1. ANGARA C. ELECTORAL COMMISION (GR No.

L-45081|July 15, 1936)

2. People v. Marti (GR No. 81561| January 18,1991)

WHEREFORE, the judgment of conviction finding appellant guilty beyond reasonable doubt of
the crime charged is hereby AFFIRMED. No costs.SO ORDERED.
BIDIN, J.:This is an appeal from a decision * rendered by the Special Criminal Court of Manila (Regional
Trial Court, Branch XLIX) convicting accused-appellant of violation of Section 21 (b), Article IV in relation
to Section 4, Article 11 and Section 2 (e) (i), Article 1 of Republic Act 6425, as amended, otherwise known
as the Dangerous Drugs Act.
The facts as summarized in the brief of the prosecution are as follows:
On August 14, 1987, between 10:00 and 11:00 a.m., the appellant and his common-law wife, Shirley
Reyes, went to the booth of the "Manila Packing and Export Forwarders" in the Pistang Pilipino
Complex, Ermita, Manila, carrying with them four (4) gift wrapped packages. Anita Reyes (the
proprietress and no relation to Shirley Reyes) attended to them. The appellant informed Anita Reyes
that he was sending the packages to a friend in Zurich, Switzerland. Appellant filled up the contract
necessary for the transaction, writing therein his name, passport number, the date of shipment and
the name and address of the consignee, namely, "WALTER FIERZ, Mattacketr II, 8052 Zurich,
Switzerland" (Decision, p. 6)
Anita Reyes then asked the appellant if she could examine and inspect the packages. Appellant,
however, refused, assuring her that the packages simply contained books, cigars, and gloves and
were gifts to his friend in Zurich. In view of appellant's representation, Anita Reyes no longer insisted
on inspecting the packages. The four (4) packages were then placed inside a brown corrugated box
one by two feet in size (1' x 2'). Styro-foam was placed at the bottom and on top of the packages
before the box was sealed with masking tape, thus making the box ready for shipment (Decision, p.
8).
Before delivery of appellant's box to the Bureau of Customs and/or Bureau of Posts, Mr. Job Reyes
(proprietor) and husband of Anita (Reyes), following standard operating procedure, opened the boxes
for final inspection. When he opened appellant's box, a peculiar odor emitted therefrom. His
curiousity aroused, he squeezed one of the bundles allegedly containing gloves and felt dried leaves
inside. Opening one of the bundles, he pulled out a cellophane wrapper protruding from the opening
of one of the gloves. He made an opening on one of the cellophane wrappers and took several grams
of the contents thereof(tsn, pp. 29-30, October 6, 1987; Emphasis supplied).
Job Reyes forthwith prepared a letter reporting the shipment to the NBI and requesting a laboratory
examination of the samples he extracted from the cellophane wrapper (tsn, pp. 5-6, October 6, 1987).
He brought the letter and a sample of appellant's shipment to the Narcotics Section of the National
Bureau of Investigation (NBI), at about 1:30 o'clock in the afternoon of that date, i.e., August 14,
1987. He was interviewed by the Chief of Narcotics Section. Job Reyes informed the NBI that the rest
of the shipment was still in his office. Therefore, Job Reyes and three (3) NBI agents, and a
photographer, went to the Reyes' office at Ermita, Manila (tsn, p. 30, October 6, 1987).
Job Reyes brought out the box in which appellant's packages were placed and, in the presence of the
NBI agents, opened the top flaps, removed the styro-foam and took out the cellophane wrappers
from inside the gloves. Dried marijuana leaves were found to have been contained inside the
cellophane wrappers (tsn, p. 38, October 6, 1987; Emphasis supplied).
The package which allegedly contained books was likewise opened by Job Reyes. He discovered
that the package contained bricks or cake-like dried marijuana leaves. The package which allegedly
contained tabacalera cigars was also opened. It turned out that dried marijuana leaves were neatly
stocked underneath the cigars (tsn, p. 39, October 6, 1987).
The NBI agents made an inventory and took charge of the box and of the contents thereof, after
signing a "Receipt" acknowledging custody of the said effects (tsn, pp. 2-3, October 7, 1987).
In this appeal, accused/appellant assigns the following errors, to wit:

THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN ADMITTING IN EVIDENCE THE ILLEGALLY SEARCHED AND
SEIZED OBJECTS CONTAINED IN THE FOUR PARCELS.
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN CONVICTING APPELLANT DESPITE THE UNDISPUTED FACT
THAT HIS RIGHTS UNDER THE CONSTITUTION WHILE UNDER CUSTODIAL PROCEEDINGS
WERE NOT OBSERVED.
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN NOT GIVING CREDENCE TO THE EXPLANATION OF THE
APPELLANT ON HOW THE FOUR PARCELS CAME INTO HIS POSSESSION (Appellant's Brief, p.
1; Rollo, p. 55)
1. Appellant contends that the evidence subject of the imputed offense had been obtained in violation of his
constitutional rights against unreasonable search and seizure and privacy of communication (Sec. 2 and 3,
Art. III, Constitution) and therefore argues that the same should be held inadmissible in evidence (Sec. 3 (2),
Art. III).
Sections 2 and 3, Article III of the Constitution provide:
Sec. 2. The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers and effects against
unreasonable searches and seizures of whatever nature and for any purpose shall be inviolable, and
no search warrant or warrant of arrest shall issue except upon probable cause to be determined
personally by the judge after examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the
witnesses he may produce, and particularly describing the place to be searched and the persons or
things to be seized.
Sec. 3. (1) The privacy of communication and correspondence shall be inviolable except upon lawful
order of the court, or when public safety or order requires otherwise as prescribed by law.
(2) Any evidence obtained in violation of this or the preceding section shall be inadmissible for any
purpose in any proceeding.
RATIONALE:
Article III, Sections 2 and 3, 1987 Constitution

3. White Light Corp v. City of Manila (GR No. 122846| January 20,2009)
This Petition2 under Rule 45 of the Revised Rules on Civil Procedure, which seeks the reversal of the
Decision3 in C.A.-G.R. S.P. No. 33316 of the Court of Appeals, challenges the validity of Manila City
Ordinance No. 7774 entitled, "An Ordinance Prohibiting Short-Time Admission, Short-Time Admission
Rates, and Wash-Up Rate Schemes in Hotels, Motels, Inns, Lodging Houses, Pension Houses, and
Similar Establishments in the City of Manila" (the Ordinance).
The facts are as follows:
On December 3, 1992, City Mayor Alfredo S. Lim (Mayor Lim) signed into law the Ordinance
SECTION 1. Declaration of Policy. It is hereby the declared policy of the City Government to protect the best
interest, health and welfare, and the morality of its constituents in general and the youth in particular.
SEC. 2. Title. This ordinance shall be known as "An Ordinance" prohibiting short time admission in hotels,
motels, lodging houses, pension houses and similar establishments in the City of Manila.
SEC. 5. Penalty Clause. Any person or corporation who shall violate any provision of this ordinance shall
upon conviction thereof be punished by a fine of Five Thousand (P5,000.00) Pesos or imprisonment for a
period of not exceeding one (1) year or both such fine and imprisonment at the discretion of the court;
Provided, That in case of [a] juridical person, the president, the manager, or the persons in charge of the
operation thereof shall be liable: Provided, further, That in case of subsequent conviction for the same
offense, the business license of the guilty party shall automatically be cancelled.
SEC. 7. Effectivity. This ordinance shall take effect immediately upon approval.

