PDAF Articles, however, the provisions under the DepEd School
Building Program and the DPWH budget, similar to its predecessors, explicitly
required prior consultation with the concerned Member of Congress61anent certain
aspects of project implementation.
Significantly, it was during this era that provisions which allowed formal
participation of non-governmental organizations (NGO) in the implementation of
government projects were introduced. In the Supplemental Budget for 2006, with
respect to the appropriation for school buildings, NGOs were, by law, encouraged
to participate. For such purpose, the law stated that "the amount of at least P250
Million of the P500 Million allotted for the construction and completion of school
buildings shall be made available to NGOs including the Federation of FilipinoChinese Chambers of Commerce and Industry, Inc. for its "Operation Barrio
School" program, with capability and proven track records in the construction of
public school buildings x x x."62 The same allocation was made available to
NGOs in the 2007 and 2009 GAAs under the DepEd Budget. 63 Also, it was in
2007 that the Government Procurement Policy Board 64(GPPB) issued Resolution
No. 12-2007 dated June 29, 2007 (GPPB Resolution 12-2007), amending the
implementing rules and regulations65 of RA 9184,66 the Government Procurement
Reform Act, to include, as a form of negotiated procurement, 67 the procedure
whereby the Procuring Entity68 (the implementing agency) may enter into a
memorandum of agreement with an NGO, provided that "an appropriation law or
ordinance earmarks an amount to be specifically contracted out to NGOs."69
G. Present Administration (2010-Present).

Differing from previous PDAF Articles but similar to the CDF Articles, the
201170 PDAF Article included an express statement on lump-sum amounts
allocated for individual legislators and the Vice-President: Representatives were
given P70 Million each, broken down into P40 Million for "hard projects"
and P30 Million for "soft projects"; while P200 Million was given to each Senator
as well as the Vice-President, with a P100 Million allocation each for "hard" and
"soft projects." Likewise, a provision on realignment of funds was included, but
with the qualification that it may be allowed only once. The same provision also
allowed the Secretaries of Education, Health, Social Welfare and Development,
Interior and Local Government, Environment and Natural Resources, Energy, and
Public Works and Highways to realign PDAF Funds, with the further conditions
that: (a) realignment is within the same implementing unit and same project
category as the original project, for infrastructure projects; (b) allotment released
has not yet been obligated for the original scope of work, and (c) the request for
realignment is with the concurrence of the legislator concerned.71
In the 201272 and 201373 PDAF Articles, it is stated that the "identification of
projects and/or designation of beneficiaries shall conform to the priority list,
standard or design prepared by each implementing agency (priority list
requirement) x x x." However, as practiced, it would still be the individual
legislator who would choose and identify the project from the said priority list.74
Provisions on legislator allocations75 as well as fund realignment76 were included
in the 2012 and 2013 PDAF Articles; but the allocation for the Vice-President,
which was pegged at P200 Million in the 2011 GAA, had been deleted. In
addition, the 2013 PDAF Article now allowed LGUs to be identified as
implementing agencies if they have the technical capability to implement the
projects.77 Legislators were also allowed to identify programs/projects, except for
assistance to indigent patients and scholarships, outside of his legislative district
provided that he secures the written concurrence of the legislator of the intended
outside-district, endorsed by the Speaker of the House.78 Finally, any realignment
of PDAF funds, modification and revision of project identification, as well as
requests for release of funds, were all required to be favorably endorsed by the
House Committee on Appropriations and the Senate Committee on Finance, as the
case may be.79
III. History of Presidential Pork Barrel in the Philippines.
While the term "Pork Barrel" has been typically associated with lump-sum, discretionary
funds of Members of Congress, the present cases and the recent controversies on the
matter have, however, shown that the terms usage has expanded to include certain funds
of the President such as the Malampaya Funds and the Presidential Social Fund.
On the one hand, the Malampaya Funds was created as a special fund under Section 880 of
Presidential Decree No. (PD) 910,81 issued by then President Ferdinand E. Marcos
(Marcos) on March 22, 1976. In enacting the said law, Marcos recognized the need to set
up a special fund to help intensify, strengthen, and consolidate government efforts
relating to the exploration, exploitation, and development of indigenous energy resources
vital to economic growth.82 Due to the energy-related activities of the government in the
Malampaya natural gas field in Palawan, or the "Malampaya Deep Water Gas-to-Power
Project",83 the special fund created under PD 910 has been currently labeled as
Malampaya Funds.
On the other hand the Presidential Social Fund was created under Section 12, Title IV 84 of
PD 1869,85 or the Charter of the Philippine Amusement and Gaming Corporation
(PAGCOR). PD 1869 was similarly issued by Marcos on July 11, 1983. More than two
(2) years after, he amended PD 1869 and accordingly issued PD 1993 on October 31,
1985,86 amending Section 1287 of the former law. As it stands, the Presidential Social
Fund has been described as a special funding facility managed and administered by the
Presidential Management Staff through which the President provides direct assistance to
priority programs and projects not funded under the regular budget. It is sourced from the
share of the government in the aggregate gross earnings of PAGCOR.88
IV. Controversies in the Philippines.
Over the decades, "pork" funds in the Philippines have increased tremendously,89 owing
in no small part to previous Presidents who reportedly used the "Pork Barrel" in order to
gain congressional support.90 It was in 1996 when the first controversy surrounding the
"Pork Barrel" erupted. Former Marikina City Representative Romeo Candazo (Candazo),
then an anonymous source, "blew the lid on the huge sums of government money that
regularly went into the pockets of legislators in the form of kickbacks."91 He said that "the
kickbacks were SOP (standard operating procedure) among legislators and ranged from
a low 19 percent to a high 52 percent of the cost of each project, which could be anything
from dredging, rip rapping, sphalting, concreting, and construction of school
buildings."92 "Other sources of kickbacks that Candazo identified were public funds
intended for medicines and textbooks. A few days later, the tale of the money trail
became the banner story of the Philippine Daily Inquirer issue of August 13, 1996,
accompanied by an illustration of a roasted pig."93 "The publication of the stories,
including those about congressional initiative allocations of certain lawmakers,
including P3.6 Billion for a Congressman, sparked public outrage."94
Thereafter, or in 2004, several concerned citizens sought the nullification of the PDAF as
enacted in the 2004 GAA for being unconstitutional. Unfortunately, for lack of "any
pertinent evidentiary support that illegal misuse of PDAF in the form of kickbacks has
become a common exercise of unscrupulous Members of Congress," the petition was
dismissed.95
Recently, or in July of the present year, the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI) began
its probe into allegations that "the government has been defrauded of some P10 Billion
over the past 10 years by a syndicate using funds from the pork barrel of lawmakers and
various government agencies for scores of ghost projects."96 The investigation was
spawned by sworn affidavits of six (6) whistle-blowers who declared that JLN
Corporation "JLN" standing for Janet Lim Napoles (Napoles) had swindled billions
of pesos from the public coffers for "ghost projects" using no fewer than 20 dummy
NGOs for an entire decade. While the NGOs were supposedly the ultimate recipients of
PDAF funds, the whistle-blowers declared that the money was diverted into Napoles
private accounts.97 Thus, after its investigation on the Napoles controversy, criminal
complaints were filed before the Office of the Ombudsman, charging five (5) lawmakers
for Plunder, and three (3) other lawmakers for Malversation, Direct Bribery, and
Violation of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act. Also recommended to be charged
in the complaints are some of the lawmakers chiefs -of-staff or representatives, the heads
and other officials of three (3) implementing agencies, and the several presidents of the
NGOs set up by Napoles.98
On August 16, 2013, the Commission on Audit (CoA) released the results of a three-year
audit investigation99 covering the use of legislators' PDAF from 2007 to 2009, or during
the last three (3) years of the Arroyo administration. The purpose of the audit was to
determine the propriety of releases of funds under PDAF and the Various Infrastructures
including Local Projects (VILP)100 by the DBM, the application of these funds and the
implementation of projects by the appropriate implementing agencies and several
government-owned-and-controlled corporations (GOCCs).101 The total releases covered
by the audit amounted to P8.374 Billion in PDAF and P32.664 Billion in VILP,
representing 58% and 32%, respectively, of the total PDAF and VILP releases that were
found to have been made nationwide during the audit period. 102 Accordingly, the Co As
findings contained in its Report No. 2012-03 (CoA Report), entitled "Priority
Development Assistance Fund (PDAF) and Various Infrastructures including Local
Projects (VILP)," were made public, the highlights of which are as follows:103
Amounts released for projects identified by a considerable number of legislators
significantly exceeded their respective allocations.
Amounts were released for projects outside of legislative districts of sponsoring
members of the Lower House.
Total VILP releases for the period exceeded the total amount appropriated under
the 2007 to 2009 GAAs.
Infrastructure projects were constructed on private lots without these having
been turned over to the government.
Significant amounts were released to implementing agencies without the latters
endorsement and without considering their mandated functions, administrative
and technical capabilities to implement projects.
Implementation of most livelihood projects was not undertaken by the
implementing agencies themselves but by NGOs endorsed by the proponent
legislators to which the Funds were transferred.
The funds were transferred to the NGOs in spite of the absence of any
appropriation law or ordinance.
Selection of the NGOs were not compliant with law and regulations.
Eighty-Two (82) NGOs entrusted with implementation of seven hundred
seventy two (772) projects amount to P6.156 Billion were either found
questionable, or submitted questionable/spurious documents, or failed to liquidate
in whole or in part their utilization of the Funds.
Procurement by the NGOs, as well as some implementing agencies, of goods
and services reportedly used in the projects were not compliant with law.
As for the "Presidential Pork Barrel", whistle-blowers alleged that" at least P900 Million
from royalties in the operation of the Malampaya gas project off Palawan province
intended for agrarian reform beneficiaries has gone into a dummy NGO." 104 According to
incumbent CoA Chairperson Maria Gracia Pulido Tan (CoA Chairperson), the CoA is, as
of this writing, in the process of preparing "one consolidated report" on the Malampaya
Funds.105
V. The Procedural Antecedents.
Spurred in large part by the findings contained in the CoA Report and the Napoles
controversy, several petitions were lodged before the Court similarly seeking that the
"Pork Barrel System" be declared unconstitutional. To recount, the relevant procedural
antecedents in these cases are as follows:
On August 28, 2013, petitioner Samson S. Alcantara (Alcantara), President of the Social Justice
Society, filed a Petition for Prohibition of even date under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court
(Alcantara Petition), seeking that the "Pork Barrel System" be declared unconstitutional, and a
writ of prohibition be issued permanently restraining respondents Franklin M. Drilon and
Feliciano S. Belmonte, Jr., in their respective capacities as the incumbent Senate President and
Speaker of the House of Representatives, from further taking any steps to enact legislation
appropriating funds for the "Pork Barrel System," in whatever form and by whatever name it
may be called, and from approving further releases pursuant thereto. 106 The Alcantara Petition
was docketed as G.R. No. 208493.
On September 3, 2013, petitioners Greco Antonious Beda B. Belgica, Jose L. Gonzalez, Reuben
M. Abante, Quintin Paredes San Diego (Belgica, et al.), and Jose M. Villegas, Jr. (Villegas) filed
an Urgent Petition For Certiorari and Prohibition With Prayer For The Immediate Issuance of
Temporary Restraining Order (TRO) and/or Writ of Preliminary Injunction dated August 27,
2013 under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court (Belgica Petition), seeking that the annual "Pork Barrel
System," presently embodied in the provisions of the GAA of 2013 which provided for the 2013
PDAF, and the Executives lump-sum, discretionary funds, such as the Malampaya Funds and
the Presidential Social Fund,107 be declared unconstitutional and null and void for being acts
constituting grave abuse of discretion. Also, they pray that the Court issue a TRO against
respondents Paquito N. Ochoa, Jr., Florencio B. Abad (Secretary Abad) and Rosalia V. De Leon,
in their respective capacities as the incumbent Executive Secretary, Secretary of the Department
of Budget and Management (DBM), and National Treasurer, or their agents, for them to
immediately cease any expenditure under the aforesaid funds. Further, they pray that the Court
order the foregoing respondents to release to the CoA and to the public: (a) "the complete
schedule/list of legislators who have availed of their PDAF and VILP from the years 2003 to
2013, specifying the use of the funds, the project or activity and the recipient entities or
individuals, and all pertinent data thereto"; and (b) "the use of the Executives lump-sum,
discretionary funds, including the proceeds from the x x x Malampaya Funds and remittances
from the PAGCOR x x x from 2003 to 2013, specifying the x x x project or activity and the
recipient entities or individuals, and all pertinent data thereto."108 Also, they pray for the
"inclusion in budgetary deliberations with the Congress of all presently off-budget, lump-sum,
discretionary funds including, but not limited to, proceeds from the Malampaya Funds and
remittances from the PAGCOR."109 The Belgica Petition was docketed as G.R. No. 208566.110
Lastly, on September 5, 2013, petitioner Pedrito M. Nepomuceno (Nepomuceno), filed a Petition
dated August 23, 2012 (Nepomuceno Petition), seeking that the PDAF be declared
unconstitutional, and a cease and desist order be issued restraining President Benigno Simeon S.
Aquino III (President Aquino) and Secretary Abad from releasing such funds to Members of
Congress and, instead, allow their release to fund priority projects identified and approved by the
Local Development Councils in consultation with the executive departments, such as the DPWH,
the Department of Tourism, the Department of Health, the Department of Transportation, and
Communication and the National Economic Development Authority.111 The Nepomuceno
Petition was docketed as UDK-14951.112
On September 10, 2013, the Court issued a Resolution of even date (a) consolidating all cases;
(b) requiring public respondents to comment on the consolidated petitions; (c) issuing a TRO
(September 10, 2013 TRO) enjoining the DBM, National Treasurer, the Executive Secretary, or
any of the persons acting under their authority from releasing (1) the remaining PDAF allocated
to Members of Congress under the GAA of 2013, and (2) Malampaya Funds under the phrase
"for such other purposes as may be hereafter directed by the President" pursuant to Section 8 of
PD 910 but not for the purpose of "financing energy resource development and exploitation
programs and projects of the government under the same provision; and (d) setting the
consolidated cases for Oral Arguments on October 8, 2013.
On September 23, 2013, the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) filed a Consolidated
Comment (Comment) of even date before the Court, seeking the lifting, or in the alternative, the
partial lifting with respect to educational and medical assistance purposes, of the Courts
September 10, 2013 TRO, and that the consolidated petitions be dismissed for lack of merit.113
On September 24, 2013, the Court issued a Resolution of even date directing petitioners to reply
to the Comment.
Petitioners, with the exception of Nepomuceno, filed their respective replies to the Comment: (a)
on September 30, 2013, Villegas filed a separate Reply dated September 27, 2013 (Villegas
Reply); (b) on October 1, 2013, Belgica, et al. filed a Reply dated September 30, 2013 (Belgica
Reply); and (c) on October 2, 2013, Alcantara filed a Reply dated October 1, 2013.
On October 1, 2013, the Court issued an Advisory providing for the guidelines to be observed by
the parties for the Oral Arguments scheduled on October 8, 2013. In view of the technicality of
the issues material to the present cases, incumbent Solicitor General Francis H. Jardeleza
(Solicitor General) was directed to bring with him during the Oral Arguments representative/s
from the DBM and Congress who would be able to competently and completely answer
questions related to, among others, the budgeting process and its implementation. Further, the
CoA Chairperson was appointed as amicus curiae and thereby requested to appear before the
Court during the Oral Arguments.
On October 8 and 10, 2013, the Oral Arguments were conducted. Thereafter, the Court directed
the parties to submit their respective memoranda within a period of seven (7) days, or until
October 17, 2013, which the parties subsequently did.
The Issues Before the Court
Based on the pleadings, and as refined during the Oral Arguments, the following are the main
issues for the Courts resolution:
I. Procedural Issues.
Whether or not (a) the issues raised in the consolidated petitions involve an actual and justiciable
controversy; (b) the issues raised in the consolidated petitions are matters of policy not subject to
judicial review; (c) petitioners have legal standing to sue; and (d) the Courts Decision dated
August 19, 1994 in G.R. Nos. 113105, 113174, 113766, and 113888, entitled "Philippine
Constitution Association v. Enriquez"114 (Philconsa) and Decision dated April 24, 2012 in G.R.
No. 164987, entitled "Lawyers Against Monopoly and Poverty v. Secretary of Budget and
Management"115 (LAMP) bar the re-litigatio n of the issue of constitutionality of the "Pork Barrel
System" under the principles of res judicata and stare decisis.
II. Substantive Issues on the "Congressional Pork Barrel."
Whether or not the 2013 PDAF Article and all other Congressional Pork Barrel Laws similar
thereto are unconstitutional considering that they violate the principles of/constitutional
provisions on (a) separation of powers; (b) non-delegability of legislative power; (c) checks and
balances; (d) accountability; (e) political dynasties; and (f) local autonomy.
III. Substantive Issues on the "Presidential Pork Barrel."
Whether or not the phrases (a) "and for such other purposes as may be hereafter directed by the
President" under Section 8 of PD 910, 116 relating to the Malampaya Funds, and (b) "to finance
the priority infrastructure development projects and to finance the restoration of damaged or
destroyed facilities due to calamities, as may be directed and authorized by the Office of the
President of the Philippines" under Section 12 of PD 1869, as amended by PD 1993, relating to
the Presidential Social Fund, are unconstitutional insofar as they constitute undue delegations of
legislative power.
These main issues shall be resolved in the order that they have been stated. In addition, the Court
shall also tackle certain ancillary issues as prompted by the present cases.
The Courts Ruling
The petitions are partly granted.
I. Procedural Issues.
The prevailing rule in constitutional litigation is that no question involving the constitutionality
or validity of a law or governmental act may be heard and decided by the Court unless there is
compliance with the legal requisites for judicial inquiry,117 namely: (a) there must be an actual
case or controversy calling for the exercise of judicial power; (b) the person challenging the act
must have the standing to question the validity of the subject act or issuance; (c) the question of
constitutionality must be raised at the earliest opportunity ; and (d) the issue of constitutionality
must be the very lis mota of the case.118 Of these requisites, case law states that the first two are
the most important119 and, therefore, shall be discussed forthwith.
A. Existence of an Actual Case or Controversy.
By constitutional fiat, judicial power operates only when there is an actual case or
controversy.120 This is embodied in Section 1, Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution which
pertinently states that "judicial power includes the duty of the courts of justice to settle actual
controversies involving rights which are legally demandable and enforceable x x x."
Jurisprudence provides that an actual case or controversy is one which "involves a conflict of
legal rights, an assertion of opposite legal claims, susceptible of judicial resolution as
distinguished from a hypothetical or abstract difference or dispute. 121 In other words, "there must
be a contrariety of legal rights that can be interpreted and enforced on the basis of existing law
and jurisprudence."122 Related to the requirement of an actual case or controversy is the
requirement of "ripeness," meaning that the questions raised for constitutional scrutiny are
already ripe for adjudication. "A question is ripe for adjudication when the act being challenged
has had a direct adverse effect on the individual challenging it. It is a prerequisite that something
had then been accomplished or performed by either branch before a court may come into the
picture, and the petitioner must allege the existence of an immediate or threatened injury to itself
as a result of the challenged action."123 "Withal, courts will decline to pass upon constitutional
issues through advisory opinions, bereft as they are of authority to resolve hypothetical or moot
questions."124
Based on these principles, the Court finds that there exists an actual and justiciable controversy
in these cases.
The requirement of contrariety of legal rights is clearly satisfied by the antagonistic positions of
the parties on the constitutionality of the "Pork Barrel System." Also, the questions in these
consolidated cases are ripe for adjudication since the challenged funds and the provisions
allowing for their utilization such as the 2013 GAA for the PDAF, PD 910 for the Malampaya
Funds and PD 1869, as amended by PD 1993, for the Presidential Social Fund are currently
existing and operational; hence, there exists an immediate or threatened injury to petitioners as a
result of the unconstitutional use of these public funds.
As for the PDAF, the Court must dispel the notion that the issues related thereto had been
rendered moot and academic by the reforms undertaken by respondents. A case becomes moot
when there is no more actual controversy between the parties or no useful purpose can be served
in passing upon the merits.125 Differing from this description, the Court observes that
respondents proposed line-item budgeting scheme would not terminate the controversy nor
diminish the useful purpose for its resolution since said reform is geared towards the 2014
budget, and not the 2013 PDAF Article which, being a distinct subject matter, remains legally
effective and existing. Neither will the Presidents declaration that he had already "abolished the
PDAF" render the issues on PDAF moot precisely because the Executive branch of government
has no constitutional authority to nullify or annul its legal existence. By constitutional design, the
annulment or nullification of a law may be done either by Congress, through the passage of a
repealing law, or by the Court, through a declaration of unconstitutionality. Instructive on this
point is the following exchange between Associate Justice Antonio T. Carpio (Justice Carpio)
and the Solicitor General during the Oral Arguments:126
Justice Carpio: The President has taken an oath to faithfully execute the law, 127 correct? Solicitor
General Jardeleza: Yes, Your Honor.
Justice Carpio: And so the President cannot refuse to implement the General Appropriations Act,
correct?
Solicitor General Jardeleza: Well, that is our answer, Your Honor. In the case, for example of the
PDAF, the President has a duty to execute the laws but in the face of the outrage over PDAF, the
President was saying, "I am not sure that I will continue the release of the soft projects," and that
started, Your Honor. Now, whether or not that (interrupted)
Justice Carpio: Yeah. I will grant the President if there are anomalies in the project, he has the
power to stop the releases in the meantime, to investigate, and that is Section 38 of Chapter 5 of
Book 6 of the Revised Administrative Code128 x x x. So at most the President can suspend, now if
the President believes that the PDAF is unconstitutional, can he just refuse to implement it?
Solicitor General Jardeleza: No, Your Honor, as we were trying to say in the specific case of the
PDAF because of the CoA Report, because of the reported irregularities and this Court can take
judicial notice, even outside, outside of the COA Report, you have the report of the whistleblowers, the President was just exercising precisely the duty .
xxxx
Justice Carpio: Yes, and that is correct. Youve seen the CoA Report, there are anomalies, you
stop and investigate, and prosecute, he has done that. But, does that mean that PDAF has been
repealed?
Solicitor General Jardeleza: No, Your Honor x x x.
xxxx
Justice Carpio: So that PDAF can be legally abolished only in two (2) cases. Congress passes a
law to repeal it, or this Court declares it unconstitutional, correct?
Solictor General Jardeleza: Yes, Your Honor.
Justice Carpio: The President has no power to legally abolish PDAF. (Emphases supplied)
Even on the assumption of mootness, jurisprudence, nevertheless, dictates that "the moot and
academic principle is not a magical formula that can automatically dissuade the Court in
resolving a case." The Court will decide cases, otherwise moot, if: first, there is a grave violation
of the Constitution; second, the exceptional character of the situation and the paramount public
interest is involved; third, when the constitutional issue raised requires formulation of controlling
principles to guide the bench, the bar, and the public; and fourth, the case is capable of repetition
yet evading review.129
The applicability of the first exception is clear from the fundamental posture of petitioners they
essentially allege grave violations of the Constitution with respect to, inter alia, the principles of
separation of powers, non-delegability of legislative power, checks and balances, accountability
and local autonomy.
The applicability of the second exception is also apparent from the nature of the interests
involved
the constitutionality of the very system within which significant amounts of public funds have
been and continue to be utilized and expended undoubtedly presents a situation of exceptional
character as well as a matter of paramount public interest. The present petitions, in fact, have
been lodged at a time when the systems flaws have never before been magnified. To the Courts
mind, the coalescence of the CoA Report, the accounts of numerous whistle-blowers, and the
governments own recognition that reforms are needed "to address the reported abuses of the
PDAF"130 demonstrates a prima facie pattern of abuse which only underscores the importance of
the matter. It is also by this finding that the Court finds petitioners claims as not merely
theorized, speculative or hypothetical. Of note is the weight accorded by the Court to the
findings made by the CoA which is the constitutionally-mandated audit arm of the government.
In Delos Santos v. CoA,131 a recent case wherein the Court upheld the CoAs disallowance of
irregularly disbursed PDAF funds, it was emphasized that:
The COA is endowed with enough latitude to determine, prevent, and disallow irregular,
unnecessary, excessive, extravagant or unconscionable expenditures of government funds. It is
tasked to be vigilant and conscientious in safeguarding the proper use of the government's, and
ultimately the people's, property. The exercise of its general audit power is among the
constitutional mechanisms that gives life to the check and balance system inherent in our form of
government.
It is the general policy of the Court to sustain the decisions of administrative authorities,
especially one which is constitutionally-created, such as the CoA, not only on the basis of the
doctrine of separation of powers but also for their presumed expertise in the laws they are
entrusted to enforce. Findings of administrative agencies are accorded not only respect but also
finality when the decision and order are not tainted with unfairness or arbitrariness that would
amount to grave abuse of discretion. It is only when the CoA has acted without or in excess of
jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction, that
this Court entertains a petition questioning its rulings. x x x. (Emphases supplied)
Thus, if only for the purpose of validating the existence of an actual and justiciable controversy
in these cases, the Court deems the findings under the CoA Report to be sufficient.
The Court also finds the third exception to be applicable largely due to the practical need for a
definitive ruling on the systems constitutionality. As disclosed during the Oral Arguments, the
CoA Chairperson estimates that thousands of notices of disallowances will be issued by her
office in connection with the findings made in the CoA Report. In this relation, Associate Justice
Marvic Mario Victor F. Leonen (Justice Leonen) pointed out that all of these would eventually
find their way to the courts.132 Accordingly, there is a compelling need to formulate controlling
principles relative to the issues raised herein in order to guide the bench, the bar, and the public,
not just for the expeditious resolution of the anticipated disallowance cases, but more
importantly, so that the government may be guided on how public funds should be utilized in
accordance with constitutional principles.
Finally, the application of the fourth exception is called for by the recognition that the
preparation and passage of the national budget is, by constitutional imprimatur, an affair of
annual occurrence.133 The relevance of the issues before the Court does not cease with the
passage of a "PDAF -free budget for 2014." 134 The evolution of the "Pork Barrel System," by its
multifarious iterations throughout the course of history, lends a semblance of truth to petitioners
claim that "the same dog will just resurface wearing a different collar." 135 In Sanlakas v.
Executive Secretary,136 the government had already backtracked on a previous course of action
yet the Court used the "capable of repetition but evading review" exception in order "to prevent
similar questions from re- emerging."137The situation similarly holds true to these cases. Indeed,
the myriad of issues underlying the manner in which certain public funds are spent, if not
resolved at this most opportune time, are capable of repetition and hence, must not evade judicial
review.
B. Matters of Policy: the Political Question Doctrine.
The "limitation on the power of judicial review to actual cases and controversies carries the
assurance that "the courts will not intrude into areas committed to the other branches of
government."138 Essentially, the foregoing limitation is a restatement of the political question

doctrine which, under the classic formulation of Baker v. Carr, 139applies when there is found,
among others, "a textually demonstrable constitutional commitment of the issue to a coordinate
political department," "a lack of judicially discoverable and manageable standards for resolving
it" or "the impossibility of deciding without an initial policy determination of a kind clearly for
non- judicial discretion." Cast against this light, respondents submit that the "the political
branches are in the best position not only to perform budget-related reforms but also to do them
in response to the specific demands of their constituents" and, as such, "urge the Court not to
impose a solution at this stage."140
The Court must deny respondents submission.
Suffice it to state that the issues raised before the Court do not present political but legal
questions which are within its province to resolve. A political question refers to "those questions
which, under the Constitution, are to be decided by the people in their sovereign capacity, or in
regard to which full discretionary authority has been delegated to the Legislature or executive
branch of the Government. It is concerned with issues dependent upon the wisdom, not legality,
of a particular measure."141 The intrinsic constitutionality of the "Pork Barrel System" is not an
issue dependent upon the wisdom of the political branches of government but rather a legal one
which the Constitution itself has commanded the Court to act upon. Scrutinizing the contours of
the system along constitutional lines is a task that the political branches of government are
incapable of rendering precisely because it is an exercise of judicial power. More importantly, the
present Constitution has not only vested the Judiciary the right to exercise judicial power but
essentially makes it a duty to proceed therewith. Section 1, Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution
cannot be any clearer: "The judicial power shall be vested in one Supreme Court and in such
lower courts as may be established by law. It includes the duty of the courts of justice to settle
actual controversies involving rights which are legally demandable and enforceable, and to
determine whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess
of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the Government." In Estrada v.
Desierto,142 the expanded concept of judicial power under the 1987 Constitution and its effect on
the political question doctrine was explained as follows:143
To a great degree, the 1987 Constitution has narrowed the reach of the political question doctrine
when it expanded the power of judicial review of this court not only to settle actual controversies
involving rights which are legally demandable and enforceable but also to determine whether or
not there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the
part of any branch or instrumentality of government. Heretofore, the judiciary has focused on the
"thou shalt not's" of the Constitution directed against the exercise of its jurisdiction. With the
new provision, however, courts are given a greater prerogative to determine what it can do to
prevent grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any
branch or instrumentality of government. Clearly, the new provision did not just grant the Court
power of doing nothing. x x x (Emphases supplied)
It must also be borne in mind that when the judiciary mediates to allocate constitutional
boundaries, it does not assert any superiority over the other departments; does not in reality
nullify or invalidate an act of the legislature or the executive, but only asserts the solemn and
sacred obligation assigned to it by the Constitution." 144 To a great extent, the Court is laudably
cognizant of the reforms undertaken by its co-equal branches of government. But it is by
constitutional force that the Court must faithfully perform its duty. Ultimately, it is the Courts
avowed intention that a resolution of these cases would not arrest or in any manner impede the
endeavors of the two other branches but, in fact, help ensure that the pillars of change are erected
on firm constitutional grounds. After all, it is in the best interest of the people that each great
branch of government, within its own sphere, contributes its share towards achieving a holistic
and genuine solution to the problems of society. For all these reasons, the Court cannot heed
respondents plea for judicial restraint.
C. Locus Standi.
"The gist of the question of standing is whether a party alleges such personal stake in the
outcome of the controversy as to assure that concrete adverseness which sharpens the
presentation of issues upon which the court depends for illumination of difficult constitutional
questions. Unless a person is injuriously affected in any of his constitutional rights by the
operation of statute or ordinance, he has no standing."145
Petitioners have come before the Court in their respective capacities as citizen-taxpayers and
accordingly, assert that they "dutifully contribute to the coffers of the National
Treasury."146 Clearly, as taxpayers, they possess the requisite standing to question the validity of
the existing "Pork Barrel System" under which the taxes they pay have been and continue to be
utilized. It is undeniable that petitioners, as taxpayers, are bound to suffer from the
unconstitutional usage of public funds, if the Court so rules. Invariably, taxpayers have been
allowed to sue where there is a claim that public funds are illegally disbursed or that public
money is being deflected to any improper purpose, or that public funds are wasted through the
enforcement of an invalid or unconstitutional law,147 as in these cases.
Moreover, as citizens, petitioners have equally fulfilled the standing requirement given that the
issues they have raised may be classified as matters "of transcendental importance, of
overreaching significance to society, or of paramount public interest."148 The CoA Chairpersons
statement during the Oral Arguments that the present controversy involves "not merely a systems
failure" but a "complete breakdown of controls" 149 amplifies, in addition to the matters abovediscussed, the seriousness of the issues involved herein. Indeed, of greater import than the
damage caused by the illegal expenditure of public funds is the mortal wound inflicted upon the
fundamental law by the enforcement of an invalid statute. 150 All told, petitioners have sufficient
locus standi to file the instant cases.
D. Res Judicata and Stare Decisis.
Res judicata (which means a "matter adjudged") and stare decisis non quieta et movere (or
simply, stare decisis which means "follow past precedents and do not disturb what has been
settled") are general procedural law principles which both deal with the effects of previous but
factually similar dispositions to subsequent cases. For the cases at bar, the Court examines the
applicability of these principles in relation to its prior rulings in Philconsa and LAMP.
The focal point of res judicata is the judgment. The principle states that a judgment on the merits
in a previous case rendered by a court of competent jurisdiction would bind a subsequent case if,
between the first and second actions, there exists an identity of parties, of subject matter, and of
causes of action.151 This required identity is not, however, attendant hereto since Philconsa and
LAMP, respectively involved constitutional challenges against the 1994 CDF Article and 2004
PDAF Article, whereas the cases at bar call for a broader constitutional scrutiny of the entire
"Pork Barrel System." Also, the ruling in LAMP is essentially a dismissal based on a procedural
technicality and, thus, hardly a judgment on the merits in that petitioners therein failed to
present any "convincing proof x x x showing that, indeed, there were direct releases of funds to
the Members of Congress, who actually spend them according to their sole discretion" or
"pertinent evidentiary support to demonstrate the illegal misuse of PDAF in the form of
kickbacks and has become a common exercise of unscrupulous Members of Congress." As such,
the Court up held, in view of the presumption of constitutionality accorded to every law, the
2004 PDAF Article, and saw "no need to review or reverse the standing pronouncements in the
said case." Hence, for the foregoing reasons, the res judicata principle, insofar as the Philconsa
and LAMP cases are concerned, cannot apply.
On the other hand, the focal point of stare decisis is the doctrine created. The principle,
entrenched under Article 8152 of the Civil Code, evokes the general rule that, for the sake of
certainty, a conclusion reached in one case should be doctrinally applied to those that follow if
the facts are substantially the same, even though the parties may be different. It proceeds from
the first principle of justice that, absent any powerful countervailing considerations, like cases
ought to be decided alike. Thus, where the same questions relating to the same event have been
put forward by the parties similarly situated as in a previous case litigated and decided by a
competent court, the rule of stare decisis is a bar to any attempt to re-litigate the same issue.153
Philconsa was the first case where a constitutional challenge against a Pork Barrel provision, i.e.,
the 1994 CDF Article, was resolved by the Court. To properly understand its context, petitioners
posturing was that "the power given to the Members of Congress to propose and identify projects
and activities to be funded by the CDF is an encroachment by the legislature on executive power,
since said power in an appropriation act is in implementation of the law" and that "the proposal
and identification of the projects do not involve the making of laws or the repeal and amendment
thereof, the only function given to the Congress by the Constitution." 154 In deference to the
foregoing submissions, the Court reached the following main conclusions: one, under the
Constitution, the power of appropriation, or the "power of the purse," belongs to Congress; two,
the power of appropriation carries with it the power to specify the project or activity to be funded
under the appropriation law and it can be detailed and as broad as Congress wants it to be; and,
three, the proposals and identifications made by Members of Congress are merely
recommendatory. At once, it is apparent that the Philconsa resolution was a limited response to a
separation of powers problem, specifically on the propriety of conferring post-enactment
identification authority to Members of Congress. On the contrary, the present cases call for a
more holistic examination of (a) the inter-relation between the CDF and PDAF Articles with
each other, formative as they are of the entire "Pork Barrel System" as well as (b) the intrarelation of post-enactment measures contained within a particular CDF or PDAF Article,
including not only those related to the area of project identification but also to the areas of fund
release and realignment. The complexity of the issues and the broader legal analyses herein
warranted may be, therefore, considered as a powerful countervailing reason against a wholesale
application of the stare decisis principle.
In addition, the Court observes that the Philconsa ruling was actually riddled with inherent
constitutional inconsistencies which similarly countervail against a full resort to stare decisis. As
may be deduced from the main conclusions of the case, Philconsas fundamental premise in
allowing Members of Congress to propose and identify of projects would be that the said
identification authority is but an aspect of the power of appropriation which has been
constitutionally lodged in Congress. From this premise, the contradictions may be easily seen. If
the authority to identify projects is an aspect of appropriation and the power of appropriation is a
form of legislative power thereby lodged in Congress, then it follows that: (a) it is Congress
which should exercise such authority, and not its individual Members; (b) such authority must be
exercised within the prescribed procedure of law passage and, hence, should not be exercised
after the GAA has already been passed; and (c) such authority, as embodied in the GAA, has the
force of law and, hence, cannot be merely recommendatory. Justice Vitugs Concurring Opinion
in the same case sums up the Philconsa quandary in this wise: "Neither would it be objectionable
for Congress, by law, to appropriate funds for such specific projects as it may be minded; to give
that authority, however, to the individual members of Congress in whatever guise, I am afraid,
would be constitutionally impermissible." As the Court now largely benefits from hindsight and
current findings on the matter, among others, the CoA Report, the Court must partially abandon
its previous ruling in Philconsa insofar as it validated the post-enactment identification authority
of Members of Congress on the guise that the same was merely recommendatory. This postulate
raises serious constitutional inconsistencies which cannot be simply excused on the ground that
such mechanism is "imaginative as it is innovative." Moreover, it must be pointed out that the
recent case of Abakada Guro Party List v. Purisima 155 (Abakada) has effectively overturned
Philconsas allowance of post-enactment legislator participation in view of the separation of
powers principle. These constitutional inconsistencies and the Abakada rule will be discussed in
greater detail in the ensuing section of this Decision.
As for LAMP, suffice it to restate that the said case was dismissed on a procedural technicality
and, hence, has not set any controlling doctrine susceptible of current application to the
substantive issues in these cases. In fine, stare decisis would not apply.
II. Substantive Issues.
A. Definition of Terms.
Before the Court proceeds to resolve the substantive issues of these cases, it must first define the
terms "Pork Barrel System," "Congressional Pork Barrel," and "Presidential Pork Barrel" as they
are essential to the ensuing discourse.
Petitioners define the term "Pork Barrel System" as the "collusion between the Legislative and
Executive branches of government to accumulate lump-sum public funds in their offices with
unchecked discretionary powers to determine its distribution as political largesse." 156 They assert
that the following elements make up the Pork Barrel System: (a) lump-sum funds are allocated
through the appropriations process to an individual officer; (b) the officer is given sole and broad
discretion in determining how the funds will be used or expended; (c) the guidelines on how to
spend or use the funds in the appropriation are either vague, overbroad or inexistent; and (d)
projects funded are intended to benefit a definite constituency in a particular part of the country
and to help the political careers of the disbursing official by yielding rich patronage
benefits.157 They further state that the Pork Barrel System is comprised of two (2) kinds of
discretionary public funds: first, the Congressional (or Legislative) Pork Barrel, currently known
as the PDAF;158 and, second, the Presidential (or Executive) Pork Barrel, specifically, the
Malampaya Funds under PD 910 and the Presidential Social Fund under PD 1869, as amended
by PD 1993.159
Considering petitioners submission and in reference to its local concept and legal history, the
Court defines the Pork Barrel System as the collective body of rules and practices that govern the
manner by which lump-sum, discretionary funds, primarily intended for local projects, are
utilized through the respective participations of the Legislative and Executive branches of
government, including its members. The Pork Barrel System involves two (2) kinds of lump-sum
discretionary funds:
First, there is the Congressional Pork Barrel which is herein defined as a kind of lump-sum,
discretionary fund wherein legislators, either individually or collectively organized into
committees, are able to effectively control certain aspects of the funds utilization through
various post-enactment measures and/or practices. In particular, petitioners consider the PDAF,
as it appears under the 2013 GAA, as Congressional Pork Barrel since it is, inter alia, a postenactment measure that allows individual legislators to wield a collective power;160 and
Second, there is the Presidential Pork Barrel which is herein defined as a kind of lump-sum,
discretionary fund which allows the President to determine the manner of its utilization. For
reasons earlier stated,161 the Court shall delimit the use of such term to refer only to the
Malampaya Funds and the Presidential Social Fund.
With these definitions in mind, the Court shall now proceed to discuss the substantive issues of
these cases.
B. Substantive Issues on the Congressional Pork Barrel.
1. Separation of Powers.
a. Statement of Principle.
The principle of separation of powers refers to the constitutional demarcation of the three
fundamental powers of government. In the celebrated words of Justice Laurel in Angara v.
Electoral Commission,162 it means that the "Constitution has blocked out with deft strokes and in
bold lines, allotment of power to the executive, the legislative and the judicial departments of the
government."163 To the legislative branch of government, through Congress, 164 belongs the power
to make laws; to the executive branch of government, through the President, 165belongs the power
to enforce laws; and to the judicial branch of government, through the Court, 166 belongs the
power to interpret laws. Because the three great powers have been, by constitutional design,
ordained in this respect, "each department of the government has exclusive cognizance of
matters within its jurisdiction, and is supreme within its own sphere." 167 Thus, "the legislature has
no authority to execute or construe the law, the executive has no authority to make or construe
the law, and the judiciary has no power to make or execute the law." 168 The principle of
separation of powers and its concepts of autonomy and independence stem from the notion that
the powers of government must be divided to avoid concentration of these powers in any one
branch; the division, it is hoped, would avoid any single branch from lording its power over the
other branches or the citizenry.169 To achieve this purpose, the divided power must be wielded by
co-equal branches of government that are equally capable of independent action in exercising
their respective mandates. Lack of independence would result in the inability of one branch of
government to check the arbitrary or self-interest assertions of another or others.170
Broadly speaking, there is a violation of the separation of powers principle when one branch of
government unduly encroaches on the domain of another. US Supreme Court decisions instruct
that the principle of separation of powers may be violated in two (2) ways: firstly, "one branch
may interfere impermissibly with the others performance of its constitutionally assigned
function";171 and "alternatively, the doctrine may be violated when one branch assumes a function
that more properly is entrusted to another."172 In other words, there is a violation of the principle
when there is impermissible (a) interference with and/or (b) assumption of another departments
functions.
The enforcement of the national budget, as primarily contained in the GAA, is indisputably a
function both constitutionally assigned and properly entrusted to the Executive branch of
government. In Guingona, Jr. v. Hon. Carague 173 (Guingona, Jr.), the Court explained that the
phase of budget execution "covers the various operational aspects of budgeting" and accordingly
includes "the evaluation of work and financial plans for individual activities," the "regulation and
release of funds" as well as all "other related activities" that comprise the budget execution
cycle.174 This is rooted in the principle that the allocation of power in the three principal branches
of government is a grant of all powers inherent in them. 175 Thus, unless the Constitution provides
otherwise, the Executive department should exclusively exercise all roles and prerogatives which
go into the implementation of the national budget as provided under the GAA as well as any
other appropriation law.
In view of the foregoing, the Legislative branch of government, much more any of its members,
should not cross over the field of implementing the national budget since, as earlier stated, the
same is properly the domain of the Executive. Again, in Guingona, Jr., the Court stated that
"Congress enters the picture when it deliberates or acts on the budget proposals of the President.
Thereafter, Congress, "in the exercise of its own judgment and wisdom, formulates an
appropriation act precisely following the process established by the Constitution, which specifies
that no money may be paid from the Treasury except in accordance with an appropriation made
by law." Upon approval and passage of the GAA, Congress law -making role necessarily comes
to an end and from there the Executives role of implementing the national budget begins. So as
not to blur the constitutional boundaries between them, Congress must "not concern it self with
details for implementation by the Executive."176
The foregoing cardinal postulates were definitively enunciated in Abakada where the Court held
that "from the moment the law becomes effective, any provision of law that empowers Congress
or any of its members to play any role in the implementation or enforcement of the law violates
the principle of separation of powers and is thus unconstitutional." 177 It must be clarified,
however, that since the restriction only pertains to "any role in the implementation or
enforcement of the law," Congress may still exercise its oversight function which is a mechanism
of checks and balances that the Constitution itself allows. But it must be made clear that
Congress role must be confined to mere oversight. Any post-enactment-measure allowing
legislator participation beyond oversight is bereft of any constitutional basis and hence,
tantamount to impermissible interference and/or assumption of executive functions. As the Court
ruled in Abakada:178
Any post-enactment congressional measure x x x should be limited to scrutiny and

investigation.1wphi1 In particular, congressional oversight must be confined to the following:
(1) scrutiny based primarily on Congress power of appropriation and the budget hearings
conducted in connection with it, its power to ask heads of departments to appear before
and be heard by either of its Houses on any matter pertaining to their departments and its
power of confirmation; and
(2) investigation and monitoring of the implementation of laws pursuant to the power of
Congress to conduct inquiries in aid of legislation.
Any action or step beyond that will undermine the separation of powers guaranteed by the
Constitution. (Emphases supplied)
b. Application.
In these cases, petitioners submit that the Congressional Pork Barrel among others, the 2013
PDAF Article "wrecks the assignment of responsibilities between the political branches" as it is
designed to allow individual legislators to interfere "way past the time it should have ceased" or,
particularly, "after the GAA is passed."179 They state that the findings and recommendations in
the CoA Report provide "an illustration of how absolute and definitive the power of legislators
wield over project implementation in complete violation of the constitutional principle of
separation of powers."180 Further, they point out that the Court in the Philconsa case only allowed
the CDF to exist on the condition that individual legislators limited their role to recommending
projects and not if they actually dictate their implementation.181
For their part, respondents counter that the separations of powers principle has not been violated
since the President maintains "ultimate authority to control the execution of the GAA and that
he "retains the final discretion to reject" the legislators proposals. 182 They maintain that the
Court, in Philconsa, "upheld the constitutionality of the power of members of Congress to
propose and identify projects so long as such proposal and identification are
recommendatory."183 As such, they claim that "everything in the Special Provisions [of the 2013
PDAF Article follows the Philconsa framework, and hence, remains constitutional."184
The Court rules in favor of petitioners.
As may be observed from its legal history, the defining feature of all forms of Congressional
Pork Barrel would be the authority of legislators to participate in the post-enactment phases of
project implementation.
At its core, legislators may it be through project lists, 185 prior consultations186 or program
menus187 have been consistently accorded post-enactment authority to identify the projects they
desire to be funded through various Congressional Pork Barrel allocations. Under the 2013
PDAF Article, the statutory authority of legislators to identify projects post-GAA may be
construed from the import of Special Provisions 1 to 3 as well as the second paragraph of Special
Provision 4. To elucidate, Special Provision 1 embodies the program menu feature which, as
evinced from past PDAF Articles, allows individual legislators to identify PDAF projects for as
long as the identified project falls under a general program listed in the said menu. Relatedly,
Special Provision 2 provides that the implementing agencies shall, within 90 days from the GAA
is passed, submit to Congress a more detailed priority list, standard or design prepared and
submitted by implementing agencies from which the legislator may make his choice. The same
provision further authorizes legislators to identify PDAF projects outside his district for as long
as the representative of the district concerned concurs in writing. Meanwhile, Special Provision 3
clarifies that PDAF projects refer to "projects to be identified by legislators" 188 and thereunder
provides the allocation limit for the total amount of projects identified by each legislator. Finally,
paragraph 2 of Special Provision 4 requires that any modification and revision of the project
identification "shall be submitted to the House Committee on Appropriations and the Senate
Committee on Finance for favorable endorsement to the DBM or the implementing agency, as
the case may be." From the foregoing special provisions, it cannot be seriously doubted that
legislators have been accorded post-enactment authority to identify PDAF projects.
Aside from the area of project identification, legislators have also been accorded post-enactment
authority in the areas of fund release and realignment. Under the 2013 PDAF Article, the
statutory authority of legislators to participate in the area of fund release through congressional
committees is contained in Special Provision 5 which explicitly states that "all request for release
of funds shall be supported by the documents prescribed under Special Provision No. 1 and
favorably endorsed by House Committee on Appropriations and the Senate Committee on
Finance, as the case may be"; while their statutory authority to participate in the area of fund
realignment is contained in: first , paragraph 2, Special Provision 4 189 which explicitly state s,
among others, that "any realignment of funds shall be submitted to the House Committee on
Appropriations and the Senate Committee on Finance for favorable endorsement to the DBM or
the implementing agency, as the case may be ; and, second , paragraph 1, also of Special
Provision 4 which authorizes the "Secretaries of Agriculture, Education, Energy, Interior and
Local Government, Labor and Employment, Public Works and Highways, Social Welfare and
Development and Trade and Industry190 x x x to approve realignment from one project/scope to
another within the allotment received from this Fund, subject to among others (iii) the request is
with the concurrence of the legislator concerned."
Clearly, these post-enactment measures which govern the areas of project identification, fund
release and fund realignment are not related to functions of congressional oversight and, hence,
allow legislators to intervene and/or assume duties that properly belong to the sphere of budget
execution. Indeed, by virtue of the foregoing, legislators have been, in one form or another,
authorized to participate in as Guingona, Jr. puts it "the various operational aspects of
budgeting," including "the evaluation of work and financial plans for individual activities" and
the "regulation and release of funds" in violation of the separation of powers principle. The
fundamental rule, as categorically articulated in Abakada, cannot be overstated from the
moment the law becomes effective, any provision of law that empowers Congress or any of its
members to play any role in the implementation or enforcement of the law violates the principle
of separation of powers and is thus unconstitutional. 191 That the said authority is treated as
merely recommendatory in nature does not alter its unconstitutional tenor since the prohibition,
to repeat, covers any role in the implementation or enforcement of the law. Towards this end, the
Court must therefore abandon its ruling in Philconsa which sanctioned the conduct of legislator
identification on the guise that the same is merely recommendatory and, as such, respondents
reliance on the same falters altogether.
Besides, it must be pointed out that respondents have nonetheless failed to substantiate their
position that the identification authority of legislators is only of recommendatory import. Quite
the contrary, respondents through the statements of the Solicitor General during the Oral
Arguments have admitted that the identification of the legislator constitutes a mandatory
requirement before his PDAF can be tapped as a funding source, thereby highlighting the
indispensability of the said act to the entire budget execution process:192
Justice Bernabe: Now, without the individual legislators identification of the project, can the
PDAF of the legislator be utilized?
Solicitor General Jardeleza: No, Your Honor.
Justice Bernabe: It cannot?
Solicitor General Jardeleza: It cannot (interrupted)
Justice Bernabe: So meaning you should have the identification of the project by the individual
legislator?
Solicitor General Jardeleza: Yes, Your Honor.

xxxx
Justice Bernabe: In short, the act of identification is mandatory?
Solictor General Jardeleza: Yes, Your Honor. In the sense that if it is not done and then there is
no identification.
xxxx
Justice Bernabe: Now, would you know of specific instances when a project was implemented
without the identification by the individual legislator?
Solicitor General Jardeleza: I do not know, Your Honor; I do not think so but I have no specific
examples. I would doubt very much, Your Honor, because to implement, there is a need for a
SARO and the NCA. And the SARO and the NCA are triggered by an identification from the
legislator.
xxxx
Solictor General Jardeleza: What we mean by mandatory, Your Honor, is we were replying to a
question, "How can a legislator make sure that he is able to get PDAF Funds?" It is mandatory in
the sense that he must identify, in that sense, Your Honor. Otherwise, if he does not identify, he
cannot avail of the PDAF Funds and his district would not be able to have PDAF Funds, only in
that sense, Your Honor. (Emphases supplied)
Thus, for all the foregoing reasons, the Court hereby declares the 2013 PDAF Article as well as
all other provisions of law which similarly allow legislators to wield any form of post-enactment
authority in the implementation or enforcement of the budget, unrelated to congressional
oversight, as violative of the separation of powers principle and thus unconstitutional. Corollary
thereto, informal practices, through which legislators have effectively intruded into the proper
phases of budget execution, must be deemed as acts of grave abuse of discretion amounting to
lack or excess of jurisdiction and, hence, accorded the same unconstitutional treatment. That
such informal practices do exist and have, in fact, been constantly observed throughout the years
has not been substantially disputed here. As pointed out by Chief Justice Maria Lourdes P.A.
Sereno (Chief Justice Sereno) during the Oral Arguments of these cases: 193
Chief Justice Sereno:
Now, from the responses of the representative of both, the DBM and two (2) Houses of
Congress, if we enforces the initial thought that I have, after I had seen the extent of this research
made by my staff, that neither the Executive nor Congress frontally faced the question of
constitutional compatibility of how they were engineering the budget process. In fact, the words
you have been using, as the three lawyers of the DBM, and both Houses of Congress has also
been using is surprise; surprised that all of these things are now surfacing. In fact, I thought that
what the 2013 PDAF provisions did was to codify in one section all the past practice that had
been done since 1991. In a certain sense, we should be thankful that they are all now in the
PDAF Special Provisions. x x x (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
Ultimately, legislators cannot exercise powers which they do not have, whether through formal
measures written into the law or informal practices institutionalized in government agencies, else
the Executive department be deprived of what the Constitution has vested as its own.
2. Non-delegability of Legislative Power.
a. Statement of Principle.
As an adjunct to the separation of powers principle,194 legislative power shall be exclusively

