Concerned Citizens v Arzaga

FACTS:
Bienvenido Arzaga and Alfredo Mauricio, both process servers of the
Office of the Clerk of Court, MTCC, Laoag City, were charged with
influence peddling, drunkenness, gambling, bribery, extortion and
manipulation of bonds by using the same property for different cases.
Both respondents had submitted their written comments denying the
charges; that upon receipt of the complaint, Judge Agnir requested the
local media to announce to the public that anyone who had evidence
against the two respondents could see him; that however, after two
months of waiting, nobody came forward to offer any evidence against
respondents; that he also interviewed the employees of the City Court to
verify the truth of the charges against the respondents, but he obtained no
information to give credence to said charges
Judge Agnir, however, reported that he received a certification from the
City Prosecutor's Office of Laoag City, to the effect that Alfredo Mauricio
was convicted of Frustrated Murder on September 29, 1983 in Criminal
Case No. 1260-XIII, but was placed on probation. Alfredo Mauricio had
also been charged with eleven (11) other criminal cases like Illegal
Possession of Firearms, Grave Slander by Deed, Grave Threats, Serious
Physical Injuries, but all of these had been dismissed.
The Court resolved to dismiss the charges against Benjamin Arzaga as
recommended but referred the case against Alfredo Mauricio to Judge
Agnir for further investigation relative to how said respondent managed to
be appointed to the position of process server despite a previous record of
conviction of the crime of frustrated murder.
Investigations reveal that respondent disclosed his conviction of the crime
of frustrated murder and that he was on probation for the same in his
application. When respondent was asked by Judge Agnir why he did not
indicate that other criminal charges were filed against him, he replied that
the question in the application form simply asked for conviction, not mere
charges.
Judge Agnir further claimed that respondent is known to be a troublesome
fellow. MTC Judge Llanes even had to file an administrative case against
respondent for serious misconduct and insubordination.
Police Inspector Felizardo Ellano of the PNP-CIS Command in Camp
Capt. Valentin San Juan, Laoag City, sent a letter addressed to the Chief
Justice through the Record Section requesting that a check be conducted
on the records of Mauricio who was at that time being charged by their
Office with the crimes of Less Serious Physical Injuries and Resistance
and Disobedience Upon Agents of a Person in Authority. Police Officer
Ellano likewise informed the Court that the respondent has already been
charged of several offenses in different courts in Laoag City which

according to him was a clear showing that Mauricio is a violent man, a

habitual offender and extremely defiant of the law.
Judge Agnir then strongly recommended the immediate and summary
dismissal from the service of respondent Mauricio for being the "ultimate
undesirable employee and a disgrace to the judiciary." He added that he
was recommending this course of action aware of the potential danger to
his person given respondent's violent nature as documented by his
criminal record. Judge Agnir was "hopeful though that the respondent's
summary dismissal will send a chilling message to other court employees
similarly engaged in nefarious activities and unethical practices which
though petty in many instances indelibly stain the image of the judiciary."
RULING:
SC adopted the investigating judge's recommendation for respondent's
dismissal from the service, the same being warranted and justified by the
facts attendant to the instant case.
Public service requires the utmost integrity and strictest discipline. Thus, a
public servant must exhibit at all times the highest sense of honesty and
integrity not only in the performance of his official duties but in his
personal and private dealings with other people. No less than the
Constitution sanctifies the principle that a public office is a public trust, and
enjoins all public officers and employees to serve with the highest degree
of responsibility, integrity, loyalty, and efficiency. In addition, the Code of
Conduct and Ethical Standards for Public Officials and Employees provide
that every public servant shall at all times uphold public interest over his or
her personal interest. By his acts and misdeeds, respondent has
undermined the public's faith in our courts and, ultimately, in the
administration of justice. The same make him unfit as a court employee.
His employment must therefore be terminated at once. Court personnel
must adhere to the high ethical standards of public service in order to
preserve the Court's good name and standing.
Time and again, this Court has emphasized that the conduct required of
court personnel, from the presiding judge to the lowliest clerk, must always
be beyond reproach and must be circumscribed with the heavy burden of
responsibility as to let them be free from any suspicion that may taint the
judiciary.
Fernandez v Sto. Tomas
FACTS:
Fernandez was serving as Director of the Office of Personnel Inspection
and Audit ("OPIA") while petitioner de Lima was serving as Director of the
Office of the Personnel Relations ("OPR"), both at the Central Office of the
Civil Service Commission in Quezon City, Metropolitan Manila.

 Both assailed the validity of Resolution No. 94-3710 of the Civil Service
Commission ("Commission") and the authority of the Commission to issue
the same.
Examination of the statutory provisions reveals that the OCSS, OPIA and
OPR, and as well each of the other Offices listed in Section 16 above,
consist of aggregations of Divisions, each of which Divisions is in turn a
grouping of Sections. Each Section, Division and Office comprises a group
of positions within the agency called the Civil Service Commission, each
group being entrusted with a more or less definable function or functions.
These functions are related to one another, each of them being embraced
by a common or general subject matter. Clearly, each Office is an internal
department or organizational unit within the Commission and that
accordingly, the OCSS, OPIA and OPR, as well as all the other Offices
within the Commission constitute administrative subdivisions of the CSC.
Put a little differently, these offices relate to the internal structure of the
Commission.
What did Resolution No. 94-3710 of the Commission do? Examination of
Resolution No. 94-3710 shows that thereby the Commission rearranged some of the administrative units (i.e., Offices) within the
Commission and, among other things, merged three (3) of them (OCSS,
OPIA and OPR) to form a new grouping called the "Research and
Development Office (RDO)."
This re-allocation or re-assignment of some functions carried with it the
transfer of the budget earmarked for such function to the Office where the
function was transferred. Moreover, the personnel, records, fixtures and
equipment that were devoted to the carrying out of such functions were
moved to the Offices to where the functions were transferred.
ISSUE:
(1) Whether or not the Civil Service Commission had legal authority to issue
Resolution No. 94-3710 to the extent it merged the OCSS [Office of
Career Systems and Standards], the OPIA [Office of Personnel Inspection
and Audit] and the OPR [Office of Personnel Relations], to form the RDO
[Research and Development Office];
(2) Whether or not Resolution No. 94-3710 violated petitioners' constitutional
right to security of tenure.
RULING:
1. The objectives sought by the Commission in enacting Resolution No. 943710 were described in that Resolution in broad terms as "effect[ing]
changes in the organization to streamline [the Commission's] operations
and improve delivery of service." These changes in internal organization
were rendered necessary by, on the one hand, the decentralization and
devolution of the Commission's functions effected by the creation of

fourteen (14) Regional Offices and ninety-five (95) Field Offices of the
Commission throughout the country, to the end that the Commission and
its staff may be brought closer physically to the government employees
that they are mandated to serve.
The Commission's Office Order assigning petitioner de Lima to the CSC
Regional Office No. 3 was precipitated by the incumbent Regional Director
filing an application for retirement, thus generating a need to find a
replacement for him. Petitioner de Lima was being assigned to that
Regional Office while the incumbent Regional Director was still there to
facilitate her take over of the duties and functions of the incumbent
Director. Petitioner de Lima's prior experience as a labor lawyer was also
a factor in her assignment to Regional Office No. 3 where public sector
unions have been very active. Petitioner Fernandez's assignment to the
CSC Regional Office No. 5 had, upon the other hand, been necessitated
by the fact that the then incumbent Director in Region V was under
investigation and needed to be transferred immediately to the Central
Office. Petitioner Fernandez was deemed the most likely designee for
Director of Regional Office No. 5 considering that the functions previously
assigned to him had been substantially devolved to the Regional Offices
such that his reassignment to a Regional Office would result in the least
disruption of the operations of the Central Office.
It thus appears to the Court that the Commission was moved by quite
legitimate considerations of administrative efficiency and convenience in
promulgating and implementing its Resolution No. 94-3710 and in
assigning petitioner Salvador C. Fernandez to the Regional Office of the
Commission in Region V in Legaspi City and petitioner Anicia M. de Lima
to the Commission's Regional Office in Region III in San Fernando,
Pampanga.
Petitioners argue that Resolution No. 94-3710 effected the "abolition" of
public offices, something which may be done only by the same legislative
authority which had created those public offices in the first place.
The Court is unable, in the circumstances of this case, to accept this
argument. The term "public office" is frequently used to refer to the
right, authority and duty, created and conferred by law, by which, for
a given period either fixed by law or enduring at the pleasure of the
creating power, an individual is invested with some portion of the
sovereign functions of government, to be exercised by that
individual for the benefit of the public. We consider that Resolution
No. 94-3710 has not abolished any public office as that term is used in the
law of public officers. It is essential to note that none of the "changes in
organization" introduced by Resolution No. 94-3710 carried with it or
necessarily involved the termination of the relationship of public
employment between the Commission and any of its officers and
employees. We find it very difficult to suppose that the 1987 Revised

Administrative Code having mentioned fourteen (14) different "Offices" of

the Civil Service Commission, meant to freeze those Offices and to cast in
concrete, as it were, the internal organization of the Commission until it
might please Congress to change such internal organization regardless of
the ever changing needs of the Civil Service as a whole. To the contrary,
thelegislative authority had expressly authorized the Commission to carry
out "changes in the organization," "as the need [for such changes]
arises." Assuming, for purposes of argument merely, that legislative
authority was necessary to carry out the kinds of changes contemplated in
Resolution No. 94-3710 (and the Court is not saying that such authority is
necessary), such legislative authority was validly delegated to the
Commission by Section 17 earlier quoted. The legislative standards to be
observed and respected in the exercise of such delegated authority are
set out not only in Section 17 itself (i.e., "as the need arises"), but also in
the Declaration of Policies found in Book V, Title I, Subtitle A, Section 1 of
the 1987 Revised Administrative Code which required the Civil Service
Commission: as the central personnel agency of the Government [to]
establish a career service, adopt measures to promote efficiency
[and] responsiveness . . . in the civil service . . . and that personnel
functions shall be decentralized,delegating the corresponding authority to
the departments, offices and agencies where such functions can be
effectively performed.
2. Petitioners in effect contend that they were unlawfully removed from
their positions in the OPIA and OPR by the implementation of
Resolution No. 94-3710 and that they cannot, without their consent, be
moved out to the Regional Offices of the Commission.
We note, firstly, that appointments to the staff of the Commission are not
appointments to a specified public office but rather appointments to
particular positions or ranks. Thus, a person may be appointed to the
position of Director III or Director IV; or to the position of Attorney IV or
Attorney V; or to the position of Records Officer I or Records Officer II; and
so forth. In the instant case, petitioners were each appointed to the
position of Director IV,without specification of any particular office or
station. The same is true with respect to the other persons holding the
same position or rank of Director IV of the Commission.
Reassignment of Fernandez and de Lima had been effected with express
statutory authority and did not constitute removals without lawful cause. It
also follows that such reassignment did not involve any violation of the
constitutional right of petitioners to security of tenure considering that they
retained their positions of Director IV and would continue to enjoy the
same rank, status and salary at their new assigned stations which they
had enjoyed at the Head Office of the Commission in Metropolitan Manila.
Petitioners had not, in other words, acquired a vested right to serve at the
Commission's Head Office.

Secondly, the above conclusion is compelled not only by the statutory

provisions relevant in the instant case, but also by a long line of cases
decided by this Court in respect of different agencies or offices of
government.
"That security of tenure is an essential and constitutionally guaranteed
feature of our Civil Service System, is not open to debate. The mantle of
its protection extends not only against removals without cause but also
against unconsented transfer which, as repeatedly enunciated, are
tantamount to removals which are within the ambit of the fundamental
guarantee. However, the availability of that security of tenure necessarily
depends, in the first instance,upon the nature of the appointment (Hojilla
vs. Marino, 121 Phil. 280 [1965].) Such that the rule which proscribes
transfers without consent as anathema to the security of tenure is
predicated upon the theory that the officer involved is appointed not
merely assigned to a particular station.
And the rule that outlaws unconsented transfers as anathema to security
of tenure applies only to an officer who is appointed not merely
assigned to a particular station. Such a rule does not proscribe a
transfer carried out under a specific statute that empowers the head of an
agency to periodically reassign the employees and officers in order to
improve the service of the agency. The use of approved techniques or
methods in personnel management to harness the abilities of employees
to promote optimum public service cannot be objected to. . . .
We conclude that the reassignment of petitioners Fernandez and de Lima
from their stations in the OPIA and OPR, respectively, to the Research
Development Office (RDO) and from the RDO to the Commissions'
Regional Offices in Regions V and III, respectively, without their consent,
did not constitute a violation of their constitutional right to security of
tenure.
Laurel v Desierto
Facts:
President Corazon C. Aquino issued Administrative Order No.
223 "constituting a Committee for the preparation of the National
Centennial Celebration in 1998."
President Fidel V. Ramos issued Executive Order No. 128 and appointed
to chair the reconstituted Commission was Vice-President Salvador H.
Laurel.
A corporation named the Philippine Centennial Expo '98 Corporation
(Expocorp) was created and petitioner was elected Expocorp Chief
Executive Officer.
Senator Ana Dominique Coseteng delivered a privilege speech in the
Senate denouncing alleged anomalies in the construction and operation of
the Centennial Exposition Project at the Clark Special Economic Zone

 President Joseph Estrada issued Administrative Order No. 35, creating

an ad hoc and independent citizens' committee to investigate all the facts
and circumstances surrounding the Philippine centennial projects
Senate Blue Ribbon Committee recommendations was "the prosecution
by the Ombudsman/DOJ of Dr. Salvador Laurel, chair of NCC and of
EXPOCORP for violating the rules on public bidding
Petitioner filed with the Office of the Ombudsman a Motion to Dismiss
questioning the jurisdiction of said office.
Issue and Ruling:
1. Petitioner, as Chair of the NCC, was not a public officer.
The Ombudsman has the power to investigate any malfeasance,
misfeasance and non-feasance by a public officer or employee of the
government, or of any subdivision, agency or instrumentality thereof,
including government-owned or controlled corporations
Neither the Constitution nor the Ombudsman Act of 1989, however,
defines who public officers are.
The characteristics of a public office, according to Mechem, include the
delegation of sovereign functions, its creation by law and not by contract,
an oath, salary, continuance of the position, scope of duties, and the
designation of the position as an office.
Did E.O. 128 delegate the NCC with some of the sovereign functions of
government? Certainly, the law did not delegate upon the NCC functions
that can be described as legislative or judicial. May the functions of the
NCC then be described as executive?
We hold that the NCC performs executive functions. The executive power
"is generally defined as the power to enforce and administer the laws. It is
the power of carrying the laws into practical operation and enforcing their
due observance." The executive function, therefore, concerns the
implementation of the policies as set forth by law.
E.O. No. 128, reconstituting the Committee for the National Centennial
Celebrations in 1998, cited the "need to strengthen the said Committee to
ensure a more coordinated and synchronized celebrations of the
Philippine Centennial and wider participation from the government and
non-government or private organizations." It also referred to the "need to
rationalize the relevance of historical links with other countries."
The NCC was precisely created to execute the foregoing policies and
objectives, to carry them into effect.
Petitioner argues that the "holding of a nationwide celebration which
marked the nation's 100th birthday may be likened to a national fiesta
which involved only the exercise of the national government's proprietary
function."

Surely, a town fiesta cannot compare to the National Centennial

Celebrations. The Centennial Celebrations was meant to commemorate
the birth of our nation after centuries of struggle against our former
colonial master, to memorialize the liberation of our people from
oppression by a foreign power.
Clearly, the NCC performs sovereign functions. It is, therefore, a public
office, and petitioner, as its Chair, is a public officer
2. Petitioner allegedly did not receive any compensation during his tenure
A salary is a usual but not a necessary criterion for determining the nature
of the position. It is not conclusive. The salary is a mere incident and
forms no part of the office. Where a salary or fees is annexed, the office is
provided for it is a naked or honorary office, and is supposed to be
accepted merely for the public good. Hence, the office of petitioner as
NCC Chair may be characterized as an honorary office, as opposed to a
lucrative office or an office of profit, i.e., one to which salary, compensation
or fees are attached. But it is a public office, nonetheless.
Having arrived at the conclusion that the NCC performs executive
functions and is, therefore, a public office, we need no longer delve at
length on the issue of whether Expocorp is a private or a public
corporation. Even assuming that Expocorp is a private corporation,
petitioner's position as Chief Executive Officer (CEO) of Expocorp arose
from his Chairmanship of the NCC. Consequently, his acts or omissions
as CEO of Expocorp must be viewed in the light of his powers and
functions as NCC Chair.
3. Whether petitioner is a public officer under the Anti-Graft and Corrupt
Practices Act
It is clear from Section 2 (b) of RA 3019 that the definition of a "public
officer" is expressly limited to the application of R.A. No. 3019. Said
definition does not apply for purposes of determining the Ombudsman's
jurisdiction, as defined by the Constitution and the Ombudsman Act of
1989.
To illustrate, the use of the term "includes" in Section 2 (b) indicates that
the definition is not restrictive. 28 The Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices
Act is just one of several laws that define "public officers."
Assuming that the definition of public officer in R.A. No. 3019 is exclusive,
the term "compensation," which is not defined by said law, has many
meanings.
How then is "compensation," as the term is used in Section 2 (b) of R.A.
No. 3019, to be interpreted?
Did petitioner receive any compensation at all as NCC Chair? Granting
that petitioner did not receive any salary, the records do not reveal if he
received any allowance, fee, honorarium, or some other form of

compensation. Notably, under the by-laws of Expocorp, the CEO is

entitled to per diems and compensation. 31 Would such fact bear any
significance?
Obviously, this proceeding is not the proper forum to settle these issues
lest we preempt the trial court from resolving them.
Dismissed
Segovia v Noel
Facts:
Vicente Segovia was appointed justice of the peace of Dumanjug, Cebu.
He continuously occupied this position until having passed sixty-five
milestones, he was ordered by the Secretary of Justice on July 1, 1924, to
vacate the office. Since that date, Pedro Noel, the auxiliary justice of the
peace has acted as justice of the peace for the municipality of Dumanjug.
Mr. Segovia instituted friendly quo warranto proceedings in the Court of
First Instance of Cebu to inquire into the right of Pedro Noel to occupy the
office of justice of the peace.
He alleged the trial judge erred in declaring that the limitation regarding
the age of justices of the peace provided by section 1 of Act No. 3107 is
not applicable to justices of the peace and auxiliary justices of the peace
appointed and acting before said law went into effect.
Issue:
whether that portion of Act No. 3107 which provides, that justices of the
peace and auxiliary justices of the peace shall be appointed to serve until
they have reach the age of sixty-five years, should be given retroactive or
prospective effect
Ruling:
Section 1 of Act No. 3107 amended Sec 2013 of Admin Code by adding at
the end thereof the following proviso: "Provided, That justices and auxiliary
justices of the peace shall be appointed to serve until they have reached
the age of sixty-five years." But section 206 of the Administrative Code
entitled "Tenure of office," and reading "a justice of the peace having the
requisite legal qualifications shall hold office during good behavior unless
his office be lawfully abolished or merged in the jurisdiction of some other
justice," was left unchanged by Act No. 3107.
A sound canon of statutory construction is that a statute operates
prospectively only and never retroactively, unless the legislative intent to
the contrary is made manifest either by the express terms of the statute or
by necessary implication.
We hold that the proviso added to section 203 of the Administrative Code
by section 1 of Act No. 3107, providing that justices and auxiliary justices

of the peace shall be appointed to serve until they have reached the age
of sixty-five years, should be given prospective effect only, and so is not
applicable to justices of the peace and auxiliary justices of the peace
appointed before Act No. 3107 went into force. Consequently, it results
that the decision of the trial court is correct in its finding of fact and law
and in its disposition of the case.
Vicente Segovia was originally appointed justice of the peace during the
enforcement of Act 1450.
Cornejo v Gabriel
Facts:
Cornejo who was the suspended municipal president of pasty seeks to
have the provincial governor temporarily restrained from investigating the
former, and to have him returned to his position as municipal president.
Provincial governor, Gabriel alleges that there have been a lot of
complaints received by him against the conduct of Cornejo, and he has
come to a conclusion that the municipal president, Cornejo should be
suspended.
Cornejos counsel argued that his client has been deprived of an office he
was chosen by popular vote, w/o an opportunity to be heard.
Gabriel replied that all they did was comply with the requirements of the
law that they are sworn to enforce.
Under the title of "Provincial supervision over municipal officers," Article IV
of Chapter 57 of the Administrative Code, provides:
o The provincial governor shall receive and investigate complaints against
municipal officers for neglect of duty, oppression, corruption, or other
form of maladministration in office. for minor delinquency he may
reprimand the offender; and if a more severe punishment seems to be
desirable, he shall submit written charges touching the matter to the
provincial board, and he may in such case suspend the officer (not
being the municipal treasurer) pending action by the board, if in his
opinion the charge be one affecting the official integrity of the officer in
question. Where suspension is thus effected, the written charges
against the officer shall be filed with the board within ten days.
o Trial of municipal officer by provincial board. When written charges
are preferred by a provincial governor against a municipal officer, the
provincial board shall, at its next meeting, regular or special, furnish a
copy of said charges to the accused official, with a notification of the
time and place of hearing thereon; and at the time and place appointed,
the board shall proceed to hear and investigate the truth or falsity of
said charges, giving the accused official full opportunity to be heard. The
hearing shall occur as soon as may be practicable, and in case
suspension has been effected, not later than fifteen days from the date
the accused is furnished a copy of the charges, unless the suspended

o
o

official shall, on sufficient grounds, request an extension of time to

prepare his defense.
Action by provincial board. If, upon due consideration, the provincial
board shall adjudge that the charges are not sustained, the proceedings
shall be dismissed; if it shall adjudge that the accused has been guilty of
misconduct which would be sufficiently punished by reprimand, or
further reprimand, it shall direct the provincial governor to deliver such
reprimand in pursuance of its judgment; and in either case the official, if
previously suspended, shall be reinstated.
If in the opinion of the board the case is one requiring more severe
discipline, it shall without unnecessary delay forward to the Chief of the
Executive Bureau certified copies of the record in the case, including the
charges, the evidence, and the findings of the board, to which shall be
added the recommendation of the board as to whether the official ought
to be suspended, further suspended, or finally dismissed from office;
and in such case the board may exercise its discretion to reinstate the
official, if already suspended, or to suspend him or continue his
suspension pending final action
The trial of a suspended municipal official and the proceedings incident
thereto shall be given preference over the current and routine business
of the board.
Action by Chief of Executive Bureau. Upon receiving the papers in
any such proceeding the Chief of the Executive Bureau shall review the
case without unnecessary delay and shall make such order for the
reinstatement, dismissal, suspension, or further suspension of the
official, as the facts shall warrant. Disciplinary suspension made upon
order of the chief of the Executive Bureau shall be without pay and in
duration shall not exceed two months. No final dismissal hereinunder
shall take effect until recommended by the Department Head and
approved by the Governor-General.

