Beruflich Dokumente
Kultur Dokumente
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. 78909 June 30, 1989
MATERNITY CHILDREN'S HOSPITAL, represented by ANTERA L. DORADO,
President, petitioner,
vs.
THE HONORABLE SECRETARY OF LABOR AND THE REGIONAL DlRECTOR
OF LABOR, REGION X,respondents.
MEDIALDEA, J.:
This is a petition for certiorari seeking the annulment of the Decision of the
respondent Secretary of Labor dated September 24, 1986, affirming with
modification the Order of respondent Regional Director of Labor, Region X, dated
August 4, 1986, awarding salary differentials and emergency cost of living
allowances (ECOLAS) to employees of petitioner, and the Order denying
petitioner's motion for reconsideration dated May 13, 1987, on the ground of grave
abuse of discretion.
Petitioner is a semi-government hospital, managed by the Board of Directors of
the Cagayan de Oro Women's Club and Puericulture Center, headed by Mrs.
Antera Dorado, as holdover President. The hospital derives its finances from the
club itself as well as from paying patients, averaging 130 per month. It is also
partly subsidized by the Philippine Charity Sweepstakes Office and the Cagayan
De Oro City government.
Petitioner has forty-one (41) employees. Aside from salary and living allowances,
the employees are given food, but the amount spent therefor is deducted from
their respective salaries (pp. 77-78, Rollo).
On May 23, 1986, ten (10) employees of the petitioner employed in different
capacities/positions filed a complaint with the Office of the Regional Director of
Labor and Employment, Region X, for underpayment of their salaries and
ECOLAS, which was docketed as ROX Case No. CW-71-86.
On June 16, 1986, the Regional Director directed two of his Labor Standard and
Welfare Officers to inspect the records of the petitioner to ascertain the truth of the
allegations in the complaints (p. 98, Rollo). Payrolls covering the periods of May,
1974, January, 1985, November, 1985 and May, 1986, were duly submitted for
inspection.
On July 17, 1986, the Labor Standard and Welfare Officers submitted their report
confirming that there was underpayment of wages and ECOLAs of all the
employees by the petitioner, the dispositive portion of which reads:
who signed the complaints, but also those (a) who are not signatories to the
complaint, and (b) those who were no longer in the service of the hospital at the
time the complaints were filed.
Petitioner likewise maintains that the Order of the respondent Regional Director of
Labor, as affirmed with modifications by respondent Secretary of Labor, does not
clearly and distinctly state the facts and the law on which the award was based. In
its "Rejoinder to Comment", petitioner further questions the authority of the
Regional Director to award salary differentials and ECOLAs to private
respondents, (relying on the case of Encarnacion vs. Baltazar, G.R. No. L-16883,
March 27, 1961, 1 SCRA 860, as authority for raising the additional issue of lack
of jurisdiction at any stage of the proceedings, p. 52, Rollo), alleging that the
original and exclusive jurisdiction over money claims is properly lodged in the
Labor Arbiter, based on Article 217, paragraph 3 of the Labor Code.
The primary issue here is whether or not the Regional Director had jurisdiction
over the case and if so, the extent of coverage of any award that should be
forthcoming, arising from his visitorial and enforcement powers under Article 128
of the Labor Code. The matter of whether or not the decision states clearly and
distinctly statement of facts as well as the law upon which it is based, becomes
relevant after the issue on jurisdiction has been resolved.
This is a labor standards case, and is governed by Art. 128-b of the Labor Code,
as amended by E.O. No. 111. Labor standards refer to the minimum requirements
prescribed by existing laws, rules, and regulations relating to wages, hours of
work, cost of living allowance and other monetary and welfare benefits, including
occupational, safety, and health standards (Section 7, Rule I, Rules on the
Disposition of Labor Standards Cases in the Regional Office, dated September
16, 1987). 1 Under the present rules, a Regional Director exercises both visitorial
and enforcement power over labor standards cases, and is therefore empowered
to adjudicate money claims, provided there stillexists an employer-employee
relationship, and the findings of the regional office is not contested by the
employer concerned.
Prior to the promulgation of E.O. No. 111 on December 24, 1986, the Regional
Director's authority over money claims was unclear. The complaint in the present
case was filed on May 23, 1986 when E.O. No. 111 was not yet in effect, and the
prevailing view was that stated in the case of Antonio Ong, Sr. vs. Henry M. Parel,
et al., G.R. No. 76710, dated December 21, 1987, thus:
. . . the Regional Director, in the exercise of his visitorial and
enforcement powers under Article 128 of the Labor Code, has no
authority to award money claims, properly falling within the
jurisdiction of the labor arbiter. . . .
. . . If the inspection results in a finding that the employer has
violated certain labor standard laws, then the regional director
The Regional Director exercised visitorial rights only under then Article 127 of the
Code as follows:
ART. 127. Visitorial Powers. The Secretary of Labor or his
duly authorized representatives, including, but not restricted, to
the labor inspectorate, shall have access to employers' records
and premises at any time of the day or night whenever work is
being undertaken therein, and the right to copy therefrom, to
question any employee and investigate any fact, condition or
matter which may be necessary to determine violations or in aid
in the enforcement of this Title and of any Wage Order or
regulation issued pursuant to this Code.
(Emphasis supplied)
Under the then Labor Code therefore (PD 442 as amended by PD 570-a, as
further amended by PD 850), there were three adjudicatory units: The Regional
Director, the Bureau of Labor Relations and the Labor Arbiter. It became
necessary to clarify and consolidate all governing provisions on jurisdiction into
one document. 2 On April 23, 1976, MOLE Policy Instructions No. 6 was issued,
and provides in part (on labor standards cases) as follows:
POLICY INSTRUCTIONS NO. 6
TO: All Concerned
SUBJECT: DISTRIBUTION OF JURISDICTION OVER LABOR
CASES
xxx xxx xxx
1. The following cases are under the exclusive
original jurisdiction of the Regional Director.
Under PD 850, labor standards cases have been taken from the
arbitration system and placed under the enforcement system,
except where a) questions of law are involved as determined by
the Regional Director, b) the amount involved exceeds
P100,000.00 or over 40% of the equity of the employer,
whichever is lower, c) the case requires evidentiary matters not
disclosed or verified in the normal course of inspection, or
d) there is no more employer-employee relationship.
The purpose is clear: to assure the worker the rights and benefits
due to him under labor standards laws without having to go
through arbitration. The worker need not litigate to get what
legally belongs to him. The whole enforcement machinery of the
Department of Labor exists to insure its expeditious delivery to
him free of charge. (Emphasis supplied)
Under the foregoing, a complaining employee who was denied his rights and
benefits due him under labor standards law need not litigate. The Regional
Director, by virtue of his enforcement power, assured "expeditious delivery to him
of his rights and benefits free of charge", provided of course, he was still in the
employ of the firm.
