1

EN BANC

G.R. No. 85140 May 17, 1990

TOMAS EUGENIO, SR., petitioner,
vs.
HON. ALEJANDRO M. VELEZ, Presiding Judge, Regional
Trial Court, Branch 20, Cagayan de Oro City, DEPUTY
SHERIFF JOHNSON TAN, JR., Deputy Sheriff of Branch 20,
Regional Trial Court, Cagayan de Oro City, and the Private
Respondents, the petitioners in Sp. Proc. No. 88-55, for
"Habeas Corpus", namely: CRISANTA VARGAS-SANCHEZ,
SANTOS and NARCISA VARGAS-BENTULAN, respondents.
G.R. No. 86470 May 17, 1990.
TOMAS EUGENIO, petitioner-appellant,
vs.
HON. ALEJANDRO M. VELEZ, Presiding Judge, Regional
Trial Court, Branch 20, Cagayan de Oro City, CRISANTA
VARGAS-SANCHEZ, FELIX VARGAS, ERNESTO VARGAS,
NATIVIDAD VARGAS-CAGAPE, NENITA VARGAS-CADENAS,
LUDIVINA VARGAS-DE LOS SANTOS and NARCISA
VARGAS-BENTULAN, respondents-appellees.
Maximo G. Rodriguez for petitioner.
Erasmo B. Damasing and Oliver Asis Improso for respondents.

PADILLA, J.:

On 5 October 1988, petitioner came to this Court with a petition

for certiorari and prohibition with application for restraining order
and/or injunction (docketed as G.R. No. 85140) seeking to enjoin
respondent Judge from proceeding with the Habeas Corpus case
(Sp. Proc. No. 88- 55, RTC, Branch 20, Cagayan de Oro
City), * the respondent Sheriff from enforcing and implementing
the writ and orders of the respondent Judge dated 28, 29, and 30
September 1988, and to declare said writ and orders as null and
void. In a resolution issued on 11 October 1988, this Court
required comment from the respondents on the petition but
denied the application for a temporary restraining order.
The records disclose the following:
Unaware of the death on 28 August 1988 of (Vitaliana Vargas
Vitaliana for brevity), her full blood brothers and sisters, herein
private respondents (Vargases', for brevity) filed on 27 September
1988, a petition for habeas corpus before the RTC of Misamis
Oriental (Branch 20, Cagayan de Oro City) alleging that Vitaliana
was forcibly taken from her residence sometime in 1987 and
confined by herein petitioner in his palacial residence in Jasaan,
Misamis Oriental. Despite her desire to escape, Vitaliana was
allegedly deprived of her liberty without any legal authority. At the
time the petition was filed, it was alleged that Vitaliana was 25
years of age, single, and living with petitioner Tomas Eugenio.
The respondent court in an order dated 28 September 1988
issued the writ of habeas corpus, but the writ was returned
unsatisfied. Petitioner refused to surrender the body of Vitaliana
(who had died on 28 August 1988) to the respondent sheriff,
reasoning that a corpse cannot be the subject of habeas
corpus proceedings; besides, according to petitioner, he had
already obtained a burial permit from the Undersecretary of the
Department of Health, authorizing the burial at the palace
quadrangle of the Philippine Benevolent Christian Missionary, Inc.
(PBCM), a registered religious sect, of which he (petitioner) is the
Supreme President and Founder.

2
Petitioner also alleged that Vitaliana died of heart failure due to
toxemia of pregnancy in his residence on 28 August 1988. As her
common law husband, petitioner claimed legal custody of her
body. These reasons were incorporated in an explanation filed
before the respondent court. Two (2) orders dated 29 and 30
September 1988 were then issued by respondent court, directing
delivery of the deceased's body to a funeral parlor in Cagayan de
Oro City and its autopsy.
Petitioner (as respondent in the habeas corpus proceedings) filed
an urgent motion to dismiss the petition therein, claiming lack of
jurisdiction of the court over the nature of the action under sec.
1(b) of Rule 16 in relation to sec. 2, Rule 72 of the Rules of
Court. 1 A special proceeding for habeas corpus, petitioner argued, is
not applicable to a dead person but extends only to all cases of
illegal confinement or detention of a live person.
Before resolving the motion to dismiss, private respondents (as
petitioners below) were granted leave to amend their
petition. 2 Claiming to have knowledge of the death of Vitaliana only
on 28 September 1988 (or after the filing of thehabeas
corpus petition), private respondents (Vargases') alleged that
petitioner Tomas Eugenia who is not in any way related to Vitaliana
was wrongfully interfering with their (Vargases') duty to bury her.
Invoking Arts. 305 and 308 of the Civil Code, 3the Vargases
contended that, as the next of kin in the Philippines, they are the
legal custodians of the dead body of their sister Vitaliana. An
exchange of pleadings followed. The motion to dismiss was finally
submitted for resolution on 21 October 1988.

It should be noted from the original petition, to the

first amended petition, up to the second amended
petition that the ultimate facts show that if the
person of Vitaliana Vargas turns out to be dead
then this Court is being prayed to declare the
petitioners as the persons entitled to the custody,
interment and/or burial of the body of said
deceased. The Court, considering the
circumstance that Vitaliana Vargas was already
dead on August 28, 1988 but only revealed to the
Court on September 29, 1988 by respondent's
counsel, did not lose jurisdiction over the nature
and subject matter of this case because it may
entertain this case thru the allegations in the body
of the petition on the determination as to who is
entitled to the custody of the dead body of the late
Vitaliana Vargas as well as the burial or interment
thereof, for the reason that under the provisions of
Sec. 19 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 129, which reads
as follows:
Sec. 19. Jurisdiction in civil cases. Regional
Trial Courts shall exercise exclusive original
jurisdiction:
(1) In all civil actions in which the
subject of the litigation is incapable
of pecuniary estimation;
xxx xxx xxx

In the absence of a restraining order from this Court, proceedings

continued before the respondent court; the body was placed in a
coffin, transferred to the Greenhills Memorial Homes in Cagayan
de Oro City, viewed by the presiding Judge of respondent court,
and examined by a duly authorized government pathologist. 4

(5) In all actions involving the

contract of marriage and marital
relations;

Denying the motion to dismiss filed by petitioner, the court a

quo held in an order, 5 dated 17 November 1988, that:

(6) In all cases not within the

exclusive jurisdiction of any court,

3
tribunal, person or body exercising
judicial or quasi-judicial functions:
xxx xxx xxx
it so provides that the Regional Trial Court has
exclusive original jurisdiction to try this case. The
authority to try the issue of custody and burial of a
dead person is within the lawful jurisdiction of this
Court because of Batas Pambansa Blg. 129 and
because of the allegations of the pleadings in this
case, which are enumerated in Sec. 19, pars. 1, 5
and 6 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 129.
Thereafter, the court a quo proceeded as in or civil cases and, in
due course, rendered a decision on 17 January 1989, 6 resolving
the main issue of whether or not said court acquired jurisdiction over
the case by treating it as an action for custody of a dead body,
without the petitioners having to file a separate civil action for such
relief, and without the Court first dismissing the original petition
for habeas corpus.
Citing Sections 19 and 20 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 129 (the
Judiciary Reorganization Act of 1981), 7 Sections 5 and 6 of Rule
135 of the Rules of Court 8 Articles 305 and 308 in relation to Article
294 of the Civil Code and Section 1104 of the Revised Administrative
Code, 9 the decision stated:
. . . . By a mere reading of the petition the court
observed that the allegations in the original
petition as well as in the two amended petitions
show that Vitaliana Vargas has been restrained of
her liberty and if she were dead then relief was
prayed for the custody and burial of said dead
person. The amendments to the petition were but
elaborations but the ultimate facts remained the
same, hence, this court strongly finds that this
court has ample jurisdiction to entertain and sit on

this case as an action for custody and burial of the

dead body because the body of the petition
controls and is binding and since this case was
raffled to this court to the exclusion of all other
courts, it is the primary duty of this court to decide
and dispose of this case. . . . . 10
Satisfied with its jurisdiction, the respondent court then proceeded
to the matter of rightful custody over the dead body, (for purposes
of burial thereof). The order of preference to give support under
Art. 294 was used as the basis of the award. Since there was no
surviving spouse, ascendants or descendants, the brothers and
sisters were preferred over petitioner who was merely a common
law spouse, the latter being himself legally married to another
woman. 11
On 23 January 1989, a new petition for review with application for
a temporary restraining order and/or preliminary injunction was
filed with this Court (G.R. No. 86470). Raised therein were pure
questions of law, basically Identical to those raised in the earlier
petition (G.R. No. 85140); hence, the consolidation of both
cases. 12 On 7 February 1989, petitioner filed an urgent motion for
the issuance of an injunction to maintain status quo pending appeal,
which this Court denied in a resolution dated 23 February 1989
stating that "Tomas Eugenio has so far failed to sufficiently establish
a clear legal right to the custody of the dead body of Vitaliana
Vargas, which now needs a decent burial." The petitions were then
submitted for decision without further pleadings.
Between the two (2) consolidated petitions, the following issues
are raised:
1. propriety of a habeas corpus proceeding under
Rule 102 of the Rules of Court to recover custody
of the dead body of a 25 year old female, single,
whose nearest surviving claimants are full blood
brothers and sisters and a common law husband.

4
2. jurisdiction of the RTC over such proceedings
and/or its authority to treat the action as one for
custody/possession/authority to bury the
deceased/recovery of the dead.
3. interpretation of par. 1, Art. 294 of the Civil
Code (Art. 199 of the new Family Code) which
states:
Art. 294. The claim for support, when proper
and two or more persons are obliged to give
it, shall be made in the following order:
(1) From the spouse;
xxx xxx xxx
Section 19, Batas Pambansa Blg. 129 provides for the exclusive
original jurisdiction of the Regional Trial Courts over civil cases.
Under Sec. 2, Rule 102 of the Rules of Court, the writ of habeas
corpus may be granted by a Court of First Instance (now
Regional Trial Court). It is an elementary rule of procedure that
what controls is not the caption of the complaint or petition; but
the allegations therein determine the nature of the action, and
even without the prayer for a specific remedy, proper relief may
nevertheless be granted by the court if the facts alleged in the
complaint and the evidence introduced so warrant. 13
When the petition for habeas corpus was filed before the court a
quo, it was not certain whether Vitaliana was dead or alive.
While habeas corpus is a writ of right, it will not issue as a matter
of course or as a mere perfimetory operation on the filing of the
petition. Judicial discretion is exercised in its issuance, and such
facts must be made to appear to the judge to whom the petition is
presented as, in his judgment, prima facie entitle the petitioner to
the writ. 14 While the court may refuse to grant the writ if the petition
is insufficient in form and substance, the writ should issue if the

petition complies with the legal requirements and its averments make
a prima facie case for relief. However, a judge who is asked to issue
a writ of habeas corpus need not be very critical in looking into the
petition for very clear grounds for the exercise of this jurisdiction. The
latter's power to make full inquiry into the cause of commitment or
detention will enable him to correct any errors or defects in the
petition. 15

In Macazo and Nunez vs. Nunez, 16 the Court frowned upon the
dismissal of a habeas corpus petition filed by a brother to obtain
custody of a minor sister, stating:
All these circumstances notwithstanding, we
believe that the case should not have been
dismissed. The court below should not have
overlooked that by dismissing the petition, it was
virtually sanctioning the continuance of an
adulterous and scandalous relation between the
minor and her married employer, respondent
Benildo Nunez against all principles of law and
morality. It is no excuse that the minor has
expressed preference for remaining with said
respondent, because the minor may not chose to
continue an illicit relation that morals and law
repudiate.
xxx xxx xxx
The minor's welfare being the paramount
consideration, the court below should not allow
the technicality, that Teofilo Macazo was not
originally made a party, to stand in the way of its
giving the child full protection. Even in a habeas
corpus proceeding the court had power to award
temporary custody to the petitioner herein, or
some other suitable person, after summoning and
hearing all parties concerned. What matters is that

5
the immoral situation disclosed by the records be
not allowed to continue. 17
After the fact of Vitaliana's death was made known to the
petitioners in the habeas corpus proceedings, amendmentof the
petition for habeas corpus, not dismissal, was proper to avoid
multiplicity of suits. Amendments to pleadings are generally
favored and should be liberally allowed in furtherance of justice in
order that every case may so far as possible be determined on its
real facts and in order to expedite the trial of cases or prevent
circuity of action and unnecessary expense, unless there are
circumstances such as inexcusable delay or the taking of the
adverse party by surprise or the like, which justify a refusal of
permission to amend. 18 As correctly alleged by respondents, the
writ ofhabeas corpus as a remedy became moot and academic due
to the death of the person allegedly restrained of liberty, but the issue
of custody remained, which the court a quo had to resolve.
Petitioner claims he is the spouse contemplated under Art. 294 of
the Civil Code, the term spouse used therein not being preceded
by any qualification; hence, in the absence of such qualification,
he is the rightful custodian of Vitaliana's body. Vitaliana's brothers
and sisters contend otherwise. Indeed, Philippine Law does not
recognize common law marriages. A man and woman not legally
married who cohabit for many years as husband and wife, who
represent themselves to the public as husband and wife, and who
are reputed to be husband and wife in the community where they
live may be considered legally mauled in common law
jurisdictions but not in the Philippines.19
While it is true that our laws do not just brush aside the fact that
such relationships are present in our society, and that they
produce a community of properties and interests which is
governed by law, 20 authority exists in case law to the effect that
such form of co-ownership requires that the man and woman living
together must not in any way be incapacitated to contract
marriage. 21 In any case, herein petitioner has a subsisting marriage
with another woman, a legal impediment which disqualified him from

even legally marrying Vitaliana. In Santero vs. CFI of Cavite, 22 ,the

Court, thru Mr. Justice Paras, interpreting Art. 188 of the Civil Code
(Support of Surviving Spouse and Children During Liquidation of
Inventoried Property) stated: "Be it noted however that with respect
to 'spouse', the same must be the legitimate 'spouse' (not commonlaw spouses)."

There is a view that under Article 332 of the Revised Penal Code,
the term "spouse" embraces common law relation for purposes of
exemption from criminal liability in cases of theft, swindling and
malicious mischief committed or caused mutually by spouses.
The Penal Code article, it is said, makes no distinction between a
couple whose cohabitation is sanctioned by a sacrament or legal
tie and another who are husband and wife de facto. 23 But this view
cannot even apply to the facts of the case at bar. We hold that the
provisions of the Civil Code, unless expressly providing to the
contrary as in Article 144, when referring to a "spouse" contemplate a
lawfully wedded spouse. Petitioner vis-a-vis Vitaliana was not a
lawfully-wedded spouse to her; in fact, he was not legally capacitated
to marry her in her lifetime.
Custody of the dead body of Vitaliana was correctly awarded to
her surviving brothers and sisters (the Vargases). Section 1103 of
the Revised Administrative Code provides:
Sec. 1103. Persons charged with duty of burial.
The immediate duty of burying the body of a
deceased person, regardless of the ultimate
liability for the expense thereof, shall devolve
upon the persons hereinbelow specified:
xxx xxx xxx
(b) If the deceased was an
unmarried man or woman, or a
child, and left any kin, the duty of
burial shall devolve upon the
nearest of kin of the deceased, if

6
they be adults and within the
Philippines and in possession of
sufficient means to defray the
necessary expenses.
WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from is AFFIRMED. Both
petitions are hereby DISMISSED. No Costs.
SO ORDERED.
Fernan, C.J., Narvasa, Melencio-Herrera, Gutierrez, Jr., Cruz,
Paras, Feliciano, Bidin, Sarmiento, Cortes, Medialdea and
Regalado, JJ., concur.
Gancayco and Grino-Aquino, JJ., are on leave.

Footnotes
* Hon. Alejandro Velez, presiding.
1 Rule 16 (Motion to Dismiss):
Sec. 1. Grounds. Within the time for pleading a
motion to dismiss the action may be made on any
of the following grounds:
(a) . . .
(b) That the court has no jurisdiction over the
nature of the action or suit;
Rule 72 (Subject Matter and Applicability of
General Rules)

xxx xxx xxx

Sec. 2. Applicability of rules of civil actions. In
the absence of special provisions, the rules
provided for in ordinary actions shall be, as far as
practicable, applicable in special proceedings.
2 3 and 11 October 1988 orders, Record of
Regional Trial Court Proceedings, pp. 74, 75 &
102.
3 Art. 305. The duty and the right to make
arrangements for the funeral of a relative shall be
in accordance with the order established for
support, under article 294. In case of descendants
of the same degree, or of brothers and sisters, the
oldest shall be preferred. In case of ascendants,
the paternal shall have a better right.
Art. 308. No human remains shall be retained,
interred disposed of or exhumed without the
consent of the persons mentioned in Articles 294
and 305.
4 Record of RTC Proceedings, pp. 296-297.
5 Ibid., p. 338.
6 Record of RTC Proceedings, p. 577.
7 Supra.
8 Sec. 5 Inherent power of courts; Sec. 6
means to carry jurisdiction into effect.
9 Sec. 1104. Right of custody to body Any
person charged by law with the duty of burying the

7
body of a deceased person is entitled to the
custody of such body for the purpose of burying it,
except when an inquest is required by law for the
purpose of determining the cause of death; and, in
case of death due to or accompanied by a
dangerous communicable disease, such body
shall until buried remain in the custody of the local
board of health or local health officer, or if there be
no such, then in the custody of the municipal
council.

20 Article 144 of the Civil Code provides:

When a man and a woman live together as
husband and wife, but they are not married, or
their marriage is void from the beginning, the
property acquired by either or both of them
through their work or industry or their wages and
salaries shall be governed by the rules on coownership.

10 G.R. No. 86470, Rollo at 34.

21 Aznar, et al. vs. Garcia, et al., G.R. Nos. L11483-84, 14 February 1958, 102 Phil. 1055.

11 Annexes 7 & 8, Petition, G.R. No.

85140, Rollo at 85 and 86.

22 G.R. Nos. 61700-03, September 24, 1987, 153

SCRA 728.

12 Resolution of 26 January 1989, G.R. No.

85140, Rollo at 114.

23 People vs. Constantino, No. 01897-CR,

September 6, 1963, 60 O.G. 3603.

13 Ras v. Sua, G.R. No. L-23302, September 25,

1968, 25 SCRA 158-159; Nactor v. IAC, G.R. No.
74122, March 15, 1988, 158 SCRA 635.
14 39 Am. Jur., 2d, Habeas corpus 129.
15 Ibid., 130.
16 G.R. No. L-12772, 24 January 1959, 105 Phil.
55.
17 Ibid.
18 PNB vs. CA, G.R. No. L-45770, 30 March
1988, 159 SCRA 933.
19 Fiel vs. Banawa, No. 56284-R, March 26,
1979, 76 OG 619.

8
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-15499

February 28, 1962

ANGELA M. BUTTE, plaintiff-appellant,

vs.
MANUEL UY and SONS, INC., defendant-appellee.
Delgado, Flores and Macapagal for plaintiff-appellant.
Pelaez and Jalandoni for defendant-appellee.
REYES, J.B.L., J.:
Appeal from a decision of the Court of First instance of Manila
dismissing the action for legal redemption filed by plaintiffappellant.
It appears that Jose V. Ramirez, during his lifetime, was a coowner of a house and lot located at Sta. Cruz, Manila, as shown
by Transfer Certificate of Title No. 52789, issued in the name of
the following co-owners: Marie Garnier Vda. de Ramirez, 1/6;
Jose V. Ramirez, 1/6; Jose E. Ramirez, 1/6; Rita de Ramirez, 1/6;
and Jose Ma. Ramirez, 1/6.
On October 20, 1951, Jose V. Ramirez died. Subsequently,
Special Proceeding No. 15026 was instituted to settle his estate,
that included the one-sixth (1/6) undivided share in the
aforementioned property. And although his last will and
testament, wherein he bequeathed his estate to his children and
grandchildren and one-third (1/3) of the free portion to Mrs.
Angela M. Butte, hereinafter referred to as plaintiff-appellant, has
been admitted to probate, the estate proceedings are still pending
up to the present on account of the claims of creditors which
exceed the assets of the deceased. The Bank of the Philippine
Islands was appointed judicial administrator.

