Beruflich Dokumente
Kultur Dokumente
EN BANC
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, G.R. No. 174659
Plaintiff-appellee,
Present:
PUNO, C.J.,
QUISUMBING,
YNARES-SANTIAGO,
CARPIO,
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ,
- v e r s u s - CORONA,
CARPIO MORALES,
AZCUNA,*
TINGA,*
CHICO-NAZARIO,
VELASCO, JR.,
NACHURA,**
REYES,***
LEONARDO-DE CASTRO and
BRION, JJ.
RAGA SARAPIDA MAMANTAK
and LIKAD SARAPIDA TAURAK,
Accused-appellants. Promulgated:
July 28, 2008
x---------------------------------------------------x
DECISION
CORONA, J.:
There are people who are simply incapable of feeling pity or
compassion for others.
Ma. Teresa Basario must have felt a dagger deep in her heart when she
lost her two-year old son, Christopher, two weeks before Christmas on
December 13, 1999. And again upon being reunited with him some 16
months later when he could neither recognize her nor remember who he was.
Justice demands that those responsible for this cruel and agonizing
separation of mother and child be punished to the full extent of the law.
At about 3:00 p.m. on December 13, 1999, Teresa went with
Christopher and her elder sister Zenaida to a McDonalds outlet in the KP
Tower in Juan Luna St., Binondo, Manila. Teresa and Christopher looked for
a vacant table while Zenaida proceeded to order their food. Shortly after
Teresa took her seat, Christopher followed Zenaida to the counter. Barely
had Christopher gone from his mothers sight when she realized that he had
disappeared. She and her sister frantically looked for him inside and outside
the premises of the fastfood outlet, to no avail. As their continued search for
the child was futile, they reported him missing to the nearest police
detachment.
The following day, Teresa went to several TV and radio stations to
inform the public of the loss of Christopher and to appeal for help and
information. Despite the publicity, however, Teresa received no word about
Christophers whereabouts. Worse, pranksters were gleefully having a field
day aggravating her misery.
On February 25, 2001, Teresa received a call from a woman who
sounded like a muslim. The caller claimed to have custody of Christopher
and asked for P30,000 in exchange for the boy.
Mamantak and Taurak pleaded not guilty when arraigned. After pretrial, trial ensued and the parties presented their respective evidence.
In defense, Mamantak and Taurak denied the charges against them.
Taurak testified that at the time and date of the alleged kidnapping, she was
peddling wares in Divisoria market, Manila. When she saw Christopher
wandering about aimlessly, she talked to him but he did not seem to
understand her. She took the boy under her care and waited for someone to
come for him. No one did. As it was already 7:00 p.m., she brought the boy
home with her to the Muslim Center in Quiapo.
The next day, she and her husband took the boy to the nearest police
outpost but no one was there so they just brought the boy to their stall. They
opted to keep the boy until his parents could claim him.
On February 17, 2001, Taurak brought the child to Maganding, Sultan
Kumander, Lanao del Sur. Sometime later, Teresa contacted her and asked
for Christophers picture for confirmation. It was at this point that Taurak
arranged a meeting at Pitangs Carinderia in Kapatagan, Lanao del Norte on
April 7, 2001. She did not bring the boy at first as a precautionary measure.
Only after confirming that Teresa was the boys mother did she relinquish
custody to her. However, she was shocked when members of the PAOCTF
suddenly arrested her. She protested because she was innocent. There were
no charges against her nor was there a warrant for her arrest.
Mamantak corroborated her sister Tauraks testimony. She claimed that
she was at Nunungan, Lanao del Norte on December 13, 1999. At that time,
she did not know the exact whereabouts of Taurak who was in Manila and
whom she had not seen for some time. They met again on April 7, 2001 at
Pitangs Carinderia but only by chance. She happened to be there when
Taurak came. When Teresa arrived later, Taurak talked to her and then left,
returning after a few hours with Christopher whom Mamantak saw for the
first time. Taurak told her that she had found the boy and was returning him
to his mother. Mamantak stayed in the carinderia all the while, waiting for
her ride home at 4:00 p.m. She was stunned when PAOCTF members
suddenly arrested her and her sister as she had not committed any crime and
there was no warrant for her arrest.
After evaluating the respective evidence of the parties, the trial court
rendered a decision[2] on November 30, 2004 finding Taurak and Mamantak
guilty as charged:
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered finding both accused
LIKAD SARAPIDA TAURAK and accused RAGA SARAPIDA
[MAMANTAK] GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of
Kidnapping for Ransom as amended by RA No. 7659 and both are hereby
sentenced to suffer the penalty of RECLUSION PERPETUA. Both
accused are hereby jointly and severally ordered to pay the Christopher
Basario represented by the mother, [Ma.] Teresa Basario the amount of
PHP50,000.00 as compensatory damages and PHP50,000.00 as moral
damages. With costs against the accused.
Both accused are given credit for the preventive imprisonment undergone
by them during the pendency of this case.
SO ORDERED.[3]
No. 00-5-03-SC, the appellate court certified the case to this Court and
accordingly ordered the elevation of the records.[6]
We affirm the Court of Appeals, with a modification of penalty.
Kidnapping is defined and punished under Article 267 of the Revised
Penal Code, as amended by Republic Act (RA) 7659:
ART. 267. Kidnapping and serious illegal detention. Any private
individual who shall kidnap or detain another, or in any other manner
deprive him of his liberty, shall suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua to
death.
1.
2.
3.
4.
ransom,
the
duration
of
his
detention
becomes
Tauraks story that she merely gave Christopher refuge was incredible.
It was like the apocryphal tale of a man accused of theft of large cattle; his
excuse was that he saw a piece of rope and brought it home not knowing that
there was a cow tied to the other end. She never even tried to bring the boy
to the proper authorities or surrender him to the Department of Social
Welfare and Developments social workers in her barangay or in the city hall
at any time during the 16 months he was with her. And how could Teresa
have initiated her phone conversations with Taurak when they were total
strangers to each other?
Similarly, Mamantaks account that she was at Pitangs Carinderia only
by coincidence and that it was only there that she first saw Christopher
invites nothing but disbelief. The unequivocal testimonies of the prosecution
witnesses on her role in arranging for the payment of ransom and the release
of the kidnap victim (e.g., confirming the identity of Teresa and demanding
and receiving the ransom money) showed otherwise. The evidence clearly
established that Mamantak was a principal in the kidnapping of Christopher.
Evidence to be believed must not only proceed from the mouth of a
credible witness but must be credible in itself. [13] The trial and appellate
courts correctly ruled that the statements of Taurak and Mamantak did not
deserve credence. Moreover, factual findings of the trial court, including its
assessment of the credibility of the witnesses and the probative weight
thereof, are accorded great, if not conclusive, value when affirmed by the
Court of Appeals.[14]
death
penalty
and
reduced
all
death
sentences
to reclusion
perpetua without eligibility for parole. Pursuant to this law, we reduce the
penalty imposed on appellants from death to reclusion perpetua, without
eligibility for parole.
Appellants
Raga
Sarapida
Mamantak and Likad Sarapida Taurak are hereby found guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of the crime of kidnapping for ransom for which they are
sentenced to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua without eligibility for
parole. They are further ordered to pay, jointly and severally,P50,000 civil
indemnity, P200,000 moral damages and P100,000 exemplary damages to
their young victim Christopher Basario.
Costs against appellants.
SO ORDERED.
RENATO C. CORONA
Associate Justice
WE CONCUR:
REYNATO S. PUNO
Chief Justice
LEONARDO A. QUISUMBING
Associate Justice
CONSUELO YNARES-SANTIAGO
Associate Justice
ANTONIO T. CARPIO
Associate Justice
MINITA V. CHICO-NAZARIO
Associate Justice
(No Part)
ANTONIO EDUARDO B. NACHURA
Associate Justice
C E R T I FI C AT I O N
Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution, I certify that the
conclusions in the above decision had been reached in consultation before
the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court.
REYNATO S. PUNO
Chief Justice
On official leave.
No part.
***
On leave.
[1]
In some parts of the records, PO2.
[2]
Penned by Acting Presiding Judge Amor A. Reyes of the Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch 43.
Court of Appeals Records, pp. 23-39.
[3]
Id.
[4]
Penned by Associate Justice Roberto A. Barrios (deceased) and concurred in by Mario L. Guaria III and
Santiago Javier Ranada (retired) of the Fifth Division of the Court of Appeals. Rollo, pp. 2-20.
[5]
Id.
[6]
Id.
[7]
When the victim is a minor and the accused is any of the parents, the crime is defined and penalized
under the second paragraph of Article 271 of the Revised Penal Code.
[8]
A public officer (such as policeman) who has a duty under the law to detain a person but detains a person
without legal ground is liable for arbitrary detention defined and penalized under Article 124 of
the Revised Penal Code. Thus, a public officer who has no legal duty to detain a person may be
prosecuted for illegal detention and kidnapping.
[9]
People v. Jatulan, G.R. No. 171653, 24 April 2007, 522 SCRA 174.
[10]
Id.
[11]
Id.
[12]
See Rubi v. Provincial Board of Mindoro, 39 Phil. 660 (1919).
[13]
People v. Alba, 326 Phil. 519 (1996).
[14]
People v. Garalde, G.R. No. 173055, 13 April 2007, 521 SCRA 327.
[15]
People v. Jatulan, supra.
[16]
Id.
[17]
As amended by RA 7659.
[18]
An Act Prohibiting the Imposition of Death Penalty in the Philippines.
[19]
See People v. Solangon, G.R. No. 172693, 21 November 2007; People v. Yambot, 397 Phil. 23, (2000).
[20]
Supra note 12.
[21]
See People v. Solangon, supra; People v. Baldogo, 444 Phil. 35, 66 (2003); People v. Garcia, 424 Phil.
158, 194 (2002).
[22]
Id.
**
people v muit
SECOND DIVISION
DECISION
TINGA, J.:
Millano Muit y Munoz (Muit), Sergio Pancho y Cagumoc, Jr.
(Pancho,
Jr.),
Rolando Dequillo y Tampos (Dequillo),
Romeo Pancho (Romeo), Eduardo EddieHermano alias Bobby Reyes alias
Eddie Reyes (Hermano), and Joseph Ferraer (Ferraer) were charged with
kidnapping for
ransom
with
homicide[1] and carnapping[2] in
two
separate informations.
Only Muit, Pancho Jr., Dequillo,
Romeo,
and Ferraer were arrested and stood trial. However, Ferraer was discharged
from the criminal cases by the Regional Trial Court (RTC) and was utilized
as a state witness.[3] All appellants pleaded not guilty during their
arraignments.
