Beruflich Dokumente
Kultur Dokumente
JAN 11 2001
PATRICK FISHER
Clerk
No. 99-7144
(D.C. No. 99-CR-29-B)
(E.D. Okla.)
Defendant-Appellant.
ORDER AND JUDGMENT
After examining the briefs and appellate record, this panel has determined
unanimously to grant the parties request for a decision on the briefs without oral
argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(f); 10th Cir. R. 34.1(G). The case is therefore
ordered submitted without oral argument.
This order and judgment is not binding precedent, except under the
doctrines of law of the case, res judicata, and collateral estoppel. The court
generally disfavors the citation of orders and judgments; nevertheless, an order
and judgment may be cited under the terms and conditions of 10th Cir. R. 36.3.
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In 1994 the IRS requested Mr. Sathers 1992 tax return. Mr. Sather replied
that he revoked all of his signatures on prior documents filed with the IRS before
1992 and asked the IRS to refund to him monies he had paid in past taxes. In
1995 the IRS began issuing summons for Mr. Sathers business and financial
records. One of Mr. Sathers former employees testified that Mr. Sather then
instructed her to shred documents showing income so that the IRS could not
determine how much income his chiropractic office had produced, instructed her
not to place large income payments from the business on the ledger sheets, and
placed a ZAP program on his business computer system that would delete the hard
drive if the IRS came to the office. After the employee was served with an IRS
summons, Mr. Sather told her it was completely voluntary and that she did not
have to talk with anyone.
In August 1995 Mr. Sather tried to obtain credit through one of his trusts at
a local bank. He gave a social security number belonging to another individual as
his own on the loan application.
In 1996 Mr. Sather rented a storage unit so that he could hide his Mercedes
from the IRS. When renting it, he unsuccessfully tried to use an alias and again
wrongfully used the other individuals social security number as his own on the
rental form. After renting the unit, Mr. Sather actually used a different unit
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without the businesss permission, later explaining that he didnt want people to
know his business.
In 1997 Mr. Sather filed the first in a series of three bankruptcy petitions
seeking protection from federal taxes. It is undisputed that the first petition,
which he later voluntarily dismissed, falsely stated that Mr. Sather owned only
$6,365 in total assets and earned $2,000/month when in fact he owned at least
$394,782 in assets and earned over $9,000 from his chiropractic business.
Mr. Sather was convicted on eight various criminal counts after the jury
rejected his good faith defense. He appeals from only three of the convictions
and raises four issues, which we address
seriatim .
II. Discussion
A. Motion to strike surplusage. An indictment must be a plain, concise,
and definite written statement of the essential facts constituting the offense
charged. Fed. R. Crim. P. 7(c)(1). On motion of the defendant, a court may
strike immaterial or irrelevant allegations that may be prejudicial to the
defendant. Fed. R. Crim. P. 7(d) & advisory committees note;
at 631. Mr. Sather first argues that the district court erred by denying his motion
to strike paragraphs 1 through 11 of Count One, which alleged a violation of 26
U.S.C. 7212(a).
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The paragraphs at issue all refer to events occurring in 1992, which was
more than six years before March 16, 1999, when the indictment was filed.
See
States , 397 U.S. 112, 115 (1970) (noting that statutes of limitation normally begin
to run when crime is complete). In so concluding, the district court analogized to
cases from other circuits holding that the date of the latest act of evasion triggers
the statute of limitations for violations of 26 U.S.C. 7201 (income tax
evasion). R. Doc. 22, at 2 n.1. Mr. Sather argues that the district court failed to
properly determine whether violation of 7212 constitutes a continuing
violation as that term of art was defined in
because single act of failing to register for draft was not a continuing violation
and statute of limitations had passed on that act). The only question we must
answer is whether the district court abused its discretion in presenting to the jury
alleged facts that occurred more than six years before the indictment issued. We
hold that it did not.
Even if Mr. Sathers acts in 1992 could not be separately prosecuted as
outside the statute of limitations, they were relevant to demonstrate the steps
Mr. Sather took to avoid taxation and the unreasonableness of Mr. Sathers good
faith defense in light of the warnings of his accountant and a tax attorney.
See
Collins , 920 F.2d at 622 (holding that jury could consider reasonableness of good
faith defense to tax evasion). Thus, the allegations were not mere surplusage
and the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying Mr. Sathers motion.
Even if the facts alleged were surplusage, we have long held that mere
surplusage in an indictment or information may be disregarded, and such
disregard does not render the indictment or information invalid if sufficient
remains to charge a crime.
1961).
B. Insufficiency of the evidence - Count Five. Mr. Sather claims that the
evidence was insufficient to support a finding of criminal intent for bankruptcy
fraud because he was not represented by an attorney in his bankruptcy
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proceedings and he therefore did not realize that his admittedly false statements
were legally false. Appellants Br. at 25. We review the sufficiency of the
evidence de novo , asking whether the direct and circumstantial evidence, together
with the reasonable inferences drawn therefrom, support a conclusion that the
defendant is guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.
court), there was ample testimony that Mr. Sather used the social security number
of a different individual as
John C. Porfilio
Circuit Judge
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