Case digest

Bayan vs Zamora GR No. 138570

Facts:
On March 14, 1947, the Philippines and the United States of America forged a
Military Bases Agreement which formalized, among others, the use of installations in the
Philippine territory by United States military personnel. To further strengthen their
defense and security relationship, the Philippines and the United States entered into a
Mutual Defense Treaty on August 30, 1951. Under the treaty, the parties agreed to
respond to any external armed attack on their territory, armed forces, public vessels, and
aircraft.

In view of the impending expiration of the RP-US Military Bases Agreement in 1991,
the Philippines and the United States negotiated for a possible extension of the military
bases agreement. On September 16, 1991, the Philippine Senate rejected the proposed
RP-US Treaty of Friendship, Cooperation and Security which, in effect, would have
extended the presence of US military bases in the Philippines. With the expiration of the
RP-US Military Bases Agreement, the periodic military exercises conducted between the
two countries were held in abeyance. Notwithstanding, the defense and security
relationship between the Philippines and the United States of America continued
pursuant to the Mutual Defense Treaty.

On July 18, 1997, the United States panel, headed by US Defense Deputy Assistant
Secretary for Asia Pacific Kurt Campbell, met with the Philippine panel, headed by
Foreign Affairs Undersecretary Rodolfo Severino Jr., to exchange notes on "the
complementing strategic interests of the United States and the Philippines in the AsiaPacific region." Both sides discussed, among other things, the possible elements
of the Visiting Forces Agreement (VFA for brevity). Negotiations by both panels on
the VFA led to a consolidated draft text, which in turn resulted to a final series of
conferences and negotiations that culminated in Manila on January 12 and 13, 1998.
Thereafter, then President Fidel V. Ramos approved the VFA, which was
respectively signed by public respondent Secretary Siazon and Unites States
Ambassador Thomas Hubbard on February 10, 1998.

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On October 5, 1998, President Joseph E. Estrada, through respondent

Secretary of Foreign Affairs, ratified the VFA.

On October 6, 1998, the President, acting through respondent Executive Secretary

Ronaldo Zamora, officially transmitted to the Senate of the Philippines, the Instrument of
Ratification, the letter of the President and the VFA, for concurrence pursuant to Section
21, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution. The Senate, in turn, referred the VFA to its
Committee on Foreign Relations, chaired by Senator Blas F. Ople, and its Committee on
National Defense and Security, chaired by Senator Rodolfo G. Biazon, for their joint
consideration and recommendation. Thereafter, joint public hearings were held by the
two Committees.

On May 3, 1999, the Committees submitted Proposed Senate Resolution No.

443 recommending the concurrence of the Senate to the VFA and the creation of a
Legislative Oversight Committee to oversee its implementation. Debates then ensued.
On May 27, 1999, Proposed Senate Resolution No. 443 was approved by the
Senate, by a two-thirds (2/3) vote of its members. Senate Resolution No. 443 was then
re-numbered as Senate Resolution No. 18.
On June 1, 1999, the VFA officially entered into force after an Exchange of Notes
between respondent Secretary Siazon and United States Ambassador Hubbard

Issue:
1. Do petitioners have legal standing as concerned citizens, taxpayers, or
legislators to question the constitutionality of the VFA?
2. Is the VFA governed by the provisions of Section 21, Article VII or of
Section 25, Article XVIII of the Constitution?
Issue: not so relevant can be disregarded
Does the VFA constitute an abdication of Philippine sovereignty?
a.Are Philippine courts deprived of their jurisdiction to hear and try offenses
committed by US military personnel?

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b.Is the Supreme Court deprived of its jurisdiction over offenses punishable
by reclusion perpetua or higher?
IV
Does the VFA violate:
a.the equal protection clause under Section 1, Article III of the Constitution?
b.the prohibition against nuclear weapons under Article II, Section 8?
c.Section 28 (4), Article VI of the Constitution granting the exemption from
taxes and duties for the equipment, materials, supplies and other
properties imported into or acquired in the Philippines by, or on
behalf, of the US Armed Forces?

Legends in ruling:

Pre-requisite of the court Court/ Interpretation

Petitioners contention

Respondents contention
Courts verdict
Rulings:
Locus Standi (legal standing)
Respondents challenge petitioners' standing to sue, on the ground that the
latter have not shown any interest in the case, and that petitioners failed to
substantiate that they have sustained, or will sustain direct injury as a result
of the operation of the VFA.

Petitioners, argues that the validity or invalidity of the VFA is a matter of

transcendental importance which justifies their standing.

A party bringing a suit challenging the constitutionality of a law, act, or

statute must show "not only that the law is invalid, but also that he has
sustained or is in immediate, or imminent danger of sustaining some direct
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injury as a result of its enforcement, and not merely that he suffers thereby
in some indefinite way." He must show that he has been, or is about to be,
denied some right or privilege to which he is lawfully entitled, or that he is
about to be subjected to some burdens or penalties by reason of the statute
complained of.
Locus standi (as a taxpayer)

Taxpayer's suit refers to a case where the act complained of directly

involves the illegal disbursement of public funds derived from taxation.

Clearly, inasmuch as no public funds raised by taxation are involved in this

case, and in the absence of any allegation by petitioners that public funds
are being misspent or illegally expended, petitioners, as taxpayers, have no
legal standing to assail the legality of the VFA.
Locus Standi (as legislators)
The court cannot uphold petitioners' standing as members of Congress, in
the absence of a clear showing of any direct injury to their person or to the
institution to which they belong.

CONSTITUTIONAL APPLICABILITY of VFA

Petitioners argue that Section 25, Article XVIII is applicable considering that
the VFA has for its subject the presence of foreign military troops in the
Philippines.

Respondents, on the contrary, maintain that Section 21, Article VII should
apply inasmuch as the VFA is not a basing arrangement but an agreement
which involves merely the temporary visits of United States personnel
engaged in joint military exercises.

Section 21, Article VII deals with treaties or international agreements in

general, in which case, the concurrence of at least two-thirds (2/3) of all the
Members of the Senate is required to make the subject treaty, or
international agreement, valid and binding on the part of the Philippines. This
provision lays down the general rule on treaties or international agreements
and applies to any form of treaty with a wide variety of subject matter, such
as, but not limited to, extradition or tax treaties or those economic in nature.

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All treaties or international agreements entered into by the Philippines,

regardless of subject matter, coverage, or particular designation or
appellation, requires the concurrence of the Senate to be valid and effective.