After PD 850, Article 216 underwent a series of amendments (aside from being renumbered as Article 217) and with it a corresponding change in the jurisdiction of,
and supervision over, the Labor Arbiters:
1. PD 1367 (5-1-78) gave Labor Arbiters
exclusive jurisdiction over unresolved issues in
collective bargaining, etc., and those cases
arising from employer-employee relationsduly
indorsed by the Regional Directors. (It also
removed his jurisdiction over moral or other
damages) In other words, the Labor Arbiter
entertained cases certified to him. (Article 228,
1978 Labor Code.)
2. PD 1391 (5-29-78) all regional units of the
National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC)
were integrated into the Regional Offices
Proper of the Ministry of Labor; effectively
transferring direct administrative control and
supervision over the Arbitration Branch to the
Director of the Regional Office of the Ministry of
Labor. "Conciliable cases" which were thus
previously under the jurisdiction of the defunct
Conciliation Section of the Regional Office for
purposes of conciliation or amicable settlement,
became immediately assignable to the
3. Disposition of Cases.
This view is in consonance with the present "Rules on the Disposition of Labor
Standard Cases in the Regional Offices " 7 issued by the Secretary of Labor,
Franklin M. Drilon on September 16, 1987.
Thus, Sections 2 and 3 of Rule II on "Money Claims Arising from Complaint
Routine Inspection", provide as follows:
Section 2. Complaint inspection. All such complaints shall
immediately be forwarded to the Regional Director who shall
refer the case to the appropriate unit in the Regional Office for
assignment to a Labor Standards and Welfare Officer (LSWO)
for field inspection. When the field inspection does not produce
the desired results, the Regional Director shall summon the
parties for summary investigation to expedite the disposition of
the case. . . .
Section 3. Complaints where no employer-employee relationship
actually exists. Where employer-employee relationship no
longer exists by reason of the fact that it has already been
severed, claims for payment of monetary benefits fall within the
exclusive and original jurisdiction of the labor arbiters. . . .
(Emphasis supplied)
Likewise, it is also clear that the limitation embodied in MOLE Policy Instructions
No. 7 to amounts not exceeding P100,000.00 has been dispensed with, in view of
the following provisions of pars. (b) and (c), Section 7 on "Restitution", the same
Rules, thus:
xxx xxx xxx
(b) Plant-level restitutions may be effected for
money claims not exceeding Fifty Thousand
(P50,000.00). . . .
(c) Restitutions in excess of the aforementioned
amount shall be effected at the Regional Office
or at the worksite subject to the prior approval
of the Regional Director.
which indicate the intention to empower the Regional Director to award money
claims in excess of P100,000.00;provided of course the employer does not
contest the findings made, based on the provisions of Section 8 thereof:
Section 8. Compromise agreement. Should the parties arrive
at an agreement as to the whole or part of the dispute, said
agreement shall be reduced in writing and signed by the parties
The enforcement power of the Regional Director cannot legally be upheld in cases
of separated employees. Article 129 of the Labor Code, cited by petitioner (p.
54, Rollo) is not applicable as said article is in aid of the enforcement power of the
Regional Director; hence, not applicable where the employee seeking to be paid
underpayment of wages is already separated from the service. His claim is purely
a money claim that has to be the subject of arbitration proceedings and therefore
within the original and exclusive jurisdiction of the Labor Arbiter.
Petitioner has likewise questioned the order dated August 4, 1986 of the Regional
Director in that it does not clearly and distinctly state the facts and the law on
which the award is based.
We invite attention to the Minister of Labor's ruling thereon, as follows:
monetary claims and benefits of workers, thereby settling any ambiguity on the
matter. Thus:
SEC. 2. Article 129 of the Labor Code of the Philippines, as
amended, is hereby further amended to read as follows:
Art. 129. Recovery of wages, simple money
claims and other benefits. Upon complaint of
any interested party, the Regional Director of
the Department of Labor and Employment or
any of the duly authorized hearing officers of
the Department is empowered, through
summary proceeding and after due notice, to
hear and decide any matter involving the
recovery of wages and other monetary claims
and benefits, including legal interest, owing to
an employee or person employed in domestic
or household service or househelper under this
Code, arising from employer-employee
relations: Provided, That such complaint does
not include a claim for reinstatement: Provided,
further, That the aggregate money claims of
each employee or househelper do not exceed
five thousand pesos (P5,000.00). The Regional
Director or hearing officer shall decide or
resolve the complaint within thirty (30) calendar
days from the date of the filing of the same. ...
Separate Opinions
SARMIENTO, J., concurring:
Separate Opinions
Subject to my opinion in G.R. Nos. 82805 and 83205.
SARMIENTO, J., concurring:
MELENCIO-HERRERA, J., concurring:
Subject to my opinion in G.R. Nos. 82805 and 83205.
I concur, with the observation that even as reconciled, it would seem inevitable to
state that the conclusion in the Zambales and Ong cases that, prior to Executive
Order No. 111, Regional Directors were not empowered to share the original and
exclusive jurisdiction conferred on Labor Arbiters over money claims, is now
deemed modified, if not superseded.
It may not be amiss to state either that under Section 2, Republic Act No. 6715,
which amends further the Labor Code of the Philippines (PD No. 442), Regional
Directors have also been granted adjudicative powers, albeit limited, over
It may not be amiss to state either that under Section 2, Republic Act No. 6715,
which amends further the Labor Code of the Philippines (PD No. 442), Regional
Directors have also been granted adjudicative powers, albeit limited, over
monetary claims and benefits of workers, thereby settling any ambiguity on the
matter. Thus:
SEC. 2. Article 129 of the Labor Code of the Philippines, as
amended, is hereby further amended to read as follows:
Art. 129. Recovery of wages, simple money
claims and other benefits. Upon complaint of
any interested party, the Regional Director of
the Department of Labor and Employment or
any of the duly authorized hearing officers of
the Department is empowered, through
summary proceeding and after due notice, to
hear and decide any matter involving the
recovery of wages and other monetary claims
and benefits, including legal interest, owing to
an employee or person employed in domestic
or household service or househelper under this
Code, arising from employer-employee
relations: Provided, That such complaint does
not include a claim for reinstatement: Provided,
further, That the aggregate money claims of
each employee or househelper do not exceed
five thousand pesos (P5,000.00). The Regional
Director or hearing officer shall decide or
resolve the complaint within thirty (30) calendar
days from the date of the filing of the same. ...
Footnotes
1 Cited in J. Nolledo, Labor Code of the Philippines, Ann., 1988 Rev. Ed. p. 217.
2 (See Critical Areas in the Administration of Labor Justice) (Proceedings of the
16th Annual Institute on Labor Relations Law 1979, U.P. Law Center, p. 5).
3 Ibid.
4 as amended by Section 2, PD 1691.
5 EO 111 expressly declared that its provisions would become effective fifteen
(15) days after publication in the Official Gazette. The executive order was
published on February 16, 1987 (83 O.G. No. 7, p. 5770) and therefore became
effective on March 3, 1987.
6 A present exception may be found in Section 2 of RA 6715, effective March 20,
1989 which gives Regional Director, "through summary proceeding, to hear and
decide any matter involving the recovery of wages and other monetary claims and
benefits, ... to an employee or person employed in domestic or household service
or househelper ... arising from employee-employer relations: Provided, That such
complaint does not include a claim for reinstatement; Provided, further, That the
aggregate money claims of each employee or househelper do not exceed five
thousand pesos (P5,000.00) ....
