TRANSPORTATION LAW CASE DIGESTS

I.

A.

CONTRACT OF TRANSPORTATION
CONCEPT, PARTIES AND PERFECTION
DANGWA TRANSPORTATION vs. COURT OF APPEALS

FACTS:

Escartin, Rodolfo Roman, the LRTA, the Metro Transit Organization, Inc.
(Metro Transit), and Prudent for the death of her husband. Trial court
ruled in favor Navidads wife and against the defendants Prudent
Security and Junelito Escartin . LRTA and Rodolfo Roman were
dismissed for lack of merit. CA held LRTA and Roman liable, hence the
petition.

Private respondents filed a complaint for damages against petitioners

for the death of Pedrito Cudiamat as a result of a vehicular accident
which occurred on March 25, 1985 at Marivic, Sapid, Mankayan,
Benguet. Petitioner Theodore M. Lardizabal was driving a passenger
bus belonging to petitioner corporation in a reckless and imprudent
manner and without due regard to traffic rules and regulations and
safety to persons and property, it ran over its passenger, Pedrito
Cudiamat. Petitioners alleged that they had observed and continued
to observe the extraordinary diligence and that it was the victim's own
carelessness and negligence which gave rise to the subject incident.

ISSUE:

RTC pronounced that Pedrito Cudiamat was negligent, which

negligence was the proximate cause of his death. However, Court of
Appeals set aside the decision of the lower court, and ordered
petitioners to pay private respondents damages due to negligence.

Contract of carriage was deemed created from the moment Navidad

paid the fare at the LRT station and entered the premises of the latter,
entitling Navidad to all the rights and protection under a contractual
relation. The appellate court had correctly held LRTA and Roman liable
for the death of Navidad in failing to exercise extraordinary diligence
imposed upon a common carrier. While the deceased might not have
then as yet boarded the train, a contract of carriage theretofore had
already existed when the victim entered the place where passengers
were supposed to be after paying the fare and getting the
corresponding token therefor.

ISSUE:
WON the CA erred in reversing the decision of the trial court and in
finding petitioners negligent and liable for the damages claimed.
HELD: CA Decision AFFIRMED
The testimonies of the witnesses show that that the bus was at full
stop when the victim boarded the same. They further confirm the
conclusion that the victim fell from the platform of the bus when it
suddenly accelerated forward and was run over by the rear right tires
of the vehicle. Under such circumstances, it cannot be said that the
deceased was guilty of negligence.
It is not negligence per se, or as a matter of law, for one attempt to
board a train or streetcar which is moving slowly. An ordinarily prudent
person would have made the attempt board the moving conveyance
under the same or similar circumstances. The fact that passengers
board and alight from slowly moving vehicle is a matter of common
experience both the driver and conductor in this case could not have
been unaware of such an ordinary practice.
Common carriers, from the nature of their business and reasons of
public policy, are bound to observe extraordinary diligence for the
safety of the passengers transported by the according to all the
circumstances of each case. A common carrier is bound to carry the
passengers safely as far as human care and foresight can provide,
using the utmost diligence very cautious persons, with a due regard for
all the circumstances.
It has also been repeatedly held that in an action based on a contract
of carriage, the court need not make an express finding of fault or
negligence on the part of the carrier in order to hold it responsible to
pay the damages sought by the passenger. By contract of carriage, the
carrier assumes the express obligation to transport the passenger to
his destination safely and observe extraordinary diligence with a due
regard for all the circumstances, and any injury that might be suffered
by the passenger is right away attributable to the fault or negligence of
the carrier. This is an exception to the general rule that negligence
must be proved, and it is therefore incumbent upon the carrier to prove
that it has exercised extraordinary diligence as prescribed in Articles
1733 and 1755 of the Civil Code.
KOREAN AIRLINES CO. v. CA
LIGHT RAIL TRANSIT AUTHORITY & RODOLFO ROMAN, versus
MARJORIE NAVIDAD, Heirs of the Late NICANOR NAVIDAD &
PRUDENT SECURITY AGENCY
FACTS:
Nicanor Navidad, then drunk, entered the EDSA LRT station after
purchasing a "token" (representing payment of the fare). While
Navidad was standing on the platform near the LRT tracks, Junelito
Escartin, the security guard assigned to the area approached him. A
misunderstanding or an altercation between the two apparently
ensued that led to a fist fight. No evidence, however, was adduced to
indicate how the fight started or who, between the two, delivered the
first blow or how Navidad later fell on the LRT tracks. At the exact
moment that Navidad fell, an LRT train, operated by petitioner Rodolfo
Roman, was coming in. Navidad was struck by the moving train, and he
was killed instantaneously. The widow of Nicanor, Marjorie Navidad,
along with her children, filed a complaint for damages against Junelito

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Whether or not there was a perfected contract of carriage between

Navidad and LRTA
HELD:
AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION but only in that (a) the award of nominal
damages is DELETED and (b) petitioner Rodolfo Roman is absolved
from liability

The law requires common carriers to carry passengers safely using the
utmost diligence of very cautious persons with due regard for all
circumstances. Such duty of a common carrier to provide safety to its
passengers so obligates it not only during the course of the trip but for
so long as the passengers are within its premises and where they
ought to be in pursuance to the contract of carriage. The statutory
provisions render a common carrier liable for death of or injury to
passengers (a) through the negligence or willful acts of its employees
or b) on account of willful acts or negligence of other passengers or of
strangers if the common carriers employees through the exercise of
due diligence could have prevented or stopped the act or omission.
In case of such death or injury, a carrier is presumed to have been at
fault or been negligent, and by simple proof of injury, the passenger is
relieved of the duty to still establish the fault or negligence of the
carrier or of its employees and the burden shifts upon the carrier to
prove that the injury is due to an unforeseen event or to force majeure.
The liability of the common carrier and that of the independent
contractor is solidary.
B.

COMMON CARRIERS (Arts. 1731 to 1766 NCC)

Definitions of domestic shipping under R.A. No.
9295 and of public service under Commonwealth
Act No. 146
2. Common Carriage
1.

PEDRO DE GUZMAN vs.COURT OF APPEALS and ERNESTO

CENDANA
FACTS:
Ernesto Cendana, a junk dealer, was engaged in buying up used
bottles and scrap metal in Pangasinan, and bring such material to
Manila for resale. He utilized two (2) six-wheeler trucks which he
owned for hauling the material to Manila. He charged freight rates
which were commonly lower than regular commercial rates for the
cargo loaded in his vehicle.
Pedro de Guzman a merchant and authorized dealer of General Milk
Company contracted with Cendana for the hauling of 750 cartons of
Liberty filled milk from a warehouse of General Milk in Makati, Rizal.
150 cartons were loaded on a truck driven by Cendana himself, while
600 cartons were placed on board the other truck which was driven by
Manuel Estrada, Cendanas driver and employee. The other 600 boxes
never reached de Guzman, since the truck which carried these boxes
was hijacked somewhere along the MacArthur Highway in Paniqui,
Tarlac, by armed men who took with them the truck, its driver, his
helper and the cargo. Having failed to exercise the extraordinary
diligence required of him by the law, he is held liable for the value of
the undelivered goods. Cendana denied that he was a common carrier
and argued that he could not be held responsible for the value of the
lost goods, such loss having been due to force majeure.
ISSUE: Whether or not Ernesto Cendana may, under the facts earlier
set forth, be properly characterized as a common carrier?

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Whether or not high jacking with robbery can be properly regarded as a
fortuitous event that can exempt the carrier?

Mitsubishi as shipper/charterer and KKKK as shipowner, in Tokyo,

Japan.

HELD:

Before loading the fertilizer aboard the vessel, four (4) of her
holds were all presumably inspected by the charterer's representative
and found fit to take a load of urea in bulk pursuant to par. 16 of the
charter-party . After the Urea fertilizer was loaded in bulk by
stevedores hired by and under the supervision of the shipper, the steel
hatches were closed with heavy iron lids, covered with three (3) layers
of tarpaulin, then tied with steel bonds. The hatches remained closed
and tightly sealed throughout the entire voyage.

