CONSTITUTIONAL LAW CASES:

(1) ATTY. ALICIA RISOS-VIDAL v. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS

AND JOSEPH EJERCITO ESTRADA
G.R. No. 20666, 21 January 2015, EN BANC (Leonardo-De Castro, J.)
Thus, from both law and jurisprudence, the right to seek public elective office is
unequivocally considered as a political right. Hence, the Court reiterates its earlier
statement that the pardon granted to former President Estrada admits no other
interpretation other than to mean that, upon acceptance of the pardon granted to him,
he regained his FULL civil and political rights including the right to seek elective office.
FACTS:
In 2007, the Sandiganbayan convicted former President Estrada for the
crime of plunder. Subsequently, former President Gloria Macapagal Arroyo
extended executive clemency by way of pardon to former President Estrada, which
the latter received and accepted. Former President Estrada filed a Certificate of
Candidacy for the position of President in the 2010 Elections, which earned three
oppositions in the COMELEC. However, all three petitions were effectively
dismissed on the uniform grounds that (i) the Constitutional proscription on
reelection applies only to a sitting president; and (ii) the pardon granted to former
President Estrada by former President Arroyo restored the formers right to vote
and be voted for a public office. The Supreme Court again dismissed the oppositions
for being moot and academic as Estrada lost the presidential bid.
Thereafter, former President Estrada filed a Certificate of Candidacy for the
position of Mayor of the City of Manila. Petitioner Risos-Vidal filed a Petition for
Disqualification against former President Estrada, relying on Section 40 of the Local
Government Code (LGC), in relation to Section 12 of the Omnibus Election Code
(OEC). The COMELEC took cognizance of the previous resolutions as regards
former President Estradas right to seek public office and dismissed the petition.
Risos-Vidal then filed the present petition before the Supreme Court.
Meanwhile, the elections were conducted and former President Estrada was
proclaimed as the duly elected Mayor of the City of Manila. Subsequently, Lim, one
of former President Estradas opponents for the position of Mayor, moved for leave
to intervene in the case. He claimed that former President Estrada is disqualified to
run for and hold public office as the pardon granted to the latter failed to expressly
remit his perpetual disqualification. Further, given that former President Estrada is
disqualified to run for and hold public office, all the votes obtained by the latter
should be declared stray, and, being the second placer, he (Lim) should be declared
the rightful winning candidate for the position of Mayor of the City of Manila.
ISSUE:
Is former President Estrada qualified to vote and be voted for in public
office as a result of the pardon granted to him by former President Arroyo?

RULING:
Yes.
The pardoning power of the President cannot be limited by legislative action.
The 1987 Constitution, specifically Section 19 of Article VII and Section 5
of Article IX-C, provides that the President of the Philippines possesses the power
to grant pardons, along with other acts of executiveclemency, to wit:
Section 19. Except in cases of impeachment, or as otherwise provided in this
Constitution, the President may grant reprieves, commutations, and pardons, and
remit fines and forfeitures, after conviction by final judgment. He shall also have
the power to grant amnesty with the concurrence of a majority of all the Members
of the Congress.
xxxx
Section 5. No pardon, amnesty, parole, or suspension of sentence for violation of
election laws, rules, and regulations shall be granted by the President without the
favorable recommendation of the Commission.
It is apparent from the foregoing constitutional provisions that the only
instances in which the President may not extend pardon remain to be in: (1)
impeachment cases; (2) cases that have not yet resulted in a final conviction; and (3)
cases involving violations of election laws, rules and regulations in which there was
no favorable recommendation coming from the COMELEC. Therefore, it can be
argued that any act of Congress by way of statute cannot operate to delimit the
pardoning power of the President.
The proper interpretation of Articles36 and 41 of the Revised Penal Code.
Articles 36 and 41 of the Revised Penal Code provides:
ART. 36. Pardon; its effects. A pardon shall not work therestoration of the right to
hold public office, or the right of suffrage, unless such rights be expressly
restored by the terms of the pardon.
A pardon shall in no case exempt the culprit from the payment of the civil
indemnity imposed upon him by the sentence.
xxxx
ART. 41. Reclusion perpetua and reclusion temporal Their accessory penalties. The
penalties of reclusion perpetua and reclusion temporal shall carry with them that of civil
interdiction for life or during the period of the sentence as the case may be, and
that of perpetual absolute disqualification which the offender shall suffer even
though pardoned as to the principal penalty, unless the same shall have
been expressly remitted in the pardon.

