Beruflich Dokumente
Kultur Dokumente
4 Rule 129
1. Republic Glass vs. Qua 435 SCRA 480 (July 30, 2004)
CARPIO, J.:
The Case
Before the Court is a petition for review[1] assailing the 6 March 2000
Decision[2] and the 26 July 2000 Resolution of the Court of Appeals in CAG.R. CV No. 54737. The Court of Appeals set aside the Order [3] of 3 May
1996 of the Regional Trial Court of Makati, Branch 63 (RTC-Branch 63), in
Civil Case No. 88-2643 and reinstated the Decision [4] of 12 January 1996 in
respondents favor.
The Facts
Petitioners Republic Glass Corporation (RGC) and Gervel, Inc.
(Gervel) together with respondent Lawrence C. Qua (Qua) were
stockholders of Ladtek, Inc. (Ladtek). Ladtek obtained loans from
Metropolitan Bank and Trust Company (Metrobank)[5] and Private
Development Corporation of the Philippines [6] (PDCP) with RGC, Gervel
and Qua as sureties. Among themselves, RGC, Gervel and Qua executed
Agreements for Contribution, Indemnity and Pledge of Shares of Stocks
(Agreements).[7]
The Agreements all state that in case of default in the payment of
Ladteks loans, the parties would reimburse each other the proportionate
share of any sum that any might pay to the creditors. [8] Thus, a common
provision appears in the Agreements:
RGC, GERVEL and QUA each covenant that each will
respectively reimburse the party made to pay the Lenders
to the extent and subject to the limitations set forth herein,
all sums of money which the party made to pay the
Lenders shall pay or become liable to pay by reason of any
of the foregoing, and will make such payments within five
(5) days from the date that the party made to pay the
Lenders gives written notice to the parties hereto that it
shall have become liable therefor and has advised the
Lenders of its willingness to pay whether or not it shall
have already paid out such sum or any part thereof to
the Lenders or to the persons entitled thereto. (Emphasis
supplied)
10.
xxx
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the decision
dated January 12, 1996 is reconsidered and set aside. The
above-entitled complaint against defendants is DISMISSED.
Likewise,
dismissed.
defendants
counterclaim
is
also
The Issues
RGC and Gervel raise the following issues for resolution:
xxx
In the final reckoning, this Court finds that the
foreclosure and sale of the shares pledged by plaintiff was
totally unjustified and without basis because the obligation
secured by the underlying pledge had been extinguished
by novation. xxx[21]
The Court of Appeals further held that there was an implied novation
or substantial incompatibility in the suretys mode or manner of payment
from one for the entire obligation to one merely of proportionate share. The
appellate court ruled that RGC and Gervels payment to the creditors only
amounted to their proportionate shares of the obligation, considering the
following evidence:
The letter of the Republic to the appellant, Exhibit
G, dated June 25, 1987, which mentioned the letter from
PDCP confirming its willingness to release the joint and
solidary obligation of the Republic and Gervel subject to
some terms and conditions, one of which is the appellants
acceptable repayment plan of his pro-rata share; and the
letter of PDCP to the Republic, Exhibit H, mentioning full
payment of the pro rata share of the Republic and
Gervel, and the need of the appellant to submit an
acceptable repayment plan covering his pro-rata share,
the release from solidary liability by PDCP, Exhibit J,
mentioning full payment by the Republic and Gervel of
their pro rata share in the loan, as solidary obligors,
subject however to the terms and conditions of the hold
out agreement; and the non-payment in full of the loan,
subject of the May 10, 1984 Promissory Note, except the 7
million payment by both Republic and Gervel, as
mentioned in the Decision (Case No. 8364, Metrobank vs.
Ladtek, et al). Precisely, Ladtek and the appellant, in said
Decision were directed to pay Metrobank the balance
ofP9,560,798, supposedly due and unpaid.
Thus, the payment did not extinguish the entire obligation and did not
benefit Qua. Accordingly, RGC and Gervel cannot demand reimbursement.
The Court of Appeals also held that Qua even became solely answerable
for the unpaid balance of the obligations by virtue of the quitclaims
executed by Metrobank and PDCP in favor of RGC and Gervel. RGC and
Gervel ceased to be solidarily liable for Ladteks loan obligations. [22]
I.
WHETHER THE PRINCIPLE OF ESTOPPEL APPLIES TO QUAS
JUDICIAL STATEMENTS THAT RGC AND GERVEL PAID THE
ENTIRE OBLIGATION.
II.
WHETHER PAYMENT OF THE ENTIRE OBLIGATION IS A
CONDITION SINE QUA NON FOR RGC AND GERVEL TO
DEMAND REIMBURSEMENT FROM QUA UNDER THE
INDEMNITY AGREEMENTS EXECUTED BY THEM AFTER RGC
AND GERVEL PAID METROBANK UNDER THE SURETY
AGREEMENT.
III.
ASSUMING ARGUENDO THAT THERE WAS NOVATION OF
THE SURETY AGREEMENTS SIGNED BY THE PARTIES AND
THE CREDITORS, WHETHER THE NOVATION IS MATERIAL IN
THIS CASE.[23]
The Courts Ruling
We deny the petition.
Whether Qua was in estoppel
RGC and Gervel contend that Qua is in estoppel for making
conflicting statements in two different and separate cases. Qua cannot now
claim
that
the
payment
made
to
Metrobank
was not for
the entire obligation because of his Motion to Dismiss Collection Case No.
8364 where he stated that RGC and Gervels payment was for
the entireobligation.
The essential elements of estoppel in pais are considered in
relation to the party to be estopped, and to the party invoking the estoppel
in his favor. On the party to be estopped, such party (1) commits
conduct amounting to false representation or concealment of material
facts or at least calculated to convey the impression that the facts are
inconsistent with those which the party subsequently attempts to assert;
(2) has the intent, or at least expectation that his conduct shall at least
influence the other party; and
(3) has knowledge, actual or
constructive, of the real facts. On the party claiming the estoppel, such
party (1) has lack of knowledge and of the means of knowledge of the
truth on the facts in question; (2) has relied, in good faith, on the conduct
or statements of the party to be estopped; (3) has acted or refrained from
acting based on such conduct or statements as to change the position or
SO ORDERED.
2. Republic vs. Sandiganbayan G.R. 166859 (April 12, 2000)
FACTS
A complaint was filed against the defendants Eduardo Cojuangco Jr., the
ACCRA lawyers, Danilo Ursua and 71 corporations by the Presidential
Commission on Good Government (PCGG) referred here as Republic of the
Philippines with regard to a block of San Miguel Corporation (SMC) stock
which were allegedly bought through the CIIF Holding Companies and
funded by the coconut levy fund passing through the Unicom Oil Mills and
directly from UCPB. The coconut levy funds were considered as
government funds since this came from contributions from the coconut
farmers with the purpose of improving and stabilizing the coconut farming
industry, however these were said to be privatized under presidential
directives of then Pres. Marcos. Defendant Cojuangco Jr., being close with
the Marcoses is said to have taken undue advantage of his association,
influence and connection, embarked upon different devices and schemes
including the use of the ACCRA Lawyers as nominee shareholders and
the defendant corporations as fronts to unjustly enrich themselves at the
expense of the Filipino people when he misused the coconut levy fund,
amounting to $150 million, to purchase 33 million shares of the SMC
through the holding companies. Hence with the allegations mentioned and
with different cases and issues which remain unresolved, the block of
shares representing 20% of the outstanding capital stock of SMC remained
sequestered by the government.
During the pre-trial brief, the Sandiganbayan sought clarification from the
parties, particularly the Republic, on their respective positions, but at the
end it found the clarifications "inadequately" enlightening. To resolve
various pending motions and pleadings, Sandiganbayan lifted and declared
the Writs of Sequestration null and void.
Despite the lifting of the writs of sequestration, since the Republic
continues to hold a claim on the shares which is yet to be resolved, it is
hereby ordered that the following shall be annotated in the relevant
corporate books of San Miguel Corporation:
(1) any sale, pledge, mortgage or other disposition of any of the shares of
the Defendants Eduardo Cojuangco, et al. shall be subject to the outcome
of this case;
(2) the Republic through the PCGG shall be given twenty (20) days written
notice by Defendants Eduardo Cojuangco, et al. prior to any sale, pledge,
mortgage or other disposition of the shares;
(3) in the event of sale, mortgage or other disposition of the shares, by the
Defendants Cojuangco, et al., the consideration therefore, whether in cash
or in kind, shall be placed in escrow with Land Bank of the Philippines,
subject to disposition only upon further orders of this Court; and
(4) any cash dividends that are declared on the shares shall be placed in
escrow with the Land Bank of the Philippines, subject to disposition only
upon further orders of this Court. If in case stock dividends are declared,
the conditions on the sale, pledge, mortgage and other disposition of any
of the shares as above-mentioned in conditions 1, 2 and 3, shall likewise
apply.
Sandiganbayan denied both Motion for Reconsideration and Motion for
Modification but eventually reduced its resolution deleting the last 2
provisions. Cojuangco, et al. filed a Motion for Authority to Sell San Miguel
Corporation (SMC) shares, praying for leave to allow the sale of SMC shares
and Sandiganbayan granted the motion. Cojuangco, et al. later rendered a
complete accounting of the proceeds from the sale of the Cojuangco block
of shares of SMC stock, informing that a total amount of P
4,786,107,428.34 had been paid to the UCPB as loan repayment.
ISSUE
Whether or not Sandiganbayan has committed grave abuse of dicretion in:
(a) in lifting the Writ of Sequestrations on the sequestered SMC shares.
(c) in deleting the last two conditions the Sandiganbayan had earlier
imposed on the subject shares of stock.
