Florence Rose Gonzalez

BSIT-3E

BOOK I
Revolts in Mindanao
The process of Spanish subjugation of Mindanao started as early as 1578; however,
Spain found it very difficult to convert the Muslims to Christianity ,Muslims were fierce
fighters as proven by the century old conflict between the Muslims and the Christians.
In 1578, the Spanish government sent an expedition to Jolo to led by Capt. Esteban
Rodriguez de Figueroa. He captured Jolo after series of fighting. Their stay did not last
long. They were not able to establish a permanent settlement. After exacting tribute,they
left Jolo.

BOOK II
Revolt in Mindanao: The Rise of Islam in Philippine Politics.
By T.J.S. George.Kuala Lumpur: Oxford Press,1980.
In the final page of a book which expounds with sympathy the plight and
afflictions of the Muslim communities of the Philippines, the reader is advised:In the
sixth year of Martian law, peace was at hand in Mindanao. This unfortunate phase must
raise doubts about in the political judgement of the author. Martial law has come and
gone in the Philippines, although its successor regime differs only in legal form. The
problem of insurrection in its southern islands remains. Even in the scale of conflict has
been reduced and its intensity moderated. A heavy military presence is still required to
contain an evident rejection of government from Manila, despite the claim by Mr.
George that President Marcos has responded positively to the challenge posed.
It is a matter of some a regret that the man who wrote such a fierce
condemnation of Prime Minister Lee Kuan Yew should find it possible to gloss over a
much less fruitful despotism and to dilute critical comment of President Marcos role in a
truly bloody story. The flaw aside, it would be unfair not to identify the merits of a volume
written with verve and clarity. The bulk of this study recounts the historical experience of
the Muslims of the Philippines and explains how their strong sense of alienation from
their Christian counterparts reached a pitch which could no longer be contained .The
author goes to great pains to enquire whether or not it is sufficient to account for the
rebellion in the south of the Philippines purely or primarily religious grounds. Without
ever reflecting the religious dimension to violence, he concludes that the issue is much
more complex and that it would be erroneous to provide an explanation on purely
sectarian grounds.
To make his point, Mr. George traces the history of the Muslim communities from the
arrival of Islam which, he claims, did not make the people of Mindanao a separate
nation. It is suggested that religion was superimposed on an anthropological comcreative conflict. Indeed, George maintains that with the initial burst of success,the
MNLF loosened the stranglehold of inhibiting orthodoxy and thereby cleared the way for
Muslim progress in contemporary terms. This interpretation brings us back full circle to
the opening sentence of this review which drew attention to the phrase peace was at
hand. It was judged to be unfortunate,I may nonetheless be apt in an ironic sense
because of its close association with another war in Southeast Asia.
The London School of Economics
And Political Science
Michael Leifer

