1

Powell v. Texas
Brief Fact Summary. The Defendant, Leroy Powell (Defendant), was arrested for violating a
Texas statute making it a crime to be drunk in a public place. At trial, he raised the defense
that he was afflicted with the disease of chronic alcoholism, and therefore, his public
drunkenness was not of his own volition. The trial judge ruled that this is not a defense to
the statute.
Synopsis of Rule of Law. Punishing a chronic alcoholic for the offense of being drunk in
public does not violate Eighth Amendment of the United States Constitutions (Constitution)
prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment.

Facts. The Defendant was arrested and charged with being in a state of intoxication in public
in violation of Texas law. The Defendant cited as a defense that he was a chronic alcoholic
and he could not control his behavior. The trial judge, sitting without a jury rejected this
defense. At trial, the only expert witness to testify was that of the Defendant, who stated that
the Defendant is a chronic alcoholic, meaning he has an uncontrollable compulsion to drink.
Issue. Is punishing a chronic alcoholic for violating a statute forbidding a defendant from
being intoxicated in public cruel and unusual punishment prohibited by the Eighth
Amendment of the Constitution?
Held. No. The Eighth Amendment prohibits the infliction of cruel and unusual punishment. In
the case of Robinson v. California, the United States Supreme Court (Supreme Court) held
that a statute making it a criminal offense to be addicted to the use of narcotics was in
violation of the Eighth Amendment and therefore unconstitutional. The Supreme Courts
reasoning was that the statute criminalized an illness. No specific act needed to have been
committed in the State of California. Rather, a person ran afoul of the law for simply existing
with the status of being addicted to narcotics. By contrast, the Texas statute here
specifically prohibits public intoxication. It, however, does not make the disease itself, i.e.
chronic alcoholism, illegal. In this respect, unlike the stricken California statute, ones
status is not considered illegal-anyone can commit the crime whether an alcoholic or notbut rather, the illegal act is allegedly uncontrollable due to the disease. In other wor
ds, chronic alcoholism seems more like an affirmative defense. Finding the Defendant not
guilty of violating this statute would render it foreseeable that this defense could be used to
defeat a multitude of offenses including DUI, assault, theft, or robbery.
Dissent. As in Robinson v. California, the Defendant was accused of being in a condition that
he had no capacity to change or avoid. Hence, the Eighth Amendment of the Constitution
forbids enforcement of the Texas statute.
Concurrence. In Robinson v. California, the statute did not criminalize a particular act, but
rather the status of being an addict. Here, the statute certainly criminalizes an act, i.e.
being intoxicated in public. Therefore, Robinson v. California does not apply.
The present case and Robinson v. California are the same and therefore, the Eighth
Amendment of the Constitution could bar prosecution under the Texas statute if the record
were adequately developed. As it were, though, the defense was insufficiently proven.

Discussion. Having a disease that makes a person unable to resist doing an act in violation
of a law does not render the law unconstitutional as cruel and unusual punishment.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-35748

December 14, 1931

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS, plaintiff-appellee,

vs.
ROMANA SILVESTRE and MARTIN ATIENZA, defendants-appellants.
Teofilo Mendoza for appellants.
Attorney-General Jaranilla for appellee.

VILLA-REAL, J.:
Martin Atienza and Romana Silvestre appeal to this court from the judgment of the Court of First
Instance of Bulacan convicting them upon the information of the crime of arson as follows: The
former as principal by direct participation, sentenced to fourteen years, eight months, and one day of
cadena temporal, in accordance with paragraph 2 of article 550, Penal Code; and the latter as
accomplice, sentenced to six years and one day of presidio mayor; and both are further sentenced
to the accessories of the law, and to pay each of the persons whose houses were destroyed by the
fire, jointly and severally, the amount set forth in the information, with costs.
Counsel appointed by the court to defend the accused- appellants de oficio, after delivering his
argument, prayed for the affirmance of the judgment with reference to the appellant Martin Atienza,
and makes the following assignments of error with reference to Romana Silvestre, to wit:
1. The lower court erred in convincing Romana Silvestre as accomplice of the crime charged
in the information.
2. Finally, the court erred in not acquitting said defendant from the information upon the
ground of insufficient evidence, or at the least, of reasonable doubt.
The following facts were proved at the hearing beyond a reasonable doubt:
Romana Silvestre, wife of Domingo Joaquin by her second marriage, cohabited with her
codefendant Martin Atienza from the month of March, 1930, in the barrio of Masocol, municipality of
Paombong, Province of Bulacan. On May 16, 1930, the complaining husband, Domingo Joaquin,
filed with the justice of the peace for that municipality, a sworn complaint for adultery, supported by
affidavits of Gerardo Cabigao and Castor de la Cruz (Exhibit B). On the same date, May 16, 1930,
the said accused were arrested on a warrant issued by said justice of the peace. On the 20th of the
month, they were released on bail, each giving a personal bond of P6,000. Pending the preliminary
investigation of the case, the two defendants begged the municipal president of Paombong,
Francisco Suerte Felipe, to speak to the complaint, Domingo Joaquin, urging him to withdraw the
complaint, the two accused binding themselves to discontinue cohabitation, and promising not to
live again in the barrio of Masocol; Martin Atienza voluntarily signed the promise (Exhibit A). The
municipal president transmitted the defendants' petition to the complaining husband, lending it his
support. Domingo Joaquin acceded to it, and on May 20, 1930, filed a motion for the dismissal of his
complaint. In consideration of this petition, the justice of the peace of Paombong dismissed the
adultery case commenced against the accused, and cancelled the bonds given by them, with the
costs against the complainant.

The accused then left the barrio of Masocol and went to live in that of Santo Nio, in the same
municipality of Paombong.
About November 20, 1930, the accused Romana Silvestre met her son by her former marriage,
Nicolas de la Cruz, in the barrio of Santo Nio, and under pretext of asking him for some nipa
leaves, followed him home to the village of Masocol, and remained there. The accused, Martin
Atienza, who had continued to cohabit with said Romana Silvestre, followed her and lived in the
home of Nicolas de la Cruz. On the night of November 25, 1930, while Nicolas de la Cruz and his
wife, Antonia de la Cruz, were gathered together with the appellants herein after supper, Martin
Atienza told said couple to take their furniture out of the house because he was going to set fire to it.
Upon being asked by Nicolas and Antonia why he wanted to set fire to the house, he answered that
that was the only way he could be revenged upon the people of Masocol who, he said, had
instigated the charge of adultery against him and his codefendant, Romana Silvestre. As Martin
Atienza was at that time armed with a pistol, no one dared say anything to him, not even Romana
Silvestre, who was about a meter away from her codefendant. Alarmed at what Martin Atienza had
said, the couple left the house at once to communicate with the barrio lieutenant, Buenaventura
Ania, as to what they had just heard Martin Atienza say; but they had hardly gone a hundred arms'
length when they heard cries of "Fire! Fire!" Turning back they saw their home in flames, and ran
back to it; but seeing that the fire had assumed considerable proportions, Antonia took refuge in the
schoolhouse with her 1 year old babe in her arms, while Nicolas went to the home of his parents-inlaw, took up the furniture he had deposited there, and carried it to the schoolhouse. The fire
destroyed about forty-eight houses. Tomas Santiago coming from the barrio artesian well, and
Tomas Gonzalez, teacher at the barrio school of Masocol, and Felipe Clemente, an old man 61
years of age, coming from their homes, to the house on fire, saw Martin Atienza going away from
the house where the fire started, and Romana Silvestre leaving it.lawphil.net
As stated in the beginning, counsel appointed by this court to defend the accused-appellant de
oficio, prays for the affirmance of the judgment appealed from with reference to defendant Martin
Atienza. The facts related heretofore, proved beyond a reasonable doubt at the hearing, justify this
petition of the de oficio counsel, and establish beyond a reasonable doubt said defendant's guilt of
arson as charged, as principal by direct participation.
With respect to the accused-appellant Romana Silvestre, the only evidence of record against her
are: That, being married, she lived adulterously with her codefendant Martin Atienza, a married man;
that both were denounced for adultery by Domingo Joaquin, Romana Silvestre's second husband;
that in view of the petition of the accused, who promised to discontinue their life together, and to
leave the barrio of Masocol, and through the good offices of the municipal president of Paombong,
the complaining husband asked for the dismissal of the complaint; that in pursuance of their
promise, both of the accused went to lived in the barrio of Santo Nio, in the same municipality; that
under pretext for some nipa leaves from her son by her former marriage, Nicolas de la Cruz, who
had gone to the barrio of Santo Nio, Romana Silvestre followed him to his house in the barrio of
Masocol on November 23, 1930, and remained there; that her codefendant, Martin Atienza followed
her, and stayed with his coaccused in the same house; that on the night of November 25, 1930, at
about 8 o'clock, while all were gathered together at home after supper, Martin Atienza expressed his
intention of burning the house as the only means of taking his revenge on the Masocol resident, who
had instigated Domingo Joaquin to file the complaint for adultery against them, which compelled
them to leave the barrio of Masocol; that Romana Silvestre listened to her codefendant's threat
without raising a protest, and did not give the alarm when the latter set fire to the house. Upon the
strength of these facts, the court below found her guilty of arson as accomplice.
Article 14 of the Penal Code, considered in connection with article 13, defines an accomplice to be
one who does not take a direct part in the commission of the act, who does not force or induce other
to commit it, nor cooperates in the commission of the act by another act without which it would not

have been accomplished, yet cooperates in the execution of the act by previous or simultaneous
actions.
Now then, which previous or simultaneous acts complicate Romana Silvestre in the crime of arson
committed by her codefendant Martin Atienza? Is it her silence when he told the spouses, Nicolas
de la Cruz and Antonia de la Cruz, to take away their furniture because he was going to set fire to
their house as the only means of revenging himself on the barrio residents, her passive presence
when Martin Atienza set fire to the house, where there is no evidence of conspiracy or cooperation,
and her failure to give the alarm when the house was already on fire?
The complicity which is penalized requires a certain degree of cooperation, whether moral, through
advice, encouragement, or agreement, or material, through external acts. In the case of the
accused-appellant Romana Silvestre, there is no evidence of moral or material cooperation, and
none of an agreement to commit the crime in question. Her mere presence and silence while they
are simultaneous acts, do not constitute cooperation, for it does not appear that they encouraged or
nerved Martin Atienza to commit the crime of arson; and as for her failure to give the alarm, that
being a subsequent act it does not make her liable as an accomplice.
The trial court found the accused-appellant Martin Atienza guilty of arson, defined and penalized in
article 550, paragraph 2, of the Penal Code, which reads as follows:
ART. 550. The penalty of cadena temporal shall be imposed upon:
xxx

xxx

xxx

2. Any person who shall set fire to any inhabited house or any building in which people are
accustomed to meet together, without knowing whether or not such building or house was
occupied at the time, or any freight train in motion, if the damage caused in such cases shall
exceed six thousand two hundred and fifty pesetas.
While the defendant indeed knew that besides himself and his codefendant, Romana Silvestre,
there was nobody in De la Cruz's house at the moment of setting fire to it, he cannot be convicted
merely arson less serious than what the trial court sentenced him for, inasmuch as that house was
the means of destroying the others, and he did not know whether these were occupied at the time or
not. If the greater seriousness of setting fire to an inhabited house, when the incendiary does not
know whether there are people in it at the time, depends upon the danger to which the inmates are
exposed, not less serious is the arson committed by setting fire to inhabited houses by means of
another inhabited house which the firebrand knew to be empty at the moment of committing the act,
if he did not know whether there were people or not in the others, inasmuch as the same danger
exists.
With the evidence produced at the trial, the accused-appellant Martin Atienza might have been
convicted of the crime of arson in the most serious degree provided for in article 549 of the Penal
Code, if the information had alleged that at the time of setting fire to the house, the defendant knew
that the other houses were occupied, taking into account that barrio residents are accustomed to
retire at the tolling of the bell for the souls in purgatory, i.e., at 8 o'clock at night.
For all the foregoing considerations, we are of the opinion and so hold, that: (1) Mere passive
presence at the scene of another's crime, mere silence and failure to give the alarm, without
evidence of agreement or conspiracy, do not constitute the cooperation required by article 14 of the
Penal Code for complicity in the commission of the crime witnessed passively, or with regard to
which one has kept silent; and (2) he who desiring to burn the houses in a barrio, without knowing
whether there are people in them or not, sets fire to one known to be vacant at the time, which

results in destroying the rest, commits the crime of arson, defined and penalized in article 550,
paragraph 2, Penal Code.
By virtue wherefore, the judgment appealed from is modified as follows: It is affirmed with reference
to the accused-appellant Martin Atienza, and reversed with reference to the accused-appellant
Romana Silvestre, who is hereby acquitted with
one-half of the costs de oficio. So ordered.

People vs. Silvestre and Atienza (Crim1)

People of the Philippine Islands, plaintiff-appellee, vs. Romana Silvestre and Martin Atienza,
defendants-appellants.

En Banc

Villareal, December 14, 1931

Topic: Elements of criminal liability (Art 3.) -- Physical element -- Act/Omission

Facts:

Romana Silvestre is the wife of Domingo Joaquin by his second marriage

Romana cohabited with codefendant Martin Atienza from March 1930 in Masocol,
Paombong, Bulacan

On May 16, 1930, Domingo filed with the justice of the peace for Paombong, Bulacan a
sworn complaint for adultery

After being arrested and released on bail, the two defendants begged the municipal president
of Paombong to speak to the complainant and urge him to withdraw the complaint

The two accused bound themselves to discontinue cohabitation and promised not to live
again in Masocol (Atienza signed the promise)

On May 20, 1930, Domingo Joaquin filed a motion for the dismissal of his complaint and the
justice of the peace dismissed the adultery case

The accused left Masocol and wen to live in Santo Nio, in Paombong

About November 20, 1930: Romana met her son by her former marriage, Nicolas de la Cruz,
in Santo Nio and followed him home to Masocol (under the pretext of asking him for some
nipa leaves)

Martin Atienza, who continued to cohabit with Romana, followed her and lived in the home of
Nicolas

On the night of November 25, 1930, while Nicolas, his wife Antonia, and the appellants were
gathered after supper, Martin told Nicolas and Antonia to take their furniture out of the house
because he was going to set fire to it

o He said that that was the only way he could be revenged upon the people of Masocol
who, he said, had instigated the charge of adultery against him and Romana
o Martin was armed with a pistol so no one dared say anything to him

Nicolas and Antonia went to ask for help but were too late

The fire destroyed about 48 houses

Witnesses saw Martin and Romana leaving the house on fire

The Court of First Instance of Bulacan convicted Martin and Romana of arson
o Martin was convicted as principal by direct participation (14 years, 8 months, and 1
day of cadena temporal)
o Romana was convicted as accomplice (6 years and 1 day of presidio mayor)

The court-appointed counsel for the accused-appellant prays for the affirmance of the CFI
decision with regard to Martin, but assigns errors with reference to Romana:
o The lower court erred in convicting Romana as acoomplice
o The court erred in not acquitting Romana upon ground of insufficient evidence, or at
least, of reasonable doubt

Issue:

Whether or not Romana can be convicted as accomplice

Holding:

No.

Ratio:

Art. 14 of the Penal Code, in connection with Art. 13 defines an accomplice to be one who
does not take a direct part in the commission of the act, who does not force or induce other
to commit it, nor cooperates in the commission of the act by another act without which it
would not have been accomplished, yet cooperates in the execution of the act by previous or
simultaneous actions.

In the case of Romana: there is no evidence of moral or material cooperation and none of an
agreement to commit the crime in question. Her mere presence and silence while they are
simultaneous acts, do not constitute cooperation, for it does not appear that they encouraged
or nerved Martin Atienza to commit the crime of arson; and as for her failure to give the
alarm, that being a subsequent act it does not make her liable as an accomplice.

Mere passive presence at the scene of another's crime, mere silence and failure to give the
alarm, without evidence of agreement or conspiracy, do not constitute the cooperation
required by Art. 14 of the Penal Code for complicity in the commission of the crime witnessed
passively, or with regard to which one has kept silent

Decision is affirmed with reference to Martin Atienza, reversed with reference to Romana Silvestre,
who is acquitted.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-32126 July 6, 1978
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
NEMESIO TALINGDAN, MAGELLAN TOBIAS, AUGUSTO BERRAS, PEDRO BIDES and
TERESA DOMOGMA, accused-appellants.

PER CURIAM:
Appeal from the conviction for the crime of murder and the sentence of life imprisonment, with
indemnity to the offended party, the heirs of the deceased Bernardo Bagabag, in the amount of
P12,000, rendered by the Court of First Instance of Abra in its Criminal Case No. 686, of all the
accused the namely, Nemesio Talingdan, Magellan Tobias, Augusta Berras, Pedro Bides and Teresa
Domogma, the last being the supposed wife of the deceased, who, because no certificate nor any
other proof of their marriage could be presented by the prosecution, could not be charged with
parricide.
Prior to the violent death of Bernardo Bagabag on the night of June 24, 1967, he and appellant
Teresa Domogma and their children, arrived together in their house at Sobosob, Salapadan, Abra,
some 100 meters distant from the municipal building of the place. For sometime, however, their
relationship had been strained and beset with troubles, for Teresa had deserted their family home a
couple of times and each time Bernardo took time out to look for her. On two (2) different occasions,
appellant Nemesis Talingdan had visited Teresa in their house while Bernardo was out at work, and
during those visits Teresa had made Corazon, their then 12-year old daughter living with them, go
down the house and leave them. Somehow, Bernardo had gotten wind that illicit relationship was
going on between Talingdan and Teresa, and during a quarrel between him and Teresa, he directly
charged the latter that should she get pregnant, the child would not be his. About a month or so
before Bernardo was killed, Teresa had again left their house and did not come back for a period of
more than three (3) weeks, and Bernardo came to know later that she and Talingdan were seen
together in the town of Tayum Abra during that time; then on Thursday night, just two (2) days before
he was gunned down, Bernardo and Teresa had a violent quarrel; Bernardo slapped Teresa several
times; the latter went down the house and sought the help of the police, and shortly thereafter,
accused Talingdan came to the vicinity of Bernardo's house and called him to come down; but
Bernardo ignored him, for accused Talingdan was a policeman at the time and was armed, so the
latter left the place, but not without warning Bernardo that someday he would kin him. Between
10:00 and 11:00 o'clock the following Friday morning, Bernardo's daughter, Corazon, who was then
in a creek to wash clothes saw her mother, Teresa, meeting with Talingdan and their co-appellants
Magellan Tobias, Augusto Berras and Pedro Bides in a small hut owned by Bernardo, some 300 to
400 meters away from the latter's house; as she approached them, she heard one of them say
"Could he elude a bullet"; and when accused Teresa Domogma noticed the presence of her
daughter, she shoved her away saying "You tell your father that we will kill him".
Shortly after the sun had set on the following day, a Saturday, June 24, 1967, while the same 12year old daughter of Bernardo was cooking food for supper in the kitchen of their house, she saw
her mother go down the house through the stairs and go to the yard where she again met with the
other appellants. As they were barely 3-4 meters from the place where the child was in the

"batalan", she heard them conversing in subdued tones, although she could not discern what they
were saying. She was able to recognize all of them through the light coming from the lamp in the
kitchen through the open "batalan" and she knows them well for they are all residents of Sobosob
and she used to see them almost everytime. She noted that the appellants had long guns at the
time. Their meeting did not last long, after about two (2) minutes Teresa came up the house and
proceeded to her room, while the other appellants went under an avocado tree nearby. As supper
was then ready, the child caged her parents to eat, Bernardo who was in the room adjoining the
kitchen did not heed his daughter's call to supper but continued working on a plow, while Teresa also
excused herself by saying she would first put her small baby to sleep. So Corazon ate supper alone,
and as soon as she was through she again called her parents to eat. This time, she informed her
father about the presence of persons downstairs, but Bernardo paid no heed to what she said. He
proceeded to the kitchen and sat himself on the floor near the door. Corazon stayed nearby
watching him. At that moment, he was suddenly fired upon from below the stairs of the "batalan".
The four accused then climbed the stairs of the "batalan" carrying their long guns and seeing that
Bernardo was still alive, Talingdan and Tobias fired at him again. Bides and Berras did not fire their
guns at that precise time, but when Corazon tried to call for help Bides warned her, saying "You call
for help and I will kill you", so she kept silent. The assailants then fled from the scene, going towards
the east.
The first to come to the aid of the family was Corazon's male teacher who lived nearby. Teresa came
out of her "silid" later; she pulled Corazon aside and questioned her, and when Corazon informed
her that she recognized the killers of her father to be her co-appellants herein, she warned her not to
reveal the matter to anyone, threatening to kill her if she ever did so. Still later on, other persons
arrived and helped fix and dress the lifeless body of the victim, Bernardo, autopsy on which was
performed in his own house by the Municipal Health Officer of the place on June 26, 1967, about 36
hours after death; burial took place on the same day. The victim's brother who came from Manila
arrived one day after the burial followed by their mother who came from La Paz, Abra where she
resides. Corazon, who had not earlier revealed the Identities of the killers of her father because she
was afraid of her own mother, was somehow able to reveal the circumstances surrounding his killing
to these immediate relatives of hers, and the sworn statement she thereafter executed on August 5,
1967 (Exh. B) finally led to the filing of the information for murder against the herein five (5)
appellants.
On the other hand, according to the evidence for the defense: Teresa prior to her marriage with
Bernardo, was a resident of the town of Manabo, Abra. She has a sister in Manila and two (2)
brothers in America who love her dearly, that is why said brothers of hers had been continuously and
regularly sending her monthly $100.00 in checks, starting from the time she was still single up to the
time of her husband's violent death on June 24, 1967, and thereafter. After their marriage, they
moved to and resided in her husband's place in Sallapadan, Abra, bringing with them three (3)
carabaos and two (2) horses, which Bernardo and she used in tilling a parcel of land in said place,
separate and distinct from the parcel of land worked on by Bernardo's parents and their other
children. She and Bernardo lived in their own house which was about 4-5 meters away from the
house of her parents-in-law. She loved Bernardo dearly, they never quarreled, and her husband
never maltreated her; although sometimes she had to talk to Bernardo when he quarrels with his
own mother who wanted that Bernardo's earnings be given to her, (the mother) which Bernardo
never did, and at those times, Bernardo would admonish Teresa "You leave me alone". Her in-laws
also hated her because her mother-in-law could not get the earnings of Bernardo for the support of
her other son, Juanito, in his schooling. On his part, Juanito also disliked her because she did not
give him any of the carpentry tools which her brothers in America were sending over to her. She
never left their conjugal home for any long period of time as charged by her mother-in-law, and if
she ever did leave the house to go to other places they were only during those times when she had
to go to Bangued to cash her dollar checks with the PNB branch there, and even on said trips, she
was sometimes accompanied by Bernardo, or if she had to go alone and leaves Sallapadan in the
morning, she rode in a weapons carrier along with merchants going to Bangued in the morning and

always rode back with them to Sallapadan in the afternoon of the same day because the weapons
carrier is owned by a resident of Sallapadan who waits for them. Teresa came to know Talingdan
only when the latter became a policeman in Sallapadan, as whenever any of the carabaos and
horses they brought from Manabo to Sallapadan got lost, she and Bernardo would go and report the
matter to the Mayor who would then refer the matter to his policemen, one of whom is Talingdan, so
that they may help locate the lost animals; Teresa knew Talingdan well because they are neighbors,
the latter's home being only about 250-300 meters away from theirs. But illicit relationship had never
existed between them.
Early in the evening of June 24, 1967, Teresa was in the kitchen of their house cooking their food for
supper. Two of the children, Corazon and Judit, were with her. Her husband, Bernardo, was then in
the adjoining room making a plow. He had to make the plow at that time of the night because at
daytime he worked as a carpenter in the convent. As soon as the food was ready, she and the
children moved over to the adjoining room where Bernardo was to call him for supper, and he then
proceeded to the kitchen to eat. Teresa and the two children were about to follow him to the kitchen
when suddenly they heard more than five (5) or six (6) successive gun shots coming from near their
"batalan". They were all so terrified that they immediately cried for help, albeit she did not know yet
at that precise time that her husband was shot, as she and the children were still in the other room
on their way to the kitchen, about three (3) meters away from Bernardo. But soon Teresa heard her
husband crying in pain, and as soon as she reached him, she took Bernardo into her arms. She did
not see the killers of her husband, as the night was then very dark and it was raining. Bernardo was
in her arms when the first group of people who responded to their cry for help arrived. Among them
were the chief of police, some members of the municipal council and appellant Tobias who even
advised Teresa not to carry the lifeless body of Bernardo to avoid abortion as she was then six (6)
months pregnant. The chief of police then conducted an investigation of the surroundings and he
found some empty shells and foot prints on the ground some meters away from the "batalan". He
also found some bullet holes on the southern walls of said "batalan" and on the nothern wallings of
the kitchen. Later, Teresa requested some persons to relay the information about the death of her
husband to her relatives in Manabo, Abra, and they in turn passed on the news to Bernardo's
mother and her family in La Paz, Abra, where they were then residing, as they have left their house
in Sallapadan about two (2) months previous after they lost the land they used to till there in a case
with the natives called Tingians. Two (2) PC soldiers arrived in the afternoon of June 26, 1967, and
after Bernardo's remains was autopsied and he was buried under their house, they conducted an
investigation, but she did not give them any information relative to the Identity of the persons who
shot her husband because she did not really see them. Her mother-in-law and a brother-in-law,
Juanita Bagabag, arrived later, the former from the town of La Paz, Abra, and the latter from Manila,
and after the usual nine (9) days mourning was over, they left Sallapadan, taking Teresa's children
under their custody. Teresa suspects that since her mother-in-law and her brother-in-law have axes
to grind against her and they have her daughter, Corazon, under their custody, they had forced the
said child to testify against her. She further declared that her late husband, Bernardo, had enemies
during his lifetime, as he had quarrels with some people over the land they work on.
Furthermore, the defense presented evidence to the effect that: Talingdan was not in Sallapadan at
the time of the killing of Bernardo on June 24, 1967; being a policeman of the place at the time, he
was one of the two (2) policemen who escorted and acted as bodyguard of the Mayor, when the
latter attended the cursillo in Bangued, all of them leaving Sallapadan on June 22 and returning
thereto four (4) days later on June 26, hence, he could not have anything to do with the said killing.
On the other hand, Tobias claimed to be in the house of one Mrs. Bayongan in Sallapadan on the
date of said killing, but he was one of the persons who was called upon by the chief of police of the
place to accompany him in answer to the call for help of the wife of the victim. The other two
appellants Bides and Berras also alleged that they were in the same house of Mrs. Bayongan on
that date; they are tillers of the land of said Mrs. Bayongan and had been staying in her house for a
long time. They were sleeping when the chief of police came that evening and asked Tobias, who
was then municipal secretary, to accompany him to the place of the shooting. They did not join

10

them, but continued sleeping. They never left the said house of Mrs. Bayongan, which is about 250300 meters away from the place of the killing, that evening of June 24, 1967.
After carefully weighing the foregoing conflicting evidence of the prosecution and defense, We have
no doubt in Our mind that in that fatal evening of June 24, 1967, appellants Nemesio Talingdan,
Magellan Tobias, Augusto Berras and Pedro Bides, all armed with long firearms and acting
inconspiracy with each other gunned down Bernardo as the latter was sitting by the supper table in
their house at Sobosob, Sallapadan, Abra. They were actually seen committing the offense by the
witness Corazon. She was the one who prepared the food and was watching her father nearby.
They were all known to her, for they were all residents of Sobosob and she used to see them often
before that night. Although only Talingdan and Tobias continued firing at her father after they had
climbed the stairs of the "batalan", it was Bides who threatened her that he would kill her if she
called for help. Berras did not fire any shot then. But even before the four appellants went up the
"batalan", they already fired shots from downstairs.
We also fully believe Corazon's testimony that two nights before, or on Thursday, June 22, 1967, the
deceased Bernardo and appellant Teresa had a violent quarrel during which he slapped her several
times. She went to seek the help of the police, and it was appellant Talingdan, a policeman of their
town, who went to the vicinity of their house and challenged her father to come down, but the latter
refused because the former was a policeman and was armed. And so, Talingdan left after shouting
to her father that "If I will find you someday, I will kill you."
We likewise accept as truthful, Corazon's declaration regarding the amorous relationship between
her mother and appellant Talingdan, as already related earlier above. So also her testimony that in
the morning following the quarrel between her father and her mother and the threat made by
Talingdan to the former, between 10:00 and 11:00 o'clock, she saw all the herein four male accusedappellants meeting with her mother in a small hut some 300 or 400 meters away from their house,
near where she was then washing clothes, and that on said occasion she overheard one of them
ask "Could (sic) he elude a bullet?", We have our doubts, however, as to whether or not her mother
did say to her in shoving her away upon seeing her approach, "You tell your father we will kill him." If
it were true that there was really such a message, it is to be wondered why she never relayed the
same to her father, specially when she again saw the said appellants on the very night in question
shortly before the shooting talking together in subdued tones with her mother and holding long arms.
Moreover, it is quite unnatural that such a warning could have been done in such a manner.
Accordingly, it is Our conclusion from the evidence related above and which We have carefully
reviewed that appellants Nemesio Talingdan, Magellan Tobias, Augusto Berras and Pedro Bides are
guilty of murder qualified by treachery, as charged, and that they committed the said offense in
conspiracy with each other, with evident premeditation and in the dwelling of the offended party. In
other words, two aggravating circumstances attended the commission of the offense, namely,
evident premeditation and that it was committed in the dwelling of the victim. No mitigating
circumstance has been proven.
Appellants insist in their brief that the lone testimony of Corazon suffered from vital contradictions
and inconsistencies and badges of falsehood because of patently unnatural circumstances alleged
by her. We do not agree. As the Solicitor General has well pointed out, the fact that the witness
varied on cross-examination the exact time of some of the occurrences she witnessed, such as, (1)
whether it was before or after Bernardo had began eating when he was shot; (2) whether it was
before or after seeing her mother's meeting with her co-accused in the morning of Friday, June 23,
1967, that she went to wash clothes; and (3) whether or not the accused were already upstairs or
still downstairs when they first fired their guns, cannot alter the veracity of her having seen
appellants in the act of mercilessly and cold-bloodedly shooting her father to death.

11

Contrary to the contention of appellants, there was nothing inherently unnatural in the circumstances
related by her. We agree with the following rebuttal of the Solicitor General:
Appellants also attempt to buttress their attack against the credibility of Corazon
Bagabag by pointing out five supposed unnatural declarations in her testimony; First,
she said that her father, appeared unconcerned when she informed him of the
presence of people downstairs. But as correctly observed by the prosecuting fiscal the
witness does not know then "the mentality of her father" (p. 62, t.s.n., hearing of March
29, 1968). Second, Corazon also declared that the accused conversed that Saturday
night preceding the day the crime charged was committed in a lighted place although
there was a place which was unlighted in the same premises. But this only proves that
the accused were too engrossed in their conversation, unmindful of whether the place
where they were talking was lighted or not, and unmindful even of the risk of
recognition. Third, witness declared that Pedro Bides and Augusto Berras did not fire
their guns. Even if these accused did withhold their fire, however, since they were
privies to the same criminal design, would this alter their culpability? Should the
witness Corazon Bagabag be discredited for merely stating an observation on her part
which is not inherently unnatural? Fourth, Corazon also declared that only three bullets
from the guns of the four male accused found their mark on the body of her father. But
would this not merely prove that not all the accused were good shots? And fifth, the
witness declared that her father was still able to talk after he was shot yet Dr. Jose
Dalisan declared that his death was instantaneous It is respectfully submitted,
however, that the doctor's opinion could yield to the positive testimony of Corazon
Bagabag in this regard without in the least affecting the findings of said doctor as
regards the cause of the death of the deceased. As thus viewed, there are no evident
badges of falsehood in the whole breadth and length of Corazon Bagabag's testimony.
(Pp. 9-10, People's Brief.)
Why and how Corazon could have concocted her version of the killing of her father, if it were not
basically true, is hardly conceivable, considering she was hardly thirteen (13) years old when she
testified, an age when according to Moore, a child , is, as a rule, but little influenced by the
suggestion of others" because "he has already got some principles, lying is distasteful to him,
because he thinks it is mean, he is no stranger to the sentiment of self- respect, and he never loses
an opportunity of being right in what he affirms." (II Moore on Facts, pp. 1055-1056.) No cogent
explanation has been offered why she would attribute the assault on her father to three other men,
aside from Talingdan whom she knew had relations with her mother, were she merely making-up her
account of how he was shot, no motive for her to do so having been shown.
Demolishing the theory of the accused that such testimony was taught to her by her uncle, His
Honor pointed out that said "testimony, both direct and cross, would show that she was constant,
firm and steady in her answers to questions directed to her." We have Ourselves read said
testimony and We are convinced of the sincerity and truthfulness of the witness. We cannot,
therefore, share appellants' apprehension in their Seventh Assignment of Error that the grave
imputation of a mother's infidelity and her suggested participation in the killing of her husband, would
if consistently impressed in the mind of their child, constitute a vicious poison enough to make the
child, right or wrong, a willing instrument in any scheme to get even with her wicked mother. We feel
Corazon was too young to he affected by the infidelity of her mother in the manner the defense
suggests. We are convinced from a reading of her whole testimony that it could not have been a
fabrication. On the whole, it is too consistent for a child of thirteen years to be able to substantially
maintain throughout her stay on the witness stand without any fatal flaw, in the face of severe and
long cross-interrogations, if she had not actually witnessed the event she had described. We reject
the possibility of her having been "brainwashed or coached" to testify as she did.