The form or manner by which the President, or Congress for that matter,
should exercise their respective Constitutional powers or prerogatives cannot be
interfered with unless it is so provided in the Constitution. This is the essence of the
principle of separation of powers deeply ingrained in our system of government
which ordains that each of the three great branches of government has exclusive
cognizance of and is supreme in matters falling within its own constitutionally
allocated sphere. More so, this fundamental principle must be observed if
noncompliance with the form imposed by one branch on a co-equal and coordinate
branch will result into the diminution of an exclusive Constitutional prerogative.
For this reason, Articles 36 and 41 of the Revised Penal Code should be
construed in a way that will give full effect to the executive clemency granted by the
President, instead of indulging in an overly strict interpretation that may serve to
impair or diminish the import of the pardon which emanated from the Office of the
President and duly signed by the Chief Executive himself/herself. The said codal
provisions must be construed to harmonize the power of Congress to define crimes
and prescribe the penalties for such crimes and the power of the President to grant
executive clemency. All that the said provisions impart is that the pardon of the
principal penalty does not carry with it the remission of the accessory penalties
unless the President expressly includes said accessory penalties in the pardon. It still
recognizes the Presidential prerogative to grant executive clemency and, specifically,
to decide to pardon the principal penalty while excluding its accessory penalties or
to pardon both. Thus, Articles 36 and 41 only clarify the effect of the pardon so
decided upon by the President on the penalties imposed in accordance with law.
A close scrutiny of the text of the pardon extended to former President
Estrada shows that both the principal penalty of reclusion perpetua and its accessory
penalties are included in the pardon. The first sentence refers to the executive
clemency extended to former President Estrada who was convicted by the
Sandiganbayan of plunder and imposed a penalty of reclusion perpetua. The latter is the
principal penalty pardoned which relieved him of imprisonment. The sentence that
followed, which states that (h)e is hereby restored to his civil and political rights,
expressly remitted the accessory penalties that attached to the principal penalty of
reclusion perpetua. Hence, even if we apply Articles 36 and 41 of the Revised Penal
Code, it is indubitable from the text of the pardon that the accessory penalties of
civil interdiction and perpetual absolute disqualification were expressly remitted
together with the principal penalty of reclusion perpetua.
The disqualification of former President Estrada under Section 40 of the LGC
in relation to Section 12 of the OEC was removed by his acceptance of the
absolute pardon granted to him.
Section 40 of the LGC identifies who are disqualified from running for any
elective local position. Risos-Vidal argues that former President Estrada is
disqualified under item (a), to wit:
(a) Those sentenced by final judgment for an offense involving
moral turpitude or for an offense punishable by one (1) year or more

of imprisonment, within two (2) years after serving sentence[.]

