ABSOLUTORY CAUSES AND OTHER

SPECIAL SITUATIONS
Absolutory causes are those where the
act committed is a crime but for reasons of
public policy and sentiment there is no penalty
imposed.
a. ENTRAPMENT AND INSTIGATION
ENTRAPMENT
Ways and means are
resorted to for the
purpose of trapping
and capturing the
lawbreaker in the
execution of his
criminal plan
The means originate
from the mind of the
criminal.

A person has
planned or is about
to commit a crime
and ways and means
are resorted to by a
public officer to trap
and catch the
criminal.
Not a bar to the
prosecution and
conviction of the
lawbreaker.

INSTIGATION
The instigator
practically induces the
would-be accused into
the commission of the
offense and himself
becomes a co-principal.
The law enforcer
conceives the
commission of the
crime and suggests to
the accused who
adopts the idea and
carries it into
execution.
A public officer or a
private detective
induces an innocent
person to commit a
crime and would arrest
him upon or after the
commission of the
crime by the latter.
The accused must be
acquitted.

People v. Lua Chu and Uy Se Ting (1931)

Facts: Samson was the chief of customs
secret service in Cebu and Natividad was the
former collector of customs. He was instructed
to make sure that the shipment containing
opium shall be unloaded in the country. He
went along the plan and then he informed the
Philippine Constabulary of all that had taken
place and they discussed a plan to capture the
opium owners.
Held: The mere fact that the chief of
customs secret service pretended to agree to a
plan for smuggling illegally imported opium
through the customhouse, in order the better to
assure the seizure of said opium and the arrest
of its importers, is no bar to the prosecution
and conviction of the accused.

Samson did not induce nor instigate the

accused to import the opium but merely
pretended to have an understanding with the
collector of customs. There is nothing immoral
in this or against the public good which should
prevent the government from prosecuting and
punishing the culprits, for this is not a case
where an innocent person is induced to commit
a crime merely to prosecute him, but it is
simply a trap set to catch a criminal.
PEOPLE v. LUA CHU AND UY SE TIENG [56
Phil. 44 (1931)]
Background of Case: On Nov. 1929, Uy Se
Tieng, was the consignee of the Shipments of
Opium
coming
from
Hongkong,
who
represented agents of the real Owners of
Shipments of Opium containing 3,252 tins. He
collaborated w/ Samson & Natividad of the
Customs by paying them an amount of P6K for
the opium to be released safely from Customs.
On Dec. 1929, upon arrival of the Shipment of
Opium in the ports of Cebu, Uy Se Tieng
informed Samson that the former consult the
real owners on how to proceed the payment of
P6K & will come over to Samson house on Dec.
17, 1929 to inform the decision of the owners.
On the same day Samson informed the
Constabulary
represented
by
Captain
Buencosejo & the Provincial Fiscal requesting a
stenographer to take down the conversation
between Samson & Uy Se Teung.
On the night of Dec. 17, 1929, Captain
Buencosejo and a stenographer named
Jumapao from a law firm and hid themselves
behind the curtains in the house of Samson to
witness the conversation between Samson, Uy
Se Teung and Lua Chu.
Captain Buencosejo & Jumapao noted the ff.
important facts:
1.
Uy Se Teung informed Samson that Lua
Chu was one of the owners of the Opium.
2.
Lua Chu informed Samson that aside
from him, there were co-owners named Tan
and another located in Amoy.
3.
Lua Chu promised to pay the P6,000
upon delivery of the opium from the
warehouse of Uy Se Tieng.
4.
A Customs Collector had a conversation
before when Samson was on vacation in
Europe, with Lua Chu and agreed on the
business of shipping the Opium.
The following morning Uy Se Tieng and
companion, Uy Ay presented papers to Samson

& Captain Buencosejo showed up & caught

them in the act & arrested the two Chinese.
The Constabulary then arrested Lua Chu &
confiscated P50K worth of Opium (3,252 tins).
Facts of Case: An Appeal was made by Uy Se
Tieng & Lua Chu & made 10 assignments of
errors made by the TC in its judgment.
Appellants Held
Point of
Defense
Juan Samson 1. A public official shall be
induced the
involved in the crime if:
defendants to
He induces a person
import the
to commit a crime for
opium.
personal gain

Does not take the

necessary steps to seize the
instrument of the crime and
to arrest the offenders before
he obtained the profits in
mind.

He obtained the
profits in mind even through
afterwards does take the
necessary steps seize the
instrument of the crime & to
arrest the offenders.
2. Even though Juan Samson
smoothed the way for the
introduction of the prohibited
drugs, the ff should be noted
that held Samson not guilty
for the crime:

The accused have

already planned and
actually ordered the opium
without the consent or
participation of Juan
Samson.

Did not help the accused

to successfully implement
there plan rather, Samson
assured the seizure of the
imported drug and the
arrest of the smugglers.
Trial judge
Not one of the means
refusal of
prescribed in section 342 of the
exclusion of Code of Civil Procedures
Juan Samson
in the witness
stand even
though he
was already
dismissed

from the
Customs
secret service
In accepting 1. The transcript contains
the transcript
certain admissions made by
taken down
the defendants.
by Jumapao
2. Stenographer attested that it
as the true &
was faithfully taken down.
correct
3. Corroborated by statement
conversation
of Juan Statement in the
between Juan
court.
Samson & Uy
Se Tieng
Concluding Remarks:
Entrapment
1.
The practice of entrapping persons into
crime for the purpose of instituting criminal
prosecutions
2.
It is a scheme or technique ensuring the
apprehension of the criminals by being in the
actual crime scene.
3.
The law officers shall not be guilty to the
crime if he have done the following:
a.
He does not induce a person to
commit a crime for personal gain or is not
involved in the planning of the crime.
b.
Does take the necessary steps to
seize the instrument of the crime and to
arrest the offenders before he obtained
the profits in mind.
Instigation: This is the involvement of a law
officer in the crime itself in the following
manners:
a.
He induces a person to commit a
crime for personal gain
b.
Doesnt take the necessary steps
to seize the instrument of the crime & to
arrest the offenders before he obtained the
profits in mind.
c.
He obtained the profits in mind
even through afterwards does take the
necessary steps seize the instrument of the
crime and to arrest the offenders.
PEOPLE v. DORIA [301 SCRA 668 (1999)]

Two civilian informants informed the PNP

Narcom that one Jun was engaged in illegal
drug activities and the Narcom agents
decided to entrap and arrest Jun in a buybust operation.
On the day of entrapment, PO3 Manlangit
handed Jun the marked bills and Jun

instructed PO3 Manlangit to wait for him

while he got the marijuana from his
associate.
When they met up, Jun gave PO3
something wrapped in plastic upon which
PO3 arrested Jun. They frisked Jun but did
not find the marked bills on him. Jun
revealed that he left the money at the house
of his associate named neneth
They wen to Neneths house. PO3 Manlangit
noticed a carton box under the dinin table
and noticed something wrapped in plastic
inside the box.
Suspicious, PO3 entered the house and took
hold of the box and found that it ha 10 bricks
of what appeared to be dried marijuana
leaves.
Simultaneously, SPO1 Badua recovered the
marked bills from Neneth. The policemen
arrested Neneth and took both her and Jun,
together with the coz, its contents and the
marked bill and turned them over to the
investigator at headquarters,
Jun was then learned to be Florencio Doria
while Neneth is Violata Gaddao.
They were both convicted feloniously selling,
administering and giving away to another 11
plastic bags of suspected marijuana fruiting
tops, in violation of R.A 6425, as amended by
RA 7659

Issue: WON Violeta Gaddao is liable

Entrapment is recognized as a valid defense

that can be raised by an accused & partakes
the nature of a confession & avoidance.

