1.

ACCESS TO PUBLIC INFORMATION

LEGASPI, petitioner, vs. CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION, respondent.
FACTS : The fundamental right of the people to information on matters of public concern is invoked in
this special civil action for mandamus instituted by petitioner Valentin L. Legaspi against the Civil Service
Commission. The respondent had earlier denied Legaspi's request for information on the civil service
eligibilities of certain persons employed as sanitarians in the Health Department of Cebu City. These
government employees, Julian Sibonghanoy and Mariano Agas, had allegedly represented themselves as
civil service eligibles who passed the civil service examinations for sanitarians.
ISSUE : WON the petitioner has legal to access government records to validate the civil service
eligibilities of the Health Department employees
HELD : The constitutional guarantee to information on matters of public concern is not absolute. It does
not open every door to any and all information. Under the Constitution, access to official records, papers,
etc., are "subject to limitations as may be provided by law" The law may therefore exempt certain types of
information from public scrutiny, such as those affecting national security It follows that, in every case, the
availability of access to a particular public record must be circumscribed by the nature of the information
sought, i.e., (a) being of public concern or one that involves public interest, and, (b) not being exempted by
law from the operation of the constitutional guarantee. The threshold question is, therefore, whether or not
the information sought is of public interest or public concern. This question is first addressed to the
government agency having custody of the desired information. However, as already discussed, this does
not give the agency concerned any discretion to grant or deny access. In case of denial of access, the
government agency has the burden of showing that the information requested is not of public concern, or, if
it is of public concern, that the same has been exempted by law from the operation of the guarantee. To
hold otherwise will serve to dilute the constitutional right. As aptly observed, ". . . the government is in an
advantageous position to marshall and interpret arguments against release . . ." (87 Harvard Law Review
1511 [1974]). To safeguard the constitutional right, every denial of access by the government agency
concerned is subject to review by the courts, and in the proper case, access may be compelled by a writ of
Mandamus Public office being a public trust it is the legitimate concern of citizens to ensure that
government positions requiring civil service eligibility are occupied only by persons who are eligibles.
Public officers are at all times accountable to the people even as to their eligibilities for their respective
positions. In the instant, case while refusing to confirm or deny the claims of eligibility, the respondent has
failed to cite any provision in the Civil Service Law which would limit the petitioner's right to know who
are, and who are not, civil service eligibles. We take judicial notice of the fact that the names of those who
pass the civil service examinations, as in bar examinations and licensure examinations for various
professions, are released to the public. Hence, there is nothing secret about one's civil service eligibility, if
actually possessed. Petitioner's request is, therefore, neither unusual nor unreasonable. And when, as in this
case, the government employees concerned claim to be civil service eligibles, the public, through any
citizen, has a right to verify their professed eligibilities from the Civil Service Commission. The civil
service eligibility of a sanitarian being of public concern, and in the absence of express limitations under
the law upon access to the register of civil service eligibles for said position, the duty of the respondent
Commission to confirm or deny the civil service eligibility of any person occupying the position becomes
imperative. Mandamus, therefore lies
Valmonte Vs Belmonte

FACTS : Petitioners in this special civil action for mandamus with preliminary injunction invoke their
right to information and pray that respondent be directed: (a) to furnish petitioners the list of the names of
the Batasang Pambansa members belonging to the UNIDO and PDP-Laban who were able to secure clean
loans immediately before the February 7 election thru the intercession/marginal note of the then First Lady
Imelda Marcos; and/or (b) to furnish petitioners with certified true copies of the documents evidencing
their respective loans; and/or (c) to allow petitioners access to the public records for the subject information
On June 20, 1986, apparently not having yet received the reply of the Government Service and Insurance
System (GSIS) Deputy General Counsel, petitioner Valmonte wrote respondent another letter, saying that
for failure to receive a reply, "(W)e are now considering ourselves free to do whatever action necessary
within the premises to pursue our desired objective in pursuance of public interest."
ISSUE : WON Valmonte, et. al. are entitled as citizens and taxpayers to inquire upon GSIS records on
behest loans given by the former First Lady Imelda Marcos to Batasang Pambansa members belonging to
the UNIDO and PDP-Laban political parties.
HELD : Respondent has failed to cite any law granting the GSIS the privilege of confidentiality as regards
the documents subject of this petition. His position is apparently based merely on considerations of policy.
The judiciary does not settle policy issues. The Court can only declare what the law is, and not what the
law should be. Under our system of government, policy issues are within the domain of the political
branches of the government, and of the people themselves as the repository of all State power. The
concerned borrowers themselves may not succeed if they choose to invoke their right to privacy,
considering the public offices they were holding at the time the loans were alleged to have been granted. It
cannot be denied that because of the interest they generate and their newsworthiness, public figures, most
especially those holding responsible positions in government, enjoy a more limited right to privacy as
compared to ordinary individuals, their actions being subject to closer public scrutiny The "transactions"
used here I suppose is generic and, therefore, it can cover both steps leading to a contract, and already a
consummated contract, Considering the intent of the framers of the Constitution which, though not binding
upon the Court, are nevertheless persuasive, and considering further that government-owned and controlled
corporations, whether performing proprietary or governmental functions are accountable to the people, the
Court is convinced that transactions entered into by the GSIS, a government-controlled corporation created
by special legislation are within the ambit of the people's right to be informed pursuant to the constitutional
policy of transparency in government dealings. Although citizens are afforded the right to information and,
pursuant thereto, are entitled to "access to official records," the Constitution does not accord them a right to
compel custodians of official records to prepare lists, abstracts, summaries and the like in their desire to
acquire information on matters of public concern.
Chavez v. Pea and Amari
Fact:
In 1973, the Comissioner on Public Highways entered into a contract to reclaim areas of Manila Bay with
the Construction and Development Corportion of the Philippines (CDCP).
PEA (Public Estates Authority) was created by President Marcos under P.D. 1084, tasked with developing
and leasing reclaimed lands. These lands were transferred to the care of PEA under P.D. 1085 as part of the
Manila Cavite Road and Reclamation Project (MCRRP). CDCP and PEA entered into an agreement that all
future projects under the MCRRP would be funded and owned by PEA.

By 1988, President Aquino issued Special Patent No. 3517 transferring lands to PEA. It was followed by
the transfer of three Titles (7309, 7311 and 7312) by the Register of Deeds of Paranaque to PEA covering
the three reclaimed islands known as the FREEDOM ISLANDS.
Subsquently, PEA entered into a joint venture agreement (JVA) with AMARI, a Thai-Philippine
corporation to develop the Freedom Islands. Along with another 250 hectares, PEA and AMARI entered
the JVA which would later transfer said lands to AMARI. This caused a stir especially when Sen. Maceda
assailed the agreement, claiming that such lands were part of public domain (famously known as the
mother of all scams).
Peitioner Frank J. Chavez filed case as a taxpayer praying for mandamus, a writ of preliminary injunction
and a TRO against the sale of reclaimed lands by PEA to AMARI and from implementing the JVA.
Following these events, under President Estradas admin, PEA and AMARI entered into an Amended JVA
and Mr. Chaves claim that the contract is null and void.
Issue:
w/n: the transfer to AMARI lands reclaimed or to be reclaimed as part of the stipulations in the (Amended)
JVA between AMARI and PEA violate Sec. 3 Art. XII of the 1987 Constitution
w/n: the court is the proper forum for raising the issue of whether the amended joint venture agreement is
grossly disadvantageous to the government.
Held:
On the issue of Amended JVA as violating the constitution:
1. The 157.84 hectares of reclaimed lands comprising the Freedom Islands, now covered by certificates of
title in the name of PEA, are alienable lands of the public domain. PEA may lease these lands to private
corporations but may not sell or transfer ownership of these lands to private corporations. PEA may only
sell these lands to Philippine citizens, subject to the ownership limitations in the 1987 Constitution and
existing laws.
2. The 592.15 hectares of submerged areas of Manila Bay remain inalienable natural resources of the public
domain until classified as alienable or disposable lands open to disposition and declared no longer needed
for public service. The government can make such classification and declaration only after PEA has
reclaimed these submerged areas. Only then can these lands qualify as agricultural lands of the public
domain, which are the only natural resources the government can alienate. In their present state, the 592.15
hectares of submerged areas are inalienable and outside the commerce of man.
3. Since the Amended JVA seeks to transfer to AMARI, a private corporation, ownership of 77.34
hectares110 of the Freedom Islands, such transfer is void for being contrary to Section 3, Article XII of the
1987 Constitution which prohibits private corporations from acquiring any kind of alienable land of the
public domain.
4. Since the Amended JVA also seeks to transfer to AMARI ownership of 290.156 hectares111 of still
submerged areas of Manila Bay, such transfer is void for being contrary to Section 2, Article XII of the
1987 Constitution which prohibits the alienation of natural resources other than agricultural lands of the
public domain.
PEA may reclaim these submerged areas. Thereafter, the government can classify the reclaimed lands as
alienable or disposable, and further declare them no longer needed for public service. Still, the transfer of
such reclaimed alienable lands of the public domain to AMARI will be void in view of Section 3, Article
XII of the 1987Constitution which prohibits private corporations from acquiring any kind of alienable land
of the public domain.
2. RELIGION AND NON-ESTABLISHMENT OF RELIGION
Estrada vs. Escritor AM P-02-1651, August 4, 2003
FACTS:

Soledad Escritor is a court interpreter since 1999 in the RTC of Las Pinas City. Alejandro Estrada, the
complainant, wrote to Judge Jose F. Caoibes, presiding judge of Branch 253, RTC of Las Pinas City,
requesting for an investigation of rumors that Escritor has been living with Luciano Quilapio Jr., a man not
her husband, and had eventually begotten a son. Escritors husband, who had lived with another woman,
died a year before she entered into the judiciary. On the other hand, Quilapio is still legally married to
another woman. Estrada is not related to either Escritor or Quilapio and is not a resident of Las Pinas but
of Bacoor, Cavite. According to the complainant, respondent should not be allowed to remain employed in
the judiciary for it will appear as if the court allows such act.
Escritor is a member of the religious sect known as the Jehovahs Witnesses and the Watch Tower and
Bible Tract Society where her conjugal arrangement with Quilapio is in conformity with their religious
beliefs. After ten years of living together, she executed on July 28, 1991 a Declaration of Pledging
Faithfulness which was approved by the congregation. Such declaration is effective when legal
impediments render it impossible for a couple to legalize their union. Gregorio, Salazar, a member of the
Jehovahs Witnesses since 1985 and has been a presiding minister since 1991, testified and explained the
import of and procedures for executing the declaration which was completely executed by Escritor and
Quilapios in Atimonan, Quezon and was signed by three witnesses and recorded in Watch Tower Central
Office.
ISSUE: Whether or not respondent should be found guilty of the administrative charge of gross and
immoral conduct and be penalized by the State for such conjugal arrangement.
HELD: A distinction between public and secular morality and religious morality should be kept in mind.
The jurisdiction of the Court extends only to public and secular morality.
The Court states that our Constitution adheres the benevolent neutrality approach that gives room for
accommodation of religious exercises as required by the Free Exercise Clause. This benevolent neutrality
could allow for accommodation of morality based on religion, provided it does not offend compelling state
interests.
The states interest is the preservation of the integrity of the judiciary by maintaining among its ranks a
high standard of morality and decency. There is nothing in the OCAs (Office of the Court Administrator)
memorandum to the Court that demonstrates how this interest is so compelling that it should override
respondents plea of religious freedom. Indeed, it is inappropriate for the complainant, a private person, to
present evidence on the compelling interest of the state. The burden of evidence should be discharged by
the proper agency of the government which is the Office of the Solicitor General.
In order to properly settle the case at bar, it is essential that the government be given an opportunity to
demonstrate the compelling state interest it seeks to uphold in opposing the respondents position that her
conjugal arrangement is not immoral and punishable as it is within the scope of free exercise protection.
The Court could not prohibit and punish her conduct where the Free Exercise Clause protects it, since this
would be an unconstitutional encroachment of her right to religious freedom. Furthermore, the court
cannot simply take a passing look at respondents claim of religious freedom but must also apply the
compelling state interest test.
IN VIEW WHEREOF, the case is REMANDED to the Office of the Court Administrator. The Solicitor
General is ordered to intervene in the case where it will be given the opportunity (a) to examine the

sincerity and centrality of respondent's claimed religious belief and practice; (b) to present evidence on the
state's "compelling interest" to override respondent's religious belief and practice; and (c) to show that the
means the state adopts in pursuing its interest is the least restrictive to respondent's religious freedom. The
rehearing should be concluded thirty (30) days from the Office of the Court Administrator's receipt of this
Decision.
Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602 (1971)
Facts:
Pennsylvania and Rhode Island statutes provided state aid to church-related elementary and secondary
schools. A group of individual taxpayers and religious liberty organizations filed suit, challenging the
constitutionality of the program. They claimed that, since the program primarily aided parochial schools, it
violated the Establishment Clause.
Issue:
Whether states can create programs that provide financial support to nonpublic elementary and secondary
schools by way or reimbursement for the cost of teachers salaries, textbooks, and instructional materials in
specified secular subjects (Pennsylvania) -- or pay a salary supplement directly to teachers of secular
subjects in religious schools (Rhode Island).
Holding:
In a unanimous decision, the Court held that both programs violate the Establishment Clause because they
create excessive entanglement between a religious entity and the state.
Reasoning:
The Court looked to three factors in determining the constitutionality of the contested programs, factors
that would become known as the Lemon test. First, whether the legislature passed the statute based on a
secular legislative purpose. The Court could find no evidence that the goal of the Pennsylvania or Rhode
Island legislatures was to advance religion. Instead the Court relied on the stated purpose, that the bill was
designed to improve "the quality of the secular education in all schools covered by the compulsory
attendance laws." Second, the Court questioned whether the programs had the primary effect of advancing
or inhibiting religion. It bypassed this prong by examining the third prong and finding a violation there,
thus obviating the need for analysis of this point. The third factor, and the point at which the Court found
the constitutional defect, was over the issue of excessive entanglement. Here, the Court held that the states
oversight and auditing requirements and the propensity for political divisiveness generated by this kind of
aid program would entangle the state and the religious entity in unconstitutional ways.
Majority:
"First, the statute must have a secular legislative purpose; second, its principal or primary effect must be
one that neither advances nor inhibits religion; finally, the statute must not foster 'excessive entanglement
with religion.'" (Chief Justice Warren Burger)
Board of Ed v. Allen
Facts of the case
A 1965 amendment to New York's Education Law required public school boards to lend textbooks to
elementary and secondary school students enrolled in private and parochial schools. The Board of
Education for New York Central School District No. 1, contending that the law violated the Establishment
and Free Exercise Clauses of the First Amendment, filed suit against James Allen, Commissioner of
Education, requesting a declaratory injunction to prevent enforcement of the statute. The trial court agreed
with the board and found the statute unconstitutional. The Appellate Division reversed the ruling, finding
that the boards lacked standing. On appeal, the New York Court of Appeals ruled the boards did have
standing, but also found that, because the law's purpose was to benefit all students regardless of the type of
school they attended, the law did not violate the First Amendment.
Question

Do the Establishment and Free Exercise Clauses of the First Amendment forbid New York from requiring
that public school boards loan textbooks to parochial school students without cost?
Conclusion
No. In a 6-3 opinion authored by Justice Byron R. White, the Court applied the test constructed
in Abington School District v. Schempp and found that, because the stated legislative purpose and necessary
effects of the statute did not advance any one religion or religion in general, the law did not violate the First
Amendment. Because the books were given to the students, rather than the parochial schools themselves,
the Court reasoned, "the financial benefit is to parents and children, not schools."
EBRALINAG, ET AL VS. DIV. SUPT. OF SCHOOLS OF CEBU G.R. No. 95770, March 1, 1993
Facts:
In 1989, DECS Regional Office in Cebu received complaints about teachers and pupils belonging to the
Jehovahs Witness, and enrolled in various public and private schools, which refused to sing the Phil.
National Anthem, salute the flag and recite the patriotic pledge.
Division Superintendent of schools, Susana B. Cabahug of the Cebu Division of DECS and her Assistant
issued Division Memorandum No. 108, dated Nov. 17, 1989, directing District Supervisors, High School
Principals and Heads of Private Educational institutions to remove from service, after due process, teachers
and school employees, and to deprive the students and pupils from the benefit of public education, if they
do not participate in daily flag ceremony and doesnt obey flag salute rule.
Members of the Jehovahs Witness sect find such memorandum to be contrary to their religious belief and
choose not to obey. Despite a number of appropriate persuasions made by the Cebu officials to let them
obey the directives, still they opted to follow their conviction to their belief. As a result, an order was
issued by the district supervisor of Daan Bantayan District of Cebu, dated July 24, 1990, ordering the
dropping from the list in the school register of all Jehovahs Witness teachers and pupils from Grade 1 to
Grade 6 who opted to follow their belief which is against the Flag Salute Law, however, given a chance to
be re-accepted if they change their mind.
Some Jehovahs Witness members appealed to the Secretary of Education but the latter did not answer to
their letter.
On Oct. 31, 1990, students and their parents filed special civil actions for Mandamus, Certiorari and
prohibition, alleging that the respondents acted without or in excess of their jurisdiction and with grave
abuse of discretion in ordering their expulsion without prior notice and hearing, hence, in violation of their
right to due process, their right to free public education and their right to freedom of speech, religion and
worship. Petitioners prayed for the voiding of the order of expulsion or dropping from the rolls issued by
the District Supervisor; prohibiting and enjoining respondent from barring them from classes; and
compelling the respondent and all persons acting for him to admit and order their(Petitioners) re-admission
I their respective schools.
On November 27, 1990, Court issued a TRO and writ of preliminary mandatory injunction, commanding
the respondents to immediately re-admit the petitioners to their respective classes until further orders.
On May 31, the Solicitor General filed a consolidated comment to the petitions defending the expulsion
orders issued by the respondents.