The facts as culled from the records are as follows:
In the afternoon of 11 November 1997, Orestes Julaton, (Julaton), a relative
of Ferraer, arrived at the latters house in Kaylaway, Nasugbu, Batangas with
SergioPancho, Sr. (Pancho, Sr.), Pancho, Jr., Dequillo and four other men
on board a gray Mitsubishi car with plate number PSV818. Julaton introduced them to Ferraer and told the latter that Pancho, Sr.
is also their relative. Pancho, Sr. told Ferraer that they wanted to use his
house as a safehouse for their visitor. Ferraer was hesitant at first as he
thought it was risky for him and his family. Hermano told Ferraer not to
worry because they are not killers; their line of work is kidnap for
ransom. Ferraer was assured that the money they will get would be shared
equally among them. Ferraer and Pancho, Sr. would guard their
victim. Later, five other men came and they were introduced
to Ferraer as Muit, Morales, alias Tony, alias David and alias Puri. They had
dinner and chatted until midnight. That evening, Morales handed
to Ferraer for safekeeping a folded carton wrapped with masking tape
contained
in
a
big
paper
bag,
and
a
green
backpack. Hermano told Ferraer that
the
package
contained
guns.Ferraer brought the package inside his room; he inspected the contents
before placing them under the bed, and saw that the carton contained a
shotgun and the green backpack, an Ingram folding. Morales and Udon also
showed him their .45 caliber guns tucked at their waists.[4]
At one
oclock in
the
afternoon
of 24
November
1997, Ferraer saw Pancho, Jr., and Hermano with a companion, seated
under the tree in front of his house.Pancho, Jr. introduced their companion
as Romeo. They informed Ferraer that the following day, they would
proceed with their plan. Romeo would be the informant since he is an
insider and a trusted general foreman of the victim. The next day, at nine
oclock in the morning, Pancho, Sr. arrived at Ferraers house alone and
askedFerraer if he was already informed of the plan. Ferraer replied in the
affirmative. Pancho, Sr. told him to wait for the groups return. However, the
group returned without the intended victim because the latter did not show
up at the construction site.[5] On 2 December 1997, the group received a call
from Romeo informing them that the victim was already at the construction
site. Hermano, Morales, Udon, Manuel, Bokbok, and Muit commuted to the
construction site at Barangay Darasa,Tanauan, Batangas. Pancho, Jr. was on
board the Mitsubishi car as back-up.
At around two oclock in the afternoon of the same date, 2 December
1997, Roger Seraspe (Seraspe), the personal driver of the victim, drove a
blue Pajero with plate number UDL-746 carrying Engr. Ruth Roldan and
the
victim
to
visit
the Flexopac project
site
at
Barangay Darasa, Tanauan, Batangas. At the site, Engr. Roldanand the
victim alighted from the Pajero and, along with Engr. Ed dela Cruz, toured
the construction site. Seraspe talked with Armand Chavez (Chavez), the
warehouseman of ILO Construction, while waiting for his boss.[6]
After the site inspection, the three engineers walked towards the direction of
the Pajero. Seraspe was surprised to see that the three engineers who stood
together suddenly lay prostrate on the ground. Seraspe and Chavez saw an
unidentified man standing near the three engineers. Three more armed men
surrounded the Pajero.Two of them approached Seraspe and Chavez. One
of the armed men, Muit, poked a gun at Seraspe and ordered him and
Chavez to lay prostrate on the ground.[7] The assailants dragged the victim
towards the Pajero. They forced the victim to order Seraspe to give them
the keys to the Pajero. When the victim was already on board
the Pajero, Seraspe heard
one
of
them
[8]
say, Sarge, nandito na ang ating pakay.
They then started the Pajero and drove away, passing through the Pagasa Road gate. Two more persons who were waiting at the Pag-asa road
boarded the Pajero.[9]
showing the cadavers of Udon, Morales, Manuel, Bokbok and the victim,
and thePajero riddled with bullets. Ferraer also saw Muit in handcuffs.
The prosecution presented Ignacio Ong, Sr., the father of the
victim Engr. Ignacio Ong, Jr.; Seraspe; Chavez; Dr. Anthony Llamas, the
PNP Medico-Legal Officer who conducted the autopsy; Supt.
Mission, Ferraer,
as
the
state
witness;
and
[12]
Atty. Narzal Mallare (Atty. Mallare),
the
lawyer
who
assisted
appellants Pancho, Jr. andDequillo in executing their respective sworn
statements as witnesses. Their accounts were corroborated by the
prosecutions documentary evidence such as the extra judicial confessions
of Pancho, Jr. and Dequillo, which were executed with the assistance of
Atty. Mallare. Muit executed two extra judicial confessions: the first
statement was dated 4 December 1997, in which he was assisted by Atty.
Ernesto Vergara, and the second statement was dated 7 December 1997 in
which he was assisted by Atty. Solomon De Jesus and witnessed by his
uncle, Bonifacio Muit (Bonifacio),
and
his
brother, Dominador Muit (Dominador). On the other hand, the defense
presented appellants Dequillo, Pancho, Jr., and Muit.
Dequillo, for his part, claimed that for the period of November to
December 1997 he was working as a mason at Villanueva Construction in
BF Homes. His work starts at 8:00 in the morning and ends
at 5:00 in the afternoon. He stated that on 8 December 1997, he was
arrested by the CIDG at his house in Purok Sto. Domingo,Barangay Holy
Spirit, Quezon City. At the CIDG Detention Center, he was questioned
about the guns used in the kidnapping of the victim. He was allegedly
tortured when he denied any knowledge about the kidnapping and was
forced to sign a statement without being allowed to read it.
Atty. Mallare only came in after he had already signed the statement. He
denied any participation in the crimes charged against him.[13]
Pancho, Jr. claimed that he was
1997 in Calbayog, Samar. He was first brought
Station, and then transferred to Camp Crame.
tortured him and forced him to sign the
arrested on 7 December
to the Calbayog City Police
He alleged that the police
written confession of his
Chavez. Ferraer testified on how the group approached and convinced him
to let them use his house to keep the victim they planned to kidnap. They
planned the crime in Ferraers house and waited for the call from Romeo to
inform them when the victim would be at the construction site. The group
received a call from Romeo on 2 December 1997 informing them that the
victim was already at the construction site, and so they went there to carry
out their plan. At the construction site, as testified to by Seraspe and
Chavez, Muit and the other members of the group pointed their guns at the
victim and his companion and ordered them to lie prostrate on the ground.
After getting the keys to the Pajerofrom Seraspe, they forced the victim to
board the vehicle with Muit driving it. They immediately reported the
kidnapping of the victim to the police and the kidnappers were intercepted
by the group led by Supt. Mission. Supt. Mission testified that the
kidnappers refused to surrender and engaged the police in a shoot out in
which the victim was among the casualties. Muit was one of the two
persons who survived the shoot out, but was apprehended by the
police. Pancho, Jr. returned to the house ofFerraer alone when the group did
not arrive at their meeting place. Ferraer, Pancho, Jr., and Pancho, Sr.
learned from the news that the group engaged the police in a shoot out and
most of them were killed, and that Muit was arrested by the police.
After investigation, the police were able to apprehend
appellants Pancho, Jr., Romeo, and Dequillo who all took part in the
botched criminal conspiracy to kidnap the victim. During the
investigation, Pancho, Jr., Dequillo, and Muit, with the assistance of their
counsels and family members, executed extra judical confessions divulging
their respective roles in the planning and execution of the crimes.
Even though Pancho, Jr., Dequillo and Romeo did not participate in
the actual abduction of the victim, they should still be held liable, as the
courts below did, because of the existence of conspiracy. Conspiracy is a
unity of purpose and intention in the commission of a crime. [26] Where
conspiracy is established, the precise modality or extent of participation of
each individual conspirator becomes secondary since the act of one is the
act of all.[27] The degree of actual participation in the commission of the
crime is immaterial.
Case Nos. P-521 and P-607 to reclusion perpetua without eligibility for
parole is AFFIRMED with the MODIFICATIONS that the compensation
for loss of earning capacity be deleted while the civil indemnity be increased
to P75,000.00 and the moral damages to P500,000.00, and that appellants
shall also pay the heirs of Ignacio Earl Ong, Jr. temperate damages
of P25,000.00 and exemplary damages of P100,000.00 for the crime of
kidnapping for ransom with homicide and P25,000.00 for the crime
ofcarnapping. Costs against appellants.
SO ORDERED.
DANTE O. TINGA
Associate Justice
WE CONCUR:
LEONARDO A. QUISUMBING
Associate Justice
Chairperson
ARTURO D. BRION
Associate Justice
ATTESTATION
I attest that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in
consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of
the Courts Division.
LEONARDO A. QUISUMBING
Associate Justice
Chairperson, Second Division
CERTIFICATION
Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution, and the
Division Chairpersons Attestation, it is hereby certified that the
conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in consultation
before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Courts
Division.
REYNATO S. PUNO
Chief Justice
[1]
Records, pp. 43-44. Crim. Case No. P-521 (for Kidnapping for Ransom with Homicide).
The undersigned Special Counsel accuses Millano Muit y Munoz alias Emi,
Eduardo Eddie Hermano alias Bobby Reyes alias Eddie Ryes, Sergio Pancho y Cagumoc,
Jr., Rolando Dequillo y Tampos, RomeoPancho and Joseph Ferraer of the crime
of Carnapping, defined and penalized under Republic Act No. 6539, otherwise known as
the Anti-Carnapping Act of 1972[,] as amended by Republic Act No. 7659, committed as
follows:
That on the 2nd day of December 1997, at about 2:00 oclock in the afternoon, at
Barangay Darasa, Municipality of Tanauan, Province of Batangas, Philippines and within
the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, together with one
John Doe, one Peter Doe, one Richard Doe and one alias Rocky Reyes whose identities
and whereabouts are still unknown, armed with firearms, conspiring and confederating
together, acting in common accord and mutually helping one another, with intent to gain
and without the knowledge and consent of the owner thereof, did then and there
[willfully], unlawfully and feloniously take, steal and carry away one (1)
Mitsubishi Pajero with Plate No. UDL-746 with an undetermined amount, owned by
Ignacio Ong, Jr., to the damage and prejudice of aforesaid owner and/or his heirs.
[CONTRARY TO LAW].
[3]
Records, p. 308.
[4]
[5]
[6]
[7]
TSN, 31 March 1998, pp. 6-7, 9-10; 13 April 1998, pp. 6-7, 9-10.
[8]
[9]
[10]
[11]
[12]
[13]
[14]
[15]
[16]
[17]
Id. at 218-219. Penned by Judge Voltaire Rosales. The dispositive portion of the decision reads
as follows:
WHEREFORE, this Court finds accused MILLANO MUIT Y MUNOZ, SERGIO
PANCHO Y CAGUMOC[,] JR., ROLANDO DEQUILLO Y TARIPOS, AND ROMEO
PANCHO, GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of KIDNAPPING FOR RANSOM[,]
resulting in the death of Ignacio Earl Ong, Jr., punished under Article 267 of the Revised
Penal Code[,] as amended by Republic Act [No.] 7659, and sentences all the accused to
suffer the penalty of DEATH.