Enacted by the city Council of Manila at its regular session today, November 10, 1992.
On December 15, 1992, the Malate Tourist and Development Corporation (MTDC) filed a complaint for
declaratory relief with prayer for a writ of preliminary injunction and/or temporary restraining order
( TRO)5 with the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Manila, Branch 9 impleading as defendant, herein respondent
City of Manila (the City) represented by Mayor Lim. 6 MTDC prayed that the Ordinance, insofar as it includes
motels and inns as among its prohibited establishments, be declared invalid and unconstitutional. MTDC
claimed that as owner and operator of the Victoria Court in Malate, Manila it was authorized by Presidential
Decree (P.D.) No. 259 to admit customers on a short time basis as well as to charge customers wash up
rates for stays of only three hours.
On December 21, 1992, petitioners White Light Corporation (WLC), Titanium Corporation (TC) and Sta. Mesa
Tourist and Development Corporation (STDC) filed a motion to intervene and to admit attached complaint-inintervention7 on the ground that the Ordinance directly affects their business interests as operators of drive-inhotels and motels in Manila.8 The three companies are components of the Anito Group of Companies which
owns and operates several hotels and motels in Metro Manila.9
On December 23, 1992, the RTC granted the motion to intervene. 10 The RTC also notified the Solicitor
General of the proceedings pursuant to then Rule 64, Section 4 of the Rules of Court. On the same date,
MTDC moved to withdraw as plaintiff.11
On December 28, 1992, the RTC granted MTDC's motion to withdraw. 12 The RTC issued a TRO on January
14, 1993, directing the City to cease and desist from enforcing the Ordinance. 13 The City filed an Answer
dated January 22, 1993 alleging that the Ordinance is a legitimate exercise of police power.14
On February 8, 1993, the RTC issued a writ of preliminary injunction ordering the city to desist from the
enforcement of the Ordinance.15 A month later, on March 8, 1993, the Solicitor General filed his Comment
arguing that the Ordinance is constitutional.
During the pre-trial conference, the WLC, TC and STDC agreed to submit the case for decision without trial
as the case involved a purely legal question. 16 On October 20, 1993, the RTC rendered a decision declaring
the Ordinance null and void. The dispositive portion of the decision reads:
WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing, [O]rdinance No. 7774 of the City of Manila is hereby declared null
and void.
Accordingly, the preliminary injunction heretofor issued is hereby made permanent.
SO ORDERED.17
The RTC noted that the ordinance "strikes at the personal liberty of the individual guaranteed and jealously
guarded by the Constitution."
WHEREFORE, the Petition is GRANTED. The Decision of the Court of Appeals is REVERSED, and the
Decision of the Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch 9, is REINSTATED. Ordinance No. 7774 is hereby
declared UNCONSTITUTIONAL. No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.

On 3 Dec 1992, then Mayor Lim signed into law Ord 7774 entitled An Ordinance prohibiting
short time admission in hotels, motels, lodging houses, pension houses and similar establishments
in the City of Manila. White Light Corp is an operator of mini hotels and motels who sought to have
the Ordinance be nullified as the said Ordinance infringes on the private rights of their patrons. The
RTC ruled in favor of WLC. It ruled that the Ordinance strikes at the personal liberty of the individual
guaranteed by the Constitution. The City maintains that the ordinance is valid as it is a valid
exercise of police power. Under the LGC, the City is empowered to regulate the establishment,
operation and maintenance of cafes, restaurants, beerhouses, hotels, motels, inns, pension houses,
lodging houses and other similar establishments, including tourist guides and transports. The CA
ruled in favor of the City.

ISSUE: Whether or not Ord 7774 is valid.

HELD: The SC ruled that the said ordinance is null and void as it indeed infringes upon individual
liberty. It also violates the due process clause which serves as a guaranty for protection against
arbitrary regulation or seizure. The said ordinance invades private rights. Note that not all who goes
into motels and hotels for wash up rate are really there for obscene purposes only. Some are
tourists who needed rest or to wash up or to freshen up. Hence, the infidelity sought to be avoided
by the said ordinance is more or less subjected only to a limited group of people. The SC reiterates
that individual rights may be adversely affected only to the extent that may fairly be required by the
legitimate demands of public interest or public welfare.

4. Poe-Llamanzares v. Comelec (GR No. 221697| March 8,2016)

Facts:
In her COC for presidency for the May 2016 elections, Grace Poe declared that she is a natural-born citizen
and that her residence in the Philippines up to the day before 9 May 2016 would be 10 years and 11 months
counted from 24 May 2005.
May 24, 2005 was the day she came to the Philippines after deciding to stay in the PH for good. Before that
however, and even afterwards, she has been going to and fro between US and Philippines. She was born in
1968, found as newborn infant in Iloilo, and was legally adopted. She immigrated to the US in 1991 and was
naturalized as American citizen in 2001. On July 18, 2006, the BI granted her petition declaring that she had
reacquired her Filipino citizenship under RA 9225. She registered as a voter and obtained a new Philippine
passport. In 2010, before assuming her post as an appointed chairperson of the MTRCB, she renounced her
American citizenship to satisfy the RA 9225 requirement . From then on, she stopped using her American
passport.
Petitions were filed before the COMELEC to deny or cancel her candidacy on the ground particularly, among
others, that she cannot be considered a natural-born Filipino citizen since she cannot prove that her biological
parents or either of them were Filipinos. The COMELEC en banc cancelled her candidacy on the ground that
she is in want of citizenship and residence requirements, and that she committed material misrepresentations
in her COC.
On certiorari, the SC reversed the ruling and held (9-6 votes) that Poe is qualified as a candidate for
Presidency. Three justices, however, abstained to vote on the natural-born citizenship issue.
Issue 1: W/N the COMELEC has jurisdiction to rule on the issue of qualifications of
candidates (Read Dissent)
Held:
No. Article IX-C, Sec 2 of the Constitution provides for the powers and functions of the COMELEC, and
deciding on the qualifications or lack thereof of a candidate is not one among them.
In contrast, the Constitution provides that only the SET and HRET tribunals have sole jurisdiction over the
election contests, returns, and qualifications of their respective members, whereas over the President and
Vice President, only the SC en banc has sole jurisdiction. As for the qualifications of candidates for such
positions, the Constitution is silent. There is simply no authorized proceeding in determining the ineligibility of
candidates before elections. Such lack of provision cannot be supplied by a mere rule, and for the
COMELEC to assimilate grounds for ineligibility into grounds for disqualification in Rule 25 in its rules of
procedures would be contrary to the intent of the Constitution.