7 Cited in J. Nolledo, Labor Code of the Philippines, Ann., 1988 Rev. Ed., p. 216.
3 0 ,
1 9 8 9
The company asserts ignorance of the union affiliations of the men in the
mine but the evidence stands uncontradicted that before the strike was
called a petition was presented by the men to the management carrying
the signatures of about eight hundred (800) worker demanding higher pay
and better working conditions. When the men struck, the operation of the
mine was completely paralyzed and there is a strong indication that a
great majority of the workers joined openly the strike. It would not have
been difficult for the respondent, with the means at its command, to find
for itself the employees and laborers who remained loyal to the company
and to consider those who struck as either members of the union or its
sympathizer.
The respondent's claim as to the motive for the suspension and
discharges lacks substance and support in the evidence and the
inferences to be drawn from it. From all what appears, it is inferred that
the respondent desire to discourage membership in the union and to rout
it if possible. The wholesale discharges were the expression of such
desire. The acts in the mind of the Court, are calculated to have two
effects. They will not only immediately affect the discharged laborers but
would also discourage other laborers from joining or remaining members
of the union.
The allegation that it has always been policy to consider the laborer's
connection with the company terminated upon termination of the working
place in which he is employed is not supported by the facts. It has been
shown that as a general rule when work in a place is completed, workers
are transferred to another working place in one level or to another level,
although in some instances days may elapse before all the men in a
bunch can be absorbed in different levels.
It is alleged that mining operations in the property vary and involve
several types, and that a miner, for example, may be good in one type,
but that it does not necessarily follow that he can do good work in another
type. And that the employment of men in particular jobs not suitable for
them increased the cost of production as a result of lower output.
Consequently, the respondent vehemently insists in its right of selecting
the men that it should employ and that in the exercise of this right it
should not be restrained or interfered with by the Court. It contends that
as to fitness of a laborer to do a particular type of work the opinion of the
management or its technical men should be respected. But all these
arguments are meaningless in the face of the finding of the Court that the
underground laborers transferred to the 'outside' work are not wanting in
experience, efficiency and other conditions alleged to be found among
the fresh laborers. The special qualifications to do particular work can not
rightly be invoked in favor of the employment of new laborers most
specially in those cases of common or unskilled labor like muckers,
trammers, helpers, etc.
1934. In our Bill of Rights we now find the following provision "The right to
form associations or societies for purposes not contrary to law shall not
be abridged." (Par. 6, section 1, art. III, Constitution.) What was an
agitation in the United States which brought about the recommendation
by the Commission on Industrial Relations created by an Act of Congress
in 1912 for the adoption of a Labor Bill of Rights as an amendment to the
United States Constitution is, in our case, virtually an accepted principle,
which may be expanded and vitalized by legislation to keep pace with the
development of time and circumstances.
By and large, these provisions in our Constitution all evince and express
the need of shifting emphasis to community interest with a view to
affirmative enhancement of human values. In conformity with the
constitutional objective and cognizant of the historical fact that industrial
and agricultural disputes had given rise to disquietude, bloodshed and
revolution in our country, the National Assembly enacted Commonwealth
Act No. 103, entitled "An Act to afford protection of labor by creating a
Court of Industrial Relations empowered to fix minimum wages for
laborers and maximum rental to be paid tenants, and to enforce
compulsory arbitration between employers or landlords, and employees
or tenants, respectively; and by prescribing penalties for the violation of
the orders" and, later, Commonwealth Act. No. 213, entitled, "An Act to
define and regulate legitimate labor organizations." (Asto this last
act, vide "finding and policy," preamble [sec. 1]of the Wagner Act [49 Sta.,
449]).
Commonwealth Act No. 103, approved October 29, 1936, was originally
Bill No. 700 of the National Assembly. More light is shed by the
explanatory statement of the Bill than by what transpired in the course of
the deliberation of the measure in the legislative chamber. "El presente
proyecto de ley," thus the explanatory statement of Bill No. 700, 'crea una
Junta de Relaciones Industriales . . . y provee el arbitraje obligatorio. . .
de acuerdo con el Articulo 6, Titulo XIII de la Constitucion, el provee que
"El Estado podrs establacerel arbitraje obligatorio." "Incorporating the
conclusion reached by a committee appointed, a year or so before it was
observed that 'bajo la legislacion actual' " evidently referring to Act No.
4055 "no existe instrumento adecuado para evitar las huelgas. El
Departamentode Trabajo desempea maramente el papel de
pacificadorentre las partes en controversia y sus decisiones no
sonobligatorias ni para los patronos ni para los obreros. El pueblo la
allegado a un grado de desarrollo industrial, quehace imperiosa el que la
intervencion del gobierno en estosconflictos sea mas efectiva . . . ." The
creation of a Court of Industrial Relations was thus proposed, endowed
"no solamente del poder de arbitrar sino tambien del deberde investigar,
decidir, y hacer recomendaciones sobre las cuestiones en conflicto y los
problem as que afectan al Capitaly al Trabajo en la Industria y la
Agricultuta bajola direccion del Presidente de la Mancomunidad de
Filipinaso a peticion del Secretario del Trabajo.
xxx
xxx
xxx
From what has been stated, it appears that the legislation which are now
called upon to construe was enacted in pursuance of what appears to be
deliberate embodiment of a new social policy, founded on the conception
of a society integrated not by independent individuals dealing at arms'
length, but by interdependent members of a consolidated whole whose
interests must be protected against mutual aggression and warfare
among and between divers and diverse units which are impelled by
counter vailing and opposite individual and group interests, and this is
particularly true in the relationship between labor and capital. Social and
industrial disturbances which fifty years ago were feudal-like and of
isolated importance may now well result in a serious strain upon the
entire economic organism of the nation . In the United States labor
legislation has undergone a long process of development too long to
nature here, culminating in the enactments of what were commonly
known as the Clayton Act, the Norris-La Guardia Act, and finally, the
Wagner Act and the Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938. The Wagner Act
created the National Labor Relations Board as an instrumentality of the
Federal Government in the settlement of labor disputes, which device is
aimed at the avoidance of unnecessary friction between labor and capital
and the establishment of industrial peace. Scrutiny of legislation in that
country and of pronouncement made by its Supreme Court reveals a
continuous renovation and change made necessary by the impact of
changing needs and economic pressure brought about by the irresistible
momentum of new social and economic forces developed there. In the
light of changes that have occured, it is doubted if the pronouncement
made by the said Supreme Court in 1905 (Lochner v. New York, 198,
U.S., 45) or in 1908 (Adair v. U.S., 52 Law. ed. 430, 208 U.S., 161, and
Coppage v. Kansas, 236 U.S., 1) cases which are relied upon by the
petitioner in its printed memorandum still retain their virtuality at the
present time. In the Philippines, social legislation has had a similar
development although of course to a much smaller degree and of
different adaptation giving rise to several attempts at meeting and solving
our peculiar social and economic problems. (See Commonwealth to the
National Assembly, September 2,1936; Executive Order No. 49, S. 1936).
The system of voluntary arbitration devised by Act No. 4055 of the
defunct Philippine Legislature has apparently been abandoned by the
enactment of the aforementioned Commonwealth Acts Nos. 103 and 213.
In the midst of changes that have taken place, it may likewise be doubted
if the pronouncement made by this court in the case of People vs. Pomar
(46 Phil., 440) also relied upon by the petitioner in its printed
memorandum still retains its virtually as a living principle. The policy of
laissez faire has to some extent given way the assumption by the
government of the right of intervention even in contractual relations
affected with public interests.
xxx
xxx
xxx
FIRST DIVISION
[G.R. No. 47800. December 2, 1940.]