American federal courts and state courts

usually use the subjective or origin of
intent test laid down in Sorrells v. U.S. to
determine whether entrapment actually
occurred. The focus of the inquiry is on the
accuseds predisposition to commit the
offense is charged, his state of mind and
inclination before his initial exposure to
government agents.

Another test is the objective test where the

test of entrapment is whether the conduct of
the law enforcement agenst was likely to
induce a normally law-abiding person, other
than one who is ready and willing, to commit
the offense.

The objective test in buy-bust operations

demands that the details of the purported
transaction must be clearly & adequately
shown. Courts should look at all factors to
determine the predisposition of an accused
to commit an offense in so far as they are

relevant to determine the validty of the

defense of inducement.
In the case at bar, Gaddao was not caught
red-handed during the buy-bust operation to
give ground for her arrest uner Sec. 5a of
Rule 113. She was not committing any crime.
Contrary to the finding of the TC, there was
no occasion at all for Gaddao to flee from the
policement to justify her arrest in hot
pursuit
Neither could her arrest ne justified under
second instance of personal knowledge in
Rule 113 as this must be based upon
probable cause which means an actual belief
or reasonable grounds for suspicion. Gaddao
was arrested solely on the basis of the
alleged indentification made by her coaccused. PO3 Manlangt, however, declared in
his direct examination that appellant Doria
named his co-accused in response to his
query as to where the marked money was.
Doria did not point to Gaddao as his associate
in the drug business, but as the person with
whom he lfet the marked bills. This
identification does not necessarily lead to the
conclusion that Gaddao conspired with Doria
in pushing drugs, If there is no showing that
the person who effected the warrantless
arrest had, in his own right, knowledge of the
acts implicating the person arrested to the
perpetration of a criminal offense, the arrest
is legally objectionable.
Furthermore, the fact that the box containing
about 6 kilos of marijuana was found in
Gaddaos house does not justify a finding
that she herself is guilty of the crime
charged.
The prosecution thus had failed to prove that
Gaddao conspired with Doria in the sale of
the said drug. Thus, Gaddao is acquitted
a. EFFECT OF PARDON
RPC, Art. 23. Effect of pardon by the
offended party. A pardon of the offended
party does not extinguish criminal action
except as provided in Article 344 of this Code;
but civil liability with regard to the interest of
the injured party is extinguished by his
express waiver.

R.A. No. 8353. Anti-Rape Law of 1997.

Article 266-C. Effect of Pardon - The
subsequent valid marriage between the

offender and the offended party shall

extinguish the criminal action or the penalty
imposed.
In case it is the legal husband who is the
offender, the subsequent forgiveness by the
wife as the offended party shall extinguish the
criminal action or the penalty. Provided, That
the crime shall be extinguish or the penalty
shall not be abated if the marriage is void ab
initio.
A pardon by the offended party does not
extinguish criminal action because a crime is an
offense against the State. In criminal cases, the
intervention of the aggrieved parties is limited
to being witnesses for the prosecution.
Compromise does not extinguish criminal
liability.
The offended party in crimes of adultery
and concubinage cannot institute criminal
prosecution, if he shall have consented or
pardoned the offenders.
- the pardon here may be implied, as
continued inaction of the offended party after
learning the offense.
- both offenders must be pardoned by
the offended party.
b. ABSOLUTORY CAUSES
Art. 6(3). - There is an attempt when the
offender commences the commission of a
felony directly or over acts, and does not
perform all the acts of execution which should
produce the felony by reason of some cause
or accident other than this own spontaneous
desistance.
Art. 20. Accessories who are exempt
from criminal liability. The penalties
prescribed for accessories shall not be
imposed upon those who are such with
respect to their spouses, ascendants,
descendants, legitimate, natural, and adopted
brothers and sisters, or relatives by affinity
within the same degrees, with the single
exception of accessories falling within the
provisions of paragraph 1 of the next
preceding article.
Art. 247. Death or physical injuries
inflicted
under
exceptional
circumstances. Any legally married
person who having surprised his spouse in the
act of committing sexual intercourse with

another person, shall kill any of them or both

of them in the act or immediately thereafter,
or shall inflict upon them any serious physical
injury, shall suffer the penalty of destierro.
If he shall inflict upon them physical
injuries of any other kind, he shall be exempt
from punishment.
These rules shall be applicable, under
the same circumstances, to parents with
respect to their daughters under eighteen
years of age, and their seducer, while the
daughters are living with their parents.
Any person who shall promote or
facilitate the prostitution of his wife or
daughter, or shall otherwise have consented
to the infidelity of the other spouse shall not
be entitled to the benefits of this article.
Art. 280. Qualified trespass to
dwelling. Any private person who shall
enter the dwelling of another against the
latter's will shall be punished by arresto
mayor and a fine not exceeding 1,000 pesos.
If the offense be committed by means of
violence or intimidation, the penalty shall be
prision correccional in its medium and
maximum periods and a fine not exceeding
1,000 pesos.
The provisions of this article shall not
be applicable to any person who shall enter
another's dwelling for the purpose of
preventing some serious harm to himself, the
occupants of the dwelling or a third person,
nor shall it be applicable to any person who
shall enter a dwelling for the purpose of
rendering some service to humanity or
justice, nor to anyone who shall enter cafes,
taverns, inn and other public houses, while
the same are open.
Art. 332. Persons exempt from
criminal liability. No criminal, but only
civil liability, shall result from the commission
of the crime of theft, swindling or malicious
mischief committed or caused mutually by the
following persons:
1.
Spouses,
ascendants
and
descendants, or relatives by affinity in the
same line.
2. The widowed spouse with respect to
the property which belonged to the deceased
spouse before the same shall have passed
into the possession of another; and
3. Brothers and sisters and brothers-inlaw and sisters-in-law, if living together.

The exemption established by this

article shall not be applicable to strangers
participating in the commission of the crime.
Art. 344. Prosecution of the crimes of
adultery,
concubinage,
seduction,
abduction,
rape
and
acts
of
lasciviousness. The crimes of adultery
and concubinage shall not be prosecuted
except upon a complaint filed by the offended
spouse.
The offended party cannot institute
criminal prosecution without including both
the guilty parties, if they are both alive, nor,
in any case, if he shall have consented or
pardoned the offenders.
The offenses of seduction, abduction, rape or
acts of lasciviousness, shall not be prosecuted
except upon a complaint filed by the offended
party or her parents, grandparents, or
guardian, nor, in any case, if the offender has
been expressly pardoned by the above named
persons, as the case may be.
In cases of seduction, abduction, acts
of lasciviousness and rape, the marriage of
the offender with the offended party shall
extinguish the criminal action or remit the
penalty already imposed upon him. The
provisions of this paragraph shall also be
applicable to the co-principals, accomplices
and accessories after the fact of the abovementioned crimes.
d. ACTS NOT COVERED BY LAW AND IN
CASE OF EXCESSIVE PUNISHMENT
Art. 5. Duty of the court in
connection with acts which should be
repressed but which are not covered by
the law, and in cases of excessive
penalties. Whenever a court has
knowledge of any act which it may deem
proper to repress and which is not punishable
by law, it shall render the proper decision,
and shall report to the Chief Executive,
through the Department of Justice, the
reasons which induce the court to believe that
said act should be made the subject of
legislation.
In the same way, the court shall submit
to the Chief Executive, through the
Department of Justice, such statement as may
be deemed proper, without suspending the
execution of the sentence, when a strict
enforcement of the provisions of this Code

would result in the imposition of a clearly

excessive penalty, taking into consideration
the degree of malice and the injury caused by
the offense.