The accused are further directed to pay heirs of the victim Ignacio Earl Ong[,] Jr.
an indemnity of FIFTY THOUSAND (P50,000.00) PESOS, actual damages in the
amount of TWO MILLION TWO HUNDRED THOUSAND (P2,200,000.00) PESOS,
and moral damages in the amount of TWO HUNDRED THOUSAND (P200,000.00)
PESOS, with subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency.
In Criminal Case No. P-607, this Court finds the accused MILLANO MUIT Y MUNOZ,
SERGIO PANCHO Y CAGUMOC[,] JR., ROLANDO DEQUILLO Y TARIPOS AND
ROMEO PANCHO, GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of CARNAPPING punished
under Republic Act [No.] 6539, and sentences all the accused to suffer the penalty of
DEATH.
In Criminal Cases Nos. P-534 and P-535, this Court finds the accused MILLANO MUIT
Y MUNOZ guilty beyond reasonable doubt of ROBBERY with violence against or
intimidation of persons, punished under Article 294 of the Revised Penal Code, and
sentences accused to an indeterminate penalty of two years and six months
of prision correccional, as minimum, up to eight years and six months of prision mayor,
Id. at 298-299.
[19]
Rollo, pp. 2-31. Penned by Associate Justice Jose Catral Mendoza, and concurred in by
Associate Justices Andres Reyes, Jr., and Ramon Bato, Jr.
[20]
WHEREFORE, the November 22, 2002 Decision of the Regional Trial Court,
Branch 83, Tanauan, Batangas, in Criminal Case Nos. P-521 and P-607, is
hereby AFFIRMED except with respect to the penalty of Death which is hereby reduced
to Reclusion Perpetua in both cases.
SO ORDERED.
[21]
Id. at 41-42.
[22]
[23]
Art. 267. Kidnapping and serious illegal detention.Any private individual who shall
kidnap or detain another, or in any other manner deprive him of his liberty, shall suffer
the penalty of reclusion perpetua to death.
1. If kidnapping of detention shall have lasted more than three days.
2. If it shall have been committed simulating public authority.
3. If any serious physical injuries shall have been inflicted upon the person
kidnapped or detained; or if threats to kill him shall have been made.
4. If the person kidnapped or detained shall be a minor, except when the accused
is any of the parents, female or a public officer.
The penalty shall be death where the kidnapping or detention was committed
for the purposes of extorting ransom from the victim or any other person, even if none
of the circumstances abovementioned were present in the commission of the offense.
When the victim is killed or dies as a consequence of the detention or is
raped, or is subjected to torture or dehumanizing acts, the maximum penalty shall be
imposed. (As amended by Sec. 8, Republic Act No. 7659.) (Emphasis supplied.)
[24]
[25]
[27]
[28]
[29]
[30]
TSN, 13 March 2001, pp. 17-18; 27 March 2001, p. 8; 18 June 2001, p. 11.
[31]
[32]
[33]
See People v. Sinoc, 341 Phil. 355 (1997); People v. Sabiyon, 437 Phil. 594 (2002).
[34]
See People v. Encipido, L-70091, 29 December 1986, 146 SCRA 478, 492, citing People
v. Domondon, 43 SCRA 486, 490-491 (1972).
[35]
[36]
People v. Reynes, 423 Phil. 363, 384 (2001) citing People v. Danico, 208 SCRA 472 (1992).
[37]
[38]
REVISED PENAL CODE, Art. 14. See People v. Lee, G.R. No. 66848, 20 December 1991, 201
SCRA 900, 911; People v. Buka, G.R. Nos. 68311-13, 30 January 1992, 205 SCRA 567, 588; People v. de
la Cruz, G.R. No. 102063, 20 January 1993, 217 SCRA 283, 296.
[39]
(a) the penalty of reclusion perpetua, when the law violated makes use of the
nomenclature of the penalties of the Revised Penal Code; or
(b) the penalty of life imprisonment, when the law violated does not make use of the
nomenclature of the penalties of the Revised Penal Code.
Pursuant to the same law, appellant shall not be eligible for parole under Act No. 4103,
otherwise known as the Indeterminate Sentence Law.
[40]
See People v. Panabang, 424 Phil. 596 (2002); People v. Cuenca, 425 Phil. 722 (2002).
[41]
[42]
445 Phil. 109, 126 (2003). See also People v. Villanueva, 456 Phil. 14, 29 (2003).
[43]
People v. Tubongbanua, G.R. No. 171271, 31 August 2006, 500 SCRA 727, 742-743; People
v. Bangcado, 399 Phil. 768, 792 (2000); People v. SPO1 Lobitania, 437 Phil. 213 (2002). See also People
v. Amion, 405 Phil. 917, 934 (2001); People v. Court of Appeals, 405 Phil. 247, 269 (2001); citing People
v. Pedroso, G.R. No. 125120, July 19, 2000; People v. Go-od, 387 Phil. 628 (2000); People
v. Rosalino Flores, 385 Phil. 159 (2000); People v. Mindanao, 390 Phil. 510 (2000); People v. Quijon, 382
Phil. 339 (2000); People v. Buluran, 382 Phil. 364 (2000).
[44]
People v. Concepcion, 409 Phil. 173, 189 (2001), citing People v. De Vera, 312 SCRA 640
[45]
[46]
Id. at 336.
(1999).
[47]
See CIVIL CODE, Art. 2230. See also People v. PO3 Roxas, 457 Phil. 566, 579 (2003),
citing People v. Catubig, G.R. No. 137842, 23 August 2001. See also People v. Bergante, 350 Phil. 275,
292-293 (1998); People v. Reyes, 350 Phil. 683, 699 (1998).
\
PEOPLE V DIONALDO
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No. 207949
y Ebron (Armando), Renato Dionaldo y Ebron (Renato), Mariano Gariguez, Jr. y Ramos
(Mariano), and Rodolfo Larido y Ebron (Rodolfo) guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime
of Kidnapping and Serious Illegal Detention.
The Facts
At around 8 o'clock in the morning of May 16, 2003, Roderick Navarro (Roderick) dropped
his brother Edwin Navarro (Edwin) off at the Health Is Wealth Gym in Caloocan City. Thirty
minutes later, he received a text message from another brother who told him that Edwin had
been kidnapped. Records show that three (3) men, later identified as Armando, Renato, and
Mariano, forcibly dragged a bloodied Edwin down the stairway of the gym and pushed him
inside a dark green Toyota car with plate number UKF 194. Upon receiving the message,
Roderick immediately reported the incident to the police. At around 10 oclock in the morning
of the same day, he received a phone call from Edwins kidnappers who threatened to kill
Edwin if he should report the matter to the police.
2
The following day, Roderick received another call from the kidnappers, who demanded the
payment of ransom money in the amount of P15,000,000.00. Roderick told them he had no
such money, as he only had P50,000.00. On May 19, 2003, after negotiations over the
telephone, the kidnappers agreed to release Edwin in exchange for the amount
of P110,000.00. Roderick was then instructed to bring the money to Batangas and wait for
their next call.
5
At around 7:30 in the evening of the same day, as Roderick was on his way to Batangas to
deliver the ransom money, the kidnappers called and instructed him to open all the windows
of the car he was driving and to turn on the hazard light when he reaches the designated
place. After a while, Roderick received another call directing him to exit in Bicutan instead
and proceed to C-5 until he arrives at the Centennial Village. He was told to park beside the
Libingan ng mga Bayani. After several hours, an orange Mitsubishi car with plate number
DEH 498 pulled up in front of his vehicle where four (4) men alighted. Roderick saw one of
the men take a mobile phone and upon uttering the word "alat," the men returned to their car
and drove away.
6
Meanwhile, a team had been organized to investigate the kidnapping of Edwin, headed by
SPO3 Romeo Caballero (SPO3 Caballero) and PO3 Nestor Acebuche (PO3 Acebuche) of
the Camp Crame Police Anti-Crime Emergency Response (PACER). During the course of
the investigation, Rodolfo, an employee at the Health Is Wealth Gym, confessed to PO3
Acebuche that he was part of the plan to kidnap Edwin, as in fact he was the one who tipped
off Mariano, Renato, Armando and a certain Virgilio Varona (Virgilio) on the condition that he
will be given a share in the ransom money. Rodolfo gave information on the whereabouts of
his cohorts, leading to their arrest on June 12, 2003. In the early morning of the following day
or on June 13, 2003, the PACER team found the dead body of Edwin at Sitio Pugpugan
Laurel, Batangas, which Roderick identified.
7
That on or about the 16th day of May, 2003 in Caloocan City, Metro Manila and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, conspiring together and
mutually helping one another, being then private persons, did then and there by force and
intimidation willfully, unlawfully and feloniously with the use of motor vehicle and superior
strength take, carry and deprive EDWIN NAVARRO Y ONA, of his liberty against his will, for
12
During trial, the death of the victim, Edwin, was established through a Certificate of
Death with Registry No. 2003-050 (subject certificate of death) showing that he died on May
19, 2003 from a gunshot wound on the head.
13
It gave credence to the positive and straightforward testimonies of the prosecution witnesses
which clearly established that it was the accusedappellants who forcibly dragged a bloodied
Edwin into a car and, consequently, deprived him of his liberty. In light thereof, it rejected
accused-appellants respective alibis and claims of torture, which were not substantiated. It
also held that the crime of Kidnapping had been committed for the purpose of extorting
ransom, which is punishable by death. However, in view of the suspended imposition of the
death penalty pursuant to Republic Act No. (RA) 9346, only the penalty of reclusion
perpetua was imposed. Further, the RTC found that conspiracy attended the commission of
the crime, as the accused-appellants individual participation was geared toward a joint
purpose and criminal design.
15
16
17
18
Notably, while the RTC found that the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses prove that
the victim Edwin was abducted, deprived of liberty, and eventually killed, a fact which is
supported by the subject certificate of death, it did not consider said death in its judgment.
The CA Ruling
19
In a Decision dated February 15, 2013, the CA affirmed in toto the RTCs conviction of
accused-appellants, finding that the prosecution was able to clearly establish all the
elements of the crime of Kidnapping and Serious Illegal Detention, namely: (a) the offender
is a private individual; (b) he kidnaps or detains another, or in any manner deprives the latter
of his liberty; (c) the act of detention or kidnapping must be illegal; and (d) in the commission
of the offense, any of the following circumstances is present: (1) the kidnapping or detention
lasts for more than three days; (2) it is committed simulating public authority; (3) any serious
physical injuries are inflicted upon the person kidnapped or detained or threats to kill him are
made; or (4) the person kidnapped or detained is a minor, except when the accused is any of
20
the parents, female or a public officer. It likewise sustained the finding that the kidnapping
was committed for the purpose of extorting ransom, as sufficiently proven by the testimony of
the brother of the victim. Moreover, the CA affirmed that conspiracy attended the
commission of the crime, as the acts of accused-appellants emanated from the same
purpose or common design, and they were united in its execution.
21
22
23
Separately, the CA found that accused-appellants claims of torture were never supported,
and that Rodolfo voluntarily signed the extrajudicial confession and was afforded competent
and independent counsel in its execution.
