Beruflich Dokumente
Kultur Dokumente
Fogu, Claudio, 1963South Central Review, Volume 23, Number 1, Spring 2006, pp. 4-22 (Article)
OVER THE PAST TWO DECADES, a multidisciplinary cohort of American scholars comprising historians, art historians, and literary critics as well as
anthropologists and sociologists have probed into the previously unexplored complexities of the cultural practices developed under and/or
supported by the Italian-Fascist regime.1 It might be too early to assess
if the contributions of this trendwhich has also coincided with a wider
and still ongoing cultural turn in historiography and historical consciousness at largeare of a paradigmatic sort, but one thing can be affirmed
already with relative certainty. Rather than adding to existing knowledge, the focus on culture in the historiography of fascism has tended to
challenge the socio-political frameworks of interpretation traditionally
connected with liberal and Marxist historiography in two fundamental
ways.
First, the study of the cultural-intellectual origins of fascist ideology
has highlighted its dynamic appropriation and syncretic combination of
ideas widespread in fin-de-sicle European culture. From the studies of
Zeev Sternhell, Walter Adamson, and Emilio Gentile we have learnt
that the crisis of liberalism was quintessentially cultural, and that the
new politics of fascism dipped their roots in the multifaceted fabric of
a modernist cultural front that had denounced the moralistic and optimistic view of evolutionary modernization associated with the consolidation of (liberal-capitalist) bourgeois culture in the second half of the
nineteenth century.2 Denouncing the Victorian synthesis of political,
artistic and scientific realism as insufficient to either describe or control
a modernity that was experienced as inherently a-historical, revolutionary, ambiguous and ambivalent, the intellectual-artistic front that we
have come to call modernist can be identified with a search for a way to
re-articulate the relationship between the secular and the sacred (religious, spiritual, mystical) before the metaphoric Death of God, first,
and the very real death of nearly a whole generation of European men in
the Great War. The intellectual history of fascist ideology has thus revealed that its illiberal content was much more complex and articulated
than the political rejection of democracy.3 For fascism, liberalism had
come to stand for a de-valued form of materialist politics, that is, a poli South Central Review 23.1 (Spring 2006): 422.
tics that had been encroached by the law of exchange value, and was
confronted by the revolutionary threat of Communist materialism, which
sought the destruction of exchange value, but in the name of the same
economic laws. Saying it with Marx and Nietzsche at the same time,
capitalism had already melted all values into air, replacing them all with
an injunction to materialist consumption, and cultural transvaluation
could thus be achieved only by re-infusing politics with the
suprahistorical aura of the sacred and the aesthetic. Therefore, the barrage of myths, symbols, mass-rituals and images in which fascist political culture expressed itself was therefore neither superstructural nor
merely propagandist. Rather, it was aimed at exploiting the ambiguities
of modernity to produce a collective consciousness structured around
the rhetorical logic of analogies, oxymorons and paradoxes.4 Hence the
second direction of research that has further challenged both liberal and
Marxist frameworks of interpretation.
The thick description of fascist forms of modernism and their relationship to the creation of a mass culture opposed and alternative to the
consumer culture developed in the liberal-capitalist world has occupied
the historiographical center stage of studies of fascism in recent years.