ISSUE: WON Art 2188 violates due process:

HELD:
Our holding, after most thoughtful consideration, is that the provisions of
section 2188 of the Administrative Code are clear and that they do not
offend the due process of law clause of the Philippine Bill of Rights.
Accordingly, it is our duty to apply the law without fear or favor.
RATIO: Due process of law is not necessarily judicial process; much of
the process by means of which the Government is carried on, and the
order of society maintained, is purely executive or administrative, which is
as much due process of law, as is judicial process. While a day in court is
a matter of right in judicial proceedings, in administrative proceedings it is
otherwise since they rest upon different principles

In certain proceedings, therefore, of an administrative character, it may be

stated, without fear of contradiction, that the right to a notice and hearing
are not essential to due process of law. Examples of special or summary
proceedings affecting the life, liberty or property of the individual without
any hearing can easily be recalled. Among these are the arrest of an
offender pending the filing of charges; the restraint of property in tax
cases; the granting of preliminary injunctionex parte; and the suspension
of officers or employees by the Governor-General or a Chief of a Bureau
pending an investigation

Abeja v Tanada
FACTS:
Petitioner Abeja and respondent Radovan (deceased) were contenders for
the office of municipal mayor of Pagbilao, Quezon, in the 1992 elections.
The election contest was a very close fight. Thereafter, Abeja filed an
election contest covering 22 precincts. Consequently, Radovan filed a
Counter-Protest covering 36 precincts. Radovan prayed that the ballots of
the 36 counter-protested precincts should only be revised and recounted if
it is shown after the revision of the contested ballots of the 22 precincts
that petitioner leads by at least one (1) vote.
Radovan died with the case left on pendency. He was substituted by ViceMayor Conrado de Rama and, surprisingly, by his surviving spouse,
Ediltrudes Radovan.
The case was left by Judge Lopez and was turned over to Judge Tanada.
In the interim, private respondent failed to commence the revision of the
ballots in the counter-protested precincts.
Eventually, the respondents prayed for the prompt resolution to the
pending cases.
ISSUES:
Whether or not the surviving spouse of the Respondent has the right for a
counter-claim on the matter?
HELD:
No. The substitution of the deceased Rosauro Radovan's widow, Ediltrudes
Radovan, on the ground that private respondent had a counter-claim for
damages is completely erroneous.
"Public office is personal to the incumbent and is not a property which
passes to his heirs." The heirs may no longer prosecute the deceased

protestee's counter-claim for damages against the protestant for that was
extinguished when death terminated his right to occupy the contested
office.
Hence, SC granted the petition.
Javier v Sandiganbayan
ONE LINER: Notwithstanding that petitioner came from the private sector to
sit as a member of the NBDB, the law invested her with some portion of the
sovereign functions of the government, so that the purpose of the
government is achieved, so she can still be charged with .
FACTS:
Petitioner was among the appointed members of the Governing Board of
the National Book Development Board.
As a part of her functions as a member of the Governing Board, she was
issued on Sep. 29, 1997 by the Office of the Pres. a travel authority to
attend the Madrid International Book Fair on Oct. 8-12, 1997. She was
paid P139,199.00 as her travelling expenses. However, petitioner did not
attend the said book fair.
On Feb. 16, 1998, Resident Auditor Rosario Martin advised petitioner to
immediately return/refund the cash advance (for the travelling expenses)
since the trip was canceled. Petitioner failed to do so.
The Executive Director, Dr. Apolonio, then filed with the Ombudsman a
complaint against the petitioner for malversation of public funds and
properties for failing to liquidate or return the said cash advance. Dr.
Apolonio also charged petitioner with violation of RA 6713 for failure to file
the Statement of Assets and Liabilities. Ombudsman found probable
cause to indict petitioner for violation of Sec/ 3 of RA 3019. Petitioner
was then charged with violation of Sec. 3 of RA3019 before the
Sandiganbayan - Criminal Case 25867. This was raffled to the First
Division.
COA charged petitioner with Malversation of Public Funds, as defined
under Art. 217 of RPC, for not liquidating the cash advance granted to her
in connection with the supposed Madrid trip. During the PI, petitioner was
required to submit a counter-affidavit but failed to do so. So, the
Ombudsman found probable cause to indict petitioner for the crime
charged and recommended the filing of an information. An Information
was then filed before the Sandiganbayan Criminal Case 27898. This
was raffled to the Third Division
*Note that at this point, 2 informations (tama ba?) were already filed
before the Sandiganbayan*
During the arraignment of the first case, she pleaded not guilty, and
returned the money subject of the criminal cases. The two cases were
thereafter consolidated in the Third Division.

Petitioner filed a Motion to Quash contesting that the Sandiganbayan has

no jurisdiction to hear the first crim case because the info did not allege
that she is a public official who is classified as salary Grade 27 or higher.
She also claims that she is not a public officer since she was appointed as
a private sector representative, and that she does not perform public
functions. Also, she says that she does not receive a monthly salary.
MTQ was denied bec. Accdg. To the First Division: The fact that the
accused does not receive any compensation in terms of salaries and
allowances, if that indeed be the case, is not the sole qualification for
being in the government service or a public official. The National Book
Development Board is a statutory government agency and the persons
who participated therein even if they are from the private sector, are public
officers to the extent that they are performing their duty therein as such.
Petitioner also avers that her right against double jeopardy was violated.
ISSUES:
WON Petitioner is a Public Officer
WON SAndiganbayan has jurisdiction
WON Double Jeopardy applies
RULING:
1) She is a public officer.
Notwithstanding that petitioner came from the private sector to sit as a
member of the NBDB, the law invested her with some portion of the
sovereign functions of the government, so that the purpose of the
government is achieved.
The NBDB is the government agency mandated to develop and support
the Philippine book publishing industry. It is a statutory government
agency created by R.A. No. 8047, which was enacted into law to ensure
the full development of the book publishing industry as well as for the
creation of organization structures to implement the said policy. To achieve
this end, the Governing Board of the NBDB was created to supervise the
implementation.
The fact that she was appointed from the public sector and not from the
other branches or agencies of the government does not take her position
outside the meaning of a public office. She was appointed to the
Governing Board in order to see to it that the purposes for which the law
was enacted are achieved.
Pursuant to the Anti-Graft Law, one is a public officer if one has been
elected or appointed to a public office. Petitioner was appointed by the
President to the Governing Board of the NDBD. Though her term is only
for a year that does not make her private person exercising a public
function. The fact that she is not receiving a monthly salary is also of no

moment. Section 7, R.A. No. 8047 provides that members of the

Governing Board shall receive per diem and such allowances as may be
authorized for every meeting actually attended and subject to pertinent
laws, rules and regulations. Also, under the Anti-Graft Law, the nature of
one's appointment, and whether the compensation one receives from the
government is only nominal, is immaterial because the person so elected
or appointed is still considered a public officer.
The RPC defines a public officer as any person who, by direct provision of
the law, popular election, popular election or appointment by competent
authority, shall take part in the performance of public functions in the
Government of the Philippine Islands, or shall perform in said Government
or in any of its branches public duties as an employee, agent, or
subordinate official, of any rank or classes, shall be deemed to be a public
officer.
Petitioner performs public functions pursuant to the law creating the
NBDB. The Governing Board even had functions enumerated under the
law, and the petitioner participated in creating the implementing rules and
regulations of RA 8047. In fact, she was supposed to represent the
country in the supposed book fair in Spain.
2) Yes.
The position of the private sector reps do not have classification since they
do not receive a monthly salary. But for purposes of determining the rank
equivalence, notwithstanding that they do not have any salary grade
assignment, the position she holds may be equated to Board Member II,
SG-28.
And according to the law Sec. 4. Jurisdiction. - The Sandiganbayan
shall exercise exclusive original jurisdiction in all cases involving:
A. Violations of Republic Act No. 3019, as amended, other known as the
Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, Republic Act No. 1379, and Chapter II,
Section 2, Title VII, Book II of the Revised Penal Code, where one or more
of the accused are officials occupying the following positions in the
government, whether in a permanent, acting or interim capacity, at the time
of the commission of the offense:
(1) Officials of the executive branch occupying the positions of regional
director and higher, otherwise classified as Grade 27 and higher, of the
Compensation and Position Classification Act of 989 (Republic Act No.
6758), specifically including:
xxxx
(2) Members of Congress and officials thereof classified as Grade Grade
'27' and up under the Compensation and Position Classification Act of 1989;
3) Double jeopardy could not attach considering that the two cases remain
pending before the Sandiganbayan and that herein petitioner had pleaded
to only one in the criminal cases against her.

Azarcon v Sandiganbayan
One-liner: Petitioners appointment as a depositary did not make him a
public officer since BIR was not authorized by law to appoint a public officer.
FACTS:
Petitioner was a contractor who engaged in earth-moving business, who
also hired subcontractor, Jaime Ancla. This subcontractor left his trucks in
the formers premises.
Upon findings that the subcontractor was tax delinquent, the RD of BIR
ordered the seizure of the subcontractors personal property that are
within the petitioners premises.
Petitioner signed a Receipt for Goods, Articles, and Things Seized Under
Authority of the National Internal Revenue wherein he assumed the duty
to preserve and protect the seized items.
Subsequently, petitioner wrote a letter to the BIR expressing his desire to
relinquish his supposed responsibilities over the seized items. These
trucks were then taken.
The petitioner and his co-accused, Ancla the subcontractor, were charged
before the Sandiganbayan with the crime of malversation of public funds
or property under Article 217 in relation to Article 222 of the Revised Penal
Code (RPC) in the following Information by Special Prosecution Officer
Victor Pascual.
The petitioner filed a motion for reinvestigation before the Sandiganbayan
on May 14, 1991, alleging that: (1) the petitioner never appeared in the
preliminary investigation; and (2) the petitioner was not a public officer,
hence a doubt exists as to why he was being charged with malversation
under Article 217 of the Revised Penal Code. The Sandiganbayan granted
the motion for reinvestigation on May 22, 1991.[14] After the
reinvestigation, Special Prosecution Officer Roger Berbano, Sr.,
recommended the withdrawal of the information but was overruled by the
Ombudsman.
The Sandiganbayan found the petitioner GUILTY beyond reasonable
doubt as principal of Malversation of Public Funds defined and penalized
under Article 217 in relation to Article 222 of the Revised Penal Code/
Hence, this petition. Petitioner avers that the Sandiganbayan does not
have jurisdiction since they are private individuals. Also, his appointment

as depository was not done by virtue of law, election, or appointment by

competent authority.
ISSUE/S:
WON Azarcon is a public officer
RULING:
No.
Article 203 of the RPC determines who are public officers:
Who are public officers. -- For the purpose of applying the provisions of this
and the preceding titles of the book, any person who, by direct provision of
the law, popular election, popular election or appointment by competent
authority, shall take part in the performance of public functions in the
Government of the Philippine Islands, or shall perform in said Government
or in any of its branches public duties as an employee, agent, or subordinate
official, of any rank or classes, shall be deemed to be a public officer.
Thus,
(to) be a public officer, one must be -(1) Taking part in the performance of public functions in the government, or
Performing in said Government or any of its branches public duties as an
employee, agent, or subordinate official, of any rank or class; and
(2) That his authority to take part in the performance of public functions or to
perform public duties must be -- a. by direct provision of the law, or b. by
popular election, or c. by appointment by competent authority.
Petitioners designation as a BIR custodian of the seized property did not
qualify as an appointment by provision of law or competent authority.
(Obviously, his performance of public functions was not authorized by
popular election)
There is no provision in the NIRC constituting a person, who has signed a
receipt of seized property, as a public officer. The BIRs power
authorizing a private individual to act as a depositary cannot be
stretched to include the power to appoint him as a public officer.
The prosecution argues that Art. 222 defines individuals who can be
prosecuted under Art. 217. According to them, by being a depositary, he
became a public officer.
Article 222 of the RPC:
Officers included in the preceding provisions. -- The provisions of this
chapter shall apply to private individuals who, in any capacity whatever,
have charge of any insular, provincial or municipal funds, revenues, or
property and to any administrator or depository of funds or property
attached, seized or deposited by public authority, even if such property
belongs to a private individual.

SC said that the legislative intent of this provision does not express or
imply that a private individual falling under Art. 222 is deemed to be a
public officer. Instead, it means: a private individual who has in his charge
any of the public funds or property enumerated therein and commits any
of the acts defined in any of the provisions of Chapter Four, Title Seven of
the RPC, should likewise be penalized with the same penalty meted to
erring public officers.
Serana v Sandiganbayan
One-liner: An investment in an individual of some portion of the sovereign
functions of the government, to be exercised by him for the benefit of the
public makes one a public officer.
FACTS:
Petitioner was a senior student from UP Cebu. She was appointed by
Pres. Estrada as a Student Regent of UP, to serve a 1 year term from Jan.
1, 2001 - Dec. 31, 2001.
In the early part of her term, she talked to Pres. Estrada regarding the
renovation of Vinzons Hall Annez (note to help you picture out: its an old
dilapidated building haha). On Sep. 2001, the petitioner, with her siblings
and relatives as trustees, registered with the SEC the OSFRI/Office of the
Student Regent Foundation, Inc. Pres. Estrada coursed to OSFRI 15M
pesos as financial assistance for the proposed renovation. Accdg. To the
information, the source of funds was the Office of the Pres.
The renovation failed to materialize. The succeeding student regent,
Kristin Bugayong, filed a complaint of Malversation of Public Funds and
Property with the Office of the Ombudsman.
On July 3, 2003, the Ombudsman, after due investigation, found probable
cause to indict petitioner and her brother Jade Ian D. Serana for estafa,
docketed as Criminal Case No. 27819 of the Sandiganbayan.
Petitioner moved to quash the information. She claimed that the
Sandiganbayan does not have any jurisdiction over the offense charged or
over her person, in her capacity as UP student regent.
She also argued that it was President Estrada, not the government, that
was duped. Even assuming that she received the P15,000,000.00, that
amount came from Estrada, not from the coffers of the government.
Petitioner contended that she was not a public officer, but a mere student
who did not receive salary for being a student regent. She also contended
that she did not have authority over the funds, since it was the Board of
Regents who had that authority as a whole.
According to the Ombudsman, petitioner, despite her protestations, was a
public officer. As a member of the BOR, she had the general powers of
administration and exercised the corporate powers of UP.

 Compensation is not an essential part of public office. Parenthetically,

compensation has been interpreted to include allowances. By this
definition, petitioner was compensated.
ISSUE:
WON she is a public officer
RULING:
YES.
In Khan, Jr. v. Office of the Ombudsman, the SC ruled that it is difficult to
pin down the definition of a public officer. The 1987 Constitution does not
define who are public officers. Rather, the varied definitions and concepts
are found in different statutes and jurisprudence.
It is not only the salary grade that determines the jurisdiction of the
Sandiganbayan. The Sandiganbayan also has jurisdiction over other
officers enumerated in P.D. No. 1606. Section 4(A)(1)(g) of P.D. No. 1606
explictly vested the Sandiganbayan with jurisdiction over Presidents,
directors or trustees, or managers of government-owned or controlled
corporations, state universities or educational institutions or foundations.
Petitioner falls under this category. As the Sandiganbayan pointed out, the
BOR performs functions similar to those of a board of trustees of a nonstock corporation. By express mandate of law, petitioner is, indeed, a
public officer as contemplated by P.D. No. 1606.
Compensation is not an essential element of public office.46 At most, it is
merely incidental to the public office.
Delegation of sovereign functions is essential in the public office. An
investment in an individual of some portion of the sovereign functions of
the government, to be exercised by him for the benefit of the public makes
one a public officer.
The Board of Regents of the University of the Philippines is performing
functions similar to those of the Board of Trustees of a non-stock
corporation. This draws to fore the conclusion that being a member of
such board, accused-movant undoubtedly falls within the category of
public officials upon whom this Court is vested with original exclusive
jurisdiction, regardless of the fact that she does not occupy a position
classified as Salary Grade 27 or higher under the Compensation and
Position Classification Act of 1989.
Go v Sandiganbayan
FACTS:
Petitioner Go is the Chairman of PIATCO. In a separate decision,
PIATCOs contracts to operate (BOT agreement scheme, etc.) NAIA 3 was
declared null and void for its predecessor-in-interest was not a qualified
bidder.

An affidavit-complaint was then filed by the chairman of AEDC (the original

proponent who lost to PIATCO in the bidding) with the office of the
Ombudsman accusing Vicente Rivera, then DOTC Sec, and Henry Go,
the petitioner & chairman of PIATCO of violation of Sec. 3g of RA 3019.
The Ombudsman filed an information accusing Rivera of committing the
offense in conspiracy with Go by willfully, unlawfully and feloniously
entering into an Amended and Restated Concession Agreement (ARCA).
(This agreement was found to be contrary to public policy since there were
amendments which changed the original agreementbasta subsequently
declared null and void)
Petitioner was arraigned and pleaded not guilty. He filed a Motion for
Determination (Redetermination) of Probable Cause and Motion to Quash.
In his comment, petitioner averred that he could not be charged under
Section 3(g) of RA 3019 because he is not a public officer and neither is
he capacitated to enter into a contract or transaction on behalf of the
government. At least one of the important elements of the crime under
Section 3(g) of RA 3019 is not allegedly present in his case.
According to the Sandiganbayan in its denial of Gos MTQ: the allegations
that accused Rivera, as DOTC Secretary, in conspiracy with petitioner Go,
entered into the ARCA with petitioner Go/PIATCO, which agreement was
manifestly and grossly disadvantageous to the government, are
constitutive of the elements of the offense charged as defined under
Section 3(g) of RA 3019.
Go insisted that he is not a public officer who cannot enter into a contract
in representation of the government, so he cannot be charged for violating
Sec. 3(g) of RA 3019. He likens it to the crime of parricide where the
essential element is the relationship of the offender to the victim and,
citing a criminal law book author, a stranger who cooperates in the
execution of the offense is not allegedly guilty of this crime. The stranger
is allegedly either liable for homicide or murder but never by "conspiracy
to commit parricide."
ISSUE/s:
WON GO can be charged of violation of Sec. 3(g) of RA3019
RULING:
YES.
The fact that one of the elements of Section 3(g) of RA 3019 is "that the
accused is a public officer" does not necessarily preclude its application to
private persons who, like petitioner Go, are being charged with conspiring
with public officers in the commission of the offense thereunder.
Private persons, when acting in conspiracy with public officers, may be
indicted and, if found guilty, held liable for the pertinent offenses under
Section 3 of RA 3019, including (g) and (h) thereof.