Meanwhile, on December 9, 1958, Mrs. Marie Garnier Vda. de

Ramirez, one of the co-owners of the late Jose V. Ramirez in the
Sta. Cruz property, sold her undivided 1/6 share to Manuel Uy &
Sons, Inc. defendant-appellant herein, for the sum of
P500,000.00. After the execution by her attorney-in-fact, Mrs.
Elsa R. Chambers, of an affidavit to the effect that formal notices
of the sale had been sent to all possible redemptioners, the deed
of sale was duly registered and Transfer Certificate of Title No.
52789 was cancelled in lieu of which a new one was issued in the
name of the vendee and the other-co-owners.
On the same day (December 9, 1958), Manuel Uy & Sons, Inc.
sent a letter to the Bank of the Philippine Islands as judicial
administrator of the estate of the late Jose V. Ramirez informing it
of the above-mentioned sale. This letter, together with that of the
bank, was forwarded by the latter to Mrs. Butte c/o her counsel
Delgado, Flores & Macapagal, Escolta, Manila, and having
received the same on December 10, 1958, said law office
delivered them to plaintiff-appellant's son, Mr. Miguel Papa, who
in turn personally handed the letters to his mother, Mrs. Butte, on
December 11 and 12, 1958. Aside from this letter of defendantappellant, the vendor, thru her attorney-in-fact Mrs. Chambers,
wrote said bank on December 11, 1958 confirming vendee's letter
regarding the sale of her 1/6 share in the Sta. Cruz property for
the sum of P500,000.00. Said letter was received by the bank on
December 15, 1958 and having endorsed it to Mrs. Butte's
counsel, the latter received the same on December 16, 1958.
Appellant received the letter on December 19, 1958.
On January 15, 1959, Mrs. Angela M. Butte, thru Atty. Resplandor
Sobretodo, sent a letter and a Philippine National Bank cashier's
check in the amount of P500,000.00 to Manuel Uy & Sons, Inc.
offering to redeem the 1/6 share sold by Mrs. Marie Garnier Vda.
de Ramirez. This tender having been refused, plaintiff on the
same day consigned the amount in court and filed the
corresponding action for legal redemption. Without prejudice to
the determination by the court of the reasonable and fair market
value of the property sold which she alleged to be grossly

9
excessive, plaintiff prayed for conveyance of the property, and for
actual, moral and exemplary damages.

share they may respectively have in the thing owned in

common. (1522a)

After the filing by defendant of its answer containing a

counterclaim, and plaintiff's reply thereto, trial was held, after
which the court rendered decision on May 13, 1959, dismissing
plaintiff's complaint on the grounds that she has no right to
redeem the property and that, if ever she had any, she exercised
the same beyond the statutory 30-day period for legal
redemptions provided by the Civil Code. The counterclaim of
defendant for damages was likewise dismissed for not being
sufficiently established. Both parties appealed directly to this
Court.

ART. 1623. The right of legal predemption or redemption

shall not be exercised except within thirty days from the
notice in writing by the respective vendor, or by the
vendor, as the case may be. The deed of sale shall not be
accorded in the Registry of Property, unless accompanied
by an affidavit of the vendor that he has given written
notice thereof at all possible redemptioners.

Based on the foregoing facts, the main issues posed in this

appeal are: (1) whether or not plaintiff-appellant, having been
bequeathed 1/3 of the free portion of the estate of Jose V.
Ramirez, can exercise the right of legal redemption over the 1/6
share sold by Mrs. Marie Garnier Vda. de Ramirez despite the
presence of the judicial administrator and pending the final
distribution of her share in the testate proceedings; and (2)
whether or not she exercised the right of legal redemption within
the period prescribed by law.

That the appellant Angela M. Butte is entitled to exercise the right

of legal redemption is clear. As testamentary heir of the estate of
J.V. Ramirez, she and her co-heirs acquired an interest in the
undivided one-sixth (1/6) share owned by her predecessor
(causante) in the Santa Cruz property, from the moment of the
death of the aforesaid co-owner, J.V. Ramirez. By law, the rights
to the succession of a deceased persons are transmitted to his
heirs from the moment of his death, and the right of succession
includes all property rights and obligations that survive the
decedent.

The applicable law involved in the present case is contained in

Articles 1620, p. 1, and 1623 of the Civil Code of the Philippines,
which read as follows:
ART. 1620. A co-owner of a thing may exercise the right of
redemption in case the shares of all the other-co-owners
or of any of them, are sold to a third person. If the price of
the alienation is grossly excessive, the redemptioner shall
pay only a reasonable one.
Should two or more co-owners desire to exercise the right
of redemption, they may only do so in proportion to the

The right of redemption of co-owners excludes that of

adjoining owners. (1524a)

ART. 776. The inheritance includes all the property, rights

and obligations of a person which are not extinguished by
his death. (659)
ART. 777. The rights to the succession are transmitted
from the moment of the death of the decedent. (657a)
ART. 947. The legatee or devisee acquires a right to the
pure and simple legacies or devisees from the death of
the testator, and transmits it to his heirs. (881a)

10
The principle of transmission as of the time of the predecessor's
death is basic in our Civil Code, and is supported by other related
articles. Thus, the capacity of the heir is determined as of the time
the decedent died (Art. 1034); the legitime is to be computed as
of the same moment(Art. 908), and so is the in officiousness of
the donation inter vivos (Art. 771). Similarly, the legacies of credit
and remission are valid only in the amount due and outstanding
at the death of the testator (Art. 935),and the fruits accruing after
that instant are deemed to pertain to the legatee (Art. 948).
As a consequence of this fundamental rule of succession, the
heirs of Jose V. Ramirez acquired his undivided share in the Sta.
Cruz property from the moment of his death, and from that
instant, they became co-owners in the aforesaid property,
together with the original surviving co-owners of their decedent
(causante). A co-owner of an undivided share is necessarily a coowner of the whole. Wherefore, any one of the Ramirez heirs, as
such co-owner, became entitled to exercise the right of legal
redemption (retracto de comuneros) as soon as another co-owner
(Maria Garnier Vda. de Ramirez) had sold her undivided share to
a stranger, Manuel Uy & Sons, Inc. This right of redemption
vested exclusively in consideration of the redemptioner's share
which the law nowhere takes into account.
The situation is in no wise altered by the existence of a judicial
administrator of the estate of Jose V. Ramirez while under the
Rules of Court the administrator has the right to the possession of
the real and personal estate of the deceased, so far as needed
for the payment of the decedent's debts and the expenses of
administration (sec. 3, Rule 85), and the administrator may bring
or defend actions for the recovery or protection of the property or
rights of the deceased (sec. 2, Rule 88), such rights of
possession and administration do not include the right of legal
redemption of the undivided share sold to Uy & Company by Mrs.
Garnier Ramirez. The reason is obvious: this right of legal
redemption only came into existence when the sale to Uy & Sons,
Inc. was perfected, eight (8) years after the death of Jose V.
Ramirez, and formed no part of his estate. The redemption right

vested in the heirs originally, in their individual capacity, they did

not derivatively acquire it from their decedent, for when Jose V.
Ramirez died, none of the other co-owners of the Sta. Cruz
property had as yet sold his undivided share to a stranger. Hence,
there was nothing to redeem and no right of redemption; and if
the late Ramirez had no such right at his death, he could not
transmit it to his own heirs. Much less could Ramirez acquire
such right of redemption eight years after his death, when the
sale to Uy & Sons, Inc. was made; because death extinguishes
civil personality, and, therefore, all further juridical capacity to
acquire or transmit rights and obligations of any kind (Civil Code
of the Phil., Art. 42).
It is argued that the actual share of appellant Mrs. Butte in the
estate of Jose V. Ramirez has not been specifically determined as
yet, that it is still contingent; and that the liquidation of estate of
Jose V. Ramirez may require the alienation of the decedent's
undivided portion in the Sta. Cruz property, in which event Mrs.
Butte would have no interest in said undivided portion. Even if it
were true, the fact would remain that so long as that undivided
share remains in the estate, the heirs of Jose V. Ramirez own it,
as the deceased did own it before his demise, so that his heirs
are now as much co-owners of the Sta. Cruz property as Jose V.
Ramirez was himself a co-owner thereof during his lifetime. As
co-owners of the property, the heirs of Jose V. Ramirez, or any
one of them, became personally vested with right of legal
redemption as soon as Mrs. Garnier sold her own pro-indiviso
interest to Uy & Sons. Even if subsequently, the undivided share
of Ramirez (and of his heirs) should eventually be sold to satisfy
the creditors of the estate, it would not destroy their ownership of
it before the sale, but would only convey or transfer it as in turn
sold (of it actually is sold) to pay his creditors. Hence, the right of
any of the Ramirez heirs to redeem the Garnier share will not be
retroactively affected. All that the law requires is that the legal
redemptioner should be a co-owner at the time the undivided
share of another co-owner is sold to a stranger. Whether or not
the redemptioner will continue being a co-owner after exercising
the legal redemptioner is irrelevant for the purposes of law.

11
Nor it can be argued that if the original share of Ramirez is sold
by the administrator, his heirs would stand in law as never having
acquired that share. This would only be true if the inheritance is
repudiated or the heir's quality as such is voided. But where the
heirship is undisputed, the purchaser of hereditary property is not
deemed to have acquired the title directly from the deceased
Ramirez, because a dead man can not convey title, nor from the
administrator who owns no part of the estate; the purchaser can
only derive his title from the Ramirez heirs, represented by the
administrator, as their trustee or legal representative.
The right of appellant Angela M. Butte to make the redemption
being established, the next point of inquiry is whether she had
made or tendered the redemption price within the 30 days from
notices as prescribed by law. This period, be it noted, is
peremptory, because the policy of the law is not to leave the
purchaser's title in uncertainty beyond the established 30-day
period. In considering whether or not the offer to redeem was
timely, we think that the notice given by the vendee (buyer)
should not be taken into account. The text of Article 1623 clearly
and expressly prescribes that the thirty days for making the
redemption are to be counted from notice in writing by the vendor.
Under the old law (Civ. Code of 1889, Art. 1524), it was
immaterial who gave the notice; so long as the redeeming coowner learned of the alienation in favor of the stranger, the
redemption period began to run. It is thus apparent that the
Philippine legislature in Article 1623 deliberately selected a
particular method of giving notice, and that method must be
deemed exclusive (39 Am. Jur., 237; Payne vs. State, 12 S.W.
[2d] 528). As ruled in Wampler vs. Lecompte, 150 Atl. 458 (affd. in
75 Law Ed. [U.S.] 275)
Why these provisions were inserted in the statute we are
not informed, but we may assume until the contrary is
shown, that a state of facts in respect thereto existed,
which warranted the legislature in so legislating.

The reasons for requiring that the notice should be given by the
seller, and not by the buyer, are easily divined. The seller of an
undivided interest is in the best position to know who are his coowners that under the law must be notified of the sale. Also, the
notice by the seller removes all doubts as to the fact of the sale,
its perfection; and its validity, the notice being a reaffirmation
thereof, so that the party need not entertain doubt that the seller
may still contest the alienation. This assurance would not exist if
the notice should be given by the buyer.
The notice which became operative is that given by Mrs.
Chambers, in her capacity as attorney-in-fact of the vendor Marie
Garnier Vda. de Ramirez. Under date of December 11, 1958, she
wrote the Administrator Bank of the Philippine Islands that her
principal's one-sixth (1/6) share in the Sta. Cruz property had
been sold to Manuel Uy & Sons, Inc. for P500,000.00. The Bank
received this notice on December 15, 1958, and on the same day
endorsed it to Mrs. Butte, care of Delgado, Flores and Macapagal
(her attorneys), who received the same on December 16, 1958.
Mrs. Butte tendered redemption and upon the vendee's refusal,
judicially consigned the price of P500,000.00 on January 15,
1959. The latter date was the last one of the thirty days allowed
by the Code for the redemption, counted by excluding December
16, 1958 and including January 15, 1959, pursuant to Article 13 of
the Civil Code. Therefore, the redemption was made in due time.
The date of receipt of the vendor's notice by the Administrator
Bank (December 15) can not be counted as determining the start
of thirty days; for the Administrator of the estate was not a proper
redemptioner, since, as previously shown, the right to redeem the
share of Marie Garnier did not form part of the estate of Jose V.
Ramirez.
We find no jurisdiction for appellant's claim that the P500,000,00.
paid by Uy & Sons, Inc. for the Garnier share is grossly
excessive. Gross excess cannot be predicated on mere individual
estimates of market price by a single realtor.

12
The redemption and consignation having been properly made,
the Uy counterclaim for damages and attorney's fees predicated
on the assumption that plaintiff's action was clearly unfounded,
becomes untenable.
PREMISES CONSIDERED, the judgment appealed from is
hereby reversed and set aside, and another one entered:
(a) Declaring the consignation of P500,000,00 made by
appellant Angela M. Butte duly and properly made;
(b) Declaring that said appellant properly exercised in due
time the legal redemption of the one-sixth (1/6) undivided
portion of the land covered by Certificate of Title No.
59363 of the Office of the Register of Deeds of the City of
Manila, sold on December 9, 1958 by Marie Garnier Vda.
de Ramirez to appellant Manuel Uy & Sons, Inc.
(c) Ordering appellant Manuel Uy & Sons, Inc. to accept
the consigned price and to convey to Angela M. Butte the
undivided portion above referred to, within 30 days from
the time our decision becomes final, and subsequently to
account for the rentals and fruits of the redeemed share
from and after January 15, 1958, until its conveyance;
and.
(d) Ordering the return of the records to the court of origin
for further proceedings conformable to this opinion.
Without finding as to costs.
Bengzon, C.J., Padilla, Bautista Angelo, Labrador, Concepcion,
Barrera and Dizon, JJ., concur.
Paredes and De Leon, JJ., took no part.

13
FIRST DIVISION

G.R. No. L-52179

April 8, 1991

MUNICIPALITY OF SAN FERNANDO, LA UNION, petitioner

vs.
HON. JUDGE ROMEO N. FIRME, JUANA RIMANDO-BANIA,
IAUREANO BANIA, JR., SOR MARIETA BANIA, MONTANO
BANIA, ORJA BANIA, AND LYDIA R. BANIA, respondents.
Mauro C. Cabading, Jr. for petitioner.
Simeon G. Hipol for private respondent.
MEDIALDEA, J.:
This is a petition for certiorari with prayer for the issuance of a writ of
preliminary mandatory injunction seeking the nullification or
modification of the proceedings and the orders issued by the
respondent Judge Romeo N. Firme, in his capacity as the presiding
judge of the Court of First Instance of La Union, Second Judicial
District, Branch IV, Bauang, La Union in Civil Case No. 107-BG,
entitled "Juana Rimando Bania, et al. vs. Macario Nieveras, et al."
dated November 4, 1975; July 13, 1976; August 23,1976; February
23, 1977; March 16, 1977; July 26, 1979; September 7, 1979;
November 7, 1979 and December 3, 1979 and the decision dated
October 10, 1979 ordering defendants Municipality of San Fernando,
La Union and Alfredo Bislig to pay, jointly and severally, the plaintiffs
for funeral expenses, actual damages consisting of the loss of
earning capacity of the deceased, attorney's fees and costs of suit
and dismissing the complaint against the Estate of Macario Nieveras
and Bernardo Balagot.

Republic of the Philippines. Respondent Honorable Judge Romeo N.

Firme is impleaded in his official capacity as the presiding judge of
the Court of First Instance of La Union, Branch IV, Bauang, La Union.
While private respondents Juana Rimando-Bania, Laureano
Bania, Jr., Sor Marietta Bania, Montano Bania, Orja Bania and
Lydia R. Bania are heirs of the deceased Laureano Bania Sr. and
plaintiffs in Civil Case No. 107-Bg before the aforesaid court.
At about 7 o'clock in the morning of December 16, 1965, a collision
occurred involving a passenger jeepney driven by Bernardo Balagot
and owned by the Estate of Macario Nieveras, a gravel and sand
truck driven by Jose Manandeg and owned by Tanquilino Velasquez
and a dump truck of the Municipality of San Fernando, La Union and
driven by Alfredo Bislig. Due to the impact, several passengers of the
jeepney including Laureano Bania Sr. died as a result of the injuries
they sustained and four (4) others suffered varying degrees of
physical injuries.
On December 11, 1966, the private respondents instituted a
compliant for damages against the Estate of Macario Nieveras and
Bernardo Balagot, owner and driver, respectively, of the passenger
jeepney, which was docketed Civil Case No. 2183 in the Court of
First Instance of La Union, Branch I, San Fernando, La Union.
However, the aforesaid defendants filed a Third Party Complaint
against the petitioner and the driver of a dump truck of petitioner.

The antecedent facts are as follows:

Thereafter, the case was subsequently transferred to Branch IV,

presided over by respondent judge and was subsequently docketed
as Civil Case No. 107-Bg. By virtue of a court order dated May 7,
1975, the private respondents amended the complaint wherein the
petitioner and its regular employee, Alfredo Bislig were impleaded for
the first time as defendants. Petitioner filed its answer and raised
affirmative defenses such as lack of cause of action, non-suability of
the State, prescription of cause of action and the negligence of the
owner and driver of the passenger jeepney as the proximate cause
of the collision.

Petitioner Municipality of San Fernando, La Union is a municipal

corporation existing under and in accordance with the laws of the

In the course of the proceedings, the respondent judge issued the

following questioned orders, to wit:

14
(1) Order dated November 4, 1975 dismissing the crossclaim against Bernardo Balagot;
(2) Order dated July 13, 1976 admitting the Amended
Answer of the Municipality of San Fernando, La Union and
Bislig and setting the hearing on the affirmative defenses
only with respect to the supposed lack of jurisdiction;

expected earnings of the late Laureano Bania Sr.,

P30,000.00 as moral damages, and P2,500.00 as attorney's
fees. Costs against said defendants.
The Complaint is dismissed as to defendants Estate of
Macario Nieveras and Bernardo Balagot.
SO ORDERED. (Rollo, p. 30)

(3) Order dated August 23, 1976 deferring there resolution of

the grounds for the Motion to Dismiss until the trial;
(4) Order dated February 23, 1977 denying the motion for
reconsideration of the order of July 13, 1976 filed by the
Municipality and Bislig for having been filed out of time;
(5) Order dated March 16, 1977 reiterating the denial of the
motion for reconsideration of the order of July 13, 1976;
(6) Order dated July 26, 1979 declaring the case deemed
submitted for decision it appearing that parties have not yet
submitted their respective memoranda despite the court's
direction; and
(7) Order dated September 7, 1979 denying the petitioner's
motion for reconsideration and/or order to recall prosecution
witnesses for cross examination.
On October 10, 1979 the trial court rendered a decision, the
dispositive portion is hereunder quoted as follows:
IN VIEW OF ALL OF (sic) THE FOREGOING, judgment is
hereby rendered for the plaintiffs, and defendants
Municipality of San Fernando, La Union and Alfredo Bislig
are ordered to pay jointly and severally, plaintiffs Juana
Rimando-Bania, Mrs. Priscilla B. Surell, Laureano Bania
Jr., Sor Marietta Bania, Mrs. Fe B. Soriano, Montano
Bania, Orja Bania and Lydia B. Bania the sums of
P1,500.00 as funeral expenses and P24,744.24 as the lost

Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration and for a new trial

without prejudice to another motion which was then pending.
However, respondent judge issued another order dated November 7,
1979 denying the motion for reconsideration of the order of
September 7, 1979 for having been filed out of time.
Finally, the respondent judge issued an order dated December 3,
1979 providing that if defendants municipality and Bislig further wish
to pursue the matter disposed of in the order of July 26, 1979, such
should be elevated to a higher court in accordance with the Rules of
Court. Hence, this petition.
Petitioner maintains that the respondent judge committed grave
abuse of discretion amounting to excess of jurisdiction in issuing the
aforesaid orders and in rendering a decision. Furthermore, petitioner
asserts that while appeal of the decision maybe available, the same
is not the speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law.
On the other hand, private respondents controvert the position of the
petitioner and allege that the petition is devoid of merit, utterly lacking
the good faith which is indispensable in a petition for certiorari and
prohibition. (Rollo, p. 42.) In addition, the private respondents stress
that petitioner has not considered that every court, including
respondent court, has the inherent power to amend and control its
process and orders so as to make them conformable to law and
justice. (Rollo, p. 43.)
The controversy boils down to the main issue of whether or not the
respondent court committed grave abuse of discretion when it

