LAW ON PUBLIC CORPORATION:

(1)

CITY OF GENERAL SANTOS, represented by its Mayor, HON. DARLENE

MAGNOLIA

R.

ANTONINO-CUSTODIO Petitioner,

vs.

COMMISSION

ON

AUDIT, Respondent.
G.R. No. 199439

April 22, 2014

NATURE:
This is a special civil action for certiorari filed by the city of General Santos asking to
find grave abuse of discretion on the part of the Commission on Audit (COA).which
affirmed the findings of its Legal Services Sector in its Opinion No. 2010-021 declaring
Ordinance No. 08, series of 2009, as illegal.
FACTS:
Ordinance No. 08, series of 2009, was passed together with its implementing rules
and regulations, designed "to entice those employees who were unproductive due to
health reasons to avail of the incentives being offered therein by way of early
retirement package."6
This contextual background in the passing of Ordinance No. 08, series of 2009, was
not contested by respondent Commission on Audit.
In

response

to

the

endorsement

of

the

city audit

team leader, respondent

Commissions regional director agreed that the grant lacked legal basis and was
contrary to the Government Service Insurance System (GSIS) Act. He forwarded the
matter to respondent Commissions Office of General Counsel, Legal Services Sector.
The Office of General Counsel issued COA-LSS Opinion No. 2010-021. Respondent
Commission on Audit observed that GenSan SERVES was not based on a law passed
by Congress but on ordinances and resolutions passed and approved by the
Sangguniang Panlungsod and Executive Orders by the city mayor.26 Moreover,
nowhere in Section 76 of Republic Act No. 7160, otherwise known as the Local
Government Code, does it provide a specific power for local government units to
establish an early retirement program.
ISSUE:
WHETHER RESPONDENT COMMISSION ON AUDIT COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF
DISCRETION WHEN IT CONSIDERED ORDINANCE NO. 08, SERIES OF 2009, IN THE
NATURE OF AN EARLY RETIREMENT PROGRAM REQUIRING A LAW AUTHORIZING IT
FOR ITS VALIDITY

HELD:
The Court agree with respondent Commission on Audit but only insofar as the
invalidity of Section 5 of the ordinance is concerned.
Section 5. GenSan SERVES Program Incentives On Top of Government Service
Insurance System (GSIS) and PAG-IBIG Benefits Any personnel qualified and
approved to receive the incentives of this program shall be entitled to whatever
retirement benefits the GSIS or PAG-IBIG is granting to a retiring government
employee.
Moreover, an eligible employee shall receive an early retirement incentive provided
under this program at the rate of one and one-half (1 1/2) months of the employees
latest basic salary for every year of service in the City Government. 9
Section 5 refers to an "early retirement incentive," the amount of which is pegged on
the beneficiarys years of service in the city government. The ordinance provides that
only those who have rendered service to the city government for at least 15 years
may apply.75 Consequently, this provision falls under the definition of a retirement
benefit. Applying the definition in Conte, it is a form of reward for an employees
loyalty and service to the city government, and it is intended to help the employee
enjoy the remaining years of his or her life by lessening his or her financial worries.
Sec. 28 (b) as amended by RA 4968 in no uncertain terms bars the creation of any
insurance or retirement plan other than the GSIS for government officers and
employees, in order to prevent the undue and inequitous proliferation of such plans. x
x x. To ignore this and rule otherwise would be tantamount to permitting every other
government office or agency to put up its own supplementary retirement benefit plan
under the guise of such "financial assistance.71
The Court declares Section 6 on post-retirement incentives as valid.
(2) ANA
THERESIA
REGULATORY
BOARD
GR NO. 181293