The trial court rendered a Decision finding private respondent to be a

common carrier and holding him liable for the value of the undelivered
goods as damages and as attorney's fees. The Court of Appeals
reversed the judgment of the trial court and held that respondent had
been engaged in transporting return loads of freight "as a casual
occupation a sideline to his scrap iron business" and not as a
common carrier.
Liability arises the moment a person or firm acts as a common carrier,
without regard to whether or not such carrier has also complied with
the requirements of the applicable regulatory statute and
implementing regulations and has been granted a certificate of public
convenience or other franchise. To exempt private respondent from the
liabilities of a common carrier because he has not secured the
necessary certificate of public convenience, would be offensive to
sound public policy; that would be to reward private respondent
precisely for failing to comply with applicable statutory requirements.
Common carriers, "by the nature of their business and for reasons of
public policy" 2 are held to a very high degree of care and diligence
("extraordinary diligence") in the carriage of goods as well as of
passengers. Article 1734 establishes the general rule that common
carriers are responsible for the loss, destruction or deterioration of the
goods which they carry, "unless the same is due to any of the following
causes only:
(1) Flood, storm, earthquake, lightning or other natural disaster or
calamity;
(2) Act of the public enemy in war, whether international or civil;
(3) Act or omission of the shipper or owner of the goods;
(4) The character-of the goods or defects in the packing or-in the
containers; and
(5) Order or act of competent public authority.
The above list of causes of loss, destruction or deterioration which
exempt the common carrier for responsibility therefor, is a closed list.
Causes falling outside the foregoing list, even if they appear to
constitute a species of force majeure fall within the scope of Article
1735, which provides as follows:
In all cases other than those mentioned in numbers 1, 2, 3, 4 and 5 of
the preceding article, if the goods are lost, destroyed or deteriorated,
common carriers are presumed to have been at fault or to have acted
negligently, unless they prove that they observed extraordinary
diligence as required in Article 1733. (Emphasis supplied)
The limits of the duty of extraordinary diligence in the vigilance over
the goods carried are reached where the goods are lost as a result of a
robbery which is attended by "grave or irresistible threat, violence or
force." In the instant case, armed men held up the second truck owned
by private respondent which carried petitioner's cargo.
The occurrence of the loss must reasonably be regarded as quite
beyond the control of the common carrier and properly regarded as a
fortuitous event. It is necessary to recall that even common carriers
are not made absolute insurers against all risks of travel and of
transport of goods, and are not held liable for acts or events which
cannot be foreseen or are inevitable, provided that they shall have
complied with the rigorous standard of extraordinary diligence.
Cendana is not liable for the value of the undelivered merchandise
which was lost because of an event entirely beyond private
respondent's control. Petition for Review on certiorari is hereby DENIED
and the Decision of the Court of Appeals dated 3 August 1977 is
AFFIRMED. No pronouncement as to costs.
PLANTERS PRODUCTS, INC. VS. COURT OF APPEALS,
SORIAMONT STEAMSHIP AGENCIES AND KYOSEI KISEN
KABUSHIKI KAISHA
G.R. No. 101503 September 15, 1993
FACTS:
Planters Products, Inc. (PPI), purchased from Mitsubishi International
Corporation (MITSUBISHI) of New York, U.S.A., 9,329.7069 metric tons
(M/T) of Urea 46% fertilizer which the latter shipped in bulk on 16 June
1974 aboard the cargo vessel M/V "Sun Plum" owned by private
respondent Kyosei Kisen Kabushiki Kaisha (KKKK) from Kenai, Alaska,
U.S.A., to Poro Point, San Fernando, La Union, Philippines, as evidenced
by Bill of Lading No. KP-1 signed by the master of the vessel and issued
on the date of departure.
Prior to its voyage, a time charter-party on the vessel M/V "Sun Plum"
pursuant to the Uniform General Charter was entered into between

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Petitioner unloaded the cargo from the holds into its steelbodied dump
trucks which were parked alongside the berth, using metal scoops
attached to the ship, pursuant to the terms and conditions of the
charter-partly (which provided for an F.I.O.S. clause). However, the
hatches remained open throughout the duration of the discharge. Each
time a dump truck was filled up, its load of Urea was covered with
tarpaulin. The port area was windy, certain portions of the route to the
warehouse were sandy and the weather was variable, raining
occasionally while the discharge was in progress.
It took eleven (11) days for PPI to unload the cargo. A private marine
and cargo surveyor, Cargo Superintendents Company Inc. (CSCI), was
hired by PPI to determine the "outturn" of the cargo shipped, by taking
draft readings of the vessel prior to and after discharge. The survey
report submitted by CSCI to the consignee (PPI) revealed a shortage in
the cargo of 106.726 M/T and that a portion of the Urea fertilizer
approximating 18 M/T was contaminated with dirt, sand and rust and
rendered unfit for commerce.
Consequently, PPI sent a claim letter
to Soriamont Steamship
Agencies (SSA), the resident agent of the carrier, KKKK, representing
the cost of the alleged shortage in the goods shipped and the
diminution in value of that portion said to have been contaminated
with dirt. Respondent SSA was not able to respond to this consignees
claim for payment because according to them, they only received a
request for shortlanded certificate and not a formal claim.
Hence, PPI filed an action for damages with the Court of First Instance
of Manila. The defendant carrier argued that the strict public policy
governing common carriers does not apply to them because they have
become private carriers by reason of the provisions of the charterparty. The court a quo however sustained the claim of the plaintiff
against the defendant carrier for the value of the goods lost or
damaged.
On appeal, respondent Court of Appeals reversed the lower court and
absolved the carrier from liability for the value of the cargo that was
lost or damaged. Relying on the 1968 case of Home Insurance
Co.v. American Steamship Agencies, Inc., the appellate court ruled
that the cargo vessel M/V "Sun Plum" owned by private respondent
KKKK was a private carrier and not a common carrier by reason of the
time charterer-party. Accordingly, the Civil Code provisions on common
carriers which set forth a presumption of negligence do not find
application in the case at bar.
ISSUE: Whether a common carrier becomes a private carrier by
reason of a charter-party.
HELD: The assailed decision of the Court of Appeals, which reversed
the trial court, is affirmed.
A "charter-party" is defined as a contract by which an entire ship, or
some principal part thereof, is let by the owner to another person for a
specified time or use; a contract of affreightment by which the owner
of a ship or other vessel lets the whole or a part of her to a merchant
or other person for the conveyance of goods, on a particular voyage, in
consideration of the payment of freight; Charter parties are of two
types: (a) contract of affreightment which involves the use of shipping
space on vessels leased by the owner in part or as a whole, to carry
goods for others; and, (b) charter by demise or bareboat charter, by
the terms of which the whole vessel is let to the charterer with a
transfer to him of its entire command and possession and consequent
control over its navigation, including the master and the crew, who are
his servants. Contract of affreightment may either be time charter,
wherein the vessel is leased to the charterer for a fixed period of time,
or voyage charter, wherein the ship is leased for a single voyage. In
both cases, the charter-party provides for the hire of vessel only, either
for a determinate period of time or for a single or consecutive voyage,
the shipowner to supply the ship's stores, pay for the wages of the
master and the crew, and defray the expenses for the maintenance of
the ship.
Upon the other hand, the term "common or public carrier" is
defined in Art. 1732 of the Civil Code. The definition extends to carriers
either by land, air or water which hold themselves out as ready to
engage in carrying goods or transporting passengers or both for

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compensation as a public employment and not as a casual occupation.
The distinction between a "common or public carrier" and a "private or
special carrier" lies in the character of the business, such that if the
undertaking is a single transaction, not a part of the general business
or occupation, although involving the carriage of goods for a fee, the
person or corporation offering such service is a private carrier.
It is not disputed that respondent carrier, in the ordinary course of
business, operates as a common carrier, transporting goods
indiscriminately for all persons. When petitioner chartered the vessel
M/V "Sun Plum", the ship captain, its officers and compliment were
under the employ of the shipowner and therefore continued to be
under its direct supervision and control. Hardly then can we charge the
charterer, a stranger to the crew and to the ship, with the duty of
caring for his cargo when the charterer did not have any control of the
means in doing so. This is evident in the present case considering that
the steering of the ship, the manning of the decks, the determination
of the course of the voyage and other technical incidents of maritime
navigation were all consigned to the officers and crew who were
screened, chosen and hired by the shipowner.
It is therefore imperative that a public carrier shall remain as such,
notwithstanding the charter of the whole or portion of a vessel by one
or more persons, provided the charter is limited to the ship only, as in
the case of a time-charter or voyage-charter. It is only when the
charter includes both the vessel and its crew, as in a bareboat or
demise that a common carrier becomes private, at least insofar as the
particular voyage covering the charter-party is concerned. Indubitably,
a shipowner in a time or voyage charter retains possession and control
of the ship, although her holds may, for the moment, be the property
of the charterer.
Respondent carrier's heavy reliance on the case of Home Insurance
Co. v. American Steamship Agencies, supra, is misplaced for the
reason that the meat of the controversy therein was the validity of a
stipulation in the charter-party exempting the shipowners from liability
for loss due to the negligence of its agent, and not the effects of a
special charter on common carriers. At any rate, the rule in the United
States that a ship chartered by a single shipper to carry special cargo
is not a common carrier, does not find application in our jurisdiction, for
we have observed that the growing concern for safety in the
transportation of passengers and /or carriage of goods by sea requires
a more exacting interpretation of admiralty laws, more particularly, the
rules governing common carriers.
In an action for recovery of damages against a common carrier on the
goods shipped, the shipper or consignee should first prove the fact of
shipment and its consequent loss or damage while the same was in the
possession, actual or constructive, of the carrier. Thereafter, the
burden of proof shifts to respondent to prove that he has exercised
extraordinary diligence required by law or that the loss, damage or
deterioration of the cargo was due to fortuitous event, or some other
circumstances inconsistent with its liability. To our mind, respondent
carrier has sufficiently overcome, by clear and convincing proof,
the prima facie presumption of negligence. Verily, the presumption of
negligence on the part of the respondent carrier has been efficaciously
overcome by the showing of extraordinary zeal and assiduity exercised
by the carrier in the care of the cargo. The period during which private
respondent was to observe the degree of diligence required of it as a
public carrier began from the time the cargo was unconditionally
placed in its charge after the vessel's holds were duly inspected and
passed scrutiny by the shipper, up to and until the vessel reached its
destination and its hull was reexamined by the consignee, but prior to
unloading.
Article 1734 of the New Civil Code provides that common carriers are
not responsible for the loss, destruction or deterioration of the goods if
caused by the charterer of the goods or defects in the packaging or in
the containers. The Code of Commerce also provides that all losses and
deterioration which the goods may suffer during the transportation by
reason of fortuitous event, force majeure, or the inherent defect of the
goods, shall be for the account and risk of the shipper, and that proof
of these accidents is incumbent upon the carrier. The carrier,
nonetheless, shall be liable for the loss and damage resulting from the
preceding causes if it is proved, as against him, that they arose
through his negligence or by reason of his having failed to take the
precautions which usage has established among careful persons.
Thus, the petition is dismissed.
ESTRELLITA M. BASCOS vs. COURT OF APPEALS and
RODOLFO A. CIPRIANO
G.R. No. 101089. April 7, 1993.
FACTS:
Rodolfo A. Cipriano representing Cipriano Trading Enterprise
(CIPTRADE) entered into a hauling contract with Jibfair Shipping Agency