RULING
Among the WOS issued, only one writ WOS 87-0218 complied with PCGG
Rules and Regulations requirement that the issuance be made by at least
two Commissioners. However, even if Writ of Sequestration No. 87-0218
complied with the requirement that the same be issued by at least two
Commissioners, the records fail to show that it was issued with factual
basis or with factual foundation. It is the absence of a prima facie basis for
the issuance of a writ of sequestration and not the lack of authority of two
(2) Commissioners which renders the said writ void ab initio. Thus, being
the case, Writ of Sequestration No. 87-0218 must be automatically lifted.
Consequently, the writs of sequestration nos. 86-0062, 86-0069, 86-0085,
86-0095, 86-0096, 86-0097 and 86-0098 must be lifted for not having
complied with the pertinent provisions of the PCGG Rules and Regulations,
all of which were issued by only one Commissioner.
Nor did the Sandiganbayan gravely abuse its discretion in reducing from
four to only two the conditions imposed for the lifting of the WOS. The
Sandiganbayan thereby acted with the best of intentions, being all too
aware that the claim of the Republic to the sequestered assets and
properties might be prejudiced or harmed pendente lite unless the
protective conditions were annotated in the corporate books of SMC.
Moreover, the issue became academic following the Sandiganbayans
promulgation of its decision dismissing the Republic's Amended Complaint,
which thereby removed the stated reason - "the Republic continues to hold
a claim on the shares which is yet to be resolved" - underlying the need for
the annotation of the conditions (whether four or two).
That on or about the (18th day of May 1981; 3rd day of June 1981;
24th day of June 1981 and 24th day of June 1981), in the
Municipality of Makati, Metro Manila, Philippines and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused
having executed a trust receipt agreement in favor of Allied
Banking Corporation in consideration of the receipt by the said
accused of goods described as "12 Containers (200 M/T) Magtar
Brand Dolomites"; "18 Containers (Zoom M/T) Magtar Brand
Dolomites"; "High Fired Refractory Sliding Nozzle Bricks"; and "High
Fired Refractory Sliding Nozzle Bricks" for which there is now due
the sum of (P278, 917.80; P419,719.20; P387, 551. 95; and
P389,085.14 respectively) under the terms of which the accused
agreed to sell the same for cash with the express obligation to
remit to the complainant bank the proceeds of the sale and/or to
turn over the goods, if not sold, on demand, but the accused, once
in possession of said goods, far from complying with his obligation
and with grave abuse of confidence, did then and there, willfully,
unlawfully and feloniously misappropriate, misapply and convert to
his own personal use and benefit the said goods and/or the
proceeds of the sale thereof, and despite repeated demands, failed
and refused and still fails and refuses, to account for and/or remit
the proceeds of sale thereof to the Allied Banking Corporation to
the damage and prejudice of the said complainant bank in the
aforementioned amount of (P278,917.80; P419,719.20;
P387,551.95; and P389,085.14).
Notwithstanding the decision rendered by the Court of Appeals, the RTCManila, Branch 53 in an order dated 19 November 1993 in Civil Case No.
92-60600, admitted petitioner's amended complaint15 which, inter alia,
prayed the court for a judgment:
xxx
xxx
xxx
While this may be true, it is no less true that the Supreme Court may, on
certain exceptional instances, resolve the merits of a case on the basis of
the records and other evidence before it, most especially when the
resolution of these issues would best serve the ends of justice and promote
the speedy disposition of cases.
Thus, considering the peculiar circumstances attendant in the instant case,
this Court sees the cogency to exercise its plenary power:
It is a rule of procedure for the Supreme Court to strive to settle
the entire controversy in a single proceeding leaving no root or
branch to bear the seeds of future litigation. No useful purpose will
be served if a case or the determination of an issue in a case is
remanded to the trial court only to have its decision raised again to
the Court of Appeals and from there to the Supreme Court
(citing Board of Commissioners vs. Judge Joselito de la Rosa and
Judge Capulong, G.R. Nos. 95122-23).
We have laid down the rule that the remand of the case or of an
issue to the lower court for further reception of evidence is not
necessary where the Court is in position to resolve the dispute
based on the records before it and particularly where the ends of
justice would not be subserved by the remand thereof (Escudero
vs. Dulay, 158 SCRA 69). Moreover, the Supreme Court is clothed
with ample authority to review matters, even those not raised on
appeal if it finds that their consideration is necessary in arriving at
a just disposition of the case. 24
On many occasions, the Court, in the public interest and for the
expeditious administration of justice, has resolved actions on the merits
instead of remanding them to the trial court for further proceedings, such
as where the ends of justice would not be subserved by the remand of the
case.25
Inexorably, the records would show that petitioner signed and executed an
application and agreement for a commercial letter of credit to finance the
purchase of imported goods. Likewise, it is undisputed that petitioner
signed and executed trust receipt documents in favor of private
respondent Allied Banking Corporation.
In its amended complaint, however, which notably was filed only after the
Court of Appeals rendered its assailed decision, petitioner urges that the
transaction entered into between the parties was one of "pure loan without
any trust receipt agreement". According to petitioner, the trust receipt
documents were intended merely as "additional or side documents
covering the said loan" contrary to petitioner's allegation in his original
complaint that the trust receipts were executed as collateral or security.
We do not agree. As Mr. Justice Story succinctly puts it: "Naked statements
must be entitled to little weight when the parties hold better evidence
behind the scenes. 26
Hence, with affirmance, we quote the findings of the Court of Appeals:
The concept in which petitioner signed the trust receipts, that is
whether he signed the trust receipts as such trust receipts or as a
mere evidence of a pure and simple loan transaction is not decisive
because precisely, a trust receipt is a security agreement of an
indebtedness.
Contrary to petitioner's assertions and in view of jurisprudence established
in this jurisdiction, a trust receipt is not merely an additional or side
document to a principal contract, which in the instant case is alleged by
petitioner to be a pure and simple loan.
As elucidated in Samo vs. People,27 a trust receipt is considered a security
transaction intended to aid in financing importers and retail dealers who do
not have sufficient funds or resources to finance the importation or
purchase of merchandise, and who may not be able to acquire credit
except through utilization, as collateral, of the merchandise imported or
purchased.
Further, a trust receipt is a document in which is expressed a security
transaction whereunder the lender, having no prior title in the goods on
which the lien is to be given and not having possession which remains in
the borrower, lends his money to the borrower on security of the goods
which the borrower is privileged to sell clear of the lien with an agreement
to pay all or part of the proceeds of the sale to the lender. 28 It is a security
agreement pursuant to which a bank acquires a "security interest" in the
goods. It secures an indebtedness and there can be no such thing as
security interest that secures no obligation.29
Clearly, a trust receipt partakes the nature of a security transaction. It
could never be a mere additional or side document as alleged by
petitioner. Otherwise, a party to a trust receipt agreement could easily
renege on its obligations thereunder, thus undermining the importance and
defeating with impunity the purpose of such an indispensable tool in
commercial transactions.
Of equal importance is the fact that in his complaint in Civil Case No. 9260600, dated 05 March 1992, petitioner alleged that the trust receipts
were executed and intended as collateral or security. Pursuant to the rules,
such particular allegation in the complaint is tantamount to a judicial
admission on the part of petitioner Ching to which he must be bound.
Thus, the Court of Appeals in its resolution dated 28 June 1993, correctly
observed:
It was petitioner himself who acknowledged the trust receipts as
mere collateral and security for the payment of the loan but kept
on insisting that the real and true transaction was one of pure loan.
...
In his present motion, the petitioner alleges that the trust receipts
are evidence of a pure loan or that the same were additional or
side documents that actually stood as promissory notes and not a
collateral or security agreement. He cannot assume a position
inconsistent with his previous allegations in his civil complaint that
the trust receipts were intended as mere collateral or security . . . .
Perhaps, realizing such flaw, petitioner, in a complete turn around, filed a
motion to admit amended complaint before the RTC-Manila. Among others,
the amended complaint alleged that the trust receipts stood as additional
or side documents, the real transaction between the parties being that of a
pure loan without any trust receipt agreement.
In an order dated 19 November 1993, the RTC-Manila, Branch 53, admitted
the amended complaint. Accordingly, with the lower court's admission of
the amended complaint, the judicial admission made in the original
complaint was, in effect, superseded.
Under the Rules, pleadings superseded or amended disappear from the
record, lose their status as pleadings and cease to be judicial admissions.
While they may nonetheless be utilized against the pleader as extrajudicial
admissions, they must, in order to have such effect, be formally offered in
evidence. If not offered in evidence, the admission contained therein will
not be considered.30
Consequently, the original complaint, having been amended, lost its
character as a judicial admission, which would have required no proof, and
became merely an extrajudicial admission, the admissibility of which, as
evidence, required its formal offer.31
In virtue thereof, the amended complaint takes the place of the original.
The latter is regarded as abandoned and ceases to perform any further
function as a pleading. The original complaint no longer forms part of the
record.32
Thus, in the instant case, the original complaint is deemed superseded by
the amended complaint. Corollarily, the judicial admissions in the original
complaint are considered abandoned. Nonetheless, we must stress that the
actuations of petitioner, as sanctioned by the RTC-Manila, Branch 53
through its order admitting the amended complaint, demands stern rebuke
from this Court.
Certainly, this Court is not unwary of the tactics employed by the petitioner
specifically in filing the amended complaint only after the promulgation of
the assailed decision of the Court of Appeals. It bears noting that a lapse of
almost eighteen months (from March 1992 to September 1993), from the
filing of the original complaint to the filing of the amended complaint, is
too lengthy a time sufficient to enkindle suspicion and enflame doubts as
to the true intentions of petitioner regarding the early disposition of the
pending cases.