24
In this case, the RTC, as affirmed by the CA, gave weight and credence to the testimonies of
the prosecution witnesses, which they found to be straightforward and consistent. Through
these testimonies, it was clearly established that accused-appellants, who were all private
individuals, took the victim Edwin and deprived him of his liberty, which acts were illegal, and
for the purpose of extorting ransom. Thus, seeing no semblance of arbitrariness or
misapprehension on the part of the court a quo, the Court finds no compelling reason to
disturb its factual findings on this score.
26
1wphi1
Anent the finding that conspiracy attended the commission of the crime, the Court likewise
finds the conclusion of the RTC in this regard, as affirmed by the CA, to be well-taken.
Conspiracy exists when two or more persons come to an agreement concerning the
commission of a felony and decide to commit it, and when conspiracy is established, the
responsibility of the conspirators is collective, not individual, rendering all of them equally
liable regardless of the extent of their respective participations. In this relation, direct proof
is not essential to establish conspiracy, as it can be presumed from and proven by the acts of
the accused pointing to a joint purpose, design, concerted action, and community of
interests. Hence, as the factual circumstances in this case clearly show that accusedappellants acted in concert at the time of the commission of the crime and that their acts
emanated from the same purpose or common design, showing unity in its execution, the
CA, affirming the trial court, correctly ruled that there was conspiracy among them.
27
28
29
The foregoing notwithstanding, the Court is, however, constrained to modify the ruling of the
RTC and the CA, as the crime the accusedappellants have committed does not, as the
records obviously bear, merely constitute Kidnapping and Serious Illegal Detention, but that
of the special complex crime of Kidnapping for Ransom with Homicide. This is in view of the
victims (i.e., Edwins) death, which was (a) specifically charged in the Information, and (b)
clearly established during the trial of this case. Notably, while this matter was not among the
issues raised before the Court, the same should nonetheless be considered in accordance
with the settled rule that in a criminal case, an appeal, as in this case, throws open the entire
case wide open for review, and the appellate court can correct errors, though unassigned,
that may be found in the appealed judgment.
30
31
After the amendment of the Revised Penal Code on December 31, 1993 by RA 7659, Article
267 of the same Code now provides:
Art. 267. Kidnapping and serious illegal detention. Any private individual who shall kidnap
or detain another, or in any other manner deprive him of his liberty, shall suffer the penalty of
reclusion perpetua to death:
1. If the kidnapping or detention shall have lasted more than three days.
2. If it shall have been committed simulating public authority.
3. If any serious physical injuries shall have been inflicted upon the person
kidnapped or detained; or if threats to kill him shall have been made.
4. If the person kidnapped or detained shall be a minor, except when the accused is
any of the parents, female or a public officer;
The penalty shall be death where the kidnapping or detention was committed for the purpose
of extorting ransom from the victim or any other person, even if none of the circumstances
above-mentioned were present in the commission of the offense.
When the victim is killed or dies as a consequence of the detention or is raped, or is
subjected to torture or dehumanizing acts, the maximum penalty shall be imposed.
(Emphases supplied)
The Court further elucidated in People v. Mercado:
32
In People v. Ramos, the accused was found guilty of two separate heinous crimes of
kidnapping for ransom and murder committed on July 13, 1994 and sentenced to death. On
appeal, this Court modified the ruling and found the accused guilty of the "special complex
crime" of kidnapping for ransom with murder under the last paragraph of Article 267, as
amended by Republic Act No. 7659. This Court said:
x x x This amendment introduced in our criminal statutes the concept of special complex
crime of kidnapping with murder or homicide. It effectively eliminated the distinction drawn
by the courts between those cases where the killing of the kidnapped victim was purposely
sought by the accused, and those where the killing of the victim was not deliberately resorted
to but was merely an afterthought. Consequently, the rule now is: Where the person
kidnapped is killed in the course of the detention, regardless of whether the killing was
purposely sought or was merely an afterthought, the kidnapping and murder or homicide can
no longer be complexed under Art. 48, nor be treated as separate crimes, but shall be
punished as a special complex crime under the last paragraph of Art. 267, as amended by
RA No. 7659. (Emphases supplied; citations omitted)
33
Thus, further taking into account the fact that the kidnapping was committed for the purpose
of extorting ransom, accused-appellants conviction must be modified from Kidnapping and
Serious Illegal Detention to the special complex crime of Kidnapping for Ransom with
Homicide, which carries the penalty of death. As earlier intimated, the enactment of RA 9346
had suspended the imposition of the death penalty. This means that the accused-appellants
could, as the CA and trial court properly ruled, only be sentenced to the penalty of reclusion
perpetua. To this, the Court adds that the accused-appellants are not eligible for parole.
34
On a final note, the Court observes that the RTC and the CA failed to award civil indemnity
as well as damages to the family of the kidnap victim. In People v. Quiachon, the Court
explained that even if the death penalty was not to be imposed on accused-appellants in
view of the prohibition in RA 9346, the award of civil indemnity was nonetheless proper, not
being dependent on the actual imposition of the death penalty but on the fact that qualifying
circumstances warranting the imposition of the death penalty attended the commission of the
crime. In the present case, considering that both the qualifying circumstances of ransom
and the death of the victim during captivity were duly alleged in the information and proven
during trial, civil indemnity in the amount of P100,000.00 must therefore be awarded to the
family of the victim, to conform with prevailing jurisprudence.
35
36
37
Similarly, the Court finds that the award of moral damages is warranted in this case. Under
Article 2217 of the Civil Code, moral damages include physical suffering, mental anguish,
fright, serious anxiety, wounded feelings, moral shock and similar injury, while Article 2219 of
the same Code provides that moral damages may be recovered in cases of illegal detention.
It cannot be denied, in this case, that the kidnap victims family suffered mental anguish,
fright, and serious anxiety over the detention and eventually, the death of Edwin. As such,
and in accordance with prevailing jurisprudence, moral damages in the amount
of P100,000.00 must perforce be awarded to the family of the victim.
38
Finally, exemplary damages must be awarded in this case, in view of the confluence of the
aforesaid qualifying circumstances and in order to deter others from committing the same
atrocious acts. In accordance with prevailing jurisprudence, therefore, the Court awards
exemplary damages in the amount of P100,000.00 to the family of the kidnap victim.
39
In addition, interest at the rate of six percent (6%) per annum shall be imposed on all
damages awarded from the date of finality of judgment until fully paid, pursuant to prevailing
jurisprudence.
40
WHEREFORE, the appeal is DISMISSED. The Decision dated February 15, 2013 of the
Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR-H.C. No. 02888 is hereby AFFIRMED with the
MODIFICATION that all the accusedappellants herein are equally found GUILTY of the
special complex crime of Kidnapping for Ransom with Homicide, and are sentenced to each
suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua, without eligibility for parole, and to pay, jointly and
severally, the family of the kidnap victim Edwin Navarro the following amounts:
(1) P100,000.00 as civil indemnity; (2) P100,000.00 as moral damages; and (3) P100,000.00
as exemplary damages, all with interest at the rate of six percent (6%) per annum from the
date of finality of judgment until fully paid.
SO ORDERED.
ESTELA M. PERLAS-BERNABE
Associate Justice
WE CONUR:
ANTONIO T. CARPIO
Associate Justice
Chairperson
ARTURO D. BRION
Associate Justice
Footnotes
Rollo, pp. 2-25. Penned by Associate Justice Samuel H. Gaerlan, with Associate
Justices Rebecca De Guia-Salvador and Apolinario D. Bruselas, Jr., concurring.
1
Id. at 6-7.
Id. at 7.
Id.
Id. at 7-8.
One of the original five (5) accused who died during trial, resulting in the dismissal
of the case against him. (See CA rollo, p. 37.)
8
10
Id. at 3.
11
12
13
15
17
18
Id. at 97.
19
Id. at 60.
20
21
Id. at 15-16.
22
Id. at 18-19.
23
24
People v. Mercado, 400 Phil. 37, 71 (2000). See also People v. Lamsen, G.R. No.
198338, February 20, 2013, 691 SCRA 498, 505-506.
25
26
27
28
29
Rollo, p. 23.
People v. Quimzon, G.R. No. 133541, April 14, 2004, 427 SCRA 261, 281, citing
People v. Feliciano, 418 Phil. 88, 106 (2001).
31
32
33
Id. at 82-83.
35
36
Id. at 428.
37
38
39
Peop e v. Dumadag, G.R. No. 176740, June 22, 2011, 652 SCRA 535, 550, citing
People v. Galvez, G.R. No. 181827, February 2, 2011, 641SCRA472, 485.
40
MADSALI V PEOPLE
MADSALI,
- versus -
CARPIO,* J.,
CORONA, J., Chairperson,
VELASCO, JR.,
NACHURA, and
PERALTA, JJ.
Promulgated:
In Criminal Case No. 12281, Sajiron Lajim (Sajiron) and Maron Lajim
(Maron) were charged with the crime of abduction with rape in an
Information[4] dated March 17, 1995, which reads:
That on or about the 1st day of July, 1994, in Barangay Malitub,
Municipality of Bataraza, Province of Palawan, Philippines, and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused conspiring,
confederating together and helping one another and by means of force,
threat, violence and intimidation, while armed with a bladed weapon
known as Badong, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously
take and carry away one AAA, a girl of 16 years of age, against her will
and consent and brought to the forest and on the occasion thereof the said
accused by means of force, threat, violence and intimidation, and while
armed with a knife, accused Sahiron Lajim, with lewd design, did then and
there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously have carnal knowledge with
said AAA, against her will and consent, to her damage and prejudice.
That on the occasion of the said Rape, accused Maron Lajim helped
Sahiron Lajim by acting as look-out during the commission of the said
crime.
CONTRARY TO LAW.
In Criminal Case No. 12309, Egap Madsali (Egap) and Sajiron Lajim
(Sajiron) were charged with the crime of serious illegal detention in an
Amended Information[5] dated August 28, 1995, which reads:
That on or about the 2nd day of July, 1994 in the morning up to December
15, 1994, at Barangay Malitub, Municipality of Bataraza, Province of
Palawan, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court,
the above-named accused conspiring, confederating together and mutually
helping one another, with the use of force, violence and intimidation, did
then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously take and detain AAA,
an unmarried woman under 15 years of age in the house of Egap Madsali
thereby depriving said AAA of her liberty all against her will and as a
result of that illegal detention, said AAA was not able to go home to her
mother for a period of more than five (5) months.
CONTRARY TO LAW.
Upon motion of the private prosecutor and with the conformity of the
Provincial Prosecutor's Office, Criminal Case No. 12309 was consolidated
with Criminal Case No. 12281, pending before the RTC of Palawan, Puerto
Princesa City, Branch 50.
Sajiron was arraigned on April 21, 1995 in Criminal Case No. 12281 and on
September 21, 1995 in Criminal Case No. 12309. He pleaded not guilty to
both charges.Egap was arrested and, thereafter, arraigned on March 8,
1996. He pleaded not guilty in Criminal Case No. 12309. Maron was
arrested and, later, arraigned on March 11, 1996. He pleaded not guilty in
Criminal Case No. 12281. A joint trial ensued. However, in July 1996, Egap
escaped while under the custody of prison guards.