 Go cannot rightfully assert the total absence of the first element in his
case because he is not being charged alone but in conspiracy with Rivera,
undoubtedly a public officer by virtue of his then being the DOTC
Secretary. So, the Sandiganbayans jurisdiction extends even to him.
Petitioner is anchoring his claim on the case of Marcos. However, this
cannot be applied to this case because Marcos (private person) was
acquitted because Dans (the public officer with whom she allegedly
conspired with) was already acquitted.
Sampayan vs Daza (GR No. 103903, September 1992)
One-liner: The de facto officer is entitled to compensation.
Facts:
Sampayan and other residents sought to disqualify Daza as Congressman
because he is a green card holder since 1974. But his term of office
already expired prior to his disqualification. Respondent said that although
he was accorded a permanent residency status on October 8, 1980 as
evidenced by a letter order of the District Director, US Immigration and
Naturalization Service, Los Angeles, he had long waived his status when
he returned to the Philippines on 1985.
Issue:
Whether or not respondent Daza should be disqualified as a member of
the House of Representatives for violation of Section 68 of the Omnibus
Election Code
Held:
Dismissed the petition for being moot and academic since by june 1992,
term of office already expired. Did not issue writ of prohibition since
jurisdiction should have been with the House Electoral Tribunal.
The proper action should have been to file a cancellation before the
elections or quo warranto within 10 days from proclamation.
A writ of prohibition can no longer be issued against respondent since his
term has already expired. A writ of prohibition is not intended to provide for
acts already consummated
A de facto officer cannot be made to reimburse funds and salaries
because his acts are valid as those of a de jure officer. He is also entitled
to emolument for actual services rendered.
General Manager of PPA vs Julia Monserate (GR No. 129616, 2002)
One-liner: A de facto officer is one who is in possession of an office and who
openly exercises its functions under color of an appointment or election,
even though such appointment or election may be irregular.

Facts:
There was reorganization of PPA, then Respondent was appointed to the
permanent position of Manager II in the Resource Management Division of
PPA by then PPA General Manager(Dumlao), while petitioner Ramon
Anino, who ranked second for the exams for the position, protested the
same to the PPA Appeals Board, where his protest that did not explain any
grounds(--_), made the PPA Appeals Board replace petitioner with
petitioner Anino and reassigned to the position of Administrative Officer, a
position even lower than respondent's previous position before she was
appointed as Division Manager.
Petitioner asked PPA for MR that was pending for 6 years, and
simultaneously filed with the CSC a precautionary appeal for the inaction
of the new General Manager of PPA Dayan questioning the appointment
of Anino(number 2/petitioner) and the decision of the PPA Appeals board.
CSC on its decision upheld the validity of the PPA Appeals board decision
stating that although there is an appointment by the then GM (Dumlao),
the appointing authority(GM Dayan) stating that her claim that she is more
qualified is not the issue before the Commission(CSC), the question
regarding who meets the qualifications for the appointing authority is not to
be distrubed by the CSC
CA reversed for lack of prior notice to respondent and there was no
supporting evidence for the decision. The reassignment violated her
constitutional rights to security of tenure and due process.
Held:
Respondent was irregularly replaced by petitioner Anino in her position as
Division Manager and illegally demoted to the position of Administrative
Officer. The Court noted the following inconsistencies: Petitioner was
appointed on October 21, 1988, upheld by the PPA Appeals Board at an
earlier date of August 11, 1988; the grounds for demotion merely cited the
source thereof without stating the actual provision, discussion, or
explanation to enable respondent to know the reason for her demotion.
The PPA Appeals Board Resolution was void for lack of evidence and
proper notice to respondent. Petitioner Anino was ordered to pay
respondent backpay differentials pertaining to the period from the time he
wrongfully assumed the contested position of Manager II up to his
retirement on November 30, 1997.
Once an appointment is issued and the moment the appointee assumes a
position in the civil service under a completed appointment, he acquires a
legal, not merely equitable, right (to the position) which is protected not
only by statute, but also by the constitution, and cannot be taken away
from him either by revocation of the appointment, or by removal, except
for cause, and with previous notice and hearing."

 Concededly, the appointing authority has a wide latitude of discretion in

the selection and appointment of qualified persons to vacant positions in
the civil service. However, the moment the discretionary power of
appointment is exercised and the appointee assumed the duties and
functions of the position, such appointment cannot anymore be revoked by
the appointing authority and appoint another in his stead, except for
cause.
A rightful incumbent of a public office may recover from a de facto officer
the salary received by the latter during the time of his wrongful tenure,
even though he (the de facto officer) occupied the office in good faith and
under color of title. A de facto officer, not having a good title, takes the
salaries at his risk and must, therefore, account to the de jure officer for
whatever salary he received during the period of his wrongful tenure.

2.

Social Justice Society v DDB

FACTS:
In its Petition for Prohibition under Rule 65, petitioner Social Justice
Society (SJS), a registered political party, seeks to prohibit the Dangerous
Drugs Board (DDB) and the Philippine Drug Enforcement Agency (PDEA)
from enforcing paragraphs (c), (d), (f), and (g) of Sec. 36 of RA 9165 on
the ground that they are constitutionally infirm. For one, the provisions
constitute undue delegation of legislative power when they give unbridled
discretion to schools and employers to determine the manner of drug
testing. For another, the provisions trench in the equal protection clause
inasmuch as they can be used to harass a student or an employee
deemed undesirable. And for a third, a persons constitutional right against
unreasonable searches is also breached by said provisions.
ISSUES:
Are paragraphs (c), (d), (f), and (g) of Sec. 36, RA 9165 unconstitutional?
HELD:
Sections (c) and (d) are constitutional.
Using US authorities, the Court ruled in favor of the constitutionality of
Section 36(c) applying the following reasonable deductions:
1. schools and their administrators stand in loco parentis with respect
to their students;

minor students have contextually fewer rights than an adult, and

are subject to the custody and supervision of their parents,
guardians, and schools;
3. schools, acting in loco parentis, have a duty to safeguard the health
and well - being of their students and may adopt such measures as
may reasonably be necessary to discharge such duty; and
4. Schools have the right to impose conditions on applicants for
admission that are fair, just, and non-discriminatory.
Indeed, it is within the prerogative of educational institutions to require,
as a condition for admission, compliance with reasonable school rules
and regulations and policies. To be sure, the right to enroll is not
absolute; it is subject to fair, reasonable, and equitable requirements.
Just as in the case of secondary and tertiary level students, the
mandatory but random drug test prescribed by Sec. 36 of RA 9165 for
officers and employees of public and private offices is justifiable, albeit
not exactly for the same reason.
For another, the random drug testing shall be undertaken under conditions
calculated to protect as much as possible the employee's privacy and
dignity. In addition, the IRR issued by the DOH provides that access to the
drug results shall be on the need to know basis; that the drug test result
and the records shall be kept confidential subject to the usual accepted
practices to protect the confidentiality of the test results. Notably, RA 9165
does not oblige the employer concerned to report to the prosecuting
agencies any information or evidence relating to the violation of the
Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act received as a result of the operation
of the drug testing. All told, therefore, the intrusion into the employees
privacy, under RA 9165, is accompanied by proper safeguards, particularly
against embarrassing leakages of test results, and is relatively minimal.
To the Court, the need for drug testing to at least minimize illegal drug use
is substantial enough to override the individuals privacy interest under the
premises.
Drug enforcement agencies perceive a mandatory random drug test to be
an effective way of preventing and deterring drug use among employees
in private offices, the threat of detection by random testing being higher
than other modes. The Court holds that the chosen method is a
reasonable and enough means to lick the problem.
Taking into account the foregoing factors, i.e., the reduced expectation of
privacy on the part of the employees, the compelling state concern likely
to be met by the search, and the well-defined limits set forth in the law to
properly guide authorities in the conduct of the random testing, we hold
that the challenged drug test requirement is, under the limited context of
the case, reasonable and, ergo, constitutional.

Pimentel v Comelec

FACTS:
Commission on Elections (COMELEC) issued Resolution No. 6486,
prescribing the rules and regulations on the mandatory drug testing of
candidates for public office in connection with the May 10, 2004
synchronized national and local elections.
Petitioner Aquilino Q. Pimentel, Jr., a senator of the Republic and a
candidate for re-election in the May 10, 2004 elections, filed a Petition for
Certiorari and Prohibition under Rule 65. In it, he seeks (1) to nullify Sec.
36(g) of RA 9165 and COMELEC Resolution No. 6486 dated December
23, 2003 for being unconstitutional in that they impose a qualification for
candidates for senators in addition to those already provided for in the
1987 Constitution; and (2) to enjoin the COMELEC from implementing
Resolution No. 6486.
ISSUE:
Do Sec. 36 (g) of RA 9165 and COMELEC Resolution No. 6486 impose
an additional qualification for candidates for senator? Corollarily, can
Congress enact a law prescribing qualifications for candidates for senator
in addition to those laid down by the Constitution?
HELD:
Sec. 36 (g) of RA 9165 is unconstitutional. It is basic that if a law or an
administrative rule violates any norm of the Constitution, that issuance is
null and void and has no effect.
COMELEC cannot, in the guise of enforcing and administering election
laws or promulgating rules and regulations to implement Sec. 36(g),
validly impose qualifications on candidates for senator in addition to what
the Constitution prescribes. If Congress cannot require a candidate for
senator to meet such additional qualification, the COMELEC, to be sure, is
also without such power. The right of a citizen in the democratic process of
election should not be defeated by unwarranted impositions of
requirement not otherwise specified in the Constitution.
Sec. 36(g) of RA 9165, effectively, enlarges the qualification requirements
enumerated in the Sec. 3, Art. VI of the Constitution. Said section
unmistakably requires a candidate for senator to be certified illegal-drug
clean, obviously as a pre-condition to the validity of a certificate of
candidacy for senator or, with like effect, a condition sine qua non to be
voted upon and, if proper, be proclaimed as senator-elect. The COMELEC
resolution completes the chain with the proviso that [n]o person elected to
any public office shall enter upon the duties of his office until he has
undergone mandatory drug test. Viewed, therefore, in its proper context,
Sec. 36(g) of RA 9165 and the implementing COMELEC Resolution add
another qualification layer to what the 1987 Constitution, at the minimum,
requires for membership in the Senate. Whether or not the drug-free bar
set up under the challenged provision is to be hurdled before or after

election is really of no moment, as getting elected would be of little value if

one cannot assume office for non-compliance with the drug-testing
requirement.
It may of course be argued, in defense of the validity of Sec. 36(g) of RA
9165, that the provision does not expressly state that non-compliance with
the drug test imposition is a disqualifying factor or would work to nullify a
certificate of candidacy. This argument may be accorded plausibility if the
drug test requirement is optional. But the particular section of the law,
without exception, made drug-testing on those covered mandatory,
necessarily suggesting that the obstinate ones shall have to suffer the
adverse consequences for not adhering to the statutory command. And
since the provision deals with candidates for public office, it stands to
reason that the adverse consequence adverted to can only refer to and
revolve around the election and the assumption of public office of the
candidates. Any other construal would reduce the mandatory nature of
Sec. 36(g) of RA 9165 into a pure jargon without meaning and effect
whatsoever.
It ought to be made abundantly clear, however, that the unconstitutionality
of Sec. 36 (g) of RA 9165 is rooted on its having infringed the
constitutional provision defining the qualification or eligibility requirements
for one aspiring to run for and serve as senator.
Lacerna v DDB & PDEA
G.R. 158633, November 3, 2008
Facts:
Petitioner Atty. Manuel J. Laserna, Jr., as citizen and taxpayer, also seeks
in his Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition under Rule 65 that Sec. 36 (c),
(d), (f), and (g) of RA 9165 be struck down as unconstitutional for
infringing on the constitutional right to privacy, the right against
unreasonable search and seizure, and the right against self-incrimination,
and for being contrary to the due process and equal protection
guarantees.
SEC. 36. Authorized Drug Testing.Authorized drug testing shall be
done by any government forensic laboratories or by any of the drug
testing laboratories accredited and monitored by the DOH to
safeguard the quality of the test results. . . . The drug testing shall
employ, among others, two (2) testing methods, the screening test
which will determine the positive result as well as the type of drug
used and the confirmatory test which will confirm a positive screening
test.
(c) Students of secondary and tertiary schools. Students of
secondary and tertiary schools shall, pursuant to the related rules and
regulations as contained in the school's student handbook and with
notice to the parents, undergo a random drug testing

d) Officers and employees of public and private offices. Officers

and employees of public and private offices, whether domestic or
overseas, shall be subjected to undergo a random drug test as
contained in the company's work rules and regulations, . . . for
purposes of reducing the risk in the workplace. Any officer or
employee found positive for use of dangerous drugs shall be dealt
with administratively which shall be a ground for suspension or
termination, subject to the provisions of Article 282 of the Labor
Code and pertinent provisions of the Civil Service Law;
(f) All persons charged before the prosecutor's office with a criminal
offense having an imposable penalty of imprisonment of not less
than six (6) years and one (1) day shall undergo a mandatory drug
test;
g) All candidates for public office whether appointed or elected both in
the national or local government shall undergo a mandatory drug
test.
In addition to the above stated penalties in this Section, those found
to be positive for dangerous drugs use shall be subject to the
provisions of Section 15 of this Act.

mandatory drug testing are "randomness" and "suspicion less". In the

case of persons charged with a crime before the prosecutor's office, a
mandatory drug testing can never be random or suspicion less. The ideas
of randomness and being suspicion less are antithetical to their being
made defendants in a criminal complaint. They are not randomly picked;
neither are they beyond suspicion. When persons suspected of
committing a crime are charged, they are singled out and are impleaded
against their will. The persons thus charged, by the bare fact of being
haled before the prosecutor's office and peaceably submitting themselves
to drug testing, if that be the case, do not necessarily consent to the
procedure, let alone waive their right to privacy. To impose mandatory
drug testing on the accused is a blatant attempt to harness a medical test
as a tool for criminal prosecution, contrary to the stated objectives of RA
9165. Drug testing in this case would violate a persons' right to privacy
guaranteed under Sec. 2, Art. III of the Constitution. Worse still, the
accused persons are veritably forced to incriminate themselves.

Issues:
(1) Do Sec. 36 (g) of RA 9165 and COMELEC Resolution No. 6486 impose
an additional qualification for candidates for senator? Corollary, can
Congress enact a law prescribing qualifications for candidates for senator in
addition to those laid down by the Constitution? and
(2) Are paragraphs (c), (d), (f), and (g) of Sec. 36, RA 9165 unconstitutional?
Specifically, do these paragraphs violate the right to privacy, the right against
unreasonable searches and seizure, and the equal protection clause? Or do
they constitute undue delegation of legislative power?

Monsanto v Factoran
G.R. No. 78239, Feb. 9, 1989
Facts:
In a decision rendered on March 25, 1983, the Sandiganbayan convicted
petitioner Salvacion A. Monsanto (then assistant treasurer of Calbayog
City) and three other accused, of the complex crime of estafa thru
falsification of public documents and sentenced them to imprisonment of
four (4) years, two (2) months and one (1) day of prision correccional as
minimum, to ten (10) years and one (1) day of prision mayor as maximum,
and to pay a fine of P3,500. They were further ordered to jointly and
severally indemnify the government in the sum of P4,892.50 representing
the balance of the amount defrauded and to pay the costs proportionately.
Petitioner Monsanto appealed her conviction to this Court which
subsequently affirmed the same. She then filed a motion for
reconsideration but while said motion was pending, she was extended on
December 17, 1984 by then President Marcos absolute pardon which she
accepted on December 21, 1984.

Ruling:
Unlike the situation covered by Sec. 36 (c) and (d) of RA 9165, the Court
finds no valid justification for mandatory drug testing for persons accused
of crimes. In the case of students, the constitutional viability of the
mandatory, random, and suspicion less drug testing for students
emanates primarily from the waiver by the students of their right to privacy
when they seek entry to the school, and from their voluntarily submitting
their persons to the parental authority of school authorities. In the case of
private and public employees, the constitutional soundness of the
mandatory, random, and suspicion less drug testing proceeds from the
reasonableness of the drug test policy and requirement
We find the situation entirely different in the case of persons charged
before the public prosecutor's office with criminal offenses punishable with
six (6) years and one (1) day imprisonment. The operative concepts in the

Issue:
Whether or not a public officer, who has been granted an absolute pardon
by the Chief Executive, is entitled to reinstatement to her former position
without need of a new appointment.
Ruling:

 Notwithstanding the expansive and effusive language of the Garland case,

we are in full agreement with the commonly-held opinion that pardon does
not ipso facto restore a convicted felon to public office necessarily
relinquished or forfeited by reason of the conviction 25 although such
pardon undoubtedly restores his eligibility for appointment to that office.
The rationale is plainly evident Public offices are intended primarily for the
collective protection, safety and benefit of the common good. They cannot
be compromised to favor private interests. To insist on automatic
reinstatement because of a mistaken notion that the pardon virtually
acquitted one from the offense of estafa would be grossly untenable. A
pardon, albeit full and plenary, cannot preclude the appointing power from
refusing appointment to anyone deemed to be of bad character, a poor
moral risk, or who is unsuitable by reason of the pardoned conviction.
For petitioner Monsanto, this is the bottom line: the absolute
disqualification or ineligibility from public office forms part of the
punishment prescribed by the Revised Penal Code for estafa thru
falsification of public documents. It is clear from the authorities referred to
that when her guilt and punishment were expunged by her pardon, this
particular disability was likewise removed. Henceforth, petitioner may
apply for reappointment to the office which was forfeited by reason of her
conviction. And in considering her qualifications and suitability for the
public post, the facts constituting her offense must be and should be
evaluated and taken into account to determine ultimately whether she can
once again be entrusted with public funds. Stated differently, the pardon
granted to petitioner has resulted in removing her disqualification from
holding public employment but it cannot go beyond that. To regain her
former post as assistant city treasurer, she must re-apply and undergo the
usual procedure required for a new appointment.
Finally, petitioner has sought exemption from the payment of the civil
indemnity imposed upon her by the sentence. The Court cannot oblige
her. Civil liability arising from crime is governed by the Revised Penal
Code. It subsists notwithstanding service of sentence, or for any reason
the sentence is not served by pardon, amnesty or commutation of
sentence. Petitioner's civil liability may only be extinguished by the same
causes recognized in the Civil Code, namely: payment, loss of the thing
due, remission of the debt, merger of the rights of creditor and debtor,
compensation and novation.
Garcia v Chair of CoA
G.R. No. 75025, 9-14-93
Facts:
Petitioner comes to us on a petition for review on certiorari of the decision
of 23 July 1985 of respondent Commission on Audit (COA) denying his
claim for payment of back wages, after he was reinstated to the service

pursuant to an executive clemency. He prays for the extraordinary remedy

of mandamus against public respondents to enforce his claim.
Petitioner was a Supervising Lineman in the Region IV Station of the
Bureau of Telecommunications in Lucena City. On 1 April 1975, petitioner
was summarily dismissed from the service on the ground of dishonesty in
accordance with the decision of the then Ministry of Public Works,
Transportation and Communications in Adm. Case No. 975 for the loss of
several telegraph poles which were located at the Sariaya-Lucena City
and Mauban-Sampaloc, Quezon, telecom lines. Petitioner did not appeal
from the decision.
Based on the same facts obtaining in the administrative action, a criminal
case for qualified theft was filed against petitioner with the then Court of
First Instance (now Regional Trial Court) of Quezon. On 23 January 1980,
the trial court rendered its decision acquitting petitioner of the offense
charged.
Consequently, petitioner sought reinstatement to his former position
in view of his acquittal in the criminal case. In an indorsement dated 7 April
1980, petitioner's request to be reinstated was denied by the Bureau of
Telecommunications. Hence, petitioner pleaded to the President of the
Philippines for executive clemency.
On 26 August 1981, acting on the favorable indorsements of the then
Ministry of Transportation and Communications and the Civil Service
Commission, Deputy Presidential Executive Assistant Joaquin T. Venus,
Jr., by authority of the President, per Resolution No. O.P. 1800, granted
executive clemency to petitioner.
Issue:
Whether he is entitled to the payment of back wages after having been
reinstated pursuant to the grant of executive clemency.
Ruling:

The petition is meritorious.

