Malabang vs Benito (what is a de facto corp)

FACTS: Municipality of Balabagan was once part of the Municipality of Malabang

before it was created into a separate municipality thru an executive order. The
Municipality Malabang filed a suit against the Municipality of Balabagan for having
been created under an invalid EO 386 and to restrain the respondent municipal
officials from performing the functions of their respective offices. Petitioner relied on
the ruling of the Pelaez case that Sec. 68 of the Administrative Code is
unconstitutional (a) because it constitutes an undue delegation of legislative power
and (b)because it offends against Section 10 (1) of Article VII of the Constitution,
which limits the President's power over local governments to mere supervision.
Section 68 of the Revised Administrative Code, approved on March 10, 1917, must
be deemed repealed by the subsequent adoption of the Constitution, in 1935, which
is utterly incompatible and inconsistent with said statutory enactment. The
Respondents on the other hand argue that the Mun. of Balabagan is at least a de
facto corporation for having been organized under color of a statute before this was
declared unconstitutional, its officers having been either elected or appointed, and
the municipality itself having discharged its corporate functions for the past five
years preceding the institution of this action. It is contended that as a de facto
corporation, its existence cannot be collaterally attacked, although it may be
inquired into directly in an action for quo warranto at the instance of the State and
not of an individual like the petitioner Balindong.
The method of challenging the existence of a municipal corporation is reserved to
the State in a proceeding for quo warranto or other direct proceeding. But the rule
disallowing collateral attacks applies only where the municipal corporation is at
least a de facto corporation. For where it is neither a corporation de jure nor de
facto, but a nullity, the rule is that its existence may be questioned collaterally or
directly in any action or proceeding by any one whose rights or interests are
affected thereby, including the citizens of the territory incorporated unless they are
estopped by their conduct from doing so.
ISSUE:W/O the municipality of Balabagan is a de facto corporation.
RULING: No, because there is no other valid statute to give color of authority to its
creation when EO 386 was subsequently declared as unconstitutional. The color of
authority requisite to the organization of a de facto municipal corporation may be:1.
A valid law enacted by the legislature.2. An unconstitutional law, valid on its face,
which has either (a)been upheld for a time by the courts or (b) not yet been
declared void; provided that a warrant for its creation can be found in some other
valid law or in the recognition of its potential existence by the general laws or
constitution of the state. In the case at bar, there is no other law that could give
color of authority to the validity of the existence of the municpality of Balabagan
when EO 386 was later on invalidated. Hence, such municipality is not a de facto
corporation.
Padilla vs. COMELEC

FACTS:
Pursuant to RA 7155, creating the Municipality of Tulay na Lupa in the province of
Camarines Norte to be composed of Barangays Tulay-naLupa, Lugui, San Antonio,
Mabilo I, Napaod, Bayan-bayn, Mataulang, Pag-asa, Maot, and Calabasa, all in the
Municipalty of Labo, same province, COMELEC scheduled a plebiscite was
conducted throughout the municipality of Labo and majority voted against the
creation of the Municipality of Tulay-na-Lupa. Petitioner prayed that the plebiscite
conducted to set aside with the contention that such plebiscite was a complete
failure.
ISSUE: Whether or not the plebiscite conducted in the areas comprising the
proposed Municipality of Tulay na Lupa and the remaining areas of the mother
Municipality of Labo is valid.
RULING: COMELEC did not commit grave abuse of discretion and the result of the
plebiscite rejecting the creation of the new municipality of Tulay-na-Lupa is valid.
It stands to reason that when the law states that the plebiscite shall be conducted
in the political units directly affected, it means that residents of the political entity
who would be economically dislocated by the separation of a portion thereof have a
right to vote in said plebiscite. Evidently, what is contemplated by the phrase
political units directly affected is the plurality of the political units which would
participate in the plebiscite.

Grio vs. COMELEC (Sec 462- conversion of sub province into Province)
G.R. No. 105120 September 2, 1992

FACTS: Grio and his LDP political party filed a certiorari case against COMELEC in
relation to the May 11, 1992 election. Grio is a candidate for Governor of Iloilo
where the sub-province of Guimaras is located. LGC of 1991 took effect requiring
the conversion of existing sub-provinces into regular provinces, and Guimaras is one
such sub-provinces, upon approval by majority of votes cast in a plebiscite. The
plebiscite favored the conversion of Guimaras into a regular province but petitioner
questioned the COMELEC that ballots should have contained spaces to allow voting
for Gov, Vice Gov and members of the Sanggunian of Iloilo.
ISSUE: Whether or not there was a complete failure of election in Guimaras.
HELD: The court held that COMELEC was under mistaken presumption that under
the LGC of 1991, whether or not the conversion of Guimaras into a regular province
is ratified by the people in plebiscite, the President will appoint provincial officials.
However, the voters favored for the conversion of Guimaras into a regular province
so there was need to undo what COMELEC has done in plebiscite. There ballots in
Guimaras should have contained spaces for Gov and Vice Gov. etc. but SC has now

considered the case moot and academic since majority voted in the affirmative for
the conversion of Guimaras.
Alvarez v. Guingona
G.R. No. 118303 January 31, 1996
Hermosisima, Jr., J.

Facts:

HB 8817, entitled An Act Converting the Municipality of Santiago into an

Independent Component City to be known as the City of Santiago, was filed in the
House of Representatives, subsequently passed by the House of Representatives,
and transmitted to the Senate. A counterpart of HB 8817, SB 1243 was filed in the
Senate, and was passed as well. The enrolled bill was submitted to and signed by
the Chief Executive as RA 7720. When a plebiscite on the Act was held on July 13,
1994, a great majority of the registered voters of Santiago voted in favor of the
conversion of Santiago into a city.

Issue:

whether or not considering that the Senate passed SB 1243, its own version of HB
8817, RA 7720 can be said to have originated in the House of Representatives

Held:

Yes. Bills of local application are required to originate exclusively in the

House of Representatives. Petitioners contend that since a bill of the same import
was passed in the Senate, it cannot be said to have originated in the House of
Representatives.

Such is untenable because it cannot be denied that the HB was filed first (18 Apr
1993). The SB was filed 19 May. The HB was approved on third reading 17 Dec, and
was transmitted to the Senate 28 Jan 1994.

The filing in the Senate of a substitute bill in anticipation of its receipt of the bill
from the House, does not contravene the constitutional requirement that a bill of

local application should originate in the House of Representatives, for as long as the
Senate does not act thereupon until it receives the House bill.

The filing in the Senate of a substitute bill in anticipation of its receipt of the bill
from the House of Representatives, does not contravene the constitutional
requirement that a bill of local application should originate in the House of
Representatives, for as long as the Senate does not act thereupon until it receives
the House bill.

In Tolentino v. Secretary of Finance, the Court said that what the Constitution simply
means is that the initiative for filing revenue, tariff, or tax bills, bills authorizing an
increase of the public debt, private bills and bills of local application must come
from the House of Representatives on the theory that, elected as they are from the
districts, the members of the House can be expected to be more sensitive to the
local needs and problems. On the other hand, the senators, who are elected at
large, are expected to approach the same problems from the national perspective.
Both views are thereby made to bear on the enactment of such laws. Nor does the
Constitution prohibit the filing in the Senate of a substitute bill in anticipation of its
receipt of the bill from the House, so long as action by the Senate as a body is
withheld pending receipt of the House bill.

MIRANDA VS AGUIRRE
G.R. No. 133064 September 16 1999
FACTS:
1994, RA No. 7720 effected the conversion of the municipality of Santiago, Isabela,
into an independent component city. July 4th, RA No. 7720 was approved by the
people of Santiago in a plebiscite. 1998, RA No. 8528 was enacted and it amended
RA No. 7720 that practically downgraded the City of Santiago from an independent
component city to a component city. Petitioners assail the constitutionality of RA No.
8528 for the lack of provision to submit the law for the approval of the people of
Santiago in a proper plebiscite.

Respondents defended the constitutionality of RA No. 8528 saying that the said act
merely reclassified the City of Santiago from an independent component city into a
component city. It allegedly did not involve any creation, division, merger,
abolition, or substantial alteration of boundaries of local government units,
therefore, a plebiscite of the people of Santiago is unnecessary. They also
questioned the standing of petitioners to file the petition and argued that the
petition raises a political question over which the Court lacks jurisdiction.

ISSUE: Whether or not the Court has jurisdiction over the petition at bar.

RULING:
Yes. RA No. 8528 is declared unconstitutional. That Supreme Court has the
jurisdiction over said petition because it involves not a political question but a
justiciable issue, and of which only the court could decide whether or not a law
passed by the Congress is unconstitutional.

That when an amendment of the law involves creation, merger, division, abolition or
substantial alteration of boundaries of local government units, a plebiscite in the
political units directly affected is mandatory.
Petitioners are directly affected in the imple-mentation of RA No. 8528. Miranda was
the mayor of Santiago City, Afiado was the President of the Sangguniang Liga,
together with 3 other petitioners were all residents and voters in the City of
Santiago. It is their right to be heard in the conversion of their city through a
plebiscite to be conducted by the COMELEC. Thus, denial of their right in RA No.
8528 gives them proper standing to strike down the law as unconstitutional.

Sec. 1 of Art. VIII of the Constitution states that: the judicial power shall be vested in
one Supreme Court and in such lower courts as may be established by law. Judicial
power includes the duty of the courts of justice to settle actual controversies
involving rights which are legally demandable and enforceable, and to determine
whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or
excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instru-mentality of the
Government.

Navarro v. Ermita
2011 April 12 URGENT MOTION TO RECALL Entry of Judgment dated October 20,
2010.
It must be borne in mind that the central policy considerations in the creation of
local government units are economic viability, efficient administration, and
capability to deliver basic services to their constituents, and the criteria prescribed
by the Local Government Code (LGC), i.e., income, population and land area, are all
designed to accomplish these results. In this light, Congress, in its collective
wisdom, has debated on the relative weight of each of these three criteria, placing
emphasis on which of them should enjoy preferential consideration. Without doubt,
the primordial criterion in the creation of local government units, particularly of a
province, is economic viability. This is the clear intent of the framers of the LGC.
Petitioner: RODOLFO G. NAVARRO, VICTOR F. BERNAL, and RENE O. MEDINA

Taxpayers and Residents of Surigao del Norte (Vice Gov, and Members of Provincial
Board)
Respondent: EXECUTIVE SECRETARY EDUARDO ERMITA
representing the President of the Philippines
Senate of the Philippines
represented by the SENATE PRESIDENT
House of Representatives
represented by the HOUSE SPEAKER
GOVERNOR ROBERT ACE S. BARBERS
representing the mother province of Surigao del Norte
GOVERNOR GERALDINE ECLEO VILLAROMAN
representing the new Province of Dinagat Islands
Movants-Intervenors: CONGRESSMAN FRANCISCO T. MATUGAS, HON. SOL T.
MATUGAS, HON. ARTURO CARLOS A. EGAY, JR., HON. SIMEON VICENTE G.
CASTRENCE, HON. MAMERTO D. GALANIDA, HON. MARGARITO M. LONGOS, and
HON. CESAR M. BAGUNDOL
Elected officials of Surigao de Norte province in the May 2010 elections
Facts:
1. Brief Recap a.
2 Oct 1996: President approves RA 9355 creating Province of Dinagat Islands into
law i.
Income : 82.69M/year ii.
Population : 106,951 iii.
Land Area : 802.12 sq. km b.
3 Dec 1996: COMELEC conducts mandatory plebiscite for ratification of creation of
province.
1People from both the mother province of Surigao del Norte and the Dinagat Islands
voted. Affirmative Votes: 69,943
1LGC, SECTION. 10.
Plebiscite Requirement
No creation, division, merger, abolition, or substantial alteration of boundaries of
local government units shall take effect unless approved by a majority of the votes
cast in a plebiscite called for the purpose in the political unit or units directly

affected. Said plebiscite shall be conducted by the Commission on Elections

(COMELEC) within one hundred twenty (120) days from the date of effectivity of the
law or ordinance effecting such action, unless said law or ordinance fixes another
date.