3. MITIGATING CIRCUMSTANCES
Mitigating circumstances are those
which, if present in the commission of the
crime, do not entirely free the actor from
criminal liability, but serve only to reduce the
penalty.
They are based on the diminution of
either freedom of action, intelligence or intent
or on the lesser perversity of the offender.
CLASSES OF MITIGATING CIRCUMSTANCES
-

1. ORDINARY MITIGATING
Those mentioned in subsections 1 to 10
of Art. 13.
2. PRIVILEGED MITIGATING

Art. 68. Penalty to be imposed upon a

person under eighteen years of age.
When the offender is a minor under eighteen
years and his case is one coming under the
provisions of the paragraphs next to the last
of Article 80 of this Code, the following rules
shall be observed:
1. Upon a person under fifteen but over
nine years of age, who is not exempted from
liability by reason of the court having
declared that he acted with discernment, a
discretionary penalty shall be imposed, but
always lower by two degrees at least than
that prescribed by law for the crime which he
committed.
2. Upon a person over fifteen and
under eighteen years of age the penalty next
lower than that prescribed by law shall be
imposed, but always in the proper period.
Art. 69. Penalty to be imposed when the
crime
committed
is
not
wholly
excusable. A penalty lower by one or two
degrees than that prescribed by law shall be
imposed if the deed is not wholly excusable
by reason of the lack of some of the
conditions required to justify the same or to
exempt from criminal liability in the several
cases mentioned in Article 11 and 12,
provided that the majority of such conditions
be present. The courts shall impose the
penalty in the period which may be deemed
proper, in view of the number and nature of
the conditions of exemption present or
lacking.

Privileged mitigating circumstances

which are applicable only to particular crimes:
1. Art. 268, par. 3. Voluntary release of
the person illegally detained within 3 days
without the offender attaining his purpose and
before the institution of criminal action. The
penalty is one degree lower.
2. Art. 333, par. 3. Abandonment without
justification of the spouse who committed
adultery. The penalty is one degree lower.
ORDINARY MC
Susceptible of being
offset by any
aggravating
circumstance
If not offset by
aggravating
circumstance,
produces the effect of
applying the penalty
provided by law for
the crime in its min
period in case of
divisible penalty

PRIVILEDGED MC
Cannot be offset by
aggravating
circumstance
The effect of imposing
upon the offender the
penalty lower by one
or two degrees than
that provided by law
for the crime.

NOTE: Mitigating circumstances only reduce

the penalty but do not change the nature of the
crime.
Art. 13. Mitigating circumstances. The
following are mitigating circumstances;
1. Those mentioned in the preceding
chapter, when all the requisites necessary to
justify or to exempt from criminal liability in
the respective cases are not attendant.
2. That the offender is under eighteen
year of age or over seventy years. In the case
of the minor, he shall be proceeded against in
accordance with the provisions of Art. 80.
3. That the offender had no intention to
commit so grave a wrong as that committed.
4. That sufficient provocation or threat
on the part of the offended party immediately
preceded the act.
5. That the act was committed in the
immediate vindication of a grave offense to
the one committing the felony (delito), his
spouse, ascendants, or relatives by affinity
within the same degrees.
6. That of having acted upon an
impulse so powerful as naturally to have
produced passion or obfuscation.
7. That the offender had voluntarily
surrendered himself to a person in authority

or his agents, or that he had voluntarily

confessed his guilt before the court prior to
the presentation of the evidence for the
prosecution;
8. That the offender is deaf and dumb,
blind or otherwise suffering some physical
defect which thus restricts his means of
action, defense, or comm4unications with his
fellow beings.
9. Such illness of the offender as would
diminish the exercise of the will-power of the
offender without however depriving him of
the consciousness of his acts.
10.
And,
finally,
any
other
circumstances of a similar nature and
analogous to those above mentioned.
Par. 1- THOSE MENTIONED IN THE
PRECEDING CHAPTER, WHEN ALL THE
REQUISITES NECESSARY TO JUSTIFY OR
TO EXEMPT FROM CRIMINAL LIABILITY IN
THE RESPECTIVE CASES ARE NOT
ATTENDANT.
The circumstances of justification or
exemption which may give place to mitigation,
because not all the requisites necessary to
justify the act or to exempt from criminal
liability in the respective cases are attendant,
are the ff:
1.
Self-defense
7. Minority over 9
and
2.
Defense of Relatives
under 15 years of
age
3.
Defense of Strangers
8. Causing injury by
mere
4.
State of necessity
accident
5.
Performance of duty
9. Uncontrollable fear
6.
Obedience to order
of superior

requisites are not present in any of the cases

referred to in circumstances number 1, 2 and 3
or Art. 11.
Ex. When the one making defense against
unlawful aggression used unreasonable means
to prevent or repel it, he is entitled to a
privileged mitigating circumstance.

2.Incomplete justifying circumstance

of avoidance of greater evil or injury.
REQUISITES under par. 4 of Art. 11:
a.
That the evil sought to be avoided
actually exists;
b.
That the injury feared be greater
than that done to avoid it;
c.
That there be no other practical
and less harmful means of preventing it.
Avoidance of greater evil or injury is a
justifying circumstance if all the three
requisites mentioned in par. 4 of Art. 11 are
present. But if any of the last two requisites is
lacking, there is only a mitigating circumstance.
3.
Incomplete
justifying
circumstance of performance of duty.
REQUISITES under par. 5 of Art. 11:
a. That the accused acted in the
performance of a duty or in the lawful
exercise of a right or office; and
b. That the injury caused or offense
committed
be
the
necessary
consequence of the due performance
of such duty or the lawful exercise of
such right or office.
In People v. Oanis, the SC considered
one of the 2 requisites as constituting the
majority. It seems that there is no ordinary
mitigating circumstance under Art. 13 par. 1
when the justifying or exempting circumstance
has 2 requisites only.

INCOMPLETE JUSTIFYING CIRCUMSTANCE

1.
Incomplete
self-defense,
defense of relatives, defense of
stranger

INCOMPLETE EXEMPTING CIRCUMSTANCE

1.
Incomplete
exempting
circumstance of minority over 9 and under
15 years of age.

In these 3 classes of defense, UNLAWFUL

AGGRESSION must always be present. It is an
indispensable requisite.
Par. 1 of Art. 13 is applicable only when
unlawful aggression is present but the other 2

REQUISITES under par. 3 of Art. 12:

a. That the offender is over 9 and under
15 years old; and
b. That
he
does
not
act
with
discernment.

 If the minor over 9 and under 15 years of age

acted with discernment, he is entitled only to a
mitigating circumstance, because not all the
requisites to exempt from criminal liability are
present.
2.
Incomplete
circumstance of accident.

exempting

REQUISITES under par. 4 of Art. 12 :

a.
A person is performing a lawful act;
b.
With due care;
c.
He causes an injury to another by
mere accident; and
d.
Without fault or intention of causing
it.
If the 2nd requisite and 1st part of the 4th
requisite are absent, the case will fall under Art.
365 which punishes reckless imprudence.
If the 1st requisite and 2nd part of the 4th
requisite are absent, it will be an intentional
felony.
3.
Incomplete
exempting
circumstance of uncontrollable fear.
REQUISITES under par. 6 of Art. 12:
a.
That the threat which caused the fear
was of an evil greater than, or at least equal
to, that which he was required to commit;
b.
That it promised an evil of such
gravity and imminence that an ordinary
person would have succumbed to it.
If only one of these requisites is
present,
there
is
only
a
mitigating
circumstance.