In the case at bar, petitioner was found administratively liable for

dishonesty and consequently dismissed from the service. However, he
was later acquitted by the trial court of the charge of qualified theft based
on the very same acts for which he was dismissed. The acquittal of
petitioner by the trial court was founded not on lack of proof beyond
reasonable doubt but on the fact that petitioner did not commit the offense
imputed to him. Aside from finding him innocent of the charge, the trial
court commended petitioner for his concern and dedication as a public
servant. Verily, petitioner's innocence is the primary reason behind the
grant of executive clemency to him, bolstered by the favorable
recommendations for his reinstatement by the Ministry of Transportation
and Communications and the Civil Service Commission.

Petitioner's automatic reinstatement to the government service entitles

him to back wages. 8 This is meant to afford relief to petitioner who is
innocent from the start and to make reparation for what he has suffered as
a result of his unjust dismissal from the service. To rule otherwise would
defeat the very intention of the executive clemency, i.e., to give justice to
petitioner. Moreover, the right to back wages is afforded to those with have
been illegally dismissed and were thus ordered reinstated or to those
otherwise acquitted of the charges against them. 9 There is no doubt that
petitioner's case falls within the situations aforementioned to entitle him to
back wages.
Further, it is worthy to note that the dismissal of petitioner was not the
result of any criminal conviction that carried with it forfeiture of the right to
hold public office, but is the direct consequence of an administrative
decision of a branch of the Executive Department over which the
President, as its head, has the power of control. The President's control
has been defined to mean "the power of an officer to alter or modify or
nullify or set aside what a subordinate officer had done in the performance
of his duties and to the judgment of the former for the latter." 10 In
pardoning petitioner and ordering his reinstatement, the Chief Executive
exercised his power of control and set aside the decision of the Ministry of
Transportation and Communications. The clemency nullified the dismissal
of petitioner and relieved him from administrative liability. The separation
of the petitioner from the service being null and void, he is thus entitled to
back wages.
After having been declared innocent of the crime of qualified theft, which
also served as basis for the administrative charge, petitioner should not be
considered to have left his office for all legal purposes, so that he is
entitled to all the rights and privileges that accrued to him by virtue of the
office held, including back wages. 11
Established jurisprudence fixes recovery of back wages to a period of five
(5) years to be paid an illegally dismissed government employee who has
been ordered reinstated. 12 The cases heretofore decided by this Court
show that petitioners therein were employees of local governments who
were removed from office by their local officials. The reasons given for
their removal were abolition of office or position, reduction of work force,
or lack of funds on the part of the local governments concerned, which
reasons were found by this Court to be either devoid of factual basis or not
sufficiently proven, otherwise, their dismissal would have been valid and
justified. In contrast, the case before us is different, involving as it does
circumstances that impel us to deviate from the general rule previously
laid down on the recovery of back wages for five (15) years. Petitioner's
reinstatement in the instant case which was ordered pursuant to a grant of
executive clemency was effected not because of lack of sufficient proof of
his commission of the offense but that, more importantly, he did not

commit the offense charged. Verily, law, equity and justice dictate that
petitioner be afforded compassion for the embarrassment, humiliation and,
above all, injustice caused to him and his family by his unfounded
dismissal. This Court cannot help surmising the painful stigma that must
have caused petitioner, the incursion on his dignity and reputation, for
having been adjudged, albeit wrongfully, a dishonest man, and worse, a
thief. Consequently, this Court finds it fair and just to award petitioner full
back wages from 1 April 1975 when he was illegally dismissed, to 12
March 1984 when he was reinstated. The payment shall be without
deduction or qualification.
Central Bank v CSC
FACTS:
Promotions Board of the Central Bank, with a representative of the Civil
Service Commission in attendance, deliberated on the filling up of the
vacant position of Assistant Bank Physician of the Central Bank of
the Philippines (Salary Grade 22).
It found Dr. Jordan, who then had the rank of Coordinating Assistant
(Salary Grade 20) as the only next-in-rank employee.
On the other hand, respondent Borja filed an application for the position of
Medical Director in the Central Bank. His papers were acted upon by the
Promotions Board and he was considered for the position of Physician
(Salary Grade 16). He was issued his appointment as Physician.
Dr. Jordan was issued an appointment as Assistant Bank Physician
Private respondent contested Dr. Jordan's appointment claiming that he
was the next-in-rank employee and that he was more qualified than she.
Bank dismissed the protest on the grounds that the protest was filed
beyond the reglementary period; that protestant is not the next-in-rank
employee as regards the contested position and, as such, he was no legal
personality to file the protest; and, that the protestee aside from being the
next-in-rank employee, met the requirements for promotion.
Private respondent appealed to the Merit Systems Board (MSB for short).
In its decision, the MSB found the appeal meritorious and ruled that
private respondent should have been the one appointed as Assistant Bank
Physician. The Bank, through Mr. Sebastian V. Palanca, Jr., Special
Assistant to the Governor, in an undated petition for reconsideration,
prayed that the MSB decision be set aside and that the Bank's decision
upholding the appointment of Dr. Jordan be left undisturbed. MSB set
aside its decision of October 28, 1986 and confirmed the approval of the
appointment of Dr. Jordan to the contested position.
Private respondent appealed to the Civil Service Commission on the
grounds that he was denied due process of law inasmuch as he was not
furnished a copy of the motion for reconsideration filed by the Bank, and
that the decision of the MSB dated January 28, 1987 is contrary to the

merit and fitness principles enshrined in the Civil Service Law and the
Constitution.
CSC issued Resolution setting aside the decision of the MSB and
directing the appointment of private respondent to the contested position.
Petitioner Central Bank filed a petition for reconsideration that the
department head enjoys wide latitude of discretion as regards the
appointment of department personnel and that the question as to who is
more competent is of no consequence since private respondent was not
yet an employee of the Central Bank at the time Dr. Jordan was
considered for promotion. However, the petitioner's motion for
reconsideration was denied by the Commission on the sole ground that its
Resolution had become final and executory on account of the failure of Dr.
Jordan to file a motion for reconsideration and that the motion for
reconsideration filed by Mr. Palanca, Jr. for and in behalf of the Central
Bank cannot be said to have been filed in behalf of Dr. Jordan inasmuch
as the Central Bank has no personality to file a motion for reconsideration
as it does not stand to be adversely affected or personally denied by the
decision of the Commission.

ISSUE:
WON the Civil Service Commission acted without or in excess of
jurisdiction in revoking the appointment of Dr. Jordan and in directing the
issuance of the appointment in favor of Dr. Borja when all the while the
qualifications of Dr. Jordan were certified by the Promotions Board and a
representative of the Civil Service Commission who was present in the
deliberations of the same board.
RULING:
It is well-settled principle that the appointing authority is given ample
discretion in the selection and appointment of qualified persons to vacant
positions. This is a management prerogative which is generally
unhampered by judicial intervention. Within the parameters of this
principle, the right to select and appoint employees is the prerogative of
the employer which may be exercised without being held liable therefor
provided that the exercise thereof is in good faith for the advancement of
the employer's interest and not for the purpose of defeating or
circumventing the rights of the employees under special laws or under
valid agreements and provided further that such prerogatives are not
exercised in a malicious, harsh, oppressive, vindictive or wanton manner,
or out of malice or spite.
There is no question that the Central Bank of the Philippines is vested with
the power of appointment under Section 14 of Republic Act No. 265, as

amended, otherwise known as the Central Bank Act. At issue in this

petition is the extent of the power of the Civil Service Commission to
approve or disapprove a particular appointment. May the Commission
revoke an appointment and direct the issuance of the appointment to
somebody else whom it believes is more qualified for the position?
Under the Civil Service Act of 1959, the Commissioner of Civil Service has
the final authority on appointments. But the situation has changed under
the new law, Presidential Decree No. 807, otherwise known as the Civil
Service Decree, wherein the Commission is not authorized to curtail
the discretion of the appointing official on the nature or kind of
appointment to be extended. The authority of the Commission is
limited to approving or reviewing the appointment in the light of the
requirements of the law governing the Civil Service.
In the case at bar, the qualifications of Dr. Jordan were never disputed.
The fact that she was qualified was attested to by the Promotions Board. A
representative of the Commission was present in the deliberation of the
said board.
Private respondent anchors his protest on the ground that he is more
qualified than the appointee. It is well-settled that when the appointee is
qualified, as in this case, and all the other legal requirements are satisfied,
the Commission has no alternative but to attest to the appointment in
accordance with the Civil Service Laws. The Commission has no
authority to revoke an appointment on the ground that another
person is more qualified for a particular position. It also has no
authority to direct the appointment of a substitute of its choice. To do
so would be an encroachment on the discretion vested upon the
appointing authority. An appointment is essentially within the discretionary
power of whomsoever it is vested, subject to the only condition that the
appointee should possess the qualifications required by law.
Private respondent alleges, however, that the power of appointment is not
absolute and that the Commission is empowered to approve or disapprove
the same, citing Section 9(h) of Article V of the Civil Service Decree and
Section 4 of Civil Service Commission Resolution No. 83-343. This is
correct. As noted earlier, the appointment is subject to verification by the
Commission as to whether or not the appointing authority complied with
the requirements of the law, otherwise, it may revoke the appointment.
However, to conclude that the Commissioner may also direct the
appointment of individuals other than the choice of the appointing power is
certainly not contemplated by the law. Section 9(h) of Article V of the Civil
Service Decree provides that the Civil Service Commission is authorized
to perform the following functions with respect to appointments in the Civil
Service, to wit:
"Approve all appointments, whether original or promotional, to
positions in the civil service, except those of presidential appointees,

members of the Armed Forces of the Philippines, police forces,

firemen, and jailguards, and disapprove those where the appointed do
not possess appropriate eligibility or required qualifications." . . .
(Emphasis supplied.)
From the foregoing, it is clear that the Commission has the authority to
check whether or not the appointee possesses the appropriate civil
service eligibility or the required qualifications. If he does, his appointment
must be approved; if not it should be disapproved. No other criterion may
be employed by the Commission when it acts on an appointment.
Thus, when as in this case, it is not disputed that the appointee, Dr.
Jordan, is qualified for the contested position, the Commission exceeded
its power in revoking her appointment on the ground that private
respondent is more qualified. The Commission cannot substitute its will for
that of the appointing authority.
It may be true that private respondent has an edge over Dr. Jordan in
terms of educational attainment inasmuch as the former holds a postgraduate degree in Medicine from a foreign educational institution and
considering that he has had experience and training in reputable
institutions here and abroad. However, under the pertinent rules on
promotion obtaining in the Central Bank, educational attainment and
training experience are just among the factors to be considered in the
promotion of its employees. The other factors to be considered are
performance rating, experience and outstanding accomplishments,
physical characteristics and personality traits and potential.
It must be stressed that the law does not impose a rigid or mechanical
standard on the appointing power. The appointing person enjoys sufficient
discretion to select and appoint employees on the basis of their fitness to
perform the duties and to assume the responsibilities of the position to be
filled. As earlier ruled in Reyes vs. Abeleda, at least sufficient discretion, if
not plenary, should be granted to those entrusted with the responsibility of
administering the offices concerned, primarily the department heads. They
are in the position to determine who can best fulfill the functions of the
office thus vacated. Unless the law speaks in mandatory and peremptory
tone, there should be full recognition of the wide scope of such
discretionary authority. The power of appointment is essentially a political
question involving considerations of wisdom which only the appointing
authority can decide.
The Court takes note that at the time Dr. Jordan was considered and
recommended for promotion to the contested position on October 3, 1984,
private respondent was not yet an employee of the Central Bank. It was
only on October 5, 1984 that he was appointed as physician and he
assumed the position only on October 9, 1984. It was, therefore,
impossible to consider him for appointment to the contested position
before that time.

Anent the argument of the respondents that the Central Bank lacks the
legal personality to contest the decision of the Commission and hence the
decision became final and executory for failure of Dr. Jordan to file a
motion for reconsideration, the Court finds the argument untenable. In an
earlier case, this Court held that it is the appointing authority who stands
adversely affected where the Civil Service Commission disapproves the
appointment made. This rule is acknowledged by the Solicitor General.
However, the Solicitor General contradicted himself by insisting that the
decision of the MSB dated October 28, 1981 became final and executory
for failure of Dr. Jordan to file a motion for reconsideration when all the
while the Central Bank filed a timely motion for reconsideration thereof.
Petitioner Central Bank, as the appointing authority is the one which can
defend its appointment since it knows the reasons for the same. Any final
determination of the issue can only be enforced through it. Moreover, it is
the act of the appointing authority that is being questioned. Indeed, when
the Commission directed the Central Bank to submit its Comment on the
appeal filed by private respondent the Commission must have been aware
that the participation of the Central Bank is indispensable. Although the
Commission also directed Dr. Jordan to file a separate Comment, it denied
the latter's request for an extension of time within which to file the same on
the ground that a protest case is not strictly an adversary proceedings
where the protestant and the protestee play active roles. The Commission
pointed out that a protest case is an action of the protestant against a
determination made by the appointing authority, a determination which
only the appointing authority could defend inasmuch as it is the latter who
knows the reasons for such determination. 24Thus, for the Commission to
say thereafter that the decision became final and executory for failure of
Dr. Jordan to appeal is obviously erroneous. As a matter of fact that
Commission is now in estoppel. After making the parties believe that the
Central Bank may participate in the controversy, the Commission cannot
later make a total turn about by alleging that the participation of the
Central Bank is inconsequential as it lacks the requisite legal personality.
Questioned Resolutions of the Civil Service Commission are hereby
declared null and void and the Commission is directed to attest the
appointment of Dr. Angela Jordan as Assistant Bank Physician. No
costs. Decision is immediately executory.
Santiago v COA
FACTS:
The petitioner was employed in the Commission on Audit as State Auditor
IV with a monthly salary of P7,219.00. In 1988, he was assigned to the
COA Auditing Unit at the Department of Transportation and
Communications and detailed to the Manila International Airport Authority.

 In computing his retirement benefits, the Government Service Insurance

System used as basis the amount of P13,068.00, considering this the
highest basic salary rate received by the petitioner in the course of his
employment. The COA disagreed, however, and paid his retirement
benefits on the basis of only his monthly salary of P7,219.00 as State
Auditor IV.
The petitioner requested recomputation based on what he claimed as his
highest basic salary rate of P13,068.00. This was denied on December 8,
1989, and he was so notified on February 5, 1990. On March 7, 1990, he
came to this Court to seek reversal of the decision of the COA on the
ground of grave abuse of discretion.
We note at the outset that there is no dispute regarding the legality of the
petitioner's occupying the second position in the MIAA and receiving
additional compensation for his services therein. As the Solicitor General
observed. "What the petitioner was receiving from the MIAA was the
additional compensation allowed under Section 17 of Act No. 4187 which,
in turn, is allowed under Section 8, Paragraph B, Article IX of the
Constitution."
In Quimzon v. Ozaeta, 7 this Court held that double appointments are not
prohibited as long as the positions involved are not incompatible, except
that the officer or employee appointed cannot receive additional or double
compensation unless specifically authorized by law. The additional
compensation received by the petitioner is not an issue in the case at bar
because of its express approval by the COA and the admission of the
Solicitor General that it is allowed under the cited provision.
More specifically, Section 17 of Act No. 4187 provides:
Any existing act, rule or order to the contrary notwithstanding, no
full time officer or employee of the government shall hereafter
receive directly or indirectly any kind of additional or extra
compensation or salary including per diems and bonuses from any
fund of the government, its dependencies, and semi-government
entities or boards created by lawexcept:
o Officers serving as chairman or members of entities and
enterprise organized, operated, owned or controlled by the
government, who may be paid per diem for each meeting actually
attended or when on official travel;
o Auditors and accountants;
o Provincial and municipal treasurers and their employees;
o Employees serving as observers of the Weather Bureau; and
o Those authorized to receive extra or additional compensation by
virtue of the provision of this Act. (Emphasis supplied).
ISSUE:

The basic issue presented in this case is the correct interpretation

of Executive Order No. 966, Section 9, providing as follows:
Sec. 9. Highest Basic Salary Rate. The compensation of salary or
pay which may be used in computing the retirement benefits shall be
limited to the highest salary rate actually received by an
official/employee as filed by law and/or indicated in his duly approved
appointment. This shall include salary adjustments duly authorized
and implemented by the presidential issuance(s) and budget
circular(s), additional basic compensation or salary indicated in an
appointment duly approved as an exception to the prohibition on
additional or double compensation, merit increases, and
compensation for substitutionary services or in an acting capacity. For
this purpose, all other compensation and or fringe benefits such as
per diems, allowances, bonuses, overtime pay, honoraria hazard pay,
flying time fees, consultancy or contractual fees, or fees in correcting
and/or releasing examination papers shall not be considered in the
computation of the retirement benefits of an official/employee.

RULING:
The Solicitor General argues, albeit not too strongly, that the additional
compensation received by the petitioner was merely an honorarium and
not a salary. As a mere honorarium, it would not fall under the provision of
Section 9 and so should not be added to his salary in computing his
retirement benefits. prcd
SC cannot accept this contention. An honorarium is defined as something
given not as a matter of obligation but in appreciation for services
rendered, a voluntary donation in consideration of services which admit of
no compensation in money. The additional compensation given to the
petitioner was in the nature of a salary because it was received by him as
a matter of right in recompense for services rendered by him as Acting
Assistant General Manager for Finance and Administration. In fact, even
Chairman Domingo referred to it in his letter dated July 14, 1988, as the
petitioner's "salary differential."
The Solicitor General's main argument is that the petitioner cannot invoke
Section 9 because he was not appointed to the second position in the
MIAA but only designated thereto. It is stressed that under the said
provision, "the compensation of salary or pay which may be used in
computing the retirement benefits shall be received by an official
employee as fixed by law and or indicated in his duly approved

appointment." The petitioner's additional salary was fixed not in a duly

approved appointment but only in a designation.
Belittling this argument, the petitioner maintains that there is no substantial
distinction between appointment and designation. He cites Mechem, who
defines appointment as "the act of designation by the executive officer,
board or body, to whom that power has been delegated, of the individual,
who is to exercise the functions of a given office." He also
invokes Borromeo v. Mariono, where this Court said that "the term
'appoint,' whether regarded in its legal or in its ordinary acceptation, is
applied to the nomination or designation of an individual."
Strictly speaking, there is an accepted legal distinction between
appointment and designation. While appointment is the selection by the
proper authority of an individual who is to exercise the functions of a given
office, designation, on the other hand, connotes merely the imposition of
additional duties, usually by law, upon a person already in the public
service by virtue of an earlier appointment (or election). Thus, the
appointed Secretary of Trade and Industry is, by statutory designation, a
member of the National Economic and Development Authority. A person
may also be designated in an acting capacity, as when he is called upon
to fill a vacancy pending the selection of a permanent appointee thereto
or, more usually, the return of the regular incumbent. In the absence of the
permanent Secretary, for example, an undersecretary is designated acting
head of the department.
As the Court said in Binamira v. Garrucho:
Appointment may be defined as the selection, by the authority
vested with the power, of an individual who is to exercise the
functions of a given office. When completed, usually with its
confirmation, the appointment results in security of tenure for the
person chosen unless he is replaceable at pleasure because of the
nature of his office. Designation, on the other hand, connotes
merely the imposition by law of additional duties on an incumbent
official, as where, in the case before us, the Secretary of Tourism is
designated Chairman of the Board of Directors of the Philippine
Tourism Authority, or where, under the Constitution, three Justices
of the Supreme Court are designated by the Chief Justice to sit in
the Electoral Tribunal of the Senate or the House of
Representatives. It is said that appointment is essentially executive
while designation is legislative in nature.
Nevertheless, SC agreeS with the petitioner that in the law in question, the
term "appointment" was used in a general sense to include the term
"designation." In other words, no distinction was intended between the two
terms in Section 9 of Executive Order No. 966. We think this to be the
more reasonable interpretation, especially considering that the provision
includes in the highest salary rate "compensation for substitutionary

services or in an acting capacity." This need not always be conferred by a

permanent appointment. A contrary reading would, in our view, militate
against the letter of the law, not to mention its spirit as we perceive it. That
spin it seeks to extend the maximum benefits to the retiree as an
additional if belated recognition of his many years of loyal and efficient
service in the government.
As thus interpreted, Section 9 clearly covers the petitioner, who was
designated Acting Assistant General Manager for Finance and
Administration in the office order issued by Secretary Reyes on August 10,
1988. The position was then vacant and could be filled either by
permanent appointment or by temporary designation. It cannot be said
that the second position was only an extension of the petitioner's office as
State Auditor IV in the Commission on Audit as otherwise there would
have been no need for his designation thereto. The second office was
distinct and separate from his position in the Commission on Audit. For the
additional services he rendered for the MIAA, he was entitled to additional
compensation which, following the letter and spirit of Section 9, should be
included in his highest basic salary rate.
It is noteworthy that the petitioner occupied the second office not only for a
few days or weeks but for more than three months. His designation as
Acting Assistant General Manager for Finance and Administration was not
a mere accommodation by the MIAA. On the contrary, in his letter to
Chairman Domingo requesting the petitioner's services. MIAA General
Manager Evergisto C. Macatulad said, "Considering his qualifications and
work experience, we believe that a finance man of his stature and caliber
can be of great help in the efficient and effective performance of the
Airport's functions."
Retirement laws should be interpreted liberally in favor of the retiree
because their intention is to provide for his sustenance, and hopefully
even comfort, when he no longer has the stamina to continue earning his
livelihood. After devoting the best years of his life to the public service, he
deserves the appreciation of a grateful government as best concretely
expressed in a generous retirement gratuity commensurate with the value
and length of his services. That generosity is the least he should expect
now that his work is done and his youth is gone. Even as he feels the
weariness in his bones and glimpses the approach of the lengthening
shadows, he should be able to luxuriate in the thought that he did his task
well, and was rewarded for it.
Petition is GRANTED. The challenged resolution is SET ASIDE and
judgment is hereby rendered DIRECTING the computation of the
petitioner's retirement benefits on the basis of his Highest Basic Salary
Rate of P13,068.00. It is so ordered.

