Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-770

April 27, 1948

ANGEL T. LIMJOCO, petitioner,

vs.
INTESTATE ESTATE OF PEDRO O. FRAGRANTE, deceased, respondent.
Angel Limjoco, Jr. and Delfin L. Gonzales for petitioner.
Bienvenido A. Tan for respondent.
HILADO, J.:
Under date of May 21, 1946, the Public Service Commission, through Deputy Commissioner Fidel
Ibaez, rendered its decision in case No. 4572 of Pedro O. Fragante, as applicant for a certificate of
public convenience to install, maintain and operate an ice plant in San Juan, Rizal, whereby said
commission held that the evidence therein showed that the public interest and convenience will be
promoted in a proper and suitable manner "by authorizing the operation and maintenance of another
ice plant of two and one-half (2-) tons in the municipality of San Juan; that the original applicant
Pedro O. Fragante was a Filipino Citizen at the time of his death; and that his intestate estate is
financially capable of maintaining the proposed service". The commission, therefore, overruled the
opposition filed in the case and ordered "that under the provisions of section 15 of Commonwealth
Act No. 146, as amended a certificate of public convenience be issued to the Intestate Estate of the
deceased Pedro Fragante, authorizing said Intestate Estate through its Special or Judicial
Administrator, appointed by the proper court of competent jurisdiction, to maintain and operate an ice
plant with a daily productive capacity of two and one-half (2-1/2) tons in the Municipality of San Juan
and to sell the ice produced from said plant in the said Municipality of San Juan and in the
Municipality of Mandaluyong, Rizal, and in Quezon City", subject to the conditions therein set forth in
detail (petitioner's brief, pp. 33-34).
Petitioner makes four assignments of error in his brief as follows:
1. The decision of the Public Service Commission is not in accordance with law.
2. The decision of the Public Service Commission is not reasonably supported by evidence.
3. The Public Service Commission erred in not giving petitioner and the Ice and Cold Storage
Industries of the Philippines, Inc., as existing operators, a reasonable opportunity to meet the
increased demand.
4. The decision of the Public Service Commission is an unwarranted departure from its
announced policy with respect to the establishment and operation of ice plant. (Pp. 1-2,
petitioner's brief.)
In his argument petitioner contends that it was error on the part of the commission to allow the
substitution of the legal representative of the estate of Pedro O. Fragante for the latter as party

applicant in the case then pending before the commission, and in subsequently granting to said
estate the certificate applied for, which is said to be in contravention of law.
If Pedro O. Fragante had not died, there can be no question that he would have had the right to
prosecute his application before the commission to its final conclusion. No one would have denied
him that right. As declared by the commission in its decision, he had invested in the ice plant in
question P 35,000, and from what the commission said regarding his other properties and business,
he would certainly have been financially able to maintain and operate said plant had he not died. His
transportation business alone was netting him about P1,440 a month. He was a Filipino citizen and
continued to be such till his demise. The commission declared in its decision, in view of the evidence
before it, that his estate was financially able to maintain and operate the ice plant. The aforesaid
right of Pedro O. Fragante to prosecute said application to its conclusion was one which by its nature
did not lapse through his death. Hence, it constitutes a part of the assets of his estate, for which a
right was property despite the possibility that in the end the commission might have denied
application, although under the facts of the case, the commission granted the application in view of
the financial ability of the estate to maintain and operate the ice plant. Petitioner, in his memorandum
of March 19, 1947, admits (page 3) that the certificate of public convenience once granted "as a rule,
should descend to his estate as an asset". Such certificate would certainly be property, and the right
to acquire such a certificate, by complying with the requisites of the law, belonged to the decedent in
his lifetime, and survived to his estate and judicial administrator after his death.
If Pedro O. Fragrante had in his lifetime secured an option to buy a piece of land and during the life
of the option he died, if the option had been given him in the ordinary course of business and not out
of special consideration for his person, there would be no doubt that said option and the right to
exercise it would have survived to his estate and legal representatives. In such a case there would
also be the possibility of failure to acquire the property should he or his estate or legal representative
fail to comply with the conditions of the option. In the case at bar Pedro O. Fragrante's undoubted
right to apply for and acquire the desired certificate of public convenience the evidence
established that the public needed the ice plant was under the law conditioned only upon the
requisite citizenship and economic ability to maintain and operate the service. Of course, such right
to acquire or obtain such certificate of public convenience was subject to failure to secure its
objective through nonfulfillment of the legal conditions, but the situation here is no different from the
legal standpoint from that of the option in the illustration just given.
Rule 88, section 2, provides that the executor or administrator may bring or defend actions, among
other cases, for the protection of the property or rights of the deceased which survive, and it says
that such actions may be brought or defended "in the right of the deceased".
Rule 82, section 1, paragraph (a), mentions among the duties of the executor or administrator, the
making of an inventory of all goods, chattels, rights, credits, and estate of the deceased which shall
come to his possession or knowledge, or to the possession of any other person for him.
In his commentaries on the Rules of Court (Volume II, 2nd ed., pages 366, 367) the present chief
Justice of this Court draws the following conclusion from the decisions cited by him:
Therefore, unless otherwise expressly provided by law, any action affecting the property
or rights(emphasis supplied) of a deceased person which may be brought by or against him
if he were alive, may likewise be instituted and prosecuted by or against the administrator,
unless the action is for recovery of money, debt or interest thereon, or unless, by its very
nature, it cannot survive, because death extinguishes the right . . . .

It is true that a proceeding upon the application for a certificate of public convenience before the
Public Service Commission is not an "action". But the foregoing provisions and citations go to prove
that the decedent's rights which by their nature are not extinguished by death go to make up a part
and parcel of the assets of his estate which, being placed under the control and management of the
executor or administrator, can not be exercised but by him in representation of the estate for the
benefit of the creditors, devisees or legatees, if any, and the heirs of the decedent. And if the right
involved happens to consist in the prosecution of an unfinished proceeding upon an application for a
certificate of public convenience of the deceased before the Public Service Commission, it is but
logical that the legal representative be empowered and entitled in behalf of the estate to make the
right effective in that proceeding.
Manresa (Vol. III, 6th ed., p. 11) says that No. 10 of article 334 and article 336 of the Civil Code,
respectively, consider as immovable and movable things rights which are not material. The same
eminent commentator says in the cited volume (p. 45) that article 336 of the Civil Code has been
deficiently drafted in that it is not sufficiently expressive of all incorporeal rights which are
also property for juridical purposes.
Corpus Juris (Vol. 50, p. 737) states that in the broad sense of the term, property includes, among
other things, "an option", and "the certificate of the railroad commission permitting the operation of a
bus line", and on page 748 of the same volume we read:
However, these terms (real property, as estate or interest) have also been declared to
include every species of title, inchoate or complete, and embrace rights which lie in contract,
whether executory or executed. (Emphasis supplied.)
Another important question raised by petitioner is whether the estate of Pedro O. Fragrante is a
"person" within the meaning of the Public Service Act.
Words and Phrases, First Series, (Vol. 6, p, 5325), states the following doctrine in the jurisdiction of
the State of Indiana:
As the estate of the decedent is in law regarded as a person, a forgery committed after the
death of the man whose name purports to be signed to the instrument may be prosecuted as
with the intent to defraud the estate. Billings vs. State, 107 Ind., 54, 55, 6 N. E. 914, 7 N. E.
763, 57 Am. Rep. 77.
The Supreme Court of Indiana in the decision cited above had before it a case of forgery committed
after the death of one Morgan for the purpose of defrauding his estate. The objection was urged that
the information did not aver that the forgery was committed with the intent to defraud any person.
The Court, per Elliott, J., disposed of this objection as follows:
. . . The reason advanced in support of this proposition is that the law does not regard the
estate of a decedent as a person. This intention (contention) cannot prevail. The estate of
the decedent is a person in legal contemplation. "The word "person" says Mr. Abbot, "in its
legal signification, is a generic term, and includes artificial as well as natural persons," 2 Abb.
Dict. 271; Douglas vs. Pacific, etc. Co., 4 Cal. 304; Planters', etc., Bank vs. Andrews, 8 Port.
(Ala.) 404. It said in another work that 'persons are of two kinds: natural and artificial. A
natural person is a human being. Artificial persons include (1) a collection or succession of
natural persons forming a corporation; (2) a collection of property to which the law attributes
the capacity of having rights and duties. The latter class of artificial persons is recognized
only to a limited extent in our law. "Examples are the estate of a bankrupt or deceased
person." 2 Rapalje & L. Law Dict. 954. Our own cases inferentially recognize the correctness

