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Introduction
A huge subject broken down into manageable chunks

Random Quote of the Day: Man will never be free until the last king is strangled with the entrails of the
last priest Denis Diderot

Holism in general terms (whether in science, sociology, economics, linguistics or

philosophy) is the idea that all the properties of a given system cannot be determined
or explained by its component parts alone, but the system as a whole determines in
an important way how the parts behave.
In philosophy, the principle of Holism (which comes from the Greek "holos" meaning
"all" or "total") was concisely summarized by Aristotle in his "Metaphysics": "The whole
is more than the sum of its parts". However, the term "holism" was only introduced
into the language by the South African statesman Jan Smuts as recently as 1926.
Holism has significance for Epistemology and the Philosophy of Language in particular.
It is contrasted to Epistemological Reductionism (the position that a complex
system can be explained by reduction to its fundamental parts) or of Atomism(insofar
as it relates to Philosophy of Language, this is the position that sentences have
meaning or content completely independently of their relations to other sentences or
beliefs).
There are two main types, Epistemological Holism (or Confirmation Holism)
and Semantic Holism which are discussed in more detail below.

Types of Holism

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Epistemological Holism (or Confirmation Holism) is the claim that a single scientific
theory cannot be tested in isolation, because a test of one theory
always depends on other theories and hypotheses. One aspect of this is that the
interpretation of observation is "theory-laden" (dependent on theory); another aspect is
that evidence alone is insufficient to determine which theory is correct.
Semantic Holism is a doctrine in the Philosophy of Language to the effect that
a certain part of language (e.g. a term or a complete sentence) can only
be understood through its relations to a (previously understood) larger segment of
language, possibly the entire language. Up until the end of the 19th Century, it was
always assumed that a word gets its meaning in isolation, independently from all
the rest of the words in a language. In 1884, Gottlob Frege formulated his
influential Context Principle, according to which it is only within the context of a
proposition or sentence that a word acquires its meaning.
In the 1950's and 1960's, philosophers such as Ludwig Wittgenstein, W.V.O.
Quine and Donald Davidson broadened this principle still further to arrive at the

position that a sentence (and therefore a word) has meaning only in the context of
a whole language. However, problems arise with the theory because, given
the limits of our cognitive abilities, we will never be able to master the whole of any
language, and it also fails to explain how two speakers can mean the same thing when
using
the
same
linguistic
expression
(and
how
communication
is
even possible between them).
Confirmation Holism and Semantic Holism are inextricably linked, and yet, although
Confirmation Holism is widely acceptedamong philosophers, Semantic Holism is
much less so. The question remains as to how the two holisms can be distinguished,
and how the undesirable consequences of "unbuttoned holism" can be limited.
Moderate Holism (or Semantic Molecularism) is a compromise position, which holds
that the meanings of words depend on some subset of the language (not the entire
language). The argument then arises as to which parts of a language
are"constitutive" of the meaning of an expression.

A is A: Aristotle's Law of Identity

Everything that exists has a specific nature. Each entity exists as something in
particular and it has characteristics that are a part of what it is. "This leaf is red, solid,
dry, rough, and flammable." "This book is white, and has 312 pages." "This coin is
round, dense, smooth, and has a picture on it." In all three of these cases we are
referring to an entity with a specific identity; the particular type of identity, or the trait
discussed, is not important. Their identities include all of their features, not just those
mentioned.
Identity is the concept that refers to this aspect of existence; the aspect of existing as
something in particular, with specific characteristics. An entity without an identity
cannot exist because it would be nothing. To exist is to exist as something, and that
means
to
exist
with
a
particular
identity.
To have an identity means to have a single identity; an object cannot have two
identities. A tree cannot be a telephone, and a dog cannot be a cat. Each entity exists
as something specific, its identity is particular, and it cannot exist as something else.
An entity can have more than one characteristic, but any characteristic it has is a part
of its identity. A car can be both blue and red, but not at the same time or not in the
same respect. Whatever portion is blue cannot be red at the same time, in the same
way. Half the car can be red, and the other half blue. But the whole car can't be both
red and blue. These two traits, blue and red, each have single, particular identities.