INTERNET I
HISTORY OF MINDANAO: Spanish Colonization
Demands for the spices and other products of Southeast Asia by the Europeans and the
Catholic Churchs push for conversion in the fourteenth century led to worldwide competition for
colonies and trading bases in Asia. When Portugal captured trading bases in the lower Malay
Peninsula, Sumatra, and the Spice Islands, King Charles V of Spain also financed the
expedition of Ferdinand Magellan in 1518. Magellan tried a westward approach to the Far East
and promised to bring the king the wealth of the 16 Orient. In 1521 his expedition discovered
islands in the Far East that became known as the Philippines. Magellan was later on killed by a
Muslim chieftain named Lapu-lapu on one the islands named Mactan and only two of his
original five ships returned to Spain.Spain neglected the islands discovered by Magellan until
King Charles son, Philip, assumed the throne in 1556. Philip was determined to stop
Portuguese control of trade in the Orient, and in 1564 directed Spanish authorities in Mexico to
return to the islands as part of a grand strategy to do this. The first permanent Spanish
settlement that was made in the Philippine islands was made in Cebu by Miguel Lopez de
Legaspi in 1565. When the Spaniards arrived in the Philippines in 1565 for their mercantilist and
religious expansionism, Islam was already developed among the people of the Southern
Philippines, particularly in the Sultanates of Sulu, Maguindanao, and Buayan and their
respective areas of jurisdiction. In the Muslim settlements in Manila, Southern Luzon, and in the
Visayan Islands, Islam was still in its early phase of development. The Spaniards referred to the
Muslims of Sulu, Mindanao, and Borneo as Moros while the non-Muslim inhabitants of the
Philippines who were later converted to Christianity were called indios. The Moros called
themselves Muslim. Through the sword and the cross, the Spaniards succeeded in colonizing
Luzon and the Visayas islands and Christianizing the people, but their attempts to expand their
conquest and implant the Christian faith on the Muslims of the Southern Philippines met with
strong and bloody resistance from them at the very start. This series of battles fought between
the Muslims and Spaniards aided by Christian Filipinos, which spanned for more than three
centuries from 1569 to 1898, is popularly known as the Moro Wars. The Spaniards justified
these wars as means to check Moro piracy and their constant raids on Christian settlements.
The Moros, however, considered the wars as their defensive actions against Spanish invasion
of their homeland. They fought back to preserve and maintain their independence, their religion,
customs, traditions, and natural resources. The use of Christian Filipinos by the Spaniards in
their military attempts to subjugate and Christianize the Muslims has caused the lingering
animosity and conflict between Muslim and Christian Filipinos. The Spanish imperialistic and
evangelistic thrusts in the Southern Philippines consequently brought about the necessity of
unity among Muslim leaders to fight against the Spanish colonizers who threatened their
common existence. The previously independent sultanates began to coordinate their actions
against their common enemy through verbal agreements although they did not really attain
lasting unity. Because of their ethnic differences and political rivalries, they often fought one
another. But in the name of Islam, they had realized that they belong to the same Islamic
brotherhood. Thus, the Moro Wars were the results of the Spanish fanatical hatred of Islam in
general and zeal to Christianize the Muslims. The ruins of many watch towers scattered along
the coast of islands in the Visayas and Luzon from which lookouts scanned the horizon for the