exercised by the body to which the Constitution has conferred the same. In particular, Section 1,
Article VI of the 1987 Constitution states that such power shall be vested in the Congress of the
Philippines which shall consist of a Senate and a House of Representatives, except to the extent
reserved to the people by the provision on initiative and referendum.195 Based on this provision, it
is clear that only Congress, acting as a bicameral body, and the people, through the process of
initiative and referendum, may constitutionally wield legislative power and no other. This
premise embodies the principle of non-delegability of legislative power, and the only recognized
exceptions thereto would be: (a) delegated legislative power to local governments which, by
immemorial practice, are allowed to legislate on purely local matters; 196 and (b) constitutionallygrafted exceptions such as the authority of the President to, by law, exercise powers necessary
and proper to carry out a declared national policy in times of war or other national
emergency,197 or fix within specified limits, and subject to such limitations and restrictions as
Congress may impose, tariff rates, import and export quotas, tonnage and wharfage dues, and
other duties or imposts within the framework of the national development program of the
Government.198
Notably, the principle of non-delegability should not be confused as a restriction to delegate rulemaking authority to implementing agencies for the limited purpose of either filling up the details
of the law for its enforcement (supplementary rule-making) or ascertaining facts to bring the law
into actual operation (contingent rule-making).199 The conceptual treatment and limitations of
delegated rule-making were explained in the case of People v. Maceren200 as follows:
The grant of the rule-making power to administrative agencies is a relaxation of the principle of
separation of powers and is an exception to the nondelegation of legislative powers.
Administrative regulations or "subordinate legislation" calculated to promote the public interest
are necessary because of "the growing complexity of modern life, the multiplication of the
subjects of governmental regulations, and the increased difficulty of administering the law."
xxxx
Nevertheless, it must be emphasized that the rule-making power must be confined to details for
regulating the mode or proceeding to carry into effect the law as it has been enacted. The power
cannot be extended to amending or expanding the statutory requirements or to embrace matters
not covered by the statute. Rules that subvert the statute cannot be sanctioned. (Emphases
supplied)
b. Application.
In the cases at bar, the Court observes that the 2013 PDAF Article, insofar as it confers postenactment identification authority to individual legislators, violates the principle of nondelegability since said legislators are effectively allowed to individually exercise the power of
appropriation, which as settled in Philconsa is lodged in Congress. 201 That the power to
appropriate must be exercised only through legislation is clear from Section 29(1), Article VI of
the 1987 Constitution which states that: "No money shall be paid out of the Treasury except in
pursuance of an appropriation made by law." To understand what constitutes an act of
appropriation, the Court, in Bengzon v. Secretary of Justice and Insular Auditor202 (Bengzon),
held that the power of appropriation involves (a) the setting apart by law of a certain sum from
the public revenue for (b) a specified purpose. Essentially, under the 2013 PDAF Article,
individual legislators are given a personal lump-sum fund from which they are able to dictate (a)
how much from such fund would go to (b) a specific project or beneficiary that they themselves
also determine. As these two (2) acts comprise the exercise of the power of appropriation as
described in Bengzon, and given that the 2013 PDAF Article authorizes individual legislators to
perform the same, undoubtedly, said legislators have been conferred the power to legislate which
the Constitution does not, however, allow. Thus, keeping with the principle of non-delegability
of legislative power, the Court hereby declares the 2013 PDAF Article, as well as all other forms
of Congressional Pork Barrel which contain the similar legislative identification feature as herein
discussed, as unconstitutional.
3. Checks and Balances.
a. Statement of Principle; Item-Veto Power.
The fact that the three great powers of government are intended to be kept separate and distinct
does not mean that they are absolutely unrestrained and independent of each other. The
Constitution has also provided for an elaborate system of checks and balances to secure
coordination in the workings of the various departments of the government.203
A prime example of a constitutional check and balance would be the Presidents power to veto an
item written into an appropriation, revenue or tariff bill submitted to him by Congress for
approval through a process known as "bill presentment." The Presidents item-veto power is
found in Section 27(2), Article VI of the 1987 Constitution which reads as follows:
Sec. 27. x x x.
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(2) The President shall have the power to veto any particular item or items in an appropriation,
revenue, or tariff bill, but the veto shall not affect the item or items to which he does not object.
The presentment of appropriation, revenue or tariff bills to the President, wherein he may
exercise his power of item-veto, forms part of the "single, finely wrought and exhaustively
considered, procedures" for law-passage as specified under the Constitution. 204 As stated in
Abakada, the final step in the law-making process is the "submission of the bill to the President
for approval. Once approved, it takes effect as law after the required publication."205
Elaborating on the Presidents item-veto power and its relevance as a check on the legislature,
the Court, in Bengzon, explained that:206
The former Organic Act and the present Constitution of the Philippines make the Chief
Executive an integral part of the law-making power. His disapproval of a bill, commonly known
as a veto, is essentially a legislative act. The questions presented to the mind of the Chief
Executive are precisely the same as those the legislature must determine in passing a bill, except
that his will be a broader point of view.
The Constitution is a limitation upon the power of the legislative department of the government,
but in this respect it is a grant of power to the executive department. The Legislature has the
affirmative power to enact laws; the Chief Executive has the negative power by the constitutional
exercise of which he may defeat the will of the Legislature. It follows that the Chief Executive
must find his authority in the Constitution. But in exercising that authority he may not be
confined to rules of strict construction or hampered by the unwise interference of the judiciary.
The courts will indulge every intendment in favor of the constitutionality of a veto in the same
manner as they will presume the constitutionality of an act as originally passed by the
Legislature. (Emphases supplied)
The justification for the Presidents item-veto power rests on a variety of policy goals such as to
prevent log-rolling legislation,207 impose fiscal restrictions on the legislature, as well as to fortify
the executive branchs role in the budgetary process.208 In Immigration and Naturalization
Service v. Chadha, the US Supreme Court characterized the Presidents item-power as "a
salutary check upon the legislative body, calculated to guard the community against the effects of
factions, precipitancy, or of any impulse unfriendly to the public good, which may happen to
influence a majority of that body"; phrased differently, it is meant to "increase the chances in
favor of the community against the passing of bad laws, through haste, inadvertence, or
design."209
For the President to exercise his item-veto power, it necessarily follows that there exists a proper
"item" which may be the object of the veto. An item, as defined in the field of appropriations,
pertains to "the particulars, the details, the distinct and severable parts of the appropriation or of
the bill." In the case of Bengzon v. Secretary of Justice of the Philippine Islands, 210 the US
Supreme Court characterized an item of appropriation as follows:
An item of an appropriation bill obviously means an item which, in itself, is a specific
appropriation of money, not some general provision of law which happens to be put into an
appropriation bill. (Emphases supplied)
On this premise, it may be concluded that an appropriation bill, to ensure that the President may
be able to exercise his power of item veto, must contain "specific appropriations of money" and
not only "general provisions" which provide for parameters of appropriation.
Further, it is significant to point out that an item of appropriation must be an item characterized
by singular correspondence meaning an allocation of a specified singular amount for a
specified singular purpose, otherwise known as a "line-item." 211 This treatment not only allows
the item to be consistent with its definition as a "specific appropriation of money" but also
ensures that the President may discernibly veto the same. Based on the foregoing formulation,
the existing Calamity Fund, Contingent Fund and the Intelligence Fund, being appropriations
which state a specified amount for a specific purpose, would then be considered as "line- item"
appropriations which are rightfully subject to item veto. Likewise, it must be observed that an
appropriation may be validly apportioned into component percentages or values; however, it is
crucial that each percentage or value must be allocated for its own corresponding purpose for
such component to be considered as a proper line-item. Moreover, as Justice Carpio correctly
pointed out, a valid appropriation may even have several related purposes that are by accounting
and budgeting practice considered as one purpose, e.g., MOOE (maintenance and other operating
expenses), in which case the related purposes shall be deemed sufficiently specific for the
exercise of the Presidents item veto power. Finally, special purpose funds and discretionary
funds would equally square with the constitutional mechanism of item-veto for as long as they
follow the rule on singular correspondence as herein discussed. Anent special purpose funds, it
must be added that Section 25(4), Article VI of the 1987 Constitution requires that the "special
appropriations bill shall specify the purpose for which it is intended, and shall be supported by
funds actually available as certified by the National Treasurer, or t o be raised by a corresponding
revenue proposal therein." Meanwhile, with respect to discretionary funds, Section 2 5(6),
Article VI of the 1987 Constitution requires that said funds "shall be disbursed only for public
purposes to be supported by appropriate vouchers and subject to such guidelines as may be
prescribed by law."
In contrast, what beckons constitutional infirmity are appropriations which merely provide for a
singular lump-sum amount to be tapped as a source of funding for multiple purposes. Since such
appropriation type necessitates the further determination of both the actual amount to be
expended and the actual purpose of the appropriation which must still be chosen from the
multiple purposes stated in the law, it cannot be said that the appropriation law already indicates
a "specific appropriation of money and hence, without a proper line-item which the President
may veto. As a practical result, the President would then be faced with the predicament of either
vetoing the entire appropriation if he finds some of its purposes wasteful or undesirable, or
approving the entire appropriation so as not to hinder some of its legitimate purposes. Finally, it
may not be amiss to state that such arrangement also raises non-delegability issues considering
that the implementing authority would still have to determine, again, both the actual amount to
be expended and the actual purpose of the appropriation. Since the foregoing determinations
constitute the integral aspects of the power to appropriate, the implementing authority would, in
effect, be exercising legislative prerogatives in violation of the principle of non-delegability.
b. Application.
In these cases, petitioners claim that "in the current x x x system where the PDAF is a lump-sum
appropriation, the legislators identification of the projects after the passage of the GAA denies
the President the chance to veto that item later on."212 Accordingly, they submit that the "item
veto power of the President mandates that appropriations bills adopt line-item budgeting" and
that "Congress cannot choose a mode of budgeting which effectively renders the constitutionallygiven power of the President useless."213
On the other hand, respondents maintain that the text of the Constitution envisions a process
which is intended to meet the demands of a modernizing economy and, as such, lump-sum
appropriations are essential to financially address situations which are barely foreseen when a
GAA is enacted. They argue that the decision of the Congress to create some lump-sum
appropriations is constitutionally allowed and textually-grounded.214
The Court agrees with petitioners.
Under the 2013 PDAF Article, the amount of P24.79 Billion only appears as a collective
allocation limit since the said amount would be further divided among individual legislators who
would then receive personal lump-sum allocations and could, after the GAA is passed,
effectively appropriate PDAF funds based on their own discretion. As these intermediate
appropriations are made by legislators only after the GAA is passed and hence, outside of the
law, it necessarily means that the actual items of PDAF appropriation would not have been
written into the General Appropriations Bill and thus effectuated without veto consideration. This
kind of lump-sum/post-enactment legislative identification budgeting system fosters the creation
of a budget within a budget" which subverts the prescribed procedure of presentment and
consequently impairs the Presidents power of item veto. As petitioners aptly point out, the
above-described system forces the President to decide between (a) accepting the entire P24.79
Billion PDAF allocation without knowing the specific projects of the legislators, which may or
may not be consistent with his national agenda and (b) rejecting the whole PDAF to the
detriment of all other legislators with legitimate projects.215
Moreover, even without its post-enactment legislative identification feature, the 2013 PDAF
Article would remain constitutionally flawed since it would then operate as a prohibited form of
lump-sum appropriation above-characterized. In particular, the lump-sum amount of P24.79
Billion would be treated as a mere funding source allotted for multiple purposes of spending, i.e.,
scholarships, medical missions, assistance to indigents, preservation of historical materials,
construction of roads, flood control, etc. This setup connotes that the appropriation law leaves the
actual amounts and purposes of the appropriation for further determination and, therefore, does
not readily indicate a discernible item which may be subject to the Presidents power of item
veto.
In fact, on the accountability side, the same lump-sum budgeting scheme has, as the CoA
Chairperson relays, "limited state auditors from obtaining relevant data and information that
would aid in more stringently auditing the utilization of said Funds." 216 Accordingly, she
recommends the adoption of a "line by line budget or amount per proposed program, activity or
project, and per implementing agency."217
Hence, in view of the reasons above-stated, the Court finds the 2013 PDAF Article, as well as all
Congressional Pork Barrel Laws of similar operation, to be unconstitutional. That such budgeting
system provides for a greater degree of flexibility to account for future contingencies cannot be
an excuse to defeat what the Constitution requires. Clearly, the first and essential truth of the
matter is that unconstitutional means do not justify even commendable ends.218
c. Accountability.
Petitioners further relate that the system under which various forms of Congressional Pork Barrel
operate defies public accountability as it renders Congress incapable of checking itself or its
Members. In particular, they point out that the Congressional Pork Barrel "gives each legislator a
direct, financial interest in the smooth, speedy passing of the yearly budget" which turns them
"from fiscalizers" into "financially-interested partners."219 They also claim that the system has an
effect on re- election as "the PDAF excels in self-perpetuation of elective officials." Finally, they
add that the "PDAF impairs the power of impeachment" as such "funds are indeed quite useful,
to well, accelerate the decisions of senators."220
The Court agrees in part.
The aphorism forged under Section 1, Article XI of the 1987 Constitution, which states that
"public office is a public trust," is an overarching reminder that every instrumentality of
government should exercise their official functions only in accordance with the principles of the
Constitution which embodies the parameters of the peoples trust. The notion of a public trust
connotes accountability,221 hence, the various mechanisms in the Constitution which are designed
to exact accountability from public officers.
Among others, an accountability mechanism with which the proper expenditure of public funds
may be checked is the power of congressional oversight. As mentioned in
Abakada,222 congressional oversight may be performed either through: (a) scrutiny based
primarily on Congress power of appropriation and the budget hearings conducted in connection
with it, its power to ask heads of departments to appear before and be heard by either of its
Houses on any matter pertaining to their departments and its power of confirmation; 223 or (b)
investigation and monitoring of the implementation of laws pursuant to the power of Congress to
conduct inquiries in aid of legislation.224
The Court agrees with petitioners that certain features embedded in some forms of Congressional
Pork Barrel, among others the 2013 PDAF Article, has an effect on congressional oversight. The
fact that individual legislators are given post-enactment roles in the implementation of the budget
makes it difficult for them to become disinterested "observers" when scrutinizing, investigating
or monitoring the implementation of the appropriation law. To a certain extent, the conduct of
oversight would be tainted as said legislators, who are vested with post-enactment authority,
would, in effect, be checking on activities in which they themselves participate. Also, it must be
pointed out that this very same concept of post-enactment authorization runs afoul of Section 14,
Article VI of the 1987 Constitution which provides that:
Sec. 14. No Senator or Member of the House of Representatives may personally appear as
counsel before any court of justice or before the Electoral Tribunals, or quasi-judicial and other
administrative bodies. Neither shall he, directly or indirectly, be interested financially in any
contract with, or in any franchise or special privilege granted by the Government, or any
subdivision, agency, or instrumentality thereof, including any government-owned or controlled
corporation, or its subsidiary, during his term of office. He shall not intervene in any matter
before any office of the Government for his pecuniary benefit or where he may be called upon to
act on account of his office. (Emphasis supplied)
Clearly, allowing legislators to intervene in the various phases of project implementation a
matter before another office of government renders them susceptible to taking undue advantage
of their own office.
The Court, however, cannot completely agree that the same post-enactment authority and/or the
individual legislators control of his PDAF per se would allow him to perpetuate himself in
office. Indeed, while the Congressional Pork Barrel and a legislators use thereof may be linked
to this area of interest, the use of his PDAF for re-election purposes is a matter which must be
analyzed based on particular facts and on a case-to-case basis.
Finally, while the Court accounts for the possibility that the close operational proximity between
legislators and the Executive department, through the formers post-enactment participation, may
affect the process of impeachment, this matter largely borders on the domain of politics and does
not strictly concern the Pork Barrel Systems intrinsic constitutionality. As such, it is an improper
subject of judicial assessment.
In sum, insofar as its post-enactment features dilute congressional oversight and violate Section
14, Article VI of the 1987 Constitution, thus impairing public accountability, the 2013 PDAF
Article and other forms of Congressional Pork Barrel of similar nature are deemed as
unconstitutional.
4. Political Dynasties.
One of the petitioners submits that the Pork Barrel System enables politicians who are members
of political dynasties to accumulate funds to perpetuate themselves in power, in contravention of
Section 26, Article II of the 1987 Constitution225 which states that:
Sec. 26. The State shall guarantee equal access to opportunities for public service, and prohibit
political dynasties as may be defined by law. (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
At the outset, suffice it to state that the foregoing provision is considered as not self-executing
due to the qualifying phrase "as may be defined by law." In this respect, said provision does not,
by and of itself, provide a judicially enforceable constitutional right but merely specifies
guideline for legislative or executive action.226Therefore, since there appears to be no standing
law which crystallizes the policy on political dynasties for enforcement, the Court must defer
from ruling on this issue.
In any event, the Court finds the above-stated argument on this score to be largely speculative
since it has not been properly demonstrated how the Pork Barrel System would be able to
propagate political dynasties.
5. Local Autonomy.
The States policy on local autonomy is principally stated in Section 25, Article II and Sections 2
and 3, Article X of the 1987 Constitution which read as follows:
ARTICLE II
Sec. 25. The State shall ensure the autonomy of local governments.
ARTICLE X
Sec. 2. The territorial and political subdivisions shall enjoy local autonomy.
Sec. 3. The Congress shall enact a local government code which shall provide for a more
responsive and accountable local government structure instituted through a system of
decentralization with effective mechanisms of recall, initiative, and referendum, allocate among
the different local government units their powers, responsibilities, and resources, and provide for
the qualifications, election, appointment and removal, term, salaries, powers and functions and
duties of local officials, and all other matters relating to the organization and operation of the
local units.
Pursuant thereto, Congress enacted RA 7160,227 otherwise known as the "Local Government
Code of 1991" (LGC), wherein the policy on local autonomy had been more specifically
explicated as follows:
Sec. 2. Declaration of Policy. (a) It is hereby declared the policy of the State that the territorial
and political subdivisions of the State shall enjoy genuine and meaningful local autonomy to
enable them to attain their fullest development as self-reliant communities and make them more
effective partners in the attainment of national goals. Toward this end, the State shall provide for
a more responsive and accountable local government structure instituted through a system of
decentralization whereby local government units shall be given more powers, authority,
responsibilities, and resources. The process of decentralization shall proceed from the National
Government to the local government units.
xxxx
(c) It is likewise the policy of the State to require all national agencies and offices to conduct
periodic consultations with appropriate local government units, nongovernmental and peoples
organizations, and other concerned sectors of the community before any project or program is
implemented in their respective jurisdictions. (Emphases and underscoring supplied)
The above-quoted provisions of the Constitution and the LGC reveal the policy of the State to
empower local government units (LGUs) to develop and ultimately, become self-sustaining and
effective contributors to the national economy. As explained by the Court in Philippine
Gamefowl Commission v. Intermediate Appellate Court:228
This is as good an occasion as any to stress the commitment of the Constitution to the policy of
local autonomy which is intended to provide the needed impetus and encouragement to the
development of our local political subdivisions as "self - reliant communities." In the words of
Jefferson, "Municipal corporations are the small republics from which the great one derives its
strength." The vitalization of local governments will enable their inhabitants to fully exploit their
resources and more important, imbue them with a deepened sense of involvement in public
affairs as members of the body politic. This objective could be blunted by undue interference by
the national government in purely local affairs which are best resolved by the officials and
inhabitants of such political units. The decision we reach today conforms not only to the letter of
the pertinent laws but also to the spirit of the Constitution. 229 (Emphases and underscoring
supplied)
In the cases at bar, petitioners contend that the Congressional Pork Barrel goes against the
constitutional principles on local autonomy since it allows district representatives, who are
national officers, to substitute their judgments in utilizing public funds for local
development.230 The Court agrees with petitioners.
Philconsa described the 1994 CDF as an attempt "to make equal the unequal" and that "it is also
a recognition that individual members of Congress, far more than the President and their
congressional colleagues, are likely to be knowledgeable about the needs of their respective
constituents and the priority to be given each project." 231Drawing strength from this
pronouncement, previous legislators justified its existence by stating that "the relatively small
projects implemented under the Congressional Pork Barrel complement and link the national
development goals to the countryside and grassroots as well as to depressed areas which are
overlooked by central agencies which are preoccupied with mega-projects.232 Similarly, in his
August 23, 2013 speech on the "abolition" of PDAF and budgetary reforms, President Aquino
mentioned that the Congressional Pork Barrel was originally established for a worthy goal,
which is to enable the representatives to identify projects for communities that the LGU
concerned cannot afford.233
Notwithstanding these declarations, the Court, however, finds an inherent defect in the system
which actually belies the avowed intention of "making equal the unequal." In particular, the
Court observes that the gauge of PDAF and CDF allocation/division is based solely on the fact of
office, without taking into account the specific interests and peculiarities of the district the
legislator represents. In this regard, the allocation/division limits are clearly not based on genuine
parameters of equality, wherein economic or geographic indicators have been taken into
consideration. As a result, a district representative of a highly-urbanized metropolis gets the same

amount of funding as a district representative of a far-flung rural province which would be
relatively "underdeveloped" compared to the former. To add, what rouses graver scrutiny is that
even Senators and Party-List Representatives and in some years, even the Vice-President who
do not represent any locality, receive funding from the Congressional Pork Barrel as well. These
certainly are anathema to the Congressional Pork Barrels original intent which is "to make equal
the unequal." Ultimately, the PDAF and CDF had become personal funds under the effective
control of each legislator and given unto them on the sole account of their office.
The Court also observes that this concept of legislator control underlying the CDF and PDAF
conflicts with the functions of the various Local Development Councils (LDCs) which are
already legally mandated to "assist the corresponding sanggunian in setting the direction of
economic and social development, and coordinating development efforts within its territorial
jurisdiction."234 Considering that LDCs are instrumentalities whose functions are essentially
geared towards managing local affairs,235 their programs, policies and resolutions should not be
overridden nor duplicated by individual legislators, who are national officers that have no lawmaking authority except only when acting as a body. The undermining effect on local autonomy
caused by the post-enactment authority conferred to the latter was succinctly put by petitioners in
the following wise:236
With PDAF, a Congressman can simply bypass the local development council and initiate
projects on his own, and even take sole credit for its execution. Indeed, this type of personalitydriven project identification has not only contributed little to the overall development of the
district, but has even contributed to "further weakening infrastructure planning and coordination
efforts of the government."
Thus, insofar as individual legislators are authorized to intervene in purely local matters and
thereby subvert genuine local autonomy, the 2013 PDAF Article as well as all other similar
forms of Congressional Pork Barrel is deemed unconstitutional.
With this final issue on the Congressional Pork Barrel resolved, the Court now turns to the
substantive issues involving the Presidential Pork Barrel.
C. Substantive Issues on the Presidential Pork Barrel.
1. Validity of Appropriation.
Petitioners preliminarily assail Section 8 of PD 910 and Section 12 of PD1869 (now, amended by
PD 1993), which respectively provide for the Malampaya Funds and the Presidential Social
Fund, as invalid appropriations laws since they do not have the "primary and specific" purpose of
authorizing the release of public funds from the National Treasury. Petitioners submit that
Section 8 of PD 910 is not an appropriation law since the "primary and specific purpose of PD
910 is the creation of an Energy Development Board and Section 8 thereof only created a Special
Fund incidental thereto.237 In similar regard, petitioners argue that Section 12 of PD 1869 is
neither a valid appropriations law since the allocation of the Presidential Social Fund is merely
incidental to the "primary and specific" purpose of PD 1869 which is the amendment of the
Franchise and Powers of PAGCOR.238 In view of the foregoing, petitioners suppose that such
funds are being used without any valid law allowing for their proper appropriation in violation of
Section 29(1), Article VI of the 1987 Constitution which states that: "No money shall be paid out
of the Treasury except in pursuance of an appropriation made by law."239
The Court disagrees.
"An appropriation made by law under the contemplation of Section 29(1), Article VI of the 1987
Constitution exists when a provision of law (a) sets apart a determinate or
determinable240 amount of money and (b) allocates the same for a particular public purpose.
These two minimum designations of amount and purpose stem from the very definition of the
word "appropriation," which means "to allot, assign, set apart or apply to a particular use or
purpose," and hence, if written into the law, demonstrate that the legislative intent to appropriate
exists. As the Constitution "does not provide or prescribe any particular form of words or
religious recitals in which an authorization or appropriation by Congress shall be made, except
that it be made by law," an appropriation law may according to Philconsa be "detailed and
as broad as Congress wants it to be" for as long as the intent to appropriate may be gleaned from
the same. As held in the case of Guingona, Jr.:241
There is no provision in our Constitution that provides or prescribes any particular form of words
or religious recitals in which an authorization or appropriation by Congress shall be made, except
that it be "made by law," such as precisely the authorization or appropriation under the
questioned presidential decrees. In other words, in terms of time horizons, an appropriation may
be made impliedly (as by past but subsisting legislations) as well as expressly for the current
fiscal year (as by enactment of laws by the present Congress), just as said appropriation may be
made in general as well as in specific terms. The Congressional authorization may be embodied
in annual laws, such as a general appropriations act or in special provisions of laws of general or
special application which appropriate public funds for specific public purposes, such as the
questioned decrees. An appropriation measure is sufficient if the legislative intention clearly and
certainly appears from the language employed (In re Continuing Appropriations, 32 P. 272),
whether in the past or in the present. (Emphases and underscoring supplied)
Likewise, as ruled by the US Supreme Court in State of Nevada v. La Grave:242
To constitute an appropriation there must be money placed in a fund applicable to the designated
purpose. The word appropriate means to allot, assign, set apart or apply to a particular use or
purpose. An appropriation in the sense of the constitution means the setting apart a portion of the
public funds for a public purpose. No particular form of words is necessary for the purpose, if the
intention to appropriate is plainly manifested. (Emphases supplied)
Thus, based on the foregoing, the Court cannot sustain the argument that the appropriation must
be the "primary and specific" purpose of the law in order for a valid appropriation law to exist.
To reiterate, if a legal provision designates a determinate or determinable amount of money and
allocates the same for a particular public purpose, then the legislative intent to appropriate
becomes apparent and, hence, already sufficient to satisfy the requirement of an "appropriation
made by law" under contemplation of the Constitution.
Section 8 of PD 910 pertinently provides:
Section 8. Appropriations. x x x
All fees, revenues and receipts of the Board from any and all sources including receipts from
service contracts and agreements such as application and processing fees, signature bonus,
discovery bonus, production bonus; all money collected from concessionaires, representing
unspent work obligations, fines and penalties under the Petroleum Act of 1949; as well as the
government share representing royalties, rentals, production share on service contracts and
similar payments on the exploration, development and exploitation of energy resources, shall
form part of a Special Fund to be used to finance energy resource development and exploitation
programs and projects of the government and for such other purposes as may be hereafter
directed by the President. (Emphases supplied)
Whereas Section 12 of PD 1869, as amended by PD 1993, reads:
Sec. 12. Special Condition of Franchise. After deducting five (5%) percent as Franchise Tax,
the Fifty (50%) percent share of the Government in the aggregate gross earnings of the
Corporation from this Franchise, or 60% if the aggregate gross earnings be less
than P150,000,000.00 shall be set aside and shall accrue to the General Fund to finance the
priority infrastructure development projects and to finance the restoration of damaged or
destroyed facilities due to calamities, as may be directed and authorized by the Office of the
President of the Philippines. (Emphases supplied)
Analyzing the legal text vis--vis the above-mentioned principles, it may then be concluded that
(a) Section 8 of PD 910, which creates a Special Fund comprised of "all fees, revenues, and
receipts of the Energy Development Board from any and all sources" (a determinable amount)
"to be used to finance energy resource development and exploitation programs and projects of
the government and for such other purposes as may be hereafter directed by the President" (a
specified public purpose), and (b) Section 12 of PD 1869, as amended by PD 1993, which
similarly sets aside, "after deducting five (5%) percent as Franchise Tax, the Fifty (50%) percent
share of the Government in the aggregate gross earnings of PAGCOR, or 60%, if the aggregate
gross earnings be less than P150,000,000.00" (also a determinable amount) "to finance the
priority infrastructure development projects and x x x the restoration of damaged or destroyed
facilities due to calamities, as may be directed and authorized by the Office of the President of
the Philippines" (also a specified public purpose), are legal appropriations under Section 29(1),
Article VI of the 1987 Constitution.
In this relation, it is apropos to note that the 2013 PDAF Article cannot be properly deemed as a
legal appropriation under the said constitutional provision precisely because, as earlier stated, it
contains post-enactment measures which effectively create a system of intermediate
appropriations. These intermediate appropriations are the actual appropriations meant for
enforcement and since they are made by individual legislators after the GAA is passed, they
occur outside the law. As such, the Court observes that the real appropriation made under the
2013 PDAF Article is not the P24.79 Billion allocated for the entire PDAF, but rather the postenactment determinations made by the individual legislators which are, to repeat, occurrences
outside of the law. Irrefragably, the 2013 PDAF Article does not constitute an "appropriation
made by law" since it, in its truest sense, only authorizes individual legislators to appropriate in
violation of the non-delegability principle as afore-discussed.
2. Undue Delegation.
On a related matter, petitioners contend that Section 8 of PD 910 constitutes an undue delegation
of legislative power since the phrase "and for such other purposes as may be hereafter directed
by the President" gives the President "unbridled discretion to determine for what purpose the
funds will be used."243 Respondents, on the other hand, urged the Court to apply the principle of
ejusdem generis to the same section and thus, construe the phrase "and for such other purposes as
may be hereafter directed by the President" to refer only to other purposes related "to energy
resource development and exploitation programs and projects of the government."244
The Court agrees with petitioners submissions.
While the designation of a determinate or determinable amount for a particular public purpose is
sufficient for a legal appropriation to exist, the appropriation law must contain adequate
legislative guidelines if the same law delegates rule-making authority to the Executive 245 either
for the purpose of (a) filling up the details of the law for its enforcement, known as
supplementary rule-making, or (b) ascertaining facts to bring the law into actual operation,
referred to as contingent rule-making.246 There are two (2) fundamental tests to ensure that the
legislative guidelines for delegated rule-making are indeed adequate. The first test is called the
"completeness test." Case law states that a law is complete when it sets forth therein the policy to
be executed, carried out, or implemented by the delegate. On the other hand, the second test is
called the "sufficient standard test." Jurisprudence holds that a law lays down a sufficient
standard when it provides adequate guidelines or limitations in the law to map out the boundaries
of the delegates authority and prevent the delegation from running riot. 247To be sufficient, the
standard must specify the limits of the delegates authority, announce the legislative policy, and
identify the conditions under which it is to be implemented.248
In view of the foregoing, the Court agrees with petitioners that the phrase "and for such other
purposes as may be hereafter directed by the President" under Section 8 of PD 910 constitutes an
undue delegation of legislative power insofar as it does not lay down a sufficient standard to
adequately determine the limits of the Presidents authority with respect to the purpose for which
the Malampaya Funds may be used. As it reads, the said phrase gives the President wide latitude
to use the Malampaya Funds for any other purpose he may direct and, in effect, allows him to
unilaterally appropriate public funds beyond the purview of the law. That the subject phrase may
be confined only to "energy resource development and exploitation programs and projects of the
government" under the principle of ejusdem generis, meaning that the general word or phrase is
to be construed to include or be restricted to things akin to, resembling, or of the same kind
or class as those specifically mentioned, 249 is belied by three (3) reasons: first, the phrase "energy
resource development and exploitation programs and projects of the government" states a
singular and general class and hence, cannot be treated as a statutory reference of specific things
from which the general phrase "for such other purposes" may be limited; second, the said phrase
also exhausts the class it represents, namely energy development programs of the
government;250 and, third, the Executive department has, in fact, used the Malampaya Funds for
non-energy related purposes under the subject phrase, thereby contradicting respondents own
position that it is limited only to "energy resource development and exploitation programs and
projects of the government."251 Thus, while Section 8 of PD 910 may have passed the
completeness test since the policy of energy development is clearly deducible from its text, the
phrase "and for such other purposes as may be hereafter directed by the President" under the
same provision of law should nonetheless be stricken down as unconstitutional as it lies
independently unfettered by any sufficient standard of the delegating law. This notwithstanding,
it must be underscored that the rest of Section 8, insofar as it allows for the use of the
Malampaya Funds "to finance energy resource development and exploitation programs and
projects of the government," remains legally effective and subsisting. Truth be told, the declared
unconstitutionality of the aforementioned phrase is but an assurance that the Malampaya Funds
would be used as it should be used only in accordance with the avowed purpose and intention
of PD 910.
As for the Presidential Social Fund, the Court takes judicial notice of the fact that Section 12 of
PD 1869 has already been amended by PD 1993 which thus moots the parties submissions on
the same.252 Nevertheless, since the amendatory provision may be readily examined under the
current parameters of discussion, the Court proceeds to resolve its constitutionality.
Primarily, Section 12 of PD 1869, as amended by PD 1993, indicates that the Presidential Social
Fund may be used "to first, finance the priority infrastructure development projects and second,
to finance the restoration of damaged or destroyed facilities due to calamities, as may be directed
and authorized by the Office of the President of the Philippines." The Court finds that while the
second indicated purpose adequately curtails the authority of the President to spend the
Presidential Social Fund only for restoration purposes which arise from calamities, the first
indicated purpose, however, gives him carte blanche authority to use the same fund for any
infrastructure project he may so determine as a "priority". Verily, the law does not supply a
definition of "priority in frastructure development projects" and hence, leaves the President
without any guideline to construe the same. To note, the delimitation of a project as one of
"infrastructure" is too broad of a classification since the said term could pertain to any kind of
facility. This may be deduced from its lexicographic definition as follows: "the underlying
framework of a system, especially public services and facilities (such as highways, schools,
bridges, sewers, and water-systems) needed to support commerce as well as economic and
residential development."253In fine, the phrase "to finance the priority infrastructure development
projects" must be stricken down as unconstitutional since similar to the above-assailed
provision under Section 8 of PD 910 it lies independently unfettered by any sufficient standard
of the delegating law. As they are severable, all other provisions of Section 12 of PD 1869, as
amended by PD 1993, remains legally effective and subsisting.
D. Ancillary Prayers. 1.
Petitioners Prayer to be Furnished Lists and Detailed Reports.

Aside from seeking the Court to declare the Pork Barrel System unconstitutional as the Court
did so in the context of its pronouncements made in this Decision petitioners equally pray that
the Executive Secretary and/or the DBM be ordered to release to the CoA and to the public: (a)
"the complete schedule/list of legislators who have availed of their PDAF and VILP from the
years 2003 to 2013, specifying the use of the funds, the project or activity and the recipient
entities or individuals, and all pertinent data thereto" (PDAF Use Schedule/List); 254 and (b) "the
use of the Executives lump-sum, discretionary funds, including the proceeds from the x x x
Malampaya Funds and remittances from the PAGCOR x x x from 2003 to 2013, specifying the x
x x project or activity and the recipient entities or individuals, and all pertinent data
thereto"255 (Presidential Pork Use Report). Petitioners prayer is grounded on Section 28, Article
II and Section 7, Article III of the 1987 Constitution which read as follows:
ARTICLE II
Sec. 28. Subject to reasonable conditions prescribed by law, the State adopts and implements a
policy of full public disclosure of all its transactions involving public interest.
ARTICLE III Sec. 7.
The right of the people to information on matters of public concern shall be recognized. Access
to official records, and to documents and papers pertaining to official acts, transactions, or
decisions, as well as to government research data used as basis for policy development, shall be
afforded the citizen, subject to such limitations as may be provided by law.
The Court denies petitioners submission.
Case law instructs that the proper remedy to invoke the right to information is to file a petition
for mandamus. As explained in the case of Legaspi v. Civil Service Commission:256
While the manner of examining public records may be subject to reasonable regulation by the
government agency in custody thereof, the duty to disclose the information of public concern,
and to afford access to public records cannot be discretionary on the part of said agencies.
Certainly, its performance cannot be made contingent upon the discretion of such agencies.
Otherwise, the enjoyment of the constitutional right may be rendered nugatory by any whimsical
exercise of agency discretion. The constitutional duty, not being discretionary, its performance
may be compelled by a writ of mandamus in a proper case.
But what is a proper case for Mandamus to issue? In the case before Us, the public right to be
enforced and the concomitant duty of the State are unequivocably set forth in the Constitution.
The decisive question on the propriety of the issuance of the writ of mandamus in this case is,
whether the information sought by the petitioner is within the ambit of the constitutional
guarantee. (Emphases supplied)
Corollarily, in the case of Valmonte v. Belmonte Jr.257 (Valmonte), it has been clarified that the
right to information does not include the right to compel the preparation of "lists, abstracts,
summaries and the like." In the same case, it was stressed that it is essential that the "applicant
has a well -defined, clear and certain legal right to the thing demanded and that it is the
imperative duty of defendant to perform the act required." Hence, without the foregoing
substantiations, the Court cannot grant a particular request for information. The pertinent
portions of Valmonte are hereunder quoted:258
Although citizens are afforded the right to information and, pursuant thereto, are entitled to
"access to official records," the Constitution does not accord them a right to compel custodians
of official records to prepare lists, abstracts, summaries and the like in their desire to acquire
information on matters of public concern.
It must be stressed that it is essential for a writ of mandamus to issue that the applicant has a
well-defined, clear and certain legal right to the thing demanded and that it is the imperative duty
of defendant to perform the act required. The corresponding duty of the respondent to perform
the required act must be clear and specific Lemi v. Valencia, G.R. No. L-20768, November
29,1968,126 SCRA 203; Ocampo v. Subido, G.R. No. L-28344, August 27, 1976, 72 SCRA 443.
The request of the petitioners fails to meet this standard, there being no duty on the part of
respondent to prepare the list requested. (Emphases supplied)
In these cases, aside from the fact that none of the petitions are in the nature of mandamus
actions, the Court finds that petitioners have failed to establish a "a well-defined, clear and
certain legal right" to be furnished by the Executive Secretary and/or the DBM of their requested
PDAF Use Schedule/List and Presidential Pork Use Report. Neither did petitioners assert any
law or administrative issuance which would form the bases of the latters duty to furnish them
with the documents requested. While petitioners pray that said information be equally released to
the CoA, it must be pointed out that the CoA has not been impleaded as a party to these cases nor
has it filed any petition before the Court to be allowed access to or to compel the release of any
official document relevant to the conduct of its audit investigations. While the Court recognizes
that the information requested is a matter of significant public concern, however, if only to
ensure that the parameters of disclosure are properly foisted and so as not to unduly hamper the
equally important interests of the government, it is constrained to deny petitioners prayer on this
score, without prejudice to a proper mandamus case which they, or even the CoA, may choose to
pursue through a separate petition.
It bears clarification that the Courts denial herein should only cover petitioners plea to be
furnished with such schedule/list and report and not in any way deny them, or the general public,
access to official documents which are already existing and of public record. Subject to
reasonable regulation and absent any valid statutory prohibition, access to these documents
should not be proscribed. Thus, in Valmonte, while the Court denied the application for
mandamus towards the preparation of the list requested by petitioners therein, it nonetheless
allowed access to the documents sought for by the latter, subject, however, to the custodians
reasonable regulations,viz.:259
In fine, petitioners are entitled to access to the documents evidencing loans granted by the GSIS,
subject to reasonable regulations that the latter may promulgate relating to the manner and hours
of examination, to the end that damage to or loss of the records may be avoided, that undue
interference with the duties of the custodian of the records may be prevented and that the right of
other persons entitled to inspect the records may be insured Legaspi v. Civil Service
Commission, supra at p. 538, quoting Subido v. Ozaeta, 80 Phil. 383, 387. The petition, as to the
second and third alternative acts sought to be done by petitioners, is meritorious.
However, the same cannot be said with regard to the first act sought by petitioners, i.e.,
"to furnish petitioners the list of the names of the Batasang Pambansa members belonging to the
UNIDO and PDP-Laban who were able to secure clean loans immediately before the February 7
election thru the intercession/marginal note of the then First Lady Imelda Marcos."
The Court, therefore, applies the same treatment here.
2. Petitioners Prayer to Include Matters in Congressional Deliberations.
Petitioners further seek that the Court "order the inclusion in budgetary deliberations with the
Congress of all presently, off-budget, lump sum, discretionary funds including but not limited to,
proceeds from the x x x Malampaya Fund, remittances from the PAGCOR and the PCSO or the
Executives Social Funds."260
Suffice it to state that the above-stated relief sought by petitioners covers a matter which is
generally left to the prerogative of the political branches of government. Hence, lest the Court
itself overreach, it must equally deny their prayer on this score.
3. Respondents Prayer to Lift TRO; Consequential Effects of Decision.
The final issue to be resolved stems from the interpretation accorded by the DBM to the concept
of released funds. In response to the Courts September 10, 2013 TRO that enjoined the release
of the remaining PDAF allocated for the year 2013, the DBM issued Circular Letter No. 2013-8
dated September 27, 2013 (DBM Circular 2013-8) which pertinently reads as follows:
3.0 Nonetheless, PDAF projects funded under the FY 2013 GAA, where a Special Allotment
Release Order (SARO) has been issued by the DBM and such SARO has been obligated by the
implementing agencies prior to the issuance of the TRO, may continually be implemented and
disbursements thereto effected by the agencies concerned.
Based on the text of the foregoing, the DBM authorized the continued implementation and
disbursement of PDAF funds as long as they are: first, covered by a SARO; and, second, that
said SARO had been obligated by the implementing agency concerned prior to the issuance of
the Courts September 10, 2013 TRO.
Petitioners take issue with the foregoing circular, arguing that "the issuance of the SARO does
not yet involve the release of funds under the PDAF, as release is only triggered by the issuance
of a Notice of Cash Allocation [(NCA)]."261 As such, PDAF disbursements, even if covered by an
obligated SARO, should remain enjoined.
For their part, respondents espouse that the subject TRO only covers "unreleased and unobligated
allotments." They explain that once a SARO has been issued and obligated by the implementing
agency concerned, the PDAF funds covered by the same are already "beyond the reach of the
TRO because they cannot be considered as remaining PDAF." They conclude that this is a
reasonable interpretation of the TRO by the DBM.262
The Court agrees with petitioners in part.
At the outset, it must be observed that the issue of whether or not the Courts September 10,
2013 TRO should be lifted is a matter rendered moot by the present Decision. The
unconstitutionality of the 2013 PDAF Article as declared herein has the consequential effect of
converting the temporary injunction into a permanent one. Hence, from the promulgation of this
Decision, the release of the remaining PDAF funds for 2013, among others, is now permanently
enjoined.
The propriety of the DBMs interpretation of the concept of "release" must, nevertheless, be
resolved as it has a practical impact on the execution of the current Decision. In particular, the
Court must resolve the issue of whether or not PDAF funds covered by obligated SAROs, at the
time this Decision is promulgated, may still be disbursed following the DBMs interpretation in
DBM Circular 2013-8.
On this score, the Court agrees with petitioners posturing for the fundamental reason that funds
covered by an obligated SARO are yet to be "released" under legal contemplation. A SARO, as
defined by the DBM itself in its website, is "aspecific authority issued to identified agencies to
incur obligations not exceeding a given amount during a specified period for the purpose
indicated. It shall cover expenditures the release of which is subject to compliance with specific
laws or regulations, or is subject to separate approval or clearance by competent authority."263
Based on this definition, it may be gleaned that a SARO only evinces the existence of an
obligation and not the directive to pay. Practically speaking, the SARO does not have the direct
and immediate effect of placing public funds beyond the control of the disbursing authority. In
fact, a SARO may even be withdrawn under certain circumstances which will prevent the actual
release of funds. On the other hand, the actual release of funds is brought about by the issuance
of the NCA,264 which is subsequent to the issuance of a SARO. As may be determined from the
statements of the DBM representative during the Oral Arguments:265
Justice Bernabe: Is the notice of allocation issued simultaneously with the SARO?
xxxx
Atty. Ruiz: It comes after. The SARO, Your Honor, is only the go signal for the agencies to
obligate or to enter into commitments. The NCA, Your Honor, is already the go signal to the
treasury for us to be able to pay or to liquidate the amounts obligated in the SARO; so it comes
after. x x x The NCA, Your Honor, is the go signal for the MDS for the authorized governmentdisbursing banks to, therefore, pay the payees depending on the projects or projects covered by
the SARO and the NCA.
Justice Bernabe: Are there instances that SAROs are cancelled or revoked?
Atty. Ruiz: Your Honor, I would like to instead submit that there are instances that the SAROs
issued are withdrawn by the DBM.
Justice Bernabe: They are withdrawn?
Atty. Ruiz: Yes, Your Honor x x x. (Emphases and underscoring supplied)
Thus, unless an NCA has been issued, public funds should not be treated as funds which have
been "released." In this respect, therefore, the disbursement of 2013 PDAF funds which are only
covered by obligated SAROs, and without any corresponding NCAs issued, must, at the time of
this Decisions promulgation, be enjoined and consequently reverted to the unappropriated
surplus of the general fund. Verily, in view of the declared unconstitutionality of the 2013 PDAF
Article, the funds appropriated pursuant thereto cannot be disbursed even though already
obligated, else the Court sanctions the dealing of funds coming from an unconstitutional source.
This same pronouncement must be equally applied to (a) the Malampaya Funds which have been
obligated but not released meaning, those merely covered by a SARO under the phrase "and
for such other purposes as may be hereafter directed by the President" pursuant to Section 8 of
PD 910; and (b) funds sourced from the Presidential Social Fund under the phrase "to finance the
priority infrastructure development projects" pursuant to Section 12 of PD 1869, as amended by
PD 1993, which were altogether declared by the Court as unconstitutional. However, these funds
should not be reverted to the general fund as afore-stated but instead, respectively remain under
the Malampaya Funds and the Presidential Social Fund to be utilized for their corresponding
special purposes not otherwise declared as unconstitutional.
E. Consequential Effects of Decision.
As a final point, it must be stressed that the Courts pronouncement anent the unconstitutionality
of (a) the 2013 PDAF Article and its Special Provisions, (b) all other Congressional Pork Barrel
provisions similar thereto, and (c) the phrases (1) "and for such other purposes as may be
hereafter directed by the President" under Section 8 of PD 910, and (2) "to finance the priority
infrastructure development projects" under Section 12 of PD 1869, as amended by PD 1993,
must only be treated as prospective in effect in view of the operative fact doctrine.
To explain, the operative fact doctrine exhorts the recognition that until the judiciary, in an
appropriate case, declares the invalidity of a certain legislative or executive act, such act is
presumed constitutional and thus, entitled to obedience and respect and should be properly
enforced and complied with. As explained in the recent case of Commissioner of Internal
Revenue v. San Roque Power Corporation,266 the doctrine merely "reflects awareness that
precisely because the judiciary is the governmental organ which has the final say on whether or
not a legislative or executive measure is valid, a period of time may have elapsed before it can
exercise the power of judicial review that may lead to a declaration of nullity. It would be to
deprive the law of its quality of fairness and justice then, if there be no recognition of what had
transpired prior to such adjudication."267 "In the language of an American Supreme Court
decision: The actual existence of a statute, prior to such a determination of unconstitutionality, is
an operative fact and may have consequences which cannot justly be ignored."268
For these reasons, this Decision should be heretofore applied prospectively.
Conclusion
The Court renders this Decision to rectify an error which has persisted in the chronicles of our
history. In the final analysis, the Court must strike down the Pork Barrel System as
unconstitutional in view of the inherent defects in the rules within which it operates. To recount,
insofar as it has allowed legislators to wield, in varying gradations, non-oversight, postenactment authority in vital areas of budget execution, the system has violated the principle of
separation of powers; insofar as it has conferred unto legislators the power of appropriation by
giving them personal, discretionary funds from which they are able to fund specific projects
which they themselves determine, it has similarly violated the principle of non-delegability of
legislative power ; insofar as it has created a system of budgeting wherein items are not
textualized into the appropriations bill, it has flouted the prescribed procedure of presentment
and, in the process, denied the President the power to veto items ; insofar as it has diluted the
effectiveness of congressional oversight by giving legislators a stake in the affairs of budget
execution, an aspect of governance which they may be called to monitor and scrutinize, the
system has equally impaired public accountability ; insofar as it has authorized legislators, who
are national officers, to intervene in affairs of purely local nature, despite the existence of
capable local institutions, it has likewise subverted genuine local autonomy ; and again, insofar
as it has conferred to the President the power to appropriate funds intended by law for energyrelated purposes only to other purposes he may deem fit as well as other public funds under the
broad classification of "priority infrastructure development projects," it has once more
transgressed the principle of non-delegability.
For as long as this nation adheres to the rule of law, any of the multifarious unconstitutional
methods and mechanisms the Court has herein pointed out should never again be adopted in any
system of governance, by any name or form, by any semblance or similarity, by any influence or
effect. Disconcerting as it is to think that a system so constitutionally unsound has monumentally
endured, the Court urges the people and its co-stewards in government to look forward with the
optimism of change and the awareness of the past. At a time of great civic unrest and vociferous
public debate, the Court fervently hopes that its Decision today, while it may not purge all the
wrongs of society nor bring back what has been lost, guides this nation to the path forged by the
Constitution so that no one may heretofore detract from its cause nor stray from its course. After
all, this is the Courts bounden duty and no others.
WHEREFORE, the petitions are PARTLY GRANTED. In view of the constitutional violations
discussed in this Decision, the Court hereby declares as UNCONSTITUTIONAL: (a) the entire
2013 PDAF Article; (b) all legal provisions of past and present Congressional Pork Barrel Laws,
such as the previous PDAF and CDF Articles and the various Congressional Insertions, which
authorize/d legislators whether individually or collectively organized into committees to
intervene, assume or participate in any of the various post-enactment stages of the budget
execution, such as but not limited to the areas of project identification, modification and revision
of project identification, fund release and/or fund realignment, unrelated to the power of
congressional oversight; (c) all legal provisions of past and present Congressional Pork Barrel
Laws, such as the previous PDAF and CDF Articles and the various Congressional Insertions,
which confer/red personal, lump-sum allocations to legislators from which they are able to fund
specific projects which they themselves determine; (d) all informal practices of similar import
and effect, which the Court similarly deems to be acts of grave abuse of discretion amounting to
lack or excess of jurisdiction; and (e) the phrases (1) "and for such other purposes as may be
hereafter directed by the President" under Section 8 of Presidential Decree No. 910 and (2) "to
finance the priority infrastructure development projects" under Section 12 of Presidential Decree
No. 1869, as amended by Presidential Decree No. 1993, for both failing the sufficient standard
test in violation of the principle of non-delegability of legislative power.
Accordingly, the Courts temporary injunction dated September 10, 2013 is hereby declared to
be PERMANENT. Thus, the disbursement/release of the remaining PDAF funds allocated for the
year 2013, as well as for all previous years, and the funds sourced from (1) the Malampaya
Funds under the phrase "and for such other purposes as may be hereafter directed by the
President" pursuant to Section 8 of Presidential Decree No. 910, and (2) the Presidential Social
Fund under the phrase "to finance the priority infrastructure development projects" pursuant to
Section 12 of Presidential Decree No. 1869, as amended by Presidential Decree No. 1993, which
are, at the time this Decision is promulgated, not covered by Notice of Cash Allocations (NCAs)
but only by Special Allotment Release Orders (SAROs), whether obligated or not, are hereby
ENJOINED. The remaining PDAF funds covered by this permanent injunction shall not be
disbursed/released but instead reverted to the unappropriated surplus of the general fund, while
the funds under the Malampaya Funds and the Presidential Social Fund shall remain therein to be
utilized for their respective special purposes not otherwise declared as unconstitutional.
On the other hand, due to improper recourse and lack of proper substantiation, the Court hereby
DENIES petitioners prayer seeking that the Executive Secretary and/or the Department of
Budget and Management be ordered to provide the public and the Commission on Audit
complete lists/schedules or detailed reports related to the availments and utilization of the funds
subject of these cases. Petitioners access to official documents already available and of public
record which are related to these funds must, however, not be prohibited but merely subjected to
the custodians reasonable regulations or any valid statutory prohibition on the same. This denial
is without prejudice to a proper mandamus case which they or the Commission on Audit may
choose to pursue through a separate petition.
The Court also DENIES petitioners prayer to order the inclusion of the funds subject of these
cases in the budgetary deliberations of Congress as the same is a matter left to the prerogative of
the political branches of government.
Finally, the Court hereby DIRECTS all prosecutorial organs of the government to, within the
bounds of reasonable dispatch, investigate and accordingly prosecute all government officials
and/or private individuals for possible criminal offenses related to the irregular, improper and/or
unlawful disbursement/utilization of all funds under the Pork Barrel System.
This Decision is immediately executory but prospective in effect.
SO ORDERED.

SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. 115455 October 30, 1995

ARTURO M. TOLENTINO, petitioner,
vs.
THE SECRETARY OF FINANCE and THE COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL
G.R. No. 115525 October 30, 1995
JUAN T. DAVID, petitioner,
vs.
TEOFISTO T. GUINGONA, JR., as Executive Secretary; ROBERTO DE OCAMPO, as
Secretary of Finance; LIWAYWAY VINZONS-CHATO, as Commissioner of Internal
Revenue; and their AUTHORIZED AGENTS OR REPRESENTATIVES, respondents.
G.R. No. 115543 October 30, 1995
RAUL S. ROCO and the INTEGRATED BAR OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioners,
vs.
THE SECRETARY OF THE DEPARTMENT OF FINANCE; THE COMMISSIONERS
OF THE BUREAU OF INTERNAL REVENUE AND BUREAU OF
G.R. No. 115544 October 30, 1995
PHILIPPINE PRESS INSTITUTE, INC.; EGP PUBLISHING CO., INC.; KAMAHALAN
PUBLISHING CORPORATION; PHILIPPINE JOURNALISTS, INC.; JOSE L. PAVIA;
and OFELIA L. DIMALANTA, petitioners,
vs.
HON. LIWAYWAY V. CHATO, in her capacity as Commissioner of Internal Revenue;
HON. TEOFISTO T. GUINGONA, JR., in his capacity as Executive Secretary; and HON.
G.R. No. 115754 October 30, 1995
CHAMBER OF REAL ESTATE AND BUILDERS ASSOCIATIONS, INC.,
(CREBA), petitioner,
vs.
THE COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE, respondent.
G.R. No. 115781 October 30, 1995
KILOSBAYAN, INC., JOVITO R. SALONGA, CIRILO A. RIGOS, ERME CAMBA,
EMILIO C. CAPULONG, JR., JOSE T. APOLO, EPHRAIM TENDERO, FERNANDO
SANTIAGO, JOSE ABCEDE, CHRISTINE TAN, FELIPE L. GOZON, RAFAEL G.
FERNANDO, RAOUL V. VICTORINO, JOSE CUNANAN, QUINTIN S. DOROMAL,
MOVEMENT OF ATTORNEYS FOR BROTHERHOOD, INTEGRITY AND
NATIONALISM, INC. ("MABINI"), FREEDOM FROM DEBT COALITION, INC., and
PHILIPPINE BIBLE SOCIETY, INC. and WIGBERTO TAADA,petitioners,
vs.
THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY, THE SECRETARY OF FINANCE, THE
COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE and THE COMMISSIONER OF

G.R. No. 115852 October 30, 1995
PHILIPPINE AIRLINES, INC., petitioner,
vs.
THE SECRETARY OF FINANCE and COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL
G.R. No. 115873 October 30, 1995
COOPERATIVE UNION OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner,
vs.
HON. LIWAYWAY V. CHATO, in her capacity as the Commissioner of Internal Revenue,
HON. TEOFISTO T. GUINGONA, JR., in his capacity as Executive Secretary, and HON.
G.R. No. 115931 October 30, 1995
PHILIPPINE EDUCATIONAL PUBLISHERS ASSOCIATION, INC. and ASSOCIATION
OF PHILIPPINE BOOK SELLERS, petitioners,
vs.
HON. ROBERTO B. DE OCAMPO, as the Secretary of Finance; HON. LIWAYWAY V.
CHATO, as the Commissioner of Internal Revenue; and HON. GUILLERMO PARAYNO,
JR., in his capacity as the Commissioner of Customs, respondents.
RESOLUTION
MENDOZA, J.:
These are motions seeking reconsideration of our decision dismissing the petitions filed in these
cases for the declaration of unconstitutionality of R.A. No. 7716, otherwise known as the
Expanded Value-Added Tax Law. The motions, of which there are 10 in all, have been filed by
the several petitioners in these cases, with the exception of the Philippine Educational Publishers
Association, Inc. and the Association of Philippine Booksellers, petitioners in G.R. No. 115931.
The Solicitor General, representing the respondents, filed a consolidated comment, to which the
Philippine Airlines, Inc., petitioner in G.R. No. 115852, and the Philippine Press Institute, Inc.,
petitioner in G.R. No. 115544, and Juan T. David, petitioner in G.R. No. 115525, each filed a
reply. In turn the Solicitor General filed on June 1, 1995 a rejoinder to the PPI's reply.
On June 27, 1995 the matter was submitted for resolution.
I. Power of the Senate to propose amendments to revenue bills. Some of the petitioners
(Tolentino, Kilosbayan, Inc., Philippine Airlines (PAL), Roco, and Chamber of Real Estate and
Builders Association (CREBA)) reiterate previous claims made by them that R.A. No. 7716 did
not "originate exclusively" in the House of Representatives as required by Art. VI, 24 of the
Constitution. Although they admit that H. No. 11197 was filed in the House of Representatives
where it passed three readings and that afterward it was sent to the Senate where after first
reading it was referred to the Senate Ways and Means Committee, they complain that the Senate
did not pass it on second and third readings. Instead what the Senate did was to pass its own
version (S. No. 1630) which it approved on May 24, 1994. Petitioner Tolentino adds that what
the Senate committee should have done was to amend H. No. 11197 by striking out the text of
the bill and substituting it with the text of S. No. 1630. That way, it is said, "the bill remains a
House bill and the Senate version just becomes the text (only the text) of the House bill."
The contention has no merit.
The enactment of S. No. 1630 is not the only instance in which the Senate proposed an
amendment to a House revenue bill by enacting its own version of a revenue bill. On at least two
occasions during the Eighth Congress, the Senate passed its own version of revenue bills, which,
in consolidation with House bills earlier passed, became the enrolled bills. These were:
R.A. No. 7369 (AN ACT TO AMEND THE OMNIBUS INVESTMENTS CODE OF 1987 BY
EXTENDING FROM FIVE (5) YEARS TO TEN YEARS THE PERIOD FOR TAX AND
DUTY EXEMPTION AND TAX CREDIT ON CAPITAL EQUIPMENT) which was approved
by the President on April 10, 1992. This Act is actually a consolidation of H. No. 34254, which
was approved by the House on January 29, 1992, and S. No. 1920, which was approved by the
Senate on February 3, 1992.
R.A. No. 7549 (AN ACT GRANTING TAX EXEMPTIONS TO WHOEVER SHALL GIVE
REWARD TO ANY FILIPINO ATHLETE WINNING A MEDAL IN OLYMPIC GAMES)
which was approved by the President on May 22, 1992. This Act is a consolidation of H. No.
22232, which was approved by the House of Representatives on August 2, 1989, and S. No. 807,
which was approved by the Senate on October 21, 1991.
On the other hand, the Ninth Congress passed revenue laws which were also the result of the
consolidation of House and Senate bills. These are the following, with indications of the dates on
which the laws were approved by the President and dates the separate bills of the two chambers
of Congress were respectively passed:
1. R.A. NO. 7642
AN ACT INCREASING THE PENALTIES FOR TAX EVASION, AMENDING
FOR THIS PURPOSE THE PERTINENT SECTIONS OF THE NATIONAL
INTERNAL REVENUE CODE (December 28, 1992).
2. R.A. NO. 7643
AN ACT TO EMPOWER THE COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE
TO REQUIRE THE PAYMENT OF THE VALUE-ADDED TAX EVERY
MONTH AND TO ALLOW LOCAL GOVERNMENT UNITS TO SHARE IN
VAT REVENUE, AMENDING FOR THIS PURPOSE CERTAIN SECTIONS OF
THE NATIONAL INTERNAL REVENUE CODE (December 28, 1992)
House Bill No. 1503, September 3, 1992

3. R.A. NO. 7646
AN ACT AUTHORIZING THE COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE
TO PRESCRIBE THE PLACE FOR PAYMENT OF INTERNAL REVENUE
TAXES BY LARGE TAXPAYERS, AMENDING FOR THIS PURPOSE
CERTAIN PROVISIONS OF THE NATIONAL INTERNAL REVENUE CODE,
AS AMENDED (February 24, 1993)
4. R.A. NO. 7649
AN ACT REQUIRING THE GOVERNMENT OR ANY OF ITS POLITICAL
SUBDIVISIONS, INSTRUMENTALITIES OR AGENCIES INCLUDING
GOVERNMENT-OWNED OR CONTROLLED CORPORATIONS (GOCCS)
TO DEDUCT AND WITHHOLD THE VALUE-ADDED TAX DUE AT THE
RATE OF THREE PERCENT (3%) ON GROSS PAYMENT FOR THE
PURCHASE OF GOODS AND SIX PERCENT (6%) ON GROSS RECEIPTS
FOR SERVICES RENDERED BY CONTRACTORS (April 6, 1993)
House Bill No. 5260, January 26, 1993
5. R.A. NO. 7656
AN ACT REQUIRING GOVERNMENT-OWNED OR CONTROLLED
CORPORATIONS TO DECLARE DIVIDENDS UNDER CERTAIN
CONDITIONS TO THE NATIONAL GOVERNMENT, AND FOR OTHER
PURPOSES (November 9, 1993)
6. R.A. NO. 7660
AN ACT RATIONALIZING FURTHER THE STRUCTURE AND
ADMINISTRATION OF THE DOCUMENTARY STAMP TAX, AMENDING
FOR THE PURPOSE CERTAIN PROVISIONS OF THE NATIONAL
INTERNAL REVENUE CODE, AS AMENDED, ALLOCATING FUNDS FOR
SPECIFIC PROGRAMS, AND FOR OTHER PURPOSES (December 23, 1993)
House Bill No. 7789, May 31, 1993
7. R.A. NO. 7717