MAXIMO CALALANG, Petitioner, v. A. D. WILLIAMS, ET
AL., Respondents.
Maximo Calalang in his own behalf.
Solicitor General Ozaeta and Assistant Solicitor General Amparo for
respondents Williams, Fragante and Bayan
City Fiscal Mabanag for the other respondents.
SYLLABUS
1. CONSTITUTIONAL LAW; CONSTITUTIONALITY OF COMMONWEALTH ACT No.
648; DELEGATION OF LEGISLATIVE POWER; AUTHORITY OF DIRECTOR OF
PUBLIC WORKS AND SECRETARY OF PUBLIC WORKS AND COMMUNICATIONS
TO PROMULGATE RULES AND REGULATIONS. The provisions of section 1 of
Commonwealth Act No. 648 do not confer legislative power upon the Director of
Public Works and the Secretary of Public Works and Communications. The
authority therein conferred upon them and under which they promulgated the
rules and regulations now complained of is not to determine what public policy
demands but merely to carry out the legislative policy laid down by the National
Assembly in said Act, to wit, "to promote safe transit upon, and avoid
obstructions on, roads and streets designated as national roads by acts of the
National Assembly or by executive orders of the President of the Philippines"
and to close them temporarily to any or all classes of traffic "whenever the
condition of the road or the traffic thereon makes such action necessary or
advisable in the public convenience and interest." The delegated power, if at all,
therefore, is not the determination of what the law shall be, but merely the
ascertainment of the facts and circumstances upon which the application of said
law is to be predicated. To promulgate rules and regulations on the use of
national roads and to determine when and how long a national road should be
closed to traffic, in view of the condition of the road or the traffic thereon and
the requirements of public convenience and interest, is an administrative
function which cannot be directly discharged by the National Assembly. It must
depend on the discretion of some other government official to whom is confided
the duty of determining whether the proper occasion exists for executing the
law. But it cannot be said that the exercise of such discretion is the making of
the law.
2. ID.; ID.; POLICE POWER; PERSONAL LIBERTY; GOVERNMENTAL AUTHORITY.
Commonwealth Act No. 548 was passed by the National Assembly in the
exercise of the paramount police power of the state. Said Act, by virtue of which
the rules and regulations complained of were promulgated, aims to promote
safe transit upon and avoid obstructions on national roads, in the interest and
convenience of the public. In enacting said law, therefore, the National
Assembly was prompted by considerations of public convenience and welfare. It
was inspired by a desire to relieve congestion of traffic, which is, to say the
least, a menace to public safety. Public welfare, then, lies at the bottom of the
enactment of said law, and the state in order to promote the general welfare
may interfere with personal liberty, with property, and with business and
occupations. Persons and property may be subjected to all kinds of restraints
and burdens, in order to secure the general comfort, health, and prosperity of
the state (U.S. v. Gomer Jesus, 31 Phil., 218). To this fundamental aim of our
Government the rights of the individual are subordinated. Liberty is a blessing
without which life is a misery, but liberty should not be made to prevail over
authority because then society will fall into anarchy. Neither should authority be
made to prevail over liberty because then the individual will fall into slavery.
The citizen should achieve the required balance of liberty and authority in his
mind through education and, personal discipline, so that there may be
established the resultant equilibrium, which means peace and order and
happiness for all. The moment greater authority is conferred upon the
government, logically so much is withdrawn from the residuum of liberty which
resides in the people. The paradox lies in the fact that the apparent curtailment
of liberty is precisely the very means of insuring its preservation.
3. ID.; ID.; SOCIAL JUSTICE. Social justice is "neither communism, nor
despotism, nor atomism, nor anarchy," but the humanization of laws and the
equalization of social and economic forces by the State so that justice in its
rational and objectively secular conception may at least be approximated. Social
justice means the promotion of the welfare of all the people, the adoption by
the Government of measures calculated to insure economic stability of all the
competent elements of society, through the maintenance of a proper economic
and social equilibrium in the interrelations of the members of the community,
constitutionally, through the adoption of measures legally justifiable, or extraconstitutionally, through the exercise of powers underlying the existence of all
governments on the time-honored principle of salus populi est suprema lex.
Social justice, therefore, must be founded on the recognition of the necessity of
interdependence among divers and diverse units of a society and of the
protection that should be equally and evenly extended to all groups as a
combined force in our social and economic life, consistent with the fundamental
and paramount objective of the state of promoting the health, comfort, and
quiet of all persons, and of bringing about "the greatest good to the greatest
number."
DECISION
LAUREL, J.:
It is alleged in the petition that the National Traffic Commission, in its resolution
of July 17, 1940, resolved to recommend to the Director of Public Works and to
the Secretary of Public Works and Communications that animal-drawn vehicles
be prohibited from passing along Rosario Street extending from Plaza Calderon
de la Barca to Dasmarias Street, from 7:30 a.m. to 12:30 p.m. and from 1:30
p.m. to 5:30 p.m.; and along Rizal Avenue extending from the railroad crossing
at Antipolo Street to Echague Street, from 7 a.m. to 11 p.m., from a period of
one year from the date of the opening of the Colgante Bridge to traffic; that the
Chairman of the National Traffic Commission, on July 18, 1940 recommended to
the Director of Public Works the adoption of the measure proposed in the
resolution aforementioned, in pursuance of the provisions of Commonwealth Act
No. 548 which authorizes said Director of Public Works, with the approval of the
Secretary of Public Works and Communications, to promulgate rules and
regulations to regulate and control the use of and traffic on national roads; that
on August 2, 1940, the Director of Public Works, in his first indorsement to the
Secretary of Public Works and Communications, recommended to the latter the
approval of the recommendation made by the Chairman of the National Traffic
Commission as aforesaid, with the modification that the closing of Rizal Avenue
to traffic to animal-drawn vehicles be limited to the portion thereof extending
from the railroad crossing at Antipolo Street to Azcarraga Street; that on August
10, 1940, the Secretary of Public Works and Communications, in his second
indorsement addressed to the Director of Public Works, approved the
recommendation of the latter that Rosario Street and Rizal Avenue be closed to
traffic of animal-drawn vehicles, between the points and during the hours as
above indicated, for a period of one year from the date of the opening of the
Colgante Bridge to traffic; that the Mayor of Manila and the Acting Chief of
Police of Manila have enforced and caused to be enforced the rules and
regulations thus adopted; that as a consequence of such enforcement, all
animal-drawn vehicles are not allowed to pass and pick up passengers in the
places above-mentioned to the detriment not only of their owners but of the
riding public as well.
It is contended by the petitioner that Commonwealth Act No. 548 by which the
Director of Public Works, with the approval of the Secretary of Public Works and
Communications, is authorized to promulgate rules and regulations for the
regulation and control of the use of and traffic on national roads and streets is
unconstitutional because it constitutes an undue delegation of legislative power.
This contention is untenable. As was observed by this court in Rubi v. Provincial
Board of Mindoro (39 Phil, 660, 700), "The rule has nowhere been better stated
than in the early Ohio case decided by Judge Ranney, and since followed in a
multitude of cases, namely: The true distinction therefore is between the
delegation of power to make the law, which necessarily involves a discretion as
to what it shall be, and conferring an authority or discretion as to its execution,
to be exercised under and in pursuance of the law. The first cannot be done; to
the latter no valid objection can be made. (Cincinnati, W. & Z. R. Co. v.