Petitioners stressed that while they do not take part in the compulsory flag ceremony, they do not engage in
external acts or behavior that would offend their countrymen who believe in expressing their love of
country through observance of the flag ceremony. They quietly stand at attention during the flag ceremony
to show their respect for the right of those who choose to participate in the solemn proceedings. Since they
do not engage in disruptive behavior, there is no warrant for their expulsion.
Issue: Whether or not the expulsion of the members of Jehovahs Witness from the schools violates right
receive free education.
Held:
The expulsion of the members of Jehovahs Witness from the schools where they are enrolled will violate
their right as Philippine citizens, under the 1987 Constitution, to receive free education, for it is the duty of
the state to protect and promote the right of all citizens to quality education, and to make such education
accessible to all (Sec. I, Art XIV). Nevertheless, their right not to participate in the Flag Ceremony does not
give them a right to disrupt such patriotic exercises. If they quietly stand at attention during flag ceremony
while their classmates and teachers salute the flag, sing the national anthem and recite the patriotic pledge,
we do not see how such conduct may possibly disturb the peace, or pose a grave and present danger of a
serious evil to public safety, public morals, public health or any legitimate public interest that the state has
a right and duty to prevent.
It is appropriate to recall the Japanese occupation of our country in 1942-1944 when every Filipino,
regardless of religious persuasion, in fear of the invader, saluted the Japanese flag and bowed before every
Japanese soldier, perhaps if petitioners had lived through that dark period of our history, they would not
quibble now about saluting the Phil. Flag.
The petitions for certiorari and prohibition are granted and expulsion orders are hereby annulled and set
aside.
Jimmy Swaggart Ministries v.Board of Equalization of California
California law required retailers to pay a 6 percent sales tax on in-state sales of tangible personal property
and residents to pay a 6 percent use tax on such property if purchased out of state. Jimmy Swaggart
Ministries, incorporated in Louisiana, sold religious materials to California residents through several direct
and mail-order "evangelistic crusades." After auditing his ministry, the California Board of Equalization
("Board") told Swaggart that under California law he had to register his ministry as a seller so the Board
could collect the appropriate sales and use taxes. After paying the taxes, Swaggart petitioned the Board for
a refund. When his petition was rejected, Swaggart challenged the Board in state court. Following two
unfavorable rulings below, the U.S. Supreme Court granted Swaggart's petition for certiorari.
Question
Did California's imposition of a sales and use tax on the sale of religious materials violate the Free Exercise
or Establishment Clauses of the First Amendment?
Conclusion
No. Basing its unanimous decision on the fact that California's sales and use tax was not a flat tax, affected
only a small portion of retail sales, and was neutrally applied, the Court found the taxes constitutional.

Moreover, since the taxes were not imposed as a precondition to spreading any given message and were
due regardless of registration, the Court rejected Swaggart's claim that California's no-fee registration
requirement acted as a prior restraint on his religious organization. Finally, the Court held that any
administrative burdens associated with the payment of taxes did not give rise to an establishment conflict
since they did not cause excessive entanglement between the government and Swaggart's organization.
Iglesia Ni Cristo Vs. Court of Appeals G.R. No. 119673 July 26, 1996
Facts:
Petitioner has a television program entitled "Ang Iglesia Ni Cristo" aired on Channel 2 every Saturday and
on Channel 13 every Sunday. The program presents and propagates petitioner's religious beliefs, doctrines
and practices often times in comparative studies with other religions. Petitioner submitted to the respondent
Board of Review for Moving Pictures and Television the VTR tapes of its TV program Series Nos. 116,
119, 121 and 128. The Board classified the series as "X" or not for public viewing on the ground that they
"offend and constitute an attack against other religions which is expressly prohibited by law."
On December 14, 1992, petitioner also filed against the respondent Board Civil Case No. Q-92-14280, with
the RTC, NCR Quezon City. Petitioner alleged that the respondent Board acted without jurisdiction or with
grave abuse of discretion in requiring petitioner to submit the VTR tapes of its TV program and in x-rating
them. It cited its TV Program Series Nos. 115, 119, 121 and 128.
The RTC ruled in favour of the petitioners. The Court of Appeals however reversed it, hence this petition.
Issues:
1.
Whether or Not the "ang iglesia ni cristo" program is not constitutionally protected as a form of
religious exercise and expression.
2.
Whether the respondent Board has the power to review petitioner's TV program "Ang Iglesia ni
Cristo,"
Ruling:
Yes. Any act that restrains speech is accompanied with presumption of invalidity. Under our constitutional
scheme, it is not the task of the State to favor any religion by protecting it against an attack by another
religion. Religious dogmas and beliefs are often at war and to preserve peace among their followers,
especially the fanatics, the establishment clause of freedom of religion prohibits the State from leaning
towards any religion. Respondent board cannot censor the speech of petitioner Iglesia ni Cristo simply
because it attacks other religions, even if said religion happens to be the most numerous church in our
country. The basis of freedom of religion is freedom of thought and it is best served by encouraging the
marketplace of dueling ideas. It is only where it is unavoidably necessary to prevent an immediate and
grave danger to the security and welfare of the community that infringement of religious freedom may be
justified, and only to the smallest extent necessary to avoid the danger. There is no showing whatsoever of
the type of harm the tapes will bring about especially the gravity and imminence of the threatened harm.
Prior restraint on speech, including religious speech, cannot be justified by hypothetical fears but only by
the showing of a substantive and imminent evil. It is inappropriate to apply the clear and present danger test
to the case at bar because the issue involves the content of speech and not the time, place or manner of
speech.
The second issue can be resolved by examining the powers of the Board under PD No. 1986 particularly
Section 3. The law gives the Board the power to screen, review and examine all "television programs." By

the clear terms of the law, the Board has the power to "approve, delete . . . and/or prohibit the . . . exhibition
and/or television broadcast of . . . television programs . . ." The law also directs the Board to apply
"contemporary Filipino cultural values as standard" to determine those which are objectionable for being
"immoral, indecent, contrary to law and/or good customs, injurious to the prestige of the Republic of the
Philippines and its people, or with a dangerous tendency to encourage the commission of violence or of a
wrong or crime."
IN VIEW WHEREOF, the Decision of the respondent Court of Appeals dated March 24, 1995 is affirmed
insofar as it sustained the jurisdiction of the respondent MTRCB to review petitioner's TV program entitled
"Ang Iglesia ni Cristo," and is reversed and set aside
3. EMINENT DOMAIN
De Knecht v. Bautista
FACTS:
The plan to extend EDSA to Roxas Boulevard to be ultimately linked to the Cavite Coastal Road Project,
originally called for the expropriation of properties along Cuneta Avenue in Pasay City. Later on, however,
the Ministry of Public Highways decided to make the proposed extension pass through Fernando Rein and
Del Pan Streets. Because of the protests of residents of the latter, the Commission on Human Settlements
recommended the reversion to the original plan, but the Ministry argued the new route which save the
government P2 million. The government filed expropriation proceedings against the owners of Fernando
Rein and Del Pan Streets, among whom was petitioner.
ISSUE:
Whether or not there is a genuine need to expropriate the properties owned by De Knecht and others
similarly situated on the ground that the choice of properties to be expropriated seemed arbitrarily made by
the DPWH.
HELD:
The choice of Fernando Rein and Del Pan Streets is arbitrary and should not receive judicial approval. The
Human Settlements Commission concluded that the cost factor is so minimal that it can be disregarded in
making a choice between the two lines. The factor of functionality strongly militates against the choice of
Fernando Rein and Del Pan Streets, while the factor of social and economic impact bears grievously on the
residents of Cuneta Avenue. While the issue would seem to boil down to a choice between people, on one
hand, and progress and development, on the other, it is to be remembered that progress and development
are carried out for the benefit of the people.
Heirs of Juancho Ardona vs. Reyes
Facts: The Philippine Tourism Authority filed 4 complaints with the Court of First Instance of Cebu City
for the expropriation of some 282 hectares of rolling land situated in barangay Alubog and Babag, Cebu
City, under PTAs express authority to acquire by purchase, by negotiation or by condemnation
proceedings any private land within and without the tourist zones for the purposes indicated in Section 5,
paragraph B(2), of its Revised Charter (PD 564). The heirs of Juancho Ardona et. Al, ) filed their
oppositions, and had a common allegation in that the taking is allegedly not impressed with public use
under the Constitution; alleging that there is no specific constitutional provision authorizing the taking of
private property for tourism purposes; that assuming that PTA has such power, the intended use cannot be
paramount to the determination of the land as a land reform area; that limiting the amount of compensation
by legislative fiat is constitutionally repugnant; and that since the land is under the land reform program, it
is the Court of Agrarian Relations and not the Court of First Instance (CFI), that has jurisdiction over the
expropriation cases. The Philippine Tourism Authority having deposited with the Philippine National Bank,
Cebu City Branch, an amount equivalent to 10% of the value of the properties pursuant to Presidential