Virtually every aspect of the ritual and image-politics implemented by
the regime, and the contribution that artists and intellectuals gave to
their institutionalization has been closely explored. The result of this
composite exploration has been the marginalization of the twin concepts of totalitarianism and propaganda, with which an earlier generation of scholars had successfully excluded the study of fascist culture
from the realm of legitimate concerns. If the theory of totalitarianism
had been devised so as to make the Fascist, Nazi and Soviet regimes
comparable, this had been possible only by highlighting disproportionately their common negative denominator, anti-individualism, and
downplaying the immense cultural differences among the utopias they
projected and sought to realize. The new focus on the cultural peculiarities of each regime had de facto redefined the very notion of totalitarianism as a term used by the actors themselves to legitimize very different goals and practices.5
Similarly, the tendency of cultural historians to identify fascist values and provide close readings of the symbolic, visual and ritual means
to institutionalize them, has de facto valorized these practices as constitutive of the fascist phenomenon rather than epiphenomenal, thereby
putting an end to the habit of grouping all non-political and non-social
facts under the dismissive and eminently anti-analytical concept of propaganda. As a result, study after study have highlighted key differences
by contrary instincts and political goals, the left-wing Bataille and the
right-wing Blanchot succumbed to the seduction of fascism precisely
because Nietzsches thought constituted the key point of conjunction
between them and Mussolinis own elaboration of fascism.13
This is not the place to assess in detail the charges and arguments that
Wolin has brought against the moment of French theory in the American academy. As anticipated above, my concern here is with the implicit challenge that Wolins argument has brought to the marriage that
some scholars have celebrated between French theory and the study of
fascist culture. What more fitting confirmation of the arguments that
Jay and Wolin have brought against the political unconscious of French
theory, than a new historiography of fascism that succumbs to the seduction of unreason and the anti-ocularcentrism of the Counter-Enlightenment project? How can scholars of fascist cultureincluding the one
who writesmaintain any distance before their object of study, when
the theoretical tools they employ in their analysis, derive themselves
from a line of thought that first did not maintain that distance before the
event itself, and later conveniently forgot to openly admit to its compromises? There is, of course, a way to avoid answering these questions
directly with some combination of sophism and polemicism, but it seems
to me that the time has come for all involved to enter in a more productive dialogue.14
My answer to the first question is a qualified yes. Seen from the narrative perspective constructed by Wolin, the embrace of so-called French
theory by some scholars of fascist cultureincluding the author of this
essaydoes partake in a line of thinking that does not identify itself
with the project of the Enlightenment, and might more readily claim a
new historicist ethos and a presentist desire to make history intelligible
derived from the lesson of the Annales.15 To the first belongs the close
attention paid by cultural historians of fascism to the theoretical insights
of engaged observers such as Walter Benjamin, Antonio Gramsci and
George Bataille, who elaborated the most powerful paradigms of interpretation for exploring not only the appeal that fascism exercised on the
Italian masses, but also the enthusiasm that it generated among so many
intellectuals and artists in Italy and abroad. That most studies of fascist
culture refer themselves either to the fascist sacralization of politics theorized by Bataille, or their aestheticization, as Benjamin puts it, or the
fascist exercise of hegemony analyzed by Gramsci in his celebrated
notebooks, is part and parcel of a solid interdisciplinary dialogue that
does not lack internal debate, of course, and even heated polemics, but
is united in the new historicist premise that the best tools of cultural
analysis and intellectual classification are the ones emerging from and
around the subject itself. By the same token, the appeal of semiotics,
discourse theory, psychoanalysis and even deconstruction as theoretical
languages offering further conceptual tools for analyzing specific cultural practices, is all the more understandable given their intellectual
tieshighlighted by Wolinto more or less seduced theorists that in
the 1930s began considering fascism precisely under the aspect of its
mass-cultural appeal. In fact, although missing from Wolins account
and the close scrutiny of most intellectual historians, even the highly
respected figure of Communist antifascist Antonio Gramsci was not
exempted from collusion with the intellectual roots of fascism. Gramscis
unique attention among Marxist theorists of his generation to the role of
intellectuals in society, and his subsequent theorization of hegemony
came principally from the revisionist reading of Marxism authored by
fascisms prime philosopher, Giovanni Gentile, in his youth.16
So, if by being part of the project of the Enlightenment is meant that
one should renounce a historicist attitude that privileges the language of
history over that of abstract ideas and the role of cultural theory and
criticism in guiding research agendas and offering tools of analysis to
make the past relevant to the understanding of the present, unless impeccable liberal credentials are offered, then, yes, I fear that most scholars of fascist culture would not pass the test. The qualification, however, is that seen from this new historicist perspective Wolins idea of a
unified and self-contained project of the Enlightenment, universal and
identical to itself in time, is just that, a contemporary idea, or more
precisely a de-historicized narrative fiction that draws its rhetorical
strength from the essentialist ideasdemocracy, tolerance, and reason
attributed by its author to its subject-agent (the Enlightenment). One
does not need to read Foucault to ascertain that despite the self-conscious cosmopolitanism and universalism embodied by several 18th-century intellectuals, there were as many Enlightenments and definitions
of its project as there were philosophes in France, and the conditions of
formulation and realization of their ideas were historically situated like
any other before them.17 And even if such a unified project had existed,
where is the evidence that it remained identical to itself in the long time
between its supposed origin in the mid 18 th -century and its
conceptualization qua project in self-defined liberal historiography?