The evidence presented by the prosecution are as follows:
On July 1, 1994, around 3:30 o'clock in the afternoon, fifteen-year-old AAA
and her aunt Inon Dama were fetching water in a cave in Barangay (Brgy.)
Malitub, Bataraza, Palawan. Suddenly, Sajiron arrived, running towards
them and carrying a badong (bolo). They tried to run away, but Sajiron
overtook them. He held the hair of AAA and told her, Sara, you go with me.
If you will not go with me, I will kill you. Inon Dama came to AAA's rescue,
but Sajiron tried to hack her. Luckily, she was able to shield herself with a
plastic container. AAA was crying while she held her aunt's hand. Sajiron
then drew his gun, which was tucked in his waist, pointed it at Inon Dama
and said, If you will not go, I will shoot you. Inon Dama went home and
reported the incident to AAA's mother. When Inon Dama left the place,
Maron, Sajiron's father, suddenly appeared with a gun and told AAA to come
with them. When AAA refused, Sajiron and Maron tied her hands behind her
back, covered her mouth with a piece of cloth, and brought her to the
forest. There, AAA was untied and undressed, leaving only her bra on.
While Sajiron was undressing AAA, she pleaded with him not to abuse her,
but Sajiron told her that if she would submit to his desire, her life would be
spared. Sajiron held her breast, touched her private parts and inserted his sex
organ inside her vagina. AAA resisted, but to no avail. She felt pain and she
noticed blood on her private parts. She was sexually abused three times on
the ground, where she was made to lie down on a bed of leaves. During the
entire time that AAA was being abused by Sajiron, Maron stood guard and
watched them.They left the forest at around 10:00 o'clock in the morning of
the following day and brought AAA to the house of Egap, where she was
detained in a room. Sajiron instructed Egap to guard AAA and to shoot her if
she would attempt to escape.
On July 2, 1994, AAAs mother came to get AAA, but Egap refused
and threatened to kill her daughter if she would report the matter to the
authorities. Out of fear of losing her daughter, she went home and did not
report the incident to the police authorities. [6] Egap asked AAA if she wanted
to marry Sajiron, but she refused. AAA was then forced to sign an unknown
document, which she was not able to read.
Nine days after the abduction, or on July 11, 1994, upon instruction of
Egap, AAA and Sajiron were married by Imam Musli Muhammad. The
marriage was solemnized against AAA's will and without the presence of her
parents. After the marriage, AAA and Sajiron lived in the house of Egap,
together with the latter's wife, children and mother-in-law. AAA stayed in
one room with Sajiron. While detained, AAA did not try to escape, because
her house was very far from the place where she was held captive, and her
captors threatened to kill her and her family if she would attempt to
escape. During her detention, Sajiron abused her twice every night. She was
free to roam within the vicinity of the house but she was usually
accompanied by Egap's wife who served as her guard. She was also guarded
and threatened by Egap's sons. She got pregnant after some time.
On November 24, 1994, BBB and Inon Dama went to Puerto Princesa
City to report AAA's abduction to the proper authorities. AAA was detained
at the house of Egap from July 2, 1994 until December 15, 1994. On
December 16, 1994, Sajiron and Egap were arrested by the police.
The defense, on the other hand, denied having committed the crimes
charged. Sajiron claimed that he and AAA were engaged for three years
prior to their elopement. During the period of their engagement, Sajiron
lived with AAA in her mother's house. AAA married Sajiron voluntarily and
out of her own free will. The sexual intercourse between AAA and Sajiron
was consensual. The defense further claimed that AAA merely filed criminal
charges against Sajiron because he did not pay the dowry (dower) in the
amount of P10,000.00 to AAA's parents. Sajiron asserted that he did not pay
the dowry because he had already rendered services to AAA's family for
about three years prior to his marriage with AAA. After the marriage,
Sajiron and AAA were brought by the latter's father to his house in Balabac,
Palawan.They stayed there for about four months. Then they went to Brgy.
Malitub, Bataraza, Palawan and stayed at the house of Egap for about two
weeks. Sajiron was thereafter arrested by the authorities. He only learned
that a case for abduction with rape was filed against him by AAA when he
was being interrogated by the Bataraza Police.
On July 25, 2002, the RTC rendered a Decision [7] finding Sajiron and Maron
guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of abduction with rape. Egap
and Sajiron were also found guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of
serious illegal detention. The dispositive portion of the Decision is as
follows:
2.
Petitioners filed a Notice of Appeal, and the records of the case were
forwarded to this Court. However, pursuant to this Courts ruling
in People v. Mateo,[8] the case was transferred to the CA. The CA rendered a
Decision dated July 31, 2007 affirming the decision of the trial court in
Criminal Case Nos. 12281 and 12309.
Hence, this petition assigning the following errors:
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN IGNORING
THE IMPLICATION OF THE 5-MONTH INACTION BY THE PRIVATE
COMPLAINANT'S MOTHER IN REPORTING THE ALLEGED
ADBUCTION AND ILLEGAL DETENTION OF HER DAUGHTER;
AND
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN IGNORING
THE
UNREBUTTED
TESTIMONY
OF
THE
PRIVATE
COMPLAINANT'S OWN FATHER.
With respect to the first assigned error, petitioners allege that the five-month
inaction of BBB through his failure to report the alleged abduction and
illegal detention of her daughter is totally inconsistent with AAA's claim that
she was abducted and illegally detained.
We are not persuaded.
Delay in reporting an incident of rape due to death threats does not affect the
credibility of the complainant, nor can it be taken against her. The charge of
rape is rendered doubtful only if the delay was unreasonable and
unexplained.[9] BBB explained that she did not immediately report the
abduction, rape and detention of her daughter to the authorities, because
Egap threatened to kill AAA,[10] who was then in his custody.
Further, BBB testified that, on another occasion, Egap threatened to kill her
if she dared to report the matter to the authorities. True enough, when Egap
learned that she did what he forbade her to do, he made good his threat and
shot her at the back.[11] Thus, BBB's delay in reporting the incident for five
months should not be taken against her.
Anent the second assignment of error, petitioners argue that the unrebutted
testimonies of CCC and Imam Musli Muhammad cast a reasonable doubt on
the charge against them. CCC testified that Sajiron courted his daughter and
proposed marriage after their three-year courtship. He claimed that he gave
his consent to the marriage of his daughter to Sajiron. Prior to the marriage,
CCC said that he was even able to talk to his daughter and his wife, and both
were amenable to the marriage. AAA never mentioned to him anything
about having been kidnapped or raped. Neither did his wife tell him of their
daughter's alleged harrowing experience. He and his wife were present
during the marriage celebration.
Again, the testimony of CCC fails to persuade Us. AAA testified that she
had never seen her father since she was a child, as her father had abandoned
them.[12] BBB testified that she and her husband had been separated for a
long time, and she did not know his whereabouts. She further said that CCC
left their place in March 1983 to go to Malaysia, and that was the last time
she saw him.[13] CCC's allegation that his wife was present during the
marriage celebration was also controverted by the testimonies of AAA, her
mother, and Imam Musli Muhammad. Thus, save for CCC's self-serving
allegations, he could not muster any sufficient evidence to beef up those
allegations. It is also very surprising that CCC, after his long absence,
suddenly appeared and testified for the defense. CCC would like to impress
upon this Court that he has maintained constant communication with his
family; however, no single witness was presented to corroborate this claim.
Furthermore, CCC, in his Malayang Sinumpaang Salaysay[14] dated
December 28, 1995, alleged that in 1991, his wife wrote and informed him
that Sajiron asked for their daughter's hand in marriage. CCC replied that he
was giving his permission for their daughter to marry. In the same salaysay,
he also said that Egap wrotehim a letter on July 4, 1994 and instructed him
to proceed to Malitub, Bataraza to discuss the intended marriage of AAA and
Sajiron. However, records are bereft of proof of the existence of these
letters. Clearly, these allegations, being unsupported by evidence, are selfserving and cannot be given any probative value.
Moreover, Imam Musli Mohammad, while testifying as prosecution witness,
attested that the parents of AAA and Sajiron were not present during the
marriage,[15] thus controverting CCC's allegation that he was present and
gave consent to the marriage. Although Imam Musli Muhammad, when
presented as an accused witness, recanted his earlier testimony that CCC
was not present at the wedding, the same cannot be given credit.
Recantations are frowned upon by the courts. A recantation of a testimony is
exceedingly unreliable, for there is always the probability that such
recantation may later on be itself repudiated. Courts look with disfavor upon
genuine desire to expose the truth, vindicate her honor and seek justice she
so greatly deserves.
Neither is the Court convinced of the sweetheart theory, the defense of the
accused, by alleging that AAA and Sajiron were engaged for three years
prior to their elopement and marriage. If there were indeed romantic
relationship between AAA and Sajiron, as the latter claims, her normal
reaction would have been to cover up for the man she supposedly loved. On
the contrary, AAA lost no time in reporting the incident to the National
Bureau of Investigation,[21] right after she was rescued by the authorities.
Moreover, the sweetheart theory proffered by the accused is effectively an
admission of carnal knowledge of the victim, which consequently places on
him the burden of proving the supposed relationship by substantial evidence.
[22]
The sweetheart theory hardly deserves any attention when an accused
does not present any evidence, such as love letters, gifts, pictures, and the
like to show that, indeed, he and the victim were sweethearts. [23] In the case
at bar, Sajiron was unable to present any evidence to prove their
relationship. Clearly, the "sweetheart theory" is a self-serving defense and
mere fabrication of the accused to exculpate himself and his cohorts from
the charges filed against them. It bears stressing that during her testimony
before the trial court, AAA vehemently denied that she and Sajiron were
sweethearts and firmly declared that the latter never lived in their house.[24]
More importantly, in rape cases, the credibility of the victim's testimony is
almost always the single most important factor. When the victim's testimony
is credible, it may be the sole basis for the accused's conviction. [25] This is so
because, owing to the nature of the offense, in many cases, the only evidence
that can be given regarding the matter is the testimony of the offended party.
[26]
In the case at bar, the trial court found AAA's testimony credible. The
trial court held that AAA's testimony was clear, categorical and consistent.
She remained steadfast in her assertions and unfaltering in her testimony
given in court on the unfortunate incident. [27] The trial court found that AAA
positively identified Sajiron and Maron as her abductors and narrated how
she was taken and thrice raped by Sajiron in the forest. AAA recounted her
sordid experience as follows:
AAA on Direct-Examination by Private Prosecutor Narrazid.
Q: On July 1, 1994 more or less at 3:30 p.m. do you remember where you
were?
A: Yes maam.
Q: Where were you?
A: We fetched water on July 1, 1994.
Q: Where?
A: In a cave, maam.
Q: Was there anything unusual that happened during that time?
A: Yes maam.
Q: What was that incident?