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Corp. whereby the former bound itself to haul the latters 2,000 m/tons
of soya bean meal from Magallanes Drive, Del Pan, Manila to the
warehouse of Purefoods Corporation in Calamba, Laguna. To carry out
its obligation, CIPTRADE, through Rodolfo Cipriano, subcontracted with
Estrellita Bascos to transport and to deliver 400 sacks of soya bean
meal from the Manila Port Area to Calamba, Laguna at the rate. But,
Bascos failed to deliver the said cargo. As a consequence, Cipriano
paid Jibfair Shipping Agency the amount of the lost goods in
accordance with the contract. Cipriano demanded reimbursement from
Bascos but the latter refused to pay.
Eventually, Cipriano filed a complaint for a sum of money and damages
with writ of preliminary attachment for breach of a contract of carriage.
The trial court granted the writ of preliminary attachment and rendered
a decision, ordering Bascos to pay for actual damages with legal
interest, attorneys fees and the costs of the suit. The court further
denied the Urgent Motion To Dissolve/Lift preliminary Attachment
filed by Bascos for being moot and academic.
Bascos appealed to the CA but the appellate court affirmed the trial
courts judgment. Hence, the petition for review on certiorari.
Petitioner, Bascos interposed the following defenses: that there was no
contract of carriage since CIPTRADE leased her cargo truck to load the
cargo from Manila Port Area to Laguna; that CIPTRADE was liable to
petitioner for loading the cargo; that the truck carrying the cargo was
hijacked along Paco, Manila; that the hijacking was immediately
reported to CIPTRADE and that petitioner and the police exerted all
efforts to locate the hijacked properties; and that hijacking, being a
force majeure, exculpated petitioner from any liability to CIPTRADE
ISSUE:
WON petitioner was a common carrier.
WON the hijacking referred to a force majeure.
HELD:
The Supreme Court dismissed the petition and affirmed the decision of
the Court of Appeals.
Petitioner is a common carrier. Article 1732 of the Civil Code defines a
common carrier as "(a) person, corporation or firm, or association
engaged in the business of carrying or transporting passengers or
goods or both, by land, water or air, for compensation, offering their
services to the public." The test to determine a common carrier is
"whether the given undertaking is a part of the business engaged in by
the carrier which he has held out to the general public as his
occupation rather than the quantity or extent of the business
transacted." In this case, petitioner herself has made the admission
that she was in the trucking business, offering her trucks to those with
cargo to move. Judicial admissions are conclusive and no evidence is
required to prove the same.
Moreover, in referring to Article 1732 of the Civil Code, it held in De
Guzman vs. Court of Appeals that The above article makes no
distinction between one whose principal business activity is the
carrying of persons or goods or both, and one who does such carrying
only as an ancillary activity (in local idiom, as a sideline). Article
1732 also carefully avoids making any distinction between a person or
enterprise offering transportation service on a regular or scheduled
basis and one offering such service on an occasional, episodic or
unscheduled basis. Neither does Article 1732 distinguish between a
carrier offering its services to the general public, i.e., the general
community or population, and one who offers services or solicits
business only from a narrow segment of the general population.
Common carriers are obliged to observe extraordinary diligence in the
vigilance over the goods transported by them. Accordingly, they are
presumed to have been at fault or to have acted negligently if the
goods are lost, destroyed or deteriorated. There are very few instances
when the presumption of negligence does not attach and these
instances are enumerated in Article 1734. In those cases where the
presumption is applied, the common carrier must prove that it
exercised extraordinary diligence in order to overcome the
presumption.
As to the second issue, the Court held that hijacking, not being
included in the provisions of Article 1734, must be dealt with under the
provisions of Article 1735 and thus, the common carrier is presumed to
have been at fault or negligent. UArticle 1745 of the Civil Code
provides that a common carrier is held responsible; and will not be
allowed to divest or to diminish such responsibility even for acts of
strangers like thieves or robbers except where such thieves or robbers
in fact acted with grave or irresistible threat, violence or force.
Affidavits were not enough to overcome the presumption. (1) Bascoss
affidavit about the hijacking was based on what had been told her by
Juanito Morden. It was not a first-hand account. While it had been
admitted in court for lack of objection on the part of Cipriano, the lower

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court had discretion in assigning weight to such evidence. (2) The
affidavit of Jesus Bascos did not dwell on how the hijacking took place.
(3) While the affidavit of Juanito Morden, the truck helper in the
hijacked truck, was presented as evidence in court, he himself was a
witness as could be gleaned from the contents of the petition.
Mr. & Mrs. Engracio Fabre, Jr. vs. CA, et al.
259 SCRA 426
Facts:
Petitioners Fabre and his wife were owners of a minibus which they
used principally in connection with a bus service for school children
which they operated. The couple had a driver, Porfirio Cabil, whom
they hired after trying him out for two weeks. His job was to take
school children to and from the St. Scholasticas College.
On November 2, 1984, private respondent Word for the World Christian
Fellowship Inc. arranged with petitioners for the transportation of 33
members from Manila to La Union and back in consideration of which
they paid P3,000 to petitioners.
The group left at 8:00 in the evening, petitioner Cabil drove the
minibus. The usual route to Caba, La Union was through Carmen,
Pangasinan. However, the bridge at Carmen was under repair, so that
petitioner Cabil, who was unfamiliar with the area (it being his first trip
to La Union), was forced to take a detour through the town of Ba-ay in
Lingayen, Pangasinan. At 11:30 that night, petitioner Cabil came upon
a sharp curve on the highway, running on a south to east direction. The
road was slippery because it was raining, causing the bus, which was
running at the speed of 50 kilometers per hour, to skid to the left road
shoulder. The bus hit the left traffic steel brace and sign along the
road and rammed the fence of one Jesus Escano, then turned over and
landed on its left side, coming to a full stop only after a series of
impacts. The bus came to rest off the road. A coconut tree which it
had hit fell on it and smashed its front portion.
Several passengers were injured. Private respondent Amyline Antonio
was thrown on the floor of the bus and pinned down by a wooden seat
which came off after being unscrewed. It took three persons to safely
remove her from this position. She was in great pain and could not
move.
A case was filed by the respondents against Fabre and Cabil. Amyline
Antonio was found to be suffering from paraplegia and is permanently
paralyzed from the waist down. The RTC ruled in favor of respondents.
Mr. & Mrs. Fabre and Cabil were ordered to pay jointly and severally
actual, moral and exemplary damages, and as well as amount of loss
of earning capacity of Antonio and attorneys fees. The Court of
Appeals affirmed the decision of the trial court with modification on the
award of damages.
Issues:
1.
2.
3.

Whether or not petitioners were negligent.

Whether or not petitioners were liable for the injuries
suffered by private respondents.
Whether or not damages can be awarded and in the positive,
up to what extent.

Held:
SC affirmed the decision of the CA but reverted the amount
of the award of damages to that ordered by the RTC.
1.

The finding that Cabil drove his bus negligently, while his
employer, the Fabres, who owned the bus, failed to exercise the
diligence of a good father of the family in the selection and
supervision of their employee is fully supported by the evidence
on record. Indeed, it was admitted by Cabil that on the night in
question, it was raining, and, as a consequence, the road was
slippery, and it was dark. However, it is undisputed that Cabil
drove his bus at the speed of 50 kilometers per hour and only
slowed down when he noticed the curve some 15 to 30 meters
ahead. Given the conditions of the road and considering that the
trip was Cabils first one outside of Manila, Cabil should have
driven his vehicle at a moderate speed. There is testimony that
the vehicles passing on that portion of the road should only be
running 20 kilometers per hour, so that at 50 kilometers per hour,
Cabil was running at a very high speed. Cabil was grossly
negligent and should be held liable for the injuries suffered by
private respondent Amyline Antonio.
Pursuant to Arts. 2176 and 2180 of the Civil Code his negligence
gave rise to the presumption that his employers, the Fabres, were
themselves negligent in the selection and supervision of their
employee. Due diligence in selection of employees is not satisfied
by finding that the applicant possessed a professional drivers
license. The employer should also examine the applicant for his
qualifications, experience and record of service. In the case at

EH 405

bar, the Fabres, in allowing Cabil to drive the bus to La Union,

apparently did not consider the fact that Cabil had been driving
for school children only, from their homes to the St. Scholasticas
College in Metro Manila. They had hired him only after a two-week
apprenticeship.
2.