Negative Votes: 63,502 c.

President appoints interim set of provincial officials d.
1 Jun 2007: New set of provincial officials elected and assume office e.
10 Feb 2010: RA 9355 declared unconstitutional. (failed to meet min land area
requirements) 2.
Decision on 2010 case declared Final and Executory on 18 May 2010 3.
This Resolution delves solely on the instant Urgent Motion to Recall Entry of
Judgment of
movants-intervenors, not on the second motions for reconsideration of the original
parties. 4.

COMELEC Resolution 8790 declared that if the decision on the 2010 case was
declared final and executory, the Dinagat Islands would revert to its former status
as a non-province. Consequently, the results of the May 2010 elections would have
to be nullified, and a special election would have to be conducted for various
positions (Governor, Vice-Governor, etc) for Surigao del Norte. Hence the
intervenors became real parties in interest with the declaration finality of the 2010
case decision. (Cong Matugas etal had petitioned to intervene before, but were
declared to have no standing since at that time, they were still candidates in the
May 2010 elections.)
Other Pertinent laws: LGC. Sec 386. Barangay - no min land area requirement LCG.
Sec 442. Municipality - 50 sq km BUT
(b) The territorial jurisdiction of a newly-created municipality shall be properly
identified by metes and bounds.
The requirement on land area shall not apply where the municipality proposed to be
created is composed of one (1) or more islands.
The territory need not be contiguous if it comprises two (2) or more islands
LGC-IRR: ARTICLE 13.
Municipalities.
(a) Requisites for Creation

A municipality shall not be created unless the following requisites are present: (iii)
Land area- which must be contiguous with an area of at least fifty (50) square
kilometers, as certified by LMB. The territory need not be contiguous if it comprises
two (2) or more islands.
The requirement on land area shall not apply where the proposed municipality is
composed of one (1) or more islands.
The territorial jurisdiction of a municipality sought to be created shall be properly
identified by metes and bounds.
LCG. Sec 450. City: 100 sq km BUT
(b) The territorial jurisdiction of a newly-created city shall be properly identified by
metes and bounds.
The requirement on land area shall not apply where the city proposed to be created
is composed of one (1) or more islands.
The territory need not be contiguous if it comprises two (2) or more islands.
LGC-IRR: ARTICLE 11. Cities
(a) Requisites for creation
A city shall not be created unless the following requisites on income and either
population or land area are present:
" The land area requirement shall not apply where the proposed city is composed
of one (1) or more
islands. "
LGC. Sec 461 Province 2000sq km BUT
(b) The territory need not be contiguous if it comprises two (2) or more islands or is
separated by a chartered city or cities which do not contribute to the income of the
province.
LGC-IRR: ARTICLE 9.
Provinces.
(a) Requisites for creation
A province shall not be created unless the following requisites on income and either
population or land area are present:
" The land area requirement shall not apply where the propose
d province is composed of one (1) or more islands. "
Petitioners
1.

Same arguments as in Navarro v. Ermita 2010 (did not meet requirements)

Respondents
1.Same arguments as in Navarro v. Ermita 2010 (met requirements)
Movants-Intervenors
1.The passage of R.A. No. 9355 operates as an act of Congress amending Section
461 of the LGC 2.

The exemption from territorial contiguity, when the intended province consists of
two or more islands, includes the exemption from the application of the minimum
land area requirement 3.

The Operative Fact Doctrine is applicable in the instant case - matter of equity and
fair play, undue burden on those who have relied on the inoperative law.
Issue:
WON a territory composed of more than 1 island is exempt from the minimum land
area requirement?
Held: Yes

SC:
1.Congress breathed flesh and blood into that exemption in Article 9(2) of the LGCIRR and transformed it into law when it enacted R.A. No. 9355 creating the Island
Province of Dinagat. The acts of Congress, in passing RA 9355, definitively show the
clear legislative intent to incorporate into the LGC that exemption from the land
area requirement
2.Please see pertinent laws With respect to the creation of municipalities,
component cities, and provinces, the
three (3) indicators of viability and projected capacity to provide services, i.e.,
income, population, and land area, are provided for. But it must be pointed out that
when the LGU to be created consists of one (1) or more islands, it is exempt from
the land area requirement as expressly provided in Section 442 and Section 450 of
the LGC if the local government unit to be created is a municipality or a component
city, respectively. This exemption is absent in the enumeration of the requisites for
the creation of a province under Section 461 of the LGC, although it is expressly
stated under Article 9(2) of the LGC-IRR. It is, therefore, logical to infer that the
genuine legislative policy decision was expressed in Section 442 (for municipalities)
and Section 450 (for component cities) of the LGC but was inadvertently omitted in

Section 461 (for provinces).Thus, when the exemption was expressly provided in
Article 9(2) of the LGC-IRR, the inclusion was intended to correct the congressional
oversight in Section 461 of the LGC and to reflect the true legislative intent.
3.Operative Fact Doctrine not really discussed. It does not apply in this case.
General Rule: An unconstitutional law produces no rights, imposes no duties and
affords no protection. It has no legal effect. It is, in legal contemplation, inoperative
as if it has not been passed
Dispositive:
Petition granted. RA 9355 and LGC-IRR Art 9 is constitutional. Excerpt: Debates in
congress regarding plebiscite and land area requirements

CHAIRMAN ALFELOR. ". The land area for Camiguin is only 229 square kilometers.
So if we hard fast on
requirements of, we set a minimum for every province,
palagay ko we just leave it to legislation, eh. Anyway, the Constitution is very clear
that in case we would like to divide, we submit it to a plebiscite.
Pabayaan natin ang tao. Kung maglalagay tayo ng set ng minimum, tila yata
mahihirapan tayo, eh. Because what is really the thrust of the Local Government
Code? Growth. To devolve powers in order for the community to have its own idea
how they will stimulate growth in their respective areas. So, in every geographical
condition, mayroon sariling id[i]osyncracies eh, we cannot make a generalization."

CITY OF PASIG VS COMELEC

G.R. No. 125646
September 10, 1999 (suspension of plebiscite proceedings pending boundary
disputes)

FACTS
On April 22, 1996, upon petition of the residents of Karangalan Village that they be
separated from its mother Barangay Manggahan and Dela Paz, City of Pasig, and to
be converted and separated into a distinct barangay to be known as Barangay
Karangalan, the City of Pasig passed and approved Ordinance No. 21, Series of
1996, creating Barangay Karangalan in Pasig City. Plebiscite on the creation of said
barangay was thereafter set for June 22, 1996.

Meanwhile on Sep. 9, 1996, the City of Pasig similarly issued Ordinance No. 52
creating Barangay Napico in Pasig City. Plebiscite for this purpose was set for March
15, 1997.Immediately upon learning of such Ordinances, the Municipality of Cainta
moved to suspend or cancel the respective plebiscites scheduled, and filed Petitions
with the COMELEC on June 19, 1996, and March 12, 1997, respectively. In both
Petitions, the Municipality of Cainta called the attention of the COMELEC to a
pending case before the RTC of Antipolo, Rizal, Branch 74, for settlement of
boundary dispute. According to the Municipality of Cainta, the proposed barangays
involve areas included in the boundary dispute subject of said pending case. Hence,
the scheduled plebiscites should be suspended or cancelled until after the said case
shall have been finally decided by the court.

ISSUE
Whether or not the plebiscites scheduled for the creation of Barangays Karangalan
and Napico should be suspended or cancelled due to a prejudicial question of
territory.

RULING
The Supreme Court held that this is an exception to the general rule of prejudicial
questions and that the suspension or cancellation of the plebiscite be granted. A
case involving a boundary dispute between Local Government Units presents a
prejudicial question which must first be decided before plebiscites for the creation of
the proposed barangays may be held.While it may be the general rule that a
prejudicial question contemplates a civil and criminal action and does not come into
play where both cases are civil, in the interest of good order, the SC can very well
suspend action on one case pending the outcome of another case closely
interrelated/linked to the first.

A requisite for the creation of a barangay is for its territorial jurisdiction to be

properly identified by metes and bounds or by more or less permanent natural
boundaries. Primarily becauseterritorial jurisdiction is an issue raised in a pending
civil case, until and unless such issue is resolved with finality, to define the
territorial jurisdiction of the proposed barangays would only be an exercise in futility.

BARANGAY SANGALANG VS. BARANGAY MAGUIHAN

G.R. No. 159792, December 23, 2009

The case is a petition for review on certiorari under rule 45, seeking to set aside the
decision and resolution of the CA.

The root of the controversy is about a barangay jurisdiction dispute between

petitioner Barangay Sangalang and respondent Barangay Maguihan, both situated
in Lemery, Batangas. Petitioner claims the lots to be within their territorial
jurisdiction, whereas respondent maintains that they are within their territorial
boundary.

The case was lodged before the Sangguniang Bayan of Lemery, Batangas, which
referred it to a hearing committee that rendered a report to the effect that the
properties belonged to petitioner. Such recommendation was affirmed by the
Sangguniang Bayan. Respondent appealed to the RTC, who ruled in favor of
respondent. Petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration which was denied by the
RTC. Petitioner filed a Notice of Appeal, and later on an Amended Notice of Appeal.
The CA dismissed the appeal, ruling that petitioner had availed itself of the wrong
remedy in filing a notice of appeal instead of filing a petition for review under Rule
42 of the Rules of Court. To wit:

"Given the procedural mandates, the Decision of the Regional Trial Court of Lemery,
Batangas, dated April 27, 2000, was rendered by the Regional Trial Court in the
exercise of its appellate jurisdiction. Appropriately, under Section 22 of Batas
Pambansa Blg. 129, decisions of the Regional Trial Court in the exercise of its
appellate jurisdiction, shall be appealable to the Court of Appeals by way of
petitions for review under Rule 42 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure."

The CA also ruled that if said appeal were to be considered as an ordinary appeal
under Rule 41, it still should be dismissed, because the submitted appellants brief
failed to contain a subject index and page references to the records requirement in
its Statement of Facts and Case and Argument, as provided for in Section 13 of Rule
44 of the 1997 Rules of Procedure. Petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration,
which was denied by the CA.

ISSUES:
1. Whether the Court committed GADLEJ in dismissing the appeal solely based in
the rigid and strict application of technicalities, overriding the merit of the appeal or
substantial justice.
2. Whether the decision and order of the RTC of Lemery, Batangas, which set aside
the appealed resolution of the Sangguiniang Bayan, are null and void because
respondent Maguihan has not perfected its appeal and by reason thereof, the RTC
has not acquired appellate jurisdiction

HELD:
As to his first assigned error, petitioner faults the CA for having strictly applied the
rules of court notwithstanding his choice of the wrong remedy; yet, on the other
hand, as to his second assigned error, petitioner faults the RTC for not having
strictly applied the rules of court to respondents alleged failure to pay the
corresponding docket fees.