AN ACT IMPOSING A TAX ON THE SALE, BARTER OR EXCHANGE OF
SHARES OF STOCK LISTED AND TRADED THROUGH THE LOCAL
STOCK EXCHANGE OR THROUGH INITIAL PUBLIC OFFERING,
AMENDING FOR THE PURPOSE THE NATIONAL INTERNAL REVENUE
CODE, AS AMENDED, BY INSERTING A NEW SECTION AND REPEALING
CERTAIN SUBSECTIONS THEREOF (May 5, 1994)
Thus, the enactment of S. No. 1630 is not the only instance in which the Senate, in the exercise
of its power to propose amendments to bills required to originate in the House, passed its own
version of a House revenue measure. It is noteworthy that, in the particular case of S. No. 1630,
petitioners Tolentino and Roco, as members of the Senate, voted to approve it on second and
third readings.
On the other hand, amendment by substitution, in the manner urged by petitioner Tolentino,
concerns a mere matter of form. Petitioner has not shown what substantial difference it would
make if, as the Senate actually did in this case, a separate bill like S. No. 1630 is instead enacted
as a substitute measure, "taking into Consideration . . . H.B. 11197."
Indeed, so far as pertinent, the Rules of the Senate only provide:
RULE XXIX
AMENDMENTS
xxx xxx xxx
68. Not more than one amendment to the original amendment shall be
considered.
No amendment by substitution shall be entertained unless the text thereof is
submitted in writing.
Any of said amendments may be withdrawn before a vote is taken thereon.
69. No amendment which seeks the inclusion of a legislative provision foreign to
the subject matter of a bill (rider) shall be entertained.
xxx xxx xxx
70-A. A bill or resolution shall not be amended by substituting it with another
which covers a subject distinct from that proposed in the original bill or
resolution. (emphasis added).
Nor is there merit in petitioners' contention that, with regard to revenue bills, the Philippine
Senate possesses less power than the U.S. Senate because of textual differences between
constitutional provisions giving them the power to propose or concur with amendments.
Art. I, 7, cl. 1 of the U.S. Constitution reads:
All Bills for raising Revenue shall originate in the House of Representatives; but
the Senate may propose or concur with amendments as on other Bills.
Art. VI, 24 of our Constitution reads:
All appropriation, revenue or tariff bills, bills authorizing increase of the public
debt, bills of local application, and private bills shall originate exclusively in the
House of Representatives, but the Senate may propose or concur with
amendments.
The addition of the word "exclusively" in the Philippine Constitution and the decision to drop the
phrase "as on other Bills" in the American version, according to petitioners, shows the intention
of the framers of our Constitution to restrict the Senate's power to propose amendments to
revenue bills. Petitioner Tolentino contends that the word "exclusively" was inserted to modify
"originate" and "the words 'as in any other bills' (sic) were eliminated so as to show that these
bills were not to be like other bills but must be treated as a special kind."
The history of this provision does not support this contention. The supposed indicia of
constitutional intent are nothing but the relics of an unsuccessful attempt to limit the power of the
Senate. It will be recalled that the 1935 Constitution originally provided for a unicameral
National Assembly. When it was decided in 1939 to change to a bicameral legislature, it became
necessary to provide for the procedure for lawmaking by the Senate and the House of
Representatives. The work of proposing amendments to the Constitution was done by the
National Assembly, acting as a constituent assembly, some of whose members, jealous of
preserving the Assembly's lawmaking powers, sought to curtail the powers of the proposed
Senate. Accordingly they proposed the following provision:
All bills appropriating public funds, revenue or tariff bills, bills of local
application, and private bills shall originate exclusively in the Assembly, but the
Senate may propose or concur with amendments. In case of disapproval by the
Senate of any such bills, the Assembly may repass the same by a two-thirds vote
of all its members, and thereupon, the bill so repassed shall be deemed enacted
and may be submitted to the President for corresponding action. In the event that
the Senate should fail to finally act on any such bills, the Assembly may, after
thirty days from the opening of the next regular session of the same legislative
term, reapprove the same with a vote of two-thirds of all the members of the
Assembly. And upon such reapproval, the bill shall be deemed enacted and may
be submitted to the President for corresponding action.
The special committee on the revision of laws of the Second National Assembly vetoed the
proposal. It deleted everything after the first sentence. As rewritten, the proposal was approved
by the National Assembly and embodied in Resolution No. 38, as amended by Resolution No.
73. (J. ARUEGO, KNOW YOUR CONSTITUTION 65-66 (1950)). The proposed amendment
was submitted to the people and ratified by them in the elections held on June 18, 1940.
This is the history of Art. VI, 18 (2) of the 1935 Constitution, from which Art. VI, 24 of the
present Constitution was derived. It explains why the word "exclusively" was added to the
American text from which the framers of the Philippine Constitution borrowed and why the
phrase "as on other Bills" was not copied. Considering the defeat of the proposal, the power of
the Senate to propose amendments must be understood to be full, plenary and complete "as on
other Bills." Thus, because revenue bills are required to originate exclusively in the House of
Representatives, the Senate cannot enact revenue measures of its own without such bills. After a
revenue bill is passed and sent over to it by the House, however, the Senate certainly can pass its
own version on the same subject matter. This follows from the coequality of the two chambers of
Congress.
That this is also the understanding of book authors of the scope of the Senate's power to concur
is clear from the following commentaries:
The power of the Senate to propose or concur with amendments is apparently
without restriction. It would seem that by virtue of this power, the Senate can
practically re-write a bill required to come from the House and leave only a trace
of the original bill. For example, a general revenue bill passed by the lower house
of the United States Congress contained provisions for the imposition of an
inheritance tax . This was changed by the Senate into a corporation tax. The
amending authority of the Senate was declared by the United States Supreme
Court to be sufficiently broad to enable it to make the alteration. [Flint v. Stone
Tracy Company, 220 U.S. 107, 55 L. ed. 389].
(L. TAADA AND F. CARREON, POLITICAL LAW OF THE PHILIPPINES
247 (1961))
The above-mentioned bills are supposed to be initiated by the House of
Representatives because it is more numerous in membership and therefore also
more representative of the people. Moreover, its members are presumed to be
more familiar with the needs of the country in regard to the enactment of the
legislation involved.
The Senate is, however, allowed much leeway in the exercise of its power to
propose or concur with amendments to the bills initiated by the House of
Representatives. Thus, in one case, a bill introduced in the U.S. House of
Representatives was changed by the Senate to make a proposed inheritance tax a
corporation tax. It is also accepted practice for the Senate to introduce what is
known as an amendment by substitution, which may entirely replace the bill
initiated in the House of Representatives.
(I. CRUZ, PHILIPPINE POLITICAL LAW 144-145 (1993)).
In sum, while Art. VI, 24 provides that all appropriation, revenue or tariff bills, bills authorizing
increase of the public debt, bills of local application, and private bills must "originate exclusively
in the House of Representatives," it also adds, "but the Senate may propose or concur with
amendments." In the exercise of this power, the Senate may propose an entirely new bill as a
substitute measure. As petitioner Tolentino states in a high school text, a committee to which a
bill is referred may do any of the following:
(1) to endorse the bill without changes; (2) to make changes in the bill omitting or
adding sections or altering its language; (3) to make and endorse an entirely new
bill as a substitute, in which case it will be known as a committee bill; or (4) to
make no report at all.
(A. TOLENTINO, THE GOVERNMENT OF THE PHILIPPINES 258 (1950))
To except from this procedure the amendment of bills which are required to originate in the
House by prescribing that the number of the House bill and its other parts up to the enacting
clause must be preserved although the text of the Senate amendment may be incorporated in
place of the original body of the bill is to insist on a mere technicality. At any rate there is no rule
prescribing this form. S. No. 1630, as a substitute measure, is therefore as much an amendment
of H. No. 11197 as any which the Senate could have made.
II. S. No. 1630 a mere amendment of H. No. 11197. Petitioners' basic error is that they assume
that S. No. 1630 is an independent and distinct bill. Hence their repeated references to its
certification that it was passed by the Senate "in substitution of S.B. No. 1129, taking into
consideration P.S. Res. No. 734 and H.B. No. 11197," implying that there is something
substantially different between the reference to S. No. 1129 and the reference to H. No. 11197.
From this premise, they conclude that R.A. No. 7716 originated both in the House and in the
Senate and that it is the product of two "half-baked bills because neither H. No. 11197 nor S. No.
1630 was passed by both houses of Congress."
In point of fact, in several instances the provisions of S. No. 1630, clearly appear to be mere
amendments of the corresponding provisions of H. No. 11197. The very tabular comparison of
the provisions of H. No. 11197 and S. No. 1630 attached as Supplement A to the basic petition of
petitioner Tolentino, while showing differences between the two bills, at the same time indicates
that the provisions of the Senate bill were precisely intended to be amendments to the House bill.
Without H. No. 11197, the Senate could not have enacted S. No. 1630. Because the Senate bill
was a mere amendment of the House bill, H. No. 11197 in its original form did not have to pass
the Senate on second and three readings. It was enough that after it was passed on first reading it
was referred to the Senate Committee on Ways and Means. Neither was it required that S. No.
1630 be passed by the House of Representatives before the two bills could be referred to the
Conference Committee.
There is legislative precedent for what was done in the case of H. No. 11197 and S. No. 1630.
When the House bill and Senate bill, which became R.A. No. 1405 (Act prohibiting the
disclosure of bank deposits), were referred to a conference committee, the question was raised
whether the two bills could be the subject of such conference, considering that the bill from one
house had not been passed by the other and vice versa. As Congressman Duran put the question:
MR. DURAN. Therefore, I raise this question of order as to procedure: If a House
bill is passed by the House but not passed by the Senate, and a Senate bill of a
similar nature is passed in the Senate but never passed in the House, can the two
bills be the subject of a conference, and can a law be enacted from these two
bills? I understand that the Senate bill in this particular instance does not refer to
investments in government securities, whereas the bill in the House, which was
introduced by the Speaker, covers two subject matters: not only investigation of
deposits in banks but also investigation of investments in government securities.
Now, since the two bills differ in their subject matter, I believe that no law can be
enacted.
Ruling on the point of order raised, the chair (Speaker Jose B. Laurel, Jr.) said:
THE SPEAKER. The report of the conference committee is in order. It is
precisely in cases like this where a conference should be had. If the House bill had
been approved by the Senate, there would have been no need of a conference; but
precisely because the Senate passed another bill on the same subject matter, the
conference committee had to be created, and we are now considering the report of
that committee.
(2 CONG. REC. NO. 13, July 27, 1955, pp. 3841-42 (emphasis added))
III. The President's certification. The fallacy in thinking that H. No. 11197 and S. No. 1630 are
distinct and unrelated measures also accounts for the petitioners' (Kilosbayan's and PAL's)
contention that because the President separately certified to the need for the immediate
enactment of these measures, his certification was ineffectual and void. The certification had to
be made of the version of the same revenue bill which at the momentwas being considered.
Otherwise, to follow petitioners' theory, it would be necessary for the President to certify as
many bills as are presented in a house of Congress even though the bills are merely versions of
the bill he has already certified. It is enough that he certifies the bill which, at the time he makes
the certification, is under consideration. Since on March 22, 1994 the Senate was considering S.
No. 1630, it was that bill which had to be certified. For that matter on June 1, 1993 the President
had earlier certified H. No. 9210 for immediate enactment because it was the one which at that
time was being considered by the House. This bill was later substituted, together with other bills,
by H. No. 11197.
As to what Presidential certification can accomplish, we have already explained in the main
decision that the phrase "except when the President certifies to the necessity of its immediate
enactment, etc." in Art. VI, 26 (2) qualifies not only the requirement that "printed copies [of a
bill] in its final form [must be] distributed to the members three days before its passage" but also
the requirement that before a bill can become a law it must have passed "three readings on
separate days." There is not only textual support for such construction but historical basis as
well.
Art. VI, 21 (2) of the 1935 Constitution originally provided:
(2) No bill shall be passed by either House unless it shall have been printed and
copies thereof in its final form furnished its Members at least three calendar days
prior to its passage, except when the President shall have certified to the necessity
of its immediate enactment. Upon the last reading of a bill, no amendment thereof
shall be allowed and the question upon its passage shall be taken immediately
thereafter, and the yeas and nays entered on the Journal.
When the 1973 Constitution was adopted, it was provided in Art. VIII, 19 (2):
(2) No bill shall become a law unless it has passed three readings on separate
days, and printed copies thereof in its final form have been distributed to the
Members three days before its passage, except when the Prime Minister certifies
to the necessity of its immediate enactment to meet a public calamity or
emergency. Upon the last reading of a bill, no amendment thereto shall be

allowed, and the vote thereon shall be taken immediately thereafter, and
the yeas and nays entered in the Journal.
This provision of the 1973 document, with slight modification, was adopted in Art. VI, 26 (2) of
the present Constitution, thus:
The exception is based on the prudential consideration that if in all cases three readings on
separate days are required and a bill has to be printed in final form before it can be passed, the
need for a law may be rendered academic by the occurrence of the very emergency or public
calamity which it is meant to address.
Petitioners further contend that a "growing budget deficit" is not an emergency, especially in a
country like the Philippines where budget deficit is a chronic condition. Even if this were the
case, an enormous budget deficit does not make the need for R.A. No. 7716 any less urgent or
the situation calling for its enactment any less an emergency.
Apparently, the members of the Senate (including some of the petitioners in these cases) believed
that there was an urgent need for consideration of S. No. 1630, because they responded to the
call of the President by voting on the bill on second and third readings on the same day. While
the judicial department is not bound by the Senate's acceptance of the President's certification,
the respect due coequal departments of the government in matters committed to them by the
Constitution and the absence of a clear showing of grave abuse of discretion caution a stay of the
judicial hand.
At any rate, we are satisfied that S. No. 1630 received thorough consideration in the Senate
where it was discussed for six days. Only its distribution in advance in its final printed form was
actually dispensed with by holding the voting on second and third readings on the same day
(March 24, 1994). Otherwise, sufficient time between the submission of the bill on February 8,
1994 on second reading and its approval on March 24, 1994 elapsed before it was finally voted
on by the Senate on third reading.
The purpose for which three readings on separate days is required is said to be two-fold: (1) to
inform the members of Congress of what they must vote on and (2) to give them notice that a
measure is progressing through the enacting process, thus enabling them and others interested in
the measure to prepare their positions with reference to it. (1 J. G. SUTHERLAND, STATUTES
AND STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION 10.04, p. 282 (1972)). These purposes were
substantially achieved in the case of R.A. No. 7716.
IV. Power of Conference Committee. It is contended (principally by Kilosbayan, Inc. and the
Movement of Attorneys for Brotherhood, Integrity and Nationalism, Inc. (MABINI)) that in
violation of the constitutional policy of full public disclosure and the people's right to know (Art.
II, 28 and Art. III, 7) the Conference Committee met for two days in executive session with
only the conferees present.
As pointed out in our main decision, even in the United States it was customary to hold such
sessions with only the conferees and their staffs in attendance and it was only in 1975 when a
new rule was adopted requiring open sessions. Unlike its American counterpart, the Philippine
Congress has not adopted a rule prescribing open hearings for conference committees.
It is nevertheless claimed that in the United States, before the adoption of the rule in 1975, at
least staff members were present. These were staff members of the Senators and Congressmen,
however, who may be presumed to be their confidential men, not stenographers as in this case
who on the last two days of the conference were excluded. There is no showing that the
conferees themselves did not take notes of their proceedings so as to give petitioner Kilosbayan
basis for claiming that even in secret diplomatic negotiations involving state interests, conferees
keep notes of their meetings. Above all, the public's right to know was fully served because the
Conference Committee in this case submitted a report showing the changes made on the differing
versions of the House and the Senate.
Petitioners cite the rules of both houses which provide that conference committee reports must
contain "a detailed, sufficiently explicit statement of the changes in or other amendments." These
changes are shown in the bill attached to the Conference Committee Report. The members of
both houses could thus ascertain what changes had been made in the original bills without the
need of a statement detailing the changes.
The same question now presented was raised when the bill which became R.A. No. 1400 (Land
Reform Act of 1955) was reported by the Conference Committee. Congressman Bengzon raised
a point of order. He said:
MR. BENGZON. My point of order is that it is out of order to consider the report
of the conference committee regarding House Bill No. 2557 by reason of the
provision of Section 11, Article XII, of the Rules of this House which provides
specifically that the conference report must be accompanied by a detailed
statement of the effects of the amendment on the bill of the House. This
conference committee report is not accompanied by that detailed statement, Mr.
Speaker. Therefore it is out of order to consider it.
Petitioner Tolentino, then the Majority Floor Leader, answered:
MR. TOLENTINO. Mr. Speaker, I should just like to say a few words in
connection with the point of order raised by the gentleman from Pangasinan.
There is no question about the provision of the Rule cited by the gentleman from
Pangasinan, butthis provision applies to those cases where only portions of the
bill have been amended. In this case before us an entire bill is
presented; therefore, it can be easily seen from the reading of the bill what the
provisions are. Besides, this procedure has been an established practice.
After some interruption, he continued:
MR. TOLENTINO. As I was saying, Mr. Speaker, we have to look into the reason
for the provisions of the Rules, and the reason for the requirement in the provision
cited by the gentleman from Pangasinan is when there are only certain words or
phrases inserted in or deleted from the provisions of the bill included in the
conference report, and we cannot understand what those words and phrases mean
and their relation to the bill. In that case, it is necessary to make a detailed
statement on how those words and phrases will affect the bill as a whole; but
when the entire bill itself is copied verbatim in the conference report, that is not
necessary. So when the reason for the Rule does not exist, the Rule does not exist.
(2 CONG. REC. NO. 2, p. 4056. (emphasis added))
Congressman Tolentino was sustained by the chair. The record shows that when the ruling was
appealed, it was upheld by viva voce and when a division of the House was called, it was
sustained
by
a
vote
of
48
to
5.
(Id.,
p. 4058)
Nor is there any doubt about the power of a conference committee to insert new provisions as
long as these are germane to the subject of the conference. As this Court held in Philippine
Judges Association v. Prado, 227 SCRA 703 (1993), in an opinion written by then Justice Cruz,
the jurisdiction of the conference committee is not limited to resolving differences between the
Senate and the House. It may propose an entirely new provision. What is important is that its
report is subsequently approved by the respective houses of Congress. This Court ruled that it
would not entertain allegations that, because new provisions had been added by the conference
committee, there was thereby a violation of the constitutional injunction that "upon the last
reading of a bill, no amendment thereto shall be allowed."
Applying these principles, we shall decline to look into the petitioners'
charges that an amendment was made upon the last reading of the bill that
eventually became R.A. No. 7354 and that copiesthereof in its final form were not
distributed among the members of each House. Both the enrolled bill and the
legislative journals certify that the measure was duly enacted i.e., in accordance
with Article VI, Sec. 26 (2) of the Constitution. We are bound by such official
assurances from a coordinate department of the government, to which we owe, at
the very least, a becoming courtesy.
(Id. at 710. (emphasis added))
It is interesting to note the following description of conference committees in the Philippines in a
1979 study:
Conference committees may be of two types: free or instructed. These committees
may be given instructions by their parent bodies or they may be left without
instructions. Normally the conference committees are without instructions, and
this is why they are often critically referred to as "the little legislatures." Once
bills have been sent to them, the conferees have almost unlimited authority to
change the clauses of the bills and in fact sometimes introduce new measures that
were not in the original legislation. No minutes are kept, and members' activities
on conference committees are difficult to determine. One congressman known for
his idealism put it this way: "I killed a bill on export incentives for my interest
group [copra] in the conference committee but I could not have done so anywhere
else." The conference committee submits a report to both houses, and usually it is
accepted. If the report is not accepted, then the committee is discharged and new
members are appointed.
(R. Jackson, Committees in the Philippine Congress, in COMMITTEES AND
LEGISLATURES: A COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS 163 (J. D. LEES AND M.
SHAW, eds.)).
In citing this study, we pass no judgment on the methods of conference committees. We cite it
only to say that conference committees here are no different from their counterparts in the United
States whose vast powers we noted in Philippine Judges Association v. Prado, supra. At all
events, under Art. VI, 16(3) each house has the power "to determine the rules of its
proceedings," including those of its committees. Any meaningful change in the method and
procedures of Congress or its committees must therefore be sought in that body itself.
V. The titles of S. No. 1630 and H. No. 11197. PAL maintains that R.A. No. 7716 violates Art. VI,
26 (1) of the Constitution which provides that "Every bill passed by Congress shall embrace
only one subject which shall be expressed in the title thereof." PAL contends that the amendment
of its franchise by the withdrawal of its exemption from the VAT is not expressed in the title of
the law.
Pursuant to 13 of P.D. No. 1590, PAL pays a franchise tax of 2% on its gross revenue "in lieu of
all other taxes, duties, royalties, registration, license and other fees and charges of any kind,
nature, or description, imposed, levied, established, assessed or collected by any municipal, city,
provincial or national authority or government agency, now or in the future."
PAL was exempted from the payment of the VAT along with other entities by 103 of the
National Internal Revenue Code, which provides as follows:
xxx xxx xxx
(q) Transactions which are exempt under special laws or international agreements
to which the Philippines is a signatory.
R.A. No. 7716 seeks to withdraw certain exemptions, including that granted to PAL, by
amending 103, as follows:
xxx xxx xxx
(q) Transactions which are exempt under special laws, except those granted under
Presidential Decree Nos. 66, 529, 972, 1491, 1590. . . .
The amendment of 103 is expressed in the title of R.A. No. 7716 which reads:
AN ACT RESTRUCTURING THE VALUE-ADDED TAX (VAT) SYSTEM,
WIDENING ITS TAX BASE AND ENHANCING ITS ADMINISTRATION,
AND FOR THESE PURPOSES AMENDING AND REPEALING THE

RELEVANT PROVISIONS OF THE NATIONAL INTERNAL REVENUE
CODE, AS AMENDED, AND FOR OTHER PURPOSES.
By stating that R.A. No. 7716 seeks to "[RESTRUCTURE] THE VALUE-ADDED TAX (VAT)
SYSTEM [BY] WIDENING ITS TAX BASE AND ENHANCING ITS ADMINISTRATION,
AND FOR THESE PURPOSES AMENDING AND REPEALING THE RELEVANT
PROVISIONS OF THE NATIONAL INTERNAL REVENUE CODE, AS AMENDED AND
FOR OTHER PURPOSES," Congress thereby clearly expresses its intention to amend any
provision of the NIRC which stands in the way of accomplishing the purpose of the law.
PAL asserts that the amendment of its franchise must be reflected in the title of the law by
specific reference to P.D. No. 1590. It is unnecessary to do this in order to comply with the
constitutional requirement, since it is already stated in the title that the law seeks to amend the
pertinent provisions of the NIRC, among which is 103(q), in order to widen the base of the
VAT. Actually, it is the bill which becomes a law that is required to express in its title the subject
of legislation. The titles of H. No. 11197 and S. No. 1630 in fact specifically referred to 103 of
the NIRC as among the provisions sought to be amended. We are satisfied that sufficient notice
had been given of the pendency of these bills in Congress before they were enacted into what is
now
R.A.
No. 7716.
In Philippine Judges Association v. Prado, supra, a similar argument as that now made by PAL
was rejected. R.A. No. 7354 is entitled AN ACT CREATING THE PHILIPPINE POSTAL
CORPORATION, DEFINING ITS POWERS, FUNCTIONS AND RESPONSIBILITIES,
PROVIDING FOR REGULATION OF THE INDUSTRY AND FOR OTHER PURPOSES
CONNECTED THEREWITH. It contained a provision repealing all franking privileges. It was
contended that the withdrawal of franking privileges was not expressed in the title of the law. In
holding that there was sufficient description of the subject of the law in its title, including the
repeal of franking privileges, this Court held:
To require every end and means necessary for the accomplishment of the general
objectives of the statute to be expressed in its title would not only be unreasonable
but would actually render legislation impossible. [Cooley, Constitutional
Limitations, 8th Ed., p. 297] As has been correctly explained:
The details of a legislative act need not be specifically stated in its
title, but matter germane to the subject as expressed in the title, and
adopted to the accomplishment of the object in view, may properly
be included in the act. Thus, it is proper to create in the same act
the machinery by which the act is to be enforced, to prescribe the
penalties for its infraction, and to remove obstacles in the way of
its execution. If such matters are properly connected with the
subject as expressed in the title, it is unnecessary that they should
also have special mention in the title. (Southern Pac. Co. v.
Bartine, 170 Fed. 725)
(227 SCRA at 707-708)
VI. Claims of press freedom and religious liberty. We have held that, as a general proposition, the
press is not exempt from the taxing power of the State and that what the constitutional guarantee
of free press prohibits are laws which single out the press or target a group belonging to the press
for special treatment or which in any way discriminate against the press on the basis of the
content of the publication, and R.A. No. 7716 is none of these.
Now it is contended by the PPI that by removing the exemption of the press from the VAT while
maintaining those granted to others, the law discriminates against the press. At any rate, it is
averred, "even nondiscriminatory taxation of constitutionally guaranteed freedom is
unconstitutional."
With respect to the first contention, it would suffice to say that since the law granted the press a
privilege, the law could take back the privilege anytime without offense to the Constitution. The
reason is simple: by granting exemptions, the State does not forever waive the exercise of its
sovereign prerogative.
Indeed, in withdrawing the exemption, the law merely subjects the press to the same tax burden
to which other businesses have long ago been subject. It is thus different from the tax involved in
the cases invoked by the PPI. The license tax in Grosjean v. American Press Co., 297 U.S. 233,
80 L. Ed. 660 (1936) was found to be discriminatory because it was laid on the gross advertising
receipts only of newspapers whose weekly circulation was over 20,000, with the result that the
tax applied only to 13 out of 124 publishers in Louisiana. These large papers were critical of
Senator Huey Long who controlled the state legislature which enacted the license tax. The
censorial motivation for the law was thus evident.
On the other hand, in Minneapolis Star & Tribune Co. v. Minnesota Comm'r of Revenue, 460
U.S. 575, 75 L. Ed. 2d 295 (1983), the tax was found to be discriminatory because although it
could have been made liable for the sales tax or, in lieu thereof, for the use tax on the privilege of
using, storing or consuming tangible goods, the press was not. Instead, the press was exempted
from both taxes. It was, however, later made to pay a specialuse tax on the cost of paper and ink
which made these items "the only items subject to the use tax that were component of goods to
be sold at retail." The U.S. Supreme Court held that the differential treatment of the press
"suggests that the goal of regulation is not related to suppression of expression, and such goal is
presumptively unconstitutional." It would therefore appear that even a law that favors the press is
constitutionally suspect. (See the dissent of Rehnquist, J. in that case)
Nor is it true that only two exemptions previously granted by E.O. No. 273 are withdrawn
"absolutely and unqualifiedly" by R.A. No. 7716. Other exemptions from the VAT, such as those
previously granted to PAL, petroleum concessionaires, enterprises registered with the Export
Processing Zone Authority, and many more are likewise totally withdrawn, in addition to
exemptions which are partially withdrawn, in an effort to broaden the base of the tax.
The PPI says that the discriminatory treatment of the press is highlighted by the fact that
transactions, which are profit oriented, continue to enjoy exemption under R.A. No. 7716. An
enumeration of some of these transactions will suffice to show that by and large this is not so and
that the exemptions are granted for a purpose. As the Solicitor General says, such exemptions are
granted, in some cases, to encourage agricultural production and, in other cases, for the personal
benefit of the end-user rather than for profit. The exempt transactions are:
services to enhance agriculture (milling of palay, corn, sugar cane and raw sugar,
of citizens returning to the Philippines) or for professional use, like professional
percentage tax.
with
gross
annual
sale
or
receipt
not

58-60)
The PPI asserts that it does not really matter that the law does not discriminate against the press
because "even nondiscriminatory taxation on constitutionally guaranteed freedom is
unconstitutional." PPI cites in support of this assertion the following statement in Murdock
v. Pennsylvania, 319 U.S. 105, 87 L. Ed. 1292 (1943):
The fact that the ordinance is "nondiscriminatory" is immaterial. The protection
afforded by the First Amendment is not so restricted. A license tax certainly does
not acquire constitutional validity because it classifies the privileges protected by
the First Amendment along with the wares and merchandise of hucksters and
peddlers and treats them all alike. Such equality in treatment does not save the
ordinance. Freedom of press, freedom of speech, freedom of religion are in
preferred position.
The Court was speaking in that case of a license tax, which, unlike an ordinary tax, is mainly for
regulation. Its imposition on the press is unconstitutional because it lays a prior restraint on the
exercise of its right. Hence, although its application to others, such those selling goods, is valid,
its application to the press or to religious groups, such as the Jehovah's Witnesses, in connection
with the latter's sale of religious books and pamphlets, is unconstitutional. As the U.S. Supreme
Court put it, "it is one thing to impose a tax on income or property of a preacher. It is quite
another thing to exact a tax on him for delivering a sermon."
A similar ruling was made by this Court in American Bible Society v. City of Manila, 101 Phil.
386 (1957) which invalidated a city ordinance requiring a business license fee on those engaged
in the sale of general merchandise. It was held that the tax could not be imposed on the sale of
bibles by the American Bible Society without restraining the free exercise of its right to
propagate.
The VAT is, however, different. It is not a license tax. It is not a tax on the exercise of a privilege,
much less a constitutional right. It is imposed on the sale, barter, lease or exchange of goods or
properties or the sale or exchange of services and the lease of properties purely for revenue
purposes. To subject the press to its payment is not to burden the exercise of its right any more
than to make the press pay income tax or subject it to general regulation is not to violate its
freedom under the Constitution.
Additionally, the Philippine Bible Society, Inc. claims that although it sells bibles, the proceeds
derived from the sales are used to subsidize the cost of printing copies which are given free to
those who cannot afford to pay so that to tax the sales would be to increase the price, while
reducing the volume of sale. Granting that to be the case, the resulting burden on the exercise of
religious freedom is so incidental as to make it difficult to differentiate it from any other
economic imposition that might make the right to disseminate religious doctrines costly.
Otherwise, to follow the petitioner's argument, to increase the tax on the sale of vestments would
be to lay an impermissible burden on the right of the preacher to make a sermon.
On the other hand the registration fee of P1,000.00 imposed by 107 of the NIRC, as amended
by 7 of R.A. No. 7716, although fixed in amount, is really just to pay for the expenses of
registration and enforcement of provisions such as those relating to accounting in 108 of the
NIRC. That the PBS distributes free bibles and therefore is not liable to pay the VAT does not
excuse it from the payment of this fee because it also sells some copies. At any rate whether the
PBS is liable for the VAT must be decided in concrete cases, in the event it is assessed this tax by
the Commissioner of Internal Revenue.
VII. Alleged violations of the due process, equal protection and contract clauses and the rule on
taxation. CREBA asserts that R.A. No. 7716 (1) impairs the obligations of contracts, (2)
classifies transactions as covered or exempt without reasonable basis and (3) violates the rule
that taxes should be uniform and equitable and that Congress shall "evolve a progressive system
of taxation."
With respect to the first contention, it is claimed that the application of the tax to existing
contracts of the sale of real property by installment or on deferred payment basis would result in
substantial increases in the monthly amortizations to be paid because of the 10% VAT. The
additional amount, it is pointed out, is something that the buyer did not anticipate at the time he
entered into the contract.
The short answer to this is the one given by this Court in an early case: "Authorities from
numerous sources are cited by the plaintiffs, but none of them show that a lawful tax on a new
subject, or an increased tax on an old one, interferes with a contract or impairs its obligation,
within the meaning of the Constitution. Even though such taxation may affect particular
contracts, as it may increase the debt of one person and lessen the security of another, or may
impose additional burdens upon one class and release the burdens of another, still the tax must be
paid unless prohibited by the Constitution, nor can it be said that it impairs the obligation of any
existing contract in its true legal sense." (La Insular v. Machuca Go-Tauco and Nubla Co-Siong,
39 Phil. 567, 574 (1919)). Indeed not only existing laws but also "the reservation of the essential
attributes of sovereignty, is . . . read into contracts as a postulate of the legal order." (PhilippineAmerican Life Ins. Co. v. Auditor General, 22 SCRA 135, 147 (1968)) Contracts must be
understood as having been made in reference to the possible exercise of the rightful authority of
the government and no obligation of contract can extend to the defeat of that authority. (Norman
v. Baltimore and Ohio R.R., 79 L. Ed. 885 (1935)).
It is next pointed out that while 4 of R.A. No. 7716 exempts such transactions as the sale of
agricultural products, food items, petroleum, and medical and veterinary services, it grants no
exemption on the sale of real property which is equally essential. The sale of real property for
socialized and low-cost housing is exempted from the tax, but CREBA claims that real estate
transactions of "the less poor," i.e., the middle class, who are equally homeless, should likewise
be exempted.
The sale of food items, petroleum, medical and veterinary services, etc., which are essential
goods and services was already exempt under 103, pars. (b) (d) (1) of the NIRC before the
enactment of R.A. No. 7716. Petitioner is in error in claiming that R.A. No. 7716 granted
exemption to these transactions, while subjecting those of petitioner to the payment of the VAT.
Moreover, there is a difference between the "homeless poor" and the "homeless less poor" in the
example given by petitioner, because the second group or middle class can afford to rent houses
in the meantime that they cannot yet buy their own homes. The two social classes are thus
differently situated in life. "It is inherent in the power to tax that the State be free to select the
subjects of taxation, and it has been repeatedly held that 'inequalities which result from a singling
out of one particular class for taxation, or exemption infringe no constitutional limitation.'" (Lutz
v. Araneta, 98 Phil. 148, 153 (1955). Accord, City of Baguio v. De Leon, 134 Phil. 912 (1968);
Sison, Jr. v. Ancheta, 130 SCRA 654, 663 (1984); Kapatiran ng mga Naglilingkod sa Pamahalaan
ng Pilipinas, Inc. v. Tan, 163 SCRA 371 (1988)).
Finally, it is contended, for the reasons already noted, that R.A. No. 7716 also violates Art. VI,
28(1) which provides that "The rule of taxation shall be uniform and equitable. The Congress
shall evolve a progressive system of taxation."
Equality and uniformity of taxation means that all taxable articles or kinds of property of the
same class be taxed at the same rate. The taxing power has the authority to make reasonable and
natural classifications for purposes of taxation. To satisfy this requirement it is enough that the
statute or ordinance applies equally to all persons, forms and corporations placed in similar
situation. (City of Baguio v. De Leon, supra; Sison, Jr. v. Ancheta, supra)
Indeed, the VAT was already provided in E.O. No. 273 long before R.A. No. 7716 was enacted.
R.A. No. 7716 merely expands the base of the tax. The validity of the original VAT Law was
questioned in Kapatiran ng Naglilingkod sa Pamahalaan ng Pilipinas, Inc. v. Tan, 163 SCRA
383 (1988) on grounds similar to those made in these cases, namely, that the law was
"oppressive, discriminatory, unjust and regressive in violation of Art. VI, 28(1) of the
Constitution." (At 382) Rejecting the challenge to the law, this Court held:
As the Court sees it, EO 273 satisfies all the requirements of a valid tax. It is
uniform. . . .
The sales tax adopted in EO 273 is applied similarly on all goods and services
sold to the public, which are not exempt, at the constant rate of 0% or 10%.
The disputed sales tax is also equitable. It is imposed only on sales of goods or
services by persons engaged in business with an aggregate gross annual sales
exceeding P200,000.00. Small corner sari-sari stores are consequently exempt
from its application. Likewise exempt from the tax are sales of farm and marine
products, so that the costs of basic food and other necessities, spared as they are
from the incidence of the VAT, are expected to be relatively lower and within the
reach of the general public.
(At 382-383)
The CREBA claims that the VAT is regressive. A similar claim is made by the Cooperative Union
of the Philippines, Inc. (CUP), while petitioner Juan T. David argues that the law contravenes the
mandate of Congress to provide for a progressive system of taxation because the law imposes a
flat rate of 10% and thus places the tax burden on all taxpayers without regard to their ability to
pay.
regressive. What it simply provides is that Congress shall "evolve a progressive system of
taxation." The constitutional provision has been interpreted to mean simply that "direct taxes
are . . . to be preferred [and] as much as possible, indirect taxes should be minimized." (E.
FERNANDO, THE CONSTITUTION OF THE PHILIPPINES 221 (Second ed. (1977)). Indeed,
the proclamation of Art. VIII, 17(1) of the 1973 Constitution from which the present Art. VI,
28(1) was taken. Sales taxes are also regressive.
the case of the VAT, the law minimizes the regressive effects of this imposition by providing
for zero rating of certain transactions (R.A. No. 7716, 3, amending 102 (b) of the NIRC),
while granting exemptions to other transactions. (R.A. No. 7716, 4, amending 103 of the
NIRC).
Thus, the following transactions involving basic and essential goods and services are exempted
from the VAT:
services to enhance agriculture (milling of palay, corn sugar cane and raw sugar,
of citizens returning to the Philippines) and or professional use, like professional
percentage tax.
with
gross
annual
sale
or
receipt
not

58-60)
On the other hand, the transactions which are subject to the VAT are those which involve goods
and services which are used or availed of mainly by higher income groups. These include real
properties held primarily for sale to customers or for lease in the ordinary course of trade or
business, the right or privilege to use patent, copyright, and other similar property or right, the
right or privilege to use industrial, commercial or scientific equipment, motion picture films,
tapes and discs, radio, television, satellite transmission and cable television time, hotels,
restaurants and similar places, securities, lending investments, taxicabs, utility cars for rent,
tourist buses, and other common carriers, services of franchise grantees of telephone and
telegraph.
The problem with CREBA's petition is that it presents broad claims of constitutional violations
by tendering issues not at retail but at wholesale and in the abstract. There is no fully developed
record which can impart to adjudication the impact of actuality. There is no factual foundation to
show in the concrete the application of the law to actual contracts and exemplify its effect on
property rights. For the fact is that petitioner's members have not even been assessed the VAT.
Petitioner's case is not made concrete by a series of hypothetical questions asked which are no
different from those dealt with in advisory opinions.
The difficulty confronting petitioner is thus apparent. He alleges arbitrariness. A
mere allegation, as here, does not suffice. There must be a factual foundation of
such unconstitutional taint. Considering that petitioner here would condemn such
a provision as void on its face, he has not made out a case. This is merely to
adhere to the authoritative doctrine that where the due process and equal
protection clauses are invoked, considering that they are not fixed rules but rather
broad standards, there is a need for proof of such persuasive character as would
lead to such a conclusion. Absent such a showing, the presumption of validity
must prevail.
(Sison, Jr. v. Ancheta, 130 SCRA at 661)
Adjudication of these broad claims must await the development of a concrete case. It may be that
postponement of adjudication would result in a multiplicity of suits. This need not be the case,
however. Enforcement of the law may give rise to such a case. A test case, provided it is an
actual case and not an abstract or hypothetical one, may thus be presented.
Nor is hardship to taxpayers alone an adequate justification for adjudicating abstract issues.
Otherwise, adjudication would be no different from the giving of advisory opinion that does not
really settle legal issues.
We are told that it is our duty under Art. VIII, 1, 2 to decide whenever a claim is made that
"there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part
of any branch or instrumentality of the government." This duty can only arise if an actual case or
controversy is before us. Under Art . VIII, 5 our jurisdiction is defined in terms of "cases" and
all that Art. VIII, 1, 2 can plausibly mean is that in the exercise of that jurisdiction we have
the judicial power to determine questions of grave abuse of discretion by any branch or
instrumentality of the government.
Put in another way, what is granted in Art. VIII, 1, 2 is "judicial power," which is "the power
of a court to hear and decide cases pending between parties who have the right to sue and be
sued in the courts of law and equity" (Lamb v. Phipps, 22 Phil. 456, 559 (1912)), as
distinguished from legislative and executive power. This power cannot be directly appropriated
until it is apportioned among several courts either by the Constitution, as in the case of Art. VIII,
5, or by statute, as in the case of the Judiciary Act of 1948 (R.A. No. 296) and the Judiciary
Reorganization Act of 1980 (B.P. Blg. 129). The power thus apportioned constitutes the court's
"jurisdiction," defined as "the power conferred by law upon a court or judge to take cognizance
of a case, to the exclusion of all others." (United States v. Arceo, 6 Phil. 29 (1906)) Without an
actual case coming within its jurisdiction, this Court cannot inquire into any allegation of grave
abuse of discretion by the other departments of the government.
VIII. Alleged violation of policy towards cooperatives. On the other hand, the Cooperative Union
of the Philippines (CUP), after briefly surveying the course of legislation, argues that it was to
adopt a definite policy of granting tax exemption to cooperatives that the present Constitution
embodies provisions on cooperatives. To subject cooperatives to the VAT would therefore be to
infringe a constitutional policy. Petitioner claims that in 1973, P.D. No. 175 was promulgated
exempting cooperatives from the payment of income taxes and sales taxes but in 1984, because
of the crisis which menaced the national economy, this exemption was withdrawn by P.D. No.
1955; that in 1986, P.D. No. 2008 again granted cooperatives exemption from income and sales
taxes until December 31, 1991, but, in the same year, E.O. No. 93 revoked the exemption; and
that finally in 1987 the framers of the Constitution "repudiated the previous actions of the
government adverse to the interests of the cooperatives, that is, the repeated revocation of the tax
exemption to cooperatives and instead upheld the policy of strengthening the cooperatives by
way of the grant of tax exemptions," by providing the following in Art. XII:
1. The goals of the national economy are a more equitable distribution of
expanding productivity as the key to raising the quality of life for all, especially
country shall be given optimum opportunity to develop. Private enterprises,
including corporations, cooperatives, and similar collective organizations, shall be
encouraged to broaden the base of their ownership.
15. The Congress shall create an agency to promote the viability and growth of
cooperatives as instruments for social justice and economic development.
Petitioner's contention has no merit. In the first place, it is not true that P.D. No. 1955 singled out
cooperatives by withdrawing their exemption from income and sales taxes under P.D. No. 175,
5. What P.D. No. 1955, 1 did was to withdraw the exemptions and preferential treatments
theretofore granted to private business enterprises in general, in view of the economic crisis
which then beset the nation. It is true that after P.D. No. 2008, 2 had restored the tax exemptions
of cooperatives in 1986, the exemption was again repealed by E.O. No. 93, 1, but then again
cooperatives were not the only ones whose exemptions were withdrawn. The withdrawal of tax
incentives applied to all, including government and private entities. In the second place, the
Constitution does not really require that cooperatives be granted tax exemptions in order to
promote their growth and viability. Hence, there is no basis for petitioner's assertion that the
government's policy toward cooperatives had been one of vacillation, as far as the grant of tax
privileges was concerned, and that it was to put an end to this indecision that the constitutional
provisions cited were adopted. Perhaps as a matter of policy cooperatives should be granted tax
exemptions, but that is left to the discretion of Congress. If Congress does not grant exemption
and there is no discrimination to cooperatives, no violation of any constitutional policy can be
charged.
Indeed, petitioner's theory amounts to saying that under the Constitution cooperatives are
exempt from taxation. Such theory is contrary to the Constitution under which only the following
are exempt from taxation: charitable institutions, churches and parsonages, by reason of Art. VI,
28 (3), and non-stock, non-profit educational institutions by reason of Art. XIV, 4 (3).
CUP's further ground for seeking the invalidation of R.A. No. 7716 is that it denies cooperatives
the equal protection of the law because electric cooperatives are exempted from the VAT. The
classification between electric and other cooperatives (farmers cooperatives, producers
cooperatives, marketing cooperatives, etc.) apparently rests on a congressional determination that
there is greater need to provide cheaper electric power to as many people as possible, especially
those living in the rural areas, than there is to provide them with other necessities in life. We
cannot say that such classification is unreasonable.
We have carefully read the various arguments raised against the constitutional validity of R.A.
No. 7716. We have in fact taken the extraordinary step of enjoining its enforcement pending
resolution of these cases. We have now come to the conclusion that the law suffers from none of
the infirmities attributed to it by petitioners and that its enactment by the other branches of the
government does not constitute a grave abuse of discretion. Any question as to its necessity,
desirability or expediency must be addressed to Congress as the body which is electorally
responsible, remembering that, as Justice Holmes has said, "legislators are the ultimate guardians
of the liberties and welfare of the people in quite as great a degree as are the courts." (Missouri,
Kansas & Texas Ry. Co. v. May, 194 U.S. 267, 270, 48 L. Ed. 971, 973 (1904)). It is not right, as
petitioner in G.R. No. 115543 does in arguing that we should enforce the public accountability of
legislators, that those who took part in passing the law in question by voting for it in Congress
should later thrust to the courts the burden of reviewing measures in the flush of enactment. This
Court does not sit as a third branch of the legislature, much less exercise a veto power over
legislation.
WHEREFORE, the motions for reconsideration are denied with finality and the temporary
restraining order previously issued is hereby lifted.
SO ORDERED.
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. 109289 October 3, 1994

RUFINO R. TAN, petitioner,
vs.
RAMON R. DEL ROSARIO, JR., as SECRETARY OF FINANCE & JOSE U. ONG, as
COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE, respondents.
G.R. No. 109446 October 3, 1994
CARAG, CABALLES, JAMORA AND SOMERA LAW OFFICES, CARLO A. CARAG,
MANUELITO O. CABALLES, ELPIDIO C. JAMORA, JR. and BENJAMIN A.
SOMERA, JR., petitioners,
vs.
RAMON R. DEL ROSARIO, in his capacity as SECRETARY OF FINANCE and JOSE U.
ONG, in his capacity as COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE, respondents.
Rufino R. Tan for and in his own behalf.
Carag, Caballes, Jamora & Zomera Law Offices for petitioners in G.R. 109446.
VITUG, J.:
These two consolidated special civil actions for prohibition challenge, in G.R. No. 109289, the
constitutionality of Republic Act No. 7496, also commonly known as the Simplified Net Income
Taxation Scheme ("SNIT"), amending certain provisions of the National Internal Revenue Code
and,
in
G.R. No. 109446, the validity of Section 6, Revenue Regulations No. 2-93, promulgated by
public respondents pursuant to said law.
Petitioners claim to be taxpayers adversely affected by the continued implementation of the
amendatory legislation.
In G.R. No. 109289, it is asserted that the enactment

No. 7496 violates the following provisions of the Constitution:
of
Republic
Act
Article VI, Section 26(1) Every bill passed by the Congress shall embrace only
one subject which shall be expressed in the title thereof.
Article VI, Section 28(1) The rule of taxation shall be uniform and equitable.
The Congress shall evolve a progressive system of taxation.
Article III, Section 1 No person shall be deprived of . . . property without due
process of law, nor shall any person be denied the equal protection of the laws.
In G.R. No. 109446, petitioners, assailing Section 6 of Revenue Regulations No. 2-93, argue that
public respondents have exceeded their rule-making authority in applying SNIT to general
professional partnerships.
The Solicitor General espouses the position taken by public respondents.
The Court has given due course to both petitions. The parties, in compliance with the Court's
directive, have filed their respective memoranda.
G.R. No. 109289
Petitioner contends that the title of House Bill No. 34314, progenitor of Republic Act No. 7496,
is a misnomer or, at least, deficient for being merely entitled, "Simplified Net Income Taxation
Scheme
for
the
Self-Employed
and Professionals Engaged in the Practice of their Profession" (Petition in G.R. No. 109289).
The full text of the title actually reads:
An Act Adopting the Simplified Net Income Taxation Scheme For The SelfEmployed and Professionals Engaged In The Practice of Their Profession,
Amending Sections 21 and 29 of the National Internal Revenue Code, as
Amended.
The pertinent provisions of Sections 21 and 29, so referred to, of the National Internal Revenue
Code, as now amended, provide:
Sec. 21. Tax on citizens or residents.
xxx xxx xxx
(f) Simplified Net Income Tax for the Self-Employed and/or Professionals
Engaged in the Practice of Profession. A tax is hereby imposed upon the
taxable net income as determined in Section 27 received during each taxable year
from all sources, other than income covered by paragraphs (b), (c), (d) and (e) of
this
section
by
every
individual
whether
a citizen of the Philippines or an alien residing in the Philippines who is selfemployed or practices his profession herein, determined in accordance with the
following schedule:
Not over P10,000 3%

Over
P10,000
P300
but not over P30,000 of excess over P10,000
9%
Over
P30,000
P2,100
15%
Over
P120,000
P15,600
20%
Over
P350,000
of excess over P350,000
30%
P61,600
Sec. 29. Deductions from gross income. In computing taxable income subject
to tax under Sections 21(a), 24(a), (b) and (c); and 25 (a)(1), there shall be
allowed as deductions the items specified in paragraphs (a) to (i) of this
section: Provided, however, That in computing taxable income subject to tax
under Section 21 (f) in the case of individuals engaged in business or practice of
profession, only the following direct costs shall be allowed as deductions:
(a) Raw materials, supplies and direct labor;
(b) Salaries of employees directly engaged in activities in the course of or
pursuant to the business or practice of their profession;
(c) Telecommunications, electricity, fuel, light and water;
(d) Business rentals;
(e) Depreciation;
(f) Contributions made to the Government and accredited relief organizations for
the rehabilitation of calamity stricken areas declared by the President; and
(g) Interest paid or accrued within a taxable year on loans contracted from
accredited financial institutions which must be proven to have been incurred in
connection with the conduct of a taxpayer's profession, trade or business.
For individuals whose cost of goods sold and direct costs are difficult to
determine, a maximum of forty per cent (40%) of their gross receipts shall be
allowed as deductions to answer for business or professional expenses as the case
may be.
On the basis of the above language of the law, it would be difficult to accept petitioner's view
that the amendatory law should be considered as having now adopted a gross income, instead of
as having still retained the netincome, taxation scheme. The allowance for deductible items, it is
true, may have significantly been reduced by the questioned law in comparison with that which
has prevailed prior to the amendment; limiting, however, allowable deductions from gross
income is neither discordant with, nor opposed to, the net income tax concept. The fact of the
matter is still that various deductions, which are by no means inconsequential, continue to be
well provided under the new law.
Article VI, Section 26(1), of the Constitution has been envisioned so as (a) to prevent log-rolling
legislation intended to unite the members of the legislature who favor any one of unrelated
subjects in support of the whole act, (b) to avoid surprises or even fraud upon the legislature, and
(c) to fairly apprise the people, through such publications of its proceedings as are usually made,
of the subjects of legislation. 1 The above objectives of the fundamental law appear to us to have
been sufficiently met. Anything else would be to require a virtual compendium of the law which
could not have been the intendment of the constitutional mandate.
Petitioner intimates that Republic Act No. 7496 desecrates the constitutional requirement that
taxation "shall be uniform and equitable" in that the law would now attempt to tax single
proprietorships and professionals differently from the manner it imposes the tax on corporations
and partnerships. The contention clearly forgets, however, that such a system of income taxation
has long been the prevailing rule even prior to Republic Act No. 7496.
Uniformity of taxation, like the kindred concept of equal protection, merely requires that all
subjects or objects of taxation, similarly situated, are to be treated alike both in privileges and
liabilities (Juan Luna Subdivision vs. Sarmiento, 91 Phil. 371). Uniformity does not forfend
classification as long as: (1) the standards that are used therefor are substantial and not arbitrary,
(2) the categorization is germane to achieve the legislative purpose, (3) the law applies, all things
being equal, to both present and future conditions, and (4) the classification applies equally well
to all those belonging to the same class (Pepsi Cola vs. City of Butuan, 24 SCRA 3; Basco vs.
PAGCOR, 197 SCRA 52).
What may instead be perceived to be apparent from the amendatory law is the legislative intent
to increasingly shift the income tax system towards the schedular approach 2 in the income
taxation of individual taxpayers and to maintain, by and large, the present global treatment 3 on
taxable corporations. We certainly do not view this classification to be arbitrary and
inappropriate.
Petitioner gives a fairly extensive discussion on the merits of the law, illustrating, in the process,
what he believes to be an imbalance between the tax liabilities of those covered by the
amendatory law and those who are not. With the legislature primarily lies the discretion to
determine the nature (kind), object (purpose), extent (rate), coverage (subjects) and situs (place)
of taxation. This court cannot freely delve into those matters which, by constitutional fiat, rightly
rest on legislative judgment. Of course, where a tax measure becomes so unconscionable and
unjust as to amount to confiscation of property, courts will not hesitate to strike it down, for,
despite all its plenitude, the power to tax cannot override constitutional proscriptions. This stage,
however, has not been demonstrated to have been reached within any appreciable distance in this
controversy before us.
Having arrived at this conclusion, the plea of petitioner to have the law declared unconstitutional
for being violative of due process must perforce fail. The due process clause may correctly be
invoked only when there is a clear contravention of inherent or constitutional limitations in the
exercise of the tax power. No such transgression is so evident to us.
G.R. No. 109446
The several propositions advanced by petitioners revolve around the question of whether or not
public respondents have exceeded their authority in promulgating Section 6, Revenue
Regulations No. 2-93, to carry out Republic Act No. 7496.
The questioned regulation reads:
Sec. 6. General Professional Partnership The general professional partnership
(GPP) and the partners comprising the GPP are covered by R. A. No. 7496. Thus,
in determining the net profit of the partnership, only the direct costs mentioned in
said law are to be deducted from partnership income. Also, the expenses paid or
incurred by partners in their individual capacities in the practice of their
profession which are not reimbursed or paid by the partnership but are not
considered as direct cost, are not deductible from his gross income.
The real objection of petitioners is focused on the administrative interpretation of public
respondents that would apply SNIT to partners in general professional partnerships. Petitioners
cite the pertinent deliberations in Congress during its enactment of Republic Act No. 7496, also
quoted by the Honorable Hernando B. Perez, minority floor leader of the House of
Representatives, in the latter's privilege speech by way of commenting on the questioned
implementing regulation of public respondents following the effectivity of the law, thusly:
MR. ALBANO, Now Mr. Speaker, I would like to get the correct
impression of this bill. Do we speak here of individuals who are
earning, I mean, who earn through business enterprises and
therefore, should file an income tax return?
MR. PEREZ. That is correct, Mr. Speaker. This does not apply to
corporations. It applies only to individuals.
(See Deliberations on H. B. No. 34314, August 6, 1991, 6:15 P.M.; Emphasis
ours).
Other deliberations support this position, to wit:
MR. ABAYA . . . Now, Mr. Speaker, did I hear the Gentleman from
Batangas say that this bill is intended to increase collections as far
as individuals are concerned and to make collection of taxes
equitable?
MR. PEREZ. That is correct, Mr. Speaker.
(Id. at 6:40 P.M.; Emphasis ours).
In fact, in the sponsorship speech of Senator Mamintal Tamano on the Senate
version of the SNITS, it is categorically stated, thus:
This bill, Mr. President, is not applicable to business corporations
or to partnerships; it is only with respect to individuals and
professionals. (Emphasis ours)
The Court, first of all, should like to correct the apparent misconception that general professional
partnerships are subject to the payment of income tax or that there is a difference in the tax
treatment between individuals engaged in business or in the practice of their respective
professions and partners in general professional partnerships. The fact of the matter is that a
general professional partnership, unlike an ordinary business partnership (which is treated as a
corporation for income tax purposes and so subject to the corporate income tax), is not itself an
income taxpayer. The income tax is imposed not on the professional partnership, which is tax
exempt, but on the partners themselves in their individual capacity computed on their distributive
shares of partnership profits. Section 23 of the Tax Code, which has not been amended at all by
Republic Act 7496, is explicit:
Sec. 23. Tax liability of members of general professional partnerships. (a)
Persons exercising a common profession in general partnership shall be liable for
income tax only in their individual capacity, and the share in the net profits of the
general professional partnership to which any taxable partner would be entitled
whether distributed or otherwise, shall be returned for taxation and the tax paid in
accordance with the provisions of this Title.
(b) In determining his distributive share in the net income of the partnership, each
partner
(1) Shall take into account separately his distributive share of the
partnership's income, gain, loss, deduction, or credit to the extent
provided by the pertinent provisions of this Code, and
(2) Shall be deemed to have elected the itemized deductions,
unless he declares his distributive share of the gross income
undiminished by his share of the deductions.
There is, then and now, no distinction in income tax liability between a person who practices his
profession alone or individually and one who does it through partnership (whether registered or
not) with others in the exercise of a common profession. Indeed, outside of the gross
compensation income tax and the final tax on passive investment income, under the present
income tax system all individuals deriving income from any source whatsoever are treated in
almost invariably the same manner and under a common set of rules.
We can well appreciate the concern taken by petitioners if perhaps we were to consider Republic
Act No. 7496 as an entirely independent, not merely as an amendatory, piece of legislation. The
view can easily become myopic, however, when the law is understood, as it should be, as only
forming part of, and subject to, the whole income tax concept and precepts long obtaining under
the National Internal Revenue Code. To elaborate a little, the phrase "income taxpayers" is an all
embracing term used in the Tax Code, and it practically covers all persons who derive taxable
income. The law, in levying the tax, adopts the most comprehensive tax situs of nationality and
residence of the taxpayer (that renders citizens, regardless of residence, and resident aliens
subject to income tax liability on their income from all sources) and of the generally accepted
and internationally recognized income taxable base (that can subject non-resident aliens and
foreign corporations to income tax on their income from Philippine sources). In the process, the
Code classifies taxpayers into four main groups, namely: (1) Individuals, (2) Corporations, (3)
Estates under Judicial Settlement and (4) Irrevocable Trusts (irrevocable both as to corpusand as
to income).
Partnerships are, under the Code, either "taxable partnerships" or "exempt