People vs. Jaurigue

Facts: A girl by the name of Avelina was being
courted and harassed by one Amado. The
young man, whom the girl flatly refused,
nevertheless persisted in his endeavors by
going to the girls house at midnight,
surreptitiously entering her room, putting his
hand on her forehead (evidently with the
intention of abusing her) and thereby causing
the girl to scream for help. Her parents arrived
but the father of the girl allowed Amado to go
home. Avelina is purported to have received
news of Amado falsely boasting of having taken
liberties with her person. In church one day,

brightly-lit and filled with other people, Amado

went to sit with Avelina and without saying a
word, placed his hand on the upper right thigh
of the girl. Avelina then pulled out her fan knife
with the intention of punishing the offenders
hand. Amado seized the girls right-hand which
held the weapon, however, Avelina was able to
quickly grab the knife with her left-hand and at
once stabbed Amado once at the base of the
left side of the neck, inflicting a mortal wound.
When asked by those around her why she did
it, she replied by saying that she couldnt take
it anymore and that she hoped that she would
be taken care of.
Issues: WON Avelina can invoke self-defense.
Held/Ratio: No. The attempt to rape a woman
constitutes an unlawful aggression sufficient to
put her in a state of legitimate defense which
will thus exempt her from criminal liability if, as
the only means to protect her honor, she
wounds or kills the offender. However, in the
present case, there could be no possibility of
her being raped. And the means employed by
her in defense of her honor, resulting in the
death of Amado, was clearly excessive. She
cannot be legally declared completely exempt
from criminal liability. However three mitigating
circumstances such as: provocation producing
passion/obfuscation, inflicting only one wound
intended to punish the offenders hand, and the
fact that she immediately surrendered herself
to the authorities, will work in her favor to
lessen the degree of punishment.

People v. Narvaez
Facts: Mamerto Narvaez has been convicted of
murder (qualified by treachery) of David
Fleischer and Flaviano Rubia. On August 22,
1968, Narvaez shot Fleischer and Rubia during
the time the two were constructing a fence that
would prevent Narvaez from getting into his
house and rice mill. The defendant was taking a
nap when he heard sounds of construction and
found fence being made. He addressed the
group and asked them to stop destroying his
house and asking if they could talk things over.
Fleischer responded with "No, gadamit,
proceed, go ahead." Defendant lost his
"equilibrium," and shot Fleisher with his
shotgun. He also shot Rubia who was running
towards the jeep where the deceased's gun was
placed. Prior to the shooting, Fleischer and Co.

(the company of Fleischer's family) was

involved in a legal battle with the defendant
and other land settlers of Cotabato over certain
pieces of property. At the time of the shooting,
the civil case was still pending for annulment
(settlers wanted granting of property to Fleisher
and Co. to be annulled). At time of the
shooting, defendant had leased his property
from Fleisher (though case pending and
ownership uncertain) to avoid trouble. On June
25, defendant received letter terminating
contract because he allegedly didn't pay rent.
He was given 6 months to remove his house
from the land. Shooting was barely 2 months
after letter. Defendant claims he killed in
defense of his person and property. CFI ruled
that
Narvaez
was
guilty.
Aggravating
circumstances of evident premeditation offset
by the mitigating circumstance of voluntary
surrender. For both murders, CFI sentenced him
to reclusion perpetua, to indemnify the heirs,
and to pay for moral damages.
Issues:
(1) WON the aggression on the property of
Narvaez was lawful or unlawful.
(2) WON self-defense can be claimed by
Narvaez in shooting those who would
Held/Ratio:
(1) Yes. The assault on the property constituted
unlawful aggression on the part of the
deceased who had no right to destroy or cause
damage to Narvaezs house, nor to close his
accessibility to the highway while he was
pleading with them to stop and talk things over
with him.
(2) No. Although aggression is established as
the first element in self-defense and there was
no provocation on the part of Narvaez (thereby
meeting the third element), the second
element, being reasonableness of resistance,
was not met when, in killing the two victims,
such resistance was disproportionate to the
attack. Hence, the act of killing the deceased
was not justifiable since not all elements for
justification are present.
Gutierrez, Dissenting: Defense of property can
only be invoked when coupled with form of
attack on person defending property. In the
case at bar, this was not so. Appellant should
then be sentenced to prision mayor. However,
since he has served more than that, he should
be released.

Par. 2 THAT THE OFFENDER IS UNDER

18 YEARS OF AGE OR OVER 70 YEARS. IN
THE CASE OF THE MINOR, HE SHALL BE
PROCEEDED AGAINST IN ACCORDANCE
WITH THE PROVISIONS OF ART. 80.
Par. 2 contemplates the ff:
1. An offender over 9 but under 15 of age
who acted with discernment.
2. An offender fifteen or over but under 18
years of age.
3. An offender over 70 years old.
Art. 80. Suspension of sentence of
minor delinquents. Whenever a minor of
either sex, under sixteen years of age at the
date of the commission of a grave or less
grave felony, is accused thereof, the court,
after hearing the evidence in the proper
proceedings,
instead
of
pronouncing
judgment of conviction, shall suspend all
further proceedings and shall commit such
minor to the custody or care of a public or
private, benevolent or charitable institution,
established under the law of the care,
correction
or
education
of
orphaned,
homeless, defective, and delinquent children,
or to the custody or care of any other
responsible person in any other place subject
to visitation and supervision by the Director of
Public Welfare or any of his agents or
representatives, if there be any, or otherwise
by the superintendent of public schools or his
representatives, subject to such conditions as
are prescribed herein below until such minor
shall have reached his majority age or for
such less period as the court may deem
proper.
The court, in committing said minor as
provided above, shall take into consideration
the religion of such minor, his parents or next
of kin, in order to avoid his commitment to
any private institution not under the control
and supervision of the religious sect or
denomination to which they belong.
The Director of Public Welfare or his
duly authorized representatives or agents, the
superintendent of public schools or his
representatives, or the person to whose
custody or care the minor has been
committed, shall submit to the court every
four months and as often as required in
special cases, a written report on the good or

bad conduct of said minor and the moral and

intellectual progress made by him.
The suspension of the proceedings
against a minor may be extended or
shortened
by
the
court
on
the
recommendation of the Director of Public
Welfare or his authorized representative or
agents, or the superintendent of public
schools or his representatives, according as to
whether the conduct of such minor has been
good or not and whether he has complied
with the conditions imposed upon him, or not.
The provisions of the first paragraph of this
article shall not, however, be affected by
those contained herein.
If the minor has been committed to the
custody or care of any of the institutions
mentioned in the first paragraph of this
article, with the approval of the Director of
Public Welfare and subject to such conditions
as this official in accordance with law may
deem proper to impose, such minor may be
allowed to stay elsewhere under the care of a
responsible person.
If the minor has behaved properly and
has complied with the conditions imposed
upon him during his confinement, in
accordance with the provisions of this article,
he shall be returned to the court in order that
the same may order his final release.
In case the minor fails to behave
properly or to comply with the regulations of
the institution to which he has been
committed or with the conditions imposed
upon him when he was committed to the care
of a responsible person, or in case he should
be found incorrigible or his continued stay in
such institution should be inadvisable, he
shall be returned to the court in order that the
same
may
render
the
judgment
corresponding to the crime committed by
him.
The expenses for the maintenance of a
minor delinquent confined in the institution to
which he has been committed, shall be borne
totally or partially by his parents or relatives
or those persons liable to support him, if they
are able to do so, in the discretion of the
court; Provided, That in case his parents or
relatives or those persons liable to support
him have not been ordered to pay said
expenses or are found indigent and cannot
pay said expenses, the municipality in which
the offense was committed shall pay one-third
of said expenses; the province to which the
municipality belongs shall pay one-third; and

the remaining one-third shall be borne by the

National Government: Provided, however,
That whenever the Secretary of Finance
certifies that a municipality is not able to pay
its share in the expenses above mentioned,
such share which is not paid by said
municipality shall be borne by the National
Government. Chartered cities shall pay twothirds of said expenses; and in case a
chartered city cannot pay said expenses, the
internal revenue allotments which may be
due to said city shall be withheld and applied
in settlement of said indebtedness in
accordance with section five hundred and
eighty-eight of the Administrative Code.