Decree No. 1533, the lower court issued separate orders authorizing PTA to take immediate possession of
the premises and directing the issuance of writs of possession. The Heirs of Ardona, et. al. then filed a
petition for certiorari with preliminary injunction before the Supreme Court.
Issue: Whether the expropriation of parcels of land for the purpose of constructing a sports complex by the
Philippine Tourism Authority be considered taking for public use.
Held: The states power of eminent domain extends to the expropriation of land for tourism purposes
although this specific objective is not expressed in the constitution. The policy objectives of the framers
can be expressed only in general terms such as social justice, local autonomy, conservation and
development of the national patrimony public interest, and general welfare, among others. The programs to
achieve these objectives vary from time to time and according to place. To freeze specific programs like
tourism into express provisions would make the constitution more prolix than bulky code and require of the
framers a prescience beyond Delphic proportions. The particular mention in the constitution of agrarian
reform and transfer of utilities and other private enterprises to public ownership merely underscores the
magnitude of the problems sought to be remedied by this programs. They do not preclude nor limit the
exercise of the power of eminent domain for the purposes like tourism and other development program
EPZA VS. DULAY [148 SCRA 305; G.R. No. L-59603; 29 Apr 1987]
Facts:
The four parcels of land which are the subject of this case is where the Mactan Export Processing Zone
Authority in Cebu (EPZA) is to be constructed. Private respondent San Antonio Development Corporation
(San Antonio, for brevity), in which these lands are registered under, claimed that the lands were
expropriated to the government without them reaching the agreement as to the compensation. Respondent
Judge Dulay then issued an order for the appointment of the commissioners to determine the just
compensation. It was later found out that the payment of the government to San Antonio would be P15 per
square meter, which was objected to by the latter contending that under PD 1533, the basis of just
compensation shall be fair and according to the fair market value declared by the owner of the property
sought to be expropriated, or by the assessor, whichever is lower. Such objection and the subsequent
Motion for Reconsideration were denied and hearing was set for the reception of the commissioners
report. EPZA then filed this petition for certiorari and mandamus enjoining the respondent from further
hearing the case.
Issue: Whether or Not the exclusive and mandatory mode of determining just compensation in PD 1533 is
unconstitutional.
Held:
The Supreme Court ruled that the mode of determination of just compensation in PD 1533 is
unconstitutional.
The method of ascertaining just compensation constitutes impermissible encroachment to judicial
prerogatives. It tends to render the courts inutile in a matter in which under the Constitution is reserved to it
for financial determination. The valuation in the decree may only serve as guiding principle or one of the
factors in determining just compensation, but it may not substitute the courts own judgment as to what
amount should be awarded and how to arrive at such amount. The determination of just compensation is a
judicial function. The executive department or the legislature may make the initial determination but when
a party claims a violation of the guarantee in the Bill of Rights that the private party may not be taken for
public use without just compensation, no statute, decree, or executive order can mandate that its own

determination shall prevail over the courts findings. Much less can the courts be precluded from looking
into the justness of the decreed compensation.
Sumulong v. Guerrero 154 SCRA 461 (1987)
F: On December 5, 1977, the National Housing Authority filed a complaint for the expropriation of 25
hectares of land in Antipolo, Rizal pursuant to PD 1224 authorizing the expropriation of private lands for
socialized housing. Among those lands sought to be expropriated are the petitioners' lands. They brought
this suit in the SC challenging the constitutionality of PD 1224.
HELD: Petitioners contend that socialized housing for the purpose of condemnation proceedings is not
public use since it will benefit only a handful of people. The "public use" requirement is an evolving
concept influences by changing conditions. Urban renewal or redevelopment and the construction of lowcost housing is recognized as a public purpose, not only because of the expanded concept of public use but
also because of specific provisions in the Constitution. Shortage in housing is a matter of state concern
since it directly and significantly affects public health, safety, the environment and, in sum, the general
welfare. Petitioners claim that there are vast areas of lands in Rizal hundreds of hectares of which are
owned by a few landowners only. Why should the NHA pick their small lots? Expropriation is not confined
to landed estates. The test to be applied for a valid expropriation of private lands was the area of the land
and not the number of people who stood to be benefitted. The State acting through the NHA is vested with
broad discretion to designate the property. The property owner may not interpose objections merely
because in their judgment some other property would have been more suitable. The provisions on just
compensation found in PD 1224, 1259, and 1313 are the same provisions which were declared
unconstitutional in EPZA v. Dulay (1987) for being encroachments on judicial prerogatives.
Manotok v. NHA 150 SCRA 89 (1987)
F:
Petitioners are the owners of two large estates known as the Tambunting Estate and Sunog-Apog in
Tondo, Manila, both of which were declared expropriated in two decrees issued by President Marcos, PD
1669 and PD 1670. The petitioners contend that the decrees violate their constitutional right to due process
and equal protection since by their mere passage their properties were automatically expropriated and they
were immediately deprived of the ownership and possession thereof without being given the chance to
oppose such expropriation. The government on the other hand contends that the power of eminent domain
is inherent in the State and when the legislature or the President through his law-making powers exercises
this power, the public use and public necessity of the expropriation and the fixing of the just compensation
become political in nature and the courts must respect the decision.
HELD: The challenged decrees are unfair in the procedures adopted and the powers given to the NHA.
The Tambunting subdivision is summarily proclaimed a blighted area and directly expropriated by decree
without the slightest semblance of a hearing or any proceeding whatsoever. The expropriation is instant and
automatic to take effect immediately upon the signing of the decree. No deposit before the taking is
required. There is not provision for any interest to be paid upon unpaid installments. Not only are the
owners given absolutely no opportunity to contest the expropriation, or question the amount of payments
fixed by the decree, but the decision of the NHA are expressly declared beyond judicial review. PD 1669
and 1670 are declared unconstitutional.

Teehankee, CJ, concurring: The judgment at bar now learly overturns the majority ruling in JM Tuason v.
LTA that the power of Congress to designate the particular property to be taken adn how much may be
condemned thereof must be duly recognized, leaving only as a judicial question whether in the exercise of
such competence, the party adversely affected is the victim of partiality and prejudice. The SC now rules
that such singling out of properties does not foreclose judicial scrutiny as to whether such expropriation by
legislative act transgresses the due process and equal protection and just compensation guarantees of the
Constitution.
4. CONTRACTS CLAUSE
RUTTER VS. ESTEBAN [93 PHIL 68; NO.L-3708; 18 MAY 1953]
Monday, February 09, 2009 Posted by Coffeeholic Writes
Labels: Case Digests, Political Law
Facts: On August 20,1941 Rutter sold to Esteban two parcels of land situated in the Manila for P9,600 of
which P4,800 were paid outright, and the balance was made payable as follows: P2,400 on or before
August 7, 1942, and P2,400 on or before August 27, 1943, with interest at the rate of 7 percent per annum.
To secure the payment of said balance of P4,800, a first mortgage has been constituted in favor of the
plaintiff. Esteban failed to pay the two installments as agreed upon, as well as the interest that had accrued
and so Rutter instituted an action to recover the balance due, the interest due and the attorney's fees. The
complaint also contains a prayer for sale of the properties mortgaged in accordance with law. Esteban
claims that this is a prewar obligation contracted and that he is a war sufferer, having filed his claim with
the Philippine War Damage Commission for the losses he had suffered as a consequence of the last war;
and that under section 2 of RA 342(moratorium law), payment of his obligation cannot be enforced until
after the lapse of eight years. The complaint was dismissed. A motion for recon was made which assails the
constitutionality of RA 342.
Issue: Whether or Not RA 342 unconstitutional on non-impairment clause grounds.
Held: Yes. The moratorium is postponement of fulfillment of obligations decreed by the state through the
medium of the courts or the legislature. Its essence is the application of police power. The economic
interests of the State may justify the exercise of its continuing and dominant protective power
notwithstanding interference with contracts. The question is not whether the legislative action affects
contracts incidentally, or directly or indirectly, but whether the legislation is addressed to a legitimate end
and the measures taken are reasonable and appropriate to that end.
However based on the Presidents general SONA and consistent with what the Court believes to be as the
only course dictated by justice, fairness and righteousness, declared that the continued operation and
enforcement of RA 342 at the present time is unreasonable and oppressive, and should not be prolonged
should be declared null and void and without effect. This holds true as regards Executive Orders Nos. 25
and 32, with greater force and reason considering that said Orders contain no limitation whatsoever in point
of time as regards the suspension of the enforcement and effectivity of monetary obligations.
Norman v. Baltimore & Ohio Railroad Co.
1. A bond for the future payment of a stated number of dollars in gold coin of the United States "of or
equivalent to the standard of weight and fineness existing" on the date of the bond, or for payment in gold
coin of the United States "of the standard of weight and fineness prevailing" on the date of the bond, is not
a contract for payment in gold coin as a commodity, or in bullion (cf. Bronson v. Rodes, 7 Wall. at p. 74 U.
S. 250), but is a contract for payment in money. Pp. 294 U. S. 298-302.

2. Such "gold clauses" are intended to afford a definite standard or measure of value, and thus to protect
against depreciation of the currency and discharge of the obligations by payment of a lesser value than that
prescribed. P. 294 U. S. 302.
3. In determining whether the Joint Resolution of June 5, 1933, exceeded the power of Congress by
undertaking to nullify such "gold clause" stipulations in preexisting money contract obligations, and by
providing that such obligations shall be discharged, dollar for dollar, in any coin or currency which at the
time of payment is legal tender for public and private debts, the Resolution must be considered in its
legislative setting, with other measures in pari materia (p. 294 U. S. 297), and in the light of the following
principles, which have heretofore been laid down by this Court, viz:
(a) The broad and comprehensive national authority over the subjects of revenue, finance, and
currency is derived from the aggregate
of the powers granted to the Congress, embracing the powers to lay and collect taxes, to borrow
money, to regulate commerce with foreign nations and among the several States, to coin money,
regulate the value thereof and of foreign coin, and fix the standards of weights and measures, and
the added express power "to make all laws which shall be necessary and proper for carrying into
execution" the other enumerated powers. P. 294 U. S. 303.
(b) The Constitution means to provide the same currency of uniform value in all the States, and
therefore the power to regulate the value of money was withdrawn from the States and vested in
Congress exclusively. P. 294 U. S. 302.
(c) Congress has power to enact that paper currency shall be equal in value to the representative
of value determined by the coinage acts, and impress upon it such qualities as currency for
purchases and for payment of debts as accord with the usage of sovereign governments. P. 294
U. S. 304.
(d) The authority to impose requirements of uniformity and parity is an essential feature of the
control of the currency, and Congress is authorized to provide a sound and uniform currency for
the country and secure the benefit of it to the people by appropriate legislation. P. 294 U. S. 304.
(e) The ownership of gold and silver coin is subject to those limitations which public policy may
require by reason of their quality as legal tender and as a medium of exchange. Hence, the power
to coin money includes the power to forbid mutilation, melting, and exportation of gold and
silver coin. P. 294 U. S. 304.
(f) Private contracts must be understood as having been made subject to the possible exercise of
the rightful authority of the Government, and their impairment, resulting from such exercise, is
not a taking of private property for public use without compensation, or a deprivation of it
without due process of law.
4. In the exercise of the constitutional authority of Congress to regulate the currency and establish the
monetary system of the country, existing contracts of private parties, States or municipalities, previously
made, and valid when made, but which interfere with the policy constitutionally adopted by Congress, may
be set aside not only through the indirect effect of the legislation, but directly, by express provision.
5. Whether the gold clauses of the contracts here in question may be deemed to interfere with the monetary
policy of Congress depends upon an appraisement of economic conditions and upon determinations
Page 294 U. S. 242
of questions of fact, as to which Congress is entitled to use its own judgment. P. 294 U. S. 311.
6. The Court may inquire whether the action of Congress, invalidating such clauses, was arbitrary or
capricious; but, if that action has reasonable relation, as an appropriate means, to a legitimate end, the
decision of Congress as to the degree of necessity for its adoption is final. P. 294 U. S. 311.