A reading of the records of the case shows that it was only in his Supplemental
Motion for Reconsideration to the RTC Decision that petitioner first raised the issue
of non-payment of docket fees. Respondent, for his part, filed with the RTC an
Opposition and Comment explaining his failure to file the corresponding docket fees,
that the non-payment of docket fees is correct, but that the appellant who appealed
the case by himself and being a layman was not aware that a docket fee should be
paid in case perfection of an appeal and no one from the courts personnel reminds
him of this requirement. In order not to sacrifice the ends of justice, the appellant
was willing to pay the docket fee and other lawful charges necessary for the
perfection of an appeal.

The Order denying petitioners motion for reconsideration was silent as to the issue
of the non-payment of docket fees. The Supreme Court deems that the RTC must
have accepted the explanation given by respondent, otherwise, said court would
have dismissed the appeal and reconsidered its decision.

The failure to pay docket fees does not automatically result in the dismissal of an
appeal, it being discretionary on the part of the appellate court to give it due course
or not. The Supreme Court will then not interfere with matters addressed to the
sound discretion of the RTC in the absence of proof that the exercise of such
discretion was tainted with bias or prejudice, or made without due circumspection of
the attendant circumstances of the case.

In any case, the more pressing issue is whether or not the Supreme Court should
even entertain petitioners appeal.

By filing a Notice of Appeal assailing the RTC Decision, petitioner has availed itself of
the remedy provided for under Rule 41 of the Rules of Court, which provides for the
ordinary mode of appeal. The CA, however, considered petitioners choice to be the
wrong remedy and, forthwith, dismissed the petition.

After an examination of relevant laws pertinent to herein petition, the Supreme

Court finds that the CA was correct in holding that petitioner had availed itself of the
wrong remedy. As correctly observed by the CA, under Section 118 of the Local
Government Code, the jurisdictional responsibility for settlement of boundary
disputes between and among local government units is to be lodged before the
proper Sangguniang Panlungsod or Sangguniang Bayan concerned, if it involves two
or more barangays in the same city or municipality. Under Section 118(e) of the
same Code, if there is a failure of amicable settlement, the dispute shall be formally
tried by the sanggunian concerned and shall decide the same within (60) days from
the date of the certification referred to.

Section 119 of the Local Government Code also provides that the decision of the
sanggunian concerned may be appealed to the RTC having jurisdiction over the area
in dispute, within the time and manner prescribed by the Rules of Court.

In the case at bar, it is clear that when the case was appealed to the RTC, the latter
took cognizance of the case in the exercise of its appellate jurisdiction, not its
original jurisdiction. Hence, any further appeal from the RTC Decision must conform
to the provisions of the Rules of Court dealing with said matter. On this score,
Section 2, Rule 41 of the Rules of Court provides:

Sec. 2. Modes of appeal.

(a) Ordinary appeal. The appeal to the Court of Appeals in cases decided by the
Regional Trial Court in the exercise of its original jurisdiction shall be taken by filing
a notice of appeal with the court which rendered the judgment or final order
appealed from and serving a copy thereof upon the adverse party. No record on
appeal shall be required except in special proceedings and other cases of multiple
or separate appeals where the law or these Rules so require. In such cases, the
record on appeal shall be filed and served in like manner.
(b) Petition for review. - The appeal to the Court of Appeals in cases decided by the
Regional Trial Court in the exercise of its appellate jurisdiction shall be by petition
for review in accordance with Rule 42.

Based on the foregoing, it is apparent that petitioner has availed itself of the wrong
remedy. Since the RTC tried the case in the exercise of its appellate jurisdiction,
petitioner should have filed a petition for review under Rule 42 of the Rules of Court,
instead of an ordinary appeal under Rule 41. The law is clear in this respect.

In any case, as in the past, the Supreme Court has recognized the emerging trend
towards a liberal construction of the Rules of Court. Courts have the prerogative to

relax procedural rules of even the most mandatory character, mindful of the duty to
reconcile both the need to speedily put an end to litigation and the parties' right to
due process. In numerous cases, this Court has allowed liberal construction of the
rules when to do so would serve the demands of substantial justice and equity.
Thus, notwithstanding petitioners wrong mode of appeal, the CA should not have so
easily dismissed the petition, considering that the parties involved are local
government units and that what is involved is the determination of their respective
territorial jurisdictions.

In the same vein, the CAs strict reliance on the requirements under Section 13 of
Rule 44 of the 1997 Rules of Procedure relating to subject index and page
references in an appellants brief is, to stress, putting a premium on technicalities.
While the purpose of Section 13, Rule 44, is to present to the appellate court in the
most helpful light, the factual and legal antecedents of a case on appeal, said rule
should not be strictly applied considering that petitioners brief before the CA
contained only 9 pages, the records of the case consisted only of a few documents
and pleadings, and there was no testimonial evidence.

Other Issues:
Moving on to the substantive merits of the case, what it basically involves is
adjudication as to which barangay the lots in dispute belong. Ideally, herein petition
should be remanded to the CA, as the same inherently involves a question of fact.
However, since this case has been pending for almost 13 years now, the Supreme
Court deems it best to once and for all settle the controversy.

Article 17, Rule III of the Rules and Regulations Implementing the Local Government
Code of 1991, outlines the procedures governing boundary disputes, including the
documents that should be attached to the petition.

The RTC observed that neither of the parties satisfied the requirement that all the
enumerated documents must be attached to the petition. Hence, like the RTC, the
Supreme Court is left with no other option but to select which between the
documents presented by the parties carries greater weight in proving its claim. The
documents presented by petitioner were sourced from the tax assessors office,
whereas the documents presented by respondent were sourced from the land
management bureau.

To the Supreme Courts mind, the presence of the cadastral map, which was
approved by the Director of Lands, should be given more weight than the
documents sourced by petitioner from the assessors office. Said map was approved

on March 17, 1986, which was approximately 10 years before the controversy in
hand developed. Hence, the same should be controlling in the absence of proof that
such document is invalid or inaccurate. As a matter of fact, notwithstanding the
hearing committees recommendation to rule in favor of petitioner, the committee
itself stated in its report that the cadastral map submitted by respondent was
authentic.

Moreover, in ruling against petitioner, the RTC also gave greater weight to the
documents submitted by respondent, thus:
x x x This Court is mindful of the fact and takes judicial notice that the Land
Management Bureau is manned by geodetic engineers with sufficient expertise and
is the cognizant agency of government charged with the responsibility of matters
respecting surveys of land. This Court likewise takes into consideration that the duty
of the provincial and municipal assessors are primarily assessments of taxes.

It is undisputed that the Land Management Bureau is the principal government

agency tasked with the survey of lands, and thus, more weight should be given to
the documents relating to its official tasks which are presumed to be done in the
ordinary course of business. Between a geodetic engineer and a tax assessor, the
conclusion is inevitable that it is the formers certification as to the location of
properties in dispute that is controlling, absent any finding of abuse of discretion. As
correctly observed by respondent and the RTC, the duty of provincial and municipal
assessors is primarily the assessment of taxes and not the survey of lands.

Lastly, petitioner alludes to a petition/resolution allegedly of persons residing in the

properties in dispute to the effect they are under the jurisdiction of petitioner. On
this note, the Supreme Court agrees with the observation of the RTC that the
determination as to whether the properties in dispute are within a certain
jurisdiction is not a decision to be made by the populace, to wit:
x x x In simple language, the population follows the territory and not vice versa. It is
the determination of the ambit and sphere of the land area as culled in the
approved barangay map that determines the jurisdiction of the barangay and not
the decision of the populace. To allow the latter will open endless litigation
concerning disputes of jurisdiction.
In sum, the Supreme Court does not belittle the documents presented by petitioner
or the duties of the provincial and municipal assessors; however, since the
documents presented by respondent are sourced from the very agency primarily
tasked with the survey of lands, more credence must be given to the same in the
absence of proof that would cast doubt on the contents thereof.

The petition is PARTLY GRANTED. The Decision and Resolution of the Court of
Appeals are hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The Decision and Order of the
Regional Trial Court, Lemery, Batangas, in Barangay Jurisdiction Dispute No. 1, are
AFFIRMED.

MUNICIPALITY OF KANANGA, Represented by its Mayor, Hon. GIOVANNI M. NAPARI

vs. Hon. FORTUNITO L. MADRONA (Municipality vs an Independent component city)
[G.R. No. 141375. April 30, 2003.]

FACTS: When a boundary dispute arose between the Municipality of Kananga and
the City of Ormoc. By agreement, the parties submitted the issue to amicable
settlement. No amicable settlement was reached.
The City of Ormoc filed before the RTC of Ormoc City a complaint to settle the
boundary dispute. Petitioner municipality filed a motion to dismiss, claiming that the
court has no jurisdiction over the subject matter, but the RTC denied the same.
RTC: it had jurisdiction over the action under Batas Pambansa Blg. 129. that Section
118 of the Local Government Code had been substantially complied with, because
both parties already had the occasion to meet and thresh out their differences. In
fact, both agreed to elevate the matter to the trial court via Resolution No. 97-01. It
also held that Section 118 governed venue; hence, the parties could waive and
agree upon it under Section 4(b) of Rule 4 of the Rules of Court.

ISSUE: WON Section 118 of the LGU on boundary dispute settlement applies.
WON respondent court may exercise original jurisdiction over the settlement of a
boundary dispute between a municipality and an independent component city.

HELD: No, Section 118 does not apply. Yes, RTC has jurisdiction.

POLITICAL LAW; LOCAL GOVERNMENT CODE; SECTION 118 THEREOF; PROCEDURE

FOR SETTLEMENT OF BOUNDARY DISPUTES BETWEEN A COMPONENT CITY OR
MUNICIPALITY AND A HIGHLY URBANIZED CITY; ORMOC IS NOT A HIGHLY URBANIZED
CITY IN CASE AT BAR.
Sec. 118.Jurisdictional Responsibility for Settlement of Boundary Disputes.
Boundary disputes between and among local government units shall, as much as
possible, be settled amicably. To this end:

(a)Boundary disputes involving two (2) or more barangays in the same city or
municipality shall be referred for settlement to the sangguniang panlungsod or
sangguniang bayan concerned.
(b)Boundary disputes involving two (2) or more municipalities within the same
province shall be referred for settlement to the sangguniang panlalawigan
concerned.
(c) Boundary disputes involving municipalities or component cities of different
provinces shall be jointly referred for settlement to the sanggunians of the provinces
concerned.
(d) Boundary disputes involving a component city or municipality on the one hand
and a highly urbanized city on the other, or two (2) or more highly urbanized cities,
shall be jointly referred for settlement to the respective sanggunians of the parties.
(e) In the event the sanggunian fails to effect an amicable settlement within sixty
(60) days from the date the dispute was referred thereto, it shall issue a certification
to that effect. Thereafter, the dispute shall be formally tried by the sanggunian
concerned which shall decide the issue within sixty (60) days from the date of the
certification referred to above.

Under Section 118 of the Local Government Code, the settlement of a boundary
dispute between a component city or a municipality on the one hand and a highly
urbanized city on the other or between two or more highly urbanized cities
shall be jointly referred for settlement to the respective sanggunians of the local
government units involved. There is no question that Kananga is a municipality
constituted under Republic Act No. 542. By virtue of Section 442(d) of the LGC, it
continued to exist and operate as such. However, Ormoc is not a highly urbanized,
but an independent component, city created under Republic Act No. 179.
Section 118 of the LGC applies to a situation in which a component city or a
municipality seeks to settle a boundary dispute with a highly urbanized city, not
with an independent component city. While Kananga is a municipality, Ormoc is an
independent component city. Clearly then, the procedure referred to in Section 118
does not apply to them.