12

The second to the sixth assignments of error in the appeal brief do not merit serious consideration.
Anent these alleged errors, suffice it to say that the following refutations of the Solicitor General are
well taken:
Appellants also decry that the trial court allegedly failed to consider the testimony of
Dr. Dalisan that the distance between the assailants and the deceased could have
been 4 to 5 meters when the shots were fired. But the appellants overlook the
testimony of Corazon Bagabag that when the first shot was fired, the gunman was
about 3- meters from her father (p. 60, t.s.n., hearing of March 29, 1968), which
disproves the theory of the defense that the killers fired from a stonepile under an
avocado tree some 4 to 5 meters away from the deceased's house. Appellants also
insist that the Court a quo ignored the testimonies of defense witness Cpl. Bonifacio
Hall and Chief of Police Rafael Berras on their having found bullet marks on the
southern walling of the house of the deceased, as well as empty cal. 30 carbine shells
under the aforementioned avocado tree. The trial court, however, made the following
apt observations on the testimony of defense witness Cpl. Bonifacio Hall:
This witness stated that we went to the house of the deceased to investigate the crime
after the deceased had already been buried; that he investigated the widow as well as
the surroundings of the house where the deceased was shot. He found empty shells of
carbine under the avocado tree. He stated that the 'batalan' of the house of the
deceased has a siding of about 1- meters high and that he saw bullet holes on the
top portion of the wall directly pointing to the open door of the 'batalan' of the house of
the deceased. When the court asked the witness what could have been the position of
the assailant in shooting the deceased, he stated that the assailant might have been
standing. The assailant could not have made a bullet hole on the top portion of the
sidings of the 'batalan' because the 'batalan' is only 1- meters high, and further,
when asked as to the level of the ground in relation to the top sidings of the 'batalan,'
he answered that it is in the same level with the ground. If this is true, it is impossible
for the assailant to make a bullet hole at the top portion sidings of the 'batalan,' hence,
the testimony of this witness who is a PC corporal is of no consequence and without
merit. The court is puzzled to find a PC corporal testifying for the defense in this case,
which case was filed by another PC sergeant belonging to the same unit and assigned
in the same province of Abra (pp. 324- 325, rec.).
As regards the empty shells also found in the vicinity of the shooting, suffice it to state
that no testimony has been presented, expert or otherwise, linking said shells to the
bullets that were fired during the shooting incident. Surmises in this respect surely
would not overcome the positive testimony of Corazon Bagabag that the accused shot
her father as they came up the 'batalan' of their house. (Pp. 11-12, People's Brief.)
At the trial, the four male appellants tried to prove that they were not at the scene of the crime when
it happened. This defense of alibi was duly considered by the trial court, but it was properly brushed
aside as untenable. In their brief, no mention thereof is made, which goes to show that in the mind
of the defense itself,. it cannot be successfully maintained and they do not, therefore, insist on it.
Nonetheless, it would do well for this Court to specifically affirm the apt pertinent ratiocination of His
Honor in reference thereto thus:
This defense, therefore, is alibi which, in the opinion of the court, can not stand firmly
in the face of a positive and unwavering testimony of the prosecution witness who
pointed out to the accused as the authors of the crime. This is so because, first,
according to the three accused Bides, Tobias and Berras they were sleeping at
8:00 o'clock that night in the house of Mrs. Bayongan which is only 250 meters away
from the scene of the crime. Granting, for the sake of argument, but without admitting,

13

that they were already sleeping at 8:00 o'clock in the house of Mrs. Bayongan,
Corazon Bagabag clearly stated that her father was gunned down at sunset which is
approximately between 6:00 and 6:30 in the evening, hence, the accused Tobias,
Berras and Bides could have committed the crime and went home to sleep in the
house of Mrs. Bayongan after the commission of the crime. According to Pedro Bides,
the house of Mrs. Bayongan is only 250 meters away from the house of the victim.
Second, the three accused have failed miserably to present the testimony of Mrs.
Bayongan, the owner of the house where they slept that night to corroborate or bolster
their defense of alibi. (Pp. 27A-28A, Annex of Appellants' Brief.)
xxx xxx xxx
Nemesio Talingdan, alias Oming, the last of the accused, also in his defense of alibi,
stated that on June 22, 1967, he accompanied Mayor Gregorio Banawa of Sallapadan
to Bangued, together with policeman Cresencio Martinez for the purpose of attending
a cursillo in Bangued They started in Sallapadan in the early morning of June 22, 1967
and arrived in Bangued the same day. According to him, he went to accompany the
mayor to the cursillo house near the Bangued Cathedral and after conducting the
mayor to the cursillo house, he went to board in the house of the cousin of Mayor
Banawa near the Filoil Station at Bangued, Abra. From that time, he never saw the
mayor until after they went home to Sallapadan on June 26th.
This kind of alibi could not gain much weight because he could have returned anytime
on the evening of June 22 or anytime before the commission of the offense to
Sallapadan and commit the crime on the 24th at sunset, then returned to Bangued,
Abra to fetch the mayor and bring him back to Sallapadan on the 26th.
The irony of this defense of alibi is that the mayor who was alleged to have been
accompanied by witness-accused is still living and very much alive. As a matter of fact,
Mayor Gregorio Banawa is still the mayor of Sallapadan, Abra, and also policeman
Cresencio Martinez, another policeman who accompanied the mayor to Bangued, is
also still living and still a policeman of Sallapadan. Why were not the mayor and the
policeman presented to corroborate or deny the testimony of Nemesio Talingdan?
Conrado B. Venus, Municipal Judge of Penarrubia Abra, and a member of the Cursillo
Movement, was presented as rebuttal witness for the prosecution. On the witness
stand, he stated that he belongs to Cursillo No. 3 of the Parish of Bangued, Abra, and
said cursillo was held on October 20 to 23, 1966, at the St. Joseph Seminary in
Galicia, Pidigan Abra, and not on June 23 to 26, 1967. As a matter of fact, Mayor
Banawa of Sallapadan also attended the cursillo held on October 20 to 23, 1966, as
could be seen in his 'Guide Book' where the signature of Gregorio Banawa appears
because they both attended Cursillo No. 3 of the Parish of Bangued.
(To) this testimony of the rebuttal witness belies partly, if not in full, the testimony of
accused Nemesio Talingdan. (Pp. 29A-30A, Annex of Appellants' Brief.)
Coming now to the particular case of appellant Teresa Domogma, as to whom the Solicitor General
has submitted a recommendation of acquittal, We find that she is not as wholly innocent in law as
she appears to the Counsel of the People. It is contended that there is no evidence proving that she
actually joined in the conspiracy to kill her husband because there is no showing of 'actual
cooperation" on her part with her co-appellants in their culpable acts that led to his death. If at all,
what is apparent, it is claimed, is "mere cognizance, acquiescence or approval" thereof on her part,
which it is argued is less than what is required for her conviction as a conspirator per People vs.
Mahlon, 99 Phil. 1068. We do not see it exactly that way.

14

True it is that the proof of her direct participation in the conspiracy is not beyond reasonable doubt,
for which reason, sue cannot have the same liability as her co-appellants. Indeed, she had no hand
at all in the actual shooting of her husband. Neither is it clear that she helped directly in the planning
and preparation thereof, albeit We are convinced that she knew it was going to be done and did not
object. (U.S. vs. Romulo, 15 Phil. 408, 411-414.) It is not definitely shown that she masterminded it
either by herself alone or together with her co-appellant Talingdan. At best, such conclusion could be
plain surmise, suspicion and conjecture, not really includible. After all, she had been having her own
unworthy ways with him for quite a long time, seemingly without any need of his complete
elimination. Why go to so much trouble for something she was already enjoying, and not even very
surreptitiously? In fact, the only remark Bernardo had occasion to make to Teresa one time was "If
you become pregnant, the one in your womb is not my child." The worst he did to her for all her
faults was just to slap her.
But this is not saying that she is entirely free from criminal liability. There is in the record morally
convincing proof that she is at the very least an accessory to the offense committed by her coaccused. She was inside the room when her husband was shot. As she came out after the shooting,
she inquired from Corazon if she was able to recognize the assailants of her father. When Corazon
Identified appellants Talingdan, Tobias, Berras and Bides as the culprits, Teresa did not only enjoin
her daughter not to reveal what she knew to anyone, she went to the extent of warning her, "Don't
tell it to anyone. I will kill you if you tell this to somebody." Later, when the peace officers who
repaired to their house to investigate what happened, instead of helping them with the information
given to her by Corazon, she claimed she had no suspects in mind. In other words, whereas, before
the actual shooting of her husband, she was more or less passive in her attitude regarding her coappellants' conspiracy, known to her, to do away with him, after Bernardo was killed, she became
active in her cooperation with them. These subsequent acts of her constitute "concealing or
assisting in the escape of the principal in the crime" which makes her liable as an accessory after
the fact under paragraph 3 of Article 19 of the Revised Penal Code.
As already indicated earlier, the offense committed by appellants was murder qualified by treachery.
It being obvious that appellants deliberately chose nighttime to suddenly and without warning
assault their victim, taking advantage of their number and arms, it is manifest that they employed
treachery to insure success in attaining their malevolent objective. In addition, it is indisputable that
appellants acted with evident premeditation. Talingdan made the threat to kill Bernardo Thursday
night, then he met with his co-accused to work out their conspiracy Friday and again on Saturday
evening just before the actual shooting. In other words, they had motive Talingdan's taking up the
cudgels for his paramour, Teresa and enough time to meditate, and desist, if they were not resolved
to proceed with their objective. Finally, they committed the offense in the dwelling of the offended
party.
In these premises, the crime committed by the male appellants being murder, qualified by treachery,
and attended by the generic aggravating circumstances of evident premeditation and that the
offense was committed in the dwelling of the offended party, the Court has no alternative under the
law but to impose upon them the capital penalty. However, as to appellant Teresa, she is hereby
found guilty only as an accessory to the same murder.
WHEREFORE, with the above finding of guilt beyond reasonable doubt of the appellants Nemesio
Talingdan, Magellan Tobias, Augusto Berras and Pedro Bides of the crime of murder with two
aggravating circumstances, without any mitigating circumstance to offset them, they are each
hereby sentenced to DEATH to be executed in accordance with law. Guilty beyond reasonable
doubt as accessory to the same murder, appellant Teresa Domogma is hereby sentenced to suffer
the indeterminate penalty of five (5) years of prision correccional as minimum to eight (8) years of
prision mayor as maximum, with the accessory penalties of the law. In all other respects, the
judgment of the trial court is affirmed, with costs against appellants.

15

People vs. Talingdan (Crim1)

The People of the Philippines, plaintiff-appellee, vs. Nemesio Talingdan, Magellan Tobias,
Augusto Berras, Pedro Bides and Teresa Domogma, accused-appellants

En Banc

Per Curiam, July 6, 1978

Topic: Elements of criminal liability (Art. 3) -- Physical element -- Act/Omission

Facts:

Teresa Domogma was the supposed wife of the deceased Bernardo Bagabag
o No certificate or any other proof of their marriage could be presented by the
prosecution
o They lived with their children in Sobosob, Salapadan, Abra
o Their relationship had been strained and beset with troubles for Teresa had
deserted her family home a couple of times and each time Bernardo took time
out to look for her

On 2 different occasions, appellant Nemesis Talingdan has visited Teresa in their

house while Bernardo was out at work, and during those visits Teresa had made
Corazon, their then 12-year old daughter to go down the house and leave them

Bernardo had gotten wind that an illicit relationship was going on between Talingdan
and Teresa

About a month before Bernardo was killed, Teresa had again left their house and did
not come back for a period of more than 3 weeks, and Bernardo came to know later
that she and Talingdan were seen together in the town of Tayum Abra during that time

Just two days before Bernardo was killed (Thursday), Bernardo and Theresa had a
violent quarrel; Bernardo slapped Theresa several times, resulting in Theresa seeking
the help of the police

Accused Talingdan, a policeman, came armed to the vicinity of Bernardo's house and
called him to come down; Bernardo ignored him; Talingdan instead left and warned
Bernardo that someday he would kill him

On Saturday, June 24, 1967, Bernardo was gunned down in his house

The defendants' and Corazon's accounts of what happened had variations

Corazon's version:

Friday morning: Corazon was in a creek to wash clothes. She saw her mother Teresa
meeting with Talingdan and their co-appellants Magellan Tobias, Augusto Berras, and
Pedro Bides in a small hut owned by Bernardo

She heard one of them say "Could he elude a bullet"

16

When Teresa noticed Corazon, she shoved her away saying "You tell your father that
we will kill him"

Saturday, after sunset: Corazon was cooking food for supper when she saw her
mother go down the house to go to the yard where she again met with the other
appellants.

She noted the long guns the appellants were carrying.

Teresa came back to the house and proceeded to her room.

Corazon informed Bernardo, who was then working on a plow, about the presence of
persons downstairs, but Bernardo paid no attention

Bernardo proceeded to the kitchen and sat himself on the floor near the door

He was suddenly fired upon form below the stairs of the batalan

The four accused climbed the stairs of the batalan and upon seeing that Bernardo was
still alive, Talingdan and Tobias fired at him again

Bides and Berras did not fire at that precise time but when Corazon tried to call for
helo, Bides warned her that he will kill her if she calls for help

Teresa came out of her room and when Corazon informed her that she recognized the
killers, the former threatened to kill the latter if she reveals the matter to anyone

The defendants'' version:

Teresa loved Bernardo dearly, they never quarreled, and her husband never maltreated
her.

Teresa came to know Talingdan only when the latter became a policeman in
Sallapadan; an illicit relationship never existed between them

Talingdan was not in Sallapadan at the time of the killing on June 24; he escorted the
Mayor in Bangued from June 22 to June 26

Tobias, Bides, and Berras claimed to be in the house of one Mrs. Bayongan in
Sallapadan, 250-300 meters from the place of the killing

Issue:

Whether or not Teresa Domogma is an accessory to Bernardo's murder

o It is contended that there is no evidence proving that she actually joined in the
conspuracy to kill her husband because there is no showing of actual
cooperation on her part with co-appellants in their culpable acts that led to his
death
o It is claimed that what is apparent is "mere cognizance, acquiescence or
approval thereof on her part, which it is argued is less than what is required for
her conviction as a conspirator

Holding:

Yes. She is an accessory to Bernardo's murder.

17

Ratio:

Note: The court believed Corazon's testimony.

It is true that proof of her direct participation in the conspiracy is not beyond
reasonable doubt; she cannot have the same liability as her co-appellants. She had no
hand in the actual shooting. It is also not clear if she helped directly in the planning
and preparation thereof. But the court is convinced that she knew it was going to be
done and did not object.

There is in the record morally convincing proof that she is at the very least an
accessory to the offense committed.

She did not only order her daughter not to reveal what she knew to anyone, she also
claimed to have no suspects in mind when the peace officers came into their house
later to investigate

Whereas before the actual shooting she was more or less passive in her attitude
regarding the conspiracy, after Bernardo was killed, she became active in her
cooperation with her co-appellants

These acts constitute "concealing or assisting in the escape of the principal in the
crime"

Male appellants sentenced to death. Guilty beyond reasonable doubt is Teresa Domogma,
sentenced to suffer the indeterminate penalty of 5 years of prision correccional as minimum
to 8 years of prision mayor as maximum.
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
SECOND DIVISION

G.R. No. 97471 February 17, 1993

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
ISABELO PUNO y GUEVARRA, alias "Beloy," and ENRIQUE AMURAO y PUNO, alias "Enry,"
accused-appellants.
The Solicitor General for plaintiff-appellee.
Edward C. Castaeda for accused-appellants.

REGALADO, J.:
The primal issue for resolution in this case is whether accused-appellants committed the felony of
kidnapping for ransom under Article 267 of the Revised Penal Code, as charged in the information;
or a violation of Presidential Decree No. 532 (Anti-Piracy and Anti-Highway Robbery Law of 1974),
as contended by the Solicitor General and found by the trial court; or the offense of simple robbery
punished by Paragraph 5, Article 294 of the Revised Penal Code, as claimed by the defense.

18

In an information dated and filed on May 31, 1989 in the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City,
Branch 103, as Criminal Case No. Q-57404 thereof, appellants were charged with kidnapping for
ransom allegedly committed in the following manner:
That on or about the 13th day of January, 1988 in Quezon City, Philippines and within
the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the said accused, being then private
individuals, conspiring together, confederating with and mutually helping each other,
did, then and there, wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously kidnap and carry away one
MARIA DEL SOCORRO SARMIENTO y MUTUC * for the purpose of extorting ransom,
to the damage and prejudice of the said offended party in such amount as may be
awarded to her under the provisions of the Civil Code. 1
On a plea of not guilty when arraigned, 2 appellants went to trial which ultimately resulted in a
judgment promulgated on September 26, 1990 finding them guilty of robbery with extortion
committed on a highway, punishable under Presidential Decree No. 532, with this disposition in the
fallo thereof:
ACCORDINGLY, judgment is hereby rendered finding the accused ISABELO PUNO
and ENRIQUE AMURAO GUILTY as principals of robbery with extortion committed on
a highway and, in accordance with P.D. 532, they are both sentenced to a jail term of
reclusion perpetua.
The two accused are likewise ordered to pay jointly and severally the offended private
victim Ma. Socorro M. Sarmiento the sum of P7,000.00 as actual damages and
P3,000.00 as temperate damages. 3
Before us now in this appeal, appellants contend that the court a quo erred (1) in convicting them
under Presidential Decree No. 532 since they were not expressly charged with a crime therein; (2)
in applying Sections 4 and 5, Rule 120 of the Rules of Court since the charge under said
presidential decree is not the offense proved and cannot rightly be used as the offense proved which
is necessarily included in the offense charged. 4
For the material antecedents of this case, we quote with approval the following counter-statement of
facts in the People's brief 5 which adopted the established findings of the court a quo, documenting
the same with page references to the transcripts of the proceedings, and which we note are without
any substantial divergence in the version proffered by the defense.
This is a prosecution for kidnapping for ransom allegedly done on January 13, 1988 by
the two accused (tsn, Jan. 8, 1990, p. 7).
Mrs. Maria Socorro Mutuc-Sarmiento owns a bakeshop in Araneta Avenue, Quezon
City called Nika Cakes and Pastries. She has a driver of her own just as her husband
does (Ibid., pp. 4-6).
At around 5:00 in the afternoon of January 13, 1988, the accused Isabelo Puno, who is
the personal driver of Mrs. Sarmiento's husband (who was then away in Davao
purportedly on account of local election there) arrived at the bakeshop. He told Mrs.
Socorro that her own driver Fred had to go to Pampanga on an emergency (something
bad befell a child), so Isabelo will temporary (sic) take his place (Id., pp. 8-9).
Mrs. Socorro's time to go home to Valle Verde in Pasig came and so she got into the
Mercedes Benz of her husband with Isabelo on (sic) the wheel. After the car turned
right in (sic) a corner of Araneta Avenue, it stopped. A young man, accused Enrique
Amurao, boarded the car beside the driver (Id., pp. 9-10).

19

Once inside, Enrique clambered on top of the back side of the front seat and went onto
where Ma. Socorro was seated at the rear. He poke (sic) a gun at her (Id., p. 10).
Isabelo, who earlier told her that Enrique is his nephew announced, "ma'm, you know,
I want to get money from you." She said she has money inside her bag and they may
get it just so they will let her go. The bag contained P7,000.00 and was taken (Id., pp.
11-14).
Further on, the two told her they wanted P100,000.00 more. Ma. Socorro agreed to
give them that but would they drop her at her gas station in Kamagong St., Makati
where the money is? The car went about the Sta. Mesa area. Meanwhile, Ma. Socorro
clutched her Rosary and prayed. Enrique's gun was menacingly storing (sic) at her soft
bread (sic) brown, perfumed neck. He said he is an NPA and threatened her (Id., p.15).
The car sped off north towards the North superhighway. There Isabelo, Beloy as he is
called, asked Ma. Socorro to issue a check for P100,000.00. Ma. Socorro complied.
She drafted 3 checks in denominations of two for P30 thousand and one for P40
thousand. Enrique ordered her to swallow a pill but she refused (Id., pp. 17-23).
Beloy turned the car around towards Metro Manila. Later, he changed his mind and
turned the car again towards Pampanga. Ma. Socorro, according to her, jumped out of
the car then, crossed to the other side of the superhighway and, after some vehicles
ignored her, she was finally able to flag down a fish vendors van. Her dress had blood
because, according to Ma. Socorro, she fell down on the ground and was injured when
she jumped out of the car. Her dress was torn too (Id., pp. 23-26).
On reaching Balintawak, Ma. Socorro reported the matter to CAPCOM (Id., p. 27).
Both accused were, day after, arrested. Enrique was arrested trying to encash Ma.
Socorro's P40,000.00 check at PCI Bank, Makati. (tsn, Oct. 18, 1989, pp. 10-13) 6
As observed by the court below, the defense does not dispute said narrative of complainant, except
that, according to appellant Puno, he stopped the car at North Diversion and freely allowed
complainant to step out of the car. He even slowed the car down as he drove away, until he saw that
his employer had gotten a ride, and he claimed that she fell down when she stubbed her toe while
running across the highway. 7
Appellants further testified that they brought the Mercedez Benz car to Dolores, San Fernando,
Pampanga and parked it near a barangay or police outpost. They thereafter ate at a restaurant and
divided their loot. 8 Much later, when he took the stand at the trial of this case, appellant Puno tried
to mitigate his liability by explaining that he was in dire need of money for the medication of his
ulcers. 9
On these relatively simple facts, and as noted at the start of this opinion, three theories have been
advanced as to what crime was committed by appellants. The trial court cohered with the
submission of the defense that the crime could not be kidnapping for ransom as charged in the
information. We likewise agree.
Prefatorily, it is worth recalling an accepted tenet in criminal law that in the determination of the
crime for which the accused should be held liable in those instances where his acts partake of the
nature of variant offenses, and the same holds true with regard to the modifying or qualifying
circumstances thereof, his motive and specific intent in perpetrating the acts complained of are
invaluable aids in arriving at a correct appreciation and accurate conclusion thereon.

20

Thus, to illustrate, the motive of the accused has been held to be relevant or essential to determine
the specific nature of the crime as, for instance, whether a murder was committed in the furtherance
of rebellion in which case the latter absorbs the former, or whether the accused had his own
personal motives for committing the murder independent of his membership in the rebellious
movement in which case rebellion and murder would constitute separate offenses. 10 Also, where
injuries were inflicted on a person in authority who was not then in the actual performance of his
official duties, the motive of the offender assumes importance because if the attack was by reason
of the previous performance of official duties by the person in authority, the crime would be direct
assault; otherwise, it would only be physical injuries. 11
In the case at bar, there is no showing whatsoever that appellants had any motive, nurtured prior to
or at the time they committed the wrongful acts against complainant, other than the extortion of
money from her under the compulsion of threats or intimidation. This much is admitted by both
appellants, without any other esoteric qualification or dubious justification. Appellant Puno, as
already stated, candidly laid the blame for his predicament on his need for funds for, in his own
testimony, "(w)hile we were along the way Mam (sic) Corina was telling me "Beloy, I know your
family very well and I know that your (sic) not (a) bad person, why are you doing this?" I told her
"Mam, (sic), because I need money and I had an ulcer and that I have been getting an (sic)
advances from our office but they refused to give me any bale (sic). . . ." 12
With respect to the specific intent of appellants vis-a-vis the charge that they had kidnapped the
victim, we can rely on the proverbial rule of ancient respectability that for this crime to exist, there
must be indubitable proof that
the actual intent of the malefactors was to deprive the offended party of her liberty, 13 and not where
such restraint of her freedom of action was merely an incident in the commission of another offense
primarily intended by the offenders. Hence, as early as United States vs. Ancheta, 14 and
consistently reiterated thereafter, 15 it has been held that the detention and/or forcible taking away of
the victims by the accused, even for an appreciable period of time but for the primary and ultimate
purpose of killing them, holds the offenders liable for taking their lives or such other offenses they
committed in relation thereto, but the incidental deprivation of the victims' liberty does not constitute
kidnapping or serious illegal detention.
That appellants in this case had no intention whatsoever to kidnap or deprive the complainant of her
personal liberty is clearly demonstrated in the veritably confessional testimony of appellant Puno:
Q At what point did Mrs. Sarmiento handed (sic) the bag containing the
P7,000.00 to your nephew?
A Santo Domingo Exit.
Q And how about the checks, where were you already when the checks
was (sic) being handed to you?
A Also at the Sto. Domingo exit when she signed the checks.
Q If your intention was just to robbed (sic) her, why is it that you still did
not allow her to stay at Sto. Domingo, after all you already received the
money and the checks?
A Because we had an agreement with her that when she signed the
checks we will take her to her house at Villa (sic) Verde.
Q And why did you not bring her back to her house at Valle Verde when
she is (sic) already given you the checks?

21

A Because while we were on the way back I (sic) came to my mind that if
we reach Balintawak or some other place along the way we might be
apprehended by the police. So when we reached Santa Rita exit I told
her "Mam (sic) we will already stop and allow you to get out of the car." 16
Neither can we consider the amounts given to appellants as equivalent to or in the nature of
ransom, considering the immediacy of their obtention thereof from the complainant personally.
Ransom, in municipal criminal law, is the money, price or consideration paid or demanded for
redemption of a captured person or persons, a payment that releases from captivity. 17 It can hardly
be assumed that when complainant readily gave the cash and checks demanded from her at gun
point, what she gave under the circumstances of this case can be equated with or was in the
concept of ransom in the law of kidnapping. These were merely amounts involuntarily surrendered
by the victim upon the occasion of a robbery or of which she was summarily divested by appellants.
Accordingly, while we hold that the crime committed is robbery as defined in Article 293 of the Code,
we, however, reject the theory of the trial court that the same constitutes the highway robbery
contemplated in and punished by Presidential Decree No. 532.
The lower court, in support of its theory, offers this ratiocination:
The court agrees that the crime is robbery. But it is also clear from the allegation in the
information that the victim was carried away and extorted for more money. The
accused admitted that the robbery was carried on from Araneta Avenue up to the North
Superhighway. They likewise admitted that along the way they intimidated Ma. Socorro
to produce more money that she had with her at the time for which reason Ma.
Socorro, not having more cash, drew out three checks. . . .
In view of the foregoing the court is of the opinion that the crimes committed is that
punishable under P.D. 532 (Anti-Piracy and Anti-Highway Robbery Law of 1974) under
which where robbery on the highway is accompanied by extortion the penalty is
reclusion perpetua. 18
The Solicitor General concurs, with the observation that pursuant to the repealing clause in Section
5 of said decree, "P.D. No- 532 is a modification of the provisions of the Revised Penal Code,
particularly Article 267 which
are inconsistent with it." 19 Such opinion and complementary submission consequently necessitate
an evaluation of the correct interplay between and the legal effects of Presidential Decree No. 532
on the pertinent Provisions of the Revised Penal Code, on which matter we are not aware that any
definitive pronouncement has as yet been made.
Contrary to the postulation of the Solicitor General, Presidential Decree No. 532 is not a modification
of Article 267 of the Revised Penal Code on kidnapping and serious illegal detention, but of Articles
306 and 307 on brigandage. This is evident from the fact that the relevant portion thereof which
treats of "highway robbery" invariably uses this term in the alternative and synonymously with
brigandage, that is, as "highway robbery/brigandage." This is but in line with our previous ruling, and
which still holds sway in criminal law, that highway robbers (ladrones) and brigands are
synonymous. 20
Harking back to the origin of our law on brigandage (bandolerismo) in order to put our discussion
thereon in the proper context and perspective, we find that a band of brigands, also known as
highwaymen or freebooters, is more than a gang of ordinary robbers. Jurisprudence on the matter
reveals that during the early part of the American occupation of our country, roving bands were
organized for robbery and pillage and since the then existing law against robbery was inadequate to
cope with such moving bands of outlaws, the Brigandage Law was passed. 21

22

The following salient distinctions between brigandage and robbery are succinctly explained in a
treatise on the subject and are of continuing validity:
The main object of the Brigandage Law is to prevent the formation of bands of
robbers. The heart of the offense consists in the formation of a band by more than
three armed persons for the purpose indicated in art. 306. Such formation is sufficient
to constitute a violation of art. 306. It would not be necessary to show, in a prosecution
under it, that a member or members of the band actually committed robbery or
kidnapping or any other purpose attainable by violent means. The crime is proven
when the organization and purpose of the band are shown to be such as are
contemplated by art 306. On the other hand, if robbery is committed by a band, whose
members were not primarily organized for the purpose of committing robbery or
kidnapping, etc., the crime would not be brigandage, but only robbery. Simply because
robbery was committed by a band of more than three armed persons, it would not
follow that it was committed by a band of brigands. In the Spanish text of art. 306, it is
required that the band "sala a los campos para dedicarse a robar." 22 (Emphasis
supplied).
In fine, the purpose of brigandage is, inter alia, indiscriminate highway robbery. If the purpose is only
a particular robbery, the crime is only robbery, or robbery in band if there are at least four armed
participants. 23 The martial law legislator, in creating and promulgating Presidential Decree No. 532
for the objectives announced therein, could not have been unaware of that distinction and is
presumed to have adopted the same, there being no indication to the contrary. This conclusion is
buttressed by the rule on contemporaneous construction, since it is one drawn from the time when
and the circumstances under which the decree to be construed originated. Contemporaneous
exposition or construction is the best and strongest in the law. 24
Further, that Presidential Decree No. 532 punishes as highway robbery or brigandage only acts of
robbery perpetrated by outlaws indiscriminately against any person or persons on Philippine
highways as defined therein, and not acts of robbery committed against only a predetermined or
particular victim, is evident from the preambular clauses thereof, to wit:
WHEREAS, reports from law-enforcement agencies reveal that lawless elements are
still committing acts of depredation upon the persons and properties of innocent and
defenseless inhabitants who travel from one place to another, thereby disturbing the
peace, order and tranquility of the nation and stunting the economic and social
progress of the people:
WHEREAS, such acts of depredations constitute . . . highway robbery/brigandage
which are among the highest forms of lawlessness condemned by the penal statutes
of all countries;
WHEREAS, it is imperative that said lawless elements be discouraged from
perpetrating such acts of depredaions by imposing heavy penalty on the offenders,
with the end in view of eliminating all obstacles to the economic, social, educational
and community progress of the people. (Emphasis supplied).
Indeed, it is hard to conceive of how a single act of robbery against a particular person chosen by
the accused as their specific victim could be considered as committed on the "innocent and
defenseless inhabitants who travel from one place to another," and which single act of depredation
would be capable of "stunting the economic and social progress of the people" as to be considered
"among the highest forms of lawlessness condemned by the penal statutes of all countries," and
would accordingly constitute an obstacle "to the economic, social, educational and community
progress of the people, " such that said isolated act would constitute the highway robbery or

23

brigandage contemplated and punished in said decree. This would be an exaggeration bordering on
the ridiculous.
True, Presidential Decree No. 532 did introduce amendments to Articles 306 and 307 of the Revised
Penal Code by increasing the penalties, albeit limiting its applicability to the offenses stated therein
when committed on the highways and without prejudice to the liability for such acts if committed.
Furthermore, the decree does not require that there be at least four armed persons forming a band
of robbers; and the presumption in the Code that said accused are brigands if they use unlicensed
firearms no longer obtains under the decree. But, and this we broadly underline, the essence of
brigandage under the Code as a crime of depredation wherein the unlawful acts are directed not
only against specific, intended or preconceived victims, but against any and all prospective victims
anywhere on the highway and whosoever they may potentially be, is the same as the concept of
brigandage which is maintained in Presidential Decree No. 532, in the same manner as it was under
its aforementioned precursor in the Code and, for that matter, under the old Brigandage Law. 25
Erroneous advertence is nevertheless made by the court below to the fact that the crime of robbery
committed by appellants should be covered by the said amendatory decree just because it was
committed on a highway. Aside from what has already been stressed regarding the absence of the
requisite elements which thereby necessarily puts the offense charged outside the purview and
intendment of that presidential issuance, it would be absurd to adopt a literal interpretation that any
unlawful taking of property committed on our highways would be covered thereby. It is an
elementary rule of statutory construction that the spirit or intent of the law should not be
subordinated to the letter thereof. Trite as it may appear, we have perforce to stress the elementary
caveat that he who considers merely the letter of an instrument goes but skin deep into its meaning,
26
and the fundamental rule that criminal justice inclines in favor of the milder form of liability in case
of doubt.
If the mere fact that the offense charged was committed on a highway would be the determinant for
the application of Presidential Decree No. 532, it would not be farfetched to expect mischievous, if
not absurd, effects on the corpus of our substantive criminal law. While we eschew resort to a
reductio ad absurdum line of reasoning, we apprehend that the aforestated theory adopted by the
trial court falls far short of the desideratum in the interpretation of laws, that is, to avoid absurdities
and conflicts. For, if a motor vehicle, either stationary or moving on a highway, is forcibly taken at
gun point by the accused who happened to take a fancy thereto, would the location of the vehicle at
the time of the unlawful taking necessarily put the offense within the ambit of Presidential Decree
No. 532, thus rendering nugatory the categorical provisions of the Anti-Carnapping Act of 1972? 27
And, if the scenario is one where the subject matter of the unlawful asportation is large cattle which
are incidentally being herded along and traversing the same highway and are impulsively set upon
by the accused, should we apply Presidential Decree No. 532 and completely disregard the explicit
prescriptions in the Anti-Cattle Rustling Law of 1974? 28
We do not entertain any doubt, therefore, that the coincidental fact that the robbery in the present
case was committed inside a car which, in the natural course of things, was casually operating on a
highway, is not within the situation envisaged by Section 2(e) of the decree in its definition of terms.
Besides, that particular provision precisely defines "highway robbery/brigandage" and, as we have
amply demonstrated, the single act of robbery conceived and committed by appellants in this case
does not constitute highway robbery or brigandage.
Accordingly, we hold that the offense committed by appellants is simple robbery defined in Article
293 and punished under Paragraph 5 of Article 294 of the Revised Penal Code with prision
correccional in its maximum period to prision mayor in its medium period. Appellants have
indisputably acted in conspiracy as shown by their concerted acts evidentiary of a unity of thought
and community of purpose. In the determination of their respective liabilities, the aggravating
circumstances of craft 29 shall be appreciated against both appellants and that of abuse of

24

confidence shall be further applied against appellant Puno, with no mitigating circumstance in favor
of either of them. At any rate, the intimidation having been made with the use of a firearm, the
penalty shall be imposed in the maximum period as decreed by Article 295 of the Code.
We further hold that there is no procedural obstacle to the conviction of appellants of the crime of
simple robbery upon an information charging them with kidnapping for ransom, since the former
offense which has been proved is necessarily included in the latter offense with which they are
charged. 30 For the former offense, it is sufficient that the elements of unlawful taking, with intent to
gain, of personal property through intimidation of the owner or possessor thereof shall be, as it has
been, proved in the case at bar. Intent to gain (animus lucrandi) is presumed to be alleged in an
information where it is charged that there was unlawful taking (apoderamiento) and appropriation by
the offender of the things subject of the robbery. 31
These foregoing elements are necessarily included in the information filed against appellants which,
as formulated, allege that they wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously kidnapped and extorted ransom
from the complainant. Such allegations, if not expressly but at the very least by necessary
implication, clearly convey that the taking of complainant's money and checks (inaccurately termed
as ransom) was unlawful, with intent to gain, and through intimidation. It cannot be logically argued
that such a charge of kidnapping for ransom does not include but could negate the presence of any
of the elements of robbery through intimidation of persons. 32
WHEREFORE, the assailed judgment of the trial court is hereby SET ASIDE and another one is
rendered CONVICTING accused-appellants Isabelo Puno y Guevarra and Enrique Amurao y Puno
of robbery as Punished in Paragraph 5 of Article 294, in relation to Article 295, of the Revised Penal
Code and IMPOSING on each of them an indeterminate sentence of four (4) years and two (2)
months of prision correccional, as minimum, to ten (10) years of prision mayor, as maximum, and
jointly and severally pay the offended party, Maria del Socorro M. Sarmiento, the amounts of
P7,000.00 as actual damages and P20,000.00 as moral damages, with costs.
SO ORDERED.
People vs. Puno (Crim1)
People of the Philippines, plaintiff-appellee, vs. Isabelo Puno y Guevarra, alias "Beloy," and
Enrique Amurao y Puno, alias "Enry," accused-appellants

En Banc

Regalado, February 17, 1993

Topic: Mental Element (Mens rea) -- Deliberate intent (Dolo) -- General and specific intent

Facts:

January 13, 1988 in QC, at around 5:00 pm: the accused Isabelo Puno, who is the
personal driver of Mrs. Sarmiento's husband (who was then away in Davao
purportedly on account of local election there) arrived at Mrs. Sarmiento's bakeshop in
Araneta Ave, QC

He told Mrs. Sarmiento that her own driver Fred had to go to Pampanga on an
emergency so Isabelo will temporarily take his place

25

When it was time for Mrs. Sarmiento to go home to Valle Verde in Pasig, she got into
her husband's Mercedes Benz with Isabelo driving

After the car turned right on a corner of Araneta Ave, it stopped and a young man,
accused Enrique Amurao, boarded the car beside the driver

Enrique pointed a gun at Mrs. Sarmiento as Isabelo told her that he needs to "get
money" from her

Mrs. Sarmiento had P7,000 on her bag which she handed to the accused

But the accused said that they wanted P100,000 more

The car sped off north towards the North superhighway where Isabelo asked Mrs.
Sarmiento to issue a check for P100,000

Mrs. Sarmiento drafted 3 checks: two P30,000 checks and one P40,000 check

Isabelo then turned the car around towards Metro Manila; later, he changed his mind
and turned the car again towards Pampanga

According to her, Mrs. Sarmiento jumped out of the car then, crossed to the other side
of the superhighway and was able to flag down a fish vendor's van, her dress had
blood because according to her, she fell down on the ground and was injured when
she jumped out of the car

The defense does not dispute the above narrative of the complainant except that
according to Isabelo, he stopped the car at North Diversion and freely allowed Mrs.
Sarmiento to step out of the car
o He said he even slowed the car down as he drove away, until he saw that his
employer had gotten a ride
o He claimed that she fell down when she stubbed her toe while running across
the highway