Sevilla v Santos
FACTS:
The petitioner has been in the government service since 1949. His last
appointment was last Assistant City Engineer of Palayan City which he
discharged until he was designated Acting City Engineer of Cabanatuan
City by President Ferdinand E. Marcos on May 2, 1981. He unhesitatingly
assumed the latter position and discharged its functions and
responsibilities until "People Power" and the EDSA Revolution intervened.
The subsequent twists and turns in his professional career are recited in
the decision dated May 31, 1989 of the Coourt of Appeals in CA- G.R. SP
No. 14489 as follows:
The advent of the 1986 Revolution and the 1987 Freedom Constitution
spelled changes and upheavals particularly within the Career Civil
Service. On August 18, 1986, the then Officer-in charge (OIC Mayor) of
Cabanatuan City, Cesar Vergara, appointed defendant-appellant Santos
as city engineer of Cabanatuan City, and on August 28, 1986, defendantappellant Santos assumed the position of city engineer. On that very same
day, a memorandum informing petitioner-appellee Sevilla of the
appointment of defendant-appellant Santos was sent by then OIC Mayor.
As petitioner-appellee Sevilla was on leave at the time, the memorandum
was received on his behalf by Anita de Guzman, the administrative officer
of the Department of Public Works and Highways (DPWH) Office of
Cabanatuan City, where petitioner-appellee Sevilla also holds office.
A few months later, or on November 14, 1986, petitioner-appellee Sevilla
was designated by then Minister Rogociano Mercado of the MPWH as
acting district engineer of Pasay City. Petitioner-appellee Sevilla served in
that capacity until he was removed from that office of the new Secretary of
the DPWH on February 3, 1987. This was what precipitated the present
controversy.
Petitioner-appellee then returned to Cabanatuan City. On March 27, 1987,
he filed a petition for quo warranto against defendant-appellant Santos,
which was docketed as Civil Case No. 879-134 (AF) before the Regional
Trial Court of Cabanatuan City, Branch 27. On January 29, 1988, the
lower rendered the impugned decision reinstating petitioner-appellee
Sevilla and entitling him payment of vacation and sick leaves for the
duration of his absence.
In his quo warranto petition, Sevilla argued that, being the presidential
appointee, he could not be removed from office by an OIC mayor. And,
even supposing that the OIC mayor had such authority, his (Sevilla's)
separation from office was illegal because none of the grounds for the
separation/replacement of public officials and employees set forth in

Section 3 of Executive Order No. 17 dated May 28, 1986, was cited to
justify the termination of his service. Section 3 of E.O. No. 17 provides:
Section 3. The following shall be the grounds for separation/replacement
of personnel:
Existence of the case for summary dismissal pursuant to Section 40
of the Civil Service Law;
Existence of a probable cause for violation of the Anti-Graft and
Corrupt Practices Act as determined by the Ministry Head concerned;
Gross incompetence or inefficiency in the discharge of functions:
Misuse of public office for partisan political purposes:
Any other analogous ground showing that the incumbent is unfit to
remain in the service or his separation/replacement is in the interest
of the service.
Sevilla filed this petition for review alleging that the Court of Appeals erred:
-

in not applying the provisions of Executive Order No. 17;

in not considering his appointment as acting city engineering of
Cabanatuan City as a specie of permanent appointment covered by
civil service security of tenure and outside the doctrine enunciated
in Austria vs. Amante (79 Phil. 790) cited by the respondent court
as basis of its decision; and
in declaring that he "voluntarily surrendered his former office," (p. 1,
Rollo) instead of finding that he merely complied with the
memorandum of the Minister of Public Works and Highways
assigning him in Pasay City.

ISSUE:
May an officer who was appointed to an office in an "acting" capacity,
bring a quo warranto action against the permanent appointee to the
position?
RULING:
The petition is devoid of merit. An "acting" appointment is merely
temporary, one which is good only until another appointment is made to
take its place (Austria vs. Amante. 79 Phil. 784). Hence, petitioner's right
to hold office as "Acting City Engineer of Cabanatuan City" was merely
temporary. It lapsed upon the appointment of Nerito Santos as the
permanent city engineer of Cabanatuan City on August 18, 1986. A mere
"designation" does not confer upon the designee security of tenure in the
position or office which he occupies in an "acting" capacity only. Thus did
this Court made such a distinction:
Appointment may be defined as the selection, by the authority vested with
the power, of an individual who is to exercise the functions of a given
office. When completed, usually with its confirmation, the appointment

results in security of tenure for the person chosen unless he is replaceable

at pleasure because of the nature of his office. Designation, on the other
hand, connotes merely the imposition by law of additional duties on an
incumbent official . . . It is said that appointment is essentially executive
while designation is legislative in nature.
Designation may also be loosely defined as an appointment because it
likewise involves the naming of a particular person to a specified public
office. That is the common understanding of the term. However, where the
person is merely designated and not appointed, the implication is that he
shall hold the office only in a temporary capacity and may be replaced at
will by the appointing authority. In this sense, the designation is
considered only an acting or temporary appointment, which does not
confer security of tenure on the person named.
Even if so understood, that is, as an appointment, the designation of the
petitioner cannot sustain his claim that he has been illegally removed. . .
Appointment involves the exercise of discretion, which because of its
nature cannot be delegated." (Binamira vs. Garrucho, 188 SCRA 158.)
The power of appointment is essentially discretionary. Its exercise may not
be controlled by the courts. The choice of an appointee from among
qualified candidates or applicants is a political and administrative decision
calling for considerations of wisdom, convenience, utility and the interests
of the service which can best be made by the head of office concerned for
he is familiar with the organizational structure and environmental
circumstances within which the appointee must function. (Lusterio vs.
Intermediate Appellate Court, 199 SCRA 255.) The appointing authority in
this particular case is the Mayor of Cabanatuan City (B.P. Blg. 337 or the
Local Government Code which provides that "the city engineer shall be
appointed by the city mayor, subject to civil service law, rules and
regulations"). The appointment of Santos by OIC City Mayor Vergara was
valid and binding for it was confirmed by the Minister of Public Works and
Highways, and approved by the Civil Service Commission.
Santiago Jr v CSC
FACTS:
Customs Commissioner Wigberto E. Taada extended a permanent
promotional appointment, as Customs Collector III, to petitioner
SANTIAGO, Jr. That appointment was approved by the Civil Service
Commission (CSC), National Capital Region Office. Prior thereto,
SANTIAGO held the position of Customs Collector I. Respondent JOSE, a
Customs Collector II, filed a protest with the Merit Systems Promotion
Board (the Board, for short) against SANTIAGO's promotional
appointment mainly on the ground that he was next-in-rank to the position
of Collector of Customs III.

Pursuant to Section 19(6) of Presidential Decree No. 807 (the Civil

Service Decree), the Board referred the protest to Commissioner Tanada
for appropriate action.
Commissioner Tanada said, in support of Santiagos promotional
appointment, that:
o The next-in-rank rule is no longer mandatory
o The protestee is competent and qualified for the positions and was not
questioned by the protestant
Existing law and jurisprudence give wide latitude of discretion to the
appointing authority provided there is no clear showing of grave abuse of
discretion or fraud
On 28 December 1987, respondent Commission affirmed the Board
Resolutions in its own Resolution No. 87-554. The Commission ruled that
although both SANTIAGO and JOSE are qualified for the position of
Customs Collector III, respondent JOSE has far better qualifications in
terms of educational attainment, civil service eligibilities, relevant seminars
and training courses taken, and holding as he does by permanent
appointment a position which is higher in rank and salary range. It added
that the Commission is empowered to administer and enforce the merit
system as mandated by the 1973 and 1987 Constitutions and to approve
all appointments, whether original or promotional, to positions in the civil
service, subject to specified exceptions, pursuant to paragraphs (a) and
(h), Section 9 of the Civil Service Law.
ISSUE:
Whether or not one who is next-in-rank should be appointed in mandatory.
RULING:
One who is next-in-rank is entitled to preferential consideration for
promotion to the higher vacancy but it does not necessarily follow that he
and no one else can be appointed. The rule neither grants a vested right
to the holder nor imposes a ministerial duty on the appointing authority to
promote such person to the next higher position. As provided for in
Section 4, CSC Resolution No. 83- 343:
o Section 4.
An employee who holds a next-in- rank position who is
deemed the most competent and qualified, possesses an appropriate civil
service eligibility, and meets the other conditions for promotion shall be
promoted to the higher position when it becomes vacant.
However, the appointing authority may promote an employee who is not
next-in-rank but who possesses superior qualifications and competence
compared to a next-in-rank employee who merely meets the minimum
requirements for the position.

 True, the Commission is empowered to approve all appointments, whether

original or promotional, to positions in the civil service and disapprove
those where the appointees do not possess the appropriate eligibility or
required qualification (paragraph (h), Section 9, P.D. No. 807). However,
consistent with our ruling in Luego vs. CSC (L-69137, 5 August 1986,143
SCRA 327), "all the commission is actually allowed to do is check whether
or not the appointee possesses the appropriate civil service eligibility or
the required qualifications. If he does, his appointment is approved; if not,
it is disapproved. No other criterion is permitted by law to be employed by
the Commission when it acts on, or as the decree says, "approves" or
"disapproves" an appointment made by the proper authorities. ...To be
sure, it has no authority to revoke the said appointment simply because it
believed that the private respondent was better qualified for that would
have constituted an encroachment on the discretion vested solely (in the
appointing authority)." All told, we fail to see any reason to disturb
SANTIAGO's promotional appointment. The minimum qualifications and
the standard of merit and fitness have been adequately satisfied as found
by the appointing authority. The latter has not been convincingly shown to
have committed any grave abuse of discretion.
Lapinid v CSC
FACTS:
Petitioner Renato M. Lapinid was appointed by the Philippine Ports
Authority to the position of Terminal Supervisor at the Manila International
Container Terminal on October 1, 1988. This appointment was protested
on December 15, 1988, by private respondent Juanito Junsay, who
reiterated his earlier representations with the Appeals Board of the PPA on
May 9, 1988, for a review of the decision of the Placement Committee
dated May 3, 1988. He contended that he should be designated terminal
supervisor, or to any other comparable position, in view of his preferential
right thereto. On June 26, 1989, complaining that the PPA had not acted
on his protest, Junsay went to the Civil Service Commission and
challenged Lapinid's appointment on the same grounds he had earlier
raised before the PPA. In a resolution dated February 14, 1990, the
Commission disposed as follows:
After a careful review of the records of the case, the Commission
finds the appeal meritorious. In the comparative evaluation sheets,
the parties were evaluated according to the following criteria,
namely: eligibility; education; work experience;
productivity/performance/ attendance; integrity; initiative/leadership;
and physical characteristics/personality traits. The results of the
evaluation are as follows:
JUNSAY, Juanito

79.5

VILLEGAS, Benjamin
LAPINID, Renato
DULFO, Antonio
MARIANO, Eleuterio
FLORES, Nestor
DE GUZMAN, Alfonso
VER, Cesar

79
75
78
79
80
80
80

ISSUE:
Is the Civil Service Commission authorized to disapprove a permanent
appointment on the ground that another person is better qualified than the
appointee and, on the basis of this finding, order his replacement by the
latter?
RULING:
It is therefore incomprehensible to the Court why, despite these definitive
pronouncements, the Civil Service Commission has seen fit to ignore, if
not defy, the clear mandate of the Court.
We declare once again, and let us hope for the last time, that the Civil
Service Commission has no power of appointment except over its own
personnel. Neither does it have the authority to review the appointments
made by other offices except only to ascertain if the appointee possesses
the required qualifications. The determination of who among aspirants with
the minimum statutory qualifications should be preferred belongs to the
appointing authority and not the Civil Service Commission. It cannot
disallow an appointment because it believes another person is better
qualified and much less can it direct the appointment of its own choice.
Appointment is a highly discretionary act that even this Court cannot
compel.1wphi1 While the act of appointment may in proper cases be the
subject of mandamus, the selection itself of the appointeetaking into
account the totality of his qualifications, including those abstract qualities
that define his personalityis the prerogative of the appointing authority.
This is a matter addressed only to the discretion of the appointing
authority. It is a political question that the Civil Service Commission has no
power to review under the Constitution and the applicable laws.
The Court believes it has stated the foregoing doctrine clearly enough,
and often enough, for the Civil Service Commission not to understand
them. The bench does; the bar does; and we see no reason why the Civil
Service Commission does not. If it will not, then that is an entirely different
matter and shall be treated accordingly. We note with stern disapproval
that the Civil Service Commission has once again directed the
appointment of its own choice in the case at bar. We must therefore make
the following injunctions which the Commission must note well and follow
strictly.

 While we appreciate the fact that the Commission is a constitutional body,

we must stress, as a necessary reminder, that every department and
office in the Republic must know its place in the scheme of the
Constitution. The Civil Service Commission should recognize that its acts
are subject to reversal by this Court, which expects full compliance with its
decisions even if the Commission may not agree with them The
Commission on Civil Service has been duly warned. Henceforth, it
disobeys at its peril.

Luego v CSC
FACTS:
Petitioner was appointed Admin Officer II, Office of the City Mayor, Cebu
City, by Mayor Solon. The appointment was described as permanent but
the CSC approved it as temporary, subject to the final action taken in the
protest filed by the private respondent and another employee.
Subsequently, the CSC found the private respondent better qualified than
the petitioner for the contested position and, accordingly directed that the
latter be appointed to said position in place of the petitioner whose
appointment is revoked. Hence, the private respondent was so appointed
to the position by Mayor Duterte, the new mayor. The petitioner, invoking
his earlier permanent appointment, questions the order and the validity of
the respondents appointment.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the CSC is authorized to disapprove a permanent
appointment on the ground that another person is better qualified than the
appointee and, on the basis of this finding, order his replacement.
RULING:
No. The appointment of the petitioner was not temporary but permanent
and was therefore protected by Constitution. The appointing authority
indicated that it was permanent, as he had the right to do so, and it was
not for the respondent CSC to reverse him and call it temporary.

Appointment is an essentially discretionary power and must be performed

by the officer in which it is vested according to his best lights, the only
condition being that the appointee should possess the qualifications
required by law. If he does, then the appointment cannot be faulted on the
ground that there are others better qualified who should have been
preferred. This is a political question involving considerations of wisdom
which only the appointing authority can decide.
Significantly, the Commission on Civil Service acknowledged that both the
petitioner and the private respondent were qualified for the position in
controversy. That recognition alone rendered it functus officio in the case
and prevented it from acting further thereon except to affirm the validity of
the petitioner's appointment. To be sure, it had no authority to revoke the
said appointment simply because it believed that the private respondent
was better qualified for that would have constituted an encroachment on
the discretion vested solely in the city mayor.
Section 9(h), Art V of the Civil Service Decree provides that the
Commission shall have inter alia the power to approve all
appointments, whether original or promotional, to positions in the civil
service .and disapprove those where the appointees do not possess
appropriate eligibility or required qualifications.
The CSC is not empowered to determine the kind or nature of the
appointment extended by the appointing officer, its authority being limited
to approving or reviewing the appointment in the light of the requirements
of the CSC Law. When the appointee is qualified and all the other legal
requirements are satisfied, the Commission has no choice but to attest to
the appointment in accordance with the CSC Laws.
CSC is without authority to revoke an appointment because of its belief
that another person was better qualified, which is an encroachment on the
discretion vested solely in the city mayor.
Abas Kida v Senate
FACTS:
On August 1, 1989 or two years after the effectivity of the 1987
Constitution, Congress acted through Republic Act (RA) No. 6734 entitled
"An Act Providing for an Organic Act for the Autonomous Region in Muslim
Mindanao. "The initially assenting provinces were Lanao del Sur,
Maguindanao, Sulu and Tawi-tawi. RA No. 6734 scheduled the first regular
elections for the regional officials of the ARMM on a date not earlier than
60 days nor later than 90 days after its ratification.
Thereafter, R.A. No. 9054 was passed to further enhance the structure of
ARMM under R.A. 6734. Along with it is the reset of the regular elections
for the ARMM regional officials to the second Monday of September 2001.
RA No. 9333was subsequently passed by Congress to reset the ARMM
regional elections to the 2ndMonday of August 2005, and on the same

date every 3 years thereafter. Unlike RA No. 6734 and RA No. 9054, RA
No. 9333 was not ratified in a plebiscite.
Pursuant to RA No. 9333, the next ARMM regional elections should have
been held on August 8, 2011. COMELEC had begun preparations for
these elections and had accepted certificates of candidacies for the
various regional offices to be elected. But on June 30, 2011, RA No. 10153
was enacted, resetting the ARMM elections to May 2013, to coincide with
the regular national and local elections of the country. With the enactment
into law of RA No. 10153, the COMELEC stopped its preparations for the
ARMM elections.
Several cases for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus originating from
different parties arose as a consequence of the passage of R.A. No. 9333
and R.A. No. 10153 questioning the validity of said laws.
On September 13, 2011, the Court issued a temporary restraining order
enjoining the implementation of RA No. 10153 and ordering the incumbent
elective officials of ARMM to continue to perform their functions should
these cases not be decided by the end of their term on September 30,
2011.
The petitioners assailing RA No. 9140, RA No. 9333 and RA No. 10153
assert that these laws amend RA No. 9054 and thus, have to comply with
the supermajority vote and plebiscite requirements prescribed under
Sections 1 and 3, Article XVII of RA No. 9094 in order to become effective.
The petitions assailing RA No. 10153 further maintain that it is
unconstitutional for its failure to comply with the three-reading requirement
of Section 26(2), Article VI of the Constitution. Also cited as grounds are
the alleged violations of the right of suffrage of the people of ARMM, as
well as the failure to adhere to the "elective and representative" character
of the executive and legislative departments of the ARMM. Lastly, the
petitioners challenged the grant to the President of the power to appoint
OICs to undertake the functions of the elective ARMM officials until the
officials elected under the May 2013 regular elections shall have assumed
office. Corrolarily, they also argue that the power of appointment also gave
the President the power of control over the ARMM, in complete violation of
Section 16, Article X of the Constitution.