of the definition given by the authors from whom we have quoted, for they declare that it is
sufficient, in pleading a claim against a decedent's estate, to designate the defendant as the
estate of the deceased person, naming him. Ginn vs. Collins, 43 Ind. 271. Unless we accept
this definition as correct, there would be a failure of justice in cases where, as here, the
forgery is committed after the death of a person whose name is forged; and this is a result to
be avoided if it can be done consistent with principle. We perceive no difficulty in avoiding
such a result; for, to our minds, it seems reasonable that the estate of a decedent should be
regarded as an artificial person. It is the creation of law for the purpose of enabling a
disposition of the assets to be properly made, and, although natural persons as heirs,
devises, or creditors, have an interest in the property, the artificial creature is a distinct legal
entity. The interest which natural persons have in it is not complete until there has been a
due administration; and one who forges the name of the decedent to an instrument
purporting to be a promissory note must be regarded as having intended to defraud the
estate of the decedent, and not the natural persons having diverse interests in it, since ha
cannot be presumed to have known who those persons were, or what was the nature of their
respective interest. The fraudulent intent is against the artificial person, the estate and
not the natural persons who have direct or contingent interest in it. (107 Ind. 54, 55, 6 N.E.
914-915.)
In the instant case there would also be a failure of justice unless the estate of Pedro O. Fragrante is
considered a "person", for quashing of the proceedings for no other reason than his death would
entail prejudicial results to his investment amounting to P35,000.00 as found by the commission, not
counting the expenses and disbursements which the proceeding can be presumed to have
occasioned him during his lifetime, let alone those defrayed by the estate thereafter. In this
jurisdiction there are ample precedents to show that the estate of a deceased person is also
considered as having legal personality independent of their heirs. Among the most recent cases may
be mentioned that of "Estate of Mota vs. Concepcion, 56 Phil., 712, 717, wherein the principal
plaintiff was the estate of the deceased Lazaro Mota, and this Court gave judgment in favor of said
estate along with the other plaintiffs in these words:
. . . the judgment appealed from must be affirmed so far as it holds that defendants
Concepcion and Whitaker are indebted to he plaintiffs in the amount of P245,804.69 . . . .
Under the regime of the Civil Code and before the enactment of the Code of Civil Procedure, the
heirs of a deceased person were considered in contemplation of law as the continuation of his
personality by virtue of the provision of article 661 of the first Code that the heirs succeed to all the
rights and obligations of the decedent by the mere fact of his death. It was so held by this Court
in Barrios vs. Dolor, 2 Phil., 44, 46. However, after the enactment of the Code of Civil Procedure,
article 661 of the Civil Code was abrogated, as held in Suiliong & Co. vs. Chio-Taysan, 12 Phil., 13,
22. In that case, as well as in many others decided by this Court after the innovations introduced by
the Code of Civil Procedure in the matter of estates of deceased persons, it has been the constant
doctrine that it is the estate or the mass of property, rights and assets left by the decedent, instead of
the heirs directly, that becomes vested and charged with his rights and obligations which survive
after his demise.
The heirs were formerly considered as the continuation of the decedent's personality simply by legal
fiction, for they might not have been flesh and blood the reason was one in the nature of a legal
exigency derived from the principle that the heirs succeeded to the rights and obligations of the
decedent. Under the present legal system, such rights and obligations as survive after death have to
be exercised and fulfilled only by the estate of the deceased. And if the same legal fiction were not
indulged, there would be no juridical basis for the estate, represented by the executor or
administrator, to exercise those rights and to fulfill those obligations of the deceased. The reason

and purpose for indulging the fiction is identical and the same in both cases. This is why according to
the Supreme Court of Indiana in Billings vs. State, supra, citing 2 Rapalje & L. Dictionary, 954,
among the artificial persons recognized by law figures "a collection of property to which the law
attributes the capacity of having rights and duties", as for instance, the estate of a bankrupt or
deceased person.
Petitioner raises the decisive question of whether or not the estate of Pedro O. Fragrante can be
considered a "citizen of the Philippines" within the meaning of section 16 of the Public Service Act,
as amended, particularly the proviso thereof expressly and categorically limiting the power of the
commission to issue certificates of public convenience or certificates of public convenience and
necessity "only to citizens of the Philippines or of the United States or to corporations,
copartnerships, associations, or joint-stock companies constituted and organized under the laws of
the Philippines", and the further proviso that sixty per centum of the stock or paid-up capital of such
entities must belong entirely to citizens of the Philippines or of the United States.
Within the Philosophy of the present legal system, the underlying reason for the legal fiction by
which, for certain purposes, the estate of the deceased person is considered a "person" is the
avoidance of injustice or prejudice resulting from the impossibility of exercising such legal rights and
fulfilling such legal obligations of the decedent as survived after his death unless the fiction is
indulged. Substantially the same reason is assigned to support the same rule in the jurisdiction of
the State of Indiana, as announced in Billings vs. State, supra, when the Supreme Court of said
State said:
. . . It seems reasonable that the estate of a decedent should be regarded as an artificial
person. it is the creation of law for the purpose of enabling a disposition of the assets to be
properly made . . . .
Within the framework and principles of the constitution itself, to cite just one example, under the bill
of rights it seems clear that while the civil rights guaranteed therein in the majority of cases relate to
natural persons, the term "person" used in section 1 (1) and (2) must be deemed to include artificial
or juridical persons, for otherwise these latter would be without the constitutional guarantee against
being deprived of property without due process of law, or the immunity from unreasonable searches
and seizures. We take it that it was the intendment of the framers to include artificial or juridical, no
less than natural, persons in these constitutional immunities and in others of similar nature. Among
these artificial or juridical persons figure estates of deceased persons. Hence, we hold that within the
framework of the Constitution, the estate of Pedro O. Fragrante should be considered an artificial or
juridical person for the purposes of the settlement and distribution of his estate which, of course,
include the exercise during the judicial administration thereof of those rights and the fulfillment of
those obligations of his which survived after his death. One of those rights was the one involved in
his pending application before the Public Service Commission in the instant case, consisting in the
prosecution of said application to its final conclusion. As stated above, an injustice would ensue from
the opposite course.
How about the point of citizenship? If by legal fiction his personality is considered extended so that
any debts or obligations left by, and surviving, him may be paid, and any surviving rights may be
exercised for the benefit of his creditors and heirs, respectively, we find no sound and cogent reason
for denying the application of the same fiction to his citizenship, and for not considering it as likewise
extended for the purposes of the aforesaid unfinished proceeding before the Public Service
Commission. The outcome of said proceeding, if successful, would in the end inure to the benefit of
the same creditors and the heirs. Even in that event petitioner could not allege any prejudice in the
legal sense, any more than he could have done if Fragrante had lived longer and obtained the
desired certificate. The fiction of such extension of his citizenship is grounded upon the same

principle, and motivated by the same reason, as the fiction of the extension of personality. The fiction
is made necessary to avoid the injustice of subjecting his estate, creditors and heirs, solely by
reason of his death to the loss of the investment amounting to P35,000, which he has already made
in the ice plant, not counting the other expenses occasioned by the instant proceeding, from the
Public Service Commission of this Court.
We can perceive no valid reason for holding that within the intent of the constitution (Article IV), its
provisions on Philippine citizenship exclude the legal principle of extension above adverted to. If for
reasons already stated our law indulges the fiction of extension of personality, if for such reasons the
estate of Pedro O. Fragrante should be considered an artificial or juridical person herein, we can find
no justification for refusing to declare a like fiction as to the extension of his citizenship for the
purposes of this proceeding.
Pedro O. Fragrante was a Filipino citizen, and as such, if he had lived, in view of the evidence of
record, he would have obtained from the commission the certificate for which he was applying. The
situation has suffered but one change, and that is, his death. His estate was that of a Filipino citizen.
And its economic ability to appropriately and adequately operate and maintain the service of an ice
plant was the same that it received from the decedent himself. In the absence of a contrary showing,
which does not exist here, his heirs may be assumed to be also Filipino citizens; and if they are not,
there is the simple expedient of revoking the certificate or enjoining them from inheriting it.
Upon the whole, we are of the opinion that for the purposes of the prosecution of said case No. 4572
of the Public Service Commission to its final conclusion, both the personality and citizenship of
Pedro O. Fragrante must be deemed extended, within the meaning and intent of the Public Service
Act, as amended, in harmony with the constitution: it is so adjudged and decreed.
Decision affirmed, without costs. So ordered.
Moran, C.J., Pablo, Bengzon, Briones, Padilla and Tuason, JJ., concur.
Paras, J., I hereby certify that Mr. Justice Feria voted with the majority.

Separate Opinions
PERFECTO, J., dissenting:
Commonwealth Act No. 146 reserves to Filipino citizens the right to obtain a certificate of public
convenience to operate an ice plant in San Juan, Rizal. The limitation is in accordance with section 8
of Article XIV of the Constitution which provides
No franchise, certificate, or any other form of authorization for the operation of a public utility
shall be granted except to citizens of the Philippines or to corporations or other entities
organized under the laws of the Philippines, sixty per centum of the capital of which is owned
by citizens of the Philippines, nor such franchise, certificate or authorization be exclusive in
character or for a longer period than fifty years. No franchise granted to any individual, firm
or corporation, except under the condition that it shall be subject to amendment, alteration,
or repeal by Congress when the public interest so requires.