A: I noticed that Sahiron Lajim run towards me and held me by my
hair. He was carrying a Barong and he was forcing me to go with
him but I refused maam.
Q: And what did you do if any when he forced you to go with him?
A: He threatened me to kill me if I will not go with him. What I did was to
hold the hair of Inon Dama who came to my rescue, maam.
Q: What did Sahiron Lajim do if any?
A: He hacked Inon Dama but was not hit and it was the container that was
hit, maam. And Sahiron Lajim left and I was forced to go with him
telling me, go with me if you do not want to die.
Q: When this Inon Dama left what happened next and you were left alone
with Sahiron Lajim?
A: His father suddenly appeared who was also carrying a gun.
Q: What happened next?
Q: Now, the second and the third time that Sahiron Lajim raped you where
was his father?
A: He was also there, maam.[28] (Emphasis supplied)
xxxx
As a rule, this Court gives great weight to the trial courts evaluation of
the testimony of a witness, because the trial court had the opportunity to
observe the facial expression, gesture, and tone of voice of a witness while
testifying, thus, putting it in a better position to determine whether a witness
was lying or telling the truth.[29]
However, the Court does not agree with the findings of the CA affirming the
trial court's judgment finding Sajiron and Maron guilty of abduction and
rape in Criminal Case No. 12281. An appeal in a criminal case opens the
entire case for review on any question, including one not raised by the
parties[30] Article 342 of the Revised Penal Code spells out the elements of
the crime of forcible abduction, thus: (a) that the person abducted is a
woman, regardless of her age, civil status, or reputation; (b) that the
abduction is against her will; and (c) that the abduction is with lewd designs.
A reading of the Information in Criminal Case No. 12281, for abduction
with rape, would readily show that the allegations therein do not charge the
accused with forcible abduction, because the taking, as alleged, was not with
lewd designs. The only act that was alleged to have been attended with lewd
design was the act of rape. Upon further perusal of the allegations in the
information, it appears that the crime charged was actually the special
complex crime of kidnapping and serious illegal detention and rape, defined and
penalized under Article 267 of the Revised Penal Code.
Although the information does not specifically allege the term kidnap or
detain, the information specifically used the terms take and carry
away. To kidnap is to carry away by unlawful force or fraud or to seize and
detain for the purpose of so carrying away.[31] Whereas, to take is to get into
one's hand or into one's possession, power, or control by force or strategem.
[32]
Thus, the word take, plus the accompanying phrase carry away, as
alleged in the information, was sufficient to inform the accused that they
were charged with unlawfully taking and detaining AAA.
Further, the real nature of the criminal charge is determined not from the
caption or preamble of the information or from the specification of the
provision of law alleged to have been violated, they being conclusions of
law which in no way affect the legal aspects of the information, but from the
actual recital of facts as alleged in the body of the information. [33] Simply
put, the crime charged is determined by the information's accusatory portion
and not by its denomination.
The accusatory portion of the information alleges that AAA was taken and
carried away by Sajiron and Maron against her will and brought to the
forest; and, on the occasion thereof, Sajiron -- by means of force, threat,
violence and intimidation -- had carnal knowledge of AAA.
The elements of kidnapping and serious illegal detention under
Article 267 of the Revised Penal Code [34] are: (1) the offender is a private
individual; (2) he kidnaps or detains another or in any other manner deprives
the latter of his liberty; (3) the act of detention or kidnapping is illegal; and
(4) in the commission of the offense, any of the following circumstances are
present: (a) the kidnapping or detention lasts for more than 3 days; or (b) it is
committed by simulating public authority; or (c) any serious physical
injuries are inflicted upon the person kidnapped or detained or threats to kill
him are made; or (d) the person kidnapped or detained is a minor, female, or
a public officer.[35]
In the case at bar, Sajiron and Maron, who are private individuals, forcibly
took and dragged AAA, a minor, to the forest and held her captive against
her will. The crime of serious illegal detention consists not only of placing a
person in an enclosure, but also of detaining him or depriving him in any
manner of his liberty.[36] For there to be kidnapping, it is enough that the
victim is restrained from going home.[37] Its essence is the actual deprivation
of the victim's liberty, coupled with indubitable proof of the intent of the
accused to effect such deprivation.[38] In the present case, although AAA was
not actually confined in an enclosed place, she was clearly restrained and
deprived of her liberty, because she was tied up and her mouth stuffed with a
piece of cloth, thus, making it very easy to physically drag her to the forest
away from her home.
The crime of rape was also proven beyond reasonable doubt in this case.
Sajiron succeeded in having carnal knowledge of AAA through the use of
force and intimidation. For fear of losing her life, AAA had no choice but to
give in to Sajiron's beastly and lustful assault.
Clearly, conspiracy between Sajiron and Maron attended the commission of
forcible abduction and the subsequent rape of AAA. Conspiracy exists when
two or more persons come to an agreement concerning a felony and decide
to commit it.[39] It may be inferred from the acts of the accused before,
during or after the commission of the crime which, when taken together,
would be enough to reveal a community of criminal design, as the proof of
Revised Penal Code by adding thereto this provision: "When the victim is killed or
dies as a consequence of the detention, or is raped, or is subjected to torture or
dehumanizing acts, the maximum penalty shall be imposed; and that this provision
gives rise to a special complex crime. (Italics in the original)
Thus, we hold that Sajiron and Maron are guilty beyond reasonable
doubt of the special complex crime of kidnapping and serious illegal
detention with rape in Criminal Case No. 12281.
In Criminal Case No. 12309, we also find Sajiron guilty beyond reasonable
doubt of the crime of serious illegal detention.
All the elements of the crime of serious illegal detention are present in the
instant case: AAA, a female and a minor, testified that on July 2, 1994, after
she was raped in the forest, she was brought to and detained at the house of
Egap and forced to cohabit with Sajiron. From the very start of her detention
on July 2, 1994, Egap directed Sajiron to guard her, and shoot her if she
attempted to escape.[42] She did not dare to escape because the accused
threatened to kill her and her family if she attempted to flee.[43]
AAA was also guarded by Egap's wife.[44] Even the two sons of Egap, upon
the latter's instruction, constantly guarded and threatened her to keep her
from leaving.[45]In fine, the accused had successfully instilled fear in AAA's
mind that escaping would cause her not only her own life, but also the lives
of her loved ones.
To give a color of legitimacy to AAA's detention, Sajiron married AAA.
However, the marriage between her and Sajiron is considered irregular under
the Code of Muslim Personal Laws (Presidential Decree No. 1083). Art. 15
(b) of said the law provides that no marriage contract shall be perfected
unless the essential requisite of mutual consent of the parties be freely given.
And under Art. 32 of the same law, if the consent of either party is vitiated
by violence, intimidation, fraud, deceit or misrepresentation, the marriage is
considered irregular (fasid) from the time of its celebration.
AAA did not give her consent to the wedding. [46] The marriage was
solemnized only upon the instruction of Egap. [47] She was also forced to sign
the marriage contract without the presence of her parents or any of her
relatives.[48] She did not want to marry Sajiron because she did not love him.
[49]
The Imam who solemnized their marriage did not even ask for the
consent of the parties.[50] He was merely compelled to solemnize the
marriage because he was afraid of Egap, and the latter threatened him.
[51]
Clearly, the marriage ceremony was a farce, and was only orchestrated by
the accused in an attempt to exculpate themselves from criminal
responsibility.
Anent Criminal Case No. 12309, the prescribed penalty for serious illegal
detention under Art. 267 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by
Republic Act (R. A.) No. 7659, is reclusion perpetua to death. There being
no aggravating or modifying circumstance in the commission of the offense,
the proper penalty to be imposed isreclusion perpetua, pursuant to Art. 63 of
the Revised Penal Code.
As to Criminal Case No. 12281, the penalty for the special complex crime of
kidnapping and serious illegal detention and rape is death. However, R.A.
No. 9346, entitled An Act Prohibiting the Imposition of Death Penalty in the
Philippines, which was approved on June 24, 2006, prohibits the imposition
of the death penalty. Thus, the penalty of death is reduced to reclusion
perpetua,[52] without eligibility for parole.[53]
As to accused Egap, his act of escaping from his police escort during the
pendency of his case and his subsequent unexplained absence during the
promulgation of the decision convicting him of the crime charged has
divested him of the right to avail himself of any remedy that may be
available to him, including his right to appeal. In a recent case, this Court
held that once an accused jumps bail or flees to a foreign country, or escapes
from prison or confinement, he loses his standing in court; and unless he
surrenders or submits to the jurisdiction of the court, he is deemed to have
waived any right to seek relief from it. [54] Hence, insofar as accused Egap is
concerned, the judgment against him became final and executory upon the
lapse of fifteen (15) days from promulgation of the judgment.
As to the award of damages.
In Criminal Case No. 12281, AAA is entitled to civil indemnity in line with
prevailing jurisprudence that civil indemnification is mandatory upon the
finding of rape.[55]
In People v. Quiachon,[56] even if the penalty of death is not to be imposed
because of the prohibition in R.A. No. 9346, the civil indemnity
of P75,000.00 is proper, because it is not dependent on the actual imposition
of the death penalty but on the fact that qualifying circumstances warranting
the imposition of the death penalty attended the commission of the offense.
As explained in People v. Salome,[57] while R.A. No. 9346 prohibits the
imposition of the death penalty, the fact remains that the penalty provided
for by the law for a heinous offense is still death, and the offense is still
heinous. Accordingly, the civil indemnity for AAA is P75,000.00.
In addition, AAA is entitled to moral damages pursuant to Art. 2219 of the
Civil Code,[58] without the necessity of additional pleadings or proof other
DIOSDADO M. PERALTA
Associate Justice
WE CONCUR:
RENATO C. CORONA
Associate Justice
Chairperson
ATTESTATION
I attest that the conclusion in the above Decision had been reached in
consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the
Courts Division.
RENATO C. CORONA
Associate Justice
Third Division, Chairperson
CERTIFICATION
Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution and the Division
Chairpersons Attestation, I certify that the conclusions in the above Decision
had been reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer
of the opinion of the Courts Division.
REYNATO S. PUNO
Chief Justice
Designated to sit as an additional member in lieu of Associate Justice Jose C. Mendoza per Special Order
No. 818 dated January 18, 2010.
[1]
Penned by Associate Justice Jose C. Reyes, Jr., with Associate Justice Jose L. Sabio, Jr.,and Associate
Justice Myrna Dimaranan Vidal, concurring; rollo, pp. 11-25.
[2]
Also referred to as Majiron Lajim in some parts of the records.
[3]
G.R. No. 167693, September 19, 2006, 502 SCRA 419.
[4]
Records I, pp. 1-2.
[5]
Records II, pp. 30.
[6]
Sinumpaang Salaysay, Records I, pp .153.
[7]
Records I, supra note 3, at 244-255.
[8]
G.R. Nos. 147678-87, July 7, 2004, 433 SCRA 640, modifying Secs. 3 and 10 of Rule 122, Sec. 13 of
Rule 124, and Sec. 3 of Rule 125 of the Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure.