RISA

HONTIVEROS-BARAQUEL

VS

TOLL

FEBRUARY 23, 2015

FACTS: Philippine National Construction Corporation (PNCC), pursuant to P.D. 1113

with the right, privilege, and authority to construct, and operate toll facilities Toll
Expressways, in a series of agreements transferred authority to perform operations
of the South Metro Manila Skyway to Skyway O & M Corporation (SOMCO).
Legislators and the Union of PNCC oppose the said transfer. They argue that the Toll
Operation Certificate issued by the The Toll Regulatory Board (TRB) to SOMCO is
highly irregular and that the transfer of authority is grossly disadvantageous to the
government.
ISSUES:
1. Whether petitioners have standing;
2. Whether the TRB has the power to grant authority to operate a toll facility;
3. Whether the assumption of toll operations by SOMCO is disadvantageous to the

government.
HELD:
1. Petitioner filed as a legislator in her capacity as party-list representative of
Akbayan. Hence, petitioners do not have the requisite legal standing, and as such,
she was only allowed to sue to question the validity of any official action when it
infringes on their prerogatives as members of Congress.
2. The Court has ruled that first, it is clear that Congress does not have the sole
authority to grant franchises for the operation of public utilities. Congress is not
required before each and every public utility may operate. Unless there is a law that
specifically requires a franchise for the operation of a public utility, particular
agencies in the executive branch may issue authorizations and licenses for the
operation of certain classes of public utilities. The authority to operate a public
utility can be granted by administrative agencies when authorized by law.
3. The allegations of petitioners are nothing more than speculations, apprehensions,
and suppositions. It is understandable that SOMCO does not yet have a proven track
record in toll operations, considering that it was only the Amendment to the
Supplemental Toll Operation Agreement (ASTOA) and the Memorandum of
Agreement that gave birth to it.
(3) CRISOSTOMO B. AQUINO, Petitioner, v. MUNICIPALITY OF MALAY,
AKLAN, Respondent.
G.R. No. 211356, September 29, 2014
NATURE:
This is a Petition for Review on Certiorari challenging the Decision 1 and the Resolution
of the Court of Appeals. The assailed rulings denied Crisostomo Aquinos Petition for
Certiorari for not being the proper remedy to question the issuance and
implementation of Executive Order No. 10, Series of 2011 (EO 10), ordering the
demolition of his hotel establishment.
FACTS:
Boracay Island West Cove Management Philippines, Inc. applied for a building permit
covering the construction of a three-storey hotel over a parcel of land in Malay, Aklan,
which is covered by a Forest Land Use Agreement for Tourism Purposes (FLAgT)
issued by the Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR). The
Municipal Zoning Administrator denied petitioners application on the ground that the
proposed construction site was within the no build zone demarcated in Municipal
Ordinance 2000-131.
Petitioner appealed the denial action to the Office of the Mayor but despite follow up,
no action was ever taken by the respondent mayor.
A Cease and Desist Order was issued by the municipal government, enjoining the
expansion of the resort, and on June 7, 2011, the Office of the Mayor of Malay, Aklan
issued the assailed EO 10, ordering the closure and demolition of Boracay West Coves
hotel.
EO 10 was partially implemented on June 10, 2011. Thereafter, two more instances
followed wherein respondents demolished the improvements introduced by Boracay
West Cove.

Petitioner filed a Petition for Certiorari with prayer for injunctive relief with the CA
Alleging that the order was issued and executed with grave abuse of discretion
Contentions of West Cove:
1) The hotel cannot summarily be abated because it is not a nuisance per se, given
the hundred million peso-worth of capital infused in the venture.
2) Municipality of Malay, Aklan should have first secured a court order before
proceeding with the demolition.
Contention of the Mayor: The demolition needed no court order because the municipal
mayor has the express power under the Local Government Code (LGC) to order the
removal of illegally constructed buildings
The CA dismissed the petition solely on procedural ground, i.e., the special writ
of certiorari can only be directed against a tribunal, board, or officer exercising judicial
or quasi-judicial functions and since the issuance of EO 10 was done in the exercise of
executive functions, and not of judicial or quasi-judicial functions, certiorari will not
lie.
ISSUE:
Whether the judicial proceedings should first be conducted before the LGU can order
the closure and demolition of the property in question.
HELD:
The Court ruled that the property involved cannot be classified as
a nuisance per sewhich can therefore be summarily abated. Here, it is merely the
hotels particular incident, its location and not its inherent qualities that rendered it a
nuisance. Otherwise stated, had it not been constructed in the no build zone, Boracay
West Cove could have secured the necessary permits without issue. As such, even if
the hotel is not a nuisance per se, it is still a nuisance per accidens
Generally, LGUs have no power to declare a particular thing as a nuisance unless such
a thing is a nuisance per se. Despite the hotels classification as a
nuisance per accidens, however, the LGU may nevertheless properly order the hotels
demolition.
This
is
because,
in
the
exercise
ofpolice power and the general welfare clause,
property rights of individuals may be subjected to restraints and burdens in order to
fulfill the objectives of the government. Moreover, the Local Government Code
authorizes city and municipal governments, acting through their local chief executives,
to issue demolition orders. The office of the mayor has quasi-judicial powers to order
the closing and demolition of establishments.
(4) THE OFFICE OF THE SOLICITOR GENERAL (OSG), Petitioner, vs.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS and THE MUNICIPAL GOVERNMENT OF
SAGUIRAN, LANAO DEL SUR, Respondents
G.R. No. 199027