Commrs. Clinton County, 1 Ohio St., 88.) Discretion, as held by Chief Justice
Marshall in Wayman v. Southard (10 Wheat., 1) may be committed by the
Legislature to an executive department or official. The Legislature may make
decisions of executive departments or subordinate officials thereof, to whom it
has committed the execution of certain acts, final on questions of fact. (U.S. v.
Kinkead, 248 Fed., 141.) The growing tendency in the decisions is to give
prominence to the necessity of the case."
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jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"SECTION 1. To promote safe transit upon, and avoid obstructions on, roads
and streets designated as national roads by acts of the National Assembly or by
executive orders of the President of the Philippines, the Director of Public Works,
with the approval of the Secretary of Public Works and Communications, shall
promulgate the necessary rules and regulations to regulate and control the use
of and traffic on such roads and streets. Such rules and regulations, with the
approval of the President, may contain provisions controlling or regulating the
construction of buildings or other structures within a reasonable distance from
along the national roads. Such roads may be temporarily closed to any or all
classes of traffic by the Director of Public Works and his duly authorized
representatives whenever the condition of the road or the traffic thereon makes
such action necessary or advisable in the public convenience and interest, or for
a specified period, with the approval of the Secretary of Public Works and
Communications."
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The above provisions of law do not confer legislative power upon the Director of
Public Works and the Secretary of Public Works and Communications. The
authority therein conferred upon them and under which they promulgated the
rules and regulations now complained of is not to determine what public policy
demands but merely to carry out the legislative policy laid down by the National
Assembly in said Act, to wit, "to promote safe transit upon and avoid
obstructions on, roads and streets designated as national roads by acts of the
National Assembly or by executive orders of the President of the Philippines"
and to close them temporarily to any or all classes of traffic "whenever the
condition of the road or the traffic makes such action necessary or advisable in
the public convenience and interest." The delegated power, if at all, therefore, is
not the determination of what the law shall be, but merely the ascertainment of
the facts and circumstances upon which the application of said law is to be
predicated. To promulgate rules and regulations on the use of national roads
and to determine when and how long a national road should be closed to traffic,
in view of the condition of the road or the traffic thereon and the requirements
of public convenience and interest, is an administrative function which cannot
be directly discharged by the National Assembly. It must depend on the
discretion of some other government official to whom is confided the duty of
determining whether the proper occasion exists for executing the law. But it
cannot be said that the exercise of such discretion is the making of the law. As
was said in Lockes Appeal (72 Pa. 491): "To assert that a law is less than a law,
because it is made to depend on a future event or act, is to rob the Legislature
of the power to act wisely for the public welfare whenever a law is passed
relating to a state of affairs not yet developed, or to things future and
impossible to fully know." The proper distinction the court said was this: "The
Legislature cannot delegate its power to make the law; but it can make a law to
delegate a power to determine some fact or state of things upon which the law
makes, or intends to make, its own action depend. To deny this would be to
stop the wheels of government. There are many things upon which wise and
useful legislation must depend which cannot be known to the law-making
power, and, must, therefore, be a subject of inquiry and determination outside
of the halls of legislation." (Field v. Clark, 143 U. S. 649, 694; 36 L. Ed. 294.)
In the case of People v. Rosenthal and Osmea, G.R. Nos. 46076 and 46077,
promulgated June 12, 1939, and in Pangasinan Transportation v. The Public
Service Commission, G.R. No. 47065, promulgated June 26, 1940, this Court
had occasion to observe that the principle of separation of powers has been
made to adapt itself to the complexities of modern governments, giving rise to
the adoption, within certain limits, of the principle of "subordinate legislation,"
not only in the United States and England but in practically all modern
governments. Accordingly, with the growing complexity of modern life, the
multiplication of the subjects of governmental regulations, and the increased
difficulty of administering the laws, the rigidity of the theory of separation of
governmental powers has, to a large extent, been relaxed by permitting the
delegation of greater powers by the legislative and vesting a larger amount of
discretion in administrative and executive officials, not only in the execution of
the laws, but also in the promulgation of certain rules and regulations calculated
to promote public interest.
The petitioner further contends that the rules and regulations promulgated by
the respondents pursuant to the provisions of Commonwealth Act No. 548
constitute an unlawful interference with legitimate business or trade and abridge
the right to personal liberty and freedom of locomotion. Commonwealth Act No.
548 was passed by the National Assembly in the exercise of the paramount
police power of the state.
Said Act, by virtue of which the rules and regulations complained of were
promulgated, aims to promote safe transit upon and avoid obstructions on
national roads, in the interest and convenience of the public. In enacting said
law, therefore, the National Assembly was prompted by considerations of public
convenience and welfare. It was inspired by a desire to relieve congestion of
traffic. which is, to say the least, a menace to public safety. Public welfare,
then, lies at the bottom of the enactment of said law, and the state in order to
promote the general welfare may interfere with personal liberty, with property,
and with business and occupations. Persons and property may be subjected to
all kinds of restraints and burdens, in order to secure the general comfort,
health, and prosperity of the state (U.S. v. Gomez Jesus, 31 Phil., 218). To this
fundamental aim of our Government the rights of the individual are
subordinated. Liberty is a blessing without which life is a misery, but liberty
should not be made to prevail over authority because then society will fall into
anarchy. Neither should authority be made to prevail over liberty because then
the individual will fall into slavery. The citizen should achieve the required
balance of liberty and authority in his mind through education and personal
discipline, so that there may be established the resultant equilibrium, which
means peace and order and happiness for all. The moment greater authority is
conferred upon the government, logically so much is withdrawn from the
residuum of liberty which resides in the people. The paradox lies in the fact that
the apparent curtailment of liberty is precisely the very means of insuring its
preservation.
The scope of police power keeps expanding as civilization advances. As was said
in the case of Dobbins v. Los Angeles (195 U.S. 223, 238; 49 L. ed. 169), "the
right to exercise the police power is a continuing one, and a business lawful
today may in the future, because of the changed situation, the growth of
population or other causes, become a menace to the public health and welfare,
and be required to yield to the public good." And in People v. Pomar (46 Phil.,
440), it was observed that "advancing civilization is bringing within the police
power of the state today things which were not thought of as being within such
power yesterday. The development of civilization, the rapidly increasing
population, the growth of public opinion, with an increasing desire on the part of
the masses and of the government to look after and care for the interests of the
individuals of the state, have brought within the police power many questions
for regulation which formerly were not so considered."
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The petitioner finally avers that the rules and regulations complained of infringe
upon the constitutional precept regarding the promotion of social justice to
insure the well-being and economic security of all the people. The promotion of
social justice, however, is to be achieved not through a mistaken sympathy
towards any given group. Social justice is "neither communism, nor despotism,
nor atomism, nor anarchy," but the humanization of laws and the equalization
of social and economic forces by the State so that justice in its rational and
objectively secular conception may at least be approximated. Social justice
means the promotion of the welfare of all the people, the adoption by the
Government of measures calculated to insure economic stability of all the
competent elements of society, through the maintenance of a proper economic
and social equilibrium in the interrelations of the members of the community,
constitutionally, through the adoption of measures legally justifiable, or extraconstitutionally, through the exercise of powers underlying the existence of all
governments on the time-honored principle of salus populi est suprema lex.