The main question in this case is whether the estate of Pedro O. Fragrante fulfills the citizenship
requirement. To our mind, the question can be restated by asking whether the heirs of Pedro O.
Fragrante fulfill the citizenship requirement of the law.
The estate is an abstract entity. As such, its legal value depends on what it represents. It is a device
by which the law gives a kind of personality and unity to undetermined tangible persons, the heirs.
They inherit and replace the deceased at the very moment of his death. As there are procedural
requisites for their identification and determination that need time for their compliance, a legal fiction
has been devised to represent them. That legal fiction is the estate, a liquid condition in process of
solidification.
The estate, therefore, has only a representative value. What the law calls estate is, a matter of fact,
intended to designate the heirs of the deceased. The question, therefore, in this case, boils down to
the citizenship of the heirs of Fragrante.
There is nothing in the record to show conclusively the citizenship of the heirs of Fragrante. If they
are Filipino citizens, the action taken by the Public Service Commission should be affirmed. If they
are not, it should be reversed.
Petitioner alleges that the estate is just a front or dummy for aliens to go around the citizenship
constitutional provision. It is alleged that Gaw Suy, the special administrator of the estate, is an alien.
We are of the opinion that the citizenship of the heirs of Fragrante should be determined by the
Commission upon evidence that the party should be present. It should also determine the dummy
question raised by the petitioner.
We are of opinion and so vote that the decision of the Public Service Commission of May 21, 1946,
be set aside and that the Commission be instructed to receive evidence of the above factual
questions and render a new decision accordingly.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No. L-27956 April 30, 1976
DIONISIO DUMLAO, in his own behalf and in his capacity as Administrator of the Testate
Estate of the late Pedro Oria; FAUSTA DUMLAO, AMADO DUMLAO, and BENJAMIN
DUMLAO, plaintiffs-appellants,
vs.
QUALITY PLASTIC PRODUCTS, INC., defendant-appellee.
Castillo & Castillo for appellants.
Eugenio T. Estavillo for appellee.

AQUINO, J.:p
On February 28, 1962 the Court of First Instance of Pangasinan in Civil Case No.
T-662 rendered a judgment ordering defendants Vicente Soliven, Pedro Oria, Santiago Laurencio,
Marcelino Sumalbag and Juana Darang to pay solidarity Quality Plastic Products, Inc. the sum of
P3,667.03 plus the legal rate of interest from November, 1958. The lower court directed that in case
the defendants failed to pay the said amount before its decision became final, then Quality Plastic
Products, Inc. "is hereby authorized to foreclose the bond, Exhibit A, in accordance with law, for the
satisfaction of the judgment". (Under that bond the four sureties bound themselves to answer
solidarity for the obligations of the principal, Vicente Soliven and certain real properties of the
sureties were "given as security for" their undertaking).
Upon defendants' failure to pay the amount of the judgment and after the decision had become final,
the lower court, on motion of Quality Plastic Products, Inc., ordered the "foreclosure" of the surety
bond and the sale at public auction of the land of Pedro Oria which he had given as security under
the bond. Oria's land, which was covered by Original Certificate of Title No. 28732 and has an area
of nine and six-tenths hectares, was levied upon and sold by the sheriff at public auction on
September 24, 1962. The sale was confirmed by the lower court in its order of November 20, 1962.
It turned out that Oria died on April 23, 1959 or long before June 13, 1960 when the action was filed.
Oria's death was not known to Quality Plastic Products, Inc. Nor were the representatives of Quality
Plastic Products, Inc. aware that in the same Tayug court Special Proceeding No. T-212, Testate
Estate of the deceased Pedro Oria, was pending.
The summons and copies of the complaint for the five defendants in Civil Case No.
T-662 had been personally served on June 24, 1960 by a deputy sheriff on Soliven, the principal in
the bond, who acknowledged such service by signing on the back of the original summons in his
own behalf and again signing for his co-defendants.

On March 1, 1963 Dionisio, Fausta, Amado and Benjamin, all surnamed Dumlao and all
testamentary heirs in Oria's duly probated will, sued Quality Plastic Products, Inc., also in the Tayug
court for the annulment of the judgment against Oria and the execution against his land. (Dionisio
Dumlao also sued in his capacity as administrator of Oria's testate estate).
The ground for annulment was lack of jurisdiction over the person of the deceased Oria (Civil Case
No. T- 873). It was only when Quality Plastic Products, Inc. received the summons in Civil Case No.
T-873 that it learned that Oria was already dead at the time the prior case, Civil Case No. T-662, was
filed.
Quality Plastic Products, Inc. in its answer alleged that Oria's heirs were aware of the suit against
Soliven and his sureties and that the said heirs were estopped to question the court's jurisdiction
over Oria.
After hearing the lower court held that it acquired jurisdiction over Soliven and the other defendants
in Civil Case No. T-662 by reason of their voluntary appearance. It reasoned out that Soliven acted
in bad faith because he did not apprise the court that Oria was dead. It specifically ruled that "it had
acquired jurisdiction over the person" of Oria and that the judgment was valid as to him. From that
decision the plaintiffs appealed.
The four assignments of error of appellants Dumlao may be boiled down to the issue as to the
validity of the lower court's judgment against the deceased Pedro Oria who, being already in the
other world, was never served with summons.
There is no difficulty in resolving that issue. Since no jurisdiction was acquired over Oria, the
judgment against him is a patent nullity (Ang Lam vs. Rosillosa and Santiago, 86 Phil. 447; Asuncion
vs. Nieto, 4 Phil. 97; Gorostiaga vs. Sarte, 68 Phil. 4).
As far as Oria was concerned, the lower court's judgment against him in Civil Case No. T-662 is void
for lack of jurisdiction over his person. He was not, and he could not have been, validly served with
summons. He had no more civil personality. His juridical capacity, which is the fitness to be the
subject of legal relations, was lost through death. (Arts. 37 and 42, Civil Code).
The lower court erred in ruling that since Soliven's counsel also appeared as counsel for Oria, there
was a voluntary appearance which enabled the court to acquire jurisdiction over Oria, as
contemplated in section 23, Rule 14 of the Revised Rules of Court. Soliven's counsel could not have
validly appeared for a dead co-defendant. Estoppel has no application to this case.
But from the fact that appellants Dumlao had to sue Quality Plastic Products, Inc. in order to annul
the judgment against Oria, it does not follow that they are entitled to claim attorney's fees against
that corporation. The parties herein agreed in their stipulation of facts that Quality Plastic Products,
Inc. was unaware of Oria's death. Appellants Dumlao in effect conceded that the appellee acted in
good faith in joining Oria as a co-defendant.
WHEREFORE, the lower court's decision is reversed and set aside. Its judgment in Civil Case No. T662 against Pedro Oria is declared void for lack of jurisdiction. The execution sale of Oria's land
covered by OCT No. 28732 is also void. No costs.
SO ORDERED.

Fernando, Barredo, Antonio and Concepcion, Jr., JJ., concur.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC

G.R. No. 85140 May 17, 1990

TOMAS EUGENIO, SR., petitioner,
vs.
HON. ALEJANDRO M. VELEZ, Presiding Judge, Regional Trial Court, Branch 20, Cagayan de
Oro City, DEPUTY SHERIFF JOHNSON TAN, JR., Deputy Sheriff of Branch 20, Regional Trial
Court, Cagayan de Oro City, and the Private Respondents, the petitioners in Sp. Proc. No. 8855, for "Habeas Corpus", namely: CRISANTA VARGAS-SANCHEZ, SANTOS and NARCISA
VARGAS-BENTULAN, respondents.
G.R. No. 86470 May 17, 1990.
TOMAS EUGENIO, petitioner-appellant,
vs.
HON. ALEJANDRO M. VELEZ, Presiding Judge, Regional Trial Court, Branch 20, Cagayan de
Oro City, CRISANTA VARGAS-SANCHEZ, FELIX VARGAS, ERNESTO VARGAS, NATIVIDAD
VARGAS-CAGAPE, NENITA VARGAS-CADENAS, LUDIVINA VARGAS-DE LOS SANTOS and
NARCISA VARGAS-BENTULAN, respondents-appellees.
Maximo G. Rodriguez for petitioner.
Erasmo B. Damasing and Oliver Asis Improso for respondents.