June 9, 2014

FACTS:
The Municipality of Saguiran was named a respondent in a petition for
mandamus4 filed with the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Lanao del Sur by the former
members of the Sangguniang Bayanof Saguiran, namely, Macmod P. Masorong,
Amrosi MacoteSamporna, Alanie L. Dalama, Hassan P. Amai-Kurot and Cadalay S.

Rataban. Therein petitioners sought to compel the Municipality of Saguiran to pay

them the aggregate amount of 726,000.00, representing their unpaid terminal leave
benefits under Section 5 of the Civil Service Commission Memorandum Circular Nos.
41, Series of 1998 and 14, Series of 1999. 5 The Municipality of Saguiran sought the
trial courts dismissal of the petition through its Verified Answer with Affirmative
Defenses and Counterclaim6 which was signed by Municipal Mayor Hadjah Rasmia B.
Macabago and Municipal Treasurer Hadji Mautinter Dimacaling.
On January 6, 2009, the RTC issued an Order 7 dismissing the petition on the ground
that the act being sought by therein petitioners was not a ministerial duty. The RTC
explained that the payment of terminal leave benefits had to undergo the ordinary
process of verification, approval or disapproval by municipal officials. 8 It, nonetheless,
directed the Municipality of Saguiran to include in its general or special budget for the
year 2009 the subject claims for terminal leave benefits.
Dissatisfied with the RTCs directive for the inclusion of the subject claims in the
municipalitys budget, the Municipality of Saguiran partially appealed the order of the
RTC to the CA. On December 14, 2009, the appellate court issued a notice 9 requiring
the OSG to file a memorandum for the Municipality of Saguiran within a nonextendible period of 30 days.
The OSG initially moved for a suspension of the period to file the required
memorandum, explaining that it had not received any document or pleading in
connection with the case.10 It asked for a period of 30 days from receipt of such
documents within which to file the required memorandum. On April 23, 2010, the
OSGs motion was denied by the CA on the ground that the relief sought was not
among the remedies allowed under the Rules of Court. The OSG was instead given a
non-extendible period of 90 days from notice within which to file the
memorandum.11 On August 5, 2010, the OSG filed a Manifestation and
Motion12 requesting to be excused from filing the memorandum on the ground of lack
of legal authority to represent the Municipality of Saguiran. It reasoned that the
Municipality of Saguiran had to be represented by its legal officer, pursuant to Article
XI(3)(i) of Republic Act No. 7160, otherwise known as the Local Government Code of
1991 (LGC).
ISSUE:
WHETHER OR NOT THE HONORABLE [CA] COMMITTED GRAVE
ABUSE OF DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO LACK OR EXCESS OF JURISDICTION IN
COMPELLING THE OSG TO REPRESENT THE MUNICIPAL GOVERNMENT OF SAGUIRAN,
LANAO DEL SUR (A LOCAL GOVERNMENT UNIT) IN ITS LAWSUIT
RULING:

The petition is meritorious.