15
deferred and failed to resolve the defense of non-suability of the
State amounting to lack of jurisdiction in a motion to dismiss.
In the case at bar, the respondent judge deferred the resolution of
the defense of non-suability of the State amounting to lack of
jurisdiction until trial. However, said respondent judge failed to
resolve such defense, proceeded with the trial and thereafter
rendered a decision against the municipality and its driver.
The respondent judge did not commit grave abuse of discretion when
in the exercise of its judgment it arbitrarily failed to resolve the vital
issue of non-suability of the State in the guise of the municipality.
However, said judge acted in excess of his jurisdiction when in his
decision dated October 10, 1979 he held the municipality liable for
the quasi-delict committed by its regular employee.
The doctrine of non-suability of the State is expressly provided for in
Article XVI, Section 3 of the Constitution, to wit: "the State may not
be sued without its consent."
Stated in simple parlance, the general rule is that the State may not
be sued except when it gives consent to be sued. Consent takes the
form of express or implied consent.
Express consent may be embodied in a general law or a special law.
The standing consent of the State to be sued in case of money
claims involving liability arising from contracts is found in Act No.
3083. A special law may be passed to enable a person to sue the
government for an alleged quasi-delict, as in Merritt v. Government of
the Philippine Islands (34 Phil 311). (see United States of America v.
Guinto, G.R. No. 76607, February 26, 1990, 182 SCRA 644, 654.)
Consent is implied when the government enters into business
contracts, thereby descending to the level of the other contracting
party, and also when the State files a complaint, thus opening itself to
a counterclaim. (Ibid)
Municipal corporations, for example, like provinces and cities, are
agencies of the State when they are engaged in governmental

functions and therefore should enjoy the sovereign immunity from

suit. Nevertheless, they are subject to suit even in the performance
of such functions because their charter provided that they can sue
and be sued. (Cruz, Philippine Political Law, 1987 Edition, p. 39)
A distinction should first be made between suability and liability.
"Suability depends on the consent of the state to be sued, liability on
the applicable law and the established facts. The circumstance that a
state is suable does not necessarily mean that it is liable; on the
other hand, it can never be held liable if it does not first consent to be
sued. Liability is not conceded by the mere fact that the state has
allowed itself to be sued. When the state does waive its sovereign
immunity, it is only giving the plaintiff the chance to prove, if it can,
that the defendant is liable." (United States of America vs.
Guinto, supra, p. 659-660)
Anent the issue of whether or not the municipality is liable for the
torts committed by its employee, the test of liability of the municipality
depends on whether or not the driver, acting in behalf of the
municipality, is performing governmental or proprietary functions. As
emphasized in the case of Torio vs. Fontanilla (G. R. No. L-29993,
October 23, 1978. 85 SCRA 599, 606), the distinction of powers
becomes important for purposes of determining the liability of the
municipality for the acts of its agents which result in an injury to third
persons.
Another statement of the test is given in City of Kokomo vs. Loy,
decided by the Supreme Court of Indiana in 1916, thus:
Municipal corporations exist in a dual capacity, and their
functions are twofold. In one they exercise the right springing
from sovereignty, and while in the performance of the duties
pertaining thereto, their acts are political and governmental.
Their officers and agents in such capacity, though elected or
appointed by them, are nevertheless public functionaries
performing a public service, and as such they are officers,
agents, and servants of the state. In the other capacity the
municipalities exercise a private, proprietary or corporate
right, arising from their existence as legal persons and not as

16
public agencies. Their officers and agents in the performance
of such functions act in behalf of the municipalities in their
corporate or individual capacity, and not for the state or
sovereign power." (112 N.E., 994-995) (Ibid, pp. 605-606.)
It has already been remarked that municipal corporations are suable
because their charters grant them the competence to sue and be
sued. Nevertheless, they are generally not liable for torts committed
by them in the discharge of governmental functions and can be held
answerable only if it can be shown that they were acting in a
proprietary capacity. In permitting such entities to be sued, the State
merely gives the claimant the right to show that the defendant was
not acting in its governmental capacity when the injury was
committed or that the case comes under the exceptions recognized
by law. Failing this, the claimant cannot recover. (Cruz, supra, p. 44.)

All premises considered, the Court is convinced that the respondent

judge's dereliction in failing to resolve the issue of non-suability did
not amount to grave abuse of discretion. But said judge exceeded his
jurisdiction when it ruled on the issue of liability.
ACCORDINGLY, the petition is GRANTED and the decision of the
respondent court is hereby modified, absolving the petitioner
municipality of any liability in favor of private respondents.
SO ORDERED.
Narvasa, Cruz, Gancayco and Grio-Aquino, JJ., concur.

In the case at bar, the driver of the dump truck of the municipality
insists that "he was on his way to the Naguilian river to get a load of
sand and gravel for the repair of San Fernando's municipal streets."
(Rollo, p. 29.)
In the absence of any evidence to the contrary, the regularity of the
performance of official duty is presumed pursuant to Section 3(m) of
Rule 131 of the Revised Rules of Court. Hence, We rule that the
driver of the dump truck was performing duties or tasks pertaining to
his office.
We already stressed in the case of Palafox, et. al. vs. Province of
Ilocos Norte, the District Engineer, and the Provincial Treasurer (102
Phil 1186) that "the construction or maintenance of roads in which
the truck and the driver worked at the time of the accident are
admittedly governmental activities."
After a careful examination of existing laws and jurisprudence, We
arrive at the conclusion that the municipality cannot be held liable for
the torts committed by its regular employee, who was then engaged
in the discharge of governmental functions. Hence, the death of the
passenger tragic and deplorable though it may be imposed on
the municipality no duty to pay monetary compensation.

FIRST DIVISION
G.R. No. 159567

17

CORAZON CATALAN,
LIBRADA CATALAN-LIM,
EULOGIO CATALAN,
MILA CATALAN-MILAN,
ZENAIDA CATALAN,
ALEX CATALAN, DAISY
CATALAN, FLORIDA
CATALAN and GEMMA
CATALAN, Heirs of the late
FELICIANO CATALAN,
Petitioners,

Present:
PUNO, C.J., Chairperson,
SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ,
CORONA,
AZCUNA, and
GARCIA, JJ.

- versus JOSE BASA, MANUEL BASA,

LAURETA BASA, DELIA BASA,
JESUS BASA and ROSALINDA
BASA, Heirs of the late MERCEDES
CATALAN,
Respondents.
Promulgated:July 31, 2007
x----------------------------------x

On October 20, 1948, FELICIANO CATALAN (Feliciano)

was discharged from active military service. The Board of Medical
Officers of the Department of Veteran Affairs found that he was
unfit to render military service due to his schizophrenic reaction,
catatonic type, which incapacitates him because of flattening of
mood and affect, preoccupation with worries, withdrawal, and
sparce (sic) and pointless speech.[1]
On September 28, 1949, Feliciano married Corazon
Cerezo.[2]
On June 16, 1951, a document was executed, titled
Absolute Deed of Donation,[3] wherein Feliciano allegedly donated
to his sister MERCEDES CATALAN(Mercedes) one-half of the
real property described, viz:
A parcel of land located at Barangay
Basing, Binmaley, Pangasinan. Bounded on the
North by heirs of Felipe Basa; on the South
by Barrio Road; On the East by heirs of Segundo
Catalan; and on the West by Roman
Basa. Containing an area of Eight Hundred One
(801) square meters, more or less.

DECISION
PUNO, C.J.:
This is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of
the Revised Rules of Court of the Court of Appeals decision in
CA-G.R. CV No. 66073, which affirmed the judgment of the
Regional Trial Court, Branch 69, Lingayen, Pangasinan, in Civil
Case No. 17666, dismissing the Complaint for Declaration of
Nullity of Documents, Recovery of Possession and Ownership,
and damages.
The facts, which are undisputed by the parties, follow:

The donation was registered with the Register of

Deeds. The Bureau of Internal Revenue then cancelled Tax
Declaration No. 2876, and, in lieu thereof, issued Tax Declaration
No. 18080[4] to Mercedes for the 400.50 square meters donated
to her. The remaining half of the property remained in Felicianos
name under Tax Declaration No. 18081.[5]
On December 11, 1953, Peoples Bank and Trust
Company filed Special Proceedings No. 4563[6] before the Court
of First Instance of Pangasinan to declare Feliciano
incompetent. On December 22, 1953, the trial court issued its
Order for Adjudication of Incompetency for Appointing Guardian
for the Estate and Fixing Allowance[7] of Feliciano. The following

18
day, the trial court appointed Peoples Bank and Trust Company
as Felicianos guardian.[8] Peoples Bank and Trust Company has
been subsequently renamed, and is presently known as the Bank
of the Philippine Islands (BPI).
On November 22, 1978, Feliciano and Corazon Cerezo
donated Lots 1 and 3 of their property, registered under Original
Certificate of Title (OCT) No. 18920, to their son Eulogio Catalan.
[9]

On March 26, 1979, Mercedes sold the property in issue

in favor of her children Delia and Jesus Basa. [10] The Deed of
Absolute Sale was registered with the Register of Deeds of
Pangasinan on February 20, 1992, and Tax Declaration No.
12911 was issued in the name of respondents.[11]
On June 24, 1983, Feliciano and Corazon Cerezo
donated Lot 2 of the aforementioned property registered under
OCT No. 18920 to their children Alex Catalan, Librada Catalan
and Zenaida Catalan. On February 14, 1983, Feliciano and
Corazon Cerezo donated Lot 4 (Plan Psu-215956) of the same
OCT No. 18920 to Eulogio and Florida Catalan.[12]
On April 1, 1997, BPI, acting as Felicianos guardian, filed
a case for Declaration of Nullity of Documents, Recovery of
Possession and Ownership,[13] as well as damages against the
herein respondents. BPI alleged that the Deed of Absolute
Donation to Mercedes was void ab initio, as Feliciano never
donated the property to Mercedes. In addition, BPI averred that
even if Feliciano had truly intended to give the property to her, the
donation would still be void, as he was not of sound mind and
was therefore incapable of giving valid consent. Thus, it claimed
that if the Deed of Absolute Donation was void ab initio, the
subsequent Deed of Absolute Sale to Delia and Jesus Basa
should likewise be nullified, for Mercedes Catalan had no right to
sell the property to anyone. BPI raised doubts about the
authenticity of the deed of sale, saying that its registration long
after the death of Mercedes Catalan indicated fraud. Thus, BPI

sought remuneration
expenses.

for

incurred

damages

and

litigation

On August 14, 1997, Feliciano passed away. The original

complaint was amended to substitute his heirs in lieu of BPI as
complainants in Civil Case No. 17666.
On December 7, 1999, the trial court found that the
evidence presented by the complainants was insufficient to
overcome the presumption that Feliciano was sane and
competent at the time he executed the deed of donation in favor
of Mercedes Catalan. Thus, the court declared, the presumption
of sanity or competency not having been duly impugned, the
presumption of due execution of the donation in question must be
upheld.[14] It rendered judgment, viz:
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing
considerations, judgment is hereby rendered:
1.

Dismissing plaintiffs complaint;

2.

Declaring the defendants Jesus

Basa and Delia Basa the lawful
owners of the land in question which is
now declared in their names under Tax
Declaration No. 12911 (Exhibit 4);

3.

Ordering the plaintiff to pay the

defendants
Attorneys
fees
of P10,000.00, and to pay the Costs.
(sic)

SO ORDERED.[15]
Petitioners challenged the trial courts decision before the
Court of Appeals via a Notice of Appeal pursuant to Rule 41 of the
Revised Rules of Court.[16] The appellate court affirmed the
decision of the trial court and held, viz:

19
In sum, the Regional Trial Court did not
commit a reversible error in disposing that
plaintiff-appellants failed to prove the insanity or
mental incapacity of late (sic) Feliciano Catalan at
the precise moment when the property in dispute
was donated.
Thus, all the elements for validity of
contracts having been present in the 1951
donation coupled with compliance with certain
solemnities required by the Civil Code indonation
inter vivos of real property under Article 749,
which provides:

SCRA 450). In a similar vein, jurisprudence has it

that documents acknowledged before a notary
public have in their favor the presumption of
regularity, and to contradict the same, there must
be evidence that is clear, convincing and more
than preponderant (Salame vs. CA, 239 SCRA
256).
WHEREFORE,
foregoing
premises
considered, the Decision dated December 7,
1999 of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 69, is
hereby affirmed.
SO ORDERED.[17]

xxx
Mercedes Catalan acquired valid title of
ownership over the property in dispute. By virtue
of her ownership, the property is completely
subjected to her will in everything not prohibited
by law of the concurrence with the rights of others
(Art. 428, NCC).
The validity of the subsequent sale
dated 26 March 1979 (Exhibit 3, appellees Folder
of Exhibits) of the property by Mercedes Catalan
to defendant-appellees Jesus Basa and Delia
Basa must be upheld. Nothing of the infirmities
which allegedly flawed its authenticity is evident
much less apparent in the deed itself or from the
evidence adduced. As correctly stated by the
RTC, the fact that the Deed of Absolute Sale was
registered only in 1992, after the death of
Mercedes Catalan does not make the sale void ab
initio. Moreover, as a notarized document, the
deed of absolute sale carries the evidentiary
weight conferred upon such public document with
respect to its due execution (Garrido vs. CA 236

Thus, petitioners filed the present appeal and raised the

following issues:
1. WHETHER OR NOT THE HONORABLE
COURT OF APPEALS HAS DECIDED CAG.R. CV NO. 66073 IN A WAY PROBABLY
NOT IN ACCORD WITH LAW OR WITH THE
APPLICABLE
DECISIONS
OF
THE
HONORABLE COURT IN HOLDING THAT
THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT DID NOT
COMMIT A REVERSIBLE ERROR IN
DISPOSING THAT PLAINTIFF-APPELLANTS
(PETITIONERS) FAILED TO PROVE THE
INSANITY OR MENTAL INCAPACITY OF
THE LATE FELICIANO CATALAN AT THE
PRECISE MOMENT WHEN THE PROPERTY
IN DISPUTE WAS DONATED;
2. WHETHER OR NOT THE CERTIFICATE OF
DISABILITY FOR DISCHARGE (EXHIBIT S)
AND THE REPORT OF A BOARD OF
OFFICERS CONVENED UNDER THE
PROVISIONS OF ARMY REGULATIONS

20
(EXHIBITS S-1 AND S-2) ARE ADMISSIBLE
IN EVIDENCE;
3.

WHETHER OR NOT THE HONORABLE

COURT OF APPEALS HAS DECIDED CAG.R. CV NO. 66073 IN A WAY PROBABLY
NOT IN ACCORD WITH LAW OR WITH THE
APPLICABLE
DECISIONS
OF
THE
HONORABLE COURT IN UPHOLDING THE
SUBSEQUENT SALE OF THE PROPERTY
IN DISPUTE BY THE DONEE MERCEDES
CATALAN
TO
HER
CHILDREN
RESPONDENTS JESUS AND DELIA BASA;
AND-

4. WHETHER OR NOT CIVIL CASE NO. 17666

IS BARRED BY PRESCRIPTION AND
LACHES.[18]
Petitioners aver that the presumption of Felicianos
competence to donate property to Mercedes had been rebutted
because they presented more than the requisite preponderance
of evidence. First, they presented the Certificate of Disability for
the Discharge of Feliciano Catalan issued on October 20,
1948 by the Board of Medical Officers of the Department of
Veteran Affairs. Second, they proved that on December 22, 1953,
Feliciano was judged an incompetent by the Court of First
Instance of Pangasinan, and put under the guardianship of
BPI. Based on these two pieces of evidence, petitioners conclude
that Feliciano had been suffering from a mental condition since
1948 which incapacitated him from entering into any contract
thereafter, until his death on August 14, 1997. Petitioners contend
that Felicianos marriage to Corazon Cerezo on September 28,
1948 does not prove that he was not insane at the time he made
the questioned donation. They further argue that the donations
Feliciano executed in favor of his successors (Decision, CA-G.R.
CV No. 66073) also cannot prove his competency because these
donations were approved and confirmed in the guardianship

proceedings.[19] In addition, petitioners claim that the Deed of

Absolute Sale executed on March 26, 1979 by Mercedes Catalan
and her children Jesus and Delia Basa is simulated and
fictitious. This is allegedly borne out by the fact that the document
was registered only on February 20, 1992, more that 10 years
after Mercedes Catalan had already died. Since Delia Basa and
Jesus Basa both knew that Feliciano was incompetent to enter
into any contract, they cannot claim to be innocent purchasers of
the property in question. [20] Lastly, petitioners assert that their
case is not barred by prescription or laches under Article 1391 of
the New Civil Code because they had filed their case on April 1,
1997, even before the four year period after Felicianos death
on August 14, 1997 had begun.[21]
The petition is bereft of merit, and we affirm the findings of
the Court of Appeals and the trial court.
A donation is an act of liberality whereby a person
disposes gratuitously a thing or right in favor of another, who
accepts it.[22] Like any other contract, an agreement of the parties
is essential. Consent in contracts presupposes the following
requisites: (1) it should be intelligent or with an exact notion of the
matter to which it refers; (2) it should be free; and (3) it should be
spontaneous.[23] The parties' intention must be clear and the
attendance of a vice of consent, like any contract, renders the
donation voidable.[24]
In order for donation of property to be valid, what is
crucial is the donors capacity to give consent at the time of the
donation. Certainly, there lies no doubt in the fact that insanity
impinges on consent freely given.[25] However, the burden of
proving such incapacity rests upon the person who alleges it; if no
sufficient proof to this effect is presented, capacity will be
presumed.[26]
A thorough perusal of the records of the case at bar
indubitably shows that the evidence presented by the petitioners
was insufficient to overcome the presumption that Feliciano was

21
competent when he donated the property in question to
Mercedes. Petitioners make much ado of the fact that, as early as
1948, Feliciano had been found to be suffering from
schizophrenia by the Board of Medical Officers of the Department
of Veteran Affairs. By itself, however, the allegation cannot prove
the incompetence of Feliciano.
A study of the nature of schizophrenia will show that
Feliciano could still be presumed capable of attending to his
property rights. Schizophrenia was brought to the attention of the
public when, in the late 1800s, Emil Kraepelin, a German
psychiatrist, combined hebrephrenia and catatonia with certain
paranoid states and called the condition dementia
praecox. Eugene Bleuler, a Swiss psychiatrist, modified
Kraepelins conception in the early 1900s to include cases with a
better outlook and in 1911 renamed the condition
schizophrenia. According to medical references, in persons with
schizophrenia, there is a gradual onset of symptoms, with
symptoms becoming increasingly bizarre as the disease
progresses. The condition improves (remission or residual stage)
and worsens (relapses) in cycles. Sometimes, sufferers may
appear relatively normal, while other patients in remission may
appear strange because they speak in a monotone, have odd
speech habits, appear to have no emotional feelings and are
prone to have ideas of reference. The latter refers to the idea that
random social behaviors are directed against the sufferers. [27] It
has been proven that the administration of the correct medicine
helps the patient. Antipsychotic medications help bring
biochemical
imbalances
closer
to
normal
in
a
schizophrenic. Medications reduce delusions, hallucinations and
incoherent thoughts and reduce or eliminate chances of relapse.
[28]
Schizophrenia can result in a dementing illness similar in many
aspects to Alzheimers disease. However, the illness will wax and
wane over many years, with only very slow deterioration of
intellect.[29]
From these scientific studies it can be deduced that a
person suffering from schizophrenia does not necessarily lose his

competence to intelligently dispose his property. By merely

alleging the existence of schizophrenia, petitioners failed to show
substantial proof that at the date of the donation, June 16, 1951,
Feliciano Catalan had lost total control of his mental faculties.
Thus, the lower courts correctly held that Feliciano was of sound
mind at that time and that this condition continued to exist until
proof to the contrary was adduced. [30] Sufficient proof of his
infirmity to give consent to contracts was only established when
the Court of First Instance of Pangasinan declared him an
incompetent on December 22, 1953.[31]
It is interesting to note that the petitioners questioned
Felicianos capacity at the time he donated the property, yet did
not see fit to question his mental competence when he entered
into a contract of marriage with Corazon Cerezo or when he
executed deeds of donation of his other properties in their
favor. The presumption that Feliciano remained competent to
execute contracts, despite his illness, is bolstered by the
existence of these other contracts. Competency and freedom
from undue influence, shown to have existed in the other acts
done or contracts executed, are presumed to continue until the
contrary is shown.[32]
Needless to state, since the donation was valid, Mercedes
had the right to sell the property to whomever she chose. [33] Not a
shred of evidence has been presented to prove the claim that
Mercedes sale of the property to her children was tainted with
fraud or falsehood. It is of little bearing that the Deed of Sale was
registered only after the death of Mercedes. What is material is
that the sale of the property to Delia and Jesus Basa was legal
and binding at the time of its execution. Thus, the property in
question belongs to Delia and Jesus Basa.
Finally, we note that the petitioners raised the issue of
prescription and laches for the first time on appeal before this
Court. It is sufficient for this Court to note that even if the present
appeal had prospered, the Deed of Donation was still a voidable,

22
not a void, contract. As such, it remained binding as it was not
annulled in a proper action in court within four years.[34]
IN VIEW WHEREOF, there being no merit in the
arguments of the petitioners, the petition is DENIED. The decision
of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 66073 is affirmed in
toto.
SO ORDERED.
[1]

Exhibit S, Original Records, p. 112.

