CYNTHIA S. BOLOS VS DANILO T.

BOLOS
Facts : Petitioner filed a petition for declaration of nullity of her marriage invoking Article 36 of the Family Code on July 10, 2003. The
RTC granted her petition on August 2, 2006. Respondent thereafter filed a motion for reconsideration after respondent received the
decision of the lower court. The decision as declared final after a motion to reconsider denial of appeal was denied.
Respondent filed a petition for review before the Court of Appeals and hereby granted. The appellate court ruled that AM no 02-11-10SC did not apply to the case at bar as their marriage was solemnized Feb 14 1980 before the family code took effect. The said court
procedure required a motion for reconsideration as a prerequisite to appeal cases on declaration of absolute nullity on void marriages
and annulment of voidable marriages. Petitioner filed her manifestation and a motion for partial reconsideration but was denied by the
appellate court as the 15-day reglementary period to file is not extendable.
Petitioner filed this said petition to the Supreme Court contending that the appellate court erred in ruling that their case is not covered
by the Family Code; that AM no 02-11-10-SC covers/pertains to the word petitions instead of marriages; if the Family code covers
the case then a motion of reconsideration is a precondition for an appeal; and, since the respondent refused to comply with the
precondition of filing a motion for reconsideration, a relaxation on the rules of appeal is not proper.
Issue: Whether or not AM no 02-11-10 SC Rules on Declaration of Absolute Nullity of void marriages and Annulment of Voidable
Marriages is applicable to the case.
Held: No. the court ruled that AM 02-11-10-SC is strict in its scope wherein section 1 of the rule reads:
Section 1. Scope This rule shall govern petitions for declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages and annulment of voidable
marriages under the Family Code of the Philippines. Applying the rule verba legis, the said section leaves no room for interpretation
and is very clear that it would only cover marriages under the Family Code. Also it would only be applied to marriages not to
petitions.
CAMACHO-REYES V. REYES
FACTS: Petitioner Maria Socorro Camacho-Reyes met respondent Ramon Reyes at the UP Diliman, in 1972 when they were both 19
years old. Petitioner enjoyed respondents style of courtship which included dining out, unlike other couples their age who were
restricted by a university students budget. At that time, respondent held a job in the family business, the Aristocrat Restaurant.
Petitioners good impression of the respondent was not diminished by the latters habit of cutting classes, not even by her discovery that
respondent was taking marijuana. On December 5, 1976, petitioner and respondent got married. They lived with Ramons parents and
they were supported by them. They had a child which made their financial difficulties worse. All the business ventures of Ramon were
unsuccessful and Socorro became the breadwinner of the family. To make things worse, despite the fact that Socorro would undergo an
operation for removal of a cyst, respondent remained unconcerned and inattentive; and simply read the newspaper, and played dumb
when petitioner requested that he accompany her as she was wheeled into the operating room. They tried to attend counselling
sessions but nothing has changed. Sometime in 1996, petitioner confirmed that respondent was having an extra-marital affair. RTC
granted the petition. CA reversed. Hence, this petition
ISSUE: Whether or not Ramon is psychologically incapacitated
HELD: Yes. Marriage is null and void. The lack of personal examination and interview of the respondent, or any other person diagnosed
with personality disorder, does not per se invalidate the testimonies of the doctors. Neither do their findings automatically constitute
hearsay that would result in their exclusion as evidence. In the instant case, respondents pattern of behavior manifests an inability, nay,
a psychological incapacity to perform the essential marital obligations as shown by his: (1) sporadic financial support; (2) extra-marital
affairs; (3) substance abuse; (4) failed business attempts; (5) unpaid money obligations; (6) inability to keep a job that is not connected
with the family businesses; and (7) criminal charges of estafa.
BACCAY VS. BACCAY
FACTS: Noel and Maribel were sweethearts. However, Noel decided to break up with Maribel because he was already involved with
another woman. To give Maribel some time to get over their relationship, they still continued to see each other albeit on a friendly basis.
