PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appelleevs. ANDRE MARTI, accused-appellant.

BIDIN,
On August 14, 1987, the appellant and his common-law wife, Shirley Reyes went to Manila Packaging and Export
Forwarders to send packages to Zurich, Switzerland. It was received by Anita Reyes and ask if she could inspect
the packages. Shirley refused and eventually convinced Anita to seal the package making it ready for shipment.
Before being sent out for delivery, Job Reyes, husband of Anita and proprietor of the courier company, conducted
an inspection of the package as part of standard operating procedures. Upon opening the package, he noticed a
suspicious odor which made him took sample of the substance he found inside. He reported this to the NBI and
invited agents to his office to inspect the package. In the presence of the NBI agents, Job Reyes opened the
suspicious package and found dried-marijuana leaves inside. A case was filed against Andre Marti in violation of
R.A. 6425 and was found guilty by the court a quo. Andre filed an appeal in the Supreme Court claiming that his
constitutional right of privacy was violated and that the evidence acquired from his package was inadmissible as
evidence against him.
Issue: Can the Constitutional Right of Privacy be enforced against private individuals?
Ruling:The Supreme Court held based on the speech of Commissioner Bernas that the Bill of Rights governs the
relationship between the individual and the state.
The constitutional proscription against unlawful searches and seizures therefore applies as a restraint directed only
against the government and its agencies tasked with the enforcement of the law. It is not meant to be invoked
against acts of private individuals. It will be recalled that Mr Job Reyes was the one who opened the box in the
presence of the NBI agents in his place of business. The mere presence of the NBI agents did not convert the
reasonable search effected by Mr. Reyes into a warrantless search and siezure proscribed by the constitution.
Merely to observe and look at that which is in plain sight is not a search.
The judgement of conviction finding appeallant guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime charged was
AFFIRMED.

BERNARD R. NALA, petitioner, vs. JUDGE JESUS M. BARROSO, JR., Presiding Judge, Regional
YNARES-SANTIAGO
On June 25, 2001, PO3 Macrino L. Alcoser together with his witness Ruel Nalagon applied for the issuance of a
warrant to search the person and residence of petitioner Bernard R. Nala, who was referred to in the application as
Rumolo Nala alias Long of Purok 4, Poblacion, Kitaotao, Bukidnon. The application was filed in connection with
petitioners alleged illegal possession of one caliber .22 magnum and one 9 mm. pistol in violation of Illegal
Possession of Firearms. On the same day, respondent Presiding Judge of RTC of Malaybalay City, issued Search
and Seizure Warrant .On July 4, 2001, at around 6:30 in the morning, Alcoser and other police officer search the
petitioners house and allegedly seized the following: (1) one piece caliber .38 revolver (snub-nose) with Serial
Number 1125609; (2) one pc. Fragmentation grenade (cacao type); (3) one pc. .22 long barrel; (4) 5- pcs live
ammunition for caliber .38 revolver; and (5) 4- four pcs. of disposable lighter and unestimated numbers of
cellophane used for packing of shabu. Petitioner questioned the validity of the search warrant and filed an Omnibus
Motion to Quash but was denied by the judge.
Lower court found that probable cause was duly established from the deposition and examination of witness
Ruel Nalagon and the testimony of PO3 Alcoser who personally conducted a surveillance to confirm the information
given by Nalagon. The fact that the items seized were not exactly the items listed in the warrant does not invalidate
the same because the items seized bear a direct relation to the crime of illegal possession of firearms. Respondent
judge also found that petitioner was sufficiently identified in the warrant although his first name was erroneously

stated therein as Romulo and not Bernard, considering that the warrant was couched in terms that would make it
enforceable against the person and residence of petitioner and no other.
ISSUES:
(1) Was petitioner sufficiently described in the search and seizure warrant?
(2) Was there probable cause for the issuance of a search and seizure warrant against petitioner?
(3) Whether or not the firearms and explosive allegedly found in petitioners residence are admissible in evidence
against him even though said firearms were not listed in the search and seizure warrant. Immaterial due to a void
search warrant.
RULING:
(1)

YES. the failure to correctly state in the search and seizure warrant the first name of petitioner, which is Bernard
and not Romulo or Rumolo, does not invalidate the warrant because the additional description alias Lolong Nala
who is said to be residing at Purok 4, Poblacion, Kitaotao, Bukidnon sufficiently enabled the police officers to locate
and identify the petitioner. . What is prohibited is a warrant against an unnamed party, and not one which, as in the
instant case, contains a descriptio personae that will enable the officer to identify the accused without difficulty.

(2)

NO. Nowhere in the affidavit and testimony of witness Ruel Nalagon nor in PO3 Macrino L. Alcosers application
for the issuance of a search warrant was it mentioned that petitioner had no license to possess a firearm. PO3
Alcoser and his witness Ruel Nalagon did not have personal knowledge but only personal belief of petitioners lack
of license to possess firearms, ammunitions and explosives; and did not adduce the evidence required to prove the
existence of probable cause. Hence, the search and seizure warrant issued on the basis of the evidence presented
is void.

(3)

The settled rule is that where entry into the premises to be searched was gained by virtue of a void search warrant,
prohibited articles seized in the course of the search are inadmissible against the accused. Prohibited articles may
be seized but only as long as the search is valid. In this case, it was not because: 1) there was no valid search
warrant; and 2) absent such a warrant, the right thereto was not validly waived by the petitioner. In short, the military
officers who entered the petitioners premises had no right to be there and therefore had no right either to seize the
pistol and bullets.
WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing, the petition is GRANTED. Search and Seizure Warrant is declared
VOID and the articles seized by virtue thereof are declared inadmissible in evidence.
VICENTE LIM SR. MAYOR SUSANA LIM, Vs. HON. NEMESIO S. FELIX HON. ANTONIO ALFANE,
GUTIERREZ, JR.,
On March 17, 1989, at about 7:30 o'clock in the morning, at the vicinity of the airport road of the Masbate Domestic
Airport, located at the municipality of Masbate province of Masbate ,Congressman Moises Espinosa, Sr. and his
security escorts, namely Provincial Guards Antonio Cortes, Gaspar Amaro, and Artemio Fuentes were attacked and
killed by a lone assassin. Dante Siblante another security escort of Congressman Espinosa, Sr. survived the
assassination plot, although, he himself suffered a gunshot wound.
An investigation of the incident then followed.
Thereafter, and for the purpose of preliminary investigation, the designated investigator, Harry O. Tantiado, TSg, of
the PC Criminal Investigation Service at Camp Bagong Ibalon Legazpi City filed an amended complaint with the
Municipal Trial Court of Masbate accusing, among others, Vicente Lim, Sr.,Mayor Susana Lim of Masbate, Jolly T.
Fernandez, Florencio T. Fernandez, Jr., Nonilon A. Bagalihog, Mayor Nestor C. Lim and Mayor Antonio Kho of the
crime of multiple murder and frustrated murder in connection with the airport incident. The case was docketed as
Criminal Case No. 9211.