Likewise, Section 12 of the OEC provides for similar prohibitions, but it
provides for an exception, to wit:
Section 12. Disqualifications. x x x unless he has been given
plenary pardon or granted amnesty.
While it may be apparent that the proscription in Section 40(a) of the LGC
is worded in absolute terms, Section 12 of the OEC provides a legal escape from the
prohibition a plenary pardon or amnesty. In other words, the latter provision
allows any person who has been granted plenary pardon or amnesty after conviction
by final judgment of an offense involving moral turpitude, inter alia, to run for and
hold any public office, whether local or national position.
The third preambular clause of the pardon did not operate to make the
pardon conditional.
Where the scope and import of the executive clemency extended by the
President is in issue, the Court must turn to the only evidence available to it, and
that is the pardon itself. From a detailed review of the four corners of said
document, nothing therein gives an iota of intimation that the third Whereas Clause is
actually a limitation, proviso, stipulation or condition on the grant of the pardon,
such that the breach of the mentioned commitment not to seek public office will
result in a revocation or cancellation of said pardon. To the Court, what it is simply
is a statement of fact or the prevailing situation at the time the executive clemency
was granted. It was not used as a condition to the efficacy or to delimit the scope of
the pardon.
Even if the Court were to subscribe to the view that the third Whereas Clause
was one of the reasons to grant the pardon, the pardon itself does not provide for
the attendant consequence of the breach thereof. This Court will be hard put to
discern the resultant effect of an eventual infringement. Just like it will be hard put
to determine which civil or political rights were restored if the Court were to take
the road suggested by Risos-Vidal that the statement [h]e is hereby restored to his civil
and political rights excludes the restoration of former President Estradas rights to
suffrage and to hold public office. The aforequoted text of the executive clemency
granted does not provide the Court with any guide as to how and where to draw the
line between the included and excluded political rights.

(2) THE DIOCESE OF BACOLOD v. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS

G.R. No. 205728, 21 January 2015, EN BANC (Leonen, J.)
What is involved in this case is the most sacred of speech forms: expression by the
electorate that tends to rouse the public to debate contemporary issues. This is not
speech by candidates or political parties to entice votes. It is a portion of the electorate
telling candidates the conditions for their election. It is the substantive content of the
right to suffrage.
FACTS:
The diocese of Bacolod posted 2 tarpaulins within a private compound
housing the San Sebastian Cathedral of Bacolod. Each tarpaulin was approximately
six feet (6') by ten feet (10') in size. They were posted on the front walls of the
cathedral within public view. The first tarpaulin contains the message IBASURA
RH Law referring to the Reproductive Health Law of 2012 or Republic Act No.
10354. The second tarpaulin is the subject of the present case. This tarpaulin
contains the heading Conscience Vote and lists candidates as either (Anti-RH)
Team Buhay with a check mark, or (Pro-RH) Team Patay with an X mark.
The electoral candidates were classified according to their vote on the adoption of
Republic Act No. 10354, otherwise known as the RH Law. Those who voted for the
passing of the law were classified by the diocese as comprising Team Patay, while
those who voted against it form Team Buhay.
The Election Officer of Bacolod ordered the removal of the 2nd tarpaulin.
Claiming it to be an election propaganda, the COMELEC issued an order
prompting for the removal of the tarpaulin for being oversized. The Diocese
assailed the said order of the COMELEC for being violative of their constitutional
right to freedom of expression and that it is a violation of the separation of the state
and the church. The Diocese likewise assails that the tarpaulins are beyond the
regulatory powers of the COMELEC regarding election materials since they are
neither candidates nor belonging to any political party.
ISSUES:
1. Can the COMELEC regulate the expression made by the Diocese of
Bacolod, the latter being private citizens?
2. Did the COMELEC order violate the constitutional right of the Diocese of
Bacolod to freedom of speech and expression?
3. Was the regulation applied by the COMELEC a content-neutral regulation?
RULING:
1. NO. COMELEC had no legal basis to regulate expressions made by
private citizens.
COMELEC considered the tarpaulin as a campaign material in their
issuances. The provisions under the Constitution, the Fair Election Act, and