sails of marauding Moro vintas stand as mute testimony to the destructive Moro Wars that
brought about so much suffering and destruction for both Moros and Christian Filipinos. The
Spaniards forced the Christians to build ships and man the galleys and pay heavy taxes to
finance Spanish military expeditions. Moreover, the Moros subjected thousands of Christians,
including women and children, to unspeakable indignities while others were sold as slaves.On
the other hand, the Spaniards, aided by 18 Christian Filipinos, plundered and burned Moro
villages and at times hanged captives from trees. The earliest clash between the Spaniards and
Christian Filipinos against the Muslim of Sulu and their Bornean allies occurred in 1569 near
Cebu, which saw the defeat of the Muslims. This was followed by the conquest of Manila by
Miguel Lopez de Legaspi in 1571. Bruneis trade activities in the Visayas and Mindanao as
stopped and in 1578 Brunei itself was attacked by the Spaniards. The first Spanish military
expedition to Mindanao and Sulu was sent in 1578 on the orders of Mindanao Governor
Francisco de Sande. Captain Esteban Rodriquez de Figueroa, the commander of the
expedition, was ordered to see to require Muslims to acknowledge Spanish sovereignty over
their territories, stop Moro piracy against Spanish shipping, and end Moro raids on
Christianized settlements in the Visayas and Luzon. He was also tasked to begin the
Hispanization and Christianization of the Moros in line with the pattern followed with respect to
other Filipino groups.Furthermore, Captain de Figueroa was ordered to arrest the preachers of
Islam, destroy their mosques and punish the Moros as deemed necessary and take special care
not to trust them. This Spanish policy on Christianization definitely is one of the root causes of
the hostility and animosity between the Muslims and Spaniards and their Christian Filipino allies.
Captain de Figueroa, who signed a contract with the Spanish government making him
governor of Mindanao and dividing profits from the exploitation of the Island and booty from
the natives before embarking on the expedition, was killed in an ambush in 19 Tampakan by the
Muslims of Maguindanao on 25 April 1596. His men retreated to an island off Zamboanga which
the Spaniards called La Cardera. The early seventeenth century saw the conflict between
Spaniards and the Sultanate of Maguindanao over the issue of whether the Visayan Islands
should pay tribute to the Spaniards or to the sultanate. The Maguindanao raided the coastal
settlements in the Visayas and captured large numbers of Visayans as slaves. Spain was also
determined to conquer the Sulu and Maguindanao Sultanates and establish Christian missions
in the areas during this century. The task of Spanish Governor Corquera was three fold: to
capture Sultan Qudarat of Maguindanao, to capture the main camp of the Sultan of Sulu, and to
invade Brunei once again to secure Spanish sovereignty. The Spanish adopted the policy of
depopulating the Muslim areas by burning settlements, fields, plantations, and enslaving
Muslims for service in the galleys. Maguindanao fell to Spanish arms in 1637 and a year later
Jolo was also conquered.In 1718 the Spaniards re-occupied and rebuilt their abandoned fort at
Zamboanga. A combined Sulu-ilanon attack on Zamboanga in 1719 was repulsed and the Sulu
Sultan Azim ud-Din allowed the Jesuits to establish a mission in Jolo. As a consequence, Azim
ud-Din was deposed by his brother and fled to Manila where he was baptized in 1751. The
British invasion and brief occupation of Manila in 1762 reduced Spanish power in the southern
Philippines and offered a hiatus in the hostilities between the Spaniards and the Moros.In 1843
the French initiated the establishment of a naval base in Basilan while the British sought to
review their trade agreement with Sulu. Spain was alarmed over the developments in the
archipelago and on the pretext of containing piracy in Sulu, attacked Jolo in 1851 and a treaty

was sealed with the sultan. By 1860 Moro resistance to Spanish domination was lessened and
the government of Mindanao was subsequently established allowing the expansion of Jesuit
missionary work in the island. Sulu was again attacked in 1876 and 1878 and a treaty was
signed with the Sulu sultan acknowledging Spanish sovereignty over his domain. By this time,
the main concern of the Spaniards was not Christian evangelization but how to get the Muslims
to recognize Spanish sovereignty and how to win their loyalty in the face of the threat posed by
rival European powers in the region. Thus, after 329 years of Spanish colonization and
Christianization, all that the Spaniards won from the Moros was control over a few garrison
towns in Moroland without extending its influence in the interior areas. They failed to subjugate
the Moros. They failed to alter the Moros Islamic faith or their customs and way of life. The
Moro Wars in the process successfully instituted the seeds of alienation between Muslim and
Christian Filipinos. When the Christian Filipinos revolted against Spain in the early nineteenth
century, the Moros naturally did not extend their support. As expected, the Moros did not
support the Christian Filipinos in their struggle against the Spaniards because they themselves
had been fighting the Spaniards for their own freedom and survival for more than three
centuries without help from the latter. The Christian Filipinos instead sided with the Spaniards.
Source: https://www.google.com/url?
sa=t&rct=j&q=&esrc=s&source=web&cd=20&ved=0ahUKEwiHupmpva7KAhXDJaYKHY_hATI4ChAWCDgwCQ&url=
http%3A%2F%2Fdtic.mil%2Fcgi-bin%2FGetTRDoc%3FAD
%3DADA406868&usg=AFQjCNEhyFLtQ8nEMKc4yDLymmU1cpjJsA&bvm=bv.112064104,d.dGY&cad=rja