Hence, the COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion when it decided on the qualification issue of
Grace as a candidate in the same case for cancellation of her COC.
Issue 2: W/N Grace Poe-Llamanzares is a natural-born Filipino citizen (Read Dissent)
Held:
Yes, Grace Poe might be and is considerably a natural-born Filipino. For that, she satisfies one of the
constitutional requirements that only natural-born Filipinos may run for presidency.
First, there is a high probability that Grace Poes parents are Filipinos. Her physical features are typical of
Filipinos. The fact that she was abandoned as an infant in a municipality where the population of the
Philippines is overwhelmingly Filipinos such that there would be more than 99% chance that a child born in
such province is a Filipino is also a circumstantial evidence of her parents nationality. That probability and
the evidence on which it is based are admissible under Rule 128, Section 4 of the Revised Rules on
Evidence. To assume otherwise is to accept the absurd, if not the virtually impossible, as the norm.
Second, by votes of 7-5, the SC pronounced that foundlings are as a class, naturalborn citizens. This is based on the finding that the deliberations of the 1934
Constitutional Convention show that the framers intended foundlings to be covered
by the enumeration. While the 1935 Constitutions enumeration is silent as to
foundlings, there is no restrictive language which would definitely exclude
foundlings either. Because of silence and ambiguity in the enumeration with respect
to foundlings, the SC felt the need to examine the intent of the framers.
Third, that foundlings are automatically conferred with natural-born citizenship is supported by treaties and
the general principles of international law. Although the Philippines is not a signatory to some of these
treaties, it adheres to the customary rule to presume foundlings as having born of the country in which the
foundling is found.
Issue 3: W/N Grace Poe satisfies the 10-year residency requirement
Held:
Yes. Grace Poe satisfied the requirements of animus manendi coupled with animus revertendi in acquiring a
new domicile.
Grace Poes domicile had been timely changed as of May 24, 2005, and not on July 18, 2006 when her
application under RA 9225 was approved by the BI. COMELECs reliance on cases which decree that an
aliens stay in the country cannot be counted unless she acquires a permanent resident visa or reacquires her
Filipino citizenship is without merit. Such cases are different from the circumstances in this case, in which
Grace Poe presented an overwhelming evidence of her actual stay and intent to abandon permanently her
domicile in the US. Coupled with her eventual application to reacquire Philippine citizenship and her familys
actual continuous stay in the Philippines over the years, it is clear that when Grace Poe returned on May 24,
2005, it was for good.
Issue 4: W/N the Grace Poes candidacy should be denied or cancelled for committing material
misrepresentations in her COC
Held:
No. The COMELEC cannot cancel her COC on the ground that she misrepresented facts as to her
citizenship and residency because such facts refer to grounds for ineligibility in which the COMELEC has no
jurisdiction to decide upon. Only when there is a prior authority finding that a candidate is suffering from a

disqualification provided by law or the Constitution that the COMELEC may deny due course or cancel her
candidacy on ground of false representations regarding her qualifications.
In this case, by authority of the Supreme Court Grace Poe is now pronounced qualified as a candidate for the
presidency. Hence, there cannot be any false representations in her COC regarding her citizenship and
residency. ##

Article VII, Section 2 of the 1987 Constitution lays down the eligibility requirements for the
office of President:
5. US v. Bull