[9]
People v. Hilario Opong y Taesa, G.R. No. 177822, June 17, 2008, 554 SCRA 706.
[10]
TSN, August 17, 1995, p. 6.
[11]
Id. at 8-9.
[12]
TSN, August 18, 1995, p. 16.
[13]
Supra note 9, at 13.
[14]
Supra not 3, at 234..
[15]
Supra note 3, at 234.
[16]
People v. Ceniza, G.R. No. 144913, September 18, 2003, 411 SCRA 304.
[17]
People v. Junio, G.R. No. 110990, October 28, 1994, 237 SCRA 826, 834.
[18]
Gan v. People, G.R. No. 165884, April 23, 2007, 521 SCRA 550, 575.
[19]
People v. Loyola, G.R. No. 126026, February 6, 2001, 351 SCRA 263, 267.
[20]
People v. Antonio, G.R. No. 157269, June 3, 2004, 430 SCRA 619, 627.
[21]
Supra note 3, at 154-155.
[22]
People v. Antonio, G.R. No. 157269, June 3, 2004, 430 SCRA 619, 626.
[23]
People v. Salvador, G.R. Nos. 136870-72, January 28, 2003, 396 SCRA 298.
[24]
[31]
WEBSTER'S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE UNABRIDGED, 1241
(1993).
[32]
Id. at 2329.
[33]
Buhat v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 119601, December 17, 1996, 265 SCRA 701, 716-717.
[34]
ART. 267. Kidnapping and serious illegal detention. - Any private individual who shall kidnap or detain
another, or in any other manner deprive him of his liberty, shall suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua to
death;
1. If the kidnapping or detention shall have lasted more than three days.
2. If it shall have been committed simulating public authority.
3. If any serious physical injuries shall have been inflicted upon the person kidnapped or
detained; or if threats to kill him shall have been made.
4. If the person kidnapped or detained shall be a minor, except when the accused is any
of the parents, female or a public officer.
The penalty shall be death where the kidnapping or detention was committed for the
purpose of extorting ransom from the victim or any other person, even if none of the
circumstances abovementioned were presented in the commission of the offense.
When the victim is killed or dies as a consequence of the detention or is raped, or is
subjected to torture or dehumanizing acts, the maximum penalty shall be imposed.
[35]
People v. Nuguid, G.R. No. 148991, January 21, 2004, 420 SCRA 533.
[36]
People v. Domasian, G.R. No. 95322, March 1, 1993, 219 SCRA 245, 253.
[37]
People v. Acbangin, G.R. No. 117216, August 9, 2000, 337 SCRA 454, 461.
[38]
People v. Obeso, G.R. No. 152285, October 24, 2003, 414 SCRA 447, 454.
[39]
Revised Penal Code, Article 8.
[40]
Go v. Sandiganbayan, Fifth Division, G.R. No. 172602, April 13, 2007, 521 SCRA 270, 290.
[41]
466 Phil. 324 (2004), citing People v. Ramos, 297 SCRA 618 (1998), and People v. Mercado, 346 SCRA
256 (2000).
[42]
Supra note 11, at 10-11.
[43]
TSN, June 10, 1996, p.12.
[44]
Id. at 19.
[45]
Id. at 12; TSN, June 11, 1996, pp. 12-13.
[46]
Supra note 11, at 13.
[47]
Id. at 13-14.
[48]
Id. at 14.
[49]
TSN, June 10, 1996, supra note 23; TSN, June 11, 1996, supra note 22.
[50]
TSN, June 11, 1996, supra note 30.
[51]
TSN, August 4, 1995, p. 10.
[52]
Sec. 2, R.A. No. 9346.
[53]
Sec. 3, R.A. No. 9346.
[54]
People v. Joven De Grano, Armando De Grano,et al., G.R. No. 167710, June 5, 2009, 588 SCRA 550.
[55]
People of the Philippines v. Pedro Nogpo, Jr., G.R. No. 184791, April 16, 2009.
[56]
G.R. No. 170236, August 31, 2006, 500 SCRA 704, 719.
[57]
500 Phil. 659, 676 (2006).
[58]
Civil Code, Article 2219. Moral damages may be recovered in the following and analogous cases: x x x
(3) Seduction, abduction, rape, or other lascivious acts; x x x.
[59]
People v. Ospig, G.R. No. 141766, November 18, 2003, 416 SCRA 32..
[60]
Id.
[61]
People v. Sabardan, G.R. No. 132135, May 21, 2004, 429 SCRA 9, 29.
[62]
People v. Solangon, G.R. No. 172693, November 21, 2007, 537 SCRA 746, 758.
[63]
Civil Code, Article 2219. Moral damages may be recovered in the following analogous cases:
xxx
(5) Illegal or arbitrary detention or arrest; x x x.
[64]
People v. Garalde, G.R. No. 173055, April 13, 2007, 521 SCRA 327, 355.
[65]
Civil liability of persons guilty of crimes against chastity. Persons guilty of rape, seduction or
abduction shall also be entitled: x x x x 3. In every case to support the offspring. X x x x.
[66]
People v. Pagsanjan, G.R. No. 139694, December 27, 2002, 394 SCRA 414.
PEOPLE V MIRANDILLA
SECOND DIVISION
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
- versus -
Promulgated:
would not have known she had an abortion had she not confessed it to him.
[25]
First, the trial judge, who had the opportunity of observing AAAs manner
and demeanour on the witness stand, was convinced of her credibility: AAA
appeared to be a simple and truthful woman, whose testimony was
consistent, steady and firm, free from any material and serious
contradictions.[33] The court continued:
The record nowhere yields any evidence of ill motive on the part of AAA
to influence her in fabricating criminal charges against Felipe Mirandilla,
Jr. The absence of ill motive enhances the standing of AAA as a witness. x
x x.
When AAA testified in court, she was sobbing. While she was facing
Felipe Mirandilla, Jr., to positively identify him in open court, she was
crying. Felipe Mirandilla Jr.s response was to smile. AAA was a picture of
a woman who was gravely harmed, craving for justice. x x x.[34]
Second, the trial court found AAAs testimony to be credible in itself. AAAs
ordeal was entered into the police blotter immediately after her escape,
[35]
negating opportunity for concoction.[36] While in Mirandillas company,
none of her parents, brothers, sisters, relatives, classmates, or anyone who
knew her, visited, saw, or talked to her. None of them knew her whereabouts.
[37]
AAAs testimony was corroborated by Dr. Sarah Vasquez, Legazpi Citys
Health Officer, who discovered the presence not only of hymenal lacerations
but also gonorrhoea, a sexually transmitted disease.
More importantly, AAA remained consistent in the midst of gruelling
cross examination. The defense lawyer tried to impeach her testimony, but
failed to do so.
The Court of Appeals confirmed AAAs credibility in affirming the
RTC decision.
We emphasize that a trial courts assessment of a witness credibility,
when affirmed by the CA, is even conclusive and binding, if not tainted with
arbitrariness or oversight of some fact or circumstance of weight or
influence.[38] This is so because of the judicial experience that trial courts are
in a better position to decide the question of credibility, having heard the
witnesses themselves and having observed firsthand their deportment and
manner of testifying under gruelling examination.[39]Thus, in Estioca v.
People,[40] we held:
In resolving issues pertaining to the credibility of the witnesses, this Court
is guided by the following principles: (1) the reviewing court will not
disturb the findings of the lower courts, unless there is a showing that it
overlooked or misapplied some fact or circumstance of weight and
substance that may affect the result of the case; (2) the findings of the trial
court on the credibility of witnesses are entitled to great respect and even
finality, as it had the opportunity to examine their demeanour when they
testified on the witness stand; and (3) a witness who testifies in a clear,
positive and convincing manner is a credible witness.[41]
Second Issue
Sweetheart Theory not Proven
Accuseds bare invocation of sweetheart theory cannot alone, stand. To be
credible, it must be corroborated by documentary, testimonial, or other
evidence.[42] Usually, these are letters, notes, photos, mementos, or credible
testimonies of those who know the lovers.[43]
The sweetheart theory as a defense, however, necessarily admits carnal
knowledge, the first element of rape. Effectively, it leaves the prosecution
the burden to prove only force or intimidation, the coupling element of rape.
Love, is not a license for lust.[44]
This admission makes the sweetheart theory more difficult to defend, for it is
not only an affirmative defense that needs convincing proof; [45] after the
prosecution has successfully established a prima facie case,[46] the burden of
evidence is shifted to the accused, [47] who has to adduce evidence that the
intercourse was consensual.[48]
A prima facie case arises when the party having the burden of proof has
produced evidence sufficient to support a finding and adjudication for him of
the issue in litigation.[49]
Burden of evidence is that logical necessity which rests on a party at any
particular time during the trial to create a prima facie case in his favour or to
overthrow one when created against him.[50](Emphasis supplied)
Mirandilla with his version of facts as narrated above attempted to meet the
prosecutions prima facie case. To corroborate it, he presented his mother,
Alicia Mirandilla; his relatives, Rogelio Marcellana and Emilio Mendoza;
and, his friend Arlene Moret.
Arlene Moret, the cigarette vendor who also served as the CRs guard,
testified that on 30 October 2000, AAA and Mirandilla arrived together at
the park.[51] They approached her and chatted with her. On cross
examination, she claimed otherwise: Mirandilla arrived alone two hours
earlier, chatting with her first, before AAA finally came. [52] She also claimed
meeting the couple for the first time on 30 October 2000, only to contradict
herself on cross examination with the version that she met them previously,
three times at least, in the previous month. [53] On the other hand, Mirandilla
claimed first meeting AAA on 3 October 2000 at the park.[54]
The accuseds mother, Alicia Mirandilla, testified meeting her son only once,
and living in Kilikao only after his imprisonment. [55] This contradicted
Mirandillas claim that he visited his mother several times in Kilikao, from
October 2000 until January 2001.[56]
Even Mirandilla contradicted himself. His claim that he saw AAA soaked in
blood, agonizing in pain, with the abortifacient pills cover lying nearby,
cannot be reconciled with his other claim that he came to know AAAs
abortion only through the latters admission.[57]
Taken individually and as a whole, the defense witnesses testimonies
contradicted each other and flip-flopped on materials facts, constraining this
Court to infer that they concocted stories in a desperate attempt to exonerate
the accused.