What about its confrontation with the rise of industrialization, the working class movement, imperialism, the Great War?
I dont doubt that a qualified answer to these questions can be provided by Wolins self-defined liberal historians, but my purpose in re-
10
11
12
Gentile was a prominent member of the intellectual generation entering the Italian cultural scene between 1900 and 1914, whose modernist
project Adamson has aptly defined as a cultural regeneration through
the secular-religious quest for new values.19 According to Adamsons
study, at the religious end of the modernist spectrum we would encounter the vociania group of Florentine intellectuals lead by Giovanni
Papini and Giuseppe Prezzoliniwhile at the secular end we would
meet Marinettis futurists. Gentile was squarely situated in the middle
of the spectrum. The new philosophical dogma actualism affirmed was
the concept of autoctisi, a neologism which appeared for the first time
in the founding document of actualism, Latto del pensare come atto
puro (1912).20 On the idealist-secular side, autoctisi meant that every
action was an act of thought and every act of thought was pure because
it was an act of spiritual self-consciousness. But on Gentiles Catholicreligious side, autoctisi was fundamentally related to the affirmation of
only one version of the Christian God: the God of Creation. It meant
self-creation, and it summarized in one concept Gentiles claim to have
definitively emancipated Christianity from both Greek philosophy and
the Protestant Reformation.
For Gentile, with the invention of a single Godboth creator and
incarnated in the man-God ChristChristianity had initially rejected
Platonic transcendentalism, only to readmit it later through the back
door with the concepts of grace and supernatural revelation. These concepts Gentile saw as the basis of Protestantism. Rejecting instead all
supernatural and mythological aspects of Christianity, actualism literally resolved the Catholic Trinity into a single self-creating Spirit, replacing the Holy attribute with the fundamental character of divinity:
creation. Gentiles combined reform of Hegelian dialectics and Catholicism thus coincided in the personalization of the Creative God-Act. The
Holy Trinity and the triadic movement of dialectics were unified in the
eternal movement of the self-creative act: the subject-Thought poses
itself before an object (of thought/action), which in the interactive process of thinking-writing-reading it overcomes and perceives as belonging to itself as subject. For Gentile, then, the act of subjectification was
a circular dynamic between thought and action that took the subject to
another level. In this respect, actualism may be best understood as a
modernist philosophy of catastrophe in the ancient affirmative sense of
the Greek verb katastrpho which meant to unify at a higher level. As
Del Noce has aptly suggested, actualism proposed a syntactical catastrophe of Catholic religion and idealist philosophy, which may be summarized as switching the declination of God from the third to the first
13
14
15
tear down the old divide between interventionists and neutralists. But
the central appeal of Gentiles positionand the related fame he acquired between Caporetto and the end of the conflict as the philosopher of the warcontinued to reside in its simultaneous articulation
and exorcism of a war imaginary rotating around the figure of the internal enemy.28 The near-death of the motherland was, for Gentile, the birth
of the Immanent State. The defeat of Caporetto was only the defeat of
the Catholic harbored in every Italian soul. The resistance and the struggle
for a final victory were the sure signs of a mature collective Italian
personality that had finally begun to interiorize the state.29 No wonder,
then, that in Politica e filosofia, the last article Gentile published before
the official end of the war, the philosopher would come to celebrate the
Italian victory as the coronation of this process as well as the occasion
for reformulating his entire philosophical system from the perspective
of the interiorized state.