In contrast, Section 25, Article XVIII is a special provision that applies to

treaties which involve the presence of foreign military bases, troops or
facilities in the Philippines. Under this provision, the concurrence of the
Senate is only one of the requisites to render compliance with the
constitutional requirements and to consider the agreement binding on the
Philippines. Section 25, Article XVIII further requires that "foreign military
bases, troops, or facilities" may be allowed in the Philippines only by virtue of
a treaty duly concurred in by the Senate, ratified by a majority of the votes
cast in a national referendum held for that purpose if so required by
Congress, and recognized as such by the other contracting state.

It is a finely-imbedded principle in statutory construction that a special

provision or law prevails over a general one. Lex specialis derogat generali.
Thus, where there is in the same statute a particular enactment and also a
general one which, in its most comprehensive sense, would include what is
embraced in the former, the particular enactment must be operative, and
the general enactment must be taken to affect only such cases within its
general language which are not within the provision of the particular
enactment
The clause does not refer to "foreign military bases, troops, or facilities"
collectively but treats them as separate and independent subjects. The use
of comma and the disjunctive word "or" clearly signifies disassociation and
independence of one thing from the others included in the
enumeration, such that, the provision contemplates three different situations
a military treaty the subject of which could be either (a) foreign bases, (b)
foreign troops, or (c) foreign facilities any of the three standing alone
places it under the coverage of Section 25, Article XVIII.
Military warships are actually used as substitutes for a land-home base not
only of military aircraft but also of military personnel and facilities. Besides,
vessels are mobile as compared to a land-based military headquarters.

Compliance of sec 25 art.xviii and sec 21 art vii

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Section 25, Article XVIII disallows foreign military bases, troops, or facilities in the
country, unless the following conditions are sufficiently met, viz: (a) it must be
under a treaty; (b) the treaty must be duly concurred in by the Senate and, when
so required by Congress, ratified by a majority of the votes cast by the people in a
national referendum; and (c) recognized as a treaty by the other contracting state.

Duly concurred by congress : As to the matter of voting, Section 21, Article

VII particularly requires that a treaty or international agreement, to be valid and
effective, must be concurred in by at least two-thirds of all the members of the
Senate. On the other hand, Section 25, Article XVIII simply provides that the treaty
be "duly concurred in by the Senate."

Recognized as treaty : it is inconsequential whether the United States treats the

VFA only as an executive agreement because, under international law, an
executive agreement is as binding as a treaty. As long as the VFA possesses the
elements of an agreement under international law, the said agreement is to be
taken equally as a treaty. For as long as the United States of America accepts or
acknowledges the VFA as a treaty, and binds itself further to comply with its
obligations under the treaty, there is indeed marked compliance with the mandate
of the Constitution.
Thus, no less than Section 2, Article II of the Constitution, declares that the
Philippines adopts the generally accepted principles of international law as part of
the law of the land and adheres to the policy of peace, equality, justice, freedom,
cooperation and amity with all nations.
Article 13 of the Declaration of Rights and Duties of States adopted by the
International Law Commission in 1949 provides: "Every State has the duty to carry
out in good faith its obligations arising from treaties and other sources of
international law, and it may not invoke provisions in its constitution or its laws as
an excuse for failure to perform this duty."
Article 26 of the Convention which provides that "Every treaty in force is binding
upon the parties to it and must be performed by them in good faith." This is known
as the principle of pacta sunt servanda which preserves the sanctity of treaties and
have been one of the most fundamental principles of positive international law,
supported by the jurisprudence of international tribunals.

GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION (as a CHIEF EXECUTIVE)

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Power to enter into treaties or international agreements, the Constitution vests the
same in the President, subject only to the concurrence of at least two thirds vote of
all the members of the Senate.

Power of the supreme court has been broaden in Article VIII, Section 1,"is merely
(to) check whether or not the governmental branch or agency has gone beyond
the constitutional limits of its jurisdiction, not that it erred or has a different view.
In the absence of a showing . . . (of) grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of
jurisdiction, there is no occasion for the Court to exercise its corrective power . . . It
has no power to look into what it thinks is apparent error.

HELD:
The petitioners have no locus standi to bring the suit because they have not
shown any interest in the case nor have they substantiated that they have sustained or
will sustain direct injury as a result of the operation of the VFA; that as taxpayers, they
have not established that the VFA involves the illegal disbursement of public funds raised
by taxation; that whether the President referred the VFA to the Senate and the latter
extended its concurrence under Section 21 , Article VII, or Section 25, Article XVIII, is
immaterial, for in either case, the fundamental law is crystalline that the concurrence of
the Senate is mandatory; that with regard to the ratification by the President of the VFA
and the exercise by the Senate of its constitutional power to concur with the VFA, the
Court, absent clear showing of grave abuse of discretion on the part of respondents, is
without power to meddle with such affairs purely executive and legislative in character
and nature; and that with the ratification of the VFA, which is equivalent to final
acceptance and with the exchange of notes between the Philippines and the USA, it now
becomes obligatory, under the principles of international law, to be bound by the terms
of the agreement.

It is inconsequential whether the United States treats the VFA only as an executive agreement because, under international law,
an executive agreement is as binding as a treaty.

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Lozano vs. Nograles GR 187883

ATTY. OLIVER O. LOZANO and ATTY. EVANGELINE J.LOZANO-ENDRIANO vs. SPEAKER
PROSPERO C. NOGRALES, Representative, Majority, House of Representatives

Facts:
-There were actually two petitions, filed by their respective petitioners in
their capacities as concerned citizens and taxpayers
-The Petitions were about the nullification of House Resolution No. 1109
entitled A Resolution Calling upon the Members of Congress to Convene for
the Purpose of Considering Proposals to Amend or Revise the Constitution,
Upon a Three-fourths Vote of All the Members of Congress. Both petitions
seek to trigger a justiciable controversy that would warrant a definitive
interpretation by the Court of Section 1, Article XVII, which provides for the
procedure for amending or revising the Constitution.
Article XVII Section 1 of the 1987Section 1. Any amendment to, or revision
of, this Constitution may be proposed by:
(1) The Congress, upon a vote of three-fourths of all its Members; or
(2) A constitutional convention. Philippine Constitution
-The petitioners alleged that HR 1109 is unconstitutional for deviation from
the prescribed procedures to amend the Constitution by excluding the
Senate of the Philippines from the complete process of proposing
amendments to the Constitution and for lack of thorough debates and
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consultations.
Issue:
Whether or not the Congress committed a violation in promulgating the
HR1109.
Held:
No, the House that the Congress ought to convene into a Constituent
Assembly and adopt some Rules for proposing changes to the charter. The
House has said it would forward H.Res.1109 to the Senate for its approval
and adoption and the possible promulgation of a Joint and Concurrent
Resolution convening the Congress into a Constituent Assembly. Petitioners
have not sufficiently proven any adverse injury or hardship from the act
complained of. House Resolution No. 1109 only resolved that the House of
Representatives shall convene at a future time for the purpose of proposing
amendments or revisions to the Constitution. No actual convention has yet
transpired and no rules of procedure have yet been adopted. No proposal
has yet been made, and hence, no usurpation of power or gross abuse of
discretion has yet taken place. House Resolution No. 1109 involves a
quintessential example of an uncertain contingent future event that may
not occur as anticipated, or indeed may not occur at all. The House has not
yet performed a positive act that would warrant an intervention from this
Court. Judicial review is exercised only to remedy a particular and concrete
injury.
The petitions were dismissed.
David vs. Arroyo GR 171396
Randolf S. David v. Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo, G.R. No. 171396, May 3, 2006
(and other consolidated cases)
DECISION
SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ, J.:
I.