COMELEC Resolution No. 9615 regulating the posting of campaign materials only
apply to candidates and political parties, and petitioners are neither of the two.
The tarpaulin was not paid for by any candidate or political party. There
was no allegation that the Diocese coordinated with any of the persons named in
the tarpaulin regarding its posting. On the other hand, petitioners posted the
tarpaulin as part of their advocacy against the RH Law. While the tarpaulin may
influence the success or failure of the named candidates and political parties, this
does not necessarily mean it is an election propaganda. The tarpaulin was not paid
for or posted in return for consideration by any candidate, political party, or
party-list group.
2. YES. The regulation is a violation of the constitutional guarantee of
free speech.
The message of the Diocese in this case will certainly not be what
candidates and political parties will carry in their election posters or media ads. The
message of the Diocese, taken as a whole, is an advocacy of a social issue that it
deeply believes. Through rhetorical devices, it communicates the desire of the
Diocese that the positions of those who run for a political position on this social
issue be determinative of how the public will vote. It primarily advocates a stand on
a social issue; only secondarily even almost incidentally will cause the election
or non-election of a candidate.
The twin tarpaulins consist of satire of political parties. Satire is a literary
form that employs such devices as sarcasm, irony and ridicule to deride prevailing
vices or follies, and this may target any individual or group in society, private and
government alike. It seeks to effectively communicate a greater purpose, often used
for political and social criticism because it tears down facades, deflates stuffed
shirts, and unmasks hypocrisy. . . . Nothing is more thoroughly democratic than to
have the high-and-mighty lampooned and spoofed. Northrop Frye, well known in
this literary field, claimed that satire had two defining features: one is wit or humor
founded on fantasy or a sense of the grotesque and absurd, the other is an object of
attack. Thus, satire frequently uses exaggeration, analogy, and other rhetorical
devices.
The tarpaulins exaggerate. Surely, Team Patay does not refer to a list of
dead individuals nor could the Archbishop of the Diocese of Bacolod have intended
it to mean that the entire plan of the candidates in his list was to cause death
intentionally. The tarpaulin caricatures political parties and parodies the intention of
those in the list. Furthermore, the list of Team Patay is juxtaposed with the list of
Team Buhay that further emphasizes the theme of its author: Reproductive health
is an important marker for the church of petitioners to endorse.
Embedded in the tarpaulin, however, are opinions expressed by Diocese. It is a
specie of expression protected by our fundamental law. It is an expression designed
to invite attention, cause debate, and hopefully, persuade. It may be motivated by
the interpretation of Diocese of their ecclesiastical duty, but their parishioners
actions will have very real secular consequence.

3. It is a CONTENT BASED REGULATION

Content-based restraint or censorship refers to restrictions based on the
subject matter of the utterance or speech. In contrast, content-neutral regulation
includes controls merely on the incidents of the speech such as time, place, or
manner of the speech. Size limitations during elections hit at a core part of
expression. The content of the tarpaulin is not easily divorced from the size of its
medium.
If we apply the test for content-neutral regulation, the questioned acts of
COMELEC will not pass the three requirements for evaluating such restraints on
freedom of speech. When the speech restraints take the form of a content-neutral
regulation, only a substantial governmental interest is required for its validity, and it
is subject only to the intermediate approach. This intermediate approach is based on
the test that we have prescribed in several cases. A content-neutral government
regulation is sufficiently justified: [1] if it is within the constitutional power of the
Government; [2] if it furthers an important or substantial governmental interest; [3]
if the governmental interest is unrelated to the suppression of free expression; and
[4] if the incident restriction on alleged [freedom of speech & expression] is no
greater than is essential to the furtherance of that interest.
On the first requisite, it is not within the constitutional powers of the
COMELEC to regulate the tarpaulin. As discussed earlier, this is a protected speech
by the petitioners who are non-candidates. On the second requirement, not only
must the governmental interest be important or substantial, it must also be
compelling as to justify the restrictions made. The third requisite is likewise lacking.
The court looks not only at the legislative intent or motive in imposing the
restriction, but more so at the effects of such restriction, if implemented. The
restriction must not be narrowly tailored to achieve the purpose. It must be
demonstrable. It must allow alternative avenues for the actor to make speech.
In this case, the size regulation is not unrelated to the suppression of
speech. Limiting the maximum size of the tarpaulin would render ineffective the
Dioceses message and violate their right to exercise freedom of expression.
The restriction in the present case does not pass even the lower test of
intermediate scrutiny for content-neutral regulations. The action of the COMELEC
in this case is a strong deterrent to further speech by the electorate. Given the
stature of the Diocese and their message, there are indicators that this will cause a
chilling effect on robust discussion during elections.

