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DAC 004 11-03, Congress of the United States waning, BE, January 29, 2003 ‘Tne Honorable George J. Tenet Director of Central Inialigence Washington, DC 20505, Door Director Tanat: ‘As you know, the fina report ofthe Joint inquiy into the events of September 11 has bean submited to the intelligence Community for declassfication review. We look {forward to early release ofthe public report so that offerts at reforms can be accelerated, Having been privioged to lead ths bipartisan, bicameral investigation tast year. ‘we are committed to working in the eurent Congress to help secura implementation of ‘ts recommendations. In furtherance ofthat goal, we are wring to the President and heads of departments and agencies about portions ofthe Joint Inquiry's recommendations that may De of particular concer to them. (ur frst recommendation cals for ostablishment of a Director of National {ntetigence, or DNI, wha In addhion to being the President’ principal intetigence ‘adviser “shall have the full range of management, budgetary and personnel ‘esponaibties needed to make the U.S. Ineligence Communty operate as a coherent “whole.” To help promote both strong leadership af the entre Intaligence Community Jeadership and an effective CIA, the Joint inquiry also recommended that Congress provide thatthe ONI not simultaneously serve as director of the CIA or any other ‘2gency. In considering this recommondation, the Congress wil carianly, we believe, DDenefft from leaming of your viws about the stengtnaning of tre role of haad of the Inteligence Community. ‘A number ofthe recommendations tha folow scdress proposed taaks of the Director of National Intaliganco, but as that reform wil require study and deliberation, for the immediate future those further recommendations are rected to the Director of Central ineligance as the present statutory head of the ineligonce Community. ‘The Joint inquiry found that prior ta Soptember 11 nelther the U.S, Goverment ‘28.8 whole nor the Inteligence Community had a comprehensive counierteresist strategy. One of aur recommendations calls on te National Securty Counc, in ‘conjunction with key agoncy and depariment heads, o prepare such a strategy forthe President's approval. The recommendation sites that he strategy should be “The Honorable George J. Tenet January 23,2003 Page 2 “government wide,” apply both “home and abroad" and include “tha growing terrorism threat posed by the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and associated technologies.” The recommendation asks that this strategy dently and fuly engage the Intetigence 2s well as foreign policy, economic, miltary and law enforcement elements thal are “crcl to a comprehensive blueprint for success in he war against terrorism,” ‘The Director of Central iteligence's ful participation in this overall process willbe ‘essential, as wal the DC's development ofthe inteligence Community componant of the full strategy. The Joint inquiry recommended thatthe Intaligence Community's ‘component of the overall salegy include a number of important items, among them ‘development of human sources to penetaleterorst organizations and networks. “To provide to ie Congress and Executive Branch policymakers intaigence ‘estimates on terrorism, the Joint Inquiry has recommended establishment on the ‘Nationa! Intaligence Counc of the postion of Nationa inteligence Officer for ‘Terrorism. The recommendation sugges that the person holding his poston also assist the Inteligence Community in davaloping a program for strategic analysis, Another recommendation addresses the need for Congress and the ‘Administration to ensure development wihin the Department of Homeland Securty of ‘an effective all-source terrorism information fusion canter, s mandated by the Homeland Seculy Act of 2002. The success of tat fusion center wil depend, as the recommendation states, on the center's Tull and timely access to all counterterrorism ‘elated inteligence information, including Yaw supporting data es needed.” Your action to ensure full cooperation betwesn the entire Inteligence Communily (including, of course, the CIA) and the Department of Homeland Secury wil be fundamental to the ‘success ofthis vita reform. We applaud the President's announcament of tho ‘establishment ofa new Terrorist Treat Integration Centor. which we understand will be located under the Director of Central ineligence. The important challenge, we believe, 1s to assure the ful and harmonious implementation of both the information fusion requirement ofthe Homeland Securty Act and the center thatthe President announced. ‘The recommendations inctude als of significant reforms tha the Intligence Committees beliave are essential for strengthening the FBI's domestic inteligence ‘capabilty. In regars to these critically needed reforms, the Joint Inquiry has. ‘recommended that Congress should droct thet the head ofthe Intaligance Community, together wit the Atfomey