Exhibit 11, Folder of Exhibits for Defendants.
[3]
Exhibit A and 1, rollo, p. 59.
[4]
Exhibit P, Folder of Exhibits for Plaintiffs-Appellants, p. 24.
[5]
Exhibit O, id. at 23.
[6]
Exhibit G, id. at 8.
[7]
Exhibit H, rollo, p. 57.
[8]
Exhibit I, Folder of Exhibits for Plaintiffs-Appellants, p. 10.
[9]
Exhibit N-2, id. at 18.
[10]
Exhibit B, rollo, p. 60.
[11]
Exhibit R and Exhibit 4, Folder of Exhibits for Plaintiffs-Appellants, p.
26.
[12]
Supra note 9.
[13]
Civil Case No. 17666.
[14]
Rollo, p. 44.
[15]
Id. at 3.
[16]
Docketed as CA-G.R. CV No. 66073.
[17]
Rollo, pp. 40-42.
[18]
Id. at 4.
[19]
Id. at 10.
[20]
Id. at 12.
[21]
Article 1391. The action for annulment shall be brought within four
years. This period shall begin: In cases of intimidation, violence or
undue influence, from the time the defect of the consent ceases.
In case of mistake or fraud, from the time of the discovery
of the same.
And when the action refers to contracts entered into by
minors or other incapacitated persons, from the time the
guardianship ceases.
[22]
CIVIL CODE, Art. 725.
[2]

[23]

Lim, Jr. v. San, G.R. No. 159723, September 9, 2004, 438 SCRA 102,
106-107.
[24]
Vitug, Civil Law Annotated, Vol. II, 2003 edition, p. 149, citing Espino
v. Spouses Vicente. G.R. No. 168396, June 22, 2006, 492 SCRA
330.
See also Article 1330 of the New Civil Code:
ARTICLE 1330. A contract where consent is given through mistake,
violence, intimidation, undue influence, or fraud is voidable.
[25]
See CIVIL CODE, Art. 1327 (2) in relation to Art. 1318 (1).
[26]
Miguela Carillo v. Justimiano Jaojoco, 46 Phil 957, 960
(1924), Vitalista, et al. v. Perez, et al., G.R. No. 164147, June 16,
2006, 491 SCRA 127.
[27] Kahn, Ada P. and Fawcett, Jan. The Encyclopedia of Mental
Health. New York, 1993, p. 326.
[28]
Id. at 327.
[29]
Samuels, Martin A., ed. Manual of Neurologic Therapeutics With
Essentials of Diagnosis, Third Edition. Boston/Toronto, Little,
Brown and Company, 1986, p. 49.
[30]
Mendozana, et al. v. Ozamiz et al., G.R. No. 143370, February 6, 2002,
376 SCRA 482, citing 29 Am Jur 2d Evidence 295; Norwood v.
Norwood, 207 Ga 148, 60 SE2d 449.
[31]
Exhibit H, rollo, p. 57.
[32]
Supra note 30, citing Blochowitz v. Blochowitz, 122 Neb 385, 240 NW
586, 82 ALR 949.
[33]
Article 428 of the New Civil Code. The owner has the right to enjoy
and dispose of a thing, without other limitations than those
established by law.
The owner has also a right of action against the holder and
possessor of the thing in order to recover it.
[34]
CIVIL CODE, Art. 1390. The following contracts are voidable or
annullable, even though there may have been no damage to the
contracting parties:
(1) Those where one of the parties is incapable of giving consent to a
contract;
(2) Those where the consent is vitiated by mistake, violence, intimidation,
undue influence or fraud.
These contracts are binding, unless they are annulled by a proper action in
court. They are susceptible of ratification.
Art. 1391. The action for annulment shall be brought within four years xxx.

23
G.R. No. L-11872

December 1, 1917

This is an appeal by bill of exceptions, filed by the counsel for the

plaintiffs from the judgment of September 22, 1914, in which the
judge of the Seventh Judicial District dismissed the complaint
filed by the plaintiffs and ordered them to keep perpetual silence
in regard to the litigated land, and to pay the costs of the suit.

and fraudulently succeeded in getting the plaintiffs Domingo and

Josefa Mercado to sign a deed of sale of the land left by their
mother, for the sum of P400, which amount was divided among
the two plaintiffs and their sisters Concepcion and Paz,
notwithstanding the fact that said land, according to its
assessment, was valued at P3,795; that one-half of the land in
question belonged to Margarita Espiritu, and one-half of this
share, that is, one-fourth of said land , to the plaintiffs, and the
other one-fourth, to their two sisters Concepcion and Paz; that the
part of the land belonging to the two plaintiffs could produce 180
cavanes of rice per annum, at P2.50 per cavan, was equivalent to
P450 per annum; and that Luis Espiritu had received said
products from 1901 until the time of his death. Said counsel
therefore asked that judgment be rendered in plaintiffs' favor by
holding to be null and void the sale they made of their respective
shares of their land, to Luis Espiritu, and that the defendant be
ordered to deliver and restore to the plaintiffs the shares of the
land that fell to the latter in the partition of the estate of their
deceased mother Margarita Espiritu, together with the products
thereof, uncollected since 1901, or their equivalent, to wit, P450
per annum, and to pay the costs of the suit.

By a complaint dated April 9, 1913, counsel for Domingo and

Josefa Mercado brought suit in the Court of First Instance of
Bulacan, against Luis Espiritu, but, as the latter died soon
thereafter, the complaint was amended by being directed against
Jose Espiritu in his capacity of his administrator of the estate of
the deceased Luis Espiritu. The plaintiffs alleged that they and
their sisters Concepcion and Paz, all surnamed Mercado, were
the children and sole heirs of Margarita Espiritu, a sister of the
deceased Luis Espiritu; that Margarita Espiritu died in 1897,
leaving as her paraphernal property a tract of land of 48 hectares
in area situated in the barrio of Panducot, municipality of
Calumpit, Bulacan, and bounded as described in paragraph 4 of
the amended complaint, which hereditary portion had since then
been held by the plaintiffs and their sisters, through their father
Wenceslao Mercado, husband of Margarita Espiritu; that, about
the year 1910, said Luis Espiritu, by means of cajolery, induced,

In due season the defendant administrator answered the

aforementioned complaint, denying each and all of the allegations
therein contained, and in special defense alleged that the land,
the subject-matter of the complaint, had an area of only 21
cavanes of seed rice; that, on May 25, 1894, its owner, the
deceased Margarita Espiritu y Yutoc, the plaintiffs' mother, with
the due authorization of her husband Wenceslao Mercado y
Arnedo Cruz sold to Luis Espiritu for the sum of P2,000 a portion
of said land, to wit, an area such as is usually required for fifteen
cavanes of seed; that subsequently, on May 14, 1901, Wenceslao
Mercado y Arnedo Cruz, the plaintiffs' father, in his capacity as
administrator of the property of his children sold under pacto de
retro to the same Luis Espiritu at the price of P375 the remainder
of the said land, to wit, an area covered by six cavanes of seed to
meet the expenses of the maintenance of his (Wenceslao's)
children, and this amount being still insufficient the successively

DOMINGO MERCADO and JOSEFA MERCADO, plaintiffsappellants,

vs.
JOSE ESPIRITU, administrator of the estate of the deceased
Luis Espiritu, defendant-appellee.
Perfecto Salas Rodriguez for appellants.
Vicente Foz for appellee.

TORRES, J.:

24
borrowed from said Luis Espiritu other sums of money
aggregating a total of P600; but that later, on May 17,1910, the
plaintiffs, alleging themselves to be of legal age, executed, with
their sisters Maria del Consejo and Maria dela Paz, the notarial
instrument inserted integrally in the 5th paragraph of the answer,
by which instrument, ratifying said sale under pacto de retro of
the land that had belonged to their mother Margarita Espiritu,
effected by their father Wenceslao Mercado in favor of Luis
Espiritu for the sum of P2,600, they sold absolutely and
perpetually to said Luis Espiritu, in consideration of P400, the
property that had belonged to their deceased mother and which
they acknowledged having received from the aforementioned
purchaser. In this cross-complaint the defendant alleged that the
complaint filed by the plaintiffs was unfounded and malicious, and
that thereby losses and damages in the sum of P1,000 had been
caused to the intestate estate of the said Luis Espiritu. He
therefore asked that judgment be rendered by ordering the
plaintiffs to keep perpetual silence with respect to the land in
litigation and, besides, to pay said intestate estate P1,000 for
losses and damages, and that the costs of the trial be charged
against them.

As the plaintiffs assailed the validity of the deed of sale, Exhibit 3,

executed by them on May 17, 1910, on the ground that they were
minors when they executed it, the questions submitted to the
decision of this court consist in determining whether it is true that
the plaintiffs were then minors and therefore incapable of selling
their property on the date borne by the instrument Exhibit 3; and
in case they then were such, whether a person who is really and
truly a minor and, notwithstanding, attests that he is of legal age,
can, after the execution of the deed and within legal period, ask
for the annulment of the instrument executed by him, because of
some defect that invalidates the contract, in accordance with the
law (Civ. Code, arts. 1263 and 1300), so that he may obtain the
restitution of the land sold.

In reply to the cross-complaint, the plaintiffs denied each and all

of the facts therein set forth, and in special defense alleged that
at the time of the execution of the deed of sale inserted in the
cross-complaint the plaintiffs were still minors, and that since they
reached their majority the four years fixed by law for the
annulment of said contract had not yet elapsed. They therefore
asked that they be absolved from the defendant's crosscomplaint.

The records shows it to have been fully proven that in 1891 Lucas
Espiritu obtained title by composition with the State, to three
parcels of land, adjoining each other, in the sitio of Panducot of
the pueblo of Calumpit, Bulacan, containing altogether an area of
75 hectares, 25 ares, and 59 centares, which facts appear in the
title Exhibit D; that, upon Luis Espiritu's death, his said lands
passed by inheritance to his four children named Victoria, Ines,
Margarita, and Luis; and that, in the partition of said decedent's
estate, the parcel of land described in the complaint as containing
forty-seven and odd hectares was allotted to the brother and
sister Luis and Margarita, in equal shares. Margarita Espiritu,
married to Wenceslao Mercado y Ardeno Cruz, had by this
husband five children, Maria Consejo, Maria de la Paz, Domingo,
Josefa, and Amalia, all surnamed Mercado y Espiritu, who, at the
death of their mother in 1896 inherited, by operation of law, onehalf of the land described in the complaint.

After trial and the introduction of evidence by both parties, the

court rendered the judgment aforementioned, to which the
plaintiffs excepted and in writing moved for a reopening of the
case and a new trial. This motion was overruled, exception was
taken by the petitioners, and the proper bill of exceptions having
been presented, the same was approved and transmitted to the
clerk of this court.

The plaintiffs' petition for annulment of the sale and the

consequent restitution to them of two-fourths of the land left by
their mother, that is, of one-fourth of all the land described in the
complaint, and which, they stated, amounts to 11 hectares, 86
ares and 37 centares. To this claim the defendant excepted,
alleging that the land in question comprised only an area such as
is customarily covered by 21 cavanes of seed.

25
It was also duly proven that, by a notarial instrument of May 25,
1894, the plaintiffs' mother conveyed by actual and absolute sale
for the sum of P2,000, to her brother Luis Espiritu a portion of the
land now on litigation, or an area such as is usually covered by
about 15 cavanes of seed; and that, on account of the loss of the
original of said instrument, which was on the possession of the
purchaser Luis Espiritu, and furthermore because, during the
revolution, the protocols or registers of public documents of the
Province of Bulacan were burned, Wenceslao Mercado y Arnedo
Cruz, the widower of the vendor and father of the plaintiffs,
executed, at the instance of the interested party Luis Espiritu, the
notarial instrument Exhibit 1, of the date of May 20, 1901, in his
own name and those of his minor children Maria Consejo, Maria
de la Paz, Domingo, Josefa, and Amalia, and therein set forth that
it was true that the sale of said portion of land had been made by
his aforementioned wife, then deceased, to Luis Espiritu in 1894.
However, even prior to said date, to wit, on May 14th of the same
year, 1901, the widower Wenceslao Mercado, according to the
private document Exhibit 2, pledged or mortgaged to the same
man, Luis Espiritu, for P375, a part, or an area covered by six
cavanes of seed, of the land that had belonged to this vendor's
deceased wife, to the said Luis Espiritu and which now forms a
part of the land in question a transaction which Mercado was
obliged to make in order to obtain funds with which "to cover his
children's needs." Wenceslao Mercado, the plaintiffs' father,
having died, about the year 1904, the plaintiffs Domingo and
Josefa Mercado, together with their sisters Consejo and Paz,
declaring themselves to be of legal age and in possession of the
required legal status to contract, executed and subscribed before
a notary the document Exhibit 3, on May 17, 1910, in which
referring to the previous sale of the land, effected by their
deceased mother for the sum of P2,600 and with her husband's
permission and authorization, they sold absolutely and in
perpetuity to Luis Espiritu, for the sum of P400 "as an increase" of
the previous purchase price, the land described in said instrument
and situated in Panducot, pueblo of Calumpit, Bulacan, of an area
equal to that usually sown with 21 cavanes of seed bounded on

the north by the lands of Flaviano Abreu and the heirs of Pedro
Espiritu, on the east by those of Victoria Espiritu and Ines
Espiritu, on the south by those of Luis Espiritu, and on the west
by those of Hermogenes Tan-Toco and by the Sapang-Maitu
stream.
In this status of the case the plaintiffs seek the annulment of the
deed Exhibit 3, on the ground that on the date of its execution
they were minors without legal capacity to contract, and for the
further reason that the deceased purchaser Luis Espiritu availed
himself of deceit and fraud in obtaining their consent for the
execution of said deed.
As it was proven by the testimony of the clerk of the parochial
church of Apalit (plaintiffs were born in Apalit) that the baptismal
register books of that parish pertaining to the years 1890-1891,
were lost or burned, the witness Maria Consejo Mercado
recognized and identified the book Exhibit A, which she testified
had been kept and taken care of by her deceased father
Wenceslao Mercado, pages 396 and 397 of which bear the
attestation that the plaintiff Domingo Mercado was born on August
4, 1890, and Josefa Mercado, on July 14, 1891. Furthermore, this
witness corroborated the averment of the plaintiffs' minority, by
the personal registration certificate of said Domingo Mercado, of
the year 1914, Exhibit C, by which it appears that in 1910 he was
only 23 years old, whereby it would also be appear that Josefa
Mercado was 22 years of age in 1910, and therefore, on May
17,1910, when the instrument of purchase and sale, Exhibit 3,
was executed, the plaintiffs must have been, respectively, 19 and
18 years of age.
The witness Maria Consejo Mercado also testified that after her
father's death her brother and sisters removed to Manila to live
there, although her brother Domingo used to reside with his uncle
Luis Espiritu, who took charge of the administration of the
property left by his predecessors in interest; that it was her uncle
Luis who got for her brother Domingo the other cedula, Exhibit B,
pertaining to the year 1910, where in it appears that the latter was

26
then already 23 years of age; that she did not know why her uncle
did so; that she and her brother and sisters merely signed the
deed of May 17, 1910; and that her father Wenceslao Mercado,
prior to his death had pledged the land to her uncle Luis Espiritu.
The witness Ines Espiritu testified that after the death of the
plaintiffs' father, it was Luis Espiritu who directed the cultivation of
the land in litigation. This testimony was corroborated by her
sister Victoria Espiritu, who added that her nephew, the plaintiff
Domingo, had lived for some time, she did not know just how
long, under the control of Luis Espiritu.

Antonio Espiritu, 60 years of age, who knew Lucas Espiritu and

the properties owned by the latter, testified that Espiritu's land
contained an area of 84 cavanes, and after its owner's death, was
under witness' administration during to harvest two harvest
seasons; that the products yielded by a portion of this land, to wit,
an area such as is sown by about 15 cavanes of seed, had been,
since 1894, utilized by Luis Espiritu, by reason of his having
acquired the land; and that, after Margarita Espiritu's death, her
husband Wenceslao Mercado took possession of another portion
of the land, containing an area of six cavanes of seed and which
had been left by this deceased, and that he held same until 1901,
when he conveyed it to Luis Espiritu.
lawphi1.net

Roque Galang, married to a sister of Luis Espiritu, stated that the

land that fell to his wife and to his sister-in-law Victoria, and which
had an area of about 8 hectares less than that of the land allotted
to the aforementioned Luis and Margarita produced for his wife
and his sister-in-law Victoria a net and minimum yield of 507
cavanes in 1907, in spite of its being high land and of inferior
quality, as compared with the land in dispute, and that its yield
was still larger in 1914, when the said two sisters' share was 764
cavanes.

The defendant-administrator, Jose Espiritu, son of the deceased

Luis Espiritu, testified that the plaintiff Domingo Mercado used to
live off and on in the house of his deceased father, about the year
1909 or 1910, and used to go back and forth between his father's
house and those of his other relatives. He denied that his father
had at any time administered the property belonging to the
Mercado brother and sisters.

Patricio Tanjucto, the notary before whom the deed Exhibit 3 was
ratified, was a witness for the defendant. He testified that this
deed was drawn up by him at the request of the plaintiff Josefa
Mercado; that the grantors of the instrument assured him that
they were all of legal age; that said document was signed by the
plaintiffs and the other contracting parties, after it had been read
to them and had been translated into the Pampangan dialect for
those of them who did not understand Spanish. On crossexamination, witness added that ever since he was 18 years of
age and began to court, he had known the plaintiff Josefa
Mercado, who was then a young maiden, although she had not
yet commenced to attend social gatherings, and that all this took
place about the year 1898, for witness said that he was then [at
the time of his testimony, 1914,] 34 years of age.