Despite their efforts to keep their meetings strictly friendly, however, Noel and Maribel had several romantic moments together. Maribel
informed Noel that she was pregnant with his child. Upon advice of his mother, Noel grudgingly agreed to marry Maribel.
During the marriage, Maribel refused to have sexual intercourse with Noel. Surprisingly, despite Maribels claim of being pregnant, Noel
never observed any symptoms of pregnancy in her. One day, Maribel did not go home for a day, and when she came home she
announced to Noel and his family that she had a miscarriage and was confined at the Chinese General Hospital where her sister
worked as a nurse. Noel confronted her about her alleged miscarriage which escalated into an intense quarrel. Maribel left Noels
house and did not come back anymore.

After less than two years of marriage, Noel filed a petition for declaration of nullity of marriage with the RTC of Manila. Despite
summons, Maribel did not participate in the proceedings. The RTC found that Maribel failed to perform the essential marital obligations
of marriage, and such failure was due to a personality disorder called Narcissistic Personality Disorder characterized by juridical
antecedence, gravity and incurability as determined by a clinical psychologist. However, the CA held that Noel failed to establish that
Maribels supposed Narcissistic Personality Disorder was the psychological incapacity contemplated by law and that it was permanent
and incurable.
ISSUE: Whether or not the marriage between the parties is null and void under Article 36 of the Family Code.
HELD: The petition lacks merit.

The Court held in Santos v. Court of Appeals that the phrase "psychological incapacity" is not meant to comprehend all possible cases
of psychoses. It refers to no less than a mental (not physical) incapacity that causes a party to be truly non cognitive of the basic marital
covenants that concomitantly must be assumed and discharged by the parties to the marriage which, as expressed by Article 68 of the
Family Code, include their mutual obligations to live together, observe love, respect and fidelity and render help and support. The
intendment of the law has been to confine it to the most serious of cases of personality disorders clearly demonstrative of an utter
insensitivity or inability to give meaning and significance to the marriage.
In this case, the totality of evidence presented by Noel was not sufficient to sustain a finding that Maribel was psychologically
incapacitated. Noels evidence merely established that Maribel refused to have sexual intercourse with him after their marriage, and that
she left him after their quarrel when he confronted her about her alleged miscarriage. He failed to prove the root cause of the alleged
psychological incapacity and establish the requirements of gravity, juridical antecedence, and incurability. As correctly observed by the
CA, the report of the psychologist, who concluded that Maribel was suffering from Narcissistic Personality Disorder traceable to her
experiences during childhood, did not establish how the personality disorder incapacitated Maribel from validly assuming the essential
obligations of the marriage. Indeed, the same psychologist even testified that Maribel was capable of entering into a marriage except
that it would be difficult for her to sustain one. Mere difficulty, it must be stressed, is not the incapacity contemplated by law. Petition is
DENIED.
SILVINO A. LIGERALDE VS. MAY ASCENSION A. PATALINGHUG
Facts: Silvino A. Ligeralde (Silvino) filed a petition to declare his marriage to May Ascension A. Patalinghug (May) void on the ground of
Mays psychological incapacity. Silvino claimed that May was immature, irresponsible and unfaithful. Silvino alleged that at one time in
their marriage, May came home at 4:00 in the morning; she claimed to have watched a video program in a neighboring town, but later
admitted that she slept with her Palestinian boyfriend in a hotel. Silvino persuaded her to be conscientious of her duties as wife and
mother but his pleas were ignored and would often lead to altercations or physical violence. Mays commitment to reform dissuaded him
from separating from her, and they started a new life. However, after a few months, May was back to her old ways. One day, Silvino
came home and could not find her; he searched for her and later found her in a nearby apartment, drinking beer with a male lover. May
subsequently confessed that she had no more love for him, and they lived separately. The psychologist, to whom Silvino referred the
matter for psychological evaluation, certified that May was psychologically incapacitated to perform her essential marital obligations;
that the incapacity started when she was still young and became manifest after marriage; and that the same was serious and incurable.