Although the granting of leave to file amended pleadings is a matter
peculiarly within the sound discretion of the trial court and such discretion
would not normally be disturbed on appeal, it is also well to mention that
this rule is relaxed when evident abuse thereof is apparent. 33
Hence, in certain instances we ruled that amendments are not proper and
should be denied when delay would arise,34 or when the amendments
would result in a change of cause of action or defense or change the
theory of the case, 35 or would be inconsistent with the allegations in the
original complaint.36
Applying the foregoing rules, petitioner, by filing the amended complaint,
in effect, altered the theory of his case. Likewise, the allegations embodied
in the amended complaint are inconsistent with that of the original
complaint inasmuch as in the latter, petitioner alleged that the trust
receipts were intended as mere collateral or security, the principal
transaction being one of pure loan.
Yet, in the amended complaint, petitioner argued that the said trust
receipts were executed as additional or side documents, the transaction
being strictly one of pure loan without any trust receipt arrangement.
Obviously these allegations are in discord in relation to each other and
therefore cannot stand in harmony.
These circumstances, taken as a whole, lead this Court to doubt the
genuine purpose of petitioner in filing the amended
complaint.1wphi1 Again, we view petitioner's actuations with abhorrence
and displeasure.
Moreover, petitioner contends that the transaction between Philippine
Blooming Mills (PBM) and private respondent Allied Banking Corporation
does not fall under the category of a trust receipt arrangement claiming
that the goods were not to be sold but were to be used, consumed and
destroyed by the importer PBM.
To our mind, petitioner's contention is a stealthy attempt to circumvent the
principle enunciated in the case ofAlied Banking Corporation vs.
Ordonez, 37 thus:
. . . In an attempt to escape criminal liability, private respondent
claims P.D. 115 covers goods which are ultimately destined for sale
and not goods for use in manufacture. But the wording of Section
13 covers failure to turn over the proceeds of the sale of the
September 2, 1966
Thereafter, the defendants filed their answer, again alleging that the
promissory notes were signed by them as mere representatives and
administrators of their parents and that the plaintiff has been informed by
Cristeta Granada and her attorney-in-fact, Jose Granada that the so-called
accounts of "Granada Hermanas" were the accounts of the spouses Matias
and Cristeta and could be charged against their properties known as Hda.
Cristeta.
Subsequently, the defendants filed another motion calling attention to
their defense alleged in their answer and praying that in view thereof "the
plaintiff be given leave of court to amend the complaint and include as
principal party defendants Cristeta Granada, and the defendants be
allowed to file their answer, if they so desire." The motion was granted in
an order of the following tenor, "... por el presente si les concede a ambas
partes autorizacion para presentar los escritos enmendados que deseen
presentar dentro del plazo reglamentario."
Accordingly, the plaintiff filed an amended complaint, this time impleading
Cristeta Granada, together with the original defendants, and it was in this
amended complaint that for the first time, the phrase "as representatives
of their parents" was inserted. There was no other amendment in the
complaint, and in the prayer, the plaintiff insisted that judgment be
rendered ordering defendants Dolores Granada, Estrella Granada and
Cristeta Granada to pay the plaintiff the amounts claimed in the complaint,
and granting such other relief as the court may deem just and
equitable.1awphl.nt
In their answer to the amended complaint, defendants Dolores and Estrella
Granada reproduced and reiterated their allegations in their answer to the
original complaint.
Cristeta Granada, in his answer under oath, significantly denied that she
has given or granted any authority to Dolores, Estrella, Feliza and Corazon,
or to any of them, to borrow money or secure a loan in her behalf from the
bank.
Replying to the answer to the amended complaint of the defendants
Dolores and Estrella Granada, the plaintiff again averred that as alleged in
the original complaint, Dolores, Estrella, Feliza and Corazon
were personally, jointly and severally liable to the plaintiff for the payment
of the amount of the loans, as that is what appears in the promissory notes
and the borrowers did not inform the bank when they applied for and
secured the loan that they were acting as agents for and in behalf of their
parents, and the filing of the amended complaint joining Cristeta Granada
was already foreclosed with Yap as the purchaser of the disputed lot in an
extra-judicial foreclosure sale which was registered on February 22, 2000.
Yap's brother later offered to sell the subject property to respondent.
Respondent entertained the said offer and negotiations ensued. On June 1,
2000, respondent bought the subject property from Yap for P950,000.00. A
Deed of Sale of Real Property was executed by the parties as evidence of
the contract. However, it was made clear in the said Deed that the
property was still subject to petitioner's right of redemption.
she is entitled to receive the rents, earnings and income derived from the
property.
Aggrieved by the Decision of the RTC, petitioner filed a petition for review
with the CA.
On September 8, 2004, the CA rendered its assailed Decision disposing,
thus:
At the outset, it bears to reiterate the settled rule that the only question
that the courts resolve in ejectment proceedings is: who is entitled to the
physical possession of the premises, that is, to the possession de facto and
not to the possession de jure.6 It does not even matter if a party's title to
the property is questionable.7 In an unlawful detainer case, the sole issue
for resolution is the physical or material possession of the property
involved, independent of any claim of ownership by any of the party
litigants.8 Where the issue of ownership is raised by any of the parties, the
courts may pass upon the same in order to determine who has the right to
possess the property.9 The adjudication is, however, merely provisional and
would not bar or prejudice an action between the same parties involving
title to the property.10
In the instant case, pending final resolution of the suit filed by petitioner
for the declaration of nullity of the real estate mortgage in favor of Yap, the
MTCC, the RTC and the CA were unanimous in sustaining the presumption
of validity of the real estate mortgage over the subject property in favor of
Yap as well as the presumption of regularity in the performance of the
duties of the public officers who subsequently conducted its foreclosure
sale and issued a provisional certificate of sale. Based on the presumed
validity of the mortgage and the subsequent foreclosure sale, the MTCC,
the RTC and the CA also sustained the validity of respondent's purchase of
the disputed property from Yap. The Court finds no cogent reason to depart
from these rulings of the MTCC, RTC and CA. Thus, for purposes of resolving
The conclusive presumption found in Section 2 (b), Rule 131 of the Rules of
Court, known as estoppel against tenants, provides as follows:
Sec. 2. Conclusive presumptions. The following are instances of
conclusive presumptions:
xxxx
(b) The tenant is not permitted to deny the title of his landlord at the time
of the commencement of the relation of landlord and tenant between
them. (Emphasis supplied).
It is clear from the abovequoted provision that what a tenant is estopped
from denying is the title of his landlord at the time of the commencement
of the landlord-tenant relation.13 If the title asserted is one that is alleged
to have been acquired subsequent to the commencement of that relation,
the presumption will not apply. 14 Hence, the tenant may show that the
landlord's title has expired or been conveyed to another or himself; and he
is not estopped to deny a claim for rent, if he has been ousted or evicted
by title paramount.15 In the present case, what respondent is claiming is
her supposed title to the subject property which she acquired subsequent
to the commencement of the landlord-tenant relation between her and
petitioner. Hence, the presumption under Section 2 (b), Rule 131 of the
Rules of Court does not apply.
The foregoing notwithstanding, even if respondent is not estopped from
denying petitioner's claim for rent, her basis for such denial, which is her
subsequent acquisition of ownership of the disputed property, is
nonetheless, an insufficient excuse from refusing to pay the rentals due to
petitioner.
There is no dispute that at the time that respondent purchased Yap's rights
over the subject property, petitioner's right of redemption as a mortgagor
has not yet expired. It is settled that during the period of redemption, it
cannot be said that the mortgagor is no longer the owner of the foreclosed
property, since the rule up to now is that the right of a purchaser at a
foreclosure sale is merely inchoate until after the period of redemption has
expired without the right being exercised.16 The title to land sold under
mortgage foreclosure remains in the mortgagor or his grantee until the
expiration of the redemption period and conveyance by the master's
deed.17 Indeed, the rule has always been that it is only upon the expiration
of the redemption period, without the judgment debtor having made use of
his right of redemption, that the ownership of the land sold becomes
consolidated in the purchaser.18
Stated differently, under Act. No. 3135, the purchaser in a foreclosure sale
has, during the redemption period, only an inchoate right and not the
absolute right to the property with all the accompanying incidents. 19 He
only becomes an absolute owner of the property if it is not redeemed
during the redemption period.20
Pending expiration of the period of redemption, Section 7 of Act No.
3135,21 as amended, provides:
Sec. 7. In any sale made under the provisions of this Act, the purchaser
may petition the Court of First Instance of the province or place where the
property or any part thereof is situated, to give him possession thereof
during the redemption period, furnishing bond in an amount equivalent to
the use of the property for a period of twelve months, to indemnify the
debtor in case it be shown that the sale was made without violating the
mortgage or without complying with the requirements of this Act. Such
petition shall be made under oath and filed in [the] form of an ex parte
motion in the registration or cadastral proceedings if the property is
registered, or in special proceedings in the case of property registered
under the Mortgage Law or under section one hundred and ninety-four of
the Administrative Code, or of any other real property encumbered with a
earnings and income derived therefrom. In this regard, the RTC correctly
cited Section 32, Rule 39 of the Rules of Court which provides as follows:
Sec. 32. Rents, earnings and income of property pending redemption. The
purchaser or a redemptioner shall not be entitled to receive the rents,
earnings and income of the property sold on execution, or the value of the
use and occupation thereof when such property is in the possession of a
tenant. All rents, earnings and income derived from the property pending
redemption shall belong to the judgment obligor until the expiration of his
period of redemption. (Emphasis supplied)
WHEREFORE, the Decision and Resolution of the Court of Appeals in CAG.R. SP No. 77617, dated September 8, 2004 and August 16, 2006,
respectively, are AFFIRMED with the following MODIFICATIONS: (1)
respondent is ORDERED to pay petitioner P108,000.00 as and for unpaid
rentals; (2) the award of attorneys fees and litigation expenses to
respondent is DELETED.
SO ORDERED.
While the above rule refers to execution sales, the Court finds no cogent
reason not to apply the same principle to a foreclosure sale, as in this case.