INTERNET II

MUTINY AT CALAGANAN : THE FORGOTTEN KATIPUNAN

REVOLT OF MINDANAO
CAGAYAN DE ORO CITY (Mike Banos / 22 Apr) Although it remains little known to this day,
Misamis was the only region which actively joined the Katipunan revolt against Spain. On
September 29, 1896, 350 revolucionarios, including 50 Bukidnon lumads, overwhelmed the
Spanish garrison and raided the armory of the Fuerza Real de Nueva Victoria in Calaganan,
found in present-day Balo-i town in Lanao del Norte province.
Unable to seize Cagayan De Oro City because of superior Spanish forces, the revolucionarios
proceeded to Sumilao in Bukidnon and marched down the coast where they commandeered a
boat and landed in Balingasag town in Misamis Oriental province.
From there the group stormed the Tercio Civil outpost in Gingoog City where the uprising was
finally put down in January 1897 with the help of reinforcements and a gunboat from Butuan
City.
It may have occurred 107 years ago but this could change the way the present Philippine flag
looks like. Local historians believe government should fund further research into determining if
there is a need to redesign the sun in the Philippine flag with nine instead of eight rays.
As every grade school student knows, the eight rays of the sun in the Philippine tricolor stand
for the eight provinces in Luzon which first rose in revolt against the Spanish colonizers in 1896.
But Cagayan de Oro historian Antonio J. Montalvan II says existing historical sources indicate
there was one other Katipunan-led revolt in the islands which occurred during that same period
in 1896 but which has not been recognized by Filipino historians.
"The Calaganan Mutiny" is detailed in the letters of Vicente Elio y Sanchez of Camiguin to the
Manila-based Spanish newspaper "La Oceania Espaola" and two other historical sources but
has never been linked to the "First Cry of Balintawak" led by Andres Bonifacio. One reason for
this could be that Elio's letters never got past Spanish censors anxious to douse the flickering
flames of revolution which had broken out in Luzon.
The mutiny exploded in September 29, 1896 among the so-called "Disciplinarios" or conscripts
consisting mostly of convicts from Luzon, who were pressed into battle against the Moros in
Lanao.
In late August of 1896, the Katipunan revolution against Spain broke out in Luzon. Exactly a
month after, or September 29, 1896, a group of Filipinos from Luzon deported to the Spanish
fort in Calaganan for training in military discipline to fight against the Moros of Lanao, mutinied
against their Spanish superiors upon receiving instructions from the Katipunan in Manila.
They raided the Spanish armory and proceeded to Cagayan to attack the town, being joined by

some Moros. On the way, they ransacked convents and homes of Spanish peninsulars.
Upon receipt of this bad news, Lt. Col. Juan de Pratt, the Military-Governor of Misamis Province,
immediately mustered and trained Filipino volunteers for the defense of Cagayan with the
approval of the Capitan General de Filipinas.
The provincial capital lacked sufficient troops for this purpose since reinforcements were badly
needed in Luzon. At that time, the seeds of revolt against the Spaniards were sprouting and
Luzon was in a state of unrest, especially in the provinces around Manila Bay.
The Filipino volunteers were grouped into a unit and divided into four sections of infantry named
as the Tercio de Voluntarios de Cagayan. They joined other army units under the overall command of Col. D. Camilo Lasala.
One of these volunteers was Apolinar Velez, who took leave from his civil government duties as
the Clerk for the Court of First Instance of the province of Misamis, Notary Public and Registrar
of Commerce.
He was given the rank of 2nd Lt. of Infantry after his training and designated as the officer-incharge for the defense of Cagayan, including all phases of defense as outposts, deployment of
men, and the safety of Filipino and Spanish civilians and their families. The women were
quartered at the convento of St. Augustine which was reinforced by army sentinels.
Meanwhile, the mutineers were on their way to Cagayan which was in a state of tension with the
residents in constant fear: news was that the Disciplinarios were pillaging town after town, killing
Chinese merchants, robbing the people and raping the women.
One midnight, twelve of the toughest rebels took advantage of the darkness and slipped in near
the Puente del General Blanco (present-day Carmen bridge) and killed the sentry. However, this
alerted the whole garrison and an exchange of fire drove the rebels out of town.
Next day, a column under the command of Col. Lasala pursued the rebels and finally caught up
with them in the town of Santa Ana, Tagoloan. The Tercio de Voluntarios de Cagayan had their
baptism of fire and defeated the rebels, scattering those who were able to escape towards the
mountains.
From Cagayan, they proceeded to Sumilao, Bukidnon where they were joined by a band of
Higa-onons. They next attacked Balingasag, and raided the outpost of Gingoog on January
1897. By that time, news of Rizal's execution had reached Cagayan and Misamis, and this
further stoked the anger of the town folk, fanning the flames of the local Katipuneros.
It took a Spanish gunboat, recalled from the Tercio Distrito de Surigao, to finally subdue the
resistance in Gingoog. This was the only known Katipunan revolt in the whole of Mindanao.