After conducting the preliminary investigation, the court issued an order dated July 31, 1989 stating therein
that . . . after weighing the affidavits and answers given by the witnesses for the prosecution during the preliminary
examination in searching questions and answers, concludes that a probable cause has been established for the
issuance of a warrant of arrest of named accused in the amended complaint, namely, Jimmy Cabarles, Ronnie
Fernandez, Nonilon Bagalihog, Jolly Fernandez, Florencio Fernandez, Jr., Vicente Lim, Sr., Susana Lim, Nestor
Lim, Antonio Kho, Jaime Liwanag, Zaldy Dumalag and Rene Tuallaalias Tidoy.
Petitioners Vicente Lim, Sr. and Susana Lim filed with the respondent court several motions and
manifestations which in substance prayed that an order be issued requiring the transmittal of the initial records of
the preliminary inquiry or investigation conducted by the Municipal Judge Barsaga of Masbate for the best
enlightenment regarding the existence of a probable cause or prima facie evidence as well as the determination of
the existence of guilt, pursuant to the mandatory mandate of the constitution that no warrant shall be issued unless
the issuing magistrate shall have himself been personally convinced of such probable cause.
In another manifestation, the Lims reiterated that the court conduct a hearing to determine if there really
exists a prima facie case against them in the light of documents which are recantations of some witnesses in the
preliminary investigation. It should also be noted that the Lims also presented to the respondent Judge documents
of recantation of witnesses whose testimonies were used to establish a prima facie case against them.
On July 5, 1990, the respondent court issued an order denying for lack of merit the motions and
manifestations and issued warrants of arrest against the accused including the petitioners herein. The judge wrote,
In the instant cases, the preliminary investigation was conducted by the Municipal Trial Court of Masbate, Masbate
which found the existence of probable cause that the offense of multiple murder was committed and that all the
accused are probably guilty thereof, which was affirmed upon review by the Provincial Prosecutor who properly filed
with the Regional Trial Court four separate informations for murder. Considering that both the two competent officers
to whom such duty was entrusted by law have declared the existence of probable cause, each information is
complete in form and substance, and there is no visible defect on its face, this Court finds it just and proper to rely
on the prosecutor's certification in each information
Petitioners question the judgment of Judge Felix.
ISSUE:WON a judge may issue a warrant of arrest without bail by simply relying on the prosecution's certification
and recommendation that a probable cause exists?
RULING:The questioned Order of respondent Judge Nemesio S. Felix of Branch 56, Regional Trial Court of Makati
dated July 5, 1990 is declared NULL and VOID and SET ASIDE. As held in Soliven v. Makasiar, the Judge does not
have to personally examine the complainant and his witnesses. The Prosecutor can perform the same functions as
a commissioner for the taking of the evidence. However, there should be necessary documents and a report
supporting the Fiscal's bare certification. All of these should be before the Judge. We cannot determine beforehand
how cursory or exhaustive the Judge's examination should be. Usually, this depends on the circumstances of each
case. The Judge has to exercise sound discretion; after all, the personal determination is vested in the Judge by the
Constitution. However, to be sure, the Judge must go beyond the Prosecutor's certification and investigation report
whenever necessary. As mentioned in the facts (stated above), the Lims presented documents of recantations of
the witnesses. Although, the general rule is that recantations are not given much weight in the determination of a
case and in the granting of a new trial the respondent Judge before issuing his own warrants of arrest should, at the
very least, have gone over the records of the preliminary examination conducted earlier in the light of the evidence
now presented by the concerned witnesses in view of the "political undertones" prevailing in the cases. In making
the required personal determination, a Judge is not precluded from relying on the evidence earlier gathered by
responsible officers. The extent of the reliance depends on the circumstances of each case and is subject to the
Judge's sound discretion. However, the Judge abuses that discretion when having no evidence before him, he
issues a warrant of arrest. Indubitably, the respondent Judge (Felix)committed a grave error when he relied solely

on the Prosecutors certification and issued the questioned Order dated July 5,1990 without having before him any
other basis for his personal determination of the existence of a probable cause.
Stonehill vs Diokno
CONCEPCION, C.J.
Respondents issued, on different dates, 42 search warrants against petitioners personally, and/or corporations for
which they are officers directing peace officers to search the persons of petitioners and premises of their offices,
warehouses and/or residences to search for personal properties books of accounts, financial records, vouchers,
correspondence, receipts, ledgers, journals, portfolios, credit journals, typewriters, and other documents showing all
business transactions including disbursement receipts, balance sheets and profit and loss statements and
Bobbins(cigarettes) as the subject of the offense for violations of Central Bank Act, Tariff and Customs Laws,
Internal Revenue Code, and Revised Penal Code.
Upon effecting the search in the offices of the aforementioned corporations and on the respective residences of the
petitioners, there seized documents, papers, money and other records. Petitioners then were subjected to
deportation proceedings and were constrained to question the legality of the searches and seizures as well as the
admissibility of those seized as evidence against them.
On March 20, 1962, the SC issued a writ of preliminary injunction and partially lifted the same on June 29, 1962 with
respect to some documents and papers.
Held:
a. Search warrants issued were violative of the Constitution and the Rules, thus, illegal or being general
warrants. There is no probable cause and warrant did not particularly specify the things to be seized.
The purpose of the requirement is to avoid placing the sanctity of the domicile and the privacy of
communication and correspondence at the mercy of the whims, caprice or passion of peace officers.
b. Document seized from an illegal search warrant is not admissible in court as a fruit of a poisonous tee.
However, they could not be returned, except if warranted by the circumstances.
c.

Petitioners were not the proper party to question the validity and return of those taken from the
corporations for which they acted as officers as they are treated as personality different from that of the
corporation.

Jose Burgos vs. Chief of Staff

ESCOLIN, J.
Two warrants were issued against petitioners for the search on the premises of Metropolitan Mail and We
Forum newspapers and the seizure of items alleged to have been used in subversive activities. Petitioners prayed
that a writ of preliminary mandatory and prohibitory injunction be issued for the return of the seized items and
articles, and thus those seized articles will not be used by the respondents against the petitioners in the court.
The petitioners questioned the warrants for the lack of probable cause and that the two warrants issued indicated
only one and the same address. In addition, the items seized subject to the warrant were real properties.
Issue: Whether or not, the two warrants are valid to justify the seizure of the items.
Held: The warrants are null and void. The Court found out that the affidavit for the application of the warrant did not
satisfy the requirement of probable cause because the statements of the witnesses are mere generalizations.
Furthermore, jurisprudence prohibits the issuance of general warrants. In this case, the warrant issued doesnt
describe and enumerate the items to be searched and seized and did not indicate and specify the subversive nature
of the said items.

JOSEFINO S. ROAN, vs.THE HONORABLE ROMULO T. GONZALES,

CRUZ, J:
The challenged search warrant was issued by the respondent judge on May 10, 1984. The petitioner's house was
searched two days later but none of the articles listed in the warrant was discovered. However, the officers
conducting the search found in the premises one Colt Magnum revolver and eighteen live bullets which they
confiscated. They are now the bases of the charge against the petitioner.
Respondent Judge said that when PC Capt. Mauro P. Quinosa personally filed his application for a search warrant
on May 10, 1984, he appeared before him in the company of his two (2) witnesses, Esmael Morada and Jesus
Tohilida, both of whom likewise presented to him their respective affidavits taken by Pat. Josue V. Lining, a police
investigator. As the application was not yet subscribed and sworn to, he proceeded to examine Captain Quillosa on
the contents thereof to ascertain, among others, if he knew and understood the same. Afterwards, he subscribed
and swore to the same before him.
ISSUE: Whether the Respondent Judge failed to comply with the proper procedure in issuing the Search Warrant.
HELD: Yes, mere affidavits of the complainant and his witnesses are thus not sufficient. The examining Judge has
to take depositions in writing of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce and attach them to the record.
Such written deposition is necessary in order that the Judge may be able to properly determine the existence or
non-existence of the probable cause, to hold liable for perjury the person giving it if it will be found later that his
declarations are false.
We, therefore, hold that the search warrant is tainted with illegality by the failure of the Judge to conform with the
essential requisites of taking the depositions in writing and attaching them to the record, rendering the search
warrant invalid. (See Rule 126, Sec 4)
The respondent judge also declared that he "saw no need to have applicant Quillosa's deposition taken considering
that he was applying for a search warrant on the basis of the information provided by the witnesses whose
depositions had already been taken by the undersigned.
In other words, the applicant was asking for the issuance of the search warrant on the basis of mere hearsay and
not of information personally known to him, as required by settled jurisprudence.
RIZAL ALIH, NASIM ALIH, vs.
MAJOR GENERAL DELFIN C. CASTRO,
CRUZ, J
Respondents who were members of the Philippine marine and defense forces raided the compound occupied by
petitioner in search of loose firearms, ammunitions and explosives. A shoot-out ensued after petitioners resisted the
intrusion by the respondents, killing a number of men. The following morning, the petitioners were arrested and
subjected to finger printing, paraffin testing and photographing despite their objection. Several kinds of rifle,
grenades and ammunitions were also confiscated.
The petitioners filed an injunction suit with a prayer to have the items illegally seized returned to them and invoked
the provisions on the Bill of Rights
The respondents admitted that the operation was done without a warrant but reasoned that they were acting under
superior orders and that operation was necessary because of the aggravation of the peace and order problem due
to the assassination of the city mayor.
Issue: WON the seizing of the items and the taking of the fingerprints and photographs of the petitioners and
subjecting them to paraffin testing are violative of the bill of Rights and are inadmissible as evidence against them.