Essentially, Politica e filosofia proposed that actualism had surpassed
its idealist precursors because it had not only dissolved the fundamental
dichotomy they had maintained between history and philosophy but, in
so doing, also allowed the resolution of philosophy into politics. As a
philosophical history (of philosophy), actualism had acknowledged the
Italian Risorgimentothe process of national unification between 1848
and 1860as the historical realization of philosophical modernity. For
Gentile, Italian patriot-thinkers had overcome the Renaissance dichotomy
between spirit and nature by means of the very idea of a concrete Italy
[ . . . ] which had become an active idea, producing itself its own realization. As a historical philosophy (of history), however, actualism had
also recognized that the conscious unification of politics and philosophy had not taken place in the Risorgimento but in the contemporaneous development of Marxs philosophy of praxis. Historical materialism had incited the proletariat to unify on the basis of a correct
understanding of human action as the unity of will, ends, and program for the dissolution of the state. For Gentile, the historical importance of Marxs philosophy of history rested on its having become the
critical consciousness of the communist movement that refers itself to
Marx. The crucial goal of actualism, therefore, was nothing short of
unveiling the implicit philosophy of Risorgimento politicians within
a counter-Marxist philosophy of history.30
This task Gentile took up in the central section of Politica e filosofia
where he elaborated the reciprocal immanence of philosophy and history with unusual clarity, but also in an unprecedented direction. For
the first time, Gentile presented their identity as the consequence of a
16
Quite predictably, the concept of history belonging to the past coincided, for Gentile, with the positivist conception of the historical fact
determined in past-time and past-space and it corresponded to our representation of ourselves to ourselves beyond the heat of passion and
action, since the fact is given as accomplished. From the perspective
of positivism, history (the transcendental whole) ended up being identified with the nature of naturalism, an irretrievable past that does not
depend on us, but conditions us. The historicity of history, Gentile
instead proposed, is intelligible only if we orient ourselves toward the
opposite concept of history belonging to the present: that is, history that
is all present and immanent in the act of its construction.32 This was the
mental reorientation that actualism had labored to induce philosophically and that now, in 1918, Gentile believed had been historically realized on the Italian war front.
Quite literally Gentile read the Italian victory in the Great War as the
historical sign of a collective reorientation of the historical imagination
toward history belonging to the present. In the first place this victory
was the result of a successful reaction of the Italian war front to the
double event that had come to endanger not only the Italian war-effort
but also his whole philosophical enterprise in October 1917: the Bolshevik Revolution and the defeat of the Italian army at Caporetto. By
all accounts, the prolonged retreat that followed the defeat of Caporetto
had produced a collective shock of unprecedented proportions throughout the Italian military war front, but its effects on the intellectual war
front had been equally momentous.33 According to Gentile, the political
success of the October Revolution had interacted with the contemporaneous psychological trauma suffered by all Italians over the military
defeat of Caporetto, thereby feeding the specter of an internal enemy
undetected by other commentators. The traumatic defeat of the Italian
army at Caporetto had temporarily helped to transform the victory of
the Bolshevik Revolution into a new historical sign of transcendental
history. After Caporetto, then, the internal enemy that the Italians had
17
18
19
20
ology in France, trans. David Maisel (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1986);
and, by the author of this article, The Historic Imaginary. Politics of History in Fascist
Italy (University of Toronto Press: Toronto, 2003).
2. See note 1 above.
3. In fact, on merely political grounds fascism would have stood in good company with most nineteenth-century liberals, since it was not until after the Great War
that liberal culture at large would identify itself with democracy.
4. Jeffrey Schnapp, Epic Demonstrations: Fascist Modernity and the 1932 Exhibition of the Fascist Revolution, in Richard Golsan, ed., Fascism, Aesthetics, and
Culture (Hanover, N.H.: University Press of New England, 1992), 132.
5. See for example Gentiles definition of totalitarianism as a vicious cultural
cycle between symbol and ritual, in The Sacralization of Politics, 63.
6. See for example Ruth Ben-Ghiats study of the fascist origins of Neorealism
in Fascist Modernities.
7. Naturally not all scholars of fascist culture either openly endorse the linguistic
turn or are particularly keen to use theory in their approach. Ruth Ben Ghiat, Walter
Adamson and Marla Stone would probably object to the characterization I am proposing here. And yet in all three cases theoretical tools like Pierre Bourdieus theory of the
cultural field (Adamson), Jean Budrillards theory of simulacra (Stone), and Walter
Benjamins theory of aestheticization (Ben-Ghiat) were invoked and used even by
these historians.
8. This textualization of context of course has been enacted with more or less
explicit intention and self-reflexivity by different scholars, but it is nonetheless typical
of a cultural historiography that has differentiated itself from earlier modes.
9. See Sylvre Lotringer and S. Cohen, eds., French Theory in America (New
York: Routledge, 2001).
10. The other most noticeable contributor is Martin Jay with Downcast Eyes: The
Denigration of Vision in Twentieth-Century French Thought (Berkeley: University of
California Press, 1993).
11. Richard Wolin, ed., The Heidegger Controversy. A Critical Reader (New York:
Columbia University Press, 1993).
12. Richard Wolin, The Politics of Being: The Political Thought of Martin
Heidegger, 19271966 (New York: Columbia University Press, 1990).