SECTION 451 THEREOF; CITY; CLASSIFICATION; ORMOC IS DEEMED AN

INDEPENDENT COMPONENT CITY IN CASE AT BAR. Under Section 451 of the LGC,
a city may be either component or highly urbanized. Ormoc is deemed an
independent component city, because its charter prohibits its voters from voting for
provincial elective officials. It is a city independent of the province. In fact, it is
considered a component, not a highly urbanized, city of Leyte in Region VIII by both
Batas Pambansa Blg. 643, which calls for a plebiscite; and the Omnibus Election
Code, which apportions representatives to the defunct Batasang Pambansa. There is
neither a declaration by the President of the Philippines nor an allegation by the

parties that it is highly urbanized. On the contrary, petitioner asserted in its Motion
to Dismiss that Ormoc was an independent chartered city.
REMEDIAL LAW; B.P. BLG. 129; GENERAL JURISDICTION OF RTCs TO ADJUDICATE ALL
CONTROVERSIES EXCEPT THOSE EXPRESSLY WITHHELD FROM THEIR PLENARY
POWERS; CASE AT BAR. As previously stated, jurisdiction is vested by law and
cannot be conferred or waived by the parties. It must exist as a matter of law and
cannot be conferred by the consent of the parties or by estoppel. It should not be
confused with venue. Inasmuch as Section 118 of the LGC finds no application to
the instant case, the general rules governing jurisdiction should then be used. The
applicable provision is found in Batas Pambansa Blg. 129, otherwise known as the
Judiciary Reorganization Act of 1980, as amended by Republic Act No. 7691. Since
there is no law providing for the exclusive jurisdiction of any court or agency over
the settlement of boundary disputes between a municipality and an independent
component city of the same province, respondent court committed no grave abuse
of discretion in denying the Motion to Dismiss. RTCs have general jurisdiction to
adjudicate all controversies except those expressly withheld from their plenary
powers. They have the power not only to take judicial cognizance of a case
instituted for judicial action for the first time, but also to do so to the exclusion of all
other courts at that stage. Indeed, the power is not only original, but also exclusive.

League of Provinces of the Philippines v DENRGR No. 175368April 11 2013

FACTS

Golden Falcon filed with DENR Mines and Geosciences Bureau Regional Office No. III (MGB RIII)an Application for Financial and Technical Assistance Agreement (AFTAA) which the
formerdenied because of the failure to secure clearances from the Forest Management Sector
andLands Management Sector. Golden Falcon filed an appeal.

While the appeal is still pending, Mercado, Cruz, Cruz and Sembrano filed with
ProvincialEnvironment and Natural Resources Office (PENRO) of Bulacan their Applications to
QuaryPermit (AQP) which covers the same area.

MGBCentral Office issued an order denying Golden Falcons appeal and affirmed MGB R-IIIs order.

Atlantic Mines and Trading Corporation (AMTC) filed with the PENRO of Bulacan an Application
for Exploration Permit (AEP) covering some area covered by Golden Falcons AFTAA
.

AMTC filed with the Provincial Mining Regulatory Board (PMRB) a protest against the AQP since the
subject is already covered by their AEP.

MGB R-III Director endorsed the AQP to the Provincial Governor of Bulacan. The AQP has been
converted to Applications for Small-Scale Mining Permits.

AMTC appealed to DENR and DENR issued a decision in favor of AMTC. DENR Secretary said that
the area was still closed when the AQP was filed; hence, the Small-Scale Mining Permits were null
and void.
ISSUES

WON Sec 17(B)(3)(iii) of the LGC and Sec 24 of the Peoples Small-Scale Mining Act of 1991
are unconstitutional for the executive control and infringing the local Autonomy of the Provinces.

WON the act of DENR nullifying, voiding and cancelling small-scale permits to executive control,
not merely supervision and usurps the devolved powers of all provinces
HELD

Art XII Sec 2(1) (Const) provides that "the exploration, development and utilization of
naturalresources shall be under the full control and supervision of the State."

Moreover, Art XII Sec 2(3) (Const) provides that "the Congress may, by law, allow smallscaleutilization of natural resources by Filipino citizens x x x."

Pursuant to Section 2, Article XII of the Constitution, R.A. No. 7076 or the People's SmallScaleMining Act of 1991, was enacted, establishing under Section 4 thereof a People's SmallScaleMining Program to be implemented by the DENR Secretary in coordination with
otherconcerned government agencies.

It should be pointed out that the Administrative Code of 1987 provides that the DENR is,
subjectto law and higher authority, in charge of carrying out the State's constitutional mandate,
underSection 2, Article XII of the Constitution, to control and supervise the exploration,
development,utilization and conservation of the country's natural resources. Hence, the
enforcement ofsmall-scale mining law in the provinces is made subject to the supervision, control
and review of
the DENR under the Local Government Code of 1991, while the Peoples Small
-Scale Mining Act of 1991 provides that the Peoples Small-Scale Mining Program is to be implemented
by the DENR Secretary in coordination with other concerned local government agencies.

 Art X Sec 4 (Const) states that "[t]he President of the Philippines shall exercise general supervision over
local governments," and Section 25 of the Local Government Code reiterates the same. General
supervision by the President means no more than seeing to it that laws are faithfully executed or that
subordinate officers act within the law.

Art. X, Sec. 2 (Const) refers to the administrative autonomy of local government units or, cast in more
technical language, the decentralization of government authority. It does not make local governments
sovereign within the State.

The Local Government Code did not fully devolve the enforcement of the small-scale mining law to the
provincial government, as its enforcement is subject to the supervision, control and review of the DENR,
which is in charge, subject to law and higher authority, of carrying out the State's constitutional mandate
to control and supervise the exploration, development, utilization of the country's natural resources.
Abbas vs. COMELECG.R. No. 89651 November 10, 1989Topics: nature of plebiscite,
constitutionality of RA 6734
Facts:
A plebiscite in thirteen (13) provinces and nine (9) cities in Mindanao and Palawan,was
scheduled for November 19, 1989, in implementation of RA 6734, entitled "An ActProviding
for an Organic Act for the Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao" (Organic Act). These
consolidated petitions pray that the Court: (1) enjoin the COMELEC from conductingthe
plebiscite; and (2) declare RA 6734, or parts thereof, unconstitutional. The argumentsagainst
R.A. 6734 raised by petitioners may generally be categorized into either of thefollowing: (a)
that R.A. 6734, or parts thereof, violates the Constitution, and (b) that certainprovisions of
R.A. No. 6734 conflict with the Tripoli Agreement.
Issue:
Whether or not certain provisions of the Organic Act are unconstitutional.
Held:
The petition has no merit and the law is constitutional.1. Petitioner contends that the tenor
of a provision in the Organic Act makes the creation of an autonomous region absolute, such
that even if only two provinces vote in favor of autonomy, an autonomous region would still
be created composed of the two provinceswhere the favorable votes were obtained. there is
a specific provision in the TransitoryProvisions (Article XIX) of the Organic Act, which
incorporates substantially the samerequirements embodied in the Constitution and fills in
the details, thus:SEC. 13. The creation of the Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao
shalltake effect when approved by a majority of the votes cast by the constituentunits
provided in paragraph (2) of Sec. 1 of Article II of this Act in a plebiscitewhich shall be held
not earlier than ninety (90) days or later than one hundredtwenty (120) days after the
approval of this Act:
Provided,
That only theprovinces and cities voting favorably in such plebiscite shall be included in
theAutonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao. The provinces and cities which inthe plebiscite
do not vote for inclusion in the Autonomous Region shall remainthe existing administrative
determination, merge the existing regions. Thus, under the Constitution and R.A. No 6734,
the creation of the autonomous region shalltake effect only when approved by a majority of

the votes cast by the constituent units in aplebiscite, and only those provinces and cities
where a majority vote in favor of the OrganicAct shall be included in the autonomous region.
The provinces and cities wherein such amajority is not attained shall not be included in the
autonomous region. It may be that evenif an autonomous region is created, not all of the
thirteen (13) provinces and nine (9) citiesmentioned in Article II, section 1 (2) of R.A. No.
6734 shall be included therein. The singleplebiscite contemplated by the Constitution and
R.A. No. 6734 will therefore bedeterminative of (1) whether there shall be an autonomous
region in Muslim Mindanao and(2) which provinces and cities, among those enumerated in
R.A. No. 6734, shall compromiseit.2. The question has been raised as to what this majority
means. Does it refer to a majority of the total votes cast in the plebiscite in all the
constituent units, or a majority in each of theconstituent units, or both? The 1987
Constitution provides: The creation of the autonomous region shall be effectivewhen
approved by majority of the votes cast by the constituent units in a plebiscite calledfor the
purpose, provided that only provinces, cities and geographic areas voting favorably n such
plebiscite shall be included in the autonomous region. [Art. X, sec, 18, para, 2]. It willreadily
be seen that the creation of the autonomous region is made to depend, not on thetotal
majority vote in the plebiscite, but on the will of the majority in each of the constituentunits
and the proviso underscores this.3. Petitioner avers that not all of the thirteen (13) provinces
and nine (9) cities included inthe Organic Act, possess such concurrence in historical and
cultural heritage and otherrelevant characteristics. By including areas, which do not strictly
share the samecharacteristic as the others, petitioner claims that Congress has expanded
the scope of theautonomous region which the constitution itself has prescribed to be
limited.Petitioner's argument is not tenable. The Constitution lays down the standards by
whichCongress shall determine which areas should constitute the autonomous region.
Guided bythese constitutional criteria, the ascertainment by Congress of the areas that
share commonattributes is within the exclusive realm of the legislature's discretion. Any
review of thisascertainment would have to go into the wisdom of the law.4. Both petitions
also question the validity of R.A. No. 6734 on the ground that it violates theconstitutional
guarantee on free exercise of religion [Art. III, sec. 5]. The objection centers ona provision in
the Organic Act which mandates that should there be any conflict between theMuslim Code
and the Tribal Code on the one had, and the national law on the other hand,the Shari'ah
courts created under the same Act should apply national law. Petitionersmaintain that the
islamic law (Shari'ah) is derived from the Koran, which makes it part of divine law. Thus it
may not be subjected to any "man-made" national law. Petitioner Abbassupports this
objection by enumerating possible instances of conflict between provisions of the Muslim
Code and national law, wherein an application of national law might be offensiveto a
Muslim's religious convictions.In the present case, no actual controversy between real
litigants exists. There are noconflicting claims involving the application of national law
resulting in an alleged violation of religious freedom. This being so, the Court in this case
may not be called upon to resolvewhat is merely a perceived potential conflict between the
provisions the Muslim Code andnational law.5. According to petitioners, said provision grants
the President the power to merge regions,a power which is not conferred by the Constitution
upon the President.While the power to merge administrative regions is not expressly
provided for in theConstitution, it is a power which has traditionally been lodged with the
President to facilitatethe exercise of the power of general supervision over local
governments. There is no conflictbetween the power of the President to merge
administrative regions with the constitutionalprovision requiring a plebiscite in the merger of
local government units because therequirement of a plebiscite in a merger expressly applies
only to provinces, cities,municipalities or barangays, not to administrative regions.6. Every
law has in its favor the presumption of constitutionality. Based on the groundsraised by
petitioners to challenge the constitutionality of R.A. No. 6734, the Court finds thatpetitioners

have failed to overcome the presumption. The dismissal of these two petitions is,therefore,
inevitable.

