Beruflich Dokumente
Kultur Dokumente
Elisabeth A. Shumaker
Clerk of Court
TENTH CIRCUIT
ELLIE E. SH U BA RG O ,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v.
No. 07-7005
After examining the briefs and appellate record, this panel has determined
unanimously that oral argument would not materially assist the determination of
this appeal. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2); 10th Cir. R. 34.1(G). The case is
therefore ordered submitted without oral argument.
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In his brief, the Commissioner argues that should this Court follow its
prior decision [in Goatcher], a finding that Shubargos EAJA motion is timely is
proper and the Court should remand the case to the district court for consideration
of the Commissioners arguments that the Commissioner w as substantially
justified and that Shubargos EAJA request is excessive. Aplee. Br. at 4. To the
extent the Commissioner is suggesting that this panel has the option of not
following this courts prior decision in Goatcher, we remind the Commissioner
that [w]e cannot overrule the judgment of another panel of this court. W e are
bound by the precedent of prior panels absent en banc reconsideration or a
superseding contrary decision by the Supreme Court. In re Smith, 10 F.3d 723,
724 (10th Cir. 1993).
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parties to appeal the district courts April 27, 2006, remand order and judgment
expired. Id.; see also 28 U.S.C. 2412(d)(2)(G) (providing that, for purposes of
EAJA, the term final judgment means a judgment that is final and not
appealable); Fed. R. App. P. 4(a)(1)(B) (providing that a judgment remains
appealable for sixty days when the U nited States or its officer or agency is a
party); Shalala v. Schaefer, 509 U .S. 292, 302 (1993) (stating that EA JAs
thirty-day time limit begins to run at the end of the sixty-day period for filing an
appeal in a social security case). Because M s. Shubargo subsequently filed her
EAJA application within thirty days of June 26, 2006, the application was timely
(as the Commissioner has conceded in his appellate brief; see Aplee. Br. at 4, 7,
9-10), and we must therefore reverse the district court and remand this matter for
further proceedings concerning M s. Shubargos EAJA fee application.
Although M s. Shubargo has requested that we simply award her an
outright award of a reasonable attorney fee in the amount of $13,546.30 for 87.80
hours of work performed before the courts, Aplt. Reply Br. at 5, arguing that this
court has the required expertise and the necessary information to make the
award, id., we decline to do so. The Commissioner has argued that the denial of
M s. Shubargos application for disability benefits was substantially justified and
that M s. Shubargos EAJA fee request is excessive, see Aplt. App. at 100-105,
and those questions should be addressed and resolved by the district court in the
first instance on remand.
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The order and opinion entered by the district court on November 15, 2006,
is REVERSED and this matter is REM ANDED to the district court for further
proceedings consistent with this opinion.
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