This case involves a contract of carriage. Petitioners, the Fabres,

did not have to be engaged in the business of public
transportation for the provisions of the Civil Code on common
carriers to apply to them.
Art. 1732. Common carriers are persons, corporations, firms or
associations engaged in the business of carrying or transporting
passengers or goods or both, by land, water, or air for
compensation, offering their services to the public.
The above article makes no distinction between one whose
principal business activity is the carrying of persons or goods or
both, and one who does such carrying only as an ancillary activity.
Neither does Article 1732 distinguish between a carrier offering its
services to the general public, i.e., the general community or
population, and one who offers services or solicits business only
from a narrow segment of the general population.
As common carriers, the Fabres were bound to exercise
extraordinary diligence for the safe transportation of the
passengers to their destination. This duty of care is not excused
by proof that they exercised the diligence of a good father of the
family in the selection and supervision of their employee.
As Art. 1759 of the Code provides:
Common carriers are liable for the death of or injuries to
passengers through the negligence or wilful acts of the formers
employees, although such employees may have acted beyond the
scope of their authority or in violation of the orders of the
common carriers.
First Philippine Industrial Corporation vs . Court of Appeals
G.R. No. 125948 December 29, 1998

Facts:
Petitioner, First Phil. Industrial Corporation (FirstPhil for brevity) is a
grantee of a pipeline concession under Republic Act No. 387, as
amended, to contract, install and operate oil pipelines. FirstPhil applied
for a mayor's permit, but before the mayor's permit could be issued,
the respondent City Treasurer required petitioner to pay a local tax
pursuant to the Local Government Code. Petitioner filed a letter-protest
addressed to the respondent City Treasurer, but the latter denied the
same contending that petitioner cannot be considered engaged in
transportation business, thus it cannot claim exemption under Section
133 (j) of the Local Government Code.
FirstPhil filed with the RTC Batangas a complaint for tax refund with
prayer for writ of preliminary injunction against respondents,
contending that the imposition of tax upon them violates Sec 133 of
the Local Government Code. On the other hand, respondents assert
that pipelines are not included in the term "common carrier" which
refers solely to ordinary carriers such as trucks, trains, ships and the
like. Respondents further posit that the term "common carrier" under
the said code pertains to the mode or manner by which a product is
delivered to its destination.
RTC dismissed the complaint, ruling that exemption granted under Sec.
133 (j) encompasses only "common carriers" so as not to overburden
the riding public or commuters with taxes. And that petitioner is not a
common carrier, but a special carrier extending its services and
facilities to a single specific or "special customer" under a "special
contract."
The case was elevated by the petitioner to the CA, but CA affirmed the
decision of the RTC. Hence this petition.
Issue:
WON the petitioner is a "common carrier" and, therefore, exempt from
the business taxc
Held: Petition was granted. CA decision was REVERSED and SET
ASIDE.
SC ruled in this case that petitioner is a common carrier and thus,
exempt from business tax.
A "common carrier" may be defined, broadly, as one who holds himself
out to the public as engaged in the business of transporting persons or
property from place to place, for compensation, offering his services to
the public generally. Art. 1732 of the Civil Code defines a "common
carrier" as "any person, corporation, firm or association engaged in the
business of carrying or transporting passengers or goods or both, by

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TRANSPORTATION LAW CASE DIGESTS

land, water, or air, for compensation, offering their services to the
public." The test for determining whether a party is a common carrier
of goods is:
1. He must be engaged in the business of carrying goods for others as
a public employment, and must hold himself out as ready to engage in
the transportation of goods for person generally as a business and not
as a casual occupation;
2. He must undertake to carry goods of the kind to which his business
is confined;
3. He must undertake to carry by the method by which his business is
conducted and over his established roads; and
4. The transportation must be for hire.

provision to the effect that the M/V"Cherokee" was a "general cargo

carrier." 14 Further, the bare fact that the vessel was carrying a
particular type of cargo for one shipper, which appears to be purely
coincidental, is not reason enough to convert the vessel from a
common to a private carrier, especially where, as in this case, it was
shown that the vessel was also carrying passengers. Under Article
1732 of the Civil Code the Civil Code defines "common carriers" in the
following terms:
Art. 1732. Common carriers are persons, corporations, firms
or associations engaged in the business of carrying or transporting
passengers or goods or both, by land, water, or air for compensation,
offering their services to the public.

Based on the above definitions and requirements, there is no doubt

that petitioner is a common carrier. It is engaged in the business of
transporting or carrying goods, i.e. petroleum products, for hire as a
public employment. It undertakes to carry for all persons indifferently,
that is, to all persons who choose to employ its services, and
transports the goods by land and for compensation. The fact that
petitioner has a limited clientele does not exclude it from the definition
of a common carrier.

On to the second assigned error, we find that the M/V "Cherokee" was
not seaworthy when it embarked on its voyage on 19 November 1984.
The vessel was not even sufficiently manned at the time. "For a vessel
to be seaworthy, it must be adequately equipped for the voyage and
manned with a sufficient number of competent officers and crew. The
failure of a common carrier to maintain in seaworthy condition its
vessel involved in a contract of carriage is a clear breach of its duty.

The definition of "common carriers" in the Civil Code makes no

distinction as to the means of transporting, as long as it is by land,
water or air. It does not provide that the transportation of the
passengers or goods should be by motor vehicle. In fact, in the United
States, oil pipe line operators are considered common carriers.
Under the Petroleum Act of the Philippines (Republic Act 387),
petitioner is considered a "common carrier.", and at the same time,
said act also regards petroleum operation as a public utility. BIR
likewise considers the petitioner a "common carrier." In so ruling, it
held that, since petitioner is a pipeline concessionaire that is engaged
only in transporting petroleum products, it is considered a common
carrier under Republic Act No. 387. Such being the case, it is not
subject to withholding tax prescribed by Revenue Regulations No. 1378, as amended.
Section 133 (j), of the Local Government Code, provides:
Sec. 133. Common Limitations on the Taxing Powers of Local
Government Units. Unless otherwise provided herein, the exercise of
the taxing powers of provinces, cities, municipalities, and barangays
shall not extend to the levy of the following:
(j) Taxes on the gross receipts of transportation contractors and
persons engaged in the transportation of passengers or freight by hire
and common carriers by air, land or water, except as provided in this
Code.
SC held that the legislative intent in excluding from the taxing power of
the local government unit the imposition of business tax against
common carriers is to prevent a duplication of the so-called "common
carrier's tax."
LOADSTAR SHIPPING CO., INC., vs.
COURT OF APPEALS
Facts:
On 19 November 1984, LOADSTAR received on board a) 705 bales of
lawanit hardwood; b) 27 boxes and crates of tilewood assemblies and
the others ;and c) 49 bundles of mouldings R & W (3) Apitong
Bolidenized. On its way to Manila from the port of Nasipit, Agusan del
Norte, the vessel, along with its cargo, sank off Limasawa Island. As a
result of the total loss of its shipment, the consignee made a claim with
LOADSTAR which, however, ignored the same. MIC filed a complaint
against LOADSTAR and PGAI, alleging that the sinking of the vessel was
due to the fault and negligence of LOADSTAR and its employees.
LOADSTAR denied any liability for the loss of the shipper's goods and
claimed that sinking of its vessel was due to force majeure. LOADSTAR
submits that the vessel was a private carrier because it was not issued
certificate of public convenience, it did not have a regular trip or
schedule nor a fixed route, and there was only "one shipper, one
consignee for a special cargo.
Issues:
(1) Is the M/V "Cherokee" a private or a common carrier?
(2) Did LOADSTAR observe due and/or ordinary diligence in these
premises.
Held: Petition is dismissed:
SC hold that LOADSTAR is a common carrier. It is not necessary that
the carrier be issued a certificate of public convenience, and this public
character is not altered by the fact that the carriage of the goods in
question was periodic, occasional, episodic or unscheduled. The bills of
lading failed to show any special arrangement, but only a general

EH 405

CALVO VS. UCPB GENERAL INSURANCE TERMINAL SERVICE, INC.

Facts:
A contract was entered into between Calvo and San Miguel Corporation
(SMC) for the transfer of certain cargoes from the port area in Manila to
the warehouse of SMC. The cargo was insured by UCPB General
Insurance Co., Inc. When the shipment arrived and unloaded from the
vessel, Calvo withdrew the cargo from the arrastre operator and
delivered the same to SMCs warehouse. When it was inspected, it was
found out that some of the goods were torn. UCPB, being the insurer,
paid for the amount of the damages and as subrogee thereafter, filed a
suit
against
Calvo.
Petitioner, on the other hand, contends that it is a private carrier not
required to observe such extraordinary diligence in the vigilance over
the
goods.
As customs broker, she does not indiscriminately hold her services out
to the public but only to selected parties.
Issue:
Whether or not Calvo is a common carrier liable for the damages for
failure to observe extraordinary diligence in the vigilance over the
goods.
Held:
The contention has no merit. In De Guzman v. Court of Appeals, the
Court dismissed a similar contention and held the party to be a
common carrier, thus The Civil Code defines "common carriers" in the following terms:
"Article 1732. Common carriers are persons, corporations, firms or
associations engaged in the business of carrying or transporting
passengers or goods or both, by land, water, or air for compensation,
offering their services to the public."
The law makes no distinction between a carrier offering its services to
the general community or solicits business only from a narrow segment
of the general population. Note that the transportation of goods holds
an integral part of Calvos business, it cannot indeed be doubted that it
is
a
common
carrier.
Asia Lighterage and Shipping Inc. v. CA
Gr, No. 147246, August 19, 2003
FACTS:
Petitioner was contracted as carrier by a corporation from Portland,
Oregon to deliver a cargo to the consignee's warehouse at Pasig City.
The cargo, however, never reached the consignee as the barge that
carried the cargo sank completely, resulting in damage to the cargo.
Private respondent, as insurer, indemnified the consignee for the lost
cargo and thus, as subrogee, sought recovery from petitioner. Both the
trial court and the appellate court ruled in favor of private respondent.
The Court ruled in favor of private respondent. Whether or not
petitioner is a common carrier, the Court ruled in the affirmative. The
principal business of petitioner is that of lighterage and drayage,
offering its barges to the public, although for limited clientele, for
carrying or transporting goods by water for compensation. Whether or
not petitioner failed to exercise extraordinary diligence in its care and
custody of the consignee's goods, the Court also ruled in the
affirmative. The barge completely sank after its towing bits broke,
resulting in the loss of the cargo. Petitioner failed to prove that the
typhoon was the proximate and only cause of the loss and that it has
exercised due diligence before, during and after the occurrence.