The Regional Trial Court (RTC) declared the marriage of Silvino and May void. The Court of Appeals (CA), however, reversed the
RTCs decision, holding that Mays alleged sexual infidelity, emotional immaturity and irresponsibility did not constitute psychological
incapacity within the contemplation of the Family Code, and that the psychologist failed to identify and prove the root cause of the
incapacity or that the incapacity was medically or clinically permanent or incurable. Silvino brought the case to the Supreme Court via a
petition for certiorari. The Supreme Court required May to comment but she could not be found.
Issue: Whether or not the marriage of Silvino and May should be declared void on the ground of Mays psychological incapacity.
Held: On procedural grounds, the petition before the Supreme Court deserved outright dismissal. Silvino should have filed a petition for
review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court rather a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the same Rules. Substantially,
the petition has no merit. The CA committed no grave abuse of discretion in rendering its decision. Psychological incapacity required by
Article 36 of the Family Code must be characterized by (a) gravity, (b) juridical antecedence and (c) incurability. The incapacity must be
grave or serious such that the party would be incapable of carrying out the ordinary duties required in marriage. It must be rooted in the
history of the party antedating the marriage, although the overt manifestations may emerge only after the marriage. It must be incurable
or, even if it were otherwise, the cure would be beyond the means of the party involved. The Supreme Court had laid down the following
guidelines in resolving petitions for declaration of nullity of marriage based on Article 36 of the Family Code: (1) The burden of proof to
show the nullity of the marriage belongs to the plaintiff; (2) the root cause of the psychological incapacity must be medically or clinically
identified, alleged in the complaint, sufficiently proven by experts and clearly explained in the decision; (3) the incapacity must be
proven to be existing at the time of the celebration of the marriage; (4) such incapacity must also be shown to be medically or clinically
permanent or incurable; and (5) such illness must be grave enough to bring about the disability of the party to assume the essential
obligations of marriage. Silvanos evidence failed to establish Mays psychological incapacity. His testimony did not prove the root
cause, gravity and incurability of Mays condition. Even the psychologist failed to show the root cause of Mays psychological incapacity.
The root cause of the psychological incapacity must be identified as a psychological illness, its incapacitating nature fully explained and
established by the totality of the evidence presented during trial. More importantly, Mays actions did not rise to the level of the
psychological incapacity that the law requires. Mays act of living an adulterous life cannot automatically be equated with a
psychological disorder, especially when no specific evidence was shown that promiscuity was a trait already existing at the inception of
marriage. Silvino must be able to establish that Mays unfaithfulness was a manifestation of a disordered personality, which made her
completely unable to discharge the essential obligations of the marital state. May was far from being a perfect wife and a good mother.
She certainly had some character flaws. But these imperfections did not warrant a conclusion that she had a psychological malady at
the time of the marriage that rendered her incapable of fulfilling her marital and family duties and obligations.
AGRAVIADOR VS. AMPARO-AGRAVIADOR
FACTS: On May 23, 1973, the petitioner and the respondent contracted marriage. They begot four children. On March 1, 2001, the
petitioner filed with the RTC a petition for the declaration of nullity of his marriage with the respondent, under Article 36 of the Family
Code. He alleged that the respondent was psychologically incapacitated to exercise the essential obligations of marriage as she was
carefree and irresponsible, and refused to do household chores like cleaning and cooking; stayed away from their house for long
periods of time; had an affair with a lesbian; did not take care of their sick child; consulted a witch doctor in order to bring him bad fate;
and refused to use the family name Agraviador in her activities.
The respondent moved to dismiss the petition on the ground that the root cause of her psychological incapacity was not medically
identified and alleged in the petition. The RTC nullified the marriage of the petitioner and the respondent in its decision. It saw merit in
the petitioners testimony and the psychiatric evaluation report. The CA reversed and set aside the RTC resolution, and dismissed the
petition.