partnerships." Ordinarily, partnerships, no matter how created or organized, are subject to
income tax (and thus alluded to as "taxable partnerships") which, for purposes of the above
categorization, are by law assimilated to be within the context of, and so legally contemplated as,
corporations. Except for few variances, such as in the application of the "constructive receipt
rule" in the derivation of income, the income tax approach is alike to both juridical persons.
Obviously, SNIT is not intended or envisioned, as so correctly pointed out in the discussions in
Congress during its deliberations on Republic Act 7496, aforequoted, to cover corporations and
partnerships which are independently subject to the payment of income tax.
"Exempt partnerships," upon the other hand, are not similarly identified as corporations nor even
considered as independent taxable entities for income tax purposes. A
general professional partnership is such an example. 4Here, the partners themselves, not the
partnership (although it is still obligated to file an income tax return [mainly for administration
and data]), are liable for the payment of income tax in their individual capacity computed on
their respective and distributive shares of profits. In the determination of the tax liability, a
partner does so as an individual, and there is no choice on the matter. In fine, under the Tax Code
on income taxation, the general professional partnership is deemed to be no more than a mere
mechanism or a flow-through entity in the generation of income by, and the ultimate distribution
of such income to, respectively, each of the individual partners.
Section 6 of Revenue Regulation No. 2-93 did not alter, but merely confirmed, the above
standing
rule
as
now
so
modified
by
Republic
Act
No. 7496 on basically the extent of allowable deductions applicable to all individual income
taxpayers on their non-compensation income. There is no evident intention of the law, either
before or after the amendatory legislation, to place in an unequal footing or in significant
variance the income tax treatment of professionals who practice their respective professions
individually and of those who do it through a general professional partnership.
WHEREFORE, the petitions are DISMISSED. No special pronouncement on costs.
SO ORDERED.
Narvasa, C.J., Cruz, Feliciano, Regalado, Davide, Jr., Romero, Bellosillo, Melo, Quiason, Puno,
Padilla and Bidin, JJ., are on leave.
SUPREME COURT
EN BANC
G.R. No. 168056 September 1, 2005
ABAKADA GURO PARTY LIST (Formerly AASJAS) OFFICERS SAMSON S.
ALCANTARA and ED VINCENT S. ALBANO, Petitioners,
vs.
THE HONORABLE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY EDUARDO ERMITA; HONORABLE
SECRETARY OF THE DEPARTMENT OF FINANCE CESAR PURISIMA; and
HONORABLE COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE GUILLERMO
PARAYNO, JR., Respondent.
DECISION
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J.:
The expenses of government, having for their object the interest of all, should be borne by
everyone, and the more man enjoys the advantages of society, the more he ought to hold himself
honored in contributing to those expenses.
-Anne Robert Jacques Turgot (1727-1781)
French statesman and economist
Mounting budget deficit, revenue generation, inadequate fiscal allocation for education,
increased emoluments for health workers, and wider coverage for full value-added tax benefits
these are the reasons why Republic Act No. 9337 (R.A. No. 9337) 1 was enacted. Reasons, the
wisdom of which, the Court even with its extensive constitutional power of review, cannot probe.
The petitioners in these cases, however, question not only the wisdom of the law, but also
perceived constitutional infirmities in its passage.
Every law enjoys in its favor the presumption of constitutionality. Their arguments
notwithstanding, petitioners failed to justify their call for the invalidity of the law. Hence, R.A.
No. 9337 is not unconstitutional.
LEGISLATIVE HISTORY
R.A. No. 9337 is a consolidation of three legislative bills namely, House Bill Nos. 3555 and
3705, and Senate Bill No. 1950.
House Bill No. 35552 was introduced on first reading on January 7, 2005. The House Committee
on Ways and Means approved the bill, in substitution of House Bill No. 1468, which
Representative (Rep.) Eric D. Singson introduced on August 8, 2004. The President certified the
bill on January 7, 2005 for immediate enactment. On January 27, 2005, the House of
Representatives approved the bill on second and third reading.
House Bill No. 37053 on the other hand, substituted House Bill No. 3105 introduced by Rep.
Salacnib F. Baterina, and House Bill No. 3381 introduced by Rep. Jacinto V. Paras. Its "mother
bill" is House Bill No. 3555. The House Committee on Ways and Means approved the bill on
February 2, 2005. The President also certified it as urgent on February 8, 2005. The House of
Representatives approved the bill on second and third reading on February 28, 2005.
Meanwhile, the Senate Committee on Ways and Means approved Senate Bill No. 19504 on
March 7, 2005, "in substitution of Senate Bill Nos. 1337, 1838 and 1873, taking into
consideration House Bill Nos. 3555 and 3705." Senator Ralph G. Recto sponsored Senate Bill
No. 1337, while Senate Bill Nos. 1838 and 1873 were both sponsored by Sens. Franklin M.
Drilon, Juan M. Flavier and Francis N. Pangilinan. The President certified the bill on March 11,
2005, and was approved by the Senate on second and third reading on April 13, 2005.
On the same date, April 13, 2005, the Senate agreed to the request of the House of
Representatives for a committee conference on the disagreeing provisions of the proposed bills.
Before long, the Conference Committee on the Disagreeing Provisions of House Bill No. 3555,
House Bill No. 3705, and Senate Bill No. 1950, "after having met and discussed in full free and
conference," recommended the approval of its report, which the Senate did on May 10, 2005, and
with the House of Representatives agreeing thereto the next day, May 11, 2005.
On May 23, 2005, the enrolled copy of the consolidated House and Senate version was
transmitted to the President, who signed the same into law on May 24, 2005. Thus, came R.A.
No. 9337.
July 1, 2005 is the effectivity date of R.A. No. 9337. 5 When said date came, the Court issued a
temporary restraining order, effective immediately and continuing until further orders, enjoining
respondents from enforcing and implementing the law.
Oral arguments were held on July 14, 2005. Significantly, during the hearing, the Court speaking
through Mr. Justice Artemio V. Panganiban, voiced the rationale for its issuance of the temporary
restraining order on July 1, 2005, to wit:
J. PANGANIBAN : . . . But before I go into the details of your presentation, let me just tell you a
little background. You know when the law took effect on July 1, 2005, the Court issued a TRO at
about 5 oclock in the afternoon. But before that, there was a lot of complaints aired on television
and on radio. Some people in a gas station were complaining that the gas prices went up by 10%.
Some people were complaining that their electric bill will go up by 10%. Other times people
riding in domestic air carrier were complaining that the prices that theyll have to pay would
have to go up by 10%. While all that was being aired, per your presentation and per our own
understanding of the law, thats not true. Its not true that the e-vat law necessarily increased
prices by 10% uniformly isnt it?
ATTY. BANIQUED : No, Your Honor.
J. PANGANIBAN : It is not?
ATTY. BANIQUED : Its not, because, Your Honor, there is an Executive Order that granted the
Petroleum companies some subsidy . . . interrupted
J. PANGANIBAN : Thats correct . . .
ATTY. BANIQUED : . . . and therefore that was meant to temper the impact . . . interrupted
J. PANGANIBAN : . . . mitigating measures . . .
ATTY. BANIQUED : Yes, Your Honor.
J. PANGANIBAN : As a matter of fact a part of the mitigating measures would be the
elimination of the Excise Tax and the import duties. That is why, it is not correct to say that the
VAT as to petroleum dealers increased prices by 10%.
J. PANGANIBAN : And therefore, there is no justification for increasing the retail price by 10%
to cover the E-Vat tax. If you consider the excise tax and the import duties, the Net Tax would
probably be in the neighborhood of 7%? We are not going into exact figures I am just trying to
deliver a point that different industries, different products, different services are hit differently.
So its not correct to say that all prices must go up by 10%.
ATTY. BANIQUED : Youre right, Your Honor.
J. PANGANIBAN : Now. For instance, Domestic Airline companies, Mr. Counsel, are at present
imposed a Sales Tax of 3%. When this E-Vat law took effect the Sales Tax was also removed as a
mitigating measure. So, therefore, there is no justification to increase the fares by 10% at best
7%, correct?
ATTY. BANIQUED : I guess so, Your Honor, yes.
J. PANGANIBAN : There are other products that the people were complaining on that first day,
were being increased arbitrarily by 10%. And thats one reason among many others this Court
had to issue TRO because of the confusion in the implementation. Thats why we added as an
issue in this case, even if its tangentially taken up by the pleadings of the parties, the confusion
in the implementation of the E-vat. Our people were subjected to the mercy of that confusion of
an across the board increase of 10%, which you yourself now admit and I think even the
Government will admit is incorrect. In some cases, it should be 3% only, in some cases it should
be 6% depending on these mitigating measures and the location and situation of each product, of
each service, of each company, isnt it?
J. PANGANIBAN : Alright. So thats one reason why we had to issue a TRO pending the
clarification of all these and we wish the government will take time to clarify all these by means
of a more detailed implementing rules, in case the law is upheld by this Court. . . .6
The Court also directed the parties to file their respective Memoranda.
G.R. No. 168056
Before R.A. No. 9337 took effect, petitioners ABAKADA GURO Party List, et al., filed a petition
for prohibition on May 27, 2005. They question the constitutionality of Sections 4, 5 and 6 of
R.A. No. 9337, amending Sections 106, 107 and 108, respectively, of the National Internal
Revenue Code (NIRC). Section 4 imposes a 10% VAT on sale of goods and properties, Section 5
imposes a 10% VAT on importation of goods, and Section 6 imposes a 10% VAT on sale of
services and use or lease of properties. These questioned provisions contain a
uniformproviso authorizing the President, upon recommendation of the Secretary of Finance, to
raise the VAT rate to 12%, effective January 1, 2006, after any of the following conditions have
been satisfied, to wit:
. . . That the President, upon the recommendation of the Secretary of Finance, shall, effective
January 1, 2006, raise the rate of value-added tax to twelve percent (12%), after any of the
following conditions has been satisfied:
(i) Value-added tax collection as a percentage of Gross Domestic Product (GDP) of the previous
year exceeds two and four-fifth percent (2 4/5%); or
(ii) National government deficit as a percentage of GDP of the previous year exceeds one and
one-half percent (1 %).
Petitioners argue that the law is unconstitutional, as it constitutes abandonment by Congress of
its exclusive authority to fix the rate of taxes under Article VI, Section 28(2) of the 1987
Philippine Constitution.
G.R. No. 168207
On June 9, 2005, Sen. Aquilino Q. Pimentel, Jr., et al., filed a petition for certiorari likewise
assailing the constitutionality of Sections 4, 5 and 6 of R.A. No. 9337.
Aside from questioning the so-called stand-by authority of the President to increase the VAT rate
to 12%, on the ground that it amounts to an undue delegation of legislative power, petitioners
also contend that the increase in the VAT rate to 12% contingent on any of the two conditions
being satisfied violates the due process clause embodied in Article III, Section 1 of the
Constitution, as it imposes an unfair and additional tax burden on the people, in that: (1) the 12%
increase is ambiguous because it does not state if the rate would be returned to the original 10%
if the conditions are no longer satisfied; (2) the rate is unfair and unreasonable, as the people are
unsure of the applicable VAT rate from year to year; and (3) the increase in the VAT rate, which
is supposed to be an incentive to the President to raise the VAT collection to at least 2 4/5 of the
GDP of the previous year, should only be based on fiscal adequacy.
Petitioners further claim that the inclusion of a stand-by authority granted to the President by the
Bicameral Conference Committee is a violation of the "no-amendment rule" upon last reading of
a bill laid down in Article VI, Section 26(2) of the Constitution.
G.R. No. 168461
Thereafter, a petition for prohibition was filed on June 29, 2005, by the Association
of Pilipinas Shell Dealers, Inc.,et al., assailing the following provisions of R.A. No. 9337:
1) Section 8, amending Section 110 (A)(2) of the NIRC, requiring that the input tax on
depreciable goods shall be amortized over a 60-month period, if the acquisition, excluding the
VAT components, exceeds One Million Pesos (P1, 000,000.00);
2) Section 8, amending Section 110 (B) of the NIRC, imposing a 70% limit on the amount of
input tax to be credited against the output tax; and
3) Section 12, amending Section 114 (c) of the NIRC, authorizing the Government or any of its
political subdivisions, instrumentalities or agencies, including GOCCs, to deduct a 5% final
withholding tax on gross payments of goods and services, which are subject to 10% VAT under
Sections 106 (sale of goods and properties) and 108 (sale of services and use or lease of
properties) of the NIRC.
Petitioners contend that these provisions are unconstitutional for being arbitrary, oppressive,
excessive, and confiscatory.
Petitioners argument is premised on the constitutional right of non-deprivation of life, liberty or
property without due process of law under Article III, Section 1 of the Constitution. According to
petitioners, the contested sections impose limitations on the amount of input tax that may be
claimed. Petitioners also argue that the input tax partakes the nature of a property that may not be
confiscated, appropriated, or limited without due process of law. Petitioners further contend that
like any other property or property right, the input tax credit may be transferred or disposed of,
and that by limiting the same, the government gets to tax a profit or value-added even if there is
no profit or value-added.
Petitioners also believe that these provisions violate the constitutional guarantee of equal
protection of the law under Article III, Section 1 of the Constitution, as the limitation on the
creditable input tax if: (1) the entity has a high ratio of input tax; or (2) invests in capital
equipment; or (3) has several transactions with the government, is not based on real and
substantial differences to meet a valid classification.
Lastly, petitioners contend that the 70% limit is anything but progressive, violative of Article VI,
Section 28(1) of the Constitution, and that it is the smaller businesses with higher input tax to
output tax ratio that will suffer the consequences thereof for it wipes out whatever meager
margins the petitioners make.
G.R. No. 168463
Several members of the House of Representatives led by Rep. Francis Joseph G. Escudero filed
this petition forcertiorari on June 30, 2005. They question the constitutionality of R.A. No. 9337
on the following grounds:
1) Sections 4, 5, and 6 of R.A. No. 9337 constitute an undue delegation of legislative power, in
violation of Article VI, Section 28(2) of the Constitution;
2) The Bicameral Conference Committee acted without jurisdiction in deleting the no pass
on provisions present in Senate Bill No. 1950 and House Bill No. 3705; and
3) Insertion by the Bicameral Conference Committee of Sections 27, 28, 34, 116, 117, 119, 121,
125,7 148, 151, 236, 237 and 288, which were present in Senate Bill No. 1950, violates Article
VI, Section 24(1) of the Constitution, which provides that all appropriation, revenue or tariff bills
shall originate exclusively in the House of Representatives
G.R. No. 168730
On the eleventh hour, Governor Enrique T. Garcia filed a petition for certiorari and prohibition
on July 20, 2005, alleging unconstitutionality of the law on the ground that the limitation on the
creditable input tax in effect allows VAT-registered establishments to retain a portion of the taxes
they collect, thus violating the principle that tax collection and revenue should be solely
allocated for public purposes and expenditures. Petitioner Garcia further claims that allowing
these establishments to pass on the tax to the consumers is inequitable, in violation of Article VI,
Section 28(1) of the Constitution.
RESPONDENTS COMMENT
The Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) filed a Comment in behalf of respondents.
Preliminarily, respondents contend that R.A. No. 9337 enjoys the presumption of
constitutionality and petitioners failed to cast doubt on its validity.
Relying on the case of Tolentino vs. Secretary of Finance, 235 SCRA
630 (1994), respondents argue that the procedural issues raised by petitioners, i.e., legality of the
bicameral proceedings, exclusive origination of revenue measures and the power of the Senate
concomitant thereto, have already been settled. With regard to the issue of undue delegation of
legislative power to the President, respondents contend that the law is complete and leaves no
discretion to the President but to increase the rate to 12% once any of the two conditions
provided therein arise.
Respondents also refute petitioners argument that the increase to 12%, as well as the 70%
limitation on the creditable input tax, the 60-month amortization on the purchase or importation
of capital goods exceedingP1,000,000.00, and the 5% final withholding tax by government
agencies, is arbitrary, oppressive, and confiscatory, and that it violates the constitutional principle
on progressive taxation, among others.
Finally, respondents manifest that R.A. No. 9337 is the anchor of the governments fiscal reform
agenda. A reform in the value-added system of taxation is the core revenue measure that will tilt
the balance towards a sustainable macroeconomic environment necessary for economic growth.
ISSUES
The Court defined the issues, as follows:
PROCEDURAL ISSUE
Whether R.A. No. 9337 violates the following provisions of the Constitution:
a. Article VI, Section 24, and
b. Article VI, Section 26(2)
SUBSTANTIVE ISSUES
1. Whether Sections 4, 5 and 6 of R.A. No. 9337, amending Sections 106, 107 and 108 of the
NIRC, violate the following provisions of the Constitution:
a. Article VI, Section 28(1), and
2. Whether Section 8 of R.A. No. 9337, amending Sections 110(A)(2) and 110(B) of the NIRC;
and Section 12 of R.A. No. 9337, amending Section 114(C) of the NIRC, violate the following
b. Article III, Section 1
RULING OF THE COURT
As a prelude, the Court deems it apt to restate the general principles and concepts of value-added
tax (VAT), as the confusion and inevitably, litigation, breeds from a fallacious notion of its
nature.
The VAT is a tax on spending or consumption. It is levied on the sale, barter, exchange or lease
of goods or properties and services.8 Being an indirect tax on expenditure, the seller of goods or
services may pass on the amount of tax paid to the buyer,9 with the seller acting merely as a tax
collector.10 The burden of VAT is intended to fall on the immediate buyers and ultimately, the
end-consumers.
In contrast, a direct tax is a tax for which a taxpayer is directly liable on the transaction or
business it engages in, without transferring the burden to someone else. 11 Examples are
individual and corporate income taxes, transfer taxes, and residence taxes.12
In the Philippines, the value-added system of sales taxation has long been in existence, albeit in a
different mode. Prior to 1978, the system was a single-stage tax computed under the "cost
deduction method" and was payable only by the original sellers. The single-stage system was
subsequently modified, and a mixture of the "cost deduction method" and "tax credit method"
was used to determine the value-added tax payable.13 Under the "tax credit method," an entity
can credit against or subtract from the VAT charged on its sales or outputs the VAT paid on its
purchases, inputs and imports.14
It was only in 1987, when President Corazon C. Aquino issued Executive Order No. 273, that the
VAT system was rationalized by imposing a multi-stage tax rate of 0% or 10% on all sales using
the "tax credit method."15
E.O. No. 273 was followed by R.A. No. 7716 or the Expanded VAT Law,16 R.A. No. 8241 or the
Improved VAT Law,17 R.A. No. 8424 or the Tax Reform Act of 1997, 18 and finally, the presently
beleaguered R.A. No. 9337, also referred to by respondents as the VAT Reform Act.
The Court will now discuss the issues in logical sequence.
PROCEDURAL ISSUE
I.
Whether R.A. No. 9337 violates the following provisions of the Constitution:
a. Article VI, Section 24, and

A. The Bicameral Conference Committee
Petitioners Escudero, et al., and Pimentel, et al., allege that the Bicameral Conference
Committee exceeded its authority by:
1) Inserting the stand-by authority in favor of the President in Sections 4, 5, and 6 of R.A. No.
9337;
2) Deleting entirely the no pass-on provisions found in both the House and Senate bills;
3) Inserting the provision imposing a 70% limit on the amount of input tax to be credited against
the output tax; and
4) Including the amendments introduced only by Senate Bill No. 1950 regarding other kinds of
taxes in addition to the value-added tax.
Petitioners now beseech the Court to define the powers of the Bicameral Conference Committee.
It should be borne in mind that the power of internal regulation and discipline are intrinsic in any
legislative body for, as unerringly elucidated by Justice Story, "[i]f the power did not exist, it
would be utterly impracticable to transact the business of the nation, either at all, or at
least with decency, deliberation, and order."19Thus, Article VI, Section 16 (3) of the
Constitution provides that "each House may determine the rules of its proceedings." Pursuant to
this inherent constitutional power to promulgate and implement its own rules of procedure, the
respective rules of each house of Congress provided for the creation of a Bicameral Conference
Committee.
Thus, Rule XIV, Sections 88 and 89 of the Rules of House of Representatives provides as
follows:
Sec. 88. Conference Committee. In the event that the House does not agree with the Senate on
the amendment to any bill or joint resolution, the differences may be settled by the conference
committees of both chambers.
In resolving the differences with the Senate, the House panel shall, as much as possible, adhere
to and support the House Bill. If the differences with the Senate are so substantial that they
materially impair the House Bill, the panel shall report such fact to the House for the latters
appropriate action.
Sec. 89. Conference Committee Reports. . . . Each report shall contain a detailed, sufficiently
explicit statement of the changes in or amendments to the subject measure.
...
The Chairman of the House panel may be interpellated on the Conference Committee Report
prior to the voting thereon. The House shall vote on the Conference Committee Report in the
same manner and procedure as it votes on a bill on third and final reading.
Rule XII, Section 35 of the Rules of the Senate states:
Sec. 35. In the event that the Senate does not agree with the House of Representatives on the
provision of any bill or joint resolution, the differences shall be settled by a conference
committee of both Houses which shall meet within ten (10) days after their composition. The
President shall designate the members of the Senate Panel in the conference committee with the
approval of the Senate.
Each Conference Committee Report shall contain a detailed and sufficiently explicit statement of
the changes in, or amendments to the subject measure, and shall be signed by a majority of the
members of each House panel, voting separately.
A comparative presentation of the conflicting House and Senate provisions and a reconciled
version thereof with the explanatory statement of the conference committee shall be attached to
the report.
...
The creation of such conference committee was apparently in response to a problem, not
addressed by any constitutional provision, where the two houses of Congress find themselves in
disagreement over changes or amendments introduced by the other house in a legislative bill.
Given that one of the most basic powers of the legislative branch is to formulate and implement
its own rules of proceedings and to discipline its members, may the Court then delve into the
details of how Congress complies with its internal rules or how it conducts its business of
passing legislation? Note that in the present petitions, the issue is not whether provisions of the
rules of both houses creating the bicameral conference committee are unconstitutional, but
whether the bicameral conference committee has strictly complied with the rules of both
houses, thereby remaining within the jurisdiction conferred upon it by Congress.
In the recent case of Farias vs. The Executive Secretary,20 the Court En
Banc, unanimously reiterated and emphasized its adherence to the "enrolled bill doctrine," thus,
declining therein petitioners plea for the Court to go behind the enrolled copy of the bill.
Assailed in said case was Congresss creation of two sets of bicameral conference committees,
the lack of records of said committees proceedings, the alleged violation of said committees of
the rules of both houses, and the disappearance or deletion of one of the provisions in the
compromise bill submitted by the bicameral conference committee. It was argued that such
irregularities in the passage of the law nullified R.A. No. 9006, or the Fair Election Act.
Striking down such argument, the Court held thus:
Under the "enrolled bill doctrine," the signing of a bill by the Speaker of the House and the
Senate President and the certification of the Secretaries of both Houses of Congress that it was
passed are conclusive of its due enactment. A review of cases reveals the Courts consistent
adherence to the rule. The Court finds no reason to deviate from the salutary rule in this
case where the irregularities alleged by the petitioners mostly involved the internal rules of
Congress, e.g., creation of the 2nd or 3 rd Bicameral Conference Committee by the
House. This Court is not the proper forum for the enforcement of these internal rules of
Congress, whether House or Senate. Parliamentary rules are merely procedural and with
their observance the courts have no concern. Whatever doubts there may be as to the
formal validity of Rep. Act No. 9006 must be resolved in its favor. The Court reiterates its
ruling in Arroyo vs. De Venecia, viz.:
But the cases, both here and abroad, in varying forms of expression, all deny to the courts
the power to inquire into allegations that, in enacting a law, a House of Congress failed to
comply with its own rules, in the absence of showing that there was a violation of a
constitutional provision or the rights of private individuals. In Osmea v. Pendatun, it was
held: "At any rate, courts have declared that the rules adopted by deliberative bodies are subject
to revocation, modification or waiver at the pleasure of the body adopting them.And it has been
said that "Parliamentary rules are merely procedural, and with their observance, the
courts have no concern. They may be waived or disregarded by the legislative body."
Consequently, "mere failure to conform to parliamentary usage will not invalidate the
action (taken by a deliberative body) when the requisite number of members have agreed
to a particular measure."21 (Emphasis supplied)
The foregoing declaration is exactly in point with the present cases, where petitioners allege
irregularities committed by the conference committee in introducing changes or deleting
provisions in the House and Senate bills. Akin to the Farias case,22 the present petitions also
raise an issue regarding the actions taken by the conference committee on matters regarding
Congress compliance with its own internal rules. As stated earlier, one of the most basic and
inherent power of the legislature is the power to formulate rules for its proceedings and the
discipline of its members. Congress is the best judge of how it should conduct its own business
expeditiously and in the most orderly manner. It is also the sole
concern of Congress to instill discipline among the members of its conference committee if it
believes that said members violated any of its rules of proceedings. Even the expanded
jurisdiction of this Court cannot apply to questions regarding only the internal operation of
Congress, thus, the Court is wont to deny a review of the internal proceedings of a co-equal
branch of government.
Moreover, as far back as 1994 or more than ten years ago, in the case of Tolentino vs. Secretary
of Finance,23the Court already made the pronouncement that "[i]f a change is desired in the
practice [of the Bicameral Conference Committee] it must be sought in Congress since this
question is not covered by any constitutional provision but is only an internal rule of each
house." 24 To date, Congress has not seen it fit to make such changes adverted to by the Court. It
seems, therefore, that Congress finds the practices of the bicameral conference committee to be
very useful for purposes of prompt and efficient legislative action.
Nevertheless, just to put minds at ease that no blatant irregularities tainted the proceedings of the
bicameral conference committees, the Court deems it necessary to dwell on the issue. The Court
observes that there was a necessity for a conference committee because a comparison of the
provisions of House Bill Nos. 3555 and 3705 on one hand, and Senate Bill No. 1950 on the
other, reveals that there were indeed disagreements. As pointed out in the petitions, said
disagreements were as follows:
House Bill No. 3555
With regard to "Stand-By Authority" in favor of President
Provides for 12% VAT on every sale of goods or properties (amending Sec. 106 of NIRC); 12% VAT on importat
use or lease of properties (amending Sec. 108 of NIRC)
With regard to the "no pass-on" provision
No similar provision
With regard to 70% limit on input tax credit
Provides that the input tax credit for capital goods on which a VAT has been paid shall be equally distributed ove
and services other than capital goods shall not exceed 5% of the total amount of such goods and services; and for
exceed 11% of the total amount of goods purchased.
With regard to amendments to be made to NIRC provisions regarding income and excise
taxes
Provided for amendments to

several NIRC provisions
regarding corporate income,
percentage, franchise and
excise taxes
The disagreements between the provisions in the House bills and the Senate bill were with regard
to (1) what rate of VAT is to be imposed; (2) whether only the VAT imposed on electricity
generation, transmission and distribution companies should not be passed on to consumers, as
proposed in the Senate bill, or both the VAT imposed on electricity generation, transmission and
distribution companies and the VAT imposed on sale of petroleum products should not be passed
on to consumers, as proposed in the House bill; (3) in what manner input tax credits should be
limited; (4) and whether the NIRC provisions on corporate income taxes, percentage, franchise
and excise taxes should be amended.
There being differences and/or disagreements on the foregoing provisions of the House and
Senate bills, the Bicameral Conference Committee was mandated by the rules of both houses of
Congress to act on the same by settling said differences and/or disagreements. The Bicameral
Conference Committee acted on the disagreeing provisions by making the following changes:
1. With regard to the disagreement on the rate of VAT to be imposed, it would appear from the
Conference Committee Report that the Bicameral Conference Committee tried to bridge the gap
in the difference between the 10% VAT rate proposed by the Senate, and the various rates with
12% as the highest VAT rate proposed by the House, by striking a compromise whereby the
present 10% VAT rate would be retained until certain conditions arise, i.e., the value-added tax
collection as a percentage of gross domestic product (GDP) of the previous year exceeds 2 4/5%,
or National Government deficit as a percentage of GDP of the previous year exceeds 1%, when
the President, upon recommendation of the Secretary of Finance shall raise the rate of VAT to
12% effective January 1, 2006.
2. With regard to the disagreement on whether only the VAT imposed on electricity generation,
transmission and distribution companies should not be passed on to consumers or whether both
the VAT imposed on electricity generation, transmission and distribution companies and the VAT
imposed on sale of petroleum products may be passed on to consumers, the Bicameral
Conference Committee chose to settle such disagreement by altogether deleting from its Report
any no pass-on provision.
3. With regard to the disagreement on whether input tax credits should be limited or not, the
Bicameral Conference Committee decided to adopt the position of the House by putting a
limitation on the amount of input tax that may be credited against the output tax, although it
crafted its own language as to the amount of the limitation on input tax credits and the manner of
computing the same by providing thus:
(A) Creditable Input Tax. . . .
...
Provided, The input tax on goods purchased or imported in a calendar month for use in trade or
business for which deduction for depreciation is allowed under this Code, shall be spread evenly
over the month of acquisition and the fifty-nine (59) succeeding months if the aggregate
acquisition cost for such goods, excluding the VAT component thereof, exceeds one million
Pesos (P1,000,000.00): PROVIDED, however, that if the estimated useful life of the capital good
is less than five (5) years, as used for depreciation purposes, then the input VAT shall be spread
over such shorter period: . . .
(B) Excess Output or Input Tax. If at the end of any taxable quarter the output tax exceeds the
input tax, the excess shall be paid by the VAT-registered person. If the input tax exceeds the
output tax, the excess shall be carried over to the succeeding quarter or quarters: PROVIDED
that the input tax inclusive of input VAT carried over from the previous quarter that may be
credited in every quarter shall not exceed seventy percent (70%) of the output VAT: PROVIDED,
HOWEVER, THAT any input tax attributable to zero-rated sales by a VAT-registered person may
at his option be refunded or credited against other internal revenue taxes, . . .
4. With regard to the amendments to other provisions of the NIRC on corporate income tax,
franchise, percentage and excise taxes, the conference committee decided to include such
amendments and basically adopted the provisions found in Senate Bill No. 1950, with some
changes as to the rate of the tax to be imposed.
Under the provisions of both the Rules of the House of Representatives and Senate Rules, the
Bicameral Conference Committee is mandated to settle the differences between the disagreeing
provisions in the House bill and the Senate bill. The term "settle" is synonymous to "reconcile"
and "harmonize."25 To reconcile or harmonize disagreeing provisions, the Bicameral Conference
Committee may then (a) adopt the specific provisions of either the House bill or Senate bill, (b)
decide that neither provisions in the House bill or the provisions in the Senate bill would
be carried into the final form of the bill, and/or (c) try to arrive at a compromise between the
disagreeing provisions.
In the present case, the changes introduced by the Bicameral Conference Committee on
disagreeing provisions were meant only to reconcile and harmonize the disagreeing provisions
for it did not inject any idea or intent that is wholly foreign to the subject embraced by the
original provisions.
The so-called stand-by authority in favor of the President, whereby the rate of 10% VAT wanted
by the Senate is retained until such time that certain conditions arise when the 12% VAT wanted
by the House shall be imposed, appears to be a compromise to try to bridge the difference in the
rate of VAT proposed by the two houses of Congress. Nevertheless, such compromise is still
totally within the subject of what rate of VAT should be imposed on taxpayers.
The no pass-on provision was deleted altogether. In the transcripts of the proceedings of the
Bicameral Conference Committee held on May 10, 2005, Sen. Ralph Recto, Chairman of the
Senate Panel, explained the reason for deleting the no pass-on provision in this wise:
. . . the thinking was just to keep the VAT law or the VAT bill simple. And we were thinking that
no sector should be a beneficiary of legislative grace, neither should any sector be discriminated
on. The VAT is an indirect tax. It is a pass on-tax. And lets keep it plain and simple. Lets not
confuse the bill and put a no pass-on provision. Two-thirds of the world have a VAT system and
in this two-thirds of the globe, I have yet to see a VAT with a no pass-though provision. So, the
thinking of the Senate is basically simple, lets keep the VAT simple.26 (Emphasis supplied)
Rep. Teodoro Locsin further made the manifestation that the no pass-on provision "never really
enjoyed the support of either House."27
With regard to the amount of input tax to be credited against output tax, the Bicameral
Conference Committee came to a compromise on the percentage rate of the limitation or cap on
such input tax credit, but again, the change introduced by the Bicameral Conference Committee
was totally within the intent of both houses to put a cap on input tax that may be
credited against the output tax. From the inception of the subject revenue bill in the House of
Representatives, one of the major objectives was to "plug a glaring loophole in the tax policy and
administration by creating vital restrictions on the claiming of input VAT tax credits . . ." and
"[b]y introducing limitations on the claiming of tax credit, we are capping a major leakage that
has placed our collection efforts at an apparent disadvantage."28
As to the amendments to NIRC provisions on taxes other than the value-added tax proposed in
Senate Bill No. 1950, since said provisions were among those referred to it, the conference
committee had to act on the same and it basically adopted the version of the Senate.
Thus, all the changes or modifications made by the Bicameral Conference Committee were
germane to subjects of the provisions referred
to it for reconciliation. Such being the case, the Court does not see any grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction committed by the Bicameral Conference Committee.
In the earlier cases of Philippine Judges Association vs. Prado29 and Tolentino vs. Secretary of
Finance,30 the Court recognized the long-standing legislative practice of giving said conference
committee ample latitude for compromising differences between the Senate and the House. Thus,
in the Tolentino case, it was held that:
. . . it is within the power of a conference committee to include in its report an entirely new
provision that is not found either in the House bill or in the Senate bill. If the committee can
propose an amendment consisting of one or two provisions, there is no reason why it cannot
propose several provisions, collectively considered as an "amendment in the nature of a
substitute," so long as such amendment is germane to the subject of the bills before the
committee. After all, its report was not final but needed the approval of both houses of Congress
to become valid as an act of the legislative department. The charge that in this case the
Conference Committee acted as a third legislative chamber is thus without any
basis.31 (Emphasis supplied)
B. R.A. No. 9337 Does Not Violate Article VI, Section 26(2) of the Constitution on the "NoAmendment Rule"
Article VI, Sec. 26 (2) of the Constitution, states:
No bill passed by either House shall become a law unless it has passed three readings on separate
days, and printed copies thereof in its final form have been distributed to its Members three days
before its passage, except when the President certifies to the necessity of its immediate
enactment to meet a public calamity or emergency. Upon the last reading of a bill, no amendment
thereto shall be allowed, and the vote thereon shall be taken immediately thereafter, and the yeas
and nays entered in the Journal.
Petitioners argument that the practice where a bicameral conference committee is allowed to add
or delete provisions in the House bill and the Senate bill after these had passed three readings is
in effect a circumvention of the "no amendment rule" (Sec. 26 (2), Art. VI of the 1987
Constitution), fails to convince the Court to deviate from its ruling in the Tolentino case that:
Nor is there any reason for requiring that the Committees Report in these cases must have
undergone three readings in each of the two houses. If that be the case, there would be no end to
negotiation since each house may seek modification of the compromise bill. . . .
Art. VI. 26 (2) must, therefore, be construed as referring only to bills introduced for the
first time in either house of Congress, not to the conference committee report. 32 (Emphasis
supplied)
The Court reiterates here that the "no-amendment rule" refers only to the procedure to be
followed by each house of Congress with regard to bills initiated in each of said respective
houses, before said bill is transmitted to the other house for its concurrence or amendment.
Verily, to construe said provision in a way as to proscribe any further changes to a bill after one
house has voted on it would lead to absurdity as this would mean that the other house of
Congress would be deprived of its constitutional power to amend or introduce changes to said
bill. Thus, Art. VI, Sec. 26 (2) of the Constitution cannot be taken to mean that the introduction
by the Bicameral Conference Committee of amendments and modifications to disagreeing
provisions in bills that have been acted upon by both houses of Congress is prohibited.
C. R.A. No. 9337 Does Not Violate Article VI, Section 24 of the Constitution on Exclusive
Origination of Revenue Bills
Coming to the issue of the validity of the amendments made regarding the NIRC provisions on
corporate income taxes and percentage, excise taxes. Petitioners refer to the following
provisions, to wit:
Section 27
Rates of Income Tax on Domestic Corporation
28(A)(1)
Tax on Resident Foreign Corporation
28(B)(1)
Inter-corporate Dividends
34(B)(1)
Inter-corporate Dividends
116
Tax on Persons Exempt from VAT
117
Percentage Tax on domestic carriers and keepers of Garage
119
Tax on franchises
121
Tax on banks and Non-Bank Financial Intermediaries
148
Excise Tax on manufactured oils and other fuels
151
Excise Tax on mineral products
236
Registration requirements
237
Issuance of receipts or sales or commercial invoices
288
Disposition of Incremental Revenue
Petitioners claim that the amendments to these provisions of the NIRC did not at all originate
from the House. They aver that House Bill No. 3555 proposed amendments only regarding
Sections 106, 107, 108, 110 and 114 of the NIRC, while House Bill No. 3705 proposed
amendments only to Sections 106, 107,108, 109, 110 and 111 of the NIRC; thus, the other
sections of the NIRC which the Senate amended but which amendments were not found in the
House bills are not intended to be amended by the House of Representatives. Hence, they argue
that since the proposed amendments did not originate from the House, such amendments are a
violation of Article VI, Section 24 of the Constitution.
The argument does not hold water.
Article VI, Section 24 of the Constitution reads:
Sec. 24. All appropriation, revenue or tariff bills, bills authorizing increase of the public debt,
bills of local application, and private bills shall originate exclusively in the House of
Representatives but the Senate may propose or concur with amendments.
In the present cases, petitioners admit that it was indeed House Bill Nos. 3555 and 3705 that
initiated the move for amending provisions of the NIRC dealing mainly with the value-added
tax. Upon transmittal of said House bills to the Senate, the Senate came out with Senate Bill No.
1950 proposing amendments not only to NIRC provisions on the value-added tax but also
amendments to NIRC provisions on other kinds of taxes. Is the introduction by the Senate of
provisions not dealing directly with the value- added tax, which is the only kind of tax being
amended in the House bills, still within the purview of the constitutional provision authorizing
the Senate to propose or concur with amendments to a revenue bill that originated from the
House?
The foregoing question had been squarely answered in the Tolentino case, wherein the Court
held, thus:
. . . To begin with, it is not the law but the revenue bill which is required by the Constitution
to "originate exclusively" in the House of Representatives. It is important to emphasize this,
because a bill originating in the House may undergo such extensive changes in the Senate that
the result may be a rewriting of the whole. . . . At this point, what is important to note is that, as a
result of the Senate action, a distinct bill may be produced. To insist that a revenue statute
and not only the bill which initiated the legislative process culminating in the enactment of
the law must substantially be the same as the House bill would be to deny the Senates
power not only to "concur with amendments" but also to "propose amendments." It would
be to violate the coequality of legislative power of the two houses of Congress and in fact make
the House superior to the Senate.
Given, then, the power of the Senate to propose amendments, the Senate can propose its
own version even with respect to bills which are required by the Constitution to originate in
the House.
...
Indeed, what the Constitution simply means is that the initiative for filing revenue, tariff or tax
bills, bills authorizing an increase of the public debt, private bills and bills of local application
must come from the House of Representatives on the theory that, elected as they are from the
districts, the members of the House can be expected to be more sensitive to the local needs
and problems. On the other hand, the senators, who are elected at large, are expected to
approach the same problems from the national perspective. Both views are thereby made to
bear on the enactment of such laws.33 (Emphasis supplied)
Since there is no question that the revenue bill exclusively originated in the House of
Representatives, the Senate was acting within its
constitutional power to introduce amendments to the House bill when it included provisions in
Senate Bill No. 1950 amending corporate income taxes, percentage, excise and franchise taxes.
Verily, Article VI, Section 24 of the Constitution does not contain any prohibition or limitation
on the extent of the amendments that may be introduced by the Senate to the House revenue bill.
Furthermore, the amendments introduced by the Senate to the NIRC provisions that had not been
touched in the House bills are still in furtherance of the intent of the House in initiating the
subject revenue bills. The Explanatory Note of House Bill No. 1468, the very first House bill
introduced on the floor, which was later substituted by House Bill No. 3555, stated:
One of the challenges faced by the present administration is the urgent and daunting task of
solving the countrys serious financial problems. To do this, government expenditures must be
strictly monitored and controlled and revenues must be significantly increased. This may be
easier said than done, but our fiscal authorities are still optimistic the government will be
operating on a balanced budget by the year 2009. In fact, several measures that will result to
significant expenditure savings have been identified by the administration. It is supported with
a credible package of revenue measures that include measures to improve tax
administration and control the leakages in revenues from income taxes and the value-added
tax (VAT). (Emphasis supplied)
Rep. Eric D. Singson, in his sponsorship speech for House Bill No. 3555, declared that:
In the budget message of our President in the year 2005, she reiterated that we all acknowledged
that on top of our agenda must be the restoration of the health of our fiscal system.
In order to considerably lower the consolidated public sector deficit and eventually achieve a
balanced budget by the year 2009, we need to seize windows of opportunities which might
seem poignant in the beginning, but in the long run prove effective and beneficial to the
overall status of our economy. One such opportunity is a review of existing tax rates,
evaluating the relevance given our present conditions.34(Emphasis supplied)
Notably therefore, the main purpose of the bills emanating from the House of Representatives is
to bring in sizeable revenues for the government
to supplement our countrys serious financial problems, and improve tax administration and
control of the leakages in revenues from income taxes and value-added taxes. As these house
bills were transmitted to the Senate, the latter, approaching the measures from the point of
national perspective, can introduce amendments within the purposes of those bills. It can provide
for ways that would soften the impact of the VAT measure on the consumer, i.e., by distributing
the burden across all sectors instead of putting it entirely on the shoulders of the consumers. The
sponsorship speech of Sen. Ralph Recto on why the provisions on income tax on corporation
were included is worth quoting:
All in all, the proposal of the Senate Committee on Ways and Means will raise P64.3 billion in
additional revenues annually even while by mitigating prices of power, services and petroleum
products.
However, not all of this will be wrung out of VAT. In fact, only P48.7 billion amount is from the
VAT on twelve goods and services. The rest of the tab P10.5 billion- will be picked by
corporations.
What we therefore prescribe is a burden sharing between corporate Philippines and the
consumer. Why should the latter bear all the pain? Why should the fiscal salvation be only on the
burden of the consumer?
The corporate worlds equity is in form of the increase in the corporate income tax from 32 to 35
percent, but up to 2008 only. This will raise P10.5 billion a year. After that, the rate will slide
back, not to its old rate of 32 percent, but two notches lower, to 30 percent.
Clearly, we are telling those with the capacity to pay, corporations, to bear with this emergency
provision that will be in effect for 1,200 days, while we put our fiscal house in order. This fiscal
medicine will have an expiry date.
For their assistance, a reward of tax reduction awaits them. We intend to keep the length of their
sacrifice brief. We would like to assure them that not because there is a light at the end of the
tunnel, this government will keep on making the tunnel long.
The responsibility will not rest solely on the weary shoulders of the small man. Big business will
be there to share the burden.35
As the Court has said, the Senate can propose amendments and in fact, the amendments made on
provisions in the tax on income of corporations are germane to the purpose of the house bills
which is to raise revenues for the government.
Likewise, the Court finds the sections referring to other percentage and excise taxes germane to
the reforms to the VAT system, as these sections would cushion the effects of VAT on consumers.
Considering that certain goods and services which were subject to percentage tax and excise tax
would no longer be VAT-exempt, the consumer would be burdened more as they would be
paying the VAT in addition to these taxes. Thus, there is a need to amend these sections to soften
the impact of VAT. Again, in his sponsorship speech, Sen. Recto said:
However, for power plants that run on oil, we will reduce to zero the present excise tax on
bunker fuel, to lessen the effect of a VAT on this product.
For electric utilities like Meralco, we will wipe out the franchise tax in exchange for a VAT.
And in the case of petroleum, while we will levy the VAT on oil products, so as not to destroy the
VAT chain, we will however bring down the excise tax on socially sensitive products such as
diesel, bunker, fuel and kerosene.
...
What do all these exercises point to? These are not contortions of giving to the left hand what
was taken from the right. Rather, these sprang from our concern of softening the impact of VAT,
so that the people can cushion the blow of higher prices they will have to pay as a result of
VAT.36
The other sections amended by the Senate pertained to matters of tax administration which are
necessary for the implementation of the changes in the VAT system.
To reiterate, the sections introduced by the Senate are germane to the subject matter and purposes
of the house bills, which is to supplement our countrys fiscal deficit, among others. Thus, the
Senate acted within its power to propose those amendments.
SUBSTANTIVE ISSUES
I.
Whether Sections 4, 5 and 6 of R.A. No. 9337, amending Sections 106, 107 and 108 of the
NIRC, violate the following provisions of the Constitution:
A. No Undue Delegation of Legislative Power
Petitioners ABAKADA GURO Party List, et al., Pimentel, Jr., et al., and Escudero, et al. contend
in common that Sections 4, 5 and 6 of R.A. No. 9337, amending Sections 106, 107 and 108,
respectively, of the NIRC giving the President the stand-by authority to raise the VAT rate from
10% to 12% when a certain condition is met, constitutes undue delegation of the legislative
power to tax.
The assailed provisions read as follows:
SEC. 4. Sec. 106 of the same Code, as amended, is hereby further amended to read as follows:
SEC. 106. Value-Added Tax on Sale of Goods or Properties.
(A) Rate and Base of Tax. There shall be levied, assessed and collected on every sale, barter or
exchange of goods or properties, a value-added tax equivalent to ten percent (10%) of the gross
selling price or gross value in money of the goods or properties sold, bartered or exchanged, such
tax to be paid by the seller or transferor:provided, that the President, upon the
recommendation of the Secretary of Finance, shall, effective January 1, 2006, raise the rate
of value-added tax to twelve percent (12%), after any of the following conditions has been
satisfied.
(i) value-added tax collection as a percentage of Gross Domestic Product (GDP) of the
previous year exceeds two and four-fifth percent (2 4/5%) or
(ii) national government deficit as a percentage of GDP of the previous year exceeds one
and one-half percent (1 %).
SEC. 5. Section 107 of the same Code, as amended, is hereby further amended to read as
follows:
SEC. 107. Value-Added Tax on Importation of Goods.
(A) In General. There shall be levied, assessed and collected on every importation of goods a
value-added tax equivalent to ten percent (10%) based on the total value used by the Bureau of
Customs in determining tariff and customs duties, plus customs duties, excise taxes, if any, and
other charges, such tax to be paid by the importer prior to the release of such goods from customs
custody: Provided, That where the customs duties are determined on the basis of the quantity or
volume of the goods, the value-added tax shall be based on the landed cost plus excise taxes, if
any: provided, further, that the President, upon the recommendation of the Secretary of
Finance, shall, effective January 1, 2006, raise the rate of value-added tax to twelve percent
(12%) after any of the following conditions has been satisfied.
and one-half percent (1 %).
SEC. 6. Section 108 of the same Code, as amended, is hereby further amended to read as
follows:
SEC. 108. Value-added Tax on Sale of Services and Use or Lease of Properties
(A) Rate and Base of Tax. There shall be levied, assessed and collected, a value-added tax
equivalent to ten percent (10%) of gross receipts derived from the sale or exchange of
services: provided, that the President, upon the recommendation of the Secretary of
Finance, shall, effective January 1, 2006, raise the rate of value-added tax to twelve percent
(12%), after any of the following conditions has been satisfied.
and one-half percent (1 %). (Emphasis supplied)
Petitioners allege that the grant of the stand-by authority to the President to increase the VAT rate
is a virtual abdication by Congress of its exclusive power to tax because such delegation is not
within the purview of Section 28 (2), Article VI of the Constitution, which provides:
The Congress may, by law, authorize the President to fix within specified limits, and may
impose, tariff rates, import and export quotas, tonnage and wharfage dues, and other duties or
imposts within the framework of the national development program of the government.
They argue that the VAT is a tax levied on the sale, barter or exchange of goods and properties as
well as on the sale or exchange of services, which cannot be included within the purview of
tariffs under the exempted delegation as the latter refers to customs duties, tolls or tribute
payable upon merchandise to the government and usually imposed on goods or merchandise
imported or exported.
Petitioners ABAKADA GURO Party List, et al., further contend that delegating to the President
the legislative power to tax is contrary to republicanism. They insist that accountability,
responsibility and transparency should dictate the actions of Congress and they should not pass
to the President the decision to impose taxes. They also argue that the law also effectively
nullified the Presidents power of control, which includes the authority to set aside and nullify
the acts of her subordinates like the Secretary of Finance, by mandating the fixing of the tax rate
by the President upon the recommendation of the Secretary of Finance.
Petitioners Pimentel, et al. aver that the President has ample powers to cause, influence or create
the conditions provided by the law to bring about either or both the conditions precedent.
On the other hand, petitioners Escudero, et al. find bizarre and revolting the situation that the
imposition of the 12% rate would be subject to the whim of the Secretary of Finance, an
unelected bureaucrat, contrary to the principle of no taxation without representation. They submit
that the Secretary of Finance is not mandated to give a favorable recommendation and he may
not even give his recommendation. Moreover, they allege that no guiding standards are provided
in the law on what basis and as to how he will make his recommendation. They claim,
nonetheless, that any recommendation of the Secretary of Finance can easily be brushed aside by
the President since the former is a mere alter ego of the latter, such that, ultimately, it is the
President who decides whether to impose the increased tax rate or not.
A brief discourse on the principle of non-delegation of powers is instructive.

The principle of separation of powers ordains that each of the three great branches of
government has exclusive cognizance of and is supreme in matters falling within its own
constitutionally allocated sphere.37 A logical
corollary to the doctrine of separation of powers is the principle of non-delegation of powers, as
expressed in the Latin maxim: potestas delegata non delegari potest which means "what has
been delegated, cannot be delegated."38 This doctrine is based on the ethical principle that such as
delegated power constitutes not only a right but a duty to be performed by the delegate through
the instrumentality of his own judgment and not through the intervening mind of another.39
With respect to the Legislature, Section 1 of Article VI of the Constitution provides that "the
Legislative power shall be vested in the Congress of the Philippines which shall consist of a
Senate and a House of Representatives." The powers which Congress is prohibited from
delegating are those which are strictly, or inherently and exclusively, legislative. Purely
legislative power, which can never be delegated, has been described as theauthority to make a
complete law complete as to the time when it shall take effect and as to whom it shall be
applicable and to determine the expediency of its enactment.40 Thus, the rule is that in order
that a court may be justified in holding a statute unconstitutional as a delegation of legislative
power, it must appear that the power involved is purely legislative in nature that is, one
appertaining exclusively to the legislative department. It is the nature of the power, and not the
liability of its use or the manner of its exercise, which determines the validity of its delegation.
Nonetheless, the general rule barring delegation of legislative powers is subject to the following
recognized limitations or exceptions:
(1) Delegation of tariff powers to the President under Section 28 (2) of Article VI of the
Constitution;
(2) Delegation of emergency powers to the President under Section 23 (2) of Article VI of the
Constitution;
(3) Delegation to the people at large;
(4) Delegation to local governments; and
(5) Delegation to administrative bodies.
In every case of permissible delegation, there must be a showing that the delegation itself is
valid. It is valid only if the law (a) is complete in itself, setting forth therein the policy to be
executed, carried out, or implemented by the delegate; 41 and (b) fixes a standard the limits of
which are sufficiently determinate and determinable to which the delegate must conform in
the performance of his functions.42 A sufficient standard is one which defines legislative policy,
marks its limits, maps out its boundaries and specifies the public agency to apply it. It indicates
the circumstances under which the legislative command is to be effected. 43 Both tests are
intended to prevent a total transference of legislative authority to the delegate, who is not
allowed to step into the shoes of the legislature and exercise a power essentially legislative.44
In People vs. Vera,45 the Court, through eminent Justice Jose P. Laurel, expounded on the concept
and extent of delegation of power in this wise:
In testing whether a statute constitutes an undue delegation of legislative power or not, it is usual
to inquire whether the statute was complete in all its terms and provisions when it left the hands
of the legislature so that nothing was left to the judgment of any other appointee or delegate of
the legislature.
...
The true distinction, says Judge Ranney, is between the delegation of power to make the
law, which necessarily involves a discretion as to what it shall be, and conferring an
authority or discretion as to its execution, to be exercised under and in pursuance of the
law. The first cannot be done; to the latter no valid objection can be made.
...
It is contended, however, that a legislative act may be made to the effect as law after it leaves the
hands of the legislature. It is true that laws may be made effective on certain contingencies, as by
proclamation of the executive or the adoption by the people of a particular community. In
Wayman vs. Southard, the Supreme Court of the United States ruled that the legislature may
delegate a power not legislative which it may itself rightfully exercise. The power to ascertain
facts is such a power which may be delegated. There is nothing essentially legislative in
ascertaining the existence of facts or conditions as the basis of the taking into effect of a
law. That is a mental process common to all branches of the government. Notwithstanding
the apparent tendency, however, to relax the rule prohibiting delegation of legislative authority
on account of the complexity arising from social and economic forces at work in this modern
industrial age, the orthodox pronouncement of Judge Cooley in his work on Constitutional
Limitations finds restatement in Prof. Willoughby's treatise on the Constitution of the United
States in the following language speaking of declaration of legislative power to administrative
agencies: The principle which permits the legislature to provide that the administrative
agent may determine when the circumstances are such as require the application of a law is
defended upon the ground that at the time this authority is granted, the rule of public
policy, which is the essence of the legislative act, is determined by the legislature. In other
words, the legislature, as it is its duty to do, determines that, under given circumstances,
certain executive or administrative action is to be taken, and that, under other
circumstances, different or no action at all is to be taken. What is thus left to the
administrative official is not the legislative determination of what public policy demands,
but simply the ascertainment of what the facts of the case require to be done according to
the terms of the law by which he is governed. The efficiency of an Act as a declaration of
legislative will must, of course, come from Congress, but the ascertainment of the
contingency upon which the Act shall take effect may be left to such agencies as it may
designate. The legislature, then, may provide that a law shall take effect upon the
happening of future specified contingencies leaving to some other person or body the power
to determine when the specified contingency has arisen. (Emphasis supplied).46
In Edu vs. Ericta,47 the Court reiterated:
What cannot be delegated is the authority under the Constitution to make laws and to alter and
repeal them; the test is the completeness of the statute in all its terms and provisions when it
leaves the hands of the legislature. To determine whether or not there is an undue delegation of
legislative power, the inquiry must be directed to the scope and definiteness of the measure
enacted. The legislative does not abdicate its functions when it describes what job must be
done, who is to do it, and what is the scope of his authority. For a complex economy, that may
be the only way in which the legislative process can go forward. A distinction has rightfully
been made between delegation of power to make the laws which necessarily involves a
discretion as to what it shall be, which constitutionally may not be done, and delegation of
authority or discretion as to its execution to be exercised under and in pursuance of the law,
to which no valid objection can be made. The Constitution is thus not to be regarded as
denying the legislature the necessary resources of flexibility and practicability. (Emphasis
supplied).48
Clearly, the legislature may delegate to executive officers or bodies the power to determine
certain facts or conditions, or the happening of contingencies, on which the operation of a statute
is, by its terms, made to depend, but the legislature must prescribe sufficient standards, policies
or limitations on their authority.49 While the power to tax cannot be delegated to executive
agencies, details as to the enforcement and administration of an exercise of such power may be
left to them, including the power to determine the existence of facts on which its operation
depends.50
The rationale for this is that the preliminary ascertainment of facts as basis for the enactment of
legislation is not of itself a legislative function, but is simply ancillary to legislation. Thus, the
duty of correlating information and making recommendations is the kind of subsidiary activity
which the legislature may perform through its members, or which it may delegate to others to
perform. Intelligent legislation on the complicated problems of modern society is impossible in
the absence of accurate information on the part of the legislators, and any reasonable method of
securing such information is proper.51 The Constitution as a continuously operative charter of
government does not require that Congress find for itself
every fact upon which it desires to base legislative action or that it make for itself detailed
determinations which it has declared to be prerequisite to application of legislative policy to
particular facts and circumstances impossible for Congress itself properly to investigate.52
In the present case, the challenged section of R.A. No. 9337 is the common proviso in Sections
4, 5 and 6 which reads as follows:
That the President, upon the recommendation of the Secretary of Finance, shall, effective
January 1, 2006, raise the rate of value-added tax to twelve percent (12%), after any of the
following conditions has been satisfied:
(i) Value-added tax collection as a percentage of Gross Domestic Product (GDP) of the previous
year exceeds two and four-fifth percent (2 4/5%); or
(ii) National government deficit as a percentage of GDP of the previous year exceeds one and
one-half percent (1 %).
The case before the Court is not a delegation of legislative power. It is simply a delegation of
ascertainment of facts upon which enforcement and administration of the increase rate under the
law is contingent. The legislature has made the operation of the 12% rate effective January 1,
2006, contingent upon a specified fact or condition. It leaves the entire operation or nonoperation of the 12% rate upon factual matters outside of the control of the executive.
No discretion would be exercised by the President. Highlighting the absence of discretion is the
fact that the wordshall is used in the common proviso. The use of the word shall connotes a
mandatory order. Its use in a statute denotes an imperative obligation and is inconsistent with the
idea of discretion.53 Where the law is clear and unambiguous, it must be taken to mean exactly
what it says, and courts have no choice but to see to it that the mandate is obeyed.54
Thus, it is the ministerial duty of the President to immediately impose the 12% rate upon the
existence of any of the conditions specified by Congress. This is a duty which cannot be evaded
by the President. Inasmuch as the law specifically uses the word shall, the exercise of discretion
by the President does not come into play. It is a clear directive to impose the 12% VAT rate when
the specified conditions are present. The time of taking into effect of the 12% VAT rate is based
on the happening of a certain specified contingency, or upon the ascertainment of certain facts or
conditions by a person or body other than the legislature itself.
The Court finds no merit to the contention of petitioners ABAKADA GURO Party List, et al. that
the law effectively nullified the Presidents power of control over the Secretary of Finance by
mandating the fixing of the tax rate by the President upon the recommendation of the Secretary
of Finance. The Court cannot also subscribe to the position of petitioners
Pimentel, et al. that the word shall should be interpreted to mean may in view of the phrase
"upon the recommendation of the Secretary of Finance." Neither does the Court find persuasive
the submission of petitioners Escudero, et al. that any recommendation by the Secretary of
Finance can easily be brushed aside by the President since the former is a mere alter ego of the
latter.
When one speaks of the Secretary of Finance as the alter ego of the President, it simply means
that as head of the Department of Finance he is the assistant and agent of the Chief Executive.
The multifarious executive and administrative functions of the Chief Executive are performed by
and through the executive departments, and the acts of the secretaries of such departments, such
as the Department of Finance, performed and promulgated in the regular course of business, are,
unless disapproved or reprobated by the Chief Executive, presumptively the acts of the Chief
Executive. The Secretary of Finance, as such, occupies a political position and holds office in an
advisory capacity, and, in the language of Thomas Jefferson, "should be of the President's bosom
confidence" and, in the language of Attorney-General Cushing, is "subject to the direction of the
President."55
In the present case, in making his recommendation to the President on the existence of either of
the two conditions, the Secretary of Finance is not acting as the alter ego of the President or even
her subordinate. In such instance, he is not subject to the power of control and direction of the
President. He is acting as the agent of the legislative department, to determine and declare the
event upon which its expressed will is to take effect. 56The Secretary of Finance becomes the
means or tool by which legislative policy is determined and implemented, considering that he
possesses all the facilities to gather data and information and has a much broader perspective to
properly evaluate them. His function is to gather and collate statistical data and other pertinent
information and verify if any of the two conditions laid out by Congress is present. His
personality in such instance is in reality but a projection of that of Congress. Thus, being the
agent of Congress and not of the President, the President cannot alter or modify or nullify, or set
aside the findings of the Secretary of Finance and to substitute the judgment of the former for
that of the latter.
Congress simply granted the Secretary of Finance the authority to ascertain the existence of a
fact, namely, whether by December 31, 2005, the value-added tax collection as a percentage of
Gross Domestic Product (GDP) of the previous year exceeds two and four-fifth percent (2 4/5%)
or the national government deficit as a percentage of GDP of the previous year exceeds one and
one-half percent (1%). If either of these two instances has occurred, the Secretary of Finance,
by legislative mandate, must submit such information to the President. Then the 12% VAT rate
must be imposed by the President effective January 1, 2006. There is no undue delegation of
legislative power but only of the discretion as to the execution of a law. This is
constitutionally permissible.57 Congress does not abdicate its functions or unduly delegate
power when it describes what job must be done, who must do it, and what is the scope of his
authority; in our complex economy that is frequently the only way in which the legislative
process can go forward.58
As to the argument of petitioners ABAKADA GURO Party List, et al. that delegating to the
President the legislative power to tax is contrary to the principle of republicanism, the same
deserves scant consideration. Congress did not delegate the power to tax but the mere
implementation of the law. The intent and will to increase the VAT rate to 12% came from
Congress and the task of the President is to simply execute the legislative policy. That Congress
chose to do so in such a manner is not within the province of the Court to inquire into, its task
being to interpret the law.59
The insinuation by petitioners Pimentel, et al. that the President has ample powers to cause,
influence or create the conditions to bring about either or both the conditions precedent does not
deserve any merit as this argument is highly speculative. The Court does not rule on allegations
which are manifestly conjectural, as these may not exist at all. The Court deals with facts, not
fancies; on realities, not appearances. When the Court acts on appearances instead of realities,
justice and law will be short-lived.
B. The 12% Increase VAT Rate Does Not Impose an Unfair and Unnecessary Additional Tax
Burden
Petitioners Pimentel, et al. argue that the 12% increase in the VAT rate imposes an unfair and
additional tax burden on the people. Petitioners also argue that the 12% increase, dependent on
any of the 2 conditions set forth in the contested provisions, is ambiguous because it does not
state if the VAT rate would be returned to the original 10% if the rates are no longer satisfied.
Petitioners also argue that such rate is unfair and unreasonable, as the people are unsure of the
applicable VAT rate from year to year.
Under the common provisos of Sections 4, 5 and 6 of R.A. No. 9337, if any of the two conditions
set forth therein are satisfied, the President shall increase the VAT rate to 12%. The provisions of
the law are clear. It does not provide for a return to the 10% rate nor does it empower the
President to so revert if, after the rate is increased to 12%, the VAT collection goes below the
24/5 of the GDP of the previous year or that the national government deficit as a percentage of
GDP of the previous year does not exceed 1%.
Therefore, no statutory construction or interpretation is needed. Neither can conditions or
limitations be introduced where none is provided for. Rewriting the law is a forbidden ground
that only Congress may tread upon.60
Thus, in the absence of any provision providing for a return to the 10% rate, which in this case
the Court finds none, petitioners argument is, at best, purely speculative. There is no basis for
petitioners fear of a fluctuating VAT rate because the law itself does not provide that the rate
should go back to 10% if the conditions provided in Sections 4, 5 and 6 are no longer present.
The rule is that where the provision of the law is clear and unambiguous, so that there is no
occasion for the court's seeking the legislative intent, the law must be taken as it is, devoid of
judicial addition or subtraction.61
Petitioners also contend that the increase in the VAT rate, which was allegedly an incentive to the
President to raise the VAT collection to at least 2 4/5 of the GDP of the previous year, should be
based on fiscal adequacy.
Petitioners obviously overlooked that increase in VAT collection is not the only condition. There
is another condition, i.e., the national government deficit as a percentage of GDP of the previous
year exceeds one and one-half percent (1 %).
Respondents explained the philosophy behind these alternative conditions:
1. VAT/GDP Ratio > 2.8%
The condition set for increasing VAT rate to 12% have economic or fiscal meaning. If VAT/GDP
is less than 2.8%, it means that government has weak or no capability of implementing the VAT
or that VAT is not effective in the function of the tax collection. Therefore, there is no value to
increase it to 12% because such action will also be ineffectual.
2. Natl Govt Deficit/GDP >1.5%
The condition set for increasing VAT when deficit/GDP is 1.5% or less means the fiscal
condition of government has reached a relatively sound position or is towards the direction of a
balanced budget position. Therefore, there is no need to increase the VAT rate since the fiscal
house is in a relatively healthy position. Otherwise stated, if the ratio is more than 1.5%, there is
indeed a need to increase the VAT rate.62
That the first condition amounts to an incentive to the President to increase the VAT collection
does not render it unconstitutional so long as there is a public purpose for which the law was
passed, which in this case, is mainly to raise revenue. In fact, fiscal adequacy dictated the need
for a raise in revenue.
The principle of fiscal adequacy as a characteristic of a sound tax system was originally stated by
Adam Smith in his Canons of Taxation (1776), as:
IV. Every tax ought to be so contrived as both to take out and to keep out of the pockets of the
people as little as possible over and above what it brings into the public treasury of the state.63
It simply means that sources of revenues must be adequate to meet government expenditures and
their variations.64
The dire need for revenue cannot be ignored. Our country is in a quagmire of financial woe.
During the Bicameral Conference Committee hearing, then Finance Secretary Purisima bluntly
depicted the countrys gloomy state of economic affairs, thus:
First, let me explain the position that the Philippines finds itself in right now. We are in a position
where 90 percent of our revenue is used for debt service. So, for every peso of revenue that we
currently raise, 90 goes to debt service. Thats interest plus amortization of our debt. So clearly,
this is not a sustainable situation. Thats the first fact.
The second fact is that our debt to GDP level is way out of line compared to other peer countries
that borrow money from that international financial markets. Our debt to GDP is approximately
equal to our GDP. Again, that shows you that this is not a sustainable situation.
The third thing that Id like to point out is the environment that we are presently operating in is
not as benign as what it used to be the past five years.
What do I mean by that?
In the past five years, weve been lucky because we were operating in a period of basically
global growth and low interest rates. The past few months, we have seen an inching up, in fact, a
rapid increase in the interest rates in the leading economies of the world. And, therefore, our
ability to borrow at reasonable prices is going to be challenged. In fact, ultimately, the question is
our ability to access the financial markets.
When the President made her speech in July last year, the environment was not as bad as it is
now, at least based on the forecast of most financial institutions. So, we were assuming that
raising 80 billion would put us in a position where we can then convince them to improve our
ability to borrow at lower rates. But conditions have changed on us because the interest rates
have gone up. In fact, just within this room, we tried to access the market for a billion dollars
because for this year alone, the Philippines will have to borrow 4 billion dollars. Of that amount,
we have borrowed 1.5 billion. We issued last January a 25-year bond at 9.7 percent cost. We
were trying to access last week and the market was not as favorable and up to now we have not
accessed and we might pull back because the conditions are not very good.
So given this situation, we at the Department of Finance believe that we really need to front-end
our deficit reduction. Because it is deficit that is causing the increase of the debt and we are in
what we call a debt spiral. The more debt you have, the more deficit you have because interest
and debt service eats and eats more of your revenue. We need to get out of this debt spiral. And
the only way, I think, we can get out of this debt spiral is really have a front-end adjustment in
our revenue base.65
The image portrayed is chilling. Congress passed the law hoping for rescue from an inevitable
catastrophe. Whether the law is indeed sufficient to answer the states economic dilemma is not
for the Court to judge. In theFarias case, the Court refused to consider the various arguments
raised therein that dwelt on the wisdom of Section 14 of R.A. No. 9006 (The Fair Election Act),
pronouncing that:
. . . policy matters are not the concern of the Court. Government policy is within the exclusive
dominion of the political branches of the government. It is not for this Court to look into the
wisdom or propriety of legislative determination. Indeed, whether an enactment is wise or
unwise, whether it is based on sound economic theory, whether it is the best means to achieve the
desired results, whether, in short, the legislative discretion within its prescribed limits should be
exercised in a particular manner are matters for the judgment of the legislature, and the serious
conflict of opinions does not suffice to bring them within the range of judicial cognizance.66
In the same vein, the Court in this case will not dawdle on the purpose of Congress or the
executive policy, given that it is not for the judiciary to "pass upon questions of wisdom, justice
or expediency of legislation."67
II.
Whether Section 8 of R.A. No. 9337, amending Sections 110(A)(2) and 110(B) of the NIRC; and
Section 12 of R.A. No. 9337, amending Section 114(C) of the NIRC, violate the following
b. Article III, Section 1
A. Due Process and Equal Protection Clauses
Petitioners Association of Pilipinas Shell Dealers, Inc., et al. argue that Section 8 of R.A. No.
9337, amending Sections 110 (A)(2), 110 (B), and Section 12 of R.A. No. 9337, amending
Section 114 (C) of the NIRC are arbitrary, oppressive, excessive and confiscatory. Their
argument is premised on the constitutional right against deprivation of life, liberty of property
without due process of law, as embodied in Article III, Section 1 of the Constitution.
Petitioners also contend that these provisions violate the constitutional guarantee of equal
protection of the law.
The doctrine is that where the due process and equal protection clauses are invoked, considering
that they are not fixed rules but rather broad standards, there is a need for proof of such
persuasive character as would lead to such a conclusion. Absent such a showing, the presumption
of validity must prevail.68
Section 8 of R.A. No. 9337, amending Section 110(B) of the NIRC imposes a limitation on the
amount of input tax that may be credited against the output tax. It states, in part: "[P]rovided, that
the input tax inclusive of the input VAT carried over from the previous quarter that may be
credited in every quarter shall not exceed seventy percent (70%) of the output VAT: "
Input Tax is defined under Section 110(A) of the NIRC, as amended, as the value-added tax
due from or paid by a VAT-registered person on the importation of goods or local purchase of
good and services, including lease or use of property, in the course of trade or business, from a
VAT-registered person, and Output Tax is the value-added tax due on the sale or lease of taxable
goods or properties or services by any person registered or required to register under the law.
Petitioners claim that the contested sections impose limitations on the amount of input tax that
may be claimed. In effect, a portion of the input tax that has already been paid cannot now be
credited against the output tax.
Petitioners argument is not absolute. It assumes that the input tax exceeds 70% of the output tax,
and therefore, the input tax in excess of 70% remains uncredited. However, to the extent that the
input tax is less than 70% of the output tax, then 100% of such input tax is still creditable.
More importantly, the excess input tax, if any, is retained in a businesss books of accounts and
remains creditable in the succeeding quarter/s. This is explicitly allowed by Section 110(B),
which provides that "if the input tax exceeds the output tax, the excess shall be carried over to
the succeeding quarter or quarters." In addition, Section 112(B) allows a VAT-registered person
to apply for the issuance of a tax credit certificate or refund for any unused input taxes, to the
extent that such input taxes have not been applied against the output taxes. Such unused input tax
may be used in payment of his other internal revenue taxes.
The non-application of the unutilized input tax in a given quarter is not ad infinitum, as
petitioners exaggeratedly contend. Their analysis of the effect of the 70% limitation is
incomplete and one-sided. It ends at the net effect that there will be unapplied/unutilized inputs
VAT for a given quarter. It does not proceed further to the fact that such unapplied/unutilized
input tax may be credited in the subsequent periods as allowed by the carry-over provision of
Section 110(B) or that it may later on be refunded through a tax credit certificate under Section
112(B).
Therefore, petitioners argument must be rejected.
On the other hand, it appears that petitioner Garcia failed to comprehend the operation of the
70% limitation on the input tax. According to petitioner, the limitation on the creditable input tax
in effect allows VAT-registered establishments to retain a portion of the taxes they collect, which
violates the principle that tax collection and revenue should be for public purposes and
expenditures
As earlier stated, the input tax is the tax paid by a person, passed on to him by the seller, when he
buys goods. Output tax meanwhile is the tax due to the person when he sells goods. In
computing the VAT payable, three possible scenarios may arise:
First, if at the end of a taxable quarter the output taxes charged by the seller are equal to the input
taxes that he paid and passed on by the suppliers, then no payment is required;
Second, when the output taxes exceed the input taxes, the person shall be liable for the excess,
which has to be paid to the Bureau of Internal Revenue (BIR);69 and
Third, if the input taxes exceed the output taxes, the excess shall be carried over to the
succeeding quarter or quarters. Should the input taxes result from zero-rated or effectively zerorated transactions, any excess over the output taxes shall instead be refunded to the taxpayer or
credited against other internal revenue taxes, at the taxpayers option.70
Section 8 of R.A. No. 9337 however, imposed a 70% limitation on the input tax. Thus, a person
can credit his input tax only up to the extent of 70% of the output tax. In laymans term, the
value-added taxes that a person/taxpayer paid and passed on to him by a seller can only be
credited up to 70% of the value-added taxes that is due to him on a taxable transaction. There is
no retention of any tax collection because the person/taxpayer has already previously paid the
input tax to a seller, and the seller will subsequently remit such input tax to the BIR. The party
directly liable for the payment of the tax is the seller.71 What only needs to be done is for the
person/taxpayer to apply or credit these input taxes, as evidenced by receipts, against his output
taxes.
Petitioners Association of Pilipinas Shell Dealers, Inc., et al. also argue that the input tax
partakes the nature of a property that may not be confiscated, appropriated, or limited without
due process of law.
The input tax is not a property or a property right within the constitutional purview of the due
process clause. A VAT-registered persons entitlement to the creditable input tax is a mere
statutory privilege.
The distinction between statutory privileges and vested rights must be borne in mind for persons
have no vested rights in statutory privileges. The state may change or take away rights, which
were created by the law of the state, although it may not take away property, which was vested
by virtue of such rights.72
Under the previous system of single-stage taxation, taxes paid at every level of distribution are
not recoverable from the taxes payable, although it becomes part of the cost, which is deductible
from the gross revenue. When Pres. Aquino issued E.O. No. 273 imposing a 10% multi-stage tax
on all sales, it was then that the crediting of the input tax paid on purchase or importation of
goods and services by VAT-registered persons against the output tax was introduced. 73 This was
adopted by the Expanded VAT Law (R.A. No. 7716),74 and The Tax Reform Act of 1997 (R.A.
No. 8424).75 The right to credit input tax as against the output tax is clearly a privilege created by
law, a privilege that also the law can remove, or in this case, limit.
Petitioners also contest as arbitrary, oppressive, excessive and confiscatory, Section 8 of R.A.
No. 9337, amending Section 110(A) of the NIRC, which provides:
SEC. 110. Tax Credits.
(A) Creditable Input Tax.
Provided, That the input tax on goods purchased or imported in a calendar month for use in trade
or business for which deduction for depreciation is allowed under this Code, shall be spread
evenly over the month of acquisition and the fifty-nine (59) succeeding months if the aggregate
acquisition cost for such goods, excluding the VAT component thereof, exceeds One million
pesos (P1,000,000.00): Provided, however, That if the estimated useful life of the capital goods
is less than five (5) years, as used for depreciation purposes, then the input VAT shall be spread
over such a shorter period: Provided, finally, That in the case of purchase of services, lease or use
of properties, the input tax shall be creditable to the purchaser, lessee or license upon payment of
the compensation, rental, royalty or fee.
The foregoing section imposes a 60-month period within which to amortize the creditable input
tax on purchase or importation of capital goods with acquisition cost of P1 Million pesos,
exclusive of the VAT component. Such spread out only poses a delay in the crediting of the input
tax. Petitioners argument is without basis because the taxpayer is not permanently deprived of
his privilege to credit the input tax.
It is worth mentioning that Congress admitted that the spread-out of the creditable input tax in
this case amounts to a 4-year interest-free loan to the government. 76 In the same breath, Congress
also justified its move by saying that the provision was designed to raise an annual revenue of
22.6 billion.77 The legislature also dispelled the fear that the provision will fend off foreign
investments, saying that foreign investors have other tax incentives provided by law, and citing
the case of China, where despite a 17.5% non-creditable VAT, foreign investments were not
deterred.78 Again, for whatever is the purpose of the 60-month amortization, this involves
executive economic policy and legislative wisdom in which the Court cannot intervene.
With regard to the 5% creditable withholding tax imposed on payments made by the government
for taxable transactions, Section 12 of R.A. No. 9337, which amended Section 114 of the NIRC,
reads:
SEC. 114. Return and Payment of Value-added Tax.
(C) Withholding of Value-added Tax. The Government or any of its political subdivisions,
instrumentalities or agencies, including government-owned or controlled corporations (GOCCs)
shall, before making payment on account of each purchase of goods and services which are
subject to the value-added tax imposed in Sections 106 and 108 of this Code, deduct and
withhold a final value-added tax at the rate of five percent (5%) of the gross payment thereof:
Provided, That the payment for lease or use of properties or property rights to nonresident
owners shall be subject to ten percent (10%) withholding tax at the time of payment. For
purposes of this Section, the payor or person in control of the payment shall be considered as the
withholding agent.
The value-added tax withheld under this Section shall be remitted within ten (10) days following
the end of the month the withholding was made.
Section 114(C) merely provides a method of collection, or as stated by respondents, a more
simplified VAT withholding system. The government in this case is constituted as a withholding
agent with respect to their payments for goods and services.
Prior to its amendment, Section 114(C) provided for different rates of value-added taxes to be
withheld -- 3% on gross payments for purchases of goods; 6% on gross payments for services
supplied by contractors other than by public works contractors; 8.5% on gross payments for
services supplied by public work contractors; or 10% on payment for the lease or use of
properties or property rights to nonresident owners. Under the present Section 114(C), these
different rates, except for the 10% on lease or property rights payment to nonresidents, were
deleted, and a uniform rate of 5% is applied.
The Court observes, however, that the law the used the word final. In tax usage, final, as opposed
to creditable, means full. Thus, it is provided in Section 114(C): "final value-added tax at the rate
of five percent (5%)."
In Revenue Regulations No. 02-98, implementing R.A. No. 8424 (The Tax Reform Act of 1997),
the concept of final withholding tax on income was explained, to wit:
SECTION 2.57. Withholding of Tax at Source
(A) Final Withholding Tax. Under the final withholding tax system the amount of income tax
withheld by the withholding agent is constituted as full and final payment of the income tax due
from the payee on the said income. The liability for payment of the tax rests primarily on the
payor as a withholding agent. Thus, in case of his failure to withhold the tax or in case of
underwithholding, the deficiency tax shall be collected from the payor/withholding agent.
(B) Creditable Withholding Tax. Under the creditable withholding tax system, taxes withheld
on certain income payments are intended to equal or at least approximate the tax due of the
payee on said income. Taxes withheld on income payments covered by the expanded
withholding tax (referred to in Sec. 2.57.2 of these regulations) and compensation income
(referred to in Sec. 2.78 also of these regulations) are creditable in nature.
As applied to value-added tax, this means that taxable transactions with the government are
subject to a 5% rate, which constitutes as full payment of the tax payable on the transaction. This
represents the net VAT payable of the seller. The other 5% effectively accounts for the standard
input VAT (deemed input VAT), in lieu of the actual input VAT directly or attributable to the
taxable transaction.79
The Court need not explore the rationale behind the provision. It is clear that Congress intended
to treat differently taxable transactions with the government.80 This is supported by the fact that
under the old provision, the 5% tax withheld by the government remains creditable against the
tax liability of the seller or contractor, to wit:
SEC. 114. Return and Payment of Value-added Tax.