What appears to be remarkable about this particular mutiny is that besides happening at
approximately the same time as the Katipunan revolt in Luzon, there is apparently a direct link
between it and the Katipunan revolt in the person of Pio Valenzuela, a cousin of Arcadia
Valenzuela of Lapasan, Cagayan de Misamis (as Cagayan de Oro was then known) who visited
Mindanao during this period (ostensibly on instructions from Andres Bonifacio himself!) to
instigate a similar revolt in Mindanao.
Augustinian Recollect chronicles confirm that this revolt was in fact instigated by a
communication from Katipuneros in Luzon, making Mindanao the ninth province to join the
Katipunan revolt, albeit not included in the eight rays of the sun in the Philippine flag which
represent the eight provinces which first rose against Spanish tyranny.
"We have yet to establish beyond a reasonable doubt the direct link between the Katipunan
revolt in Luzon and the Calaganan Mutiny, but there appears to be extant sources which seem
to indicate that such a link did exist, and that Pio Valenzuela did indeed come to Mindanao on
the instructions of Andres Bonifacio to foment a revolt against the Spaniards," Montalvan said.
Another unique aspect of the revolt was that it was participated in by Mindanao's tri-people: the
Christian immigrants, the indigenous natives in the person of Higa-onons from Bukidnon, and a
group of Moros from Lanao, making it not only a Katipunan revolt, but one in which all three of
Mindanao's tri-people was represented.
"Should a direct link be established between Bonifacio's Katipunan revolt in Luzon and the
Calaganan Mutiny, then the people of Mindanao can rightfully petition the national government
to add a ninth ray to the sun in the Philippine flag," Montalvan said.
What needs to be done at this point is to verify primary sources such as the Consular Letters of
the French Embassy in Manila to Paris where the Calaganan Mutiny is described in detail,
Montalvan added.
The letters are now in the archives of the National Museum in Manila, as are other extant
documents like the historical account of the Jesuit historian Pablo Pastells in which the
"Calaganan Mutiny" is also described in detail.

Source:
http://zamboangajournal.blogspot.com/2006/04/mutiny-at-calaganan-forgotten.html