Held: The court held that superior orders nor the suspicion that the respondents had against petitioners did not
excuse the former from observing the guaranty provided for by the constitution against unreasonable searches and
seizure. The petitioners were entitled to due process and should be protected from the arbitrary actions of those
tasked to execute the law. Furthermore, there was no showing that the operation was urgent nor was there any
showing of the petitioners as criminals or fugitives of justice to merit approval by virtue of Rule 113, Section 5 of the
Rules of Court.
The items seized, having been the fruits of the poisonous tree were held inadmissible as evidence in any
proceedings against the petitioners. The operation by the respondents was done without a warrant and so the items
seized during said operation should not be acknowledged in court as evidence. But said evidence should remain in
the custody of the law (custodia legis).
However, as to the issue on finger-printing, photographing and paraffin-testing as violative of the provision against
self-incrimination, the court held that the prohibition against self-incrimination applies to testimonial compulsion only.
As Justice Holmes put it in Holt v. United States, 18 The prohibition of compelling a man in a criminal court to be a
witness against himself is a prohibition of the use of physical or moral compulsion to extort communications from
him, not an exclusion of his body as evidence when it may be material.
CYNTHIA D. NOLASCO, MILA ROQUE and WILLIE C. TOLENTINO, vs.HON. ERNANI CRUZ PAO,
MELENCIO-HERRERA, J.
Aquilar-Roque and Nolasco were arrested by a Constabulary Security Group (CSG) at the intersection of Mayon
Street, Quezon City On the same day, a searched was conducted. Ct. Col. Virgilio Saldajeno; applied for search
warrant from the respondent Hon. Ernani Cruz Pano, after a month of round the clock surveillance of the premises
as a suspected underground house of the CPP/NPA, particularly connected to MV Karagatan / Pena Andrea
cases. The searching party seized 428 documents and written materials, and additionally a portable typewriter and
2 wooden boxes. The City Fiscal information for violation of PD No. 33, Illegal Possession of Subversive Documents
Petitioners contend that the Search Warrant is void because it is a general warrant since it does not sufficiently
describe with particularly the things subject of the search and seizure and that probable cause had not been
properly established for lack of searching questions propounded to the applicants witness.
Disputed Search Warrant: Documents, papers and other records of the communist party of the Philippines / New
Peoples Army and or the National Democratic Front, such as Minutes of the Party Philippines..
ISSUE: Whether or not the search warrant issued was of general warrant and illegal?
HELD: The search warrant is of General, thus, it was hereby annulled by set aside.
RATIONALE: The Search Warrant does not specify what the subversive books and instructions are; what are the
manuals not otherwise available to the public certain to make them subversive or to enable them to be used for the
crime of rebellion. There is absent a definite guideline to the searching team as to what items might be lawfully
seized thus giving the officers of the law discretion regarding what articles they should seize as, in fact, taken also
were a portable typewriter.
Mere generalization will not suffice and odes not satisfy the requirements of probable cause upon which a warrant
may issue.
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, vs. MIKAEL MALMSTEDT
PADILLA, J.
Captain Alen Vasco, the commanding officer of the first regional command (NARCOM) stationed at camp Dangwa,
ordered his men to set up a temporary checkpoint for the purpose of checking all vehicles coming from the
Cordillera Region. The order to establish a checkpoint was prompted by persistent reports that vehicles coming

from Sagada were transporting marijuana and other prohibited drugs. And an information also was received about a
Caucasian coming from Sagada had in his possession prohibited drugs.
In the afternoon the bus where accused was riding stopped. Sgt. Fider and CIC Galutan boarded the bus
and announced that they were members of the NARCOM and that they would conduct an inspection. During the
inspection CIC Galutan noticed a bulge on accused waist. Suspecting the bulge on accused waist to be a gun, the
officer asked for accuseds passport and other identification papers. When accused failed to comply, the officer
required him to bring out whatever it was that was bulging o his waist. And it turned out to be a pouched bag and
when accused opened the same bag the officer noticed four suspicious looking objects wrapped in brown packing
tape. It contained hashish, a derivative of marijuana.
Thereafter, the accused was invited outside the bus for questioning. But before he alighted from the bus
accused stopped to get two travelling bags. The officer inspects the bag. It was only after the officers had opened
the bags that the accused finally presented his passport. The two bags contained a stuffed toy each, upon
inspection the stuff toy contained also hashish.
Issue:Whether or not there is a violation of the constitutional right against unreasonable search and seizure
Ruling:The Supreme Court held that under Section 5 Rule 113 of the Rules of Court provides:
Arrest without warrant; when lawful a peace officer or a private person may, without a warrant, arrest a person:
a) When, in the presence, the person to be arrested has committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to
commit an offense;
b) When an offense has in fact just been committed, and he has personal knowledge of facts indicating that the
person to be arrested has committed it; and
c) When the person to be arrested is a prisoner who has escaped from a penal establishment or place where he is
serving final judgment or temporary confined while his case is pending, or has escaped while being transferred from
one confinement to another
Accused was searched and arrested while transporting prohibited drugs. A crime was actually being committed by
the accused and he was caught in flagrante delicto, thus the search made upon his personal effects falls squarely
under paragraph 1 of the foregoing provision of law, which allows a warrantless search incident to a lawful arrest.
Probable cause has been defined as such facts and circumstances which could lead a reasonable, discreet and
prudent man to believe that an offense has been committed, and that the object sought in connection with the
offense are in the placed sought to be searched.
When NARCOM received the information that a Caucasian travelling from Sagada to Baguio City was carrying with
him a prohibited drug, there was no time to obtain a search warrant.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, vs.RUBEN BURGOS y TITO,
GUTIERREZ, JR.,
Facts: Defendant is charged with illegal possession of firearm in furtherance of subversion (tasks such as recruiting
members to the NPA and collection of contributions from its members) and found guilty by the RTC of Digos, Davao
del Sur. From the information filed by the police authorities upon the information given by Masamlok, allegedly a
man defendant tried to recruit into the NPA, the police authorities arrest defendant and had his house searched.
Subsequently, certain NPA-related documents and a firearm, allegedly issued and used by one Alias Cmdr. Pol of
the NPA, are confiscated. Defendant denies being involved in any subversive activities and claims that he has been
tortured in order to accept ownership of subject firearm and that his alleged extrajudicial statements have been
made only under fear, threat and intimidation on his person and his family. He avers that his arrest is unlawful as it
is done without valid warrant, that the trial court erred in holding the search warrant in his house for the firearm
lawful, and that the trial court erred in holding him guilty beyond reasonable doubt for violation of PD 9 in relation to
GOs 6and 7.