ISSUE:
WON the Presidents power to appoint is constitutional.
Whether or not the 1987 Constitution mandates the synchronization of
elections
Whether or not the passage of RA No. 10153 violates the provisions of the
1987 Constitution
RULING:
YES, the grant [to the President] of the power to appoint OICs in the
ARMM is constitutional. Since the Presidents authority to appoint OICs

emanates from RA No. 10153, it falls under the third group of officials that
the President can appoint pursuant to Section 16, Article VII of the
Constitution. Thus, the assailed law facially rests on clear constitutional
basis.
Court dismissed the petition and affirmed the constitutionality of R.A.
10153 in toto. The Court agreed with respondent Office of the Solicitor
General (OSG) on its position that the Constitution mandates
synchronization, citing Sections 1, 2 and 5, Article XVIII (Transitory
Provisions) of the 1987 Constitution. While the Constitution does not
expressly state that Congress has to synchronize national and local
elections, the clear intent towards this objective can be gleaned from the
Transitory Provisions (Article XVIII) of the Constitution, which show the
extent to which the Constitutional Commission, by deliberately making
adjustments to the terms of the incumbent officials, sought to attain
synchronization of elections.
The objective behind setting a common termination date for all elective
officials, done among others through the shortening the terms of the
twelve winning senators with the least number of votes, is to synchronize
the holding of all future elections whether national or local to once every
three years. This intention finds full support in the discussions during the
Constitutional Commission deliberations. Furthermore, to achieve
synchronization, Congress necessarily has to reconcile the schedule of
the ARMMs regular elections (which should have been held in August
2011 based on RA No. 9333) with the fixed schedule of the national and
local elections (fixed by RA No. 7166 to be held in May 2013).
In Osmena v. Commission on Elections, the court thus explained:
It is clear from the aforequoted provisions of the 1987 Constitution
that the terms of office of Senators, Members of the House of
Representatives, the local officials, the President and the VicePresident have been synchronized to end on the same hour, date
and year noon of June 30, 1992.
It is likewise evident from the wording of the above-mentioned Sections
that the term of synchronization is used synonymously as the phrase
holding simultaneously since this is the precise intent in terminating their
Office Tenure on the same day or occasion. This common termination date
will synchronize future elections to once every three years (Bernas, the
Constitution of the Republic of the Philippines, Vol. II, p. 605).
That the election for Senators, Members of the House of Representatives
and the local officials (under Sec. 2, Art. XVIII) will have to be
synchronized with the election for President and Vice President (under
Sec. 5, Art. XVIII) is likewise evident from the x x x records of the
proceedings in the Constitutional Commission. [Emphasis supplied.]
Although called regional elections, the ARMM elections should be included
among the elections to be synchronized as it is a "local" election based on

the wording and structure of the Constitution. Regional elections in the

ARMM for the positions of governor, vice-governor and regional assembly
representatives fall within the classification of "local" elections, since they
pertain to the elected officials who will serve within the limited region of
ARMM. From the perspective of the Constitution, autonomous regions are
considered one of the forms of local governments, as evident from Article
X of the Constitution entitled "Local Government." Autonomous regions
are established and discussed under Sections 15 to 21 of this Article the
article wholly devoted to Local Government.
Third issue: Congress, in passing RA No. 10153, acted strictly within its
constitutional mandate. Given an array of choices, it acted within due
constitutional bounds and with marked reasonableness in light of the
necessary adjustments that synchronization demands. Congress,
therefore, cannot be accused of any evasion of a positive duty or of a
refusal to perform its duty nor is there reason to accord merit to the
petitioners claims of grave abuse of discretion.
In relation with synchronization, both autonomy and the synchronization of
national and local elections are recognized and established constitutional
mandates, with one being as compelling as the other. If their compelling
force differs at all, the difference is in their coverage; synchronization
operates on and affects the whole country, while regional autonomy as the
term suggests directly carries a narrower regional effect although its
national effect cannot be discounted.
In all these, the need for interim measures is dictated by necessity; out-ofthe-way arrangements and approaches were adopted or used in order to
adjust to the goal or objective in sight in a manner that does not do
violence to the Constitution and to reasonably accepted norms. Under
these limitations, the choice of measures was a question of wisdom left to
congressional discretion.
However, the holdover contained in R.A. No. 10153, for those who were
elected in executive and legislative positions in the ARMM during the
2008-2011 term as an option that Congress could have chosen because a
holdover violates Section 8, Article X of the Constitution. In the case of the
terms of local officials, their term has been fixed clearly and unequivocally,
allowing no room for any implementing legislation with respect to the fixed
term itself and no vagueness that would allow an interpretation from this
Court. Thus, the term of three years for local officials should stay at three
(3) years as fixed by the Constitution and cannot be extended by holdover
by Congress.
RA No. 10153, does not in any way amend what the organic law of the
ARMM (RA No. 9054) sets outs in terms of structure of governance. What
RA No. 10153 in fact only does is to "appoint officers-in-charge for the
Office of the Regional Governor, Regional Vice Governor and Members of
the Regional Legislative Assembly who shall perform the functions

pertaining to the said offices until the officials duly elected in the May 2013
elections shall have qualified and assumed office. "This power is far
different from appointing elective ARMM officials for the abbreviated term
ending on the assumption to office of the officials elected in the May 2013
elections. It must be therefore emphasized that the law must be
interpreted as an interim measure to synchronize elections and must not
be interpreted otherwise.

CARABEO v. CA
G.R. No 178000 and 178003, Dec 04, 2009
Topic: Laws on Public Officers; Introductory Concepts; F. Code of
Conduct: RA 6713
FACTS:

The Department of Finance-Revenue Integrity Protection

Service (DOF-RIPS), composed of private respondents filed a
complaint with the Office of the Ombudsman against Carabeo,
Officer-in-Charge (OIC) of the Office of the Treasurer of
Paraaque City.

The complaint pertinently alleged:

o In September 1981, CARABEO first occupied the position of
Revenue Collection Clerk at the Office of the City Treasurer of
Paraaque earning an annual gross salary of Eight Thousand
Four Hundred Pesos (P8,400.00).
o As the present City Treasurer (In-charge of Office) at the City
of Paraaque, CARABEO receives an annual gross salary of
Two Hundred Ninety One Thousand Thirty Six Pesos
(P291,036.00).
o The net worth of CARABEO, based on his Statements of
Assets Liabilities and Net Worth (SALNs), from the time he

commenced employment at the Paraaque Treasurer's Office

in 1981 has ballooned from P114,900.00 to approximately P7.5
Million in the year 2004. HSIDT
o Equally noticeable as the drastic increase in his net worth is
the steady accumulation of various expensive properties by
CARABEO and his spouse ranging from real properties to
vehicles to club shares ownership.
o However, CARABEO did not declare most of the foregoing
vehicles in his SALNs.
o The records of the Land Transportation Office however belie
this declaration of ownership of only three vehicles and later (in
year 2004), of only one vehicle, with the LTO certification that
CARABEO and/or his spouse owns at least seven vehicles
including the expensive Ford F150 and Honda CRV.
o Also, CARABEO and/or his spouse acquired the 1,000 sq.m.
Tagaytay property in year 2001 but this substantial property
acquisition was not reflected in the SALNs of CARABEO for
said year as well as for the subsequent year.
o CARABEO's failure to disclose his and his spouse's ownership
of the foregoing Tagaytay property and vehicles in the pertinent
SALNs amounts to a violation of Section 7 of RA 3019 and
Section 8(A) of RA 6713 requiring him to file under oath the
true and detailed statement of his assets as well as those of
his spouse.
o Any anticipated claim to the effect that CARABEO's wife has
business undertakings that should explain their acquired
wealth cannot also be given credence. Our inquiry with the BIR
further showed that CARABEO's spouse, Cynthia, had no tax
payments reflected on the Bureau's records, except for a onetime tax payment of approximately three thousand pesos
(representing capital gains tax for one transaction). Such
information provided by the BIR shows that CARABEO's
spouse had no substantial income that can justify the foregoing
property acquisitions.
the Office of the Ombudsman directed Secretary Teves to place
Carabeo under preventive suspension for a period not to exceed
six months without pay.
the Court of Appeals issued a 60-day Temporary Restraining Order
(TRO) enjoining the enforcement of Carabeo's preventive
suspension.
Aggrieved, Carabeo filed a petition for certiorari, alleging that grave
abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction
attended the approval of his preventive suspension.

Carabeo filed another petition before the CA where he prayed,

among others, that Secretary Teves be cited for contempt of court.
On 31 October 2006, the Court of Appeals rendered a Joint
Decision, DISMISSING the consolidated cases

ISSUE/S:

WON CA committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or

excess of jurisdiction in:
(1) ruling that the failure to provide implementing rules of EO 259 does not
render the same unenforceable;
(2) sustaining the preventive suspension imposed by the Ombudsman on
Carabeo; and
(3) not considering the complaint against Carabeo a violation of Section 10
of RA 6713 which entitles Carabeo to be informed beforehand and to take
the necessary corrective action.
RULING:
We dismiss the petition.
(1) ruling that the failure to provide implementing rules of EO 259 does
not render the same unenforceable;

The question on EO 259's enforceability is immaterial to the validity

of the charges against Carabeo.
(2) sustaining the preventive suspension imposed by the Ombudsman
on Carabeo;

The preventive suspension order was legal.

Carabeo contends that there must be prior notice and hearing

before the Ombudsman may issue a preventive suspension order.

The contention is bereft of merit. Settled is the rule that prior

notice and hearing are not required in the issuance of a
preventive suspension order, such suspension not being a
penalty but only a preliminary step in an administrative
investigation.

As held in Nera v. Garcia:

If after such investigation, the charges are established and the
person investigated is found guilty of acts warranting his
removal, then he is removed or dismissed. This is the penalty.

Moreover, there is nothing in the law, specifically Section 24 of RA

6770, or The Ombudsman Act of 1989, which requires that notice
and hearing precede the preventive suspension of an erring public
official.

Under Section 24 of RA 6770, two requisites must concur to render

the preventive suspension order valid.
First, there must be a prior determination by the Ombudsman
that the evidence of respondent's guilt is strong.
Second, (a) the offense charged must involve dishonesty,
oppression, grave misconduct or neglect in the performance of
duty; (b) the charges would warrant removal from the service;
or (c) the respondent's continued stay in office may prejudice
the case filed against him.
So as not to influence the investigation or for the officer to not
tinker/ manipulate the documents which form part of the
evidence of the case.
These requisites are present here. The Ombudsman justified the
issuance of the preventive suspension order in this wise:
o deliberate failure of respondent Carabeo to disclose all of his
supposed properties in his SALN, particularly the vehicles
which are registered in his name involves dishonesty which, if
proven, warrant his corresponding removal from the
government service.
o Second, being the OIC of the Office of the City Treasurer's
Office of Paraaque, respondent Carabeo's continued stay
thereat may prejudice the outcome of the instant case, he
being the head of that particular office, albeit in an Officer-inCharge capacity.
o Third, the evidence of guilt against him is strong. It bears
stressing that as the current OIC of the Office of the City
Treasurer's Office of Paraaque receiving only an annual gross
salary of P291,036.00, it is highly inconceivable how
respondent Carabeo could have legally acquired all these real
and personal properties.
o Fourth, respondent's unauthorized foreign travels abroad
numbering fifteen (15) times between the years 1996 to 2004,
indicates that he has financial resources which could not be
legally justified relying solely on his declared income.
Whether the evidence of guilt is strong is left to the determination of
the Ombudsman by taking into account the evidence before him.
Moreover, Carabeo cannot claim any right against, or damage or
injury that he is bound to suffer from the issuance of the preventive
suspension order, since there is no vested right to a public office, or
even an absolute right to hold it.
Public office is not property but a "public trust or agency." While
their right to due process may be relied upon by public officials to
protect their security of tenure which, in a limited sense, is

analogous to property, such fundamental right to security of tenure

cannot be invoked against a preventive suspension order which is a
preventive measure, not imposed as a penalty.
An order of preventive suspension is not a demonstration of a
public official's guilt, which can be pronounced only after a trial on
the merits.

(3) not considering the complaint against Carabeo a violation of

Section 10 of RA 6713 which entitles Carabeo to be informed
beforehand and to take the necessary corrective action.

Carabeo's non-disclosure of assets in his SALN constitutes a

violation of RA 3019, among others.

Carabeo claims that the complaint against him involves a violation

of Section 10, RA 6713, or the Code of Conduct and Ethical
Standards for Public Officials and Employees, which entitles him to
be informed beforehand of his omission and to take the necessary
corrective action.

While Section 10 of RA 6713 indeed allows for corrective

measures, Carabeo is charged not only with violation of RA 6713,
but also with violation of the Revised Penal Code, RA 1379, and RA
3019, as amended, specifically Sections 7 and 8 thereof.

In Ombudsman v. Valeroso, the Court explained fully the

significance of these provisions, to wit:
o Section 8 above, speaks of unlawful acquisition of wealth, the evil
sought to be suppressed and avoided, and Section 7, which
mandates full disclosure of wealth in the SALN, is a means of
preventing said evil and is aimed particularly at curtailing and
minimizing, the opportunities for official corruption and
maintaining a standard of honesty in the public service.
"Unexplained" matter normally results from "non-disclosure" or
concealment of vital facts. SALN, which all public officials and
employees are mandated to file, are the means to achieve the
policy of accountability of all public officers and employees in the
government. By the SALN, the public are able to monitor
movement in the fortune of a public official; it is a valid
check and balance mechanism to verify undisclosed
properties and wealth.

Significantly, Carabeo failed to show any requirement under RA

3019 that prior notice of the non-completion of the SALN and its
correction precede the filing of charges for violation of its
provisions.

Based on the foregoing, the Court of Appeals did not commit grave
abuse of discretion in rendering the assailed decision.

Grave abuse of discretion implies such capricious and whimsical

exercise of judgment as is equivalent to lack of jurisdiction.
It exists where the power is exercised in an arbitrary or despotic
manner by reason of passion or personal hostility. It must be so
patent and gross as to amount to an evasion of positive duty or to a
virtual refusal to perform the duty enjoined or to act at all in
contemplation of law. No abuse, much less grave abuse, attended
the Court of Appeals' judgment in these cases.

LO CHAM v. OCAMPO
77 Phil. 636, 638 (1946)
Topic: B. Scope of Authority; Doctrine of Necessary Implication
FACTS:

Gregorio T. Lantin, a doctor of medicine and lawyer, Acting Chief,

Medico-Legal Section, Division of Investigation, Department of
Justice, was given an assignment by Acting Secretary of Justice
Ramon Quisumbing in a letter dated October 8, 1945, which reads:
"SIR:
"Pursuant to the request of the City Fiscal of manila and in
accordance with the provision of section 1686 of the
Revised Administrative Code, you are hereby temporarily detailed
to this office effective today, to assist him in the discharge of his
duties with the same powers and functions of an assistant city
fiscal."

Following his detail, Doctor Lantin signed and filed informations in

the aforesaid cases after, presumably, conducting preliminary
investigations.

Thereafter, the attorneys for the defendants filed motions to quash

on the ground that Gregorio T. Lantin has no authority to sign
information as assistant city fiscal of Manila. When two of these
motions were denied and one was sustained, the losing parties
instituted the instant proceedings for certiorari.
ISSUE/S:

WON Gregorio T. Lantin has the authority of to sign information as

assistant city fiscal of Manila.
RULING:

Section 1686 of the Revised Administrative Code, as amended by

section 4 of Commonwealth Act No. 14, provides:
o "SEC. 1686. Additional counsel to assist fiscal. The Secretary
of Justice may appoint any lawyer, being either a subordinate
from his office or a competent person not in the public service,
temporarily to assist a fiscal or prosecuting attorney in the
discharge of his duties, and with the same authority therein as
might be exercised by the Attorney General or Solicitor General."
It will be noted that the law uses general terms.
It is a general rule of statutory interpretation that provisions should
not be given a restricted meaning where no restriction is indicated.
Just as the express enumerate of persons, objects, situations, etc.,
is construed to exclude those not mentioned, according to a wellknown maxim, so no distinction should be made none appears to
be intended.
This is not an arbitrary rule but one founded on logic. It is fair to
presume that if the legislature had wanted to forbid the lawyer
appointed to assist the fiscal, to sign informations, make
investigations and conduct prosecutions, it would have said so or
indicated its intention by clear implication.

SC said that the power to investigate, file and prosecute criminal

cases is inherent in the right to assist.
The duties of a public officer include all those:
o which truly lie within its scope;
o essential to accomplish the main purpose of the office;
o relevant to accomplish the main purpose even if they are
merely incidental and collateral.

If the Law does not prohibit specific acts, all related acts may
be performed pursuant to the Doctrine of Necessary
Implication.
We need to be reminded that of all the functions of the fiscal, those
referred to are the most important and outstanding and the ones in
which the fiscal usually needs aid.
There is nothing so sacrosanct in the signing of complaints, making
of investigations and conducting of prosecutions that only an officer
appointed by the President or one expressly empowered by law
may be permitted to assume these functions.
Certainly a lawyer who is invested with the same authority as might
be exercised by the Attorney General or Solicitor General is
presumed to be competent to be entrusted with any of the duties,
without exception, devolving on a prosecuting attorney.

That the person designated in a particular instance does not

measure up to the educational specifications imposed by law is
beside the point. It does not detract from the conclusion that, in the
light of the high standard of training and experience required, there
is no anomaly and no injustice is committed in lodging on the
person designated by the Secretary of Justice those powers of the
prosecuting attorney which we have named.
The duties of a public office include all those which truly lie within
its scope, those which are essential to the accomplishment of the
main purpose for which the office was created, and those which,
although incidental and collateral, are germane to, and serve to
promote the accomplishment of the principal purposes. (43
American Jurisprudence, 68, 70.)
The authority to sign informations make investigations and conduct
prosecutions is within the inferences to be gathered from the
circumstances which prompted the passage of section 4 of
Commonwealth Act No. 144 and it predecessors.
It is not to the point to inquire whether the Solicitor General has
now the power to sign informations. Granting that he does not
retain such power, a question which we do not decide, this
circumstance nevertheless does not alter the result at which we
have arrived.
The reason is that the power to sign informations, make
investigations and conduct prosecutions is inherent in the power "to
assist" a prosecuting attorney, as these words are used in
the Administrative Code.
It does not emanate from the powers of the Attorney General or
Solicitor General conferred upon the officer designated by the
Secretary of Justice;
it is ingrained in the office or designation itself.
The powers of the Solicitor General bestowed on the appointee to
assist the fiscal must be held as cumulative or an addition to the
authority to sign informations, which is inherent in his appointment.
In other words, the clause "with the same authority therein as might
be exercised by the Attorney General or Solicitor General" does not
exclude the latter authority. The former practice of the Attorney
General to which we have alluded portrays a distinction between
and separation of the two powers or sets of powers.
The power of the Attorney General to sign information, as we have
pointed out, owed its being, not to the powers legitimately
pertaining to his office as Attorney General but to the special
provision authorizing him to assist fiscals. And it may be pertinent to

know that when the Attorney General's power to assist provincial

fiscals ceased, he stopped signing informations.
The phraseology of section 17 of Act No. 867 before cited also
affords an illustration of the idea that the authority to assist is
separate and apart from the general powers of the Attorney
General. In the language of this section, the person appointed was
(1) to assist the fiscal in the discharge of his duties and
(2) to represent the Attorney General in such matters.
If the two phrases meant the same thing, then one of them would
be superfluous. There is no apparent reason for holding that one or
the other was a surplusage.
APRUEBA v. GANZON
G.R. No 138570, Oct. 10, 2000

Topic: C. Kinds of Authority; Ministerial

FACTS:

On October 24, 1960, petitioners Salvador Aprueba and Asuncion

Modoc filed with the Court of First Instance of Iloilo a petition for a
mandamus against respondent City Mayor of Iloilo City,

they are owners and operators of a cafeteria located in Stall 17-C of

the city market

respondent city mayor ordered his policemen to close it for alleged

violation of city ordinance as they did on same date despite their
protest;

petitioner Aprueba was informed by the latter that the store could
only be reopened if petitioners paid all their back accounts,

that after paying the back accounts, respondent still refused to

allow reopening of the store and instead chided him for working
against respondent's candidacy in the last elections; that
respondent told petitioner Aprueba to comply with health rules and
regulations which he did;

that respondent told him later that the store space would be used
as an extension (bodega) of the city health office;

respondent filed an answer with counterclaim denying the material

allegations of said complaint and alleging as defense that the
remedy of mandamus cannot be resorted to for the purpose of
compelling him to reopen the stall,

petitioners' privilege to remain therein rests on an implied contract

of lease and that obligations that rest solely on contract cannot be
enforced by mandamus where there is no question of trust or
official duty;

the trial court issued an order dismissing the petition, which in

pertinent part, reads:
". . . the remedy of mandamus applied for by the petitioner is not
the proper remedy but if at all, the action must be an action for
specific performance based on a contractual obligation.
The right to the occupancy of stall No. 17-C of the Public Market of
the City of Iloilo by petitioner is but a privilege which the respondent
Mayor may or may not grant but not a duty enjoined upon him by
law by reason of his position."