The concept of identity is important because it makes explicit that reality has a
definite nature. Since reality has an identity, it is knowable. Since it exists in a
particular way, it has no contradictions.
Aristotle's Principle of Non-Contradiction (PNC for short)
Summary of Stanford Encyclopedia Article's main points
three versions of the principle of non-contradiction
o semantic (i.e. about truth and statements)
opposite assertions cannot be true at the same time (Metaph IV 6
1011b1320)
this version is a variant of the ontological version below
o doxastic (i.e. about our beliefs)
It is impossible to hold (suppose) the same thing to be and not to
be (Metaph IV 3 1005b24 cf.1005b2930)
i.e. it is impossible to hold the same thing to be F and not to be F.
this may not seem plausible
People have inconsistent beliefs
Must one believe the consequences of one's beliefs?
Can one knowingly believe an outright
contradiction?
what a man says he does not necessarily
believe (Metaph IV 3 1005b2326)
An alternate way of understanding the doxastic claim:
one should not hold the same thing to be F and not to be F.

 not a descriptive, but a normative claim, a claim about what

it is rational to believe.
one cannot rationally hold the same thing to be F and
not-F.
distinguish the possibility of believing that x is F and not F in a
particular case from the possibility of disbelieving the first version
of PNC in its full generality.
o ontological (i.e. about what exists)

This one is the one referred to as PNC and is usually taken to

be the main version of the principle

It is impossible for the same thing to belong and not to belong at

the same time to the same thing and in the same respect (Metaph
IV 3 1005b1920).
with the appropriate qualifications: The same thing that belongs
must be one and the same thing and it must be the actual thing and
not merely its linguistic expression. Also, the thing that belongs
must belong actually, and not merely potentially, to its bearer.
o Which version Aristotle intends to establish is a matter of controversy.
PNC cannot be proven, but there are some very strong indications that it is
right:
o Without it, we could not do many things, Aristotle claims:
we could not demarcate the subject matter of any of the special
sciences,
we would not be able to distinguish between what something is,
for example a human being or a rabbit, and what it is like, for
example pale or white.
Aristotle's own distinction between essence and accident would be
impossible to draw

 the inability to draw distinctions in general would make rational

discussion impossible
o So there are indirect indications that it is right.
o BUT all of the above assumes that those who deny PNC claim that PNC
applies nowhere at all: that there is no area in which It is impossible for
the same thing to belong and not to belong at the same time to the same
thing and in the same respect.
Could an opponent claim that PNC works in most areas, but not
all?
Where does Aristotle talk about it?
o Metaphysics IV (Gamma) 36, especially 4
BY FAR the most important discussion
o in De Interpretatione
o chapter 11 of Posterior Analytics I
Where is the PNC in Aristotle's system
o In the Metaphysics: it is part of the study of being qua being
How it belongs there is a matter of some controversy: it does not
seem obvious that it belongs there.
o It is a "common axiom"
Common to what? to all the special sciences (i.e. biology,
mathematics, geology, etc.)
but it is also common to the science of being qua being: no
science can prove PNC: it is indemonstrable
axiom? it is not demonstrable and so is at the bedrock of any
science

 if it were demonstrable, the premises of that demonstration

would be more basic
also, it cannot be demonstrated because every
demonstration relies on its being right
you cannot prove it is right by assuming it is right
that would be "begging the question"
you cannot suppose for a moment that it is
wrong and then see what happens, because
"seeing what happens" involves assuming that
it is right!
o It has no specific subject matter: it applies to everything that is (the
ontological version) as well as to everything one thinks or imagines
(doxastic version).
o Is it prior to truth, reference and identity?
it assumes identity: it cannot be formulated without it: "one and
the same thing" involves identity
this is pushing the Aristotelian envelope: that never stops scholars
Refuting those who deny the PNC
o Although it cannot be demonstrated, those who deny it can be refuted on
their own terms.
o The Greek term for "refutation" was "elenchus": it was used often of
Socrates' method of arguing.
o The method:
"opponent" says that some claim is the case.
"opponent" also agrees that a couple other things are the case.
But the other things conflict with the first claim.