Issue:
1. Whether or not the accused can be convicted of kidnapping for ransom as charged
2. Whether or not the said robbery can be classified as "highway robbery" under PD No.
532 (Anti-Piracy and Anti-Highway Robbery Law of 1974)
Holding:
1. No.
2. No.
Ratio:
1. There is no showing whatsoever that appellants had any motive, nurtured prior to or at
the time they committed the wrongful acts against complainant, other than the
extortion of money from her under the compulsion of threats or intimidation.
o For this crime to exist, there must be indubitable proof that the actual intent of
the malefactors was to deprive the offended party of her liberty

26

o In the case, the restraint of her freedom of action was merely an incident in the
commission of another offense primarily intended by the offenders
o This does not constitute kidnapping or serious illegal detention
2. Jurisprudence reveals that during the early part of the American occupation of our
country, roving bands were organized for robbery and pillage and since the then
existing law against robbery was inadequate to cope with such moving bands of
outlaws, the Brigandage Law was passed (this is the origin of the law on highway
robbery)
o PD No. 532 punishes as highway robbery only acts of robbery perpetrated by
outlaws indiscriminately against any person or persons on Philippine highways
and not acts of robbery committed against only a predetermined or particular
victim
o The mere fact that the robbery was committed inside a car which was casually
operating on a highway does not make PD No 532 applicable to the case
o This is not justified by the accused's intention
Accused-appellants convicted of robbery (indeterminate sentence of 4 years and 2 months
or prision correccional, as minimum, to 10 years of prision mayor. Accused to pay Mrs.
Sarmiento P7,000 as actual damages and P20,000 as moral damages.)
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-5272

March 19, 1910

THE UNITED STATES, plaintiff-appellee,

vs.
AH CHONG, defendant-appellant.
Gibb & Gale, for appellant.
Attorney-General Villamor, for appellee.
CARSON, J.:
The evidence as to many of the essential and vital facts in this case is limited to the testimony of the
accused himself, because from the very nature of these facts and from the circumstances
surrounding the incident upon which these proceedings rest, no other evidence as to these facts
was available either to the prosecution or to the defense. We think, however, that, giving the
accused the benefit of the doubt as to the weight of the evidence touching those details of the
incident as to which there can be said to be any doubt, the following statement of the material facts
disclose by the record may be taken to be substantially correct:
The defendant, Ah Chong, was employed as a cook at "Officers' quarters, No. 27," Fort Mc Kinley,
Rizal Province, and at the same place Pascual Gualberto, deceased, was employed as a house boy
or muchacho. "Officers' quarters No. 27" as a detached house situates some 40 meters from the
nearest building, and in August, 19087, was occupied solely as an officers' mess or club. No one
slept in the house except the two servants, who jointly occupied a small room toward the rear of the
building, the door of which opened upon a narrow porch running along the side of the building, by

27

which communication was had with the other part of the house. This porch was covered by a heavy
growth of vines for its entire length and height. The door of the room was not furnished with a
permanent bolt or lock, and occupants, as a measure of security, had attached a small hook or
catch on the inside of the door, and were in the habit of reinforcing this somewhat insecure means of
fastening the door by placing against it a chair. In the room there was but one small window, which,
like the door, opened on the porch. Aside from the door and window, there were no other openings
of any kind in the room.
On the night of August 14, 1908, at about 10 o'clock, the defendant, who had received for the night,
was suddenly awakened by some trying to force open the door of the room. He sat up in bed and
called out twice, "Who is there?" He heard no answer and was convinced by the noise at the door
that it was being pushed open by someone bent upon forcing his way into the room. Due to the
heavy growth of vines along the front of the porch, the room was very dark, and the defendant,
fearing that the intruder was a robber or a thief, leaped to his feet and called out. "If you enter the
room, I will kill you." At that moment he was struck just above the knee by the edge of the chair
which had been placed against the door. In the darkness and confusion the defendant thought that
the blow had been inflicted by the person who had forced the door open, whom he supposed to be a
burglar, though in the light of after events, it is probable that the chair was merely thrown back into
the room by the sudden opening of the door against which it rested. Seizing a common kitchen knife
which he kept under his pillow, the defendant struck out wildly at the intruder who, it afterwards
turned out, was his roommate, Pascual. Pascual ran out upon the porch and fell down on the steps
in a desperately wounded condition, followed by the defendant, who immediately recognized him in
the moonlight. Seeing that Pascual was wounded, he called to his employers who slept in the next
house, No. 28, and ran back to his room to secure bandages to bind up Pascual's wounds.
There had been several robberies in Fort McKinley not long prior to the date of the incident just
described, one of which took place in a house in which the defendant was employed as cook; and
as defendant alleges, it was because of these repeated robberies he kept a knife under his pillow for
his personal protection.
The deceased and the accused, who roomed together and who appear to have on friendly and
amicable terms prior to the fatal incident, had an understanding that when either returned at night,
he should knock at the door and acquiant his companion with his identity. Pascual had left the house
early in the evening and gone for a walk with his friends, Celestino Quiambao and Mariano Ibaez,
servants employed at officers' quarters No. 28, the nearest house to the mess hall. The three
returned from their walk at about 10 o'clock, and Celestino and Mariano stopped at their room at No.
28, Pascual going on to his room at No. 27. A few moments after the party separated, Celestino and
Mariano heard cries for assistance and upon returning to No. 27 found Pascual sitting on the back
steps fatally wounded in the stomach, whereupon one of them ran back to No. 28 and called
Liuetenants Jacobs and Healy, who immediately went to the aid of the wounded man.
The defendant then and there admitted that he had stabbed his roommate, but said that he did it
under the impression that Pascual was "a ladron" because he forced open the door of their sleeping
room, despite defendant's warnings.
No reasonable explanation of the remarkable conduct on the part of Pascuals suggests itself, unless
it be that the boy in a spirit of mischief was playing a trick on his Chinese roommate, and sought to
frightened him by forcing his way into the room, refusing to give his name or say who he was, in
order to make Ah Chong believe that he was being attacked by a robber.
Defendant was placed under arrest forthwith, and Pascual was conveyed to the military hospital,
where he died from the effects of the wound on the following day.

28

The defendant was charged with the crime of assassination, tried, and found guilty by the trial court
of simple homicide, with extenuating circumstances, and sentenced to six years and one day
presidio mayor, the minimum penalty prescribed by law.
At the trial in the court below the defendant admitted that he killed his roommate, Pascual
Gualberto, but insisted that he struck the fatal blow without any intent to do a wrongful act, in the
exercise of his lawful right of self-defense.
Article 8 of the Penal Code provides that
The following are not delinquent and are therefore exempt from criminal liability:
xxx

xxx

xxx

4 He who acts in defense of his person or rights, provided there are the following attendant
circumstances:
(1) Illegal aggression.
(2) Reasonable necessity of the means employed to prevent or repel it.
(3) Lack of sufficient provocation on the part of the person defending himself.
Under these provisions we think that there can be no doubt that defendant would be entitle to
complete exception from criminal liability for the death of the victim of his fatal blow, if the intruder
who forced open the door of his room had been in fact a dangerous thief or "ladron," as the
defendant believed him to be. No one, under such circumstances, would doubt the right of the
defendant to resist and repel such an intrusion, and the thief having forced open the door
notwithstanding defendant's thrice-repeated warning to desist, and his threat that he would kill the
intruder if he persisted in his attempt, it will not be questioned that in the darkness of the night, in a
small room, with no means of escape, with the thief advancing upon him despite his warnings
defendant would have been wholly justified in using any available weapon to defend himself from
such an assault, and in striking promptly, without waiting for the thief to discover his whereabouts
and deliver the first blow.
But the evidence clearly discloses that the intruder was not a thief or a "ladron." That neither the
defendant nor his property nor any of the property under his charge was in real danger at the time
when he struck the fatal blow. That there was no such "unlawful aggression" on the part of a thief or
"ladron" as defendant believed he was repelling and resisting, and that there was no real "necessity"
for the use of the knife to defend his person or his property or the property under his charge.
The question then squarely presents it self, whether in this jurisdiction one can be held criminally
responsible who, by reason of a mistake as to the facts, does an act for which he would be exempt
from criminal liability if the facts were as he supposed them to be, but which would constitute the
crime of homicide or assassination if the actor had known the true state of the facts at the time when
he committed the act. To this question we think there can be but one answer, and we hold that under
such circumstances there is no criminal liability, provided always that the alleged ignorance or
mistake or fact was not due to negligence or bad faith.
In broader terms, ignorance or mistake of fact, if such ignorance or mistake of fact is sufficient to
negative a particular intent which under the law is a necessary ingredient of the offense charged
(e.g., in larcerny, animus furendi; in murder, malice; in crimes intent) "cancels the presumption of
intent," and works an acquittal; except in those cases where the circumstances demand a conviction
under the penal provisions touching criminal negligence; and in cases where, under the provisions
of article 1 of the Penal Code one voluntarily committing a crime or misdeamor incurs criminal

29

liability for any wrongful act committed by him, even though it be different from that which he
intended to commit. (Wharton's Criminal Law, sec. 87 and cases cited; McClain's Crim. Law, sec.
133 and cases cited; Pettit vs. S., 28 Tex. Ap., 240; Commonwealth vs. Power, 7 Met., 596; Yates
vs. People, 32 N.Y., 509; Isham vs. State, 38 Ala., 213; Commonwealth vs. Rogers, 7 Met., 500.)
The general proposition thus stated hardly admits of discussion, and the only question worthy of
consideration is whether malice or criminal intent is an essential element or ingredient of the crimes
of homicide and assassination as defined and penalized in the Penal Code. It has been said that
since the definitions there given of these as well as most other crimes and offense therein defined,
do not specifically and expressly declare that the acts constituting the crime or offense must be
committed with malice or with criminal intent in order that the actor may be held criminally liable, the
commission of the acts set out in the various definitions subjects the actor to the penalties described
therein, unless it appears that he is exempted from liability under one or other of the express
provisions of article 8 of the code, which treats of exemption. But while it is true that contrary to the
general rule of legislative enactment in the United States, the definitions of crimes and offenses as
set out in the Penal Code rarely contain provisions expressly declaring that malice or criminal intent
is an essential ingredient of the crime, nevertheless, the general provisions of article 1 of the code
clearly indicate that malice, or criminal intent in some form, is an essential requisite of all crimes and
offense therein defined, in the absence of express provisions modifying the general rule, such as
are those touching liability resulting from acts negligently or imprudently committed, and acts done
by one voluntarily committing a crime or misdemeanor, where the act committed is different from
that which he intended to commit. And it is to be observed that even these exceptions are more
apparent than real, for "There is little distinction, except in degree, between a will to do a wrongful
thing and indifference whether it is done or not. Therefore carelessness is criminal, and within limits
supplies the place of the affirmative criminal intent" (Bishop's New Criminal Law, vol. 1, s. 313); and,
again, "There is so little difference between a disposition to do a great harm and a disposition to do
harm that one of them may very well be looked upon as the measure of the other. Since, therefore,
the guilt of a crime consists in the disposition to do harm, which the criminal shows by committing it,
and since this disposition is greater or less in proportion to the harm which is done by the crime, the
consequence is that the guilt of the crime follows the same proportion; it is greater or less according
as the crime in its own nature does greater or less harm" (Ruth. Ints. C. 18, p. 11); or, as it has been
otherwise stated, the thing done, having proceeded from a corrupt mid, is to be viewed the same
whether the corruption was of one particular form or another.
Article 1 of the Penal Code is as follows:
Crimes or misdemeanors are voluntary acts and ommissions punished by law.
Acts and omissions punished by law are always presumed to be voluntarily unless the
contrary shall appear.
An person voluntarily committing a crime or misdemeanor shall incur criminal liability, even
though the wrongful act committed be different from that which he had intended to commit.
The celebrated Spanish jurist Pacheco, discussing the meaning of the word "voluntary" as used in
this article, say that a voluntary act is a free, intelligent, and intentional act, and roundly asserts that
without intention (intention to do wrong or criminal intention) there can be no crime; and that the
word "voluntary" implies and includes the words "con malicia," which were expressly set out in the
definition of the word "crime" in the code of 1822, but omitted from the code of 1870, because, as
Pacheco insists, their use in the former code was redundant, being implied and included in the word
"voluntary." (Pacheco, Codigo Penal, vol. 1, p. 74.)
Viada, while insisting that the absence of intention to commit the crime can only be said to exempt
from criminal responsibility when the act which was actually intended to be done was in itself a

30

lawful one, and in the absence of negligence or imprudence, nevertheless admits and recognizes in
his discussion of the provisions of this article of the code that in general without intention there can
be no crime. (Viada, vol. 1, p. 16.) And, as we have shown above, the exceptions insisted upon by
Viada are more apparent than real.
Silvela, in discussing the doctrine herein laid down, says:
In fact, it is sufficient to remember the first article, which declared that where there is no
intention there is no crime . . . in order to affirm, without fear of mistake, that under our code
there can be no crime if there is no act, an act which must fall within the sphere of ethics if
there is no moral injury. (Vol. 2, the Criminal Law, folio 169.)
And to the same effect are various decisions of the supreme court of Spain, as, for example in its
sentence of May 31, 1882, in which it made use of the following language:
It is necessary that this act, in order to constitute a crime, involve all the malice which is
supposed from the operation of the will and an intent to cause the injury which may be the
object of the crime.
And again in its sentence of March 16, 1892, wherein it held that "considering that, whatever may be
the civil effects of the inscription of his three sons, made by the appellant in the civil registry and in
the parochial church, there can be no crime because of the lack of the necessary element or
criminal intention, which characterizes every action or ommission punished by law; nor is he guilty of
criminal negligence."
And to the same effect in its sentence of December 30, 1896, it made use of the following language:
. . . Considering that the moral element of the crime, that is, intent or malice or their absence
in the commission of an act defined and punished by law as criminal, is not a necessary
question of fact submitted to the exclusive judgment and decision of the trial court.
That the author of the Penal Code deemed criminal intent or malice to be an essential element of
the various crimes and misdemeanors therein defined becomes clear also from an examination of
the provisions of article 568, which are as follows:
He who shall execute through reckless negligence an act that, if done with malice, would
constitute a grave crime, shall be punished with the penalty of arresto mayor in its maximum
degree, to prision correccional in its minimum degrees if it shall constitute a less grave crime.
He who in violation of the regulations shall commit a crime through simple imprudence or
negligence shall incur the penalty of arresto mayor in its medium and maximum degrees.
In the application of these penalties the courts shall proceed according to their discretion,
without being subject to the rules prescribed in article 81.
The provisions of this article shall not be applicable if the penalty prescribed for the crime is
equal to or less than those contained in the first paragraph thereof, in which case the courts
shall apply the next one thereto in the degree which they may consider proper.
The word "malice" in this article is manifestly substantially equivalent to the words "criminal intent,"
and the direct inference from its provisions is that the commission of the acts contemplated therein,
in the absence of malice (criminal intent), negligence, and imprudence, does not impose any
criminal liability on the actor.

31

The word "voluntary" as used in article 1 of the Penal Code would seem to approximate in meaning
the word "willful" as used in English and American statute to designate a form of criminal intent. It
has been said that while the word "willful" sometimes means little more than intentionally or
designedly, yet it is more frequently understood to extent a little further and approximate the idea of
the milder kind of legal malice; that is, it signifies an evil intent without justifiable excuse. In one case
it was said to mean, as employed in a statute in contemplation, "wantonly" or "causelessly;" in
another, "without reasonable grounds to believe the thing lawful." And Shaw, C. J., once said that
ordinarily in a statute it means "not merely `voluntarily' but with a bad purpose; in other words,
corruptly." In English and the American statutes defining crimes "malice," "malicious," "maliciously,"
and "malice aforethought" are words indicating intent, more purely technical than "willful" or willfully,"
but "the difference between them is not great;" the word "malice" not often being understood to
require general malevolence toward a particular individual, and signifying rather the intent from our
legal justification. (Bishop's New Criminal Law, vol. 1, secs. 428 and 429, and cases cited.)
But even in the absence of express words in a statute, setting out a condition in the definition of a
crime that it be committed "voluntarily," willfully," "maliciously" "with malice aforethought," or in one
of the various modes generally construed to imply a criminal intent, we think that reasoning from
general principles it will always be found that with the rare exceptions hereinafter mentioned, to
constitute a crime evil intent must combine with an act. Mr. Bishop, who supports his position with
numerous citations from the decided cases, thus forcely present this doctrine:
In no one thing does criminal jurisprudence differ more from civil than in the rule as to the
intent. In controversies between private parties the quo animo with which a thing was done is
sometimes important, not always; but crime proceeds only from a criminal mind. So that
There can be no crime, large or small, without an evil mind. In other words, punishment is the
sentence of wickedness, without which it can not be. And neither in philosophical speculation
nor in religious or mortal sentiment would any people in any age allow that a man should be
deemed guilty unless his mind was so. It is therefore a principle of our legal system, as
probably it is of every other, that the essence of an offense is the wrongful intent, without
which it can not exists. We find this doctrine confirmed by
Legal maxims. The ancient wisdom of the law, equally with the modern, is distinct on this
subject. It consequently has supplied to us such maxims as Actus non facit reum nisi mens
sit rea, "the act itself does not make man guilty unless his intention were so;" Actus me incito
factus non est meus actus, "an act done by me against my will is not my act;" and others of
the like sort. In this, as just said, criminal jurisprudence differs from civil. So also
Moral science and moral sentiment teach the same thing. "By reference to the intention, we
inculpate or exculpate others or ourselves without any respect to the happiness or misery
actually produced. Let the result of an action be what it may, we hold a man guilty simply on
the ground of intention; or, on the dame ground, we hold him innocent." The calm judgment of
mankind keeps this doctrine among its jewels. In times of excitement, when vengeance takes
the place of justice, every guard around the innocent is cast down. But with the return of
reason comes the public voice that where the mind is pure, he who differs in act from his
neighbors does not offend. And
In the spontaneous judgment which springs from the nature given by God to man, no one
deems another to deserve punishment for what he did from an upright mind, destitute of
every form of evil. And whenever a person is made to suffer a punishment which the
community deems not his due, so far from its placing an evil mark upon him, it elevates him
to the seat of the martyr. Even infancy itself spontaneously pleads the want of bad intent in
justification of what has the appearance of wrong, with the utmost confidence that the plea, if
its truth is credited, will be accepted as good. Now these facts are only the voice of nature

32

uttering one of her immutable truths. It is, then, the doctrine of the law, superior to all other
doctrines, because first in nature from which the law itself proceeds, that no man is to be
punished as a criminal unless his intent is wrong. (Bishop's New Criminal Law, vol. 1, secs.
286 to 290.)
Compelled by necessity, "the great master of all things," an apparent departure from this doctrine of
abstract justice result from the adoption of the arbitrary rule that Ignorantia juris non excusat
("Ignorance of the law excuses no man"), without which justice could not be administered in our
tribunals; and compelled also by the same doctrine of necessity, the courts have recognized the
power of the legislature to forbid, in a limited class of cases, the doing of certain acts, and to make
their commission criminal without regard to the intent of the doer. Without discussing these
exceptional cases at length, it is sufficient here to say that the courts have always held that unless
the intention of the lawmaker to make the commission of certain acts criminal without regard to the
intent of the doer is clear and beyond question the statute will not be so construed (cases cited in
Cyc., vol. 12, p. 158, notes 76 and 77); and the rule that ignorance of the law excuses no man has
been said not to be a real departure from the law's fundamental principle that crime exists only
where the mind is at fault, because "the evil purpose need not be to break the law, and if suffices if it
is simply to do the thing which the law in fact forbids." (Bishop's New Criminal Law, sec. 300, and
cases cited.)
But, however this may be, there is no technical rule, and no pressing necessity therefore, requiring
mistake in fact to be dealt with otherwise that in strict accord with the principles of abstract justice.
On the contrary, the maxim here is Ignorantia facti excusat ("Ignorance or mistake in point of fact is,
in all cases of supposed offense, a sufficient excuse"). (Brown's Leg. Max., 2d ed., 190.)
Since evil intent is in general an inseparable element in every crime, any such mistake of fact as
shows the act committed to have proceeded from no sort of evil in the mind necessarily relieves the
actor from criminal liability provided always there is no fault or negligence on his part; and as laid
down by Baron Parke, "The guilt of the accused must depend on the circumstances as they appear
to him." (Reg. vs. Thurborn, 1 Den. C., 387; P. vs. Anderson, 44 Cal.., 65; P. vs. Lamb, 54 Barb.,
342; Yates vs. P., 32 N. Y., 509; Patterson vs. P., 46 Barb., 625; Reg. vs. Cohen, 8 Cox C. C., 41; P.
vs. Miles, 55 Cal., 207, 209; Nalley vs. S., 28 Tex. Ap., 387.) That is to say, the question as to
whether he honestly, in good faith, and without fault or negligence fell into the mistake is to be
determined by the circumstances as they appeared to him at the time when the mistake was made,
and the effect which the surrounding circumstances might reasonably be expected to have on his
mind, in forming the intent, criminal or other wise, upon which he acted.
If, in language not uncommon in the cases, one has reasonable cause to believe the
existence of facts which will justify a killing or, in terms more nicely in accord with the
principles on which the rule is founded, if without fault or carelessness he does believe them
he is legally guiltless of the homicide; though he mistook the facts, and so the life of an
innocent person is unfortunately extinguished. In other words, and with reference to the right
of self-defense and the not quite harmonious authorities, it is the doctrine of reason and
sufficiently sustained in adjudication, that notwithstanding some decisions apparently
adverse, whenever a man undertakes self-defense, he is justified in acting on the facts as
they appear to him. If, without fault or carelessness, he is misled concerning them, and
defends himself correctly according to what he thus supposes the facts to be the law will not
punish him though they are in truth otherwise, and he was really no occassion for the
extreme measures. (Bishop's New Criminal Law, sec. 305, and large array of cases there
cited.)
The common illustration in the American and English textbooks of the application of this rule is the
case where a man, masked and disguised as a footpad, at night and on a lonely road, "holds up" his
friends in a spirit of mischief, and with leveled pistol demands his money or his life, but is killed by

33

his friend under the mistaken belief that the attack is a real one, that the pistol leveled at his head is
loaded, and that his life and property are in imminent danger at the hands of the aggressor. No one
will doubt that if the facts were such as the slayer believed them to be he would be innocent of the
commission of any crime and wholly exempt from criminal liability, although if he knew the real state
of the facts when he took the life of his friend he would undoubtedly be guilty of the crime of
homicide or assassination. Under such circumstances, proof of his innocent mistake of the facts
overcomes the presumption of malice or criminal intent, and (since malice or criminal intent is a
necessary ingredient of the "act punished by law" in cases of homicide or assassination) overcomes
at the same time the presumption established in article 1 of the code, that the "act punished by law"
was committed "voluntarily."
Parson, C.J., in the Massachusetts court, once said:
If the party killing had reasonable grounds for believing that the person slain had a felonious
design against him, and under that supposition killed him, although it should afterwards
appear that there was no such design, it will not be murder, but it will be either manslaughter
or excusable homicide, according to the degree of caution used and the probable grounds of
such belief. (Charge to the grand jury in Selfridge's case, Whart, Hom., 417, 418, Lloyd's
report of the case, p.7.)
In this case, Parker, J., charging the petit jury, enforced the doctrine as follows:
A, in the peaceable pursuit of his affairs, sees B rushing rapidly toward him, with an
outstretched arms and a pistol in his hand, and using violent menaces against his life as he
advances. Having approached near enough in the same attitude, A, who has a club in his
hand, strikes B over the head before or at the instant the pistol is discharged; and of the
wound B dies. It turns out the pistol was loaded with powder only, and that the real design of
B was only to terrify A. Will any reasonable man say that A is more criminal that he would
have been if there had been a bullet in the pistol? Those who hold such doctrine must require
that a man so attacked must, before he strikes the assailant, stop and ascertain how the
pistol is loaded a doctrine which would entirely take away the essential right of selfdefense. And when it is considered that the jury who try the cause, and not the party killing,
are to judge of the reasonable grounds of his apprehension, no danger can be supposed to
flow from this principle. (Lloyd's Rep., p. 160.)
To the same effect are various decisions of the supreme court of Spain, cited by Viada, a few of
which are here set out in full because the facts are somewhat analogous to those in the case at bar.
QUESTION III. When it is shown that the accused was sitting at his hearth, at night, in
company only of his wife, without other light than reflected from the fire, and that the man with
his back to the door was attending to the fire, there suddenly entered a person whom he did
not see or know, who struck him one or two blows, producing a contusion on the shoulder,
because of which he turned, seized the person and took from his the stick with which he had
undoubtedly been struck, and gave the unknown person a blow, knocking him to the floor,
and afterwards striking him another blow on the head, leaving the unknown lying on the floor,
and left the house. It turned out the unknown person was his father-in-law, to whom he
rendered assistance as soon as he learned his identity, and who died in about six days in
consequence of cerebral congestion resulting from the blow. The accused, who confessed
the facts, had always sustained pleasant relations with his father-in-law, whom he visited
during his sickness, demonstrating great grief over the occurrence. Shall he be considered
free from criminal responsibility, as having acted in self-defense, with all the circumstances
related in paragraph 4, article 8, of the Penal Code? The criminal branch of the Audiencia of
Valladolid found that he was an illegal aggressor, without sufficient provocation, and that
there did not exists rational necessity for the employment of the force used, and in

34

accordance with articles 419 and 87 of the Penal Code condemned him to twenty months of
imprisonment, with accessory penalty and costs. Upon appeal by the accused, he was
acquitted by the supreme court, under the following sentence: "Considering, from the facts
found by the sentence to have been proven, that the accused was surprised from behind, at
night, in his house beside his wife who was nursing her child, was attacked, struck, and
beaten, without being able to distinguish with which they might have executed their criminal
intent, because of the there was no other than fire light in the room, and considering that in
such a situation and when the acts executed demonstrated that they might endanger his
existence, and possibly that of his wife and child, more especially because his assailant was
unknown, he should have defended himself, and in doing so with the same stick with which
he was attacked, he did not exceed the limits of self-defense, nor did he use means which
were not rationally necessary, particularly because the instrument with which he killed was
the one which he took from his assailant, and was capable of producing death, and in the
darkness of the house and the consteration which naturally resulted from such strong
aggression, it was not given him to known or distinguish whether there was one or more
assailants, nor the arms which they might bear, not that which they might accomplish, and
considering that the lower court did not find from the accepted facts that there existed rational
necessity for the means employed, and that it did not apply paragraph 4 of article 8 of the
Penal Code, it erred, etc." (Sentence of supreme court of Spain, February 28, 1876.) (Viada,
Vol. I, p. 266.) .
QUESTION XIX. A person returning, at night, to his house, which was situated in a retired
part of the city, upon arriving at a point where there was no light, heard the voice of a man, at
a distance of some 8 paces, saying: "Face down, hand over you money!" because of which,
and almost at the same money, he fired two shots from his pistol, distinguishing immediately
the voice of one of his friends (who had before simulated a different voice) saying, "Oh! they
have killed me," and hastening to his assistance, finding the body lying upon the ground, he
cried, "Miguel, Miguel, speak, for God's sake, or I am ruined," realizing that he had been the
victim of a joke, and not receiving a reply, and observing that his friend was a corpse, he
retired from the place. Shall he be declared exempt in toto from responsibility as the author of
this homicide, as having acted in just self-defense under the circumstances defined in
paragraph 4, article 8, Penal Code? The criminal branch of the Audiencia of Malaga did not
so find, but only found in favor of the accused two of the requisites of said article, but not that
of the reasonableness of the means employed to repel the attack, and, therefore, condemned
the accused to eight years and one day of prison mayor, etc. The supreme court acquitted
the accused on his appeal from this sentence, holding that the accused was acting under a
justifiable and excusable mistake of fact as to the identity of the person calling to him, and
that under the circumstances, the darkness and remoteness, etc., the means employed were
rational and the shooting justifiable. (Sentence supreme court, March 17, 1885.) (Viada, Vol.
I, p. 136.)
QUESTION VI. The owner of a mill, situated in a remote spot, is awakened, at night, by a
large stone thrown against his window at this, he puts his head out of the window and
inquires what is wanted, and is answered "the delivery of all of his money, otherwise his
house would be burned" because of which, and observing in an alley adjacent to the mill
four individuals, one of whom addressed him with blasphemy, he fired his pistol at one the
men, who, on the next morning was found dead on the same spot. Shall this man be declared
exempt from criminal responsibility as having acted in just self-defense with all of the
requisites of law? The criminal branch of the requisites of law? The criminal branch of the
Audiencia of Zaragoza finds that there existed in favor of the accused a majority of the
requisites to exempt him from criminal responsibility, but not that of reasonable necessity for
the means, employed, and condemned the accused to twelve months of prision correctional
for the homicide committed. Upon appeal, the supreme court acquitted the condemned,
finding that the accused, in firing at the malefactors, who attack his mill at night in a remote

35

spot by threatening robbery and incendiarism, was acting in just self-defense of his person,
property, and family. (Sentence of May 23, 1877). (I Viada, p. 128.)
A careful examination of the facts as disclosed in the case at bar convinces us that the defendant
Chinaman struck the fatal blow alleged in the information in the firm belief that the intruder who
forced open the door of his sleeping room was a thief, from whose assault he was in imminent peril,
both of his life and of his property and of the property committed to his charge; that in view of all the
circumstances, as they must have presented themselves to the defendant at the time, he acted in
good faith, without malice, or criminal intent, in the belief that he was doing no more than exercising
his legitimate right of self-defense; that had the facts been as he believed them to be he would have
been wholly exempt from criminal liability on account of his act; and that he can not be said to have
been guilty of negligence or recklessness or even carelessness in falling into his mistake as to the
facts, or in the means adopted by him to defend himself from the imminent danger which he believe
threatened his person and his property and the property under his charge.
The judgment of conviction and the sentence imposed by the trial court should be reversed, and the
defendant acquitted of the crime with which he is charged and his bail bond exonerated, with the
costs of both instance de oficio. So ordered.
US vs. Ah Chong (Crim1)
The United States, plaintiff-appellee, vs. Ah Chong, defendant-appellant.

En Banc

Carson, March 19, 1910

Topic: Mental element (Mens rea) - Deliberate intent (Dolo) - Mistake of fact

Facts:

The defendant Ah Chong was a cook at "Officers' quarters, No. 27," Fort McKinley,
Rizal Province

Pascual Gualberto, deceased, works at the same place as a house boy or muchacho

"Officers' quarters, No. 27" was a detached house some 40 meters from the nearest
building

No one slept in the house except the two servants who jointly occupied a small room
toward the rear of the building, the door of which opened upon a narrow porch
running along the side of the building
o This porch was covered by a heavy growth of vines for its entire length and
height
o The door of the room was not furnished with a permanent bolt or lock; the
occupants, as a measure of security, had attached a small hook or catch on the
inside of the door, and were in the habit of reinforcing this somewhat insecure
means of fastening the door by placing against it a chair

On the night of August 14, 1908, at about 10:00 pm, the defendant was suddenly
awakened by some trying to force open the door of the room

36

He called out twice, "Who is there?"

He heard no answer and was convinced by the noise at the door that it was being
pushed open by someone bent upon forcing his way into the room

The defendant warned the intruder "If you enter the room, I will kill you."

Seizing a common kitchen knife which he kept under his pillow, the defendant struck
out wildly at the intruder (when he entered the room) who turned out to be his
roommate Pascual

Pascual ran out upon the porch heavily wounded

Recognizing Pascual, the defendant called to his employers who slept in the next
house and ran back to his room to secure bandages to bind up Pascual's wounds

Pascual died from the effects of the wound the following day

The roommates appear to have been in friendly and amicable terms prior to the
incident, and had an understanding that when either returned at night, he should
knock that the door and acquaint his companion with his identity

The defendant alleges that he kept the knife under his pillow as personal protection
because of repeated robberies in Fort McKinley

Defendant admitted to stabbing his roommate, but said that he did it under the
impression that Pascual was "a ladron (thief)" because he forced open the door of
their sleeping room, despite the defendant's warnings

Defendant was found guilty by the trial court of simple homicide, with extenuating
(mitigating) circumstances, and sentenced to 6 years and 1 day presidio mayor, the
minimum penalty prescribed by law

Issue:

Whether or not the defendant can be held criminally responsible

Holding:

No.

Ratio:

By reason of a mistake as to the facts, the defendant did an act for which he would be
exempt from criminal liability if the facts were as he supposed them to be (i.e. if
Pascual was actually a thief, he will not be criminally liable/responsible because it
would be self-defense), but would constitute the crime of homicide or assassination if
the actor had known the true state of the facts (i.e. if he knew that it was actually
Pascual, he would be guilty of homicide/assassination)

The defendant's ignorance or mistake of fact was not due to negligence or bad faith

"The act itself foes not make man guilty unless his intention were so"
o The essence of the offense is the wrongful intent, without which it cannot exist

"The guilt of the accused must depend on the circumstances as they appear to him."

37

If one has reasonable cause to believe the existence of facts which will justify a killing,
if without fault or carelessness he does believe them, he is legally guiltless of the
homicide

The defendant was doing no more than exercise his legitimate right of self-defense

He cannot be said to have been guilty of negligence or recklessness or even

carelessness in falling into his mistake as to the facts

RTC's decision is reversed. The defendant is acquitted.

Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-47722

July 27, 1943

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,

vs.
ANTONIO Z. OANIS and ALBERTO GALANTA, defendants-appellants.
Antonio Z. Oanis in his own behalf.
Maximo L. Valenzuela for appellant Galanta.
Acting Solicitor-General Ibaez and Assistant Attorney Torres for appellee.
MORAN, J.:
Charged with the crime of murder of one Serapio Tecson, the accused Antonio Z. Oanis and Alberto Galanta,
chief of police of Cabanatuan and corporal of the Philippine Constabulary, respectively, were, after due trial,
found guilty by the lower court of homicide through reckless imprudence and were sentenced each to an
indeterminate penalty of from one year and six months to two years and two months of prison correccional
and to indemnify jointly and severally the heirs of the deceased in the amount of P1,000. Defendants appealed
separately from this judgment.
In the afternoon of December 24, 1938. Captain Godofredo Monsod, Constabulary Provincial Inspector at
Cabanatuan, Nueva Ecija, received from Major Guido a telegram of the following tenor: "Information
received escaped convict Anselmo Balagtas with bailarina and Irene in Cabanatuan get him dead or alive."
Captain Monsod accordingly called for his first sergeant and asked that he be given four men. Defendant
corporal Alberto Galanta, and privates Nicomedes Oralo, Venancio Serna and D. Fernandez, upon order of
their sergeant, reported at the office of the Provincial Inspector where they were shown a copy of the abovequoted telegram and a newspaper clipping containing a picture of Balagtas. They were instructed to arrest
Balagtas and, if overpowered, to follow the instruction contained in the telegram. The same instruction was
given to the chief of police Oanis who was likewise called by the Provincial Inspector. When the chief of
police was asked whether he knew one Irene, a bailarina, he answered that he knew one of loose morals of the
same name. Upon request of the Provincial Inspector, the chief of police tried to locate some of his men to
guide the constabulary soldiers in ascertaining Balagtas' whereabouts, and failing to see anyone of them he
volunteered to go with the party. The Provincial Inspector divided the party into two groups with defendants
Oanis and Galanta, and private Fernandez taking the route to Rizal street leading to the house where Irene was
supposedly living. When this group arrived at Irene's house, Oanis approached one Brigida Mallare, who was
then stripping banana stalks, and asked her where Irene's room was. Brigida indicated the place and upon
further inquiry also said that Irene was sleeping with her paramour. Brigida trembling, immediately returned to
her own room which was very near that occupied by Irene and her paramour. Defendants Oanis and Galanta

38

then went to the room of Irene, and an seeing a man sleeping with his back towards the door where they were,
simultaneously or successively fired at him with their .32 and .45 caliber revolvers. Awakened by the
gunshots, Irene saw her paramour already wounded, and looking at the door where the shots came, she saw the
defendants still firing at him. Shocked by the entire scene. Irene fainted; it turned out later that the person shot
and killed was not the notorious criminal Anselmo Balagtas but a peaceful and innocent citizen named Serapio
Tecson, Irene's paramour. The Provincial Inspector, informed of the killing, repaired to the scene and when he
asked as to who killed the deceased. Galanta, referring to himself and to Oanis, answered: "We two, sir." The
corpse was thereafter brought to the provincial hospital and upon autopsy by Dr. Ricardo de Castro, multiple
gunshot wounds inflicted by a .32 and a .45 caliber revolvers were found on Tecson's body which caused his
death.
These are the facts as found by the trial court and fully supported by the evidence, particularly by the
testimony of Irene Requinea. Appellants gave, however, a different version of the tragedy. According to
Appellant Galanta, when he and chief of police Oanis arrived at the house, the latter asked Brigida where
Irene's room was. Brigida indicated the place, and upon further inquiry as to the whereabouts of Anselmo
Balagtas, she said that he too was sleeping in the same room. Oanis went to the room thus indicated and upon
opening the curtain covering the door, he said: "If you are Balagtas, stand up." Tecson, the supposed Balagtas,
and Irene woke up and as the former was about to sit up in bed. Oanis fired at him. Wounded, Tecson leaned
towards the door, and Oanis receded and shouted: "That is Balagtas." Galanta then fired at Tecson.
On the other hand, Oanis testified that after he had opened the curtain covering the door and after having said,
"if you are Balagtas stand up." Galanta at once fired at Tecson, the supposed Balagtas, while the latter was still
lying on bed, and continued firing until he had exhausted his bullets: that it was only thereafter that he, Oanis,
entered the door and upon seeing the supposed Balagtas, who was then apparently watching and picking up
something from the floor, he fired at him.
The trial court refused to believe the appellants. Their testimonies are certainly incredible not only because
they are vitiated by a natural urge to exculpate themselves of the crime, but also because they are materially
contradictory. Oasis averred that be fired at Tecson when the latter was apparently watching somebody in an
attitudes of picking up something from the floor; on the other hand, Galanta testified that Oasis shot Tecson
while the latter was about to sit up in bed immediately after he was awakened by a noise. Galanta testified that
he fired at Tecson, the supposed Balagtas, when the latter was rushing at him. But Oanis assured that when
Galanta shot Tecson, the latter was still lying on bed. It is apparent from these contradictions that when each of
the appellants tries to exculpate himself of the crime charged, he is at once belied by the other; but their
mutual incriminating averments dovetail with and corroborate substantially, the testimony of Irene Requinea.
It should be recalled that, according to Requinea, Tecson was still sleeping in bed when he was shot to death
by appellants. And this, to a certain extent, is confirmed by both appellants themselves in their mutual
recriminations. According, to Galanta, Oanis shot Tecson when the latter was still in bed about to sit up just
after he was awakened by a noise. And Oanis assured that when Galanta shot Tecson, the latter was still lying
in bed. Thus corroborated, and considering that the trial court had the opportunity to observe her demeanor on
the stand, we believe and so hold that no error was committed in accepting her testimony and in rejecting the
exculpatory pretensions of the two appellants. Furthermore, a careful examination of Irene's testimony will
show not only that her version of the tragedy is not concocted but that it contains all indicia of veracity. In her
cross-examination, even misleading questions had been put which were unsuccessful, the witness having stuck
to the truth in every detail of the occurrence. Under these circumstances, we do not feel ourselves justified in
disturbing the findings of fact made by the trial court.
The true fact, therefore, of the case is that, while Tecson was sleeping in his room with his back towards the
door, Oanis and Galanta, on sight, fired at him simultaneously or successively, believing him to be Anselmo
Balagtas but without having made previously any reasonable inquiry as to his identity. And the question is
whether or not they may, upon such fact, be held responsible for the death thus caused to Tecson. It is
contended that, as appellants acted in innocent mistake of fact in the honest performance of their official
duties, both of them believing that Tecson was Balagtas, they incur no criminal liability. Sustaining this theory
in part, the lower court held and so declared them guilty of the crime of homicide through reckless

39

imprudence. We are of the opinion, however, that, under the circumstances of the case, the crime committed
by appellants is murder through specially mitigated by circumstances to be mentioned below.
In support of the theory of non-liability by reasons of honest mistake of fact, appellants rely on the case of
U.S. v. Ah Chong, 15 Phil., 488. The maxim is ignorantia facti excusat, but this applies only when the mistake
is committed without fault or carelessness. In the Ah Chong case, defendant therein after having gone to bed
was awakened by someone trying to open the door. He called out twice, "who is there," but received no
answer. Fearing that the intruder was a robber, he leaped from his bed and called out again., "If you enter the
room I will kill you." But at that precise moment, he was struck by a chair which had been placed against the
door and believing that he was then being attacked, he seized a kitchen knife and struck and fatally wounded
the intruder who turned out to be his room-mate. A common illustration of innocent mistake of fact is the case
of a man who was marked as a footpad at night and in a lonely road held up a friend in a spirit of mischief, and
with leveled, pistol demanded his money or life. He was killed by his friend under the mistaken belief that the
attack was real, that the pistol leveled at his head was loaded and that his life and property were in imminent
danger at the hands of the aggressor. In these instances, there is an innocent mistake of fact committed without
any fault or carelessness because the accused, having no time or opportunity to make a further inquiry, and
being pressed by circumstances to act immediately, had no alternative but to take the facts as they then
appeared to him, and such facts justified his act of killing. In the instant case, appellants, unlike the accused in
the instances cited, found no circumstances whatsoever which would press them to immediate action. The
person in the room being then asleep, appellants had ample time and opportunity to ascertain his identity
without hazard to themselves, and could even effect a bloodless arrest if any reasonable effort to that end had
been made, as the victim was unarmed, according to Irene Requinea. This, indeed, is the only legitimate
course of action for appellants to follow even if the victim was really Balagtas, as they were instructed not to
kill Balagtas at sight but to arrest him, and to get him dead or alive only if resistance or aggression is offered
by him.
Although an officer in making a lawful arrest is justified in using such force as is reasonably necessary to
secure and detain the offender, overcome his resistance, prevent his escape, recapture him if he escapes, and
protect himself from bodily harm (People vs. Delima, 46 Phil, 738), yet he is never justified in using
unnecessary force or in treating him with wanton violence, or in resorting to dangerous means when the arrest
could be effected otherwise (6 C.J.S., par. 13, p. 612). The doctrine is restated in the new Rules of Court thus:
"No unnecessary or unreasonable force shall be used in making an arrest, and the person arrested shall not be
subject to any greater restraint than is necessary for his detention." (Rule 109, sec. 2, par. 2). And a peace
officer cannot claim exemption from criminal liability if he uses unnecessary force or violence in making an
arrest (5 C.J., p. 753; U.S. vs. Mendoza, 2 Phil., 109). It may be true that Anselmo Balagtas was a notorious
criminal, a life-termer, a fugitive from justice and a menace to the peace of the community, but these facts
alone constitute no justification for killing him when in effecting his arrest, he offers no resistance or in fact no
resistance can be offered, as when he is asleep. This, in effect, is the principle laid down, although upon
different facts, in U.S. vs. Donoso (3 Phil., 234, 242).
It is, however, suggested that a notorious criminal "must be taken by storm" without regard to his right to life
which he has by such notoriety already forfeited. We may approve of this standard of official conduct where
the criminal offers resistance or does something which places his captors in danger of imminent attack.
Otherwise we cannot see how, as in the present case, the mere fact of notoriety can make the life of a criminal
a mere trifle in the hands of the officers of the law. Notoriety rightly supplies a basis for redoubled official
alertness and vigilance; it never can justify precipitate action at the cost of human life. Where, as here, the
precipitate action of the appellants has cost an innocent life and there exist no circumstances whatsoever to
warrant action of such character in the mind of a reasonably prudent man, condemnation not condonation
should be the rule; otherwise we should offer a premium to crime in the shelter of official actuation.
The crime committed by appellants is not merely criminal negligence, the killing being intentional and not
accidental. In criminal negligence, the injury caused to another should be unintentional, it being simply the
incident of another act performed without malice. (People vs. Sara, 55 Phil., 939). In the words of Viada, "para
que se celifique un hecho de imprudencia es preciso que no haya mediado en el malicia ni intencion alguna de

40

daar; existiendo esa intencion, debera calificarse el hecho del delito que ha producido, por mas que no haya
sido la intencion del agente el causar un mal de tanta gravedad como el que se produjo." (Tomo 7, Viada
Codigo Penal Comentado, 5.a ed. pag. 7). And, as once held by this Court, a deliberate intent to do an
unlawful act is essentially inconsistent with the idea of reckless imprudence (People vs. Nanquil, 43 Phil., 232;
People vs. Bindor, 56 Phil., 16), and where such unlawful act is wilfully done, a mistake in the identity of the
intended victim cannot be considered as reckless imprudence (People vs. Gona, 54 Phil., 605) to support a plea
of mitigated liability.
As the deceased was killed while asleep, the crime committed is murder with the qualifying circumstance of
alevosia. There is, however, a mitigating circumstance of weight consisting in the incomplete justifying
circumstance defined in article 11, No. 5, of the Revised Penal Code. According to such legal provision, a
person incurs no criminal liability when he acts in the fulfillment of a duty or in the lawful exercise of a right
or office. There are two requisites in order that the circumstance may be taken as a justifying one: (a) that the
offender acted in the performance of a duty or in the lawful exercise of a right; and (b) that the injury or
offense committed be the necessary consequence of the due performance of such duty or the lawful exercise of
such right or office. In the instance case, only the first requisite is present appellants have acted in the
performance of a duty. The second requisite is wanting for the crime by them committed is not the necessary
consequence of a due performance of their duty. Their duty was to arrest Balagtas or to get him dead or alive if
resistance is offered by him and they are overpowered. But through impatience or over-anxiety or in their
desire to take no chances, they have exceeded in the fulfillment of such duty by killing the person whom they
believed to be Balagtas without any resistance from him and without making any previous inquiry as to his
identity. According to article 69 of the Revised Penal Code, the penalty lower by one or two degrees than that
prescribed by law shall, in such case, be imposed.
For all the foregoing, the judgment is modified and appellants are hereby declared guilty of murder with the
mitigating circumstance above mentioned, and accordingly sentenced to an indeterminate penalty of from five
(5) years of prision correctional to fifteen (15) years of reclusion temporal, with the accessories of the law,
and to pay the heirs of the deceased Serapio Tecson jointly and severally an indemnity of P2,000, with costs.
Yulo, C.J., Bocobo, Generoso and Lopez Vito, A., concur.

People vs. Oanis (Crim1)

The People of the Philippines, plaintiff-appellee, vs. Antonio Z. Oanis and Alberto Galanta, defendantappellants.

July 27, 1943

Moran, J:

Facts:

Chief of Police Antonio Oanis and Corporal Alberto Galanta were instructed by the
Constabulary Provincial Inspector to arrest the escaped convict, Anselmo Balagtas, with
bailarina named Irene, and if overpowered, to get him dead or alive.

Upon arrival at the place where Irene could be found, Oanis approached and asked Brigada
Mallare where Irene's room was. Brigada indicated the room and said that Irene was sleeping
with her paramour.

Oanis and Galanta then went to the room and upon seeing a man sleeping with his back
towards the door, they simultaneously fired at him.

41

Shocked by the entire scene, Irene fainted.

It turned out later that the man shot and killed was not Balagtas but an innocent man named
Serapio Tecson, Irene's paramour.

Issue:

Whether or not Oanis and Galanta can be held responsible for Tecson's death.

Held:

Yes

Ratio:

No unnecessary or unreasonable force shall be used in making an arrest, and the person
arrested shall not be subject to any greater restraint than is necessary for his detention. A
peace officer cannot claim exemption from criminal liability if he uses unnecessary or
unreasonable force in making an arrest.
o

Through impatience of desire to take chances, Oanis and Galanta have exceeded in the
fulfillment of their duty by killing the person whom they believed to be Balagtas without
any resistance from him and without making any previous inquiry as to his identity.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
Adm. Case No. 3086 February 23, 1988
ALEXANDER PADILLA, complainant,
vs.
THE HON. BALTAZAR R. DIZON, Presiding Judge of the Regional Trial Court of Pasay City
Branch 113, respondent.
RESOLUTION

PER CURIAM:
This is an administrative complaint, dated August 6, 1987, filed by the then Commissioner of
Customs, Alexander Padilla, against respondent Baltazar R. Dizon, RTC Judge, Branch 115, Pasay
City, for rendering a manifestly erroneous decision due, at the very least, to gross incompetence and
gross ignorance of the law, in Criminal Case No. 86- 10126-P, entitled "People of the Philippines vs.
Lo Chi Fai", acquitting said accused of the offense charged, i.e., smuggling of foreign currency out
of the country.
Required by the Court to answer the complaint, the respondent judge filed an Answer, dated
October 6, 1987, reciting his "commendable record as a fearless prosecutor" since his appointment
as Assistant City Fiscal of Manila on December 4, 1962, until his appointment eventually as RTC
Judge on February 18, 1983; that at in the reorganization of the judiciary after the February 26, 1986
revolution, he was reappointed to his present position; that his length of service as prosecutor and
judge is "tangible proof that would negate the allegations of the petitioner" (should be complainant),

42

whereas the latter did not last long in the service for reasons only known to him; that the decision
involved in the complaint was promulgated by respondent on September 29, 1986, but the complaint
against him was filed only on August 6, 1987, a clear indication of malice and ill-will of the
complainant to subject respondent to harassment, humiliation and vindictiveness; that his decision,
of which he submits a copy (Annex A) as part of his Answer, is based on "fundamental principles
and the foundation of rights and justice" and that if there are mistakes or errors in the questioned
decision, they are committed in good faith. Accordingly, respondent prays for the dismissal of the
petition (should be complaint).
The issue before the Court is whether or not the respondent judge is guilty of gross incompetence or
gross ignorance of the law in rendering the decision in question. A judge can not be held to account
or answer, criminally, civilly or administratively, for an erroneous decision rendered by him in good
faith.
The case in which the respondent rendered a decision of acquittal involved a tourist, Lo Chi Fai,
who was caught by a Customs guard at the Manila International Airport while attempting to smuggle
foreign currency and foreign exchange instruments out of the country. Lo Chi Fai, was apprehended
by a customs guard and two PAFSECOM officers on July 9, 1986, while on board Flight PR 300 of
the Philippine Air Lines bound for Hongkong. At the time of his apprehension, he was found carrying
with him foreign currency and foreign exchange instruments (380 pieces) amounting to US$
355,349.57, in various currency denominations, to wit: Japanese Yen, Swiss Franc, Australian
Dollar, Singapore Dollar, HFL Guilder, French Franc, U.S. Dollar, English Pound, Malaysian Dollar,
Deutsche Mark, Canadian Dollar and Hongkong Dollar, without any authority as provided by law. At
the time the accused was apprehended, he was able to exhibit two currency declarations which he
was supposed to have accomplished upon his arrival in Manila in previous trips, namely, CB
Currency Declaration No. 05048, dated May 4, 1986 for US$39,600.00 and Japanese Yen
4,000,000.00, and CB Currency Declaration No. 06346, dated June 29, 1986 for Japanese Yen
6,600,000.00.
An information was filed against Lo Chi Fai, with the RTC of Pasay City for violation of Sec. 6,
Central Bank Circular No. 960, as follows:
That on or about the 9th day of July, 1986, in the City of Pasay, Metro Manila,
Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named
accused, Mr. LO CHI FAI, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously attempt
to take out of the Philippines through the Manila International Airport the following
foreign currencies in cash and in checks:

Japanese Yen

Y 32,800,000.00

Swiss Franc

SW. FR 6,9000.00

Australian Dollar

A$ 17,425.00

Singapore Dollar

S$ 9,945.00

Deutsche Marck

DM 18,595.00

Canadian Dollar

CS 13,330.00

43

Hongkong Dollar

HK$ 15,630.00

HFL Guilder

HFL 430.00

French Franc

F/6,860.00

US Dollar

US$ 73,950.00

English Pound

5,318.00

Malaysian Dollar

M$. 14,760.00

(in checks)

Australian Dollar

A$ 7,750.00

British Pound

700.00

US Dollar

US$ 17,630.00

Canadian Dollar

C$ 990.00

without authority from the Central Bank.

Contrary to Law.
The case, which was docketed as Criminal Case No. 86-10126-P, was subsequently raffled to
Branch 113, presided by herein respondent Judge Baltazar A. Dizon.
Section 6 of Circular No. 960 of the Central Bank provides as follows:
Sec. 6. Export, import of foreign exchange; exceptions. No person shall take out or
transmit or attempt to take out or transmit foreign exchange in any form, out of the
Philippines directly, through other persons, through the mails or through international
carriers except when specifically authorized by the Central Bank or allowed under
existing international agreements or Central Bank regulations.
Tourists and non-resident visitors may take out or send out from the Philippine foreign
exchange in amounts not exceeding such amounts of foreign exchange brought in by
them. For purposes of establishing the amount of foreign exchange brought in or out of
the Philippines, tourists and non-resident temporary visitors bringing with them more

44

than US$3,000.00 or its equivalent in other foreign currencies shall declare their
foreign exchange in the form prescribed by the Central Bank at points of entries upon
arrival in the Philippines.
The penal sanction is provided by Section 1, P.D. No. 1883, which reads as follows:
Section 1. Blackmarketing of Foreign Exchange . That any person who shall engage
in the trading or purchase and sale of foreign currency in violation of existing laws or
rules and regulations of the Central Bank shall be guilty of the crime of blackmarketing
of foreign exchange and shall suffer the penalty of reclusion temporal, (minimum of 12
years and I day and maximum of 20 years) and a fine of no less than fifty thousand
(P50,000.00) Pesos.
At the trial, the accused tried to establish that he was a businessman from Kowloon, Hongkong,
engaged in the garment business, in which he had invested 4 to 5 million Hongkong Dollars; that he
had come to the Philippines 9 to 1 0 times, although the only dates he could remember were April 2,
1986, May 4, 1986, June 28,1986, and July 8, 1986; that the reason for his coming to the
Philippines was to invest in business in the Philippines and also to play in the casino; that he had a
group of business associates who decided to invest in business with him, namely: Wakita Noboyuki,
Kobayashi Nabuo, Lee Shiang Pin, Lee Chin and Cze Kai Kwan, who had their own businesses in
Japan and Hongkong; that when he came to the Philippines on April 2,1986, he brought
US$50,000.00 and 8,500,000.00 Japanese Yen which he tried to declare but the Central Bank
representative refused to accept his declaration, until he could get a confirmation as to the source of
the money, for which reason he contacted his bank in Hongkong and a telex was sent to him on April
3,1986 (Exh. 4). He also brought in with him US$39,000.00 and 4,000,000.00 Japanese Yen when
he arrived on May 4,1986 which he declared (Exh. 1). Again, he declared 8,600,000.00 Japanese
Yen when he arrived on June 28, 1986 (Exh. 2). He also testified that his business associates, as
per their agreement to invest in some business with him in the Philippines, started putting their
money for this purpose in a common fund, hence, every time anyone of them came to the
Philippines, they would declare the money they were bringing in, and all declarations were handed
to and kept by him; these currency declarations were presented at the trial as exhibits for the
defense. When asked by the court why he did not present all of these declarations when he was
apprehended at the airport, his answer was that he was not asked to present the declaration papers
of his associates, and besides, he does not understand English and he was not told to do so. He
also testified on cross-examination that the reason he was going back to Hongkong bringing with
him all the money intended to be invested in the Philippines was because of the fear of his group
that the "revolution" taking place in Manila might become widespread. It was because of this fear
that he was urged by his associates to come to Manila on July 8, 1986 to bring the money out of the
Philippines.
The respondent judge, in his decision acquitting the accused, stated:
The factual issue for this Court to determine is whether or not the accused wilfully
violated Section 6 of Circular No. 960. The fact that the accused had in his possession
the foreign currencies when he was about to depart from the Philippines did not by that
act alone make him liable for Violation of Section 6.
What is imperative is the purpose for which the act of bringing foreign currencies out of
the country was done the very intention. It is that which qualifies the act as criminal or
not. There must be that clear intention to violate and benefit from the act done. Intent
is a mental state, the existence of which is shown by overt acts of a person.
The respondent proceeded to analyze the evidence which, according to him, tended to show that
the accused had no wilfull intention to violate the law. According to the respondent in his decision:
... this Court is persuaded to accept the explanation of the defense that the currencies
confiscated and/or seized from the accused belong to him and his business associates
abovenamed. And from the unwavering and unequivocal testimonies of Mr. Templo
and all of currencies in question came from abroad and not from the local source
which is what is being prohibited by the government. Yes, simply reading the
provisions of said circular will, readily show that the currency declaration is required for

45

the purpose of establishing the amount of currency being brought by tourist or

temporary non-resident visitors into the country. The currency declarations, therefore,
is already (sic) intended to serve as a guideline for the Customs authorities to
determine the amounts actually brought in by them to correspond to the amounts that
could be allowed to be taken out. Indeed, this Court is amazed and really has its
misgivings in the manner currency declarations were made as testified to by the
Central Bank employees. Why the Bureau of Customs representative never took part
in all these declarations testified to by no less than five (5) Central Bank employees?
Seemingly, these employees are the favorites of these travellers. It is the hope of this
Court that the authorities must do something to remedy the evident flaw in the system
for effective implementation of the questioned Central Bank Circular No. 960.
But even with a doubtful mind this Court would not be able to pin criminal responsibility
on the accused. This is due to its steadfast adherence and devotion to the rule of law-a
factor in restoring the almost lost faith and erosion of confidence of the people in the
administration of justice. Courts of Justice are guided only by the rule of evidence.
The respondent-judge has shown gross incompetence or gross ignorance of the law in holding that
to convict the accused for violation of Central Bank Circular No. 960, the prosecution must establish
that the accused had the criminal intent to violate the law. The respondent ought to know that proof
of malice or deliberate intent (mens rea) is not essential in offenses punished by special laws, which
are mala prohibita. In requiring proof of malice, the respondent has by his gross ignorance allowed
the accused to go scot free. The accused at the time of his apprehension at the Manila International
Airport had in his possession the amount of US$355,349.57 in assorted foreign currencies and
foreign exchange instruments (380 pieces), without any specific authority from the Central Bank as
required by law. At the time of his apprehension, he was able to exhibit only two foreign currency
declarations in his possession. These were old declarations made by him on the occasion of his
previous trips to the Philippines.
Although lack of malice or wilfull intent is not a valid defense in a case for violation of Central Bank
Circular No. 960, the respondent nonetheless chose to exonerate the accused based on his defense
that the foreign currency he was bringing out of the country at the time he was apprehended by the
customs authorities were brought into the Philippines by him and his alleged business associates on
several previous occasions when they came to the Philippines, supposedly to be used for the
purpose of investing in some unspecified or undetermined business ventures; that this money was
kept in the Philippines and he precisely came to the Philippines to take the money out as he and his
alleged business associates were afraid that the "attempted revolution" which occurred on July
6,1986 might spread. Such fantastic tale, although totally irrelevant to the matter of the criminal
liability of the accused under the information, was swallowed by the respondent-judge "hook, line
and sinker." It did not matter to the respondent that the foreign currency and foreign currency
instruments found in the possession of the accused when he was apprehended at the airport-380
pieces in all-and the amounts of such foreign exchange did not correspond to the foreign currency
declarations presented by the accused at the trial. It did not matter to the respondent that the
accused by his own story admitted, in effect, that he was a carrier" of foreign currency for other
people. The respondent closed his eyes to the fact that the very substantial amounts of foreign
exchange found in the possession of the accused at the time of his apprehension consisted of
personal checks of other people, as well as cash in various currency denominations (12 kinds of
currency in all), which clearly belied the claim of the accused that they were part of the funds which
he and his supposed associates had brought in and kept in the Philippines for the purpose of
investing in some business ventures. The respondent ignored the fact that most of the CB Currency
declarations presented by the defense at the trial were declarations belonging to other people which
could not be utilized by the accused to justify his having the foreign exchange in his possession.
Although contrary to ordinary human experience and behavior, the respondent judge chose to give
credence to the fantastic tale of the accused that he and his alleged business associates had
brought in from time to time and accumulated and kept in the Philippines foreign exchange (of very
substantial amounts in cash and checks in various foreign currency denominations) for the purpose
of investing in business even before they knew and had come to an agreement as to the specific
business venture in which they were going to invest. These and other circumstances which make
the story concocted by the accused so palpably unbelievable as to render the findings of the
respondent judge obviously contrived to favor the acquittal of the accused, thereby clearly negating

46

his claim that he rendered the decision "in good faith." His actuations in this case amount to grave
misconduct prejudicial to the interest of sound and fair administration of justice.
He not only acquitted the accused Lo Chi Fai, but directed in his decision the release to the accused
of at least the amount of US$3,000.00, allowed, according to respondent, under Central Bank
Circular No. 960. This, in spite of the fact that forfeiture proceedings had already been instituted by
the Bureau of Customs over the currency listed in the information, which according to the
respondent should be respected since the Bureau of Customs "has the exclusive jurisdiction in the
matter of seizure and forfeiture of the property involved in the alleged infringements of the aforesaid
Central Bank Circular." In invoking the provisions of CB Circular No. 960 to justify the release of US$
3,000.00 to the accused, the respondent judge again displayed gross incompetence and gross
ignorance of the law. There is nothing in the said CB Circular which could be taken as authority for
the trial court to release the said amount of U.S. Currency to the accused. According to the abovecited CB Circular, tourists may take out or send out from the Philippines foreign exchange in
amounts not exceeding such amounts of foreign exchange brought in by them; for the purpose of
establishing such amount, tourists or non-resident temporary visitors bringing with them more than
US$3,000.00 or its equivalent in other foreign currencies must declare their foreign exchange at
points of entries upon arrival in the Philippines. In other words, CB Circular No. 960 merely provides
that for the purpose of establishing the amount of foreign currency brought in or out of the
Philippines, a tourist upon arrival is required to declare any foreign exchange he is bringing in at the
time of his arrival, if the same exceeds the amount of US$3,000.00 or its equivalent in other foreign
currencies. There is nothing in said circular that would justify returning to him the amount of at least
US$3,000.00, if he is caught attempting to bring out foreign exchange in excess of said amount
without specific authority from the Central Bank.
Accordingly, the Court finds the respondent Regional Trial Court Judge, Baltazar R. Dizon, guilty of
gross incompetence, gross ignorance of the law and grave and serious misconduct affecting his
integrity and efficiency, and consistent with the responsibility of this Court for the just and proper
administration of justice and for the attainment of the objective of maintaining the people's faith in
the judiciary (People vs. Valenzuela, 135 SCRA 712), it is hereby ordered that the Respondent
Judge be DISMISSED from the service. All leave and retirement benefits and privileges to which he
may be entitled are hereby forfeited with prejudice to his being reinstated in any branch of
government service, including government-owned and/or controlled agencies or corporations.
This resolution is immediately executory.
SO ORDERED.

Padilla vs. Dizon (Crim1)

Alexander Padilla, complainant, vs. The Hon. Baltazar R. Dizon, Presiding Judge of the Regional Trial
Court of Pasay City, Branch 113, respondent.

February 23, 1988

Per Curiam

Facts:

Respondent Baltazar R. Dizon acquitted, in his decision, the tourist and accused, Lo Chi Fai,
saying that Lo Chi Fai had no willful intention to violate the law. He also directed the release to
Lo Chi Fai of at least the amount of US$3,000.00 under Central Bank Circular No. 960.
o

Lo Chi Fai was caught by Customs guard at the Manila International Airport while
attempting to smuggle foreign currency and foreign exchange instruments out of the
country.

47
o

An information was filed against Lo Chi Fai with the RTC for violation of Sec. 6, Central
Bank Circular No. 960 with a penal sanction provided by Sec. 1, PD NO. 1883.

Sec. 6, Central Bank Circular No. 960 provides that no person shall take out or
transmit or attempt to take out or transmit foreign exchange in any form out of
the Philippines without an authorization by the Central Bank. Tourists and nonresident visitors may take out or send out from the Philippine foreign exchange
in amounts not exceeding such amounts of foreign exchange brought in by
them. Tourists and non-resident temporary visitors bringing with them more
than US$3,000.00 or its equivalent in other foreign currencies shall declare their
foreign exchange in the form prescribed by the Central Bank at points of entries
upon arrival in the Philippines.

Sec. 1, P.D. No. 1883 provides that any person who shall engage in the trading or
purchase and sale of foreign currency in violation of existing laws or rules and
regulations of the Central Bank shall be guilty of the crime of blackmarketing of
foreign exchange and shall suffer the penalty of reclusion temporal (minimum of
12 years and 1 day and maximum of 20 years) and a fine of no less than
P50,000.00.

At the trial, Lo Chi Fai tried to establish that he was a businessman from Hongkong,
that he had come to the Philippines 9 to 10 times to invest in business in the country
with his business associates, and that he and his business associates declared all the
money they brought in and all declarations were handed to and kept by him.

Because of the revolution taking place in Manila during that time, Lo Chi Fai was urged
by his business associates to come to Manila to bring the money out of the Philippines.

Commissioner of Customs, Alexander Padilla, then filed a complaint against Baltazar R. Dizon
for acquitting Lo Chi Fai.

Issue:

Whether or not respondent Baltazar R. Dizon is guilty of gross incompetence or gross

ignorance of the law in holding that the accused, Lo Chi Fai, for violation of Central Bank
Circular No. 960, the prosecution must establish that the accused had the criminal intent to
violate the law.

Held:

Yes.

Ratio:

Baltazar R. Dizon ignored the fact that the foreign currency and foreign currency instruments
found in the possession of Lo Chi Fai when he was apprehended at the airport and the
amounts of such foreign exchange did not correspond to the foreign currency declarations
presented by Lo Chi Fai at the trial, and that these currency declarations were declarations
belonging to other people.

In invoking the provisions of the Central Bank Circular No. 960 to justify the release of
US$3,000.00 to Lo Chi Fai, Baltazar R. Dizon again diplayed gross incompetence and gross
ignorance of law. There is nothing in the Central Bank Circular which could be taken as
authority for the trial court to release the said amount of US Currency to Lo Chi Fai.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
SECOND DIVISION

48

G.R. No. 96132 June 26, 1992

ORIEL MAGNO, petitioner,
vs.
HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS and PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondents.

PARAS, J.:
This is an appeal by certiorari under Rule 45 of the Revised Rules of Court, from the decision* of the
respondent Court of Appeals which affirmed in toto the decision of the Regional Trial Court of
Quezon City, Branch 104 finding the accused petitioner, guilty of violations of Batas Pambansa Blg.
22, in Criminal Cases Q-35693 to 35696 before they were elevated on appeal to the respondent
appellate Court under CA-G.R. CR No. 04889.
The antecedent facts and circumstances of the four (4) counts of the offense charged, have been
clearly illustrated, in the Comment of the Office of the Solicitor General as official counsel for the
public respondent, thus:
Petitioner was in the process of putting up a car repair shop sometime in April 1983, but a did not
have complete equipment that could make his venture workable. He also had another problem, and
that while he was going into this entrepreneurship, he lacked funds with which to purchase the
necessary equipment to make such business operational. Thus, petitioner, representing Ultra
Sources International Corporation, approached Corazon Teng, (private complainant) Vice President
of Mancor Industries (hereinafter referred to as Mancor) for his needed car repair service equipment
of which Mancor was a distributor, (Rollo, pp. 40-41)
Having been approached by petitioner on his predicament, who fully bared that he had no sufficient
funds to buy the equipment needed, the former (Corazon Teng) referred Magno to LS Finance and
Management Corporation (LB Finance for brevity) advising its Vice-President, Joey Gomez, that
Mancor was willing and able to supply the pieces of equipment needed if LS Finance could
accommodate petitioner and provide him credit facilities. (Ibid., P. 41)
The arrangement went through on condition that petitioner has to put up a warranty deposit
equivalent to thirty per centum (30%) of the total value of the pieces of equipment to be purchased,
amounting to P29,790.00. Since petitioner could not come up with such amount, he requested Joey
Gomez on a personal level to look for a third party who could lend him the equivalent amount of the
warranty deposit, however, unknown to petitioner, it was Corazon Teng who advanced the deposit in
question, on condition that the same would be paid as a short term loan at 3% interest (Ibid., P. 41)
The specific provision in the Leasing Agreement, reads:
1.1. WARRANTY DEPOSIT Before or upon delivery of each item of Equipment, the
Lessee shall deposit with the Lessor such sum or sums specified in Schedule A to
serve as security for the faithful performance of its obligations.
This deposit shall be refunded to the Lessee upon the satisfactory completion of the
entire period of Lease, subject to the conditions of clause 1.12 of this Article. (Ibid., p.
17)
As part of the arrangement, petitioner and LS Finance entered into a leasing agreement whereby LS
Finance would lease the garage equipments and petitioner would pay the corresponding rent with

49

the option to buy the same. After the documentation was completed, the equipment were delivered
to petitioner who in turn issued a postdated check and gave it to Joey Gomez who, unknown to the
petitioner, delivered the same to Corazon Teng. When the check matured, Petitioner requested
through Joey Gomez not to deposit the check as he (Magno) was no longer banking with Pacific
Bank.
To replace the first check issued, petitioner issued another set of six (6) postdated checks. Two (2)
checks dated July 29, 1983 were deposited and cleared while the four (4) others, which were the
subject of the four counts of the aforestated charges subject of the petition, were held momentarily
by Corazon Teng, on the request of Magno as they were not covered with sufficient funds. These
checks were a) Piso Bank Check Nos. 006858, dated August 15, 1983, 006859 dated August 28,
1983 and 006860 dated September 15, 1983, all in the amount of P5,038.43 and No. 006861 dated
September 28, 1983, in the amount of P10,076.87. (Ibid., pp. 42 & 43).
Subsequently, petitioner could not pay LS Finance the monthly rentals, thus it pulled out the garage
equipments. It was then on this occasion that petitioner became aware that Corazon Teng was the
one who advanced the warranty deposit. Petitioner with his wife went to see Corazon Teng and
promised to pay the latter but the payment never came and when the four (4) checks were
deposited they were returned for the reason "account closed." (Ibid., p. 43)
After joint trial before the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch 104, the accused-petitioner
was convicted for violations of BP Blg. 22 on the four (4) cases, as follows:
. . . finding the accused-appellant guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the offense of
violations of B.P. Blg. 22 and sentencing the accused to imprisonment for one year in
each Criminal Case Nos. Q-35693, Q-35695 and Q-35696 and to pay to complainant
the respective amounts reflected in subject checks. (Ibid., pp. 25, 27)
Reviewing the above and the affirmation of the above-stated decision of the court a quo, this Court
is intrigued about the outcome of the checks subject of the cases which were intended by the
parties, the petitioner on the one hand and the private complainant on the other, to cover the
"warranty deposit" equivalent to the 30% requirement of the financing company. Corazon Teng is
one of the officers of Mancor, the supplier of the equipment subject of the Leasing Agreement
subject of the high financing scheme undertaken by the petitioner as lessee of the repair service
equipment, which was arranged at the instance of Mrs. Teng from the very beginning of the
transaction.
By the nature of the "warranty deposit" amounting to P29,790.00 corresponding to 30% of the
"purchase/lease" value of the equipments subject of the transaction, it is obvious that the "cash out"
made by Mrs. Teng was not used by petitioner who was just paying rentals for the equipment. It
would have been different if petitioner opted to purchase the pieces of equipment on or about the
termination of the lease-purchase agreement in which case he had to pay the additional amount of
the warranty deposit which should have formed part of the purchase price. As the transaction did not
ripen into a purchase, but remained a lease with rentals being paid for the loaned equipment, which
were pulled out by the Lessor (Mancor) when the petitioner failed to continue paying possibly due to
economic constraints or business failure, then it is lawful and just that the warranty deposit should
not be charged against the petitioner.
To charge the petitioner for the refund of a "warranty deposit" which he did not withdraw as it was
not his own account, it having remained with LS Finance, is to even make him pay an unjust "debt",
to say the least, since petitioner did not receive the amount in question. All the while, said amount
was in the safekeeping of the financing company, which is managed, supervised and operated by
the corporation officials and employees of LS Finance. Petitioner did not even know that the checks
he issued were turned over by Joey Gomez to Mrs. Teng, whose operation was kept from his