PADILLA, J.:
On 5 October 1988, petitioner came to this Court with a petition for certiorari and prohibition with
application for restraining order and/or injunction (docketed as G.R. No. 85140) seeking to enjoin
respondent Judge from proceeding with the Habeas Corpus case (Sp. Proc. No. 88- 55, RTC,
Branch 20, Cagayan de Oro City), * the respondent Sheriff from enforcing and implementing the writ
and orders of the respondent Judge dated 28, 29, and 30 September 1988, and to declare said writ
and orders as null and void. In a resolution issued on 11 October 1988, this Court required comment
from the respondents on the petition but denied the application for a temporary restraining order.
The records disclose the following:

Unaware of the death on 28 August 1988 of (Vitaliana Vargas Vitaliana for brevity), her full blood
brothers and sisters, herein private respondents (Vargases', for brevity) filed on 27 September 1988,
a petition for habeas corpus before the RTC of Misamis Oriental (Branch 20, Cagayan de Oro City)
alleging that Vitaliana was forcibly taken from her residence sometime in 1987 and confined by
herein petitioner in his palacial residence in Jasaan, Misamis Oriental. Despite her desire to escape,
Vitaliana was allegedly deprived of her liberty without any legal authority. At the time the petition was
filed, it was alleged that Vitaliana was 25 years of age, single, and living with petitioner Tomas
Eugenio.
The respondent court in an order dated 28 September 1988 issued the writ of habeas corpus, but
the writ was returned unsatisfied. Petitioner refused to surrender the body of Vitaliana (who had died
on 28 August 1988) to the respondent sheriff, reasoning that a corpse cannot be the subject
of habeas corpus proceedings; besides, according to petitioner, he had already obtained a burial
permit from the Undersecretary of the Department of Health, authorizing the burial at the palace
quadrangle of the Philippine Benevolent Christian Missionary, Inc. (PBCM), a registered religious
sect, of which he (petitioner) is the Supreme President and Founder.
Petitioner also alleged that Vitaliana died of heart failure due to toxemia of pregnancy in his
residence on 28 August 1988. As her common law husband, petitioner claimed legal custody of her
body. These reasons were incorporated in an explanation filed before the respondent court. Two (2)
orders dated 29 and 30 September 1988 were then issued by respondent court, directing delivery of
the deceased's body to a funeral parlor in Cagayan de Oro City and its autopsy.
Petitioner (as respondent in the habeas corpus proceedings) filed an urgent motion to dismiss the
petition therein, claiming lack of jurisdiction of the court over the nature of the action under sec. 1(b)
of Rule 16 in relation to sec. 2, Rule 72 of the Rules of Court. 1 A special proceeding for habeas
corpus, petitioner argued, is not applicable to a dead person but extends only to all cases of illegal
confinement or detention of a live person.
Before resolving the motion to dismiss, private respondents (as petitioners below) were granted
leave to amend their petition. 2 Claiming to have knowledge of the death of Vitaliana only on 28
September 1988 (or after the filing of thehabeas corpus petition), private respondents (Vargases') alleged
that petitioner Tomas Eugenia who is not in any way related to Vitaliana was wrongfully interfering with
their (Vargases') duty to bury her. Invoking Arts. 305 and 308 of the Civil Code, 3the Vargases contended
that, as the next of kin in the Philippines, they are the legal custodians of the dead body of their sister
Vitaliana. An exchange of pleadings followed. The motion to dismiss was finally submitted for resolution
on 21 October 1988.
In the absence of a restraining order from this Court, proceedings continued before the respondent
court; the body was placed in a coffin, transferred to the Greenhills Memorial Homes in Cagayan de
Oro City, viewed by the presiding Judge of respondent court, and examined by a duly authorized
government pathologist. 4
Denying the motion to dismiss filed by petitioner, the court a quo held in an order, 5 dated 17
November 1988, that:
It should be noted from the original petition, to the first amended petition, up to the
second amended petition that the ultimate facts show that if the person of Vitaliana
Vargas turns out to be dead then this Court is being prayed to declare the petitioners

as the persons entitled to the custody, interment and/or burial of the body of said
deceased. The Court, considering the circumstance that Vitaliana Vargas was
already dead on August 28, 1988 but only revealed to the Court on September 29,
1988 by respondent's counsel, did not lose jurisdiction over the nature and subject
matter of this case because it may entertain this case thru the allegations in the body
of the petition on the determination as to who is entitled to the custody of the dead
body of the late Vitaliana Vargas as well as the burial or interment thereof, for the
reason that under the provisions of Sec. 19 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 129, which
reads as follows:
Sec. 19. Jurisdiction in civil cases. Regional Trial Courts shall exercise exclusive
original jurisdiction:
(1) In all civil actions in which the subject of the litigation is incapable
of pecuniary estimation;
xxx xxx xxx
(5) In all actions involving the contract of marriage and marital
relations;
(6) In all cases not within the exclusive jurisdiction of any court,
tribunal, person or body exercising judicial or quasi-judicial functions:
xxx xxx xxx
it so provides that the Regional Trial Court has exclusive original jurisdiction to try
this case. The authority to try the issue of custody and burial of a dead person is
within the lawful jurisdiction of this Court because of Batas Pambansa Blg. 129 and
because of the allegations of the pleadings in this case, which are enumerated in
Sec. 19, pars. 1, 5 and 6 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 129.
Thereafter, the court a quo proceeded as in or civil cases and, in due course, rendered a decision on
17 January 1989, 6 resolving the main issue of whether or not said court acquired jurisdiction over the
case by treating it as an action for custody of a dead body, without the petitioners having to file a separate
civil action for such relief, and without the Court first dismissing the original petition for habeas corpus.
Citing Sections 19 and 20 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 129 (the Judiciary Reorganization Act of
1981), 7 Sections 5 and 6 of Rule 135 of the Rules of Court 8 Articles 305 and 308 in relation to Article 294
of the Civil Code and Section 1104 of the Revised Administrative Code, 9 the decision stated:
. . . . By a mere reading of the petition the court observed that the allegations in the
original petition as well as in the two amended petitions show that Vitaliana Vargas
has been restrained of her liberty and if she were dead then relief was prayed for the
custody and burial of said dead person. The amendments to the petition were but
elaborations but the ultimate facts remained the same, hence, this court strongly
finds that this court has ample jurisdiction to entertain and sit on this case as an
action for custody and burial of the dead body because the body of the petition
controls and is binding and since this case was raffled to this court to the exclusion of

all other courts, it is the primary duty of this court to decide and dispose of this case. .
. . . 10
Satisfied with its jurisdiction, the respondent court then proceeded to the matter of rightful custody
over the dead body, (for purposes of burial thereof). The order of preference to give support under
Art. 294 was used as the basis of the award. Since there was no surviving spouse, ascendants or
descendants, the brothers and sisters were preferred over petitioner who was merely a common law
spouse, the latter being himself legally married to another woman. 11
On 23 January 1989, a new petition for review with application for a temporary restraining order
and/or preliminary injunction was filed with this Court (G.R. No. 86470). Raised therein were pure
questions of law, basically Identical to those raised in the earlier petition (G.R. No. 85140); hence,
the consolidation of both cases.12 On 7 February 1989, petitioner filed an urgent motion for the issuance
of an injunction to maintain status quo pending appeal, which this Court denied in a resolution dated 23
February 1989 stating that "Tomas Eugenio has so far failed to sufficiently establish a clear legal right to
the custody of the dead body of Vitaliana Vargas, which now needs a decent burial." The petitions were
then submitted for decision without further pleadings.
Between the two (2) consolidated petitions, the following issues are raised:
1. propriety of a habeas corpus proceeding under Rule 102 of the Rules of Court to
recover custody of the dead body of a 25 year old female, single, whose nearest
surviving claimants are full blood brothers and sisters and a common law husband.
2. jurisdiction of the RTC over such proceedings and/or its authority to treat the
action as one for custody/possession/authority to bury the deceased/recovery of the
dead.
3. interpretation of par. 1, Art. 294 of the Civil Code (Art. 199 of the
new Family Code) which states:
Art. 294. The claim for support, when proper and two or more
persons are obliged to give it, shall be made in the following order:
(1) From the spouse;
xxx xxx xxx
Section 19, Batas Pambansa Blg. 129 provides for the exclusive original jurisdiction of the Regional
Trial Courts over civil cases. Under Sec. 2, Rule 102 of the Rules of Court, the writ of habeas
corpus may be granted by a Court of First Instance (now Regional Trial Court). It is an elementary
rule of procedure that what controls is not the caption of the complaint or petition; but the allegations
therein determine the nature of the action, and even without the prayer for a specific remedy, proper
relief may nevertheless be granted by the court if the facts alleged in the complaint and the evidence
introduced so warrant. 13
When the petition for habeas corpus was filed before the court a quo, it was not certain whether
Vitaliana was dead or alive. While habeas corpus is a writ of right, it will not issue as a matter of
course or as a mere perfimetory operation on the filing of the petition. Judicial discretion is exercised