Ordillo vs. COMELEC case brief summary

Facts:
The province of Benguet, Mountain Province, Ifugao, Abra, Kalinga-Apayao, and Baguio City
cast their vote in a plebiscite held in pursuant to R.A. 6766 creating the Cordillera
Autonomous Region. The result of the plebiscite showed that the creation of the Region was
only approved by Ifugao. In consideration of the proviso in Sec. 13(A) that only the provinces
and city voting favorably shall be included in the CAR.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the province of Ifugao can validly constitute the Cordillera Autonomous
Region.

Ruling:
No, in constuing the word region in Article X Sec 15 of the 1987 Constitution it includes
provinces, cities, municipalities and geographical areas, that a region is to be made up of
two or more constituent unit.
Therefore, Ifugao itself cannot solely constitute a region.

Ordillo v. COMELEC
G.R. No. 93054, December 4, 1990
Gutierrez, J.
FACTS- January 30, 1990, pursuant to Republic Act No. 6766 entitled An Act Providing for
anOrganic Act for the Cordillera Autonomous Region, the people of the provinces of
Benguet,Mountain Province, Ifugao, Abra and Kalinga-Apayao and the city of Baguio cast
their votesin a plebiscite.- Results of plebiscite: approved by majority of 5,889 votes in
Ifugao, rejected by 148,676 inthe rest provinces and city. The province of Ifugao makes up
only 11% of total population,and as such has the second smallest number of inhabitants, of
the abovementioned areas.- February 14, 1990, COMELEC issued Resolution No. 2259
stating that the Organic Act forthe Region has been approved and/or ratified by majority of
votes cast only in the provinceof Ifugao. Secretary of Justice also issued a memorandum for
the President reiteratingCOMELEC resolution, stating that Ifugao being the only province
which voted favorably then. Alone, legally and validly constitutes CAR.- March 8, 1990,
Congress ebacted Republic Act No. 6861 setting elections in CAR of Ifugaoon first Monday of
March 1991.- Even before COMELEC resolution, Executive Secretary issued February 5, 1990
amemorandum granting authority to wind up the affairs of the Cordillera Executive Board
andCordillera Regional Assembly created under Executive Order No. 220.- March 30, 1990,

President issued Administrative Order No. 160 declaring among othersthat the Cordillera
Executive Board and Cordillera Regional Assembly and all offices underExecutive Order No.
220 were abolished in view of the ratification of Organic Act.- Petitioners: there can be no
valid Cordillera Autonomous Region in only one province as theConstitution and Republic Act
No. 6766 require that the said Region be composed of morethan one constituent unit.Petitioners therefore pray that the court:a.declare null and void COMELEC resolution No.
2259, the memorandum of theSecretary of Justice, Administrative Order No. 160, and
Republic Act No. 6861 andprohibit and restrain the respondents from implementing the
same and spending publicfunds for the purposeb.declare Executive Order No. 220
constituting the Cordillera Executive Board and theCordillera Regional Assembly and other
offices to be still in force and effect until anotherorganic law for the Autonomous Region shall
have been enacted by Congress and thesame is duly ratified by the voters in the constituent
units.
ISSUE
WON the province of Ifugao, being the only province which voted favorably for thecreation of
the Cordillera Autonomous Region can, alone, legally and validly constitute suchregion.
HELD
- The sole province of Ifugao cannot validly constitute the Cordillera Autonomous
Region.a.The keyword ins Article X, Section 15 of the 1987 Constitution provinces,
cities,municipalities and geographical areas connote that region is to be made up of
morethan one constituent unit. The term region used in its ordinary sense means two
ormore provinces.- rule in statutory construction must be applied here: the language of the
Constitution,as much as possible should be understood in the sense it has in common use
and thatthe words used in constitutional provisions are to be given their ordinary
meaningexcept where technical terms are employed.

b.The entirety of Republic Act No. 6766 creating the Cordillera Autonomous Region isinfused
with provisions which rule against the sole province of Ifugao constituting theRegion.- It can
be gleaned that Congress never intended that a single province may constitutethe
autonomous region.- If this were so, we would be faced with the absurd situation of having
two sets of officials: a set of provincial officials and another set of regional officials exercising
theirexecutive and legislative powers over exactly the same small area. (Ifugao is one of the
smallest provinces in the Philippines, population-wise) (Art III sec 1 and 2; Art V,sec 1 and 4;
Art XII sec 10 of RA 6766)- Allotment of Ten Million Pesos to Regional Government for its
initial organizationalrequirements can not be construed as funding only a lone and small
province [Art XXIsec 13(B)(c)]- Certain provisions of the Act call for officials coming from
different provinces andcities in the Region, as well as tribal courts and the development of
a commonregional language. (Art V sec 16; Art VI sec 3; Art VII; Art XV RA 6766)- Thus, to
contemplate the situation envisioned by the COMELEC would not only violate theletter and
intent of the Constitution and Republic Act No. 6766 but would be impractical and illogical.

Sema v. COMELEC
(July 16, 2008)

Doctrine:
Ang daming relevant parts regarding creation. Please see Ratio.
NATURE:
Consolidated petitions (certiorari prohibition and mandamus; declaratory relief; and
prohibition and mandamus) seek to annul Resolution No. 7902 dated May 10, 2007 of the
COMELEC, treating Cotabato City as part of the legislative district of the Province of Shariff
Kabunsuan.
PONENTE:
Carpio, En Banc

FACTS:
The Ordinance appended to the 1987 Constitution of the Philippines apportioned 2
legislative districts for Maguindanao. The first consists of Cotabato City and 8 municipalities.
Maguindanao forms part of the ARMM, created under its Organic Act,
RA 6734, as amended by RA 9054. Cotabato City, as part of Maguindanaos first
legislative district, is not part of the ARMM but of Region XII (having voted against its
inclusion in November 1989 plebiscite). On
28 August 2006, the ARMMs legislature, the ARMM Regional Assembly, exercising
its power to create provinces under Section 19, Article VI of RA 9054, enacted Muslim
Mindanao Autonomy Act No. 201 (MMA Act 201) creating the Province of Shariff Kabunsuan
composed of the 8 municipalities in the first district of Maguindanao. Later, 3 new
municipalities were carved out of the original 9, constituting Shariff Kabunsuan, resulting to
total of 11. Cotabato City is not part of Maguindanao. Maguindanao voters ratifi
ed Shariff Kabunsuans creation in 29 October 2006
plebiscite. On 6 February 2007, Cotabato City passed Board Resolution No. 3999, requesting
the
COMELEC to clarify the status of Cotabato City in view of the conversion of the First
District of Maguindanao
into a regular province under MMA Act 201. The COMELEC
issued Resolution No. 07-0407 on 6 March 2007 "maintaining the status quo with Cotabato
City as part of Shariff Kabunsuan in the First Legislative District of
Maguindanao. Resolution No. 07
-0407, ad
opted the COMELECs Law Department
recommendation under a Memorandum dated 27 February 2007. The COMELEC
issued on 29 March 2007 Resolution No. 7845 stating that Maguindanaos first

legislative district is composed only of Cotabato City because of the enactment of MMA Act
201. On 10 May 2007, the COMELEC issued Resolution No. 7902 (subject of these cases),
amending Resolution No. 07-0407 by renaming the legislative district in question as
Shariff Kabunsuan Province with Cotabato
City (formerly First District of
Maguindanao with Cotabato City).
Meanwhile, the Shariff Kabunsuan creation plebiscite was supervised and officiated by the
COMELEC pursuant to Resolution No. 7727. (Option Votes: In favor for creation 285,372;
Against the creation 8,802) The following municipalities seceded from Maguindanao and
formed the new province. All of them were from the first legislative district of Maguindanao.
(Barira, Buldon, Datu Blah T. Sinsuat, Datu Odin Sinsuat, Kabuntalan, Matanog, Parang,
Sultan Kudarat, Sultan Mastura, Upi) Kabuntalan was chosen as the capital of the new
province. The province was the first to be created under Republic Act No. 9054 or the
Expanded ARMM law. Sandra Sema questioned COMELEC Resolution 7902 which combined
Shariff Kabunsuan and Cotabato City into a single legislative district during the Philippine
general election, 2007. Sema lost to incumbent Congress representative of the Shariff
Kabunsuan and Cotabato district, Didagen Dilangalen.
ISSUES
:

Whether the ARMM Regional Assembly Can Create the Province of Shariff Kabunsuan If in the
affirmative, whether a province created by the ARMM Regional Assembly under MMA Act 201
pursuant to Section 19, Article VI of RA 9054 is entitled to one representative in the House of
Representatives without need of a national law creating a legislative district for such
province.
HELD:
The petitions have no merit. We rule that (1) Section 19, Article VI of RA 9054 is
unconstitutional insofar as it grants to the ARMM Regional Assembly the power to create
provinces and cities; (2) MMA Act 201 creating the Province of Shariff Kabunsuan is void; and
(3) COMELEC Resolution No. 7902 is valid.

RATIO/RULING:
The creation of any of the four local government units - province, city, municipality or
barangay - must comply with three conditions. First, the creation of a local government unit
must follow the criteria fixed in the Local Government Code. Second, such creation must not
conflict with any provision of the Constitution. Third, there must be a plebiscite in the
political units affected. There is neither an express prohibition nor an express grant of
authority in the Constitution for Congress to delegate to regional or local legislative bodies
the power to create local government units. However, under its plenary legislative powers,
Congress can delegate to local legislative bodies the power to create local government units,
subject to reasonable standards and provided no conflict arises with any provision of the

Constitution. In fact, Congress has delegated to provincial boards, and city and municipal
councils, the power to create barangays within their jurisdiction, subject to compliance with
the criteria established in the Local Government Code, and the plebiscite requirement in
Section 10, Article X of the Constitution. However, under the Local Government Code, "only
x x x an Act of Congress" can create provinces, cities or municipalities. Under Section 19,
Article VI of RA 9054, Congress delegated to the ARMM Regional Assembly the power to
create provinces, cities, municipalities and barangays within the ARMM. Congress made the
delegation under its plenary legislative powers because the power to create local
government units is not one of the express legislative powers granted by the Constitution to
regional legislative bodies. In the present case, the question arises whether the delegation
to the ARMM Regional Assembly of the power to create provinces, cities, municipalities and
barangays conflicts with any provision of the Constitution. There is no provision in the
Constitution that conflicts with the delegation to regional legislative bodies of the power to
create municipalities and barangays, provided Section 10, Article X of the Constitution is
followed. However, the creation of provinces and cities is another matter. Section 5 (3),
Article VI of the Constitution provides, "Each city with a population of at least two hundred
fifty thousand, or each province, shall have at least one representative" in the House of
Representatives. Similarly, Section 3 of the Ordinance appended to the Constitution
provides, "Any province that may hereafter be created, or any city whose population may
hereafter increase to more than two hundred fifty thousand shall be entitled in the
immediately following election to at least one Member x x x." Clearly, a province cannot be
created without a legislative district because it will violate Section 5 (3), Article VI of the
Constitution as well as Section 3 of the Ordinance appended to the Constitution. For the
same reason, a city with a population of 250,000 or more cannot also be created without a
legislative district. Thus, the power to create a province, or a city with a population of
250,000 or more, requires also the power to create a legislative district. Even the creation of
a city with a population of less than 250,000 involves the power to create a legislative
district because once the city's population reaches 250,000, the city automatically becomes
entitled to one representative under Section 5 (3), Article VI of the Constitution and Section
3 of the Ordinance appended to the Constitution.
Thus, the power to create a province or city inherently involves the power to create a
legislative district.
Legislative Districts are Created or Reapportioned Only by an Act of Congress
Under the present Constitution, as well as in past Constitutions, the power to increase the
allowable membership in the House of Representatives, and to reapportion legislative
districts, is vested exclusively in Congress. Section 5, Article VI of the Constitution provides
that Congress of the exclusive power to create or reapportion legislative districts is logical.
Congress is a national legislature and any increase in its allowable membership or in its
incumbent membership through the creation of legislative districts must be embodied in a
national law. Only Congress can enact such a law. It would be anomalous for regional or local
legislative bodies to create or reapportion legislative districts for a national legislature like
Congress. An inferior legislative body, created by a superior legislative body, cannot change
the membership of the superior legislative body. The creation of the ARMM, and the grant of
legislative powers to its Regional Assembly under its organic act, did not divest Congress of
its exclusive authority to create legislative districts. This is clear from the Constitution and
the ARMM Organic Act, as amended.
Nothing in Section 20, Article X of the Constitution authorizes autonomous regions, expressly
or impliedly, to create or reapportion legislative districts for Congress.