7. Congress was entitled to consider the great volume of obligations with gold clauses because of its
obvious bearing upon the question whether their existence constituted a substantial obstruction to the
congressional policy. P. 294 U. S. 313.
8. Taken literally, as calling for actual payment in gold coin, these promises were calculated to increase the
demand for gold, to encourage hoarding, and to stimulate attempts at exportation of gold coin, in direct
opposition to the policy of Congress. P. 294 U. S. 313.
9. Congress has power, in its control of the monetary system, to endeavor to conserve the gold resources of
the Treasury, to insure its command of gold in order to protect and increase its reserves, and to prohibit the
exportation of gold coin or its use for any purpose inconsistent with the needs of the Treasury. P.
10. Treated as "gold value" clauses, such stipulations are still hostile to the policy of Congress, and subject
to prohibition, for the following reasons:
(a) Although, at the date of the Joint Resolution, the dollar had not yet been devalued,
devaluation (reduction of the weight of the gold dollar as the standard of value, which occurred
later) was then in prospect and a uniform currency was intended. P. 294 U. S. 314.
(b) Congress could constitutionally act upon the gold clauses in anticipation of this devaluation,
if the clauses interfered with its policy. P. 294 U. S. 315.
(c) It may be judicially noticed that the bonds issued by States, municipalities, railroads, other
public utilities and many industrial corporations contain such gold clauses. P. 294 U. S. 315.
(d) If States, municipalities, railroads, public utilities, industrial corporations, etc., receiving all
their income in the devalued currency were obliged to pay their gold clause obligations in
amounts of currency determined on the basis of the former gold standard, it is easy to see that
this disparity of conditions would cause a dislocation of the domestic economy.
265 N.Y. 37; 191 N.E. 726, affirmed.
Dist. Ct. U.S. (unreported), affirmed.
Writs of certiorari were granted (293 U.S. 546, 548) to review two decisions sustaining the power of
Congress to invalidate "gold clauses" in private money contracts.
In the first case, an action on a coupon from a railroad bond, the Court of Appeals of New York sustained
the trial court in limiting the recovery to the face of the coupon, dollar for dollar, in currency.
In the second case, a proceeding under 77 of the Bankruptcy Act, a federal District Court made a like
ruling with respect to certain other railroad bonds. In this case, two appeals were taken to the Circuit Court
of Appeals, one allowed by that court and the other by the District Judge. While they were pending, this
Court granted writs of certiorari on the petition of the United States and the Reconstruction Finance
Corporation, which had both intervened in the District Court.
5. EX-POST FATCO LEGISLATION AND BILL OF ATTAINDER
Republic vs. Hernandez, GR No. 117209, February 9, 1996
Facts: The RTC granted the petition for adoption of Kevin Earl Bartolome Moran and simultaneously
granted the prayer therein for the change of the first name of said adoptee to Aaron Joseph, to
complement the surname Munson y Andrade which he acquired consequent to his adoption.
Petitioner opposed the inclusion of the relief for change of name in the same petition for adoption
objecting to the joinder of the petition for adoption and the petitions for the change of name in a single
proceeding, arguing that these petition should be conducted and pursued as two separate proceedings.
Petitioner argues that a petition for adoption and a petition for change of name are two special
proceedings which, in substance and purpose, are different from and are not related to each other, being
respectively governed by distinct sets of law and rules. Petitioner further contends that what the law

allows is the change of the surname of the adoptee, as a matter of right, to conform with that of the
adopter and as a natural consequence of the adoption thus granted. If what is sought is the change of the
registered given or proper name, and since this would involve a substantial change of ones legal name,
a petition for change of name under Rule 103 should accordingly be instituted, with the substantive and
adjective requisites therefor being conformably satisfied.
Private respondents, on the contrary, admittedly filed the petition for adoption with a prayer for change
of name predicated upon Section 5, Rule 2 which allows permissive joinder of causes of action in order
to avoid multiplicity of suits and in line with the policy of discouraging protracted and vexatious
litigations. It is argued that there is no prohibition in the Rules against the joinder of adoption and
change of name being pleaded as two separate but related causes of action in a single petition.
Issue: WON respondent judge erred in granting prayer for the change of the given or proper name if the
adoptee in a petition for adoption.
Held: No.
Par (1), Art. 189 of the Family Code provides one of the legal effect of adoption:
(1) For civil purposes, the adopted shall be deemed to be a legitimate child of the adopters and both shall
acquire the reciprocal rights and obligations arising from the relationship of parent and child, including
the right of the adopted to use the surname of the adopters;
The law allows the adoptee, as a matter of right and obligation, to bear the surname of the adopter, upon
issuance of the decree of adoption. It is the change of the adoptees surname to follow that of the adopter
which is the natural and necessary consequence of a grant of adoption and must specifically be
contained in the order of the court, in fact, even if not prayed for by petitioner.
However, the given or proper name, also known as the first or Christian name, of the adoptee must
remain as it was originally registered in the civil register. The creation of an adoptive relationship does
not confer upon the adopter a license to change the adoptees registered Christian or first name. The
automatic change thereof, premised solely upon the adoption thus granted, is beyond the purview of a
decree of adoption. Neither is it a mere incident in nor an adjunct of an adoption proceeding, such that a
prayer therefor furtively inserted in a petition for adoption, as in this case, cannot properly be granted.
The official name of a person whose birth is registered in the civil register is the name appearing therein.
If a change in ones name is desired, this can only be done by filing and strictly complying with the
substantive and procedural requirements for a special proceeding for change of name under Rule 103 of
the Rules of Court, wherein the sufficiency of the reasons or grounds therefor can be threshed out and
accordingly determined.
A petition for change of name being a proceeding in rem, strict compliance with all the requirements
therefor is indispensable in order to vest the court with jurisdiction for its adjudication. It is an
independent and discrete special proceeding, in and by itself, governed by its own set of rules. A fortiori,
it cannot be granted by means of any other proceeding. To consider it as a mere incident or an offshoot
of another special proceeding would be to denigrate its role and significance as the appropriate remedy
available under our remedial law system.
ALBINO S. CO, vs. COURT OF APPEALS and PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES,

FACTS: A criminal complaint for violation of Batas Pambansa Bilang 22 was filed by the salvage
company against petitioner with the Regional Trial Court. The case eventuated in petitioners conviction
of the crime charged on the basis that a check issued merely to guarantee the performance of an
obligation is nevertheless covered by B.P. Blg. 22. Pending litigation, Ministry of Justice Circular No. 4
(which excludes guarantee check from application of B.P. Blg. 22) was subsequently reversed by
Ministry Circular No. 12 which ruled that a check issued merely to guarantee the performance of an
obligation is nevertheless covered by B.P. Blg. 22. Petitioner appealed to the Court of Appeals. There he
sought exoneration upon the theory that it was reversible error for the Regional Trial Court but the Court
of Appeals affirmed his conviction.
ISSUE: Whether or not Ministry Circular No. 12 dated August 8, 1984 declaring the guarantee check
will no longer be considered as a valid defense be retroactively applied.
HELD: NO. Decision of the Court of Appeals and RTC were set aside. Criminal prosecution against
accused-petitioner was dismissed.
RATIO:
It would seem that the weight of authority is decidedly in favor of the proposition that the Courts
decision of September 21, 1987 in Que v. People, 154 SCRA 160 (1987) that a check issued merely to
guarantee the performance of an obligation is nevertheless covered by B.P. Blg. 22 should not be
given retrospective effect to the prejudice of the petitioner and other persons situated, who relied on the
official opinion of the Minister of Justice that such a check did not fall within the scope of B.P. Blg. 22.
This is after all a criminal action all doubts in which, pursuant to familiar, fundamental doctrine, must be
resolved in favor of the accused. Everything considered, the Court sees no compelling reason why the
doctrine of mala prohibita should override the principle of prospectivity, and its clear implications as
herein above set out and discussed, negating criminal liability.