in its issuance, and such facts must be made to appear to the judge to whom the petition is
presented as, in his judgment, prima facie entitle the petitioner to the writ. 14 While the court may
refuse to grant the writ if the petition is insufficient in form and substance, the writ should issue if the
petition complies with the legal requirements and its averments make a prima facie case for relief.
However, a judge who is asked to issue a writ of habeas corpus need not be very critical in looking into
the petition for very clear grounds for the exercise of this jurisdiction. The latter's power to make full
inquiry into the cause of commitment or detention will enable him to correct any errors or defects in the
petition. 15
In Macazo and Nunez vs. Nunez, 16 the Court frowned upon the dismissal of a habeas
corpus petition filed by a brother to obtain custody of a minor sister, stating:
All these circumstances notwithstanding, we believe that the case should not have
been dismissed. The court below should not have overlooked that by dismissing the
petition, it was virtually sanctioning the continuance of an adulterous and scandalous
relation between the minor and her married employer, respondent Benildo Nunez
against all principles of law and morality. It is no excuse that the minor has expressed
preference for remaining with said respondent, because the minor may not chose to
continue an illicit relation that morals and law repudiate.
xxx xxx xxx
The minor's welfare being the paramount consideration, the court below should not
allow the technicality, that Teofilo Macazo was not originally made a party, to stand in
the way of its giving the child full protection. Even in a habeas corpus proceeding the
court had power to award temporary custody to the petitioner herein, or some other
suitable person, after summoning and hearing all parties concerned. What matters is
that the immoral situation disclosed by the records be not allowed to continue. 17
After the fact of Vitaliana's death was made known to the petitioners in the habeas
corpus proceedings,amendment of the petition for habeas corpus, not dismissal, was proper to avoid
multiplicity of suits. Amendments to pleadings are generally favored and should be liberally allowed
in furtherance of justice in order that every case may so far as possible be determined on its real
facts and in order to expedite the trial of cases or prevent circuity of action and unnecessary
expense, unless there are circumstances such as inexcusable delay or the taking of the adverse
party by surprise or the like, which justify a refusal of permission to amend. 18 As correctly alleged by
respondents, the writ of habeas corpus as a remedy became moot and academic due to the death of the
person allegedly restrained of liberty, but the issue of custody remained, which the court a quo had to
resolve.
Petitioner claims he is the spouse contemplated under Art. 294 of the Civil Code, the term spouse
used therein not being preceded by any qualification; hence, in the absence of such qualification, he
is the rightful custodian of Vitaliana's body. Vitaliana's brothers and sisters contend otherwise.
Indeed, Philippine Law does not recognize common law marriages. A man and woman not legally
married who cohabit for many years as husband and wife, who represent themselves to the public
as husband and wife, and who are reputed to be husband and wife in the community where they live
may be considered legally mauled in common law jurisdictions but not in the Philippines. 19

While it is true that our laws do not just brush aside the fact that such relationships are present in our
society, and that they produce a community of properties and interests which is governed by
law, 20 authority exists in case law to the effect that such form of co-ownership requires that the man and
woman living together must not in any way be incapacitated to contract marriage. 21 In any case, herein
petitioner has a subsisting marriage with another woman, a legal impediment which disqualified him from
even legally marrying Vitaliana. In Santero vs. CFI of Cavite, 22 ,the Court, thru Mr. Justice Paras,
interpreting Art. 188 of the Civil Code (Support of Surviving Spouse and Children During Liquidation of
Inventoried Property) stated: "Be it noted however that with respect to 'spouse', the same must be the
legitimate 'spouse' (not common-law spouses)."
There is a view that under Article 332 of the Revised Penal Code, the term "spouse" embraces
common law relation for purposes of exemption from criminal liability in cases of theft, swindling and
malicious mischief committed or caused mutually by spouses. The Penal Code article, it is said,
makes no distinction between a couple whose cohabitation is sanctioned by a sacrament or legal tie
and another who are husband and wife de facto. 23 But this view cannot even apply to the facts of the
case at bar. We hold that the provisions of the Civil Code, unless expressly providing to the contrary as in
Article 144, when referring to a "spouse" contemplate a lawfully wedded spouse. Petitioner vis-a-vis
Vitaliana was not a lawfully-wedded spouse to her; in fact, he was not legally capacitated to marry her in
her lifetime.
Custody of the dead body of Vitaliana was correctly awarded to her surviving brothers and sisters
(the Vargases). Section 1103 of the Revised Administrative Code provides:
Sec. 1103. Persons charged with duty of burial. The immediate duty of burying the
body of a deceased person, regardless of the ultimate liability for the expense
thereof, shall devolve upon the persons hereinbelow specified:
xxx xxx xxx
(b) If the deceased was an unmarried man or woman, or a child, and
left any kin, the duty of burial shall devolve upon the nearest of kin of
the deceased, if they be adults and within the Philippines and in
possession of sufficient means to defray the necessary expenses.
WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from is AFFIRMED. Both petitions are hereby DISMISSED.
No Costs.
SO ORDERED.
Fernan, C.J., Narvasa, Melencio-Herrera, Gutierrez, Jr., Cruz, Paras, Feliciano, Bidin, Sarmiento,
Cortes, Medialdea and Regalado, JJ., concur.
Gancayco and Grino-Aquino, JJ., are on leave.

Footnotes
* Hon. Alejandro Velez, presiding.

1 Rule 16 (Motion to Dismiss):

Sec. 1. Grounds. Within the time for pleading a motion to dismiss the action may
be made on any of the following grounds:
(a) . . .
(b) That the court has no jurisdiction over the nature of the action or suit;
Rule 72 (Subject Matter and Applicability of General Rules)
xxx xxx xxx
Sec. 2. Applicability of rules of civil actions. In the absence of special provisions,
the rules provided for in ordinary actions shall be, as far as practicable, applicable in
special proceedings.
2 3 and 11 October 1988 orders, Record of Regional Trial Court Proceedings, pp. 74,
75 & 102.
3 Art. 305. The duty and the right to make arrangements for the funeral of a relative
shall be in accordance with the order established for support, under article 294. In
case of descendants of the same degree, or of brothers and sisters, the oldest shall
be preferred. In case of ascendants, the paternal shall have a better right.
Art. 308. No human remains shall be retained, interred disposed of or exhumed
without the consent of the persons mentioned in Articles 294 and 305.
4 Record of RTC Proceedings, pp. 296-297.
5 Ibid., p. 338.
6 Record of RTC Proceedings, p. 577.
7 Supra.
8 Sec. 5 Inherent power of courts; Sec. 6 means to carry jurisdiction into effect.
9 Sec. 1104. Right of custody to body Any person charged by law with the duty of
burying the body of a deceased person is entitled to the custody of such body for the
purpose of burying it, except when an inquest is required by law for the purpose of
determining the cause of death; and, in case of death due to or accompanied by a
dangerous communicable disease, such body shall until buried remain in the custody
of the local board of health or local health officer, or if there be no such, then in the
custody of the municipal council.
10 G.R. No. 86470, Rollo at 34.

11 Annexes 7 & 8, Petition, G.R. No. 85140, Rollo at 85 and 86.

12 Resolution of 26 January 1989, G.R. No. 85140, Rollo at 114.
13 Ras v. Sua, G.R. No. L-23302, September 25, 1968, 25 SCRA 158-159; Nactor v.
IAC, G.R. No. 74122, March 15, 1988, 158 SCRA 635.
14 39 Am. Jur., 2d, Habeas corpus 129.
15 Ibid., 130.
16 G.R. No. L-12772, 24 January 1959, 105 Phil. 55.
17 Ibid.
18 PNB vs. CA, G.R. No. L-45770, 30 March 1988, 159 SCRA 933.
19 Fiel vs. Banawa, No. 56284-R, March 26, 1979, 76 OG 619.
20 Article 144 of the Civil Code provides:
When a man and a woman live together as husband and wife, but they are not
married, or their marriage is void from the beginning, the property acquired by either
or both of them through their work or industry or their wages and salaries shall be
governed by the rules on co-ownership.
21 Aznar, et al. vs. Garcia, et al., G.R. Nos. L-11483-84, 14 February 1958, 102 Phil.
1055.
22 G.R. Nos. 61700-03, September 24, 1987, 153 SCRA 728.
23 People vs. Constantino, No. 01897-CR, September 6, 1963, 60 O.G. 3603.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. 88211 October 27, 1989
FERDINAND E. MARCOS, IMELDA R. MARCOS, FERDINAND R. MARCOS. JR., IRENE M.
ARANETA, IMEE M. MANOTOC, TOMAS MANOTOC, GREGORIO ARANETA, PACIFICO E.
MARCOS, NICANOR YIGUEZ and PHILIPPINE CONSTITUTION ASSOCIATION (PHILCONSA),
represented by its President, CONRADO F. ESTRELLA, petitioners,
vs.
HONORABLE RAUL MANGLAPUS, CATALINO MACARAIG, SEDFREY ORDOEZ, MIRIAM
DEFENSOR SANTIAGO, FIDEL RAMOS, RENATO DE VILLA, in their capacity as Secretary of
Foreign Affairs, Executive Secretary, Secretary of Justice, Immigration Commissioner,
Secretary of National Defense and Chief of Staff, respectively, respondents.
RESOLUTION