The situation became different, however, after the expiration of the
redemption period on February 23, 2001. Since there is no allegation,
much less evidence, that petitioner redeemed the subject property within
one year from the date of registration of the certificate of sale, respondent
became the owner thereof. Consolidation of title becomes a right upon the
expiration of the redemption period.26 Having become the owner of the
disputed property, respondent is then entitled to its possession.
As a consequence, petitioner's ejectment suit filed against respondent was
rendered moot when the period of redemption expired on February 23,
2001 without petitioner having redeemed the subject property, for upon
expiration of such period petitioner lost his possessory right over the same.
Hence, the only remaining right that petitioner can enforce is his right to
the rentals during the time that he was still entitled to physical possession
of the subject property that is from May 2000 until February 23,
2001.1wphi1
In this regard, this Court agrees with the findings of the MTCC that, based
on the evidence and the pleadings filed by petitioner, respondent is liable
for payment of rentals beginning May 2000 until February 2001, or for a
period of ten (10) months. However, it is not disputed that respondent
already gave to petitioner the sum of P27,000.00, which is equivalent to
two (2) months rental, as deposit to cover for any unpaid rentals. It is only
proper to deduct this amount from the rentals due to petitioner, thus
leaving P108,000.00 unpaid rentals.
As to attorneys fees and litigation expenses, the Court agrees with the RTC
that since petitioner is, in entitled to unpaid rentals, her complaint which,
among others, prays for the payment of unpaid rentals, is justified. Thus,
A careful scrutiny of the evidence shows that the guilt of the accused has
not been proven beyond reasonable doubt.
The American serviceman who was alleged to be the informer was not
presented before the trial court. Without his testimony, the conclusion of
the court that the accused was seen delivering marijuana wrapped in a tin
foil to the American is not supported by the evidence on hand. Who was
delivering the marijuana and who was selling it? The accused pointed to
the American as the one selling the prohibited goods. Such testimony was
not rebutted by the prosecution since the American informer was never
presented as a witness. Captain Arturo Castillo, the apprehending officer,
was not in a position to see or hear the goings-on at the table of the
American and the accused. The officer was five meters away from the two
persons. The place where the event took place was dimly lighted. And with
all that noise, it would be impossible for him to hear the transactions
happening at the table five meters away. There is thus a hiatus to the
evidence fatal to a finding of guilt. 7
In the case of People v. Ale, 8 this Court held that the identity of the poseurbuyer is vital where the accused denies having sold marijuana to anyone.
The failure to present the American is, to our mind, fatal to the
prosecution's case for it is presumed that evidence wilfully suppressed
would be adverse if produced. 9
The prosecution's evidence leaves much to be desired. If the inculpatory
facts and circumstances are capable of two or more explanations, one of
which is consistent with the innocence of the accused and the other
consistent with his guilt, then the evidence does not fulfill the test of moral
certainty and is not sufficient to support a conviction. 10 The constitutional
presumption of innocence stands until overthrown by strong and
convincing evidence, one which will prove guilt beyond reasonable
doubt. 11
Petilla, alleging that not only are their testimonies inconsistent with each
other, but also that each testimony is self-contradictory and improbable,
and in addition, witnesses who could have given more reliable testimony
were not presented, thereby demonstrating further, by this supposed
suppression of evidence, the untrustworthiness of the aforementioned
state witnesses' testimony. Appellant has pointed out where the alleged
inconsistencies, self-contradictions and improbabilities lie. Going over how
each and every one of them were shown by the Solicitor General not to be
such as claimed by the appellant, We find the efforts of the said counsel to
have convincingly achieved his ends, as can best be demonstrated by
quoting from appellee's brief 3 the following:
(a) The fact that Saturnina Petilla testified that only the
victim and Benjamin Dayuta were inside the house of Lolita
Manalili when the incident happened does not necessarily
contradict the testimony of Dayuta that, aside from them
(Dayuta and victim), they had a third companion (Dayuta's
helper). True, there was no barrier between her (Petilla)
and the place of the incident, which was about five arms
length away. But the fact, however, is that she was outside
looking through the door which was partly opened.
Naturally, she could not have seen the four corners of the
room where the incident happened as the partly opened
door reveals only a portion of the room. And, being a mere
helper, it is safe to assume that this third companion was
sitting at a corner a little bit farther from the two (Dayuta
and victim). This explains why Petilla only saw Dayuta and
the victim at the time of the incident;
(b) There is actually no real inconsistency between
Dayuta's testimony that the victim when stabbed was
sitting with his back towards the door from that of Petilla
that the accused-appellant stabbed the victim when the
latter already fell on the floor. It will be recalled that
accused- appellant stabbed the victim twice. Hence, it
could be that Petilla was describing the position of the
victim at the time he was stabbed the second time when
he was already felled by the first stab. In the case of
Dayuta, he was describing the position of the victim at the
time accused- appellant started to stab him (victim);
(c) The testimonies of prosecution witnesses Benjamin
Dayuta, Saturnina Petilla and Lolita Manalili complement
rather than contradict each other as alleged (p. 8,
(c) The fact that Dayuta could not tell the kind of weapon
used by accused-appellant in stabbing to death the victim,
does not affect the credibility of his (Dayuta) testimony.
The incident is a startling occurrence which was so sudden
and unexpected that one witnessing the same, especially if
he himself is involved, cannot be expected to watch it with
sobriety as to be able to observe even the kind of weapon
used.
(d) We see nothing incredible in the testimony of Dayuta
regarding his whereabouts, as well as that of the victim,
after the stabbing incident (pp. 10-11, Appellant's Brief.
The fact that he (Dayuta) saw the victim running towards
the alley leading to a house while he was running towards
the waiting shed, does not contradict his other statement
that the victim was ahead of him in the waiting shed. It
could be that the victim, while running towards the alley
was helped by neighbors who learned of the incident and
rushed him to the waiting shed where he could be brought
to the hospital. That explains why the victim was even
ahead of Dayuta at the waiting shed.
(e) Petilla's testimony regarding the victim's age, as well as
the time when she came to know the latter, are merely
based on her estimates and recollection. Consequently,
their inaccuracy win not affect the credibility of her
testimony. Besides, these are insignificant and immaterial
matters, as the Identity of the victim is not disputed.
(f) It is not unnatural for petilla to have followed
theaccused-appellant to where the crime was committed,
despite the danger to her life. In fact, not a few people died
because of curiosity. This is demonstrated time and again
when policemen had to drive away people who
unnecessarily expose themselves to dangers, like fires and
quarrels, just to satisfy their curiosity.
(g) Petilla's testimony is not rendered incredible simply
because she did not know what the accused-appellant used
in stabbing the victim. As already stated, the incident was
a startling occurrence and, therefore, people watching it,
especially a woman cannot be expected to observe such
minor details as the kind of weapon used by the assailant.
and unexpected, and from behind as to deny the victim any chance at
defense by evading or parrying the blow, was positively established with
the testimony of Saturnina Petilla and Lolita Manalili on this particular fact,
which was unrebutted.
By this fact alone that he stabbed Juan Padayao, appellant's testimony on
the only incident in which he is supposed to have been involved his
having been hit with a "pingga" by Dayuta when he (appellant) merely
tried to pacify Leodegario Petilla who, armed with a knife, was engaged in
a street quarrel with 6 or 7 men, and went home thereafter, inferentially
denying even having laid a hand or touched the victim, is rendered
unbelievable. In effect, his defense is that of alibi which is totally
unavailing against his having been positively Identified 6 by witnesses as
the assailant of the victim, one of whom is Saturnina Petilla, the mother of
Leodegario Petilla whom he allegedly approached as a friend to pacify him
in his quarrel against persons who overwhelmingly outnumbered him.
Appellant allegedly went to Saturnina to report that his son was involved in
that street quarrel. With Saturnina Petilla testifying that appellant even
chased her when she tried to intervene when appellant slapped his wife
during a quarrel, threatening anyone who would dare intervene, the
testimony of appellant as to his friendly mission in seeing Saturnina
becomes totally unworthy of belief, for if the testimony were true, what
motive has Saturnina to testify falsely against appellant.
As the trial court also observed, appellant's testimony suffers from
improbability because
... Admitting that on the date and time of the stabbing, he
was merely to approach the quarreling group and
Leodegario Petilla; attempted to pacify Leodegario Petilla,
and ran away when he was hit on the head with a 'pingga'
by Benjamin Dayuta. The version of accused Hinlo suffers
with so many improbabilities. He claims that he saw his
friend Leodegario Petilla armed with a knife, 7 inches long
facing a group of 6 to 7 men. It was a situation fraught with
dangers. Yet, accused Hinlo approached the group and his
friend Leodegario Petilla, merely to pacify them. Even
granting this extraordinary course of action to be true, yet
when accused Hinlo again asserts that when he was hit on
the head with a 'pingga', he ran away, leaving his friend
alone, it is hard to believe him. Not only that. After
informing Saturnina Petilla, mother of Leodegario Petilla,
that her son was quarreling with a group of men, he just
went home, again, leaving his friend to his fate. What is
Savings Account No. 26580, with the Security Bank and Trust Company,
Escolta St., Manila, hereinafter called SBTC in short, with an initial deposit
of P500.00, made on 21 Feb. 1973, for which he was given a pass book in
his name of Tomas P. Flores (see Exh. C). He made a second deposit of
P400.00 then a withdrawal of P500.00 then a deposit of P775.00, and then
a withdrawal of P1,000.00 (Entries on Exh. C).