6. NON-IMPRISONMENT FOR DEBT AND INVOLUNTARY SERVITUDE

GANAWAY VS QUILLEN 1922
Facts: George Ganaway prays to be released from Bilibid Prison because of imprisonment for debt in a
civil case growing out of a contract.-Civil Case: Thomas Casey vs Ganaway complaint is grounded on a
contract and asks for an accounting-Contract was about the publication of a book Forbes MemoirsCasey sued for breach of contract Atty-Gen: reason for imprisonment is by order of Hon. Harvey (Judge of
CFI of Manila) issued under authority of Chapter 17 of Code of Civil Procedure Arrest of Defendant
Issue : WON Ganaway should be released YES
Ratio: 1. Imprisonment for debt is absolutely prohibited-No exception in cases of fraud-Sought to prevent
use of State power to coerce payment of debt, control of creditor over person of debtor (recovery of debt by
restraint of debtors person 1 )-History: Alabama Supreme Court in Carr vs Alabama held that a statute
making it a misdemeanor for a person in banking to receive a de-posit of money knowing himself to be
insolvent is void and unconstitutional even if there is the defense of payment to depositor-debt arising
from action ex contractu-Does not include damages arising from actions ex delicto because these do not
arise from contracts but are imposed upon the defendant for the wrong he has done (aka punishment) 2.
Code of Civil Procedure is based on similar California Code BUT latter allows for imprisonment in cases
of fraud. - Therefore Court is not bound by California Code 3. Similar case of Tan Cong vs Stewart - Sang

Kee (company) sued Tan Cong to recover P30,000 - Tan Cong was employed by plaintiffs as general agent
for their mercantile establishment - Tan Cong was requested to turn over funds, personal property, stocks
but he REFUSED - Detention order by the judge but upon petition for habeas corpus, he was released. This
was because imprisonment in actions for recov- ery of money in a cause of action arising from a contract is
prohibited by Section 5 of the Phil Bill of 1902 WRIT GRANTED. GANAWAY should be released - Note
that Court made it a point to declare that this decision does not make Chapter 17 invalid. This is only
limited to the facts of the present case.
SERAFIN VS. LINDAYAG [67 SCRA 166; ADM. MATTER. NO. 297-MJ; 30 SEPT 1975]
Facts: Plaintiff failed to pay a simple indebtedness for P1500 Carmelito Mendoza, then municipal secretary
and his wife Corazon Mendoza and therefore an estafa case was filed against her. Complainant admitted
complaint. Now complainant filed a case against respondent Judge for not dismissing the case and issuing a
warrant of arrest as it falls on the category of a simple indebtedness, since elements of estafa are not
present. Further she contended that no person should be imprisoned for non-payment of a loan of a sum of
money. Two months after respondent dismissed plaintiffs case. (Judge here committed gross ignorance of
law. Even if complainant desisted case was pursued.)
Issue: Whether or Not there was a violation committed by the judge when it ordered the imprisonment of
plaintiff for non-payment of debt?
Held: Yes. Since plaintiff did not commit any offense as, his debt is considered a simple loan granted by her
friends to her. There is no collateral or security because complainant was an old friend of the spouses who
lent the money and that when they wrote her a letter of demand she promised to pay them and said that if
she failed to keep her promise, they could get her valuable things at her home. Under the Constitution she
is protected. Judge therefore in admitting such a "criminal complaint" that was plainly civil in aspects from
the very face of the complaint and the "evidence" presented, and issuing on the same day the warrant of
arrest upon his utterly baseless finding "that the accused is probably guilty of the crime charged,"
respondent grossly failed to perform his duties properly.
Florentina Lozano vs Judge Antonio Martinez et al
This case is a consolidation of 8 cases regarding violations of the Bouncing Checks Law or Batas
Pambansa Blg. 22 (enacted April 3, 1979). In one of the eight cases, Judge David Nitafan of RTC Manila
declared the law unconstitutional. Among the arguments against the constitutionality of the law are a.) it is
violative of the constitutional provision on non-imprisonment due to debt, and b.) it impairs freedom of
contract.
ISSUE: Whether or not BP 22 is constitutional.
HELD: Yes, BP 22 is constitutional.
The Supreme Court first discussed the history of the law. The SC explained how the law on estafa was not
sufficient to cover all acts involving the issuance of worthless checks; that in estafa, it only punishes the
fraudulent issuance of worthless checks to cover prior or simultaneous obligations but not pre-existing
obligations.
BP 22 is aimed at putting a stop to or curbing the practice of issuing checks that are worthless, i.e. checks
that end up being rejected or dishonored for payment. The practice is proscribed by the state because of the
injury it causes to public interests.

BP 22 is not violative of the constitutional prohibition against imprisonment for debt. The debt
contemplated by the constitution are those arising from contracts (ex contractu). No one is going to prison
for non-payment of contractual debts.
However, non-payment of debts arising from crimes (ex delicto) is punishable. This is precisely why the
mala prohibita crime of issuing worthless checks as defined in BP 22 was enacted by Congress. It is a valid
exercise of police power.
Due to the insufficiency of the Revised Penal Code, BP 22 was enacted to punish the following acts:
any person who, having sufficient funds in or credit with the drawee bank when he makes or draws and
issues a check, shall fail to keep sufficient funds or to maintain a credit to cover the full amount of the
check if presented within a period of ninety (90) days from the date appearing thereon, for which reason it
is dishonored by the drawee bank.
And
any person who makes or draws and issues any check on account or for value, knowing at the time of
issue that he does not have sufficient funds in or credit with the drawee bank for the payment of said check
in full upon presentment, which check is subsequently dishonored by the drawee bank for insufficiency of
funds or credit or would have been dishonored for the same reason had not the drawer, without any valid
reason, ordered the bank to stop payment.
Congress was able to determine at that time that the issuance of worthless checks was a huge problem. The
enactment of BP 22 is a declaration by the legislature that, as a matter of public policy, the making and
issuance of a worthless check is deemed public nuisance to be abated by the imposition of penal sanctions.
Checks are widely used due to the convenience it brings in commercial transactions and confidence is the
primary basis why merchants rely on it for their various commercial undertakings. If such confidence is
shaken, the usefulness of checks as currency substitutes would be greatly diminished or may become nil.
Any practice therefore tending to destroy that confidence should be deterred for the proliferation of
worthless checks can only create havoc in trade circles and the banking community. Thus, the Congress,
through their exercise of police power, declared that the making and issuance of a worthless check is
deemed a public nuisance which can be abated by the imposition of penal sanctions.
The Supreme Court however also explained that (regardless of their previous explanation on ex delicto
debts) the non-payment of a debt is not the gravamen of the violations of BP 22. The gravamen of the
offense punished by BP 22 is the act of making and issuing a worthless check or a check that is dishonored
upon its presentation for payment. It is not the non-payment of an obligation which the law punishes. The
law is not intended or designed to coerce a debtor to pay his debt. The thrust of the law is to prohibit, under
pain of penal sanctions, the making of worthless checks and putting them in circulation. Because of its
deleterious effects on the public interest, the practice is proscribed by the law. The law punishes the act not
as an offense against property, but an offense against public order.
7. ACADEMIC FREEDOM
Epicharis Garcia vs. The Faculty Admission Committee
Facts:1. That in summer, 1975, Respondent admitted Petitioner for studies leading to an M.A.in
Theology;2. That on May 30, 1975, when Petitioner wanted to enroll for the same course for
thefirst semester, 1975-1976 respondent told her about the letter he had written her,informing her
of the faculty's decision to bar her from re-admission in their schoolreason in the letter:
Petitioners frequent questions and difficulties had the effect of slowing down the progress of the
class.3. Fr. Pedro Sevilla, the school's Director, that the compromises she was offering

wereunacceptable, their decision was final, and that it were better for her to seek for admission at
the UST Graduate School4. Petitioner then subsequently made inquiries in said school, as to the
possibilities for her pursuing her graduate studies for an for M.A. in Theology, and she was
informedthat she could enroll at the UST Ecclesiastical Faculties, but that she would have to
fulfiltheir requirements for Baccalaureate in Philosophy in order to have her degree later
inTheology which would entail about four to five years more of studies whereas inthe
Loyola School of Studies to which she is being unlawfully refused readmission, itwould entail
only about two years more.5. She prayed for a writ of mandamus for the purpose of allowing her
to enroll in thecurrent semester
Issue:
Whether or not the Faculty Admissions Committee had authority and discretion inallowing
petitioner to continue studying or not?
Held:
Yes. Being a particular educational institution (seminary). Petition dismissed for lack of
merit.Petitioner cannot compel the mandamus to admit her into further studies since
therespondent had no clear duty to admit the petitioner. That respondent Fr. Lambino andLoyola
School of Technology has the discretion whether to admit the petitioner or not.Factors that were
considered are academic standards, personality traits, character orientation and nature of Loyola
School of Theology as a seminary.
Isabelo v. Perpetual Help College of Rizal and DECS [1993]
Facts:

A student, Manuelito Isabelo, Jr., filed the instant petition for mandamus with prayer for a writ of
mandamus addressed to DECS to implement its order to re-admit him as a senior graduating student of
Perpetual Help College of Rizal (PHCR)

Manuelito was enrolled at the Perpetual Help College of Rizal for BS Criminology. He was
elected Public Relations Officer ("PRO") of the Supreme Student Council

He was invited to attend a meeting with PHCR officials on 08 May 1991. He was asked by the VP
for Academic Affairs, Dr. Grace De Leon, to sign Resolution No. 105 that would implement a 20% tuition
fee increase for the school year 1991-1992.