Social justice, therefore, must be founded on the recognition of the necessity of
interdependence among divers and diverse units of a society and of the
protection that should be equally and evenly extended to all groups as a
combined force in our social and economic life, consistent with the fundamental
and paramount objective of the state of promoting the health, comfort, and
quiet of all persons, and of bringing about "the greatest good to the greatest
number."
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In view of the foregoing, the writ of prohibition prayed for is hereby denied, with
costs against the petitioner. So ordered.
Avancea, C.J., Imperial, Diaz. and Horrilleno. JJ. concur.
10. The directive was complied with . . . . The reason for not
conducting ramp inventory was put forth as:
It is clear that the grievance was filed with Mr. Abad's secretary during his
12
absence. Under Section 2 of the CBA aforequoted, the division head shall act on the
grievance within five (5) days from the date of presentation thereof, otherwise "the
grievance must be resolved in favor of the aggrieved party." It is not disputed that the
grievants knew that division head Reynaldo Abad was then "on leave" when they filed
13
their grievance which was received by Abad's secretary. This knowledge, however,
should not prevent the application of the CBA.
On this score, respondent NLRC aptly ruled:
. . . Based on the facts heretofore narrated, division head Reynaldo
Abad had to act on the grievance of complainants within five days
from 21 November 1984. Therefore, when Reynaldo Abad, failed to
act within the reglementary period, complainants, believing in good
faith that the effect of the CBA had already set in, cannot be blamed
if they did not conduct ramp inventory for the days thereafter. In this
regard, respondent PAL argued that Reynaldo Abad was on leave at
the time the grievance was presented. This, however, is of no
moment, for it is hard to believe that everything under Abad's
authority would have to stand still during his absence from office. To
be sure, it is to be expected that someone has to be left to attend to
Abad's duties. Of course, this may be a product of inadvertence on
the part of PAL management, but certainly, complainants should not
14
be made to suffer the consequences.
15
employer. That could not have been the intendment of the pertinent provision of the
CBA, much less the benevolent policy underlying our labor laws.
ACCORDINGLY, on the foregoing premises, the instant petition is hereby DENIED and
the assailed decision of respondent National Labor Relations Commission is
AFFIRMED. This judgment is immediately executory.
SO ORDERED.
Narvasa, C.J., Feliciano, Nocon and Campos, Jr., JJ., concur.
It is not capable of an exact definition but has been, purposely, veiled in general terms
to underscore its all-comprehensive embrace.
"Its scope, ever-expanding to meet the exigencies of the times, even to anticipate the
future where it could be done, provides enough room for an efficient and flexible
6
response to conditions and circumstances thus assuring the greatest benefits."
It finds no specific Constitutional grant for the plain reason that it does not owe its
origin to the Charter. Along with the taxing power and eminent domain, it is inborn in
the very fact of statehood and sovereignty. It is a fundamental attribute of government
that has enabled it to perform the most vital functions of governance. Marshall, to
7
whom the expression has been credited, refers to it succinctly as the plenary power
8
of the State "to govern its citizens."
"The police power of the State ... is a power coextensive with self- protection, and it is
not inaptly termed the "law of overwhelming necessity." It may be said to be that
inherent and plenary power in the State which enables it to prohibit all things hurtful to
9
the comfort, safety, and welfare of society."
It constitutes an implied limitation on the Bill of Rights. According to Fernando, it is
"rooted in the conception that men in organizing the state and imposing upon its
government limitations to safeguard constitutional rights did not intend thereby to
enable an individual citizen or a group of citizens to obstruct unreasonably the
enactment of such salutary measures calculated to ensure communal peace, safety,
10
good order, and welfare." Significantly, the Bill of Rights itself does not purport to be
an absolute guaranty of individual rights and liberties "Even liberty itself, the greatest of
11
all rights, is not unrestricted license to act according to one's will." It is subject to the
far more overriding demands and requirements of the greater number.
Notwithstanding its extensive sweep, police power is not without its own limitations.
For all its awesome consequences, it may not be exercised arbitrarily or unreasonably.
Otherwise, and in that event, it defeats the purpose for which it is exercised, that is, to
advance the public good. Thus, when the power is used to further private interests at
12
the expense of the citizenry, there is a clear misuse of the power.
In the light of the foregoing, the petition must be dismissed.
13
As a general rule, official acts enjoy a presumed vahdity. In the absence of clear and
convincing evidence to the contrary, the presumption logically stands.
The petitioner has shown no satisfactory reason why the contested measure should be
nullified. There is no question that Department Order No. 1 applies only to "female
14
contract workers," but it does not thereby make an undue discrimination between the
15
sexes. It is well-settled that "equality before the law" under the Constitution does not
import a perfect Identity of rights among all men and women. It admits of
classifications, provided that (1) such classifications rest on substantial distinctions; (2)
they are germane to the purposes of the law; (3) they are not confined to existing
16
conditions; and (4) they apply equally to all members of the same class.
The Court is satisfied that the classification made-the preference for female workers
rests on substantial distinctions.
As a matter of judicial notice, the Court is well aware of the unhappy plight that has
befallen our female labor force abroad, especially domestic servants, amid exploitative
working conditions marked by, in not a few cases, physical and personal abuse. The
sordid tales of maltreatment suffered by migrant Filipina workers, even rape and
various forms of torture, confirmed by testimonies of returning workers, are compelling
motives for urgent Government action. As precisely the caretaker of Constitutional
rights, the Court is called upon to protect victims of exploitation. In fulfilling that duty,
the Court sustains the Government's efforts.
The same, however, cannot be said of our male workers. In the first place, there is no
evidence that, except perhaps for isolated instances, our men abroad have been
afflicted with an Identical predicament. The petitioner has proffered no argument that
the Government should act similarly with respect to male workers. The Court, of
course, is not impressing some male chauvinistic notion that men are superior to
women. What the Court is saying is that it was largely a matter of evidence (that
women domestic workers are being ill-treated abroad in massive instances) and not
upon some fanciful or arbitrary yardstick that the Government acted in this case. It is
evidence capable indeed of unquestionable demonstration and evidence this Court
accepts. The Court cannot, however, say the same thing as far as men are concerned.
There is simply no evidence to justify such an inference. Suffice it to state, then, that
insofar as classifications are concerned, this Court is content that distinctions are
borne by the evidence. Discrimination in this case is justified.
As we have furthermore indicated, executive determinations are generally final on the
Court. Under a republican regime, it is the executive branch that enforces policy. For
their part, the courts decide, in the proper cases, whether that policy, or the manner by
which it is implemented, agrees with the Constitution or the laws, but it is not for them
to question its wisdom. As a co-equal body, the judiciary has great respect for
determinations of the Chief Executive or his subalterns, especially when the legislature
itself has specifically given them enough room on how the law should be effectively
enforced. In the case at bar, there is no gainsaying the fact, and the Court will deal
with this at greater length shortly, that Department Order No. 1 implements the rulemaking powers granted by the Labor Code. But what should be noted is the fact that in
spite of such a fiction of finality, the Court is on its own persuaded that prevailing
conditions indeed call for a deployment ban.