On the other hand, Section 3, Article IV of RA 9054 amending the ARMM Organic Act,
provides, "
The Regional Assembly may exercise legislative power
xxx
except on the following matters:
xxx
(k)

National elections
. x x x." Since the ARMM Regional Assembly has no legislative power to enact laws relating
to national elections, it cannot create a legislative district whose representative is elected in
national elections. Whenever Congress enacts a law creating a legislative district, the first
representative is always elected in the "next national elections" from the effectivity of the
law. Indeed, the office of a legislative district representative to Congress is a
national office
, and its occupant, a Member of the House of Representatives, is a
national official
. It would be incongruous for a regional legislative body like the ARMM Regional Assembly to
create a national office when its legislative powers extend only to its regional territory. The
office of a district representative is maintained by national funds and the salary of its
occupant is paid out of national funds. It is a self-evident inherent limitation on the
legislative powers of every local or regional legislative body that it can only create local or
regional offices, respectively, and it can never create a national office. To allow the ARMM
Regional Assembly to create a national office is to allow its legislative powers to operate
outside the ARMM's territorial jurisdiction.
This violates Section 20, Article X of the Constitution which expressly limits the coverage of
the Regional Assembly's legislative powers "[w]ithin its territorial jurisdiction
xxx
."
The ARMM Regional Assembly itself, in creating Shariff Kabunsuan, recognized the exclusive
nature of Congress' power to create or reapportion legislative districts by abstaining from
creating a legislative district for Shariff Kabunsuan.
First
. The issue in
Felwa,
among others, was whether Republic Act No. 4695 (RA 4695), creating the provinces of
Benguet, Mountain Province, Ifugao, and Kalinga-Apayao and providing for congressional

representation in the old and new provinces, was unconstitutional for "creati[ng]
congressional districts without the apportionment provided in the Constitution." The Court
answered in the negative.
Pursuant to this Section, a representative district may come into existence: (a) indirectly,
through the creation of a province

for "each province shall have at least one member" in the House of Representatives; or (b)
by direct creation of several representative districts within a province.
The requirements concerning the apportionment of representative districts and the territory
thereof refer only to the second method of creation of representative districts, and do not
apply to those incidental to the creation of provinces, under the first method. This is
deducible, not only from the general tenor of the provision above quoted, but, also, from the
fact that the apportionment therein alluded to refers to that which is made by an Act of
Congress.
Indeed, when a province is created by statute, the corresponding representative district,
comes into existence neither by authority of that statute which cannot provide otherwise nor
by apportionment, but by operation of the Constitution, without a reapportionment
.
Second
. Sema's theory also undermines the composition and independence of the House of
Representatives. Under Section 19,Article VI of RA 9054, the ARMM Regional Assembly can
create provinces and cities within the ARMM
with or without
regard to the criteria fixed in Section 461 of RA 7160, namely: minimum annual income of
P20,000,000, and minimum contiguous territory of 2,000 square kilometers or minimum
population of 250,000. The following scenarios thus become distinct possibilities: An inferior
legislative body like the ARMM Regional Assembly can create 100 or more provinces and
thus increase the membership of a superior legislative body, the House of Representatives,
beyond the maximum limit of 250 fixed in the Constitution (unless a national law provides
otherwise); (2) The proportional representation in the House of Representatives based on
one representative for at least every 250,000 residents will be negated because the ARMM
Regional Assembly need not comply with the requirement in Section 461(a)(ii) of RA 7160
that every province created must have a population of at least 250,000; and (3)
Representatives from the ARMM provinces can become the majority in the House of
Representatives through the ARMM Regional Assembly's continuous creation of provinces or
cities within the ARMM. Neither the framers of the 1987 Constitution in adopting the
provisions in Article X on regional autonomy,
[37]
nor Congress in enacting RA 9054, envisioned or intended these disastrous consequences
that certainly would wreck the tri-branch system of government under our Constitution.
Clearly, the power to create or reapportion legislative districts cannot be delegated by
Congress but must be exercised by Congress itself. Even the ARMM Regional Assembly
recognizes this.

The Constitution empowered Congress to create or reapportion legislative districts, not the
regional assemblies. Section 3 of the Ordinance to the Constitution which states, "[A]ny
province that may hereafter be created x x x shall be entitled in the immediately following
election to at least one Member," refers to a province created by Congress itself through a
national law. The reason is that the creation of a province increases the actual membership
of the House of Representatives, an increase that only Congress can decide. Incidentally, in
the present 14
th
Congress, there are 219
[38]
district representatives out of the maximum 250 seats in the House of Representatives.
Since party-list members shall constitute 20 percent of total membership of the House, there
should at least be 50 party-list seats available in every election in case 50 party-list
candidates are proclaimed winners. This leaves only 200 seats for district representatives,
much less than the 219 incumbent district representatives. Thus, there is a need now for
Congress to increase by law the allowable membership of the House, even before Congress
can create new provinces. The present case involves the creation of a local government unit
that necessarily involves also the creation of a legislative district. The Court will not pass
upon the constitutionality of the creation of municipalities and barangays that does not
comply with the criteria established in Section 461 of RA 7160, as mandated in Section 10,
Article X of the Constitution, because the creation of such municipalities and barangays does
not involve the creation of legislative districts. We leave the resolution of this issue to an
appropriate case. In summary, we rule that Section 19, Article VI of RA 9054, insofar as it
grants to the ARMM Regional Assembly the power to create provinces and cities, is void for
being contrary to Section 5 of Article VI and Section 20 of Article X of the Constitution, as
well as Section 3 of the Ordinance appended to the Constitution. Only Congress can create
provinces and cities because the creation of provinces and cities necessarily includes the
creation of legislative districts, a power only Congress can exercise under Section 5, Article
VI of the Constitution and Section 3 of the Ordinance appended to the Constitution. The
ARMM Regional Assembly cannot create a province without a legislative district because the
Constitution mandates that every province shall have a legislative district. Moreover, the
ARMM Regional Assembly cannot enact a law creating a national office like the office of a
district representative of Congress because the legislative powers of the ARMM Regional
Assembly operate only within its territorial jurisdiction as provided in Section 20, Article X of
the Constitution. Thus, we rule that MMA Act 201, enacted by the ARMM Regional Assembly
and creating the Province of Shariff Kabunsuan, is void.
Resolution No. 7902 Complies with the Constitution
Consequently, we hold that COMELEC Resolution No. 7902, preserving the geographic and
legislative district of the First District of Maguindanao with Cotabato City, is valid as it merely
complies with Section 5 of Article VI and Section 20 of Article X of the Constitution, as well as
Section 1 of the Ordinance appended to the Constitution.
DISPOSITION:
we declare Section 19, Article VI of Republic Act No. 9054 UNCONSTITUTIONAL insofar as it
grants to the Regional Assembly of the Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao the power
to create provinces and cities. Thus, we declare VOID Muslim Mindanao Autonomy Act No.

201 creating the Province of Shariff Kabunsuan. Consequently, we rule that COMELEC
Resolution No. 7902 is VALID.
VOTE:
Puno, Quisumbing, Austria-Martinez, Corona, Carpio-Morales, Nachura and Reyes concur.
Tinga, Concurring and Dissenting (joined by Ynares-Santiago, Azcuna, Leonardo-de Castro
and Brion concur in this dissent):
Petition should be denied but on another basis, because the majority in effect contravenes
the constitutional policy of greater local autonomy. Sema does not have standing to question
resolution because she is stopped, having filed for candidacy as representative of Shariff
Kabunsuan and Cotabato City. As to Marquez, petition is not timely filed, having come after
the May 2007 elections. The petition was even filed after the voters had already elected the
candidate of their choosing, a sovereign act which he seeks to annul. Marquez also does not
have a valid cause of action as he is seeking to compel COMELEC to call for congressional
elections for Cotabato City. One, Rep. Dilangalen already represents Cotabato City. Secondly,
COMELEC does not have the power to set congressional elections for Cotabato City. Even
assuming Congress is impleaded, this Court cannot compel Congress to call for such
election. What the Constitution contemplated for ARMM was political autonomy. Citing
Justice
Cortez, The creation o
f autonomous regions in Muslim Mindanao and the Cordilleras, which is peculiar to the 1987
Constitution, contemplates the grant of political
autonomy and not just administrative autonomy to these regions. Unfortunately, the
majority gives short shrift to the considerations of local autonomy, even as such paradigm
partakes of a constitutional mandate. Tinga is opining that there is nothing in the
Constitution that bars Congress from delegating the power to create provinces
and that considering the constitu
tional mandate of local autonomy for Muslim Mindanao, it can be said that such delegation is
in furtherance of the constitutional
design.
For him, since the Constitution does not specifically commit this power to Congress, it may
be validly delegated.
For Justice Tinga, the power to create provinces is not the same as the power to create a
legislative district. The latter power is specifically committed by the Constitution to
Congress. A law may later be passed by Congress to create a legislative district in the new
province.
[GIST: Hes saying the case should not have gone on to the merits, since it can be
dismissed on procedural grounds, the requisites for challenging constitutionality of an act
not having been fulfilled. By saying what they did, the majority dealt the policy of local
autonomy a blow.
So hes concurring in the result and in the part where majority said that ARMM

legislative body cannot create a legislative district but he dissents on other portions for,
notably, the on the issue of power to create a province being a power that Congress can
delegate.

PROVINCE OF NORTH COTABATO VS GOVERNMENT OF THE REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES

Posted by kaye lee on 9:43 PM

G.R. No. 183591

October 14 2008

Province of North Cotabato vs Government of the Republic of the Philippines

FACTS:
On August 5, 2008, the Government of the Republic of the Philippines and the Moro Islamic
Liberation Front (MILF) were scheduled to sign a Memorandum of Agreement of the Ancestral
Domain Aspect of the GRP - MILF Tripoli Agreement on Peace of 2001 in Kuala Lumpur,
Malaysia.
Invoking the right to information on matters of public concern, the petitioners seek to
compel respondents to disclose and furnish them the complete and official copies of the MAAD and to prohibit the slated signing of the MOA-AD and the holding of public consultation
thereon. They also pray that the MOA-AD be declared unconstitutional. The Court issued a
TRO enjoining the GRP from signing the same.