LEGAL EFFECTS OF VARIOUS AGES OF

OFFENDER:
1. Under 9 years of age, an exempting
circumstance. (Art. 12, par. 2)
2. Over 9 and under 15 years of age, also an
exempting circumstance, unless he acted
with discernment (Art. 12, par. 3)
3. Minor delinquent under 18 years of age, the
sentence may be suspended. (Art. 192, PD
No. 603 as amended by PD 1179)
4. Under 18 years of age, privileged
mitigating circumstance (Art. 68)
5. 18 years or over, full criminal responsibility.
Par. 3 THAT THE OFFENDER HAD NO
INTENTION TO COMMIT SO GR A WRONG
AS THAT COMMITTED.
This circumstance can be taken into
account only when the facts proven show that
there is a notable and evident disproportion
between the means employed to execute the
criminal act and its consequences.
The intention, as an internal act, is
judged not only by the proportion of the means
employed by him to the evil produced by his
act, but also by the fact that the blow was or
was not aimed at a vital part of the body.
Intention must be judged by
considering the weapon used, the injury
inflicted and his attitude of the mind when the
accused attacked the deceased.
This mitigating circumstance is not
applicable when the offender employed brute
force.

 Lack of intent to commit so grave a

wrong is not appreciated where the offense
committed is characterized by treachery.
In crimes against persons who do not
die as a result of the assault, the absence of
the intent to kill reduces the felony to mere
physical injuries, but it does not constitute a
mitigating circumstance under Art. 13 par 3.
It is not applicable to felonies by
negligence because in these kinds of felonies,
there is no intent on the part of the offender
which may be considered diminished.
Par. 3 is only applicable to offense
resulting in physical injuries or material harm.
It is not applicable to defamation or slander.
PEOPLE v. URAL [56 SCRA 138 (1974)]
Facts: Ural was convicted of murder by the
Zamboanga CFI sentencing him to reclusion
perpetua, and orderinh im to indemnify the
heirs of Felix Napola, in the sum of P12K and to
pay the costs. The judgment of conviction was
based on the testimony of Brigido Alberto,
former detention prisoner who witnessed what
happened. Ural, a policeman, boxed the
deceased, Felix Napola, a detention prisoner,
inside the jail. As a consequence of the fistic
blows, the deceased collapsed on the floor. The
accused stepped on the prostate body and left.
After a while he returned with a bottle poured
its contents on the recumbent body of the
deceased, ignited it with a match and left the
cell again. As a consequence, the victim later
on died of the burns. The crime committed by
appellant Ural was murder by means of fire
(incendio) (Art 248(3), RPC)
Held: The trial court correctly held that the
accused took advantage of his public position
(Art 14(1), RPC) but it failed to appreciated the
mitigating circumstance of "no intention to
commit so grave a wrong as that committed."
(Art.13(3), RPC). The intention, as an internal
act, is judged not only by the proportion of the
means employed by him to the evil produced
by his act, but also by the fact that the blow
was or was not aimed at a vital part of the
body. Thus, it may be deduced from the proven
facts that the accused had no intent to kill the
victim, his design being only to maltreat him,
such that when he realized the fearful
consequences of his felonious act, he allowed
the victim to secure medical treatment at the
municipal dispensary.

Lack of intent to commit so grave a wrong

offsets the generic aggravating, circumstance
of abuse of his official position. The trial court
properly imposed the penalty of reclusion
perpetua which is the medium period of the
penalty for murder (Arts 64(4) and 248, RPC)
PEOPLE V. GONZALEZ (2001)
Facts: Both of the families of Andres and
that of Gonzalez were on their way to the exit
of the Loyola Memorial Park. Gonzales was with
his grandson and 3 housemaids, while Andres
was driving with his pregnant wife, Feliber, his
2yr old son, Kenneth, his nephew Kevin and his
sister-in-law. At an intersection, their two
vehicles almost collided. Gonzales continued
driving while Andres tailed Gonzales vehicle
and cut him off when he found the opportunity
to do so, then got out of his vehicle and
knocked on the appellant's car window. Heated
exchange of remarks followed. On his way back
to his vehicle, he met Gonzales son, Dino.
Andres had a shouting match this time with
Dino. Gonzales then alighted from his car and
fired a single shot at the last window on the left
side of Andres' vehicle at an angle away from
Andres. The single bullet fired hit Kenneth,
Kevin and Feliber which caused the latters
death.
Held: The mitigating circumstance of
passion and obfuscation is not obtaining.
Andres' act of shouting at Gonzales son, who
was then a nurse and of legal age, is not
sufficient to produce passion and obfuscation.
Dino was shouting back at Andres. It was not a
case wherein Gonzales son appeared helpless
and oppressed that Gonzales lost his reason
and shot at the vehicle of Andres. The same
holds true for Gonzales claim of provocation on
the part of Andres. Provocation must be
sufficient to excite a person to commit the
wrong committed and that the provocation
must be commensurate to the crime
committed. The sufficiency of provocation
varies according to the circumstances of the
case. The aggressive behavior of Andres
towards Gonzales and his son may be
demeaning or humiliating but it is not sufficient
provocation to shoot at Gonzales vehicle.
Par. 4. THAT SUFFICIENT
PROVOCATION OR THREAT ON THE PART
OF THE OFFENDED PARTY IMMEDIATELY
PRECEDED THE ACT
PROVOCATION

- Any unjust or improper conduct or act

of the offended party, capable of exciting,
inciting, or irritating anyone.
REQUISITES:
a.
That the provocation must be
sufficient
b.
That it must originate from the
offended party
c.
That the provocation must be
immediate to the act, i.e., to the
commission of the crime by the person
who is provoked.
People v. Pagal (1977)
Facts: Pagal and Torcelino, employees of Gau
Guan, conspired together to take away from
their employer P1,281. When Gau Guan
refused to open the kaha de yero, they
stabbed him with an icepick and clubbed him
with an iron pipe which resulted to his death.
The two accused were charged with the crime
of robbery with homicide. On appeal, they
claimed that they are entitled to 2 mitigating
circumstances: sufficient provocation or threat
on the part of the offended party and having
acted upon an impulse so powerful as to
produce passion and obfuscation.
Held: First, the provocation and obfuscation
arising from one and the same cause should be
treated as only one mitigating circumstance.
Since the alleged provocation which caused the
obfuscation of the appellants arose from the
same
incident,
that
is,
the
alleged
maltreatment and/or ill-treatment of the
appellants by the deceased, those two
mitigating circumstances cannot be considered
as two distinct and separate circumstances but
should be treated as one.
Secondly, the circumstance of passion and
obfuscation cannot be mitigating in a crime
which is planned and calmly meditated before
its execution, as in the case at bar.
Third, the maltreatment that appellants claim
the victim to have committed against them
occurred much earlier than the date of the
commission of the crime. Provocation in order
to be mitigating must be sufficient and
immediately preceding the act.
Thus, where the accused killed his wife during
a quarrel, because he, who had no work,
resented her suggestion to join her brother in
the business of cutting logs, the 2 mitigating
circumstances of provocation & obfuscation
cannot be considering in favor of the accused.