There is likewise no doubt that such a classification is germane to the purpose behind
the measure. Unquestionably, it is the avowed objective of Department Order No. 1 to
17
"enhance the protection for Filipino female overseas workers" this Court has no
quarrel that in the midst of the terrible mistreatment Filipina workers have suffered
abroad, a ban on deployment will be for their own good and welfare.
The Order does not narrowly apply to existing conditions. Rather, it is intended to apply
indefinitely so long as those conditions exist. This is clear from the Order itself
("Pending review of the administrative and legal measures, in the Philippines and in
18
the host countries . . ." ), meaning to say that should the authorities arrive at a means
impressed with a greater degree of permanency, the ban shall be lifted. As a stop-gap
"Protection to labor" does not signify the promotion of employment alone. What
concerns the Constitution more paramountly is that such an employment be above all,
decent, just, and humane. It is bad enough that the country has to send its sons and
daughters to strange lands because it cannot satisfy their employment needs at home.
Under these circumstances, the Government is duty-bound to insure that our toiling
expatriates have adequate protection, personally and economically, while away from
home. In this case, the Government has evidence, an evidence the petitioner cannot
seriously dispute, of the lack or inadequacy of such protection, and as part of its duty, it
has precisely ordered an indefinite ban on deployment.
The Court finds furthermore that the Government has not indiscriminately made use of
its authority. It is not contested that it has in fact removed the prohibition with respect
to certain countries as manifested by the Solicitor General.
The non-impairment clause of the Constitution, invoked by the petitioner, must yield to
31
the loftier purposes targetted by the Government. Freedom of contract and
enterprise, like all other freedoms, is not free from restrictions, more so in this
jurisdiction, where laissez faire has never been fully accepted as a controlling
economic way of life.
This Court understands the grave implications the questioned Order has on the
business of recruitment. The concern of the Government, however, is not necessarily
to maintain profits of business firms. In the ordinary sequence of events, it is profits
that suffer as a result of Government regulation. The interest of the State is to provide
a decent living to its citizens. The Government has convinced the Court in this case
that this is its intent. We do not find the impugned Order to be tainted with a grave
abuse of discretion to warrant the extraordinary relief prayed for.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED. No costs.
SO ORDERED.
Yap, C.J., Fernan, Narvasa, Melencio-Herrera, Cruz, Paras, Feliciano, Gancayco,
Padilla, Bidin, Cortes and Grio-Aquino, JJ., concur.
Gutierrez, Jr. and Medialdea, JJ., are on leave.
reasons that in those cases it was the persons themselves whose rights and
immunities under the constitution were being violated that invoked the protection of the
courts.
The petitioner is within its legitimate sphere of interest when it complains that the
appealed order restrains it in its liberty to engage the men it pleases. This complaint
merits a more detailed examination.
That the employer's right to hire labor is not absolute has to be admitted. "This
privilege of hiring and firing ad libitum is, of course, being subjected to restraints
today." Statutes are cutting in on it. And so does Commonwealth Act No. 103. The
regulations of the hours of labor of employees and of the employment of women and
children are familiar examples of the limitation of the employer's right in this regard.
The petitioner's request for permission to employ additional; laborers is an implicit
recognition of the correctness of the proposition. The power of the legislature to make
regulations is subject only to the condition that they should be affected with public
interest and reasonable under the circumstances. The power may be exercised directly
by the law-making body or delegated by appropriate rules to the courts or
administrative agencies.
We are of the opinion that the order under consideration meets the test of
reasonableness and public interest. The passage of Commonwealth Act No. 103 was
"in conformity with the constitutional objective and . . . the historical fact that industrial
and agricultural disputes have given rise to disquietude, bloodshed and revolution in
our country." (Antamok Goldfields Mining Co. vs. Court of Industrial Relations, 40 Off.
1
Gaz., 8th Supp., 173.) "Commonwealth Act No. 103 has precisely vested the Court of
Industrial Relations with authority to intervene in all disputes between employees or
strikes arising from the difference as regards wages, compensation, and other labor
conditions which it may take cognizance of." (Central Azucarera de Tarlac vs. Court of
2
Industrial Relations, 40 Off. Gaz., 3rd Supp., 319, 324.) Thus it has jurisdiction to
determine the number of men to be laid off during off-seasons. By the same token, the
court may specify that a certain proportion of the additional laborers to be employed
should be Filipinos, if such condition, in the court's opinion, "is necessary or expedient
for the purpose of settling disputes or doing justice to the parties."
The order in question has that specific end in view. In parallel view the court observed:
"Undoubtedly, without the admonition of the Court, nothing could prevent petitioner
from hiring purely alien laborers, and there is no gainsaying the fact that further conflict
or dispute would naturally ensue. To cope with this contingency, and acting within the
powers granted by the organic law, the court, believing in the necessity and
expediency of making patent its desire to avoid probable and possible further
misunderstanding between the parties, issued the order."
We are not prepared to declare that the order is not conducive to the aim pursued. The
question is a practical one depending on facts with which the court is best familiar. The
fact already noted should not be lost sight of that there is a pending strike and
besides, that the employment of temporary laborers was opposed by the striking
employees and was the subject of a protracted hearing.
We can not agree with the petitioner that the order constitutes an unlawful intrusion
into the sphere of legislation, by attempting to lay down a public policy of the state or to
settle a political question. In the first place, we believe, as we have already explained,
that the court's action falls within the legitimate scope of its jurisdiction. In the second
place, the order does not formulate a policy and is not political in character. It is not a
permanent, all-embracing regulation. It is a compromise and emergency measure
applicable only in this case and calculated to bridge a temporary gap and to adjust
conflicting interests in an existing and menacing controversy. The hiring of Chinese
laborers by the petitioner was rightly considered by the court likely to lead the parties
away from the reconciliation which it was the function of the court to effectuate.
As far as the petitioner is concerned, the requirement that majority of the laborers to be
employed should be Filipinos is certain not arbitrary, unreasonable or unjust. The
petitioner's right to employ labor or to make contract with respect thereto is not
unreasonably curtailed and its interest is not jeopardized. We take it that the nationality
of the additional laborers to be taken in is immaterial to the petitioner. In its application
for permission to employ twelve temporary laborers it expressly says that these could
be Filipinos or Chinese. On the face of this statement, assuming the same to be
sincere, the petitioner objection to the condition imposed by the court would appear to
be academic and a trifle.
We should not close without adverting to the fact that the petitioner does not so much
as pretend that the hiring of additional laborers is its prerogative as a matter of right. It
seems to be conceded that during the pendency of the dispute the petitioner could
employ temporary laborers only with the permission of the Court of Industrial
Relations. The granting of the application thus lies within the sound judgment of the
court, and if the court could turn it down entirely, as we think it could, its authority to
quality the permission should be undeniable, provided only that the qualification is not
arbitrary, against law, morals, or established public policy, which it is not; it is an
expedient and emergency step designed to relieve petitioner's own difficulties. Also
important to remember is that it is not compulsory on petitioner's part to take
advantage of the order. Being a permute petitioner is the sole judge of whether it
should take the order as it is, or leave it if it does not suit its interest to hire new
laborers other than Chinese.
The order appealed from is affirmed with costs to this appeal against the petitionerappellant.
Moran, C.J., Pablo, Padilla, and Torres, JJ., concur.