Manuelito refused to sign the resolution; instead he asked for a 2-week period to take the matter up
with fellow officers.

Since, the administration assured that the request of the student council would be considered
favorably, the petitioner finally signed Resolution No. 105.

PHCR announced that it will increase tuition fees in all levels. The student council filed with the
DECS a motion for reconsideration. DECS held the advised that the "collection of the increase (should) be
held in abeyance pending the resolution of (the) matter."

The administration dropped Manuelito from PHCR's list of students because of the following
reasons:
o Non compliance of CMT requirement as per DECS Order No. 9, S. 1990 and DECS Memorandum No.
80, S. 1991 and PHCR Internal Memo. No. 891-007;
o No NCEE during the admission in the BS Criminology course;
o Official Admission Credential not yet submitted;
o Void declaration of CMT subjects (MS 11, 12, 21 and 22)


He took special training during the semestral break, and he was able to pass it, but PHCR still
refused to give him that accreditation, insisting that he by then had ceased to be a student of PHCR.

Manuelito wrote to DECS, which in turn sent their letter to PHCR ordering that students should be
allowed to continue their classes pending the resolution. PHCR did not comply with the directive.

Manuelito: Real reason PHCR has voided his enrollment is his active participation in opposing
PHCR's application for tuition fee increase with the DECS.

PHCR: invokes "academic freedom" in dropping the petitioner from its roll of students. HE been
allowed to enroll "conditionally" pending the completion of his remedial classes in CMT, in which he
failed.
Issue: WON PHCR may drop Manuelito from the list of students. CASE REMANDED.

In Garcia vs. Loyola School of Theology: admission to an institution of higher learning is

discretionary upon the school and that such an admission is a mere privilege, rather than a right, on the part
of the student.

In Ateneo de Manila University vs. Capulon: the term "academic freedom" "the freedom to
determine on academic grounds who may teach, what may be taught (and) how it shall be taught," but
likewise "who may be admitted to study."

However academic freedom is not an unabridged license. It is a privilege that assumes a correlative
duty to exercise it responsibly.

In Non vs. Dames II: abandoned Alcuaz vs. PSBA, (that enrollment of a student is a semester-tosemester contract, and that the school may not be compelled to renew the contract) by recognizing instead
the right of a student to be enrolled for the entire period in order to complete his course. We have also
stressed that the contract between the school and the student, imbued, as it is, with public interest, is not an
ordinary contract.

Expulsion is disproportionate to his deficiencies in his CMT course. The circumstances show that
the PHCR has strongly been influenced by his participation in questioning PHCR's application for tuition
fee increase.

However DECS should determine whether the petitioner really deserves to be in senior class or has a
number of school deficiencies to overcome, as the respondent school counters.
REYES V CA
Facts:
Petitioners Romeo Reyes, Angel Parayao and Emilio Mananghaya question the respondent Courts
decision, which affirmed with modification the agrarian courts decision, which ordered them and the other
defendants therein to, among others, restore possession of the disputed landholding to private respondent,
Eufrocina Vda. dela Cruz.
Juan Mendoza, father of defendant Olympio, is the owner of farm lots in Bahay Pare, Candaba, Pampanga.
Devoted to the production of palay, the lots were tenanted and cultivated by now deceased Julian dela Cruz,
husband of plaintiff Eufrocina dela Cruz.
Eufrocina alleged that her husbands death, she succeeded him as bona fidetenant of the subject lots; that
Olympio, in conspiracy with the other defendants, prevented her daughter Violeta and her workers through
force, intimidation, strategy and stealth, from entering and working on the subject premises; and that until
the filing of the instant case, defendants had refused to vacate and surrender the lots, thus violating her
tenancy rights. Plaintiff therefore prayed for judgment for the recovery of possession and damages with a
writ of preliminary mandatory injunction in the meantime.

Defendant barangay officials denied interference in the tenancy relationship existing between plaintiff and
defendant Mendoza, particularly in the cultivation of the latters farm lots and asked for the dismissal of the
case, moral damages and attorneys fees.
Mendoza raised abandonment, sublease and mortgage of the farm lots without his consent and approval,
and non-payment of rentals, irrigation fees and other taxes due the government, as his defenses.
Petitioners now bring the present Petition for Review on Certiorari.
Issue: W/N the court erred in holding petitioners liable
Held: No. The evidence presented before the trial court and CA served as basis in arriving at their findings
of fact. The Supreme Court will not analyze such evidence all over again because settled is the rule that
only questions of law may be raised in a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of
Court absent the exceptions which do not obtain in the instant case.
In agrarian cases, the quantum of evidence is no more than substantial evidence. Substantial evidence does
not necessarily import preponderant evidence, as is required in an ordinarily civil case. It has been defined
to be such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion and its
absence is not shown by stressing that there is contrary evidence on record, direct or circumstantial, for the
appellate court cannot substitute its own judgment or criteria for that of the trial court in determining
wherein lies the weight of evidence or what evidence is entitled to belief.
UP BOARD OF REGENTS VS. COURT OF APPEALS
This is a petition to review Court of Appeals decision of issuing Writ of Mandamus to the petitioner to
restore PRs (Private Respondent) college degree.
FACTS:
Private respondent Arokiasamy William was enrolled in a Doctoral Program in Anthropology of the UP
Diliman College of Social Sciences and Philosophy.
An oral defense by the PR was held on February 5, 1993. After going over the dissertations, the panel
pointed out after it has been looked into that some portion of it were lifted from other sources without
proper acknowledgement, hence requesting her to revise the dissertation which PR failed to do so resulting
to her not obtaining approval from 2 of the panels of the Oral Defense.
When questioned by Dean Paz, PR sent a letter on April 17, 1993 explaining the reasons why the signature
of Dr. Medina (one of the panels) wasnt affixed and advised that she relied on Dean Pazs remark dated
March 5, 1993 when the former stated that a majority vote of the panel members was sufficient for a
student to pass, notwithstanding the failure to obtain the consent of the Deans representative. She also
expressed her disappointment over the CSSP administration for maliciously working or the disapproval of
her dissertation, and further warned Dean Paz against encouraging perfidious acts against her.
On April 21, 1992, Dean Paz sent a letter to the Vice Chancellor for Academic Affairs requesting the name
of the PR to be excluded in the list of candidates for graduation which failed to reach the recipient on time,
hence, the PR was able to graduate on April 24, 1993.
In a letter addressed to Dean Paz, Dr. Medina formally charged private respondent with plagiarism and
recommended that the doctorate granted to her be withdrawn which the PR was informed of dated June 7,
1993.
An ad hoc committee was formed and after thorough investigation, it was reported that they found at least
90 instances or portions in the thesis which were lifted from sources without due acknowledgement.
Further investigations and interviews with the PR were held to reinvestigate her case which involved the
Board of Regents until it has been established that PR is guilty of the allegation of Plagiarism which was
actually admitted by the PR herself to the special committee.
A letter from the Board of Regents addressed to the PR was sent informing the latter that it has been
concluded by the committee that her doctorate degree will be withdrawn.

A petition has been filed to the Chairman of the board of regents for reinvestigation which was hereby
denied, hence, PR filed a petition for mandamus to restore her degree which includes payment for moral
and exemplary damages which was also denied by branch 227 trial court.
On August 6, 1996, PR appealed to the Court of Appeals, which on December 16, 1997 reversed the lower
courts decision and ordered petitioner to restore PRs degree.
Hence, this petition.
ISSUE:
1. Whether or not the Court of Appeals erred in holding that the doctoral degree given by UP cannot be
recalled without violating her right to enjoyment of intellectual property to justice and equity.
2. Whether or not the Private Respondent was deprived of her right to substantive due process.
HELD:
1. Yes. The court held that academic freedom is guaranteed to institutions of higher learning by Art
XIV of the 1987 Constitution. This freedom includes deciding whom a university will confer
degrees on. If the degree is procured by error or fraud then the Board of Regents, subject to due
process being followed, may cancel that degree.
Art. XIV, Section 5 par. 2 of the Constitution provides that academic freedom shall be enjoyed in all
institutions of higher learning.
It is a freedom granted to institutions of higher learning which is thus given a wide sphere of authority
certainly extending to the choice of students. If such institution of higher learning can decide who can and
who cannot study in it, it certainly can also determine on whom it can confer the honor and distinction of
being its graduates.
2. NO. The court held that in administrative proceedings, the essence of due process is simply the
opportunity to explain ones side of a controversy or a chance seek reconsideration of the action
or ruling complained of. A party who has availed of the opportunity to present his position
cannot tenably claim to have been denied due process. In the case at bar, the PR was informed in
writing of the charges against her and afforded opportunities to refute them. Due process in an
administrative context does not require trial-type proceedings similar to those in the courts
of justice. It is noteworthy that the U.P. Rules do not require the attendance of persons whose
cases are included as items on the agenda of the Board of Regents.
DEPARTMENT OF EDUCATION VS. SAN DIEGO