Par. 5. THAT THE ACT WAS COMMITTED

IN THE IMMEDIATE VINDICATION OF A
GRAVE
OFFENSE
TO
THE
ONE
COMMITTING THE FELONY (DELITO), HIS
SPOUSE, ASCENDANTS, DESCENDANTS,
LEGITIMATE, NATURAL OR ADOPTED
BROTHERS OR SISTERS, OR RELATIVES
BY AFFINITY WITHIN THE SAME DEGREE.
REQUISITES:
That there be a grave offense done to
the one committing the felony, his spouse,
ascendants,
descendants,
legitimate,
natural or adopted brothers or sisters, or
relatives by affinity within the same
degree.
b.
That the felony is committed in
vindication of such grave offense. A lapse
of time is allowed between the vindication
and the doing of the grave offense.

a.

PROVOCATION
It is made directly
only to the person
committing
the
offense
The
cause
that
brought about the
provocation need not
be a grave offense.
It is necessary that
the provocation or
threat immediately
preceded the act.

VINDICATION
The grave offense may
be
committed
also
against the offenders
relatives mentioned in
the law.
The offended party
must have done a
grave offense to the
offender or his relatives
mentioned in the law.
The vindication of the
grave offense may be
proximate,
which
admits of an interval of
time
between
the
grace offense done by
the offended party and
the commission of the
crime.

Basis to determine the gravity of offense

in vindication
The question whether or not a certain
personal offense is grave must be decided by
the court, having in mind the social standing of
the person, the place and the time when the
insult was made.
Vindication of a grave offense and passion or
obfuscation cannot be counted separately and
independently.
PEOPLE v. BENITO

FACTS:
Alberto Benito was a former clerk of the
Civil Service Commission but was suspended
for Dishonesty and was later charged with
Qualified Theft, Malversation of Public Funds,
Estafa and Falsification of Documents and
administratively charged for Dishonesty leading
to his dismissal in 1966. In 1969 he went to the
CSC to seek help from Pedro Moncayo Jr., the
victim who was a CPA and Asst. Chief of the
Personnel Transactions Div. and Acting Chief,
Admin. Div. of the Comm. Moncayo was the one
who reported to the CSC Commissioner about
Benitos malversation which he confessed to
him. Benito alleged that after asking for help,
he was insulted by Moncayo twice, on Dec. 11
and Dec. 12, the latter in front of a lot of
people. At 5:25 on Dec. 12 armed with an
unlicensed Cal. 22 revolver Benito waited
outside the CSC for Moncayo and shot him 8
times in the head and other body parts when
the victim was inside his car which was stopped
due to heavy traffic. After 5 hours the incident
his sworn statement was taken wherein he
admitted to shooting Moncayo. Benito was
sentenced to death by the Circuit Crim. Court of
Manila and it was affirmed by the SC.
In his MFR Benito contends that Benitos
remark that a thief was loitering in the
premises of the CSC was tantamount to
kicking a man already down or rubbing salt into
a raw wound and that it was made in a loud
voice, exposing him to ridicule in the presence
of his officemates. The SolGen argues that the
defamatory remark cannot give rise to a
mitigating
circumstance
of
immediate
vindication since it was not specifically directed
to Benito and that this was uttered at 11 am
while Moncayo was killed at 5 pm, and Benito
still saw Moncayo at 2 pm.
ISSUE: WON Benito is entitled to the mitigating
circumstance of immediate vindication of a
grave offense? NO.
HELD:
Even if Mocayos remark was directed at
Benito this mitigating circumstance would still
not be appreciated. The 6 hrs interval between
the alleged grave offense committed by
Moncayo and the assassination was more than
sufficient to enable Benito to recover his
serenity. Instead of using the time to recover
his composure he used it to plan Moncayos
death. Benito ambushed Moncayo just a few
minutes after the victim left the office. He acted

with treachery and evident premeditation in

perpetrating the coldblooded murder.
Benito assassinated Moncayo not for the
defamatory remark but for his refusal to change
his report as to favor Benito. He did not act to
vindicate an alleged grave offense but mainly
to chastise Moncayo for having exposed the
alleged anomalies or defraudation committed
by Benito and for obstinately refusing to
change his report.
BACABAC v. PEOPLE
FACTS:
Dec. 23, 1990 Hernani Quidato, the
victim was at a dance hall with Eduardo
and Melchor Selibio. And so were
Jonathan Bacabac and Edzel Talnquines
Jonathan and Edzel left for home and
encountered Quidatos group and had a
misunderstanding.
Jesus Rosadio witnessed the commotion
and saw Melchor assault Edzel. He
warned them that Edzel was a
councilors son but was threatened in
return. He left and reported the incident
to the councilor while both Edzel and
Jonathan managed to flee.
Quidato and his companion went home
but
encountered
Ricardo
Bacabac (petitioner) together with Edzel
and Jonathan, and Edzels father Jose
and other relatives carrying armed
weapons.
Jesus pointed out to them as the people
who manhandled Jonathan and Edzel.
Hernani apologized, saying it was just a
case of mistaken identity. But after Jesus
berated them for being bullies, Bacabac
fired into the air while Jose fired at
Hernani and Eduard even hitting
Jonathan. Eduard fell while Hernani in a
kneeling position raising his hand in
surrender was again shot by Jose.
Melchor escaped. Hernani, Eduardo and
Jonathan were brought to the hospital,
Hernani was DOA while Eduardo died 2
hours later.
2 informations for murder where filed at
the RTC Iloilo against Jose, Edzel,
Jonathan and Bacabac which were tried
jointly. The RTC found the presence of
conspiracy among petitioner and his coaccused, convicting them of murder
qualified by treachery.CA affirmed this
decision.

Petitioner assails CAs decision.

ISSUE: WON the petitioner can invoke the

mitigating
circumstance
of
immediate
vindication of a grave offense? NO.
HELD:
For such mitigating circumstance to be
credited, the act should be, following Article 13,
paragraph 5 of the Revised Penal Code,
committed in the immediate vindication of a
grave offense to the one committing the
felony (delito), his spouse, ascendants,
descendants,
legitimate,
natural
or
adopted brothers or sisters, or relatives
by affinity within the same degree. The
offense committed on Edzel was hitting his
ear with a stick (according to Jesus), a bamboo
pole (according to Edzel). By Edzels own
clarification, [he] was hit at [his] ear, not on
[his] head. That act would certainly not be
classified as grave offense. And Edzel is
petitioners nephew, hence, not a relative by
affinity within the same degree contemplated
in Article 13, paragraph 5 of the Revised Penal
Code.
Par. 6. THAT OF HAVING ACTED UPON
AN IMPULSE SO POWERFUL AS
NATURALLY TO HAVE PRODUCED
PASSION OR OBFUSCATION.
REQUISITES:
a. The accused acted upon an impulse.
b. The impulse must be so powerful that
it
naturally
produce
passion
or
obfuscation in him.
Passion or obfuscation may constitute as a
mitigating circumstance only when the same
arose from LAWFUL SENTIMENTS. It is not
applicable when:
a. The act committed in a spirit of
LAWLESSNESS.
b. the act is committed in a spirit of REVENGE.
The crime committed must be the result of a
sudden impulse of natural and uncontrollable
fury.
The accused who raped a woman is not
entitled to the mitigating circumstance of
having acted upon an impulse so powerful as
naturally to have produced passion just

because he finds himself in a secluded place

with that young ravishing woman, almost naked
and therefore, liable to succumb to the
uncontrollable passion of his bestial instinct.
The mitigating circumstance of obfuscation
arising from jealousy cannot be invoked in favor
of the accused whose relationship with the
woman was illegitimate.
Passion and obfuscation may lawfully arise
from causes existing only in the honest belief of
the offender.
PASSION OR
OBFUSCATION
Mitigating
circumstance
Cannot give rise to an
irresistible force
because the latter
requires physical force
Passion or obfuscation
is in the offender
himself
Must arise from lawful
sentiments