Separate Opinions
OZAETA, J., with whom concur PARAS, MONTEMAYOR, and
REYES, JJ., dissenting:
During the trial of an industrial dispute between the petitioner and the respondent labor
union, the former applied to the Court of Industrial Relations for authority "to hire about
twelve more laborers from time to time and on a temporary basis, to be chosen by the
petitioner from either Filipinos or Chinese." the court granted the authority applied for
but imposed as a condition that the majority of the twelve new laborers to be hired
"should be native and only a nominal percentage thereof alien." In imposing such
condition the court said:
The hiring of laborers who are not native or Filipino should be discouraged, as
it is being discouraged by this court. In these critical moments of
unemployment, any competition of alien and native labor would be destructive
of our Nation that is in the making. By the act of God, this nation is the
Philippines, her soil is the patrimony of the Filipino people, and in this
Philippine soil the Filipino laborers must have priority and preference. No
capitalistic management can violate this written law, unless it wants to court
trouble and conflict. In the hiring, therefore, of laborers, it is the opinion of this
court that management, in employing aliens, should be prudent and cautious
and should, as much as possible, employ only a small percentage thereof
limited to those absolutely necessary and confidential.
The power of the Court of Industrial Relations to impose such condition as to limit the
authority of the employer to hire laborers than Filipinos is challenged by the petitioner.
"The petitioner is within its legitimate sphere of interest when it complains that the
appealed order restrains it in liberty to engage the men it pleases," says the majority
opinion, and we add "regardless of race or nationality." It is true that no alien laborer
who may be adversely affected by the order has been made a party herein. Under the
circumstances of the case he could not be expected to have intervened in the incident
which gave rise to the order complained of. But his intervention is not necessary in
order to determine whether or not the Court of Industrial Relations is empowered by
law to impose the condition above mentioned. If the court has no power to discriminate
against a certain class of laborers on account of their race or nationality, it has no
power to impose the condition in question, and the employer has legitimate right to
complain against such imposition.
The Court of Industrial Relations impliedly admits the nonexistence of any statue
providing that Filipino laborers must be preferred over aliens; but it claims or adopts an
"unwritten law" to that effect and says that "no capitalistic management can violate this
unwritten law, unless it wants to court trouble and conflict." Who made such unwritten
law? Certainly the Congress of the Philippines, the only entity authorized by the
Constitution to make laws, and which does not promulgate unwritten laws, did not do
so. The court, therefore, cannot take cognizance of, and much less apply, such
supposed unwritten law.
It is sheer usurpation of legislative power for the court to enact or make laws. Its power
is confined to interpreting and applying the laws enacted by the legislature.
The case of Truax vs. Reich (600 law. ed., 131), which was decided by the Supreme
Court of the United States on November 1, 1915, is of pertinent and persuasive
application to the question at issue in that, in our opinion, it emphasizes the utter lack
of power of the court to impose the condition here complained of; for in said case
Supreme Court of the United States ruled that the Legislature of the State of Arizona
could not validly enact a law similar to the supposed unwritten law which the Court of
Industrial Relations has conceived and has tried to enforce. The law involved in said
case pertinently reads as follows:
SEC. 1. Any company, corporation, partnership, association or individual who
is, may hereafter become, an employer of more than five (5) workers at any
one time, in the state of Arizona, regardless of kind or class of work, or sex of
workers, shall employ not less than (80) per cent qualified electors or nativeborn citizens of the United States or some subdivision thereof.
SEC. 2. Any company, corporation, partnership, association or individual,
their agent or agents, found guilty of violating any of the provisions of this act
shall be subject to a fine of not less than one hundred ($100) dollars, and
imprisoned for not less than thirty (30) days.
Mike Raich, a native of Austria and an inhabitant of the State of Arizona, but not a
qualified elector, was employed as a cook by William Truax in his restaurant, where he
had nine employees, of whom seven were neither native-born citizens of the United
States nor qualified electors. After the passage of said law Raich was informed by his
employer that because of its requirements and because of the fear of the penalties that
would be incurred in case of its violation, he would be discharged. Thereupon Raich
sued Truax and the Attorney General of Arizona to enjoin them from enforcing the law
on the ground that it was unconstitutional because it denied him the equal protection of
the laws. Both the District Court and the Supreme Court of the United States upheld
his contention. The court said that the complainant was entitled under the Fourteenth
Amendment to the equal protection of the laws of Arizona. "These provisions," said the
court, "are universal in their application, to all person within the territorial jurisdiction,
without regard to any differences of race, of color, or of nationality; and the equal laws.
. . . The discrimination defined by the act does not pertain to the regulation or
distribution of the public domain, or of the common property or resources of the people
of the state, the enjoyment of which may be limited to its citizens as against both aliens
and the citizens of other states." The court said further:
It is sought to justify this act as an exercise of the power of the state to make
reasonable classifications in legislating to promote the health, safety, morals,
and welfare of those within its jurisdiction. But this admitted authority, with the
broad range of legislative discretion that it implies, does not go so far as to
make it possible for the state to deny to lawful inhabitants, because of their
race or nationality, the ordinary means of earning a livelihood. It requires no
argument to show that the right to work for a living in the common
occupations of the community is of the very essence of the personal freedom
and opportunity that it was the purpose of the Amendment to secure. . . . If
this could be refused solely upon the ground of race or nationality, the
prohibition of the denial to any person of the equal protection of the laws
would be a barren form of words. It is no answer to say, as it is argued, that
the act proceeds upon the assumption that 'the employment of aliens, unless
restrained, was a peril to the public welfare. The discrimination against aliens
in the wide range of employments to which the acts relates is made an end in
itself, and thus the authority to deny to aliens, upon the mere fact of their
Bus Co. Employees' Union, G. R. No. 46739; National Labor Union vs. San Miguel
Brewery, CIR case No. 26-V, June 12, 1947)."
Thus the Court of Industrial Relations itself correctly held that the respondent labor
union has no right to encroach upon the prerogative of the company to determine and
adopt its own policy in the selection of its employees and workers, and that the court
itself should not intervene in such selection because there was no proof of
discrimination or retaliation on the part of the company. Yet in the dispositive part of its
order the court not only intervenes in such selection but compels the company to
discriminate against a certain class of laborers. The inconsistency and illegality of the
order appealed from are too patent fro argument.
To hold that the Court of Industrial Relations may, under section 13, impose any
condition in its order or award in order to prevent further industrial disputes, regardless
of whether or not such condition is in violation of law or of the Constitution, is, in our
opinion, thinkable. It goes without saying that industrial dispute must be settled in
accordance with law and justice. Suppose that the members of a labor union should
demand of an employer that 80 per cent of the new laborers the latter may hire should
be Filipinos, or that all of them should be Tagalogs or Ilocanos, and should threaten to
declare a strike unless such demand be complied with; would the court be justified in
granting such demand under section 13 on the ground that by doing so it would
prevent a or strike or lockout and settle an industrial dispute? The negative answer can
hardly be disputed, since unreasonableness or illegal demands should not be
countenanced by the court. Yet the affirmance by this Court of the order appealed from
in effect authorizes the Court of Industrial Relations hereafter to commit such
arbitrariness.
For the foregoing reasons, we vote to modify the appealed order by eliminating
therefrom the discriminatory condition in question.