THE FACTS

On February 24, 2006, as the Filipino nation celebrated the 20th Anniversary
of the EDSA People Power I, President Arroyo issued PP 1017, implemented
by G.O. No. 5, declaring a state of national emergency, thus:
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NOW, THEREFORE, I, Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo, President of the Republic of

the Philippines and Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces of the
Philippines, by virtue of the powers vested upon me by Section 18, Article 7
of the Philippine Constitution which states that: The President. . . whenever
it becomes necessary, . . . may call out (the) armed forces to prevent or
suppress. . .rebellion. . ., and in my capacity as their Commander-inChief, do hereby command the Armed Forces of the Philippines, to maintain
law and order throughout the Philippines, prevent or suppress all forms of
lawless violence as well as any act of insurrection or rebellion and to enforce
obedience to all the laws and to all decrees, orders and regulations
promulgated by me personally or upon my direction; and as provided in
Section 17, Article 12 of the Constitution do hereby declare a State of
National Emergency.
In their presentation of the factual bases of PP 1017 and G.O. No. 5,
respondents stated that the proximate cause behind the executive
issuances was the conspiracy among some military officers, leftist
insurgents of the New Peoples Army, and some members of the political
opposition in a plot to unseat or assassinate President Arroyo. They
considered the aim to oust or assassinate the President and take-over the
reins of government as a clear and present danger.
Petitioners David and Llamas were arrested without warrants on February
24, 2006 on their way to EDSA. Meanwhile, the offices of the newspaper
Daily Tribune, which was perceived to be anti-Arroyo, was searched without
warrant at about 1:00 A.M. on February 25, 2006. Seized from the premises
in the absence of any official of the Daily Tribune except the security guard
of the building were several materials for publication. The law enforcers, a
composite team of PNP and AFP officers, cited as basis of the warrantless
arrests and the warrantless search and seizure was Presidential
Proclamation 1017 issued by then President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo in the
exercise of her constitutional power to call out the Armed Forces of the
Philippines to prevent or suppress lawless violence.
II.

THE ISSUE

1. Were the warrantless arrests of petitioners David, et al., made pursuant

to PP 1017, valid?
2. Was the warrantless search and seizure on the Daily
Tribunes officesconducted pursuant to PP 1017 valid?
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III. THE RULING

[The Court partially GRANTED the petitions.]
1. NO, the warrantless arrests of petitioners David, et al., made
pursuant to PP 1017, were NOT valid.
[S]earches, seizures and arrests are normally unreasonable unless
authorized by a validly issued search warrant or warrant of arrest. Section 5,
Rule 113 of the Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure provides [for the
following circumstances of valid warrantless arrests]:
Sec. 5. Arrest without warrant; when lawful. - A peace officer or a
private person may, without a warrant, arrest a person:
(a) When, in his presence, the person to be arrested has committed, is
actually committing, or is attempting to commit an offense.
(b) When an offense has just been committed and he has probable cause
to believe based on personal knowledge of facts or circumstances that the
person to be arrested has committed it; and
x x x.
Neither of the [provisions on in flagrante nor hot pursuit warrantless arrests]
justifies petitioner Davids warrantless arrest. During the inquest for the
charges of inciting to sedition and violation of BP 880, all that the arresting
officers could invoke was their observation that some rallyists were wearing
t-shirts with the invective Oust Gloria Nowand their erroneous assumption
that petitioner David was the leader of the rally.Consequently, the Inquest
Prosecutor ordered his immediate release on the ground of insufficiency of
evidence. He noted that petitioner David was not wearing the subject t-shirt
and even if he was wearing it, such fact is insufficient to charge him with
inciting to sedition.
2. NO, the warrantless search and seizure on the Daily
Tribunes officesconducted pursuant to PP 1017 was NOT valid.
[T]he search [and seizure in the Daily Tribune premises] is illegal. Rule 126
of The Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure lays down the steps in the
conduct of search and seizure. Section 4 requires that a search warrant be
issued upon probable cause in connection with one specific offence to be
determined personally by the judge after examination under oath or
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affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce. Section 8

mandates that the search of a house, room, or any other premise be made
in the presence of the lawful occupant thereof or any member of his family
or in the absence of the latter, in the presence of two (2) witnesses of
sufficient age and discretion residing in the same locality. And Section 9
states that the warrant must direct that it be served in the daytime, unless
the property is on the person or in the place ordered to be searched, in
which case a direction may be inserted that it be served at any time of the
day or night. All these rules were violated by the CIDG operatives.

Osmea vs. COMELEC, 199 SCRA 750

FACTS:
On June 20, 1991, RA No. 7056 was enacted. Such RA was made for the 1992
National and Local Elections
On July 30, 1991, Governor Emilio Osmea of Cebu, et al filed a petition against
the COMELEC for the nullity of the said RA on the reason that the said law was
unconstitutional.
Such provisions in the said RA that were deemed by the petitioners
unconstitutional were:
o Republic Act 7056 violates the mandate of the Constitution for the holding of
synchronized national and local elections on the second Monday of May
1992.
o Republic Act 7056, particularly the 2nd paragraph of Section 3 thereof,
providing that all incumbent provincial, city and municipal officials shall hold
over beyond June 30, 1992 and shall serve until their successors shall have
been duly elected and qualified violates Section 2, Article XVIII (Transitory
Provision) of the Constitution.
o The same paragraph of Section 3 of Republic Act 7056, which in effect,
shortens the term or tenure of office of local officials to be elected on the 2nd
Monday of November, 1992 violates Section 8, Article X of the Constitution.
o Section 8 of Republic Act 7056, providing for the campaign periods for
Presidential, Vice-Presidential and Senatorial elections, violates the provision
of Section 9, Article IX under the title "Commission on Elections" of the
Constitution.
o The so-called many difficult if not insurmountable problems mentioned in
Republic Act 7056 to synchronized national and local elections set by the
Constitution on the second Monday of May, 1992, are not sufficient, much
less, valid justification for postponing the local elections to the second
Monday of November 1992, and in the process violating the Constitution
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itself. If, at all, Congress can devise ways and means, within the parameters
of the Constitution, to eliminate or at least minimize these problems and if
this, still, is not feasible, resort can be made to the self-correcting
mechanism built in the Constitution for its amendment or revision.