The OSGs powers and functions are defined in the Administrative Code of 1987
(Administrative Code), particularly in Section 35, Book IV, Title III, Chapter 12
thereof, which reads:
Sec. 35. Powers and Functions. The Office of the Solicitor General shall represent
the Government of the Philippines, its agencies and instrumentalities and its officials
and agents in any litigation, proceeding, investigation or matter requiring the services
of a lawyer. When authorized by the President or head of the office concerned, it shall
also represent government-owned or controlled corporations. The Office of the
Solicitor General shall constitute the law office of the Government and, as such, shall
discharge duties requiring the services of a lawyer. It shall have the following specific
powers and functions:

(1) Represent the Government in the Supreme Court and the Court of Appeals in all
criminal proceedings; represent the Government and its officers in the Supreme
Court, the Court of Appeals, and all other courts or tribunals in all civil actions and
special proceedings in which the Government or any officer thereof in his official
capacity is a party;
A cursory reading of this provision may create the impression that the OSGs mandate
under the Administrative Code is unqualified, and thus broad enough to include
representation of a local government unit in any case filed by or against it, as local
government units, indisputably, form part of the Government of the Philippines.
Towards a proper resolution of the pending issue, however, the OSGs mandate under
the Administrative Code must be construed taking into account the other statutes that
pertain to the same subject of representation in courts. As the Court explained in
Philippine Economic Zone Authority v. Green Asia Construction & Development
Corporation:17
Statutes are in pari materia when they relate to the same person or thing or to the
same class of persons or things, or object, or cover the same specific or particular
subject matter.
It is axiomatic in statutory construction that a statute must be interpreted, not only to
be consistent with itself, but also to harmonize with other laws on the same subject
matter, as to form a complete, coherent and intelligible system. The rule is expressed
in the maxim, "interpretare et concordare legibus est optimus interpretandi," or every
statute must be so construed and harmonized with other statutes as to form a
uniform system of jurisprudence.18
On the matter of counsels representation for the government, the Administrative
Code is not the only law that delves on the issue.1wphi1 Specifically for local
government units, the LGC limits the lawyers who are authorized to represent them in
court actions, as the law defines the mandate of a local government units legal officer.
Book III, Title V, Article XI, Section 481 of the LGC provides:
Article
The Legal Officer

Eleven

Sec. 481. Qualifications, Term, Powers and Duties.

(a) No person shall be appointed legal officer unless he is a citizen of the Philippines, a
resident of the local government concerned, of good moral character, and a member
of the Philippine Bar. x x x.
xxxx
The appointment of legal officer shall be mandatory for the provincial and city
governments and optional for the municipal government.
(b) The legal officer, the chief legal counsel of the local government unit, shall take
charge of the office of legal services and shall:
xxxx
(3) In addition to the foregoing duties and functions, the legal officer shall:

(i) Represent the local government unit in all civil actions and special proceedings
wherein the local government unit or any official thereof, in his official capacity, is a
party: Provided, That, in actions or proceedings where a component city or
municipality is a party adverse to the provincial government or to another component
city or municipality, a special legal officer may be deployed to represent the adverse
party;
x x x x (Emphasis ours)
Evidently, this provision of the LGC not only identifies the powers and functions of a
local government units legal officer. It also restricts, as it names, the lawyer who may
represent the local government unit as its counsel in court proceedings. Being a
special law on the issue of representation in court that is exclusively made applicable
to local government units, the LGC must prevail over the provisions of the
Administrative Code, which classifies only as a general law on the subject matter. The
Court held in Social Justice Society (SJS), et al. v. Hon. Atienza, Jr.: 19
The special act and the general law must stand together, one as the law of the
particular subject and the other as the law of general application. The special law
must be taken as intended to constitute an exception to, or a qualification of, the
general act or provision.

(5) CORPORATE STRATEGIES DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION vs

NORMAN AGOJO
G.R. No. 208740, 19 November 2014

There could be no presumption of the regularity of any administrative action which

resulted in depriving a taxpayer of his property through a tax sale.

FACTS:

Respondent Norman A. Agojo initiated a petition for the issuance of a new

certificate of title for the property it bought through tax sale by an LGU. Petitioner
Corporate Strategies Development Corp. (CSDC), which was the previous property
owner, filed an opposition challenging the validity of the sale. They alleged: that they
did not receive a notice of tax delinquency or the warrant subjecting the property;
that the pertinent notice and warrant were apparently sent to CSDCs old office
address at 6/F Tuscan Building, Herrera St., Legaspi Village, Makati City, despite its
transfer to another location years ago; and that the sale violated the procedural
requirements prescribed under the LGC. Specifically, they questioned the following:
(a) the failure of the City Treasurer to exert further steps to send the warrant at the
address where the property itself was located; (b) the failure to serve the warrant on
the occupant of the property as mandated by Section 258 of the LGC; (c) the failure

to serve the copies of the warrant of levy upon the Register of Deeds and the City
Assessor of Makati prior to the auction sale following the said provision in relation to
Section 260 of the LGC; (d) the failure to annotate the notice of levy on the title of the
property prior to the conduct of the auction sale on May 24, 2006; and (e) the gross
inadequacy of the bid price for the property considering that it only represented five
(5) percent of the value of the property in the total amount of 35,000,000.00 based
on the zonal valuation. Because of these alleged defects, petitioner assailed the
auction sale for being defective pursuant to the provisions of the LGC. To these,
respondent invoked the rule on presumption of regularity.