EN BANC:
In its decision dated September 15,1989, the Court, by a vote of eight (8) to seven (7), dismissed the
petition, after finding that the President did not act arbitrarily or with grave abuse of discretion in

determining that the return of former President Marcos and his family at the present time and under
present circumstances pose a threat to national interest and welfare and in prohibiting their return to
the Philippines. On September 28, 1989, former President Marcos died in Honolulu, Hawaii. In a
statement, President Aquino said:
In the interest of the safety of those who will take the death of Mr. Marcos in widely
and passionately conflicting ways, and for the tranquility of the state and order of
society, the remains of Ferdinand E. Marcos will not be allowed to be brought to our
country until such time as the government, be it under this administration or the
succeeding one, shall otherwise decide. [Motion for Reconsideration, p. 1; Rollo, p,
443.]
On October 2, 1989, a Motion for Reconsideration was filed by petitioners, raising the following
major arguments:
1. to bar former President Marcos and his family from returning to the Philippines is to deny them not
only the inherent right of citizens to return to their country of birth but also the protection of the
Constitution and all of the rights guaranteed to Filipinos under the Constitution;
2. the President has no power to bar a Filipino from his own country; if she has, she had exercised it
arbitrarily; and
3. there is no basis for barring the return of the family of former President Marcos. Thus, petitioners
prayed that the Court reconsider its decision, order respondents to issue the necessary travel
documents to enable Mrs. Imelda R. Marcos, Ferdinand R. Marcos, Jr., Irene M. Araneta, Imee M.
Manotoc, Tommy Manotoc and Gregorio Araneta to return to the Philippines, and enjoin respondents
from implementing President Aquino's decision to bar the return of the remains of Mr. Marcos, and
the other petitioners, to the Philippines.
Commenting on the motion for reconsideration, the Solicitor General argued that the motion for
reconsideration is moot and academic as to the deceased Mr. Marcos. Moreover, he asserts that
"the 'formal' rights being invoked by the Marcoses under the label 'right to return', including the label
'return of Marcos' remains, is in reality or substance a 'right' to destabilize the country, a 'right' to hide
the Marcoses' incessant shadowy orchestrated efforts at destabilization." [Comment, p. 29.] Thus, he
prays that the Motion for Reconsideration be denied for lack of merit.
We deny the motion for reconsideration.
1. It must be emphasized that as in all motions for reconsideration, the burden is upon the movants,
petitioner herein, to show that there are compelling reasons to reconsider the decision of the Court.
2. After a thorough consideration of the matters raised in the motion for reconsideration, the Court is
of the view that no compelling reasons have been established by petitioners to warrant a
reconsideration of the Court's decision.
The death of Mr. Marcos, although it may be viewed as a supervening event, has not changed the
factual scenario under which the Court's decision was rendered. The threats to the government, to
which the return of the Marcoses has been viewed to provide a catalytic effect, have not been shown
to have ceased. On the contrary, instead of erasing fears as to the destabilization that will be caused

by the return of the Marcoses, Mrs. Marcos reinforced the basis for the decision to bar their return
when she called President Aquino "illegal," claiming that it is Mr. Marcos, not Mrs. Aquino, who is the
"legal" President of the Philippines, and declared that the matter "should be brought to all the courts
of the world." [Comment, p. 1; Philippine Star, October 4, 1989.]
3. Contrary to petitioners' view, it cannot be denied that the President, upon whom executive power
is vested, has unstated residual powers which are implied from the grant of executive power and
which are necessary for her to comply with her duties under the Constitution. The powers of the
President are not limited to what are expressly enumerated in the article on the Executive
Department and in scattered provisions of the Constitution. This is so, notwithstanding the avowed
intent of the members of the Constitutional Commission of 1986 to limit the powers of the President
as a reaction to the abuses under the regime of Mr. Marcos, for the result was a limitation of specific
power of the President, particularly those relating to the commander-in-chief clause, but not a
diminution of the general grant of executive power.
That the President has powers other than those expressly stated in the Constitution is nothing new.
This is recognized under the U.S. Constitution from which we have patterned the distribution of
governmental powers among three (3) separate branches.
Article II, [section] 1, provides that "The Executive Power shall be vested in a
President of the United States of America." In Alexander Hamilton's widely accepted
view, this statement cannot be read as mere shorthand for the specific executive
authorizations that follow it in [sections] 2 and 3. Hamilton stressed the difference
between the sweeping language of article II, section 1, and the conditional language
of article I, [section] 1: "All legislative Powers herein granted shall be vested in a
Congress of the United States . . ." Hamilton submitted that "[t]he [article III
enumeration [in sections 2 and 31 ought therefore to be considered, as intended
merely to specify the principal articles implied in the definition of execution power;
leaving the rest to flow from the general grant of that power, interpreted in confomity
with other parts of the Constitution...
In Myers v. United States, the Supreme Court accepted Hamilton's proposition,
concluding that the federal executive, unlike the Congress, could exercise power
from sources not enumerated, so long as not forbidden by the constitutional text: the
executive power was given in general terms, strengthened by specific terms where
emphasis was regarded as appropriate, and was limited by direct expressions where
limitation was needed. . ." The language of Chief Justice Taft in Myers makes clear
that the constitutional concept of inherent power is not a synonym for power without
limit; rather, the concept suggests only that not all powers granted in the Constitution
are themselves exhausted by internal enumeration, so that, within a sphere properly
regarded as one of "executive' power, authority is implied unless there or elsewhere
expressly limited. [TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 158-159 (1978).]
And neither can we subscribe to the view that a recognition of the President's implied or residual
powers is tantamount to setting the stage for another dictatorship. Despite petitioners' strained
analogy, the residual powers of the President under the Constitution should not be confused with the
power of the President under the 1973 Constitution to legislate pursuant to Amendment No. 6 which
provides:

Whenever in the judgment of the President (Prime Minister), there exists a grave
emergency or a threat or imminence thereof, or whenever the interim Batasang
Pambansa or the regular National Assembly fails or is unable to act adequately on
any matter for any reason that in his judgment requires immediate action, he may, in
order to meet the exigency, issue the necessary decrees, orders, or letters of
instruction, which shall form part of the law of the land,
There is no similarity between the residual powers of the President under the 1987 Constitution and
the power of the President under the 1973 Constitution pursuant to Amendment No. 6. First of all,
Amendment No. 6 refers to an express grant of power. It is not implied. Then, Amendment No. 6
refers to a grant to the President of thespecific power of legislation.
4. Among the duties of the President under the Constitution, in compliance with his (or her) oath of
office, is to protect and promote the interest and welfare of the people. Her decision to bar the return
of the Marcoses and subsequently, the remains of Mr. Marcos at the present time and under present
circumstances is in compliance with this bounden duty. In the absence of a clear showing that she
had acted with arbitrariness or with grave abuse of discretion in arriving at this decision, the Court
will not enjoin the implementation of this decision.
ACCORDINGLY, the Court resolved to DENY the Motion for Reconsideration for lack of merit."

Separate Opinions

CRUZ, J., dissenting:

Nothing important has happened to change my vote for granting the petition. The death of Marcos
has not plunged the nation into paroxysms of grief as the so-called "loyalists" had hoped. By and
large, it has been met with only passing interest if not outright indifference from the people. Clearly,
the discredited dictator is in death no El Cid. Marcos dead is only an unpleasant memory, not a bolt
of lightning to whip the blood.
This only shows that if he was at all a threat to the national security when he was already moribund
that feeble threat has died with him. As the government stresses, he has been reduced to a nonperson (which makes me wonder why it is still afraid of him). His cadaver is not even regarded as a
symbol of this or that or whatever except by his fanatical followers. It is only a dead body waiting to
be interred in this country.
This is a tempest in a teapot. We have more important things to do than debating over a corpse that
deserves no kinder fate than dissolution and oblivion. I say let it be brought home and buried deep
and let us be done with it forever.
PARAS, J., dissenting on the Motion for Reconsideration:
I find no reason to deviate from the dissenting opinion I have already expressed.