(C) Withholding of Creditable Value-added Tax. The Government or any of its political
subdivisions, instrumentalities or agencies, including government-owned or controlled
corporations (GOCCs) shall, before making payment on account of each purchase of goods from
sellers and services rendered by contractors which are subject to the value-added tax imposed in
Sections 106 and 108 of this Code, deduct and withhold the value-added tax due at the rate of
three percent (3%) of the gross payment for the purchase of goods and six percent (6%) on gross
receipts for services rendered by contractors on every sale or installment payment which shall
becreditable against the value-added tax liability of the seller or contractor: Provided,
however, That in the case of government public works contractors, the withholding rate shall be
eight and one-half percent (8.5%): Provided, further, That the payment for lease or use of
properties or property rights to nonresident owners shall be subject to ten percent (10%)
withholding tax at the time of payment. For this purpose, the payor or person in control of the
payment shall be considered as the withholding agent.
The valued-added tax withheld under this Section shall be remitted within ten (10) days
following the end of the month the withholding was made. (Emphasis supplied)
As amended, the use of the word final and the deletion of the word creditable exhibits
Congresss intention to treat transactions with the government differently. Since it has not been
shown that the class subject to the 5% final withholding tax has been unreasonably narrowed,
there is no reason to invalidate the provision. Petitioners, as petroleum dealers, are not the only
ones subjected to the 5% final withholding tax. It applies to all those who deal with the
government.
Moreover, the actual input tax is not totally lost or uncreditable, as petitioners believe. Revenue
Regulations No. 14-2005 or the Consolidated Value-Added Tax Regulations 2005 issued by the
BIR, provides that should the actual input tax exceed 5% of gross payments, the excess may
form part of the cost. Equally, should the actual input tax be less than 5%, the difference is
treated as income.81
Petitioners also argue that by imposing a limitation on the creditable input tax, the government
gets to tax a profit or value-added even if there is no profit or value-added.
Petitioners stance is purely hypothetical, argumentative, and again, one-sided. The Court will
not engage in a legal joust where premises are what ifs, arguments, theoretical and facts,
uncertain. Any disquisition by the Court on this point will only be, as Shakespeare describes life
in Macbeth,82 "full of sound and fury, signifying nothing."
Whats more, petitioners contention assumes the proposition that there is no profit or valueadded. It need not take an astute businessman to know that it is a matter of exception that a
business will sell goods or services without profit or value-added. It cannot be overstressed that a
business is created precisely for profit.
The equal protection clause under the Constitution means that "no person or class of persons
shall be deprived of the same protection of laws which is enjoyed by other persons or other
classes in the same place and in like circumstances."83
The power of the State to make reasonable and natural classifications for the purposes of taxation
has long been established. Whether it relates to the subject of taxation, the kind of property, the
rates to be levied, or the amounts to be raised, the methods of assessment, valuation and
collection, the States power is entitled to presumption of validity. As a rule, the judiciary will
not interfere with such power absent a clear showing of unreasonableness, discrimination, or
arbitrariness.84
Petitioners point out that the limitation on the creditable input tax if the entity has a high ratio of
input tax, or invests in capital equipment, or has several transactions with the government, is not
based on real and substantial differences to meet a valid classification.
The argument is pedantic, if not outright baseless. The law does not make any classification in
the subject of taxation, the kind of property, the rates to be levied or the amounts to be raised, the
methods of assessment, valuation and collection. Petitioners alleged distinctions are based on
variables that bear different consequences. While the implementation of the law may yield
varying end results depending on ones profit margin and value-added, the Court cannot go
beyond what the legislature has laid down and interfere with the affairs of business.
The equal protection clause does not require the universal application of the laws on all persons
or things without distinction. This might in fact sometimes result in unequal protection. What the
clause requires is equality among equals as determined according to a valid classification. By
classification is meant the grouping of persons or things similar to each other in certain
particulars and different from all others in these same particulars.85
Petitioners brought to the Courts attention the introduction of Senate Bill No. 2038 by Sens.
S.R. Osmea III and Ma. Ana Consuelo A.S. Madrigal on June 6, 2005, and House Bill No.
4493 by Rep. Eric D. Singson. The proposed legislation seeks to amend the 70% limitation by
increasing the same to 90%. This, according to petitioners, supports their stance that the 70%
limitation is arbitrary and confiscatory. On this score, suffice it to say that these are still proposed
legislations. Until Congress amends the law, and absent any unequivocal basis for its
unconstitutionality, the 70% limitation stays.
B. Uniformity and Equitability of Taxation
Article VI, Section 28(1) of the Constitution reads:
The rule of taxation shall be uniform and equitable. The Congress shall evolve a progressive
system of taxation.
Uniformity in taxation means that all taxable articles or kinds of property of the same class shall
be taxed at the same rate. Different articles may be taxed at different amounts provided that the
rate is uniform on the same class everywhere with all people at all times.86
In this case, the tax law is uniform as it provides a standard rate of 0% or 10% (or 12%) on all
goods and services. Sections 4, 5 and 6 of R.A. No. 9337, amending Sections 106, 107 and 108,
respectively, of the NIRC, provide for a rate of 10% (or 12%) on sale of goods and properties,
importation of goods, and sale of services and use or lease of properties. These same sections
also provide for a 0% rate on certain sales and transaction.
Neither does the law make any distinction as to the type of industry or trade that will bear the
70% limitation on the creditable input tax, 5-year amortization of input tax paid on purchase of
capital goods or the 5% final withholding tax by the government. It must be stressed that the rule
of uniform taxation does not deprive Congress of the power to classify subjects of taxation, and
only demands uniformity within the particular class.87
R.A. No. 9337 is also equitable. The law is equipped with a threshold margin. The VAT rate of
0% or 10% (or 12%) does not apply to sales of goods or services with gross annual sales or
receipts not exceedingP1,500,000.00.88 Also, basic marine and agricultural food products in their
original state are still not subject to the tax, 89 thus ensuring that prices at the grassroots level will
remain accessible. As was stated in Kapatiran ng mga Naglilingkod sa Pamahalaan ng
Pilipinas, Inc. vs. Tan:90
The disputed sales tax is also equitable. It is imposed only on sales of goods or services by
persons engaged in business with an aggregate gross annual sales exceeding P200,000.00. Small
corner sari-sari stores are consequently exempt from its application. Likewise exempt from the
tax are sales of farm and marine products, so that the costs of basic food and other necessities,
spared as they are from the incidence of the VAT, are expected to be relatively lower and within
the reach of the general public.
It is admitted that R.A. No. 9337 puts a premium on businesses with low profit margins, and
unduly favors those with high profit margins. Congress was not oblivious to this. Thus, to
equalize the weighty burden the law entails, the law, under Section 116, imposed a 3%
percentage tax on VAT-exempt persons under Section 109(v), i.e., transactions with gross annual
sales and/or receipts not exceeding P1.5 Million. This acts as a equalizer because in effect,
bigger businesses that qualify for VAT coverage and VAT-exempt taxpayers stand on equalfooting.
Moreover, Congress provided mitigating measures to cushion the impact of the imposition of the
tax on those previously exempt. Excise taxes on petroleum products 91 and natural gas92 were
reduced. Percentage tax on domestic carriers was removed.93 Power producers are now exempt
from paying franchise tax.94
Aside from these, Congress also increased the income tax rates of corporations, in order to
distribute the burden of taxation. Domestic, foreign, and non-resident corporations are now
subject to a 35% income tax rate, from a previous 32%.95 Intercorporate dividends of nonresident foreign corporations are still subject to 15% final withholding tax but the tax credit
allowed on the corporations domicile was increased to 20%. 96 The Philippine Amusement and
Gaming Corporation (PAGCOR) is not exempt from income taxes anymore. 97 Even the sale by
an artist of his works or services performed for the production of such works was not spared.
All these were designed to ease, as well as spread out, the burden of taxation, which would
otherwise rest largely on the consumers. It cannot therefore be gainsaid that R.A. No. 9337 is
equitable.
C. Progressivity of Taxation
Lastly, petitioners contend that the limitation on the creditable input tax is anything but
regressive. It is the smaller business with higher input tax-output tax ratio that will suffer the
consequences.
Progressive taxation is built on the principle of the taxpayers ability to pay. This principle was
also lifted from Adam Smiths Canons of Taxation, and it states:
I. The subjects of every state ought to contribute towards the support of the government, as
nearly as possible, in proportion to their respective abilities; that is, in proportion to the revenue
which they respectively enjoy under the protection of the state.
Taxation is progressive when its rate goes up depending on the resources of the person affected.98
The VAT is an antithesis of progressive taxation. By its very nature, it is regressive. The principle
of progressive taxation has no relation with the VAT system inasmuch as the VAT paid by the
consumer or business for every goods bought or services enjoyed is the same regardless of
income. In
other words, the VAT paid eats the same portion of an income, whether big or small. The
disparity lies in the income earned by a person or profit margin marked by a business, such that
the higher the income or profit margin, the smaller the portion of the income or profit that is
eaten by VAT. A converso, the lower the income or profit margin, the bigger the part that the VAT
eats away. At the end of the day, it is really the lower income group or businesses with low-profit
margins that is always hardest hit.
Nevertheless, the Constitution does not really prohibit the imposition of indirect taxes, like the
VAT. What it simply provides is that Congress shall "evolve a progressive system of taxation."
The Court stated in the Tolentino case, thus:
regressive. What it simply provides is that Congress shall evolve a progressive system of
taxation. The constitutional provision has been interpreted to mean simply that direct taxes are .
. . to be preferred [and] as much as possible, indirect taxes should be minimized. (E.
FERNANDO, THE CONSTITUTION OF THE PHILIPPINES 221 (Second ed. 1977)) Indeed,
the proclamation of Art. VIII, 17 (1) of the 1973 Constitution from which the present Art. VI,
28 (1) was taken. Sales taxes are also regressive.
the case of the VAT, the law minimizes the regressive effects of this imposition by providing for
zero rating of certain transactions (R.A. No. 7716, 3, amending 102 (b) of the NIRC), while
granting exemptions to other transactions. (R.A. No. 7716, 4 amending 103 of the NIRC)99
CONCLUSION
It has been said that taxes are the lifeblood of the government. In this case, it is just an enema, a
first-aid measure to resuscitate an economy in distress. The Court is neither blind nor is it turning
a deaf ear on the plight of the masses. But it does not have the panacea for the malady that the
law seeks to remedy. As in other cases, the Court cannot strike down a law as unconstitutional
simply because of its yokes.
Let us not be overly influenced by the plea that for every wrong there is a remedy, and that the
judiciary should stand ready to afford relief. There are undoubtedly many wrongs the judicature
may not correct, for instance, those involving political questions. . . .
Let us likewise disabuse our minds from the notion that the judiciary is the repository of
remedies for all political or social ills; We should not forget that the Constitution has judiciously
allocated the powers of government to three distinct and separate compartments; and that judicial
interpretation has tended to the preservation of the independence of the three, and a zealous
regard of the prerogatives of each, knowing full well that one is not the guardian of the others
and that, for official wrong-doing, each may be brought to account, either by impeachment, trial
or by the ballot box.100
The words of the Court in Vera vs. Avelino101 holds true then, as it still holds true now. All things
considered, there is no raison d'tre for the unconstitutionality of R.A. No. 9337.
WHEREFORE, Republic Act No. 9337 not being unconstitutional, the petitions in G.R. Nos.
168056, 168207, 168461, 168463, and 168730, are hereby DISMISSED.
There being no constitutional impediment to the full enforcement and implementation of R.A.
No. 9337, the temporary restraining order issued by the Court on July 1, 2005 is LIFTED upon
finality of herein decision.
SO ORDERED.
[G.R. No. 87636. November 19, 1990.]
NEPTALI A. GONZALES, ERNESTO M. MACEDA, ALBERTO G. ROMULO,

HEHERSON T. ALVAREZ, EDGARDO J. ANGARA, AGAPITO A. AQUINO, TEOFISTO
T. GUINGONA, JR., ERNESTO F. HERRERA, JOSE D. LINA, JR., JOHN OSMEA,
VICENTE T. PATERNO, RENE A. SAGUISAG, LETICIA RAMOS-SHAHANI,
MAMINTAL ABDUL J. TAMANO, WIGBERTO E. TAADA, JOVITO R. SALONGA,
ORLANDO S. MERCADO, JUAN PONCE ENRILE, JOSEPH ESTRADA, SOTERO
LAUREL, AQUILINO PIMENTEL, JR., SANTANINA RASUL, VICTOR
ZIGA, Petitioners, v. HON. CATALINO MACARAIG, JR., HON. VICENTE JAYME,
HON. CARLOS DOMINGUEZ, HON. FULGENCIO FACTORAN, HON. FIORELLO
ESTUAR, HON. LOURDES QUISUMBING, HON. RAUL MANGLAPUS, HON.
ALFREDO BENGSON, HON. JOSE CONCEPCION, HON. LUIS SANTOS, HON. MITA
PARDO DE TAVERA, HON. RAINERIO REYES, HON. GUILLERMO CARAGUE,
HON. ROSALINA CAJUCOM and HON. EUFEMIO C. DOMINGO, Respondents.
Gonzales, Batiller, Bilog & Associates for petitioners.
DECISION
This constitutional controversy between the legislative and executive departments of government
stemmed from Senate Resolution No. 381, adopted on 2 February 1989,
"Authorizing and Directing the Committee on Finance to Bring in the Name of the Senate of the
Philippines the Proper Suit with the Supreme Court of the Philippines contesting the
Constitutionality of the Veto by the President of Special and General Provisions, particularly
Section 55, of the General Appropriation Bill of 1989 (H.B. No. 19186) and For Other
Purposes."cralaw
virtua1aw
library
Petitioners are thus before us as members and ex-officio members of the Committee on Finance
of the Senate and as "substantial taxpayers whose vital interests may be affected by this
case."cralaw
virtua1aw
library
Respondents are members of the Cabinet tasked with the implementation of the General
Appropriations Act of 1989 and 1990, some of them incumbents, while others have already been
replaced, and include the National Treasurer and the Commission on Audit Chairman, all of
whom
are
being
sued
in
their
official
capacities.chanrobles.com:cralaw:red
The
Background
Facts
On 16 December 1988, Congress passed House Bill No. 19186, or the General Appropriations
Bill for the Fiscal Year 1989. As passed, it eliminated or decreased certain items included in the
proposed
budget
submitted
by
the
President.
Pursuant to the constitutional provision on the passage of bills, Congress presented the said Bill
to
the
President
for
consideration
and
approval.
On 29 December 1988, the President signed the Bill into law, and declared the same to have
become Rep. Act No. 6688. In the process, seven (7) Special Provisions and Section 55, a
"General
Provision,"
were
vetoed.
On 2 February 1989, the Senate, in the same Resolution No. 381 mentioned at the outset, further
expressed:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"WHEREAS, Be it Resolved, as it is hereby Resolved, That the Senate express its sense that the
veto by the President of Section 55 of the GENERAL PROVISIONS of the General
Appropriation Bill of 1989 (H.B. No. 19186) is unconstitutional and, therefore, void and without
any
force
and
effect;
hence,
the
aforesaid
Section
55
remains;
"x
x"
Thus it is that, on 11 April 1989, this Petition for Prohibition/ Mandamus was filed, with a prayer
for the issuance of a Writ of Preliminary Injunction and Restraining Order, assailing mainly the
constitutionality or legality of the Presidential veto of Section 55, and seeking to enjoin
respondents from implementing Rep. Act No. 6688. No Restraining Order was issued by the
Court.
The Comment, submitted by the Solicitor General on 25 August 1989 (after several extensions
granted), was considered as the Answer to the Petition and, on 7 September 1989, the Court
Resolved to give due course to the Petition and to require the parties to submit their respective
Memoranda. Petitioners filed their Memorandum on 12 December 1989. But, on 19 January
1990, they filed a Motion for Leave to File and to Admit Supplemental Petition, which was
granted, basically raising the same issue as in the original Petition, this time questioning the
Presidents veto of certain provisions, particularly Section 16, of House Bill 26934, or the
General Appropriations Bill for Fiscal Year 1990, which the President declared to have become
Rep. Act No. 6831.chanrobles virtualawlibrary chanrobles.com:chanrobles.com.ph
The Solicitor Generals Comment on the Supplemental Petition, on behalf of respondent public
officials, was submitted on 24 April 1990. On 15 May 1990, the Court required the parties to file
simultaneously their consolidated memoranda, to include the Supplemental Petition, within an
inextendible period of thirty (30) days from notice. However, because the original Resolution of
15 May 1990 merely required the filing of a memorandum on the Supplemental Petition, a
revised Resolution requiring consolidated memoranda, within thirty (30) days from notice, was
released
on
28
June
1990.
The Consolidated Memoranda were respectively filed on 26 June 1990 by petitioners, and on 1
August 1990 by respondents. On 14 August 1990, both Memoranda were Noted and the case was
deemed
submitted
for
deliberation.
On 11 September 1990, the Court heard the case on oral argument and required the submittal of
supplemental Memoranda, the last of which was filed on 26 September 1990.
The
Vetoed
Provisions
and
Reasons
Therefor
Section 55 of the Appropriations Act of 1989 (Section 55 [FY 89] hereinafter), which was
vetoed
by
the
President,
reads:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"SEC. 55. Prohibition Against the Restoration or Increase of Recommended Appropriations
Disapproved and/or Reduced by Congress: No item of appropriation recommended by the
President in the Budget submitted to Congress pursuant to Article VII, Section 22 of the
Constitution which has been disapproved or reduced in this Act shall be restored or increased by
the use of appropriations authorized for other purposes by augmentation. An item of
appropriation for any purpose recommended by the President in the Budget shall be deemed to
have been disapproved by Congress if no corresponding appropriation for the specific purpose is
provided
in
this
Act."cralaw
virtua1aw
library
We
quote
below
the
reason
for
the
Presidential
veto:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"The provision violates Section 25 (5) of Article VI of the Constitution. If allowed, this Section
would nullify not only the constitutional and statutory authority of the President, but also that of
the President of the Senate, the Speaker of the House of Representatives, the Chief Justice of the
Supreme Court, and Heads of Constitutional Commissions, to augment any item in the general
appropriations law for their respective offices from savings in other items of their respective
appropriations. A careful review of the legislative action on the budget as submitted shows that in
almost all cases, the budgets of agencies as recommended by the President, as well as those of
the Senate, the House of Representatives, and the Constitutional Commissions, have been
reduced. An unwanted consequence of this provision is the inability of the President, the
President of the Senate, Speaker of the House of Representatives, the Chief Justice of the
Supreme Court, and the heads of Constitutional Commissions to augment any item of
appropriation of their respective offices from savings in other items of their respective
appropriations even in cases of calamity or in the event of urgent need to accelerate the
implementation
of
essential
public
services
and
infrastructure
projects.
"Furthermore, this provision is inconsistent with Section 12 and other similar provisions of this
General
Appropriations
Act."cralaw
virtua1aw
library
A substantially similar provision as the vetoed Section 55 appears in the Appropriations Act of
1990,
this
time
crafted
as
follows:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"B.
GENERAL
PROVISIONS
"Sec. 16. Use of Savings. The President of the Philippines, the President of the Senate, the
Speaker of the House of Representatives, the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court, the Heads of
Constitutional Commissions under Article IX of the Constitution and the Ombudsman are hereby
authorized to augment any item in this Act for their respective offices from savings in other items
of their appropriations: PROVIDED, THAT NO ITEM OF APPROPRIATION
RECOMMENDED BY THE PRESIDENT IN THE BUDGET SUBMITTED TO CONGRESS
PURSUANT TO ARTICLE VII, SECTION 22 OF THE CONSTITUTION WHICH HAS BEEN
DISAPPROVED OR REDUCED BY CONGRESS SHALL BE RESTORED OR INCREASED
BY THE USE OF APPROPRIATIONS AUTHORIZED FOR OTHER PURPOSES IN THIS
ACT BY AUGMENTATION. AN ITEM OF APPROPRIATION FOR ANY PURPOSE
RECOMMENDED BY THE PRESIDENT IN THE BUDGET SHALL BE DEEMED TO HAVE
BEEN DISAPPROVED BY CONGRESS IF NO CORRESPONDING APPROPRIATION FOR
THE SPECIFIC PURPOSE IS PROVIDED IN THIS ACT."cralaw virtua1aw library
It should be noted that in the 1989 Appropriations Act, the "Use of Savings" appears in Section
12, separate and apart from Section 55; whereas in the 1990 Appropriations Act, the "Use of
Savings" and the vetoed provision have been commingled in Section 16 only, with the vetoed
provision
made
to
appear
as
a
condition
or
restriction.
Essentially the same reason was given for the veto of Section 16 (FY 90),
thus:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"I am vetoing this provision for the reason that it violates Section 25 (5) of Article VI of the
Constitution in relation to Sections 44 and 45 of P.D. No. 1177 as amended by R.A. No. 6670
which authorizes the President to use savings to augment any item of appropriations in the
Executive
Branch
of
the
Government.
"Parenthetically, there is a case pending in the Supreme Court relative to the validity of the
Presidents veto on Section 55 of the General Provisions of Republic Act No. 6688 upon which
the amendment on this Section was based. Inclusion, therefore, of the proviso in the last sentence
of this section might prejudice the Executive Branchs position in the case.
"Moreover, if allowed, this Section would nullify not only the constitutional and statutory
authority of the President, but also that of the officials enumerated under Section 25 (5) of Article
VI of the Constitution, to augment any item in the general appropriations law for their respective
appropriations.
"An unwanted consequence of this provision would be the inability of the President, the
President of the Senate, Speaker of the House of Representatives, the Chief Justice of the
Supreme Court, and heads of Constitutional Commissions to augment any item of appropriation
of their respective offices from savings in other items of their respective appropriations even in
cases of national emergency or in the event of urgent need to accelerate the implementation of
essential public services and infrastructure projects."cralaw virtua1aw library
The fundamental issue raised is whether or not the veto by the President of Section 55 of the
1989 Appropriations Bill (Section 55 FY 89), and subsequently of its counterpart Section 16 of
the 1990 Appropriations Bill (Section 16 FY 90), is unconstitutional and without
effect.chanrobles.com:cralaw:red
The
Contending
Views
In essence, petitioners cause is anchored on the following grounds: (1) the Presidents line-veto
power as regards appropriation bills is limited to item/s and does not cover provision/s; therefore,
she exceeded her authority when she vetoed Section 55 (FY 89) and Section 16 (FY 90) which
are provisions; (2) when the President objects to a provision of an appropriation bill, she cannot
exercise the item-veto power but should veto the entire bill; (3) the item-veto power does not
carry with it the power to strike out conditions or restrictions for that would be legislation, in
violation of the doctrine of separation of powers; and (4) the power of augmentation in Article
VI, Section 25 [5] of the 1987 Constitution, has to be provided for by law and, therefore,
Congress is also vested with the prerogative to impose restrictions on the exercise of that power.
The Solicitor General, as counsel for public respondents, counters that the issue at bar is a
political question beyond the power of this Court to determine; that petitioners had a political
remedy, which was to override the veto; that Section 55 is a "rider" because it is extraneous to
the Appropriations Act and, therefore, merits the Presidents veto; that the power of the President
to augment items in the appropriations for the executive branches had already been provided for
in the Budget Law, specifically Sections 44 and 45 of Pres. Decree No. 1177, as amended by
Rep. Act No. 6670 (4 August 1988); and that the President is empowered by the Constitution to
veto provisions or other "distinct and severable parts" of an Appropriations Bill.
Judicial
Determination
With the Senate maintaining that the Presidents veto is unconstitutional, and that charge being
controverted, there is an actual case or justiciable controversy between the Upper House of
Congress and the executive department that may be taken cognizance of by this Court.
"Indeed, where the legislature or the executive branch is acting within the limits of its authority,
the judiciary cannot and ought not to interfere with the former. But where the legislature or the
executive acts beyond the scope of its constitutional powers, it becomes the duty of the judiciary
to declare what the other branches of the government had assumed to do as void. This is the
essence of judicial power conferred by the Constitution in one Supreme Court and in such lower
courts as may be established by law [Art. VIII, Section 1 of the 1935 Constitution; Art. X,
Section 1 of the 1973 Constitution and which was adopted as part of the Freedom Constitution,
and Art. VIII, Section 1 of the 1987 Constitution] and which power this Court has exercised in
many instances" (Demetria v. Alba, G.R. No. 71977, 27 February 1987, 148 SCRA 209).
We take note as well of what petitioners stress as the "imperative need for a definitive ruling by
this Court as to the exact parameters of the exercise of the item-veto power of the President as
regards appropriation bills . . . in order to obviate the recurrence of a similar problem whenever a
general appropriations bill is passed by Congress." Indeed, the contextual reiteration of Section
55 (FY 89) in Section 16 (FY 90) and again, its veto by the President, underscore the need for
judicial arbitrament. The Court does not thereby assert its superiority over or exhibit lack of
respect due the other co-ordinate departments but discharges a solemn and sacred duty to
determine essentially the scope of intersecting powers in regard which the Executive and the
Senate
are
in
dispute.chanrobles.com
virtual
law
library
Petitioners have also brought this suit as taxpayers. As ruled in Sanidad v. COMELEC (No. L44640, 12 October 1976, 73 SCRA 333), this Court enjoys the open discretion to entertain
taxpayers suits or not. In Tolentino v. COMELEC (No. L-34150, 16 October 1961, 41 SCRA
702), it was also held that a member of the Senate has the requisite personality to bring a suit
where
a
constitutional
issue
is
raised.cralawnad
The political question doctrine neither interposes an obstacle to judicial determination of the
rival claims. The jurisdiction to delimit constitutional boundaries has been given to this Court. It
cannot abdicate that obligation mandated by the 1987 Constitution, although said provision by no
means does away with the applicability of the principle in appropriate cases.
"SECTION 1. The judicial power shall be vested in one Supreme Court and in such lower courts
as
may
be
established
by
law.
Judicial power includes the duty of the courts of justice to settle actual controversies involving
rights which are legally demandable and enforceable, and to determine whether or not there has
been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any
branch
or
instrumentality
of
the
Government."cralaw
virtua1aw
library
Nor is this the first time that the constitutionality of a Presidential veto is raised to the Court. The
two oft-cited cases are Bengson v. Secretary of Justice (62 Phil. 912 [1936]), penned by Justice
George A. Malcolm, which upheld the veto questioned before it, but which decision was reversed
by the U.S. Supreme Court in the same entitled case in 292 U.S. 410, infra, essentially on the
ground that an Appropriations Bill was not involved. The second case is Bolinao Electronics v.
Valencia (G.R. No. L-20740, 30 June 1964, 11 SCRA 486), infra, which rejected the Presidents
veto
of
a
condition
or
restriction
in
an
Appropriations
Bill.
The
Extent
of
the
Presidents
Item-veto
Power
The focal issue for resolution is whether or not the President exceeded the item-veto power
accorded by the Constitution. Or differently put, has the President the power to veto "provisions"
of
an
Appropriations
Bill?
Petitioners contend that Section 55 (FY 89) and Section 16 (FY 90) are provisions and not
items and are, therefore, outside the scope of the item-veto power of the President.chanrobles
lawlibrary
:
rednad
The veto power of the President is expressed in Article VI, Section 27 of the 1987 Constitution
reading,
in
full,
as
follows:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"Sec. 27. (1) Every bill passed by the Congress shall, before it becomes a law, be presented to the
President. If he approves the same, he shall sign it; otherwise, he shall veto it and return the same
with his objections to the House where it originated, which shall enter the objections at large in
its Journal and proceed to reconsider it. If, after such reconsideration, two-thirds of all the
Members of such House shall agree to pass the bill, it shall be sent, together with the objections,
to the other House by which it shall likewise be reconsidered, and if approved by two-thirds of
all the Members of that House, it shall become a law. In all such cases, the votes of each House
shall be determined by yeas or nays, and the names of the Members voting for or against shall be
entered in its Journal. The President shall communicate his veto of any bill to the House where it
originated within thirty days after the date of receipt thereof; otherwise, it shall become a law as
if
he
had
signed
it.
"(2) The President shall have the power to veto any particular item or items in an appropriation,
revenue, or tariff bill, but the veto shall not affect the item or items to which he does not
object."cralaw
virtua1aw
library
Paragraph (1) refers to the general veto power of the President and if exercised would result in
the veto of the entire bill, as a general rule. Paragraph (2) is what is referred to as the item-veto
power or the line-veto power. It allows the exercise of the veto over a particular item or items in
an appropriation, revenue, or tariff bill. As specified, the President may not veto less than all of
an item of an Appropriations Bill. In other words, the power given the executive to disapprove
any item or items in an Appropriations Bill does not grant the authority to veto a part of an item
and
to
approve
the
remaining
portion
of
the
same
item.
Originally, item veto exclusively referred to veto of items of appropriation bills and first came
into being in the former Organic Act, the Act of Congress of 29 August 1916. This was followed
by the 1935 Constitution, which contained a similar provision in its Section 11(2), Article VI,
except that the veto power was made more expansive by the inclusion of this
sentence:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
". . . When a provision of an appropriation bill affects one or more items of the same, the
President can not veto the provision without at the same time vetoing the particular item or items
to
which
it
relates
.
.
."cralaw
virtua1aw
library
The 1935 Constitution further broadened the Presidents veto power to include the veto of item
or
items
of
revenue
and
tariff
bills.
With the advent of the 1973 Constitution, the section took a more simple and compact form,
thus:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"Section 20 (2). The Prime Minister shall have the power to veto any particular item or items in
an appropriation, revenue, or tariff bill, but the veto shall not affect the item or items to which he
does
not
object."cralaw
virtua1aw
library
It is to be noted that the counterpart provision in the 1987 Constitution (Article VI, Section 27
[2], supra), is a verbatim reproduction except for the public official concerned. In other words,
also eliminated has been any reference to the veto of a provision. The vital question is: should
this exclusion be interpreted to mean as a disallowance of the power to veto a provision, as
petitioners
urge?
The terms item and provision in budgetary legislation and practice are concededly different. An
item in a bill refers to the particulars, the details, the distinct and severable parts . . . of the bill
(Bengzon, supra, at 916). It is an indivisible sum of money dedicated to a stated purpose
(Commonwealth v. Dodson, 11 S.E., 2d 120, 124, 125, etc., 176 Va. 281). The United States
Supreme Court, in the case of Bengzon v. Secretary of Justice (299 U.S. 410, 414, 57 S.Ct 252,
81 L. Ed., 312) declared "that an item of an appropriation bill obviously means an item which
in itself is a specific appropriation of money, not some general provision of law, which happens
to
be
put
into
an
appropriation
bill."cralaw
virtua1aw
library
It is our considered opinion that, notwithstanding the elimination in Article VI, Section 27 (2) of
the 1987 Constitution of any reference to the veto of a provision, the extent of the Presidents
veto power as previously defined by the 1935 Constitution has not changed. This is because the
eliminated proviso merely pronounces the basic principle that a distinct and severable part of a
bill may be the subject of a separate veto (Bengzon v. Secretary of Justice, 62 Phil., 912, 916
(1926); 2 BERNAS, Joaquin, S.J., The Constitution of the Republic of the Philippines, 1st ed.,
154-155,
[1988]).
The restrictive interpretation urged by petitioners that the President may not veto a provision
without vetoing the entire bill not only disregards the basic principle that a distinct and severable
part of a bill may be the subject of a separate veto but also overlooks the Constitutional mandate
that any provision in the general appropriations bill shall relate specifically to some particular
appropriation therein and that any such provision shall be limited in its operation to the
appropriation to which it relates (1987 Constitution, Article VI, Section 25 [2]). In other words,
in the true sense of the term, a provision in an Appropriations Bill is limited in its operation to
some particular appropriation to which it relates, and does not relate to the entire bill.chanrobles
law
library
Petitioners further submission that, since the exercise of the veto power by the President
partakes of the nature of legislative powers it should be strictly construed, is negative by the
following
dictum
in
Bengzon,
supra,
reading:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"The Constitution is a limitation upon the power of the legislative department of the government,
but in this respect it is a grant of power to the executive department. The Legislature has the
affirmative power to enact laws; the Chief Executive has the negative power by the constitutional
exercise of which he may defeat the will of the Legislature. It follows that the Chief Executive
must find his authority in the Constitution. But in exercising that authority he may not be
confined to rules of strict construction or hampered by the unwise interference of the judiciary.
The courts will indulge every intendment in favor of the constitutionality of a veto the same as
they will presume the constitutionality of an act as originally passed by the Legislature"
(Commonwealth v. Barnett [1901], 199 Pa., 161; 55 L.R.A., 882; People v. Board of Councilmen
[1892], 20 N.Y.S., 52; Fulmore v. Lane [1911], 104 Tex., 499; Texas Co. v. State [1927], 53
A.L.R.,
258
[at
917]).
Inappropriateness
of
the
so-called
"Provisions"
But even assuming arguendo that provisions are beyond the executive power to veto, we are of
the opinion that Section 55 (FY 89) and Section 16 (FY 90) are not provisions in the budgetary
sense of the term. Article VI, Section 25 (2) of the 1987 Constitution
provides:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"Sec. 25 (2) No provision or enactment shall be embraced in the general appropriations bill
unless it relates specifically to some particular appropriation therein. Any such provision or
enactment shall be limited in its operation to the appropriation to which it relates."cralaw
virtua1aw
library
Explicit is the requirement that a provision in the Appropriations Bill should relate specifically to
some" particular appropriation" therein. The challenged "provisions" fall short of this
requirement. Firstly, the vetoed "provisions" do not relate to any particular or distinctive
appropriation. They apply generally to all items disapproved or reduced by Congress in the
Appropriations Bill. Secondly, the disapproved or reduced items are nowhere to be found on the
face of the Bill. To discover them, resort will have to be made to the original recommendations
made by the President and to the source indicated by petitioners themselves, i.e., the "Legislative
Budget Research and Monitoring Office" (Annex B-1 and B-2, Petition). Thirdly, the vetoed
Sections are more of an expression of Congressional policy in respect of augmentation from
savings rather than a budgetary appropriation. Consequently, Section 55 (FY 89) and Section 16
(FY 90) although labelled as "provisions," are actually inappropriate provisions that should be
treated as items for the purpose of the Presidents veto power. (Henry v. Edwards [1977] 346 S
Rep.
2d,
157-158)
"Just as the President may not use his item-veto to usurp constitutional powers conferred on the
legislature, neither can the legislature deprive the Governor of the constitutional powers
conferred on him as chief executive officer of the state by including in a general appropriation
bill matters more properly enacted in separate legislation. The Governors constitutional power
to veto bills of general legislation . . . cannot be abridged by the careful placement of such
measures in a general appropriation bill, thereby forcing the Governor to choose between
approving unacceptable substantive legislation or vetoing items of expenditure essential to the
operation of government. The legislature cannot by location of a bill give it immunity from
executive veto. Nor can it circumvent the Governors veto power over substantive legislation by
artfully drafting general law measures so that they appear to be true conditions or limitations on
an item of appropriation. Otherwise, the legislature would be permitted to impair the

constitutional responsibilities and functions of a co-equal branch of government in contravention
of the separation of powers doctrine . . . We are no more willing to allow the legislature to use its
appropriation power to infringe on the Governors constitutional right to veto matters of
substantive legislation than we are to allow the Governor to encroach on the constitutional
powers of the legislature. In order to avoid this result, we hold that, when the legislature inserts
inappropriate provisions in a general appropriation bill, such provisions must be treated as
items for purposes of the Governors item veto power over general appropriation bills.
x
". . . Legislative control cannot be exercised in such a manner as to encumber the general
appropriation bill with veto-proof logrolling measure, special interest provisions which could
not succeed if separately enacted, or riders, substantive pieces of legislation incorporated in a
bill
to
insure
passage
without
veto.
.
.
."
(Emphasis
supplied)
Inappropriateness
of
the
so-called
"Conditions/Restrictions"
Petitioners maintain, however, that Congress is free to impose conditions in an Appropriations

Bill and where conditions are attached, the veto power does not carry with it the power to strike
them out, citing Commonwealth v. Dodson (11 SE, 2d 130, supra) and Bolinao Electronics
Corporation v. Valencia (No. L-20740, June 30, 1964, 11 SCRA 486). In other words, their
theory is that Section 55 (FY 89) and Section 16 (FY 90) are such conditions/restrictions and
thus
beyond
the
veto
power.chanrobles
virtual
lawlibrary
There can be no denying that inherent in the power of appropriation is the power to specify how
money shall be spent; and that in addition to distinct "items" of appropriation, the Legislature
may include in Appropriation Bills qualifications, conditions, limitations or restrictions on
expenditure of funds. Settled also is the rule that the Executive is not allowed to veto a condition
or proviso of an appropriation while allowing the appropriation itself to stand (Fairfield v. Foster,
supra, at 320). That was also the ruling in Bolinao, supra, which held that the veto of a condition
in an Appropriations Bill which did not include a veto of the items to which the condition related
was
deemed
invalid
and
without
effect
whatsoever.
However, for the rule to apply, restrictions should be such in the real sense of the term, not some
matters which are more properly dealt with in a separate legislation (Henry v. Edwards, La, 346,
So 2d 153). Restrictions or conditions in an Appropriations Bill must exhibit a connection with
money items in a budgetary sense in the schedule of expenditures. Again, the test is
appropriateness.
"It is not enough that a provision be related to the institution or agency to which funds are
appropriated. Conditions and limitations properly included in an appropriation bill must exhibit
such a connexity with money items of appropriation that they logically belong in a schedule of
expenditures . . . the ultimate test is one of appropriateness" (Henry v. Edwards, supra, at 158).
Tested by these criteria, Section 55 (FY 89) and Section 16 (FY 90) must also be held to be
inappropriate "conditions." While they, particularly, Section 16 (FY 90), have been "artfully
drafted" to appear as true conditions or limitations, they are actually general law measures more
appropriate
for
substantive
and,
therefore,
separate
legislation.
Further, neither of them shows the necessary connection with a schedule of expenditures. The
reason, as explained earlier, is that items reduced or disapproved by Congress would not appear
on the face of the enrolled bill or Appropriations Act itself. They can only be detected when
compared with the original budgetary submittals of the President. In fact, Sections 55 (FY 89)
and 16 (FY 90) themselves provide that an item "shall be deemed to have been disapproved by
Congress if no corresponding appropriation for the specific purpose is provided in this
Act."cralaw
virtua1aw
library
Considering that the vetoed provisions are not, in the budgetary sense of the term, conditions or
restrictions, the case of Bolinao Electronics Corporation v. Valencia (supra), invoked by
petitioners, becomes inapplicable. In that case, a public works bill contained an item
appropriating a certain sum for assistance to television stations, subject to the condition that the
amount would not be available to places where there were commercial television stations. Then
President Macapagal approved the appropriation but vetoed the condition. When challenged
before this Court, it was held that the veto was ineffectual and that the approval of the item
carried with it the approval of the condition attached to it. In contrast with the case at bar, there is
no condition, in the budgetary sense of the term, attached to an appropriation or item in the
appropriation bill which was struck out. For obviously, Sections 55 (FY 89) and 16 (FY 90)
partake more of a curtailment on the power to augment from savings; in other words, "a general
provision of law, which happens to be put in an appropriation bill" (Bengzon v. Secretary of
Justice,
supra).
The
Power
of
Augmentation
and
The
Validity
of
the
Veto
The President promptly vetoed Section 55 (FY 89) and Section 16 (FY 90) because they nullify
the authority of the Chief Executive and heads of different branches of government to augment
any item in the General Appropriations Law for their respective offices from savings in other
items of their respective appropriations, as guaranteed by Article VI, Section 25 (5) of the
Constitution.
Said
provision
reads:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"Sec. 25. (5) No law shall be passed authorizing any transfer of appropriations; however, the
President, the President of the Senate, the Speaker of the House of Representatives, the Chief
Justice of the Supreme Court, and the heads of Constitutional Commissions may, by law, be
authorized to augment any item in the general appropriations law for their respective offices
from savings in other items of their respective appropriations" (Emphasis ours).
Noteworthy is the fact that the power to augment from savings lies dormant until authorized by
law.
This Court upheld the validity of the power of augmentation from savings in Demetria v. Alba,
which
ruled:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
". . . to afford the heads of the different branches of the government and those of the
constitutional commissions considerable flexibility in the use of public funds and resources, the
constitution allowed the enactment of a law authorizing the transfer of funds for the purpose of
augmenting an item from savings in another item in the appropriation of the government branch
or constitutional body concerned. The leeway granted was thus limited. The purpose and
conditions for which funds may be transferred were specified, i.e., transfer may be allowed for
the purpose of augmenting an item and such transfer may be made only if there are savings from
another item in the appropriation of the government branch or constitutional body" (G.R. No.
71977,
27
February
1987,
148
SCRA
214).
The 1973 Constitution contained an identical authority to augment from savings in its Article
VIII, Section 16 (5), except for mention of the Prime Minister among the officials vested with
that
power.
1
In 1977, the statutory authority of the President to augment any appropriation of the executive
department in the General Appropriations Act from savings was specifically provided for in
Section 44 of Presidential Decree No. 1177, as amended (RA 6670, 4 August 1988), otherwise
known as the "Budget Reform Decree of 1977." It reads:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"Sec.
44.
"The President shall, likewise, have the authority to augment any appropriation of the Executive
Department in the General Appropriations Act, from savings in the appropriations of another
department, bureau, office or agency within the Executive Branch, pursuant to the provisions of
Art. VIII, Sec. 16 (5) of the Constitution (now Sec. 25 (5), Art. VI)" (Emphasis ours), (N.B.: The
first paragraph declared void in Demetria v. Alba, supra, has been deleted).
Similarly, the use by the President of savings to cover deficits is specifically authorized in the
same
Decree.
Thus:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"Sec. 45. Authority to Use Savings in Appropriations to Cover Deficits. Except as otherwise
provided in the General Appropriations Act, any savings in the regular appropriations authorized
in the General Appropriations Act for programs and projects of any department, office or agency,
may, with the approval of the President be used to cover a deficit in any other item of the regular
appropriations:
".
.
.
A more recent grant is found in Section 12 of the General Appropriations Act of 1989, the text of
which is repeated in the first paragraph of Section 16 (FY 90). Section 12 reads:chanrobles
virtual
lawlibrary
"Sec. 12. Use of Savings. The President, the President of the Senate, the Speaker of the House
of Representatives, the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court, the heads of the Constitutional
Commissions, and the Ombudsman are hereby authorized to augment any item in this Act for
their respective offices from savings in other items of their respective appropriations."cralaw
virtua1aw
library
There should be no question, therefore, that statutory authority has, in fact, been granted. And
once given, the heads of the different branches of the Government and those of the Constitutional
Commissions are afforded considerable flexibility in the use of public funds and resources
(Demetria v. Alba, supra). The doctrine of separation of powers is in no way endangered because
the transfer is made within a department (or branch of government) and not from one department
(branch) to another (CRUZ, Isagani A., Philippine Political Law [1989] p. 155).
When Sections 55 (FY 89) and 16 (FY 90), therefore, prohibit the restoration or increase by
augmentation of appropriations disapproved or reduced by Congress, they impair the
constitutional and statutory authority of the President and other key officials to augment any item
or any appropriation from savings in the interest of expediency and efficiency. The exercise of
such authority in respect of disapproved or reduced items by no means vests in the Executive the
power to rewrite the entire budget, as petitioners contend, the leeway granted being delimited to
transfers within the department or branch concerned, the sourcing to come only from savings.
More importantly, it strikes us, too, that for such a special power as that of augmentation from
savings, the same is merely incorporated in the General Appropriations Bill. An Appropriations
Bill is "one the primary and specific aim of which is to make appropriation of money from the
public treasury" (Bengzon v. Secretary of Justice, 292 U.S., 410, 57 S.Ct. 252). It is a legislative
authorization of receipts and expenditures. The power of augmentation from savings, on the
other hand, can by no means be considered a specific appropriation of money. It is a nonappropriation item inserted in an appropriation measure.chanrobles law library : red
The same thing must be said of Section 55 (FY 89), taken in conjunction with Section 12, and
Section 16 (FY 90), which prohibit the restoration or increase by augmentation of
appropriations disapproved and/or reduced by Congress. They are non-appropriation items, an
appropriation being a setting apart by law of a certain sum from the public revenue for a specific
purpose (Bengzon v. Secretary of Justice, 62 Phil. 912, 916 [1936]). It bears repeating that they
are more of a substantive expression of a legislative objective to restrict the power of
augmentation granted to the President and other key officials. They are actually matters of
general law and more properly the subject of a separate legislation that will embody, define and
delimit the scope of the special power of augmentation from savings instead of being
inappropriately incorporated annually in the Appropriation Act. To sanction this practice would
be to give the Legislature the freedom to grant or withhold the power from the Executive and
other officials, and thus put in yearly jeopardy the exercise of that power.
If, indeed, by the later enactments of Section 55 (FY 89) and Section 16 (FY 90), Congress, as
petitioners argue, intended to amend or repeal Pres. Decree No. 1177, with all the more reason
should it have so provided in a separate enactment, it being basic that implied repeals are not
favored. For the same reason, we cannot subscribe to petitioners allegation that Pres. Decree No.
1177 has been revoked by the 1987 Constitution. The 1987 Constitution itself provides for the
continuance of laws, decrees, executive orders, proclamations, letters of instructions, and other
executive issuances not inconsistent with the Constitution until amended, repealed, or revoked
(1987
Constitution,
Article
XVIII,
Section
3).
If, indeed, the legislature believed that the exercise of the veto powers by the executive were
unconstitutional, the remedy laid down by the Constitution is crystal clear. A Presidential veto
may be overriden by the votes of two-thirds of members of Congress (1987 Constitution, Article
VI, Section 27[1], supra). But Congress made no attempt to override the Presidential veto.
Petitioners argument that the veto is ineffectual so that there is "nothing to override" (citing
Bolinao) has lost force and effect with the executive veto having been herein upheld.
As we see it, there need be no future conflict if the legislative and executive branches of
government adhere to the spirit of the Constitution, each exercising its respective powers with
due deference to the constitutional responsibilities and functions of the other. Thereby, the
delicate
equilibrium
of
governmental
powers
remains
on
even
keel.
WHEREFORE, the constitutionality of the assailed Presidential veto is UPHELD and this
Petition is hereby DISMISSED.

SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. 103524 April 15, 1992

CESAR BENGZON, QUERUBE MAKALINTAL, LINO M. PATAJO, JOSE LEUTERIO,
ET AL., petitioners,
vs.
HON. FRANKLIN N. DRILON, in his capacity as Executive Secretary, HON.
GUILLERMO CARAGUE, in his capacity as Secretary of Department of Budget and
Management, and HON. ROSALINA CAJUCOM, in her capacity as National
Treasurer, respondents.
A.M. No. 91-8-225-CA April 15, 1992
REQUEST OF RETIRED JUSTICES MANUEL P. BARCELONA, JUAN P. ENRIQUEZ,
JUAN O. REYES, JR. and GUARDSON R. LOOD FOR READJUSTMENT OF THEIR
MONTHLY PENSION.
GUTIERREZ, JR., J.:

The issue in this petition is the constitutionality of the veto by the President of certain provisions
in the General Appropriations Act for the Fiscal Year 1992 relating to the payment of the
adjusted pensions of retired Justices of the Supreme Court and the Court of Appeals.
The petitioners are retired Justices of the Supreme Court and Court of Appeals who are currently
receiving monthly pensions under Republic Act No. 910 as amended by Republic Act No. 1797.
They filed the instant petition on their own behalf and in representation of all other retired
Justices of the Supreme Court and the Court of Appeals similarly situated.
Named respondents are Hon. Franklin Drilon the Executive Secretary, Hon. Guillermo Carague
as Secretary of the Department of Budget and Management, and Hon. Rosalinda Cajucom, the
Treasurer of the Philippines. The respondents are sued in their official capacities, being officials
of the Executive Department involved in the implementation of the release of funds appropriated
in the Annual Appropriations Law.
We treat the Comments of the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) as an Answer and decide the
petition on its merits.
The factual backdrop of this case is as follows:
On June 20, 1953, Republic Act No, 910 was enacted to provide the retirement pensions of
Justices of the Supreme Court and of the Court of Appeals who have rendered at least twenty
(20) years service either in the Judiciary or in any other branch of the Government or in both,
having attained the age of seventy (70) years or who resign by reason of incapacity to discharge
the duties of the office. The retired Justice shall receive during the residue of his natural life the
salary which he was receiving at the time of his retirement or resignation.
Republic Act No. 910 was amended by Republic Act No. 1797 (approved on June 21, 1957)
which provided that:
Sec. 3-A. In case the salary of Justices of the Supreme Court or of the Court of
Appeals is increased or decreased, such increased or decreased salary shall, for
purposes of this Act, be deemed to be the salary or the retirement pension which a
Justice who as of June twelve, nineteen hundred fifty-four had ceased to be such
to accept another position in the Government or who retired was receiving at the
time of his cessation in office. Provided, that any benefits that have already
accrued prior to such increase or decrease shall not be affected thereby.
Identical retirement benefits were also given to the members of the Constitutional Commissions
under Republic Act No. 1568, as amended by Republic Act No. 3595. On November 12, 1974,
on the occasion of the Armed Forces Loyalty Day, President Marcos signed Presidential Decree
578 which extended similar retirement benefits to the members of the Armed Forces giving them
also the automatic readjustment features of Republic Act No. 1797 and Republic Act No. 3595.
Two months later, however, President Marcos issued Presidential Decree 644 on January 25,
1975 repealing Section 3-A of Republic Act No. 1797 and Republic Act No. 3595 (amending
Republic Act No. 1568 and Presidential Decree No. 578) which authorized the adjustment of the
pension of the retired Justices of the Supreme Court, Court of Appeals, Chairman and members
of the Constitutional Commissions and the officers and enlisted members of the Armed Forces to
the prevailing rates of salaries.
Significantly, under Presidential Decree 1638 the automatic readjustment of the retirement
pension of officers and enlisted men was subsequently restored by President Marcos. A later
decree Presidential Decree 1909 was also issued providing for the automatic readjustment of the
pensions of members of the Armed Forces who have retired prior to September 10, 1979.
While the adjustment of the retirement pensions for members of the Armed Forces who number
in the tens of thousands was restored, that of the retired Justices of the Supreme Court and Court
of Appeals who are only a handful and fairly advanced in years, was not.
Realizing the unfairness of the discrimination against the members of the Judiciary and the
Constitutional Commissions, Congress approved in 1990 a bill for the reenactment of the
repealed provisions of Republic Act No. 1797 and Republic Act No. 3595. Congress was under
the impression that Presidential Decree 644 became law after it was published in the Official
Gazette on April 7, 1977. In the explanatory note of House Bill No. 16297 and Senate Bill No.
740, the legislature saw the need to reenact Republic Act Nos. 1797 and 3595 to restore said
retirement pensions and privileges of the retired Justices and members of the Constitutional
Commissions, in order to assure those serving in the Supreme Court, Court of Appeals and
Constitutional Commissions adequate old age pensions even during the time when the
purchasing power of the peso has been diminished substantially by worldwide recession or
inflation. This is underscored by the fact that the petitioner retired Chief Justice, a retired
Associate Justice of the Supreme Court and the retired Presiding Justice are presently receiving
monthly pensions of P3,333.33, P2,666.66 and P2,333.33 respectively.
President Aquino, however vetoed House Bill No. 16297 on July 11, 1990 on the ground that
according to her "it would erode the very foundation of the Government's collective effort to
adhere faithfully to and enforce strictly the policy on standardization of compensation as
articulated in Republic Act No. 6758 known as Compensation and Position Classification Act of
1989." She further said that "the Government should not grant distinct privileges to select group
of officials whose retirement benefits under existing laws already enjoy preferential treatment
over those of the vast majority of our civil service servants."
Prior to the instant petition, however, Retired Court of Appeals Justices Manuel P. Barcelona,
Juan P. Enriquez, Juan O. Reyes, Jr. and Guardson R. Lood filed a letter/petition dated April 22,
1991 which we treated as Administrative Matter No. 91-8-225-CA. The petitioners asked this
Court far a readjustment of their monthly pensions in accordance with Republic Act No. 1797.
They reasoned out that Presidential Decree 644 repealing Republic Act No. 1797 did not become
law as there was no valid publication pursuant to Taada v. Tuvera, (136 SCRA 27 [1985]) and
146 SCRA 446 [1986]). Presidential Decree 644 promulgated on January 24, 1975 appeared for
the first time only in the supplemental issue of the Official Gazette, (Vol. 74, No. 14) purportedly
dated April 4, 1977 but published only on September 5, 1983. Since Presidential Decree 644 has
no binding force and effect of law, it therefore did not repeal Republic Act No. 1797.
In a Resolution dated November 28, 1991 the Court acted favorably on the request. The
dispositive portion reads as follows:
WHEREFORE, the requests of retired Justices Manuel P. Barcelona, Juan P.

Enriquez, Juan O. Reyes and Guardson Lood are GRANTED. It is hereby
AUTHORIZED that their monthly pensions be adjusted and paid on the basis of
RA 1797 effective January 1, 1991 without prejudice to the payment on their
pension differentials corresponding to the previous years upon the availability of
funds for the purpose.
Pursuant to the above resolution, Congress included in the General Appropriations Bill for Fiscal
Year 1992 certain appropriations for the Judiciary intended for the payment of the adjusted
pension rates due the retired Justices of the Supreme Court and Court of Appeals.
The pertinent provisions in House Bill No. 34925 are as follows:
XXVIII. THE JUDICIARY
A. Supreme Court of the Philippines and the Lower Courts.
For general administration, administration of personnel benefits, supervision of
courts, adjudication of constitutional questions appealed and other cases,
operation and maintenance of the Judicial and Bar Council in the Supreme Court,
and the adjudication of regional court cases, metropolitan court cases, municipal
trial court cases in Cities, municipal circuit court cases, municipal, court cases,
Shari'a district court cases and Shari'a circuit court cases as indicated hereunder
P2,095,651,000
xxx xxx xxx
Special Provisions.
1. Augmentation of any Item in the Court's Appropriations. Any savings in the
appropriation for the Supreme Court and the Lower Courts may be utilized by the
Chief Justice of the Supreme Court to augment any item of the Court's
appropriations for: (a) printing of decisions and publications of Philippine
Reports; b) commutable terminal leaves of Justices and other personnel of the
Supreme Court and any payment of adjusted pension rates to retired Justices
entitled thereto pursuant to Administrative Matter No. 91-8-225-CA; (c) repair,
maintenance, improvement, and other operating expenses of the courts' books and
periodicals; (d) purchase, maintenance and improvement of printing equipment; e)
necessary expenses for the employment of temporary employees, contractual and
casual employees, for judicial administration; f) maintenance and improvement of
the Court's Electronic Data Processing; (g) extraordinary expenses of the Chief
Justice, attendance in international conferences and conduct of training programs;
(h) commutable transportation and representation allowances and fringe benefits
for Justices, Clerks of Court, Court Administrator, Chief of Offices and other
Court personnel in accordance with the rates prescribed by law; and (i)
compensation of attorneys-de-oficio; PROVIDED, that as mandated by LOI No.
489 any increases in salary and allowances shall be subject to the usual
procedures and policies as provided for under P.D. No. 985 and other pertinent
laws. (page 1071, General Appropriations Act, FY 1992; Emphasis supplied)
xxx xxx xxx
4. Payment of Adjusted Pension Rates to Retired Justices. The amount herein

appropriated for payment of pensions to retired judges and justices shall include
the payment of pensions at the adjusted rates to retired justices of the Supreme
Court entitled thereto pursuant to the ruling of the Court in Administrative Matter
No. 91-8-225-C.A. (page 1071, General Appropriations Act, FY 1992).
xxx xxx xxx
Activities and Purposes
1. General Administration and Support Services.
a.
General
administrative
Services
P
43,515,000
b.
Payment
of
retirement
gratuity
of
national
goverment
officials
and
employees
P
206,717,000
c.
Payment
of
terminal
leave
benefits
to
officials and employees antitled thereto P 55,316,000
d.
Payment
of
pension
totired
jude
and justice entitled thereto P 22,500,000
(page 1071, General Appropriations Act, FY 1992)
C. COURT OF APPEALS
For
general
administration,
of
personnel
benefit,
benefits
adjudication
of
appealed
and
as indicated hereunder P114,615,000
administration
and
the
other
cases
Special Provisions.
1. Authority to Use Savings. Subject to the approval of the Chief Justice of the
Supreme Court in accordance with Section 25(5), Article VI of the Constitution of
the Republic of the Philippines, the Presiding Justice may be authorized to use
any savings in any item of the appropriation for the Court of Appeals for purposes
of: (1) improving its compound and facilities; and (2) for augmenting any
deficiency in any item of its appropriation including its extraordinary
expenses and payment of adjusted pension rates to retired justices entitled thereto
pursuant to Administrative Matter No. 91-8-225-C.A. (page 1079, General
Appropriations Act, FY 1992; Emphasis supplied)
2. Payment of adjustment Pension Rates to Retired Justices. The amount herein
appropriated for payment of pensions to retired judges and justices shall include
the payment of pensions at the adjusted rates to retired justices of the Court of
Appeals entitled thereto pursuant to the Ruling of the Supreme Court in
Administrative Matter No. 91-6-225-C.A. (page 1079 General Appropriations
Act, FY 1992).
XL. GENERAL FUND ADJUSTMENT
For
general
fund
adjustment
for
operational
and
special
requirements
as indicated hereunder P500,000,000
xxx xxx xxx
Special Provisions
1. Use of the Fund. This fund shall be used for:
xxx xxx xxx
1.3. Authorized overdrafts and/or valid unbooked obligations,
including the payment of back salaries and related personnel
benefits arising from decision of competent authority including the
Supreme Court decision in Administrative Matter No. 91-8-225C.A. and COA decision in No. 1704." (page 11649 Gen.
Appropriations Act, FY 1992; Emphasis supplied)
On January 15, 1992, the President vetoed the underlined portions of Section 1 and the entire
Section 4 the Special Provisions for the Supreme Court of the Philippines and the Lower Courts
(General Appropriations Act, FY 1992, page 1071) and the underlined portions of Section 1 and
the entire Section 2, of the Special Provisions for the Court of Appeals (page 1079) and the
underlined portions of Section 1.3 of Article XLV of the Special Provisions of the General Fund
Adjustments (page 1164, General Appropriations Act, FY 1992).
The reason given for the veto of said provisions is that "the resolution of this Honorable Court in
Administrative Matter No. 91-8-225-CA pursuant to which the foregoing appropriations for the
payment of the retired Justices of the Supreme Court and the Court of Appeals have been enacted
effectively nullified the veto of the President on House Bill No. 16297, the bill which provided
for the automatic increase in the retirement pensions of the Justices of the Supreme Court and the
Court of Appeals and chairmen of the Constitutional Commissions by re-enacting Republic Act
No. 1797 and Republic Act No. 3595. The President's veto of the aforesaid provisions was
further justified by reiterating the earlier reasons for vetoing House Bill No. 16297: "they would
erode the very foundation of our collective effort to adhere faithfully to and enforce strictly the
policy and standardization of compensation. We should not permit the grant of distinct privileges
to select group of officials whose retirement pensions under existing laws already enjoy
preferential treatment over those of the vast majority of our civil servants."
Hence, the instant petition filed by the petitioners with the assertions that:
1) The subject veto is not an item veto;
2) The veto by the Executive is violative of the doctrine of separation of powers;
3) The veto deprives the retired Justices of their rights to the pensions due them;
4) The questioned veto impairs the Fiscal Autonomy guaranteed by the
Constitution.
Raising similar grounds, the petitioners in AM-91-8-225-CA, brought to the attention of this
Court that the veto constitutes no legal obstacle to the continued payment of the adjusted
pensions pursuant to the Court's resolution.
On February 14, 1992, the Court resolved to consolidate Administrative Matter No. 91-8-225-CA
with G.R. No. 103524.
The petitioners' contentions are well-taken.
I
It cannot be overstressed that in a constitutional government such as ours, the rule of law must
prevail. The Constitution is the basic and paramount law to which all other laws must conform
and to which all persons including the highest official of this land must defer. From this cardinal
postulate, it follows that the three branches of government must discharge their respective
functions within the limits of authority conferred by the Constitution. Under the principle of
separation of powers, neither Congress, the President nor the Judiciary may encroach on fields
allocated to the other branches of government. The legislature is generally limited to the
enactment of laws, the executive to the enforcement of laws and the judiciary to their
interpretation and application to cases and controversies.
The Constitution expressly confers or the judiciary the power to maintain inviolate what it
decrees. As the guardian of the Constitution we cannot shirk the duty of seeing to it that the
officers in each branch of government do not go beyond their constitutionally allocated
boundaries and that the entire Government itself or any of its branches does not violate the basic
liberties of the people. The essence of this judicial duty was emphatically explained by Justice
Laurel in the leading case of Angara v. Electoral Commission, (63 Phil. 139 [1936]) to wit:
The Constitution is a definition of the powers of government. Who is to determine
the nature, scope and extent of such powers? The Constitution itself has provided
for the instrumentality of the judiciary as the rational way. And when the judiciary
mediates to allocate constitutional boundaries it does not assert any superiority
over the other department, it does not in reality nullify or invalidate an act of the
legislature, but only asserts the solemn and sacred obligation assigned to it by the
Constitution to determine conflicting claims of authority under the Constitution
and to establish for the parties in an actual controversy the rights which that
instrument secures and guarantees to them. (Emphasis supplied)
The act of the Executive in vetoing the particular provisions is an exercise of a constitutionally
vested power. But even as the Constitution grants the power, it also provides limitations to its
exercise. The veto power is not absolute.
The pertinent provision of the Constitution reads:
The President shall have the power to veto any particular item or items in an
appropriation, revenue or tariff bill but the veto shall not affect the item or items
to which he does not object. (Section 27(2), Article VI, Constitution)
The OSG is correct when it states that the Executive must veto a bill in its entirety or not at all.
He or she cannot act like an editor crossing out specific lines, provisions, or paragraphs in a bill
that he or she dislikes. In the exercise of the veto power, it is generally all or nothing. However,
when it comes to appropriation, revenue or tariff bills, the Administration needs the money to run
the machinery of government and it can not veto the entire bill even if it may contain
objectionable features. The President is, therefore, compelled to approve into law the entire bill,
including its undesirable parts. It is for this reason that the Constitution has wisely provided the
"item veto power" to avoid inexpedient riders being attached to an indispensable appropriation or
revenue measure.
The Constitution provides that only a particular item or items may be vetoed. The power to
disapprove any item or items in an appropriate bill does not grant the authority to veto a part of
an item and to approve the remaining portion of the same item. (Gonzales v. Macaraig, Jr., 191
SCRA 452, 464 [1990])
We distinguish an item from a provision in the following manner:
The terms item and provision in budgetary legislation and practice are concededly
different. An itemin a bill refers to the particulars, the details, the distinct and
severable parts . . . of the bill (Bengzon,supra, at 916.) It is an indivisible sum of
money dedicated to a stated purpose (Commonwealth v. Dodson, 11 S.E. 2d 120,
124, 125, etc., 176 Va. 281) The United States Supreme Court, in the case
of Bengzon v. Secretary of Justice (299 U.S. 410, 414, 57 Ct. 252, 81 L. Ed,
312) declared "that an"tem" of an appropriation bill obviously means an
item which in itself is a specific appropriation of money, not some general
provision of law, which happens to be put into an appropriation bill." (id. at page
465)
We regret having to state that misimpressions or unfortunately wrong advice must have been the
basis of the disputed veto.
The general fund adjustment is an item which appropriates P500,000,000.00 to enable the
Government to meet certain unavoidable obligations which may have been inadequately funded
by the specific items for the different branches, departments, bureaus, agencies, and offices of
the government.
The President did not veto this item. What were vetoed were methods or systems placed by
Congress to insure that permanent and continuing obligations to certain officials would be paid
when they fell due.
An examination of the entire sections and the underlined portions of the law which were vetoed
will readily show that portions of the item have been chopped up into vetoed and unvetoed parts.
Less than all of an item has been vetoed. Moreover, the vetoed portions are not items. They
are provisions.
Thus, the augmentation of specific appropriations found inadequate to pay retirement payments,
by transferring savings from other items of appropriation is a provision and not an item. It gives
power to the Chief Justice to transfer funds from one item to another. There is no specific
appropriation of money involved.
In the same manner, the provision which states that in compliance with decisions of the Supreme
Court and the Commission on Audit, funds still undetermined in amount may be drawn from the
general fund adjustment is not an item. It is the "general fund adjustment" itself which is the
item. This was not touched. It was not vetoed.
More ironic is the fact that misinformation led the Executive to believe that the items in the 1992
Appropriations Act were being vetoed when, in fact, the veto struck something else.
What were really vetoed are:
(1) Republic Act No. 1797 enacted as early as June 21, 1957; and
(2) The Resolution of the Supreme Court dated November 28, 1991 in Administrative Matter No.
91-8-225-CA.
We need no lengthy justifications or citations of authorities to declare that no President may veto
the provisions of a law enacted thirty-five (35) years before his or her term of office. Neither
may the President set aside or reverse a final and executory judgment of this Court through the
exercise of the veto power.
A few background facts may be reiterated to fully explain the unhappy situation.
Republic Act No. 1797 provided for the adjustment of pensions of retired Justices which
privilege was extended to retired members of Constitutional Commissions by Republic Act No.
3595.
On January 25, 1975, President Marcos issued Presidential Decree No. 644 which repealed
Republic Acts 1797 and 3595. Subsequently, automatic readjustment of pensions for retired
Armed Forces officers and men was surreptitiously restored through Presidential Decree Nos.
1638 and 1909.
It was the impression that Presidential Decree No. 644 had reduced the pensions of Justices and
Constitutional Commissioners which led Congress to restore the repealed provisions through
House Bill No. 16297 in 1990. When her finance and budget advisers gave the wrong
information that the questioned provisions in the 1992 General Appropriations Act were simply
an attempt to overcome her earlier 1990 veto, she issued the veto now challenged in this petition.
It turns out, however, that P.D. No. 644 never became valid law. If P.D. No. 644 was not law, it
follows that Rep. Act No. 1797 was not repealed and continues to be effective up to the present.
In the same way that it was enforced from 1951 to 1975, so should it be enforced today.
House Bill No. 16297 was superfluous as it tried to restore benefits which were never taken
away validly. The veto of House Bill No. 16297 in 1991 did not also produce any effect. Both
were based on erroneous and non-existent premises.
From the foregoing discussion, it can be seen that when the President vetoed certain provisions
of the 1992 General Appropriations Act, she was actually vetoing Republic Act No. 1797 which,
of course, is beyond her power to accomplish.
Presidential Decree No. 644 which purportedly repealed Republic Act No. 1717 never achieved
that purpose because it was not properly published. It never became a law.
The case of Tada v. Tuvera (134 SCRA 27 [1985]and 146 SCRA 446 [1986]) specifically
requires that "all laws shall immediately upon their approval or as soon thereafter as possible, be
published in full in the Official Gazette, to become effective only after fifteen days from their
publication, or on another date specified by the legislature, in accordance with Article 2 of the
Civil Code." This was the Court's answer to the petition of Senator Lorenzo Taada and other
opposition leaders who challenged the validity of Marcos' decrees which, while never published,
were being enforced. Secret decrees are anathema in a free society.
In support of their request, the petitioners in Administrative Matter No. 91-9-225-CA secured
certification from Director Lucita C. Sanchez of the National Printing Office that the April 4,
1977 Supplement to the Official Gazette was published only on September 5, 1983 and officially
released on September 29, 1983.
On the issue of whether or not Presidential Decree 644 became law, the Court has already
categorically spoken in a definitive ruling on the matter, to wit:
xxx xxx xxx
PD 644 was promulgated by President Marcos on January 24, 1975, but was not
immediately or soon thereafter published although preceding and subsequent
decrees were duly published in the Official Gazette. It now appears that it was
intended as a secret decree "NOT FOR PUBLICATION" as the notation on the
face of the original copy thereof plainly indicates (Annex B). It is also clear that
the decree was published in the back-dated Supplement only after it was
challenged in the Taadacase as among the presidential decrees that had not
become effective for lack of the required publication. The petition was filed on
May 7, 1983, four months before the actual publication of the decree.
It took more than eight years to publish the decree after its promulgation in 1975.
Moreover, the publication was made in bad faith insofar as it purported to show
that it was done in 1977 when the now demonstrated fact is that the April 4, 1977
supplement was actually published and released only in September 1983. The
belated publication was obviously intended to refute the petitioner's claim in
the Taada case and to support the Solicitor General's submission that the petition
had become moot and academic.
xxx xxx xxx
We agree that PD 644 never became a law because it was not validly published
and that, consequently, it did not have the effect of repealing RA 1797. The
requesting Justices (including Justice Lood, whose request for the upgrading of
his pension was denied on January 15, 1991) are therefore entitled to be paid their
monthly pensions on the basis of the latter measure, which remains unchanged to
date.
The Supreme Court has spoken and it has done so with finality, logically and rightly so as to
assure stability in legal relations, and avoid confusion. (see Ver v. Quetullo, 163 SCRA 80
[1988]) Like other decisions of this Court, the ruling and principles set out in the Court
resolution constitute binding precedent. (Bulig-Bulig Kita Kamaganak Association, et al. v.
Sulpicio Lines, Inc., Regional Trial Court, etc., G.R. 847500 16 May 1989, En Banc, Minute
Resolution)
The challenged veto has far-reaching implications which the Court can not countenance as they
undermine the principle of separation of powers. The Executive has no authority to set aside and
overrule a decision of the Supreme Court.
We must emphasize that the Supreme Court did not enact Rep. Act No. 1797. It is not within its
powers to pass laws in the first place. Its duty is confined to interpreting or defining what the law
is and whether or not it violates a provision of the Constitution.
As early as 1953, Congress passed a law providing for retirement pensions to retired Justices of
the Supreme Court and the Court of Appeals. This law was amended by Republic Act 1797 in
1957. Funds necessary to pay the retirement pensions under these statutes are deemed
automatically appropriated every year.
Thus, Congress included in the General Appropriations Act of 1992, provisions identifying funds
and savings which may be used to pay the adjusted pensions pursuant to the Supreme Court
Resolution. As long as retirement laws remain in the statute book, there is an existing obligation
on the part of the government to pay the adjusted pension rate pursuant to RA 1797 and AM-918-225-CA.
Neither may the veto power of the President be exercised as a means of repealing RA 1797. This
is arrogating unto the Presidency legislative powers which are beyond its authority. The
President has no power to enact or amend statutes promulgated by her predecessors much less to
repeal existing laws. The President's power is merely to execute the laws as passed by Congress.
II
There is a matter of greater consequence arising from this petition. The attempt to use the veto
power to set aside a Resolution of this Court and to deprive retirees of benefits given them by
Rep. Act No. 1797 trenches upon the constitutional grant of fiscal autonomy to the Judiciary.
Sec. 3, Art. VIII mandates that:
Sec. 3 The Judiciary shall enjoy fiscal autonomy. Appropriations for the Judiciary
may not be reduced by the legislature below the amount appropriated for the
previous year and, after approval, shall be automatically and regularly released.
We can not overstress the importance of and the need for an independent judiciary. The Court has
on various past occasions explained the significance of judicial independence. In the case of De
la Llana v. Alba (112 SCRA 294 [1982]), it ruled:
It is a cardinal rule of faith of our constitutional regime that it is the people who
are endowed with rights, to secure which a government is instituted. Acting as it
does through public officials, it has to grant them either expressly or implicitly
certain powers. These they exercise not for their own benefit but for the body
politic. . . .
A public office is a public trust. That is more than a moral adjuration. It is a legal
imperative. The law may vest in a public official certain rights. It does so to
enable them to perform his functions and fulfill his responsibilities more
efficiently. . . . It is an added guarantee that justices and judges can administer
justice undeterred by any fear of reprisal or untoward consequence. Their
judgments then are even more likely to be inspired solely by their knowledge of
the law and the dictates of their conscience, free from the corrupting influence of
base or unworthy motives. The independence of which they are assured is
impressed with a significance transcending that of a purely personal right. (At pp.
338-339)
The exercise of the veto power in this case may be traced back to the efforts of the Department of
Budget and Management (DBM) to ignore or overlook the plain mandate of the Constitution on
fiscal autonomy. The OSG Comment reflects the same truncated view of the provision.
We have repeatedly in the past few years called the attention of DBM that not only does it
allocate less than one percent (1%) of the national budget annually for the 22,769 Justices,
Judges, and court personnel all over the country but it also examines with a fine-toothed come
how we spend the funds appropriated by Congress based on DBM recommendations.
The gist of our position papers and arguments before Congress is as follows:
The DBM requires the Supreme Court, with Constitutional Commissions, and the
Ombudsman to submit budget proposals in accordance with parameters it
establishes. DBM evaluates the proposals, asks each agency to defend its
proposals during DBM budget hearings, submits its own version of the proposals
to Congress without informing the agency of major alterations and mutilations
inflicted on their proposals, and expects each agency to defend in Congress
proposals not of the agency's making.
After the general appropriations bill is passed by Congress and signed into law by
the President, the tight and officious control by DBM continues. For the release of
appropriated funds, the Judiciary, Constitutional Commissions, and Ombudsman
are instructed through "guidelines", how to prepare Work and Financial Plans and
requests for monthly allotments. The DBM evaluates and approves these plans
and requests and on the basis of its approval authorizes the release of allotments
with corresponding notices of cash allocation. These notices specify the maximum
withdrawals each month which the Supreme Court, the Commissions and the
Ombudsman may make from the servicing government bank. The above agencies
are also required to submit to DBM monthly, quarterly and year-end budget
accountability reports to indicate their performance, physical and financial
operations and income,
The DBM reserves to itself the power to review the accountability reports and
when importuned for needed funds, to release additional allotments to the agency.
Since DBM always prunes the budget proposals to below subsistence levels and
since emergency situations usually occur during the fiscal year, the Chief Justices,
Chairmen of the Commissions, and Ombudsman are compelled to make
pilgrimages to DBM for additional funds to tide their respective agencies over the
emergency.
What is fiscal autonomy?
As envisioned in the Constitution, the fiscal autonomy enjoyed by the Judiciary, the Civil Service
Commission, the Commission on Audit, the Commission on Elections, and the Office of the
Ombudsman contemplates a guarantee on full flexibility to allocate and utilize their resources
with the wisdom and dispatch that their needs require. It recognizes the power and authority to
levy, assess and collect fees, fix rates of compensation not exceeding the highest rates authorized
by law for compensation and pay plans of the government and allocate and disburse such sums
as may be provided by law or prescribed by them in the course of the discharge of their
functions.
Fiscal autonomy means freedom from outside control. If the Supreme Court says it needs 100
typewriters but DBM rules we need only 10 typewriters and sends its recommendations to
Congress without even informing us, the autonomy given by the Constitution becomes an empty
and illusory platitude.
The Judiciary, the Constitutional Commissions, and the Ombudsman must have the
independence end flexibility needed in the discharge of their constitutional duties. The
imposition of restrictions and constraints on the manner the independent constitutional offices
allocate and utilize the funds appropriated for their operations is anathema to fiscal autonomy
and violative not only of the express mandate of the Constitution but especially as regards the
Supreme Court, of the independence and separation of powers upon which the entire fabric of
our constitutional system is based. In the interest of comity and cooperation, the Supreme Court,
Constitutional Commissions, and the Ombudsman have so far limited their objections to constant
reminders. We now agree with the petitioners that this grant of autonomy should cease to be a
meaningless provision.
In the case at bar, the veto of these specific provisions in the General Appropriations Act is
tantamount to dictating to the Judiciary how its funds should be utilized, which is clearly
repugnant to fiscal autonomy. The freedom of the Chief Justice to make adjustments in the
utilization of the funds appropriated for the expenditures of the judiciary, including the use of
any savings from any particular item to cover deficits or shortages in other items of the Judiciary
is withheld. Pursuant to the Constitutional mandate, the Judiciary must enjoy freedom in the
disposition of the funds allocated to it in the appropriations law. It knows its priorities just as it is
aware of the fiscal restraints. The Chief Justice must be given a free hand on how to augment
appropriations where augmentation is needed.
Furthermore, in the case of Gonzales v. Macaraig (191 SCRA 452 [1990]), the Court upheld the
authority of the President and other key officials to augment any item or any appropriation from
savings in the interest of expediency and efficiency. The Court stated that:
There should be no question, therefore, that statutory authority has, in fact, been
granted. And once given, the heads of the different branches of the Government
and those of the Constitutional Commissions are afforded considerable flexibility
in the use of public funds and resources (Demetria v. Alba, supra). The doctrine of
separation of powers is in no way endangered because the transfer is made within
a department (or branch of government) and not from one department (branch) to
another.
The Constitution, particularly Article VI, Section 25(5) also provides:
Sec. 25. (5) No law shall be passed authorizing any transfer of appropriations;
however, the President, the President of the Senate, the Speaker of the House of
Representatives, the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court, and the heads of
Constitutional Commissions may, by law, be authorized to augment any item in
the general appropriations law for their respective offices from savings in other
items of their respective appropriations.
In the instant case, the vetoed provisions which relate to the use of savings for augmenting items
for the payment of the pension differentials, among others, are clearly in consonance with the
abovestated pronouncements of the Court. The veto impairs the power of the Chief Justice to
augment other items in the Judiciary's appropriation, in contravention of the constitutional
provision on "fiscal autonomy."
III
Finally, it can not be denied that the retired Justices have a vested right to the accrued pensions
due them pursuant to RA 1797.
The right to a public pension is of statutory origin and statutes dealing with pensions have been
enacted by practically all the states in the United States (State ex rel. Murray v, Riley, 44 Del
505, 62 A2d 236), and presumably in most countries of the world. Statutory provisions for the
support of Judges or Justices on retirement are founded on services rendered to the state. Where a
judge has complied with the statutory prerequisite for retirement with pay, his right to retire and
draw salary becomes vested and may not, thereafter, be revoked or impaired. (Gay v. Whitehurst,
44 So ad 430)
Thus, in the Philippines, a number of retirement laws have been enacted, the purpose of which is
to entice competent men and women to enter the government service and to permit them to retire
therefrom with relative security, not only those who have retained their vigor but, more so, those
who have been incapacitated by illness or accident. (In re: Amount of the Monthly Pension of
Judges and Justices Starting From the Sixth Year of their Retirement and After the Expiration of
the Initial Five-year Period of Retirement, (190 SCRA 315 [1990]).
As early as 1953, Rep. Act No. 910 was enacted to grant pensions to retired Justices of the
Supreme Court and Court of Appeals.
This was amended by RA 1797 which provided for an automatic adjustment of the pension rates.
Through the years, laws were enacted and jurisprudence expounded to afford retirees better
benefits.
P.D. No. 1438, for one, was promulgated on June 10, 1978 amending RA 910 providing that the
lump sum of 5 years gratuity to which the retired Justices of the Supreme Court and Court of
Appeals were entitled was to be computed on the basis of the highest monthly aggregate of
transportation, living and representation allowances each Justice was receiving on the date of his
resignation. The Supreme Court in a resolution dated October 4, 1990, stated that this law on
gratuities covers the monthly pensions of retired Judges and Justices which should include the
highest monthly aggregate of transportation, living and representation allowances the retiree was
receiving on the date of retirement. (In Re: Amount of the Monthly Pension of Judges and
Justices, supra)
The rationale behind the veto which implies that Justices and Constitutional officers are unduly
favored is, again, a misimpression.
Immediately, we can state that retired Armed Forces officers and enlisted men number in the tens
of thousands while retired Justices are so few they can be immediately identified. Justices retire
at age 70 while military men retire at a much younger age some retired Generals left the
military at age 50 or earlier. Yet the benefits in Rep. Act No. 1797 are made to apply equally to
both groups. Any ideas arising from an alleged violation of the equal protection clause should
first be directed to retirees in the military or civil service where the reason for the retirement
provision is not based on indubitable and constitutionally sanctioned grounds, not to a handful of
retired Justices whose retirement pensions are founded on constitutional reasons.
The provisions regarding retirement pensions of justices arise from the package of protections
given by the Constitution to guarantee and preserve the independence of the Judiciary.
The Constitution expressly vests the power of judicial review in this Court. Any institution given
the power to declare, in proper cases, that act of both the President and Congress are
unconstitutional needs a high degree of independence in the exercise of its functions. Our
jurisdiction may not be reduced by Congress. Neither may it be increased without our advice and
concurrence. Justices may not be removed until they reach age 70 except through impeachment.
All courts and court personnel are under the administrative supervision of the Supreme Court.
The President may not appoint any Judge or Justice unless he or she has been nominated by the
Judicial and Bar Council which, in turn, is under the Supreme Court's supervision. Our salaries
may not be decreased during our continuance in office. We cannot be designated to any agency
performing administrative or quasi-judicial functions. We are specifically given fiscal autonomy.
The Judiciary is not only independent of, but also co-equal and coordinate with the Executive
and Legislative Departments. (Article VIII and section 30, Article VI, Constitution)
Any argument which seeks to remove special privileges given by law to former Justices of this
Court and the ground that there should be no "grant of distinct privileges" or "preferential
treatment" to retired Justices ignores these provisions of the Constitution and, in effect, asks that
these Constitutional provisions on special protections for the Judiciary be repealed. The integrity
of our entire constitutional system is premised to a large extent on the independence of the
Judiciary. All these provisions are intended to preserve that independence. So are the laws on
retirement benefits of Justices.
One last point.
The Office of the Solicitor General argues that:
. . . Moreover, by granting these benefits to retired Justices implies that public
funds, raised from taxes on other citizens, will be paid off to select individuals
who are already leading private lives and have ceased performing public service.
Said the United States Supreme Court, speaking through Mr. Justice Miller: "To
lay with one hand the power of the government on the property of the citizen, and
with the other to bestow upon favored individuals . . . is nonetheless a robbery
because it is done under the forms of law . . ." (Law Association V. Topeka, 20
Wall. 655) (Comment, p. 16)
The above arguments are not only specious, impolite and offensive; they certainly are
unbecoming of an office whose top officials are supposed to be, under their charter, learned in
the law.
Chief Justice Cesar Bengzon and Chief Justice Querube Makalintal, Justices J.B.L. Reyes,
Cecilia Muoz Palma, Efren Plana, Vicente Abad Santos, and, in fact, all retired Justices of the
Supreme Court and the Court of Appeals may no longer be in the active service. Still, the
Solicitor General and all lawyers under him who represent the government before the two courts
and whose predecessors themselves appeared before these retirees, should show some continuing
esteem and good manners toward these Justices who are now in the evening of their years.
All that the retirees ask is to be given the benefits granted by law. To characterize them as
engaging in "robbery" is intemperate, abrasive, and disrespectful more so because the argument
is unfounded.
If the Comment is characteristic of OSG pleadings today, then we are sorry to state that the then
quality of research in that institution has severely deteriorated.
In the first place, the citation of the case is, wrong. The title is not LAW Association v.
Topeka but Citizen's Savings and Loan Association of Cleveland, Ohio v. Topeka City (20 Wall.
655; 87 U.S. 729; 22 Law. Ed. 455 [1874]. Second, the case involved the validity of a statute
authorizing cities and counties to issue bonds for the purpose of building bridges, waterpower,
and other public works to aid private railroads improve their services. The law was declared void
on the ground that the right of a municipality to impose a tax cannot be used for private interests.
The case was decided in 1874. The world has turned over more than 40,000 times since that
ancient period. Public use is now equated with public interest. Public money may now be used
for slum clearance, low-cost housing, squatter resettlement, urban and agrarian reform where
only private persons are the immediate beneficiaries. What was "robbery" in 1874 is now called
"social justice." There is nothing about retirement benefits in the cited case. Obviously, the OSG
lawyers cited from an old textbook or encyclopedia which could not even spell "loan" correctly.
Good lawyers are expected to go to primary sources and to use only relevant citations.
The Court has been deluged with letters and petitions by former colleagues in the Judiciary
requesting adjustments in their pensions just so they would be able to cope with the everyday
living expenses not to mention the high cost of medical bills that old age entails. As Justice Cruz
aptly stated in Teodoro J. Santiago v. COA, (G.R. No. 92284, July 12, 1991);
Retirement laws should be interpreted liberally in favor of the retiree because
their intention is to provide for his sustenance, and hopefully even comfort, when
he no longer has the stamina to continue earning his livelihood. After devoting the
best years of his life to the public service, he deserves the appreciation of a
grateful government as best concretely expressed in a generous retirement gratuity
commensurate with the value and length of his services. That generosity is the
least he should expect now that his work is done and his youth is gone. Even as he
feels the weariness in his bones and glimpses the approach of the lengthening
shadows, he should be able to luxuriate in the thought that he did his task well,
and was rewarded for it.
For as long as these retired Justices are entitled under laws which continue to be effective, the
government can not deprive them of their vested right to the payment of their pensions.
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby GRANTED. The questioned veto is SET ASIDE as illegal
and unconstitutional. The vetoed provisions of the 1992 Appropriations Act are declared valid
and subsisting. The respondents are ordered to automatically and regularly release pursuant to
the grant of fiscal autonomy the funds appropriated for the subject pensions as well as the other
appropriations for the Judiciary. The resolution in Administrative Matter No. 91-8-225-CA dated
November 28, 1991 is likewise ordered to be implemented as promulgated.
SO ORDERED.

SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. 81311 June 30, 1988
KAPATIRAN NG MGA NAGLILINGKOD SA PAMAHALAAN NG PILIPINAS, INC.,
HERMINIGILDO C. DUMLAO, GERONIMO Q. QUADRA, and MARIO C.
VILLANUEVA, petitioners,
vs.
HON. BIENVENIDO TAN, as Commissioner of Internal Revenue, respondent.
G.R. No. 81820 June 30, 1988
KILUSANG MAYO UNO LABOR CENTER (KMU), its officers and affiliated labor
federations and alliances,petitioners,
vs.
THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY, SECRETARY OF FINANCE, THE COMMISSIONER
OF INTERNAL REVENUE, and SECRETARY OF BUDGET, respondents.
G.R. No. 81921 June 30, 1988
INTEGRATED CUSTOMS BROKERS ASSOCIATION OF THE PHILIPPINES and
JESUS B. BANAL, petitioners,
vs.
The HON. COMMISSIONER, BUREAU OF INTERNAL REVENUE, respondent.
G.R. No. 82152 June 30, 1988
RICARDO C. VALMONTE, petitioner,
vs.
THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY, SECRETARY OF FINANCE, COMMISSIONER OF
INTERNAL REVENUE and SECRETARY OF BUDGET, respondent.
Franklin S. Farolan for petitioner Kapatiran in G.R. No. 81311.
Jaime C. Opinion for individual petitioners in G.R. No. 81311.
Banzuela, Flores, Miralles, Raeses, Sy, Taquio and Associates for petitioners in G.R. No 81820.
Union of Lawyers and Advocates for Peoples Right collaborating counsel for petitioners in G.R.
No 81820.
Jose C. Leabres and Joselito R. Enriquez for petitioners in G.R. No. 81921.
PADILLA, J.:
These four (4) petitions, which have been consolidated because of the similarity of the main
issues involved therein, seek to nullify Executive Order No. 273 (EO 273, for short), issued by
the President of the Philippines on 25 July 1987, to take effect on 1 January 1988, and which
amended certain sections of the National Internal Revenue Code and adopted the value-added tax
(VAT, for short), for being unconstitutional in that its enactment is not alledgedly within the
powers of the President; that the VAT is oppressive, discriminatory, regressive, and violates the
due process and equal protection clauses and other provisions of the 1987 Constitution.
The Solicitor General prays for the dismissal of the petitions on the ground that the petitioners
have failed to show justification for the exercise of its judicial powers, viz. (1) the existence of
an appropriate case; (2) an interest, personal and substantial, of the party raising the
constitutional questions; (3) the constitutional question should be raised at the earliest
opportunity; and (4) the question of constitutionality is directly and necessarily involved in a
justiciable controversy and its resolution is essential to the protection of the rights of the parties.
According to the Solicitor General, only the third requisite that the constitutional question
should be raised at the earliest opportunity has been complied with. He also questions the
legal standing of the petitioners who, he contends, are merely asking for an advisory opinion
from the Court, there being no justiciable controversy for resolution.
Objections to taxpayers' suit for lack of sufficient personality standing, or interest are, however,
in the main procedural matters. Considering the importance to the public of the cases at bar, and
in keeping with the Court's duty, under the 1987 Constitution, to determine wether or not the
other branches of government have kept themselves within the limits of the Constitution and the
laws and that they have not abused the discretion given to them, the Court has brushed aside
technicalities of procedure and has taken cognizance of these petitions.
But, before resolving the issues raised, a brief look into the tax law in question is in order.
The VAT is a tax levied on a wide range of goods and services. It is a tax on the value, added by
every seller, with aggregate gross annual sales of articles and/or services, exceeding P200,00.00,
to his purchase of goods and services, unless exempt. VAT is computed at the rate of 0% or 10%
of the gross selling price of goods or gross receipts realized from the sale of services.
The VAT is said to have eliminated privilege taxes, multiple rated sales tax on manufacturers and
producers, advance sales tax, and compensating tax on importations. The framers of EO 273 that
it is principally aimed to rationalize the system of taxing goods and services; simplify tax
administration; and make the tax system more equitable, to enable the country to attain economic
recovery.
The VAT is not entirely new. It was already in force, in a modified form, before EO 273 was
issued. As pointed out by the Solicitor General, the Philippine sales tax system, prior to the
issuance of EO 273, was essentially a single stage value added tax system computed under the
"cost subtraction method" or "cost deduction method" and was imposed only on original sale,
barter or exchange of articles by manufacturers, producers, or importers. Subsequent sales of
such articles were not subject to sales tax. However, with the issuance of PD 1991 on 31 October
1985, a 3% tax was imposed on a second sale, which was reduced to 1.5% upon the issuance of
PD 2006 on 31 December 1985, to take effect 1 January 1986. Reduced sales taxes were
imposed not only on the second sale, but on every subsequent sale, as well. EO 273 merely
increased the VAT on every sale to 10%, unless zero-rated or exempt.
Petitioners first contend that EO 273 is unconstitutional on the Ground that the President had no
authority to issue EO 273 on 25 July 1987.
The contention is without merit.
It should be recalled that under Proclamation No. 3, which decreed a Provisional Constitution,
sole legislative authority was vested upon the President. Art. II, sec. 1 of the Provisional
Constitution states:
Sec. 1. Until a legislature is elected and convened under a new Constitution, the
President shall continue to exercise legislative powers.
On 15 October 1986, the Constitutional Commission of 1986 adopted a new Constitution for the
Republic of the Philippines which was ratified in a plebiscite conducted on 2 February 1987.
Article XVIII, sec. 6 of said Constitution, hereafter referred to as the 1987 Constitution,
provides:
Sec. 6. The incumbent President shall continue to exercise legislative powers until
the first Congress is convened.
It should be noted that, under both the Provisional and the 1987 Constitutions, the President is
vested with legislative powers until a legislature under a new Constitution is convened. The first
Congress, created and elected under the 1987 Constitution, was convened on 27 July 1987.
Hence, the enactment of EO 273 on 25 July 1987, two (2) days before Congress convened on 27
July 1987, was within the President's constitutional power and authority to legislate.
Petitioner Valmonte claims, additionally, that Congress was really convened on 30 June 1987
(not 27 July 1987). He contends that the word "convene" is synonymous with "the date when the
elected members of Congress assumed office."
The contention is without merit. The word "convene" which has been interpreted to mean "to call
together, cause to assemble, or convoke," 1 is clearly different from assumption of office by
the individual members of Congress or their taking the oath of office. As an example, we call to
mind the interim National Assembly created under the 1973 Constitution, which had not been
"convened" but some members of the body, more particularly the delegates to the 1971
Constitutional Convention who had opted to serve therein by voting affirmatively for the
approval of said Constitution, had taken their oath of office.
To uphold the submission of petitioner Valmonte would stretch the definition of the word
"convene" a bit too far. It would also defeat the purpose of the framers of the 1987 Constitutional
and render meaningless some other provisions of said Constitution. For example, the provisions
of Art. VI, sec. 15, requiring Congress to conveneonce every year on the fourth Monday of July
for its regular session would be a contrariety, since Congress would already be deemed to be in
session after the individual members have taken their oath of office. A portion of the provisions
of Art. VII, sec. 10, requiring Congress to convene for the purpose of enacting a law calling for a
special election to elect a President and Vice-President in case a vacancy occurs in said offices,
would also be a surplusage. The portion of Art. VII, sec. 11, third paragraph, requiring Congress
to convene, if not in session, to decide a conflict between the President and the Cabinet as to
whether or not the President and the Cabinet as to whether or not the President can re-assume the
powers and duties of his office, would also be redundant. The same is true with the portion of
Art. VII, sec. 18, which requires Congress to convene within twenty-four (24) hours following
the declaration of martial law or the suspension of the privilage of the writ of habeas corpus.
The 1987 Constitution mentions a specific date when the President loses her power to legislate.
If the framers of said Constitution had intended to terminate the exercise of legislative powers by
the President at the beginning of the term of office of the members of Congress, they should have
so stated (but did not) in clear and unequivocal terms. The Court has not power to re-write the
Constitution and give it a meaning different from that intended.
The Court also finds no merit in the petitioners' claim that EO 273 was issued by the President in
grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction. "Grave abuse of discretion"
has been defined, as follows:
Grave abuse of discretion" implies such capricious and whimsical exercise of
judgment as is equivalent to lack of jurisdiction (Abad Santos vs. Province of
Tarlac, 38 Off. Gaz. 834), or, in other words, where the power is exercised in an
arbitrary or despotic manner by reason of passion or personal hostility, and it must
be so patent and gross as to amount to an evasion of positive duty or to a virtual
refusal to perform the duty enjoined or to act at all in contemplation of law.
(Tavera-Luna, Inc. vs. Nable, 38 Off. Gaz. 62). 2
Petitioners have failed to show that EO 273 was issued capriciously and whimsically or in an
arbitrary or despotic manner by reason of passion or personal hostility. It appears that a
comprehensive study of the VAT had been extensively discussed by this framers and other
government agencies involved in its implementation, even under the past administration. As the
Solicitor General correctly sated. "The signing of E.O. 273 was merely the last stage in the
exercise of her legislative powers. The legislative process started long before the signing when
the data were gathered, proposals were weighed and the final wordings of the measure were
drafted, revised and finalized. Certainly, it cannot be said that the President made a jump, so to
speak, on the Congress, two days before it convened." 3
Next, the petitioners claim that EO 273 is oppressive, discriminatory, unjust and regressive, in
violation of the provisions of Art. VI, sec. 28(1) of the 1987 Constitution, which states:
Sec. 28 (1) The rule of taxation shall be uniform and equitable. The Congress
shall evolve a progressive system of taxation.
The petitioners" assertions in this regard are not supported by facts and circumstances to warrant
their conclusions. They have failed to adequately show that the VAT is oppressive, discriminatory
or unjust. Petitioners merely rely upon newspaper articles which are actually hearsay and have
evidentiary value. To justify the nullification of a law. there must be a clear and unequivocal
breach of the Constitution, not a doubtful and argumentative implication. 4
As the Court sees it, EO 273 satisfies all the requirements of a valid tax. It is uniform. The court,
in City of Baguio vs. De Leon, 5 said:
... In Philippine Trust Company v. Yatco (69 Phil. 420), Justice Laurel, speaking
for the Court, stated: "A tax is considered uniform when it operates with the same
force and effect in every place where the subject may be found."
There was no occasion in that case to consider the possible effect on such a
constitutional requirement where there is a classification. The opportunity came in
Eastern Theatrical Co. v. Alfonso (83 Phil. 852, 862). Thus: "Equality and
uniformity in taxation means that all taxable articles or kinds of property of the
same class shall be taxed at the same rate. The taxing power has the authority to
make reasonable and natural classifications for purposes of taxation; . . ." About
two years later, Justice Tuason, speaking for this Court in Manila Race Horses
Trainers Assn. v. de la Fuente (88 Phil. 60, 65) incorporated the above excerpt in
his opinion and continued; "Taking everything into account, the differentiation
against which the plaintiffs complain conforms to the practical dictates of justice
and equity and is not discriminatory within the meaning of the Constitution."
To satisfy this requirement then, all that is needed as held in another case decided
two years later, (Uy Matias v. City of Cebu, 93 Phil. 300) is that the statute or
ordinance in question "applies equally to all persons, firms and corporations
placed in similar situation." This Court is on record as accepting the view in a
leading American case (Carmichael v. Southern Coal and Coke Co., 301 US 495)
that "inequalities which result from a singling out of one particular class for
taxation or exemption infringe no constitutional limitation." (Lutz v. Araneta, 98
Phil. 148, 153).
The sales tax adopted in EO 273 is applied similarly on all goods and services sold to the public,
which are not exempt, at the constant rate of 0% or 10%.
The disputed sales tax is also equitable. It is imposed only on sales of goods or services by
persons engage in business with an aggregate gross annual sales exceeding P200,000.00. Small
corner sari-sari stores are consequently exempt from its application. Likewise exempt from the
tax are sales of farm and marine products, spared as they are from the incidence of the VAT, are
expected to be relatively lower and within the reach of the general public. 6
The Court likewise finds no merit in the contention of the petitioner Integrated Customs Brokers
Association of the Philippines that EO 273, more particularly the new Sec. 103 (r) of the
National Internal Revenue Code, unduly discriminates against customs brokers. The contested
provision states:
Sec. 103. Exempt transactions. The following shall be exempt from the valueadded tax:
xxx xxx xxx
(r) Service performed in the exercise of profession or calling (except customs
brokers) subject to the occupation tax under the Local Tax Code, and professional
services performed by registered general professional partnerships;
The phrase "except customs brokers" is not meant to discriminate against customs brokers. It was
inserted in Sec. 103(r) to complement the provisions of Sec. 102 of the Code, which makes the
services of customs brokers subject to the payment of the VAT and to distinguish customs
brokers from other professionals who are subject to the payment of an occupation tax under the
Local Tax Code. Pertinent provisions of Sec. 102 read:
Sec. 102. Value-added tax on sale of services. There shall be levied, assessed
and collected, a value-added tax equivalent to 10% percent of gross receipts
derived by any person engaged in the sale of services. The phrase sale of services"
means the performance of all kinds of services for others for a fee, remuneration
or consideration, including those performed or rendered by construction and
service contractors; stock, real estate, commercial, customs and immigration
brokers; lessors of personal property; lessors or distributors of cinematographic
films; persons engaged in milling, processing, manufacturing or repacking goods
for others; and similar services regardless of whether or not the performance
thereof call for the exercise or use of the physical or mental faculties: ...
With the insertion of the clarificatory phrase "except customs brokers" in Sec. 103(r), a potential
conflict between the two sections, (Secs. 102 and 103), insofar as customs brokers are concerned,
is averted.
At any rate, the distinction of the customs brokers from the other professionals who are subject
to occupation tax under the Local Tax Code is based upon material differences, in that the
activities of customs brokers (like those of stock, real estate and immigration brokers) partake
more of a business, rather than a profession and were thus subjected to the percentage tax under
Sec. 174 of the National Internal Revenue Code prior to its amendment by EO 273. EO 273
abolished the percentage tax and replaced it with the VAT. If the petitioner Association did not
protest the classification of customs brokers then, the Court sees no reason why it should protest
now.
The Court takes note that EO 273 has been in effect for more than five (5) months now, so that
the fears expressed by the petitioners that the adoption of the VAT will trigger skyrocketing of
prices of basic commodities and services, as well as mass actions and demonstrations against the
VAT should by now be evident. The fact that nothing of the sort has happened shows that the
fears and apprehensions of the petitioners appear to be more imagined than real. It would seem
that the VAT is not as bad as we are made to believe.
In any event, if petitioners seriously believe that the adoption and continued application of the
VAT are prejudicial to the general welfare or the interests of the majority of the people, they
should seek recourse and relief from the political branches of the government. The Court,
following the time-honored doctrine of separation of powers, cannot substitute its judgment for
that of the President as to the wisdom, justice and advisability of the adoption of the VAT. The
Court can only look into and determine whether or not EO 273 was enacted and made effective
as law, in the manner required by, and consistent with, the Constitution, and to make sure that it
was not issued in grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction; and, in
this regard, the Court finds no reason to impede its application or continued implementation.
WHEREFORE, the petitions are DISMISSED. Without pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.
Yap, C.J., Fernan, Narvasa, Melencio-Herrera, Cruz, Paras, Feliciano, Gancayco, Bidin,
Sarmiento, Cortes and Grio-Aquino, JJ., concur.
Gutierrez, Jr. and Medialdea, JJ., are on leave.

SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. 144104
June 29, 2004
LUNG CENTER OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner,

vs.
QUEZON CITY and CONSTANTINO P. ROSAS, in his capacity as City Assessor of
Quezon City,respondents.
DECISION
CALLEJO, SR., J.:
This is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, as amended, of the
Decision1 dated July 17, 2000 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 57014 which affirmed
the decision of the Central Board of Assessment Appeals holding that the lot owned by the
petitioner and its hospital building constructed thereon are subject to assessment for purposes of
real property tax.
The Antecedents
The petitioner Lung Center of the Philippines is a non-stock and non-profit entity established on
January 16, 1981 by virtue of Presidential Decree No. 1823.2 It is the registered owner of a
parcel of land, particularly described as Lot No. RP-3-B-3A-1-B-1, SWO-04-000495, located at
Quezon Avenue corner Elliptical Road, Central District, Quezon City. The lot has an area of
121,463 square meters and is covered by Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. 261320 of the
Registry of Deeds of Quezon City. Erected in the middle of the aforesaid lot is a hospital known
as the Lung Center of the Philippines. A big space at the ground floor is being leased to private
parties, for canteen and small store spaces, and to medical or professional practitioners who use
the same as their private clinics for their patients whom they charge for their professional
services. Almost one-half of the entire area on the left side of the building along Quezon Avenue
is vacant and idle, while a big portion on the right side, at the corner of Quezon Avenue and
Elliptical Road, is being leased for commercial purposes to a private enterprise known as the
Elliptical Orchids and Garden Center.
The petitioner accepts paying and non-paying patients. It also renders medical services to outpatients, both paying and non-paying. Aside from its income from paying patients, the petitioner
receives annual subsidies from the government.
On June 7, 1993, both the land and the hospital building of the petitioner were assessed for real
property taxes in the amount of P4,554,860 by the City Assessor of Quezon City.3 Accordingly,
Tax Declaration Nos. C-021-01226 (16-2518) and C-021-01231 (15-2518-A) were issued for the
land and the hospital building, respectively.4 On August 25, 1993, the petitioner filed a Claim for
Exemption5 from real property taxes with the City Assessor, predicated on its claim that it is a
charitable institution. The petitioners request was denied, and a petition was, thereafter, filed
before the Local Board of Assessment Appeals of Quezon City (QC-LBAA, for brevity) for the
reversal of the resolution of the City Assessor. The petitioner alleged that under Section 28,
paragraph 3 of the 1987 Constitution, the property is exempt from real property taxes. It averred
that a minimum of 60% of its hospital beds are exclusively used for charity patients and that the
major thrust of its hospital operation is to serve charity patients. The petitioner contends that it is
a charitable institution and, as such, is exempt from real property taxes. The QC-LBAA rendered
judgment dismissing the petition and holding the petitioner liable for real property taxes.6
The QC-LBAAs decision was, likewise, affirmed on appeal by the Central Board of Assessment
Appeals of Quezon City (CBAA, for brevity) 7 which ruled that the petitioner was not a charitable
institution and that its real properties were not actually, directly and exclusively used for
charitable purposes; hence, it was not entitled to real property tax exemption under the
constitution and the law. The petitioner sought relief from the Court of Appeals, which rendered
judgment affirming the decision of the CBAA.8
Undaunted, the petitioner filed its petition in this Court contending that:
A. THE COURT A QUO ERRED IN DECLARING PETITIONER AS NOT ENTITLED
TO REALTY TAX EXEMPTIONS ON THE GROUND THAT ITS LAND, BUILDING
AND IMPROVEMENTS, SUBJECT OF ASSESSMENT, ARE NOT ACTUALLY,
DIRECTLY AND EXCLUSIVELY DEVOTED FOR CHARITABLE PURPOSES.
B. WHILE PETITIONER IS NOT DECLARED AS REAL PROPERTY TAX EXEMPT
UNDER ITS CHARTER, PD 1823, SAID EXEMPTION MAY NEVERTHELESS BE
EXTENDED UPON PROPER APPLICATION.
The petitioner avers that it is a charitable institution within the context of Section 28(3), Article
VI of the 1987 Constitution. It asserts that its character as a charitable institution is not altered by
the fact that it admits paying patients and renders medical services to them, leases portions of the
land to private parties, and rents out portions of the hospital to private medical practitioners from
which it derives income to be used for operational expenses. The petitioner points out that for the
years 1995 to 1999, 100% of its out-patients were charity patients and of the hospitals 282-bed
capacity, 60% thereof, or 170 beds, is allotted to charity patients. It asserts that the fact that it
receives subsidies from the government attests to its character as a charitable institution. It
contends that the "exclusivity" required in the Constitution does not necessarily mean "solely."
Hence, even if a portion of its real estate is leased out to private individuals from whom it
derives income, it does not lose its character as a charitable institution, and its exemption from
the payment of real estate taxes on its real property. The petitioner cited our ruling in Herrera v.
QC-BAA9 to bolster its pose. The petitioner further contends that even if P.D. No. 1823 does not
exempt it from the payment of real estate taxes, it is not precluded from seeking tax exemption
under the 1987 Constitution.
In their comment on the petition, the respondents aver that the petitioner is not a charitable entity.
The petitioners real property is not exempt from the payment of real estate taxes under P.D. No.
1823 and even under the 1987 Constitution because it failed to prove that it is a charitable
institution and that the said property is actually, directly and exclusively used for charitable
purposes. The respondents noted that in a newspaper report, it appears that graft charges were
filed with the Sandiganbayan against the director of the petitioner, its administrative officer, and
Zenaida Rivera, the proprietress of the Elliptical Orchids and Garden Center, for entering into a
lease contract over 7,663.13 square meters of the property in 1990 for only P20,000 a month,
when the monthly rental should be P357,000 a month as determined by the Commission on
Audit; and that instead of complying with the directive of the COA for the cancellation of the
contract for being grossly prejudicial to the government, the petitioner renewed the same on
March 13, 1995 for a monthly rental of only P24,000. They assert that the petitioner uses the
subsidies granted by the government for charity patients and uses the rest of its income from the
property for the benefit of paying patients, among other purposes. They aver that the petitioner
failed to adduce substantial evidence that 100% of its out-patients and 170 beds in the hospital
are reserved for indigent patients. The respondents further assert, thus:
13. That the claims/allegations of the Petitioner LCP do not speak well of its record of
service. That before a patient is admitted for treatment in the Center, first impression is
that it is pay-patient and required to pay a certain amount as deposit. That even if a
patient is living below the poverty line, he is charged with high hospital bills. And,
without these bills being first settled, the poor patient cannot be allowed to leave the
hospital or be discharged without first paying the hospital bills or issue a promissory note
guaranteed and indorsed by an influential agency or person known only to the Center;
that even the remains of deceased poor patients suffered the same fate. Moreover, before
a patient is admitted for treatment as free or charity patient, one must undergo a series of
interviews and must submit all the requirements needed by the Center, usually
accompanied by endorsement by an influential agency or person known only to the
Center. These facts were heard and admitted by the Petitioner LCP during the hearings
before the Honorable QC-BAA and Honorable CBAA. These are the reasons of indigent
patients, instead of seeking treatment with the Center, they prefer to be treated at the
Quezon Institute. Can such practice by the Center be called charitable?10
The Issues
The issues for resolution are the following: (a) whether the petitioner is a charitable institution
within the context of Presidential Decree No. 1823 and the 1973 and 1987 Constitutions and
Section 234(b) of Republic Act No. 7160; and (b) whether the real properties of the petitioner are
exempt from real property taxes.
The Courts Ruling
The petition is partially granted.
On the first issue, we hold that the petitioner is a charitable institution within the context of the
1973 and 1987 Constitutions. To determine whether an enterprise is a charitable institution/entity
or not, the elements which should be considered include the statute creating the enterprise, its
corporate purposes, its constitution and by-laws, the methods of administration, the nature of the
actual work performed, the character of the services rendered, the indefiniteness of the
beneficiaries, and the use and occupation of the properties.11
In the legal sense, a charity may be fully defined as a gift, to be applied consistently with existing
laws, for the benefit of an indefinite number of persons, either by bringing their minds and hearts
under the influence of education or religion, by assisting them to establish themselves in life or
otherwise lessening the burden of government.12 It may be applied to almost anything that tend to
promote the well-doing and well-being of social man. It embraces the improvement and
promotion of the happiness of man.13 The word "charitable" is not restricted to relief of the poor
or sick.14 The test of a charity and a charitable organization are in law the same. The test whether
an enterprise is charitable or not is whether it exists to carry out a purpose reorganized in law as
charitable or whether it is maintained for gain, profit, or private advantage.
Under P.D. No. 1823, the petitioner is a non-profit and non-stock corporation which, subject to
the provisions of the decree, is to be administered by the Office of the President of the
Philippines with the Ministry of Health and the Ministry of Human Settlements. It was organized
for the welfare and benefit of the Filipino people principally to help combat the high incidence of
lung and pulmonary diseases in the Philippines. The raison detre for the creation of the
petitioner is stated in the decree, viz:
Whereas, for decades, respiratory diseases have been a priority concern, having been the
leading cause of illness and death in the Philippines, comprising more than 45% of the
total annual deaths from all causes, thus, exacting a tremendous toll on human resources,
which ailments are likely to increase and degenerate into serious lung diseases on account
of unabated pollution, industrialization and unchecked cigarette smoking in the
country;lavvph!l.net
Whereas, the more common lung diseases are, to a great extent, preventable, and curable
with early and adequate medical care, immunization and through prompt and intensive
prevention and health education programs;
Whereas, there is an urgent need to consolidate and reinforce existing programs,
strategies and efforts at preventing, treating and rehabilitating people affected by lung
diseases, and to undertake research and training on the cure and prevention of lung
diseases, through a Lung Center which will house and nurture the above and related
activities and provide tertiary-level care for more difficult and problematical cases;
Whereas, to achieve this purpose, the Government intends to provide material and
financial support towards the establishment and maintenance of a Lung Center for the
welfare and benefit of the Filipino people.15
The purposes for which the petitioner was created are spelled out in its Articles of Incorporation,
thus:
SECOND: That the purposes for which such corporation is formed are as follows:
1. To construct, establish, equip, maintain, administer and conduct an integrated
medical institution which shall specialize in the treatment, care, rehabilitation
and/or relief of lung and allied diseases in line with the concern of the government
to assist and provide material and financial support in the establishment and
maintenance of a lung center primarily to benefit the people of the Philippines and
in pursuance of the policy of the State to secure the well-being of the people by
providing them specialized health and medical services and by minimizing the
incidence of lung diseases in the country and elsewhere.
2. To promote the noble undertaking of scientific research related to the
prevention of lung or pulmonary ailments and the care of lung patients, including
the holding of a series of relevant congresses, conventions, seminars and
conferences;
3. To stimulate and, whenever possible, underwrite scientific researches on the
biological, demographic, social, economic, eugenic and physiological aspects of
lung or pulmonary diseases and their control; and to collect and publish the
findings of such research for public consumption;
4. To facilitate the dissemination of ideas and public acceptance of information on

lung consciousness or awareness, and the development of fact-finding,
information and reporting facilities for and in aid of the general purposes or
objects aforesaid, especially in human lung requirements, general health and
physical fitness, and other relevant or related fields;
5. To encourage the training of physicians, nurses, health officers, social workers
and medical and technical personnel in the practical and scientific implementation
of services to lung patients;
6. To assist universities and research institutions in their studies about lung
diseases, to encourage advanced training in matters of the lung and related fields
and to support educational programs of value to general health;
7. To encourage the formation of other organizations on the national, provincial
and/or city and local levels; and to coordinate their various efforts and activities
for the purpose of achieving a more effective programmatic approach on the
common problems relative to the objectives enumerated herein;
8. To seek and obtain assistance in any form from both international and local
foundations and organizations; and to administer grants and funds that may be
given to the organization;
9. To extend, whenever possible and expedient, medical services to the public
and, in general, to promote and protect the health of the masses of our people,
which has long been recognized as an economic asset and a social blessing;
10. To help prevent, relieve and alleviate the lung or pulmonary afflictions and
maladies of the people in any and all walks of life, including those who are poor
and needy, all without regard to or discrimination, because of race, creed, color or
political belief of the persons helped; and to enable them to obtain treatment when
such disorders occur;
11. To participate, as circumstances may warrant, in any activity designed and
carried on to promote the general health of the community;
12. To acquire and/or borrow funds and to own all funds or equipment,
educational materials and supplies by purchase, donation, or otherwise and to
dispose of and distribute the same in such manner, and, on such basis as the
Center shall, from time to time, deem proper and best, under the particular
circumstances, to serve its general and non-profit purposes and
objectives;lavvphil.net
13. To buy, purchase, acquire, own, lease, hold, sell, exchange, transfer and
dispose of properties, whether real or personal, for purposes herein mentioned;
and
14. To do everything necessary, proper, advisable or convenient for the
accomplishment of any of the powers herein set forth and to do every other act
and thing incidental thereto or connected therewith.16
Hence, the medical services of the petitioner are to be rendered to the public in general in any
and all walks of life including those who are poor and the needy without discrimination. After
all, any person, the rich as well as the poor, may fall sick or be injured or wounded and become a
subject of charity.17
As a general principle, a charitable institution does not lose its character as such and its
exemption from taxes simply because it derives income from paying patients, whether outpatient, or confined in the hospital, or receives subsidies from the government, so long as the
money received is devoted or used altogether to the charitable object which it is intended to
achieve; and no money inures to the private benefit of the persons managing or operating the
institution.18 In Congregational Sunday School, etc. v. Board of Review,19 the State Supreme
Court of Illinois held, thus:
[A]n institution does not lose its charitable character, and consequent exemption from
taxation, by reason of the fact that those recipients of its benefits who are able to pay are
required to do so, where no profit is made by the institution and the amounts so received
are applied in furthering its charitable purposes, and those benefits are refused to none on
account of inability to pay therefor. The fundamental ground upon which all exemptions
in favor of charitable institutions are based is the benefit conferred upon the public by
them, and a consequent relief, to some extent, of the burden upon the state to care for and
advance the interests of its citizens.20
As aptly stated by the State Supreme Court of South Dakota in Lutheran Hospital Association of
South Dakota v. Baker:21
[T]he fact that paying patients are taken, the profits derived from attendance upon
these patients being exclusively devoted to the maintenance of the charity, seems rather to
enhance the usefulness of the institution to the poor; for it is a matter of common
observation amongst those who have gone about at all amongst the suffering classes, that
the deserving poor can with difficulty be persuaded to enter an asylum of any kind
confined to the reception of objects of charity; and that their honest pride is much less
wounded by being placed in an institution in which paying patients are also received. The
fact of receiving money from some of the patients does not, we think, at all impair the
character of the charity, so long as the money thus received is devoted altogether to the
charitable object which the institution is intended to further.22
The money received by the petitioner becomes a part of the trust fund and must be devoted to
public trust purposes and cannot be diverted to private profit or benefit.23
Under P.D. No. 1823, the petitioner is entitled to receive donations. The petitioner does not lose
its character as a charitable institution simply because the gift or donation is in the form of
subsidies granted by the government. As held by the State Supreme Court of Utah in Yorgason v.
County Board of Equalization of Salt Lake County:24
Second, the government subsidy payments are provided to the project. Thus, those
payments are like a gift or donation of any other kind except they come from the
government. In both Intermountain Health Care and the present case, the crux is the
presence or absence of material reciprocity. It is entirely irrelevant to this analysis that the
government, rather than a private benefactor, chose to make up the deficit resulting from
the exchange between St. Marks Tower and the tenants by making a contribution to the
landlord, just as it would have been irrelevant in Intermountain Health Care if the
patients income supplements had come from private individuals rather than the
government.
Therefore, the fact that subsidization of part of the cost of furnishing such housing is by
the government rather than private charitable contributions does not dictate the denial of
a charitable exemption if the facts otherwise support such an exemption, as they do
here.25
In this case, the petitioner adduced substantial evidence that it spent its income, including the
subsidies from the government for 1991 and 1992 for its patients and for the operation of the
hospital. It even incurred a net loss in 1991 and 1992 from its operations.
Even as we find that the petitioner is a charitable institution, we hold, anent the second issue, that
those portions of its real property that are leased to private entities are not exempt from real
property taxes as these are not actually, directly and exclusively used for charitable purposes.
The settled rule in this jurisdiction is that laws granting exemption from tax are
construed strictissimi juris against the taxpayer and liberally in favor of the taxing power.
Taxation is the rule and exemption is the exception. The effect of an exemption is equivalent to
an appropriation. Hence, a claim for exemption from tax payments must be clearly shown and
based on language in the law too plain to be mistaken.26 As held in Salvation Army v. Hoehn:27
An intention on the part of the legislature to grant an exemption from the taxing power of
the state will never be implied from language which will admit of any other reasonable
construction. Such an intention must be expressed in clear and unmistakable terms, or
must appear by necessary implication from the language used, for it is a well settled
principle that, when a special privilege or exemption is claimed under a statute, charter or
act of incorporation, it is to be construed strictly against the property owner and in favor
of the public. This principle applies with peculiar force to a claim of exemption from
taxation . 28
Section 2 of Presidential Decree No. 1823, relied upon by the petitioner, specifically provides
that the petitioner shall enjoy the tax exemptions and privileges:
SEC. 2. TAX EXEMPTIONS AND PRIVILEGES. Being a non-profit, non-stock
corporation organized primarily to help combat the high incidence of lung and pulmonary
diseases in the Philippines, all donations, contributions, endowments and equipment and
supplies to be imported by authorized entities or persons and by the Board of Trustees of
the Lung Center of the Philippines, Inc., for the actual use and benefit of the Lung
Center, shall be exempt from income and gift taxes, the same further deductible in full for
the purpose of determining the maximum deductible amount under Section 30, paragraph
(h), of the National Internal Revenue Code, as amended.
The Lung Center of the Philippines shall be exempt from the payment of taxes, charges
and fees imposed by the Government or any political subdivision or instrumentality
thereof with respect to equipment purchases made by, or for the Lung Center.29
It is plain as day that under the decree, the petitioner does not enjoy any property tax exemption
privileges for its real properties as well as the building constructed thereon. If the intentions were
otherwise, the same should have been among the enumeration of tax exempt privileges under
Section 2:
It is a settled rule of statutory construction that the express mention of one person, thing,
or consequence implies the exclusion of all others. The rule is expressed in the familiar
maxim, expressio unius est exclusio alterius.
The rule of expressio unius est exclusio alterius is formulated in a number of ways. One
variation of the rule is the principle that what is expressed puts an end to that which is
implied. Expressium facit cessare tacitum. Thus, where a statute, by its terms, is
expressly limited to certain matters, it may not, by interpretation or construction, be
extended to other matters.
...
The rule of expressio unius est exclusio alterius and its variations are canons of restrictive
interpretation. They are based on the rules of logic and the natural workings of the human
mind. They are predicated upon ones own voluntary act and not upon that of others.
They proceed from the premise that the legislature would not have made specified
enumeration in a statute had the intention been not to restrict its meaning and confine its
terms to those expressly mentioned.30
The exemption must not be so enlarged by construction since the reasonable presumption is that
the State has granted in express terms all it intended to grant at all, and that unless the privilege is
limited to the very terms of the statute the favor would be intended beyond what was meant.31
Section 28(3), Article VI of the 1987 Philippine Constitution provides, thus:
(3) Charitable institutions, churches and parsonages or convents appurtenant thereto,
mosques,
non-profit
cemeteries,
and
all
lands,
buildings,
and
improvements, actually, directly and exclusively used for religious, charitable or
educational purposes shall be exempt from taxation.32
The tax exemption under this constitutional provision covers property taxes only.33 As Chief
Justice Hilario G. Davide, Jr., then a member of the 1986 Constitutional Commission, explained:
". . . what is exempted is not the institution itself . . .; those exempted from real estate taxes are
lands, buildings and improvements actually, directly and exclusively used for religious,
charitable or educational purposes."34
Consequently, the constitutional provision is implemented by Section 234(b) of Republic Act No.
7160 (otherwise known as the Local Government Code of 1991) as follows:
SECTION 234. Exemptions from Real Property Tax. The following are exempted from
payment of the real property tax:
...
(b) Charitable institutions, churches, parsonages or convents appurtenant thereto,
mosques, non-profit or religious cemeteries and all lands, buildings, and
improvements actually, directly, andexclusively used for religious, charitable or
educational purposes.35
We note that under the 1935 Constitution, "... all lands, buildings, and improvements used
exclusively for charitable purposes shall be exempt from taxation." 36 However, under the
1973 and the present Constitutions, for "lands, buildings, and improvements" of the charitable
institution to be considered exempt, the same should not only be "exclusively" used for
charitable purposes; it is required that such property be used "actually" and "directly" for such
purposes.37
In light of the foregoing substantial changes in the Constitution, the petitioner cannot rely on our
ruling in Herrera v. Quezon City Board of Assessment Appeals which was promulgated on
September 30, 1961 before the 1973 and 1987 Constitutions took effect.38 As this Court held
in Province of Abra v. Hernando:39
Under the 1935 Constitution: "Cemeteries, churches, and parsonages or convents
appurtenant thereto, and all lands, buildings, and improvements used exclusively for
religious, charitable, or educational purposes shall be exempt from taxation." The present
Constitution added "charitable institutions, mosques, and non-profit cemeteries" and
required that for the exemption of "lands, buildings, and improvements," they should not
only be "exclusively" but also "actually" and "directly" used for religious or charitable
purposes. The Constitution is worded differently. The change should not be ignored. It
must be duly taken into consideration. Reliance on past decisions would have sufficed
were the words "actually" as well as "directly" not added. There must be proof therefore
of the actual and direct use of the lands, buildings, and improvements for religious or
charitable purposes to be exempt from taxation.
Under the 1973 and 1987 Constitutions and Rep. Act No. 7160 in order to be entitled to the
exemption, the petitioner is burdened to prove, by clear and unequivocal proof, that (a) it is a
charitable
institution;
and
(b)
its
real
properties
are ACTUALLY, DIRECTLY and EXCLUSIVELY used for charitable purposes. "Exclusive"
is defined as possessed and enjoyed to the exclusion of others; debarred from participation or
enjoyment; and "exclusively" is defined, "in a manner to exclude; as enjoying a privilege
exclusively."40 If real property is used for one or more commercial purposes, it is not exclusively
used for the exempted purposes but is subject to taxation. 41 The words "dominant use" or
"principal use" cannot be substituted for the words "used exclusively" without doing violence to
the Constitutions and the law.42 Solely is synonymous with exclusively.43
What is meant by actual, direct and exclusive use of the property for charitable purposes is the
direct and immediate and actual application of the property itself to the purposes for which the
charitable institution is organized. It is not the use of the income from the real property that is
determinative of whether the property is used for tax-exempt purposes.44
The petitioner failed to discharge its burden to prove that the entirety of its real property is
actually, directly and exclusively used for charitable purposes. While portions of the hospital are
used for the treatment of patients and the dispensation of medical services to them, whether
paying or non-paying, other portions thereof are being leased to private individuals for their
clinics and a canteen. Further, a portion of the land is being leased to a private individual for her
business enterprise under the business name "Elliptical Orchids and Garden Center." Indeed, the
petitioners evidence shows that it collected P1,136,483.45 as rentals in 1991 and P1,679,999.28
for 1992 from the said lessees.
Accordingly, we hold that the portions of the land leased to private entities as well as those parts
of the hospital leased to private individuals are not exempt from such taxes. 45 On the other hand,
the portions of the land occupied by the hospital and portions of the hospital used for its patients,
whether paying or non-paying, are exempt from real property taxes.
IN LIGHT OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the petition is PARTIALLY GRANTED. The
respondent Quezon City Assessor is hereby DIRECTED to determine, after due hearing, the
precise portions of the land and the area thereof which are leased to private persons, and to
compute the real property taxes due thereon as provided for by law.
SO ORDERED.
Davide, Jr., Puno, Vitug, Panganiban, Quisumbing, Ynares-Santiago, Sandoval-Gutierrez,
Carpio, Austria-Martinez, Corona, Carpio Morales, Azcuna, and Tinga, JJ., concur.
SUPREME COURT
Manila
SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No. L-49336 August 31, 1981
THE PROVINCE OF ABRA, represented by LADISLAO ANCHETA, Provincial
Assessor, petitioner,
vs.
HONORABLE HAROLD M. HERNANDO, in his capacity as Presiding Judge of Branch I,
Court of First Instance Abra; THE ROMAN CATHOLIC BISHOP OF BANGUED, INC.,
represented by Bishop Odilo etspueler and Reverend Felipe Flores, respondents.
FERNANDO, C.J.:
On the face of this certiorari and mandamus petition filed by the Province of Abra, 1 it clearly
appears that the actuation of respondent Judge Harold M. Hernando of the Court of First Instance
of Abra left much to be desired. First, there was a denial of a motion to dismiss 2 an action for
declaratory relief by private respondent Roman Catholic Bishop of Bangued desirous of being
exempted from a real estate tax followed by a summary judgment 3 granting such exemption,
without even hearing the side of petitioner. In the rather vigorous language of the Acting
Provincial Fiscal, as counsel for petitioner, respondent Judge "virtually ignored the pertinent
provisions of the Rules of Court; ... wantonly violated the rights of petitioner to due process, by
giving due course to the petition of private respondent for declaratory relief, and thereafter
without allowing petitioner to answer and without any hearing, adjudged the case; all in total
disregard of basic laws of procedure and basic provisions of due process in the constitution,
thereby indicating a failure to grasp and understand the law, which goes into the competence of
the Honorable Presiding Judge." 4
It was the submission of counsel that an action for declaratory relief would be proper only before
a breach or violation of any statute, executive order or regulation. 5 Moreover, there being a tax
assessment made by the Provincial Assessor on the properties of respondent Roman Catholic
Bishop, petitioner failed to exhaust the administrative remedies available under Presidential
Decree No. 464 before filing such court action. Further, it was pointed out to respondent Judge
that he failed to abide by the pertinent provision of such Presidential Decree which provides as
follows: "No court shall entertain any suit assailing the validity of a tax assessed under this Code
until the taxpayer, shall have paid, under protest, the tax assessed against him nor shall any court
declare any tax invalid by reason of irregularities or informalities in the proceedings of the
officers charged with the assessment or collection of taxes, or of failure to perform their duties
within this time herein specified for their performance unless such irregularities, informalities or
failure shall have impaired the substantial rights of the taxpayer; nor shall any court declare any
portion of the tax assessed under the provisions of this Code invalid except upon condition that
the taxpayer shall pay the just amount of the tax, as determined by the court in the pending
proceeding." 6
When asked to comment, respondent Judge began with the allegation that there "is no question
that the real properties sought to be taxed by the Province of Abra are properties of the
respondent Roman Catholic Bishop of Bangued, Inc." 7 The very next sentence assumed the very
point it asked when he categorically stated: "Likewise, there is no dispute that the properties
including their procedure are actually, directly and exclusively used by the Roman Catholic
Bishop of Bangued, Inc. for religious or charitable purposes." 8 For him then: "The proper
remedy of the petitioner is appeal and not this special civil action." 9 A more exhaustive comment
was submitted by private respondent Roman Catholic Bishop of Bangued, Inc. It was, however,
unable to lessen the force of the objection raised by petitioner Province of Abra, especially the
due process aspect. it is to be admitted that his opposition to the petition, pressed with vigor,
ostensibly finds a semblance of support from the authorities cited. It is thus impressed with a
scholarly aspect. It suffers, however, from the grave infirmity of stating that only a pure question
of law is presented when a claim for exemption is made.
The petition must be granted.
1. Respondent Judge would not have erred so grievously had he merely compared the provisions
of the present Constitution with that appearing in the 1935 Charter on the tax exemption of
"lands, buildings, and improvements." There is a marked difference. Under the 1935
Constitution: "Cemeteries, churches, and parsonages or convents appurtenant thereto, and all
lands, buildings, and improvements used exclusively for religious, charitable, or educational
purposes shall be exempt from taxation." 10 The present Constitution added "charitable
institutions, mosques, and non-profit cemeteries" and required that for the exemption of ":lands,
buildings, and improvements," they should not only be "exclusively" but also "actually and
"directly" used for religious or charitable purposes. 11 The Constitution is worded differently. The
change should not be ignored. It must be duly taken into consideration. Reliance on past
decisions would have sufficed were the words "actually" as well as "directly" not added. There
must be proof therefore of the actual and direct use of the lands, buildings, and improvements
for religious or charitable purposes to be exempt from taxation. According to Commissioner of
Internal Revenue v. Guerrero: 12 "From 1906, in Catholic Church v. Hastings to 1966, in Esso
Standard Eastern, Inc. v. Acting Commissioner of Customs, it has been the constant and uniform
holding that exemption from taxation is not favored and is never presumed, so that if granted it
must be strictly construed against the taxpayer. Affirmatively put, the law frowns on exemption
from taxation, hence, an exempting provision should be construed strictissimi juris." 13 In Manila
Electric Company v. Vera, 14 a 1975 decision, such principle was reiterated, reference being made
to Republic Flour Mills, Inc. v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue; 15Commissioner of Customs
v. Philippine Acetylene Co. & CTA; 16 and Davao Light and Power Co., Inc. v. Commissioner of
Customs. 17
2. Petitioner Province of Abra is therefore fully justified in invoking the protection of procedural
due process. If there is any case where proof is necessary to demonstrate that there is compliance
with the constitutional provision that allows an exemption, this is it. Instead, respondent Judge
accepted at its face the allegation of private respondent. All that was alleged in the petition for
declaratory relief filed by private respondents, after mentioning certain parcels of land owned by
it, are that they are used "actually, directly and exclusively" as sources of support of the parish
priest and his helpers and also of private respondent Bishop. 18 In the motion to dismiss filed on
behalf of petitioner Province of Abra, the objection was based primarily on the lack of
jurisdiction, as the validity of a tax assessment may be questioned before the Local Board of
Assessment Appeals and not with a court. There was also mention of a lack of a cause of action,
but only because, in its view, declaratory relief is not proper, as there had been breach or
violation of the right of government to assess and collect taxes on such property. It clearly
appears, therefore, that in failing to accord a hearing to petitioner Province of Abra and deciding
the case immediately in favor of private respondent, respondent Judge failed to abide by the
constitutional command of procedural due process.
WHEREFORE, the petition is granted and the resolution of June 19, 1978 is set aside.
Respondent Judge, or who ever is acting on his behalf, is ordered to hear the case on the merit.
No costs.
Barredo, Concepcion, Jr., and De Castro, JJ., concur.
Aquino, J., concur in the result.
Abad Santos, J., is on leave.
SUPREME COURT
Manila
SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No. L-39086 June 15, 1988
ABRA VALLEY COLLEGE, INC., represented by PEDRO V. BORGONIA, petitioner,
vs.
HON. JUAN P. AQUINO, Judge, Court of First Instance, Abra; ARMIN M. CARIAGA,
Provincial Treasurer, Abra; GASPAR V. BOSQUE, Municipal Treasurer, Bangued, Abra;
HEIRS OF PATERNO MILLARE,respondents.
PARAS, J.:
This is a petition for review on certiorari of the decision * of the defunct Court of First Instance
of Abra, Branch I, dated June 14, 1974, rendered in Civil Case No. 656, entitled "Abra Valley
Junior College, Inc., represented by Pedro V. Borgonia, plaintiff vs. Armin M. Cariaga as
Provincial Treasurer of Abra, Gaspar V. Bosque as Municipal Treasurer of Bangued, Abra and
Paterno Millare, defendants," the decretal portion of which reads:
IN VIEW OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the Court hereby declares:
That the distraint seizure and sale by the Municipal Treasurer of Bangued, Abra,
the Provincial Treasurer of said province against the lot and building of the Abra
Valley Junior College, Inc., represented by Director Pedro Borgonia located at
Bangued, Abra, is valid;
That since the school is not exempt from paying taxes, it should therefore pay all
back taxes in the amount of P5,140.31 and back taxes and penalties from the
promulgation of this decision;
That the amount deposited by the plaintaff him the sum of P60,000.00 before the
trial, be confiscated to apply for the payment of the back taxes and for the
redemption of the property in question, if the amount is less than P6,000.00, the
remainder must be returned to the Director of Pedro Borgonia, who represents the
plaintiff herein;
That the deposit of the Municipal Treasurer in the amount of P6,000.00 also
before the trial must be returned to said Municipal Treasurer of Bangued, Abra;
And finally the case is hereby ordered dismissed with costs against the plaintiff.
SO ORDERED. (Rollo, pp. 22-23)
Petitioner, an educational corporation and institution of higher learning duly incorporated with
the Securities and Exchange Commission in 1948, filed a complaint (Annex "1" of Answer by
the respondents Heirs of Paterno Millare; Rollo, pp. 95-97) on July 10, 1972 in the court a quo to
annul and declare void the "Notice of Seizure' and the "Notice of Sale" of its lot and building
located at Bangued, Abra, for non-payment of real estate taxes and penalties amounting to
P5,140.31. Said "Notice of Seizure" of the college lot and building covered by Original
Certificate of Title No. Q-83 duly registered in the name of petitioner, plaintiff below, on July 6,
1972, by respondents Municipal Treasurer and Provincial Treasurer, defendants below, was
issued for the satisfaction of the said taxes thereon. The "Notice of Sale" was caused to be served
upon the petitioner by the respondent treasurers on July 8, 1972 for the sale at public auction of
said college lot and building, which sale was held on the same date. Dr. Paterno Millare, then
Municipal Mayor of Bangued, Abra, offered the highest bid of P6,000.00 which was duly
accepted. The certificate of sale was correspondingly issued to him.
On August 10, 1972, the respondent Paterno Millare (now deceased) filed through counstel a
motion to dismiss the complaint.
On August 23, 1972, the respondent Provincial Treasurer and Municipal Treasurer, through then
Provincial Fiscal Loreto C. Roldan, filed their answer (Annex "2" of Answer by the respondents
Heirs of Patemo Millare; Rollo, pp. 98-100) to the complaint. This was followed by an amended
answer (Annex "3," ibid, Rollo, pp. 101-103) on August 31, 1972.
On September 1, 1972 the respondent Paterno Millare filed his answer (Annex "5," ibid; Rollo,
pp. 106-108).
On October 12, 1972, with the aforesaid sale of the school premises at public auction, the
respondent Judge, Hon. Juan P. Aquino of the Court of First Instance of Abra, Branch I, ordered
(Annex "6," ibid; Rollo, pp. 109-110) the respondents provincial and municipal treasurers to
deliver to the Clerk of Court the proceeds of the auction sale. Hence, on December 14, 1972,
petitioner, through Director Borgonia, deposited with the trial court the sum of P6,000.00
evidenced by PNB Check No. 904369.
On April 12, 1973, the parties entered into a stipulation of facts adopted and embodied by the
trial court in its questioned decision. Said Stipulations reads:
STIPULATION OF FACTS
COME NOW the parties, assisted by counsels, and to this Honorable Court
respectfully enter into the following agreed stipulation of facts:
1. That the personal circumstances of the parties as stated in paragraph 1 of the
complaint is admitted; but the particular person of Mr. Armin M. Cariaga is to be
substituted, however, by anyone who is actually holding the position of Provincial
Treasurer of the Province of Abra;
2. That the plaintiff Abra Valley Junior College, Inc. is the owner of the lot and
buildings thereon located in Bangued, Abra under Original Certificate of Title No.
0-83;
3. That the defendant Gaspar V. Bosque, as Municipal treasurer of Bangued, Abra
caused to be served upon the Abra Valley Junior College, Inc. a Notice of Seizure
on the property of said school under Original Certificate of Title No. 0-83 for the
satisfaction of real property taxes thereon, amounting to P5,140.31; the Notice of
Seizure being the one attached to the complaint as Exhibit A;
4. That on June 8, 1972 the above properties of the Abra Valley Junior College,
Inc. was sold at public auction for the satisfaction of the unpaid real property
taxes thereon and the same was sold to defendant Paterno Millare who offered the
highest bid of P6,000.00 and a Certificate of Sale in his favor was issued by the
defendant Municipal Treasurer.
5. That all other matters not particularly and specially covered by this stipulation
of facts will be the subject of evidence by the parties.
WHEREFORE, it is respectfully prayed of the Honorable Court to consider and
admit this stipulation of facts on the point agreed upon by the parties.
Bangued, Abra, April 12, 1973.
Sgd. Agripino Brillantes
Typ AGRIPINO BRILLANTES
Attorney for Plaintiff
Sgd. Loreto Roldan
Typ LORETO ROLDAN
Provincial Fiscal
Counsel for Defendants

Provincial Treasurer of
Abra and the Municipal
Treasurer of Bangued, Abra
Sgd. Demetrio V. Pre
Typ. DEMETRIO V. PRE
Attorney for Defendant
Paterno Millare (Rollo, pp. 17-18)
Aside from the Stipulation of Facts, the trial court among others, found the following: (a) that the
school is recognized by the government and is offering Primary, High School and College
Courses, and has a school population of more than one thousand students all in all; (b) that it is
located right in the heart of the town of Bangued, a few meters from the plaza and about 120
meters from the Court of First Instance building; (c) that the elementary pupils are housed in a
two-storey building across the street; (d) that the high school and college students are housed in
the main building; (e) that the Director with his family is in the second floor of the main
building; and (f) that the annual gross income of the school reaches more than one hundred
thousand pesos.
From all the foregoing, the only issue left for the Court to determine and as agreed by the parties,
is whether or not the lot and building in question are used exclusively for educational purposes.
(Rollo, p. 20)
The succeeding Provincial Fiscal, Hon. Jose A. Solomon and his Assistant, Hon. Eustaquio Z.
Montero, filed a Memorandum for the Government on March 25, 1974, and a Supplemental
Memorandum on May 7, 1974, wherein they opined "that based on the evidence, the laws
applicable, court decisions and jurisprudence, the school building and school lot used for
educational purposes of the Abra Valley College, Inc., are exempted from the payment of taxes."
(Annexes "B," "B-1" of Petition; Rollo, pp. 24-49; 44 and 49).
Nonetheless, the trial court disagreed because of the use of the second floor by the Director of
petitioner school for residential purposes. He thus ruled for the government and rendered the
assailed decision.
After having been granted by the trial court ten (10) days from August 6, 1974 within which to
perfect its appeal (Per Order dated August 6, 1974; Annex "G" of Petition; Rollo, p. 57)
petitioner instead availed of the instant petition for review on certiorari with prayer for
preliminary injunction before this Court, which petition was filed on August 17, 1974 (Rollo,
p.2).
In the resolution dated August 16, 1974, this Court resolved to give DUE COURSE to the
petition (Rollo, p. 58). Respondents were required to answer said petition (Rollo, p. 74).
Petitioner raised the following assignments of error:
I
THE COURT A QUO ERRED IN SUSTAINING AS VALID THE SEIZURE AND SALE OF
THE COLLEGE LOT AND BUILDING USED FOR EDUCATIONAL PURPOSES OF THE
PETITIONER.
II
THE COURT A QUO ERRED IN DECLARING THAT THE COLLEGE LOT AND
BUILDING OF THE PETITIONER ARE NOT USED EXCLUSIVELY FOR EDUCATIONAL
PURPOSES MERELY BECAUSE THE COLLEGE PRESIDENT RESIDES IN ONE ROOM
OF THE COLLEGE BUILDING.
III
THE COURT A QUO ERRED IN DECLARING THAT THE COLLEGE LOT AND
BUILDING OF THE PETITIONER ARE NOT EXEMPT FROM PROPERTY TAXES AND IN
ORDERING PETITIONER TO PAY P5,140.31 AS REALTY TAXES.
IV
THE COURT A QUO ERRED IN ORDERING THE CONFISCATION OF THE P6,000.00
DEPOSIT MADE IN THE COURT BY PETITIONER AS PAYMENT OF THE P5,140.31
REALTY TAXES. (See Brief for the Petitioner, pp. 1-2)
The main issue in this case is the proper interpretation of the phrase "used exclusively for
educational purposes."
Petitioner contends that the primary use of the lot and building for educational purposes, and not
the incidental use thereof, determines and exemption from property taxes under Section 22 (3),
Article VI of the 1935 Constitution. Hence, the seizure and sale of subject college lot and
building, which are contrary thereto as well as to the provision of Commonwealth Act No. 470,
otherwise known as the Assessment Law, are without legal basis and therefore void.
On the other hand, private respondents maintain that the college lot and building in question
which were subjected to seizure and sale to answer for the unpaid tax are used: (1) for the
educational purposes of the college; (2) as the permanent residence of the President and Director
thereof, Mr. Pedro V. Borgonia, and his family including the in-laws and grandchildren; and (3)
for commercial purposes because the ground floor of the college building is being used and
rented by a commercial establishment, the Northern Marketing Corporation (See photograph
attached as Annex "8" (Comment; Rollo, p. 90]).
Due to its time frame, the constitutional provision which finds application in the case at bar is
Section 22, paragraph 3, Article VI, of the then 1935 Philippine Constitution, which expressly
grants exemption from realty taxes for "Cemeteries, churches and parsonages or convents
appurtenant thereto, and all lands, buildings, and improvements used exclusively for religious,
charitable or educational purposes ...
Relative thereto, Section 54, paragraph c, Commonwealth Act No. 470 as amended by Republic
Act No. 409, otherwise known as the Assessment Law, provides:
The following are exempted from real property tax under the Assessment Law:
xxx xxx xxx
(c) churches and parsonages or convents appurtenant thereto, and all lands,
buildings, and improvements used exclusively for religious, charitable, scientific
or educational purposes.
xxx xxx xxx
In this regard petitioner argues that the primary use of the school lot and building is the basic and
controlling guide, norm and standard to determine tax exemption, and not the mere incidental use
thereof.
As early as 1916 in YMCA of Manila vs. Collector of lnternal Revenue, 33 Phil. 217 [1916], this
Court ruled that while it may be true that the YMCA keeps a lodging and a boarding house and
maintains a restaurant for its members, still these do not constitute business in the ordinary
acceptance of the word, but an institution used exclusively for religious, charitable and
educational purposes, and as such, it is entitled to be exempted from taxation.
In the case of Bishop of Nueva Segovia v. Provincial Board of Ilocos Norte, 51 Phil. 352 [1972],
this Court included in the exemption a vegetable garden in an adjacent lot and another lot
formerly used as a cemetery. It was clarified that the term "used exclusively" considers incidental
use also. Thus, the exemption from payment of land tax in favor of the convent includes, not
only the land actually occupied by the building but also the adjacent garden devoted to the
incidental use of the parish priest. The lot which is not used for commercial purposes but serves
solely as a sort of lodging place, also qualifies for exemption because this constitutes incidental
use in religious functions.
The phrase "exclusively used for educational purposes" was further clarified by this Court in the
cases of Herrera vs. Quezon City Board of assessment Appeals, 3 SCRA 186 [1961]
and Commissioner of Internal Revenue vs. Bishop of the Missionary District, 14 SCRA 991
[1965], thus
Moreover, the exemption in favor of property used exclusively for charitable or
educational purposes is 'not limited to property actually indispensable' therefor
(Cooley on Taxation, Vol. 2, p. 1430), but extends to facilities which are
incidental to and reasonably necessary for the accomplishment of said purposes,
such as in the case of hospitals, "a school for training nurses, a nurses' home,
property use to provide housing facilities for interns, resident doctors,
superintendents, and other members of the hospital staff, and recreational
facilities for student nurses, interns, and residents' (84 CJS 6621), such as
"Athletic fields" including "a firm used for the inmates of the institution. (Cooley
on Taxation, Vol. 2, p. 1430).
The test of exemption from taxation is the use of the property for purposes mentioned in the
Constitution (Apostolic Prefect v. City Treasurer of Baguio, 71 Phil, 547 [1941]).
It must be stressed however, that while this Court allows a more liberal and non-restrictive
interpretation of the phrase "exclusively used for educational purposes" as provided for in Article
VI, Section 22, paragraph 3 of the 1935 Philippine Constitution, reasonable emphasis has always
been made that exemption extends to facilities which are incidental to and reasonably necessary
for the accomplishment of the main purposes. Otherwise stated, the use of the school building or
lot for commercial purposes is neither contemplated by law, nor by jurisprudence. Thus, while
the use of the second floor of the main building in the case at bar for residential purposes of the
Director and his family, may find justification under the concept of incidental use, which is
complimentary to the main or primary purposeeducational, the lease of the first floor thereof
to the Northern Marketing Corporation cannot by any stretch of the imagination be considered
incidental to the purpose of education.
It will be noted however that the aforementioned lease appears to have been raised for the first
time in this Court. That the matter was not taken up in the to court is really apparent in the
decision of respondent Judge. No mention thereof was made in the stipulation of facts, not even
in the description of the school building by the trial judge, both embodied in the decision nor as
one of the issues to resolve in order to determine whether or not said properly may be exempted
from payment of real estate taxes (Rollo, pp. 17-23). On the other hand, it is noteworthy that
such fact was not disputed even after it was raised in this Court.
Indeed, it is axiomatic that facts not raised in the lower court cannot be taken up for the first time
on appeal. Nonetheless, as an exception to the rule, this Court has held that although a factual
issue is not squarely raised below, still in the interest of substantial justice, this Court is not
prevented from considering a pivotal factual matter. "The Supreme Court is clothed with ample
authority to review palpable errors not assigned as such if it finds that their consideration is
necessary in arriving at a just decision." (Perez vs. Court of Appeals, 127 SCRA 645 [1984]).
Under the 1935 Constitution, the trial court correctly arrived at the conclusion that the school
building as well as the lot where it is built, should be taxed, not because the second floor of the
same is being used by the Director and his family for residential purposes, but because the first
floor thereof is being used for commercial purposes. However, since only a portion is used for
purposes of commerce, it is only fair that half of the assessed tax be returned to the school
involved.
PREMISES CONSIDERED, the decision of the Court of First Instance of Abra, Branch I, is
hereby AFFIRMED subject to the modification that half of the assessed tax be returned to the
petitioner.
SO ORDERED.
Yap, C.J., Melencio-Herrera, Padilla and Sarmiento, JJ., concur.

SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-10405
December 29, 1960
WENCESLAO PASCUAL, in his official capacity as Provincial Governor of

Rizal, petitioner-appellant,
vs.
THE SECRETARY OF PUBLIC WORKS AND COMMUNICATIONS, ET
AL., respondents-appellees.
Asst. Fiscal Noli M. Cortes and Jose P. Santos for appellant.

Office of the Asst. Solicitor General Jose G. Bautista and Solicitor A. A. Torres for appellee.
CONCEPCION, J.:
Appeal, by petitioner Wenceslao Pascual, from a decision of the Court of First Instance of Rizal,
dismissing the above entitled case and dissolving the writ of preliminary injunction therein
issued, without costs.
On August 31, 1954, petitioner Wenceslao Pascual, as Provincial Governor of Rizal, instituted
this action for declaratory relief, with injunction, upon the ground that Republic Act No. 920,
entitled "An Act Appropriating Funds for Public Works", approved on June 20, 1953, contained,
in section 1-C (a) thereof, an item (43[h]) of P85,000.00 "for the construction, reconstruction,
repair, extension and improvement" of Pasig feeder road terminals (Gen. Roxas Gen. Araneta
Gen. Lucban Gen. Capinpin Gen. Segundo Gen. Delgado Gen. Malvar Gen.
Lim)"; that, at the time of the passage and approval of said Act, the aforementioned feeder roads
were "nothing but projected and planned subdivision roads, not yet constructed, . . . within the
Antonio Subdivision . . . situated at . . . Pasig, Rizal" (according to the tracings attached to the
petition as Annexes A and B, near Shaw Boulevard, not far away from the intersection between
the latter and Highway 54), which projected feeder roads "do not connect any government
property or any important premises to the main highway"; that the aforementioned Antonio
Subdivision (as well as the lands on which said feeder roads were to be construed) were private
properties of respondent Jose C. Zulueta, who, at the time of the passage and approval of said
Act, was a member of the Senate of the Philippines; that on May, 1953, respondent Zulueta,
addressed a letter to the Municipal Council of Pasig, Rizal, offering to donate said projected
feeder roads to the municipality of Pasig, Rizal; that, on June 13, 1953, the offer was accepted by
the council, subject to the condition "that the donor would submit a plan of the said roads and
agree to change the names of two of them"; that no deed of donation in favor of the municipality
of Pasig was, however, executed; that on July 10, 1953, respondent Zulueta wrote another letter
to said council, calling attention to the approval of Republic Act. No. 920, and the sum of
P85,000.00 appropriated therein for the construction of the projected feeder roads in question;
that the municipal council of Pasig endorsed said letter of respondent Zulueta to the District
Engineer of Rizal, who, up to the present "has not made any endorsement thereon" that inasmuch
as the projected feeder roads in question were private property at the time of the passage and
approval of Republic Act No. 920, the appropriation of P85,000.00 therein made, for the
construction, reconstruction, repair, extension and improvement of said projected feeder roads,
was illegal and, therefore, void ab initio"; that said appropriation of P85,000.00 was made by
Congress because its members were made to believe that the projected feeder roads in question
were "public roads and not private streets of a private subdivision"'; that, "in order to give a
semblance of legality, when there is absolutely none, to the aforementioned appropriation",
respondents Zulueta executed on December 12, 1953, while he was a member of the Senate of
the Philippines, an alleged deed of donation copy of which is annexed to the petition of the
four (4) parcels of land constituting said projected feeder roads, in favor of the Government of
the Republic of the Philippines; that said alleged deed of donation was, on the same date,
accepted by the then Executive Secretary; that being subject to an onerous condition, said
donation partook of the nature of a contract; that, such, said donation violated the provision of
our fundamental law prohibiting members of Congress from being directly or indirectly
financially interested in any contract with the Government, and, hence, is unconstitutional, as
well as null and void ab initio, for the construction of the projected feeder roads in question with
public funds would greatly enhance or increase the value of the aforementioned subdivision of
respondent Zulueta, "aside from relieving him from the burden of constructing his subdivision
streets or roads at his own expense"; that the construction of said projected feeder roads was then
being undertaken by the Bureau of Public Highways; and that, unless restrained by the court, the
respondents would continue to execute, comply with, follow and implement the aforementioned
illegal provision of law, "to the irreparable damage, detriment and prejudice not only to the
petitioner but to the Filipino nation."
Petitioner prayed, therefore, that the contested item of Republic Act No. 920 be declared null and
void; that the alleged deed of donation of the feeder roads in question be "declared
unconstitutional and, therefor, illegal"; that a writ of injunction be issued enjoining the Secretary
of Public Works and Communications, the Director of the Bureau of Public Works and Highways
and Jose C. Zulueta from ordering or allowing the continuance of the above-mentioned feeder
roads project, and from making and securing any new and further releases on the aforementioned
item of Republic Act No. 920, and the disbursing officers of the Department of Public Works and
Highways from making any further payments out of said funds provided for in Republic Act No.
920; and that pending final hearing on the merits, a writ of preliminary injunction be issued
enjoining the aforementioned parties respondent from making and securing any new and further
releases on the aforesaid item of Republic Act No. 920 and from making any further payments
out of said illegally appropriated funds.
Respondents moved to dismiss the petition upon the ground that petitioner had "no legal capacity
to sue", and that the petition did "not state a cause of action". In support to this motion,
respondent Zulueta alleged that the Provincial Fiscal of Rizal, not its provincial governor, should
represent the Province of Rizal, pursuant to section 1683 of the Revised Administrative Code;
that said respondent is " not aware of any law which makes illegal the appropriation of public
funds for the improvements of . . . private property"; and that, the constitutional provision
invoked by petitioner is inapplicable to the donation in question, the same being a pure act of
liberality, not a contract. The other respondents, in turn, maintained that petitioner could not
assail the appropriation in question because "there is no actual bona fide case . . . in which the
validity of Republic Act No. 920 is necessarily involved" and petitioner "has not shown that he
has a personal and substantial interest" in said Act "and that its enforcement has caused or will
cause him a direct injury."
Acting upon said motions to dismiss, the lower court rendered the aforementioned decision,
dated October 29, 1953, holding that, since public interest is involved in this case, the Provincial
Governor of Rizal and the provincial fiscal thereof who represents him therein, "have the
requisite personalities" to question the constitutionality of the disputed item of Republic Act No.
920; that "the legislature is without power appropriate public revenues for anything but a public
purpose", that the instructions and improvement of the feeder roads in question, if such roads
where private property, would not be a public purpose; that, being subject to the following
condition:
The within donation is hereby made upon the condition that the Government of the
Republic of the Philippines will use the parcels of land hereby donated for street
purposes only and for no other purposes whatsoever; it being expressly understood that
should the Government of the Republic of the Philippines violate the condition hereby
imposed upon it, the title to the land hereby donated shall, upon such violation, ipso facto
revert to the DONOR, JOSE C. ZULUETA. (Emphasis supplied.)
which is onerous, the donation in question is a contract; that said donation or contract is
"absolutely forbidden by the Constitution" and consequently "illegal", for Article 1409 of the
Civil Code of the Philippines, declares in existence and void from the very beginning contracts
"whose cause, objector purpose is contrary to law, morals . . . or public policy"; that the legality
of said donation may not be contested, however, by petitioner herein, because his "interest are
not directly affected" thereby; and that, accordingly, the appropriation in question "should be
upheld" and the case dismissed.
At the outset, it should be noted that we are concerned with a decision granting the
aforementioned motions to dismiss, which as much, are deemed to have admitted hypothetically
the allegations of fact made in the petition of appellant herein. According to said petition,
respondent Zulueta is the owner of several parcels of residential land situated in Pasig, Rizal, and
known as the Antonio Subdivision, certain portions of which had been reserved for the projected
feeder roads aforementioned, which, admittedly, were private property of said respondent when
Republic Act No. 920, appropriating P85,000.00 for the "construction, reconstruction, repair,
extension and improvement" of said roads, was passed by Congress, as well as when it was
approved by the President on June 20, 1953. The petition further alleges that the construction of
said roads, to be undertaken with the aforementioned appropriation of P85,000.00, would have
the effect of relieving respondent Zulueta of the burden of constructing his subdivision streets or
roads at his own expenses, 1and would "greatly enhance or increase the value of the subdivision"
of said respondent. The lower court held that under these circumstances, the appropriation in
question was "clearly for a private, not a public purpose."
Respondents do not deny the accuracy of this conclusion, which is self-evident. 2However,
respondent Zulueta contended, in his motion to dismiss that:
A law passed by Congress and approved by the President can never be illegal because
Congress is the source of all laws . . . Aside from the fact that movant is not aware of any
law which makes illegal the appropriation of public funds for the improvement of what
we, in the meantime, may assume as private property . . . (Record on Appeal, p. 33.)
The first proposition must be rejected most emphatically, it being inconsistent with the nature of
the Government established under the Constitution of the Republic of the Philippines and the
system of checks and balances underlying our political structure. Moreover, it is refuted by the
decisions of this Court invalidating legislative enactments deemed violative of the Constitution
or organic laws. 3
As regards the legal feasibility of appropriating public funds for a public purpose, the principle
according to Ruling Case Law, is this:
It is a general rule that the legislature is without power to appropriate public revenue for
anything but a public purpose. . . . It is the essential character of the direct object of the
expenditure which must determine its validity as justifying a tax, and not the magnitude
of the interest to be affected nor the degree to which the general advantage of the
community, and thus the public welfare, may be ultimately benefited by their
promotion. Incidental to the public or to the state, which results from the promotion of
private interest and the prosperity of private enterprises or business, does not justify their
aid by the use public money. (25 R.L.C. pp. 398-400; Emphasis supplied.)
The rule is set forth in Corpus Juris Secundum in the following language:
In accordance with the rule that the taxing power must be exercised for public purposes
only, discussedsupra sec. 14, money raised by taxation can be expended only for public
purposes and not for the advantage of private individuals. (85 C.J.S. pp. 645-646;
emphasis supplied.)
Explaining the reason underlying said rule, Corpus Juris Secundum states:
Generally, under the express or implied provisions of the constitution, public funds may
be used only for public purpose. The right of the legislature to appropriate funds is
correlative with its right to tax, and, under constitutional provisions against taxation
except for public purposes and prohibiting the collection of a tax for one purpose and the
devotion thereof to another purpose, no appropriation of state funds can be made for
other than for a public purpose.
xxx
xxx
xxx
The test of the constitutionality of a statute requiring the use of public funds is whether
the statute is designed to promote the public interest, as opposed to the furtherance of the
advantage of individuals, although each advantage to individuals might incidentally serve
the public. (81 C.J.S. pp. 1147; emphasis supplied.)
Needless to say, this Court is fully in accord with the foregoing views which, apart from being
patently sound, are a necessary corollary to our democratic system of government, which, as
such, exists primarily for the promotion of the general welfare. Besides, reflecting as they do, the
established jurisprudence in the United States, after whose constitutional system ours has been
patterned, said views and jurisprudence are, likewise, part and parcel of our own constitutional
law.lawphil.net
This notwithstanding, the lower court felt constrained to uphold the appropriation in question,
upon the ground that petitioner may not contest the legality of the donation above referred to
because the same does not affect him directly. This conclusion is, presumably, based upon the
following premises, namely: (1) that, if valid, said donation cured the constitutional infirmity of
the aforementioned appropriation; (2) that the latter may not be annulled without a previous
declaration of unconstitutionality of the said donation; and (3) that the rule set forth in Article
1421 of the Civil Code is absolute, and admits of no exception. We do not agree with these
premises.
The validity of a statute depends upon the powers of Congress at the time of its passage or
approval, not upon events occurring, or acts performed, subsequently thereto, unless the latter
consists of an amendment of the organic law, removing, with retrospective operation, the
constitutional limitation infringed by said statute. Referring to the P85,000.00 appropriation for
the projected feeder roads in question, the legality thereof depended upon whether said roads
were public or private property when the bill, which, latter on, became Republic Act 920, was
passed by Congress, or, when said bill was approved by the President and the disbursement of
said sum became effective, or on June 20, 1953 (see section 13 of said Act). Inasmuch as the land
on which the projected feeder roads were to be constructed belonged then to respondent Zulueta,
the result is that said appropriation sought a private purpose, and hence, was null and void. 4 The
donation to the Government, over five (5) months after the approval and effectivity of said Act,
made, according to the petition, for the purpose of giving a "semblance of legality", or legalizing,
the appropriation in question, did not cure its aforementioned basic defect. Consequently, a
judicial nullification of said donation need not precede the declaration of unconstitutionality of
said appropriation.
Again, Article 1421 of our Civil Code, like many other statutory enactments, is subject to
exceptions. For instance, the creditors of a party to an illegal contract may, under the conditions
set forth in Article 1177 of said Code, exercise the rights and actions of the latter, except only
those which are inherent in his person, including therefore, his right to the annulment of said
contract, even though such creditors are not affected by the same, except indirectly, in the
manner indicated in said legal provision.
Again, it is well-stated that the validity of a statute may be contested only by one who will
sustain a direct injury in consequence of its enforcement. Yet, there are many decisions
nullifying, at the instance of taxpayers, laws providing for the disbursement of public
funds, 5upon the theory that "the expenditure of public funds by an officer of the State for the
purpose of administering an unconstitutional act constitutes a misapplication of such funds,"
which may be enjoined at the request of a taxpayer. 6Although there are some decisions to the
contrary, 7the prevailing view in the United States is stated in the American Jurisprudence as
follows:
In the determination of the degree of interest essential to give the requisite standing to
attack the constitutionality of a statute, the general rule is that not only persons
individually affected, but alsotaxpayers, have sufficient interest in preventing the illegal
expenditure of moneys raised by taxation and may therefore question the constitutionality
of statutes requiring expenditure of public moneys. (11 Am. Jur. 761; emphasis supplied.)
However, this view was not favored by the Supreme Court of the U.S. in Frothingham vs.
Mellon (262 U.S. 447), insofar as federal laws are concerned, upon the ground that the
relationship of a taxpayer of the U.S. to its Federal Government is different from that of a
taxpayer of a municipal corporation to its government. Indeed, under the composite system of
government existing in the U.S., the states of the Union are integral part of the Federation from
an international viewpoint, but, each state enjoys internally a substantial measure of sovereignty,
subject to the limitations imposed by the Federal Constitution. In fact, the same was made by
representatives ofeach state of the Union, not of the people of the U.S., except insofar as the
former represented the people of the respective States, and the people of each State has,
independently of that of the others, ratified said Constitution. In other words, the Federal
Constitution and the Federal statutes have become binding upon the people of the U.S. in
consequence of an act of, and, in this sense, through the respective states of the Union of which
they are citizens. The peculiar nature of the relation between said people and the Federal
Government of the U.S. is reflected in the election of its President, who is chosen directly, not by
the people of the U.S., but by electors chosen by each State, in such manner as the legislature
thereof may direct (Article II, section 2, of the Federal Constitution).lawphi1.net
The relation between the people of the Philippines and its taxpayers, on the other hand, and the
Republic of the Philippines, on the other, is not identical to that obtaining between the people
and taxpayers of the U.S. and its Federal Government. It is closer, from a domestic viewpoint, to
that existing between the people and taxpayers of each state and the government thereof, except
that the authority of the Republic of the Philippines over the people of the Philippines is more
fully direct than that of the states of the Union, insofar as the simple and unitarytype of our
national government is not subject to limitations analogous to those imposed by the Federal
Constitution upon the states of the Union, and those imposed upon the Federal Government in
the interest of the Union. For this reason, the rule recognizing the right of taxpayers to assail the
constitutionality of a legislation appropriating local or state public funds which has been
upheld by the Federal Supreme Court (Crampton vs.Zabriskie, 101 U.S. 601) has greater
application in the Philippines than that adopted with respect to acts of Congress of the United
States appropriating federal funds.
Indeed, in the Province of Tayabas vs. Perez (56 Phil., 257), involving the expropriation of a land
by the Province of Tayabas, two (2) taxpayers thereof were allowed to intervene for the purpose
of contesting the price being paid to the owner thereof, as unduly exorbitant. It is true that in
Custodio vs. President of the Senate (42 Off. Gaz., 1243), a taxpayer and employee of the
Government was not permitted to question the constitutionality of an appropriation for backpay
of members of Congress. However, in Rodriguez vs. Treasurer of the Philippines and
Barredo vs. Commission on Elections (84 Phil., 368; 45 Off. Gaz., 4411), we entertained the
action of taxpayers impugning the validity of certain appropriations of public funds, and
invalidated the same. Moreover, the reason that impelled this Court to take such position in said
two (2) cases the importance of the issues therein raised is present in the case at bar. Again,
like the petitioners in the Rodriguez and Barredo cases, petitioner herein is not merely a
taxpayer. The Province of Rizal, which he represents officially as its Provincial Governor, is our
most populated political subdivision, 8and, the taxpayers therein bear a substantial portion of the
burden of taxation, in the Philippines.
Hence, it is our considered opinion that the circumstances surrounding this case sufficiently
justify petitioners action in contesting the appropriation and donation in question; that this action
should not have been dismissed by the lower court; and that the writ of preliminary injunction
should have been maintained.
Wherefore, the decision appealed from is hereby reversed, and the records are remanded to the
lower court for further proceedings not inconsistent with this decision, with the costs of this
instance against respondent Jose C. Zulueta. It is so ordered.
Paras, C.J., Bengzon, Padilla, Bautista Angelo, Labrador, Reyes, J.B.L., Barrera, Gutierrez
David, Paredes, and Dizon, JJ., concur.
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-45459
March 13, 1937
GREGORIO AGLIPAY, petitioner,

vs.
JUAN RUIZ, respondent.
Vicente Sotto for petitioner.
Office of the Solicitor-General Tuason for respondent.
LAUREL, J.:
The petitioner, Mons. Gregorio Aglipay, Supreme Head of the Philippine Independent Church,
seeks the issuance from this court of a writ of prohibition to prevent the respondent Director of
Posts from issuing and selling postage stamps commemorative of the Thirty-third International
Eucharistic Congress.
In May, 1936, the Director of Posts announced in the dailies of Manila that he would order the
issues of postage stamps commemorating the celebration in the City of Manila of the Thirty-third
international Eucharistic Congress, organized by the Roman Catholic Church. The petitioner, in
the fulfillment of what he considers to be a civic duty, requested Vicente Sotto, Esq., member of
the Philippine Bar, to denounce the matter to the President of the Philippines. In spite of the
protest of the petitioner's attorney, the respondent publicly announced having sent to the United
States the designs of the postage stamps for printing as follows:
"In the center is chalice, with grape vine and stalks of wheat as border design. The stamps are
blue, green, brown, cardinal red, violet and orange, 1 inch by 1,094 inches. The denominations
are for 2, 6, 16, 20, 36 and 50 centavos." The said stamps were actually issued and sold though
the greater part thereof, to this day, remains unsold. The further sale of the stamps is sought to be
prevented by the petitioner herein.
The Solicitor-General contends that the writ of prohibition is not the proper legal remedy in the
instant case, although he admits that the writ may properly restrain ministerial functions. While,
generally, prohibition as an extraordinary legal writ will not issue to restrain or control the
performance of other than judicial or quasi-judicial functions (50 C. J., 6580, its issuance and
enforcement are regulated by statute and in this jurisdiction may issue to . . . inferior tribunals,
corporations, boards, or persons, whether excercising functions judicial or ministerial, which are
without or in excess of the jurisdiction of such tribunal, corporation, board, or person, . . . ."
(Secs. 516 and 226, Code of Civil Procedure.) The terms "judicial" and "ministerial" used with
reference to "functions" in the statute are undoubtedly comprehensive and include the challenged
act of the respondent Director of Posts in the present case, which act because alleged to be
violative of the Constitution is a fortiorari "without or in excess of . . . jurisdiction." The
statutory rule, therefore, in the jurisdiction is that the writ of prohibition is not confined
exclusively to courts or tribunals to keep them within the limits of their own jurisdiction and to
prevent them from encroaching upon the jurisdiction of other tribunals, but will issue, in
appropriate cases, to an officer or person whose acts are without or in excess of his authority. Not
infrequently, "the writ is granted, where it is necessary for the orderly administration of justice,
or to prevent the use of the strong arm of the law in an oppressive or vindictive manner, or a
multiplicity of actions." (Dimayuga and Fajardo vs. Fernandez [1923], 43 Phil., 304, 307.)
The more important question raised refers to the alleged violation of the Constitution by the
respondent in issuing and selling postage stamps commemorative of the Thirty-third
International Eucharistic Congress. It is alleged that this action of the respondent is violative of
the provisions of section 23, subsection 3, Article VI, of the Constitution of the Philippines,
which provides as follows:
No public money or property shall ever be appropriated, applied, or used, directly or
indirectly, for the use, benefit, or support of any sect, church, denomination, secretarian,
institution, or system of religion, or for the use, benefit, or support of any priest, preacher,
minister, or other religious teacher or dignitary as such, except when such priest,
preacher, minister, or dignitary is assigned to the armed forces or to any penal institution,
orphanage, or leprosarium.
The prohibition herein expressed is a direct corollary of the principle of separation of church and
state. Without the necessity of adverting to the historical background of this principle in our
country, it is sufficient to say that our history, not to speak of the history of mankind, has taught
us that the union of church and state is prejudicial to both, for ocassions might arise when the
estate will use the church, and the church the state, as a weapon in the furtherance of their
recognized this principle of separation of church and state in the early stages of our constitutional
development; it was inserted in the Treaty of Paris between the United States and Spain of
December 10, 1898, reiterated in President McKinley's Instructions of the Philippine
Commission, reaffirmed in the Philippine Bill of 1902 and in the autonomy Act of August 29,
1916, and finally embodied in the constitution of the Philippines as the supreme expression of
the Filipino people. It is almost trite to say now that in this country we enjoy both religious and
civil freedom. All the officers of the Government, from the highest to the lowest, in taking their
oath to support and defend the constitution, bind themselves to recognize and respect the
constitutional guarantee of religious freedom, with its inherent limitations and recognized
implications. It should be stated that what is guaranteed by our Constitution is religious liberty,
not mere religious toleration.
Religious freedom, however, as a constitutional mandate is not inhibition of profound reverence
for religion and is not denial of its influence in human affairs. Religion as a profession of faith to
an active power that binds and elevates man to his Creator is recognized. And, in so far as it
instills into the minds the purest principles of morality, its influence is deeply felt and highly
appreciated. When the Filipino people, in the preamble of their Constitution, implored "the aid
of Divine Providence, in order to establish a government that shall embody their ideals, conserve
and develop the patrimony of the nation, promote the general welfare, and secure to themselves
and their posterity the blessings of independence under a regime of justice, liberty and
democracy," they thereby manifested reliance upon Him who guides the destinies of men and
nations. The elevating influence of religion in human society is recognized here as elsewhere. In
fact, certain general concessions are indiscriminately accorded to religious sects and
denominations. Our Constitution and laws exempt from taxation properties devoted exclusively
to religious purposes (sec. 14, subsec. 3, Art. VI, Constitution of the Philippines and sec. 1,
subsec. 4, Ordinance appended thereto; Assessment Law, sec. 344, par. [c]. Adm. Code).
Sectarian aid is not prohibited when a priest, preacher, minister or other religious teacher or
dignitary as such is assigned to the armed forces or to any penal institution, orphanage or
leprosarium 9 sec. 13, subsec. 3, Art. VI, Constitution of the Philippines). Optional religious
instruction in the public schools is by constitutional mandate allowed (sec. 5, Art. XIII,
Constitution of the Philippines, in relation to sec. 928, Adm. Code). Thursday and Friday of Holy
Week, Thanksgiving Day, Christmas Day, and Sundays and made legal holidays (sec. 29, Adm.
Code) because of the secular idea that their observance is conclusive to beneficial moral results.
The law allows divorce but punishes polygamy and bigamy; and certain crimes against religious
worship are considered crimes against the fundamental laws of the state (see arts. 132 and 133,
Revised Penal Code).
In the case at bar, it appears that the respondent Director of Posts issued the postage stamps in
question under the provisions of Act No. 4052 of the Philippine Legislature. This Act is as
follows:
No. 4052. AN ACT APPROPRIATING THE SUM OF SIXTY THOUSAND PESOS
AND MAKING THE SAME AVAILABLE OUT OF ANY FUNDS IN THE INSULAR
TREASURY NOT OTHERWISE APPROPRIATED FOR THE COST OF PLATES AND
PRINTING OF POSTAGE STAMPS WITH NEW DESIGNS, AND FOR OTHER