The respondents, COMELEC, questioned the jurisdiction of the Court to review

such case for they stated that the controversy was merely a political one and
therefore does not fall under the courts jurisdiction

Issues:
First, whether or not, the Court has the right to review the case.
Second, whether or not, the RA 7056 was unconstitutional
Decision:
On the first Issue:
The Court has the competence and right to act on the matter at bar because what
was presented was the question on the legality of RA 7056 and not its wisdom.
The Court also stated that even if the issue was political in nature, it was not
exclusively a political one, hence, involving a question of national
importance and falls for juridical review.
The Court further stated that under Section 1, Art. VIII of the 1987 constitution, it is
within the powers of the court to determine whether there is grave abuse of
discretion resulting to excess or lack of jurisdiction by other branches of the
government.
On the second issue:
YES. It is unconstitutional.
Article XVIII, Sections 2 and 5 of the 1987 Constitution which provides for the
synchronization of national and local elections. However, RA 7056 provides for the
de-synchronization of election by mandating that there be two separate elections
in 1992.
o The synchronization stated in RA 7056 will only synchronized future
elections
R.A. No. 7056 also violated the clear mandate of Sec. 8, Art. X of 1987 Constitution
which fixed the term of office of all elective local officials, except barangay officials,
to three (3) years. If the local election will be held on the second Monday of
November 1992 under RA 7056, those to be elected will be serving for only two
years and seven months, that is, from November 30, 1992 to June 30, 1995, not
three years.

13

The law was also held violative of Sec. 9, Article IX of the Constitution by changing
the campaign period. RA 7056 provides for a different campaign period, as follows:

a) For President arid Vice-Presidential elections one hundred thirty (130) days
before
the
day
of
election.
b) For Senatorial elections, ninety (90) days before the day of the election, and

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c) For the election of Members of the House of Representatives and local elective
provincial, city and municipal officials forty-five (45) days before the day of the
elections.

The petition is granted. The temporary restraining order for RA 7056 is permanent.
RA
7056
is
declared
UNCONSTITUTIONAL,
hence,
null
and
void.
Note: Classmates, in this issue, the discussion over procedural issues were very
very very lengthy compared to the discussion over the MAIN issue.
In a nutshell, RA 7056 is UNCONSTITUTIONAL because it suggests:
o A separate national and local elections
o Extension on the terms of incumbent elective officials
o Local officials elected will only serve 2 years and 7 months (dapat 3 years
under Sec.8, Art. 10 of 1987 Constitution)
o Different campaign periods. (Dapat comelec lang ang nay jurisdiction over
this under Sec. 9 Art. 9 of the consti and not the congress.)

ABS CBN broadcasting corporation, petitioner Vs Commission on Elections,

respondent. G.R No. 133486
Facts:

ABS CBN filed for a petition for certiorari under rule 65 of the rules of Court assailing
Commission on Elections (COMELEC) enc banc Resolution No. 98 14191 dated April
21,1998 In the said Resolution, the poll body
RESOLVED to approve the issuance of a restraining order to stop ABS-CBN or any
other groups, its agents or representatives from conducting such exit survey and to
authorize the Honorable Chairman to issue the same.

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The Resolution was issued by the Comelec allegedly upon "information from [a] reliable
source that ABS-CBN (Lopez Group) has prepared a project, with PR groups, to conduct
radio-TV coverage of the elections . . . and to make [an] exit survey of the . . . vote during
the elections for national officials particularly for President and Vice President, results of
which shall be [broadcast] immediately."2 The electoral body believed that such project
might conflict with the official Comelec count, as well as the unofficial quick count of the
National Movement for Free Elections (Namfrel). It also noted that it had not authorized or
deputized Petitioner ABS-CBN to undertake the exit survey.

On May 9, 1998, this Court issued the Temporary Restraining Order prayed for by
petitioner.

Legal Issues:

Whether or not the petition should be rendered as moot and academic

Whether or not the case still holds transcendental grounds
Whether or not the contention of the solicitor general that: the petitioners failure to
exhaust available remedies before the issuing forum, specifically the filing of a motion for
reconsideration.

Court Ruling:

The issue is not totally moot. While the assailed Resolution referred specifically to the May
11, 1998 election, its implications on the people's fundamental freedom of expression
transcend the past election. The holding of periodic elections is a basic feature of our
democratic government. By its very nature, exit polling is tied up with elections. To set
aside the resolution of the issue now will only postpone a task that could well crop up
again in future elections
Since the fundamental freedoms of speech and of the press are being invoked here, we
have resolved to settle, for the guidance of posterity, whether they likewise protect the
holding of exit polls and the dissemination of data derived there from
This Court, however, has ruled in the past that this procedural requirement may be
glossed over to prevent a miscarriage of justice, when the issue involves the principle of
social justice or the protection of labor, when the decision or resolution sought to be set
aside is a nullity, or when the need for relief is extremely urgent and certiorari is the only
adequate and speedy remedy available.

Note: The gist of the case is mostly found on the first page of the case, but for a thorough
understanding of the proceeding it would be best advised that one reads the entire proceeding
which is only up to the 4 th page, and that the remaining pages contain opinions and other
pertinent details

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YNOT VS INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT
G.R. No. 74457 March 20, 1987

RESTITUTO YNOT, petitioner,

vs.
INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT, THE STATION COMMANDER, INTEGRATED NATIONAL
POLICE, BAROTAC NUEVO, ILOILO and THE REGIONAL DIRECTOR, BUREAU OF ANIMAL
INDUSTRY, REGION IV, ILOILO CITY, respondents.
Ramon A. Gonzales for petitioner.
FACTS:
1. The petitioner had transported six carabaos in a pump boat from Masbate to Iloilo on
January 13, 1984, when they were confiscated by the police station commander of
Barotac Nuevo, Iloilo, for violation of Executive Order No. 626-A. The petitioner sued for
recovery, and the Regional Trial Court of Iloilo City issued a writ of replevin upon his filing
of a supersedeas bond of P12,000.00. After considering the merits of the case, the court
sustained the confiscation of the carabaos and, since they could no longer be produced,
ordered the confiscation of the bond. The court also declined to rule on the
constitutionality of the executive order, as raise by the petitioner, for lack of authority and
also for its presumed validity.

