166 F.

3d 346
98 CJ C.A.R. 6401
NOTICE: Although citation of unpublished opinions remains unfavored,
unpublished opinions may now be cited if the opinion has persuasive value on a
material issue, and a copy is attached to the citing document or, if cited in oral
argument, copies are furnished to the Court and all parties. See General Order of
November 29, 1993, suspending 10th Cir. Rule 36.3 until December 31, 1995, or
further order.

James Elmer DOBSON, Plaintiff-Appellant,

v.
Nathan A. McNALLY, Jr., in his official capacity as Crook
County Jailer; Brian Moorhouse, in his official capacity as
Crook County Sheriff; Ty Stutzman, in his official capacity
as Crook County Deputy Sheriff; Joseph M. Baron, in his
official capacity as Crook County Attorney; Bill Rice, in
his official capacity as Crook County Deputy Attorney; Dale
Sander, in his official capacity as Crook County Deputy
Sheriff; April Glick, in her official capacity as Crook
County Deputy Sheriff; Douglas Deskin, in his official
capacity as Wyoming Department of Transportation Highway
Patrol Office, Defendants-Appellees.
No. 98-8063.

United States Court of Appeals, Tenth Circuit.

Dec. 23, 1998.

(D.C. No. 97-CV-0069-B) (D.Wyo.)

Before SEYMOUR, Chief Judge, BARRETT, and BRISCOE, Circuit
Judges.

1ORDER AND JUDGMENT*

2

After examining the briefs and appellate record, this panel has determined

unanimously that oral argument would not materially assist the determination
of this appeal. See Fed. R.App. P. 34(a)(2); 10th Cir. R. 34.1.9. Therefore, the
case is ordered submitted without oral argument.

James Elmer Dobson, appearing pro se, appeals the district court's dismissal of
his 42 U.S.C. 1983 civil rights complaint. We exercise jurisdiction pursuant to
28 U.S.C. 1291 and affirm.

Dobson was allegedly arrested on or about September 5, 1996, and charged the
following day with two counts of attempting to obtain property from another
person by false pretense and with intent to defraud. Although the record is
unclear, it appears he was detained in county jail for a brief period of time until
he made bail. It also appears a search warrant was issued for his residence. The
record does not indicate the outcome of the criminal proceedings.

Dobson filed his complaint on March 20, 1997, against various officials
involved in his arrest and detainment, claiming he was entitled to $17 million in
damages due to various violations of his constitutional rights. The three
defendants who were members of the Wyoming judiciary moved to dismiss,
asserting absolute judicial immunity. The district court granted their motion and
dismissed the causes of action against them without prejudice. Dobson
attempted to appeal the dismissal, but this court dismissed his appeal for lack of
jurisdiction, concluding the order was not a final appealable order. Dobson v.
Waugh, 131 F.3d 151 (10th Cir.1997) (table). The remaining defendants moved
to dismiss the complaint for failure to state a claim. Dobson responded with a
motion for summary judgment against all of the defendants, including those
who were dismissed. The district court denied the motion for summary
judgment and granted defendants' motion to dismiss, stating:

The Court will grant Defendants' Motion to Dismiss. Simply put, Plaintiff's
complaint fails to state the facts that form the basis of his claims. This renders
the complaint largely incomprehensible and leaves the Court without means to
assess Plaintiff's conclusory allegations of constitutional violations. Because
Plaintiff appears pro se, the Court will allow Plaintiff twenty (20) days from the
date of the hearing (May 21, 1998), in which to amend his complaint by stating
concisely and with specificity the underlying facts out of which his claims arise.

Record, Doc. 42 at 1-2. Dobson filed an amended complaint against all of the
original defendants on June 9, 1998. The district court dismissed the action on
June 29, 1998, with prejudice due to plaintiff's failure "to amend his complaint
as instructed by the Court." Record, Doc. 53 at 1.