In rebuttal, Antonio Mercado, a cousin of Wenceslao, father of the

plaintiffs, testified that he mediate in several transactions in
connection with a piece of land belonging to Margarita Espiritu.
When shown the deed of purchase and sale Exhibit 1, he stated
that he was not acquainted with its contents. This same witness
also testified that he mediated in a transaction had between
Wenceslao Mercado and Luis Espiritu (he did not remember the
year), in which the former sold to the latter a parcel of land
situated in Panducot. He stated that as he was a witness of the
deed of sale he could identify this instrument were it exhibited to
him; but he did not do so, for no instrument whatever was
presented to him for identification. The transaction mentioned
must have concerned either the ratification of the sale of the land
of 15 cavanes, in 1901, attested in Exhibit 1, or the mortgage or
pledge of the other parcel of 6 cavanes, given on May 14, 1901,
by Wenceslao Mercado to Luis Espiritu, as may be seen by the
private document Exhibit 2. In rebuttal, the plaintiff Josefa

27
Mercado denied having gone to the house of the notary Tanjutco
for the purpose of requesting him to draw up any document
whatever. She stated that she saw the document Exhibit 3 for the
first time in the house of her uncle Luis Espiritu on the day she
signed it, on which occasion and while said document was being
signed said notary was not present, nor were the witnesses
thereto whose names appear therein; and that she went to her
said uncle's house, because he had sent for her, as well as her
brother and sisters, sending a carromata to fetch them. Victoria
Espiritu denied ever having been in the house of her brother. Luis
Espiritu in company with the plaintiffs, for the purpose of giving
her consent to the execution of any deed in behalf of her brother.
The evidence adduced at the trial does not show, even
circumstantially, that the purchaser Luis Espiritu employed fraud,
deceit, violence, or intimidation, in order to effect the sale
mentioned in the document Exhibit 3, executed on May 17, 1910.
In this document the vendors, the brother and the sisters
Domingo, Maria del Consejo, Paz and, Josefa surnamed
Mercado y Espiritu, attested the certainty of the previous sale
which their mother, during her lifetime, had made in behalf of said
purchaser Luis Espiritu, her brother with the consent of her
husband Wenceslao Mercado, father of the vendors of the portion
of land situated in the barrio of Panducot, pueblo of Calumpit,
Bulacan; and in consideration of the fact that the said vendor Luis
Espiritu paid them, as an increase, the sum of P400, by virtue of
the contract made with him, they declare having sold to him
absolutely and in perpetuity said parcel of the land, waive and
thenceforth any and all rights they may have, inasmuch as said
sum constitutes the just price of the property.
So that said document Exhibit 3 is virtually an acknowledgment of
the contract of sale of the parcel or portion of land that would
contain 15 cavanes of seed rice made by the vendors' mother in
favor of the purchaser Luis Espiritu, their uncle, and likewise an
acknowledgment of the contract of pledge or mortgage of the
remainder of said land, an area of six cavanes, made with the
same purchaser, at an increase of P400 over the price of P2,600,

making an aggregate sum of P3,000, decomposed as follows:

P2,000, collected during her lifetime, by the vendors' father; and
the said increase of P400, collected by the plaintiffs.
In the aforementioned sale, according to the deed of May 25,
1894, Margarita Espiritu conveyed to her brother Luis the parcel
of 15 cavanes of seed, Exhibit 1, and after her death the plaintiffs'
widowed father mortgaged or pledged the remaining parcel or
portion of 6 cavanes of seed to her brother-in-law, Luis Espiritu, in
May, 1901 (Exhibit 2). So it is that the notarial instrument Exhibit
3, which was assailed by the plaintiffs, recognized the validity of
the previous contracts, and the totality of the land, consisting of
an area containing 21 cavanes of seed rice, was sold absolutely
and in perpetuity, the vendors receiving in exchange P400 more;
and there is no conclusive proof in the record that this last
document was false and simulated on account of the employment
of any violence, intimidation, fraud, or deceit, in the procuring of
the consent of the vendors who executed it.
Considering the relation that exists between the document Exhibit
3 and those of previous dates, Exhibits 1 and 2, and taking into
the account the relationship between the contracting parties, and
also the general custom that prevails in many provinces of these
Islands for the vendor or debtor to obtain an increase in the price
of the sale or of the pledge, or an increase in the amount loaned,
without proof to the contrary, it would be improper and illegal to
hold, in view of the facts hereinabove set forth, that the purchaser
Luis Espiritu, now deceased, had any need to forge or simulate
the document Exhibit 3 inasmuch as, since May, 1894, he has
held in the capacity of owner by virtue of a prior acquisition, the
parcel of land of 15 cavanes of seed, and likewise, since May,
1901, according to the contract of mortgage or pledge, the parcel
of 6 cavanes, or the remainder of the total area of 21 cavanes.
So that Luis Espiritu was, during his lifetime, and now, after his
death, his testate or intestate estate is in lawful possession of the
parcel of land situated in Panducot that contains 21 cavanes of
seed, by virtue of the title of conveyance of ownership of the land

28
measuring 15 cavanes, and, in consequence of the contract of
pledge or mortgage in security for the sum of P600, is likewise in
lawful possession of the remainder of the land, or an area
containing 6 cavanes of seed.

being the husband who authorized said conveyance,

notwithstanding that his testimony affected his children's interest
and prejudiced his own, as the owner of any fruits that might be
produced by said real property.

The plaintiffs have absolutely no right whatever to recover said

first parcel of land, as its ownership was conveyed to the
purchaser by means of a singular title of purchase and sale; and
as to the other portion of 6 cavanes of seed, they could have
redeemed it before May 17, 1910, upon the payment or the return
of the sum which their deceased father Wenceslao Mercado had,
during his lifetime, received as a loan under security of the
pledged property; but, after the execution of the document Exhibit
3, the creditor Luis Espiritu definitely acquired the ownership of
said parcel of 6 cavanes. It is therefore a rash venture to attempt
to recover this latter parcel by means of the contract of final and
absolute sale, set forth in the deed Exhibit 3.

The signature and handwriting of the document Exhibit 2 were

identified as authentic by one of the plaintiffs, Consejo Mercado,
and as the record shows no evidence whatever that this
document is false, and it does not appear to have been assailed
as such, and as it was signed by the plaintiffs' father, there is no
legal ground or well-founded reason why it should be rejected. It
was therefore properly admitted as evidence of the certainty of
the facts therein set forth.

Moreover, the notarial document Exhibit 1, are regards the

statements made therein, is of the nature of a public document
and is evidence of the fact which gave rise to its execution and of
the date of the latter, even against a third person and his
predecessors in interest such as are the plaintiffs. (Civ. Code, art.
1218.)
The plaintiffs' father, Wenceslao Mercado, recognizing it to be
perfectly true that his wife Margarita Espiritu sold said parcel of
land which she inherited from her father, of an area of about "15
cavanes of seed," to her brother Luis Espiritu, by means of an
instrument executed by her on May 25,1894 an instrument that
disappeared or was burned and likewise recognizing that the
protocols and register books belonging to the Province of Bulacan
were destroyed as a result of the past revolution, at the request of
his brother-in-law Luis Espiritu he had no objection to give the
testimony recorded in said notarial instrument, as it was the truth
regarding what had occurred, and in so doing he acted as the
plaintiffs' legitimate father in the exercise of his parental authority,
inasmuch as he had personal knowledge of said sale, he himself

The principal defect attributed by the plaintiffs to the document

Exhibit 3 consists in that, on the date of May 17, 1910, when it
was executed that they signed it, they were minors, that is, they
had not yet attained the age of 21 years fixed by Act No. 1891,
though no evidence appears in the record that the plaintiffs
Josefa and Domingo Mercado were in fact minors, for no certified
copies were presented of their baptismal certificates, nor did the
plaintiffs adduce any supplemental evidence whatever to prove
that Domingo was actually 19 and Josefa 18 years of age when
they signed the document Exhibit 3, on May 17, 1910, inasmuch
as the copybook, Exhibit A, notwithstanding the testimony of the
plaintiff Consejo Mercado, does not constitute sufficient proof of
the dates of births of the said Domingo and Josefa.
However, even in the doubt whether they certainly were of legal
age on the date referred to, it cannot be gainsaid that in the
document Exhibit 3 they stated that they were of legal age at the
time they executed and signed it, and on that account the sale
mentioned in said notarial deed Exhibit 3 is perfectly valid a
sale that is considered as limited solely to the parcel of land of 6
cavanes of seed, pledged by the deceased father of the plaintiffs
in security for P600 received by him as a loan from his brother-inlaw Luis Espiritu, for the reason that the parcel of 15 cavanes had
been lawfully sold by its original owner, the plaintiffs' mother.

29
The courts, in their interpretation of the law, have laid down the
rule that the sale of real estate, made by minors who pretend to
be of legal age, when in fact they are not, is valid, and they will
not be permitted to excuse themselves from the fulfillment of the
obligations contracted by them, or to have them annulled in
pursuance of the provisions of Law 6, title 19, of the 6th Partida;
and the judgment that holds such a sale to be valid and absolves
the purchaser from the complaint filed against him does not
violate the laws relative to the sale of minors' property, nor the
juridical rules established in consonance therewith. (Decisions of
the supreme court of Spain, of April 27, 1860, July 11, 1868, and
March 1, 1875.)
itc@alf

With respect to the true age of the plaintiffs, no proof was

adduced of the fact that it was Luis Espiritu who took out
Domingo Mercado's personal registration certificate on April 13,
1910, causing the age of 23 years to be entered therein in order
to corroborate the date of the notarial instrument of May 17th of
the same year; and the supposition that he did, would also allow it
to be supposed, in order to show the propriety of the claim, that
the cedula Exhibit C was taken out on February 14, 1914, where
in it is recorded that Domingo Mercado was on that date 23 years
of age, for both these facts are not proved; neither was any proof
adduced against the statement made by the plaintiffs Domingo
and Josefa in the notarial instrument Exhibit 3, that, on the date
when they executed it, they were already of legal age, and,
besides the annotation contained in the copybook Exhibit A, no
supplemental proof of their true ages was introduced.
Aside from the foregoing, from a careful examination of the record
in this case, it cannot be concluded that the plaintiffs, who claim
to have minors when they executed the notarial instrument
Exhibit 3, have suffered positive and actual losses and damages
in their rights and interests as a result of the execution of said
document, inasmuch as the sale effected by the plaintiffs' mother,
Margarita Espiritu, in May, 1894, of the greater part of the land of
21 cavanes of seed, did not occasion any damage or prejudice to
the plaintiffs, inasmuch as their father stated in the document

Exhibit 2 that he was obliged to mortgage or pledge said

remaining portion of the land in order to secure the loan of the
P375 furnished by Luis Espiritu and which was subsequently
increased to P600 so as to provide for certain engagements or
perhaps to meet the needs of his children, the plaintiff; and
therefore, to judge from the statements made by their father
himself, they received through him, in exchange for the land of 6
cavanes of seed, which passed into the possession of the creditor
Luis Espiritu, the benefit which must have accrued to them from
the sums of money received as loans; and, finally, on the
execution of the impugned document Exhibit 3, the plaintiffs
received and divided between themselves the sum of P400,
which sum, added to that P2,000 received by Margarita Espiritu,
and to that of the P600 collected by Wenceslao Mercado,
widower of the latter and father of the plaintiffs, makes all together
the sum of P3,000, the amount paid by the purchaser as the price
of all the land containing 21 cavanes of seed, and is the just price
of the property, was not impugned, and, consequently, should be
considered as equivalent to, and compensatory for, the true value
of said land.
For the foregoing reasons, whereby the errors assigned to the
judgment appealed from have been refuted, and deeming said
judgment to be in accordance with law and the evidence of
record, we should, and do hereby, affirm the same, with costs
against the appellants. So ordered.
Arellano, C. J., Johnson, Street, and Malcolm, JJ., concur.

30
Separate Opinions

CARSON, J., concurring:

I concur.
But in order to avoid misunderstanding, I think it well to indicate
that the general statement, in the prevailing opinion to the effect
that the making of false representations as to his age by an infant
executing a contract will preclude him from disaffirming the
contract or setting up the defense of infancy, must be understood
as limited to cases wherein, on account of the minor's
representations as to his majority, and because of his near
approach thereto, the other party had good reason to believe,
and did in fact believe the minor capable of contracting.
The doctrine set forth in the Partidas, relied upon by the supreme
court of Spain in the cases cited in the prevailing opinion, is
substantially similar to the doctrine of estoppel as applied in like
instances by many of the courts in the United States.
For the purposes of convenient comparison, I here insert some
citations of authority, Spanish and American, recognizing the
limitations upon the general doctrine to which I am inviting
attention at this time; and in this connection it is worthy of note
that the courts of the United States look with rather less favor
than the supreme court of Spain upon the application of the
doctrine, doubtless because the cases wherein it may properly be
applied, are much less likely to occur in a jurisdiction where
majority is reached at the age of 21 than a jurisdiction wherein
majority is not ordinarily attained until the infant reaches the age
of 25.
Ley 6, tit. 19, Partida 6. is, in part, as follows:

If he who is minor (1) deceitfully says or sets forth in an

instrument that he is over twenty-five years of age, and
this assertion is believed by another person who takes
him to be of about that age, (2) in an action at law he
should be deemed to be of the age he asserted, and
should no (3) afterwards be released from liability on the
plea that he was not of said age when he assumed the
obligation. The reason for this is that the law helps the
deceived and not the deceivers.
In the glossary to these provisions of the Partidas by Gregorio
Lopez, I find the following:
(1) De tal tiempo. Nota bene hoc verbum, nam si
appareret ex aspectu eum esse minorem, tunc
adversarius non potest dicere se deceptum; imo tam ipse,
quam minor videntur esse in dolo, quo casu competit
minori restitutio, quia facta doli compensatione, perinde
ast ac si nullus fuiset in dolo, et ideo datur restitutio; et
quia scienti dolus non infertur, l. 1. D. de act. empt.
secundum Cyn. Alberic et Salic. in l. 3. C. si minor se
major. dixer. adde Albericum tenentem, quabndo per
aspectum a liter constaret, in authent. sacramenta
puberum, col. 3. C. si advers vendit.
(2) Engoosamente. Adde 1. 2. et 3. C. si minor se major.
dixer. Et adverte nam per istam legem Partitarum, que
non distinguit, an adultus, vel pupillus talem assertionem
faciat, videtur comprobari dictum Guillielm. de Cun. de
quo per Paul. de Castr. in 1. qui jurasse. in princ. D. de
jurejur. quod si pupillus proximus pubertari juret, cum
contrahit, se esse puberem, et postea etiam juret, quod
non veniet contra contractum quod habebit locum
dispositio authenticae sacramenta puberum, sicut si esset
pubes: et cum isto dicto transit ibi Paul. de Cast. multum
commendans, dicens, se alibi non legisse; si tamen
teneamus illam opinionem, quod etiam pupillus doli capax
obligatur ex juramento, non esset ita miranda dicat,

31
decissio; vide per Alexand. in dict. 1.qui jurasse, in princ.
Item lex ista Partitarum expresse sentit de adulto, non de
pupillo, cum superius dixit, que paresciere de tal tiempo:
Doctores etiam intelligunt de adulto 11. dict. tit. C. si
minor. se major. dixer. et patet ex 11. illius tituli. Quid
autem dicemus in dubio, cum non constat de dolo
minoris? Azon. in summa illius tit. in fin. Cynus tamen, et
alli, tenent oppositum, quia dolus non praesumitur, nisi
probetur, 1. quotiens, s., qui dolo, D. de probat. Et hoc
etiam vult ista lex Partitarum, cum dicit, si lo faze
engoosamente: et ita tenent Alberic. et Salicet. in dict. 1.
3. ubi etiam Bart. in fin. Si autem minor sui facilitate
asserat se mojorem, et ita juret, tunc distingue, ut habetur
dict. 1. 3 quia aut juravit verbo tenus, et tunc non
restituitur, nisi per instrumentum seu scripturam probet se
minorem; et si juravit corporaliter, nullo modo restituitur, ut
ibi; et per quae instrumenta probentur, cum verbo tenus
juravit, vide per Specul. tit. de restit, in integr. s. quis
autem, col. 4. vers. sed cujusmodi erit scriptura, ubi etiam
vide per Speculatorem aliquas notabiles quaestiones in
ista materia, in col. 5. videlicet, an praejudicet sibi minor
ex tali juramento in aliis contractibus, et tenet, quod non;
et tenet glossa finalis in 1. de aetate, D. de minor. in fin.
gloss. vide ibi per Speculat. ubi etiam de aliis in ista
materia.
In the decision of the supreme court of Spain dated the 27th of
April, 1860, I find an excellent illustration of the conditions under
which that court applied the doctrine, as appears from the
following resolution therein set forth.
Sales of real estate made by minors are valid when the
latter pretend to be twenty-five years of age and, due to
the circumstances that they are nearly of that age, are
married, or have administration of their property, or on
account of other special circumstances affecting them, the
other parties to the contract believe them to be of legal
age.

With these citations compare the general doctrine in the United

States as set forth in 22 Cyc. (p. 610), supported by numerous
citations of authority.
Estoppel to disaffirm (I) In General. The doctrine of
estoppel not being as a general rule applicable to infants,
the court will not readily hold that his acts during infancy
have created an estoppel against him to disaffirm his
contracts. Certainly the infant cannot be estopped by the
acts or admissions of other persons.
(II) False representations as to age. According to some
authorities the fact that an infant at the time of entering
into a contract falsely represented to the person with
whom he dealt that he had attained the age of majority
does not give any validity to the contract or estop the
infant from disaffirming the same or setting up the
defense of infancy against the enforcement of any rights
thereunder; but there is also authority for the view that
such false representations will create an estoppel against
the infant, and under the statutes of some states no
contract can be disaffirmed where, on account of the
minor's representations as to his majority, the other party
had good reason to believe the minor capable of
contracting. Where the infant has made no
representations whatever as to his age, the mere fact that
the person with whom he dealt believed him to be of age,
even though his belief was warranted by the infant's
appearance and the surrounding circumstances, and the
infant knew of such belief, will not render the contract
valid or estop the infant to disaffirm.

32
under eighteen years and his case is one coming under
the provisions of the paragraphs next to the last of Article
80 of this Code, the following rules shall be observed:
1. Upon a person under fifteen but over nine years
of age, who is not exempted from liability by
reason of the court having declared that he acted
with discernment, a discretionary penalty shall be
imposed, but always lower by two degrees at least
than that prescribed by law for the crime which he
committed.
2. Upon a person over fifteen and under eighteen
years of age the penalty next lower than that
prescribed by law shall be imposed, but always in
the proper period.
Section 41. Credit in Service of Sentence. The child in
conflict with the law shall be credited in the services of his
of his/her sentence with the full time spent in actual
commitment and detention under this Act.
35

36

Sections 6, 38 and 39 of RA No. 9344.

People v. Arbalate, G.R. No. 183457, September 17,

2009, 600 SCRA 239, 255; People v. Satonero, G.R. No.
186233, October 2, 2009, 602 SCRA 769.
37

38

Id.

39

G.R. No. 137842, August 23, 2001, 363 SCRA 621.

33
THIRD DIVISION
G.R. No. 173822

We affirm their conviction, but we reduce the penalty

imposed on Salvador Monreal because the RTC and the CA did
not duly appreciate his minority at the time of the commission of
the crime. We order his immediate release from prison because
he already served his sentence, as hereby modified. Also, we add
to the damages to which the heirs of the victim were entitled in
order to accord with the prevailing law and jurisprudence.

SALVADOR ATIZADO and

SALVADOR MONREAL,
Petitioners,

Present:

-versus -

CARPIO MORALES, Chairperson,

Antecedents
BRION,
BERSAMIN,
On June 20, 1994, the Office of the Sorsogon Provincial
VILLARAMA, JR., and
Prosecutor
formally charged the petitioners and a certain Danilo
SERENO, JJ.
Atizado (Danilo) with murder through the following information, to
wit:
Promulgated:

PEOPLE OF THEPHILIPPINES,
Respondent.
October 13, 2010
x----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------x
DECISION
BERSAMIN, J.:

On May 4, 2000, the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch

52, Sorsogon, convicted the petitioners of murder.
[1]
On December 13, 2005, the Court of Appeals (CA) affirmed
their conviction in C.A.-G.R. CR-HC No. 01450, but modified the
awarded damages.[2]
The petitioners contest the CAs affirmance of their
conviction in this appeal via petition for review on certiorari.

That on or about the 18 th day of April 1994,

at Barangay Boga, Municipality of Castilla,
Province of Sorsogon, Philippines, and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the abovenamed accused, conspiring, confederating and
mutually helping one another, did then and there,
willfully, unlawfully and feloniously, with treachery
and evident premeditation, and without any
justifiable cause or motive, with intent to kill,
armed with handguns, attack, assault and shot
one Rogelio Llona y Llave, a Sangguniang Bayan
member of Castilla, Sorsogon, thereby inflicting
upon him mortal and serious wounds which
directly caused his instantaneous death, to the
damage and prejudice of his legal heirs.
CONTRARY TO LAW. [3]

34
After the petitioners and Danilo pleaded not guilty to the
information on November 7, 1994,[4] the trial ensued.
The witnesses for the State were Simeona Mirandilla
(Mirandilla), Major Saadra Gani (Major Gani), Dr. Wilhelmo
Abrantes (Dr. Abrantes), Lawrence Llona (Lawrence), and
Herminia Llona (Herminia).
Mirandilla narrated that on April 18, 1994 she and the late
Rogelio Llona (Llona), her common-law husband, had attended
the fiesta of Barangay Bonga in Castilla, Sorsogon; that at about
8 pm of that date, they had gone to the house of Manuel Desder
(Desder) in the same barangay; that as they and Jose Jesalva
(Jesalva), a barangay kagawad of the place, were seated in the
sala of Desders house, she heard thundering steps as if people
were running and then two successive gunshots; that she then
saw Atizado pointing a gun at the prostrate body of Llona; that
seeing Atizado about to shoot Llona again, she shouted: Stop,
thats enough!; that while aiding Llona, she heard three clicking
sounds, and, turning towards the direction of the clicking sounds,
saw Monreal point his gun at her while he was moving backwards
and simultaneously adjusting the cylinder of his gun; that the
petitioners then fled the scene of the shooting; that she rushed to
the house of barangay captain Juanito Lagonsing (Lagonsing) to
report the shooting; and that she and Lagonsing brought Llona to
a hospital where Llona was pronounced dead.[5]
Major Gani testified that the petitioners and Danilo were
arrested on May 18, 1994,[6] based on the warrant of arrest issued
by Judge Teodisio R. Dino, Jr. of the Municipal Trial Court in
Castilla, Sorsogon.