ISSUE: Whether or not there is basis to nullify the petitioners marriage to the respondent on the ground of psychological incapacity to
comply with the essential marital obligations.
HELD: The court resolves to deny the petition for lack of merit, and hold that no sufficient basis exists to annul the marriage, pursuant to
Article 36 of the Family Code and its related jurisprudence.
The totality of evidence presented failed to establish the respondents psychological incapacity. In the present case, the petitioners
testimony failed to establish that the respondents condition is a manifestation of a disordered personality rooted on some incapacitating
or debilitating psychological condition that makes her completely unable to discharge the essential marital obligations. If at all, the
petitioner merely showed that the respondent had some personality defects that showed their manifestation during the marriage; his
testimony sorely lacked details necessary to establish that the respondents defects existed at the inception of the marriage. In addition,
the petitioner failed to discuss the gravity of the respondents condition; neither did he mention that the respondents malady was
incurable, or if it were otherwise, the cure would be beyond the respondents means to undertake. The petitioners declarations that the
respondent "does not accept her fault," "does not want to change," and "refused to reform" are insufficient to establish a psychological
or mental defect that is serious, grave, or incurable as contemplated by Article 36 of the Family Code.
The Court also finds that the Psychiatric Evaluation Report fell short in proving that the respondent was psychologically incapacitated to
perform the essential marital duties. The doctor did not personally evaluate and examine the respondent. Largely, the doctor relied on
the information provided by the petitioner. The Petition is DENIED and the decision of the CA is AFFIRMED.
TORING VS. TORING
FACTS: A and B were husband and wife. B filed a petition for annulment before the RTC. He claimed that A was psychologically
incapacitated to comply with the essential obligations of marriage prior to, at the time of, and subsequent to the celebration of their
marriage.
Ricardo offered; the psychological evaluation of his expert witness, psychiatrist. Dr Albaran testified A had Narcissistic Personality
Disorder that rendered her psychologically incapacitated to fulfill her essential marital obligations based on the information she
gathered from her psychological evaluation on B and the couples son, C. The doctor did not personally examine A. B alleged that A
was an adulteress and a squanderer.
The RTC annulled the marriage. The CA reversed saying that RTC failed to specifically point out the root illness or defect that caused
As psychological incapacity, and likewise failed to show that the incapacity already existed at the time of celebration of marriage. The
CA found that the conclusions from Dr. Albarans psychological evaluation do not appear to have been drawn from well-rounded and fair
sources, and dwelt mostly on hearsay statements and rumors. Likewise, the CA found that Ricardos allegations on As overspending
and infidelity do not constitute adequate grounds for declaring the marriage null and void under Article 36 of the Family Code.
ISSUE: Whether the RTC was correct in declaring the nullity of the marriage.
HELD: No, the RTC was wrong. CA decision affirmed.
According to Molina case, the definitive guidelines in the interpretation and application of this article are the following:
(1) The burden of proof to show the nullity of the marriage belongs to the plaintiff. Any doubt should be resolved in favor of the
existence and continuation of the marriage and against its dissolution and nullity.
(2) The root cause of the psychological incapacity must be (a) medically or clinically identified, (b) alleged in the complaint, (c)
sufficiently proven by experts and (d) clearly explained in the decision. Such root cause must be identified as a psychological illness
and its incapacitating nature fully explained. Expert evidence may be given by qualified psychiatrists and clinical psychologists.
(3) The incapacity must be proven to be existing at "the time of the celebration" of the marriage.
(4) Such incapacity must also be shown to be medically or clinically permanent or incurable. Furthermore, such incapacity must be
relevant to the assumption of marriage obligations, not necessarily to those not related to marriage.
(5) Such illness must be grave enough to bring about the disability of the party to assume the essential obligations of marriage. The
illness must be shown as downright incapacity or inability, not a refusal, neglect or difficulty, much less ill will.
(6) The essential marital obligations must be those embraced by Articles 68 up to 71 of the Family Code as regards the husband and
wife as well as Articles 220, 221 and 225 of the same Code in regard to parents and their children.