Firstly, the former President, although already dead, is still entitled to certain rights. It is not correct to
say that a dead man, since he is no longer a human being, has ceased to have rights. For instance,
our Revised Penal Code prohibits the commission of libel against a deceased individual. And even if
we were to assume the non- existence anymore of his human rights what about the human rights of
his widow and the other members of his family?
Secondly, up to now, the alleged threats to national security have remained unproved and
consequently, unpersuasive. Our Armed Forces can easily control any possible uprising or political
and military destabilization. In fact, the converse appears to be nearer the truth, that is, if we do not
allow the remains to come, more trouble may be expected.
Thirdly, reconciliation can proceed at a much faster pace if the petition for the return is granted. To
refuse the request can mean a hardening of resistance against the well-intentioned aim of the
administration. Upon the other hand, to grant the petition may well soften the hearts of the
oppositionists; paving the way for a united citizenry.
Finally, the entire world will surely applaud our government's act of mercy. As Shakespeare once
wrote "the quality of mercy is not strained." Surely, compassion is the better part of government.
Remove mercy, and you remove the best reason against civil strife, which if not abated can turn our
country into a mainstream of fiery dissent and in the end, as one great man has put it, the question
will no longer be what is right, but what is left.
PADILLA, J., dissenting:
The death of former President Ferdinand E. Marcos, which supervened after decision in this case
had been rendered, was pre-empted and foreseen in my original dissenting opinion. There I said that
the first cogent and decisive proposition in this case is that "Mr. Marcos is a Filipino and, as such,
entitled to return to, die and be buried in this country." I have only to add a few statements to that
dissenting opinion.
Respondents have succeeded in denying Mr. Marcos the first two (2) rights, i.e. to return to and die
in this country, The remaining right of this Filipino that cries out for vindication at this late hour is the
right to be buried in this country. Will the respondents be allowed to complete the circle of denying
the constitutional and human right of Mr. Marcos to travel which, as stated in my dissenting opinion,
includes the right to return to, die and be buried in this country? The answer should be in the
negative if the Constitution is to still prevail; the answer should be in the negative if we are to avoid
the completely indefensible act of denying a Filipino the last right to blend his mortal remains with a
few square feet of earth in the treasured land of his birth.
Those who would deny this Filipino the only constitutional and human right that can be accorded him
now say that the constitutional and human right to be buried in this country would apply to any
Filipino, except Mr. Marcos, because he was a dictator and he plundered the country. This is the
most irrelevant argument that can be raised at this time. For, our democracy is built on the
fundamental assumption (so we believe) that the Constitution and all its guarantees apply
to all Filipinos, whether dictator or pauper, learned or ignorant, religious or agnostic as long as he is
a Filipino.
It is said that to accord this Filipino the right to be buried in this country would pose a serious threat
to national security and public safety. What threat? As pointed out in my dissenting opinion, the

second cogent and decisive proposition in this case is that respondents have not presented any
"hard evidence" (factual bases) or convincing proof of such threat. "All we have are general
conclusions of national security and public safety' in avoidance of a specific, demandable and
enforceable constitutional and basic human right to return." Recent events have, to my mind, served
to confirm the validity of such dissenting statement.
If a live Marcos returning to this country did not pose a serious threat to national security, the
situation cannot be any worse with a dead Marcos returning. For, a dead Marcos will return to be
buried into mother earth, where there are no protests, "demos", or even dissents, where the rule that
reigns, in the language of Mr. Justice Jackson in Barnette is the "unanimity of the graveyard."
It is said that, while a dead Marcos has been rendered impotent to threaten national security, his
supporters would pose that threat to national security. This argument is untenable as it is without
merit. As I see it, Marcos' supporters pose a greater threat to peace and order, with Marcos deprived
of his right to burial in this country. On the other hand, if the remains of Mr. Marcos are brought to the
country and allowed the burial to which he is constitutionally and humanly entitled, Marcos'
supporters would be deprived of an otherwise potent argumentso conducive to mass protests and
even violencethat their Idol has been cruelly denied the right to be buried in his homeland.
It is also said that Mr. Marcos, in cadaver form, has no constitutional or human rights, to speak of.
This contention entirely begs the issue. In the first place, one cannot overlook that the right of Mr.
Marcos, as a Filipino, to be buried in this country, is asserted not for the first time after his death. It
was vigorously asserted long before his death. But, more importantly, the right of every Filipino to be
buried in his country, is part of a continuing right that starts from birth and ends only on the day he is
finally laid to rest in his country.
This dissenting opinion does not pretend to deny the Philippine government the right to lay down
conditions for the burial of Mr. Marcos in this country, but I submit that these conditions must, as a
fundamental postulate, recognize the right of the man, as a Filipino, to be buried in this country
NOW.
The majority resolution, in effect, bans Mr. Marcos' burial in this country now. Without in any way
affecting my respect and regard for my brethren and sisters in the majority, I am deeply concerned
and greatly disturbed that, with their decision banning a dead Marcos from burial in this country, they
have passed an opportunity to defuse a constitutional crisis that, in my humble assessment,
threatens to ignite an already divided nation, Regrettably, they have ignored the constitutional
dimension of the problem rooted in the ageless and finest tradition of our people for respect and
deference to the dead. What predictably follows will be a continuing strife, among our people, of
unending hatred, recriminations and retaliations. God save this country!
My vote is for this Court to ORDER the respondents to allow the immediate return and burial in the
Republic of the Philippines of former President Ferdinand E. Marcos, subject to such conditions as
the Philippine government may impose in the interest of peace and order.
SARMIENTO, J., Dissenting:
The case has curious trappings of a deja vu, the shoe being on the other foot, yet, as I stated before,
I can not allow personal emotions to soften my "hardened impartiality" and deny, as a consequence,

the rights of the ex-President's bereaved to bury his remains in his homeland, and for them to return
from exile. As I had, then, voted to grant the petition, so do I vote to grant reconsideration.
I have gone to lengths to locate in the four comers of the Constitution, by direct grant or by
implication, the President's supposed "residual" power to forbid citizens from entering the
motherland reiterated in the resolution of the majority. I have found none. I am not agreed, that:
3. Contrary to petitioners view, it cannot be denied that the President, upon whom
executive power is vested, has unstated residual powers which are implied from the
grant of executive power and which are necessary for her to comply with her duties
under the Constitution. The powers of the President are not limited to what are
expressly enumerated in the article on the Executive Department and in scattered
provisions of the Constitution. This, notwithstanding the avowed intent of the
members of the Constitutional Commission of 1986 to limit the powers of the
President as a reaction to the abuses under the regime of Mr. Marcos, for the result
was a limitation of specific powers of the President, particularly those relating to the
commander-in-chief clause, but not a diminution of the general grant of executive
power.
It is a nice word game, but it is nothing else. For, if the Constitution has imposed limitations on
specific powers of the President, it has, a fortiori, prescribed a diminution of executive power. The
Charter says that the right may only be restricted by: (1) a court order; or (2) by fiat of law. Had the
fundamental law intended a presidential imprimatur, it would have said so. It would have also
completed the symmetry: judicial, congressional, and executive restraints on the right. No amount of
presumed residual executive power can amend the Charter.
It is well to note that the Bill of Rights stands primarily, a limitation not only against legislative
encroachments on individual liberties, but more so, against presidential intrusions. And especially so,
because the President is the caretaker of the military establishment that has, several times over,
been unkind to part of the population it has also sworn to protect.
That "[t]he threats to the government, to which the return of the Marcoses has been viewed to
provide a catalytic effect, have not been shown to have ceased" (Res., 3) is the realm of conjecture,
speculation, and imagination. The military has shown no hard evidence that "the return of the
Marcoses" would indeed interpose a threat to national security. And apparently, the majority itself is
not convinced ("has been viewed...").
That Mrs. Marcos has referred to President Corazon Aquino as an illegitimate President, does not,
so I submit, reinforce alleged fears of a massive destabilization awaiting the nation. The military has
said over and over that Marcos followers are not capable of successful destabilization effort. And
only this morning (October 27, 1989), media reported the assurances given to foreign investors by
no less than the President, of the political and economic stability of the nation, as well as the
Government's capability to quell forces that menace the gains of EDSA.
I have no eulogies to say on the passing of Mr. Marcos. My personal impressions, however, are
beside the point. I reiterate that the President has no power to deny requests of Marcos relatives to
bury Marcos in his homeland. As for the former, let them get their just deserts here too. And let the
matter rest.