Dr. Abrantes confirmed that Llona died due to two

gunshot wounds in the back that penetrated his spinal column,
liver, and abdomen.[7]
Lawrence and Herminia stated that the Llona family
spent P30,000.00 for the funeral expenses of Llona.[8]
Denying
the
accusation,
the
petitioners interposed alibi. The witnesses for the Defense were
Monreal, Roger Villafe (Villafe), Merlinda Lolos, Joseph
Lorenzana (Lorenzana), Jesalva, and Lagonsing.
The Defense showed that at the time of the commission
of the crime, Atizado had been in his family residence
in Barangay Tomalaytay, Castilla,
Sorsogon, because he had been sick of influenza, while Monreal
and Danilo had been in the house of a certain Ariel also
in Barangay Tomalaytay, Castilla, Sorsogon drinking gin; that the
petitioners and Danilo had not been recognized to be at the crime
scene during the shooting of Llona; and that the petitioners had
been implicated only because of their being employed by their
uncle Lorenzana, the alleged mastermind in the killing of Llona.
As stated, on May 4, 2000, the RTC convicted the
petitioners but acquitted Danilo, viz:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the
Court finds accused Salvador Atizado and
Salvador Monreal guilty beyond reasonable doubt
of the crime of murder, defined and penalized
under Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code, with
the qualifying circumstance of treachery, the Court
hereby sentences each of the accused to an
imprisonment of Reclusion Perpetua and to pay
the heirs of Rogelio Llona the sum of Fifty

35
Thousand (P50,000.00) Pesos, Philippines
currency, in solidum, as civil indemnity, without
subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency; to
reimburse the heirs of the victim the amount
of P30,000.00 as actual expenses and to pay the
cost.
Accused Danilo Atizado on reasonable
doubt is hereby acquitted of the crime charged
and he being a detention prisoner, his immediate
release from the provincial jail is hereby ordered,
unless he is charged of other lawful cause or
causes.
Accused Salvador Atizado and Salvador
Monreal being detained, shall be credited in full in
the service of their sentence.
SO ORDERED.[9]
The Court referred the petitioners direct appeal to the CA
pursuant to People v. Mateo.[10]
On December 13, 2005, the CA affirmed the conviction,
disposing:

civil indemnity; (b) P30,000.00 as actual

damages; and (c)P50,000.00 as moral damages.
SO ORDERED.[11]

After the CA denied their motion for reconsideration,[12] the

petitioners now appeal.
Issue
The petitioners submit that the RTC and the CA erred in
finding them guilty of murder beyond reasonable doubt based on
the eyewitness testimony of Mirandilla despite her not being a
credible witness; that some circumstances rendered Mirandillas
testimony unreliable, namely: (a) she had failed to identify them
as the assailants of Llona, because she had not actually
witnessed them shooting at Llona; (b) she had merely assumed
that they had been the assailants from the fact that they had
worked for Lorenzana, the supposed mastermind; (c) the autopsy
report stated that Llona had been shot from a distance, not at
close range, contrary to Mirandillas claim; (d) Mirandillas
testimony was contrary to human experience; and (e) Mirandillas
account was inconsistent with that of Jesalvas.
Ruling

WHEREFORE, the judgment of conviction is

AFFIRMED. Accused-appellants Salvador Atizado
and Salvador Monreal are hereby ordered to
suffer the imprisonment ofReclusion Perpetua.
Likewise, they are ordered to pay the heirs of
Rogelio Llona the amount of: (a) P50,000.00 as

The conviction of the petitioners is affirmed, subject to

modifications in the penalty imposed on Monreal and in the
amounts and kinds of damages as civil liability.

36
I.
Factual findings of the RTC and CA
are accorded respect
The RTC and CAs conclusions were based on Mirandillas
positive identification of the petitioners as the malefactors and on
her description of the acts of each of them made during her court
testimony on March 6, 1995,[13] viz:
q Who were you saying we sat together?
a Kdg. Llona, Mr. Jose Jesalva and I was letting
my 5 years old child to sleep.
q Can you demonstrate or described before this
Honorable Court the size of the sala and the
house you wherein (sic)?
a The size of the sale (sic) is about 3 x 3 meters.
q Now, please show to this Honorable Court the
relative position, the sitting arrangement of
yours, Kgd. Llona and Kgd. Jesalva.
a I was sitting on a long bench then my child was
on my lap, then Kdg. Llona was infront of
me, I was at the right side of Kdg. Llona
q How about Kdg. Jesalva?
a This Kgd. Jesalva was facing Kgd. Llona and
Kgd. Llona was facing the door in
otherwords, the door was at his back.
q Was the door open?
a Yes, sir.

q Was the door immediately found Rather was this

the main door of the house?
a That was the main door leading to the porch of
the house.
q And from the porch is the main stairs already?
a Yes, sir.
q Now, what were you doing there after dinner as
you said you have finished assisting the
persons in Bongga about the program, ...
after that, what were you doing then?
a I was letting my child to sleep and Kgd. Llona
was fanning my child.
q How about Kgd. Jesalva?
a His head was stopping (sic) because of his
drunkenness.
q Can you tell this Honorable Court, while you
were on that situation, if there was any
incident that happened?
a There was a sudden thundering steps as if
they were running and there were
successive shots.
q Simultaneously
with
these
two
(2)
successive shots can you see the origin
or who was responsible for the shots?
a Upon hearing the shots, I turned my head
and saw Salvador Atizado.
q Who is this Salvador Atizado?

37
a He was the one who shot Kgd. Llona.
q Can you be able to identify him?
a (Witness identifying the person, and when
asked
of
his
name
answered Salvador Atizado.)
q So when you heard the shots, who was actually
shot?
a Kgd. Llona, because after looking at the (3)
persons I saw Kgd. Llona sliding downward.
q Then after that what happened?
a Then I stood immediately and I told the persons
responsible stop thats enough, and I gave
assistance to Kgd. Llona.
q Then after that what happened?
a My intention was to let Kgd. Llona push-up but I
heard three (3) clicks of the trigger of the
gun.
q Then what did you do when you heard that?
a After which I turned my head suddenly then I
saw this Salvador Monreal but at that
time I do not know his name.
q Then what did you see of him?
aI
saw
this Salvador Monreal
stepping
backward and he was adjusting the
cylinder of the gun.

q Now, when you saw and heard Atizado three (3)

clicks of the gun, can you see where the gun
was pointed at?
a It was pointed towards me.
q So, there were three (3) shots that did not
actually fired towards you?
a Yes, sir.
q So when you said that you saw this man
Monreal, can you still recognize this
man?
a Yes, sir.
q Could you be able to point at him, if he is in
Court?
a Yes, sir.
q Kindly please go down and tap his
shoulder?
a (witness going down and proceeded to the first
bench and tap the shoulder of the person,
the person tapped by the witness answered
to the name Salvador Monreal.)
q You said, when you stood up and face with him
while he was adjusting his revolver and he
was moving backward, did you see other
persons as his companion, if any?
a At the first time when I turned my head back, I
saw this Atizado he was already on the
process of leaving the place.

38
q Who is the first name of this Atizado?
a Danilo Atizado
q And did they actually leave the place at that
moment?
a Salvador Monreal was the one left.
Our own review persuades us to concur with the RTC and
the CA. Indeed, Mirandillas positive identification of the
petitioners as the killers, and her declarations on what each of the
petitioners did when they mounted their sudden deadly assault
against Llona left no doubt whatsoever that they had conspired to
kill and had done so with treachery.
It is a basic rule of appellate adjudication in this
jurisdiction that the trial judges evaluation of the credibility of a
witness and of the witness testimony is accorded the highest
respect because the trial judges unique opportunity to observe
directly the demeanor of the witness enables him to determine
whether the witness is telling the truth or not. [14] Such evaluation,
when affirmed by the CA, is binding on the Court unless facts or
circumstances of weight have been overlooked, misapprehended,
or misinterpreted that, if considered, would materially affect the
disposition of the case. [15] We thus apply the rule, considering that
the petitioners have not called attention to and proved any
overlooked, misapprehended, or misinterpreted circumstance.
Fortifying the application of the rule is that Mirandillas positive
declarations on the identities of the assailants prevailed over the
petitioners denials and alibi.[16]
Under the law, a conspiracy exists when two or more
persons come to an agreement concerning the commission of a
felony and decide to commit it.[17] Yet, the State did not have to

prove the petitioners previous agreement to commit the murder,

[18]
because their conspiracy was deduced from the mode and
manner in which they had perpetrated their criminal act. [19] They
had acted in concert in assaulting Llona, with their individual acts
manifesting a community of purpose and design to achieve their
evil end. As it is, all the conspirators in a crime are liable as coprincipals.[20] Thus, they cannot now successfully assail their
conviction as co-principals in murder.
Murder is defined and punished by Article 248 of
the Revised Penal Code (RPC), as amended by Republic Act No.
7659, which provides:
Article 248. Murder. Any person who, not
falling within the provisions of Article 246 shall kill
another, shall be guilty of murder and shall be
punished by reclusion perpetuato death, if
committed with any of the following attendant
circumstances:
1. With treachery, taking advantage of
superior strength, with the aid of armed men, or
employing means to weaken the defense or of
means or persons to insure or afford impunity.
2. In consideration of a price, reward, or
promise.
3. By means of inundation, fire, poison,
explosion, shipwreck, stranding of a vessel,
derailment or assault upon a railroad, fall of an
airship, or by means of motor vehicles, or with the

39
use of any other means involving great waste and
ruin.
4. On occasion of any of the calamities
enumerated in the preceding paragraph, or of an
earthquake, eruption of a volcano, destructive
cyclone, epidemic or other public calamity.
5. With evident premeditation.
6. With cruelty, by deliberately and
inhumanly augmenting the suffering of the victim,
or outraging or scoffing at his person or corpse.
There is treachery when the offender commits any of the
crimes against the person, employing means, methods or forms
in the execution thereof which tend directly and specially to insure
its execution, without risk to himself arising from the defense
which offended party might make.[21] For treachery to be
attendant, the means, method, or form of execution must be
deliberated upon or consciously adopted by the offenders.
[22]
Moreover, treachery must be present and seen by the witness
right at the inception of the attack.[23]
The CA held that Mirandillas testimonial narrative
sufficiently established that treachery attended the attack o[n] the
victim because Atizados shooting the victim at the latters back
had been intended to ensure the execution of the crime; and that
Atizado and Monreals conspiracy to kill the victim was proved by
their presence at the scene of the crime each armed with a
handgun that they had fired except that Monreals handgun did
not fire.[24]

We concur with the CA on the attendance of treachery.

The petitioners mounted their deadly assault with suddenness
and without the victim being aware of its imminence. Neither an
altercation between the victim and the assailants had preceded
the assault, nor had the victim provoked the assault in the
slightest. The assailants had designed their assault to be swift
and unexpected, in order to deprive their victim of the opportunity
to defend himself.[25] Such manner constituted a deliberate
adoption of a method of attack that ensured their unhampered
execution of the crime.
II.
Modification of the Penalty on Monreal
and of the Civil Damages

Under Article 248 of the RPC, as amended by Republic

Act No. 7659, the penalty for murder is reclusion perpetua to
death. There being no modifying circumstances, the CA correctly
imposed the lesser penalty of reclusion perpetua on Atizado,
which was conformable with Article 63 (2) of the RPC.
[26]
But reclusion perpetua was not the correct penalty for Monreal
due to his being a minor over 15 but under 18 years of age. The
RTC and the CA did not appreciate Monreals minority at the time
of the commission of the murder probably because his birth
certificate was not presented at the trial.
Yet, it cannot be doubted that Monreal was a minor below
18 years of age when the crime was committed on April 18,
1994. Firstly, his counter-affidavit executed on June 30
1994 stated that he was 17 years of age.[27] Secondly, the police
blotter recording his arrest mentioned that he was 17 years old at
the time of his arrest on May 18, 1994.[28] Thirdly, Villafes affidavit

40
dated June 29, 1994 averred that Monreal was a minor on the
date of the incident.[29] Fourthly, as RTCs minutes of
hearing dated March 9, 1999 showed,[30] Monreal was 22 years
old when he testified on direct examination on March 9, 1999,
[31]
which meant that he was not over 18 years of age when he
committed the crime. And, fifthly, Mirandilla described Monreal as
a teenager and young looking at the time of the incident.[32]
The foregoing showing of Monreals minority was legally
sufficient, for it conformed with the norms subsequently set under
Section 7 of Republic Act No. 9344, also known as the Juvenile
Justice and Welfare Act of 2006,[33] viz:
Section 7. Determination of Age. - The child
in conflict with the law shall enjoy the
presumption of minority. He/She shall enjoy all
the rights of a child in conflict with the law until
he/she is proven to be eighteen (18) years old or
older. The age of a child may be determined
from the childs birth certificate, baptismal
certificate or any other pertinent documents.
In the absence of these documents, age may
be based on information from the child
himself/herself, testimonies of other persons,
the physical appearance of the child and other
relevant evidence. In case of doubt as to the
age of the child, it shall be resolved in his/her
favor.
Any person contesting the age of the child in
conflict with the law prior to the filing of the
information in any appropriate court may file a
case in a summary proceeding for the

determination of age before the Family Court

which shall decide the case within twenty-four (24)
hours from receipt of the appropriate pleadings of
all interested parties.
If a case has been filed against the child in
conflict with the law and is pending in the
appropriate court, the person shall file a motion to
determine the age of the child in the same court
where the case is pending. Pending hearing on
the said motion, proceedings on the main case
shall be suspended.
In all proceedings, law enforcement officers,
prosecutors, judges and other government
officials concerned shall exert all efforts at
determining the age of the child in conflict with the
law.
Pursuant to Article 68 (2) of the RPC, [34] when the offender
is over 15 and under 18 years of age, the penalty next lower than
that prescribed by law is imposed. Based on Article 61 (2) of the
RPC, reclusion temporal is the penalty next lower than reclusion
perpetua to death. Applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law and
Article 64 of the RPC, therefore, the range of the penalty of
imprisonment imposable on Monreal was prision mayor in any of
its periods, as the minimum period, toreclusion temporal in its
medium period, as the maximum period. Accordingly, his proper
indeterminate penalty is from six years and one day of prision
mayor, as the minimum period, to 14 years, eight months, and
one day of reclusion temporal, as the maximum period.

41
Monreal has been detained for over 16 years, that is, from
the time of his arrest on May 18, 1994 until the present. Given
that the entire period of Monreals detention should be credited in
the service of his sentence, pursuant to Section 41 of Republic
Act No. 9344,[35] the revision of the penalty now warrants his
immediate release from the penitentiary.
In this regard, the benefits in favor of children in conflict
with the law as granted under Republic Act No. 9344, which aims
to promote the welfare of minor offenders through programs and
services, such as delinquency prevention, intervention, diversion,
rehabilitation and re-integration, geared towards their
development, are retroactively applied to Monreal as a convict
serving his sentence. Its Section 68 expressly so provides:
Section 68. Children Who Have Been
Convicted and are Serving Sentences. Persons
who have been convicted and are serving
sentence at the time of the effectivity of this
Act, and who were below the age of eighteen
(18) years at the time of the commission of the
offense for which they were convicted and are
serving sentence, shall likewise benefit from
the retroactive application of this Act. They
shall be entitled to appropriate dispositions
provided under this Act and their sentences shall
be
adjusted
accordingly.They
shall
be
immediately released if they are so qualified
under this Act or other applicable laws.

Both petitioners were adjudged solidarily liable to pay

damages to the surviving heirs of Llona. Their solidary civil

liability arising from the commission of the crime stands,

[36]
despite the reduction of Monreals penalty. But we must reform
the awards of damages in order to conform to prevailing
jurisprudence. The CA granted only P50,000.00 as civil
indemnity, P30,000.00 as actual damages, and P50,000.00 as
moral damages. We hold that the amounts for death indemnity
and moral damages should each be raised to P75,000.00 to
accord with prevailing case law;[37] and that exemplary damages
of P30,000.00 due to the attendance of treachery should be
further awarded,[38] to accord with the pronouncement in People v.
Catubig,[39] to wit:
The commission of an offense has twopronged effect, one on the public as it breaches
the social order and other upon the private victim
as it causes personal sufferings, each of which, is
addressed by, respectively, the prescription of
heavier punishment for the accused and by an
award of additional damages to the victim. The
increase of the penalty or a shift to a graver
felony underscores the exacerbation of the
offense by the attendance of aggravating
circumstances, whether ordinary or qualifying,
in its commission.Unlike the criminal liability
which is basically a State concern, the award
of damages, however is likewise, if not
primarily, intended for the offended party who
suffers thereby. It would make little sense for
an award of exemplary damages to be due the
private offended party when the aggravating
circumstance is ordinary but to be withheld
when it is qualifying. Withal, the ordinary or
qualifying
nature
of
an
aggravating

42
circumstance is a distinction that should only
be of consequence to the criminal, rather than
to the civil liability of the offender. In fine,
relative to the civil aspect of the case, an
aggravating circumstance, whether ordinary
or qualifying, should entitle the offended party
to an award of exemplary damages within the
unbridled meaning of Article 2230 of the Civil
Code.

Let a copy of this decision be furnished for immediate

implementation to the Director of the Bureau of Corrections
in Muntinlupa City by personal service. The Director of Bureau of
Corrections shall report to this Court the action he has taken on
this decision within five days from service.
SO ORDERED.

[1]

The award of actual damages of P30,000.00 is upheld for

being supported by the record.
WHEREFORE, the Court affirms the decision
dated December 13, 2005 promulgated in CA-G.R. CR-HC No.
01450, subject to the following modifications:
(a) Salvador Monreal is sentenced to suffer the
indeterminate penalty from six years and one day of prision
mayor, as the minimum period, to 14 years, eight months, and
one day of reclusion temporal, as the maximum period;
(b) The Court orders the Bureau of Corrections in
Muntinlupa City to immediately release Salvador Monreal due to
his having fully served the penalty imposed on him, unless he is
being held for other lawful causes; and
(c) The Court directs the petitioners to pay jointly and
solidarily to the heirs of Roger L. Llona P75,000.00 as death
indemnity, P75,000.00 as moral damages,P30,000.00 as
exemplary damages, and P30,000.00 as actual damages.

Original records, pp. 357-364 (Criminal Case No. 94-3653).

Rollo, pp. 18-36; penned by Associate Justice Vicente S.E. Veloso, with
Associate Justice Bienvenido L. Reyes and Associate Justice Amelita G.
Tolentino, concurring.
[3]
Original records, pp. 20-23.
[4]
Id. pp. 55-56.
[5]
TSN, March 6, 1995, pp. 2-14.
[6]
TSN, February 22, 1995, p. 8.
[7]
TSN, February 20, 1995, pp. 2-4.
[8]
TSN, January 9, 1995; February 22, 1995, p. 22.
[9]
Supra, note 1, p. 364.
[10]
G.R. Nos. 147678-87, July 7, 2004, 433 SCRA 640.
[11]
Rollo, p. 36.
[12]
Id., p. 43.
[13]
At pp. 5-10.
[14]
People v. Pascual, G.R. No. 173309, January 23, 2007, 512 SCRA 385,
392.
[15]
People v. Domingo, G.R. No. 184958, September 17, 2009, 600 SCRA
280, 293; People v. Gerasta, G.R. No. 176981, December 24, 2008, 575
SCRA 503, 512.
[16]
See People v. Magdaraog, G.R. No. 151251, May 19, 2004, 428 SCRA
529, 531.
[17]
Article 8, Revised Penal Code.
[18]
People v. Cabrera, G.R. No. 105992, February 1, 1955, 241 SCRA 28.
[19]
People v. Factao, G.R. No. 12566, January 13, 2004, 419 SCRA 38.
[20]
People v. Peralta, No. L-19069, October 29, 1968, 25 SCRA 759, 776777; People v. Pablo, G.R. Nos. 120394-97, January 16, 2001, 349 SCRA
79.
[21]
Article 14, paragraph 16, Revised Penal Code.
[2]

43
[22]

People v. Punzalan, No. L-54562, August 6, 1982, 153 SCRA 1, 2.