Issue: If defendants arrest, the search of his home, and the subsequent confiscation of a firearm and several NPArelated documents are lawful.
The right of the person to be secure against any unreasonable seizure of his body and any deprivation of liberty
is a most basic and fundamental one. The statute or rule, which allows exceptions to the requirement of
warrants of arrest is strictly construed. Any exception must clearly fall within the situations when securing
a warrant would be absurd or is manifestly unnecessary as provided by the Rule. We cannot liberally
construe the rule on arrests without warrant or extend its application beyond the cases specifically provided
by law. To do so would infringe upon personal liberty and set back a basic right so often violated and so
deserving of full protection.
Almeida-Sanchez v. United States
Petitioner, a Mexican citizen and holder of a valid work permit, challenges the constitutionality of the Border Patrol's
warrantless search of his automobile 25 air miles north of the Mexican border. The search, made without probable
cause or consent, uncovered marihuana, which was used to convict petitioner of a federal crime. The Government
seeks to justify the search on the basis of 287(a)(3) of the Immigration and Nationality Act, which provides for
warrantless searches of automobiles and other conveyances "within a reasonable distance from any external
boundary of the United States," as authorized by regulations to be promulgated by the Attorney General. The
Attorney General's regulation defines "reasonable distance" as "within 100 air miles from any external boundary of
the United States." The Court of Appeals upheld the search on the basis of the Act and regulation.
Held: The warrantless search of petitioner's automobile, made without probable cause or consent, violated the
Fourth Amendment. Pp. 413 U. S. 269-275.
(a) The search cannot be justified on the basis of any special rules applicable to automobile searches, as probable
cause was lacking; nor can it be justified by analogy with administrative inspections, as the officers had no warrant
or reason to believe that petitioner had crossed the border or committed an offense, and there was no consent by
petitioner. Pp. 413 U. S. 269-272.
(b) The search was not a border search or the functional equivalent thereof. Pp. 413 U. S. 272-275.
452 F.2d 459, reversed.
This case involved the United States border patrol which conducted a search without warrant or probable cause.
The vehicle was stopped and searched an automobile for illegal aliens twenty-five miles from the Mexican border.
[1] The Court approached the search from two views: automobile search and border search. As to the validity of the
search under the automobile exception, the Court found no justification for the search under the Carroll doctrine
because there was no probable cause. The Court added that "the Carroll doctrine does not declare a field day for
the police in searching automobiles. Automobile or no automobile, there must be probable cause for the search."
Delaware v. Prouse (No. 77-1571)
A patrolman in a police cruiser stopped an automobile occupied by respondent and seized marihuana in plain view
on the car floor. Respondent was subsequently indicted for illegal possession of a controlled substance. At a
hearing on respondent's motion to suppress the marihuana, the patrolman testified that, prior to stopping the
vehicle, he had observed neither traffic or equipment violations nor any suspicious activity, and that he made the
stop only in order to check the driver's license and the car's registration. The patrolman was not acting pursuant to
any standards, guidelines, or procedures pertaining to document spot checks, promulgated by either his department
or the State Attorney General. The trial court granted the motion to suppress, finding the stop and detention to have
been wholly capricious, and therefore violative of the Fourth Amendment. The Delaware Supreme Court affirmed.
Held:
1. This Court has jurisdiction in this case even though the Delaware Supreme Court held that the stop at issue not
only violated the Federal Constitution but also was impermissible under the Delaware Constitution. That court's
opinion shows that, even if the State Constitution would have provided an adequate basis for the judgment below,

the court did not intend to rest its decision independently on the State Constitution, its holding instead depending
upon its view of the reach of the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments. Pp. 651-653.
2. Except where there is at least articulable and reasonable suspicion that a motorist is unlicensed or that an
automobile is not registered, or that either the vehicle or an occupant is otherwise subject to seizure for violation of
law, stopping an automobile and detaining the driver in order to check his driver's license and the registration of the
automobile are unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment. Pp. 653-663.
(a) Stopping an automobile and detaining its occupants constitute a "seizure" within the meaning of the Fourth and
Fourteenth Amendments, even though the purpose of the stop is limited and the resulting detention quite brief. The
permissibility of a particular law enforcement practice is judged by balancing its intrusion on the individual's Fourth
Amendment interests against its promotion of legitimate governmental interests. Pp. 653-655. [p649]
(b) The State's interest in discretionary spot checks as a means of ensuring the safety of its roadways does not
outweigh the resulting intrusion on the privacy and security of the persons detained. Given the physical and
psychological intrusion visited upon the occupants of a vehicle by a random stop to check documents, cf. United
States v. Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U. 3. 873; zzzzzzz in an automobile does not lose all reasonable expectation of
privacy simply because the automobile and its use are subject to government regulation. People are not shorn of all
Fourth Amendment protection when they step from their homes onto the public sidewalk; nor are they shorn of
those interests when they step from the sidewalks into their automobiles. Pp. 662-663.
(d) The holding in this case does not preclude Delaware or other States from developing methods for spot checks
that involve less intrusion or that do not involve the unconstrained exercise of discretion. Questioning of all
oncoming traffic at roadblock-type stops is one possible alternative. P. 663.
RICARDO C. VALMONTE AND ULAP vs.GEN. RENATO DE VILLA AND NCR DISTRICT COMMAND,
PADILLA, J.
On 20 January 1987, the National Capital Region District Command (NCRDC) was activated pursuant to Letter of
Instruction 02/87 of the Philippine General Headquarters, AFP, with the mission of conducting security operations
within its area of responsibility and peripheral areas, for the purpose of establishing an effective territorial defense,
maintaining peace and order, and providing an atmosphere conducive to the social, economic and political
development of the National Capital Region. As part of its duty to maintain peace and order, the NCRDC installed
checkpoints in various parts of Valenzuela, Metro Manila.
Petitioners aver that, because of the installation of said checkpoints, the residents of Valenzuela are worried of
being harassed and of their safety being placed at the arbitrary, capricious and whimsical disposition of the military
manning the checkpoints, considering that their cars and vehicles are being subjected to regular searches and
check-ups, especially at night or at dawn, without the benefit of a search warrant and/or court order. Their alleged
fear for their safety increased when, at dawn of 9 July 1988, Benjamin Parpon, a supply officer of the Municipality of
Valenzuela, Bulacan, was gunned down allegedly in cold blood by the members of the NCRDC manning the
checkpoint along McArthur Highway at Malinta, Valenzuela, for ignoring and/or refusing to submit himself to the
checkpoint and for continuing to speed off inspire of warning shots fired in the air. Petitioner Valmonte also claims
that, on several occasions, he had gone thru these checkpoints where he was stopped and his car subjected to
search/check-up without a court order or search warrant. Instances have occurred where a citizen, while not killed,
had been harassed. Petitioners contended that the checkpoints gave the respondents blanket authority to make
searches and seizures without search warrant or court order in violation of the Constitution. Finally, on 17 July 1988,
military and police checkpoints in Metro Manila were temporarily lifted and a review and refinement of the rules in
the conduct of the police and military manning the checkpoints was ordered by the National Capital Regional
Command Chief and the Metropolitan Police Director.
Issue: The question was raised as to whether or not checkpoints violate the right of the people against
unreasonable search and seizures.