As a rule, self-contradictions and contradictory statement of witnesses
should be reconciled,[58] it being true that such is possible since a witness is
not expected to give error-free testimony considering the lapse of time and
the treachery of human memory.[59] But, this principle, learned from lessons
of human experience, applies only to minor or trivial matters innocent lapses
that do not affect witness credibility.[60] They do not apply to selfcontradictions on material facts.[61] Where these contradictions cannot be
reconciled, the Court has to reject the testimonies, [62] and apply the
maxim, falsus in uno, falsus in omnibus. Thus,
To completely disregard all the testimony of a witness based on the
maxim falsus in uno, falsus in omnibus, testimony must have been false as
to a material point, and the witness must have a conscious and deliberate
intention to falsify a material point. In other words, its requirements,
which must concur, are the following: (1) that the false testimony is as to
one or more material points; and (2) that there should be a conscious and
deliberate intention to falsity.[63]
The reason behind this rule is that when an accused appeals from the
sentence of the trial court, he waives the constitutional safeguard against
double jeopardy and throws the whole case open to the review of the
appellate court, which is then called upon to render such judgment as law
and justice dictate, whether favorable or unfavorable to the appellant.[66]
To reiterate, the six informations charged Mirandilla with kidnapping
and serious illegal detention with rape (Crim. Case No. 9278), four counts of
rape (Crim. Case Nos. 9274-75-76-77), and one count of rape through sexual
assault (Crim. Case No. 9279).
The accusatory portion of the information in Criminal Case No. 9278
alleged that Mirandilla kidnapped AAA and seriously and illegally detained
her for more than three days during which time he had carnal knowledge of
her, against her will.[67]
The Court agrees with the CA in finding Mirandilla guilty of the special
complex crime of kidnapping with rape, instead of simple kidnapping as the
RTC ruled. It was the RTC, no less, which found that Mirandilla kidnapped
AAA, held her in detention for 39 days and carnally abused her while
holding a gun and/or a knife.[68]
Rape under Article 266-A of the Revised Penal Code states that:
Art. 266-A. Rape, When and How Committed. Rape is committed
AAA was able to prove each element of rape committed under Article 266A, par. 1(a) of the Revised Penal Code, that (1) Mirandilla had carnal
knowledge of her; (2) through force, threat, or intimidation. She was also
able to prove each element of rape by sexual assault under Article 266-A,
par. 2 of the Revised Penal Code: (1) Mirandilla inserted his penis into her
mouth; (2) through force, threat, or intimidation.
Likewise, kidnapping and serious illegal detention is provided for
under Article 267 of the Revised Penal Code:
Article 267. Kidnapping and serious illegal detention. Any private
individual who shall kidnap or detain another, or in any manner deprive
him of his liberty, shall suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua to death;
1. If the kidnapping or detention shall have lasted more than three days.
xxx
Notably, however, no matter how many rapes had been committed in the
special complex crime of kidnapping with rape, the resultant crime is only
one kidnapping with rape.[73] This is because these composite acts are
regarded as a single indivisible offense as in fact R.A. No. 7659 punishes
these acts with only one single penalty. In a way, R.A. 7659 depreciated the
seriousness of rape because no matter how many times the victim was raped,
like in the present case, there is only one crime committed the special
complex crime of kidnapping with rape.
However, for the crime of kidnapping with rape, as in this case, the offender
should not have taken the victim with lewd designs, otherwise, it would be
complex crime of forcible abduction with rape. In People v. Garcia,[74] we
explained that if the taking was by forcible abduction and the woman was
raped several times, the crimes committed is one complex crime of forcible
abduction with rape, in as much as the forcible abduction was only
necessary for the first rape; and each of the other counts of rape constitutes
distinct and separate count of rape.[75]
It having been established that Mirandillas act was kidnapping and serious
illegal detention (not forcible abduction) and on the occasion thereof, he
raped AAA several times, We hold that Mirandilla is guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of the special complex crime of kidnapping and serious
illegal detention with rape, warranting the penalty of death. However, in
view of R.A. No. 9346 entitled, An Act Prohibiting the Imposition of Death
Penalty in the Philippines,[76] the penalty of death is hereby reduced
to reclusion perpetua,[77] without eligibility for parole.[78]
We, therefore, modify the CA Decision. We hold that the separate
informations of rape cannot be considered as separate and distinct crimes in
view of the above discussion.
As to the award of damages, we have the following rulings.
This Court has consistently held that upon the finding of the fact of rape, the
award of civil damages ex delicto is mandatory.[79] As we elucidated
in People v. Prades,[80] the award authorized by the criminal law as civil
indemnity ex delicto for the offended party, aside from other proven actual
damages, is itself equivalent to actual or compensatory damages in civil law.
[81]
Thus, we held that the civil liability ex delicto provided by the Revised
Penal Code, that is, restitution, reparation, and indemnification,[82] all
correspond to actual or compensatory damages in the Civil Code.[83]
In the 1998 landmark case of People v. Victor,[84] the Court enunciated that if,
in the crime of rape, the death penalty is imposed, the indemnity ex
delicto for the victim shall be in the increased amount of NOT[85] less
than P75,000.00. To reiterate the words of the Court: this is not only a
reaction to the apathetic societal perception of the penal law and the
financial fluctuation over time, but also an expression of the displeasure of
the Court over the incidence of heinous crimes...[86]xxx (Emphasis
supplied)
After the enactment R.A. 9346,[87] prohibiting the imposition of death
penalty, questions arose as to the continued applicability of
the Victor[88] ruling. Thus, inPeople v. Quiachon,[89] the Court pronounced
that even if the penalty of death is not to be imposed because of R.A. No.
9346, the civil indemnity ex delicto ofP75,000.00 still applies because this
indemnity is not dependent on the actual imposition of death, but on the
fact that qualifying circumstances warranting the penalty of death
attended the commission of the offense.[90] As explained in People v.
Salome,[91] while R.A. No. 9346 prohibits the imposition of the death
penalty, the fact remains that the penalty provided for by the law for a
heinous offense is still death, and the offense is still heinous. [92] (Emphasis
supplied)
In addition, AAA is entitled to moral damages pursuant to Art. 2219 of the
Civil Code,[93] without the necessity of additional pleadings or proof other
than the fact of rape. This move of dispensing evidence to prove moral
damage in rape cases, traces its origin in People v. Prades,[94] where we held
that:
The Court has also resolved that in crimes of rape, such as that under
consideration, moral damages may additionally be awarded to the
victim in the criminal proceeding, in such amount as the Court deems
just, without the need for pleading or proof of the basis thereof as has
heretofore been the practice. Indeed, the conventional requirement
ofallegata et probata in civil procedure and for essentially civil cases
should be dispensed with in criminal prosecutions for rape with the civil
aspect included therein, since no appropriate pleadings are filed wherein
such allegations can be made. (Emphasis supplied)
Corollarily, the fact that complainant has suffered the trauma of mental,
physical and psychological sufferings which constitute the bases for moral
damages are too obvious to still require the recital thereof at the trial
by the victim, since the Court itself even assumes and acknowledges such
agony on her part as a gauge of her credibility. What exists by necessary
implication as being ineludibly present in the case need not go through
superfluity of still being proven through a testimonial charade. (Emphasis
supplied)[95]
WE CONCUR:
ANTONIO T. CARPIO
Associate Justice
Chairperson
ARTURO D. BRION
Associate Justice
DIOSDADO M. PERALTA
Associate Justice
AT T E S TAT I O N
I attest that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in
consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of
the Courts Division.
ANTONIO T. CARPIO
Associate Justice
Chairperson
C E R T I F I C AT I O N
Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution, and the Division
Chairpersons Attestation, it is hereby certified that the conclusions in the
above Decision had been reached in consultation before the case was
assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Courts Division.
RENATO C. CORONA
Chief Justice
[38]
Soriano v. People, G.R. No. 148123, 30 June 2008, 556 SCRA 595, 611.
People v. Vallador, 327 Phil. 303, 311 (1996).
[40]
G.R. No. 173876, 27 June 2008, 556 SCRA 300.
[41]
Id. at 312.
[42]
People v. Nogpo, G.R. No. 184791, 16 April 2009, 585 SCRA 725, 743.
[43]
People v. Jimenez, G.R. No. 128364, 4 February 1999, 302 SCRA 607, 617.
[44]
People v. Novio, G.R. No. 139332, 20 June 2003, 404 SCRA 462, 474.
[45]
People v. Ayuda, G.R. No. 128882, 2 October 2003, 412 SCRA 538.
[46]
C.J.S. 32-A, 1016, p. 626.
[47]
People v. Nogpo, supra note 42 at 742.
[48]
Id.
[49]
C.J.S. 32-A, 1016, p. 626.
[50]
FRANCISCO, BASIC EVIDENCE, 1999 (2nd ed.), p. 354.
[51]
TSN, 24 November 2003, p. 7.
[52]
Id. at 17.
[53]
Id. at 18.
[54]
TSN, 21 January 2004, p. 5.
[55]
TSN, 25 March 2004, pp. 9-11.
[56]
TSN, 21 January 2004, p. 13; 26 January 2004, pp. 16 and 31.
[57]
TSN, 26 January 2004, pp. 28-32.
[58]
AGPALO, HAND BOOK ON EVIDENCE, p. 454-455 (2003).
[59]
Id.
[60]
Id.
[61]
Id.
[62]
Id.
[63]
Id. at 461, citing People v. Pacpac, 248 SCRA 77 (1995), People v. Dasig, 93 Phil. 618 (1953).
[64]
People v. Madsali, G.R. No. 179570, 4 February 2010, 611 SCRA 596, 613-614 citing Edgar Esqueda v.
People, G.R. No. 170222, 18 June 2009, 589 SCRA 489.
[65]
1 Phil. 83 (1902).
[66]
Lontoc v. People, 74 Phil 513, 519 (1943).
[67]
RTC Decision, CA rollo, p. 94.
[68]
Id. at 99.
[69]
People v. Baldogo, G.R. No. 128106-07, 24 January 2004, 396 SCRA 31, 57, citing, GROIZARD, EL
CODIGO PENAL DE 1870, Tomo V. pp. 639-640, cited in People v. Marasigan, et al., 55 O.G. 8297
(1959).
[70]
AN ACT TO IMPOSE THE DEATH PENALTY ON CERTAIN HEINOUS CRIMES, AMENDING
FOR THAT PURPOSE THE REVISED PENAL CODE, AS AMENDED, OTHER SPECIAL
PENAL LAWS, AND FOR OTHER PURPOSES
[71]
466 Phil. 324 (2004).
[72]
Id.
[73]
BOADO, NOTES AND CASES ON THE REVISED PENAL CODE, pp. 529-530 (2001).
[74]
G.R. No. 141125, 28 February 2002, 378 SCRA 266.
[75]
Id. at 278.
[76]
Approved on 24 June 2006.
[77]
Sec 2, R.A. No. 9346.
[78]
Sec 3, R.A. No. 9346.
[79]
People v. Tagud, Sr., G.R. No. 140733, 30 January 2002. 375 SCRA 291, 309-310; People v. Nogpo,
supra note 42 at 749.
[80]
G.R. No. 127569, 30 July 1998, 293 SCRA 411.
[81]
Id. at 429 citing People v. Victor, G.R. No. 127903, July 8, 1998.
[82]
REVISED PENAL CODE, Articles 104-107.
[83]
CIVIL CODE, Articles 2194-2215.
[84]
G.R. No. 127903, 9 July 1998, 292 SCRA 186.
[85]
Id. at 200-201.
[86]
Id. at 201.
[87]
An Act Prohibiting the Imposition of Death Penalty, approved on June 24, 2006.
[39]
[88]