NEWSPAPER I
PHILIPPINES : MISSING THE PEACE IN MUSLIM MINDANAO
There is still no peace in Muslim Mindanao. A recent agreement to grant the region autonomy
had support but is now in limbo after 44 policemen were killed in the region on 25 January 2015.
So why has peace eluded Mindanao for so long ? And how much longer will Mindanao have to
wait for the missing peace ?
A major reason behind the historical inability to come up with a cohesive and lasting peace plan
for Mindanao has to do with an orthodox explanation. An explanation that is shared by the most
disparate of social and political forces government officials, Muslim separatists, communists,
public intellectuals, the media and even all-knowing development experts. It is an orthodoxy that
has consistently promoted a narrative that assumes a history of unceasing conflict on the
countrys second biggest island. It puts a high premium on minority majority tensions, religion
as an inspirational force for armed change and the omnipresence of a capable state and its
coercive apparatuses in the Philippine south.
On the contrary, Muslim Mindanao has a far more complex history, and this is what the
orthodoxy has papered over. Conflict, in particular, has been the exception rather than the rule,
and where it did happen this was mostly caused by factors other than religion. The orthodoxy
has not only widely exaggerated the omnipresence and capacity of the Philippine state but also
understated the power of local Muslim elites and, as such, underestimated their role in both
the war and the quest for peace in the umma (nation).
Conflict with the state has been intermittent. During the colonial period revolts were few, and
when they did occur they were motivated less by grand visions than by localised exigent
demands, including taxation, abuses by colonial officials, the end of the slave trade, and intraelite conflict. These multifaceted and localised forms of militant engagement with outside
powers continued to be the norm even in the era of the separatist rebellions.
Resistance was also paralleled by a prolonged period of Muslim collaboration with their
supposed enemies. Muslim elites did not hesitate to work with national partners to keep their
authority over their local constituents. This is the singular advantage that these traditional
leaders armed with modern political designations (senator, congressman) have over their rebel
rivals. With their longer history, social embeddedness, and ability to make political adjustments,
Muslim elites have come to outwit the state and outlast the separatists. Manilas authority in the
Muslim zones was and continues to be mediated through local power.
The orthodox narrative also highlights the various government colonisation schemes as a cause
of the conflict. What it does not tell us is that these programs failed. They fell victim to limited
budgets, corruption and inefficiency in Manila as well as in the field sites. A Land Settlement
Development Corporation became an agency of incompetent political appointees and
corrupters that made, as US agriculture expert Merrill Abbey points out, the fast clearance of
land titles next to impossible to accomplish.
The Bureau of Lands, which was supposed to oversee the organised distribution of homestead
settlements, was, as economist Peter Krinks contended, hampered by the wartime destruction
of records, the lack of funds and by the illicit intervention of politicians. The consequences of

this inefficient state delivery system were dramatic. Hunger and famine stalked many
communities.
But the clashes only started with the filling up of the frontier and the determination of President
Ferdinand Marcos to assert central state authority. By the 1960s spontaneous migration filled up
the frontier as 1.2 million people settled in the region. But this alone did not immediately lead to
clashes with Muslims. Settlers and Muslims coexisted peacefully, trading in marketplaces where
goods and harvests were sold. Peace was ensured by the Muslim elites who saw the settlers as
new electoral constituents. But then President Ferdinand Marcos asserted central state
authority.
In his first three years in power, Marcos vowed to pursue an economic program that would
integrate Mindanao into the national development plan. He reconfigured local politics by
promoting new strongmen and expanded the national armys presence all to challenge the old
Muslim elites.
All these became the catalysts for the first separatist war led by the Moro National Liberation
Front (MNLF) the Philippines only conventional war after World War II. But after more than a
year, battlefield losses forced the MNLF to revert to guerrilla warfare. The organisation also split
with the largest breakaway group forming the rival Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF). Marcos
fell in 1986 and his successor, Corazon Aquino, restored constitutional politics.
The MNLF splintered further after 1986 and an ageing and tired leadership finally signed a
peace agreement with the government10 years later. Many MNLF leaders established
themselves as new players in their localities, becoming legislators, provincial governors and city
and town mayors.
The MILF filled the void left by the MNLF, flexing its muscle in a series of brutal confrontations
with the army in the late 1990s and early 2000s. But its war was largely defensive, and it was
never able to expand the area under its control. After a series of failed negotiations, the MILF
finally signed an agreement with the government on 24 January 2014. MILF agreed to the
creation of a new autonomous region with the power to raise its own revenues and have its own
regional army. A bill was then introduced for the Philippine legislature to pass.
But on 25 January 2015, a secret police operation to capture two terrorists hiding in MILF
territory turned awry and 44 policemen were killed. An angry public forced supporters to
postpone legislative hearing on the bill. There was unanimity that the MILF was at fault and
must account for the massacre.
And now there is still no peace in Muslim Mindanao.