(7) Interpretations given by the National Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal of the Catholic Church in the Philippines, while not controlling or
decisive, should be given great respect by our courts.
The intent of the law to confine the application of Article 36 of the Family Code to the most serious cases of personality disorders; these
are the disorders that result in the utter insensitivity or inability of the afflicted party to give meaning and significance to the marriage he
or she contracted.
In the present case and guided by these standards, we find the totality of the petitioners evidence to be insufficient to prove that A was
psychologically incapacitated to perform her duties as a wife.
Though the law does not require that the allegedly incapacitated spouse be personally examined by a physician or by a psychologist as
a condition sine qua non for the declaration of nullity of marriage under Article 36. However, it is still essential although from sources
other than the respondent spouse to show his or her personality profile, or its approximation, at the time of marriage; the root cause of
the inability to appreciate the essential obligations of marriage; and the gravity, permanence and incurability of the condition.
In the present case, the only other party outside of the spouses who was ever asked to give statements for purposes of As
psychological evaluation was C, the spouses eldest son who would not have been very reliable as a witness because he could not
have been there when the spouses were married and could not have been expected to know what was happening between his parents

until long after his birth.

Of more serious consequence, fatal to Ricardos cause, is the failure of Dr. Albarans psychological evaluation to fully explain the details
i.e., the what, how, when, where and since when of Teresitas alleged Narcissistic Personality Disorder. Dr. Albaran never explained,
too, the incapacitating nature of Teresitas alleged personality disorder, and how it related to the essential marital obligations that she
failed to assume. Neither did the good doctor adequately explain in her psychological evaluation how grave and incurable was As
psychological disorder.
B failed to discharge the burden of proof to show that TA suffered from psychological incapacity; thus, his petition for annulment of
marriage must fail.
We reiterate that irreconcilable differences, sexual infidelity or perversion, emotional immaturity and irresponsibility, and the like, do not
by themselves warrant a finding of psychological incapacity, as the same may only be due to a persons difficulty, refusal or neglect to
undertake the obligations of marriage that is not rooted in some psychological illness that Article 36 of the Family Code addresses.
B also failed to show the adverse integral element and link to As allegedly disordered personality. Moreover, B failed to prove that As
alleged character traits already existed at the inception of their marriage.
Finally, the root cause of the psychological incapacity needs to be alleged in a petition for annulment under Article 36 of the Family
Code. What is not required is the expert opinion to prove the root cause of the psychological incapacity. CA decision affirmed.
REPUBLIC VS CA, MOLINA
FACTS: Roridel and Reynaldo got married in 1985 in Manila. During the early years of their marriage, Reynaldo showed signs of
immaturity and irresponsibility, observed from his tendency to spend time with his friends and squandered money with them, his
dependency from his parents for financial aid and dishonesty in matters involving finances. Roridel became the sole breadwinner of the
family. She then resigned her job in Manila and went to Baguio. Reynaldo left her and their child a week later. The couple is separated
in fact for more than 3 years.
Roridel filed a petition to have their marriage void under Article 36, citing Reynaldo's psychological incapacity. She presented evidence
consisted of her own testimony, of her two friends, a social worker and a psychiatrist. Reynaldo did not present any evidence and
appeared only during the pre-trial. The RTC granted the petition, declaring the marriage void. Solicitor General appealed to the CA. CA
denied the appeals and ruled in favor of the trial court.
ISSUE: Whether or not opposing or conflicting personalities constitute psychological incapacity.
RULING: No. There is no clear showing to us that the psychological defect spoken of is incapacity; but appears to be more of a
difficulty, if not outright refusal or neglect in the performance of some marital obligations. Mere showing of irreconcilable
differences and conflicting personalities in no wise constitutes psychological incapacity.