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TRANSPORTATION LAW CASE DIGESTS

HCISED
ISSUE:
Whether or Not the petitioner is a common carrier.
RULING: YES.
Petitioner is a common carrier whether its carrying of goods is done on
an irregular rather than scheduled manner, and with an only limited
clientele. A common carrier need not have fixed and publicly known
routes. Neither does it have to maintain terminals or issue tickets. To
be sure, petitioner fits the test of a common carrier as laid down in
Bascos vs. Court of Appeals. The test to determine a common carrier is
"whether the given undertaking is a part of the business engaged in by
the carrier which he has held out to the general public as his
occupation rather than the quantity or extent of the business
transacted." In the case at bar, the petitioner admitted that it is
engaged in the business of shipping and lighterage, offering its barges
to the public, despite its limited clientele for carrying or transporting
goods by water for compensation.
Article 1732 of the Civil Code defines common carriers as persons,
corporations, firms or associations engaged in the business of carrying
or transporting passengers or goods or both, by land, water, or air, for
compensation..offering their services to the public. Petitioner contends
that it is not a common carrier but a private carrier. Allegedly, it has no
fixed and publicly known route, maintains no terminals, and issues no
tickets. It points out that it is not obliged to carry indiscriminately for
any person. It is not bound to carry goods unless it consents. In short,
it does not hold out its services to the general public. In De Guzman vs.
Court of Appeals, we held that the definition of common carriers in
Article 1732 of the Civil Code makes no distinction between one whose
principal business activity is the carrying of persons or goods or both,
and one who does such carrying only as an ancillary activity. We also
did not distinguish between a person or enterprise offering
transportation service on a regular or scheduled basis and one offering
such service on an occasional, episodic or unscheduled basis. Further,
we ruled that Article 1732 does not distinguish between a carrier
offering its services to the general public, and one who offers services
or solicits business only from a narrow segment of the general
population.
Common carriers are bound to observe extraordinary diligence in the
vigilance over the goods transported by them. They are presumed to
have been at fault or to have acted negligently if the goods are lost,
destroyed or deteriorated. To overcome the presumption of negligence
in the case of loss, destruction or deterioration of the goods,
deterioration of the goods, the common carrier must prove that it
exercised extraordinary diligence. There are, however, exceptions to
this rule. Article 1734 of the Civil Code enumerates the instances when
the presumption of negligence does not attach: Art. 1734. Common
carriers are responsible for the loss, destruction, or deterioration of the
goods, unless the same is due to any of the following causes only: (1)
Flood, storm, earthquake, lightning, or other natural disaster or
calamity; (2) Act of the public enemy in war, whether international or
civil; (3) Act or omission of the shipper or owner of the goods; (4) The
character of the goods or defects in the packing or in the containers;
(5) Order or act of competent public authority.
In the case at bar, the barge completely sank after its towing bits
broke, resulting in the total loss of its cargo. Petitioner claims that this
was caused by a typhoon, hence, it should not be held liable for the
loss of the cargo. However, petitioner failed to prove that the typhoon
is the proximate and only cause of the loss of the goods, and that it
has exercised due diligence before, during and after the occurrence of
the typhoon to prevent or minimize the loss. The evidence show that,
even before the towing bits of the barge broke, it had already
previously sustained damage when it hit a sunken object while docked
at the Engineering Island. It even suffered a hole. Clearly, this could
not be solely attributed to the typhoon. The partly-submerged vessel
was refloated but its hole was patched with only clay and cement. The
patch work was merely a provisional remedy, not enough for the barge
to sail safely. Thus, when petitioner persisted to proceed with the
voyage, it recklessly exposed the cargo to further damage.
AF Sanchez Brokerage vs CA
(Dec 21, 2004)

Wyett engaged the services of AF Sanchez where the latter delivered

the shipment to Hizon Laboratories upon instruction of Wyett. Upon
inspection, it was found out that at least 44 cartons containing
contraceptives were in bad condition. Wyett claimed insurance from
FGU. FGU exercising its right of subrogation claims damages against AF
Sanchez who delivered the damaged goods. AF Sanchez contended
that it is not a common carrier but a brokerage firm.
Issue:
Held:

Is

AF

Sanchez

common

SC held that Art 1732 of the Civil Code in defining common carrier does
not distinguish whether the activity is undertaken as a principal activity
or merely as an ancillary activity. In this case, while it is true that AF
Sanchez is principally engaged as a broker, it cannot be denied from
the evidence presented that part of the services it offers to its
customers is the delivery of the goods to their respective consignees.
Note:
AF Sanchez claimed that the proximate cause of the damage is
improper packing. Under the CC, improper packing of the goods is an
exonerating circumstance. But in this case, the SC held that though the
goods were improperly packed, since AF Sanchez knew of the condition
and yet it accepted the shipment without protest or reservation, the
defense is deemed waived.
Schmitz Transport and Brokerage Corp v Transort Venture Inc.,
GR 150255 April 22,2005
Facts:
On September 25, 1991, SYTCO Pte Ltd. Singapore shipped from the
port of Ilyichevsk, Russia on board M/V Alexander Saveliev 545 hot
rolled steel sheets in coil weighing 6,992,450 metric tons.
The
cargoes, which were to be discharged at the port of Manila in favor of
the consignee, Little Giant Steel Pipe Corporation (Little Giant), were
insured against all risks with Industrial Insurance Company Ltd.
(Industrial Insurance) under Marine Policy No. M-91-3747-TIS.
The
vessel arrived at the port of Manila and the Philippine Ports Authority
(PPA) assigned it a place of berth at the outside breakwater at the
Manila South Harbor.
Schmitz Transport, whose services the consignee engaged to secure
the requisite clearances, to receive the cargoes from the shipside, and
to deliver them to its (the consignees) warehouse at Cainta, Rizal, in
turn engaged the services of TVI to send a barge and tugboat at
shipside. TVIs tugboat Lailani towed the barge Erika V to shipside.
The tugboat, after positioning the barge alongside the vessel, left and
returned to the port terminal.
Arrastre operator Ocean Terminal
Services Inc. commenced to unload 37 of the 545 coils from the vessel
unto the barge. By 12:30 a.m. of October 27, 1991 during which the
weather condition had become inclement due to an approaching storm,
the unloading unto the barge of the 37 coils was accomplished. No
tugboat pulled the barge back to the pier, however. At around 5:30
a.m. of October 27, 1991, due to strong waves, the crew of the barge
abandoned it and transferred to the vessel. The barge pitched and
rolled with the waves and eventually capsized, washing the 37 coils
into the sea.
Little Giant thus filed a formal claim against Industrial Insurance which
paid it the amount of P5,246,113.11. Little Giant thereupon executed a
subrogation receipt in favor of Industrial Insurance.
Industrial
Insurance later filed a complaint against Schmitz Transport,
TVI, and Black Sea through its representative Inchcape (the
defendants) before the RTC of Manila, they faulted the
defendants for undertaking the unloading of the cargoes while
typhoon signal No. 1 was raised. The RTC held all the defendants
negligent. Defendants Schmitz Transport and TVI filed a joint
motion for reconsideration assailing the finding that they are
common carriers. RTC denied the motion for reconsideration.
CA affirmed the RTC decision in toto, finding that all the defendants
were common carriers Black Sea and TVI for engaging in the
transport of goods and cargoes over the seas as a regular business and
not as an isolated transaction, and Schmitz Transport for entering into
a contract with Little Giant to transport the cargoes from ship to port
for a fee.
Issue:

Facts:

Whether or not Black Sea and TVI are common carriers

AF Sanchez is engaged in a broker business wherein its main job is to

calculate customs duty, fees and charges as well as storage fees for
the cargoes. Part also of the services being given by AF Sanchez is the
delivery of the shipment to the consignee upon the instruction of the
shipper.

Held :

EH 405

carrier?

Contrary to petitioners insistence, this Court, as did the appellate

court, finds that petitioner is a common carrier. For it undertook to
transport the cargoes from the shipside of M/V Alexander Saveliev to
the consignees warehouse at Cainta, Rizal. As the appellate court put

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TRANSPORTATION LAW CASE DIGESTS