ISSUE: Whether or not the sale is valid.

HELD: The sale was not valid. Under Section 75 of Presidential Decree (P.D.) No.
1529, otherwise known as the Property Registration Decree, the registered owner is
given the right to pursue legal and equitable remedies to impeach or annul the
proceedings for the issuance of new certificates of title upon the expiration of the
redemption period. In this case, petitioners opposed the issuance of a new certificate
of title in favor of the respondent on the ground that the auction sale was null and
void

Citing jurisprudence, it was held that there could be no presumption of the regularity
of any administrative action which resulted in depriving a taxpayer of his property
through a tax sale. This is an exception to the rule that administrative proceedings are
presumed to be regular. On the contrary, the due process of law to be followed in tax
proceedings must be established by proof and the general rule was that the purchaser
of a tax title was bound to take upon himself the burden of showing the regularity of
all proceedings leading up to the sale.

Further, as previously held, it is incumbent upon a buyer to prove the regularity of all
proceedings leading to the sale for the buyer could not rely on the presumption of
regularity accorded to ordinary administrative proceedings.

Clearly, the jurisprudence on the matter clearly demonstrates that the burden to
prove compliance with the validity of the proceedings leading up to the tax

delinquency sale is incumbent upon the buyer or the winning bidder, which, in this
case, is the respondent. This is premised on the rule that a sale of land for tax
delinquency is in derogation of property and due process rights of the registered
owner. In order to be valid, the steps required by law must be strictly followed. The
burden to show that such steps were taken lies on the person claiming its validity, for
the Court cannot allow mere presumption of regularity to take precedence over the
right of a property owner to due process accorded no less than by the Constitution.

Respondent failed to establish that the following requirements were followed. Under
Section 254 of the LGC, it is required that the notice of delinquency must be posted at
the main hall and in a publicly accessible and conspicuous place in each barangay of
the local government unit concerned. It shall also be published once a week for two
(2) consecutive weeks, in a newspaper of general circulation in the province, city, or
municipality.

Moreover, Section 258 of the LGC further requires that should the treasurer issue a
warrant of levy, the same shall be mailed to or served upon the delinquent owner of
the real property or person having legal interest therein, or in case he is out of the
country or cannot be located, the administrator or occupant of the property. At the
same time, the written notice of the levy with the attached warrant shall be mailed to
or served upon the assessor and the Registrar of Deeds of the province, city or
municipality within the Metropolitan Manila Area where the property is located, who
shall annotate the levy on the tax declaration and certificate of title of the property,
respectively.

In addition, Section 260 of the LGC also mandates that within thirty (30) days after
service of the warrant of levy, the local treasurer shall proceed to publicly advertise
for sale or auction the property or a usable portion thereof as may be necessary to
satisfy the tax delinquency and expenses of sale. Such advertisement shall be effected
by posting a notice at the main entrance of the provincial, city or municipal building,
and in a publicly accessible and conspicuous place in the barangay where the real
property is located, and by publication once a week for two (2) weeks in a newspaper
of general circulation in the province, city or municipality where the property is
located.

The requirements for a tax delinquency sale under the LGC are mandatory. Strict
adherence to the statutes governing tax sales is imperative not only for the protection
of the taxpayers, but also to allay any possible suspicion of collusion between the
buyer and the public officials called upon to enforce the laws. Particularly, the notice of
sale to the delinquent land owners and to the public in general is an essential and
indispensable requirement of law, the non-fulfilment of which vitiates the sale. Thus,
the holding of a tax sale despite the absence of the requisite notice, as in this case, is
tantamount to a violation of the delinquent taxpayers substantial right to due
process.