CASE DIGEST: US vs Bull, 15 Phil 7

Case Title: US vs Bull, 15 Phil 7
Subject Matter: Applicability of Art. 2 of the Revised Penal Code
Facts:

On December 2, 1908, a steamship vessel engaged in the transport of animals named Stanford
commanded by H.N. Bull docked in the port of Manila, Philippines. It was found that said vessel
from Ampieng, Formosa carried 674 heads of cattle without providing appropriate shelter and
proper suitable means for securing the animals which resulted for most of the animals to get hurt
and others to have died while in transit.
This cruelty to animals is said to be contrary to Acts No. 55 and No. 275 of the Philippine
Constitution. It is however contended that cases cannot be filed because neither was it said that the
court sitting where the animals were disembarked would take jurisdiction, nor did it say about ships
not licensed under Philippine laws, like the ships involved.
Issue:

Whether or not the court had jurisdiction over an offense committed on board a foreign ship while
inside the territorial waters of the Philippines.
Held:

Yes. When the vessel comes within 3 miles from the headlines which embrace the entrance of
Manila Bay, the vessel is within territorial waters and thus, the laws of the Philippines shall apply. A
crime committed on board a Norwegian merchant vessel sailing to the Philippines is within the
jurisdiction of the courts of the Philippines if the illegal conditions existed during the time the ship
was within the territorial waters - regardless of the fact that the same conditions existed when the
ship settled from the foreign port and while it was on the high seas,
In light of the above restriction, the defendant was found guilty and sentenced to pay a fine of two
hundred and fifty pesos with subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency, and to pay the costs.

6. US v. Ah Chong
US vs. Ah Chong (Crim1)

The United States, plaintiff-appellee, vs. Ah Chong, defendant-appellant.

En Banc

Carson, March 19, 1910

Topic: Mental element (Mens rea) - Deliberate intent (Dolo) - Mistake of fact

Facts:
The defendant Ah Chong was a cook at "Officers' quarters, No. 27," Fort McKinley, Rizal
Province
Pascual Gualberto, deceased, works at the same place as a house boy or muchacho
"Officers' quarters, No. 27" was a detached house some 40 meters from the nearest
building
No one slept in the house except the two servants who jointly occupied a small room
toward the rear of the building, the door of which opened upon a narrow porch running
along the side of the building
This porch was covered by a heavy growth of vines for its entire length and height
The door of the room was not furnished with a permanent bolt or lock; the occupants, as a
measure of security, had attached a small hook or catch on the inside of the door, and were
in the habit of reinforcing this somewhat insecure means of fastening the door by placing
against it a chair
On the night of August 14, 1908, at about 10:00 pm, the defendant was suddenly
awakened by some trying to force open the door of the room
He called out twice, "Who is there?"
He heard no answer and was convinced by the noise at the door that it was being pushed
open by someone bent upon forcing his way into the room
The defendant warned the intruder "If you enter the room, I will kill you."
Seizing a common kitchen knife which he kept under his pillow, the defendant struck out
wildly at the intruder (when he entered the room) who turned out to be his roommate
Pascual
Pascual ran out upon the porch heavily wounded
Recognizing Pascual, the defendant called to his employers who slept in the next house and
ran back to his room to secure bandages to bind up Pascual's wounds
Pascual died from the effects of the wound the following day
The roommates appear to have been in friendly and amicable terms prior to the incident,
and had an understanding that when either returned at night, he should knock that the
door and acquaint his companion with his identity
The defendant alleges that he kept the knife under his pillow as personal protection
because of repeated robberies in Fort McKinley
Defendant admitted to stabbing his roommate, but said that he did it under the impression
that Pascual was "a ladron (thief)" because he forced open the door of their sleeping room,
despite the defendant's warnings