50

knowledge on her instruction. This fact alone evoke suspicion that the transaction is irregular and
immoral per se, hence, she specifically requested Gomez not to divulge the source of the "warranty
deposit".
It is intriguing to realize that Mrs. Teng did not want the petitioner to know that it was she who
"accommodated" petitioner's request for Joey Gomez, to source out the needed funds for the
"warranty deposit". Thus it unfolds the kind of transaction that is shrouded with mystery, gimmickry
and doubtful legality. It is in simple language, a scheme whereby Mrs. Teng as the supplier of the
equipment in the name of her corporation, Mancor, would be able to "sell or lease" its goods as in
this case, and at the same time, privately financing those who desperately need petty
accommodations as this one. This modus operandi has in so many instances victimized
unsuspecting businessmen, who likewise need protection from the law, by availing of the
deceptively called "warranty deposit" not realizing that they also fall prey to leasing equipment under
the guise of a lease-purchase agreement when it is a scheme designed to skim off business clients.
This maneuvering has serious implications especially with respect to the threat of the penal sanction
of the law in issue, as in this case. And, with a willing court system to apply the full harshness of the
special law in question, using the "mala prohibitia" doctrine, the noble objective of the law is tainted
with materialism and opportunism in the highest, degree.
This angle is bolstered by the fact that since the petitioner or lessee referred to above in the lease
agreement knew that the amount of P29,790.00 subject of the cases, were mere accommodationarrangements with somebody thru Joey Gomez, petitioner did not even attempt to secure the refund
of said amount from LS Finance, notwithstanding the agreement provision to the contrary. To argue
that after the termination of the lease agreement, the warranty deposit should be refundable in full to
Mrs. Teng by petitioner when he did not cash out the "warranty deposit" for his official or personal
use, is to stretch the nicety of the alleged law (B.P. No, 22) violated.
For all intents and purposes, the law was devised to safeguard the interest of the banking system
and the legitimate public checking account user. It did not intend to shelter or favor nor encourage
users of the system to enrich themselves through manipulations and circumvention of the noble
purpose and objective of the law. Least should it be used also as a means of jeopardizing honest-togoodness transactions with some color of "get-rich" scheme to the prejudice of well-meaning
businessmen who are the pillars of society.
Under the utilitarian theory, the "protective theory" in criminal law, "affirms that the primary function
of punishment is the protective (sic) of society against actual and potential wrongdoers." It is not
clear whether petitioner could be considered as having actually committed the wrong sought to be
punished in the offense charged, but on the other hand, it can be safely said that the actuations of
Mrs. Carolina Teng amount to that of potential wrongdoers whose operations should also be clipped
at some point in time in order that the unwary public will not be failing prey to such a vicious
transaction (Aquino, The Revised Penal Code, 1987 Edition, Vol. I, P. 11)
Corollary to the above view, is the application of the theory that "criminal law is founded upon that
moral disapprobation . . . of actions which are immoral, i.e., which are detrimental (or dangerous) to
those conditions upon which depend the existence and progress of human society. This
disappropriation is inevitable to the extent that morality is generally founded and built upon a certain
concurrence in the moral opinions of all. . . . That which we call punishment is only an external
means of emphasizing moral disapprobation the method of punishment is in reality the amount of
punishment," (Ibid., P. 11, citing People v. Roldan Zaballero, CA 54 O.G. 6904, Note also Justice
Pablo's view in People v. Piosca and Peremne, 86 Phil. 31).
Thus, it behooves upon a court of law that in applying the punishment imposed upon the accused,
the objective of retribution of a wronged society, should be directed against the "actual and potential

51

wrongdoers." In the instant case, there is no doubt that petitioner's four (4) checks were used to
collateralize an accommodation, and not to cover the receipt of an actual "account or credit for
value" as this was absent, and therefore petitioner should not be punished for mere issuance of the
checks in question. Following the aforecited theory, in petitioner's stead the "potential wrongdoer",
whose operation could be a menace to society, should not be glorified by convicting the petitioner.
While in case of doubt, the case should have been resolved in favor of the accused, however, by the
open admission of the appellate court below, oven when the ultimate beneficiary of the "warranty
deposit" is of doubtful certainty, the accused was convicted, as shown below:
Nor do We see any merit in appellant's claim that the obligation of the accused to
complainant had been extinguished by the termination of the leasing agreement by
the terms of which the warranty deposit advanced by complainant was refundable to
the accused as lessee and that as the lessor L.S. Finance neither made any
liquidation of said amount nor returned the same to the accused, it may he assumed
that the amount was already returned to the complainant. For these allegations, even
if true, do not change the fact, admitted by appellant and established by the evidence,
that the four checks were originally issued on account or for value. And as We have
already observed, in order that there may be a conviction under the from paragraph of
Section 2 of B.P. Blg 22 with respect to the element of said offense that the check
should have been made and issued on account or for value it is sufficient, all the
other elements of the offense being present, that the check must have been drawn
and issued in payment of an obligation.
Moreover, even granting, arguendo, that the extinguishment, after the issuance of the
checks, of the obligation in consideration of which the checks were issued, would have
resulted in placing the case at bar beyond the purview of the prohibition in Section 1 of
BP Blg. 22, there is no satisfactory proof that there was such an extinguishment in the
present case. Appellee aptly points out that appellant had not adduced any direct
evidence to prove that the amount advanced by the complainant to cover the warranty
deposit must already have been returned to her. (Rollo, p. 30)
It is indubitable that the respondent Court of Appeals even disregarded the cardinal rule that the
accused is presumed innocent until proven guilty beyond reasonable doubt. On the contrary, the
same court even expected the petitioner-appellant to adduce evidence to show that he was not
guilty of the crime charged. But how can be produce documents showing that the warranty deposit
has already been taken back by Mrs. Teng when she is an officer of Mancor which has interest in
the transaction, besides being personally interested in the profit of her side-line. Thus, even if she
may have gotten back the value of the accommodation, she would still pursue collecting from the
petitioner since she had in her possession the checks that "bounced".
That the court a quo merely relied on the law, without looking into the real nature of the warranty
deposit is evident from the following pronouncement:
And the trail court concluded that there is no question that the accused violated BP
Blg. 22, which is a special statutory law, violations of which are mala prohibita. The
court relied on the rule that in cases of mala prohibita, the only inquiry is whether or
not the law had been violated, proof of criminal intent not being necessary for the
conviction of the accused, the acts being prohibited for reasons of public policy and
the defenses of good faith and absence of criminal intent being unavailing in
prosecutions for said offenses." (Ibid., p. 26)
The crux of the matter rests upon the reason for the drawing of the postdated checks by the
petitioner, i.e., whether they were drawn or issued "to apply on account or for value", as required

52

under Section 1 of B.P. Blg, 22. When viewed against the following definitions of the catch-terms
"warranty" and "deposit", for which the postdated checks were issued or drawn, all the more, the
alleged crime could not have been committed by petitioner:
a) Warranty A promise that a proposition of fact is true. A promise that certain facts
are truly as they are represented to be and that they will remain so: . . . (Black's Law
Dictionary, Fifth Edition, (1979) p. 1423)
A cross-reference to the following term shows:
Fitness for Particular Purpose:
Where the seller at the time of contracting has reason to know any particular purpose
for which the goods are required and that the buyer is relying on the seller's skill or
judgment to select or furnish suitable goods, there is, unless excluded or modified, an
implied warranty that the goods shall be fit for such purpose, (Ibid., p. 573)
b) Deposit: Money lodged with a person as an earnest or security for the
performance of some contract, to be forfeited if the depositor fails in his undertaking. It
may be deemed to be part payment and to that extent may constitute the purchaser
the actual owner of the estate.
To commit to custody, or to lay down; to place; to put. To lodge for safe- keeping or as
a pledge to intrust to the care of another.
The act of placing money in the custody of a bank or banker, for safety or
convenience, to be withdrawn at the will of the depositor or under rules and regulations
agreed on. Also, the money so deposited, or the credit which the depositor receives for
it. Deposit, according to its commonly accepted and generally understood among
bankers and by the public, includes not only deposits payable on demand and for
which certificates, whether interest-bearing or not, may be issued, payable on
demand, or on certain notice or at a fixed future time. (Ibid., pp. 394-395)
Furthermore, the element of "knowing at the time of issue that he does not have sufficient funds in
or credit with the drawee bank for the payment of such check in full upon its presentment, which
check is subsequently dishonored by the drawee bank for insufficiency of funds or credit or would
have been dishonored for the same reason . . . is inversely applied in this case. From the very
beginning, petitioner never hid the fact that he did not have the funds with which to put up the
warranty deposit and as a matter of fact, he openly intimated this to the vital conduit of the
transaction, Joey Gomez, to whom petitioner was introduced by Mrs. Teng. It would have been
different if this predicament was not communicated to all the parties he dealt with regarding the
lease agreement the financing of which was covered by L.S. Finance Management.
WHEREFORE, the appealed decision is REVERSED and the accused-petitioner is hereby
ACQUITTED of the crime charged.
SO ORDERED.

Magno vs. CA (Crim1)

Oriel Magno, petitioner, vs. Honorable Court of Appeals and People of the Philippines, respondents.

June 26, 1992

53

Paras, J:

Facts:

Oriel Magno, lacking fund in acquiring complete set of equipment to make his car repair shop
operational, approached Corazon Teng, Vice President of Mancor Industries.

VP Teng referred Magno to LS Finance and Management Corporation, advising its Vice
President, Joey Gomez, that Mancor was willing to supply the pieces of equipment needed if
LS Finance could accommodate Magno and and provide him credit facilities.

The arrangement went on requiring Magno to pay 30% of the total amount of the equipment as
warranty deposit but Magno couldn't afford to pay so he requested VP Gomez to look for third
party who could lend him that amount.

Without Magno's knowledge, Corazon was the one who provided that amount.

As payment to the equipment, Magno issued six checks, two of them were cleared and the rest
had no sufficient fund.

Because of the unsuccessful venture, Magno failed to pay LS Finance which then pulled out
the equipment.

Magno was charged of violation of BP Blg. 2 (The Bouncing Checks Law) and found guilty.

Issue:

Whether or not Magno should be punished for the issuance of the checks in question.

Held:

No

Ratio:

To charge Magno for the refund of a warranty deposit which he did not withdraw as it was not
his own account, it having remained with LS Finance, is to even make him pay an unjust debt
since he did not receive the amount in question. All the while, said amount was in the
safekeeping of the financing company which is managed by the officials and employees of LS
Finance.

[G.R. No. 148560. November 19, 2001]

JOSEPH EJERCITO ESTRADA, petitioner, vs. SANDIGANBAYAN (Third Division) and PEOPLE OF
THE PHILIPPINES, respondents.
DECISION
BELLOSILLO, J.:
JOHN STUART MILL, in his essay On Liberty, unleashes the full fury of his pen in defense of the
rights of the individual from the vast powers of the State and the inroads of societal pressure. But
even as he draws a sacrosanct line demarcating the limits on individuality beyond which the State
cannot tread - asserting that "individual spontaneity" must be allowed to flourish with very little
regard to social interference - he veritably acknowledges that the exercise of rights and liberties is

54

imbued with a civic obligation, which society is justified in enforcing at all cost, against those who
would endeavor to withhold fulfillment. Thus he says The sole end for which mankind is warranted, individually or collectively, in interfering with the liberty
of action of any of their number, is self-protection. The only purpose for which power can be
rightfully exercised over any member of a civilized community, against his will, is to prevent harm to
others.
Parallel to individual liberty is the natural and illimitable right of the State to self-preservation. With
the end of maintaining the integrity and cohesiveness of the body politic, it behooves the State to
formulate a system of laws that would compel obeisance to its collective wisdom and inflict
punishment for non-observance.
The movement from Mill's individual liberalism to unsystematic collectivism wrought changes in the
social order, carrying with it a new formulation of fundamental rights and duties more attuned to the
imperatives of contemporary socio-political ideologies. In the process, the web of rights and State
impositions became tangled and obscured, enmeshed in threads of multiple shades and colors, the
skein irregular and broken. Antagonism, often outright collision, between the law as the expression
of the will of the State, and the zealous attempts by its members to preserve their individuality and
dignity, inevitably followed. It is when individual rights are pitted against State authority that judicial
conscience is put to its severest test.
Petitioner Joseph Ejercito Estrada, the highest-ranking official to be prosecuted under RA 7080 (An
Act Defining and Penalizing the Crime of Plunder),i[1] as amended by RA 7659,ii[2] wishes to
impress upon us that the assailed law is so defectively fashioned that it crosses that thin but distinct
line which divides the valid from the constitutionally infirm. He therefore makes a stringent call for
this Court to subject the Plunder Law to the crucible of constitutionality mainly because, according to
him, (a) it suffers from the vice of vagueness; (b) it dispenses with the "reasonable doubt" standard
in criminal prosecutions; and, (c) it abolishes the element of mens rea in crimes already punishable
under The Revised Penal Code, all of which are purportedly clear violations of the fundamental
rights of the accused to due process and to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation
against him.
Specifically, the provisions of the Plunder Law claimed by petitioner to have transgressed
constitutional boundaries are Secs. 1, par. (d), 2 and 4 which are reproduced hereunder:
Section 1. x x x x (d) "Ill-gotten wealth" means any asset, property, business, enterprise or material
possession of any person within the purview of Section Two (2) hereof, acquired by him directly or
indirectly through dummies, nominees, agents, subordinates and/or business associates by any
combination or series of the following means or similar schemes:
(1) Through misappropriation, conversion, misuse, or malversation of public funds or raids on the
public treasury;
(2) By receiving, directly or indirectly, any commission, gift, share, percentage, kickbacks or any
other form of pecuniary benefit from any person and/or entity in connection with any government
contract or project or by reason of the office or position of the public office concerned;
(3) By the illegal or fraudulent conveyance or disposition of assets belonging to the National
Government or any of its subdivisions, agencies or instrumentalities, or government owned or
controlled corporations and their subsidiaries;
(4) By obtaining, receiving or accepting directly or indirectly any shares of stock, equity or any other
form of interest or participation including the promise of future employment in any business
enterprise or undertaking;
(5) By establishing agricultural, industrial or commercial monopolies or other combinations and/or
implementation of decrees and orders intended to benefit particular persons or special interests; or

55

(6) By taking advantage of official position, authority, relationship, connection or influence to unjustly
enrich himself or themselves at the expense and to the damage and prejudice of the Filipino people
and the Republic of the Philippines.
Section 2. Definition of the Crime of Plunder, Penalties. - Any public officer who, by himself or in
connivance with members of his family, relatives by affinity or consanguinity, business associates,
subordinates or other persons, amasses, accumulates or acquires ill-gotten wealth through a
combination or series of overt or criminal acts as described in Section 1 (d) hereof, in the
aggregate amount or total value of at least fifty million pesos (P50,000,000.00) shall be guilty of the
crime of plunder and shall be punished by reclusion perpetua to death. Any person who participated
with the said public officer in the commission of an offense contributing to the crime of plunder shall
likewise be punished for such offense. In the imposition of penalties, the degree of participation and
the attendance of mitigating and extenuating circumstances as provided by the Revised Penal Code
shall be considered by the court. The court shall declare any and all ill-gotten wealth and their
interests and other incomes and assets including the properties and shares of stocks derived from
the deposit or investment thereof forfeited in favor of the State (underscoring supplied).
Section 4. Rule of Evidence. - For purposes of establishing the crime of plunder, it shall not be
necessary to prove each and every criminal act done by the accused in furtherance of the
scheme or conspiracy to amass, accumulate or acquire ill-gotten wealth, it being sufficient to
establish beyond reasonable doubt a pattern of overt or criminal acts indicative of the overall
unlawful scheme or conspiracy (underscoring supplied).
On 4 April 2001 the Office of the Ombudsman filed before the Sandiganbayan eight (8) separate
Informations, docketed as: (a) Crim. Case No. 26558, for violation of RA 7080, as amended by RA
7659; (b) Crim. Cases Nos. 26559 to 26562, inclusive, for violation of Secs. 3, par. (a), 3, par. (a), 3,
par. (e) and 3, par. (e), of RA 3019 (Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act), respectively; (c) Crim.
Case No. 26563, for violation of Sec. 7, par. (d), of RA 6713 (The Code of Conduct and Ethical
Standards for Public Officials and Employees); (d) Crim. Case No. 26564, for Perjury (Art. 183 of
The Revised Penal Code); and, (e) Crim. Case No. 26565, for Illegal Use Of An Alias (CA No. 142,
as amended by RA 6085).
On 11 April 2001 petitioner filed an Omnibus Motion for the remand of the case to the Ombudsman
for preliminary investigation with respect to specification "d" of the charges in the Information in
Crim. Case No. 26558; and, for reconsideration/reinvestigation of the offenses under specifications
"a," "b," and "c" to give the accused an opportunity to file counter-affidavits and other documents
necessary to prove lack of probable cause. Noticeably, the grounds raised were only lack of
preliminary investigation, reconsideration/reinvestigation of offenses, and opportunity to prove lack
of probable cause. The purported ambiguity of the charges and the vagueness of the law under
which they are charged were never raised in that Omnibus Motion thus indicating the explicitness
and comprehensibility of the Plunder Law.
On 25 April 2001 the Sandiganbayan, Third Division, issued a Resolution in Crim. Case No. 26558
finding that "a probable cause for the offense of PLUNDER exists to justify the issuance of warrants
for the arrest of the accused." On 25 June 2001 petitioner's motion for reconsideration was denied
by the Sandiganbayan.
On 14 June 2001 petitioner moved to quash the Information in Crim. Case No. 26558 on the ground
that the facts alleged therein did not constitute an indictable offense since the law on which it was
based was unconstitutional for vagueness, and that the Amended Information for Plunder charged
more than one (1) offense. On 21 June 2001 the Government filed its Opposition to the Motion to
Quash, and five (5) days later or on 26 June 2001 petitioner submitted his Reply to the Opposition.
On 9 July 2001 the Sandiganbayan denied petitioner's Motion to Quash.
As concisely delineated by this Court during the oral arguments on 18 September 2001, the issues
for resolution in the instant petition for certiorari are: (a) The Plunder Law is unconstitutional for
being vague; (b) The Plunder Law requires less evidence for proving the predicate crimes of plunder
and therefore violates the rights of the accused to due process; and, (c) Whether Plunder as defined
in RA 7080 is a malum prohibitum, and if so, whether it is within the power of Congress to so classify
it.

56

Preliminarily, the whole gamut of legal concepts pertaining to the validity of legislation is predicated
on the basic principle that a legislative measure is presumed to be in harmony with the
Constitution.iii[3] Courts invariably train their sights on this fundamental rule whenever a legislative
act is under a constitutional attack, for it is the postulate of constitutional adjudication. This strong
predilection for constitutionality takes its bearings on the idea that it is forbidden for one branch of
the government to encroach upon the duties and powers of another. Thus it has been said that the
presumption is based on the deference the judicial branch accords to its coordinate branch - the
legislature.
If there is any reasonable basis upon which the legislation may firmly rest, the courts must assume
that the legislature is ever conscious of the borders and edges of its plenary powers, and has
passed the law with full knowledge of the facts and for the purpose of promoting what is right and
advancing the welfare of the majority. Hence in determining whether the acts of the legislature are in
tune with the fundamental law, courts should proceed with judicial restraint and act with caution and
forbearance. Every intendment of the law must be adjudged by the courts in favor of its
constitutionality, invalidity being a measure of last resort. In construing therefore the provisions of a
statute, courts must first ascertain whether an interpretation is fairly possible to sidestep the
question of constitutionality.
In La Union Credit Cooperative, Inc. v. Yaranoniv[4] we held that as long as there is some basis for
the decision of the court, the constitutionality of the challenged law will not be touched and the case
will be decided on other available grounds. Yet the force of the presumption is not sufficient to
catapult a fundamentally deficient law into the safe environs of constitutionality. Of course, where the
law clearly and palpably transgresses the hallowed domain of the organic law, it must be struck
down on sight lest the positive commands of the fundamental law be unduly eroded.
Verily, the onerous task of rebutting the presumption weighs heavily on the party challenging the
validity of the statute. He must demonstrate beyond any tinge of doubt that there is indeed an
infringement of the constitution, for absent such a showing, there can be no finding of
unconstitutionality. A doubt, even if well-founded, will hardly suffice. As tersely put by Justice
Malcolm, "To doubt is to sustain."v[5] And petitioner has miserably failed in the instant case to
discharge his burden and overcome the presumption of constitutionality of the Plunder Law.
As it is written, the Plunder Law contains ascertainable standards and well-defined parameters
which would enable the accused to determine the nature of his violation. Section 2 is sufficiently
explicit in its description of the acts, conduct and conditions required or forbidden, and prescribes
the elements of the crime with reasonable certainty and particularity. Thus 1. That the offender is a public officer who acts by himself or in connivance with members of his
family, relatives by affinity or consanguinity, business associates, subordinates or other persons;
2. That he amassed, accumulated or acquired ill-gotten wealth through a combination or series of
the following overt or criminal acts: (a) through misappropriation, conversion, misuse, or
malversation of public funds or raids on the public treasury; (b) by receiving, directly or indirectly,
any commission, gift, share, percentage, kickback or any other form of pecuniary benefits from any
person and/or entity in connection with any government contract or project or by reason of the office
or position of the public officer; (c) by the illegal or fraudulent conveyance or disposition of assets
belonging to the National Government or any of its subdivisions, agencies or instrumentalities of
Government owned or controlled corporations or their subsidiaries; (d) by obtaining, receiving or
accepting directly or indirectly any shares of stock, equity or any other form of interest or
participation including the promise of future employment in any business enterprise or undertaking;
(e) by establishing agricultural, industrial or commercial monopolies or other combinations and/or
implementation of decrees and orders intended to benefit particular persons or special interests; or
(f) by taking advantage of official position, authority, relationship, connection or influence to unjustly
enrich himself or themselves at the expense and to the damage and prejudice of the Filipino people
and the Republic of the Philippines; and,
3. That the aggregate amount or total value of the ill-gotten wealth amassed, accumulated or
acquired is at least P50,000,000.00.

57

As long as the law affords some comprehensible guide or rule that would inform those who are
subject to it what conduct would render them liable to its penalties, its validity will be sustained. It
must sufficiently guide the judge in its application; the counsel, in defending one charged with its
violation; and more importantly, the accused, in identifying the realm of the proscribed conduct.
Indeed, it can be understood with little difficulty that what the assailed statute punishes is the act of a
public officer in amassing or accumulating ill-gotten wealth of at least P50,000,000.00 through a
series or combination of acts enumerated in Sec. 1, par. (d), of the Plunder Law.
In fact, the amended Information itself closely tracks the language of the law, indicating with
reasonable certainty the various elements of the offense which petitioner is alleged to have
committed:
"The undersigned Ombudsman, Prosecutor and OIC-Director, EPIB, Office of the Ombudsman,
hereby accuses former PRESIDENT OF THE REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, Joseph Ejercito
Estrada, a.k.a. 'ASIONG SALONGA' and a.k.a. 'JOSE VELARDE,' together with Jose 'Jinggoy'
Estrada, Charlie 'Atong' Ang, Edward Serapio, Yolanda T. Ricaforte, Alma Alfaro, JOHN DOE a.k.a.
Eleuterio Tan OR Eleuterio Ramos Tan or Mr. Uy, Jane Doe a.k.a. Delia Rajas, and John DOES &
Jane Does, of the crime of Plunder, defined and penalized under R.A. No. 7080, as amended by
Sec. 12 of R.A. No. 7659, committed as follows:
That during the period from June, 1998 to January 2001, in the Philippines, and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, accused Joseph Ejercito Estrada, THEN A PRESIDENT OF
THE REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, by himself AND/OR in CONNIVANCE/CONSPIRACY with
his co-accused, WHO ARE MEMBERS OF HIS FAMILY, RELATIVES BY AFFINITY OR
CONSANGUINITY, BUSINESS ASSOCIATES, SUBORDINATES AND/OR OTHER PERSONS, BY
TAKING UNDUE ADVANTAGE OF HIS OFFICIAL POSITION, AUTHORITY, RELATIONSHIP,
CONNECTION, OR INFLUENCE, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and criminally amass,
accumulate and acquire BY HIMSELF, DIRECTLY OR INDIRECTLY, ill-gotten wealth in the
aggregate amount or TOTAL VALUE of FOUR BILLION NINETY SEVEN MILLION EIGHT
HUNDRED FOUR THOUSAND ONE HUNDRED SEVENTY THREE PESOS AND SEVENTEEN
CENTAVOS (P4,097,804,173.17), more or less, THEREBY UNJUSTLY ENRICHING HIMSELF OR
THEMSELVES AT THE EXPENSE AND TO THE DAMAGE OF THE FILIPINO PEOPLE AND THE
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, through ANY OR A combination OR A series of overt OR
criminal acts, OR SIMILAR SCHEMES OR MEANS, described as follows:
(a) by receiving OR collecting, directly or indirectly, on SEVERAL INSTANCES, MONEY IN THE
AGGREGATE AMOUNT OF FIVE HUNDRED FORTY-FIVE MILLION PESOS ( P545,000,000.00),
MORE OR LESS, FROM ILLEGAL GAMBLING IN THE FORM OF GIFT, SHARE, PERCENTAGE,
KICKBACK OR ANY FORM OF PECUNIARY BENEFIT, BY HIMSELF AND/OR in connection with
co-accused CHARLIE 'ATONG' ANG, Jose 'Jinggoy' Estrada, Yolanda T. Ricaforte, Edward
Serapio, AND JOHN DOES AND JANE DOES, in consideration OF TOLERATION OR
PROTECTION OF ILLEGAL GAMBLING;
(b) by DIVERTING, RECEIVING, misappropriating, converting OR misusing DIRECTLY OR
INDIRECTLY, for HIS OR THEIR PERSONAL gain and benefit, public funds in the amount of ONE
HUNDRED THIRTY MILLION PESOS (P130,000,000.00), more or less, representing a portion of
the TWO HUNDRED MILLION PESOS (P200,000,000.00) tobacco excise tax share allocated for
the province of Ilocos Sur under R.A. No. 7171, by himself and/or in connivance with co-accused
Charlie 'Atong' Ang, Alma Alfaro, JOHN DOE a.k.a. Eleuterio Ramos Tan or Mr. Uy, Jane Doe a.k.a.
Delia Rajas, AND OTHER JOHN DOES & JANE DOES; (italic supplied).
(c) by directing, ordering and compelling, FOR HIS PERSONAL GAIN AND BENEFIT, the
Government Service Insurance System (GSIS) TO PURCHASE 351,878,000 SHARES OF
STOCKS, MORE OR LESS, and the Social Security System (SSS), 329,855,000 SHARES OF
STOCK, MORE OR LESS, OF THE BELLE CORPORATION IN THE AMOUNT OF MORE OR
LESS ONE BILLION ONE HUNDRED TWO MILLION NINE HUNDRED SIXTY FIVE THOUSAND
SIX HUNDRED SEVEN PESOS AND FIFTY CENTAVOS (P1,102,965,607.50) AND MORE OR
LESS SEVEN HUNDRED FORTY FOUR MILLION SIX HUNDRED TWELVE THOUSAND AND
FOUR HUNDRED FIFTY PESOS (P744,612,450.00), RESPECTIVELY, OR A TOTAL OF MORE
OR LESS ONE BILLION EIGHT HUNDRED FORTY SEVEN MILLION FIVE HUNDRED SEVENTY
EIGHT THOUSAND FIFTY SEVEN PESOS AND FIFTY CENTAVOS (P1,847,578,057.50); AND BY

58

COLLECTING OR RECEIVING, DIRECTLY OR INDIRECTLY, BY HIMSELF AND/OR IN

CONNIVANCE WITH JOHN DOES AND JANE DOES, COMMISSIONS OR PERCENTAGES BY
REASON OF SAID PURCHASES OF SHARES OF STOCK IN THE AMOUNT OF ONE HUNDRED
EIGHTY NINE MILLION SEVEN HUNDRED THOUSAND PESOS (P189,700,000.00) MORE OR
LESS, FROM THE BELLE CORPORATION WHICH BECAME PART OF THE DEPOSIT IN THE
EQUITABLE-PCI BANK UNDER THE ACCOUNT NAME 'JOSE VELARDE;'
(d) by unjustly enriching himself FROM COMMISSIONS, GIFTS, SHARES, PERCENTAGES,
KICKBACKS, OR ANY FORM OF PECUNIARY BENEFITS, IN CONNIVANCE WITH JOHN DOES
AND JANE DOES, in the amount of MORE OR LESS THREE BILLION TWO HUNDRED THIRTY
THREE MILLION ONE HUNDRED FOUR THOUSAND ONE HUNDRED SEVENTY THREE PESOS
AND SEVENTEEN CENTAVOS (P3,233,104,173.17) AND DEPOSITING THE SAME UNDER HIS
ACCOUNT NAME 'JOSE VELARDE' AT THE EQUITABLE-PCI BANK."
We discern nothing in the foregoing that is vague or ambiguous - as there is obviously none - that
will confuse petitioner in his defense. Although subject to proof, these factual assertions clearly
show that the elements of the crime are easily understood and provide adequate contrast between
the innocent and the prohibited acts. Upon such unequivocal assertions, petitioner is completely
informed of the accusations against him as to enable him to prepare for an intelligent defense.
Petitioner, however, bewails the failure of the law to provide for the statutory definition of the terms
"combination" and "series" in the key phrase "a combination or series of overt or criminal acts" found
in Sec. 1, par. (d), and Sec. 2, and the word "pattern" in Sec. 4. These omissions, according to
petitioner, render the Plunder Law unconstitutional for being impermissibly vague and overbroad
and deny him the right to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against him, hence,
violative of his fundamental right to due process.
The rationalization seems to us to be pure sophistry. A statute is not rendered uncertain and void
merely because general terms are used therein, or because of the employment of terms without
defining them;vi[6] much less do we have to define every word we use. Besides, there is no positive
constitutional or statutory command requiring the legislature to define each and every word in an
enactment. Congress is not restricted in the form of expression of its will, and its inability to so
define the words employed in a statute will not necessarily result in the vagueness or ambiguity of
the law so long as the legislative will is clear, or at least, can be gathered from the whole act, which
is distinctly expressed in the Plunder Law.
Moreover, it is a well-settled principle of legal hermeneutics that words of a statute will be interpreted
in their natural, plain and ordinary acceptation and signification, vii[7] unless it is evident that the
legislature intended a technical or special legal meaning to those words. viii[8] The intention of the
lawmakers - who are, ordinarily, untrained philologists and lexicographers - to use statutory
phraseology in such a manner is always presumed. Thus, Webster's New Collegiate Dictionary
contains the following commonly accepted definition of the words "combination" and "series:"
Combination - the result or product of combining; the act or process of combining. To combine is to
bring into such close relationship as to obscure individual characters.
Series - a number of things or events of the same class coming one after another in spatial and
temporal succession.
That Congress intended the words "combination" and "series" to be understood in their popular
meanings is pristinely evident from the legislative deliberations on the bill which eventually became
RA 7080 or the Plunder Law:
DELIBERATIONS OF THE BICAMERAL COMMITTEE ON JUSTICE, 7 May 1991
REP. ISIDRO: I am just intrigued again by our definition of plunder. We say THROUGH A
COMBINATION OR SERIES OF OVERT OR CRIMINAL ACTS AS MENTIONED IN SECTION ONE
HEREOF. Now when we say combination, we actually mean to say, if there are two or more means,
we mean to say that number one and two or number one and something else are included, how
about a series of the same act? For example, through misappropriation, conversion, misuse, will
these be included also?

59

REP. GARCIA: Yeah, because we say a series.

REP. ISIDRO: Series.
REP. GARCIA: Yeah, we include series.
REP. ISIDRO: But we say we begin with a combination.
REP. GARCIA: Yes.
REP. ISIDRO: When we say combination, it seems that REP. GARCIA: Two.
REP. ISIDRO: Not only two but we seem to mean that two of the enumerated means not twice of
one enumeration.
REP. GARCIA: No, no, not twice.
REP. ISIDRO: Not twice?
REP. GARCIA: Yes. Combination is not twice - but combination, two acts.
REP. ISIDRO: So in other words, thats it. When we say combination, we mean, two different acts. It
cannot be a repetition of the same act.
REP. GARCIA: That be referred to series, yeah.
REP. ISIDRO: No, no. Supposing one act is repeated, so there are two.
REP. GARCIA: A series.
REP. ISIDRO: Thats not series. Its a combination. Because when we say combination or series, we
seem to say that two or more, di ba?
REP. GARCIA: Yes, this distinguishes it really from ordinary crimes. That is why, I said, that is a very
good suggestion because if it is only one act, it may fall under ordinary crime but we have here a
combination or series of overt or criminal acts. So x x x x
REP. GARCIA: Series. One after the other eh di....
SEN. TANADA: So that would fall under the term series?
REP. GARCIA: Series, oo.
REP. ISIDRO: Now, if it is a combination, ano, two misappropriations....
REP. GARCIA: Its not... Two misappropriations will not be combination. Series.
REP. ISIDRO: So, it is not a combination?
REP. GARCIA: Yes.
REP. ISIDRO: When you say combination, two different?
REP. GARCIA: Yes.
SEN. TANADA: Two different.
REP. ISIDRO: Two different acts.

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REP. GARCIA: For example, ha...