Held: The Supreme Court held to dismiss the petition. True, the manning of checkpoints by the military is
susceptible of abuse by the men in uniform, in the same manner that all governmental power is susceptible of
abuse. But, at the cost of occasional inconvenience, discomfort and even irritation to the citizen, the checkpoints
during these abnormal times, when conducted within reasonable limits, are part of the price we pay for an orderly
society and a peaceful community. Between the inherent right of the state to protect its existence and promote
public welfareand and individuals right against a warrantless search which is however reasonably conducted, the
former should prevail.
Umil vs. Ramos
This consolidated case of 8 petitions for habeas corpus assails the validity of the arrests and searches made by the
military on the petitioners. The arrests relied on the confidential information that the authorities received. Except
for one case where inciting to sedition was charged, the rest are charged with subversion for being a member of the
New Peoples Army.
RULING: The arrests were legal. Regarding the subversion cases, the arrests were legal since subversion is a form
of a continuing crime together with rebellion, conspiracy or proposal to commit rebellion/subversion, and crimes
committed in furtherance thereof or in connection therewith. On the inciting to sedition case, the arrest was legal
since an information was filed prior to his arrest. Lastly, the arrests were not fishing expeditions but a result of an indepth surveillance of NPA safe houses pinpointed by none other than members of the NPA.
The right to preliminary investigation should be exercised by the offender as soon as possible. Otherwise, it would
be considered as impliedly waived and the filing of information can proceed. This sort of irregularity is not sufficient
to set aside a valid judgment upon a sufficient complaint and after a trial free from error.
DISSENT: (Sarmiento, J.) The confidential information was nothing but hearsay. The searches and arrests made
were bereft of probable cause and that the petitioners were not caught in flagrante delicto or in any overt act.
Utmost, the authorities was lucky in their fishing expeditions.
2. The Bill of Rights can only be invoked only against the state. People vs. Marti --Marti and his wife went to
the booth of the "Manila Packing and Export Forwarders" carrying with them four (4) gift-wrapped packages. Marti
informed the owner that the packages simply contained books, cigars and gloves as gifts to his friends in Zurich and
refused to allow the owner to examine and inspect the packages. However, before the delivery of the box to the
Bureau of Customs, the owner's husband inspected the package and found marijuana which was later turned over
to the NBI. A case was filed against Marti. Marti invoked his right against illegal searches and seizure. Held: The
constitutional proscription against unlawful searches and seizures therefore applies as a restraint directed only
against the government and its agencies tasked with the enforcement of the law. Thus, it could only be invoked
against the State to whom the restraint against arbitrary and unreasonable exercise of power is imposed.
Corollarily, alleged violations against unreasonable search and seizure may only be invoked against the State by an
individual unjustly traduced by the exercise of sovereign authority. To agree with appellant that an act of a private
individual in violation of the Bill of Rights should also be construed as an act of the State would result in serious
legal complications and an absurd interpretation of the constitution
ALAIN MANALILI y DIZON, vs. COURT OF APPEALS and PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES,
PANGANIBAN, J.
Nature: Petition for review on certiorari of a decision of the Court of Appeals
Pat. Romeo Espiritu and Pat. Anger Lumabas were patrolling the vicinity of the Kalookan City Cemetery due to
reports of drug addicts roaming the area. They chanced upon a male (who turned out to be petitioner Alain Manalili
y Dizon) who seemed to be high on drugs in front of the cemetery. He was observed to have reddish eyesand to
be walking in a swaying manner. When Manalili tried to avoid the policemen, the latter approached him and asked
what he was holding in his hands. Manalili tried to resist, but the policemen were persistent until he yielded his
wallet which they examined and found to contain crushed marijuana residue. Further examination by the Forensic

Chemistry Section of the NBI confirmed the findings. Trial court convicted Manalili of violation of Section8, Article II,
of RA 6425. Upon appeal, the Court of Appeals affirmed the decision of the trial court.(In his defense, Manalili
claimed that he was not walking; that he was riding a tricycle until the three policemen ordered the driver of the
tricycle to stop because the driver and passenger were allegedly under the influence of marijuana. He claimed that
he was searched and his pants were turned inside-out but nothing was found. To some extent he implied that the
marijuana sample found in his entity was framed up by the policemen.)
Issue: WON the evidence seized during a stop-and-frisk operation is admissible.
Held: Yes
Ratio: The general rule is that a search and seizure must be validated by a previously secured judicial warrant.
However, this is not absolute and exceptions have been contemplated by the law:
1. Search incidental to a lawful rrest
2. Search of moving vehicles
3. Seizure in plain view
4. Customs search
5. Waiver by the accused themselves of their right against unreasonable search and seizure.
In the cited cases, the search and seizure may be made only with probable cause as essential requirement.
Probable cause (in relation to search and seizure): Existence of such facts and circumstances which could lead a
reasonably discreet and prudent man to believe that an offense has been committed and that the item, article, or
object sought in connection with said offense or subject to seizure and destruction by law is in the place to be
searched.
A stop-and-frisk operation is another exception to the general rule. In this case, probable cause was established
with Manalilis suspicious behaviour.
Malacat v Court of Appeals
DAVIDE, JR
On August 29, 1990 at about 6:30 in the evening, allegedly in response to bomb threats reported seven days
earlier, Rodolfo Yu of the Western Police District, Metropolitan Police Force of the Integrated National Police, Police
Station No. 3, Quiapo, Manila, was on foot patrol with three other police officers (all of them in uniform) along
Quezon Boulevard, Quiapo, Manila, near the Mercury Drug store at Plaza Miranda. They chanced upon two groups
of Muslim-looking men, with each group, comprised of three to four men, posted at opposite sides of the corner of
stop and frisk, where a warrant and seizure can be effected without necessarily being preceded by an arrest and
whose object is either to maintain the status quo momentarily while the police officer seeks to obtain more
information; and that the seizure of the grenade from Malacat was incidental to a lawful arrest. The trial court thus
found Malacat guilty of the crime of illegal possession of explosives under Section 3 of PD 1866, and sentenced him
to suffer the penalty of not less than 17 years, 4 months and 1 day of Reclusion Temporal, as minimum, and not
more than 30 years of Reclusion Perpetua, as maximum. On 18 February 1994, Malacat filed a notice of appeal
indicating that he was appealing to the Supreme Court. However, the record of the case was forwarded to the Court
of Appeals (CA-GR CR 15988). In its decision of 24 January 1996, the Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court.
Manalili filed a petition for review with the Supreme Court.
Issue: Whether the search made on Malacat is valid, pursuant to the exception of stop and frisk.
Ruling: The trial court ruled that the warrantless search and seizure of petitioner was akin to a stop and frisk,
where a warrant and seizure can be effected without necessarily being preceded by an arrest and whose object is