2. The petitioner appealed the decision to the Intermediate Appellate Court, which upheld
the trial court, and he has now come before us in this petition for review on certiorari.The
thrust of his petition is that the executive order is unconstitutional insofar as it authorizes
outright confiscation of the carabao or carabeef being transported across provincial
boundaries. His claim is that the penalty is invalid because it is imposed without according
the owner a right to be heard before a competent and impartial court as guaranteed by
due process. He complains that the measure should not have been presumed, and so
sustained, as constitutional. There is also a challenge to the improper exercise of the
legislative power by the former President under Amendment No. 6 of the 1973
Constitution.

3. Executive Order No. 626-A reads in full as follows:

WHEREAS, the President has given orders prohibiting the interprovincial movement
of carabaos and the slaughtering of carabaos not complying with the requirements
of Executive Order No. 626 particularly with respect to age;

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WHEREAS, it has been observed that despite such orders the violators still manage
to circumvent the prohibition against inter-provincial movement of carabaos by
transporting carabeef instead; and

WHEREAS, in order to achieve the purposes and objectives of Executive Order No.
626 and the prohibition against interprovincial movement of carabaos, it is
necessary to strengthen the said Executive Order and provide for the disposition of
the carabaos and carabeef subject of the violation;

NOW, THEREFORE, I, FERDINAND E. MARCOS, President of the Philippines, by virtue

of the powers vested in me by the Constitution, do hereby promulgate the following:
SECTION 1. Executive Order No. 626 is hereby amended such that
henceforth, no carabao regardless of age, sex, physical condition or purpose
and no carabeef shall be transported from one province to another. The
carabao or carabeef transported in violation of this Executive Order as
amended shall be subject to confiscation and forfeiture by the government,
to be distributed to charitable institutions and other similar institutions as the
Chairman of the National Meat Inspection Commission may see fit, in the
case of carabeef, and to deserving farmers through dispersal as the Director
of Animal Industry may see fit, in the case of carabaos.
SECTION 2. This Executive Order shall take effect immediately.

Done in the City of Manila, this 25th day of October, in the year of Our Lord,
nineteen hundred and eighty.

(SGD.) FERDINAND MARCOS

President
Republic of the Philippines
ISSUES:
1.

17

Whether or not lower courts (Municipal Trial Courts, Regional Courts and Appellate Courts)
have the authority to exercise Judicial Review

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2. Whether or not Executive Order No. 626-A is constitutional
a. Whether or not there was improper exercise of the legislative power by the former
President under Amendment No. 6 of the 1973 Constitution
b. Whether or not Executive Order No. 626-A a valid exercise of Police Power

RULING:
1. This Court has declared that while lower courts should observe a becoming modesty in
examining constitutional questions, they are nonetheless not prevented from resolving the
same whenever warranted, subject only to review by the highest tribunal. 6 We have
jurisdiction under the Constitution to "review, revise, reverse, modify or affirm on appeal
or certiorari, as the law or rules of court may provide," final judgments and orders of lower
courts in, among others, all cases involving the constitutionality of certain measures. 7 This
simply means that the resolution of such cases may be made in the first instance by these
lower courts.Stated otherwise, courts should not follow the path of least resistance by
simply presuming the constitutionality of a law when it is questioned. On the contrary,
they should probe the issue more deeply, to relieve the abscess, paraphrasing another
distinguished jurist, 9 and so heal the wound or excise the affliction.
Judicial power authorizes this; and when the exercise is demanded, there should be no
shirking of the task for fear of retaliation, or loss of favor, or popular censure, or any other
similar inhibition unworthy of the bench, especially this Court.
2. Whether or not Executive Order No. 626-A is constitutional
a.

18

The challenged measure is denominated an executive order but it is really

presidential decree, promulgating a new rule instead of merely implementing an
existing law. It was issued by President Marcos not for the purpose of taking care
that the laws were faithfully executed but in the exercise of his legislative authority
under Amendment No. 6. It was provided thereunder that whenever in his judgment
there existed a grave emergency or a threat or imminence thereof or whenever the
legislature failed or was unable to act adequately on any matter that in his
judgment required immediate action, he could, in order to meet the exigency, issue
decrees, orders or letters of instruction that were to have the force and effect of law.
As there is no showing of any exigency to justify the exercise of that extraordinary
power then, the petitioner has reason, indeed, to question the validity of the
executive order. Nevertheless, since the determination of the grounds was supposed
to have been made by the President "in his judgment, " a phrase that will lead to
protracted discussion not really necessary at this time, we reserve resolution of this
matter until a more appropriate occasion. For the nonce, we confine ourselves to
the more fundamental question of due process.

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b. To sum up then, we find that the challenged measure is an invalid exercise of the
police power because the method employed to conserve the carabaos is not
reasonably necessary to the purpose of the law and, worse, is unduly oppressive.
Due process is violated because the owner of the property confiscated is denied
the right to be heard in his defense and is immediately condemned and
punished. The conferment on the administrative authorities of the power to
adjudge the guilt of the supposed offender is a clear encroachment on judicial
functions and militates against the doctrine of separation of powers. There
is, finally, also an invalid delegation of legislative powers to the officers
mentioned therein who are granted unlimited discretion in the distribution
of the properties arbitrarily taken. For these reasons, we hereby declare
Executive Order No. 626-A unconstitutional.

3. We agree with the respondent court, however, that the police station commander who
confiscated the petitioner's carabaos is not liable in damages for enforcing the executive
order in accordance with its mandate. The law was at that time presumptively valid, and it
was his obligation, as a member of the police, to enforce it. It would have been
impertinent of him, being a mere subordinate of the President, to declare the executive
order unconstitutional and, on his own responsibility alone, refuse to execute it. Even the
trial court, in fact, and the Court of Appeals itself did not feel they had the competence, for
all their superior authority, to question the order we now annul.