"On 13 March (sic, August) accused went to SBTC and filled up or
accomplished and signed a deposit slip (Exh. B) for a deposit of P18,060.00
in check. With the deposit slip, he submitted to Urbana Ramos de Ferrer,
Teller No. 2 of SBTC, his pass book (Exh. C) and a Philippine Bank of
Communications Check No. U-186378, dated August 9, 1973 (Exh. A) for
P18,060.00, appearing to have been signed and issued by `F. Dycaico',
who was then maintaining with the Philippine Bank of Communications,
hereinafter referred also as PBC, a checking account No. 13360. This check
was signed and indorsed by the accused. Upon deposit of this check for
P18,060.00, the said sum was posted in the pass book (Exh. C), as shown
in Exhibit C-1. (T.S.N., pp. 5-15, Oct. 10, 1973, hearing).:-cralaw
DECISION
REGALADO, J.:
This petition for review on Certiorari impugns the decision of the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. No. 16246-47-CR 1 which affirmed the judgment of the
former Court of First Instance of Manila in Criminal Cases Nos. 15006 and
15007 convicting herein accused-petitioner of estafa and attempted
estafa, respectively.
The facts as found by the trial court and adopted by respondent court are
as follows:
"From the evidence extant on the record, the following facts appear
undisputed: That accused Koh Tieck Heng, alias Tomas P. Flores opened
"On 16 August 1973, the accused withdrew from this Savings Account No.
26580, the sum of P10,000.00 upon submission to Margarita Tiongson,
Teller No. 3, of a withdrawal slip (Exh. E) accomplished and signed by him.
Such withdrawal was posted in the pass book (Exh. C), shown by Exhibit C2. Upon receipt of the amount withdrawn, the teller caused the accused to
sign at the back of the withdrawal slip and which signature is marked
Exhibit E-1. On the next day, 17 August 1973, the accused withdrew
another amount of P5,500.00 upon defendant's submission to Teller No. 3
of a withdrawal slip (Exh. F) and the pass book. The withdrawal was posted
in the pass book as shown by Exhibit C-3. Upon receipt of the sum
withdrawn, the teller caused the accused to sign at the back of the
withdrawal slip and which signature is marked Exhibit F-1. (T.S.N., pp. 2130; 32-39, id.).
"On 18 August 1973, the accused went again to the SBTC to deposit
another Philippine Bank of Communications Check No. U-186414 (Exh. H),
dated 11 August 1973 for P18,060.00 which appears to be signed by 'F.
Dycaico' against Checking Account No. 13360. Accused, therefore, filled up
and accomplished a deposit slip (Exh. I) for P18,060.00. After
accomplishing Exhibit I, accused submitted the check (Exh. H), the pass
book (Exh. C) and the deposit slip (Exh. I) to Candida Abella Villanueva,
Teller No. 5. The deposit of P18,060.00 was thus posted at the pass book
(Exh. C), as shown by Exh. C-4 (T.S.N., pp. 60-70, Id.).
"Sometime in that month of August 1973, Florencio Dycaico, who
maintains the Checking Account No. 13360 with the Philippine Bank of
Communications saw his Statement of Account and came upon an amount
of P18,060.00 debited against his account. He complained to the PBC that
he never issued a check for that much. With this information PBC informed
SBTC that the check, Exh. A, was a spurious check. So, SBTC officials
instructed their bank tellers to watch for Tomas P. Flores. NBI agent
Mamerto Espartero was also assigned to crack down on check forgers or
passers in company with an informer, at the premises of SBTC, in
coordination with SBTC officials (T.S.N., pp. 3-7, 12, 16-17, Nov. 12, 1973,
hearing).
"Then, came the pay off. The accused appeared in the SBTC premises on
22 August 1973. He filled up, accomplished and signed a withdrawal slip
(Exh. K) for P15,500.00, and after that he submitted his passbook (Exh. C)
with the withdrawal slip to Maria Victoria Soriano, SBTC Teller No. 7.
Forewarned to watch for the accused Tomas P. Flores, she asked the
accused to sign his name in Exh. K, and he did sign it as requested. He
signed his name of Koh Tieck Heng (See Exh. K-3). After that, Teller No. 7
brought the slip and the pass book of Tomas P. Flores. Teller No. 7 returned
to her cage and then called up for Tomas P. Flores. The accused went to
Teller No. 7. Teller No. 7 asked the accused to sign his name at the back,
and which signature is marked Exh. K-2. After he signed Exh. K-2, the NBI
agent Espartero swooped down on the accused and apprehended him. The
accused was brought inside the Cashier's Office. He was interviewed and
then later brought to the NBI office where he was investigated. In the
course of his investigation, he executed a written statement now marked
Exh. M. (T.S.N., pp. 3-20, Oct. 22, 1973, hearing)." 2
Based on the facts narrated, appellant Koh Tieck Heng, alias Teddy Koh,
alias Tomas P. Flores, was charged in Criminal Case No. 15006 before the
then Court of First Instance of Manila, Branch XII, with the crime of estafa
thru falsification of a commercial document in an information which reads:
"That on or about and during the period comprised between August 13,
1973 and August 17, 1973, inclusive, in the City of Manila, Philippines, the
said accused, conspiring and confederating with one whose true name,
identity and present whereabouts are still unknown and mutually helping
each other, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously, with
intent to defraud, commit acts of falsification on a commercial document in
the following manner, to wit: the said accused, after opening a savings
account with the Security Bank and Trust Company, under Savings Account
No. 26580 in the name of Tomas P. Flores, and having somehow illegally
obtained possession of Philippine Bank of Communications Check No. U186378, dated July 14, 1973, pay to cash, in the amount of P225.00, issued
by F. DYCAICO, and therefore a commercial document, did then and there
wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously forge and falsify and/or cause to be
forged and falsified the aforesaid check by then and there erasing and
altering and/or causing to be erased and altered the date and amount of
said check and superimposing or causing to be superimposed over the
original date and amount of said check the following: 'Aug. 9' after the
printed word 'MANILA', the figures '73' after the figures '19', the figures
'P18,060.00' after the sign 'P' and the words 'Eighteen Thousand Sixty
Only' after the printed word 'PESOS', thus causing it to appear as it did
appear that said check was issued on August 9, 1973, for the amount of
P18,060.00, when in truth and in fact as the said accused well knew, the
correct date of said check is July 14, 1973, and the real amount of the
check so drawn and issued by said F. DYCAICO is only for P225.00, thereby
making or causing to be made alterations and changes in a genuine
document which altered or changed its meaning: that once the aforesaid
check had been forged and falsified, altered or otherwise changed in the
manner above set forth, said accused affixed the signature Tomas P. Flores
at the back thereof and deposited said check in his account with the
Security Bank and Trust Company, Escolta Branch, this City, which check
was cleared by the Philippine Bank of Communications upon presentation
thereof believing that said check is genuine; and thereafter, said accused,
with intent to defraud, withdrew from said account the amounts of
P10,000.00 and P5,500.00 on August 16, 1973 and August 17, 1973
respectively, or a total of P15,500.00, which amount, once in his
possession, said accused misappropriated, misapplied and converted to his
own personal use and benefit, to the damage and prejudice of the Security
Bank and Trust Company and/or the Philippine Bank of Communications in
the aforesaid amount of P15,500.00, Philippine currency." (Emphasis
supplied.) 3
On the same date, appellant was also charged in Criminal Case No. 15007
with attempted estafa thru falsification of a commercial document before
the same court under the following information:
"That on or about and during the period comprised between August 18,
1973 and `August 22, 1973, inclusive, in the City of Manila, Philippines, the
said accused, being then a depositor of the Security Bank and Trust
Company, Escolta Branch, this City, under Savings Account No. 26580,
conspiring and confederating together with one whose true name, identity
and present whereabouts are still unknown and mutually helping each
other, with intent to defraud, commenced the commission of the crime of
estafa thru falsification of commercial document directly by overt acts, to
wit: the said accused having somehow obtained possession of Philippine
Bank of Communications Check No. U-186414, dated August 11, 1973, pay
to cash, in the amount of P2,030.00 issued by F. DYCAICO, and therefore a
commercial document, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and
feloniously forge and falsify and or cause to be forged and falsified the
aforesaid check by then and there erasing and altering and/or causing to
be erased and altered the amount of said check and superimposing or
causing to be superimposed over the original amount of said check the
figures 'P18,060.00' after the sign 'P' and the words 'Eighteen Thousand
Sixty Only' after the printed word 'Pesos', thus causing it to appear, as in
fact it did appear, that said check was issued for the amount of
P18,060.00, when in truth and in fact as the accused well knew, the correct
and real amount of the check so drawn and issued by said F. DYCAICO is
only for P2,030.00 thereby making or causing to be made alterations and
changes in a genuine document which altered or changed its meaning;
that once the aforesaid check had been forged and falsified, altered or
otherwise changed in the manner above set forth, said accused affixed the
signature Tomas P. Flores at the back of said check and deposited the same
in his account with the Security Bank and Trust Company, the latter
believing that said check is genuine, accepted the same for deposit, and
thereafter, the said accused with intent to defraud, accomplished a
withdrawal slip for the sum of P15,500.00 and presented the same to the
teller of the Security Bank and Trust Company for the purpose of
withdrawing the said amount, but the said accused did not perform all the
acts of execution which should have produced the crime of estafa thru
falsification of a commercial document by reason of some cause other than
his own spontaneous desistance, that is, by the timely discovery made by
the officials and/or employees of said bank of the forgery and falsification
made on the aforesaid check before payment could be made which led
then and there to the apprehension of said accused." (Emphasis ours.) 4
Appellant pleaded not guilty when arraigned in both cases, which were
subsequently ordered consolidated. In his defense at the trial, and later
adopted for the same purpose in his brief, appellant claims::-cralaw
"That on August 9, 1973, he went to the Supersonic Auto Supply, situated
at the corner of Espaa and P. Leoncio Sts., Sampaloc, Manila. He went
there to buy auto spare parts as he is engaged in the buying and selling of
auto spare parts. When he was at this store, a person whom accused
claimed to know later as Jimmy Go, was also buying tires. The store did not
have tires for sale, and so the tire salesman pointed to the accused as one
who is selling such stuff. So, this man went to the accused and asked him if
he had tires for sale. Accused asked the man who introduced himself to the
accused as Jimmy Go, how many tires he needed. This man told the
accused he needed twenty-four (24) pieces of tires. Accused told this
`Jimmy Go' that he had the 24 tires but that he needed cash. Accused told
`Jimmy Go' that he does not accept checks for payment, especially he did
not know him. Accused claims that was the first time he had met this man
'Jimmy Go'. 'Jimmy Go', however, told the accused that he can issue the
check and he can deliver the tires only after having encashed the same. To
this proposition, the accused agreed. 'Jimmy Go', therefore, brought out a
check, now Exh. A, and then signed it in his presence. He signed the name
'F. Dycaico'. He then crossed the check at the upper left hand corner of the
check. Accused claims that except the signature and the lines used to
cross the check as aforementioned all the other handwritten portions of the
check were already there when 'Jimmy Go' signed it.