General and the Secretary of Homeland Securily, should ‘eport to Congress on the FBI's progress. The report should include “the specific ‘manner in which a new domestic inteligence service could be estabished in the United ‘The Honorable George J. Tenet January 28, 2003 Page 3 ‘States, recognizing the need to enhance national securty while fully protecting civil Teries” ‘The Committees expressed their strong conviction that “the nteligence ‘Community's employees remain ts greatest resource.” They recommend that the head ofthe inteligence Community “shauid requle that measures be Implemented to greatly ‘enhance the recrltment and development of a workforce wih the inteligence skis and ‘expertise needed for succass in counterertotst efor" Several pariculer actions are set forth in the recommendation. One is that iteligence Community agencies should ‘expand and improve counterterarism taining, incuding about information sharing ‘among law enforcement and inteligance personnel, the use of he Foreign Inteligance Surveliance Act, and waichlsting. The recommendation includes steps to improve Inteligence Community language capablities and the ullization of the skils and ‘experionca of rtrd personnel. Itcals on the ntligence Community to “enhance recrutment of @ more ethnically and culturally verse workforce.” ‘A further personnel recommendation proposes, in par, that Congress enact legislation, modsied on the landmark Goldwaler-Nichols Department of Defense Reorganization Act of 1986, to help instil the concept of ointness” throughout the Inteligence Community and ensure that its components wil work more closely together ‘han has been the case. ‘The mechanisms identified inthe resormendation inckide ‘such things as joint tours for intelligence and iaw enforcement personnel as wel as incentives for joint service throughout the Intefigence Community. in developing these. ‘ideas, Congress would benefit from the Administration's deailad proposals. “The Joint Inquiry identifed several important objectives conceming classified information, including expanding access by federal agencies outside the Inteigence ‘Community, by state and local aulhories, and by the American public. To this end, we recommended thatthe Director of Cental intaligence, in consutaton withthe heads of key components of te ineligence Communty, including the Atoey General, should ‘oport tothe Intligence Commities on “proposals for & new and more realise ‘approach to the processes and structures that have governed the designation of ‘Sensitive and classified information.” The report should also address “proposals to protect agains! the use ofthe classification process as a shield to protect agency self Interest” ‘The Congress and the Nation as a whole will be grateful for your attention and ‘response to these and other matters dentfied Inthe course ofthe Joint Ingulry, Further, we are confident that the Congress wal benefit fom other recommendations ‘The Honorable George J. Tenet January 28, 2003 Page ‘thet you might have for legislative or administrative action to improve the Nation's ‘counterterorist eapabilies. ‘Chairman, Senate Inteligence ‘Chairman, House Inteligence ‘Commitee, 107" Congrass ‘Commitse, 107° and 108" ‘Congresses Richard Shelby / Nancy Pelos! { Vico Chairman, Senate Inaligente Ranking Minority Member, House ‘Commitee, 107" Congress inlefigence Commitee, 107" Congress and Member ex office (as Minority Leader), 108 Congress Enclosure: As stated re Lo Co RES, 20SessiON HH, Rt. No, 107. JOINT INQUIRY INTO INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY ACTIVITIES BEFORE AND AFTER THE TERRORIST ATTACKS OF SEPTEMBER 11, 2001 REPORT oF THE US. SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE ON ELLIGENCE AND U.S. HOUSE PERMANENT SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE WITH ADDITIONAL VIEWS DECEMBER 2002 PART FOUR—FINDING, DISCUSSION AND NARRATIVE REGARDING CERTAIN SENSITIVE NATIONAL SECURITY MATTERS 20. Biuding contact with, aud received support ur assistance from, incviduals whe may be covaected to ‘White ia the United States, some of the September 11 hijackers were ia the Sauuti Government. There is information, primarily from FBI sources, that at last two of those individuals were alle rn by some ta be Suud! intelligence officers. The Joint uiry’s review confirmed that the Intelligence Community also has Information, much of ‘whieh bas yet to be independently verified, indicating that incividuals associated with te ‘Saudi Government in the United States may have other testo alsQavlta aad other terrorist groups. ‘The FU and CIA bave jaformed the Joint Laqutry that, stuce the September 11 attacks, they are treating the Saudi issue seriously, but both still have only a limited anderstand 2 ofthe Saudi Governments testo terrorist elements. In their testimony, either CIA wor FBI witnesses were able to ideutfy defialtively the extent of Saud support {or tervorist atvity globally or within the United States and he extent to which