either to maintain the status quo momentarily while the police officer seeks to obtain more information. Probable
cause was not required as it was not certain that a crime had been committed, however, the situation called for an
investigation, hence to require probable cause would have been premature. The RTC emphasized that Yu and his
companions were confronted with an emergency, in which the delay necessary to obtain a warrant, threatens the
destruction of evidence and the officers had to act in haste, as petitioner and his companions were acting
suspiciously, considering the time, place and reported cases of bombing. Further, petitioners group suddenly ran
away in different directions as they saw the arresting officers approach, thus it is reasonable for an officer to
conduct a limited search, the purpose of which is not necessarily to discover evidence of a crime, but to allow the
officer to pursue his investigation without fear of violence. The trial court then ruled that the seizure of the grenade
from petitioner was incidental to a lawful arrest, and since petitioner later voluntarily admitted such fact to the police
investigator for the purpose of bombing the Mercury Drug Store, concluded that sufficient evidence existed to
establish petitioners guilt beyond reasonable doubt.
WHEREFORE, the challenged decision of the Seventeenth Division of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR No.
15988 is SET ASIDE for lack of jurisdiction on the part of said Court and, on ground of reasonable doubt, the
decision of 10 February 1994 of Branch 5 of the Regional Trial Court of Manila is REVERSED and petitioner
SAMMY MALACAT y MANDAR is hereby ACQUITTED and ORDERED immediately released from detention,
unless his further detention is justified for any other lawful cause.
David vs Macapagal Arroyo
SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ, J.
On February 24, 2006, President Arroyo issued PP No. 1017 declaring a state of emergency, thus:
NOW, THEREFORE, I, Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo, President of the Republic of the Philippines and Commander-inChief of the Armed Forces of the Philippines, [calling-out power] by virtue of the powers vested upon me by Section
18, Article 7 of the Philippine Constitution which states that: The President. . . whenever it becomes
necessary, . . . may call out (the) armed forces to prevent or suppress. . .rebellion. . ., and in my capacity as
their Commander-in-Chief, do hereby command the Armed Forces of the Philippines, to maintain law and order
throughout the Philippines, prevent or suppress all forms of lawless violence as well as any act of insurrection or
rebellion ["take care" power] and to enforce obedience to all the laws and to all decrees, orders and regulations
promulgated by me personally or upon my direction; and [power to take over] as provided in Section 17, Article 12 of
the Constitution do hereby declare a State of National Emergency.
On the same day, PGMA issued G.O. No. 5 implementing PP1017, directing the members of the AFP and PNP "to
immediately carry out the necessary and appropriate actions and measures to suppress and prevent acts of
terrorism and lawless violence."
David, et al. assailed PP 1017 on the grounds that (1) it encroaches on the emergency powers of Congress; (2) it is
a subterfuge to avoid the constitutional requirements for the imposition of martial law; and (3) it violates the
constitutional guarantees of freedom of the press, of speech and of assembly. They alleged direct injury resulting
from illegal arrest and unlawful search committed by police operatives pursuant to PP 1017.
During the hearing, the Solicitor General argued that the issuance of PP 1017 and GO 5 have factual basis, and
contended that the intent of the Constitution is to give full discretionary powers to the President in determining the
necessity of calling out the armed forces. The petitioners did not contend the facts stated b the Solicitor General.
ISSUE: Whether or not the PP 1017 and G.O. No. 5 is constitutional.
RULING: The operative portion of PP 1017 may be divided into three important provisions, thus:
First provision: by virtue of the power vested upon me by Section 18, Artilce VII do hereby command the
Armed Forces of the Philippines, to maintain law and order throughout the Philippines, prevent or suppress all forms
of lawless violence as well any act of insurrection or rebellion

Second provision: and to enforce obedience to all the laws and to all decrees, orders and regulations
promulgated by me personally or upon my direction;
Third provision: as provided in Section 17, Article XII of the Constitution do hereby declare a State of National
Emergency.
PP 1017 is partially constitutional insofar as provided by the first provision of the decree.
First Provision: Calling Out Power.
The only criterion for the exercise of the calling-out power is that whenever it becomes necessary, the President
may call the armed forces to prevent or suppress lawless violence, invasion or rebellion. (Integrated Bar of
the Philippines v. Zamora)
President Arroyos declaration of a state of rebellion was merely an act declaring a status or condition of public
moment or interest, a declaration allowed under Section 4, Chap 2, Bk II of the Revised Administration Code. Such
declaration, in the words of Sanlakas, is harmless, without legal significance, and deemed not written. In these
cases, PP 1017 is more than that. In declaring a state of national emergency, President Arroyo did not only rely on
Section 18, Article VII of the Constitution, a provision calling on the AFP to prevent or suppress lawless violence,
invasion or rebellion. She also relied on Section 17, Article XII, a provision on the States extraordinary power to
take over privately-owned public utility and business affected with public interest. Indeed, PP 1017 calls for the
exercise of an awesome power. Obviously, such Proclamation cannot be deemed harmless.
To clarify, PP 1017 is not a declaration of Martial Law. It is merely an exercise of President Arroyos calling-out
power for the armed forces to assist her in preventing or suppressing lawless violence.
Second Provision: The "Take Care" Power.
The second provision pertains to the power of the President to ensure that the laws be faithfully executed. This is
based on Section 17, Article VII which reads:
SEC. 17. The President shall have control of all the executive departments, bureaus, and offices. He shall ensure
that the laws be faithfully executed.
This Court rules that the assailed PP 1017 is unconstitutional insofar as it grants President Arroyo the
authority to promulgate decrees. Legislative power is peculiarly within the province of the Legislature. Section
1, Article VI categorically states that [t]he legislative power shall be vested in the Congress of the Philippines
which shall consist of a Senate and a House of Representatives. To be sure, neither Martial Law nor a state of
rebellion nor a state of emergency can justify President Arroyos exercise of legislative power by issuing decrees.
Third Provision: The Power to Take Over
Distinction must be drawn between the Presidents authority to declarea state of national emergency and to
exercise emergency powers. To the first, Section 18, Article VII grants the President such power, hence, no
legitimate constitutional objection can be raised. But to the second, manifold constitutional issues arise.
Generally, Congress is the repository of emergency powers. This is evident in the tenor of Section 23 (2), Article VI
authorizing it to delegate such powers to the President. Certainly, a body cannot delegate a power not reposed
upon it. However, knowing that during grave emergencies, it may not be possible or practicable for Congress to
meet and exercise its powers, the Framers of our Constitution deemed it wise to allow Congress to grant
emergency powers to the President, subject to certain conditions, thus:
(1) There must be a war or other emergency.
(2) The delegation must be for a limited period only.
(3) The delegation must be subject to such restrictions as the Congress may prescribe.

(4) The emergency powers must be exercised to carry out a national policy declared by Congress.
Section 17, Article XII must be understood as an aspect of the emergency powers clause. The taking over of
private business affected with public interest is just another facet of the emergency powers generally reposed upon
Congress. Thus, when Section 17 states that the the State may, during the emergency and under reasonable
terms prescribed by it, temporarily take over or direct the operation of any privately owned public utility or business
affected with public interest, it refers to Congress, not the President. Now, whether or not the President may
exercise such power is dependent on whether Congress may delegate it to him pursuant to a law prescribing the
reasonable terms thereof.
Following our interpretation of Section 17, Article XII, invoked by President Arroyo in issuing PP 1017, this Court
rules that such Proclamation does not authorize her during the emergency to temporarily take over or direct the
operation of any privately owned public utility or business affected with public interest without authority from
Congress.
Let it be emphasized that while the President alone can declare a state of national emergency, however, without
legislation, he has no power to take over privately-owned public utility or business affected with public interest. Nor
can he determine when such exceptional circumstances have ceased. Likewise, without legislation, the President
has no power to point out the types of businesses affected with public interest that should be taken over. In short,
the President has no absolute authority to exercise all the powers of the State under Section 17, Article VII in the
absence of an emergency powers act passed by Congress.
As of G.O. No. 5, it is constitutional since it provides a standard by which the AFP and the PNP should implement
PP 1017, i.e. whatever is necessary and appropriate actions and measures to suppress and prevent acts of
lawless violence. Considering that acts of terrorism have not yet been defined and made punishable by the
Legislature, such portion of G.O. No. 5 is declared unconstitutional.
ARLENE BABST, vs. NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE BOARD,
PLANA, J.
Babst vs. National Intelligence Board [GR L-62992, 28 September 1984] Resolution En Banc, Plana (J): 6 concur, 2
concur in result, 2 on leave, 1 concur in separate opinion, 2 dissent in separate opinions Facts: Arlene Babst,
Odette Alcantara, Ceres P. Doyo, Jo-Ann Q. Maglipon, Domini Torrevillas-Suarez, Lorna Kalaw-Tirol, Cielo
Buenaventura, Sylvia Mayuga, Sheila S. Coronel, et al. are columnists, feature article writers and reporters of
various local publications. At different dates since July 1980, some of them have allegedly been summoned by
military authorities who have subjected them to sustained interrogation on various aspects of their works, feelings,
sentiments, beliefs, associations and even their private lives. Aside from the interrogations, a criminal complaint for
libel was filed by Brig. Gen. Artemio Tidier, Jr. on 9 February 1983 with the Office of the City Fiscal, Manila, against
Domini Torrevillas-Suarez, editor of the Panorama, and Ma. Ceres Doyo based on an article written by Doyo and
published in the 28 March 1982 issue of the Panorama, on which the author had been interrogated by Brig. Gen.
Wilfredo Estrada (Ret.), Col. Renato Ecarma, NBI Asst. Director Ponciano Fernando, Col. Balbino Diego, Col.
Galileo Kintanar, Col. Eustaquio Peralta, et. al. The complaint included an staggering P10 million claim for
damages. (An information for libel has since been filed with the Regional Trial Court of the National Capital Region
against Suarez and Doyo.) On 3 March 1983, Babst, et. al. filed a petition for prohibition with preliminary injunction,
which was superseded by the amended and supplemental petition for prohibition with preliminary injunction, seeking
to prohibit the respondents (a) from issuing subpoenas or letters of invitation to Babst, et. al. and interrogating them,
and (b) from filing libel suits on matters that have been the subject of inquiry by the National Intelligence Board
(NIB). Issue: Whether the issuance by the NIB of letters of invitation to Babst, et.al., their subsequent interrogation,
and the filing of libel suits against Suarez and Dayo, are illegal and unconstitutional as they are violative of the
constitutional guarantee on free expression since they have the effect of imposing restrictive guidelines and norms
on mass media. Held: Prohibition will not issue in respect of the libel charges now pending in court against Suarez
and Doyo and similar suits that might be filed. The writ of prohibition is directed against a tribunal, board or person
acting without or in excess of jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion vis-a-vis certain proceedings pending
before it. The libel cases adverted to are not pending before the NIB or any other respondent. Further, the issue of