4. FINAL RULING:

WHEREFORE, Executive Order No. 626-A is hereby declared unconstitutional. Except as

affirmed above, the decision of the Court of Appeals is reversed. The supersedeas bond is
cancelled and the amount thereof is ordered restored to the petitioner. No costs.

IN RE: SATURNINO V. BERMUDEZ, petitioner

October 24, 1986

G.R. No. 76180,

FACTS:
In a petition for declaratory relief impleading no respondents, petitioner, as a lawyer,
quotes the first paragraph of Section 5 (not Section 7 as erroneously stated) of Article
XVIII of the proposed 1986 Constitution, which provides in full as follows:

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"Sec. 5.The six-year term of the incumbent President and Vice-President elected in the
February 7, 1986 election is, for purposes of synchronization of elections, hereby
extended to noon of June 30, 1992."
"The first regular elections for the President and Vice-President under this Constitution
shall be held on the second Monday of May, 1992."
Claiming that the said provision "is not clear" as to whom it refers, he then asks the
Court "to declare and answer the question of the construction and definiteness as to
who, among the present incumbent President Corazon Aquino and Vice President
Salvador Laurel and the elected President Ferdinand E. Marcos and Vice President Arturo
M. Tolentino being referred to under the said Section 7 (sic) of ARTICLE XVIII of the
TRANSITORY PROVISIONS of the proposed 1986 Constitution refers to, . . . "

ISSUE:
1. Whether or not the Supreme court has the jurisdiction in declaring who is the elected
President and Vice President in the Febuary 7, 1986?
HELD:
No.
"Petitioners have no personality to sue and their petitions state no cause of action. For
the legitimacy of the Aquino government is not a justiciable matter. It belongs to the
realm of politics where only the people of the Philippines are the judge. And the people
have made the judgment; they have accepted the government of President Corazon C.
Aquino which is in effective control of the entire country so that it is not merely a de
facto government but in fact and law a de jure government. Moreover, the community of
nations has recognized the legitimacy of the present government. All the eleven
members of this Court, as reorganized, have sworn to uphold the fundamental law of the
Republic under her government." (Joint Resolution of May 22, 1986 in G.R. No. 73748
[Lawyers League for a Better Philippines, etc. vs. President Corazon C. Aquino, et al.];
G.R. No. 73972 [People's Crusade for Supremacy of the Constitution etc. vs. Mrs. Cory
Aquino, et al.]; and G.R. No. 73990 [Councilor Clifton U. Ganay vs. Corazon C. Aquino, et
al.])
For the above-quoted reasons, which are fully applicable to the petition at bar, mutatis
mutandis, there can be no question that President Corazon C. Aquino and Vice-President
Salvador H. Laurel are the incumbent and legitimate President and Vice President of the
Republic of the Philippines.

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TAADA VS. CUENCO

Facts:

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The Senate, in its session of February 22, 1956, upon nomination of Senator Cipriano
Primicias, on behalf of the Nacionalista Party, chose Senators Jose P. Laurel, Fernando
Lopez and Cipriano Primicias, as members of the Senate Electoral Tribunal.
o the Senate consists of 23 Senators who belong to the Nacionalista Party, and one
(1) Senator namely, petitioner, Lorenzo M. Taada belonging to the Citizens
Party
Senator Taada, on behalf of the Citizens Party was next chosen by the Senate as
member of said Tribunal.
Then, upon nomination of Senator Primicias, on behalf of the Committee on Rules of
the Senate, and over the objections of Senators Taada and Sumulong, the Senate
choose respondents Senators Mariano J. Cuenco and Francisco A. Delgado as members
of the same Electoral Tribunal.
Subsequently, the Chairman of the latter appointed: (1) Alfredo Cruz and Catalina
Cayetano, as technical assistant and private secretary, respectively, to
Senator Cuenco, as supposed member of the Senate Electoral Tribunal, upon his
recommendation of said respondents; and (2) Manuel Serapio and Placido Reyes, as
technical assistant and private secretary, respectively to Senator Delgado, as
supposed member of said Electoral Tribunal, and upon his recommendation.
Soon, thereafter, Senator Lorenzo M. Taada and Congressman Diosdado Macapagal
instituted the case at bar against Senators Cuenco and Delgado, and said Alfredo
Cruz, Catalina Cayetano, Manuel Serapio and Placido Reyes, as well as Fernando
Hipolito, in his capacity as Cashier and Disbursing Officer of the Senate Electoral
Tribunal.
Ang connection, by the way, ni Diosdado Macapagal in this case is that he is also a
petitioner contesting the results of the subsequent 1955 elections (he was one of
the official candidates for the Liberal Party, in which he lost btw) in Senate
Electoral Case no. 4, pending the Senate Electoral tribunal. If Cuenco and Delgado
(members of the Nacionalista Party) remain members of the Senate Electoral
Tribunal, it will surely deprivve Macapagal and his co-protestants of their
constitutional rights to have their election protest tried and decided fairly.
Petitioners further allege that:
o the Committee on Rules for the Senate, in nominating Senators Cuenco and
Delgado, and the Senate, in choosing these respondents, as members of the
Senate Electoral Tribunal, had "acted absolutely without power or color of
authority and in clear violation . . . of Article VI, Section 11 of the Constitution";
"The Senate and the House of Representatives shall each have an Electoral
Tribunal which shall be the sole judge of all contests relating to the election,
returns, and qualifications of their respective Members. Each Electoral
Tribunal shall be composed of nine Members, three of whom shall be
Justices of the Supreme Court to be designated by the Chief Justice, and the
remaining six shall be Members of the Senate or of the House of
Representatives, as the case may be, who shall be chosen by each House,
three upon nomination of the party having the largest number of votes and

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three of the party having the second largest number of votes therein. The
Senior Justice in each Electoral Tribunal shall be its Chairman."
In short, there should be an equal number of representatives (3 members
each) from the majority party in the senate and the minority party, the
tribunal must also include an equal number of members/ Justices from the
Supreme court. However, there is only one member of the minority party--si Tanada. So the solution was for the member of the minority party to elect
two other senators of the majority party. However, the person who
nominated Cuenco and Delgado was member of the majority party man, so
the war begins.
Respondents:
o Admitted the main allegations of the fact in the petition, except insofar as it
questions the legality and validity of the election of respondents
o Respondents, likewise, allege, by way of special and affirmative defenses, that:
(a) this Court is without power, authority of jurisdiction to direct or control
the action of the Senate in choosing the members of the Electoral Tribunal;
and
(b) that the petition states no cause of action, because
"petitioner Taada has exhausted his right to nominate after he nominated
himself and refused to nominate two (2) more Senators"
Respondents are assailing the jurisdiction of the court on the ground that the power to
choose six (6) Senators as members of the Senate Electoral Tribunal has been expressly
conferred by the Constitution upon the Senate and that the only remedy available to
petitioners herein "is not in the judicial forum", but "to bring the matter to the bar of
public opinion."