ISSUE/S:

WON the Court of First Instance correctly dismissed the petitioners'

petition for mandamus.
RULING:
The Mayor cannot be compelled because the grant business license is a
discretionary act on his part in the exercise of police power and for
reasons of public policy and sound public administration. But in this case,
actually, what it means by police power and for reasons of public policy
and sound public administration is thisyou are not my supporter during
elections. The stall owner here did not support the mayor when he ran for
mayor in the elections. But then, the mayor can always hide under the
cloak of exercise of police power.
Exception: Where there is grave abuse of discretion, manifest injustice,
palpable excess of authority equivalent to denial of settled rights and there
is no other plain, adequate or speedy remedy

An exit Note that the refusal of respondent to allow reopening of the

cafeteria is predicated on the provision of Section 10 (m) of the City
Charter which states:
"SEC. 10. General duties and powers of the Mayor. The
mayor shall have immediate control over the executive functions
of the several departments of the City, and shall have the
following general duties and powers:
xxx xxx xxx
"(m) To grant and refuse municipal licenses and to revolve the
same for violation of the conditions upon which they were
granted, or if acts prohibited by law or municipal ordinance are
being committed under the protection of such licenses or in the
premises in which the business for which the same have been
granted is carried out, or for any other good reason of general
interest."

Moreover, the privilege of petitioners to obtain a renewal of the

permit (after the implied lease contract expired) rested on the
sound discretion of respondent and refusal on his part to grant the

continuance of the privilege (especially after petitioner Aprueba's

alleged violation of city ordinance by allowing co-petitioner Modoc
to operate business in stall 17-C) cannot be the subject of an action
for mandamus.
In a long line of decisions, the Court had held that mandamus will
not issue to control or review the exercise of discretion of a public
officer where the law imposes on him the right or duty to exercise
judgment in reference to any matter in which he is required to act
(Blanco vs. Board 46 Phil. 192; Lee Wing vs. Collector, 30 Phil.
363; see II Moran, Comments on the Rules of Court, 170-171).
And where the legal rights of petitioners, as in the present case, are
not well-defined, clear, and certain, the petition for mandamus must
be dismissed (Viuda de Zamora vs. Wright, 53 Phil. 613).
The privilege of operating a market stall under license is always
subject to the police power of the city government and may be
refused or granted for reasons of public policy and sound public
administration.
Such privilege is not absolute but revocable under an implied lease
contract subject to the general welfare clause.
Another rule is that a contractual obligation, as the lease to
petitioner Aprueba of the stall in question, is not a duty specifically
enjoined by law resulting from office, trust, or station, and the rule
universally accepted is that mandamus never lies to enforce the
performance of contractual obligations (City of Manila vs. Posadas,
40 Phil. 309; Florida & Peninsular R. Co. vs. State ex rel. Tansvere,
20 LRA 419).
As the trial court correctly observed, petitioners' remedy is an action
for specific performance, if proper, based on a contractual
obligation (Quiogue vs. Romualdez, 46 Phil. 337; Jacinto vs.
Director, 49 Phil. 853) and not mandamus.
FIRST PHIL. HOLDINGS v. SANDIGANBAYAN
G.R. No 88345, Feb. 01, 1996

Topic: C. Kinds of Authority; Ministerial

FACTS:

In Civil Case No. 0035 pending before the respondent

Sandiganbayan, the PCGG prays for the return, reconveyance,
accounting and restitution with damages of certain funds and
properties which were allegedly acquired by private respondents
through "abuse of right and power and through unjust enrichment".

The herein petition states that part of these funds and properties
are some 6,299,177 sequestered shares of stock in the Philippine

Commercial International Bank (PCIBank) which were allegedly

acquired by the respondent spouses, as beneficial owners, in
violation of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, as amended,
and therefore subject to forfeiture in favor of the Republic for being
"unexplained wealth".
Said shares were allegedly purchased from petitioner by
respondent Romualdez using respondents Equities and Narciso as
"his dummy buyers", with "no or negligible 'cash out' ".
On April 27, 1988, respondent Court granted the motion for
intervention of respondent Trans Middle East (Phils.) Equities, Inc.
(Equities, hereafter), which claims ownership of said shares as well
as the corresponding rights appurtenant to ownership, like the right
to vote the shares and to receive dividends.
On December 28, 1988, petitioner, First Philippine Holdings
Corporation, Inc. (FPHCI) (formerly Meralco Securities
Corporation), filed its own "Motion for Leave to Intervene and to
Admit Complaint in Intervention"
In the aforementioned assailed Resolutions, the respondent Court
denied petitioner's motion for intervention because
1) The "right sought to be enforced . . . aside from being
contingent, is not only personal between FPHC
(petitioner herein) and Trans Middle East Philippine
Equities and Edilberto S. Narciso, Jr., but also intracorporate in nature . . . ." The Sandiganbayan's
jurisdiction
"cannot
extend
to
intra-corporate
controversies nor to the nullification of sale between two
or more private persons nor to cases filed by private
persons against perceived cronies" and
2) The intervention "will unduly delay the proceedings and
prejudice the adjudication of the rights of the original
parties."

ISSUE/S:

WON FPHCI have the Right to Intervene particularly in the "return,

reconveyance, accounting and restitution with damages" of the
6,299,177 PCIBank shares in favor of the Republic

WON the Sandiganbayan have jurisdiction to declare as void the

sale of such shares to respondents Narciso and Equities as alleged
dummies of respondent Romualdez and to return them to FPHCI

WON If the answer to both questions is in the affirmative, did

respondent Court abuse its discretion in denying the Motion for
Intervention, and may the writ of mandamus be issued to
compel it to grant such motion?

RULING:

The First Issue: Does FPHCI Have

the Right to Intervene?
Intervention is a remedy by which a third party, not originally
impleaded in a proceeding, becomes a litigant therein to enable him
to protect or preserve a right or interest which may be affected by
such proceeding.
Its purpose, according to Francisco, is "to settle in one action and
by a single judgment the whole controversy (among) the persons
involved".
Under the rule above-quoted, intervention shall be allowed when a
person has:
* a legal interest in the matter in litigation;
* or in the success of any of the parties
* or an interest against the parties
* or when he is so situated as to be adversely affected by a
distribution or disposition of property in the custody of
the court or of an officer thereof.
We have no doubt that petitioner has a legal interest in the shares
which are the subject of the controversy. At the very least, it is "so
situated as to be adversely affected by a distribution or disposition
of the (sequestered shares) in the custody of the court."
Unquestionably, the shares are sequestered and thus are "in the
custody of the court," because by sequestration properties are
placed in the control of a court to preserve them and/or to prevent
their sale, encumbrance or disposition pending the determination of
the legality or illegality of their acquisition and their true ownership.
No such final determination is possible unless the parties who have
legitimate but conflicting claims are made parties or, as in this case,
allowed to intervene in the main action.
The Second Issue: Does Sandiganbayan
Have Jurisdiction over the Subject Matter?
The jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan has been clarified in the case
of PCGG vs. Hon. Emmanuel G. Pea, etc., et al., thus:
". . . Under Section 2 of the President's Executive Order
No. 14 issued on May 7, 1986, all cases of the Commission
regarding "the Funds, Moneys, Assets, and Properties Illegally
Acquired or Misappropriated by Former President Ferdinand
Marcos, Mrs. Imelda Romualdez Marcos, and their Close
Relatives, Subordinates, Business Associates, Dummies, Agents,
or Nominees" whether civil or criminal, are lodged within the
"exclusive and original jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan" and all
incidents arising from, incidental to, or related to, such cases

necessarily fall likewise under the Sandiganbayan's exclusive

and original jurisdiction subject to review on certiorari exclusively
by the Supreme Court."
This ruling was reiterated in six (6) subsequent cases which were
decided jointly and where the Court held:
". . . "all incidents arising from, incidental to, or related to, such
cases," such as the dispute over the sale of the shares, the
propriety of the issuance of ancillary writs or provisional remedies
relative thereto, the sequestration thereof, which may not be
made the subject to separate actions or proceedings in another
forum."
In Republic vs. Sandiganbayan,
o "Intervention is not an independent action, but is ancillary and
supplemental to an existing litigation. Since the respondent
Sandiganbayan has the exclusive and original jurisdiction over
Civil Case No. 0025, it has likewise original and exclusive
jurisdiction over the private respondents' action for intervention
therein."
o "It is therefore indubitable that in view of the extraordinary nature
of sequestration, parties who claim ownership or interest in the
subject matter of sequestration proceedings before the
Sandiganbayan have no other recourse than intervention in the
litigation before the Sandiganbayan, whose decision is subject to
review on certiorari exclusively by this Court, for no other court or
forum has jurisdiction over proceedings for the recovery of illgotten wealth."
Indeed, in the face of such previous rulings, the inescapable
conclusion is that the instant intervention must be allowed
otherwise the Sandiganbayan will not be able to determine the
ultimate owner of the shares under sequestration.
In understanding the extent of the jurisdiction of respondent Court
over cases involving the validity of sales contracts which ordinarily
would be within the powers of ordinary courts to resolve, or which
normally are taken cognizance of by an administrative agency like
the Securities and Exchange Commission tasked to handle intracorporate disputes, it helps to keep in mind the rationale for such
exclusivity of jurisdiction, thus:
"The rationale of the exclusivity of such jurisdiction is readily
understood. Given the magnitude of the past regime's 'organized
pillage' and the ingenuity of the plunderers and pillagers with the
assistance of the experts and best legal minds available in the
market, it is a matter of sheer necessity to restrict access to the
lower courts, which would have tied into knots and made

impossible the Commission's gigantic task of recovering the

plundered wealth of the nation, whom the past regime in the
process had saddled and laid prostrate with a huge $27 billion
foreign debt that has since ballooned to $28.5 billion." (emphasis
supplied)
That allowing the intervention may entail some delay in the
proceedings in Civil Case No. 0035 is of no moment. After all, there
may be even longer delays and, worse, confusion in processes and
rulings, and uncertainty in results, if petitioners were to be
authorized and/or required to file a separate action to litigate the
herein matter.
The Third Issue: Will Mandamus Lie?
The grant of intervention is a discretionary act of the court that
cannot be compelled by mandamus. But since the company
established legal interest in the matter at litigation, the denial of
intervention based on flimsy grounds (that it will unduly delay the
case) amount to grave abuse of discretion. As such, mandamus lies
against the discretionary act of granting or denying the motion to
intervene.
Note: The writ is issued to compel the exercise of discretion but not
the discretion itself. In other words, the court can say decide but it
cannot say decide this way.
In resolving to deny petitioner's motion for intervention, respondent
Court abused its discretion because, clearly, the question of
ownership of the shares under sequestration is within its
jurisdiction, being an incident arising from or in connection with the
case under its exclusive and original jurisdiction.
The respondent Court has jurisdiction to entertain both complaints
and answers in intervention over properties under sequestration by
the PCGG.
With the denial of its intervention, petitioner is deprived of a remedy
in law to recover its property alleged to have been taken illegally
from it.
As provided under Rule 12, Sec. 2 (b), intervention shall be allowed
"in the exercise of discretion" by a court.
Ordinarily, mandamus will not prosper to compel a discretionary
act.
But where there is "gross abuse of discretion, manifest injustice or
palpable excess of authority" equivalent to denial of a settled right
to which petitioner is entitled, and there is no other plain, speedy
and adequate remedy, the writ shall issue.

In Antiquera vs. Baluyot, et al., 21 such exceptions were allowed,

"because the discretion must be exercised under the law, and not
contrary to law."

CSC v. RICHARD CRUZ

G.R. No 187858, Aug 09, 2011
Topic: D. Rights and Privileges; Right to Compensation
FACTS:

The respondent, Storekeeper A of the City of Malolos Water

District (CMWD), was charged with grave misconduct and
dishonesty by CMWD General Manager (GM) Nicasio Reyes.

He allegedly uttered a false, malicious and damaging

statement(Masasamang tao ang mga BOD at General
Manager) against GM Reyes and the rest of the CMWD Board of
Directors (Board);

four of the respondent's subordinates allegedly witnessed the

utterance.

The dishonesty charge, in turn, stemmed from the respondent's act

of claiming overtime pay despite his failure to log in and out in the
computerized daily time record for three working days.

The respondent denied the charges against him. On the charge of

grave misconduct, he stressed that three of the four witnesses
already retracted their statements against him.

On the charge of dishonesty, he asserted that he never failed to log

in and log out. He reasoned that the lack of record was caused by
technical computer problems. The respondent submitted
documents showing that he rendered overtime work on the three
days that the CMWD questioned.

GM Reyes preventively suspended the respondent for 15 days.

Before the expiration of his preventive suspension, however, GM
Reyes, with the approval of the CMWD Board, found the
respondent guilty of grave misconduct and dishonesty, and
dismissed him from the service.

CSC RULING
The respondent elevated the findings of the CMWD and his
dismissal to the CSC, which absolved him of the two charges and
ordered his reinstatement. In CSC Resolution No. 080305, the CSC
found no factual basis to support the charges of grave misconduct
and dishonesty.

The CSC, however, found the respondent liable for violation of

reasonable office rules for his failure to log in and log out. It
imposed on him the penalty of reprimand but did not order the
payment of back salaries.
CA RULING
Applying the ruling in Bangalisan v. Hon. CA, the CA found merit in
the respondent's appeal and awarded him back salaries from the
time he was dismissed up to his actual reinstatement. The CA
reasoned out that CSC Resolution No. 080305 totally exonerated
the respondent from the charges laid against him.

ISSUE/S:

WON The Respondent is entitled to back salaries after the CSC

ordered his reinstatement to his former position, consonant with the
CSC ruling that he was guilty only of violation of reasonable office
rules and regulations.
RULING:
We deny the petition for lack of merit.

The Court's starting point for this outcome is the "no work-no pay"
principle public officials are only entitled to compensation if they
render service.

We have excepted from this general principle and awarded back

salaries even for unworked days to illegally dismissed or unjustly
suspended employees based on the constitutional provision that
"no officer or employee in the civil service shall be removed or
suspended except for cause provided by law";

to deny these employees their back salaries amounts to

unwarranted punishment after they have been exonerated from the
charge that led to their dismissal or suspension.

The present legal basis for an award of back salaries is Section 47,
Book V of the Administrative Code of 1987.
Section 47.Disciplinary Jurisdiction. . . . .
(4)An appeal shall not stop the decision from being executory,
and in case the penalty is suspension or removal, the respondent
shall be considered as having been under preventive
suspension during the pendency of the appeal in the event he
wins an appeal. (italics ours)

This provision, however, on its face, does not support a claim for
back salaries since it does not expressly provide for back salaries
during this period; our established rulings hold that back salaries
may not be awarded for the period of preventive suspension as

the law itself authorizes its imposition so that its legality is beyond
question.

To resolve the seeming conflict, the Court crafted two conditions

before an employee may be entitled to back salaries:
a) the employee must be found innocent of the charges and
b) his suspension must be unjustified.

The reasoning behind these conditions runs this way: although an

employee is considered under preventive suspension during the
pendency of a successful appeal, the law itself only authorizes
preventive suspension for a fixed period; hence, his suspension
beyond this fixed period is unjustified and must be compensated.

The CSC's rigid and mechanical application of these two conditions

may have resulted from a misreading of our rulings on the matter;
hence, a look at our jurisprudence appears in order.
Jurisprudential definition of exoneration

The mere reduction of the penalty on appeal does not entitle a

government employee to back salaries if he was not exonerated of
the charge against him. This is the Court's teaching in City Mayor
of Zamboanga v. CA.

Bangalisan reiterated that the payment of back salaries, during the

period of suspension of a member of the civil service who is
subsequently ordered reinstated, may be decreed only if the
employee is found innocent of the charges which caused the
suspension and when the suspension is unjustified.

the Court distinguished preventive suspension from suspension

pending appeal for the purpose of determining the extent of an
employee's entitlement to back salaries.

The Court ruled that under Executive Order (E.O.) No. 292, there
are two kinds of preventive suspension of civil service employees
who are charged with offenses punishable by removal or
suspension:
o (i) preventive suspension pending investigation and
o (ii) preventive suspension pending appeal;
o compensation is due only for the period of preventive
suspension pending appeal should the employee be
ultimately exonerated.

A careful reading of these cases would reveal that a strict

observance of the second condition for an award of back salaries
becomes important only if the employee is not totally innocent
of any administrative infraction.

where the employee is completely exonerated of the administrative

charge or acquitted in the criminal case arising from the same facts

based on a finding of innocence, the second requirement becomes

subsumed in the first. Otherwise, a determination of the act/s and
offense/s actually committed and of the corresponding penalty
imposed has to be made.
Unjustified suspension

On the suspension/dismissal aspect, this second condition is met

upon a showing that the separation from office is not warranted
under the circumstances because the government employee gave
no cause for suspension or dismissal.

This squarely applies in cases where the government employee did

not commit the offense charged, punishable by suspension or
dismissal (total exoneration); or the government employee is found
guilty of another offense for an act different from that for which he
was charged.
Bangalisan, Jacinto and De la Cruz illustrate
the application of the two conditions

Bangalisan, Jacinto and De la Cruz all stemmed from the illegal

mass actions of public school teachers in Metro Manila in 1990.
The teachers were charged with grave misconduct, gross neglect of
duty, and gross violation of civil service law, rules and regulations,
among others. The then Secretary of Education found them guilty
and dismissed them from the service. The CSC, on appeal, ordered
the teachers reinstated, but withheld the grant of their back
salaries.

Under this factual backdrop, we applied the two conditions and

distinguished between the teachers who were absent from their
respective classes because they participated in the illegal mass
action, on one hand, and the teachers who were absent for some
other reason, on the other hand.

With respect to the teachers who participated in the illegal mass

actions, we ruled that they were not entitled to back salaries since
they were not exonerated. We explained that liability for a lesser
offense, carrying a penalty less than dismissal, is not equivalent to
exoneration. On the second condition, we ruled that their
suspension is not unjustified since they have given a ground for
their suspension i.e., the unjustified abandonment of their
classes to the prejudice of their students, the very factual premise
of the administrative charges against them for which they were
suspended.

With respect to the teachers who were away from their classes but
did not participate in the illegal strike, the Court awarded them back
salaries, considering that: first, they did not commit the act for

which they were dismissed and suspended; and second, they were
found guilty of another offense, i.e., violation of reasonable office
rules and regulations which is not penalized with suspension or
dismissal. The Court ruled that these teachers were totally
exonerated of the charge, and found their dismissal and
suspension likewise unjustified since the offense they were found to
have committed only merited the imposition of the penalty of
reprimand.
These cases show the Court's consistent stand in determining the
propriety of the award of back salaries. The government employees
must not only be found innocent of the charges; their suspension
must likewise be shown to be unjustified.

The Present Case

We find that the CA was correct in awarding the respondent his

back salaries during the period he was suspended from work,
following his dismissal until his reinstatement to his former position.
The records show that the charges of grave misconduct and
dishonesty against him were not substantiated. As the CSC found,
there was no corrupt motive showing malice on the part of the
respondent in making the complained utterance. Likewise, the CSC
found that the charge of dishonesty was well refuted by the
respondent's evidence showing that he rendered overtime work on
the days in question.

We fully respect the factual findings of the CSC especially since the
CA affirmed these factual findings. However, on the legal issue of
the respondent's entitlement to back salaries, we are fully in accord
with the CA's conclusion that the two conditions to justify the award
of back salaries exist in the present case.

The first condition was met since the offense which the
respondent was found guilty of (violation of reasonable rules
and regulations) stemmed from an act (failure to log in and log
out) different from the act of dishonesty (claiming overtime
pay despite his failure to render overtime work) that he was
charged with.

The second condition was met as the respondent's committed

offense merits neither dismissal from the service nor
suspension (for more than one month), but only reprimand.

In sum, the respondent is entitled to back salaries from the time

he was dismissed by the CMWD until his reinstatement to his
former position i.e., for the period of his preventive suspension
pending appeal. For the period of his preventive suspension

pending investigation, the respondent is not entitled to any

back salaries per our ruling in Hon. Gloria.