(3) RHONDA AVE S. VIVARES, et al.v. ST. THERESAS COLLEGE, et. al.
G.R. No. 202666, 29 September 2014, THIRD DIVISION, (Velasco, Jr., J.)
Availment of the writ of habeas data requires the existence of a nexus between the right
to privacy on the one hand, and the right to life, liberty or security on the other.
FACTS:
Nenita Julia V. Daluz and Julienne Vide Suzara, both minors, were graduating high school
students at St. Theresas College (STC), Cebu City. While changing into their swimsuits
for a beach party they were about to attend, Julia and Julienne, along with several
others, took digital pictures of themselves clad only in their undergarments and were
uploaded by Angela Lindsay Tan on her Facebook profile. Mylene Theza T. Escudero, a
computer teacher of STC, learned from her
students that Julia, Julienne, and Chloe Lourdes Taboada posted pictures online,
depicting themselves from the waist up, dressed only in brassieres. Using STCs
computers, Escuderos students logged in to their respective personal Facebook
accounts and showed her photos of the identified students, which include Julia and
Julienne: (a) drinking hard liquor and smoking cigarettes inside a bar; and (b) wearing
articles of clothing that show virtually the entirety of their black brassieres. There were
times when access to or the availability of the identified students photos was not
confined to the girls Facebook friends, but were, in fact, viewable by any Facebook user.
STCs Discipline-in-Charge penalized the students by barring them from joining the
commencement exercises. Angelas mother, Dr. Armenia M. Tan, filed a petition for
injunction and damages before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) against STC, praying that
STC be enjoined from implementing the sanction that precluded Angela from joining the
commencement exercises to which Rhonda Ave Vivares, Julias mother, joined as
intervenor. The RTC issued a Temporary Restraining Order (TRO) allowing students to
attend the graduation ceremony. Despite the issuance of the TRO, STC barred the
sanctioned students from participating in the graduation rites. Thereafter, Virares filed
before the RTC a Petition for the Issuance of a Writ of Habeas Data, arguing that the
privacy setting of their childrens Facebook accounts was set at Friends Only.
The RTC rendered a decision dismissing the petition for habeas data stating that the
Vivares, et al. failed to prove the existence of an actual or threatened violation of the
minors right to privacy, one of the preconditions for the issuance of the writ of habeas
data.
ISSUE:
Was there an actual or threatened violation of the right to privacy of the
minors involved so as to warrant the issuance of writ of habeas data?
RULING:
No. In developing the writ of habeas data, the Court aimed to protect an
individuals right to informational privacy, among others. A comparative law scholar has,
in fact, defined habeas data as a procedure designed to safeguard individual freedom
from abuse in the information age. The writ, however, will not issue on the basis merely
of an alleged unauthorized access to information about a person.