it, as long as a person or corporation holds [itself] to the
public for the purpose of transporting goods as [a] business,
[it] is already considered a common carrier regardless if [it]
owns the vehicle to be used or has to hire one. That petitioner is
a common carrier, the testimony of its own Vice-President and General
Manager Noel Aro that part of the services it offers to its clients as a
brokerage firm includes the transportation of cargoes reflects so.
It is settled that under a given set of facts, a customs broker may be
regarded as a common carrier. Thus, this Court, in A.F. Sanchez
Brokerage, Inc. v. The Honorable Court of Appeals,[44] held:
The appellate court did not err in finding petitioner, a
customs broker, to be also a common carrier, as defined
under Article 1732 of the Civil Code, to wit,
Art.
1732.
Common
carriers
are
persons,
corporations, firms or associations engaged in the
business of carrying or transporting passengers or
goods or both, by land, water, or air, for
compensation, offering their services to the public.
xxx
Article 1732 does not distinguish between one whose principal
business activity is the carrying of goods and one who does such
carrying only as an ancillary activity. The contention, therefore, of
petitioner that it is not a common carrier but a customs broker whose
principal function is to prepare the correct customs declaration and
proper shipping documents as required by law is bereft of merit. It
suffices that petitioner undertakes to deliver the goods for
pecuniary consideration.
And in Calvo v. UCPB General Insurance Co. Inc.,[46] this Court held
that as the transportation of goods is an integral part of a
customs broker, the customs broker is also a common carrier.
For to declare otherwise would be to deprive those with whom [it]
contracts the protection which the law affords them notwithstanding
the fact that the obligation to carry goods for [its] customers, is part
and parcel of petitioners business.
PHIL CHARTER vs. M/V "NATIONAL HONOR,"
[G.R. No. 161833. July 8, 2005.]
FACTS:
On November 5, 1995, J. Trading Co. Ltd. of Seoul, Korea, loaded a
shipment of four units of parts and accessories on board the vessel M/V
"National Honor," represented in the Philippines by its agent, National
Shipping Corporation of the Philippines (NSCP). The shipment was
contained in two wooden crates, namely, Crate No. 1 and Crate No. 2,
complete and in good order condition. Crate No. 1 contained the
following articles: one (1) unit Lathe Machine complete with parts and
accessories; one (1) unit Surface Grinder complete with parts and
accessories; and one (1) unit Milling Machine complete with parts and
accessories. On the flooring of the wooden crates were three wooden
battens placed side by side to support the weight of the cargo. It was
insured for P2,547,270.00 with the Philippine Charter Insurance
Corporation (PCIC).
The M/V "National Honor" arrived at the Manila International Container
Terminal (MICT). The International Container Terminal Services,
Incorporated (ICTSI) was the exclusive arrastre operator of MICT and
was charged with discharging the cargoes from the vessel. Claudio
Cansino, the stevedore of the ICTSI, placed two sling cables on each
end of Crate No. 1. No sling cable was fastened on the mid-portion of
the crate. As the crate was being hoisted from the vessel's hatch, the
mid-portion of the wooden flooring suddenly snapped in the air, about
five feet high from the vessel's twin deck, sending all its contents
crashing down hard, resulting in extensive damage to the shipment.
Blue Mono International Company, Incorporated (BMICI) subsequently
filed separate claims against the NSCP, the ICTSI, and its insurer, the
PCIC, for US$61,500.00. When the other companies denied liability,
PCIC paid the claim and was issued a Subrogation Receipt for
P1,740,634.50. On March 22, 1995, PCIC, as subrogee, filed with the
RTC of Manila a Complaint for Damages against the "Unknown owner of
the vessel M/V National Honor," NSCP and ICTSI, as defendants. ICTSI,
for its part, filed its Answer with Counterclaim and Cross-claim against
its co-defendant NSCP, claiming that the loss/damage of the shipment
was caused exclusively by the defective material of the wooden
battens of the shipment, insufficient packing or acts of the shipper.
The trial court rendered judgment for PCIC and ordered the complaint
dismissed. According to the trial court, the loss of the shipment
contained in Crate No. 1 was due to the internal defect and weakness
of the materials used in the fabrication of the crates. The CA affirmed
in TOTO the decision of the RTC.
ISSUE:

EH 405

WHETHER OR NOT THE COMMON CARRIER IS LIABLE FOR THE DAMAGE

SUSTAINED BY THE SHIPMENT IN THE HANDS OF THE ARRASTRE
OPERATOR.
HELD: THE RULING OF THE RTC AND CA WAS UPHELD.
The petitioner posits that the loss/damage was caused by the
mishandling of the shipment by therein respondent ICTSI, the arrastre
operator, and not by its negligence. The petition has no merit.
We agree with the contention of the petitioner that common carriers,
from the nature of their business and for reasons of public policy, are
mandated to observe extraordinary diligence in the vigilance over the
goods according to all the circumstances of each case. The
extraordinary diligence in the vigilance over the goods requires
common carriers to render service with the greatest skill and foresight
and "to use all reasonable means to ascertain the nature and
characteristic of goods tendered for shipment, and to exercise due care
in the handling and stowage, including such methods as their nature
requires." When the goods shipped are either lost or arrive in damaged
condition, a presumption arises against the carrier of its failure to
observe that diligence, and there need not be an express finding of
negligence to hold it liable. However, under Article 1734 of the New
Civil Code, the presumption of negligence does not apply to any of
the following causes:
1.
Flood, storm, earthquake, lightning or other natural
disaster or calamity;
2.
Act of the public enemy in war, whether international
or civil;
3.
Act or omission of the shipper or owner of the goods;
4.
The character of the goods or defects in the packing
or in the containers;
5.
Order or act of competent public authority.
It bears stressing that the enumeration in Article 1734 of the New Civil
Code which exempts the common carrier for the loss or damage to the
cargo is a closed list. Crate No. 1 was provided by the shipper of the
machineries in Seoul, Korea. There is nothing in the record which would
indicate that defendant ICTSI had any role in the choice of the
materials used in fabricating this crate. Said defendant, therefore,
cannot be held as blame worthy for the loss of the machineries
contained in Crate No. 1.
The CA affirmed the ruling of the RTC, thus:
The case at bar falls under one of the exceptions mentioned in Article
1734 of the Civil Code, particularly number (4) thereof, i.e., the
character of the goods or defects in the packing or in the containers.
The trial court found that the breakage of the crate was not due to the
fault or negligence of ICTSI, but to the inherent defect and weakness of
the materials used in the fabrication of the said crate.
Upon examination of the records, We find no compelling reason to
depart from the factual findings of the trial court. It appears that the
wooden batten used as support for the flooring was not made of good
materials, which caused the middle portion thereof to give way when it
was lifted. The shipper also failed to indicate signs to notify the
stevedores that extra care should be employed in handling the
shipment. Appellant's allegation that since the cargo arrived safely
from the port of [P]usan, Korea without defect, the fault should be
attributed to the arrastre operator who mishandled the cargo; is
without merit. The cargo fell while it was being carried only at about
five (5) feet high above the ground. It would not have so easily
collapsed had the cargo been properly packed. The shipper should
have used materials of stronger quality to support the heavy machines.
Not only did the shipper fail to properly pack the cargo, it also failed to
indicate an arrow in the middle portion of the cargo where additional
slings should be attached.
While it is true that the crate contained machineries and spare parts, it
cannot thereby be concluded that the respondents knew or should
have known that the middle wooden batten had a hole, or that it was
not strong enough to bear the weight of the shipment. The statement
in the Bill of Lading, that the shipment was in apparent good condition,
is sufficient to sustain a finding of absence of defects in the
merchandise. Case law has it that such statement will create a prima
facie presumption only as to the external condition and not to that not
open to inspection.
LEA MER INDUSTRIES INC VS MALAYAN INSURANCE CO, INC.
GR No. 161745, SEPTEMBER 30, 2005
FACTS:
Ilian Silica Mining entered into a contract of carriage with the
petitioner, Lea Mer Industries Inc. for the shipment of 900 metric tons
of silica sand worth P565,000. The cargo was consigned to Vulcan
Industrial and Mining Corporation and was to be shipped from Palawan
to Manila. The silica sand was boarded to Judy VII, the vessel leased by

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TRANSPORTATION LAW CASE DIGESTS

Lea Mer. However, during the course of its voyage, the vessel sank
which led to the loss of the cargo.
Consequently, the respondent, as the insurer, paid Vulcan the value of
the lost cargo. Malayan Insurance Co., Inc. then collected from the
petitioner the amount it paid to Vulcan as reimbursement and as its
exercise on the right of subrogation. Lea Mer refused to pay which led
Malayan to institute a complaint with the RTC. The RTC dismissed the
complaint stating that the loss was due to a fortuitous event, Typhoon
Trining. Petitioner did not know that a typhoon was coming and that it
has been cleared by the Philippine Coast Guard to travel from Palawan
to Manila. The CA reversed the ruling of the trial court for the reason
that said vessel was not seaworthy when it sailed to Manila.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the petitioner is liable for the loss of the cargo.
HELD:
CA reversed. Common carriers are persons, corporations, firms or
associations engaged in the business of carrying or transporting
passengers or goods, or both by land, water, or air when this
service is offered to the public for compensation. Petitioner is clearly a
common carrier, because it offers to the public its business of
transporting goods through its vessels. Thus, the Court corrects the
trial court's finding that petitioner became a private carrier when
Vulcan chartered it. Charter parties are classified as contracts of
demise (or bareboat) and affreightment, which are distinguished as
follows:
"Under the demise or bareboat charter of the vessel, the charterer will
generally be considered as owner for the voyage or service stipulated.
The charterer mans the vessel with his own people and becomes, in
effect, the owner pro hac vice, subject to liability to others for damages
caused by negligence. To create a demise, the owner of a vessel must
completely and exclusively relinquish possession, command and
navigation thereof to the charterer; anything short of such a complete
transfer is a contract of affreightment (time or voyage charter party) or
not a charter party at all."
The distinction is significant, because a demise or bareboat charter
indicates a business undertaking that is private in character.
Consequently, the rights and obligations of the parties to a contract of
private carriage are governed principally by their stipulations, not by
the law on common carriers. The Contract in the present case was one
of affreightment, as shown by the fact that it was petitioner's crew that
manned the tugboat M/V Ayalit and controlled the barge Judy VII.
Common carriers are bound to observe extraordinary diligence in their
vigilance over the goods and the safety of the passengers they
transport, as required by the nature of their business and for reasons of
public policy. Extraordinary diligence requires rendering service with
the greatest skill and foresight to avoid damage and destruction to the
goods entrusted for carriage and delivery.
Common carriers are presumed to have been at fault or to have acted
negligently for loss or damage to the goods that they have
transported. This presumption can be rebutted only by proof that they
observed extraordinary diligence, or that the loss or damage was
occasioned by any of the following causes:
"(1)
Flood, storm, earthquake, lightning, or other natural disaster
or calamity;
"(2)
Act of the public enemy in war, whether international or civil;
"(3)
Act or omission of the shipper or owner of the goods;
"(4)
The character of the goods or defects in the packing or in the
containers;
"(5)
Order or act of competent public authority."
Jurisprudence defines the elements of a "fortuitous event" as follows:
(a) the cause of the unforeseen and unexpected occurrence, or the
failure of the debtors to comply with their obligations, must have been
independent of human will; (b) the event that constituted the caso
fortuito must have been impossible to foresee or, if foreseeable,
impossible to avoid; (c) the occurrence must have been such as to
render it impossible for the debtors to fulfill their obligation in a normal
manner; and (d) the obligor must have been free from any
participation in the aggravation of the resulting injury to the creditor. To
excuse the common carrier fully of any liability, the fortuitous event
must have been the proximate and only cause of the loss. Moreover, it
should have exercised due diligence to prevent or minimize the loss
before, during and after the occurrence of the fortuitous event. As
required by the pertinent law, it was not enough for the common
carrier to show that there was an unforeseen or unexpected
occurrence. It had to show that it was free from any fault a fact it
miserably failed to prove.
LOADSTAR SHIPPING CO., INC., v. CA