REP. ISIDRO: Now a series, meaning, repetition...
DELIBERATIONS ON SENATE BILL NO. 733, 6 June 1989
SENATOR MACEDA: In line with our interpellations that sometimes one or maybe even two acts
may already result in such a big amount, on line 25, would the Sponsor consider deleting the words
a series of overt or, to read, therefore: or conspiracy COMMITTED by criminal acts such as.
Remove the idea of necessitating a series. Anyway, the criminal acts are in the plural.
SENATOR TANADA: That would mean a combination of two or more of the acts mentioned in this.
THE PRESIDENT: Probably two or more would be....
SENATOR MACEDA: Yes, because a series implies several or many; two or more.
SENATOR TANADA: Accepted, Mr. President x x x x
THE PRESIDENT: If there is only one, then he has to be prosecuted under the particular crime. But
when we say acts of plunder there should be, at least, two or more.
SENATOR ROMULO: In other words, that is already covered by existing laws, Mr. President.
Thus when the Plunder Law speaks of "combination," it is referring to at least two (2) acts falling
under different categories of enumeration provided in Sec. 1, par. (d), e.g., raids on the public
treasury in Sec. 1, par. (d), subpar. (1), and fraudulent conveyance of assets belonging to the
National Government under Sec. 1, par. (d), subpar. (3).
On the other hand, to constitute a series" there must be two (2) or more overt or criminal acts falling
under the same category of enumeration found in Sec. 1, par. (d), say, misappropriation,
malversation and raids on the public treasury, all of which fall under Sec. 1, par. (d), subpar. (1).
Verily, had the legislature intended a technical or distinctive meaning for "combination" and "series,"
it would have taken greater pains in specifically providing for it in the law.
As for "pattern," we agree with the observations of the Sandiganbayan ix[9] that this term is
sufficiently defined in Sec. 4, in relation to Sec. 1, par. (d), and Sec. 2 x x x x under Sec. 1 (d) of the law, a 'pattern' consists of at least a combination or series of overt or
criminal acts enumerated in subsections (1) to (6) of Sec. 1 (d). Secondly, pursuant to Sec. 2 of the
law, the pattern of overt or criminal acts is directed towards a common purpose or goal which is to
enable the public officer to amass, accumulate or acquire ill-gotten wealth. And thirdly, there must
either be an 'overall unlawful scheme' or 'conspiracy' to achieve said common goal. As commonly
understood, the term 'overall unlawful scheme' indicates a 'general plan of action or method' which
the principal accused and public officer and others conniving with him follow to achieve the
aforesaid common goal. In the alternative, if there is no such overall scheme or where the schemes
or methods used by multiple accused vary, the overt or criminal acts must form part of a conspiracy
to attain a common goal.
Hence, it cannot plausibly be contended that the law does not give a fair warning and sufficient
notice of what it seeks to penalize. Under the circumstances, petitioner's reliance on the "void-forvagueness" doctrine is manifestly misplaced. The doctrine has been formulated in various ways, but
is most commonly stated to the effect that a statute establishing a criminal offense must define the
offense with sufficient definiteness that persons of ordinary intelligence can understand what
conduct is prohibited by the statute. It can only be invoked against that specie of legislation that is
utterly vague on its face, i.e., that which cannot be clarified either by a saving clause or by
construction.
A statute or act may be said to be vague when it lacks comprehensible standards that men of
common intelligence must necessarily guess at its meaning and differ in its application. In such
instance, the statute is repugnant to the Constitution in two (2) respects - it violates due process for

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failure to accord persons, especially the parties targeted by it, fair notice of what conduct to avoid;
and, it leaves law enforcers unbridled discretion in carrying out its provisions and becomes an
arbitrary flexing of the Government muscle.x[10] But the doctrine does not apply as against
legislations that are merely couched in imprecise language but which nonetheless specify a
standard though defectively phrased; or to those that are apparently ambiguous yet fairly applicable
to certain types of activities. The first may be "saved" by proper construction, while no challenge
may be mounted as against the second whenever directed against such activities. xi[11] With more
reason, the doctrine cannot be invoked where the assailed statute is clear and free from ambiguity,
as in this case.
The test in determining whether a criminal statute is void for uncertainty is whether the language
conveys a sufficiently definite warning as to the proscribed conduct when measured by common
understanding and practice.xii[12] It must be stressed, however, that the "vagueness" doctrine merely
requires a reasonable degree of certainty for the statute to be upheld - not absolute precision or
mathematical exactitude, as petitioner seems to suggest. Flexibility, rather than meticulous
specificity, is permissible as long as the metes and bounds of the statute are clearly delineated. An
act will not be held invalid merely because it might have been more explicit in its wordings or
detailed in its provisions, especially where, because of the nature of the act, it would be impossible
to provide all the details in advance as in all other statutes.
Moreover, we agree with, hence we adopt, the observations of Mr. Justice Vicente V. Mendoza
during the deliberations of the Court that the allegations that the Plunder Law is vague and
overbroad do not justify a facial review of its validity The void-for-vagueness doctrine states that "a statute which either forbids or requires the doing of
an act in terms so vague that men of common intelligence must necessarily guess at its meaning
and differ as to its application, violates the first essential of due process of law." xiii[13] The
overbreadth doctrine, on the other hand, decrees that "a governmental purpose may not be
achieved by means which sweep unnecessarily broadly and thereby invade the area of protected
freedoms."xiv[14]
A facial challenge is allowed to be made to a vague statute and to one which is overbroad because
of possible "chilling effect" upon protected speech. The theory is that "[w]hen statutes regulate or
proscribe speech and no readily apparent construction suggests itself as a vehicle for rehabilitating
the statutes in a single prosecution, the transcendent value to all society of constitutionally protected
expression is deemed to justify allowing attacks on overly broad statutes with no requirement that
the person making the attack demonstrate that his own conduct could not be regulated by a statute
drawn with narrow specificity."xv[15] The possible harm to society in permitting some unprotected
speech to go unpunished is outweighed by the possibility that the protected speech of others may
be deterred and perceived grievances left to fester because of possible inhibitory effects of overly
broad statutes.
This rationale does not apply to penal statutes. Criminal statutes have general in terrorem effect
resulting from their very existence, and, if facial challenge is allowed for this reason alone, the State
may well be prevented from enacting laws against socially harmful conduct. In the area of criminal
law, the law cannot take chances as in the area of free speech.
The overbreadth and vagueness doctrines then have special application only to free speech cases.
They are inapt for testing the validity of penal statutes. As the U.S. Supreme Court put it, in an
opinion by Chief Justice Rehnquist, "we have not recognized an 'overbreadth' doctrine outside the
limited context of the First Amendment." xvi[16] In Broadrick v. Oklahoma,xvii[17] the Court ruled that
"claims of facial overbreadth have been entertained in cases involving statutes which, by their terms,
seek to regulate only spoken words" and, again, that "overbreadth claims, if entertained at all, have
been curtailed when invoked against ordinary criminal laws that are sought to be applied to
protected conduct." For this reason, it has been held that "a facial challenge to a legislative act is the
most difficult challenge to mount successfully, since the challenger must establish that no set of
circumstances exists under which the Act would be valid." xviii[18] As for the vagueness doctrine, it is
said that a litigant may challenge a statute on its face only if it is vague in all its possible
applications. "A plaintiff who engages in some conduct that is clearly proscribed cannot complain of
the vagueness of the law as applied to the conduct of others." xix[19]

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In sum, the doctrines of strict scrutiny, overbreadth, and vagueness are analytical tools developed
for testing "on their faces" statutes in free speech cases or, as they are called in American law, First
Amendment cases. They cannot be made to do service when what is involved is a criminal statute.
With respect to such statute, the established rule is that "one to whom application of a statute is
constitutional will not be heard to attack the statute on the ground that impliedly it might also be
taken as applying to other persons or other situations in which its application might be
unconstitutional."xx[20] As has been pointed out, "vagueness challenges in the First Amendment
context, like overbreadth challenges typically produce facial invalidation, while statutes found vague
as a matter of due process typically are invalidated [only] 'as applied' to a particular
defendant."xxi[21] Consequently, there is no basis for petitioner's claim that this Court review the AntiPlunder Law on its face and in its entirety.
Indeed, "on its face" invalidation of statutes results in striking them down entirely on the ground that
they might be applied to parties not before the Court whose activities are constitutionally
protected.xxii[22] It constitutes a departure from the case and controversy requirement of the
Constitution and permits decisions to be made without concrete factual settings and in sterile
abstract contexts.xxiii[23] But, as the U.S. Supreme Court pointed out in Younger v. Harrisxxiv[24]
[T]he task of analyzing a proposed statute, pinpointing its deficiencies, and requiring correction of
these deficiencies before the statute is put into effect, is rarely if ever an appropriate task for the
judiciary. The combination of the relative remoteness of the controversy, the impact on the legislative
process of the relief sought, and above all the speculative and amorphous nature of the required
line-by-line analysis of detailed statutes, . . . ordinarily results in a kind of case that is wholly
unsatisfactory for deciding constitutional questions, whichever way they might be decided.
For these reasons, "on its face" invalidation of statutes has been described as "manifestly strong
medicine," to be employed "sparingly and only as a last resort," xxv[25] and is generally disfavored.xxvi
[26] In determining the constitutionality of a statute, therefore, its provisions which are alleged to
have been violated in a case must be examined in the light of the conduct with which the defendant
is charged.xxvii[27]
In light of the foregoing disquisition, it is evident that the purported ambiguity of the Plunder Law, so
tenaciously claimed and argued at length by petitioner, is more imagined than real. Ambiguity, where
none exists, cannot be created by dissecting parts and words in the statute to furnish support to
critics who cavil at the want of scientific precision in the law. Every provision of the law should be
construed in relation and with reference to every other part. To be sure, it will take more than
nitpicking to overturn the well-entrenched presumption of constitutionality and validity of the Plunder
Law. A fortiori, petitioner cannot feign ignorance of what the Plunder Law is all about. Being one of
the Senators who voted for its passage, petitioner must be aware that the law was extensively
deliberated upon by the Senate and its appropriate committees by reason of which he even
registered his affirmative vote with full knowledge of its legal implications and sound constitutional
anchorage.
The parallel case of Gallego v. Sandiganbayanxxviii[28] must be mentioned if only to illustrate and
emphasize the point that courts are loathed to declare a statute void for uncertainty unless the law
itself is so imperfect and deficient in its details, and is susceptible of no reasonable construction that
will support and give it effect. In that case, petitioners Gallego and Agoncillo challenged the
constitutionality of Sec. 3, par. (e), of The Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act for being vague.
Petitioners posited, among others, that the term "unwarranted" is highly imprecise and elastic with
no common law meaning or settled definition by prior judicial or administrative precedents; that, for
its vagueness, Sec. 3, par. (e), violates due process in that it does not give fair warning or sufficient
notice of what it seeks to penalize. Petitioners further argued that the Information charged them with
three (3) distinct offenses, to wit: (a) giving of "unwarranted" benefits through manifest partiality; (b)
giving of "unwarranted" benefits through evident bad faith; and, (c) giving of "unwarranted" benefits
through gross inexcusable negligence while in the discharge of their official function and that their
right to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against them was violated because
they were left to guess which of the three (3) offenses, if not all, they were being charged and
prosecuted.
In dismissing the petition, this Court held that Sec. 3, par. (e), of The Anti-Graft and Corrupt
Practices Act does not suffer from the constitutional defect of vagueness. The phrases "manifest

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partiality," "evident bad faith," and "gross and inexcusable negligence" merely describe the different
modes by which the offense penalized in Sec. 3, par. (e), of the statute may be committed, and the
use of all these phrases in the same Information does not mean that the indictment charges three
(3) distinct offenses.
The word 'unwarranted' is not uncertain. It seems lacking adequate or official support; unjustified;
unauthorized (Webster, Third International Dictionary, p. 2514); or without justification or adequate
reason (Philadelphia Newspapers, Inc. v. US Dept. of Justice, C.D. Pa., 405 F. Supp. 8, 12, cited in
Words and Phrases, Permanent Edition, Vol. 43-A 1978, Cumulative Annual Pocket Part, p. 19).
The assailed provisions of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act consider a corrupt practice and
make unlawful the act of the public officer in:
x x x or giving any private party any unwarranted benefits, advantage or preference in the discharge
of his official, administrative or judicial functions through manifest partiality, evident bad faith or
gross inexcusable negligence, x x x (Section 3 [e], Rep. Act 3019, as amended).
It is not at all difficult to comprehend that what the aforequoted penal provisions penalize is the act
of a public officer, in the discharge of his official, administrative or judicial functions, in giving any
private party benefits, advantage or preference which is unjustified, unauthorized or without
justification or adequate reason, through manifest partiality, evident bad faith or gross inexcusable
negligence.
In other words, this Court found that there was nothing vague or ambiguous in the use of the term
"unwarranted" in Sec. 3, par. (e), of The Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, which was understood
in its primary and general acceptation. Consequently, in that case, petitioners' objection thereto was
held inadequate to declare the section unconstitutional.
On the second issue, petitioner advances the highly stretched theory that Sec. 4 of the Plunder Law
circumvents the immutable obligation of the prosecution to prove beyond reasonable doubt the
predicate acts constituting the crime of plunder when it requires only proof of a pattern of overt or
criminal acts showing unlawful scheme or conspiracy SEC. 4. Rule of Evidence. - For purposes of establishing the crime of plunder, it shall not be
necessary to prove each and every criminal act done by the accused in furtherance of the scheme
or conspiracy to amass, accumulate or acquire ill-gotten wealth, it being sufficient to establish
beyond reasonable doubt a pattern of overt or criminal acts indicative of the overall unlawful
scheme or conspiracy.
The running fault in this reasoning is obvious even to the simplistic mind. In a criminal prosecution
for plunder, as in all other crimes, the accused always has in his favor the presumption of innocence
which is guaranteed by the Bill of Rights, and unless the State succeeds in demonstrating by proof
beyond reasonable doubt that culpability lies, the accused is entitled to an acquittal. xxix[29] The use
of the "reasonable doubt" standard is indispensable to command the respect and confidence of the
community in the application of criminal law. It is critical that the moral force of criminal law be not
diluted by a standard of proof that leaves people in doubt whether innocent men are being
condemned. It is also important in our free society that every individual going about his ordinary
affairs has confidence that his government cannot adjudge him guilty of a criminal offense without
convincing a proper factfinder of his guilt with utmost certainty. This "reasonable doubt" standard
has acquired such exalted stature in the realm of constitutional law as it gives life to the Due
Process Clause which protects the accused against conviction except upon proof beyond
reasonable doubt of every fact necessary to constitute the crime with which he is charged. xxx[30] The
following exchanges between Rep. Rodolfo Albano and Rep. Pablo Garcia on this score during the
deliberations in the floor of the House of Representatives are elucidating DELIBERATIONS OF THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES ON RA 7080, 9 October 1990
MR. ALBANO: Now, Mr. Speaker, it is also elementary in our criminal law that what is alleged in the
information must be proven beyond reasonable doubt. If we will prove only one act and find him
guilty of the other acts enumerated in the information, does that not work against the right of the
accused especially so if the amount committed, say, by falsification is less than P100 million, but the

64

totality of the crime committed is P100 million since there is malversation, bribery, falsification of
public document, coercion, theft?
MR. GARCIA: Mr. Speaker, not everything alleged in the information needs to be proved beyond
reasonable doubt. What is required to be proved beyond reasonable doubt is every element of the
crime charged. For example, Mr. Speaker, there is an enumeration of the things taken by the robber
in the information three pairs of pants, pieces of jewelry. These need not be proved beyond
reasonable doubt, but these will not prevent the conviction of a crime for which he was charged just
because, say, instead of 3 pairs of diamond earrings the prosecution proved two. Now, what is
required to be proved beyond reasonable doubt is the element of the offense.
MR. ALBANO: I am aware of that, Mr. Speaker, but considering that in the crime of plunder the
totality of the amount is very important, I feel that such a series of overt criminal acts has to be
taken singly. For instance, in the act of bribery, he was able to accumulate only P50,000 and in the
crime of extortion, he was only able to accumulate P1 million. Now, when we add the totality of the
other acts as required under this bill through the interpretation on the rule of evidence, it is just one
single act, so how can we now convict him?
MR. GARCIA: With due respect, Mr. Speaker, for purposes of proving an essential element of the
crime, there is a need to prove that element beyond reasonable doubt. For example, one essential
element of the crime is that the amount involved is P100 million. Now, in a series of defalcations and
other acts of corruption in the enumeration the total amount would be P110 or P120 million, but
there are certain acts that could not be proved, so, we will sum up the amounts involved in those
transactions which were proved. Now, if the amount involved in these transactions, proved beyond
reasonable doubt, is P100 million, then there is a crime of plunder (underscoring supplied).
It is thus plain from the foregoing that the legislature did not in any manner refashion the standard
quantum of proof in the crime of plunder. The burden still remains with the prosecution to prove
beyond any iota of doubt every fact or element necessary to constitute the crime.
The thesis that Sec. 4 does away with proof of each and every component of the crime suffers from
a dismal misconception of the import of that provision. What the prosecution needs to prove beyond
reasonable doubt is only a number of acts sufficient to form a combination or series which would
constitute a pattern and involving an amount of at least P50,000,000.00. There is no need to prove
each and every other act alleged in the Information to have been committed by the accused in
furtherance of the overall unlawful scheme or conspiracy to amass, accumulate or acquire ill-gotten
wealth. To illustrate, supposing that the accused is charged in an Information for plunder with having
committed fifty (50) raids on the public treasury. The prosecution need not prove all these fifty (50)
raids, it being sufficient to prove by pattern at least two (2) of the raids beyond reasonable doubt
provided only that they amounted to at least P50,000,000.00.xxxi[31]
A reading of Sec. 2 in conjunction with Sec. 4, brings us to the logical conclusion that "pattern of
overt or criminal acts indicative of the overall unlawful scheme or conspiracy" inheres in the very
acts of accumulating, acquiring or amassing hidden wealth. Stated otherwise, such pattern arises
where the prosecution is able to prove beyond reasonable doubt the predicate acts as defined in
Sec. 1, par. (d). Pattern is merely a by-product of the proof of the predicate acts. This conclusion is
consistent with reason and common sense. There would be no other explanation for a combination
or series of
overt or criminal acts to stash P50,000,000.00 or more, than "a scheme or conspiracy to amass,
accumulate or acquire ill gotten wealth." The prosecution is therefore not required to make a
deliberate and conscious effort to prove pattern as it necessarily follows with the establishment of a
series or combination of the predicate acts.
Relative to petitioner's contentions on the purported defect of Sec. 4 is his submission that "pattern"
is "a very important element of the crime of plunder;" and that Sec. 4 is "two pronged, (as) it
contains a rule of evidence and a substantive element of the crime," such that without it the accused
cannot be convicted of plunder -

65

JUSTICE BELLOSILLO: In other words, cannot an accused be convicted under the Plunder Law
without applying Section 4 on the Rule of Evidence if there is proof beyond reasonable doubt of the
commission of the acts complained of?
ATTY. AGABIN: In that case he can be convicted of individual crimes enumerated in the Revised
Penal Code, but not plunder.
JUSTICE BELLOSILLO: In other words, if all the elements of the crime are proved beyond
reasonable doubt without applying Section 4, can you not have a conviction under the Plunder Law?
ATTY. AGABIN: Not a conviction for plunder, your Honor.
JUSTICE BELLOSILLO: Can you not disregard the application of Sec. 4 in convicting an accused
charged for violation of the Plunder Law?
ATTY. AGABIN: Well, your Honor, in the first place Section 4 lays down a substantive element of the
law x x x x
JUSTICE BELLOSILLO: What I said is - do we have to avail of Section 4 when there is proof
beyond reasonable doubt on the acts charged constituting plunder?
ATTY. AGABIN: Yes, your Honor, because Section 4 is two pronged, it contains a rule of evidence
and it contains a substantive element of the crime of plunder. So, there is no way by which we can
avoid Section 4.
JUSTICE BELLOSILLO: But there is proof beyond reasonable doubt insofar as the predicate crimes
charged are concerned that you do not have to go that far by applying Section 4?
ATTY. AGABIN: Your Honor, our thinking is that Section 4 contains a very important element of the
crime of plunder and that cannot be avoided by the prosecution. xxxii[32]
We do not subscribe to petitioner's stand. Primarily, all the essential elements of plunder can be
culled and understood from its definition in Sec. 2, in relation to Sec. 1, par. (d), and "pattern" is not
one of them. Moreover, the epigraph and opening clause of Sec. 4 is clear and unequivocal:
SEC. 4. Rule of Evidence. - For purposes of establishing the crime of plunder x x x x
It purports to do no more than prescribe a rule of procedure for the prosecution of a criminal case for
plunder. Being a purely procedural measure, Sec. 4 does not define or establish any substantive
right in favor of the accused but only operates in furtherance of a remedy. It is only a means to an
end, an aid to substantive law. Indubitably, even without invoking Sec. 4, a conviction for plunder
may be had, for what is crucial for the prosecution is to present sufficient evidence to engender that
moral certitude exacted by the fundamental law to prove the guilt of the accused beyond reasonable
doubt. Thus, even granting for the sake of argument that Sec. 4 is flawed and vitiated for the
reasons advanced by petitioner, it may simply be severed from the rest of the provisions without
necessarily resulting in the demise of the law; after all, the existing rules on evidence can supplant
Sec. 4 more than enough. Besides, Sec. 7 of RA 7080 provides for a separability clause Sec. 7. Separability of Provisions. - If any provisions of this Act or the application thereof to any
person or circumstance is held invalid, the remaining provisions of this Act and the application of
such provisions to other persons or circumstances shall not be affected thereby.
Implicit in the foregoing section is that to avoid the whole act from being declared invalid as a result
of the nullity of some of its provisions, assuming that to be the case although it is not really so, all
the provisions thereof should accordingly be treated independently of each other, especially if by
doing so, the objectives of the statute can best be achieved.
As regards the third issue, again we agree with Justice Mendoza that plunder is a malum in se
which requires proof of criminal intent. Thus, he says, in his Concurring Opinion -

66

x x x Precisely because the constitutive crimes are mala in se the element of mens rea must be
proven in a prosecution for plunder. It is noteworthy that the amended information alleges that the
crime of plunder was committed "willfully, unlawfully and criminally." It thus alleges guilty knowledge
on the part of petitioner.
In support of his contention that the statute eliminates the requirement of mens rea and that is the
reason he claims the statute is void, petitioner cites the following remarks of Senator Taada made
during the deliberation on S.B. No. 733:
SENATOR TAADA . . . And the evidence that will be required to convict him would not be evidence
for each and every individual criminal act but only evidence sufficient to establish the conspiracy or
scheme to commit this crime of plunder.xxxiii[33]
However, Senator Taada was discussing 4 as shown by the succeeding portion of the transcript
quoted by petitioner:
SENATOR ROMULO: And, Mr. President, the Gentleman feels that it is contained in Section 4, Rule
of Evidence, which, in the Gentleman's view, would provide for a speedier and faster process of
attending to this kind of cases?
SENATOR TAADA: Yes, Mr. President . . .xxxiv[34]
Senator Taada was only saying that where the charge is conspiracy to commit plunder, the
prosecution need not prove each and every criminal act done to further the scheme or conspiracy, it
being enough if it proves beyond reasonable doubt a pattern of overt or ciminal acts indicative of the
overall unlawful scheme or conspiracy. As far as the acts constituting the pattern are concerned,
however, the elements of the crime must be proved and the requisite mens rea must be shown.
Indeed, 2 provides that Any person who participated with the said public officer in the commission of an offense contributing
to the crime of plunder shall likewise be punished for such offense. In the imposition of penalties, the
degree of participation and the attendance of mitigating and extenuating circumstances, as provided
by the Revised Penal Code, shall be considered by the court.
The application of mitigating and extenuating circumstances in the Revised Penal Code to
prosecutions under the Anti-Plunder Law indicates quite clearly that mens rea is an element of
plunder since the degree of responsibility of the offender is determined by his criminal intent. It is
true that 2 refers to "any person who participates with the said public officer in the commission of an
offense contributing to the crime of plunder." There is no reason to believe, however, that it does not
apply as well to the public officer as principal in the crime. As Justice Holmes said: "We agree to all
the generalities about not supplying criminal laws with what they omit, but there is no canon against
using common sense in construing laws as saying what they obviously mean." xxxv[35]
Finally, any doubt as to whether the crime of plunder is a malum in se must be deemed to have
been resolved in the affirmative by the decision of Congress in 1993 to include it among the heinous
crimes punishable by reclusion perpetua to death. Other heinous crimes are punished with death as
a straight penalty in R.A. No. 7659. Referring to these groups of heinous crimes, this Court held in
People v. Echegaray:xxxvi[36]
The evil of a crime may take various forms. There are crimes that are, by their very nature,
despicable, either because life was callously taken or the victim is treated like an animal and utterly
dehumanized as to completely disrupt the normal course of his or her growth as a human being . . . .
Seen in this light, the capital crimes of kidnapping and serious illegal detention for ransom resulting
in the death of the victim or the victim is raped, tortured, or subjected to dehumanizing acts;
destructive arson resulting in death; and drug offenses involving minors or resulting in the death of
the victim in the case of other crimes; as well as murder, rape, parricide, infanticide, kidnapping and
serious illegal detention, where the victim is detained for more than three days or serious physical
injuries were inflicted on the victim or threats to kill him were made or the victim is a minor, robbery
with homicide, rape or intentional mutilation, destructive arson, and carnapping where the owner,

67

driver or occupant of the carnapped vehicle is killed or raped, which are penalized by reclusion
perpetua to death, are clearly heinous by their very nature.
There are crimes, however, in which the abomination lies in the significance and implications of the
subject criminal acts in the scheme of the larger socio-political and economic context in which the
state finds itself to be struggling to develop and provide for its poor and underprivileged masses.
Reeling from decades of corrupt tyrannical rule that bankrupted the government and impoverished
the population, the Philippine Government must muster the political will to dismantle the culture of
corruption, dishonesty, greed and syndicated criminality that so deeply entrenched itself in the
structures of society and the psyche of the populace. [With the government] terribly lacking the
money to provide even the most basic services to its people, any form of misappropriation or
misapplication of government funds translates to an actual threat to the very existence of
government, and in turn, the very survival of the people it governs over. Viewed in this context, no
less heinous are the effects and repercussions of crimes like qualified bribery, destructive arson
resulting in death, and drug offenses involving government officials, employees or officers, that their
perpetrators must not be allowed to cause further destruction and damage to society.
The legislative declaration in R.A. No. 7659 that plunder is a heinous offense implies that it is a
malum in se. For when the acts punished are inherently immoral or inherently wrong, they are mala
in sexxxvii[37] and it does not matter that such acts are punished in a special law, especially since in
the case of plunder the predicate crimes are mainly mala in se. Indeed, it would be absurd to treat
prosecutions for plunder as though they are mere prosecutions for violations of the Bouncing Check
Law (B.P. Blg. 22) or of an ordinance against jaywalking, without regard to the inherent wrongness
of the acts.
To clinch, petitioner likewise assails the validity of RA 7659, the amendatory law of RA 7080, on
constitutional grounds. Suffice it to say however that it is now too late in the day for him to resurrect
this long dead issue, the same having been eternally consigned by People v. Echegarayxxxviii[38] to
the archives of jurisprudential history. The declaration of this Court therein that RA 7659 is
constitutionally valid stands as a declaration of the State, and becomes, by necessary effect,
assimilated in the Constitution now as an integral part of it.
Our nation has been racked by scandals of corruption and obscene profligacy of officials in high
places which have shaken its very foundation. The anatomy of graft and corruption has become
more elaborate in the corridors of time as unscrupulous people relentlessly contrive more and more
ingenious ways to bilk the coffers of the government. Drastic and radical measures are imperative to
fight the increasingly sophisticated, extraordinarily methodical and economically catastrophic looting
of the national treasury. Such is the Plunder Law, especially designed to disentangle those ghastly
tissues of grand-scale corruption which, if left unchecked, will spread like a malignant tumor and
ultimately consume the moral and institutional fiber of our nation. The Plunder Law, indeed, is a
living testament to the will of the legislature to ultimately eradicate this scourge and thus secure
society against the avarice and other venalities in public office.
These are times that try men's souls. In the checkered history of this nation, few issues of national
importance can equal the amount of interest and passion generated by petitioner's ignominious fall
from the highest office, and his eventual prosecution and trial under a virginal statute. This
continuing saga has driven a wedge of dissension among our people that may linger for a long time.
Only by responding to the clarion call for patriotism, to rise above factionalism and prejudices, shall
we emerge triumphant in the midst of ferment.
PREMISES CONSIDERED, this Court holds that RA 7080 otherwise known as the Plunder Law, as
amended by RA 7659, is CONSTITUTIONAL. Consequently, the petition to declare the law
unconstitutional is DISMISSED for lack of merit.
SO ORDERED.

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xxxviiiSandiganbayan G.R. No. 148560 November 19,2001

Lessons Applicable:
Consti Overbreadth doctrine, void-for-vagueness doctrine
Crim Law 1- mala in se
Crim pro proof beyond reasonable doubt
Laws Applicable: Art. 3 RPC
FACTS:

An information is filed against former President Joseph Ejercito Estrada a.k.a.

'Asiong Salonga' and 'Jose Velarde,' together with Jose 'Jinggoy' Estrada,
Charlie 'Atong' Ang, Edward Serapio, Yolanda T. Ricaforte, Alma Alfaro, John
Doe a.k.a. Eleuterio Tan or Eleuterio Ramos Tan or Mr. Uy, Jane Doe a.k.a.
Delia Rajas and John Does & Jane Does of the crime of Plunder under RA 7080
(An Act Defining and Penalizing the Crime of Plunder)
o June, 1998 to January 2001: Estrada himself and/or in
connivance/conspiracy with his co-accused, who are members of his
family, relatives by affinity or consanguinity, business associates,
subordinates and/or other persons, by taking undue advantage of his
official position, authority, relationship, connection, or influence, did then
and there willfully, unlawfully and criminally amass, accumulate and
acquire by himself, directly or indirectly, ill-gotten wealth of
P4,097,804,173.17 thereby unjustly enriching himself or themselves at
the expense and to the damage of the Filipino people and the Republic
of the Philippines, through any or a combination or a series of overt or
criminal acts, or similar schemes or means
o Received P545,000,000.00 in the form of gift, share, percentage,
kickback or any form of pecuniary benefit, by himself and/or in
connection with co-accused Charlie 'Atong' Ang, Jose 'Jinggoy' Estrada,
Yolanda T. Ricaforte, Edward Serapio, and John Does and Jane Does, in
consideration of toleration or protection of illegal gambling
o Diverting, receiving, misappropriating, converting or misusing directly or
indirectly, for his or their personal gain and benefit, public funds of
P130,000,000.00, more or less, representing a portion of
P200,000,000.00) tobacco excise tax share allocated for the province of
Ilocos Sur under R.A. No. 7171, by himself and/or in connivance with
co-accused Charlie 'Atong' Ang, Alma Alfaro, John Doe a.k.a. Eleuterio
Ramos Tan or Mr. Uy, Jane Doe a.k.a. Delia Rajas, and other John Does
& Jane Does
o For His Personal Gain And Benefit, The Government Service Insurance
System (GSIS) To Purchase 351,878,000 Shares Of Stocks, More Or
Less, And The Social Security System (SSS), 329,855,000 Shares Of
Stock, More Or Less, Of The Belle Corporation worth P1,102,965,607.50
and P744,612,450.00 respectively and by collecting or receiving, directly
or indirectly, by himself and/or in connivance with John Does and Jane
Does, commissions or percentages by reason of said purchases which

became part of the deposit in the equitable-pci bank under the account
name Jose Velarde
o by unjustly enriching himself from commissions, gifts, shares,
percentages, kickbacks, or any form of pecuniary benefits, in connivance
with John Does and Jane Does, P3,233,104,173.17 and depositing the
same under his account name Jose Velarde at the Equitable-Pci Bank

1.
2.
3.

1.
2.
3.
4.
5.

1.
2.
3.

Estrada questions the constitutionality of the Plunder Law since for him:

it suffers from the vice of vagueness

it dispenses with the "reasonable doubt" standard in criminal prosecutions
it abolishes the element of mens rea in crimes already punishable under The Revised Penal
Code
April 4, 2001: Office of the Ombudsman filed before the Sandiganbayan 8 separate
Informations, docketed as:
Crim. Case No. 26558, for violation of RA 7080, as amended by RA 7659
Crim. Cases Nos. 26559 to 26562, inclusive, for violation of Secs. 3, par. (a), 3, par. (a), 3,
par. (e) and 3, par. (e), of RA 3019 (Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act), respectively
Crim. Case No. 26563, for violation of Sec. 7, par. (d), of RA 6713 (The Code of Conduct
and Ethical Standards for Public Officials and Employees)
Crim. Case No. 26564, for Perjury (Art. 183 of The Revised Penal Code)
Crim. Case No. 26565, for Illegal Use Of An Alias (CA No. 142, as amended by RA 6085)
April 11, 2001: Estrada filed an Omnibus Motion on the grounds of lack of preliminary
investigation, reconsideration/reinvestigation of offenses and opportunity to prove lack of
probable cause. - Denied
April 25, 2001: Sandiganbayan issued a Resolution in Crim. Case No. 26558 finding that a
probable cause for the offense of plunder exists to justify the issuance of warrants for the
arrest of the accused
June 14, 2001: Estrada moved to quash the Information in Crim. Case No. 26558 on the
ground that the facts alleged therein did NOT constitute an indictable offense since the law on
which it was based was unconstitutional for vagueness and that the Amended Information for
Plunder charged more than 1 offense Denied
Estrada filed a petition for certiorari are:
The Plunder Law is unconstitutional for being vague
The Plunder Law requires less evidence for proving the predicate crimes of plunder and
therefore violates the rights of the accused to due process
Whether Plunder as defined in RA 7080 is a malum prohibitum, and if so, whether it is within
the power of Congress to so classify it

ISSUES:
W/N the Plunder Law is constitutional (consti1)
W/N the Plunder Law dispenses with the "reasonable doubt" standard in criminal
prosecutions (crim pro)
3. W/N the Plunder Law is a malum prohibitum (crim law 1)
1.
2.

1.

HELD: Petition is dismissed. Plunder Law is constitutional.

YES
Miserably failed in the instant case to discharge his burden and overcome the presumption
of constitutionality of the Plunder Law
Plunder Law contains ascertainable standards and well-defined parameters which would
enable the accused to determine the nature of his violation.
Combination- at least two (2) acts falling under different categories of enumeration
series - must be two (2) or more overt or criminal acts falling under the same category of
enumeration
pattern - at least a combination or series of overt or criminal acts enumerated in
subsections (1) to (6) of Sec. 1 (d)


o
o
o
o
a.
b.
o

2.

Void-For-Vagueness Doctrine - a statute which either forbids or requires the doing of an

act in terms so vague that men of common intelligence must necessarily guess at its meaning
and differ as to its application, violates the first essential of due process of law
The test in determining whether a criminal statute is void for uncertainty is whether the
language conveys a sufficiently definite warning as to the proscribed conduct when measured
by common understanding and practice
can only be invoked against that specie of legislation that is utterly vague on its face, i.e., that
which cannot be clarified either by a saving clause or by construction
a statute or act may be said to be vague when it lacks comprehensible standards that men of
common intelligence must necessarily guess at its meaning and differ in its application.
the statute is repugnant to the Constitution in 2 respects:
it violates due process for failure to accord persons, especially the parties targeted by it, fair
notice of what conduct to avoid
it leaves law enforcers unbridled discretion in carrying out its provisions and becomes an
arbitrary flexing of the Government muscle
As for the vagueness doctrine, it is said that a litigant may challenge a statute on its face only
if it is vague in all its possible applications
Overbreadth Doctrine - a governmental purpose may NOT be achieved by means which
sweep unnecessarily broadly and thereby invade the area of protected freedoms
overbreadth claims, if entertained at all, have been curtailed when invoked against ordinary
criminal laws that are sought to be applied to protected conduct
A facial challenge is allowed to be made to a vague statute and to one which is overbroad
because of possible "chilling effect" upon protected speech.
Criminal statutes have general in terrorem effect resulting from their very existence, and, if
facial challenge is allowed for this reason alone, the State may well be prevented from
enacting laws against socially harmful conduct. In the area of criminal law, the law cannot
take chances as in the area of free speech.
The overbreadth and vagueness doctrines then have special application only to free
speech cases.