People v. Sayaboc, G.R. No. 147201, January 15, 2004, 419 SCRA 659,
660; People v. Cajurao, G.R. No. 122767, January 20, 2004, 420 SCRA
207, 208; People v. Guillermo, G.R. No. 147786, January 20, 2004, 420
SCRA 326, 328.
[24]
CA Rollo, pp. 163-165.
[25]
People v. Villanueva, G.R. No. 122746, January 29, 1999, 302
[23]

SCRA 380, 382.

[26]

Article 63. Rules for the application of indivisible penalties. In all cases
in which the law prescribes a single indivisible penalty, it shall be applied
by the courts regardless of any mitigating or aggravating circumstances that
may have attended the commission of the deed.
In all cases in which the law prescribes a penalty composed of two
indivisible penalties, the following rules shall be observed in the
application thereof:
xxx
2. When there are neither mitigating nor aggravating
circumstances and there is no aggravating circumstance, the lesser
penalty shall be applied.

[35]

Section 41. Credit in Service of Sentence. The child in conflict with the
law shall be credited in the services of his of his/her sentence with the full
time spent in actual commitment and detention under this Act.
[36]
Sections 6, 38 and 39 of RA No. 9344.
[37]
People v. Arbalate, G.R. No. 183457, September 17, 2009, 600 SCRA
239, 255; People v. Satonero, G.R. No. 186233, October 2, 2009, 602
SCRA 769.
[38]
Id.
[39]
G.R. No. 137842, August 23, 2001, 363 SCRA 621.

xxx
[27]

Original records, pp. 28-29.

[28]
TSN, February 22, 1995, p. 8.
[29]
Original records, p. 30.
[30]
Id., p. 338.
[31]
TSN, March 9, 1999, p. 1.
[32]
TSN, March 28, 1995, pp. 50-51.
[33]
The law was enacted on April 28, 2006 and took effect on May 20, 2006.
[34]
Article 68. Penalty to be imposed upon a person under eighteen years of
age. When the offender is a minor under eighteen years and his case is one
coming under the provisions of the paragraphs next to the last of Article 80
of this Code, the following rules shall be observed:
1. Upon a person under fifteen but over nine years of age, who is not
exempted from liability by reason of the court having declared that he acted
with discernment, a discretionary penalty shall be imposed, but always
lower by two degrees at least than that prescribed by law for the crime
which he committed.
2. Upon a person over fifteen and under eighteen years of age the
penalty next lower than that prescribed by law shall be imposed, but
always in the proper period.

EN BANC

44
G.R. No. 176947

February 19, 2009

GAUDENCIO M. CORDORA, Petitioner,

vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS and GUSTAVO S.
TAMBUNTING, Respondents.

1. No. 6 I am a Natural Born/Filipino Citizen

2. No. 9 No. of years of Residence before May 14,
2001.
36 in the Philippines and 25 in the Constituency where I
seek to be elected;

DECISION
3. No. 12 I am ELIGIBLE for the office I seek to be
elected.3 (Boldface and capitalization in the original)

CARPIO, J.:
The Case
This is a petition for certiorari and mandamus, with prayer for the
issuance of a temporary restraining order under Rule 65 of the
1997 Rules of Civil Procedure.
In EO Case No. 05-17, Gaudencio M. Cordora (Cordora) accused
Gustavo S. Tambunting (Tambunting) of an election offense for
violating Section 74 in relation to Section 262 of the Omnibus
Election Code. The Commission on Elections (COMELEC) En
Banc dismissed Cordoras complaint in a Resolution1 dated 18
August 2006. The present petition seeks to reverse the 18 August
2006 Resolution as well as the Resolution2 dated 20 February
2007 of the COMELEC En Banc which denied Cordoras motion
for reconsideration.
The Facts
In his complaint affidavit filed before the COMELEC Law
Department, Cordora asserted that Tambunting made false
assertions in the following items:
That Annex A [Tambuntings Certificate of Candidacy for the 2001
elections] and Annex B [Tambuntings Certificate of Candidacy for
the 2004 elections] state, among others, as follows, particularly
Nos. 6, 9 and 12 thereof:

Cordora stated that Tambunting was not eligible to run for local
public office because Tambunting lacked the required citizenship
and residency requirements.
To disprove Tambuntings claim of being a natural-born Filipino
citizen, Cordora presented a certification from the Bureau of
Immigration which stated that, in two instances, Tambunting
claimed that he is an American: upon arrival in the Philippines on
16 December 2000 and upon departure from the Philippines on
17 June 2001. According to Cordora, these travel dates confirmed
that Tambunting acquired American citizenship through
naturalization in Honolulu, Hawaii on 2 December 2000. Cordora
concluded:
That Councilor Gustavo S. Tambunting contrary to the provision
of Sec 74 (OEC): [sic] Re: CONTENTS OF CERTIFICATE OF
CANDIDACY: which requires the declarant/affiant to state, among
others, under oath, that he isa Filipino (No. 6), No.
9- residence requirement which he lost when [he was]
naturalized as an American Citizenon December 2, 2000 at [sic]
Honolulu, Hawaii, knowingly and
willfully affirmed and reiterated that he possesses the
above basic requirements under No. 12 that he is indeed
eligible for the office to which he seeks to be elected, when in
truth and in fact, the contrary is indubitably established by his

45
own statements before the Philippine Bureau of Immigration x x
x.4 (Emphases in the original)
Tambunting, on the other hand, maintained that he did not make
any misrepresentation in his certificates of candidacy. To refute
Cordoras claim that Tambunting is not a natural-born Filipino,
Tambunting presented a copy of his birth certificate which showed
that he was born of a Filipino mother and an American father.
Tambunting further denied that he was naturalized as an
American citizen. The certificate of citizenship conferred by the
US government after Tambuntings father petitioned him through
INS Form I-130 (Petition for Relative) merely confirmed
Tambuntings citizenship which he acquired at birth. Tambuntings
possession of an American passport did not mean that
Tambunting is not a Filipino citizen. Tambunting also took an oath
of allegiance on 18 November 2003 pursuant to Republic Act No.
9225 (R.A. No. 9225), or the Citizenship Retention and
Reacquisition Act of 2003.
Tambunting further stated that he has resided in the Philippines
since birth. Tambunting has imbibed the Filipino culture, has
spoken the Filipino language, and has been educated in Filipino
schools. Tambunting maintained that proof of his loyalty and
devotion to the Philippines was shown by his service as councilor
of Paraaque.
To refute Cordoras claim that the number of years of residency
stated in Tambuntings certificates of candidacy is false because
Tambunting lost his residency because of his naturalization as an
American citizen, Tambunting contended that the residency
requirement is not the same as citizenship.
The Ruling of the COMELEC Law Department
The COMELEC Law Department recommended the dismissal of
Cordoras complaint against Tambunting because Cordora failed
to substantiate his charges against Tambunting. Cordoras

reliance on the certification of the Bureau of Immigration that

Tambunting traveled on an American passport is not sufficient to
prove that Tambunting is an American citizen.
The Ruling of the COMELEC En Banc
The COMELEC En Banc affirmed the findings and the resolution
of the COMELEC Law Department. The COMELEC En Banc was
convinced that Cordora failed to support his accusation against
Tambunting by sufficient and convincing evidence.
The dispositive portion of the COMELEC En Bancs Resolution
reads as follows:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant complaint is
hereby DISMISSED for insufficiency of evidence to establish
probable cause.
SO ORDERED.5
Commissioner Rene V. Sarmiento (Commissioner Sarmiento)
wrote a separate opinion which concurred with the findings of
the En Banc Resolution. Commissioner Sarmiento pointed out
that Tambunting could be considered a dual citizen. Moreover,
Tambunting effectively renounced his American citizenship when
he filed his certificates of candidacy in 2001 and 2004 and ran for
public office.
Cordora filed a motion for reconsideration which raised the same
grounds and the same arguments in his complaint. In its
Resolution promulgated on 20 February 2007, the COMELEC En
Banc dismissed Cordoras motion for reconsideration for lack of
merit.
The Issue

46
Cordora submits that the COMELEC acted with grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction when it
declared that there is no sufficient evidence to support probable
cause that may warrant the prosecution of Tambunting for an
election offense.
Cordoras petition is not an action to disqualify Tambunting
because of Tambuntings failure to meet citizenship and residency
requirements. Neither is the present petition an action to declare
Tambunting a non-Filipino and a non-resident. The present
petition seeks to prosecute Tambunting for knowingly making
untruthful statements in his certificates of candidacy.
The Ruling of the Court
The petition has no merit. We affirm the ruling of the
COMELEC En Banc.

Contents of certificate of candidacy. The certificate of

candidacy shall state that the person filing it is announcing his
candidacy for the office stated therein and that he is eligible for
said office; x x x the political party to which he belongs; civil
status; his date of birth; residence; his post office address for all
election purposes; his profession or occupation; that he will
support and defend the Constitution of the Philippines and will
maintain true faith and allegiance thereto; that he will obey the
laws, legal orders and decrees promulgated by the duly
constituted authorities; that he is not a permanent resident or
immigrant to a foreign country; that the obligation imposed by his
oath is assumed voluntarily, without mental reservation or
purpose of evasion; and that the facts stated in the certificate of
candidacy are true to the best of his knowledge.
xxx

Whether there is Probable Cause to Hold Tambunting for

Trial for Having Committed an Election Offense

The person filing a certificate of candidacy shall also affix his

latest photograph, passport size; a statement in duplicate
containing his bio-data and program of government not exceeding
one hundred words, if he so desires.

There was no grave abuse of discretion in the COMELEC En

Bancs ruling that there is no sufficient and convincing evidence to
support a finding of probable cause to hold Tambunting for trial for
violation of Section 74 in relation to Section 262 of the Omnibus
Election Code.

Section 262 of the Omnibus Election Code, on the other hand,

provides that violation of Section 74, among other sections in the
Code, shall constitute an election offense.

Probable cause constitutes those facts and circumstances which

would lead a reasonably discreet and prudent man to believe that
an offense has been committed. Determining probable cause is
an intellectual activity premised on the prior physical presentation
or submission of documentary or testimonial proofs either
confirming, negating or qualifying the allegations in the
complaint.6
Section 74 of the Omnibus Election Code reads as follows:

Tambuntings Dual Citizenship

Tambunting does not deny that he is born of a Filipino mother and
an American father. Neither does he deny that he underwent the
process involved in INS Form I-130 (Petition for Relative)
because of his fathers citizenship. Tambunting claims that
because of his parents differing citizenships, he is both Filipino
and American by birth. Cordora, on the other hand, insists that
Tambunting is a naturalized American citizen.

47
We agree with Commissioner Sarmientos observation that
Tambunting possesses dual citizenship. Because of the
circumstances of his birth, it was no longer necessary for
Tambunting to undergo the naturalization process to acquire
American citizenship. The process involved in INS Form I-130
only served to confirm the American citizenship which Tambunting
acquired at birth. The certification from the Bureau of Immigration
which Cordora presented contained two trips where Tambunting
claimed that he is an American. However, the same certification
showed nine other trips where Tambunting claimed that he is
Filipino. Clearly, Tambunting possessed dual citizenship prior to
the filing of his certificate of candidacy before the 2001 elections.
The fact that Tambunting had dual citizenship did not disqualify
him from running for public office.7
Requirements for dual citizens from birth who desire to run
for public office
We deem it necessary to reiterate our previous ruling in Mercado
v. Manzano, wherein we ruled that dual citizenship is not a
ground for disqualification from running for any elective local
position.
To begin with, dual citizenship is different from dual allegiance.
The former arises when, as a result of the concurrent application
of the different laws of two or more states, a person is
simultaneously considered a national by the said states. For
instance, such a situation may arise when a person whose
parents are citizens of a state which adheres to the principle
of jus sanguinis is born in a state which follows the doctrine of jus
soli. Such a person, ipso facto and without any voluntary act on
his part, is concurrently considered a citizen of both states.
Considering the citizenship clause (Art. IV) of our Constitution, it
is possible for the following classes of citizens of the Philippines
to possess dual citizenship:
(1) Those born of Filipino fathers and/or mothers in
foreign countries which follow the principle of jus soli;

(2) Those born in the Philippines of Filipino mothers and

alien fathers if by the laws of their fathers country such
children are citizens of that country;
(3) Those who marry aliens if by the laws of the latters
country the former are considered citizens, unless by their
act or omission they are deemed to have renounced
Philippine citizenship.
There may be other situations in which a citizen of the Philippines
may, without performing any act, be also a citizen of another
state; but the above cases are clearly possible given the
constitutional provisions on citizenship.
Dual allegiance, on the other hand, refers to the situation in which
a person simultaneously owes, by some positive act, loyalty to
two or more states. While dual citizenship is involuntary, dual
allegiance is the result of an individuals volition.
xxx
[I]n including 5 in Article IV on citizenship, the concern of the
Constitutional Commission was not with dual citizensper se but
with naturalized citizens who maintain their allegiance to their
countries of origin even after their naturalization. Hence, the
phrase "dual citizenship" in R.A. No. 7160, 40(d) and in R.A. No.
7854, 20 must be understood as referring to "dual allegiance."
Consequently, persons with mere dual citizenship do not fall
under this disqualification. Unlike those with dual allegiance,
who must, therefore, be subject to strict process with
respect to the termination of their status, for candidates with
dual citizenship, it should suffice if, upon the filing of their
certificates of candidacy, they elect Philippine citizenship to
terminate their status as persons with dual citizenship
considering that their condition is the unavoidable
consequence of conflicting laws of different states. As
Joaquin G. Bernas, one of the most perceptive members of the

48
Constitutional Commission, pointed out: "[D]ual citizenship is just
a reality imposed on us because we have no control of the laws
on citizenship of other countries. We recognize a child of a
Filipino mother. But whether or not she is considered a citizen of
another country is something completely beyond our control."
By electing Philippine citizenship, such candidates at the same
time forswear allegiance to the other country of which they are
also citizens and thereby terminate their status as dual citizens. It
may be that, from the point of view of the foreign state and of its
laws, such an individual has not effectively renounced his foreign
citizenship. That is of no moment as the following discussion on
40(d) between Senators Enrile and Pimentel clearly shows:
SENATOR ENRILE. Mr. President, I would like to ask clarification
of line 41, page 17: "Any person with dual citizenship" is
disqualified to run for any elective local position. Under the
present Constitution, Mr. President, someone whose mother is a
citizen of the Philippines but his father is a foreigner is a naturalborn citizen of the Republic. There is no requirement that such a
natural-born citizen, upon reaching the age of majority, must elect
or give up Philippine citizenship.
On the assumption that this person would carry two passports,
one belonging to the country of his or her father and one
belonging to the Republic of the Philippines, may such a situation
disqualify the person to run for a local government position?
SENATOR PIMENTEL. To my mind, Mr. President, it only means
that at the moment when he would want to run for public office,
he has to repudiate one of his citizenships.
SENATOR ENRILE. Suppose he carries only a Philippine
passport but the country of origin or the country of the father
claims that person, nevertheless, as a citizen,? No one can
renounce. There are such countries in the world.
1avvphi1

SENATOR PIMENTEL. Well, the very fact that he is running for

public office would, in effect, be an election for him of his desire to
be considered a Filipino citizen.
SENATOR ENRILE. But, precisely, Mr. President, the Constitution
does not require an election. Under the Constitution, a person
whose mother is a citizen of the Philippines is, at birth, a citizen
without any overt act to claim the citizenship.
SENATOR PIMENTEL. Yes. What we are saying, Mr. President,
is: Under the Gentlemans example, if he does not renounce his
other citizenship, then he is opening himself to question. So, if he
is really interested to run, the first thing he should do is to say in
the Certificate of Candidacy that: "I am a Filipino citizen, and I
have only one citizenship."
SENATOR ENRILE. But we are talking from the viewpoint of
Philippine law, Mr. President. He will always have one citizenship,
and that is the citizenship invested upon him or her in the
Constitution of the Republic.
SENATOR PIMENTEL. That is true, Mr. President. But if he
exercises acts that will prove that he also acknowledges other
citizenships, then he will probably fall under this
disqualification.8 (Emphasis supplied)
We have to consider the present case in consonance with our
rulings in Mercado v. Manzano,9 Valles v.
COMELEC,10 and AASJS v.
Datumanong.11 Mercado and Valles involve similar operative facts
as the present case. Manzano and Valles, like Tambunting,
possessed dual citizenship by the circumstances of their birth.
Manzano was born to Filipino parents in the United States which
follows the doctrine of jus soli. Valles was born to an Australian
mother and a Filipino father in Australia. Our rulings
in Manzano and Valles stated that dual citizenship is different
from dual allegiance both by cause and, for those desiring to run

49
for public office, by effect. Dual citizenship is involuntary and
arises when, as a result of the concurrent application of the
different laws of two or more states, a person is simultaneously
considered a national by the said states. Thus, like any other
natural-born Filipino, it is enough for a person with dual
citizenship who seeks public office to file his certificate of
candidacy and swear to the oath of allegiance contained therein.
Dual allegiance, on the other hand, is brought about by the
individuals active participation in the naturalization
process. AASJS states that, under R.A. No. 9225, a Filipino who
becomes a naturalized citizen of another country is allowed to
retain his Filipino citizenship by swearing to the supreme authority
of the Republic of the Philippines. The act of taking an oath of
allegiance is an implicit renunciation of a naturalized citizens
foreign citizenship.

and, at the time of filing the certificate of candidacy, make a

personal and sworn renunciation of any and all foreign citizenship
before any public officer authorized to administer an oath" aside
from the oath of allegiance prescribed in Section 3 of R.A. No.
9225. The twin requirements of swearing to an Oath of Allegiance
and executing a Renunciation of Foreign Citizenship served as
the bases for our recent rulings inJacot v. Dal and
COMELEC,13 Velasco v. COMELEC,14 and Japzon v.
COMELEC,15 all of which involve natural-born Filipinos who later
became naturalized citizens of another country and thereafter ran
for elective office in the Philippines. In the present case,
Tambunting, a natural-born Filipino, did not subsequently become
a naturalized citizen of another country. Hence, the twin
requirements in R.A. No. 9225 do not apply to him.
Tambuntings residency

R.A. No. 9225, or the Citizenship Retention and Reacquisition Act

of 2003, was enacted years after the promulgation
of Manzano and Valles. The oath found in Section 3 of R.A. No.
9225 reads as follows:
I __________ , solemnly swear (or affirm) that I will support and
defend the Constitution of the Republic of the Philippines and
obey the laws and legal orders promulgated by the duly
constituted authorities of the Philippines; and I hereby declare
that I recognize and accept the supreme authority of the
Philippines and will maintain true faith and allegiance thereto; and
that I impose this obligation upon myself voluntarily without
mental reservation or purpose of evasion.
In Sections 2 and 3 of R.A. No. 9225, the framers were not
concerned with dual citizenship per se, but with the status of
naturalized citizens who maintain their allegiance to their
countries of origin even after their naturalization.12 Section 5(3) of
R.A. No. 9225 states that naturalized citizens who reacquire
Filipino citizenship and desire to run for elective public office in
the Philippines shall "meet the qualifications for holding such
public office as required by the Constitution and existing laws

Cordora concluded that Tambunting failed to meet the residency

requirement because of Tambuntings naturalization as an
American. Cordoras reasoning fails because Tambunting is not a
naturalized American. Moreover, residency, for the purpose of
election laws, includes the twin elements of the fact of residing in
a fixed place and the intention to return there permanently,16 and
is not dependent upon citizenship.
In view of the above, we hold that Cordora failed to establish that
Tambunting indeed willfully made false entries in his certificates of
candidacy. On the contrary, Tambunting sufficiently proved his
innocence of the charge filed against him. Tambunting is eligible
for the office which he sought to be elected and fulfilled the
citizenship and residency requirements prescribed by law.
WHEREFORE, we DISMISS the petition. We AFFIRM the
Resolutions of the Commission on Elections En Bancdated 18
August 2006 and 20 February 2007 in EO Case No. 05-17.
SO ORDERED.