"After signing Exh. A, 'Jimmy Go' handed it to the accused. Seeing the
amount to be big, as the cost price of the 24 pieces of tires was only about
P3,000.00, more or less, the accused told, 'Jimmy Go' that he has no cash
to return for the difference. 'Jimmy Go' told him to just deliver the
difference after he has encashed it. So the accused got the check and they
parted.
"He claimed he went to the SBTC on 13 August 1973 as he deposited the
check (Exh. A) in his bank account (passbook, Exh. C), filling up therefor a
deposit slip (Exh. B.). The accused claimed that on 13 August 1973, he
went to withdraw P10,000.00, accomplishing Exh. E. After withdrawing
P10,000.00, the accused went to Espaa St. and delivered to 'Jimmy Go'
the P10,000.00. He delivered the tires in the afternoon. On that same day,
'Jimmy Go' told the accused that he needed the balance of the money and
so he said that he delivered the balance of P5,500.00 on 16 August 1973.
On this date, 16 Aug. 1973, as per his claim, 'Jimmy Go' again delivered to
him another check (Exh. H) as 'Jimmy Go' was buying another fifty (50)
pieces of tires. So, he took the check and deposited it with SBTC on his
account (passbook, Exh. C). He claims he could not get the proceeds of the
checks because at the time he was withdrawing from his deposit, two men
approached him and immediately handcuffed him" 5
"It is a fact that under the two informations, the mode of falsification
attributed to the Accused is that of having erased and altered the dates
and amounts of the checks in question, and superimposing or causing to
be superimposed over the original dates and amount of said checks other
dates and amounts, thereby making alterations and changes in genuine
documents which changed their meaning. Clearly, therefore, the offense
charged is that penalized under Article 172 in relation to Article 171 (6) of
the Revised Penal Code.
"It is to be noted, however, that presented in evidence by the prosecution
for the First Case were two checks, Exhs. 'A' and `O', which both bear the
identical Check No. U-186378 but the former bears the amount of P225.00,
while the latter that of P18,060.00, both drawn and issued by 'F. Dycaico'.
For the Second Case, two checks were likewise presented, Exhs. 'H' and 'P'
which bear the identical Check No. U-186414, but the former bears the
amount of P2,030.00 while the latter that of P18,060.00, both drawn and
issued by 'F. Dycaico'.
"Prosecution witness, Florencio Dycaico, admitted that he issued the
checks, Exhs. 'O' and 'P', in the amounts of P225.00 and P2,030.00
respectively, but denied having issued at all the checks, Exhibits 'A' and
'H', both in the respective amounts of P18,060.00.
"It has to be conceded, therefore, as alleged by the defense, and likewise
admitted by the People, that considering the evidence adduced, there were
no erasures nor alterations nor superimpositions as alleged in both
Informations, but that Exhibits 'A' and 'H' were forgeries in toto. In other
words, while the Accused has been charged of Estafa and Attempted Estafa
thru Falsification of a commercial document under Article 172 in relation to
Article 171, paragraph 6 the Revised Penal Code, reading
'Art. 171. . . . shall falsify a document by committing any of the following
acts:
xxx
'6. Making any alterations or intercalation in a genuine document which
changes its meaning,'
based on the evidence, the accusation would fall under either paragraph 1
or 2 of Article 171 of the same Code which reads:
'1. Counterfeiting or imitating any handwriting, signature or rubric;
'2. Causing it to appear that persons have participated in any act or
proceeding when they did not in fact so participate.'
"Be that as it may, as pointed out by the State, the aforementioned
variance affects solely the charge of Falsification, of which the Accused
should not have been convicted under the time-honored rule that an
Accused should be informed of the true nature and cause of the accusation
against him. However, with respect to the charges of Estafa and Attempted
Estafa, respectively, (complexed under the two Informations with
Falsification of a Commercial Document) conviction would still be proper,
the two essential requisites of Estafa, namely fraud or deceit and damage
to another, having been charged and proven." 13
On the second issue, appellant contends that respondent court erred in
convicting him of attempted estafa in Criminal Case No. 15007 when it
admitted in its decision that appellant was not able to withdraw the value
of the second check as he was apprehended in the act of withdrawing the
same. From this, he argues that having failed to withdraw the sum as part
value of the second check, no amount whatsoever was taken by him,
hence no damage or prejudice was suffered by the bank. Absent such
damage, he concludes, he cannot be convicted of attempted estafa.: nad
This is specious argumentation.
Basically, the two essential requisites of fraud or deceit and damage or
injury must be established by sufficient and competent evidence in order
that the crime of estafa may be established. 14 Deceit is the false
representation of a matter of fact (whether by words or conduct, by false or
misleading allegations, or by concealment of that which should have been
disclosed) which deceives or is intended to deceive another so that he shall
act upon it to his legal injury. 15 The fact that appellant was the possessor
and utterer of the checks in question (Exhibits "A" and "H") and having
benefited from the subsequent withdrawals, as well as having attempted to
gain by trying to withdraw an amount thereon, the inevitable conclusion
would be that he was the one who falsified said Exhibits "A" and "H".
Ineluctably, the use of the spurious checks is by itself fraud or deceit.
Although one of the essential elements of estafa is damage or prejudice to
the offended party, 16 in the absence of proof thereof the offender would
at least be guilty of attempted estafa. Appellant commenced the
commission of the crime of estafa but he failed to perform all the acts of
execution which would produce the crime, not by reason of his own
spontaneous desistance but because of his apprehension by the authorities
before he could obtain the amount. Since only the intent to cause damage
and not the damage itself has been shown, respondent court correctly
convicted appellant of attempted estafa.
Lastly, appellant insists that there is no evidence whatsoever pointing to
him as the person who falsified the two checks in question (Exhs. "A" and
"H"), as the prosecution failed to refute his version regarding the
circumstances under which he allegedly took possession of the said
checks. He further posits the view that while the courts may apply the
presumptions of law in some cases, the presumption that the possessor of
a falsified document is presumed to be the forger does not constitute proof
beyond reasonable doubt and cannot be applied in his case, allegedly
because the provisions not only of the Constitution but also of the Rules of
Court must be the basis of the judgment.
We disagree.
While it may appear that the prosecution failed to directly contradict the
claim of appellant as to how he came into possession of the two checks, it
is understandable that the prosecution would not always have the means
for obtaining such direct evidence to confute acts contrived clandestinely.
MELENCIO-HERRERA, J:
This is an automatic review of the Decision of the Court of First Instance of
Samar, Branch IX, convicting Benito de la Cruz and Cipring de la Cruz of
the crime of Robbery in Band with Double Homicide and imposing upon
them the capital punishment.
The prosecution narrates the occurrence as follows:
Melchor Bago, 64 years of age, was the light-house keeper at Hinamok
Island, Salvacion, Basey, Western Samar. On October 29, 1968, at about
5:00 o'clock in the afternoon, he was proceeding to light the lamp at the
said light-house, which is about two-thirds of a kilometer away from his
house on the seashore, where he and his wife, Adriana Bago, lived. On the
way, he met Elmerio Banasan, a fisherman who had just arrived from
fishing, and who informed him that he saw some persons disembark from a
motorized banca (referred to in the transcript as a "pumpboat"). Looking
towards the sea, Melchor saw a "pumpboat" anchored at about "40 brazas"
from the "beach of the light-house." It was painted green and yellow with a
roof covering the boat so that when someone enters, he cannot be
seen. 1 Noting nothing unusual, he proceeded on his way. Upon reaching
the base of the light-house, he saw a person crouching behind the cogon
grass about four arm's-lengths away. He called out saying "who are you,
what are you doing there?" The man stood up, followed by four others.
They were all armed, two with revolvers, one with a rifle and still another
with a homemade shotgun or "paltik." All of them encircled him. One of the
men who was carrying a revolver and whom he came to know later as the
accused, Benito de la Cruz, ordered the others to hogtie him, warning him
not to shout and resist otherwise he would be killed; while another, whose
name he knew later as Cipring de la Cruz, took his bolo away. Then Benito
de la Cruz inquired where he kept the .38 Cal. rifle and .45 Cal. pistol
issued by the Government to him. Melchor denied having those firearms.
He was then taken by Benito, Cipring and another companion to a nearby
cemetery. After being made to sit, his upper arms were tied to the post of a
tomb with his feet likewise tied to the fence. Cipring tied Melchor's arms
loosely but Benito told him to tighten it in order to prevent escape. Then
Benito de la Cruz asked Melchor which part of his house was open and
Melchor replied that it was the door and window facing the sea. The group
then stuffed Melchor's mouth with a piece of cloth and a handkerchief, and
before leaving, Benito told him that they would kill his wife and would
return to kill him too.