NO.
The use of the "reasonable doubt" standard is indispensable to command the respect and
confidence of the community in the application of criminal law.
o has acquired such exalted stature in the realm of constitutional law as it gives life to the Due
Process Clause which protects the accused against conviction except upon proof beyond
reasonable doubt of every fact necessary to constitute the crime with which he is charged

What the prosecution needs to prove beyond reasonable doubt is only a number of acts
sufficient to form a combination or series which would constitute a pattern and involving an
amount of at least P50,000,000.00. There is no need to prove each and every other act
alleged in the Information to have been committed by the accused in furtherance of the
overall unlawful scheme or conspiracy to amass, accumulate or acquire ill-gotten wealth
o Pattern is merely a by-product of the proof of the predicate acts. This conclusion is
consistent with reason and common sense. There would be no other explanation for a
combination or series of overt or criminal acts to stash P50,000,000.00 or more, than "a
scheme or conspiracy to amass, accumulate or acquire ill gotten wealth."
3. NO

plunder is a malum in se which requires proof of criminal intent (mens rea)

o Any person who participated with the said public officer in the commission of an offense
contributing to the crime of plunder shall likewise be punished for such offense.
o In the imposition of penalties, the degree of participation and the attendance of mitigating and
extenuating circumstances, as provided by the Revised Penal Code, shall be considered by
the court.
indicates quite clearly that mens rea is an element of plunder since the degree of
responsibility of the offender is determined by his criminal intent
o The legislative declaration in R.A. No. 7659 that plunder is a heinous offense implies that it is
a malum in se. For when the acts punished are inherently immoral or inherently wrong, they
are mala in se and it does not matter that such acts are punished in a special law, especially
since in the case of plunder the predicate crimes are mainly mala in se

[G.R. No. 129764. March 12, 2002]

GEOFFREY F. GRIFFITH, petitioner, vs. HON. COURT OF APPEALS, RTC JUDGE EDWIN
A. VILLASOR, MTC JUDGE MANUEL D.L. VILLAMAYOR and PHELPS DODGE PHILS.,
INC., respondents.
DECISION
QUISUMBING, J.:
Assailed in this petition is the decision[1] dated March 14, 1997 of the Court of Appeals in CAG.R. SP No. 19621, affirming the Regional Trial Courts decision[2] finding petitioner Geoffrey
F. Griffith guilty on two counts for violation of Batas Pambansa Blg. 22 (the Bouncing Checks
Law), and sentencing him to suffer imprisonment for a period of six months on each count, to
be served consecutively. Also assailed is the Court of Appeals resolution[3] dated July 8, 1997
denying petitioners motion for reconsideration.
The facts are as follows:
In 1985, Phelps Dodge Philippines, Inc. leased its lot and factory building to Lincoln Gerard,
Inc. for a term of two years at a monthly rental of P75,000. When Lincoln Gerard, Inc. incurred
rental arrearages, Geoffrey F. Griffith, in his capacity as president of Lincoln Gerard, Inc.,
issued the following checks:
Far East Bank and Trust Co. Check No. 06B-C-075065, dated April 15, 1986 for
P100,000.00, payable to Phelps Dodge Phils. Inc.; and
Far East Bank and Trust Co. Check No. 06B-C-075066, dated May 1, 1986 for
P115,442.65, payable to Phelps Dodge Phils. Inc.[4]
The voucher for these checks contained the following instruction:
These checks are not to be presented without prior approval from this Corporation to be given
not later than May 30, 1986.
Also written on the face of the voucher was the following note:
However, if written approval of Lincoln Gerard, Inc. is not given before May 30, 1986, Phelps
Dodge, Phils. shall present the cheques for payment. This is final and irrevocable.[5]
On May 29, 1986, Griffith wrote Phelps Dodge not to present the said checks for payment on
May 30, 1986 because they could not be funded due to a four-week labor strike that had
earlier paralyzed the business operations of Lincoln Gerard.[6]
Previously, in a letter dated May 20, 1986, Phelps Dodge, through its treasurer Ricardo R.
Manarang, advised Lincoln Gerard that it was transferring the contents of the Lincoln Gerard
warehouse in the leased premises since a new tenant was moving in. Phelps Dodge told
Lincoln Gerard that its properties would be placed in our compound and under our custody.[7]

On June 2, 1986,[8] when no further communication was received from Lincoln Gerard,
Phelps Dodge presented the two checks for payment but these were dishonored by the bank
for having been drawn against insufficient funds. Three days later, Phelps Dodge sent a
demand letter to Lincoln Gerard, apprising Griffith of the dishonor of the checks and asking
him to fund them within the time prescribed by law.[9] Lincoln Gerard still failed to fund the
checks but Griffith sent a letter to Phelps Dodge, explaining Lincolns inability to fund said
checks due to the strike.[10] Subsequently, on June 19, 1986, Phelps Dodge notified Lincoln
Gerard that its properties would be foreclosed. Phelps Dodge went ahead with the foreclosure
and auction sale on June 20, 1986,[11] despite Lincoln Gerards protest.[12]
On May 10, 1988, two informations for violation of B.P. 22 docketed as Criminal Cases Nos.
73260 and 73261 were filed against petitioner before the Regional Trial Court. The motion for
reconsideration filed by Griffith was dismissed, and so were his petition for review filed before
the Department of Justice and later on his motion to quash filed before the RTC. Griffith then
filed a petition for certiorari before the Court of Appeals that was likewise denied.
Meanwhile, on November 6, 1987, Lincoln Gerard lodged a complaint for damages docketed
as Civil Case No. 55276 before the Regional Trial Court of Pasig, Branch 69, against Phelps
Dodge and the notary public who conducted the auction sale.[13] On July 19, 1991, the trial
court ruled that the foreclosure and auction sale were invalid, but applied the proceeds
thereof to Lincoln Gerards arrearages. It also ordered Phelps Dodge to return to Lincoln
Gerard the P1,072,586.88 as excess.[14] The court stated:
The evidence shows that defendant corporation had already received the amount of
P254,600 as a result of the invalid auction sale. The latter amount should be applied to the
rental in arrears owed by the plaintiff corporation to the defendant corporation (P301,953.12).
Thus, the plaintiff corporation still owes the defendant corporation the amount of P47,953.12
as rental arrears. In order to get the true and real damages that defendant corporation should
pay the plaintiff corporation, the balance of the rental arrears should be deducted from the
amount of P1,120,540.00, the total value of the items belonging to the plaintiff corporation and
sold by the defendant corporation at a public auction. The net result is P1,072,586.88. [15]
On appeal, the Court of Appeals affirmed the RTC decision, and this became final and
executory.[16]
On August 25, 1994, the criminal cases against Griffith pending before the RTC were
remanded to the Metropolitan Trial Court (MeTC), in view of Republic Act No. 7691 that
expanded the jurisdiction of the MeTC.
On July 25, 1995, the MeTC, in Criminal Cases Nos. 41678 and 41679, found Griffith guilty
on both counts for violation of B.P. 22,[17] and sentenced him to suffer imprisonment for six
months on each count, to be served consecutively. Thus:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, this court finds the accused GEOFFREY F. GRIFFITH,
GUILTY OF VIOLATION of Section 1 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 22, otherwise known as the
Bouncing Checks Law on two counts.
The accused is therefore hereby sentence (sic) to suffer imprisonment for a period of SIX (6)
MONTHS in Criminal Case No. 41678 and another SIX (6) MONTHS in Criminal Case No.
41679, both of which shall be served consecutively.

Considering that the civil aspect of these cases has already been decided by the Regional
Trial Court Branch 69, Pasig, regardless of its finality, of which this court has no record, this
Court shall not resolve the same because they are either Res Judicata or Pendente Litis.
SO ORDERED.[18]
On appeal, the RTC affirmed in toto the lower courts decision.
Petitioner then appealed his conviction to the Court of Appeals. In a consolidated decision
dated March 14, 1997, the appellate court ruled:
WHEREFORE, absent any prima facie merit in it, the Petition for Review under consideration
is hereby DENIED DUE COURSE. Costs against petitioner.
SO ORDERED. [19]
Petitioner moved for a reconsideration of said decision but this was denied by the appellate
court in a resolution dated July 8, 1997.[20] Hence, this petition seeking reversal of the CA
decision and resolution on the criminal cases, anchored on the following grounds:
I.THE COURT OF APPEALS DECISION DATED 14 MARCH 1997 AND ITS RESOLUTION
DATED 8 JULY 1997 ARE CONTRARY TO THE RULING IN MAGNO V. COURT OF
APPEALS, WHERE THIS HONORABLE COURT LAID DOWN THE DOCTRINE THAT A
CONVICTION UNDER B.P. 22 CANNOT BE BASED ON AN INVERSE APPLICATION OF
THE ELEMENT OF KNOWLEDGE.
II.
THE COURT OF APPEALS DECISION DATED 14 MARCH 1997 AND ITS
RESOLUTON DATED 8 JULY 1997 RESULT IN AN UNCONSTITUTIONAL APPLICATION
OF THE PROVISIONS OF B.P. 22.
III.
THE COURT OF APPEALS DECISION DATED 14 MARCH 1997 AND ITS
RESOLUTION DATED 8 JULY 1997 STATING THAT PAYMENT THROUGH NOTARIAL
FORECLOSURE BEFORE THE FILING OF THE CRIMINAL INFORMATIONS UNDER B.P.
22 DOES NOT ABATE CRIMINAL LIABILITY, ARE ERRONEOUS AND RESULT IN THE
INIQUITOUS INTERPRETATION OF THE LAW.
IV.
THE COURT OF APPEALS DECISION DATED 14 MARCH 1997 AND ITS
RESOLUTION DATED 8 JULY 1997 ARE INCONSISTENT WITH ITS OWN FINDINGS AND
CONCLUSIONS IN A RELATED CASE (CA-G.R. NO. 20980) INVOLVING THE SAME
PETITIONER AND RESPONDENT AND THE SAME TRANSACTION SUBJECT OF THIS
CASE.
V.
THE COURT OF APPEALS DECISION DATED 14 MARCH 1997 AND ITS
RESOLUTION DATED 8 JULY 1997 WHICH RELIED ON THE RULING IN THE CASE OF
LIM V. COURT OF APPEALS ON VENUE TO JUSTIFY ITS FINDING THAT PETITIONER
HAS COMMITTED TWO COUNTS OF VIOLATION OF B.P. 22, ARE CONTRAY TO LAW
AND JURISPRUDENCE. [21]
Petitioner points out that he communicated to Phelps Dodge through a note on the voucher
attached to the checks, the fact that said checks were unfunded at the time of their issuance.
Petitioner contends that this good faith on his part negates any intent to put worthless checks
in circulation, which is what B.P. 22 seeks to penalize. Moreover, as regards the second

check that was postdated, petitioner contends that there could not be any violation of B.P. 22
with said check since the element of knowledge of insufficiency of funds is absent. Petitioner
could not have known at the time of its issuance that the postdated check would be
dishonored when presented for payment later on.
Petitioner argues that his conviction in this case would be violative of the constitutional
proscription against imprisonment for failure to pay a debt, since petitioner would be punished
not for knowingly issuing an unfunded check but for failing to pay an obligation when it fell
due.
Petitioner also asserts that the payment made by Lincoln Gerard through the proceeds of the
notarial foreclosure and auction sale extinguished his criminal liability.
On the other hand, private respondent contends that all the elements that comprise violation
of B.P. 22 are present in this case. Moreover, the payment in this case was made beyond the
five-day period, counted from notice of dishonor, provided by the law and thus did not
extinguish petitioners criminal liability.
For the State, the Solicitor General contends that Lincoln Gerard assured Phelps Dodge,
through the note on the voucher attached to the checks, that said checks would be covered
with sufficient funds by May 30, 1996, which assurance was final and irrevocable.[22] The
OSG also argues that B.P. 22 does not distinguish between a check that is postdated and one
that is not, for as long as the drawer issued the checks with knowledge of his insufficient
funds and the check is dishonored upon presentment.
There is no unconstitutional punishment for failure to pay a debt in this case, since according
to the OSG, what B.P. 22 penalizes is the act of making and issuing a worthless check that is
dishonored upon presentation for payment, not the failure to pay a debt.[23]
The OSG asserts that the supposed payment that resulted from Phelps Dodges notarial
foreclosure of Lincoln Gerards properties could not bar prosecution under B.P. 22, since
damage or prejudice to the payee is immaterial. Moreover, said payment was made only after
the violation of the law had already been committed. It was made beyond the five-day period,
from notice of dishonor of the checks, provided under B.P. 22.
The principal issue in this case is whether petitioner Geoffrey F. Griffith, president of Lincoln
Gerard, Inc., has been erroneously convicted and sentenced for violation of the Bouncing
Checks Law (Batas Pambansa Blg. 22). His conviction on two counts and sentence of six
months imprisonment for each count by the respondent MTC Judge Manuel Villamayor was
upheld by respondent RTC Judge Edwin Villasor and affirmed by the respondent Court of
Appeals. But private respondent appears to have collected more than the value of the two
checks in question before the filing in the trial court of the case for violation of B.P. 22. Hence,
petitioner insists he has been wrongfully convicted and sentenced. To resolve this issue, we
must determine whether the alleged payment of the amount of the checks two years prior to
the filing of the information for violation of B.P. 22 justifies his acquittal.
Whether there is an unconstitutional application of the provisions of B.P. 22 in this case,
however, does not appear to us an appropriate issue for consideration now. A purported
constitutional issue raised by petitioner may only be resolved if essential to the decision of a
case and controversy. But here we find that this case can be resolved on other grounds. Well
to remember, courts do not pass upon constitutional questions that are not the very lis mota of
a case.[24]

In the present case, the checks were conditionally issued for arrearages on rental payments
incurred by Lincoln Gerard, Inc. The checks were signed by petitioner, the president of
Lincoln Gerard. It was a condition written on the voucher for each check that the check was
not to be presented for payment without clearance from Lincoln Gerard, to be given at a
specific date. However, Lincoln Gerard was unable to give such clearance owing to a labor
strike that paralyzed its business and resulted to the companys inability to fund its checks.
Still, Phelps Dodge deposited the checks, per a note on the voucher attached thereto that if
written approval was not received from Lincoln Gerard before May 30, 1986, the checks
would be presented for payment. This is final and irrevocable, according to the note that was
written actually by an officer of Phelps Dodge, not by petitioner. The checks were dishonored
and Phelps Dodge filed criminal cases for violation of B.P. 22 against petitioner. But this filing
took place only after Phelps Dodge had collected the amount of the checks, with more than
one million pesos to spare, through notarial foreclosure and auction sale of Lincoln Gerards
properties earlier impounded by Phelps Dodge.
In our view, considering the circumstances of the case, the instant petition is meritorious.
The Bouncing Checks Law was devised to safeguard the interest of the banking system and
the legitimate public checking account user.[25] It was not designed to favor or encourage
those who seek to enrich themselves through manipulation and circumvention of the purpose
of the law.[26] Noteworthy, in Administrative Circular No. 12-2000, this Court has expressed a
policy preference for fine as penalty in cases of B.P. 22 violations rather than imprisonment to
best serve the ends of criminal justice.
Moreover, while the philosophy underlying our penal system leans toward the classical school
that imposes penalties for retribution,[27] such retribution should be aimed at actual and
potential wrongdoers.[28] Note that in the two criminal cases filed by Phelps Dodge against
petitioner, the checks issued were corporate checks that Lincoln Gerard allegedly failed to
fund for a valid reason duly communicated to the payee. Further, it bears repeating that
Phelps Dodge, through a notarial foreclosure and auction that were later on judicially declared
invalid, sold Lincoln Gerards property for cash amounting to P1,120,540[29] to satisfy Phelps
Dodge claim for unpaid rentals. Said property was already in Phelps Dodges custody earlier,
purportedly because a new tenant was moving into the leased premises. The obligation of
Lincoln Gerard to Phelps Dodge for said rentals was only P301,953.12.[30] Thus, by resorting
to the remedy of foreclosure and auction sale, Phelps Dodge was able to collect the face
value of the two checks, totalling P215,442.65. In fact, it impounded items owned by Lincoln
Gerard valued far in excess of the debt or the checks. This was the situation when, almost
two years after the auction sale, petitioner was charged with two counts of violation of B.P. 22.
By that time, the civil obligation of Lincoln Gerard, Inc. to Phelps Dodge Phils. Inc. was no
longer subsisting, though respondent Court of Appeals calls the payment thereof as
involuntary.[31] That the money value of the two checks signed by petitioner was already
collected, however, could not be ignored in appreciating the antecedents of the two criminal
charges against petitioner. Because of the invalid foreclosure and sale, Phelps Dodge was
ordered to pay or return P1,072,586.88 to Lincoln Gerard, per decision of the Regional Trial
Court of Pasig, Branch 69, which became final after it was affirmed by the appellate court. We
cannot, under these circumstances, see how petitioners conviction and sentence could be
upheld without running afoul of basic principles of fairness and justice. For Phelps Dodge has,
in our view, already exacted its proverbial pound of flesh through foreclosure and auction sale
as its chosen remedy.

That is why we find quite instructive the reasoning of the Court of Appeals earlier rendered in
deciding the petition for Certiorari and Injunction, Griffith v. Judge Milagros Caguioa, CA-G.R.
SP No. 20980, in connection with the petitioners motion to quash the charges herein before
they were tried on the merits.[32]
Said Justice C. Francisco with the concurrence of Justices Reynato S. Puno and Asaali S.
Isnani:
We are persuaded that the defense has good and solid defenses against both charges in
Criminal Cases Nos. 73260-61. We can even say that the decision rendered in Branch 69 in
Civil Case No. 55276, well-written as it is, had put up a formidable obstacle to any conviction
in the criminal cases with the findings therein made that the sale by public auction of the
properties of Lincoln was illegal and had no justification under the facts; that also the
proceeds realized in the said sale should be deducted from the account of Lincoln with
Phelps, so that only P47,953.12 may only be the rentals in arrears which Lincoln should pay,
computed at P301,953.12 less P254,600.00; that out of what had happened in the case as
the trial court had resolved in its decision, Phelps is duty bound to pay Lincoln in damages
P1,072,586.88 from which had been deducted the amount of P47,953.12 representing the
balance of the rental in arrearages; and that consequently, there is absolutely no
consideration remaining in support of the two (2) subject checks.[33]
Petitioners efforts to quash in the Court of Appeals the charges against him was frustrated on
procedural grounds because, according to Justice Francisco, appeal and not certiorari was
the proper remedy.[34] In a petition for certiorari, only issues of jurisdiction including grave
abuse of discretion are considered, but an appeal in a criminal case opens the entire case for
review.
While we agree with the private respondent that the gravamen of violation of B.P. 22 is the
issuance of worthless checks that are dishonored upon their presentment for payment, we
should not apply penal laws mechanically.[35] We must find if the application of the law is
consistent with the purpose of and reason for the law. Ratione cessat lex, et cessat lex.
(When the reason for the law ceases, the law ceases.) It is not the letter alone but the spirit of
the law also that gives it life. This is especially so in this case where a debtors criminalization
would not serve the ends of justice but in fact subvert it. The creditor having collected already
more than a sufficient amount to cover the value of the checks for payment of rentals, via
auction sale, we find that holding the debtors president to answer for a criminal offense under
B.P. 22 two years after said collection, is no longer tenable nor justified by law or equitable
considerations.
In sum, considering that the money value of the two checks issued by petitioner has already
been effectively paid two years before the informations against him were filed, we find merit in
this petition. We hold that petitioner herein could not be validly and justly convicted or
sentenced for violation of B.P. 22. Whether the number of checks issued determines the
number of violations of B.P. 22, or whether there should be a distinction between postdated
and other kinds of checks need no longer detain us for being immaterial now to the
determination of the issue of guilt or innocence of petitioner.
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby GRANTED. The decision of the Court of Appeals in CAG.R. No. 19621 dated March 14, 1997, and its resolution dated July 8, 1997, are REVERSED
and SET ASIDE. Petitioner Geoffrey F. Griffith is ACQUITTED of the charges of violation of
B.P. 22 in Criminal Cases Nos. 41678 and 41679.

Costs de officio.
SO ORDERED.
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
FIRST DIVISION
G.R. No. L-66884 May 28, 1988
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
VICENTE TEMBLOR alias "RONALD," defendant-appellant.
The Solicitor General for plaintiff-appellee.
Wilfred D. Asis for defendant-appellant.

GRIO-AQUINO, J.:
The accused-appellant Vicente Temblor alias "Ronald" was charged with the crime of murder
in Criminal Case No. 1809 of the Court of First Instance (now Regional Trial Court) of Agusan
del Norte and Butuan City for shooting to death Julius Cagampang. The information alleged:
That on or about the evening of December 30, 1980 at Talo-ao, Buenavista,
Agusan del Norte, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court,
the said accused conspiring, and confederating with one another with Anecito
Ellevera who is at large, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously,
with treachery and with intent to kill, attack, assault and shoot with firearms one
Julius Cagampang, hitting the latter on the vital parts of the body thereby
inflicting mortal wounds, causing the direct and instantaneous death of the said
Julius Cagampang.
CONTRARY TO LAW: Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code.
Upon arraignment on June 8, 1982, he entered a plea of not guilty. After trial, he was
convicted and sentenced to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua, with the accessory
penalties thereof under Articles 41 and 42 of the Revised Penal Code, and to indemnify the
heirs of the victim in the amount of P12,000 without subsidiary imprisonment in case of
insolvency. He appealed.
The evidence of the prosecution showed that at about 7:30 in the evening of December 30,
1980, while Cagampang, his wife and their two children, were conversing in the store
adjacent to their house in Barangay Talo-ao, Buenavista, Province of Agusan del Norte, the
accused Vicente Temblor alias Ronald, arrived and asked to buy a half-pack of Hope
cigarettes. While Cagampang was opening a pack of cigarettes, there was a sudden burst of
gunfire and Cagampang instantly fell on the floor, wounded and bleeding on the head. His
wife Victorina, upon seeing that her husband had been shot, shouted her husband's name
"Jul" Two persons, one of whom she later Identified as the accused, barged into the interior of

the store through the main door and demanded that she brings out her husband's firearm.
"Igawas mo ang iyang armas!" ("You let out his firearm!") they shouted. The accused fired two
more shots at the fallen victim. Terrified, Victorina hurried to get the "maleta" (suitcase) where
her husband's firearm was hidden. She gave the suitcase to the accused who, after
inspecting its contents, took her husband's .38 caliber revolver, and fled.
In 1981, some months after the incident, Victorina was summoned to the Buenavista police
station by the Station Commander Milan, where she saw and Identified the accused as the
man who killed her husband.
The accused's defense was an alibi. He alleged that from 4:00 o'clock in the afternoon of
December 30, 1980, he and his father had been in the house of Silverio Perol in Barangay
Camagong, Nasipit, Agusan del Norte, where they spent the night drinking over a slaughtered
dog as "pulutan," until 8:00 o'clock in the morning of the following day, December 31, 1980.
The accused and his companion, admittedly members of the dreaded NPA (New People's
Army) were not apprehended earlier because they hid in the mountains of Malapong with
other members- followers of the New People's Army. Temblor surrendered to Mayor Dick
Carmona of Nasipit during the mass surrender of dissidents in August, 1981. He was arrested
by the Buenavista Police at the Buenavista public market on November 26, 1981 and
detained at the Buenavista municipal jail.
The accused capitalized the fact that the victim's widow, Victorina, did not know him by name.
That circumstance allegedly renders the Identification of the accused, as the perpetrator of
her husband's killing, insufficient. However, during the trial, the accused was positively
identified by the widow who recognized him because she was less than a meter away from
him inside the store which was well lighted inside by a 40-watt flourescent lamp and by an
incandescent lamp outside. Her testimony was corroborated by another prosecution witness
a tricycle driver, Claudio Sabanal who was a long-time acquaintance of the accused and
who knew him as "Ronald." He saw the accused in the store of Cagampang at about 7:30
o'clock in the evening of December 30, 1980. He heard the gunshots coming from inside the
store, and saw the people scampering away.
Dr. Alfredo Salonga who issued the post-mortem examination report certified that the victim
sustained three (3) gunshot wounds.
Rebutting the accused's alibi, the prosecution presented a Certification of the Nasipit Lumber
Company's Personnel Officer, Jose F. Tinga (Exh. D), and the NALCO Daily Time Record of
Silverio Perol (Exh. D), showing that Perol was not at home drinking with the accused and his
father, but was at work on December 30, 1980 from 10:50 o'clock in the evening up to 7:00
o'clock in the morning of December 31, 1980. The accused did not bother to overcome this
piece of rebuttal evidence.
In this appeal, the appellant alleges that the court a quo erred:
1. in finding that he was positively identified by the prosecution witness as the
killer of the deceased Julius Cagampang; and
2. in rejecting his defense of allbi.
The appeal deserves no merit. Was the accused positively Identified as the killer of
Cagampang? The settled rule is that the trial court's assessment of the credibility of witnesses

while testifying is generally binding on the appellate court because of its superior advantage
in observing their conduct and demeanor and its findings, when supported by convincingly
credible evidence as in the case at bar, shall not be disturbed on appeal (People vs. Dava,
149 SCRA, 582).<re||an1w>
The minor inconsistencies in the testimony of the eyewitness Victorina Vda. de Cagampang
did not diminish her credibility, especially because she had positively Identified the accused
as her husband's assailant, and her testimony is corroborated by the other witnesses. Her
testimony is credible, probable and entirely in accord with human experience.
Appellant's self-serving and uncorroborated alibi cannot prevail over the positive Identification
made by the prosecution witnesses who had no base motives to falsely accuse him of the
crime. Furthermore, the rule is that in order for an alibi to be acceptable as a defense, it is not
enough that the appellant was somewhere else when the crime was committed; it must be
demonstrated beyond doubt that it was physically impossible for him to be at the scene of the
crime. Here it was admitted that Perol's house in barrio Camagong, Nasipit is accessible to
barrio Talo-ao in Buenavista by jeep or tricycle via a well-paved road in a matter of 15 to 20
minutes. The testimony of the witnesses who had positively Identified him could not be
overcome by the defendant's alibi. (People vs. Mercado, 97 SCRA 232; People vs. Venancio
Ramilo, 146 SCRA 258.)
Appellant's alleged lack of motive for killing Cagampang was rejected by the trial court which
opined that the defendant's knowledge that Cagampang possessed a firearm was motive
enough to kill him as killings perpetrated by members of the New People's Army for the sole
purpose of acquiring more arms and ammunition for their group are prevalent not only in
Agusan del Norte but elsewhere in the country. It is known as the NPA's "agaw armas"
campaign. Moreover, proof of motive is not essential when the culprit has been positively
Identified (People vs. Tan, Jr., 145 SCRA 615).
The records further show that the accused and his companion fled after killing Cagampang
and taking his firearm. They hid in the mountains of Agusan del Norte. Their flight was an
implied admission of guilt (People vs. Dante Astor, 149 SCRA 325; People vs. Realon, 99
SCRA 422).
WHEREFORE, the judgment appealed from is affirmed in all respects, except as to the civil
indemnity payable to the heirs of the Julius Cagampang which is increased to P30,000.00.
SO ORDERED.
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No. L-68969 January 22, 1988
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner,
vs.
USMAN HASSAN y AYUN, respondent.

SARMIENTO, J.:
This is a pauper's appeal of the decision 1 of the Regional Trial Court of Zamboanga City,
Ninth Judicial Region Branch XIII, dated January 25, 1984, which "finds the accused USMAN
HASSAN y AYUN guilty beyond reasonable doubt as principal of the Crime of MURDER, and
there being neither aggravating nor mitigating circumstance attending the commission of the
crime, and pursuant to Paragraph No. 1 of Article 64 of the Revised Penal Code, hereby
imposes upon the said accused the penalty of RECLUSION PERPETUA and all its accessory
penalties; to indemnify the heirs of the deceased victim Ramon Pichel, Jr. y Uro the amount of
P12,000.00 and to pay the costs." 2
Usman Hassan was accused of murder for stabbing to death Ramon Pichel, Jr. y Uro, 24,
single, and a resident of Zamboanga City. 3 At the time of his death on July 23,1981, the
deceased was employed as manager of the sand and gravel business of his father. On the
other hand, Hassan was an illiterate, 15-year-old pushcart cargador. 4
The quality of justice and the majesty of the law shine ever brightest when they are applied
with more jealousy to the poor, the marginalized, and the disadvantaged. Usman Hassan, the
herein accused-appellant, belongs to this class. At the time of the alleged commission of the
crime, he was poor, marginalized, and disadvantaged. He was a flotsam in a sea of violence,
following the odyssey of his widowed mother from one poverty-stricken area to another in
order to escape the ravages of internicine war and rebellion in Zamboanga del Sur. In the 15
years of Hassan's existence, he and his family had to evacuate to other places for fear of their
lives, six times. His existence in this world has not even been officially recorded; his birth has
not been registered in the Registry of Births because the Samal tribe, to which he belongs,
does not see the importance of registering births and deaths.
Usman was convicted on the bases of the testimony of a lone eyewitness for the prosecution
and the sloppiness of the investigation conducted by the police investigator, Police Corporal
Rogelio Carpio of the Homicide and Arson Section of the Zamboanga City Police Station, who
also testified for the prosecution.
We rule that Usman Hassan's guilt was not proved beyond reasonable doubt and that Usman
Hassan must, therefore, be set free.
The lone eyewitness for the prosecution is Jose Samson, 24 years old when he testified,
married, and a resident of Zamboanga City. On the day of the killing, he was employed at the
sand and gravel business of the father of the deceased but was jobless at the time of his
examination-in-chief on February 3, 1982.
He testified that he was with Ramon Pichel, Jr. at about 7:00 o'clock in the evening of July 23,
1981; that he was a backrider in the motorcycle of Ramon when they went to buy mangoes at
Fruit Paradise near the Barter Trade Zone in Zamboanga City that while he was selecting
mangoes, he saw a person stab Ramon who was seated at his red Honda motorcycle which
was parked about two or three meters from the fruit stand where he Samson) was selecting
mangoes; that he saw the assailant stab Ramon "only once" and that after the stabbing, the
assailant ran towards the PNB Building. When asked at the cross-examination if he knew the
assailant, Samson said, "I know him by face but I do not know his name." 5
This sole eyewitness recounted the stabbing thus: "While Ramoncito Pichel, Jr. was holding
the motorcycle with both of his hands, the assailant come from behind, held his left hand and
stabbed him from behind on his chest while the victim was sitting on the motorcycle." He

claimed that he was able to see the assailant because it was very bright there that Ramon
was facing the light of a petromax lamp, and that all these happened in front of the fruit stand
a distance of about 6 to 7 meters from the side of the road.
Samson described the assailant as wearing a white, short-sleeved t-shirt and maong pants,
but "he did not see if the aggressor was wearing shoes," that the assailant stabbed Ramon
with a knife but "he did not exactly see what kind of knife it was, and he did not see how long
the knife was He said he brought the wounded Ramon to the Zamboanga City General
Hospital in a tricycle.
On cross-examination, Samson testified:
xxx xxx xxx
Q When you rushed Ramon Pichel, Jr. to the hospital you came to
know that he was already dead, is that correct?
A Yes, sir, I learned that he was already dead.
Q In the hospital, were you investigated by the police?
A They just asked the description of that person as to his attire and
his appearance.
Q And it was while in the hospital that you told them the
description of the one who stabbed Ramon Pichel, Jr.?
A Yes, Sir.
Q And the body of Ramon Pichel, Jr., was brought to the Funeraria La Merced?
A Yes, sir,
Q Can you recall what time was that?
A I do not know what time was that.
Q And it was all La Merced Funeraria that the police brought to you the
accused?
A...
Q For Identification?
A Yes, sir.
Q And he was alone when you Identified him?
A Yes he was alone.
Q Aside from working with the Pichel family in their sand and gravel business,
do you have any blood relationship with them?

A Yes. sir. 6
(Emphasis supplied)
xxx xxx xxx
What comes as a surprise is that Samson's statement 7 which was taken only on July 25,
1981, two days after the stabbing, and sworn to only on July 27, 1981, also two days after it
was taken, or four days after the killing, was never presented or mentioned by the prosecution
at all. The information was practically forced out of Police Corporal Rogelio P. Carpio, a
witness for the People, during his cross-examination. 8 The sworn statement contained the
following questions and answers:
xxx xxx xxx
Q-14. What and please narrate it to me briefly in your own words,
the incident you are referring?
A-14. While I was busy selecting some mangoes, I saw
unidentified person whom I can recognize by face if seen again
embraced my companion Ramon Pitcher Jr. while the latter was
aboard his motorcycle parked within the area. That this person
without much ado, and armed with a knife suddenly stabbed him
(Ramon). That by coincidence to this incident, our eye met each
other and immediately thereafter, he fled the area toward the
Philippine National Bank (PNB). That this unidentified person was
sporting a semi-long hair, dressed in White Polo-Shirt (Short
sleeve), maong pants height to more or less 5'5, Dark Complexion.
That as this unidentified person fled the area I immediately came
to aid my companion, Ramon Pitcher, Jr., and rushed him to
Zamboanga General Hospital, on board a Tricycle. That may
companion (Ramon) did not whispered (sic) any words to me for
he was in serious condition and few minutes later, he expired.
Q-15. Was tills unidentified person was with companion when he
attack (sic) Ramon Pitcher Jr.?
A-15. He was alone Sir.
Q-16. Can you really Identified (sic) this person who attacked and
stabbed your companion, Ramon Pitcher, Jr., that evening in
question?
A-16. Yes, Sir,
Q-17. Do you still remember that confrontation we made at the
Office of La Merced Funeral Homes, wherein you were confronted
with one Usman Hassan, whom this Officer brought along?
A-17. Yes, Sir.