13. Richard Wolin, The Seduction of Unreason. The Intellectual Romance with
Fascism from Nietzsche to Postmodernism (Princeton: Princeton University Press,
2004), especially 5961.
14. Let me just raise incidentally in note a polemical question addressed to the
implications of Wolins methodology: given the premises of Wolins indictment of
thinkers who more or less explicitly flirted with Fascism, what should we do with
thinkers we find standing on the conservative-nationalist side of the political fence
while also identifying themselves with the project of the enlightenment? What for
example of Comtes support for the creation of a Church of positive science? Or Herbert
Spencers attribution of the 1844 famine to the excessive production of sperm among
Irish Catholics? Or Max Webers virulent nationalism during the Great War?
15. Catherine Gallagher and Stephen Greenblatt, Practicing New Historicism (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2000); and on the importance of the present in
historical research, see the still unsurpassed Marc Bloch, The Historians Craft (New
York: Vintage Books, 1953).
21
16. See Peter Ives, Gramscis Politics of Language: Engaging the Bakhtin Circle
and the Frankfurt School (Toronto: Toronto University Press, 2004).
17. See Keith Baker, Whats Left of Enlightenment? A Postmodern Question
(Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2001).
18. See note 11.
19. Walter Adamson, Modernism and Fascism: The Politics of Culture in Italy,
19031922, American Historical Review 95 (1990): 360.
20. Giovanni Gentile, Latto del pensare come atto puro, Annuario della
biblioteca filosofica di Palermo I (1912): 2742; now in Giovanni Gentile. Opere complete, 310321.
21. Augusto Del Noce, Giovanni Gentile. Per una interpretazione filosofica della
storia contemporanea (Bologna, 1990), 268.
22. Antonio Gramsci, Quaderni del carcere. 193435, vol. III, 2038. For a discussion of futurisms anti-representational syntax see Andrew Hewitt, Fascist Modernism.
23. On the delicate question of the relationship among Croce, Gentile, and the
modernist cultural front illustrated by Adamson, I do not agree with the authors recent
inclusion of Croce in the first generation of the Italian modernist avant-garde.
Adamson, Modernism and Fascism, 368; compare to Benedetto Croce and the Death
of Ideology, The Journal of Modern History 55, n. 2 (June 1983): 208236, where
Adamson mentions neither the term avant-garde nor modernism.
24. During the war Gentile published sixty-four articles in prominent national newspapers, and political journals, which he later collected in two volumes: Guerra e fede
(1918), and Dopo la vittoria (1919).
25. The articles were published in Il Resto del Carlino, Corriere Toscano, Giornale
dItalia, Rassegna Italiana, Politica, Il Messaggero della Domenica, LIdea Nazionale,
Volont, Il Nuovo Giornale, and collected in 1919 in the popular volume Guerra e
fede. Frammenti politici (Naples, 1919). All Quotations are from the new edition of
Guerra e fede in Giovanni Gentile. Opere varie, vol. XVIII (Florence, 1989)
26. Walter Adamson, The Language of Opposition in Early Twentieth-Century
Italy: Rhetorical Continuities between Prewar Florentine Avant-gardism and Mussolinis
Fascism, Journal of Modern History 64 (March 1992): 2251.
27. Adamson, The Language of Opposition in Early Twentieth-Century Italy:
Rhetorical Continuities between Prewar Florentine Avant-gardism and Mussolinis
Fascism, pp. 136, 141, 143, 142, 132, 122.
28. Gentile published his first public statement on the incumbent European war as
a pamphlet entitled La filosofia della guerra (Palermo, 1914).
29. Gentile, La filosofia della guerra 102, and 110.
30. Gentile, La filosofia della Guerra, pp. 150, 156, 157, 157.
31. Gentile, Politica e filosofia, 145, my emphasis.
32. Gentile, Politica e filosofia, 148, my emphasis.
33. Giovanna Procacci, Aspetti della mentalit collettiva durante la guerra. LItalia
dopo Caporetto, in La Grande Guerra. Esperienza, memoria, immagini, edited by
Dino Leoni and Camillo Zadra (Bologna: Il Mulino, 1986), 261289.
34. Leninism, Gentile argued in a related article, was unrealistic because it negated the political substance common to all individuals, groups and social classes,
just as much as Kantian liberalism had become obsolete because it had maintained a
distinction between moral and political action. Gentile, Lenin, in Guerra e fede,
441442.
22