At about 9:00 o'clock in the evening of that same day, Camilo Saborrido, a
fisherman, whose house is near that of Melchor, was unloading coconut
shells from his banca and carrying them to his house. While doing so, he
noticed a motorized banca, which had come from the direction of the lighthouse, drop anchor in front of Melchor's house. That banca was about fifty
meters away from where he was. Then he saw seven men disembark and
proceed uphill towards, the direction of Melchor's house. He did not bother
to see what those persons were up to as he was far from them. It was only
the next day that he saw the dead body of one Edilberto Estriber on the
beach about 30 meters away from where he was unloading coconut shells
the night before. He also saw the dead body of Melchor's wife, with hands
and legs tied to a piece of wood, lying face up, with a strip of rattan tied
tightly around her neck.
Melchor remained tied at the cemetery until 10:00 o'clock the next
morning when the barrio teenagers found and untied him and informed
him that his wife and Edilberto Estriber had been killed. Reaching home, he
saw the dead body of his wife about three arm's lengths from their abode.
Inside his house, things were in disarray, and the following were missing:
radio, cash, flashlight, one can of rice, canned goods, three pairs of
earrings, two gold necklaces, three suitcases and a trunk of clothes, all
valued at P1,313.00.
The dead body of Edilberto Estriber was found on the beach in front of
Melchor's house, with wounds on the left and right breast. Dr. Harry S.
Marabut Municipal Health Officer of Basey, Samar, performed the autopsy
on the cadavers of Adriana Bago and Edilberto Estriber on October 30,
1968. His findings were reflected in the postmortem reports he issued, to
wit: t.hqw
Adriana Bago
xxx xxx xxx
III External and internal Findings:
A. Head and Neck - Presence of multiple abrasions at the
Muchal area (semi circular) with the fracture of the hyoid
bone, blocking the air passage producing asphyxia.
B. Thorax - Hypersthenic Type - Opening of thoracic cavity lungs expanded.
C. Upper Extremities - presence of abrasions at both wristjoints.
D. Lower Extremities - presence of abrasions at both ankle
joints.
IV Cause of Death: Asphyxia due to Strangulation (fracture
of hyoid bone). 2
xxx xxx xxx
Edilberto Estriber:
xxx xxx xxx
III External and lnternal Findings:
A. Head and Neck - presence of multiple abrasions at the
frontal and maxillary areas with compacted sand particles.
B. Thorax
1) Presence of thru-thru wound at Right supra- mamary
area traversing the right lung making an exit at right
scapular angle (1" x 1/3" x 9").
2) Presence of thru-thru wound at Right Infra-Mamary area
hitting the right lung making an exit at Right infra-capular
area (1" x 1/3" x 9").
3) Presence of three (3) penetrating wounds (1" x 1/3" x
6") at Right Mamary area hitting the Right Lung.
Upon arriving at the beach at San Roque, Tanauan, Leyte, on December 11,
1968, Melchor Bago Identified a boat thereat as the very same boat he saw
at Hinamok Island on October 29, 1968, except that it was painted
differently in blue. A police sergeant of Tanauan, Leyte, who was with them
called the owners of said boat, and when the two appellants appeared, one
after the other, and came face to face with Melchor, the latter "had a
certain unusual feeling and his hair stood on its ends 4 as he recognized
them to be those who had tied him that fateful evening. Parenthetically, at
that point of his testimony, the Fiscal placed on record "the reaction of this
witness when answering the question of the Court with respect to the
spontaneous Identity of the accused, because the witness jerked and
demonstrating spontaneity as if he saw a long lost friend." Melchor, at the
time, was wearing sunglasses so he himself would not be recognized.
Melchor then informed the police "secretly" of the Identity of his assailants
but since the police were not armed with warrants of arrest, they all
returned home to Basey, Western Samar.
The appellants were arrested on December 12, 1968 and were brought to
Basey, Samar, where they were investigated by the Chief of Police. The
latter likewise filed the corresponding Complaint for Robbery in Band with
Double Homicide before the Municipal Court of Basey on the same day.
During the investigation, both appellants denied participation in the
commission of the robbery-homicide on October 29, 1968. However, on
December 14, 1968, a Saturday, the Chief of Police was informed by one of
the jailers that Cipring de la Cruz wanted to confide something to him
about the incident, He was thereupon investigated anew by the Chief of
Police. The investigation, which was reduced to writing, was finished at
past 12:00 o'clock noon but Cipring de la Cruz was unable to sign the same
because the Municipal Judge before whom the Chief of Police believed it
should be signed had already gone home. The following Monday,
December 16, 1968, Cipring de la Cruz, accompanied by his counsel was
taken to the Municipal Judge but at that time he refused to sign and
confirm the statement he had given.
On February 26, 1969, the corresponding Information charging appellants
and three Does with the crime of Robbery in Band with Double Homicide
was filed before the Court of First Instance of Western Samar, Branch IV,
reading as follows: t.hqw
That on or about the 29th day of October, 1968, in the
Municipality of Basey, Western Samar, Philippines, and
within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the abovenamed accused conspiring and confederating together and
mutually helping one another with John Doe, Peter Doe,
and Paul Doe who are all still at large and while armed with
firearms and deadly weapons with intent of gain, with
violence against and intimidation of persons did then and
there wilfully, unlawfully, and feloniously hogtie one
Melchor Bago with a piece of rope after which they forcibly
entered the dwelling of said Melchor Bago and once inside
ARTICLES
WORTH
OF
VALUE
RadioTransistor(Maharl
ika)
P
170.00
Cash
8.50
Flashlight
4.50
15.00
Canned Goods
15.00
Three suitcases
50.00
550.50
Total amount
P1,313.
00
300.00
1. Nocturnity;
2. Use of Motor Boat;
150.00
50.00
CONTRARY TO LAW.
4. The lower Court erred in finding both accused responsible for the death
of Edilberto Estriber.
5. The lower Court erred in disregarding the defense of both accused and
instead of acquitting them, the Court convicted them and imposed the
penalty of death.
6. The lower Court erred in not acquitting both accused on reasonable
doubt.
Fundamentally, appellants assail the judgment of conviction of the lower
Court on the ground that it was based on circumstantial evidence.
There is, indeed, no direct evidence that both deceased were killed by
appellants and their companions. We find, however, that the combination
of all circumstances in this case is sufficient to warrant conviction with
moral certainty.
Melchor Bago testified that after being encircled by the group of five armed
men, appellant Benito de la Cruz inquired from him regarding the firearms
issued to him by the Government. Thereafter, while he was being tied in
the cemetery, Benito also asked "what portion of your house is open?" And
he answered "the door facing the sea is now open. 6 Subsequently, Benito
de la Cruz told him before they left him tied to a post in the cemetery that
they would kill his wife. 7
At around 9:00 o'clock in the evening, Camilo Saborrido a fisherman,
whose house was near that of Melchor Bago, testified that he saw a
"pumpboat" anchor in front of the latter's house. And more significantly,
that it had come from the direction of the light-house. He declared that he
could see it clearly because it was a moonlight night. Then he saw seven
men disembark from the boat and proceed uphill towards the house of
Melchor. The next day, he found the dead bodies of Adriana Bago and
Edilberto Estriber. 8
The foregoing chain of circumstances, pieced together, in point of time and
by sequence of events, point to one conclusion that appellants and their
companions were the ones who tied up Melchor in the cemetery; hence,
they proceeded to Melchor's house, as they themselves had categorically
told Melchor. In the latter place, they must still have looked for the firearms
issued to Melchor, as shown by the fact that Melchor found things in the
House in disarray. Thereafter, they robbed the house and on that occasion
killed Adriana Bago and Edilberto Estriber. That Adriana was bound hand
and foot is characteristic of the same maltreatment that Melchor received
in the cemetery when his arms, his hands and his feet were also bound and
tied by appellants and their companions.
Additionally, after a search along the northeastern coast of Leyte, Melchor
accompanied by the police, chanced upon a motorized banca which
Melchor readily Identified as that which was anchored fifty yards away from
the lighthouse in the afternoon of October 29, 1968. And when he saw the
owners thereof upon being summoned by the police, he readily recognized
them to be the culprits. If they did not recognize him nor suspected that
the police were tracking them, it was because the police disguised their
mission by inviting people to drink in a store by the seashore. 9
Appellants, however, assail Melchor's testimony in that being an old man,
64 years of age, he already had a faulty memory as shown by the fact that
he could not even remember the names of the policemen who
accompanied him during the search. 10 While this may be so, it does not
necessarily follow that he would have the same difficulty recognizing the
faces of persons who had maltreated him and who had killed his wife. The
passage of forty-three days from the commission of the robbery and
homicide up to the date the appellants were Identified and arrested would
neither dim his memory after having undergone such a harrowing and
traumatic experience.
Appellants further contend that during the months of October, November
and December, it is of common knowledge that the days are shorter and
the night longer so that at 5:25 P.M., Melchor Bago could no longer have
seen clearly the faces of appellants. Note can be taken of the fact,
however, that at that hour in October, objects and people are still readily
discernible especially at short distances. It must be recalled that appellants
not only came very near to Melchor, but they even tied him and talked to
him. They came close enough and stayed long enough with him to enable
him to see and remember their faces.
The inconsistencies in Melchor's testimony, such as the time he was
released from the cemetery as compared to the hour the autopsies were
conducted, is a minor detail that does not affect his basic credibility, but on
the contrary, enhances it for it belies that his version of the incident has
been concocted or rehearsed.
The trial Court neither erred in giving credence and weight to the
testimony of the Chief of Police of Basey, Samar, to the effect that he had
investigated appellant Cipring de la Cruz and had reduced it to writing, but
that the latter changed his mind and refused to sign it two days later. The
defense has not presented any convincing reason that would impel us to
disregard his testimony. As Chief of Police, he acted in the performance of
his official duty, and the legal presumption remains that official duty has
been regularly performed. 11 In regards the unsigned statement of Cipring
Upon the foregoing premises, conviction for the crime of Robbery with
Double Homicide is warranted, with the aggravating circumstances of
nighttime, and of having been committed by a band being present, and
with no mitigating circumstance to offset them.