 So "opponent" is inconsistent and must give up either the original

claim or some of the subsequent claims.
o Aristotle is trying to show that the opponent of the PNC is committed to
one thing that is not contradictory.
The opponent is not bothered by inconsistency: that is what it
means to deny PNC.
Aristotle assumes his opponent takes the very strong position that
for any x and for any F, it is possible for F to belong and not to
belong to x at the same time in the same respect.
Aristotle wants to draw the opponent into saying
something, without making a complete statement, that
shows that he does accept that x is F and is not at the same
time not F
Aristotle seems to be arguing that the world conforms to PNC, or
that PNC is true, because it is presupposed by and explains the
opponent's ability to say something significant.
Aristotle may be aiming to show that the ontological version of
the principle of non-contradiction is true, or he may be aiming to
show merely that it cannot be disbelieved
Aristotle's challenge to his opponent:
o signify some one thing to both herself and another person.
in other words, communicate just one thing: "dog" or "man" for
instance.
if the communication works (i.e. if the person communicating and
the person being communicated with both understand the same
thing), then Aristotle thinks the opponent is committed to PNC in
at least one instance.
Aristotle is showing the opponent that if she wants to reject PNC
she must:

 pick out the same object (e.g. "human being") and say that
contradictory predicates apply to it
if she does not mean anything definite by human being,
for example, then she will be unable to pick out a subject of
predication, for example, a human being, and say that
contradictory predicates apply.
o opponents cannot have any one thing to which accidents are attributed
Aristotle's "substance" and "essence" serves to provide the thing
to which accidents adhere
those who deny PNC canot have such a thing to hold accidents
together: they claim that every x is F and is not F.
thus they cannot have "substance"
it makes no sense to say the "pale" is "musical"
you have to say the pale "thing" is also a musical "thing": and that
requires a "thing" that just is that thing (and not not that thing)
it also makes no sense to say that Jacques is just a bundle of
accidents: without some unifying factor to make them all
"Jacques," they are just a heap of accidents without unity: that
unifying factor must make them one thing and not not one thing.
o What if opponent refuses to take the challenge?
opponent is no better than a vegetable
both in that Aristotle cannot talk to a vegetable and in that the
opponent cannot show that she is not a vegetable
even if opponent refuses to try to communicate, she must still act,
and action involves commitment to the claim that something in
the world is x and not not-x.

 opponent might reply that she can act "as if" there are
things in the world that are what they are and are not what
they are not.
in that case, all Aristotle shows is that we have to act "as if"
PNC is correct. That is something.
but Aristotle obviously wants more
can he have more?
o Aristotle claims that rejecting PNC involves rejecting anything that plays
the role of making it the case that we can reliably communicate AND
also involves rejecting any metaphysical analysis of things in the world
that makes it the case that thing are just what they are and not
simultaneously not what they are.
At the end of Metaphysics IV.4, Aristotle says:
However much all things may be so and not so, still there is a
more and a less in the nature of things; for we should not say that
two and three are equally even, nor is he who thinks four things
are five equally wrong with him who thinks they are a thousand. If
then they are not equally wrong, obviously one is less wrong and
therefore more right. If then that which has more of any quality is
nearer to it, there must be some truth to which the more true is
nearer.
o Aristotle never works it out, but what about a world in which our views
are mere approximations of truth, and even if they happen to be the truth,
we cannot be certain of that? I.e. a world like that of modern science.
Could there be a "fuzzy" or "vague" essentialism?
Aristotle's confused opponents:
o In Metaphysics IV.5, Aristotle talks about opponents who see a thing
changing and conclude from their observations of chance that the same
thing must have had contrary properties. Contrary properties come into
existence out of the same thing.