EH 405

Facts:
On 19 November 1984, LOADSTAR received on board a) 705 bales of
lawanit hardwood; b) 27 boxes and crates of tilewood assemblies and
the others ;and c) 49 bundles of mouldings R & W (3) Apitong
Bolidenized. On its way to Manila from the port of Nasipit, Agusan del
Norte, the vessel, along with its cargo, sank off Limasawa Island. As a
result of the total loss of its shipment, the consignee made a claim with
LOADSTAR which, however, ignored the same. MIC filed a complaint
against LOADSTAR and PGAI, alleging that the sinking of the vessel was
due to the fault and negligence of LOADSTAR and its employees.
LOADSTAR denied any liability for the loss of the shipper's goods and
claimed that sinking of its vessel was due to force majeure. LOADSTAR
submits that the vessel was a private carrier because it was not issued
certificate of public convenience, it did not have a regular trip or
schedule nor a fixed route, and there was only "one shipper, one
consignee for a special cargo.
Issues:
(1) Is the M/V "Cherokee" a private or a common carrier?
(2) Did LOADSTAR observe due and/or ordinary diligence in these
premises.
Held: Petition is dismissed:
SC hold that LOADSTAR is a common carrier. It is not necessary that
the carrier be issued a certificate of public convenience, and this public
character is not altered by the fact that the carriage of the goods in
question was periodic, occasional, episodic or unscheduled. The bills of
lading failed to show any special arrangement, but only a general
provision to the effect that the M/V"Cherokee" was a "general cargo
carrier." 14 Further, the bare fact that the vessel was carrying a
particular type of cargo for one shipper, which appears to be purely
coincidental, is not reason enough to convert the vessel from a
common to a private carrier, especially where, as in this case, it was
shown that the vessel was also carrying passengers. Under Article
1732 of the Civil Code the Civil Code defines "common carriers" in the
following terms:
Art. 1732. Common carriers are persons, corporations, firms
or associations engaged in the business of carrying or transporting
passengers or goods or both, by land, water, or air for compensation,
offering their services to the public.
On to the second assigned error, we find that the M/V "Cherokee" was
not seaworthy when it embarked on its voyage on 19 November 1984.
The vessel was not even sufficiently manned at the time. "For a vessel
to be seaworthy, it must be adequately equipped for the voyage and
manned with a sufficient number of competent officers and crew. The
failure of a common carrier to maintain in seaworthy condition its
vessel involved in a contract of carriage is a clear breach of its duty.
CEBU SALVAGE CORP. v. PHIL HOME ASSURANCE
3.

Private Carriage

Home Insurance Co. v. American Steamship Agencies

23 SCRA 24
FACTS:
"Consorcio Pesquero del Peru of South America" shipped freight prepaid at Chimbate, Peru, 21,740 jute bags of Peruvian fish meal through
SS Crowborough. The cargo, consigned to San Miguel Brewery, Inc.,
now San Miguel Corporation, and insured by Home Insurance Company
for $202,505, arrived in Manila and was discharged into the lighters of
Luzon Stevedoring Company. When the cargo was delivered to
consignee San Miguel Brewery Inc., there were shortages amounting to
P12,033.85, causing the latter to lay claims against Luzon Stevedoring
Corporation, Home Insurance Company and the American Steamship
Agencies, owner and operator of SS Crowborough.
Because the others denied liability, Home Insurance Company paid the
consignee P14,870.71. Having been refused reimbursement by both
the Luzon Stevedoring Corporation and American Steamship Agencies,
Home Insurance Company, as subrogee to the consignee, filed against
them before the Court of First Instance a complaint for recovery of
P14,870.71 with legal interest, plus attorney's fees.
In answer, Luzon Stevedoring Corporation alleged that it delivered with
due diligence the goods in the same quantity and quality that it had
received the same from the carrier. It also claimed that plaintiff's claim
had prescribed under Article 366 of the Code of Commerce stating that
the claim must be made within 24 hours from receipt of the cargo.
American Steamship Agencies denied liability by alleging that under
the provisions of the Charter party referred to in the bills of lading, the

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TRANSPORTATION LAW CASE DIGESTS

charterer, not the shipowner, was responsible for any loss or damage
of the cargo. Furthermore, it claimed to have exercised due diligence in
stowing the goods and that as a mere forwarding agent, it was not
responsible for losses or damages to the cargo.

upon opening the three hatches containing the shipment, nearly all the
skids of tinplates and hot rolled sheets were allegedly found to be wet
and rusty. NSC filed a complaint for damages but RTC dismissed the
complaint

The Court of First Instance absolved the Luzon Stevedoring Corporation

from any liability and ordered the American Steamship Agencies to pay
the sum. Hence, this petition.

Issues:
1.
2.

ISSUE:
Is the stipulation in the charter party of the owner's non-liability valid
so as to absolve the American Steamship Agencies from liability for
loss?

Held:

RULING:
Judgment was reversed and American Steamship Agencies was
absolved liability.

The bills of lading provided at the back thereof that the bills of
lading shall be governed by and subject to the terms and
conditions of the charter party, if any, otherwise, the bills of
lading prevail over all the agreements.
o

1.

Under
American
jurisprudence,
a
common
carrier
undertaking to carry a special cargo or chartered to a special
person only, becomes a private carrier.8 As a private carrier,
a stipulation exempting the owner from liability for the
negligence of its agent is not against public policy, and is
deemed valid
he Civil Code provisions on common carriers should not be
applied where the carrier is not acting as such but as a
private carrier. The stipulation in the charter party absolving
the owner from liability for loss due to the negligence of its
agent would be void only if the strict public policy governing
common carriers is applied. Such policy has no force where
the public at large is not involved, as in the case of a ship
totally chartered for the use of a single party.

And furthermore, in a charter of the entire vessel, the bill of lading

issued by the master to the charterer, as shipper, is in fact and
legal contemplation merely a receipt and a document of title not a
contract, for the contract is the charter party. The consignee may
not claim ignorance of said charter party because the bills of
lading expressly referred to the same. Accordingly, the
consignees under the bills of lading must likewise abide by the
terms of the charter party. And as stated, recovery cannot be had
thereunder, for loss or damage to the cargo, against the
shipowners, unless the same is due to personal acts or negligence
of said owner or its manager, as distinguished from its other
agents or employees. In this case, no such personal act or
negligence has been proved.

NATIONAL STEEL CORPORATION vs. COURT OF APPEALS (1997)

Facts:
NSC hired MV Vlasons I, a private vessel owned by VSI. They entered
into a contract of voyage charter hire wherein the contract states that
NSC hired VSI's vessel to make one voyage to load steel products at
Iligan City and discharge them at North Harbor, Manila. On arrival and

EH 405

VSI was not a common carrier but a private carrier. It is

undisputed that VSI did not offer its services to the general
public. The extent of VSI's responsibility and liability over
NSC's cargo are determined primarily by the stipulations in
the contract of carriage or charter party and the Code of
Commerce. The burden of proof lies on the part of NSC and
not the VSI.
Article 1732 of the Civil Code defines a common carrier as
"persons, corporations, firms or associations engaged in the
business of carrying or transporting passengers or goods or
both, by land, water or air, for compensation, offering their
services to the public." It has been held that the true test of
a common carrier is the carriage of passengers or goods,
provided it has space, for all who opt to avail themselves of
its transportation service for a fee. A carrier which does not
qualify under the above test is deemed a private carrier.
"Generally, private carriage is undertaken by special
agreement and the carrier does not hold himself out to carry
goods for the general public. . . ."

Section 2, paragraph 2 of the charter party, provides that the

owner is liable for loss or damage to the goods caused by
personal want of due diligence on its part or its manager to
make the vessel in all respects seaworthy and to secure that
she be properly manned, equipped and supplied or by the
personal act or default of the owner or its manager. Said
paragraph, however, exempts the owner of the vessel from
any loss or damage or delay arising from any other source,
even from the neglect or fault of the captain or crew or some
other person employed by the owner on board, for whose
acts the owner would ordinarily be liable except for said
paragraph..

The Court of First Instance declared the contract as contrary to

Article 587 of the Code of Commerce making the ship agent civilly
liable for indemnities suffered by third persons arising from acts
or omissions of the captain in the care of the goods and Article
1744 of the Civil Code under which a stipulation between the
common carrier and the shipper or owner limiting the liability of
the former for loss or destruction of the goods to a degree less
than extraordinary diligence is valid provided it be reasonable,
just and not contrary to public policy. The release from liability in
this case was held unreasonable and contrary to the public policy
on common carriers.
o

whether VSI contracted with NSC as a common carrier or as

a private carrier
Whether or not the provisions of the Civil Code of the
Philippines on common carriers pursuant to which there
exist[s] a presumption of negligence against the common
carrier in case of loss or damage to the cargo are applicable
to a private carrier.

2.

Because the MV Vlason I was a private carrier, the

shipowner's obligations are governed by the provisions of
the Code of Commerce and not by the Civil Code which, as a
general rule places the prima facie presumption of
negligence on a common carrier.
IN A CONTRACT OF PRIVATE CARRIAGE, THE BURDEN OF
PROOF IN CASE OF ACCIDENT IS ON THE CARRIER but the
court exempts VSI due to force majeure.
NSC must prove that the damage to its shipment was caused
by VSI's willful negligence or failure to exercise due diligence
in making MV Vlason I seaworthy and fit for holding, carrying
and safekeeping the cargo. The burden of proof was placed
on NSC by the parties' agreement.

