Article 487 Any one of the co- owners may bring

action for ejectment.

1. An ejectment case filed by a co- owner need not
be joined by the other co- owners. It is a
representative suit as the other co- owners are
deemd included as plaintiffs (Sunga v. de Guzman
90 SCRA 618)
As to the alleged error of the Court for not
dismissing the case for the non-inclusion of
indispensable parties, appellees contend that this
question was never raised in the Motion to Dismiss
filed by petitioners with the trial court (pp. 6-10,
Record on Appeal), nor in their brief in the Court of
Appeals, and, therefore may not be raised, nor
given consideration. for the first time in this Court.
This is a valid proposition We have to uphold.
Even by virtue of express provisions of law,
representative suits that need not be joined
by an parties in the same status or
condition, and linked together with a
common interest, are permissible. Thus
anyone of the co-owners may bring an action
for ejectment (Article 487, Civil Code), while
prescription obtained by a co-proprietor or a coowner shall benefit the others (Article 111 Civil
Code). Moreover, non-joinder of parties, is not a
ground to dismiss an action.
2. The Article abandoned the old rule that an action
for ejectment cannot be maintained by a coowner without the joinder of the other co- owners
(Spouses Mendoza v. Coronel, G.R. No. 156402,
February 13, 2006).
Article 487 is a departure from the rule laid
down in the case of Palarca v. Baguisi which held
that an action for ejectment must be brought by all

the co-owners. As explained by Tolentino, the law

now allows a co-owner to bring an action for
ejectment, which covers all kinds of actions for the
recovery of possession, including forcible entry
and unlawful detainer, without the necessity of
joining all the other co-owners as co-plaintiffs,
because the suit is deemed to be instituted for the
benefit of all.
3. Any co- owner may file an action under Article
487 not only against a third person but also
against another co- owner who takes exclusive
possession of and asserts exclusive ownership
over the property. (De Guia v. Court of Appeals)
4. An ejectment suit filed by a co- owner will benefit
the other co- owner. (Baloloy v. Hular, G.R. No.
157767, September 9, 2004)
Under Article 487 of the New Civil
Code, any of the co-owners may bring an
action in ejectment. This article covers all
kinds of actions for the recovery of
possession, including an accion publiciana
and a reinvidicatory action. A co-owner may
bring such an action without the necessity of
joining all the other co-owners as coplaintiffs because the suit is deemed to be
instituted for the benefit of all. Any judgment
of the court in favor of the co-owner will benefit
the others but if such judgment is adverse, the
same cannot prejudice the rights of the
unimpleaded co-owners.
Forcible Entry
1. In order to successfully file an action for forcible
entry, the complainant must be in prior

possession of the property (Abad v. Farrales, G.R.

No. 178635, April 11, 2011).
There is no question that Abad made an
allegation in his complaint that Oscar and Daisy
forcibly entered the subject property. The only issue
is with respect to his allegation, citing such property
as one "of which they have complete physical and
material possession of the same until deprived
thereof." Abad argues that this substantially alleges
plaintiffs prior physical possession of the property
before the dispossession, sufficient to confer on the
MeTC jurisdiction over the action. The Court agrees.
The plaintiff in a forcible entry suit is not required to
use in his allegations the exact terminology
employed by the rules. It is enough that the facts set
up in the complaint show that dispossession took
place under the required conditions.
It is of course not enough that the allegations of
the complaint make out a case for forcible entry. The
plaintiff must also be able to prove his allegations. He
has to prove that he had prior physical possession for
this gives him the security that entitles him to remain in
the property until a person with a better right lawfully
ejects him.
2. Unlawfully
entering
the
subject
property,
erecting a structure thereon and excluding the
lawful possessor therefrom would necessarily
imply the use of force (Antazo v. Doblada, 611
SCRA 586, February 4, 2010)
Petitioners argument is misplaced, considering
that this is a forcible entry case. They are apparently
referring to possession flowing from ownership of the
property, as opposed to actual possession. In ejectment
cases, possession means nothing more than actual
physical possession, not legal possession in the sense

contemplated in civil law.

Prior physical possession is the primary
consideration in a forcible entry case. A party who can
prove prior possession can recover such possession
even against the owner himself. Whatever may be the
character of his possession, if he has in his favor prior
possession in time, he has the security that entitles him
to remain on the property until a person with a better
right lawfully ejects him. The party in peaceable quiet
possession shall not be thrown out by a strong hand,
violence or terror.
We are convinced that respondents were in
prior possession of the property and that
petitioners deprived them of such possession by
means of force.
In the Letter dated May 26, 2003, Atty. Jimmy R.
Panganiban of Panganiban Law Office, on behalf of
petitioners, wrote to respondents:
Accordingly, FINAL DEMAND is hereby made
upon all of you to remove the bamboo
fence
and
to
restore
my
clients
possession within five (5) days from receipt of
this letter.
We also note that petitioners did not deny
in their Answer respondents allegation that
they constructed a concrete fence on the
subject property. Failure to specifically deny the
allegation amounts to a judicial admission.
Unlawfully entering the subject property,
erecting
a
structure
thereon
and
excluding therefrom the prior possessor
would necessarily imply the use of force.
In
order
to
constitute
force,
the
trespasser does not have to institute a

state of war. No other proof is necessary.

3. The acts of going to the property and
excluding the lawful possessor therefrom
necessarily implyexertion of force. (Spouses
Baes v. Lutheran Church in the Philippines, GR
142308, November 15, 2005)
There is forcible entry or desahucio when one is
deprived of physical possession of land or building by
means of force, intimidation, threat, strategy or stealth.
In such cases, the possession is illegal from the
beginning and the basic inquiry centers on who has the
prior possession de facto. In filing forcible entry cases,
the law tells us that two allegations are mandatory for
the municipal court to acquire jurisdiction: first, the
plaintiff must allege prior physical possession of the
property, and second, he must also allege that he was
deprived of his possession by any of the means
provided for in Section 1, Rule 70 of the Rules of Court
i.e., by force, intimidation, threat, strategy or stealth. It
is also settled that in the resolution thereof, what is
important is determining who is entitled to the physical
possession of the property. Indeed, any of the parties
who can prove prior possession de facto may recover
such possession even from the owner himself since
such cases proceed independently of any claim of
ownership and the plaintiff needs merely to prove prior
possession de facto and undue deprivation thereof.
In order to constitute force that would justify
a forcible entry case, the trespasser does not
have to institute a state of war. The act of going
to the property and excluding the lawful
possessor therefrom necessarily implies the
exertion of force over the property which is all that is
necessary and sufficient to show that the action is
based on the provisions of Section 1, Rule 70 of the
Rules of Court.

As expressly stated in David vs. Cordova, the

words by force, intimidation, threat, strategy or
stealth include every situation or condition under
which one person can wrongfully enter upon real
property and exclude another, who has had prior
possession therefrom. If a trespasser enters upon
land in open daylight, under the very eyes of the person
already clothed with lawful possession, but without the
consent of the latter, and there plants himself and
excludes such prior possessor from the property, the
action of forcible entry and detainer can unquestionably
be maintained, even though no force is used by the
trespasser other than such as is necessarily implied
from the mere acts of planting himself on the ground
and excluding the other party.