Defendant was found guilty by the trial court of simple homicide, with extenuating
(mitigating) circumstances, and sentenced to 6 years and 1 day presidio mayor, the
minimum penalty prescribed by law
Issue:
Whether or not the defendant can be held criminally responsible
Holding:
No.
Ratio:
By reason of a mistake as to the facts, the defendant did an act for which he would be
exempt from criminal liability if the facts were as he supposed them to be (i.e. if Pascual
was actually a thief, he will not be criminally liable/responsible because it would be selfdefense), but would constitute the crime of homicide or assassination if the actor had
known the true state of the facts (i.e. if he knew that it was actually Pascual, he would be
guilty of homicide/assassination)
The defendant's ignorance or mistake of fact was not due to negligence or bad faith
"The act itself foes not make man guilty unless his intention were so"
The essence of the offense is the wrongful intent, without which it cannot exist
"The guilt of the accused must depend on the circumstances as they appear to him."
If one has reasonable cause to believe the existence of facts which will justify a killing, if
without fault or carelessness he does believe them, he is legally guiltless of the homicide
The defendant was doing no more than exercise his legitimate right of self-defense
He cannot be said to have been guilty of negligence or recklessness or even carelessness
in falling into his mistake as to the facts
RTC's decision is reversed. The defendant is acquitted.

7. Suzette Nicholas v. Romulo

8. Merrit vs. Govt of the Philippine Islands
FACTS:
Plaintiff was involved in an accident concerning him and a General Hospital ambulance
resulting in him being incapacitated. He sustained severe injuries rendering him unable to
return to work. Act No. 2457 was enacted in his favor which reads:
"An act authorizing E. Merritt to bring suit against the Government of the Philippine Islands
and authorizing the Attorney-General of said Islands to appear in said suit.
"Whereas a claim has been filed against the Government of the Philippine Islands by Mr. E.
Merritt, of Manila, for damages resulting from a collision between his motorcycle and the
ambulance of the General Hospital on March twenty-fifth, nineteen hundred and thirteen;
"Whereas it is not known who is responsible for the accident nor is it possible to determine
the amount of damages, if any , to which the claimant is entitled; and
"Whereas the Director of Public Works and the Attorney-General recommend that an act be
passed by the Legislature authorizing Mr. E. Merritt to bring suit in the courts against the
Government, in order that said questions may be decided: Now, therefore,

"By authority of the United States, be it enacted by the Philippine Legislature, that:
"SECTION 1. E. Merritt is hereby authorized to bring suit in the Court of First Instance of the
city of Manila against the Government of the Philippine Islands in order to fix the
responsibility for the collision between his motorcycle and the ambulance of the General
Hospital, and to determine the amount of the damages, if any, to which Mr. E. Merritt is
entitled on account of said collision, and the attorney-General of the Philippine Islands is
hereby authorized and directed to appear at the trial on the behalf of the Government of
said Islands, to defend said Government at the same.
"SEC. 2. This Act shall take effect on its passage.
"Enacted, February 3, 1915."
ISSUE:
Whether or not the State is immune from suit.
HELD:
The accident was due to the negligence of the ambulances chauffeur. As the negligence
was committed by an agent or employee of the government involving tort, the inquiry
arises whether the government is legally liable for damages. The State is not liable for the
torts committed by its officers or agents whom it employs, except when expressly made so
by legislative enactment. The government does not undertake to guarantee to any person
the fidelity of the officers or agents whom it employs since that would involve it in all its
operations in endless embarrassments, difficulties and losses, which would be subversive
of the public interest. By consenting to be sued, a state simply waives its immunity from
suit. It does not thereby concede its liability or create any cause of action in his favor, or
extend his liability to any cause not previously recognized. It merely gives a remedy to
enforce a preexisting liability and submits itself to the jurisdiction of the court, subject to its
right to interpose any lawful defense. The State is not responsible for the damages suffered
by private individuals in consequence of acts performed by its employees in the discharge
of the functions pertaining to their office, because neither fault nor negligence can be
presumed on the part of the state in the organization of branches in the public service and
in the appointment of its agents. The responsibility of the State is limited to that which it
contracts through a special agent, duly empowered by a definite order or commission to
perform some act or charged with some definite purpose which gives rise to the
claim. Read full text
9. Taada v. Tuvera

Case Digest: Taada vs. Tuvera

G.R. No. L-63915 (146 SCRA 446) April 24, 1985
Taada vs. Tuvera
FACTS:
Petitioners sought a writ of mandamus to compel respondent public officials to publish, and/or
cause the publication in the Official Gazette of various presidential decrees, letters of instructions,
general orders, proclamations, executive orders, letter of implementation and administrative orders,
invoking the right to be informed on matters of public concern as recognized by the 1973
constitution.
ISSUE:

Whether or not the publication of presidential decrees, letters of instructions, general orders,
proclamations, executive orders, letter of implementation and administrative orders is necessary
before its enforcement.
RULING:
Article 2 of the Civil Code provides that laws shall take effect after fifteen days following
the completion of their publication in the Official Gazette, unless it is otherwise
provided The Court has ruled that publication in the Official Gazette is necessary in those
cases where the legislation itself does not provide for its effectivity date-for then the date
of publication is material for determining its date of effectivity, which is the fifteenth day
following its publication-but not when the law itself provides for the date when it goes into
effect. Article 2 does not preclude the requirement of publication in the Official Gazette,
even if the law itself provides for the date of its effectivity.
The publication of all presidential issuances of a public nature or of general applicability
is mandated by law. Obviously, presidential decrees that provide for fines, forfeitures or
penalties for their violation or otherwise impose a burden or. the people, such as tax and
revenue measures, fall within this category. Other presidential issuances which apply only
to particular persons or class of persons such as administrative and executive orders need
not be published on the assumption that they have been circularized to all concerned.
Publication is, therefore, mandatory.

10.Padilla v. Dizon
Adm. Case No. 3086 February 23, 1988

Padilla vs. Dizon (Crim1)

Alexander Padilla, complainant, vs. The Hon. Baltazar R. Dizon, Presiding Judge of the
Regional Trial Court of Pasay City, Branch 113, respondent.

February 23, 1988

Per Curiam
Facts:
Respondent Baltazar R. Dizon acquitted, in his decision, the tourist and accused, Lo Chi Fai,
saying that Lo Chi Fai had no willful intention to violate the law. He also directed the release
to Lo Chi Fai of at least the amount of US$3,000.00 under Central Bank Circular No. 960.
Lo Chi Fai was caught by Customs guard at the Manila International Airport while
attempting to smuggle foreign currency and foreign exchange instruments out of the
country.
An information was filed against Lo Chi Fai with the RTC for violation of Sec. 6, Central Bank
Circular No. 960 with a penal sanction provided by Sec. 1, PD NO. 1883.
Sec. 6, Central Bank Circular No. 960 provides that no person shall take out or transmit or
attempt to take out or transmit foreign exchange in any form out of the Philippines without
an authorization by the Central Bank. Tourists and non-resident visitors may take out or
send out from the Philippine foreign exchange in amounts not exceeding such amounts of
foreign exchange brought in by them. Tourists and non-resident temporary visitors bringing
with them more than US$3,000.00 or its equivalent in other foreign currencies shall declare
their foreign exchange in the form prescribed by the Central Bank at points of entries upon
arrival in the Philippines.

Sec. 1, P.D. No. 1883 provides that any person who shall engage in the trading or purchase
and sale of foreign currency in violation of existing laws or rules and regulations of the
Central Bank shall be guilty of the crime of blackmarketing of foreign exchange and shall
suffer the penalty of reclusion temporal (minimum of 12 years and 1 day and maximum of
20 years) and a fine of no less than P50,000.00.
At the trial, Lo Chi Fai tried to establish that he was a businessman from Hongkong, that he
had come to the Philippines 9 to 10 times to invest in business in the country with his
business associates, and that he and his business associates declared all the money they
brought in and all declarations were handed to and kept by him.
Because of the revolution taking place in Manila during that time, Lo Chi Fai was urged by
his business associates to come to Manila to bring the money out of the Philippines.
Commissioner of Customs, Alexander Padilla, then filed a complaint against Baltazar R.
Dizon for acquitting Lo Chi Fai.
Issue:
Whether or not respondent Baltazar R. Dizon is guilty of gross incompetence or gross
ignorance of the law in holding that the accused, Lo Chi Fai, for violation of Central Bank
Circular No. 960, the prosecution must establish that the accused had the criminal intent to
violate the law.
Held:
Yes.
Ratio:
Baltazar R. Dizon ignored the fact that the foreign currency and foreign currency
instruments found in the possession of Lo Chi Fai when he was apprehended at the airport
and the amounts of such foreign exchange did not correspond to the foreign currency
declarations presented by Lo Chi Fai at the trial, and that these currency declarations were
declarations belonging to other people.
In invoking the provisions of the Central Bank Circular No. 960 to justify the release of
US$3,000.00 to Lo Chi Fai, Baltazar R. Dizon again diplayed gross incompetence and gross
ignorance of law. There is nothing in the Central Bank Circular which could be taken as
authority for the trial court to release the said amount of US Currency to Lo Chi Fai.