The Court, in this case, promulgated guidelines in the interpretation and application of Article 36 of the Family Code: 1) The burden of
proof to show the nullity of marriage belongs to the plaintiff; 2) the root cause of PI must be (a) medically or clinically identified (b)
alleged in the complaint (c) sufficiently proven by experts (d) clearly explained in the decision; 3) it must be existing at the time of the
celebration of the marriage; 4) it must be medically or clinically permanent or incurable; 5) it must be grave enough to bring about the
disability of the party to assume the marital obligations of marriage; 6) the marital obligations must be embraced by Articles 68 to 71,
and Articles 220, 221 and 225 in regard of parents and their children; 7) interpretation by the National Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal of
Catholic of Church of the Philippines, although not binding, should be given great respect; and 8) the prosecuting attorney or fiscal and
the Solicitor General must appear as counsel for the State.
CHI MING TSOI vs. COURT OF APPEALS, GINA LAO-TSOI
FACTS: Ching married Gina on May 22, 1988 at the Manila Cathedral, Intramuros, Manila as evidenced by their marriage contract.
After the celebration they had a reception and then proceeded to the house of the Ching Ming Tsois mother. There they slept together
on the same bed in the same room for the first night of their married life.
Ginas version: that contrary to her expectations that as newlyweds they were supposed to enjoy making love that night of their
marriage, or having sexual intercourse, with each other, Ching however just went to bed, slept on one side and then turned his back
and went to sleep. There was no sexual intercourse between them that night. The same thing happened on the second, third and fourth
nights.
In an effort to have their honey moon in a private place where they can enjoy together during their first week as husband and wife they
went to Baguio City. But they did so together with Chings mother, uncle and nephew as they were all invited by her husband. There
was no sexual intercourse between them for four days in Baguio since Ching avoided her by taking a long walk during siesta time or by
just sleeping on a rocking chair located at the living room.They slept together in the same room and on the same bed since May 22,
1988 (day of their marriage) until March 15, 1989 (ten months). But during this period there was no attempt of sexual intercourse
between them. Gina claims that she did not even see her husbands private parts nor did he see hers.Because of this, they submitted
themselves for medical examinations to Dr. Eufemio Macalalag. Results were that Gina is healthy, normal and still a virgin while Chings
examination was kept confidential up to this time. The Gina claims that her husband is impotent, a closet homosexual as he did not
show his penis. She said she had observed him using an eyebrow pencil and sometimes the cleansing cream of his mother. She also
said her husband only married her to acquire or maintain his residency status here in the country and to publicly maintain the
appearance of a normal man

Chings version: he claims that if their marriage shall be annulled by reason of psychological incapacity, the fault lies with Gina. He does
not want their marriage annulled for reasons of (1) that he loves her very much (2) that he has no defect on his part and he is physically
and psychologically capable (3) since the relationship is still very young and if there is any differences between the two of them, it can
still be reconciled and that according to him, if either one of them has some incapabilities, there is no certainty that this will not be
cured. Ching admitted that since his marriage to Gina there was no sexual contact between them. But, the reason for this, according to
the defendant, was that every time he wants to have sexual intercourse with his wife, she always avoided him and whenever he
caresses her private parts, she always removed his hands.
ISSUE: Whether or not Ching is psychologically incapacitated to comply with the essential marital obligations of marriage
HELD: The Supreme Court affirmed the decisions of the trial court and Court of Appeals in rendering as VOID the marriage entered into
by Ching and Gina on May 22, 1988. No costs.
The Supreme Court held that the prolonged refusal of a spouse to have sexual intercourse with his or her spouse is considered a sign
of psychological incapacity. If a spouse, although physically capable but simply refuses to perform his or her essential marriage
obligations, and the refusal is senseless and constant, Catholic marriage tribunals attribute the causes to psychological incapacity than
to stubborn refusal. Senseless and protracted refusal is equivalent to psychological incapacity.
One of the essential marital obligations under the Family Code is to procreate children basedon the universal principle that procreation
of children through sexual cooperation is the basic end of marriage. Constant non-fulfillment of this obligation will finally destroy the
integrity or wholeness of the marriage. In the case at bar, the senseless and protracted refusal of one of the parties to fulfill this marital
obligation is equivalent to psychological incapacity.