180 SCRA 533 (December 21, 1989)

Facts:
The respondent failed to pass the National Medical Admission Test (NMAT) 3 times and he was denied
admission to take the test for another time by the petitioner under its rule that a student is allowed only to
take the NMAT 3 times and after 3 consecutive failures a student shall not be allowed to take NMAT the
4th time. Respondent invoke his constitutional rights on academic freedom and quality education in his
petition for mandamus before the court. Respondent judge rendered decision citing the admission rule of
the petitioner as an arbitrary exercise of police power, depriving respondent of his right to pursue medical
education thus this petition for review before the higher court.
Issue: Whether or not the admission rule implemented by petitioner an arbitrary exercise of police power.
Held: The court held that police power is validly exercised if (a) the interests of the public generally, as
distinguished from those of a particular class, require the interference of the State, and (b) the means
employed are reasonably necessary to the attainment of the object sought to be accomplished and not
unduly oppressive upon individuals. The proper exercise of the police power requires the concurrence of a
lawful subject and a lawful method. The subject of the challenged regulation is certainly within the ambit

of the police power. It is the right and indeed the responsibility of the State to insure that the medical
profession is not infiltrated by incompetents to whom patients may unwarily entrust their lives and health.
The method employed by the challenged regulation is not irrelevant to the purpose of the law nor is it
arbitrary or oppressive. The three-flunk rule is intended to insulate the medical schools and ultimately the
medical profession from the intrusion of those not qualified to be doctors. The State needs to implement
decisive steps to regulate system of education by directing students to the course where he is best suited
through initial tests and evaluation. The decision of the respondent judge was reversed.
TABLARIN VS. GUTIERREZ [152 SCRA 730; G.R. No. 78164; 31 July 1987]
Facts: The petitioners sought to enjoin the Secretary of Education, Culture and Sports, the Board of
Medical Education and the Center for Educational Measurement from enforcing Section 5 (a) and (f) of
Republic Act No. 2382, as amended, and MECS Order No. 52, series of 1985, dated 23 August 1985 and
from requiring the taking and passing of the NMAT as a condition for securing certificates of eligibility for
admission, from proceeding with accepting applications for taking the NMAT and from administering the
NMAT as scheduled on 26 April 1987 and in the future. The trial court denied said petition on 20 April
1987. The NMAT was conducted and administered as previously scheduled.
Republic Act 2382, as amended by Republic Acts Nos. 4224 and 5946, known as the "Medical Act of
1959" defines its basic objectives in the following manner:
"SECTION 1. Objectives. This Act provides for and shall govern (a) the standardization and regulation
of medical education; (b) the examination for registration of physicians; and (c) the supervision, control
and regulation of the practice of medicine in the Philippines."
The statute, among other things, created a Board of Medical Education. Its functions as specified in Section
5 of the statute include the following:
"(a) To determine and prescribe requirements for admission into a recognized college of medicine;
xxx
(f) To accept applications for certification for admission to a medical school and keep a register of those
issued said certificate; and to collect from said applicants the amount of twenty-five pesos each which shall
accrue to the operating fund of the Board of Medical Education;
Section 7 prescribes certain minimum requirements for applicants to medical schools:
"Admission requirements. The medical college may admit any student who has not been convicted by
any court of competent jurisdiction of any offense involving moral turpitude and who presents (a) a record
of completion of a bachelor's degree in science or arts; (b) a certificate of eligibility for entrance to a
medical school from the Board of Medical Education; (c) a certificate of good moral character issued by
two former professors in the college of liberal arts; and (d) birth certificate. Nothing in this act shall be
construed to inhibit any college of medicine from establishing, in addition to the preceding, other entrance
requirements that may be deemed admissible.
MECS Order No. 52, s. 1985, issued by the then Minister of Education, Culture and Sports and dated 23
August 1985, established a uniform admission test called the National Medical Admission Test (NMAT) as
an additional requirement for issuance of a certificate of eligibility for admission into medical schools of
the Philippines, beginning with the school year 1986-1987. This Order goes on to state that: "2. The

NMAT, an aptitude test, is considered as an instrument toward upgrading the selection of applicants for
admission into the medical schools and its calculated to improve the quality of medical education in the
country. The cutoff score for the successful applicants, based on the scores on the NMAT, shall be
determined every year by the Board of Medical Education after consultation with the Association of
Philippine Medical Colleges. The NMAT rating of each applicant, together with the other admission
requirements as presently called for under existing rules, shall serve as a basis for the issuance of the
prescribed certificate of eligibility for admission into the medical colleges.
Issue: Whether or not Section 5 (a) and (f) of Republic Act No. 2382, as amended, and MECS Order No.
52, s. 1985 are constitutional.
Held: Yes. We conclude that prescribing the NMAT and requiring certain minimum scores therein as a
condition for admission to medical schools in the Philippines, do not constitute an unconstitutional
imposition.
The police power, it is commonplace learning, is the pervasive and non-waivable power and authority of
the sovereign to secure and promote all the important interests and needs in a word, the public order
of the general community. An important component of that public order is the health and physical safety
and well being of the population, the securing of which no one can deny is a legitimate objective of
governmental effort and regulation. Perhaps the only issue that needs some consideration is whether there
is some reasonable relation between the prescribing of passing the NMAT as a condition for admission to
medical school on the one hand, and the securing of the health and safety of the general community, on the
other hand. This question is perhaps most usefully approached by recalling that the regulation of the
practice of medicine in all its branches has long been recognized as a reasonable method of protecting the
health and safety of the public.
MECS Order No. 52, s. 1985 articulates the rationale of regulation of this type: the improvement of the
professional and technical quality of the graduates of medical schools, by upgrading the quality of those
admitted to the student body of the medical schools. That upgrading is sought by selectivity in the process
of admission, selectivity consisting, among other things, of limiting admission to those who exhibit in the
required degree the aptitude for medical studies and eventually for medical practice. The need to maintain,
and the difficulties of maintaining, high standards in our professional schools in general, and medical
schools in particular, in the current stage of our social and economic development, are widely known. We
believe that the government is entitled to prescribe an admission test like the NMAT as a means for
achieving its stated objective of "upgrading the selection of applicants into [our] medical schools" and of
"improv[ing] the quality of medical education in the country. We are entitled to hold that the NMAT is
reasonably related to the securing of the ultimate end of legislation and regulation in this area. That end, it
is useful to recall, is the protection of the public from the potentially deadly effects of incompetence and
ignorance in those who would undertake to treat our bodies and minds for disease or trauma.
WHEREFORE, the Petition for Certiorari is DISMISSED and the Order of the respondent trial court
denying the petition for a writ of preliminary injunction is AFFIRMED. Costs against petitioners.
NON VS. DAMES [185 SCRA 523; G.R. NO. 89317; 20 MAY 1990]
Facts: Petitioners, students in private respondent Mabini Colleges, Inc. in Daet, Camarines Norte, were not
allowed to re-enroll by the school for the academic year 1988-1989 for leading or participating in student

mass actions against the school in the preceding semester. The subject of the protests is not, however, made
clear in the pleadings.
Petitioners filed a petition in the court seeking their readmission or re-enrollment to the school, but the trial
court dismissed the petition. They now petition the court to reverse its ruling in Alcuaz vs. PSBA1, which
was also applied in the case. The court said that petitioners waived their privilege to be admitted for reenrollment with respondent college when they adopted, signed, and used its enrollment form for the first
semester of school year 1988-89, which states that: The Mabini College reserves the right to deny
admission of students whose scholarship and attendance are unsatisfactory and to require withdrawal of
students whose conduct discredits the institution and/or whose activities unduly disrupts or interfere with
the efficient operation of the college. Students, therefore, are required to behave in accord with the Mabini
College code of conduct and discipline.
Issue: Whether or Not the students right to freedom of speech and assembly infringed.
Held: Yes. The protection to the cognate rights of speech and assembly guaranteed by the Constitution is
similarly available to students is well-settled in our jurisdiction. However there are limitations. The
permissible limitation on Student Exercise of Constitutional Rights within the school presupposes that
conduct by the student, in class or out of it, which for any reason whether it stems from time, place, or type
of behavior should not materially disrupt classwork or must not involve substantial disorder or invasion of
the rights of others.
SOPHIA ALCUAZ, ET AL., vs. PSBA
FACTS:
In 1986, some PSBA students, herein petitioners Alcuaz et. al. staged demonstrations in the premises of the
school. In order for the demonstration to be settled, an agreement was entered into among others the
regulations for the conduct of protest action. In spite of the agreement, it was alleged that the petitioners,
committed tumultuous and anarchic acts within the premises of the school, fanned by the cooperation of the
intervening professors, causing disruption of classes to the prejudice of the majority students. The school
took administrative sanctions upon them in view of their participation in the demonstration. The students
and the intervening professors were sanctioned. They were dismissed and terminated.
ISSUE:Whether or not there has been a deprivation of constitutional rights of expression and assembly and
of due process of law of the students who have been barred from re-enrollment.
HELD:
The Supreme Court held that due process in disciplinary cases such as the case at bar does not entail
proceedings and hearings similar to those prescribed for actions and proceedings in the courts of justice.
The Court has already recognized the right of the school to refuse re-enrollment of students for academic
delinquency and violation of disciplinary regulations. In the schools administrative process, both students
and professors were given three (3) days from receipt of letter to explain in writing why the school should
not take administrative sanction against them. With respect to the academic activities of the students and
the teaching loads of the teachers, the respondent school has created new class for the petitioners and the
intervening professors during and when the investigation was going on.
The Court then upheld that there is no denial of due process where all requirements of administrative due
process were met by the school and the students were given the opportunity to be heard and that the right of
expression and assembly are not absolute especially when parties are bound to certain rules under a
contract.