validity of the libel, charges by reason of their alleged collision with freedom of expression, is a matter that should
be raised in the proper forum, i.e., before the court where the libel cases are pending or where they may be filed.
The same rule applies to the issue of admissibility as evidence of matters that have been elicited in the course of an
inquiry or interrogation conducted by the NIB, which Babst, et. al. claim to have been illegally obtained. Finally, the
right to seek redress when libeled is a personal and individual privilege of the aggrieved party, and no one among
the officials has the authority to restrain any of his subordinates who has been libeled from vindicating his right by
instituting a libel suit. Brig. Gen. Tadiar has filed the libel case against Suarez and Doyo in his personal capacity.
Moreover, he is not even a member of the NIB. And the NIB does not appear to have anything to do with Gen.
Tadiar's private right to complain of libel.
BLAS F. OPLE, vs. RUBEN D. TORRES,
PUNO, J.
Administrative Order No. 308, entitled "Adoption of a National ComputerizedIdentification Reference System," was
issued by President Fidel Ramos On December 12, 1996.Senator Blas F. Ople filed a petition seeking to invalidate
A.O. No. 308 on several grounds. One of them is that: The establishment of a National Computerized Identification
Reference System requires a legislative act. The issuance of A.O. No.308 by the President is an unconstitutional
usurpation of the legislative powers of congress. Petitioner claims that A.O. No. 308 is not a mere administrative
order but a law and hence, beyond the power of the President to issue. He alleges that A.O. No.308 establishes a
system of identification that is all-encompassing in scope, affects the life and liberty of every Filipino citizen and
foreign resident, and more particularly, violates their right to privacy. On this point, respondents counter-argue
that: A.O. No. 308 was issued within the executive and administrative powers of the president without encroaching
on the legislative powers of congress.
ISSUE: Whether the issuance of A.O. No. 308 is an unconstitutional usurpation of the power of Congress to
legislate.
RULING: Legislative power is the authority to make laws, and to alter and repeal them. The Constitution has
vested this power in the Congress. The grant of legislative power to Congress is broad, general,
and comprehensive. Any power deemed to be legislative by usage and tradition, is necessarily possessed by
Congress, unless the Constitutionh as lodged it elsewhere. The executive power, on the other hand, is vested in the
President. It is generally defined as the power to enforce and administer the laws. It is the power of carrying the
laws into practical operation and enforcing their due observance. As head of the Executive Department, the
President is the Chief Executive. He represents the government as a whole and sees to it that all laws are enforced
by the officials and employees of his department. He has control over the executive department, bureaus and
offices. Corollary to the power of control, the President also has the duty of supervising the enforcement of laws for
the maintenance of general peace and public order. Thus, he is granted administrative power over bureaus
and offices under his control to enable him to discharge his duties
effectively. Administrative power is concerned with the work of applying policies and enforcingorders as determined
by proper governmental organs. It enables the President to fix a uniform standard of administrative efficiency and
check the official conduct of his agents. To this end, he can issue administrative orders, rules and regulations. From
these precepts, the Court holds that A.O. No. 308 involves a subject that is not appropriate to be covered by an
administrative order.
The Administrative Code of 1987 provides:
Sec. 3. Administrative Orders.
Acts of the President which relate to particular aspects of governmental operation in pursuance of his duties as
administrative head shall be promulgated in administrative orders.
An administrative order is an ordinance issued by the President which relates to specific aspects in the
administrative operation of government. It must be in harmony with the law and should be for the sole purpose of
implementing the law and carrying out the legislative policy. The Court rejects the argument that A.O. No.

308 implements the legislative policy of the Administrative Code of 1987. The Code is a general law and
incorporates in a unified document the major structural, functional and procedural principles of governance and
embodies changes in administrative structure and procedures designed to serve the people. It cannot be
simplistically argued that A.O. No. 308 merely implements
the Administrative Code of 1987. It establishes for the first time a National ComputerizedIdentification
Reference System. Such a System requires a delicate adjustment of various contending state policies the primacy
of national security, the extent of privacy interest against dossier-gathering by government, the choice of policies,
etc. As said administrative order redefines the parameters of some basic rights of our citizenry vis-a-vis the State as
well as the line that separates the administrative power of the President to make rules and the legislative power of
Congress, it ought to be evident that it deals with a subject that should be covered by law. Petition is granted and
A.O. No. 308 is declared null and void for being unconstitutional.
CECILIA ZULUETA, vs. COURT OF APPEALS and ALFREDO MARTIN,
MENDOZA, J
Cecilia Zulueta is the wife of Dr. Alfredo Martin. On 26 March 1982, Zulueta entered the clinic of her husband, a
doctor of medicine, and in the presence of her mother, a driver and Martins secretary, forcibly opened the drawers
and cabinet in her husbands clinic and took 157 documents consisting of private correspondence between Dr.
Martin and his alleged paramours, greetings cards, cancelled checks, diaries, Dr. Martins passport, and
photographs. The documents and papers were seized for use in evidence in a case for legal separation and for
disqualification from the practice of medicine which Zulueta had filed against her husband. Dr. Martin brought the
action for recovery of the documents and papers and for damages against Zulueta, with the Regional Trial Court of
Manila, Branch X. After trial, the trial court rendered judgment for Martin, declaring him the capital/exclusive owner
of the properties described in paragraph 3 of Martins Complaint or those further described in the Motion to Return
and Suppress and ordering Zulueta and any person acting in her behalf to a immediately return the properties to Dr.
Martin and to pay him P5,000.00, as nominal damages; P5,000.00, as moral damages and attorneys fees; and to
pay the costs of the suit. On appeal, the Court of Appeals affirmed the decision of the Regional Trial Court. Zulueta
filed the petition for review with the Supreme Court.
Issue: Whether the injunction declaring the privacy of communication and correspondence to be inviolable apply
even to the spouse of the aggrieved party.
Held: The documents and papers are inadmissible in evidence. The constitutional injunction declaring the privacy
of communication and correspondence [to be] inviolable is no less applicable simply because it is the wife (who
thinks herself aggrieved by her husbands infidelity) who is the party against whom the constitutional provision is to
be enforced. The only exception to the prohibition in the Constitution is if there is a lawful order [from a] court or
when public safety or order requires otherwise, as prescribed by law. Any violation of this provision renders the
evidence obtained inadmissible for any purpose in any proceeding. The intimacies between husband and wife do
not justify any one of them in breaking the drawers and cabinets of the other and in ransacking them for any telltale
evidence of marital infidelity. A person, by contracting marriage, does not shed his/her integrity or his right to privacy
as an individual and the constitutional protection is ever available to him or to her. The law insures absolute freedom
of communication between the spouses by making it privileged. Neither husband nor wife may testify for or against
the other without the consent of the affected spouse while the marriage subsists. Neither may be examined without
the consent of the other as to any communication received in confidence by one from the other during the marriage,
save for specified exceptions. But one thing is freedom of communication; quite another is a compulsion for each
one to share what one knows with the other. And this has nothing to do with the duty of fidelity that each owes to the
other.
AYER PRODUCTIONS PTY. LTD. vs. HON.IGNACIO M. CAPULONG and JUAN PONCE ENRILE
FELICIANO, J
Petitioner McElroy an Australian film maker, and his movie production company, Ayer Productions, envisioned,
sometime in 1987, for commercial viewing and for Philippine and international release, the historic peaceful struggle