IRRESISTIBLE
FORCE
Exempting
circumstance

Irresistible force
must come from a
third person
The irresistible force
is unlawful

PASSION
PROVOCATION
Produced by an
Comes form the
impulse which may
injured party
be caused by
provocation
Need not be
Must immediately
immediate. It is only
precede the
required that the
commission of the
influence thereof lasts crime
until the moment the
crime is committed
The effect is the loss of reason and self-control
on the part of the offender.
US v. HICKS (1909)
Facts: For about 5 years, Hicks and Sola
lived illicitly in the manner of husband and wife
but they separated. A few days later, Sola
contracted new relations with another negro
named Wallace. Hicks went to Wallaces house
and asked the latter to go out. They talked for
awhile and then Hicks shot Wallace
Held: Even if it is true that the accused
acted with obfuscation because of jealousy, the
mitigating circumstance cannot be considered
in his favor because the causes which mitigate
criminal responsibility for the loss of self-

control are such which originate from

legitimate feelings and not those which arise
from vicious, unworthy and immoral passions.
The cause of the passion of the accused was
his vexation engendered by the refusal of the
woman to continue to live in illicit relations
with him, which she had a perfect right to do.
U.S. v. DELA CRUZ [22 Phil. 429 (1912)]
Facts: The accused, in the heat of passion,
killed his common-law wife upon discovering
her in flagrante in carnal communication with a
common acquaintance.
Held: In this a case, the accused was entitled
to the mitigating circumstance of passion or
obfuscation. The facts in this case must be
distinguished from the case of U.S. vs. Hicks
where it was found that the accused,
deliberately and after due reflection resolved to
kill the woman who had left him for another
man. With a clean and well-prepared weapon,
he enetered the house, disguising his intention
and calming her by his apparent repose and
tranquility, doubtless in order to successfully
accomplish his criminal design. In this case, the
cause of the alleged passion and obfuscation of
the accused was his vexation, disappointment
and anger engendered by the refusal of the
woman to continue to live in illicit relations with
him, which she had a perfect right to do. In the
present case, however, the impulse was caused
by the sudden revelation that she was untrue to
him, and his discovery of her in flagrante in the
arms of another.
Judgment: Modified by a finding that the
commission of the crime was marked with the
extenuating circumstance of passion and
obfuscation, penalty is reduced from 14 yrs 8
mos and 1 day of reclusion temporal to 12 yrs
and 1 day of reclusion temporal.
PEOPLE v. GELAVER
FACTS:
Eduardo Gelaver was married to Victoria
Pacinabao, with whom he begot four children.
They lived together at their conjugal home until
July 3, 1987 when she abandoned her family to
live with her paramour.
Gelaver testified that on March 24, 1988,
after he was informed by his daughter where
his wife and paramour were living and
immediately repaired to that place. Upon
entering the house, he saw his wife lying on her
back and her paramour on top of her, having
sexual intercourse.

Appellant's version of the killing was that

when his wife saw him, she pushed her
paramour aside. Her paramour immediately
stood up, took a knife placed on top of the
bedside table and attacked appellant. The latter
was able to wrest possession of the knife and
then used it against the paramour, who evaded
the thrusts of the appellant by hiding behind
the victim. Thus, it was the victim who received
the stab intended for the paramour.
As to why he continued to stab his wife,
appellant said that his mind had been
"dimmed" or overpowered by passion and
obfuscation by the sight of his wife having
carnal act with her paramour.
Randy Mamon, testified that at 7:00 a.m.
of March 24, 1988, he heard shouts coming
from the house of Tessie Lampedario. He saw
the Gelaver and a woman having a heated
argument, thereafter, appellant held the neck
of the victim, dragged her and with a knife on
his right hand, stabbed the latter three times
on the breast and then fled.
Gelaver was found guilty of Parricide by
the RTC and sentenced to reclusion perpetua.
ISSUE: WON the RTC was correct in finding the
presence of the mitigating circumstance of
passion or obfuscation?
HELD:
The trial court erred in finding the
presence of the mitigating circumstance of
passion or obfuscation "as a result of his
(appellant's) wife leaving their home and their
children." Before this circumstance may be
taken into consideration, it is necessary to
establish the existence of an unlawful act
sufficient to produce such a condition of mind.
The act producing the obfuscation must not be
far removed from the commission of the crime
by a considerable length of time, during which
the accused might have recovered his
equanimity. The crime was committed almost a
year after the victim had abandoned the
conjugal dwelling.
Par. 7. THAT THE OFFENDER HAD
VOLUNTARILY SURRENDERED HIMSELF
TO A PERSON IN AUTHORITY OR HIS
AGENTS, OR THAT HE HAD VOLUNTARILY
CONFESSED HIS GUILT BEFORE THE
COURT PRIOR TO THE PRESENTATION OF
THE EVIDENCE FOR THE PROSECUTION.

2 MITIGATING CIRCUMSTANCES UNDER

THIS PARAGRAPH:
1. Voluntary surrender to a person in
authority or his agents;
2. Voluntary confession of guilt before the
court prior to the presentation of evidence for
the prosecution.
REQUISITES OF VOLUNTARY SURRENDER:
a.
That the offender had not been
actually arrested.
b.
That the offender surrendered himself
to a person in authority or to the latters
agent.
c.
That the surrender was voluntary.
Merely requesting a policeman to accompany
the accused to the police HQ is not equivalent
to voluntary surrender.
Other examples:
a. The warrant of arrest showed that the
accused was in fact arrested.
b. The accused surrendered only after
the warrant of arrest was served.
c. The accused went into hiding and
surrendered only when they realized that the
forces of the law were closing in on them.
Surrender must be SPONTANEOUS. He
surrendered 1) because he acknowledges his
guilty or 2) because he wishes to save them the
trouble and expenses necessarily incurred in
his search and capture.
The surrender must be by reason of the
commission of the crime for which he is
prosecuted.
PEOPLE v. AMAGUIN [229 SCRA 166 (1994)]
Facts: Celso and Gildo Amaguin, together with
others, attacked Pacifico and Diosdado Oros.
During the fray, Gildo was armed with a knife
and an Indian target. And just as they were
about to finish off the Oro brothers, Willie, the
eldest of the Amaguins, appeared with a
revolver and delivered the coup de grace. They
invoke the mitigating circumstance of voluntary
surrender.
Held: SC agrees with the accused-appellants
view that voluntary surrender should be
appreciated in their favor. While it may have
taken both Willie and Gildo a week before
turning themselves in, the fact it, they