While the law provides that the husband and the wife are obliged to live together, observer mutual love, respect and fidelity, the
sanction therefore is actually the spontaneous, mutual affection between husband and wife and not any legal mandate or court order
(Cuaderno vs. Cuaderno, 120 Phil. 1298). Love is useless unless it is shared with another. Indeed, no man is an island, the cruelest act
of a partner in marriage is to say I could not have cared less. This is so because an ungiven self is an unfulfilled self. The egoist has
nothing but himself. In the natural order, it is sexual intimacy that brings spouses wholeness and oneness. Sexual intimacy is a gift and
a participation in the mystery of creation. It is a function which enlivens the hope of procreation and ensures the continuation of family
relations.
LEOUEL SANTOS VS COURT OF APPEALS & JULIA ROSARIO BEDIA-SANTOS
FACTS: Leouel, a member of the Army, met Julia in Iloilo City. In September 1986, they got married. The couple latter lived with Julias
parents. Julia gave birth to a son in 1987. Their marriage, however, was marred by the frequent interference of Julias parent as averred
by Leouel. The couple also occasionally quarrels about as to, among other things, when should they start living independently from
Julias parents. In 1988, Julia went to the US to work as a nurse despite Leouels opposition. 7 months later, she and Leouel got to talk
and she promised to return home in 1989. She never went home that year. In 1990, Leouel got the chance to be in the US due to a
military training. During his stay, he desperately tried to locate his wife but to no avail. Leouel, in an effort to at least have his wife come
home, filed to nullify their marriage due to Julias psychological incapacity. Leouel asserted that due to Julias failure to return home or
at least communicate with him even with all his effort constitutes psychological incapacity. Julia attacked the complaint and she said
that it is Leouel who is incompetent. The prosecutor ascertained that there is no collusion between the two. Leouels petition is however
denied by the lower and appellate court.
ISSUE: Whether or not psychological incapacity is attendant to the case at bar.
HELD: Before deciding on the case, the SC noted that the Family Code did not define the term psychological incapacity, which is
adopted from the Catholic Canon Law. But basing it on the deliberations of the Family Code Revision Committee, the provision in PI,
adopted with less specificity than expected, has been designed to allow some resiliency in its application. The FCRC did not give any
examples of PI for fear that the giving of examples would limit the applicability of the provision under the principle of ejusdem generis.
Rather, the FCRC would like the judge to interpret the provision on a case-to-case basis, guided by experience, the findings of experts
and researchers in psychological disciplines, and by decisions of church tribunals which, although not binding on the civil courts, may
be given persuasive effect since the provision was taken from Canon Law. The term psychological incapacity defies any precise
definition since psychological causes can be of an infinite variety. Article 36 of the Family Code cannot be taken and construed
independently of but must stand in conjunction with, existing precepts in our law on marriage. PI should refer to no less than a mental
(not physical) incapacity that causes a party to be truly incognitive of the basic marital covenants that concomitantly must be assumed
and discharged by the parties to the marriage which (Art. 68), include their mutual obligations to live together, observe love, respect and
fidelity and render help and support. The intendment of the law has been to confine the meaning of PI to the most serious cases of
personality disorders clearly demonstrative of an utter insensitivity or inability to give meaning and significance to the marriage. This
psychological condition must exist at the time the marriage is celebrated.
The SC also notes that PI must be characterized by
(a) gravity,
(b) juridical antecedence, and
(c) incurability. The incapacity must be grave or serious such that the party would be incapable of carrying out the ordinary duties
required in marriage; it must be rooted in the history of the party antedating the marriage, although the overt manifestations may
emerge only after the marriage; and it must be incurable or, even if it were otherwise, the cure would be beyond the means of the party
involved. In the case at bar, although Leouel stands aggrieved, his petition must be dismissed because the alleged PI of his wife is not
clearly shown by the factual settings presented. The factual settings do not come close to the standard required to decree a nullity of
marriage.