Separate Opinions
CRUZ, J., dissenting:
Nothing important has happened to change my vote for granting the petition. The death of Marcos
has not plunged the nation into paroxysms of grief as the so-called "loyalists" had hoped. By and
large, it has been met with only passing interest if not outright indifference from the people. Clearly,
the discredited dictator is in death no El Cid. Marcos dead is only an unpleasant memory, not a bolt
of lightning to whip the blood.
This only shows that if he was at all a threat to the national security when he was already moribund
that feeble threat has died with him. As the government stresses, he has been reduced to a nonperson (which makes me wonder why it is still afraid of him). His cadaver is not even regarded as a
symbol of this or that or whatever except by his fanatical followers. It is only a dead body waiting to
be interred in this country.
This is a tempest in a teapot. We have more important things to do than debating over a corpse that
deserves no kinder fate than dissolution and oblivion. I say let it be brought home and buried deep
and let us be done with it forever.
PARAS, J., dissenting on the Motion for Reconsideration:
I find no reason to deviate from the dissenting opinion I have already expressed.
Firstly, the former President, although already dead, is still entitled to certain rights. It is not correct to
say that a dead man, since he is no longer a human being, has ceased to have rights. For instance,
our Revised Penal Code prohibits the commission of libel against a deceased individual. And even if
we were to assume the non- existence anymore of his human rights what about the human rights of
his widow and the other members of his family?
Secondly, up to now, the alleged threats to national security have remained unproved and
consequently, unpersuasive. Our Armed Forces can easily control any possible uprising or political
and military destabilization. In fact, the converse appears to be nearer the truth, that is, if we do not
allow the remains to come, more trouble may be expected.
Thirdly, reconciliation can proceed at a much faster pace if the petition for the return is granted. To
refuse the request can mean a hardening of resistance against the well-intentioned aim of the
administration. Upon the other hand, to grant the petition may well soften the hearts of the
oppositionists; paving the way for a united citizenry.
Finally, the entire world will surely applaud our government's act of mercy. As Shakespeare once
wrote "the quality of mercy is not strained." Surely, compassion is the better part of government.
Remove mercy, and you remove the best reason against civil strife, which if not abated can turn our
country into a mainstream of fiery dissent and in the end, as one great man has put it, the question
will no longer be what is right, but what is left.
PADILLA, J., dissenting:

The death of former President Ferdinand E. Marcos, which supervened after decision in this case
had been rendered, was pre-empted and foreseen in my original dissenting opinion. There I said that
the first cogent and decisive proposition in this case is that "Mr. Marcos is a Filipino and, as such,
entitled to return to, die and be buried in this country." I have only to add a few statements to that
dissenting opinion.
Respondents have succeeded in denying Mr. Marcos the first two (2) rights, i.e. to return to and die
in this country, The remaining right of this Filipino that cries out for vindication at this late hour is the
right to be buried in this country. Will the respondents be allowed to complete the circle of denying
the constitutional and human right of Mr. Marcos to travel which, as stated in my dissenting opinion,
includes the right to return to, die and be buried in this country? The answer should be in the
negative if the Constitution is to still prevail; the answer should be in the negative if we are to avoid
the completely indefensible act of denying a Filipino the last right to blend his mortal remains with a
few square feet of earth in the treasured land of his birth.
Those who would deny this Filipino the only constitutional and human right that can be accorded him
now say that the constitutional and human right to be buried in this country would apply to any
Filipino, except Mr. Marcos, because he was a dictator and he plundered the country. This is the
most irrelevant argument that can be raised at this time. For, our democracy is built on the
fundamental assumption (so we believe) that the Constitution and all its guarantees apply
to all Filipinos, whether dictator or pauper, learned or ignorant, religious or agnostic as long as he is
a Filipino.
It is said that to accord this Filipino the right to be buried in this country would pose a serious threat
to national security and public safety. What threat? As pointed out in my dissenting opinion, the
second cogent and decisive proposition in this case is that respondents have not presented any
"hard evidence" (factual bases) or convincing proof of such threat. "All we have are general
conclusions of national security and public safety' in avoidance of a specific, demandable and
enforceable constitutional and basic human right to return." Recent events have, to my mind, served
to confirm the validity of such dissenting statement.
If a live Marcos returning to this country did not pose a serious threat to national security, the
situation cannot be any worse with a dead Marcos returning. For, a dead Marcos will return to be
buried into mother earth, where there are no protests, "demos", or even dissents, where the rule that
reigns, in the language of Mr. Justice Jackson in Barnette is the "unanimity of the graveyard."
It is said that, while a dead Marcos has been rendered impotent to threaten national security, his
supporters would pose that threat to national security. This argument is untenable as it is without
merit. As I see it, Marcos' supporters pose a greater threat to peace and order, with Marcos deprived
of his right to burial in this country. On the other hand, if the remains of Mr. Marcos are brought to the
country and allowed the burial to which he is constitutionally and humanly entitled, Marcos'
supporters would be deprived of an otherwise potent argumentso conducive to mass protests and
even violencethat their Idol has been cruelly denied the right to be buried in his homeland.
It is also said that Mr. Marcos, in cadaver form, has no constitutional or human rights, to speak of.
This contention entirely begs the issue. In the first place, one cannot overlook that the right of Mr.
Marcos, as a Filipino, to be buried in this country, is asserted not for the first time after his death. It
was vigorously asserted long before his death. But, more importantly, the right of every Filipino to be

buried in his country, is part of a continuing right that starts from birth and ends only on the day he is
finally laid to rest in his country.
This dissenting opinion does not pretend to deny the Philippine government the right to lay down
conditions for the burial of Mr. Marcos in this country, but I submit that these conditions must, as a
fundamental postulate, recognize the right of the man, as a Filipino, to be buried in this country
NOW.
The majority resolution, in effect, bans Mr. Marcos' burial in this country now. Without in any way
affecting my respect and regard for my brethren and sisters in the majority, I am deeply concerned
and greatly disturbed that, with their decision banning a dead Marcos from burial in this country, they
have passed an opportunity to defuse a constitutional crisis that, in my humble assessment,
threatens to ignite an already divided nation, Regrettably, they have ignored the constitutional
dimension of the problem rooted in the ageless and finest tradition of our people for respect and
deference to the dead. What predictably follows will be a continuing strife, among our people, of
unending hatred, recriminations and retaliations. God save this country!
My vote is for this Court to ORDER the respondents to allow the immediate return and burial in the
Republic of the Philippines of former President Ferdinand E. Marcos, subject to such conditions as
the Philippine government may impose in the interest of peace and order.
SARMIENTO, J., Dissenting:
The case has curious trappings of a deja vu, the shoe being on the other foot, yet, as I stated before,
I can not allow personal emotions to soften my "hardened impartiality" and deny, as a consequence,
the rights of the ex-President's bereaved to bury his remains in his homeland, and for them to return
from exile. As I had, then, voted to grant the petition, so do I vote to grant reconsideration.
I have gone to lengths to locate in the four comers of the Constitution, by direct grant or by
implication, the President's supposed "residual" power to forbid citizens from entering the
motherland reiterated in the resolution of the majority. I have found none. I am not agreed, that:
3. Contrary to petitioners view, it cannot be denied that the President, upon whom
executive power is vested, has unstated residual powers which are implied from the
grant of executive power and which are necessary for her to comply with her duties
under the Constitution. The powers of the President are not limited to what are
expressly enumerated in the article on the Executive Department and in scattered
provisions of the Constitution. This, notwithstanding the avowed intent of the
members of the Constitutional Commission of 1986 to limit the powers of the
President as a reaction to the abuses under the regime of Mr. Marcos, for the result
was a limitation of specific powers of the President, particularly those relating to the
commander-in-chief clause, but not a diminution of the general grant of executive
power.
It is a nice word game, but it is nothing else. For, if the Constitution has imposed limitations on
specific powers of the President, it has, a fortiori, prescribed a diminution of executive power. The
Charter says that the right may only be restricted by: (1) a court order; or (2) by fiat of law. Had the
fundamental law intended a presidential imprimatur, it would have said so. It would have also

completed the symmetry: judicial, congressional, and executive restraints on the right. No amount of
presumed residual executive power can amend the Charter.
It is well to note that the Bill of Rights stands primarily, a limitation not only against legislative
encroachments on individual liberties, but more so, against presidential intrusions. And especially so,
because the President is the caretaker of the military establishment that has, several times over,
been unkind to part of the population it has also sworn to protect.
That "[t]he threats to the government, to which the return of the Marcoses has been viewed to
provide a catalytic effect, have not been shown to have ceased" (Res., 3) is the realm of conjecture,
speculation, and imagination. The military has shown no hard evidence that "the return of the
Marcoses" would indeed interpose a threat to national security. And apparently, the majority itself is
not convinced ("has been viewed...").
That Mrs. Marcos has referred to President Corazon Aquino as an illegitimate President, does not,
so I submit, reinforce alleged fears of a massive destabilization awaiting the nation. The military has
said over and over that Marcos followers are not capable of successful destabilization effort. And
only this morning (October 27, 1989), media reported the assurances given to foreign investors by
no less than the President, of the political and economic stability of the nation, as well as the
Government's capability to quell forces that menace the gains of EDSA.
I have no eulogies to say on the passing of Mr. Marcos. My personal impressions, however, are
beside the point. I reiterate that the President has no power to deny requests of Marcos relatives to
bury Marcos in his homeland. As for the former, let them get their just deserts here too. And let the
matter rest.