ISSUES:
1. Whether or not the constitutionality and the legality of the MOA is ripe for adjudication;
2. Whether or not there is a violation of the people's right to information on matters of public
concern (Art 3 Sec. 7) under a state policy of full disclosure of all its transactions involving
public interest (Art 2, Sec 28) including public consultation under RA 7160 (Local
Government Code of 1991)
3. Whether or not the signing of the MOA, the Government of the Republic of the Philippines
would be binding itself
a) to create and recognize the Bangsamoro Juridical Entity (BJE) as a separate state, or a
juridical, territorial or political subdivision not recognized by law;
b) to revise or amend the Constitution and existing laws to conform to the MOA;
c) to concede to or recognize the claim of the Moro Islamic Liberation Front for ancestral
domain in violation of Republic Act No. 8371 (THE INDIGENOUS PEOPLES RIGHTS ACT OF
1997),
particularly Section 3(g) & Chapter VII (DELINEATION,
RECOGNITION OF ANCESTRAL DOMAINS)

RULINGS:
1. Yes, the petitions are ripe for adjudication. The failure of the respondents to consult the
local government units or communities affected constitutes a departure by respondents
from their mandate under EO No. 3. Moreover, the respondents exceeded their authority by
the mere act of guaranteeing amendments to the Constitution. Any alleged violation of the
Constitution by any branch of government is a proper matter for judicial review.
As the petitions involve constitutional issues which are of paramount public interest or of
transcendental importance, the Court grants the petitioners, petitioners-in-intervention and
intervening respondents the requisite locus standi in keeping with the liberal stance adopted
in David v. Macapagal- Arroyo.
In Pimentel, Jr. v. Aguirre, this Court held:
x x x [B]y the mere enactment of the questioned law or the approval of the challenged
action, the dispute is said to have ripened into a judicial controversy even without any other
overt act . Indeed, even a singular violation of the Constitution and/or the law is enough to
awaken judicial duty.x x x x
By the same token, when an act of the President, who in our constitutional scheme is a
coequal of Congress, is seriously alleged to have infringed the Constitution and the laws x x
x settling the dispute becomes the duty and the responsibility of the courts.
That the law or act in question is not yet effective does not negate ripeness.

2. Yes. The Court finds that there is a grave violation of the Constitution involved in the
matters of public concern (Sec 7 Art III) under a state policy of full disclosure of all its
transactions involving public interest (Art 2, Sec 28) including public consultation under RA
7160 (Local Government Code of 1991).
(Sec 7 ArtIII) The right to information guarantees the right of the people to demand
information, while Sec 28 recognizes the duty of officialdom to give information even if
nobody demands. The complete and effective exercise of the right to information
necessitates that its complementary provision on public disclosure derive the same selfexecutory nature, subject only to reasonable safeguards or limitations as may be provided
by law.
The contents of the MOA-AD is a matter of paramount public concern involving public
interest in the highest order. In declaring that the right to information contemplates steps
and negotiations leading to the consummation of the contract, jurisprudence finds no
distinction as to the executory nature or commercial character of the agreement.
E.O. No. 3 itself is replete with mechanics for continuing consultations on both national and
local levels and for a principal forum for consensus-building. In fact, it is the duty of the
Presidential Adviser on the Peace Process to conduct regular dialogues to seek relevant
information, comments, advice, and recommendations from peace partners and concerned
sectors of society.

3.

a) to create and recognize the Bangsamoro Juridical Entity (BJE) as a separate state, or a
juridical, territorial or political subdivision not recognized by law;

Yes. The provisions of the MOA indicate, among other things, that the Parties aimed to vest
in the BJE the status of an associated state or, at any rate, a status closely approximating it.
The concept of association is not recognized under the present Constitution.

No province, city, or municipality, not even the ARMM, is recognized under our laws as
having an associative relationship with the national government. Indeed, the concept
implies powers that go beyond anything ever granted by the Constitution to any local or
regional government. It also implies the recognition of the associated entity as a state. The
Constitution, however, does not contemplate any state in this jurisdiction other than the
Philippine State, much less does it provide for a transitory status that aims to prepare any
part of Philippine territory for independence.

The BJE is a far more powerful entity than the autonomous region recognized in the
Constitution. It is not merely an expanded version of the ARMM, the status of its relationship
with the national government being fundamentally different from that of the ARMM. Indeed,
BJE is a state in all but name as it meets the criteria of a state laid down in the Montevideo
Convention, namely, a permanent population, a defined territory, a government, and a
capacity to enter into relations with other states.

Even assuming arguendo that the MOA-AD would not necessarily sever any portion of
Philippine territory, the spirit animating it which has betrayed itself by its use of the
concept of association runs counter to the national sovereignty and territorial integrity of
the Republic.

The defining concept underlying the relationship between the national government and the
BJE being itself contrary to the present Constitution, it is not surprising that many of the
specific provisions of the MOA-AD on the formation and powers of the BJE are in conflict with
the Constitution and the laws. The BJE is more of a state than an autonomous region. But
even assuming that it is covered by the term autonomous region in the constitutional
provision just quoted, the MOA-AD would still be in conflict with it.

b) to revise or amend the Constitution and existing laws to conform to the MOA:

The MOA-AD provides that any provisions of the MOA-AD requiring amendments to the
existing legal framework shall come into force upon the signing of a Comprehensive
Compact and upon effecting the necessary changes to the legal framework, implying an

amendment of the Constitution to accommodate the MOA-AD. This stipulation, in effect,

guaranteed to the MILF the amendment of the Constitution .

It will be observed that the President has authority, as stated in her oath of office, only to
preserve and defend the Constitution. Such presidential power does not, however, extend to
allowing her to change the Constitution, but simply to recommend proposed amendments or
revision. As long as she limits herself to recommending these changes and submits to the
proper procedure for constitutional amendments and revision, her mere recommendation
need not be construed as an unconstitutional act.

The suspensive clause in the MOA-AD viewed in light of the above-discussed standards.

Given the limited nature of the Presidents authority to propose constitutional amendments,
she cannot guarantee to any third party that the required amendments will eventually be
put in place, nor even be submitted to a plebiscite. The most she could do is submit these
proposals as recommendations either to Congress or the people, in whom constituent
powers are vested.

c) to concede to or recognize the claim of the Moro Islamic Liberation Front for ancestral
domain in violation of Republic Act No. 8371 (THE INDIGENOUS PEOPLES RIGHTS ACT OF
1997),
particularly Section 3(g) & Chapter VII (DELINEATION,
RECOGNITION OF ANCESTRAL DOMAINS)
This strand begins with the statement that it is the birthright of all Moros and all Indigenous
peoples of Mindanao to identify themselves and be accepted as Bangsamoros. It defines
Bangsamoro people as the natives or original inhabitants of Mindanao and its adjacent
islands including Palawan and the Sulu archipelago at the time of conquest or colonization,
and their descendants whether mixed or of full blood, including their spouses.

Thus, the concept of Bangsamoro, as defined in this strand of the MOA-AD, includes not
only Moros as traditionally understood even by Muslims, but all indigenous peoples of
Mindanao and its adjacent islands. The MOA-AD adds that the freedom of choice of
indigenous peoples shall be respected. What this freedom of choice consists in has not been
specifically defined. The MOA-AD proceeds to refer to the Bangsamoro homeland, the
ownership of which is vested exclusively in the Bangsamoro people by virtue of their prior
rights of occupation. Both parties to the MOA-AD acknowledge that ancestral domain does
not form part of the public domain.

Republic Act No. 8371 or the Indigenous Peoples Rights Act of 1997 provides for clear-cut
procedure for the recognition and delineation of ancestral domain, which entails, among
other things, the observance of the free and prior informed consent of the Indigenous
Cultural Communities/Indigenous Peoples. Notably, the statute does not grant the Executive

Department or any government agency the power to delineate and recognize an ancestral
domain claim by mere agreement or compromise.

Two, Republic Act No. 7160 or the Local Government Code of 1991 requires all national
offices to conduct consultations beforeany project or program critical to the environment
and human ecology including those that may call for the eviction of a particular group of
people residing in such locality, is implemented therein. The MOA-AD is one peculiar
program that unequivocally and unilaterally vests ownership of a vast territory to the
Bangsamoro people, which could pervasively and drastically result to the diaspora or
displacement of a great number of inhabitants from their total environment.

CONCLUSION:
In sum, the Presidential Adviser on the Peace Process committed grave abuse of discretion
when he failed to carry out the pertinent consultation process, as mandated by E.O. No. 3,
Republic Act No. 7160, and Republic Act No. 8371. The furtive process by which the MOA-AD
was designed and crafted runs contrary to and in excess of the legal authority, and amounts
to a whimsical, capricious, oppressive, arbitrary and despotic exercise thereof. It illustrates a
gross evasion of positive duty and a virtual refusal to perform the duty enjoined.

The MOA-AD cannot be reconciled with the present Constitution and laws. Not only its
specific provisions but the very concept underlying them, namely, the associative
relationship envisioned between the GRP and the BJE, are unconstitutional, for the concept
presupposes that the associated entity is a state and implies that the same is on its way to
independence.
Datu Kida v. Senate of the Philippines., GR 196271 (2012)
(Constitutionality of RA 10153)/CONSTITUTIONAL

Facts:
RA 6734 provided for the organic act mandated by the constitution for the formation
of ARMM. Unfortunately said organic act did not provide for the exact date for the regional
elections in ARMM. Because of this, several Laws were enacted to provide for the date of the
election ; RA 9054- Second Monday of September 2001, RA 9140November 26, 2001, RA
93332nd Monday of August 2005. And on the same date every three years thereafter.
Pursuant to RA 9333, COMELEC made preparations for August 8, 2001 Election but
sometime in June, Congress enacted RA 10153- An act providing for the synchronization of
the elections in ARMM with the national and local elections.
Several people, including herein plaintiff assailed the constitutionality of the said enactment.

Issue/s:

1.
WON ARMM is a distinct from an ordinary local government unit and therefore should
not be required to hold its election during the local elections mandated in the constitution.

2.
WON RA. 10153 is constitutional on the basis that it granted the president the power to
appoint OIC for several elective positions until such positions be filled during the May 2013
elections.

Held:
1.
No ARMM is not a distinct government unit therefore not exempt from the
synchronization of election. SC held that the inclusion of autonomous regions in the
enumeration of political subdivisions of the State under the heading Local Government
indicates quite clearly the constitutional intent to consider autonomous regions as one of the
forms of local governments.

That the Constitution mentions only the national government and the local
governments, and does not make a distinction between the local government and the
regional government, is particularly revealing, betraying as it does the intention of the
framers of the Constitution to consider the autonomous regions not as separate forms of
government, but as political units which, while having more powers and attributes than
other local government units, still remain under the category of local governments. Since
autonomous regions are classified as local governments, it follows that elections held in
autonomous regions are also considered as local elections.

2.
Yes, The Supreme court upheld the constitutionality of RA 10153 stating that there is
no incompatibility between the Presidents power of supervision over local governments and
autonomous regions, and the power granted to the President, within the specific confines of
RA No. 10153, to appoint OICs.

The power of supervision is defined as the power of a superior officer to see to it that lower
officers perform their functions in accordance with law. This is distinguished from the power
of control or the power of an officer to alter or modify or set aside what a subordinate
officer had done in the performance of his duties and to substitute the judgment of the
former for the latter.

The petitioners apprehension regarding the Presidents alleged power of control over the
OICs is rooted in their belief that the Presidents appointment power includes the power to
remove these officials at will. In this way, the petitioners foresee that the appointed OICs will
be beholden to the President, and act as representatives of the President and not of the
people.