of the Filipinos at EDSA. The proposed motion picture entitled "The Four Day Revolution" was endorsed by the
MTRCB as and other government agencies consulted. Ramos also signified his approval of the intended film
production.
It is designed to be viewed in a six-hour mini-series television play, presented in a "docu-drama" style, creating four
fictional characters interwoven with real events, and utilizing actual documentary footage as background. David
Williamson is Australia's leading playwright and Professor McCoy (University of New South Wales) is an American
historian have developed a script.
Enrile declared that he will not approve the use, appropriation, reproduction and/or exhibition of his name, or
picture, or that of any member of his family in any cinema or television production, film or other medium for
advertising or commercial exploitation. petitioners acceded to this demand and the name of Enrile was deleted from
the movie script, and petitioners proceeded to film the projected motion picture. However, a complaint was filed by
Enrile invoking his right to privacy. RTC ordered for the desistance of the movie production and making of any
reference to plaintiff or his family and from creating any fictitious character in lieu of plaintiff which nevertheless is
based on, or bears substantial or marked resemblance to Enrile. Hence the appeal.
Issue: Whether or Not freedom of expression was violated.
Held: Yes. Freedom of speech and of expression includes the freedom to film and produce motion pictures and
exhibit such motion pictures in theaters or to diffuse them through television. Furthermore the circumstance that the
production of motion picture films is a commercial activity expected to yield monetary profit, is not a disqualification
for availing of freedom of speech and of expression.
The projected motion picture was as yet uncompleted and hence not exhibited to any audience. Neither private
respondent nor the respondent trial Judge knew what the completed film would precisely look like. There was, in
other words, no "clear and present danger" of any violation of any right to privacy. Subject matter is one of public
interest and concern. The subject thus relates to a highly critical stage in the history of the country.
At all relevant times, during which the momentous events, clearly of public concern, that petitioners propose to film
were taking place, Enrile was a "public figure:" Such public figures were held to have lost, to some extent at least,
their right to privacy.
The line of equilibrium in the specific context of the instant case between the constitutional freedom of speech and
of expression and the right of privacy, may be marked out in terms of a requirement that the proposed motion
picture must be fairly truthful and historical in its presentation of events.
MANUEL LAGUNZAD, vs.MARIA SOTO VDA. DE GONZALES and THE COURT OF APPEALS,
MELENCIO-HERRERA, J
Petitioner Manuel Lagunzad, a newspaperman, began the production of a movie entitled "The Moises Padilla Story"
portraying the life of Moises Padilla, a mayoralty candidate of the Nacionalista Party for the Municipality of Magallon,
Negros Occidental and for whose murder, Governor Rafael Lacson, a member of the Liberal Party then in power
and his men were tried and convicted. The emphasis of the movie was on the public life of Moises Padilla, there
were portions which dealt with his private and family life including the portrayal in some scenes, of his mother, Maria
Soto, private respondent herein, and of one "Auring" as his girl friend. Padillas half sister, for and in behalf of her
mother, Vda.de Gonzales, objected to the "exploitation" of his life and demanded in writing for certain changes,
corrections and deletions in the movie. After some bargaining as to the amount to be paid Lagunzad and Vda. de
Gonzales, executed a "Licensing Agreement" whereby the latter as LICENSOR granted Lagunzad authority and
permission to exploit, use, and develop the life story of Moises Padilla for purposes of producing the picture for
consideration of P20,000.00.Lagunzad paid Vda. de Gonzales the amount of P5,000.00. Subsequently, the movie
was shown indifferent theaters all over the country. Because petitioner refused to pay any additional amounts
pursuant to the Agreement, Vda. de Gonzales instituted the present suit against him praying for judgment in her

favor ordering petitioner 1) to pay her the balance of P15,000.00, with legal interest from of the Complaint; and 2)
to render an accounting of the proceeds from the picture and to pay the corresponding 2-1/2% royalty there from,
among others. Petitioner contended in his Answer that the episodes in life of Moises Padilla depicted in the movie
were matters of public knowledge and occurred at or about the same time that the deceased became and was a
public figure; that private respondent has no property right over those incidents; that the Licensing Agreement was
without valid cause or consideration and constitutes an infringement on the constitutional right of freedom of speech
and of the press; and that he paid private respondent the amount of P5,000.00 only because of the coercion and
threat employed upon him. As a counterclaim, petitioner sought for the nullification of the Licensing Agreement, Both
the trial court and the CA ruled in favor of Vda. deGonzales.
ISSUES Whether or not the fictionalized representation of Moises Padilla is an intrusion upon his right to privacy
notwithstanding that he was a public figure.
Whether or not Vda. de Gonzales., the mother, has any property right over the life of Moises Padilla considering that
the latter was a public figure.
Whether or not the Licensing Agreement constitutes an infringement on the constitutional right of freedom of speech
and of the press.
HELD YES, being a public figure ipso facto does not automatically destroy in toto a person's right to privacy. The
right to invade as person's privacy to disseminate public information does not extend to a fictional or novelized
representation of a person, no matter how public a figure he or she may be. In the case at bar, while it is true that
petitioner exerted efforts to present a true-to-life story of Moises Padilla, petitioner admits that he included a little
romance in the film because without it, it would be a drab story of torture and brutality.
YES, Lagunzad cannot dispense with the need for prior consent and authority from the deceased heirs to portray
publicly episodes in said deceased's life and in that of his mother and the members of his family. As held in Schuyler
v. Curtis" a privilege may be given the surviving relatives of a deceased person to protect his memory, but the
privilege exists for the benefit of the living, to protect their feelings and to prevent a violation of their own rights in the
character and memory of the deceased."
NO, Lagunzad claims that as a citizen and as a newspaperman, he had the right to express his thoughts in film on
the public life of Moises Padilla without prior restraint. The right of freedom of expression, indeed, occupies a
preferred position in the "hierarchy of civil liberties." It is not, however, without limitations. One criterion for
permissible limitation on freedom of speech and of the press is the "balancing-of-interests test." The principle
requires a court to take conscious and detailed consideration of the interplay of interests observable in a given
situation or type of situation."
In the case at bar, the interests observable are the right to privacy asserted by respondent and the right of -freedom
of expression invoked by petitioner. Taking into account the interplay of those interests, and considering the
obligations assumed in the Licensing Agreement entered into by petitioner, the validity of such agreement will have
to be upheld particularly because the limits of freedom of expression are reached when expression touches upon
matters of essentially private concern