voluntarily surrendered to the police before

arrest could be effected. For voluntary
surrender to be appreciated, the following must
be present: (a) offender has not been actually
arrested; (b) offender surrendered himself to a
person in authority; and (c) the surrender must
be voluntary. All these requisites appear to
have attended their surrender.
PEOPLE v. DELA CRUZ
FACTS:
On May 30, 1936 Francisco Dela Cruz,
Fernando Legaspi and 3 other persons
confederated and helped one another to attack
and assault Yu Wan inflicting upon him physical
injuries
requiring
medical
attendance
preventing him from working for some days and
stealing his personal property of P26. Dela Cruz
was alleged to be a habitual delinquent under
the RPC, since he was previously convicted
once for theft and twice for estafa with final
judgment. The accused pleaded not guilty.
During the trial, after 2 witnesses for the
prosecution had testified, Dela Cruz withdrew
their plea of not guilty and pleaded guilty
instead. Dela Cruz was sentenced for 6 mos. 1
day prision correctional but as a habitual
delinquent there was addl penalty of 6 yrs 1
day prision mayor. Legaspi was sentenced to
10 mos. Dela Cruz is appealing the sentence.
ISSUE: WON there was the mitigating
circumstance of voluntary plea of guilt? NO
HELD:
The appellants plea of guilty does not
constitute a mitigating circumstance under
Article 13 (7) of the RPC which requires that
this plea be spontaneous and that it be made
prior to the presentation of evidence by the
prosecution. The confession of guilt constitutes
a cause for the mitigating of the penalty
because as an act of repentance and respect
for the law, it indicates a moral disposition of in
the accused favorable to his reform. At the case
at bar, the accused does not deserve this
benefit for the reason that his plea of guilt was
given only after the prosecution has started its
presentation of
evidence. It
was not
spontaneous or made with a sincere desire to
repent but merely speculative and is most likely
made on the belief that the trial will result in his
conviction.

Par. 8. THAT THE OFFENDER IS DEAF

AND DUMB, BLIND OR OTHERWISE
SUFFERING FROM SOME PHYSICAL
DEFECT WHICH THUS RESTRICTS HIS
MEANS OF ACTION, DEFENSE, OR
COMMUNICATION WITH HIS FELLOW
BEINGS.
This paragraph does not distinguish between
educated and uneducated deaf-mute or blind
persons.
Physical defect referred to in this paragraph
is such as being armless, cripple, or a stutterer,
whereby his means to act, defend himself or
communicate with his fellow beings are limited.
Par. 9. SUCH ILLNESS OF THE
OFFENDER AS WOULD DIMINISH THE
EXERCISE OF THE WILL-POWER OF THE
OFFENDER WITHOUT HOWEVER
DEPRIVING HIM OF CONSCIOUSNESS OF
HIS ACTS.
REQUISITES:
a. That the illness of the offender must
diminish the exercise of his willpower.
b. That such illness should not deprive
the offender of consciousness of his
acts.
When the offender completely lost the
exercise of will-power, it may be an exempting
circumstance.
It is said that this paragraph refers only to
diseases of pathological state that trouble the
conscience or will.
Ex. A mother who, under the influence of a
puerperal fever, killed her child the day
following her delivery.
PEOPLE v. FORMIGONES [87 Phil. 658
(1950)]
Nature: Appeal from the decision of the CFI of
Camarines Sur finding Abelardo Formigones
guilty of parricide & sentencing him to reclusion
perpetua, to indemnify the heirs of the
deceased in the amount of P2K, and to pay
costs.
Facts: In the month of Nov. 1946, Abelardo was
living on his farm in Camarines Sur w/ his wife,
Julia Agricola & their 5 children. From there they

transferred in the house of his half-brother,

Zacarias Formigones in the same municipality to
find employment as harvesters of palay. After a
month, Julia was sitting at the head of the stairs
of the house when Abelardo, w/o previous
quarrel or provocation whatsoever, took his bolo
from the wall of the house & stabbed his wife
Julia, in the back, the blade penetrating the right
lung & causing a severe hemorrhage resulting in
her death. Abelardo then took his dead wife &
laid her on the floor of the living room & then lay
down beside her. In this position, he was found
by the people who came in response to the
shouts made by his eldest daughter, Irene
Formigones.
The motive was admittedly that of jealousy
because according to his statement, he used to
have quarrels with his wife for reason that he
often saw her in the company of his brother,
Zacarias; that he suspected the 2 were
maintaining illicit relations because he noticed
that his wife had become indifferent to him.
During the preliminary investigation, the
accused pleaded guilty. At the case in the CFI,
he also pleaded guilty but didnt testify. His
counsel presented the testimony of 2 guards of
the provincial jail where Abelardo was confined
to the effect that his conduct was rather
strange & that he behaved like an insane
person, at times he would remain silent, walk
around stark naked, refuse to take a bath &
wash his clothes etc... The appeal is based
merely on the theory that the appellant is an
IMBECILE & therefore exempt from criminal
liability under RPC A12.
Issue: WON Abelardo is an imbecile at the time
of the commission of the crime, thus exempted
from criminal liability
Held: No. He is not an imbecile. According Dr.
Francisco
Gomes,
although
he
was
feebleminded, he is not an imbecile as he could
still distinguish between right & wrong & even
feel remorse. In order that a person could be
regarded as an imbecile w/in the meaning of
RPC A12 so as to be exempt from criminal
liability, he must be deprived completely of
reason or discernment & freedom of will at the
time of committing the crime. (Note that
definition is same as insanity)
As to the strange behavior of the accused
during his confinement, assuming it was not
feigned to stimulate insanity, it may be
attributed either to his being feebleminded or
eccentric, or to a morbid mental condition

produced by remorse at having killed his wife. A

man who could feel the pangs of jealousy & take
violent measures to the extent of killing his wife
who he suspected of being unfaithful to him, in
the belief that in doing so, he was vindicating his
honor, could hardly be regarded as an imbecile.
WON the suspicions were justified, is of little or
no importance. The fact is that he believed her
faithless. Furthermore, in his written statement,
he readily admitted that he killed his wife, & at
the trial he made no effort to deny of repudiate
said written statements, thus saving the
government all the trouble & expense of
catching him & securing his conviction.
But 2 mitigating circumstances are present:
passion or obfuscation (having killed his wife in
a jealous rage) & feeblemindedness.
Judgment: In conclusion, appellant is found
guilty of parricide & the lower courts judgment
is hereby affirmed w/ the modification that
appellant will be credited with half of any
preventive imprisonment he has undergone
(because of the 2 mitigating circumstances)
Par. 10. AND FINALLY, ANY OTHER
CIRCUMSTANCE OF A SIMILAR NATURE
AND ANALOGOUS OF THOSE
ABOVEMENTIONED.
Over 60 years old with failing sight, similar to
over 70 years of age mentioned in paragraph 2.
Voluntary restitution of the property stolen by
the accused or immediately reimbursing the
amount malversed is a mitigating circumstance
as analogous to voluntary surrender.
Not resisting arrest is not analogous to
voluntary surrender.
Testifying for the prosecution is analogous to
plea of guilty.
CIRCUMSTANCES WHICH ARE NEITHER
EXEMPTING NOR MITIGATING

1. Mistake in the blow or aberratio ictus, for

2.

3.
4.
5.

under Art. 48, there is a complex crime

committed. The penalty is even higher.
Mistake in the identity of the victim, for
under Art. 4, par. 1, the accused is
criminally liable even if the wrong done
is different from that which is intended.
Entrapment of the accused.
The accused is over 18 years of age. If
the offender is over 18 years old, his age
is neither exempting nor mitigating.
Performance of righteous action.