SOLIVEN VS MAKASIAR
PETITIONER'S CONTENTION
Petitioner Beltran argues that "the reasons which necessitate presidential
immunity from suit impose a correlative disability to file suit".
He contends that if criminal proceedings ensue by virtue of the
President's filing of her complaint-affidavit, she may subsequently have to
be a witness for the prosecution, bringing her under the trial court's
jurisdiction.
This, continues Beltran, would in an indirect way defeat her privilege of
immunity from suit, as by testifying on the witness stand, she would be
exposing herself to possible contempt of court or perjury
ISSUE:
(1) whether or not the President of the Philippines, under the Constitution,
may initiate criminal proceedings against the petitioners through the
filing of a complaint-affidavit.
RULING:
The rationale for the grant to the President of the privilege of immunity
from suit is to assure the exercise of Presidential duties and
functions free from any hindrance or distraction, considering that

being the Chief Executive of the Government is a job that, aside from
requiring all of the office-holder's time, also demands undivided attention.
But this privilege of immunity from suit, pertains to the President by
virtue of the office and may be invoked only by the holder of the
office; not by any other person in the President's behalf.
There is nothing in our laws that would prevent the President from
waiving the privilege.
The choice of whether to exercise the privilege or to waive it is solely the
President's prerogative.
WHEREFORE, finding no grave abuse of discretion amounting to excess or
lack of jurisdiction on the part of the public respondents, the Court Resolved
to DISMISS the petitions in G. R. Nos. 82585, 82827 and 83979. The Order
to maintainstatus quo contained in the Resolution of the Court en banc dated
April 7, 1988 and reiterated in the Resolution dated April 26, 1988 is LIFTED.

FAROLAN VS SOLMAC MARKETING

FACTS
At the time of the commission of the acts complained of by the private
respondent, petitioner Ramon Farolan was then the Acting Commissioner
of Customs while petitioner Guillermo Parayno was then the Acting Chief,
Customs Intelligence and Investigation Division.
They were thus sued in their official capacities as officers in the
government. Nevertheless, they were both held personally liable for the
awarded damages.
Private respondent Solmac Marketing Corporation is a corporation
organized and existing under the laws of the Philippines. It was the
assignee, transferee, and owner of an importation of Clojus Recycling
Plastic Products of 202,204 kilograms of what is technically known as
polypropylene film, valued at US$69,250.05.
Respondent SOLMAC presented a Board of Investment (BOI) authority
for polypropylene film scrap. However, upon examination of the shipment
by the National Institute of Science and Technology (NIST), it turned out
that the Clojus shipment was not OPP film scrap, as declared by the
assignee respondent SOLMAC to the Bureau of Customs and BOI
Governor Lilia R. Bautista, but oriented polypropylene the importation of
which is restricted, if not prohibited, under Letter of Instructions (LOI) No.
658-B.

Considering that the shipment was different from what had been
authorized by the BOI and by law, petitioners Parayno and Farolan
withheld the release of the subject importation.
Petitioner Parayno, then Chief of Customs Intelligence and Investigation
Division, wrote the BOI asking for the latter's advice on whether or not the
subject importation may be released, and the BOI agreed that the subject
imports may be released but that holes may be drilled on them by the
Bureau of Customs prior to their release.
Atty. Dakila Castro, (then) counsel of private respondent wrote to
petitioner Commissioner Farolan of Customs asking for the release of the
importation. The importation was not released, however, on the ground
that holes had to be drilled on them first.
Then, BOI Governor H. Zayco wrote a letter to the Bureau of Customs
stating that the subject goods may be released without drilling of holes
inasmuch as the goods arrived prior to the endorsement on August 17,
1982 to the drilling of holes on all importations of waste/scrap films.
RTC rendered a decision ordering defendants to release the subject
importation immediately without drilling of holes, subject only to the
normal requirements of the customs processing for such release to be
done with utmost dispatch as time is of the essence; and the preliminary
injunction hereto issued is hereby made permanent until actual physical
release of the merchandise and without pronouncement as to costs.
Solmac appealed to the court of appeals only insofar as to the denial of
the award of damages is concerned.
On the other hand, the petitioners did not appeal from this decision
because as far as they were concerned, they had already complied with
their duty. They had already ordered the release of the importation
"without drilling of holes," as in fact it was so released, in compliance with
the advice to effect such immediate release contained in a letter of BOI
dated October 9, 1984, to Commissioner Farolan.
Thus, to stress, even before the RTC rendered its decision on February 5,
1984, the Clojus shipment of OPP was already released 10 to the private
respondent in its capacity as assignee of the same.
Be that as it may, the private respondent filed its appeal demanding that
the petitioners be held, in their personal and private capacities, liable for
damages despite the finding of lack of bad faith on the part of the public
officers.
Court of Appeals modified the appealed judgment by ordering the
defendants Ramon Farolan and Guillermo Parayno solidarily, in their
personal capacity, to pay the plaintiff temperate damages in the sum of
P100,000 exemplary damages in the sum of P100,000 and P50,000 as
attorney's fees and expenses of litigation. Costs against the defendants.
ISSUE

 whether or not the petitioners acted in good faith in not immediately

releasing the questioned importation, or
can they be held liable, in their personal and private capacities, for
damages to the private respondent.
RULING
We rule for the petitioners. We hold that his finding of the trial court is
correct for good faith is always presumed and it is upon him who alleges
the contrary that the burden of proof lies.
We did not see any clear and convincing proof showing the alleged bad
faith of the petitioners. On the contrary, the record is replete with evidence
bolstering the petitioners' claim of good faith.
First, where was the report of the National Institute of Science and
Technology (NIST) dated January 25, 1982 that, contrary to what the
respondent claimed, the subject importation was not OPP film scraps
but oriented polypropylene, a plastic product of stronger material,
whose importation to the Philippines was restricted, if not prohibited,
under LOI-658-B. 17 It was on the strength of this finding that the
petitioners withheld the release of the subject importation for being
contrary to law.
Second, the petitioners testified that, on many occasions, the Bureau
of Customs sought the advice of the BOI on whether the subject
importation might be released.
Third, petitioner Parayno also testified during the trial that up to that
time (of the trial) there was no clear-cut policy on the part of the BOI
regarding the entry into the Philippines of oriented polypropylene
(OPP), as the letters of BOI Governors Tordesillas and Zayco of
November 8, 1983 and September 24, 1982, respectively, ordering
the release of the subject importation did not clarify the BOI policy on
the matter.
From all the foregoing, even the highest officers of the BOI themselves
were not in agreement as to what proper course to take on the subject of
the various importations of Oriented Polypropylene (OPP) and
Polypropylene (PP) withheld by the Bureau of Customs. Confusion over
the disposition of this particular importation obviates bad faith.
Consequently, the petitioners can not be said to have acted in bad faith in
not immediately releasing the import goods without first obtaining the
necessary clarificatory guidelines from the BOI. As public officers, the
petitioners had the duty to see to it that the law they were tasked to
implement, i.e., LOI 658-B, was faithfully complied with.
It is the duty of the Court to see to it that public officers are not hampered
in the performance of their duties or in making decisions for fear of
personal liability for damages due to honest mistake. Whatever damage
they may have caused as a result of mistake. Whatever damage they
may have caused as a result of such an erroneous interpretation, if any at

all, is in the nature of a damnum absque injuria. Mistakes concededly

committed by public officers are not actionable absent any clear showing
that they were motivated by malice or gross negligence amounting to bad
faith. After all, "even under the law of public officers, the acts of the
petitioners are protected by the presumption of good faith.
The presumption that an official duty has been regularly
performed applies in favor of the petitioners. Omnia praesumuntur rite et
solemniter esse acta. (All things are presumed to be correctly and
solemnly done.) It was private respondent's burden to overcome this juris
tantum presumption. We are not persuaded that it has been able to do so.
Tuzon v CA
CONCEPT: DOCTRINE OF OFFICIAL IMMUNITY
FACTS:
The Sangguniang Bayan of Camalaniugan, Cagayan, unanimously
adopted Resolution No. 9, for the construction of Sports and Nutrition
Center, to provide the proper center wherein the government program of
Nutrition and physical development of the people. Thus, the Sangguniang
Bayan have (sic) thought of fund-raising scheme, to help finance the
construction of the project, by soliciting 1% donation from the thresher
operators who will apply for a permit to thresh within the jurisdiction of this
municipality, of all the palay threshed by them to help finance the
continuation of the construction of the Sports and Nutrition Center
Building. The municipal treasurer is hereby authorized to enter into an
agreement to all thresher operators, that will come to apply for a permit to
thresh palay within the jurisdiction of this municipality to donate 1% of all
the palay threshed by them.
Private respondent Saturnino T. Jurado sent his agent to the municipal
treasurer's office to pay the license fee of P285.00 for thresher operators.
Mapagu refused to accept the payment and required him to first secure a
mayor's permit.
Mayor Domingo Tuzon, the herein other petitioner, said that Jurado should
first comply with Resolution No. 9 and sign the agreement before the
permit could be issued.
Jurado ignored the requirement. Instead, he sent the P285.00 license fee
by postal money order to the office of the municipal treasurer who,
however, returned the said amount. The reason given was the failure of
the respondent to comply with Resolution No. 9.
Jurado filed a complaint against the Mapagu and Tuzon
TC: upheld the challenged measure. However, it dismissed the claims for
damages of both parties for lack of evidence.
CA: affirmed the validity of Resolution No. 9 and the implementing
agreement. Nevertheless, it found Tuzon and Mapagu to have acted

maliciously and in bad faith when they denied Jurado's application for the
mayor's permit and license.
PETITIONERS CONTENTION: They were acting in their official capacity
when they enforced the resolution, which was duly adopted by the
Sangguniang Bayan and later declared to be valid by both the trial and the
appellate courts. Thus, they cannot be held personally liable in damages,
more so because their act was not tainted with bad faith or malice.
RESPONDENTS CONTENTION: the signing of the implementing
agreement was not a condition sine qua non to the issuance of a permit
and license. Hence the petitioners' unwarranted refusal to issue the permit
and license despite his offer to pay the required fee constituted bad faith
on their part.

does it appear that the petitioners stood to gain personally from refusing to
issue to Jurado the mayor's permit and license he needed. The petitioners
were not Jurado's business competitors nor has it been established that
they intended to favor his competitors. On the contrary, the record
discloses that the resolution was uniformly applied to all the threshers in
the municipality without discrimination or preference.
The Court is convinced that the petitioners acted within the scope of their
authority and in consonance with their honest interpretation of the
resolution in question. As a rule, a public officer, whether judicial, quasijudicial or executive, is not personally liable to one injured in consequence
of an act performed within the scope of his official authority, and in line of
his official duty.

ISSUE:
WON the petitioners are liable to Jurado for refusing to issue to him a
mayor's permit and license to operate his palay-threshing business.

Taduran v CSC
CONCEPT: PREFERECE IN PROMOTION
FACTS:
In the Regional Health Offices of the Ministry of Health, there are positions
of Supervising Dentist and Senior Dentist, the former being of higher rank.
In 1977, the position of Supervising Dentist in Regional Health Office No.
4, Manila, became vacant. At that time, petitioner TADURAN was the
Supervising Dentist of Regional Health Office (RHO) No. 9, Zamboanga
City, while private respondent GODINEZ was Senior Dentist of Regional
Health Office (RHO) No. 4, Manila.
On February 23, 1977, the Secretary of Health (now Minister of Health)
appointed TADURAN as Supervising Dentist of RHO No. 4. It was a
"transfer from a similar position in Regional Health Office No. 9, without
alteration in salary,"
On March 7, 1977, GODINEZ protested TADURAN's appointment before
the Civil Service Commission on the ground that as Senior Dentist in RHO
No. 4, promotion was hers of right since she was the next-in-rank to
Supervising Dentist.
It is admitted that GODINEZ has an edge over TADURAN in terms of
educational attainment as she has a Certificate in Public Health, which
TADURAN does not possess.
However, the appointing authority considered the fact that TADURAN
outranks GODINEZ in points of experience, rank and salary.
TADURAN had been a:
World Health Organization Fellow;
had conducted Dental Epidemiological Survey in Singapore for 3
months, and
had an extensive supervisory field woork experience compared to
the experience of GODINEZ in field work supervision, which had
started only on October 25, 1976.

RULING:
NO, because petitioners acted in good faith in the discharge of their official
functions.
The private respondent anchors his claim for damages on Article 27 of the
New Civil Code, which reads: Art. 27. Any person suffering material or
moral loss because a public servant or employee refuses or neglects,
without just cause, to perform his official duty may file an action for
damages and other relief against the latter, without prejudice to any
disciplinary administrative action that may be taken.
It has been remarked that one purpose of this article is to end the "bribery
system, where the public official, for some flimsy excuse, delays or
refuses the performance of his duty until he gets some kind of pabagsak."
7 Official inaction may also be due to plain indolence or a cynical
indifference to the responsibilities of public service. According to Phil.
Match Co. Ltd. v. City of Cebu, 8 the provision presupposes that the
refusal or omission of a public official to perform his official duty is
attributable to malice or inexcusable negligence. In any event, the erring
public functionary is justly punishable under this article for whatever loss
or damage the complainant has sustained.
In the present case, it has not even been alleged that the Mayor Tuzon's
refusal to act on the private respondent's application was an attempt to
compel him to resort to bribery to obtain approval of his application. It
cannot be said either that the mayor and the municipal treasurer were
motivated by personal spite or were grossly negligent in refusing to issue
the permit and license to Jurado.
It is no less significant that no evidence has been offered to show that the
petitioners singled out the private respondent for persecution. Neither

 CSC: upheld the Decision of its Merit Systems Board finding no

justification for the appointment of TADURAN, a transferee, despite the
availability of a next-in-rank employee in the same region in the person of
GODINEZ. It declared the appointment by the Secretary (now Minister) of
Health null and void, directed TADURAN's return to his former station, and
recommended the promotion of GODINEZ to the contested position.
ISSUE:
WON, under P.D. No. 807, the promotion of a Senior Dentist to a vacant
position of Supervising Dentist in the same region has priority over the
transfer to the vacant position of one who is already a Supervising Dentist
in another region
RULING:
NO
There is no mandatory nor peremptory requirement in PD 807 that
persons next-in-rank are entitled to preference in appointment. What it
does provide is that they would be among the first to be considered for the
vacancy if qualified, and if the vacancy is not filled by promotion, the same
shall be filled by transfer or other modes of appointment.
The noticeable change introduced by Section 19(6) of P.D. No. 807 lies in
that a qualified next-in-rank employee shall have the right to appeal an
appointment in favor of one who is appointed by transfer and not next-inrank if the employee making the appeal is not satisfied with the written
special reason or reasons given by the appointing authority for such
appointment. In other words, "special reason or reasons" are now required
to be given even in case of an appointment by transfer and not next-inrank. However, the right of appeal granted to the next-in-rank who has not
been promoted, cannot be construed as indicative of a legislative intent to
give priority to promotion over transfer as a means of filling vacant
positions. Such restrictive interpretation would unjustifiably imply that nextin-ranks are more fit and meritorious for appointment than those of higher
rank moved by transfer. It would also impose a rigid formula on the
appointing power contrary to the policy of the law that among those
qualified and eligible, an appointing authority is granted discretion and
prerogative of choice of the one he deems most fit for appointment. 2 The
cardinal requirement is merit and fitness under Article XII, B, Section 2, of
the 1973 Constitution, and the demands of public service.
The decision of the MSB is reversed which was affirmed by CSC.
SC upholds the appointment of Taduran.
Santiago v COA
CONCEPT: RETIREMENT PAY
FACTS:

Santiago was employed in the Commission on Audit as State Auditor IV

with a monthly salary of P7,219.00.
In 1988, he was assigned to the COA Auditing Unit at the Department of
Transportation and Communications and detailed to the Manila
International Airport Authority.
On July 1, 1988, the board of directors of the MIAA passed a resolution
recommending the designation of Santiago as Assistant General Manager
for Finance and Administration, effective 15 August 1988, subject to the
following conditions:
He will retain his plantilla position in COA;
His compensation from MIAA, shall be the difference between the salary
of AGM for Finance and Administration (MIAA) and that of State Auditor IV
(COA); and
His retirement benefits shall be chargeable against COA.
On August 10, 1988, Santiago was designated as Acting Assistant
General Manager for Finance and Administration, effective August 16,
1988.
The petitioner served in this capacity and collected the differential salary
of P5,849.00 plus his salary of P7,219.00 for a total compensation of
P13,068.00. He received this compensation until December 5, 1988, when
he was transferred to the Presidential Management Staff under COA
Office Order No. 8811448 dated December 6, 1988.
On March 1, 1989, the petitioner retired after working in the government
for 44 years.
In computing his retirement benefits, the Government Service Insurance
System used as basis the amount of P13,068.00, considering this the
highest basic salary rate received by the petitioner in the course of his
employment. The COA disagreed, however, and paid his retirement
benefits on the basis of only his monthly salary of P7,219.00 as State
Auditor IV.
The petitioner requested recomputation based on what he claimed as his
highest basic salary rate of P13,068.00. This was denied on December 8,
1989, and he was so notified on February 5, 1990. On March 7, 1990, he
came to this Court to seek reversal of the decision of the COA on the
ground of grave abuse of discretion.
ISSUE:
Does double appointment of the petitioner bars him from receiving
additional compensation?
WON the additional compensation received by Santiago is considered as
honorarium that will not be added to his salary in computing the retirement
benefits

 Can Santiago invoke, Executive Order No. 966, Section 9, even if the was
not appointed to his second position in MIAA but only designated thereto?
Sec. 9. Highest Basic Salary Rate. The compensation of salary or
pay which may be used in computing the retirement benefits shall be
limited to the highest salary rate actually received by an
official/employee as filed by law and/or indicated in his duly approved
appointment. This shall include salary adjustments duly authorized and
implemented by the presidential issuance(s) and budget circular(s),
additional basic compensation or salary indicated in an appointment
duly approved as an exception to the prohibition on additional or double
compensation, merit increases, and compensation for substitutionary
services or in an acting capacity. For this purpose, all other
compensation and or fringe benefits such as per diems, allowances,
bonuses, overtime pay, honoraria hazard pay, flying time fees,
consultancy or contractual fees, or fees in correcting and/or releasing
examination papers shall not be considered in the computation of the
retirement benefits of an official/employee.
RULING:
NO.
In Quimzon v. Ozaeta, 7 this Court held that double appointments are not
prohibited as long as the positions involved are not incompatible, except
that the officer or employee appointed cannot receive additional or double
compensation unless specifically authorized by law. The additional
compensation received by the petitioner is not an issue in the case at bar
because of its express approval by the COA and the admission of the
Solicitor General that it is allowed under the cited provision.
NO.
An honorarium is defined as something given not as a matter of obligation
but in appreciation for services rendered, a voluntary donation in
consideration of services which admit of no compensation in money 8 The
additional compensation given to the petitioner was in the nature of a
salary because it was received by him as a matter of right in recompense
for services rendered by him as Acting Assistant General Manager for
Finance and Administration. In fact, even Chairman Domingo referred to it
in his letter dated July 14, 1988, as the petitioner's "salary differential."
YES.
As the Court said in Binamira v. Garrucho: Appointment may be defined as
the selection, by the authority vested with the power, of an individual who
is to exercise the functions of a given office. When completed, usually with
its confirmation, the appointment results in security of tenure for the
person chosen unless he is replaceable at pleasure because of the nature
of his office. Designation, on the other hand, connotes merely the
imposition by law of additional duties on an incumbent official, as where, in

the case before us, the Secretary of Tourism is designated Chairman of

the Board of Directors of the Philippine Tourism Authority, or where, under
the Constitution, three Justices of the Supreme Court are designated by
the Chief Justice to sit in the Electoral Tribunal of the Senate or the House
of Representatives. It is said that appointment is essentially executive
while designation is legislative in nature. Thus, the term "appointment"
was used in a general sense to include the term "designation." In other
words, no distinction was intended between the two terms in Section 9 of
Executive Order No. 966.
As thus interpreted, Section 9 clearly covers the petitioner, who was
designated Acting Assistant General Manager for Finance and
Administration in the office order issued by Secretary Reyes on August 10,
1988. The position was then vacant and could be filled either by
permanent appointment or by temporary designation. It cannot be said
that the second position was only an extension of the petitioner's office as
State Auditor IV in the Commission on Audit as otherwise there would
have been no need for his designation thereto. The second office was
distinct and separate from his position in the Commission on Audit. For the
additional services he rendered for the MIAA, he was entitled to additional
compensation which, following the letter and spirit of Section 9, should be
included in his highest basic salary rate.
Retirement laws should be interpreted liberally in favor of the retiree
because their intention is to provide for his sustenance, and hopefully
even comfort, when he no longer has the stamina to continue earning his
livelihood. After devoting the best years of his life to the public service, he
deserves the appreciation of a grateful government as best concretely
expressed in a generous retirement gratuity commensurate with the value
and length of his services. That generosity is the least he should expect
now that his work is done and his youth is gone. Even as he feels the
weariness in his bones and glimpses the approach of the lengthening
shadows, he should be able to luxuriate in the thought that he did his task
well, and was rewarded for it.