We construe the district court's dismissal of Dobson's amended complaint as a

dismissal pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6) for failure to state a claim upon
which relief can be granted and review the dismissal de novo, taking all of the
plaintiff's well-pleaded allegations as true and construing them in the light most
favorable to plaintiff. See Yoder v. Honeywell, Inc., 104 F.3d 1215, 1224 (10th
Cir.), cert. denied --- U.S. ----, 118 S.Ct. 55, 139 L.Ed.2d 19 (1997). Although
we must liberally construe a pro se plaintiff's complaint, we may not accept as
true those allegations that are conclusory in nature. See Hall v. Bellmon, 935
F.2d 1106, 1110 (10th Cir.1991) ("[C]onclusory allegations without supporting
factual averments are insufficient to state a claim on which relief can be
based."). Under Rule 12(b)(6), a district court may dismiss a complaint that
does not contain a "short and plain statement of the claim," as required by
Fed.R.Civ.P. 8(a)(2), if there appears to be no set of facts on which plaintiff
may state a claim for relief. See Monument Builders of Greater Kansas City,
Inc. v. American Cemetery Ass'n, 891 F.2d 1473, 1480 (10th Cir.1989).

At the outset, we note Dobson's amended complaint, though somewhat more

specific than his original complaint, substantially fails to describe the grounds
upon which his claim rests. The amended complaint (like the original
complaint) is largely comprised of conclusory allegations of constitutional
deprivations apparently arising out of Dobson's arrest and subsequent
confinement. Even taking into account information contained in supporting
exhibits attached to the amended complaint, we are left with serious questions
about the claims Dobson is attempting to assert.

10

Even assuming, arguendo, that Dobson's amended complaint satisfies the

requirements of Rule 8(a), we conclude he has failed to state a claim upon
which relief can be granted against any of the named defendants. The three
members of the Wyoming judiciary are entitled to absolute judicial immunity.
See Stump v. Sparkman, 435 U.S. 349, 355-57, 98 S.Ct. 1099, 55 L.Ed.2d 331
(1978). The two county prosecutors involved in the prosecution of Dobson's
criminal case are entitled to immunity from suit under 1983. See Imbler v.
Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409, 420-24, 96 S.Ct. 984, 47 L.Ed.2d 128 (1976).

11

The amended complaint fails to demonstrate that Dobson is entitled to any legal
relief arising from the actions of the highway patrol officer who allegedly
arrested Dobson. Although Dobson alleges the officer arrested him "without
the proper and lawful paperwork," there is no assertion the officer lacked
probable cause to arrest Dobson, as would be necessary to prevail under 1983
on a claim of unlawful arrest. See Thompson v. City of Lawrence, 58 F.3d
1511, 1515 (10th Cir.1995); Karr v. Smith, 774 F.2d 1029, 1031 (10th
Cir.1985); see also Beck v. Ohio, 379 U.S. 89, 91, 85 S.Ct. 223, 13 L.Ed.2d

142 (1964) (warrantless arrest permissible if probable cause exists to believe

person has committed crime).
12

With respect to the three county law enforcement officers who were allegedly
involved in execution of a search warrant at Dobson's residence, the amended
complaint contains only conclusory allegations of constitutional violations. The
complaint asserts they "violated Plaintiff's GOD Given rights, and
Constitutionally Secured Rights by Search and Seizing the property of the
Plaintiff, which denied Plaintiff Due Process of Law." Record, Doc. 44 at 3.
The amended complaint does not assert the search warrant (a copy of which is
attached to the amended complaint) was not supported by probable cause or
that the officers failed to comply with the terms of the warrant. See generally
United States v. Kennedy, 131 F.3d 1371, 1375 (10th Cir.1997), cert. denied --U.S. ----, 119 S.Ct. 151, 142 L.Ed.2d 123 (1998); United States v. Medlin, 842
F.2d 1194, 1199 (10th Cir.1988).

13

Finally, as to the two remaining defendants who were allegedly involved in

Dobson's post-arrest detainment in the county jail, there is no basis for
concluding they violated Dobson's constitutional rights. Even assuming, as
alleged by Dobson, they refused to allow him to use various herbal teas
(allegedly for self-medication) and required that he sign his name on a
fingerprint card, we conclude this is insufficient to demonstrate Dobson was
subjected to any constitutional deprivations. See, e.g., White v. State of Colo.,
157 F.3d 1226, 1233-34 (10th Cir.1998) (to state cognizable claim under
Eighth Amendment, prisoner must allege acts or omissions sufficiently harmful
to evidence deliberate indifference to serious medical needs).

14

AFFIRMED. The mandate shall issue forthwith.

This order and judgment is not binding precedent, except under the doctrines of
law of the case, res judicata, and collateral estoppel. The court generally
disfavors the citation of orders and judgments; nevertheless, an order and
judgment may be cited under the terms and conditions of 10th Cir. R. 36.3