50
Footnotes
*

On official leave.
On official leave.

**

***

On official leave.

Rollo, pp. 36-41. Penned by Commissioner Florentino A.

Tuason, Jr., with Chairman Benjamin S. Abalos, Sr.,
Commissioners Resurreccion Z. Borra, Romeo A.
Brawner, Rene V. Sarmiento, and Nicodemo T. Ferrer
concurring.
1

Id. at 44-47. Penned by Commissioner Rene V.

Sarmiento, with Chairman Benjamin S. Abalos, Sr.,
Commissioners Resurreccion Z. Borra, Florentino A.
Tuason, Jr., Romeo A. Brawner, and Nicodemo T. Ferrer
concurring.
2

Id. at 29.

Id. at 30.

Id. at 40.

Kilosbayan, Inc. v. COMELEC, 345 Phil. 1141, 1173

(1997).
6

See Valles v. Commission on Elections, 392 Phil. 327

(2000).
7

367 Phil. 132, 144-145, 147-149 (1999). Citations

omitted.
8

367 Phil. 132 (1999).

10

392 Phil. 327 (2000).

11

G.R. No. 160869, 11 May 2007, 523 SCRA 108.

12

Id. at 117.

13

G.R. No. 179848, 29 November 2008.

14

G.R. No. 180051, 24 December 2008.

15

G.R. No. 180088, 19 January 2009.

See Romualdez-Marcos v. Commission on Elections,

G.R. No. 119976, 18 September 1995, 248 SCRA 300.
16

51

FIRST DIVISION
G.R. No. 166470

Meanwhile, as the only child of Maria and the sole testate heir of
Sotero, Lulu inherited valuable real properties from the San Juan
family (conservatively estimated at P50 million in 1997).

August 7, 2009

CECILIO C. HERNANDEZ, MA. VICTORIA C. HERNANDEZ1

and NATIVIDAD CRUZ-HERNANDEZ, Petitioners,
vs.
JOVITA SAN JUAN-SANTOS, Respondent.
x - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -x
G.R. No. 169217
CECILIO C. HERNANDEZ, MA. VICTORIA C. HERNANDEZSAGUN and TERESA C. HERNANDEZ-VILLA
ABRILLE, Petitioners,
vs.
JOVITA SAN JUAN-SANTOS,2 Respondent.
DECISION
CORONA, J.:
Maria Lourdes San Juan Hernandez (or Lulu) was born on
February 14, 1947 to the spouses Felix Hernandez and Maria
San Juan Hernandez. Unfortunately, the latter died due to
complications during childbirth. After Maria's death, Felix left Lulu
in the care of her maternal uncle, Sotero C. San Juan.
On December 16, 1951, Felix married Natividad Cruz. The union
produced three children, petitioners Cecilio C. Hernandez, Ma.
Victoria C. Hernandez-Sagun and Teresa C. Hernandez-Villa
Abrille.

Sometime in 1957, Lulu went to live with her father and his new
family. She was then 10 years old and studying at La Consolacion
College. However, due to her "violent personality," Lulu stopped
schooling when she reached Grade 5.
In 1968, upon reaching the age of majority, Lulu was given full
control of her estate.3 Nevertheless, because Lulu did not even
finish her elementary education, Felix continued to exercise
actual administration of Lulus properties. Upon Felix's death in
1993, petitioners took over the task of administering Lulu's
properties.
During the period of their informal administration (from 1968 until
1993), Felix and petitioners undertook various "projects" involving
Lulus real properties. In 1974, Felix allegedly purchased one of
Lulus properties for an undisclosed amount to develop the
Marilou Subdivision.4 In 1995, Ma. Victoria informed Lulu that her
11-hectare Montalban, Rizal property5 was under litigation. Thus,
Lulu signed a special power of attorney6 (SPA) believing that she
was authorizing Ma. Victoria to appear in court on her behalf
when she was in fact unknowingly authorizing her half-sister to
sell the said property to the Manila Electric Company
for P18,206,400.7 Thereafter, Cecilio asked Lulu to authorize him
to lease her 45-hectare property in Montalban, Rizal to Oxford
Concrete Aggregates for P58,500 per month so that she could
have a car and driver at her disposal.
In September 1998, Lulu sought the assistance of her maternal
first cousin, respondent Jovita San Juan-Santos, after learning
that petitioners had been dissipating her estate. She confided to
Jovita that she was made to live in the basement of petitioners
Montalban, Rizal home and was receiving a measly daily
allowance of P400 for her food and medication.

52
Respondent was appalled as Lulu was severely overweight,
unkempt and smelled of urine. She later found out that Lulu was
occupying a cramped room lit by a single fluorescent lamp
without running water. Since she had not been given a proper
toilet, Lulu urinated and defecated in the garden. Due to Lulu's
poor hygiene, respondent brought her to several physicians for
medical examination. Lulu was found to be afflicted with
tuberculosis, rheumatism and diabetes from which she was
suffering several complications.8
Thereafter, the San Juan family demanded an inventory and
accounting of Lulus estate from petitioners.9 However, the
demand was ignored.
On October 2, 1998, respondent filed a petition for
guardianship10 in the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of San Mateo,
Rizal, Branch 76. She alleged that Lulu was incapable of taking
care of herself and managing her estate because she was of
weak mind.
Subsequently, petitioners moved to intervene in the proceedings
to oppose the same.
Natividad denied that Marilou Subdivision belonged to Lulu. Since
she and her late husband were the registered owners of the said
property, it was allegedly part of their conjugal partnership.
Cecilio, Teresa and Ma. Victoria, for their part, claimed that the
issue of Lulus competency had been settled in 1968 (upon her
emancipation) when the court ordered her legal guardian and
maternal uncle, Ciriaco San Juan, to deliver the properties for her
to manage.
They likewise asserted that Lulu was literate and, for that reason,
aware of the consequences of executing an SPA. Furthermore,
whether or not Cecilio and Ma. Victoria acted within the scope of
their respective authorities could not be determined in a

guardianship proceeding, such matter being the proper subject of

an ordinary civil action.
Petitioners also admitted that the property developed into the
Marilou Subdivision was among those parcels of land Lulu
inherited from the San Juan family. However, because the "sale"
between Felix and Lulu had taken place in 1974, questions
regarding its legality were already barred by the statute of
limitations. Thus, its validity could no longer be impugned, or so
they claimed.
During the hearing, Lulu was presented and asked to testify on
her genealogy and experiences with the San Juan and
Hernandez families. Lulu identified and described her parents,
stepmother, half-siblings and maternal relatives. She claimed
inheriting tracts of land from the San Juan family. However, these
properties were dissipated by the Hernandez family as they lived
a "luxurious" lifestyle. When asked to explain this allegation, Lulu
said that her stepmother and half-siblings rode in cars while she
was made to ride a tricycle.
Medical specialists testified to explain the results of Lulus
examinations which revealed the alarming state of her
health.11 Not only was Lulu severely afflicted with diabetes
mellitus and suffering from its complications,12 she also had an
existing artheroselorotic cardiovascular disease (which was
aggravated by her obesity). Furthermore, they unanimously
opined that in view of Lulus intelligence level (which was below
average) and fragile mental state, she would not be able to care
for herself and self-administer her medications.
In a decision dated September 25, 2001,13 the RTC concluded
that, due to her weak physical and mental condition, there was a
need to appoint a legal guardian over the person and property of
Lulu. Thus, it declared Lulu an incompetent and appointed
respondent as guardian over the person and property of Lulu on
a P1 million bond.

53
Petitioners moved for reconsideration asserting that the P1 million
bond was grossly insufficient to secure LulusP50-million estate
against fraudulent loss or dissipation.14 The motion, however, was
denied.15
On July 2, 2002, petitioners appealed the September 25, 2001
decision of the RTC to the Court of Appeals (CA).16The appeal
was docketed as CA-G.R. CV No. 75760.
On December 29, 2004, the CA issued a decision affirming the
September 25, 2001 decision of the RTC (in the petition for
guardianship) in toto.17 It held that respondent presented sufficient
evidence to prove that Lulu, because of her illnesses and low
educational attainment, needed assistance in taking care of
herself and managing her affairs considering the extent of her
estate. With regard to the respondents appointment as the legal
guardian, the CA found that, since Lulu did not trust petitioners,
none of them was qualified to be her legal guardian. Because
guardianship was a trust relationship, the RTC was bound to
appoint someone Lulu clearly trusted.
1avvphi1

The PACER subsequently discovered that petitioners were

keeping Lulu somewhere in Rodriguez, Rizal. Despite their initial
hostility to the investigation, Ma. Victoria and Cecilio subsequently
contacted the PACER to inform them that Lulu voluntarily left with
Natividad because her guardian had allegedly been maltreating
her.19
On December 15, 2003, respondent filed a petition for habeas
corpus20 in the CA alleging that petitioners abducted Lulu and
were holding her captive in an undisclosed location in Rodriguez,
Rizal.
On April 26, 2005, the CA granted the petition for habeas
corpus, ruling that Jovita, as her legal guardian, was entitled to
her custody. 21
Petitioners moved for the reconsideration of the said decision but
it was denied in a resolution dated July 12, 2005. 22 Aggrieved,
they filed this petition for review on certiorari docketed as G.R.
No. 169217. This was consolidated with G.R. No. 166470.

Petitioners now assail the December 29, 2004 decision of the CA

in this Court in a petition for review on certiorari docketed as G.R.
No. 166470.18

The basic issue in petitions of this nature is whether the person is

an incompetent who requires the appointment of a judicial
guardian over her person and property.

Meanwhile, Lulu moved into 8 R. Santos St., Marikina City

(Marikina apartment) and was provided with two housemaids
tasked to care for her. Sometime in November 2003, Lulu was
abducted from her Marikina apartment. Jovita immediately sought
the assistance of the Police Anti-Crime Emergency Response
(PACER) division of the Philippine National Police.

Petitioners claim that the opinions of Lulu's attending

physicians23 regarding her mental state were inadmissible in
evidence as they were not experts in psychiatry. Respondent
therefore failed to prove that Lulu's illnesses rendered her an
incompetent. She should have been presumed to be of sound
mind and/or in full possession of her mental capacity. For this
reason, Lulu should be allowed to live with them since under
Articles 194 to 196 of the Family Code,24 legitimate brothers and
sisters, whether half-blood or full-blood are required to support
each other fully.

54
Respondent, on the other hand, reiterated her arguments before
the courts a quo. She disclosed that Lulu had been confined in
Recovery.com, a psychosocial rehabilitation center and
convalescent home care facility in Quezon City, since 2004 due to
violent and destructive behavior. She also had delusions of being
physically and sexually abused by "Boy Negro" and imaginary
pets she called "Michael" and "Madonna."25 The November 21,
2005 medical report26 stated Lulu had unspecified mental
retardation with psychosis but claimed significant improvements
in her behavior.

Under Section 2, Rule 92 of the Rules of Court,31 persons who,

though of sound mind but by reason of age, disease, weak mind
or other similar causes are incapable of taking care of themselves
and their property without outside aid, are considered as
incompetents who may properly be placed under guardianship.
The RTC and the CA both found that Lulu was incapable of taking
care of herself and her properties without outside aid due to her
ailments and weak mind. Thus, since determining whether or not
Lulu is in fact an incompetent would require a reexamination of
the evidence presented in the courts a quo, it undoubtedly
involves questions of fact.

We find the petition to be without merit.

Under Section 50, Rule 103 of the Rules of Court, an ordinary
witness may give his opinion on the mental sanity of a person
with whom he is sufficiently acquainted.27 Lulu's attending
physicians spoke and interacted with her. Such occasions
allowed them to thoroughly observe her behavior and conclude
that her intelligence level was below average and her mental
stage below normal. Their opinions were admissible in evidence.
Furthermore, where the sanity of a person is at issue, expert
opinion is not necessary.28 The observations of the trial judge
coupled with evidence29 establishing the person's state of mental
sanity will suffice.30 Here, the trial judge was given ample
opportunity to observe Lulu personally when she testified before
the RTC.

As a general rule, this Court only resolves questions of law in a

petition for review. We only take cognizance of questions of fact in
exceptional circumstances, none of which is present in this
case.32 We thus adopt the factual findings of the RTC as affirmed
by the CA.
1avvph!1

Similarly, we see no compelling reason to reverse the trial and

appellate courts finding as to the propriety of respondent's
appointment as the judicial guardian of Lulu.33 We therefore affirm
her appointment as such. Consequently, respondent is tasked to
care for and take full custody of Lulu, and manage her estate as
well.34
Inasmuch as respondents appointment as the judicial guardian of
Lulu was proper, the issuance of a writ of habeas corpus in her
favor was also in order.
A writ of habeas corpus extends to all cases of illegal confinement
or detention or by which the rightful custody of person is withheld
from the one entitled thereto.35 Respondent, as the judicial
guardian of Lulu, was duty-bound to care for and protect her
ward. For her to perform her obligation, respondent must have
custody of Lulu. Thus, she was entitled to a writ of habeas
corpus after she was unduly deprived of the custody of her
ward.36

55
WHEREFORE, the petitions are hereby DENIED.
Petitioners are furthermore ordered to render to respondent,
Lulus legal guardian, an accurate and faithful accounting of all
the properties and funds they unlawfully appropriated for
themselves from the estate of Maria Lourdes San Juan
Hernandez, within thirty (30) days from receipt of this decision. If
warranted, the proper complaints should also be filed against
them for any criminal liability in connection with the dissipation of
Maria Lourdes San Juan Hernandezs estate and her unlawful
abduction from the custody of her legal guardian.

Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution, I certify

that the conclusions in the above decision had been reached in
consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the
opinion of the Courts Division.
REYNATO S. PUNO
Chief Justice

Footnotes

Treble costs against petitioners.

"Ma. Teresa Hernandez-Villa Abrille" in some parts of the

records.
1

SO ORDERED.
RENATO C. CORONA
Associate Justice

The Court of Appeals was impleaded as respondent but

was excluded as party in these cases pursuant to Section
4, Rule 45 of the Rules of Court.
2

WE CONCUR:

Order dated July 31, 1968 in SP No. 1127 penned by

Judge Andres Reyes of the Court of First Instance of
Pasig, Rizal, Branch VI. Rollo (G.R. No. 166470), p. 128.
3

REYNATO S. PUNO
Chief Justice
Chairperson

Referred to as Marylou Subdivision or Marilou Village

Subdivision in some parts of the records.
4

ANTONIO T. CARPIO
Associate Justice

TERESITA J. LEONARDODE CASTRO

Associate Justice

LUCAS P. BERSAMIN
Associate Justice
C E R T I F I C AT I O N

Covered by TCT No. 248784. Rollo (G.R. No. 166470),

p. 109.
5

Id., pp. 110-111.

Deed of Sale. Id., pp. 112-115.

Medical report dated September 18, 1998. Id., pp. 118121.

8

56
9

10

Letter dated September 20, 1998. Id., pp. 116-117.

Docketed as Sp. Proc. No. 250. Id., pp. 99-102.

Lulu was examined by cardiologist-internist Perfecto

Palafox, diabetologist-internist Rosa Allyn Sy and general
practitioner Eliza Mei Perez. Surgeon Jacinto Bautista
removed a mass from Lulus ear lobe and skin.

Penned by Associate Justice Amelita G. Tolentino and

concurred in by Associate Justices Roberto A. Barrios and
Vicente S.E. Veloso of the Ninth Division of the Court of
Appeals. Id., pp. 39-54.
21

11

Lulu was nearly blind due to cataract and suspected to

have gallstones in her kidneys.
12

13

Penned by Judge Jose C. Reyes, Jr. Rollo, pp. 87-98.

14

Id., pp. 143-147.

15

Order dated April 26, 2002. Id., pp. 154-155.

16

Docketed as CA-G.R. CV No. 75760.

Penned by Associate Justice Delilah Vidallon-Magtolis

(retired) and concurred in by Associate Justices Eliezer R.
de los Santos (retired) and Monina Arevalo-Zearosa of
the Special Fourth Division of the Court of Appeals. Dated
December 29, 2004. Rollo (G.R. No. 166470), pp. 61-86.
17

18

Under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court.

Signed by Police Superintendent Nicolas M.

Gregorio. Rollo (G.R. No. 169217), pp. 81-82.
19

20

Id., pp. 58-63.

22

Id., pp. 56-57.

23

Supra note 11.

24

Family Code, Arts. 194, 195 and 196 provide:

Article 194. Support compromises everything
indispensable for sustenance, dwelling, clothing,
medical attendance, education and transportation,
in keeping with the financial capacity of the family.
The education of the person entitled to be
supported referred to in the preceding paragraph
shall include his schooling or training for some
profession, trade or vocation, even beyond the
age of majority. Transportation shall include
expenses in going to and from school, or to and
from place of work.
Article 195. Subject to the provisions of the
succeeding articles, the following are obliged to
support each other to the whole extent set forth in
the preceding article:
1. The spouses;
2. Legitimate ascendants and
descendants;
3. Parents and their legitimate children
and the legitimate and illegitimate children
of the latter;

57
4. Parents and their illegitimate children
and the legitimate and illegitimate children
of the latter; and

The witness may also testify on his impression of

the emotion, behavior, condition or appearance of
a person. (emphasis supplied)

5. Legitimate brothers and sisters,

whether of full or half-blood.

28

People v. Bacaling, 447 Phil. 197, 204 (2003). (citations

omitted)

Article 196. Brothers and sisters not legitimately

related, whether of the full or half-blood, are
likewise bound to support each other to the full
extent set forth in Article 194, except only when
the need for support of the brother or sister, being
of age, is due to a cause imputable to the
claimant's fault or negligence.

29

The opinions of Lulu's attending physicians have been

verified by the 2001 medical report of Recovery.com
which diagnosed Lulu's condition as unspecified mental
retardation with psychoses.
30

People v. Bacaling, supra note 28.

31

Section 2, Rule 92, Rules of Court, provides:

Report [the Court of Appeals] on the Condition of the

Ward, Ma. Lourdes S.J. Fernandez, Annex "A." Rollo(G.R.
No. 166470), pp. 248-249.
25

Section 2. Meaning of word "incompetent."

Under this rule, the word "incompetent" includes
persons suffering the penalty of civil interdiction or
who are hospitalized lepers, prodigals, deaf and
dumb who are unable to read and write, those
who are of unsound mind, even though they have
lucid intervals, and persons not being of unsound
mind, but by reason of age, disease, weak mind,
and other similar causes, cannot, without outside
aid, take care of themselves and manage their
property, becoming thereby an easy prey for
deceit and exploitation.

Prepared by attending physician Edison C. Galindez,

pp. 250-254.
26

27

Section 50, Rule 130, Rules of Court, provides:

Section 50. Opinion of an Ordinary Witness. The
opinion of a witness for which proper basis is
given shall be received in evidence regarding-(a) The identity of a person about whom
he has adequate knowledge;

32

(b) A handwriting with which he has

sufficient familiarity; and

33

(c) The mental sanity of a person with

whom he is sufficiently acquainted.

34

Goyena v. Ledesma-Gustilo, 443 Phil. 150, 158-160

(2003). (citations omitted)
See Rules of Court, Rule 93 for the qualifications of a
judicial guardian.
Section 1, Rule 96, Rules of Court, provides:

58
Section 1. To what guardianship shall extend. -- A
guardian appointed shall have care and
custody of the person of his ward, and the
management of his estate, or the management
of his estate only, as the case may be. The
guardian of the estate of a nonresident shall have
the management of all the estate of the ward
within the Philippines, and no court other than that
in which such guardian was appointed shall have

jurisdiction over the guardianship. (emphasis

supplied)
35

Ilusorio v. Bildner, 387 Phil. 915, 922 (2000).

36

See Tijing v. Court of Appeals, 406 Phil. 449 (2001).