 Here, Aristotle introduces the distinction between potential and

actual.
X an be both potentially F and actually not-F
but X cannot be both actually F and actually not-F.
o Other opponents had a problem because of conflicting appearances (the
following is verbatim from the Stanf. Enc. of Phil.):
There are three sorts of cases of conflicting appearances:
Things appear different to different members of the same
species, e.g., the same thing is thought bitter by some and
sweet by others (Metaph IV 5 1009b23).
Things appear different to members of different species
(e.g., to other animals and to us) (Metaph IV 5 1009b78).
Things do not always appear the same even to the senses of
the same individual (Metaph IV 5 1009b89).
It is not clear which appearances are true and which false (Metaph
IV 5 1009b10).
Conclusions:
Nothing is true (Democritus in dogmatic mood, Metaph IV
5 1009b1112).
(If something is true) it is not clear to us (Democritus in
skeptical mood, Metaph IV 5 1009b12).
Everything is just as true as everything else. (This is
mentioned as an explanation of premiss 2 at Metaph IV 5
1009b1011. It is Protagoras's view, as described at the
beginning of the chapter.)
Aristotle agrees with 1

 Aristotle disagrees with 2: he does not think that people are really
confused about which appearances are right in cases of conflicting
appearances:
they trust experts
they trust their senses for things each sense is authoritative
about
many moderns take conflicting appearances seriously, especially
in ethics.
Another set of opponents are "Protagoras, Heraclitus, and
Theaetetus," who are characters in Plato's
dialogue Theaetetus
In Metaphysics IV 5, Aristotle mentions Protagoras' doctrine that
each individual human being is the measure of all things. In his
At Theaetetus 151183, Plato argues that Theaetetus, who holds
that knowledge is nothing but perception, is committed to
Protagoras's view via an argument from conflicting appearances.
If the wind appears cold to you but hot to me and knowledge is
nothing but perception, then we must both be correct, as
Protagoras says.
Plato argues that Protagoras is committed to the view that
nothing is anything in itself (otherwise one might be wrong
about how it really is) and to a secret Heraclitean
doctrine of flux. In order to accommodate more and more
conflicting appearances, and to avoid violating PNC, more
and more flux is needed, until we reach a radical version of
Heraclitus's doctrine according to which everything is so
and not so (Tht 183), with accompanying difficulties for
ordinary language. The extended argument also contains a
mini-argument, a self-refutation, where Plato draws the
exquisite conclusion that Protagoras refutes himself if he
agrees that other people disagree with his own view (Tht
171A-D). If they are right, then he must be wrong!

 elements of Plato's discussion re-surface in Aristotle's

Metaphysics IV.
Protagoras's view and the suggestion that everything
is so and not so go hand in hand.
Heraclitus's followers thought that there is so much
change in the world that it is impossible to say
anything true, and so Cratylus, one of their number,
was reduced to wagging his finger.
Cratylus was mistaken: when things change,
something persists, and even if the quantity of a
thing is not constant, we know each thing by what
sort of thing it is.

At the end of chapter 6, Aristotle concludes, Let this, then suffice to show (1)
that the firmest belief is that opposite assertions are not true at the same time,
(2) what happens to those who speak in this way and (3) why people do speak
in this way (Metaph IV 6 1011b1315).
o On the first point, as we saw, it is controversial whether Aristotle's
conclusion that the firmest belief is a belief in PNC carries with it the
presupposition that PNC is true, a presupposition that is needed for his
own project of first philosophy.
o On the third point, Aristotle discusses views about perception and
change that lead people to say that they reject PNC.
o On the second point, Aristotle shows that those who say that they reject
PNC do not really do so, or, if they do, they will be giving up intelligible
discourse and action, andone might addthey will be living in a
world of mere sophistry and power.
o It is controversial how much of an essentialist or indeed realist view one
must accept if one accepts PNC, but it is clear that PNC is essential for
the project of an Aristotelian science.

o Without it, Aristotle notes, beginners in philosophy who are interested in

the truth would be off on a wild goose chase (Metaph VI 5 1009b368).