VALENZUELA HARDWOOD AND INDUSTRIAL SUPPLY v. CA

FACTS:
Plaintiff shipped at Maconcon Port, Isabela 940 round logs on board
M/V Seven Ambassador, a vessel owned by defendant Seven Brothers
Shipping Corporation. Plaintiff insured the logs against loss and/or
damage with defendant South Sea Surety and Insurance Co., Inc. for
P2M and the latter issued its Marine Cargo Insurance Policy on said
date. In the meantime, the M/V Seven Ambassador sank resulting in
the loss of the plaintiffs insured logs.
Plaintiff demanded from defendant South Sea Surety and Insurance
Co., Inc. the payment of the proceeds of the policy but the latter
denied liability under the policy. Plaintiff likewise filed a formal claim
with defendant Seven Brothers Shipping Corporation for the value of
the lost logs but the latter denied the claim.
Court of Appeals affirmed in part the RTC judgment by sustaining the
liability of South Sea Surety and Insurance Company ("South Sea"), but
modified it by holding that Seven Brothers Shipping Corporation
("Seven Brothers") was not liable for the lost cargo.
ISSUE:
Whether defendants shipping corporation and the surety company are
liable to the plaintiff for the latter's lost logs.
HELD:
The charter party between the petitioner and private respondent
stipulated that the "(o)wners shall not be responsible for loss, split,
short-landing, breakages and any kind of damages to the cargo"
VALID

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TRANSPORTATION LAW CASE DIGESTS

There is no dispute between the parties that the proximate cause of
the sinking of M/V Seven Ambassadors resulting in the loss of its cargo
was the "snapping of the iron chains and the subsequent rolling of the
logs to the portside due to the negligence of the captain in stowing and
securing the logs on board the vessel and not due to fortuitous event."
Likewise undisputed is the status of Private Respondent Seven Brothers
as a private carrier when it contracted to transport the cargo of
Petitioner Valenzuela. Even the latter admits this in its petition.
Private respondent had acted as a private carrier in transporting
petitioner's lauan logs. Thus, Article 1745 and other Civil Code
provisions on common carriers which were cited by petitioner may not
be applied unless expressly stipulated by the parties in their charter
party.
In a contract of private carriage, the parties may validly stipulate that
responsibility for the cargo rests solely on the charterer, exempting the
shipowner from liability for loss of or damage to the cargo caused even
by the negligence of the ship captain. Pursuant to Article 1306 of the
Civil Code, such stipulation is valid because it is freely entered into by
the parties and the same is not contrary to law, morals, good customs,
public order, or public policy. Indeed, their contract of private carriage
is not even a contract of adhesion. We stress that in a contract of
private carriage, the parties may freely stipulate their duties and
obligations which perforce would be binding on them. Unlike in
contract involving a common carrier, private carriage does not involve
the general public. Hence, the stringent provisions of the Civil Code on
common carriers protecting the general public cannot justifiably be
applied to a ship transporting commercial goods as a private carrier.
Consequently, the public policy embodied therein is not contravened
by stipulations in a charter party that lessen or remove the protection
given by law in contracts involving common carriers.
The provisions of our Civil Code on common carriers were taken from
Anglo-American law. Under American jurisprudence, a common carrier
undertaking to carry a special cargo or chartered to a special person
only, becomes a private carrier. As a private carrier a stipulation
exempting the owner from liability for the negligence of its agent is not
against public policy and is deemed valid. Such doctrine We find
reasonable. The Civil Code provisions on common carriers should not
be applied where the carrier is not acting as such but as a private
carrier. The stipulation in the charter party absolving the owner from
liability for loss due to the negligence of its agent would be void only if
the strict public policy governing common carriers is applied. Such
policy has no force where the public at large is not involved as in this
case of a ship totally chartered for the use of a single party. (Home
Insurance Co. vs. American Steamship Agencies Inc., 23 SCRA 24, April
4, 1968)
FGU INSURANCE v. G.P. SARMIENTO
Crisostomo vs. CA
G.R. No. 138334 August 25, 2003
FACTS:
In May 1991, petitioner Estela L. Crisostomo contracted the services of
respondent Caravan Travel and Tours International, Inc. to arrange and
facilitate her booking, ticketing and accommodation in a tour dubbed
Jewels of Europe. The package tour included the countries of
England, Holland, Germany, Austria, Liechstenstein, Switzerland and
France at a total cost of P74,322.70.Petitioner was given a 5% discount
on the amount, which included airfare, and the booking fee was also
waived because petitioners niece, Meriam Menor, was respondent
companys ticketing manager.
Pursuant to said contract, Menor went to her aunts residence on June
12, 1991 a Wednesday to deliver petitioners travel documents and
plane tickets.Petitioner, in turn, gave Menor the full payment for the
package tour.Menor then told her to be at the Ninoy Aquino
International Airport (NAIA) on Saturday,two hours before her flight on
board British Airways.
Without checking her travel documents, petitioner went to NAIA on
Saturday, June 15, 1991, to take the flight for the first leg of her
journey from Manila to Hongkong. To petitioners dismay, she
discovered that the flight she was supposed to take had already
departed the previous day.She learned that her plane ticket was for the
flight scheduled on June 14, 1991. She thus called up Menor to
complain.
Subsequently, Menor prevailed upon petitioner to take another tour
the British Pageant which included England, Scotland and Wales in
its itinerary. For this tour package, petitioner was asked anew to pay
US$785.00 or P20,881.00 (at the then prevailing exchange rate of
P26.60). She gave respondent US$300 or P7,980.00 as partial payment
and commenced the trip in July 1991.

EH 405

Upon petitioners return from Europe, she demanded from respondent

the reimbursement of P61,421.70, representing the difference between
the sum she paid for Jewels of Europe and the amount she owed
respondent for the British Pageant tour. Despite several demands,
respondent company refused to reimburse the amount, contending
that the same was non-refundable.Petitioner was thus constrained to
file a complaint against respondent for breach of contract of carriage
and damages, which was docketed as Civil Case No. 92-133 and raffled
to Branch 59 of the Regional Trial Court of Makati City.
After due proceedings, the trial court rendered a decision in favor of
Estela Crisostomo.
But it was reversed by the Court of Appeals. Hence, this petition.
ISSUE:
Is the Caravan Travel and Tours liable for reimbursement and
damages?
HELD: Petition DENIED.
By definition, a contract of carriage or transportation is one whereby a
certain person or association of persons obligate themselves to
transport persons, things, or news from one place to another for a fixed
price.Such person or association of persons are regarded as carriers
and are classified as private or special carriers and common or public
carriers.A common carrier is defined under Article 1732 of the Civil
Code as persons, corporations, firms or associations engaged in the
business of carrying or transporting passengers or goods or both, by
land, water or air, for compensation, offering their services to the
public.
It is obvious from the above definition that respondent is not an entity
engaged in the business of transporting either passengers or goods
and is therefore, neither a private nor a common carrier. Respondent
did not undertake to transport petitioner from one place to another
since its covenant with its customers is simply to make travel
arrangements in their behalf. Respondents services as a travel agency
include procuring tickets and facilitating travel permits or visas as well
as booking customers for tours.
While petitioner concededly bought her plane ticket through the efforts
of respondent company, this does not mean that the latter ipso facto is
a common carrier. At most, respondent acted merely as an agent of the
airline, with whom petitioner ultimately contracted for her carriage to
Europe. Respondents obligation to petitioner in this regard was simply
to see to it that petitioner was properly booked with the airline for the
appointed date and time. Her transport to the place of destination,
meanwhile, pertained directly to the airline.
The object of petitioners contractual relation with respondent is the
latters service of arranging and facilitating petitioners booking,
ticketing and accommodation in the package tour. In contrast, the
object of a contract of carriage is the transportation of passengers or
goods. It is in this sense that the contract between the parties in this
case was an ordinary one for services and not one of carriage.
Petitioners submission is premised on a wrong assumption.It is thus
not bound under the law to observe extraordinary diligence in the
performance of its obligation, as petitioner claims.
Since the contract between the parties is an ordinary one for services,
the standard of care required of respondent is that of a good father of a
family under Article 1173 of the Civil Code.This connotes reasonable
care consistent with that which an ordinarily prudent person would
have observed when confronted with a similar situation. The test to
determine whether negligence attended the performance of an
obligation is: did the defendant in doing the alleged negligent act use
that reasonable care and caution which an ordinarily prudent person
would have used in the same situation?If not, then he is guilty of
negligence.
we do not agree with the finding of the lower court that Menors
negligence concurred with the negligence of petitioner and resultantly
caused damage to the latter. Contrary to petitioners claim, the
evidence on record shows that respondent exercised due diligence in
performing its obligations under the contract and followed standard
procedure in rendering its services to petitioner. As correctly observed
by the lower court, the plane ticket. issued to petitioner clearly
reflected the departure date and time, contrary to petitioners
contention. The travel documents, consisting of the tour itinerary,
vouchers and instructions, were likewise delivered to petitioner two
days prior to the trip. Respondent also properly booked petitioner for
the tour, prepared the necessary documents and procured the plane
tickets. It arranged petitioners hotel accommodation as well as food,
land transfers and sightseeing excursions, in accordance with its
avowed undertaking. Therefore, it is clear that respondent performed

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TRANSPORTATION LAW CASE DIGESTS

its prestation under the contract as well as everything else that was
essential to book petitioner for the tour.
Hence, petitioner cannot recover and must bear her own damage.

4.
5.
6.

Distinction from towage, arrester and stevedoring

Governing Laws
Registered Owner Rule and Kabit System

EH 405

Page 11