Estate of Miguel Mamuyac, deceased FRANCISCO GAGO, petitioner-appellant,
vs. CORNELIO MAMUYAC, AMBROSIO LARIOSA, FELICIANA BAUZON, and CATALINA
MAMUYAC, opponents-appellees. G.R. No. L-26317 ; January 29, 1927 ; J. Johnson NATURE: Appeal from CFI decision denying the probate of the decedents will FACTS: The deceased priest Miguel Mamuyac executed a last will and testament in July 1918. After his death, his sister, Narcisa Mamuyac-Gago and her husband, herein petitioner Francisco Gago, initiated probate proceedings for the admittance of the 1918 will into probate. This was opposed by herein respondents. The probate court did not probate the will upon the ground that the deceased had executed a NEW WILL AND TESTAMENT on April 1919. This APRIL 1919 Will was submitted for probate by the Gagos. Again, the respondents opposed, this time averring that the 1919 will is just a CARBON COPY of the 1918 will. The probate court DENIED probate based on its findings: 1) That the 1919 will was indeed just a carbon copy of the 1918 will; 2) That the original will was in the possession of the deceased; this fact was in a way corroborated by Narcisa Mamuyac-Gago (Petitioner) herself, admitting that the original was in the possession of her deceased brother; 3) That this will was REVOKED in 1920 by the deceased during his lifetime per testimony of Jose Fenoy, who typed the will of the deceased; 4) That the cancellation was voluntarily done by the deceased after he sold his house and lot to a certain Carlos Bejar; That per testimony of said Carlos Bejar, the deceased assured him that the will be revoked after the sale. ISSUE: WON the will should be probated HELD: No RATIO: In probate proceedings, the petitioner has to prove 1) that the will exists and 2) that the will was executed with all the formalities required by law. Here, the petitioners were able to prove that there was a will, per their presentation of the carbon copy of the original will. However, evidence shows that the original will was REVOKED by the deceased. First, it is not disputed that the original will was in the possession of the deceased. Where a will which cannot be found is shown to have been in the possession of the testator, when last seen, the presumption is, in the absence of other competent evidence, that the same was cancelled or destroyed. The same presumption arises where it is shown that the testator had ready access to the will and it cannot be found after his death. It will not be presumed that such will has been destroyed by any other person without the knowledge or authority of the testator. The force of the presumption of cancellation or revocation by the testator, while varying greatly, being weak or strong according to the circumstances, is never conclusive, but may be overcome by proof that the will was not destroyed by the testator with intent to revoke it. The law does not require any evidence of the revocation or cancellation of a will to be preserved. It therefore becomes difficult at times to prove the revocation or cancellation of wills. Here, however, the presumption of revocation applies and was not overcome by contrary evidence by the petitioners.