NEWSPAPER II
ZAMBOANGA FOLK PRAY FOR RAIN; WATER RATIONED

ZAMBOANGA CITYSuffering the brunt of the dry spell brought about by the El Nio weather
phenomenon, consumers have turned to prayer power to ease the situation amid rising tensions
in the neighborhoods over the limited water supply.
We have performed prayers, particularly the recital of Oratio Imperata at the watershed. We
are hoping and praying for rain, said Leonardo Ray Vasquez, the general manager of the
Zamboanga City Water District (ZCWD).
From an average flow of about 14,000 cubic meters per hour in previous years, the ZCWD said,
supply has gone down to only about 4,000 these days. On Friday, the district started rationing
water to about half of its 72,000 consumers, as water at the Pasonanca River dam dropped
below critical level.
Zamboanga Archbishop Romulo de la Cruz urged priests and laymen in all 35 churches and 98
chapels here to pray the Oratio Imperata Ad Petendam Pluviam for rain.
We have been requested [to recite] prayers for rain until the Pasonanca water dam is filled
enough for the daily consumption of our people, diocesan priest Mike Ufana told the Inquirer.
Oratio Imperata is a 40-line prayer recited for special intentions after each communion, he
said. People are asked to kneel and read the prayer aloud.
Those who have less in life were the priority for the water-rationing scheme, Vasquez said.
But as soon as the scheme started after taps barely produced water, some neighbors reportedly
began bickering over the basic necessity.

Dry spell until May

We will deliver tankers to them but on a ration basis because we cannot, at this time, cater to
all, Vasquez said. He pointed out that the dry spell was expected until May but that the water
district was trying its best to provide a solution.
At the Buggoc transitory site in Sta. Catalina village, where thousands of people displaced by
the 2013 fighting between government soldiers and Moro National Liberation Front members
are staying, the meek were forced to give way to those who believe they were more powerful.
The city hosts 11 transitory sites for about 4,000 families displaced by the 2013 rampage of
followers of Moro leader Nur Misuari.
Asikal Asiral, a camp leader at Buggoc, said trucks would deliver water outside the gate, but we
are being prevented by home-based villagers from getting our supply until all the other families
were finished fetching theirs.
Those two blue water tanks were intended for us, but we are powerless, Asiral said of the
plight of those at the transitory sites who are mainly Badjao.

Bickering among evacuees

Rey Amil, a Badjao, told the Inquirer that his people did not want to fight and just allowed the
more assertive villagers to take the water intended for the transitory site. Home-based families
are too many, we avoid fighting them, he said.
Amil said he hopes the water tanks would be placed inside Buggoc next time.
People are also fighting over scarce supply at the Masepla transitory site.
You cannot blame other families. Those who can fetch more and save more will have more to
consume, said Zarah Bazari, one of the camp leaders.
We hardly have sufficient water these days. In the past, the water district delivered two to three
trucks daily; now, just once every other day, she said.
Lucky are those who can afford to buy mineral water, Bazari said.
When informed about the situation in the transitory sites, Alejo Rojas Jr., ZCWD assistant
general manager, stressed that the internally displaced families are our priority in water
delivery.
We are trying our best to deliver but the supply is not enough, Rojas said.
Situation could get worse
The reality, he said, is the ZCWD also has to ration water to 30 other villages due to the drastic
drop in the level of water at the Pasonanca River, the main source of the drinking water supply
here.

Unless a good amount of rain drops in the next days, the situation could only get worse,
Vasquez said.
Amid the water shortage, the city council has yet to declare a state of calamity, Councilor Kim
Elago told the Inquirer.
The ZCWD has already asked the councilors to do so, Councilor Melchor Sadain said. It was
endorsed by the City Disaster Risk Reduction and Management Council, said Sheila Belen
Covarrubias, city information officer.
The declaration would allow the water firm to institute contingency plans with the use of calamity
funds, Covarrubias said.
Mayor Ma. Isabelle Salazar has asked her division chiefs, including the city agriculture officer,
to expedite the conduct of mitigating measures on water and energy conservation.