Issue: (insofar as the topic on Political Question is concerned)

Whether or not the courts have the jurisdiction to direct or control the action of the
Senate in choosing the members of the Electoral Tribunal.
Ruling:
It is, therefore, our opinion that we have, not only jurisdiction, but, also, the duty, to
consider and determine the principal issue raised by the parties herein.
On the grounds that:
this is not an action against the Senate, and it does not seek to compel the latter,
either directly or indirectly, to allow the petitioners to perform their duties as members
of said House. Although the Constitution provides that the Senate shall choose six (6)
Senators to be members of the Senate Electoral Tribunal, the latter is part neither of
Congress nor of the Senate.
Again, under the Constitution, "the legislative power" is vested exclusively in the
Congress of the Philippines. Yet, this does not detract from the power of the courts to
pass upon the constitutionality of acts of Congress. And, since judicial power includes
the authority to inquire into the legality of statutes enacted by the two Houses of
Congress, and approved by the Executive, there can be no reason why the validity of
an act of one of said Houses, like that of any other branch of the Government, may not
be determined in the proper actions. Thus, in the exercise of the so- called "judicial
supremacy", this Court declared that a resolution of the defunct National Assembly
could not bar the exercise of the powers of the former Electoral Commission under the
original Constitution.
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The only ground upon which respondents' objection to the jurisdiction of this Court and
their theory to the effect that the proper remedy for petitioners herein is, not the
present action, but an appeal to public opinion, could possibly be entertained is,
therefore, whether the case at bar raises merely a political question, not one justiciable
in nature.
It is well-settled doctrine that political questions are not within the province of
the judiciary, except to the extent that power to deal with such questions has
been conferred upon the courts by express constitutional or statutory
provisions.
The term "political question" connotes, in legal parlance, what it means in ordinary
parlance, namely, a question of policy. In other words, in the language of Corpus Juris
Secundum (supra), it refers to "those questions which, under the Constitution, are to
be decided by the people in their sovereign capacity, or in regard to whichfull
discretionary authority has been delegated to the Legislature or executive branch of
the Government." It is concerned with issues dependent upon the wisdom, not
legality, of a particular measure.

Such is not the nature of the question for determination in the present case. Here, we
are called upon to decide whether the election of Senators Cuenco and Delgado, by
the Senate, as members of the Senate Electoral Tribunal, upon nomination by Senator
Primicias a member and spokesman of the party having the largestnumber of votes
in the Senate on behalf of its Committee on Rules, contravenes the constitutional
mandate that said members of the Senate Electoral Tribunal shall be chosen "upon
nomination . . . of the party having the second largest number of votes" in the Senate,
and hence, is null and void. This is not a political question. The Senate is not clothed
with "full discretionary authority" in the choice of members of the Senate Electoral
Tribunal. The exercise of its power thereon is subject to constitutional limitations which
are claimed to be mandatory in nature. It is clearly within the legitimate province of
the judicial department to pass upon the validity of the proceedings in connection
therewith.

ESTRADA VS. ARROYO

FACTS:
Estrada alleges that he is the President on leave while respondent Gloria MacapagalArroyo claims she is the President. From the beginning of Eraps term, he was plagued by
problems that slowly but surely eroded his popularity. His sharp descent from power
started on October 4, 2000. Singson, a longtime friend of the Estrada, went on air and
accused the Estrada, his family and friends of receiving millions of pesos from jueteng
lords. The expos immediately ignited reactions of rage. On January 19, the fall from
power of the petitioner appeared inevitable. At 1:20 p.m., the petitioner informed
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Executive Secretary Edgardo Angara that General Angelo Reyes, Chief of Staff of the
Armed Forces of the Philippines, had defected. January 20 turned to be the day of
surrender. On January 22, the Monday after taking her oath, respondent Arroyo
immediately discharged the powers and duties of the Presidency. After his fall from the
pedestal of power, the Eraps legal problems appeared in clusters. Several cases
previously filed against him in the Office of the Ombudsman were set in motion.
ISSUES:
I. Whether or not the cases at bar involve a political question?
(Political Question are those questions which under the constitution are to be
decided by the people in their sovereign capacity in regard to which the full
discretionary authority has been delegated to the legislative and executive branch
of the government)
HELD: The cases at bar pose legal and not political questions. The principal issues
for resolution require the proper interpretation of certain provisions in the 1987
Constitution, notably section 1 of Article II, and section 8 of Article VII, and the
allocation of governmental powers under section 11 76 of Article VII. The issues
likewise call for a ruling on the scope of presidential immunity from suit. They also
involve the correct calibration of the right of petitioner against prejudicial publicity.
As early as the 1803 case of Marbury v. Madison, the doctrine has been laid down
that" it is emphatically the province and duty of the judicial department to say
what the law is. . ." Thus, respondent's in vocation of the doctrine of political
question is but a foray in the dark.
II. Whether or not Estrada has resigned as a president or not.
HELD: The SC holds that the resignation of Estrada cannot be doubted. It was
confirmed by his leaving Malacaang. Resignation is not a high level legal
abstraction. It is a factual question and its elements are beyond quibble: there
must be an intent to resign and the intent must be coupled by acts of
relinquishment. The validity of a resignation is not government by any formal
requirement as to form. It can be oral. It can be written. It can be express. It can
be implied. As long as the resignation is clear, it must be given legal effect.
III. Whether or not Arroyo is a legitimate (de jure) president
HELD: Even if Erap can prove that he did not resign, still, he cannot successfully
claim that he is a President on leave on the ground that he is merely unable to
govern temporarily. That claim has been laid to rest by Congress and the decision
that respondent Arroyo is the de jure President made by a co-equal branch of
government cannot be reviewed by this Court.
IV. Whether or not the petitioner enjoys immunity from suit. Assuming he
enjoys immunity, the extent of the immunity
HELD: This is in accord with our ruling in that 'incumbent Presidents are immune
from suit or from being brought to court during the period of their incumbency and
tenure" but not beyond. Considering the peculiar circumstance that the
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Case digest