The crime of Robbery with Homicide is punishable by reclusion perpetua to
death. 15 In consonance with Article 63(l) of the same Code, appellants
should be sentenced to the capital punishment. However, for lack of the
required number of votes, the penalty to be imposed is the next lower in
degree or reclusion perpetua.
WHEREFORE, as thus modified, the judgment appealed from is hereby
affirmed, with the additional modification that the accused, jointly and
severally, shall indemnify Melchor Bago in the amount of P1,313.00, the
value of the articles stolen.
Costs against accused-appellants.
SO ORDERED.
MARTIN, J.:
This is a petition for review of the decision of the respondent Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. No. 42895-R 1 issuing a Writ of Mandamus to the Court
of First Instance of Rizal commanding it to give due course to the appeal of
private respondent Erdulfo C. Boiser, from the order of said court denying
appeal of private respondent from the order denying his Urgent Omnibus
Motion for Relief of Judgment, New Trial, to Recall the Writ of Execution and
to Suspend Execution. Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration of the
decision of the respondent Court of Appeals but said motion was denied.
Hence, this petition for review on certiorari of the decision of the
respondent Court of Appeals, pressing upon the following errors:
I
IN NOT HOLDING THAT A WRIT OF MANDAMUS IS NOT
AVAILABLE TO COMPEL THE TRIAL COURT TO GIVE DUE
COURSE TO THE PATENTLY FRIVOLOUS AND DILATORY
APPEAL OF RESPONDENT BOISER.
II
IN DISREGARDING THE FACT CONCLUSIVELY ESTABLISHED
IN THE RECORDS THAT RESPONDENT BOISER FILED HIS
PETITION FOR RELIEF MORE THAN SIXTY (60) DAYS FROM
SERVICE OF THE DECISION UPON HIM.
III
IN NOT HOLDING THAT RESPONDENT BOISER IS NOT
ENTITLED TO RELIEF FROM THE JUDGMENT, BECAUSE IN
HIS ANSWER HE ADMITTED EVERY ALLEGATION IN THE
COMPLAINT AND PRESENTED NO DEFENSE WHATSOEVER.
IV
IN NOT HOLDING THAT RELIEF FROM JUDGMENT IS NOT
AVAILABLE TO RESPONDENT BOISER BECAUSE IT WAS DUE
TO HIS OWN INEXCUSABLE NEGLIGENCE THAT HE LOST HIS
RIGHT TO AVAIL HIMSELF OF OTHER REMEDIES.
V
IN NOT HOLDING THAT RESPONDENT BOISER WAS NOT
DENIED DUE PROCESS OF LAW.
Initially, the petitioner questions the priority of the grant of the writ
of mandamus by the respondent Court of Appeals compelling the trial
appeal of private respondent from the order denying his "Omnibus Motion
for Relief of Judgment, New Trial, to Recall the Writ of Execution and to
Suspend Execution." Consequently, the respondent Court of Appeals acted
correctly in issuing the writ of mandamus to compel the trial court to give
due course to the appeal of private respondent for under Section 15, Rule
41 of the Revised Rules of Court "when erroneously a motion to dismiss an
appeal is granted or a record on appeal is disallowed by the trial court, a
proper petition for mandamus may be filed in the appellate court."
IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the judgment of the respondent Court of
Appeals is hereby affirmed. With costs against petitioner.
SO ORDERED.
The Facts
Eduardo Dewara (Eduardo) and petitioner Elenita Magallanes Dewara
(Elenita) were married before the enactment of the Family Code. Thus, the
Civil Code governed their marital relations. Husband and wife were
separated-in-fact because Elenita went to work in California, United States
of America, while Eduardo stayed in Bacolod City.
On January 20, 1985, Eduardo, while driving a private jeep registered in the
name of Elenita,4 hit respondent Ronnie Lamela (Ronnie). Ronnie filed a
criminal case for serious physical injuries through reckless
imprudence5against Eduardo before the Municipal Trial Court in Cities
(MTCC), Branch IV, Bacolod City. The MTCC found Eduardo guilty of the
charge and sentenced him to suffer the penalty of imprisonment of two (2)
months and one (1) day to (3) months, and to pay civil indemnity of SixtyTwo Thousand Five Hundred Ninety-Eight Pesos and Seventy Centavos
(P62,598.70) as actual damages and Ten Thousand Pesos (P10,000.00) as
moral damages. On appeal, the RTC6 affirmed the decision of the
MTCC7 and it became final and executory.8
paraphernal or exclusive property and could not be made to answer for the
personal liability of her husband. Furthermore, as the registered owner of
the property, she received no notice of the execution sale. She sought the
annulment of the sale and the annulment of the issuance of the new TCT in
the name of respondent spouses.12
On the other hand, respondent spouses averred that the subject lot was
the conjugal property of petitioner Elenita and Eduardo. They asserted that
the property was acquired by Elenita during her marriage to Eduardo; that
the property was acquired with the money of Eduardo because, at the time
of the acquisition of the property, Elenita was a plain housewife; that the
jeep involved in the accident was registered in the name of petitioner; and
that Elenita did not interpose any objection pending the levy on execution
of the property.13
On September 2, 1999, the RTC rendered a decision in favor of petitioner,
the fallo of which reads:
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered in favor of the [petitioner] and
against the [respondents]:
The writ of execution on the civil liability was served on Eduardo, but it was
returned unsatisfied because he had no property in his name. Ronnie
requested the City Sheriff, respondent Stenile Alvero, to levy on Lot No.
234-C, Psd. 26667 of the Bacolod Cadastre, with an area of One Thousand
Four Hundred Forty (1,440) square meters (sq m), under Transfer
Certificate of Title (TCT) No. T-80054, in the name of "ELENITA M. DEWARA,
of legal age, Filipino, married to Eduardo Dewara, and resident of Bacolod
City," to satisfy the judgment on the civil liability of Eduardo. The City
Sheriff served a notice of embargo on the title of the lot and subsequently
sold the lot in a public auction. In the execution sale, there were no
interested buyers other than Ronnie. The City Sheriff issued a certificate of
sale to spouses Ronnie and Gina Lamela to satisfy the civil liability in the
decision against Eduardo.9Ronnie then caused the consolidation of title in a
Cadastral Proceeding before the RTC, which ordered the cancellation of TCT
No. T-80054 in the name of Elenita and the issuance of a new certificate of
title in the name of respondent spouses.10
SO ORDERED.14
The RTC declared that said property was paraphernal in nature. It arrived at
this conclusion by tracing how Elenita acquired the subject property. Based
on the documentary evidence submitted, Elenitas grandfather, Exequiel
Magallanes, originally owned Lot No. 234-C. Upon his demise, his children,
Jesus (Elenitas father), Salud, and Concepcion, inherited the property,
each entitled to a share equal to one-third (1/3) of the total area of the
land. They were issued a new title (TCT No. T-17541) for the property. On
In reversing the decision of the RTC, the CA elucidated that the gross
inadequacy of the price alone does not affect a contract of sale, except
that it may indicate a defect in the consent, or that the parties really
intended a donation or some other act or contract. Except for the
assertions of Elenita, there was nothing in the records that would indicate a
defect in Jesus and Concepcion Magallanes consent to the sale. 19 The CA
ruled that Elenita and Eduardo acquired the property by onerous title
during their marriage through their common fund. Thus, it belonged to the
conjugal partnership of gains and might be levied upon to answer for civil
liabilities adjudged against Eduardo.20
The sole issue for resolution is whether the subject property is the
paraphernal/exclusive property of Elenita or the conjugal property of
spouses Elenita and Eduardo.
Having declared that the property was the paraphernal property of Elenita,
the RTC ruled that the civil liability of Eduardo, which was personal to him,
could not be charged to the exclusive property of his wife. 17
On appeal, the CA reversed the decision of the RTC. The dispositive portion
of the Decision reads:
WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing, the instant appeal is GRANTED.
The assailed decision of the Regional Trial Court of Bacolod City, Branch 54,
dated September 2, 1999, in Civil Case No. 93-7942 is hereby REVERSED
and SET ASIDE, and a new Decision is entered DISMISSING the complaint
for lack of merit. Let a copy of this Decision be furnished to the Office of
the Register of Deeds of Bacolod City, Negros Occidental [which] is hereby
ordered to cancel Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-80054 or any transfer
certificate of title covering Lot No. 234-C issued in the name of Elenita M.
Dewara, and reinstate Transfer Certificate of Title No. 167403 or issue a
new transfer certificate of title covering Lot No. 234-C in the name of
Ronnie Lamela. No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.18
The answer to this question will define whether the property may be
subject to levy and execution sale to answer for the civil liability adjudged
against Eduardo in the criminal case for serious physical injuries, which
judgment had already attained finality.
The Ruling of the Court
All property of the marriage is presumed to belong to the conjugal
partnership, unless it be proved that it pertains exclusively to the husband
or to the wife.21 Registration in the name of the husband or the wife alone
does not destroy this presumption.22 The separation-in-fact between the
husband and the wife without judicial approval shall not affect the conjugal
partnership. The lot retains its conjugal nature.23 Moreover, the
presumption of conjugal ownership applies even when the manner in which
the property was acquired does not appear. The use of the conjugal funds
is not an essential requirement for the presumption to arise. 24
There is no dispute that the subject property was acquired by spouses
Elenita and Eduardo during their marriage. It is also undisputed that their
marital relations are governed by the conjugal partnership of gains, since
they were married before the enactment of the Family Code and they did
not execute any prenuptial agreement as to their property relations. Thus,
the legal presumption of the conjugal nature of the property applies to the
lot in question. The presumption that the property is conjugal property may