PURPOSES.
Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the Philippines in
Legislature assembled and by the authority of the same:
SECTION 1. The sum of sixty thousand pesos is hereby appropriated and made immediately
available out of any funds in the Insular Treasury not otherwise appropriated, for the costs of
plates and printing of postage stamps with new designs, and other expenses incident thereto.
SEC. 2. The Director of Posts, with the approval of the Secretary of Public Works and
Communications, is hereby authorized to dispose of the whole or any portion of the amount
herein appropriated in the manner indicated and as often as may be deemed advantageous to the
Government.
SEC. 3. This amount or any portion thereof not otherwise expended shall not revert to the
Treasury.
SEC. 4. This act shall take effect on its approval.
Approved, February 21, 1933.
It will be seen that the Act appropriates the sum of sixty thousand pesos for the costs of plates
and printing of postage stamps with new designs and other expenses incident thereto, and
authorizes the Director of Posts, with the approval of the Secretary of Public Works and
Communications, to dispose of the amount appropriated in the manner indicated and "as often as
may be deemed advantageous to the Government". The printing and issuance of the postage
stamps in question appears to have been approved by authority of the President of the Philippines
in a letter dated September 1, 1936, made part of the respondent's memorandum as Exhibit A.
The respondent alleges that the Government of the Philippines would suffer losses if the writ
prayed for is granted. He estimates the revenue to be derived from the sale of the postage stamps
in question at P1,618,17.10 and states that there still remain to be sold stamps worth
P1,402,279.02.
Act No. 4052 contemplates no religious purpose in view. What it gives the Director of Posts is
the discretionary power to determine when the issuance of special postage stamps would be
"advantageous to the Government." Of course, the phrase "advantageous to the Government"
does not authorize the violation of the Constitution. It does not authorize the appropriation, use
or application of public money or property for the use, benefit or support of a particular sect or
church. In the present case, however, the issuance of the postage stamps in question by the
Director of Posts and the Secretary of Public Works and Communications was not inspired by
any sectarian denomination. The stamps were not issue and sold for the benefit of the Roman
Catholic Church. Nor were money derived from the sale of the stamps given to that church. On
the contrary, it appears from the latter of the Director of Posts of June 5, 1936, incorporated on
page 2 of the petitioner's complaint, that the only purpose in issuing and selling the stamps was
"to advertise the Philippines and attract more tourist to this country." The officials concerned
merely, took advantage of an event considered of international importance "to give publicity to
the Philippines and its people" (Letter of the Undersecretary of Public Works and
Communications to the President of the Philippines, June 9, 1936; p. 3, petitioner's complaint). It
is significant to note that the stamps as actually designed and printed (Exhibit 2), instead of
showing a Catholic Church chalice as originally planned, contains a map of the Philippines and
the location of the City of Manila, and an inscription as follows: "Seat XXXIII International
Eucharistic Congress, Feb. 3-7,1937." What is emphasized is not the Eucharistic Congress itself
but Manila, the capital of the Philippines, as the seat of that congress. It is obvious that while the
issuance and sale of the stamps in question may be said to be inseparably linked with an event of
a religious character, the resulting propaganda, if any, received by the Roman Catholic Church,
was not the aim and purpose of the Government. We are of the opinion that the Government
should not be embarassed in its activities simply because of incidental results, more or less
religious in character, if the purpose had in view is one which could legitimately be undertaken
by appropriate legislation. The main purpose should not be frustrated by its subordinate to mere
incidental results not contemplated. (Vide Bradfield vs. Roberts, 175 U. S., 295; 20 Sup. Ct.
Rep., 121; 44 Law. ed., 168.)
We are much impressed with the vehement appeal of counsel for the petitioner to maintain
inviolate the complete separation of church and state and curb any attempt to infringe by
indirection a constitutional inhibition. Indeed, in the Philippines, once the scene of religious
intolerance and prescription, care should be taken that at this stage of our political development
nothing is done by the Government or its officials that may lead to the belief that the
Government is taking sides or favoring a particular religious sect or institution. But, upon very
serious reflection, examination of Act No. 4052, and scrutiny of the attending circumstances, we
have come to the conclusion that there has been no constitutional infraction in the case at bar, Act
No. 4052 grants the Director of Posts, with the approval of the Secretary of Public Works and
Communications, discretion to misuse postage stamps with new designs "as often as may be
deemed advantageous to the Government." Even if we were to assume that these officials made
use of a poor judgment in issuing and selling the postage stamps in question still, the case of the
petitioner would fail to take in weight. Between the exercise of a poor judgment and the
unconstitutionality of the step taken, a gap exists which is yet to be filled to justify the court in
setting aside the official act assailed as coming within a constitutional inhibition.
The petition for a writ of prohibition is hereby denied, without pronouncement as to costs. So
ordered.
Avancea, C.J., Villa-Real, Abad Santos, Imperial, Diaz and Concepcion, JJ., concur.

SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. 94571
April 22, 1991
TEOFISTO T. GUINGONA, JR. and AQUILINO Q. PIMENTEL, JR., petitioners,

vs.
HON. GUILLERMO CARAGUE, in his capacity as Secretary, Budget & Management,
HON. ROZALINA S. CAJUCOM in her capacity as National Treasurer and
COMMISSION ON AUDIT, respondents.
Ramon A. Gonzales for petitioners.
GANCAYCO, J.:
This is a case of first impression whereby petitioners question the constitutionality of the
automatic appropriation for debt service in the 1990 budget.
As alleged in the petition, the facts are as follows:
The 1990 budget consists of P98.4 Billion in automatic appropriation (with P86.8 Billion for
debt service) and P155.3 Billion appropriated under Republic Act No. 6831, otherwise known as
the General Appropriations Act, or a total of P233.5 Billion, 1 while the appropriations for the
Department of Education, Culture and Sports amount to P27,017,813,000.00.2
The said automatic appropriation for debt service is authorized by P.D. No. 81, entitled
"Amending Certain Provisions of Republic Act Numbered Four Thousand Eight Hundred Sixty,
as Amended (Re: Foreign Borrowing Act)," by P.D. No. 1177, entitled "Revising the Budget
Process in Order to Institutionalize the Budgetary Innovations of the New Society," and by P.D.
No. 1967, entitled "An Act Strenghthening the Guarantee and Payment Positions of the Republic
of the Philippines on Its Contingent Liabilities Arising out of Relent and Guaranteed Loan by
Appropriating Funds For The Purpose.
There can be no question that petitioners as Senators of the Republic of the Philippines may
bring this suit where a constitutional issue is raised. 3 Indeed, even a taxpayer has personality to
restrain unlawful expenditure of public funds.
The petitioner seek the declaration of the unconstitutionality of P.D. No. 81, Sections 31 of P.D.
1177, and P.D. No. 1967. The petition also seeks to restrain the disbursement for debt service
under the 1990 budget pursuant to said decrees.
Respondents contend that the petition involves a pure political question which is the repeal or
amendment of said laws addressed to the judgment, wisdom and patriotism of the legislative
body and not this Court.
In Gonzales,5 the main issue was the unconstitutionality of the presidential veto of certain
provision particularly Section 16 of the General Appropriations Act of 1990, R.A. No. 6831. This
Court, in disposing of the issue, stated
The political question doctrine neither interposes an obstacle to judicial determination of
the rival claims. The jurisdiction to delimit constitutional boundaries has been given to
this Court. It cannot abdicate that obligation mandated by the 1987 Constitution, although
said provision by no means does away with the applicability of the principle in
appropriate cases.
Sec. 1. The judicial power shad be vested in one Supreme Court and in such lower
courts as may be established by law.
Government.
With the Senate maintaining that the President's veto is unconstitutional and that charge
being controverted, there is an actual case or justiciable controversy between the Upper
House of Congress and the executive department that may be taken cognizance of by this
Court.
The questions raised in the instant petition are
I. IS THE APPROPRIATION OF P86 BILLION IN THE P233 BILLION 1990
BUDGET VIOLATIVE OF SECTION 5, ARTICLE XIV OF THE CONSTITUTION?
II. ARE PD No. 81, PD No. 1177 AND PD No. 1967 STILL OPERATIVE UNDER THE
CONSTITUTION?
III. ARE THEY VIOLATIVE OF SECTION 29(l), ARTICLE VI OF THE
CONSTITUTION?6
There is thus a justiciable controversy raised in the petition which this Court may properly take
cognizance of On the first issue, the petitioners aver
According to Sec. 5, Art. XIV of the Constitution:
(5) The State shall assign the highest budgetary priority to education and ensure
that teaching will attract and retain its rightful share of the best available talents
through adequate remuneration and other means of job satisfaction and
fulfillment.
The reason behind the said provision is stated, thus:
In explaining his proposed amendment, Mr. Ople stated that all the great and
sincere piety professed by every President and every Congress of the Philippines
since the end of World War II for the economic welfare of the public
schoolteachers always ended up in failure and this failure, he stated, had caused
mass defection of the best and brightest teachers to other careers,
including menial jobs in overseas employment and concerted actions by them to
project their grievances, mainly over low pay and abject working conditions.
He pointed to the high expectations generated by the February Revolution,
especially keen among public schoolteachers, which at present exacerbate these
long frustrated hopes.
Mr. Ople stated that despite the sincerity of all administrations that tried vainly to
respond to the needs of the teachers, the central problem that always defeated
their pious intentions was really the one budgetary priority in the sense that any
proposed increase for public schoolteachers had to be multiplied many times by
the number of government employees in general and their equitable claims to any
pay standardization such that the pay rate of teachers is hopelessly pegged to the
rate of government workers in general. This, he stated, foredoomed the prospect
of a significant pay increase for teachers.
Mr. Ople pointed out that the recognition by the Constitution of the highest
priority for public schoolteachers, and by implication, for all teachers, would
ensure that the President and Congress would be strongly urged by a
constitutional mandate to grant to them such a level of remuneration and other
incentives that would make teaching competitive again and attractive to the best
available talents in the nation.
Finally, Mr. Ople recalled that before World War II, teaching competed most
successfully against all other career choices for the best and the brightest of the
younger generation. It is for this reason, he stated, that his proposed amendment if
approved, would ensure that teaching would be restored to its lost glory as the
career of choice for the most talented and most public-spirited of the younger
generation in the sense that it would become the countervailing measure against
the continued decline of teaching and the wholesale desertion of this noble
profession presently taking place. He further stated that this would ensure that the
future and the quality of the population would be asserted as a top priority
against many clamorous and importunate but less important claims of the present.
(Journal of the Constitutional Commission, Vol. II, p. 1172)
However, as against this constitutional intention, P86 Billion is appropriated for debt service
while only P27 Billion is appropriated for the Department of Education in the 1990 budget. It
plain, therefore, that the said appropriation for debt services is inconsistent with the Constitution,
hence, viod (Art. 7, New Civil Code).7
While it is true that under Section 5(5), Article XIV of the Constitution Congress is mandated to
"assign the highest budgetary priority to education" in order to "insure that teaching will attract
and retain its rightful share of the best available talents through adequate remuneration and other
means of job satisfaction and fulfillment," it does not thereby follow that the hands of Congress
are so hamstrung as to deprive it the power to respond to the imperatives of the national interest
and for the attainment of other state policies or objectives.
As aptly observed by respondents, since 1985, the budget for education has tripled to upgrade
and improve the facility of the public school system. The compensation of teachers has been
doubled. The amount of P29,740,611,000.008 set aside for the Department of Education, Culture
and Sports under the General Appropriations Act (R.A. No. 6831), is the highest budgetary
allocation among all department budgets. This is a clear compliance with the aforesaid
constitutional mandate according highest priority to education.
Having faithfully complied therewith, Congress is certainly not without any power, guided only
by its good judgment, to provide an appropriation, that can reasonably service our enormous
debt, the greater portion of which was inherited from the previous administration. It is not only a
matter of honor and to protect the credit standing of the country. More especially, the very
survival of our economy is at stake. Thus, if in the process Congress appropriated an amount for
debt service bigger than the share allocated to education, the Court finds and so holds that said
appropriation cannot be thereby assailed as unconstitutional.
Now to the second issue. The petitioners made the following observations:
To begin with, Rep. Act 4860 entitled "AN ACT AUTHORIZING THE PRESIDENT OF
THE PHILIPPINES TO OBTAIN SUCH FOREIGN LOANS AND CREDITS, OR TO
INCUR SUCH FOREIGN INDEBTEDNESS, AS MAY BE NECESSARY TO
FINANCE APPROVED ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT PURPOSES OR PROJECTS,
AND TO GUARANTEE, IN BEHALF OF THE REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES,
FOREIGN LOANS OBTAINED OR BONDS ISSUED BY CORPORATIONS OWNED

OR CONTROLLED BY THE GOVERNMENT OF THE PHILIPPINES FOR
ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT PURPOSES INCLUDING THOSE INCURRED FOR
PURPOSES OF RELENDING TO THE PRIVATE SECTOR, APPROPRIATING THE
NECESSARY FUNDS THEREFOR, AND FOR OTHER PURPOSES, provides:
Sec. 2. The total amount of loans, credits and indebtedness, excluding interests,
which the President of the Philippines is authorized to incur under this Act shall
not exceed one billion United States dollars or its equivalent in other foreign
currencies at the exchange rate prevailing at the time the loans, credits and
indebtedness are incurred: Provided, however, That the total loans, credits and
indebtedness incurred under this Act shall not exceed two hundred fifty million in
the fiscal year of the approval of this Act, and two hundred fifty million every
fiscal year thereafter, all in United States dollars or its equivalent in other
currencies.
Sec. 5. It shall be the duty of the President, within thirty days after the opening of
every regular session, to report to the Congress the amount of loans, credits and
indebtedness contracted, as well as the guarantees extended, and the purposes and
projects for which the loans, credits and indebtedness were incurred, and the
guarantees extended, as well as such loans which may be reloaned to Filipino
owned or controlled corporations and similar purposes.
Sec. 6. The Congress shall appropriate the necessary amount out of any funds in
the National Treasury not otherwise appropriated, to cover the payment of the
principal and interest on such loans, credits or indebtedness as and when they
shall become due.
However, after the declaration of martial law, President Marcos issued PD 81 amending Section
6, thus:
Sec. 7. Section six of the same Act is hereby further amended to read as follows:
Sec. 6. Any provision of law to the contrary notwithstanding, and in order to
enable the Republic of the Philippines to pay the principal, interest, taxes and
other normal banking charges on the loans, credits or indebtedness, or on the
bonds, debentures, securities or other evidences of indebtedness sold in
international markets incurred under the authority of this Act, the proceeds of
which are deemed appropriated for the projects, all the revenue realized from the
projects financed by such loans, credits or indebtedness, or on the bonds,
debentures, securities or other evidences of indebtedness, shall be turned over in
full, after deducting actual and necessary expenses for the operation and
maintenance of said projects, to the National Treasury by the government office,
agency or instrumentality, or government-owned or controlled corporation
concerned, which is hereby appropriated for the purpose as and when they shall
become due. In case the revenue realized is insufficient to cover the principal,
interest and other charges, such portion of the budgetary savings as may be
necessary to cover the balance or deficiency shall be set aside exclusively for the
purpose by the government office, agency or instrumentality, or governmentowned or controlled corporation concerned: Provided, That, if there still remains a
deficiency, such amount necessary to cover the payment of the principal and
interest on such loans, credit or indebtedness as and when they shall become due
is hereby appropriated out of any funds in the national treasury not otherwise
appropriated: . . .
President Marcos also issued PD 1177, which provides:
Sec. 31. Automatic appropriations. All expenditures for (a) personnel

retirement premiums, government service insurance, and other similar fixed
expenditures, (b) principal and interest on public debt, (c) national government
guarantees of obligations which are drawn upon, are automatically
appropriated; Provided, that no obligations shall be incurred or payments made
from funds thus automatically appropriated except as issued in the form of regular
budgetary allotments.
and PD 1967, which provides:
Sec. 1. There is hereby appropriated, out of any funds in the National Treasury not
otherwise appropriated, such amounts as may be necessary to effect payments on
foreign or domestic loans,or foreign or domestic loans whereon creditors make a
call on the direct and indirect guarantee of the Republic of the Philippines,
obtained by:
a. The Republic of the Philippines the proceeds of which were relent to
government-owned or controlled corporations and/or government financial
institutions;
b. government-owned or controlled corporations and/or government
financial institutions the proceeds of which were relent to public or private
institutions;
c. government-owned or controlled corporations and/or financial
institutions and guaranteed by the Republic of the Philippines;
d. other public or private institutions and guaranteed by governmentowned or controlled corporations and/or government financial institutions.
Sec. 2. All repayments made by borrower institutions on the loans for whose
account advances were made by the National Treasury will revert to the General
Fund.
Sec. 3. In the event that any borrower institution is unable to settle the advances
made out of the appropriation provided therein, the Treasurer of the Philippines
shall make the proper recommendation to the Minister of Finance on whether
such advances shall be treated as equity or subsidy of the National Government
to the institution concerned, which shall be considered in the budgetary program
of the Government.
In the "Budget of Expenditures and Sources of Financing Fiscal Year 1990,"
which accompanied her budget message to Congress, the President of the
Philippines, Corazon C. Aquino, stated:
Sources Appropriation
The P233.5 billion budget proposed for fiscal year 1990 will require P132.1 billion of
new programmed appropriations out of a total P155.3 billion in new legislative
authorization from Congress. The rest of the budget, totalling P101.4 billion, will be
sourced from existing appropriations: P98.4 billion from Automatic Appropriations and
P3.0 billion from Continuing Appropriations (Fig. 4).
And according to Figure 4, . . ., P86.8 billion out of the P98.4 Billion are programmed for debt
service. In other words, the President had, on her own, determined and set aside the said amount
of P98.4 Billion with the rest of the appropriations of P155.3 Billion to be determined and fixed
by Congress, which is now Rep. Act 6831.9
Petitioners argue that the said automatic appropriations under the aforesaid decrees of then
President Marcos became functus oficio when he was ousted in February, 1986; that upon the
expiration of the one-man legislature in the person of President Marcos, the legislative power
was restored to Congress on February 2, 1987 when the Constitution was ratified by the people;
that there is a need for a new legislation by Congress providing for automatic appropriation, but
Congress, up to the present, has not approved any such law; and thus the said P86.8 Billion
automatic appropriation in the 1990 budget is an administrative act that rests on no law, and thus,
it cannot be enforced.
Moreover, petitioners contend that assuming arguendo that P.D. No. 81, P.D. No. 1177 and P.D.
No. 1967 did not expire with the ouster of President Marcos, after the adoption of the 1987
Constitution, the said decrees are inoperative under Section 3, Article XVIII which provides
Sec. 3. All existing laws, decrees, executive orders, proclamations, letters of instructions,
and other executive issuances not inconsistent with this Constitution shall
remain operative until amended, repealed, or revoked." (Emphasis supplied.)
They then point out that since the said decrees are inconsistent with Section 24, Article VI of the
Constitution, i.e.,
Sec. 24. All appropriation, revenue or tariff bills, bills authorizing increase of the public
debt, bills of local application, and private bills shall originate exclusively in the House of
Representatives, but the Senate may propose or concur with amendments. (Emphasis
supplied.)
whereby bills have to be approved by the President, 10 then a law must be passed by Congress to
authorize said automatic appropriation. Further, petitioners state said decrees violate Section
29(l) of Article VI of the Constitution which provides as follows
Sec. 29(l). No money shall be paid out of the Treasury except in pursuance of
an appropriation made by law.
They assert that there must be definiteness, certainty and exactness in an
appropriation,11 otherwise it is an undue delegation of legislative power to the President who
determines in advance the amount appropriated for the debt service.12
The Court is not persuaded.
Section 3, Article XVIII of the Constitution recognizes that "All existing laws, decrees, executive
orders, proclamations, letters of instructions and other executive issuances not inconsistent with
the Constitution shall remain operative until amended, repealed or revoked."
This transitory provision of the Constitution has precisely been adopted by its framers to
preserve the social order so that legislation by the then President Marcos may be recognized.
Such laws are to remain in force and effect unless they are inconsistent with the Constitution or,
are otherwise amended, repealed or revoked.
An examination of the aforecited presidential decrees show the clear intent that the amounts
needed to cover the payment of the principal and interest on all foreign loans, including those
guaranteed by the national government, should be made available when they shall become due
precisely without the necessity of periodic enactments of separate laws appropriating funds
therefor, since both the periods and necessities are incapable of determination in advance.
The automatic appropriation provides the flexibility for the effective execution of debt
management policies. Its political wisdom has been convincingly discussed by the Solicitor
General as he argues
. . . First, for example, it enables the Government to take advantage of a favorable turn of
market conditions by redeeming high-interest securities and borrowing at lower rates, or
to shift from short-term to long-term instruments, or to enter into arrangements that could
lighten our outstanding debt burden debt-to-equity, debt to asset, debt-to-debt or other
such schemes. Second, the automatic appropriation obviates the serious difficulties in
debt servicing arising from any deviation from what has been previously programmed.
The annual debt service estimates, which are usually made one year in advance, are based
on a mathematical set or matrix or, in layman's parlance, "basket" of foreign exchange
and interest rateassumptions which may significantly differ from actual rates not even in
proportion to changes on the basis of the assumptions. Absent an automatic appropriation
clause, the Philippine Government has to await and depend upon Congressional action,
which by the time this comes, may no longer be responsive to the intended conditions
which in the meantime may have already drastically changed. In the meantime, also,
delayed payments and arrearages may have supervened, only to worsen our debt serviceto-total expenditure ratio in the budget due to penalties and/or demand for immediate
payment even before due dates.
Clearly, the claim that payment of the loans and indebtedness is conditioned upon the
continuance of the person of President Marcos and his legislative power goes against the
intent and purpose of the law. The purpose is foreseen to subsist with or without the
person of Marcos.13
The argument of petitioners that the said presidential decrees did not meet the requirement and
are therefore inconsistent with Sections 24 and 27 of Article VI of the Constitution which
requires, among others, that "all appropriations, . . . bills authorizing increase of public debt"
must be passed by Congress and approved by the President is untenable. Certainly, the framers of
the Constitution did not contemplate that existing laws in the statute books including existing
presidential decrees appropriating public money are reduced to mere "bills" that must again go
through the legislative million The only reasonable interpretation of said provisions of the
Constitution which refer to "bills" is that they mean appropriation measures still to be passed by
Congress. If the intention of the framers thereof were otherwise they should have expressed their
decision in a more direct or express manner.
Well-known is the rule that repeal or amendment by implication is frowned upon. Equally
fundamental is the principle that construction of the Constitution and law is generally applied
prospectively and not retrospectively unless it is so clearly stated.
On the third issue that there is undue delegation of legislative power, in Edu vs. Ericta,14 this
Court had this to say
What cannot be delegated is the authority under the Constitution to make laws and to
alter and repeal them; the test is the completeness of the statute in all its terms and
provisions when it leaves the hands of the legislature. To determine whether or not there
is an undue delegation of legislative power, the inequity must be directed to the scope and
definiteness of the measure enacted. The legislature does not abdicate its function when it
describes what job must be done, who is to do it, and what is the scope of his authority.
For a complex economy, that may indeed be the only way in which legislative process
can go forward . . .
To avoid the taint of unlawful delegation there must be a standard, which implies at the
very least that the legislature itself determines matters of principle and lays down
fundamental policy . . .
The standard may be either express or implied . . . from the policy and purpose of the act
considered as whole . . .
In People vs. Vera,15 this Court said "the true distinction is between the delegation of power to
make the law, which necessarily involves discretion as to what the law shall be, and conferring
authority or discretion as to its execution, to be exercised under and in pursuance of the law. The
first cannot be done; to the latter no valid objection can be made."
Ideally, the law must be complete in all its essential terms and conditions when it leaves the
legislature so that there will be nothing left for the delegate to do when it reaches him except
enforce it. If there are gaps in the law that will prevent its enforcement unless they are first filled,
the delegate will then have been given the opportunity to step in the shoes of the legislature and
exercise a discretion essentially legislative in order to repair the omissions. This is invalid
delegation.16
The Court finds that in this case the questioned laws are complete in all their essential terms and
conditions and sufficient standards are indicated therein.
The legislative intention in R.A. No. 4860, as amended, Section 31 of P.D. No. 1177 and P.D.
No. 1967 is that the amount needed should be automatically set aside in order to enable the
Republic of the Philippines to pay the principal, interest, taxes and other normal banking charges
on the loans, credits or indebtedness incurred as guaranteed by it when they shall become due
without the need to enact a separate law appropriating funds therefor as the need arises. The
purpose of these laws is to enable the government to make prompt payment and/or advances for
all loans to protect and maintain the credit standing of the country.
Although the subject presidential decrees do not state specific amounts to be paid, necessitated
by the very nature of the problem being addressed, the amounts nevertheless are made certain by
the legislative parameters provided in the decrees. The Executive is not of unlimited discretion as
to the amounts to be disbursed for debt servicing. The mandate is to pay only the principal,
interest, taxes and other normal banking charges on the loans, credits or indebtedness, or on the
bonds, debentures or security or other evidences of indebtedness sold in international markets
incurred by virtue of the law, as and when they shall become due. No uncertainty arises in
executive implementation as the limit will be the exact amounts as shown by the books of the
Treasury.
The Government budgetary process has been graphically described to consist of four major
phases as aptly discussed by the Solicitor General:
The Government budgeting process consists of four major phases:
1. Budget preparation. The first step is essentially tasked upon the Executive Branch and
covers the estimation of government revenues, the determination of budgetary priorities
and activities within the constraints imposed by available revenues and by borrowing
limits, and the translation of desired priorities and activities into expenditure levels.
Budget preparation starts with the budget call issued by the Department of Budget and
Management. Each agency is required to submit agency budget estimates in line with the
requirements consistent with the general ceilings set by the Development Budget
Coordinating Council (DBCC).
With regard to debt servicing, the DBCC staff, based on the macro-economic projections
of interest rates (e.g. LIBOR rate) and estimated sources of domestic and foreign
financing, estimates debt service levels. Upon issuance of budget call, the Bureau of
Treasury computes for the interest and principal payments for the year for all direct
national government borrowings and other liabilities assumed by the same.
2. Legislative authorization. At this stage, Congress enters the picture and deliberates
or acts on the budget proposals of the President, and Congress in the exercise of its own
judgment and wisdomformulates an appropriation act precisely following the process
established by the Constitution, which specifies that no money may be paid from the
Treasury except in accordance with an appropriation made by law.
Debt service is not included in the General Appropriation Act, since authorization
therefor already exists under RA No. 4860 and 245, as amended and PD 1967. Precisely
in the fight of this subsisting authorization as embodied in said Republic Acts and PD for
debt service, Congress does not concern itself with details for implementation by the
Executive, but largely with annual levels and approval thereof upon due deliberations as
part of the whole obligation program for the year. Upon such approval, Congress has
spoken and cannot be said to have delegated its wisdom to the Executive, on whose part
lies theimplementation or execution of the legislative wisdom.
3. Budget Execution. Tasked on the Executive, the third phase of the budget process
covers the variousoperational aspects of budgeting. The establishment of obligation
authority ceilings, the evaluation of work and financial plans for individual activities, the
continuing review of government fiscal position, the regulation of funds releases, the
implementation of cash payment schedules, and other related activities comprise this
phase of the budget cycle.
Release from the debt service fired is triggered by a request of the Bureau of the Treasury
for allotments from the Department of Budget and Management, one quarter in advance
of payment schedule, to ensure prompt payments. The Bureau of Treasury, upon
receiving official billings from the creditors, remits payments to creditors through the
Central Bank or to the Sinking Fund established for government security issues (Annex
F).
4. Budget accountability. The fourth phase refers to the evaluation of actual performance
and initially approved work targets, obligations incurred, personnel hired and work
accomplished are compared with the targets set at the time the agency budgets were
approved.
There being no undue delegation of legislative power as clearly above shown, petitioners
insist nevertheless that subject presidential decrees constitute undue delegation of
legislative power to the executive on the alleged ground that the appropriations therein
are not exact, certain or definite, invoking in support therefor the Constitution of
Nebraska, the constitution under which the case of State v. Moore, 69 NW 974, cited by
petitioners, was decided. Unlike the Constitution of Nebraska, however, our Constitution
does not require a definite, certain, exact or "specific appropriation made by law."
Section 29, Article VI of our 1987 Constitution omits any of these words and simply
states:
Section 29(l). No money shall be paid out of the treasury except in pursuance of
an appropriation made by law.
More significantly, there is no provision in our Constitution that provides or prescribes
any particular form of words or religious recitals in which an authorization or
appropriation by Congress shall be made, except that it be "made by law," such as
precisely the authorization or appropriation under the questioned presidential decrees. In
other words, in terms of time horizons, an appropriation may be made impliedly (as by
past but subsisting legislations) as well as expressly for the current fiscal year (as by
enactment of laws by the present Congress), just as said appropriation may be made in
general as well as in specific terms. The Congressional authorization may be embodied in
annual laws, such as a general appropriations act or in special provisions of laws of
general or special application which appropriate public funds for specific public
purposes, such as the questioned decrees. An appropriation measure is sufficient if the
legislative intention clearly and certainly appears from the language employed (In re
Continuing Appropriations, 32 P. 272), whether in the past or in the present.17
Thus, in accordance with Section 22, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution, President Corazon C.
Aquino submitted to Congress the Budget of Expenditures and Sources of Financing for the
Fiscal Year 1990. The proposed 1990 expenditure program covering the estimated obligation that
will be incurred by the national government during the fiscal year amounts to P233.5 Billion. Of
the proposed budget, P86.8 is set aside for debt servicing as follows:
1wphi1
National Government Debt
Service Expenditures, 1990
(in million pesos)
Domestic
RA 245, as
amended
Interest
Payments
Principal
Amortization
Total
Foreign
RA 4860
as amended,
PD 1967
Total
P36,861
P18,570
P55,431
16,310
15,077
31,387
P53,171
========
P33,647
========
P86,818
========
18
as authorized under P.D. 1967 and R.A. 4860 and 245, as amended.
The Court, therefor, finds that R.A. No. 4860, as amended by P.D. No. 81, Section 31 of P.D.
1177 and P.D. No. 1967 constitute lawful authorizations or appropriations, unless they are
repealed or otherwise amended by Congress. The Executive was thus merely complying with the
duty to implement the same.
There can be no question as to the patriotism and good motive of petitioners in filing this
petition. Unfortunately, the petition must fail on the constitutional and legal issues raised. As to
whether or not the country should honor its international debt, more especially the enormous
amount that had been incurred by the past administration, which appears to be the ultimate
objective of the petition, is not an issue that is presented or proposed to be addressed by the
Court. Indeed, it is more of a political decision for Congress and the Executive to determine in
the exercise of their wisdom and sound discretion.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED, without pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.
Fernan, C.J., Narvasa, Melencio-Herrera, Feliciano, Bidin, Grio-Aquino, Medialdea,
Regalado and Davide, Jr., JJ., concur.

SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. 99886 March 31, 1993

JOHN H. OSMEA, petitioner,
vs.
OSCAR ORBOS, in his capacity as Executive Secretary; JESUS ESTANISLAO, in his
capacity as Secretary of Finance; WENCESLAO DELA PAZ, in his capacity as Head of the
Office of Energy Affairs; REX V. TANTIONGCO, and the ENERGY REGULATORY
BOARD, respondents.
Nachura & Sarmiento for petitioner.
The Solicitor General for public respondents.
NARVASA, C.J.:
The petitioner seeks the corrective, 1 prohibitive and coercive remedies provided by Rule 65 of
the Rules of Court, 2 upon the following posited grounds, viz.: 3
1) the invalidity of the "TRUST ACCOUNT" in the books of account of the Ministry of Energy
(now, the Office of Energy Affairs), created pursuant to 8, paragraph 1, of P.D. No. 1956, as
amended, "said creation of a trust fund being contrary to Section 29 (3), Article VI of the . .
Constitution; 4
2) the unconstitutionality of 8, paragraph 1 (c) of P.D. No. 1956, as amended by Executive
Order No. 137, for "being an undue and invalid delegation of legislative power . . to the Energy
Regulatory Board;" 5
3) the illegality of the reimbursements to oil companies, paid out of the Oil Price Stabilization
Fund, 6 because
it
contravenes
8,
paragraph
2
(2)
of
P. D. 1956, as amended; and
4) the consequent nullity of the Order dated December 10, 1990 and the necessity of a rollback
of the pump prices and petroleum products to the levels prevailing prior to the said Order.
It will be recalled that on October 10, 1984, President Ferdinand Marcos issued P.D. 1956
creating a Special Account in the General Fund, designated as the Oil Price Stabilization Fund
(OPSF). The OPSF was designed to reimburse oil companies for cost increases in crude oil and
imported petroleum products resulting from exchange rate adjustments and from increases in the
world market prices of crude oil.
Subsequently, the OPSF was reclassified into a "trust liability account," in virtue of E.O.
1024, 7 and ordered released from the National Treasury to the Ministry of Energy. The same
Executive Order also authorized the investment of the fund in government securities, with the
earnings from such placements accruing to the fund.
President Corazon C. Aquino, amended P.D. 1956. She promulgated Executive Order No. 137 on
February 27, 1987, expanding the grounds for reimbursement to oil companies for possible cost
underrecovery incurred as a result of the reduction of domestic prices of petroleum products, the
amount of the underrecovery being left for determination by the Ministry of Finance.
Now, the petition alleges that the status of the OPSF as of March 31, 1991 showed a "Terminal
Fund Balance deficit" of some P12.877 billion; 8 that to abate the worsening deficit, "the Energy
Regulatory Board . . issued an Order on December 10, 1990, approving the increase in pump
prices of petroleum products," and at the rate of recoupment, the OPSF deficit should have been
fully covered in a span of six (6) months, but this notwithstanding, the respondents Oscar
Orbos, in his capacity as Executive Secretary; Jesus Estanislao, in his capacity as Secretary of
Finance; Wenceslao de la Paz, in his capacity as Head of the Office of Energy Affairs; Chairman
Rex V. Tantiongco and the Energy Regulatory Board "are poised to accept, process and pay
claims not authorized under P.D. 1956." 9
The petition further avers that the creation
29(3), Article VI of the Constitution, reading as follows:
of
the
trust
fund
violates
(3) All money collected on any tax levied for a special purpose shall be treated as
a special fund and paid out for such purposes only. If the purpose for which a
special fund was created has been fulfilled or abandoned, the balance, if any, shall
be transferred to the general funds of the Government.
The petitioner argues that "the monies collected pursuant to . . P.D. 1956, as amended, must be
treated as a 'SPECIAL FUND,' not as a 'trust account' or a 'trust fund,' and that "if a special tax is
collected for a specific purpose, the revenue generated therefrom shall 'be treated as a special
fund' to be used only for the purpose indicated, and not channeled to another government
objective." 10 Petitioner further points out that since "a 'special fund' consists of monies collected
through the taxing power of a State, such amounts belong to the State, although the use thereof is
limited to the special purpose/objective for which it was created." 11
He also contends that the "delegation of legislative authority" to the ERB violates 28 (2).
Article VI of the Constitution, viz.:
(2) The Congress may, by law, authorize the President to fix, within specified
limits, and subject to such limitations and restrictions as it may impose, tariff
rates, import and export quotas, tonnage and wharfage dues, and other duties or
imposts within the framework of the national development program of the
Government;
and, inasmuch as the delegation relates to the exercise of the power of taxation, "the
limits, limitations and restrictions must be quantitative, that is, the law must not only
specify how to tax, who (shall) be taxed (and) what the tax is for, but also impose a
specific limit on how much to tax." 12
The petitioner does not suggest that a "trust account" is illegal per se, but maintains that the
monies collected, which form part of the OPSF, should be maintained in a special account of the
general fund for the reason that the Constitution so provides, and because they are,
supposedly, taxes levied for a special purpose. He assumes that the Fund is formed from a tax
undoubtedly because a portion thereof is taken from collections of ad valoremtaxes and the
increases thereon.
It thus appears that the challenge posed by the petitioner is premised primarily on the view that
the powers granted to the ERB under P.D. 1956, as amended, partake of the nature of the taxation
power of the State. The Solicitor General observes that the "argument rests on the assumption
that the OPSF is a form of revenue measure drawing from a special tax to be expended for a
special purpose." 13 The petitioner's perceptions are, in the Court's view, not quite correct.
To address this critical misgiving in the position of the petitioner on these issues, the Court
recalls its holding inValmonte v. Energy Regulatory Board, et al. 14
The foregoing arguments suggest the presence of misconceptions about the nature
and functions of the OPSF. The OPSF is a "Trust Account" which was established
"for the purpose of minimizing the frequent price changes brought about by
exchange rate adjustment and/or changes in world market prices of crude oil and
imported petroleum products." 15 Under P.D. No. 1956, as amended by Executive
Order No. 137 dated 27 February 1987, this Trust Account may be funded from
any of the following sources:
a) Any increase in the tax collection from ad valorem tax or
customs duty imposed on petroleum products subject to tax under
this Decree arising from exchange rate adjustment, as may be
determined by the Minister of Finance in consultation with the
Board of Energy;
b) Any increase in the tax collection as a result of the lifting of tax
exemptions of government corporations, as may be determined by
the Minister of Finance in consultation with the Board of Energy:
c) Any additional amount to be imposed on petroleum products to
augment the resources of the Fund through an appropriate Order
that may be issued by the Board of Energy requiring payment of
persons or companies engaged in the business of importing,
manufacturing and/or marketing petroleum products;
d) Any resulting peso cost differentials in case the actual peso costs
paid by oil companies in the importation of crude oil and
petroleum products is less than the peso costs computed using the
reference foreign exchange rate as fixed by the Board of Energy.
xxx xxx xxx
The fact that the world market prices of oil, measured by the spot market in
Rotterdam, vary from day to day is of judicial notice. Freight rates for hauling
crude oil and petroleum products from sources of supply to the Philippines may
also vary from time to time. The exchange rate of the pesovis-a-vis the U.S. dollar
and other convertible foreign currencies also changes from day to day. These
fluctuations in world market prices and in tanker rates and foreign exchange rates
would in a completely free market translate into corresponding adjustments in
domestic prices of oil and petroleum products with sympathetic frequency. But
domestic prices which vary from day to day or even only from week to week
would result in a chaotic market with unpredictable effects upon the country's
economy in general. The OPSF was established precisely to protect local
consumers from the adverse consequences that such frequent oil price
adjustments may have upon the economy.Thus, the OPSF serves as a pocket, as it
were, into which a portion of the purchase price of oil and petroleum products
paid by consumers as well as some tax revenues are inputted and from which
amounts are drawn from time to time to reimburse oil companies, when
appropriate situations arise, for increases in, as well as underrecovery of, costs of
crude importation. The OPSF is thus a buffer mechanism through which the
domestic consumer prices of oil and petroleum products are stabilized, instead of
fluctuating every so often, and oil companies are allowed to recover those
portions of their costs which they would not otherwise recover given the level of
domestic prices existing at any given time. To the extent that some tax revenues
are also put into it, the OPSF is in effect a device through which the domestic
prices of petroleum products are subsidized in part. It appears to the Court that
the establishment and maintenance of the OPSF is well within that pervasive and
non-waivable power and responsibility of the government to secure the physical
and economic survival and well-being of the community, that comprehensive
sovereign authority we designate as the police power of the State. The
stabilization, and subsidy of domestic prices of petroleum products and fuel oil
clearly critical in importance considering, among other things, the continuing high
level of dependence of the country on imported crude oil are appropriately
regarded as public purposes.
Also of relevance is this Court's ruling in relation to the sugar stabilization fund the nature of
which is not far different from the OPSF. In Gaston v. Republic Planters Bank, 16 this Court
upheld the legality of the sugar stabilization fees and explained their nature and character, viz.:
The stabilization fees collected are in the nature of a tax, which is within the
power of the State to impose for the promotion of the sugar industry (Lutz v.
Araneta, 98 Phil. 148). . . . The tax collected is not in a pure exercise of the taxing
power. It is levied with a regulatory purpose, to provide a means for the
stabilization of the sugar industry. The levy is primarily in the exercise of the
police power of the State (Lutz v. Araneta, supra).
xxx xxx xxx
The stabilization fees in question are levied by the State upon sugar millers,
planters and producers for a special purpose that of "financing the growth and
development of the sugar industry and all its components, stabilization of the
domestic market including the foreign market." The fact that the State has taken
possession of moneys pursuant to law is sufficient to constitute them state funds,
even though they are held for a special purpose (Lawrence v. American Surety
Co. 263 Mich. 586, 249 ALR 535, cited in 42 Am Jur Sec. 2, p. 718). Having been
levied for a special purpose, the revenues collected are to be treated as a special
fund, to be, in the language of the statute, "administered in trust" for the purpose
intended. Once the purpose has been fulfilled or abandoned, the balance if any, is
to be transferred to the general funds of the Government. That is the essence of
the trust intended (SEE 1987 Constitution, Article VI, Sec. 29(3), lifted from the
1935 Constitution, Article VI, Sec. 23(1). 17
The character of the Stabilization Fund as a special kind of fund is emphasized by
the fact that the funds are deposited in the Philippine National Bank and not in
the Philippine Treasury, moneys from which may be paid out only in pursuance
of an appropriation made by law (1987) Constitution, Article VI, Sec. 29 (3),

lifted from the 1935 Constitution, Article VI, Sec. 23(1). (Emphasis supplied).
Hence, it seems clear that while the funds collected may be referred to as taxes, they are exacted
in the exercise of the police power of the State. Moreover, that the OPSF is a special fund is plain
from the special treatment given it by E.O. 137. It is segregated from the general fund; and while
it is placed in what the law refers to as a "trust liability account," the fund nonetheless remains
subject to the scrutiny and review of the COA. The Court is satisfied that these measures comply
with the constitutional description of a "special fund." Indeed, the practice is not without
precedent.
With regard to the alleged undue delegation of legislative power, the Court finds that the
provision conferring the authority upon the ERB to impose additional amounts on petroleum
products provides a sufficient standard by which the authority must be exercised. In addition to
the general policy of the law to protect the local consumer by stabilizing and subsidizing
domestic pump rates, 8(c) of P.D. 1956 18 expressly authorizes the ERB to impose additional
amounts to augment the resources of the Fund.
What petitioner would wish is the fixing of some definite, quantitative restriction, or "a specific
limit on how much to tax." 19 The Court is cited to this requirement by the petitioner on the
premise that what is involved here is the power of taxation; but as already discussed, this is not
the case. What is here involved is not so much the power of taxation as police power. Although
the provision authorizing the ERB to impose additional amounts could be construed to refer to
the power of taxation, it cannot be overlooked that the overriding consideration is to enable the
delegate to act with expediency in carrying out the objectives of the law which are embraced by
the police power of the State.
The interplay and constant fluctuation of the various factors involved in the determination of the
price of oil and petroleum products, and the frequently shifting need to either augment or exhaust
the Fund, do not conveniently permit the setting of fixed or rigid parameters in the law as
proposed by the petitioner. To do so would render the ERB unable to respond effectively so as to
mitigate or avoid the undesirable consequences of such fluidity. As such, the standard as it is
expressed, suffices to guide the delegate in the exercise of the delegated power, taking account of
the circumstances under which it is to be exercised.
For a valid delegation of power, it is essential that the law delegating the power must be (1)
complete in itself, that is it must set forth the policy to be executed by the delegate and (2) it
must
fix
a
standard
limits
of
which
20
are sufficiently determinate or determinable to which the delegate must conform.
. . . As pointed out in Edu v. Ericta: "To avoid the taint of unlawful delegation,
there must be a standard, which implies at the very least that the legislature itself
determines matters of principle and lays down fundamental policy. Otherwise, the
charge of complete abdication may be hard to repel. A standard thus defines
legislative policy, marks its limits, maps out its boundaries and specifies the
public agency to apply it. It indicates the circumstances under which the
legislative command is to be effected. It is the criterion by which the legislative
purpose may be carried out. Thereafter, the executive or administrative office
designated may in pursuance of the above guidelines promulgate supplemental
rules and regulations. The standard may either be express or implied. If the
former, the non-delegation objection is easily met. The standard though does not
have to be spelled out specifically. It could be implied from the policy and
purpose of the act considered as a whole. 21
It would seem that from the above-quoted ruling, the petition for prohibition should fail.
The standard, as the Court has already stated, may even be implied. In that light, there can be no
ground upon which to sustain the petition, inasmuch as the challenged law sets forth a
determinable standard which guides the exercise of the power granted to the ERB. By the same
token, the proper exercise of the delegated power may be tested with ease. It seems obvious that
what the law intended was to permit the additional imposts for as long as there exists a need to
protect the general public and the petroleum industry from the adverse consequences of pump
rate fluctuations. "Where the standards set up for the guidance of an administrative officer and
the action taken are in fact recorded in the orders of such officer, so that Congress, the courts and
the public are assured that the orders in the judgment of such officer conform to the legislative
standard, there is no failure in the performance of the legislative functions." 22
This Court thus finds no serious impediment to sustaining the validity of the legislation; the
express purpose for which the imposts are permitted and the general objectives and purposes of
the fund are readily discernible, and they constitute a sufficient standard upon which the
delegation of power may be justified.
In relation to the third question respecting the illegality of the reimbursements to oil
companies, paid out of the Oil Price Stabilization Fund, because allegedly in contravention of
8, paragraph 2 (2) of P.D. 1956, amended 23 the Court finds for the petitioner.
The petition assails the payment of certain items or accounts in favor of the petroleum companies
(i.e., inventory losses, financing charges, fuel oil sales to the National Power Corporation, etc.)
because not authorized by law. Petitioner contends that "these claims are not embraced in the
enumeration in 8 of P.D. 1956 . . since none of them was incurred 'as a result of the reduction
of domestic prices of petroleum products,'" 24 and since these items are reimbursements for which
the OPSF should not have responded, the amount of the P12.877 billion deficit "should be
reduced by P5,277.2 million." 25 It is argued "that under the principle of ejusdem generis . . . the
term 'other factors' (as used in 8 of P.D. 1956) . . can only include such 'other factors' which
necessarily result in the reduction of domestic prices of petroleum products." 26
The Solicitor General, for his part, contends that "(t)o place said (term) within the restrictive
confines of the rule ofejusdem generis would reduce (E.O. 137) to a meaningless provision."
This Court, in Caltex Philippines, Inc. v. The Honorable Commissioner on Audit, et al., 27 passed
upon the application of ejusdem generis to paragraph 2 of 8 of P.D. 1956, viz.:
The rule of ejusdem generis states that "[w]here words follow an enumeration of
persons or things, by words of a particular and specific meaning, such general
words are not to be construed in their widest extent, but are held to be as applying
only to persons or things of the same kind or class as those specifically
mentioned." 28 A reading of subparagraphs (i) and (ii) easily discloses that they do
not have a common characteristic. The first relates to price reduction as directed
by the Board of Energy while the second refers to reduction in internal ad
valorem taxes. Therefore, subparagraph (iii) cannot be limited by the enumeration
in these subparagraphs. What should be considered for purposes of determining
the "other factors" in subparagraph (iii) is the first sentence of paragraph (2) of the
Section which explicitly allows the cost underrecovery only if such were incurred
as a result of the reduction of domestic prices of petroleum products.
The Court thus holds, that the reimbursement of financing charges is not authorized by paragraph
2 of 8 of P.D. 1956, for the reason that they were not incurred as a result of the reduction of
domestic prices of petroleum products. Under the same provision, however, the payment of
inventory losses is upheld as valid, being clearly a result of domestic price reduction, when oil
companies incur a cost underrecovery for yet unsold stocks of oil in inventory acquired at a
higher price.
Reimbursement for cost underrecovery from the sales of oil to the National Power Corporation is
equally permissible, not as coming within the provisions of P.D. 1956, but in virtue of other laws
and regulations as held inCaltex 29 and which have been pointed to by the Solicitor General. At
any rate, doubts about the propriety of such reimbursements have been dispelled by the
enactment of R.A. 6952, establishing the Petroleum Price Standby Fund, 2 of which
specifically authorizes the reimbursement of "cost underrecovery incurred as a result of fuel oil
sales to the National Power Corporation."
Anent the overpayment refunds mentioned by the petitioner, no substantive discussion has been
presented to show how this is prohibited by P.D. 1956. Nor has the Solicitor General taken any
effort to defend the propriety of this refund. In fine, neither of the parties, beyond the mere
mention of overpayment refunds, has at all bothered to discuss the arguments for or against the
legality of the so-called overpayment refunds. To be sure, the absence of any argument for or
against the validity of the refund cannot result in its disallowance by the Court. Unless the
impropriety or illegality of the overpayment refund has been clearly and specifically shown,
there can be no basis upon which to nullify the same.
Finally, the Court finds no necessity to rule on the remaining issue, the same having been
rendered moot and academic. As of date hereof, the pump rates of gasoline have been reduced to
levels below even those prayed for in the petition.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED insofar as it prays for the nullification of the
reimbursement of financing charges, paid pursuant to E.O. 137, and DISMISSED in all other
respects.
SO ORDERED.
Cruz, Feliciano, Padilla, Bidin, Grio-Aquino, Regalado, Davide, Jr., Romero, Nocon,
Bellosillo, Melo, Campos, Jr., and Quiason, JJ., concur.
Gutierrez, Jr., J., is on leave.

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Republic of the Philippines

amount to an abandonment of my present position as Executive

2. While the doctrine of separation of powers is a relative theory not to be

July 15, 1936

JOSE A. ANGARA, petitioner,

Godofredo Reyes for petitioner.

Sr. ROXAS. La diferencia, seor Presidente, consiste solamente en obviar la objecion

intrinsic merits of the controversy. The Commonwealth Government was inaugurated on

irregularities in the appreciation, counting and consideration of votes in specified electoral

powers." It involves a matter which 'the sovereign has entrusted to

Republic of the Philippines

February 28, 1957

LORENZO M. TAADA and DIOSDADO MACAPAGAL, petitioners,

business, it is generally regarded as directory, unless followed by words of absolute prohibition;

Paras, C.J., dissenting:.

This presumption as to mandatory quality is usually followed unless it is unmistakably manifest

Republic of the Philippines

THE REFERENDUM ISSUES

conceivable controversy, especially one involving a conflict as to the correct

proposed Constitution, as against seven hundred forty-three thousand eight

MUNOZ PALMA, J., dissenting:

Republic of the Philippines

REP. RAUL A. DAZA, petitioner,

Sec. 18. There shall be a Commission on Appointments consisting of the

largest number of votes in the Senate-behalf of its Committee on Rules,

In the course of the deliberations, a serious procedural objection was raised by

xxx xxx xxx

Republic of the Philippines

G.R. No. 101273 July 3, 1992

Commission and may be revised by the President upon recommendation of the

Republic of the Philippines

August 26, 1949

J. ANTONIO ARANETA, petitioner,

August 26, 1949

J. ANTONIO ARANETA and GREGORIO VILLAMOR, petitioners,

August 26, 1949

EULOGIO RODRIGUEZ, Sr., por si y como Presidente del Partido

August 26, 1949

LEON MA. GURRERO, petitioner,

August 26, 1949

THE COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, THE AUDITOR GENERAL and THE INSULAR

PARAS, J., concurring:

I fully agree with the majority when in its opinion it says:

BENGZON, J., dissenting:

September 16, 1949

FERIA, J., concurring:

AN ACT DECLARING A STATE OF TOTAL EMERGENCY AS A RESULT OF WAR

unconstitutional because it is against the express provision of the Constitution. It would be an

BENGZON, J., concurring:

REYES, J., concurring:

JUGO, J., concurring:

MONTEMAYOR, J., concurring and dissenting:

Republic of the Philippines

November 16, 1937

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS and HONGKONG & SHANGHAI

. . . Si este Juzgado concediera la poblacion solicitada por las circunstancias y la historia

By the twentieth article of the declaration of rights in the constitution of this

Republic of the Philippines

Narvasa, Gancayco, Grio-Aquino and Medialdea, JJ., concur.

Republic of the Philippines

February 27, 1922

THE UNITED STATES, plaintiff-appellee,

Same constitution Delegation of power to commission. The authority thus given