Q-18. Was he the very person, who attacked and stabbed your
companion, Ramon Pitcher, Jr.?
A-18. Yes, Sir, he was the very person who attacked and stabbed
my companion, Ramon Pitcher, Jr., that evening in question.
Q-19. Why?
A-19. Because his face and other physical appearance were fully
noted by me and this I cannot forget for the rest of my life.
Q-20. Before this incident, was there any altercation that had
ensued while in the process of buying some mangoes in that
area?
A-20. None Sir.
Q-21. Were you able to note what kind of knife used by said
Usman Hassan in stabbing your companion, Ramon Pitcher Jr.?
A-21: None Sir,
Q-22. Well, I have nothing more to ask of you, do you have
anything more to say, add or alter in this statement?
A-22. No more Sir.
Q-23. Are you willing to give a supplemental statement if needed
in the future?
A-23. Yes, Sir. 9
(Emphasis supplied)
xxx xxx xxx
The version of the sole eyewitness appearing in his statement 10 is substantially the same as
that embodied in the "Case Report," Exhibit it "C", by Police Corporal Carpio, also admitted a
s Exhibit "2." This exhibit for the prosecution confirms the sworn statement of witness Samson
that an unidentified person, whom he recognized only by face, appeared and without any
provocation, the latter embraced the victim and stabbed the same allegedly with a knife." The
rest of the Case Report: is also significant in that it confirms the confrontation between the
accused and Jose Samson in the funeral parlor arranged by the police Investigator and
prosecution witness, Corporal Carpio.
xxx xxx xxx
From this end, a follow-up was made within the premises of the Old Barter
Trade, wherein the person of USMAN HASSAN Y AYUN, of Paso Bolong, this
City, was arrested in connection with the above stated incident. That this Officer
and companions arrested this person Usman due to his physical appearance,
which was fully described by victim's companion. Jose Samson. During his
arrest, a knife, measuring to more or less seven (7) inches in blade was

confiscated in his possession. The person of Usman Hassan was brought along
at the La Merced Funeral Homes for a confrontation with victims companion,
Jose Samson and in this confrontation, Jose Samson positively Identified said
Usman Hassan as the very person who stabbed the victim.
Usman Hassan, on the other hand, denied the charges levelled against hub and
admitted ownership of said knife; claiming among other things that he used said
knife for slicing mangoes. 11
xxx xxx xxx
We hold that the evidence for the prosecution in its entirety does not satisfy the quantum of
proof beyond reasonable doubt required by the Constitution, the law, and applicable
jurisprudence to convict an accused person. The said evidence denies us the moral certainty
which would allow us to pronounce, without uneasiness of conscience. Usman Hassan y
Ayun guilty of the killing of the deceased Ramon Pichel, Jr. y Uro, and condemn him to life
imprisonment and in effect turning him into a flotsam again in a sea of convicted felons in
which he would be a very young stranger.
In evaluating the worth of the testimony of the lone eyewitness for the prosecution against the
denial and alibi of the accused, value judgment must not be separated from the
constitutionally guaranteed presumption of innocence.
When the evidence for the prosecution and the evidence for the accused are
weighed, the scales must be tipped in favor of the latter. This is because of the
constitutional presumtion of innocence the accused enjoys as a counter-foil to
the awesome authority of the State that is prosecuting him.
The element of doubt, if reasonable in this case, must operate against the
inference of guilt the prosecution would draw from its evidence. That evidence,
as it happens, consists only of the uncorroborated statement of the two
policemen which, as previously observed, is flawed and therefore suspect. 12
The testimony of Jose Samson, the lone eyewitness, is weak and unconvincing. And so with
the evidence sought to be introduced by Police Corporal Carpio. We discover, for example,
that the expert testimony of the medico-legal officer of the National Bureau of Investigation,
Dr. Valentin Bernalez, presented by the prosecution, contradicted, on material points, the
testimony of the one eyewitness, Jose Samson. While Samson averred on the witness stand
that he saw the assailant stab the deceased "from behind on his chest" 13 only once, the NBI
medico-legal officer Identified two stab wounds, one at the front portion of the chest at the
level and third rib, (sic) and another stab wound located at the left arm posterior aspect." 14
The same medical expert also concluded from the nature and location of the chest wound,
which was the cause of death, that the same was inflicted on the victim while the alleged
accused was in front of him." 15
The investigation of this case by the Homicide/Arson Section of the Zamboanga Southern
Police Sector, 16 at Zamboanga City, particularly by Police Corporal Rogelio P. Carpio, leaves
much to be desired. For one, we are not satisfied with the procedure adopted by the police
investigators in the Identification of the accused as the assailant. We have no doubt that
Usman Hassan was "presented" alone 17 to Jose Samson by the police investigator and
prosecution witness, Police Corporal Carpio, and his police companions, at the office of the
La Merced Funeral Homes in Zamboanga City. As correctly termed by the very evidence 18 of

the prosecution, the procedure adopted by the police investigators was a confrontation"
between Jose Samson, Jr. and Usman. Earlier, on direct examination, Corporal Carpio
testified that Usman was alone when he was brought to Samson for confrontation in the
funeral parlor. However, on cross-examination, Carpio made a turnabout by saying that the
accused was Identified by Samson in a "police line-up;" this tergiversation we dare say, was
an afterthought, more the result of an over or careless cross-examination, augmented by the
leading questions 19 of the trial judge rather than a fastidiousness if not sincerity, on the part of
the police investigator, to honestly correct erroneous statements in his examination-in-chief.
The fact remains that both Samson and the accused testified clearly and unequivocably that
Usman was alone when presented to Samson by Carpio. There was no such police line-up as
the police investigator, to honestly correct erreoneous statements in his examination-in-chief.
The fact remains that both Samson and the accused testified clearly and unequivocably that
Usman was alone when presented to Samson by Carpio. There was no such police
investigator claimed on second thought.
The manner by which Jose Samson, Jr. was made to confront and Identify the accused alone
at the funeral parlor, without being placed in the police line-up, was "pointedly suggsestive,
generated confidence where there was none, activated visual imagination, and, all told,
subserted his reliability as eyewitness. This unusual, coarse, and highly singular method of
Identification, which revolts against the accepted principles of scientific crime detection,
alienates the esteem of every just man, and commands neither our respect nor acceptance."
20

Moreover, the confrontation arranged by the police investigator between the self-proclaimed
eyewitness and the accused did violence to the right of the latter to counsel in all stages of
the investigation into the commission of a crime especially at its most crucial stage the
Identification of the accused.
As it turned out, the method of Identification became just a confrontation. At that critical and
decisive moment, the scales of justice tipped unevenly against the young, poor, and
disadvantaged accused. The police procedure adopted in this case in which only the accused
was presented to witness Samson, in the funeral parlor, and in the presence of the grieving
relatives of the victim, is as tainted as an uncounselled confession and thus falls within the
same ambit of the constitutionally entrenched protection. For this infringement alone, the
accused-appellant should be acquitted.
Moreover, aside from this slipshod Identification procedure, the rest of the investigation of the
crime and the preparation of the evidence for prosecution were done haphazardly,
perfunctorily, and superficially. Samson was not investigated thoroughly and immediately after
the incident. As previously mentioned, his statement was taken by the investigator only two
days after the murder of Ramon Pichel, Jr. and sworn only two days after it had been taken.
Similarly, there is nothing in the record to show that the fruit vendorfrom whom Samson and
the deceased were buying mangoes that fateful evening and who certainly must have
witnessed the fatal stabbingwas investigated, or why he was not investigated. Nor is any
explanation given as to why the companion 21 of the accused at the time Corporal Carpio
arrested him (accused) 'sitting on a pushcart " 22 at about 8:00 P.M. (around 7:00 P.M.,
according to Usman) of that same evening near the scene of the crime, was not also
investigated when he could have been a material witness of the killing or of the innocence of
the accused. In addition, the knife and its scabbard, 23 Confiscated by Carpio from Usman
(tucked on the right side of his waist") at the time of his arrest, were not even subjected to any
testing at all to determine the presence of human blood which could be typed and compared

with the blood type of the deceased. A crime laboratory test had Carpio or the prosecuting
fiscal, or even the trial judge, insisted on it would have revealed whether or not the knife in
question (confiscated from the accused by Carpio one hour after the alleged commission of
the crime) had indeed been the weapon used to kill Ramon. The police investigator instead
nonchalantly dismissed this sin of omission by saying that the knife could have been cleaned
or the bloodstain could have been taken away. 24 This presumption of the deadly weapon's
having been "cleaned" of bloodstains is tantamount to pronouncing the accused of being
guilty.
Our doubt about the guilt of the accused is further deepened by a resolution, 25 in a separate
case, 26 of Assistant City Fiscal of Zamboanga City and deputized Tanod bayan Prosecutor
Pablo Murillo, which clearly reveals that on July 24, 1981, a day after the killing of Ramon
Pichel, Jr., a similar stabbing took place at Plaza Pershing near the place of the earlier
incident, with the suspect in that frustrated homicide case being a certain Benhar Isa, 'a
notorious and a deadly police character" in Zamboanga City, with a long record of arrests. In
that resolution, Fiscal Murillo said the same Benhar Isa was tagged as 'also a suspect in the
stabbing of Ramon Pichel, Jr. to death and the stabbing of Pastor Henry Villagracia at the
Fruit Paradise, this City." The said resolution further states that "with regards to this incident
or witnesses ever testified for fear of possible reprisals." 27
The trial of Usman Hassan began on October 27, 1981. Benhar Isa himself was killed by a
policeman on August 28, 1981, while he (Isa) "was apparently under the influence of liquor
armed with a knife (was) molesting and extorting money from innocent civilians' and "making
trouble." 28 The records of the case at bar do not show any attempt on the part of Corporal
Carpio, or any other police officer, to investigate or question Benhar Isa in connection with the
killing of Pichel, Jr. Was it fear of the notorious police character that made the police officers
disregard the possible connection between the slaying of Ramon and that of the person
(Harun Acan y Arang of the Ministry of National Defense) 29 who was allegedly stabbed by
Benhar Isa a day after the killing of Ramon Jr.? And yet questioning Isa might have provided
that vital link to the resolution of Usman's guilt or innocence. But why should the police
officers investigate Isa when Usman Hassan was already in custody and could be an
available fall guy? Usman Hassan, instead, became a victim of a grave injustice. Indeed,
Usman Hassan is too poor to wage a legal fight to prove his innocence. And he is so
marginalized as to claim and deserve an honest-to-goodness, thorough, and fair police
investigation with all angles and leads pursued to their logical, if not scientific, conclusions.
Sadly circumstanced as he is, the authority of the State was too awesome for him to
counteract.
The appealed decision made much ado of the admission by Usman "that he was arrested at
the former barter trade, which is a place just across the place of the stabbing at the Fruit
Paradise." 30 The trial judge found it "therefore strange that on the very evening of the
stabbing incident he was still at the barter trade area by 8:00 o'clock in the evening when he
usually comes to the city proper at about 6:00 o'clock in the morning and goes home at past
5:00 o'clock and sometimes 6:00 o'clock in the afternoon." 31 Usman's explanation that, at
around 7:00 o'clock P.M., he was waiting for transportation to take him home was found by
the trial court as 'flimsy and weak since he did not explain why he had to go home late that
evening." 32 But the whole trouble is nobody asked him. The trial judge did not propound any
single question to the accused, and only three to his mother on innocuous matters, by way of
clarification, if only to put on record what the mother and son could articulate with clarity.
Taking into account their poverty and illiteracy, the mother and son needed as much, if not
more, help, than the trial judge extended to the prosecution witnesses during their

examination by asking them clarificatory and mostly leading questions. In that sense and to
that extent, the accused was disadvantaged.
A fact that looms large, though mutely to testify on the innocence of the accused but the
importance of which was brushed away by the trial judge was the presence of the accused
near the scene (about 100 to 150 meters away) soon after the stabbing (he testified at around
7:00 P.M. although Police Corporal Carpio stated it was 8:00 P.M.) where he was found sitting
on his pushcart with a companion. If he were the assailant, he would have fled. But the trial
court instead indulged in conjecture, foisting the probability that the accused 'was lulled by a
false sense of security in returning to the place (of the stabbing), when no police officers
immediately responded and appeared at the scene of the crime," adding 'there are numerous
cases in the past where criminals return to the scene of their crimes, for reasons only
psychologist can explain." 33 It must have escaped the trial court's attention that Usman has
no criminal record, and, therefore, he could not be generally classed with criminals. In the
second place, the trial court's rationalization ignores the biblical truism recognized by human
nature and endorsed with approval by this Court that "(T)he wicked flee when no man
pursueth but the righteous are as bold as a lion." 34
And now as a penultimate observation, we could not help but note the total absence of motive
ascribed to Usman for stabbing Ramon, a complete stranger to him. While, as a general rule,
motive is not essential in order to arrive at a conviction, because, after all, motive is a state of
mind, 35 procedurally, however, for purposes of complying with the requirement that a
judgment of guilty must stem from proof beyond reasonable doubt, the lack of motive on the
part of the accused plays a pivotal role towards his acquittal. This is especially true where
there is doubt as to the Identity of the culprit 36 as when 'the Identification is extremely
tenuous," 37 as in this case.
We can not end this travail without adverting to the cavalier manner in which the trial court
disregarded the claimed young age of Usman Hassan.
The defense claims that the accused Usman Hassan is a minor, basing such
claim on the testimony of Lahunay Hassan, the mother of said accused, who
declared that her son Usman Hassan, who is one of her four (4) children, was
born in the year 1967. She testified that she was just told by a person coming
from their place about the year of the birth of her son Usman. However on
cross-examination, Lahunay Hassan cannot even remember the date or year of
birth of her other children. The failure of Lahunay Hassan to remember the date
or year of birth of her children is of course understandable, considering that she
is unschooled and she belongs to a tribe that does not register births, deaths or
marriages, however, it is strange that she only took pains to find out the year of
birth of her son Usman. For this reason, the Court granted a motion of the
defense on September 13, 1982, to have the herein accused examined by a
competent dentist to determine his age. However, the findings of the dentist of
Zamboanga General Hospital which is marked as Exhibit "5" shows the
following: "age cannot be determined accurately under present mouth
conditions. Approximately, he can be from 14 to 21 years of age." This simply
means that the herein accused could either be 14 years of age or 21 years of
age, or any age in between those aforestated years. From the observation of
this court, the accused Usman Hassan was about 18 years of age at the time he
committed this crime and this observation is based on his personal appearance,
his size and facial features and other personal characteristics, hence he can not

be classified as a youthful offender under Article. 189 of Presendential Decree

No. 603, as ammended by Presedential Decree No. 1179. In the case of U.S.
vs. Mallari, 29 Phil. 13 and People vs. Reyes and Panganiban, CA 48 O.G.
1022, cited in the Edition, Page 680, it was ruled by the Supreme Court that "In
cases where the age of the culprit is at issue as a basis for claiming an
exempting mitigating circumstance, it is incumbent upon the accused to
establish that circumstance ad any other elements of defense. 38
Considering that the age of the accused could exempt him from punishment or cause the
suspension of his sentence under Articles 12 and 80, respectively of the Revised Penal Code,
if found guilty, more meticulousness and care should have been demanded of medical or
scientific sources, and less reliance on the observation of the judge as had happened in this
case. The preliminary findings of the dentist that the accused could be anywhere between
fourteen to twenty one years, despite the difficulty of arriving at an accurate determination due
to Hassan's mouth condition, would have placed the trial judge on notice that there is the
probability that the accused might be exempted from criminal liability due to his young age. All
the foregoing indicates that the accused had not been granted the concern and compassion
with which the poor, marginalized, and disadvantaged so critically deserve. It is when judicial
and police processes and procedures are thoughtlessly and haphazardly observed that cries
of the law and justice being denied the poor are heard. In any event, all this would not be of
any moment now, considering the acquittal of the accused herein ordered.
WHEREFORE, the decision is hereby REVERSED, and the accused Usman Hassan y Ayun
is ACQUITTED of the crime charged. His release from confinement is hereby Ordered, unless
he is held for another legal cause. With costs de oficio.
SO ORDERED.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
FIRST DIVISION
G.R. No. 175942

September 13, 2007

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee,

vs.
MARLON DELIM, LEON DELIM, MANUEL DELIM alias "BONG," NORBERTO DELIM and
RONALD DELIM alias "BONG," Accused,
NORBERTO DELIM, Accused-Appellant.
DECISION
GARCIA, J.:
On appeal to this Court is the Decision1 dated July 28, 2006 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in
CA-G.R. CR.-HC No. 02001, finding herein accused-appellant Norberto Delim guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of the crime of Homicide. The decision affirmed with modifications an earlier
decision of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Urdaneta City, Pangasinan, Branch 46, in its

Criminal Case No. U-10059 which found appellant guilty of the more serious offense of
Murder and sentenced him to the supreme penalty of death.
On account of the penalty of death imposed by the trial court, the case was directly elevated
to this Court for automatic review in G.R. No. 153543. However, pursuant to our decision in
People v. Mateo2 modifying the pertinent provisions of the Revised Rules on Criminal
Procedure insofar as direct appeals from the RTC to the Supreme Court in cases where the
penalty imposed is death, reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment, the case was transferred to
the CA for "appropriate action and disposition" per this Courts Resolution of January 17,
2006,3 whereat it was docketed as CA-G.R. CR.-HC No. 02001. Following the CAs
affirmance, albeit with modifications, of the trial courts decision, appellant is again with this
Court via the present recourse pursuant to a Notice of Appeal 4 filed by him with the CA.
The Case
Marlon, Leon, Manuel @ "Bong," Norberto and Ronald @ "Bong," all surnamed Delim, were
jointly indicted in the RTC of Urdaneta City, Pangasinan for the crime of Murder under an
Information5 which reads as follows:
That on or about January 23, 1999, in the evening at Brgy. Bila, Sison, Pangasinan and within
the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused armed with short firearms
barged-in and entered the house of Modesto Delim and once inside with intent to kill,
treachery, evident premeditation, conspiring with one another, did then and there, willfully,
unlawfully and feloniously grab, hold, hogtie, gag with a piece of cloth, brought out and abduct
Modesto Delim, accused Leon and Manuel Delim stayed in the house guarded and prevented
the wife and son of Modesto Delim from helping the latter, thereafter with abuse of superior
strength stabbed and killed said Modesto Delim, to the damage and prejudice of his heirs.
CONTRARY to Art. 248, Revised Penal Code, as amended by Republic Act No. 7659.
Since Marlon, Leon and Ronald were the only ones duly apprehended, said three accused
stood trial for the crime. On January 14, 2000, the trial court rendered judgment finding the
three guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Murder and sentenced them to suffer the
death penalty. On January 28, 2003, this Court, on automatic review, affirmed the decision of
the trial court but with the modification that the three were only guilty of Homicide. 6 Marlon,
Leon and Ronald are already serving their respective sentences at the New Bilibid Prisons,
Muntinlupa City. The other accused, Manuel Delim, remained at-large up to the present, while
herein accused-appellant Norberto Delim, then known as "Robert Delim," was subsequently
arrested by the police authorities.
Subsequent to his arrest, Robert was arraigned under the same information for Murder.
Assisted by counsel, he pleaded "Not guilty" to the charge. After a reinvestigation was
conducted, the real name of Robert was found to be Norberto Delim. Accordingly, the
Information was amended on July 10, 2001. 7 Thereafter, trial with respect to herein accusedappellant Norberto Delim ensued.
The Evidence
In the course of the proceedings, the prosecution proffered in evidence the testimonies of Rita
Manalo and Randy Manalo, the victims wife and son, respectively, and that of Dra. Ma. Fe
Lagmay de Guzman, the Municipal Health Officer of Sison, Pangasinan, who conducted the
autopsy on the body of the victim, plus the documents marked in the course of trial. For its

part, the defense adduced in evidence the testimonies of appellant himself and those of his
mother, Lucila Delim, and neighbors Emilio Lutan and Nora Ramos.
In its Brief, the People, thru the Office of the Solicitor General, presents the prosecution's
version of the incident, to wit:
On January 23, 1999, at around six-thirty in the evening, the victim, Modesto Delim, his wife
Rita Manalo, son, Randy Manalo, and two young grandchildren, were about to take their
supper in their house at Brgy. Bila, Sison, Pangasinan, when suddenly, appellant Norbert
Delim, together with co-accused Marlon Delim and Ronald Delim, barged into their house
carrying short firearms. While Modesto was seated at the dinner table, Marlon poked a gun at
him, and then appellant and Ronald dragged him out of the house. Randy saw the group
which abducted his father who was then taken to Brgy. Paldit, Sison, Pangasinan. Shortly,
appellants co-accused Leon Delim and Manuel Delim, who were also armed with short
firearms, appeared and guarded the front door of the house to prevent Rita and Randy from
following the victim. Leon and Manuel left the house at around seven oclock in the morning of
the next day.
On January 27, 1999, four days after Modestos abduction, his lifeless and decomposing body
with several stab wounds and a gunshot wound in the head was discovered in a grassy area
at the housing project in Brgy. Paldit.8
The testimony of Dra. Ma. Fe Lagmay de Guzman, given on August 16, 1999 during the trial
of the other three (3) accused (Marlon, Leon and Ronald), was adopted by the prosecution
without objection from the appellant. Said witness testimony showed that the victim (1)
suffered from five gunshot wounds, inflamed penis and scrotum and seven stab wounds; (2)
died of multiple gunshot wounds; and (3) autopsy was conducted four days after the victim
died.
In defense, herein appellant denied the charge against him and averred that on the date of
the alleged commission of the crime, he was in Villa Paz, Naguilian, Isabela where his family
had transferred from Bila, Sison, Pangasinan in the year 1986. According to him, he worked
at the farm on that day of January 23, 1999, and later in the afternoon of the same day, he,
together with some companions, walked home and arrived at their house at eight oclock in
the evening. Though admitting that one of his co-accused, Marlon, is his brother, appellant
denied any relation with the victim Modesto Delim despite their having the same surname. He
completely denied knowing Modestos wife, Rita, and son, Randy. Lastly, appellant declared
that since his family moved to Isabela in 1986, he had been to Pangasinan only once and that
was in 1997.
Lucila Delim, mother of appellant, corroborated her sons testimony and added that the trip by
buses from Sison, Pangasinan to Naguilian, Isabela is every 30 minutes. Nora Ramos and
Emilio Lutan, appellants neighbors at Villa Paz, Naguilian, Isabela both attested to appellants
presence thereat on January 23, 1999, the former having seen appellant at about ten oclock
in the evening of said day and at six oclock the following morning, while the latter claiming to
have been with the appellant at the farm the whole day of January 23, 1999.
The trial and appellate courts decisions
In a decision9 dated April 29, 2002, the trial court, basing its judgment purely on circumstantial
evidence and appreciating the qualifying circumstance of treachery, adjudged appellant guilty
beyond reasonable doubt of murder and sentenced him to suffer the death penalty.

Dispositively, the decision states:

WHEREFORE, JUDGMENT OF CONVICTION beyond reasonable doubt is hereby rendered
against Norberto Delim the commission of Murder, a crime defined and penalized under
Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code as amended by R.A. 7659 and the Court sentences
him to suffer the penalty of DEATH, to be implemented in the manner as provided for by law;
the Court likewise orders the accused to jointly and solidarily (with accused Ronald, Marlon
and Leon all surnamed Delim), to pay civil indemnity of P50,000.00; to indemnify the heirs of
Modesto Delim the sum of P75,000.00 as moral damages; and P25,000.00 as exemplary
damages as stated in the decision of this Court against accused Ronald Delim, Marlon Delim
and Leon Delim dated January 14, 2000.
The Branch Clerk of Court is hereby ordered to transmit the entire records of this case to the
Honorable Supreme Court and to prepare the mitimus fifteen (15) days from date of
promulgation.
The Jail Warden, Bureau of Jail Management and Penology, Urdaneta City, is hereby ordered
to transmit the person of Norberto Delim to the New Bilibid Prisons, Muntinlupa City, fifteen
(15) days from receipt of this decision.
Let an Alias Warrant of Arrest be issued for the apprehension of accused Manuel Delim. In the
meantime, let the case against him be ARCHIVED.
SO ORDERED.
As earlier stated, when directly elevated to this Court for automatic review in view of the
penalty imposed, the case was transferred to the CA for appropriate action and disposition,
whereat it was docketed as CA-G.R. CR.-HC No. 02001.
In its decision dated July 28, 2006, the CA partially granted the appeal as it ruled that while
appellants guilt was duly proved, nonetheless, it was only for the crime of homicide since the
qualifying circumstance of treachery was not attendant at the time the victim was killed. We
quote the fallo of the CA decision:
WHEREFORE, the Appeal is partially GRANTED. The assailed decision of the RTC, Br. 46 of
Urdaneta City is hereby modified in that appellant Norberto Delim is found guilty of homicide
as defined in and penalized by Article 249 of the Revised Penal Code and is meted the
indeterminate penalty of 10 years and I day of prision mayor in its maximum period as
minimum to 14 years, 8 months and 1 day of reclusion temporal in its medium period as
maximum, there being no modifying circumstances in the commission of the crime.
Accused is ordered to pay the heirs of the victim in the amount of P50,000.00 by way of civil
indemnity, the amount of P50,000.00 by way of moral damages and the amount of
P25,000.00 as exemplary damages.
SO ORDERED.10
The case is again with us in view of the Notice of Appeal interposed by appellant from the CA
decision.
In its Resolution11 of February 26, 2007, the Court accepted the appeal and required the
parties to file their respective supplemental briefs, if they so desire. In their respective

Manifestations,12 the parties waived the filing of supplemental briefs and instead merely
adopted the Briefs13 they have earlier respectively filed with this Court before the case was
transferred to the CA.
In his Brief, appellant asks this Court to consider the following: (1) whether the circumstantial
evidence presented was sufficient for conviction; (2) whether conspiracy was sufficiently
established; and (3) whether his guilt was proved beyond reasonable doubt.
The appeal must fail.
Conviction in a criminal case does not entail absolute certainty; what is required only is that
degree of proof which, after an examination of the entire records of the case, produces in an
unprejudiced mind moral certainty of the culpability of the accused. 14
At the outset, we may well emphasize that direct evidence of the commission of a crime is not
the only basis on which a court draws its finding of guilt, because established facts that form a
chain of circumstances can lead the mind intuitively or impel a conscious process of
reasoning towards a conviction.15 Indeed, rules on evidence and principles in jurisprudence
sustain the conviction of an accused through circumstantial evidence, defined as that which
"indirectly proves a fact in issue through an inference which the fact-finder draws from the
evidence established."16 Resort thereto is essential when the lack of direct testimony would
result in setting a felon free.17 It is not a weaker form of evidence vis-a-vis direct evidence. 18
Cases have recognized that in its effect upon the courts, circumstantial evidence may surpass
direct evidence in weight and probative force. 19
Section 4, Rule 133 of the Rules of Court states that circumstantial evidence suffices to
convict if: (a) there is more than one circumstance; (b) the facts from which the inferences are
derived have been proven; and (c) the combination of all the circumstances is such as to
produce a conviction beyond reasonable doubt. Thus, to justify a conviction based on
circumstantial evidence, the combination of circumstances must be interwoven in such a way
as to leave no reasonable doubt as to the guilt of the accused. 20
After a careful review of the records of this case, we find that, when viewed as a whole, the
circumstantial evidence proved by the prosecution points unerringly to the culpability of
appellant Norberto Delim as one of the persons responsible for the killing of the victim,
Modesto Delim. Indeed, the combination of the circumstances which comprised such
evidence forms an unbroken chain that points to appellant as one of the perpetrators of the
crime.
First, the forcible abduction of the victim from his house with the use of short firearms by the
appellant together with Marlon Delim and Ronald Delim on January 23, 1999 at about eight
oclock in the evening. Second, right after the victim was taken out of the house, appellants
two other co-accused, Manuel Delim and Leon Delim, armed with short firearms, guarded and
prevented household members from getting out until the following morning of January 24,
1999. And third, four days after the abduction, the victims dead body was found with multiple
gunshot wounds.
The circumstance of abduction was duly established by the testimony of the victims son,
Randy Manalo, to wit:
Q While taking your supper that time, do you recall if there was anything unusual that
happened at that time?

A When we were about to eat three armed men entered our house.
Q Do you know these three armed men who entered your house?
A Yes, sir.
Q Who are they, name them one by one?
A Marlon Delim, Robert Delim and Ronald Delim.
xxx

xxx

xxx

Q xxx What kind of arm were they carrying at that time?

A Short handgun, (sic) sir.
Q When these three armed persons whom you have mentioned, armed with short
firearms, what did they do then when they entered your house?
A They took my father, sir.
Q Who took your father?
A Marlon Delim, Robert Delim, and Ronald Delim, sir.
xxx

xxx

xxx

Q How did they get your father?

A They poked a gun and brought him outside the house, sir.21
Q What is the name of Norberto Delim, has he another name?
A The name that they called him in our place is Robert, madam.
xxx

xxx

xxx

Q His name given to the Honorable Court was Norberto and you said Robert entered
your house that evening. This Norberto and Robert is the same who entered that
evening of your house on January 23, 1999?
A Yes, sir.
Q How did these three (3) enter your house that evening of January 23, 1999?
A They entered thru the door, sir.
Q In other words, before they enter (sic) your house, your door was already open, is
that correct?
A Yes sir.
Q When these three (3) including Robert Delim entered your house, what happened
next after that?

A They forcibly took hold of my father and brought out, sir.

Q You said your father was forcibly took (sic) how did they forcibly take your father?
A They took hold of him, pulled him outside the house, sir.
Q Who pulled your father outside your House?
A Marlon, Ronald, and Robert, sir.22
The second circumstance was likewise established by Randys testimony, viz:
Q What did you do after that when these three (3) pulled your father Modesto Delim
outside your house?
A When my father was pulled outside from the house, Leon Delim and Manuel Delim
were with arms, sir.
Q What kind of arms were they holding?
A Short firearms, sir.23
Q After bringing your father out from your house, what transpired next?
A Manuel Delim and Leon Delim said "Stay in your house," and guarded us.
xxx

xxx

xxx

Q When your father was pulled out from your house by these three persons, what did
you and your mother do while these three persons were taking out of your house?
A We did not do anything because Manuel and Leon Delim guarded us.
COURT
Where, in your house?
A Yes, sir.
xxx

xxx

xxx

COURT
Why do you know that they were guarding you?
A Because they were at the door, sir?
Q What was their appearance that time when these two persons were guarding you,
these Leon and Manuel?
A They were armed, sir.
Q What do you mean by armed?

A They have gun, sir.

Q What kind of firearm?
A Short firearm, sir.24
Notably, another witness, the victims wife, Rita Manalo, corroborated Randys afore-quoted
testimony.25
As for the victim dying of multiple gunshot wounds which were all fatal, the Autopsy Report 26
and the testimony of the municipal health officer 27 who conducted the autopsy duly proved
such circumstance.
In light of the aforementioned evidence, the collapse of appellants defenses, i.e., denial and
alibi, is inevitable. More so, in the face of the categorical and positive identification of
appellant by the two (2) prosecution witnesses, both of whom saw appellant up close, as one
of the three (3) malefactors who forcibly abducted and dragged the victim out of the house on
that fateful night of January 23, 1999. For sure, alibi cannot be given greater evidentiary value
than the testimonies of credible witnesses who testify on affirmative matters. 28 Positive
identification destroys the defense of alibi and renders it impotent, especially where such
identification is credible and categorical. 29
Besides, basic is the rule that for alibi to prosper, the accused must prove that he was
somewhere else when the crime was committed and that it was physically impossible for him
to have been at the scene of the crime.30 Physical impossibility refers to the distance between
the place where the appellant was when the crime transpired and the place where it was
committed, as well as the facility of access between the two places. 31
Here, appellant argues that he was nowhere near the crime scene on the night of January 23,
1999. But even assuming that the distance between Naguilian, Isabela where appellant
allegedly was, and Sison, Pangasinan where the crime took place, can be negotiated in eight
(8) hours as asserted by the appellant, still, it was not physically impossible for him to be at
the locus criminis at the time of the killing, for, as admitted by his mother, Lucila Delim, the
bus trips to and from said places are every thirty (30) minutes.
Notwithstanding the foregoing established facts, appellant insists on his innocence, claiming
that conspiracy was not established by clear and convincing evidence.
Conspiracy exists when two or more persons come to an agreement concerning the
commission of a crime and decide to commit it.32 It may be proved by direct or circumstantial
evidence consisting of acts, words, or conduct of the alleged conspirators before, during and
after the commission of the felony to achieve a common design or purpose. 33 Hence, common
design is the essence of conspiracy.
Here, as found by the trial and appellate courts, appellant acted in concert with his other coaccused Marlon, Ronald, Manuel and Leon to achieve a common criminal design. Indeed,
conspiracy among said accused could easily be deduced from their presence and actual
participation in the commission of the crime. As aptly stated by the trial court:
In this case, while there was no previous agreement between accused Norberto Delim and all
other accused to kill the victim, the simultaneous acts of accused Marlon, Ronald and
Norberto Delim in forcibly taking hold and bringing out the victim from his house and the use

of Manuel and Leon Delim as guards to watch the wife and son and other members of the
household showed unity of purpose. The concerted action of all the afore-named accused
against the victim, Modesto Delim, made them co-principals by direct participation, and
therefore conspiracy is proved.34
In any event, this Court, in People v. Delim,35 already ruled as to the existence of conspiracy
among appellants co-accused, Marlon, Ronald and Leon, all surnamed Delim. We held
therein:
In the case at bar, Marlon, Ronald and Leon arrived together in the house of Modesto, each
armed with a handgun. Marlon and Ronald barged into said house while Leon stood guard by
the door thereof. After Marlon and Ronald had left with Modesto in tow, Leon stood by the
door and warned Randy and Rita not to leave the house. Leon stood guard by the door of the
house until 7:00 a.m. of January 24, 1999 when he left the house. The overt acts of all the
malefactors were so synchronized and executed with precision evincing a preconceived plan
or design of all the malefactors to achieve a common purpose, namely the killing of Modesto.
Irrefragably, the tasks assigned to Leon in the commission of the crime were (a) to act as a
lookout; (b) to ensure that Rita and Randy remain in their house to prevent them from seeking
assistance from police authorities and their relatives before their mission to kill Modesto shall
have been a fait accompli as well as the escape of Marlon and Roland. Patently, Leon, a
lookout for the group, is guilty of the killing of Modesto. Leon may not have been at the situs
criminis when Modesto was killed by Marlon and Roland nevertheless he is a principal by
direct participation. If part of a crime has been committed in one place and part in another,
each person concerned in the commission of either part is liable as principal. No matter how
wide may be the separation of the conspirators, if they are all engaged in a common plan for
the execution of a felony and all take their part in furtherance of the common design, all are
liable as principals. Actual presence is not necessary if there is a direct connection between
the actor and the crime.
`
Conspiracy having been established, the act of one, therefore, is the act of all and everyone
of the conspirators, appellant included, is guilty with the others in equal degree.
The sufficiency of the circumstantial evidence having been established and the existence of
conspiracy duly proved, appellants exact criminal responsibility must now be determined.
Pertinently, as defined by Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code, the crime of Murder is
committed by a person who kills another with treachery. Treachery exists when the offender
commits a crime against persons, employing means, methods or forms in the execution
thereof which tend directly and specifically to ensure its execution, without risk to himself
arising from any defense or retaliatory act which the victim might make. 36
Under the facts of this case, no one actually saw how the killing was perpetrated. No
evidence, whether direct or circumstantial, was presented to establish that there had been the
qualifying circumstance of treachery in the commission of the crime. Indeed, a review of the
trial courts decision reveals that the trial judge discussed the presence of treachery during
the abduction of the victim but was silent as to its presence at the time of the killing. Ergo,
treachery, which must be proven positively, cannot be appreciated in this case so as to
elevate the killing to murder.
We, thus, concur with the following observations of the CA:

We subscribe to appellees stand that appellant should be convicted and sentenced only for
the crime of homicide and not murder since the qualifying circumstance of treachery was not
proved. The circumstance allegedly pointed out as implying treachery had reference to victim
Modesto Delims forcible abduction by Marlon, Ronald and by appellant Norberto Delim and
not when he was killed. For treachery to be correctly appreciated, the following elements must
be shown: (1) that the means of execution employed prevented the victim from defending
himself or retaliating and (2) it was deliberately and consciously adopted.
In the case at bar, there was no evidence showing that victim Modesto Delim was
defenseless before and at the time he was killed. The fact of dragging and forcibly abducting
the victim cannot imply that he was killed with treachery.37
Furthermore, in the aforesaid case of People v. Delim, 38 this Court made the following
ratiocination:
xxx Although the victim may have been defenseless at the time he was seized but there is no
evidence as to the particulars of how he was assaulted and killed, treachery cannot be
appreciated against the accused. In this case, the victim was defenseless when seized by
Marlon and Ronald. However, the prosecution failed to present any witness or conclusive
evidence that Modesto was defenseless immediately before and when he was attacked and
killed. It cannot be presumed that although he was defenseless when he was seized, the
victim was in the same situation when he was attacked, shot and stabbed by the malefactors.
xxx
The qualifying circumstance of treachery not having been appreciated then against
appellants co-accused Marlon, Ronald and Leon Delim, said circumstance cannot now be
appreciated against appellant. Verily, absent any qualifying circumstance, appellant can be
convicted only of homicide defined and penalized by Article 249 of the Revised Penal Code. 39
In sum, we find appellants guilt for the crime of homicide to have been proven beyond
reasonable doubt.
Thus, the CA correctly meted on appellant the indeterminate penalty of 10 years and 1 day of
prision mayor in its maximum period as minimum to 14 years, 8 months and 1 day of
reclusion temporal in its medium period as maximum, there being no modifying circumstance
in the commission of the crime. Likewise proper are the awards of civil indemnity and moral
damages in the amount of P50,000.00 each, as well as exemplary damages in the amount of
P25,000.00.
WHEREFORE, the appealed decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR.-HC No. 02001
is hereby AFFIRMED in all respects.
No costs.
SO ORDERED.
Criminal Law- People vs. Delim
This case is with regard to Art 8 and 13 of the Revised Penal Code
"the act of one is the act of all"

Case of People of the R.P. vs. Delim

G.R. No. 142773 28January2003

FACTS OF THE CASE:

It is due to the automatic review of the decision of the RTC Branch 46 (Urdaneta City)
finding the appellants, guilty beyond reasonable doubt and sentencing them to death
for the murder of Modesto Bantas.

Appellants pleaded not guilty to the charge. The appellants and victim are related for
modesto is an adopted son of their father. On January 23,1999 Marlon, Robert and
Ronald Delim charged into the house and poked a gun at modesto and herded him
outside the house. Leon and Manuel Delim both armed stayed put and made sure that
randy and rita stayed put.

Modesto's lifeless body was then found on January 25, 1999. Marlon, Ronald, and Leon
used denial and alibi as their evidence against the charge.
*alibis are the weakest of all defenses since it is easy to contrive and difficult to
disprove

ISSUES OF THE CASE:

Is conspiracy and treachery present in this case to ensure that murder can be the
crime?

Yes there is:

CONSPIRACY- is determined when two or more persons agree to commit a felony and
decide to commit it. Conspiracy must be proven with the same quantum of evidence as
the felony itself, more specifically by proof beyond reasonable doubt. It is not essential
that there be proof as to the existence of a previous agreement to commit a crime. It is
sufficient if, at the time of commission of the crime, the accused had the same purpose
and were united in its executed.
appellants acted in unison when they abducted Modesto. So their acts were
synchronized and executed with precision evincing a preconceived plan to kill
Modesto

There is no:

TREACHERY- there is treachery when the offender commits any of the crimes against
person, employing means, methods, or forms in the execution thereof which tend
directly and especially to insure its execution, without risk to himself arising from the
defense which the offended party might make.
For it to be appreciated prosecution needs to prove:
a. employment of means of execution which gives the person no opportunity
to defend himself
b. the means of execution is deliberately and consciously adopted
in the appellants case there are no evidence to the particulars on how Modesto was
assaulted and killed and this in fact does mean that treachery cannot be proven since
it cannot be presumed that modesto was defenseless during the time that he was
being attacked and shot at by the appellants.
Sheer numbers by the appellants when they attacked modesto does not constitute
proof that the three took advantage of their numerical superiority and their handguns
when Modesto was shot and stabbed.

HELD:
APPELLANTS ARE GUILTY BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT OF THE FELONY OF
HOMICIDE (THE DECISION OF THE LOWER COURTS WERE MODIFIED TO LOWER
THE CRIME FROM MURDER TO HOMICIDE)