Section 3 of RA No. 10153 expressly contradicts the petitioners supposition. The provision
states:

Section 3. Appointment of Officers-in-Charge. The President shall appoint officers-incharge for the Office of the Regional Governor, Regional Vice Governor and Members of the
Regional Legislative Assembly who shall perform the functions pertaining to the said offices
until the officials duly elected in the May 2013 elections shall have qualified and assumed
office.

The wording of the law is clear. Once the President has appointed the OICs for the offices of
the Governor, Vice Governor and members of the Regional Legislative Assembly, these same
officials will remain in office until they are replaced by the duly elected officials in the May
2013 elections. Nothing in this provision even hints that the President has the power to
recall the appointments he already made. Clearly, the petitioners fears in this regard are
more apparent than real.

CAMP JOHN HAY VS LIM G.R. No. 119775 MARCH 29, 2005 FACTS: Petitioners filed their
Petition for prohibition, mandamus and declaratory relief assailing (1) theconstitutionality of
Proclamation No. 420 and (2) the legality of the Memorandum of Agreement and
JointVenture Agreement previously entered into between public respondent BCDA and
private respondents.Section 3 of Proclamation No. 420 was declared NULL AND VOID and is
accordingly declared of no legalforce and effect.Intervener CJHDC filed a Motion for Leave to
Intervene alleging that it, together with its consortiumpartners, entered into a Lease
Agreement dated October 19, 1996 with respondent BCDA for thedevelopment of
the John Hay SEZ; and that it "stands to be most affected" by this Court's
Decision"invalidating the grant of tax exemption and other financial incentives" in the John
Hay SEZ since "[i]tsfinancial obligations and development and investment commitments
under the Lease Agreement wereentered into upon the premise that these incentives are
valid and subsisting."CJHDC, proffering grounds parallel to those of public respondents,
prays that: (1) it be granted leave tointervene in this case; (2) its attached Motion for
Reconsideration in Intervention be admitted; and (3) thisCourt's Decision of October 24,
2003 be reconsidered and petitioners' petition dismissed.CJHDC's Motion for leave to
Intervene was granted and noted its Motion for Reconsideration
inIntervention.ISSUE: Whether the tax exemptions and other financial incentives granted to
the Subic SEZ underSection 12 of R.A. No. 7227 (Bases Conversion and Development Act of
1992), are applicable to theJohn Hay SEZ.RULING: CJHDC's argument that the President's
"power to create Special Economic Zones carries withit the power to provide for tax and
financial incentives," does not lie. It is the legislative branch which hasthe inherent power
not only to select the subjects of taxation but to grant exemptions. Paragraph 4,Section 28
of Article VI of the Constitution is crystal clear: "[n]o law granting any tax exemption shall
bepassed without the concurrence of a majority of all the Members of the Congress."Hence,
it is only the legislature, as limited by the provisions of the Constitution, which has full power
toexempt any person or corporation or class of property from taxation. The Constitution
itself may providefor specific tax exemptions or local governments may pass ordinances
providing for exemption from localtaxes, but, otherwise, it is only the legislative branch
which has the power to grant tax exemptions, itspower to exempt being as broad as its
power to tax.There is absolutely nothing in R.A. No. 7227 which can be considered a grant of
tax exemption in favor ofpublic respondent BCDA. Rather, the beneficiaries of the tax
exemptions and other incentives in Section12 (the only provision in R.A. No. 7227 which
expressly grants tax exemptions) are clearly the businessenterprises located within the
Subic SEZ.Contrary to public respondents' interpretation, the Decision of October 24, 2003
does not "tie the hands"of executive or administrative agencies from implementing any

present or future legislation which affordstax or other financial incentives to qualified

persons doing business in the John Hay SEZ or elsewhere.The second sentence of Section 3
of Proclamation No. 420 was declared null and void only insofar as itpurported to grant tax
exemptions and other financial incentives to business enterprises located in JohnHay SEZ.
However, where there is statutory basis for exemptions or incentives, there is
nothing to prevent qualified persons from applying for and availing thereof.

G. R. No. 79956
January 29, 1990
Cordillera Broad Coalitionvs.Commission on Audit
Facts:Pursuant to a ceasefire agreement signed on September 13, 1986, the Cordillera
Peoples Liberation Army (CPLA) and the Cordillera Bodong Administration agreed that the
Cordillera people shall not undertake their demands through armed and violent struggle but
by peaceful means, such as political negotiations.A subsequent joint agreement was then
arrived at by the two parties. Such agreement states that they are to:Par. 2. Work together
in drafting an Executive Order to create a preparatory body thatcould perform policy-making
and administrative functions and undertake consultationsand studies leading to a draft
organic act for the Cordilleras.Par. 3. Have representatives from the Cordillera panel join the
study group of the R.P.Panel in drafting the Executive Order.Pursuant to the above joint
agreement, E.O. 220 was drafted by a panel of the Philippinegovernment and of the
representatives of the Cordillera people. This was then signed into lawby President Corazon
Aquino, in the exercise of her legislative powers, creating the CordilleraAdministrative
Region [CAR], which covers the provinces of Abra, Benguet, Ifugao, Kalinga-Apayao and
Mountain Province and the City of Baguio.Petitioners assail the constitutionality of E.O. 220
on the primary ground that by issuing the saidorder, the President, in the exercise of
her legislative powers, had virtually pre-emptedCongress from its mandated task of
enacting an organic act and created an autonomous regionin the Cordilleras.Issue:Whether
or not E.O. 220 is constitutionalRuling:The Supreme Court has come to the conclusion that
petitioners are unfounded.
E.O. 220 does not create the autonomous region contemplated in the Constitution. It merely
provides for transitory measures in anticipation of the enactment of an organic act and the
creation of an autonomous region. In short, it prepares the ground for autonomy. This does
not necessarily conflict with the provisions of the Constitution on autonomous regions.The
Constitution outlines a complex procedure for the creation of an autonomous region in the
Cordilleras. Since such process will undoubtedly take time, the President saw it fit to provide
forsome measures to address the urgent needs of the Cordilleras in the meantime that the
organic act had not yet been passed and the autonomous region created. At this time, the
President was still exercising legislative powers as the First Congress had not yet
convened.Based on Article X Section 18 of the Constitution (providing the basic structure of
government inthe autonomous region), the Supreme Court finds that E. O. No. 220
did not establish anautonomous regional government. The bodies created by E. O. No.
220 do not supplant theexisting local governmental structure; nor are they autonomous
government agencies. Theymerely constitute the mechanism for an "umbrella" that
brings together the existing localgovernments, the agencies of the National
Government, the ethno-linguistic groups or tribesand non-governmental organizations in
a concerted effort to spur development in theCordilleras.In fact, it was Republic Act
No. 6766, the organic act for the Cordillera autonomous region signed into law on October

23, 1989, and the plebiscite for the approval of the act which completed the autonomous
region-creating process outlined in the Constitution.Therefore, E.O. 220 is constitutional.
Petition is dismissed for lack of merit.

Badua vs Cordillera
Facts: Spouses Leonor and Rosa Badua allegedly own farm land from which they were
forcibly ejected through the decision of the Cordillera Bodong Administration, with the case
entitled David Quema v. Leonor Badua. The background of this case reveals that David
Quema owns the parcels of land evidenced by Tax Declarations 4997 and 4998. The parcels
of land were purchased from Dr. Erotida Valera. Twenty-two (22) years later, he was able to
redeem the parcels of land through payment of 10,000 to the vendor's heir, Jessie Macaraeg.
Quema was prevented from tilling the land by Rosa Badua. Prompted by such turn of events,
David Quema filed a case in the Baranggay Council but failed to have the dispute settled. A
judge advised Quema to file his case in the provincial courts. However, Quema did not, and
filed it in the tribal court of the Maeng Tribe. Due to several warnings from the tribe, spouses
Badua filed a petition for special relief, with the following to be settled: a. That the
respondents be enjoined from enforcing the decision of the tribal court in the pending case.
b. The respondents be prohibited from usurping judicial power. c. That the legal personality
of the Cordillera Bodong Administration be clarified. The Baduas also allege that they were
denied due process (or hearing) and that the tribal court has NO jurisdiction over the case,
since neither they nor the respondent are members of the Maeng tribe. The respondents
contend that the SC has no jurisdiction over the case since the tribal court is NOT a part of
the judicial system.

Issue: Whether the tribal court has jurisdiction over the case.

Held: No. Tribal courts are not a part of the Philippine judicial system which consists of the
Supreme Court and the lower courts which have been established by law (Sec. 1, Art. VIII,
1987 Constitution). They do not possess judicial power. Like the pangkats or conciliation
panels created by P.D. No. 1508 in the barangays, they are advisory and conciliatory bodies
whose principal objective is to bring together the parties to a dispute and persuade them to
make peace, settle, and compromise. An amicable settlement, compromise, and arbitration
award rendered by a pangkat, if not seasonably repudiated, has the force and effect of a
final judgment of a court (Sec. 11, P.D. 1508), but it can be enforced only through the local
city or municipal court to which the secretary of the Lupon transmits the compromise
settlement or arbitration award upon expiration of the period to annul or repudiate it (Sec.
14, P.D. 1508). Similarly, the decisions of a tribal court based on compromise or arbitration,
as provided in P.D. 1508, may be enforced or set aside, in and through the regular courts
today.

Negros Oriental Electric vs Cooperative

In 1985, the Sangguniang Panlungsod (SP) of Dumaguete sought to conduct an investigation
in connection with pending legislation related to the operations of public utilities. Invited in
the hearing were the heads of NORECO II (Negros Oriental II Electric Cooperative, Inc.)
Paterio Torres and Arturo Umbac. NORECO II is alleged to have installed inefficient power

lines in the said city. Torres and Umbac refused to appear before the SP and they alleged
that the power to investigate, and to order the improvement of, alleged inefficient power
lines to conform to standards is lodged exclusively with the National Electrification
Administration (NEA); and neither the Charter of the City of Dumaguete nor the [old] Local
Government Code (Batas Pambansa Blg. 337) grants the SP such power. The SP averred that
inherent in the legislative functions performed by the respondent SP is the power to conduct
investigations in aid of legislation and with it, the power to punish for contempt in inquiries
on matters within its jurisdiction.

ISSUE: Whether or not LGUs can issue contempt.

HELD: No. There is no express provision either in the 1973 Constitution or in the LGC (BP
337) granting local legislative bodies, the power to subpoena witnesses and the power to
punish non-members for contempt. Absent a constitutional or legal provision for the exercise
of these powers, the only possible justification for the issuance of a subpoena and for the
punishment of non-members for contumacious behavior would be for said power to be
deemed implied in the statutory grant of delegated legislative power. But, the contempt
power and the subpoena power partake of a judicial nature. They cannot be implied in the
grant of legislative power. Neither can they exist as mere incidents of the performance of
legislative functions. To allow local legislative bodies or administrative agencies to exercise
these powers without express statutory basis would run afoul of the doctrine of separation of
powers. There being no provision in the LGC explicitly granting local legislative bodies, the
power to issue compulsory process and the power to punish for contempt, the SP of
Dumaguete is devoid of power to punish the petitioners Torres and Umbac for contempt. The
Ad Hoc Committee of said legislative body has even less basis to claim that it can exercise
these powers. Even assuming that the SP and the Ad-Hoc Committee had the power to issue
the subpoena and the order complained of, such issuances would still be void for being ultra
vires. The contempt power (and the subpoena power) if actually possessed, may only be
exercised where the subject matter of the investigation is within the jurisdiction of the
legislative body.