such Chewct ss 1 SS ES ar test n par ue othe Jolt Ingly's focus on sis, he PHT and CLA estab 13S tiene coverages unncepabe, ven the git nd immediacy ote potent isk to US, uatiogalseceriy, The neligene Comunity eds to address tht area of coucern as aggressively and as quickly ae possible Discussion: One reator forthe limited underanding that it was only 8 11 that he US, Government nto agpessvely i tigate his seu 119, he FB apparcaly did not fous investigalve resources cn i MMII 215 tions is te United Sates due to Sua Arabia's sats a en A fay” Apreseaive of te Prior to —— SS ——_—_—_ as ore September 11,2001, the FBI received “no reporting fom: any member of the tateligence Community” that thre as 2 presence inthe Unite Stats According to vanous FBI documents and at least oxe CIA memorandum, some ofthe September 11 hijackers, while inthe United States spparetly had contcts with individuals who may be connected tothe Saudi Government. While the Joint inquiry uncovered his material ring the course ofits review of FBI and C1A documents, it id not attempt to investigate aud sssess the accuracy and significance of this information independently, recognizing that such a {ask would be beyond the scope of ths Joint Inguty. Instead, the Jon nqusryrelerred. a 003 ic Abe ubasea'e poccersione; and + According to an FBI agent in Phoent, the FBI suspects Mohsmumed al-Qudhacein of 3 Wee light, whic the PI's Phoenix alice now suspects may have been a ein was involved in s 1999 incident aboard “iry rm to test asline seatity. using the fight, al-Quétsesin and his associate asked the Might attendants « variety of suspicious questions; a-Qudhacsin thea attempted to the cockpit on two ocestions. Al-Quihacein and bis asociate were ying 0 \Washingion, D.C. to atten a party atthe Saudi Embassy aud both claimed tha heir ticigets wore paid forby the Saudi Embusry. During the comte of is investigation FThas discovered thet both a-Quibacein and the ots the dividual involved in thie incident had connections to teers Finally, the Committees are parculary enneerned abou the serious norare of allegations contined ins CLA memorandum foand by the Joint inquiry Staffn te files ofthe FOI's Sam Dingo Field Office That memorandum, which discuss alleged Snearial connections besween the September 11 hijackers, Sandi Goverament offices, and members ofthe Siudi Royst Fomily, wes drofted by 2 C14 ce Ec! information from FBI las. The CLA officer tent to the CTC 10 determine whether CIA bad pomarily ditional information. He alse provided 2 copy tothe FBI agent responsible forthe investigation of one ofthe individuals dicusoud in the memorandum, Despite the ienplcations of te CIA memorandum, the FBI agent inchuded the memoranéusn in an individual jt case fle ad didnot forward itte FBI Headguarters. a9 rere os in the memorandum until the Joint Inquiry brought the memorandums of etatere Posse Sa i Government Connections to Terrorists and Terrorist Groups Walle in the United States, sme of the Septenber 11 jackere weve in contact with, and cosived supporto assistance from, individuals who may be connect tothe Saud Govesument. Theres catia, fo toast wo of thao lividus were allege vo be Sat lgence officers. The Joint nguiry” red thst the Leuelligence Community also has information, such of whieh remains speculative and yet to be independently verified, indicating that Saudi Government o United States may nave ther ties to el-Qa’id and other terorstproups. ‘The Commitees are particularly concemed about the ations conained in a CTA memorandum found within “That memorandum, which discusses alleged financial cormections between the September 11 Iajackers, Saudi Government ufcisle, and membere of the Saudi Roysl Family, was dafled by CA ofc: IAI, civ primarily on information from FBI fies. In their est before the Joint Iguity, nether the CUA nor the FRI was able to tively identify for Wiese Committees the extent of Saud support for terorist activity sloball or within the United Stater and the extent to whieh such suppor, fit exit, fs Intentional o innocent in nature, Bott the FBI and CIA have indicated to the Commitee that ‘hey are now aggressively pursuing Saudi ated terorit iates net Seponbar 1 he FB appara did ot os inesigatl a the United States due to Soudi Arabia's statue as an American“: " ——— ete oes I i ct beatings that, peor to Seplember 11°, the FBI received "no reporting from any member ofthe (MMMM sco i the United Sits Tncellignce Cosnmunity” thatthe ‘shouldbe clear that this Joa Inquiry has made no final detenniuations a 0 the ‘libilry or sufficiency ofthe information eganding thes: issues that send CLA document foun contained in PB Iwas uot tack of his Joint Inquiry to conduct the kind of extensive investigation that would be required to det mined the tras significance of eny such alleged connections tothe Saudi Goverament. On the one tnd, it possible that these kinds of connections could suggest 2 indicates is

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