impeachment process against the petitioner has been aborted and thereafter he
lost the presidency, petitioner Estrada cannot demand as a condition sine qua non
to his criminal prosecution before the Ombudsman that he be convicted in the
impeachment proceedings. We now come to the scope of immunity that can be
claimed by petitioner as a non-sitting President. The cases filed against petitioner
Estrada are criminal in character. They involve plunder, bribery and graft and
corruption. By no stretch of the imagination can these crimes, especially plunder
which carries the death penalty, be covered by the alleged mantle of immunity of a
non-sitting president. Petitioner cannot cite any decision of this Court licensing the
President to commit criminal acts and wrapping him with post-tenure immunity
from liability. It will be anomalous to hold that immunity is an inoculation from
liability for unlawful acts and conditions. The rule is that unlawful acts of public
officials are not acts of the State and the officer who acts illegally is not acting as
such but stands in the same footing as any trespasser.
V. Whether or not the prosecution of petitioner Estrada should be enjoined due
to prejudicial publicity
HELD: There is not enough evidence to warrant this Court to enjoin the preliminary
investigation of the petitioner by the respondent Ombudsman.
Petitioner needs to offer more than hostile headlines to discharge his burden of
proof. He needs to show more weighty social science evidence to successfully
prove the impaired capacity of a judge to render a bias-free decision. Well to note,
the cases against the petitioner are still undergoing preliminary investigation by a
special panel of prosecutors in the office of the respondent Ombudsman. No
allegation whatsoever has been made by the petitioner that the minds of the
members of this special panel have already been infected by bias because of the
pervasive prejudicial publicity against him. Indeed, the special panel has yet to
come out with its findings and the Court cannot second guess whether its
recommendation will be unfavourable to the petitioner.

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Salazar vs. Achacoso

FACTS:
Rosalie Tesoro of Pasay City in a sworn statement filed with the POEA, charged petitioner
with illegal recruitment. Public respondent Atty. Ferdinand Marquez sent petitioner a
telegram directing him to appear to the POEA regarding the complaint against him. On
the same day, after knowing that petitioner had no license to operate a recruitment
agency, public respondent Administrator Tomas Achacoso issued a Closure and Seizure
Order No. 1205 to petitioner. It stated that there will a seizure of the documents and
paraphernalia being used or intended to be used as the means of committing illegal
recruitment, it having verified that petitioner has
(1) No valid license or authority from the Department of Labor and Employment to recruit
and deploy workers for overseas employment;
(2) Committed/are committing acts prohibited under Article 34 of the New Labor Code in
relation to Article 38 of the same code.
A team was then tasked to implement the said Order. The group, accompanied by
mediamen and Mandaluyong policemen, went to petitioners residence. Beforeentering
the place,the team served the said Closure and Seizure order on a certain Mrs. Flora
Salazar who voluntarily allowed them entry into the premises. The team confiscated
assorted costumes. Petitioner filed with POEA a letter requesting for the return of
the seized properties, because she was not given prior notice and hearing. The said
Order violated due process. She also alleged that it violated Sec. 2 of the Bill of Rights,
and the properties were confiscated against her will and were done with unreasonable
force and intimidation.
Letter of the petitioner:
Gentlemen:
On behalf of Ms.Horty Salazar of 615 R.O. Santos, Mandaluyong, Metro Manila, we
respectfully request that the personal properties seized at her residence last January 26,
1988 be immediately returned on the ground that said seizure was contrary to law and
against the will of the owner thereof. Among our reasons are the following:

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1. Our client has not been given any prior notice or hearing, hence the
Closure and Seizure Order No. 1205 dated November 3, 1987 violates "due
process of law" guaranteed under Sec. 1, Art. III, of the Philippine
Constitution.
2. Your acts also violate Sec. 2, Art. III of the Philippine Constitution which
guarantees right of the people "to be secure in their persons, houses,
papers, and effects against unreasonable searches and seizures of whatever
nature and for any purpose."
3. The premises invaded by your Mr.Ferdi Marquez and five (5) others
(including 2 policemen) are the private residence of the Salazar family, and
the entry, search as well as the seizure of the personal properties belonging
to our client were without her consent and were done with unreasonable
force and intimidation, together with grave abuse of the color of authority,
and constitute robbery and violation of domicile under Arts. 293 and 128 of
the Revised Penal Code.
Unless said personal properties worth around TEN THOUSAND PESOS
(P10,000.00) in all (and which were already due for shipment to Japan) are
returned within twenty-four (24) hours from your receipt hereof, we shall feel
free to take all legal action, civil and criminal, to protect our client's interests.
We trust that you will give due attention to these important matters.

ISSUE:
Whether or Not the Philippine Overseas Employment Administration (or the Secretary of
Labor) can validly issue warrants ofsearch and seizure (or arrest) under Article 38 of the
Labor Code.
HELD:
Under the new Constitution, (Article III, Section 2) . . . no search warrant or
warrant of arrest shall issue except upon probable cause to be determined personally by
the judge after examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the
witnesses he may produce, and particularly describing the place to be searched and the
persons or things to be seized.
Mayors and prosecuting officers cannot issue warrants of seizure or arrest. The
Closure and Seizure Order was based on Article 38 of the Labor Code. The Supreme
Court held, We reiterate that the Secretary of Labor, not being a judge, may no longer
issue search or arrest warrants. Hence, the authorities must go through the judicial
process.
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To that extent, we declare Article 38, paragraph (c), of the Labor Code, unconstitutional
and of no force and effect The power of the President to order the arrest of aliens
for deportation is, obviously, exceptional. It (the power to order arrests) cannot be made
to extend to other cases, like the one at bar. Under the Constitution, it is the sole domain
of the courts. Furthermore, the search and seizure order was in the nature of a general
warrant. The court held that the warrant is null and void, because it must identify
specifically the things to be seized.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. Article 38, paragraph (c) of the Labor Code is
declared UNCONSTITUTIONAL and null and void. The respondents are ORDERED to
return all materials seized as a result of the implementation of Search and Seizure Order
No. 1205.
i

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iArticle 38 paragraph (c) The Minister of Laboror his duly authorized representative shall have the power to
recommend the arrest and detention of any person engaged in illegal recruitment.
Article III ,Section 2, of the 1987 Constitutionno search warrant or warrant of arrest shall issue except upon
probable cause to be determined personally by the judge after examination under oath or affirmation of the
complainant and the witnesses he may produce, and particularly describing the place to be searched and the
persons or things to be seized. .. It is only judges, and no other, who may issue warrants of arrest and search.
EXCEPTION is in cases of deportation of illegal and undesirable aliens, whom the President or the
Commissioner of Immigration may order arrested, following a final order of deportation, for the purpose of
deportation.

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