Availment of the writ requires the existence of a nexus between the right to privacy on
the one hand, and the right to life, liberty or security on the other. Thus, the existence of
a persons right to informational privacy and a showing, at least by substantial evidence,
of an actual or threatened violation of the right to privacy in life, liberty or security of the
victim are indispensable before the privilege of the writ may be extended.
Facebook was armed with different privacy tools designed to regulate the accessibility of
a users profile as well as information uploaded by the user. These are designed to set up
barriers to broaden or limit the visibility of his or her specific profile content, statuses,
and photos, among others, from other users point of view. In other words, Facebook
extends its users an avenue to make the availability of their Facebook activities reflect
their choice as to when and to what extent to disclose facts about themselves and to
put others in the position of receiving such confidences. Ideally, the selected setting will
be based on ones desire to interact with others, coupled with the opposing need to
withhold certain information as well
as to regulate the spreading of his or her personal information. Needless to say, as the
privacy setting becomes more limiting, fewer Facebook users can view that
users particular post.
It is through the availability of said privacy tools that many OSN users are said to have a
subjective expectation that only those whom they grant access to their profile will view
the information they post or upload thereto. Before one can have an expectation of
privacy in his or her OSN activity, it is first necessary that said
user, in this case their children, manifest the intention to keep certain posts private,
through the employment of measures to prevent access thereto or to limit its visibility.
And this intention can materialize in cyberspace through the utilization of the OSNs
privacy tools. In other words, utilization of these privacy tools is the manifestation, in
cyber word, of the users invocation of his or her right to informational privacy. Therefore,
a Facebook user who opts to make use of a privacy tool to grant or deny access to his or
her post or profile detail should not be denied the informational privacy right which
necessarily accompanies said choice.

(4) FIRST CLASS CADET ALDRIN JEFF P. CUDIA OF THE PHILIPPINE MILITARY
ACADEMY, REPRESENTED BY HIS FATHER RENATO P. CUDIA, WHO ALSO ACTS
ON HIS OWN BEHALF, AND BERTENI CATALUA CAUSING, Petitioners, v. THE
SUPERINTENDENT OF THE PHILIPPINE MILITARY ACADEMY (PMA), THE HONOR
COMMITTEE (HC) OF 2014 OF THE PMA AND HC MEMBERS, AND THE CADET
REVIEW AND APPEALS BOARD (CRAB), Respondents.
G.R. No. 211362, February 24, 2015
FACTS:
Aldrin Jeff Cudia was a member of the Philippine Military Academy (PMA) Siklab
Diwa Class of 2014. On November 14, 2013, Cudias class had a lesson examination in
their Operations Research (OR) subject the schedule of which was from 1:30pm to 3pm.

However, after he submitted his exam paper, Cudia made a query to their OR teacher.
Said teacher, then asked Cudia to wait for her. Cudia complied and as a result, he was
late for his next class (English). Later, the English teacher reported Cudia for being late.
In his explanation, Cudia averred that he was late because his OR class was dismissed a
bit late. The tactical officer (TO) tasked to look upon the matter concluded that Cudia lied
when he said that their OR class was dismissed late because the OR teacher said she
never dismissed her class late. Thus, Cudia was meted with demerits and touring hours
because of said infraction.
Cudia did not agree with the penalty hence he asked the TO about it. Not content with
the explanation of the TO, Cudia said he will be appealing the penalty he incurred to the
senior tactical officer (STO). The TO then asked Cudia to write his appeal.
In his appeal, Cudia stated that his being late was out of his control because his OR class
was dismissed at 3pm while his English class started at 3pm also. To that the TO replied:
that on record, and based on the interview with the teachers concerned, the OR teacher
did not dismiss them (the class) beyond 3pm and the English class started at 3:05pm,
not 3pm; that besides, under PMA rules, once a student submitted his examination
paper, he is dismissed from said class and may be excused to leave the classroom,
hence, Cudia was in fact dismissed well before 3pm; that it was a lie for Cudia to state
that the class was dismissed late because again, on that day in the OR class, each
student was dismissed as they submit their examination, and were not dismissed as a
class; that if Cudia was ordered by the teacher to stay, it was not because such
transaction was initiated by the teacher, rather, it was initiated by Cudia (because of his
query to the teacher), although there were at least two students with Cudia at that time
querying the teacher, the three of them cannot be considered a class; Cudia could just
have stated all that instead of saying that his class was dismissed a bit late, hence he
lied. The STO sustained the decision of the TO.
Later, the TO reported Cudia to the PMAs Honor Committee (HC) for allegedly violating
the Honor Code. Allegedly, Cudia lied in his written appeal when he said his class was
dismissed late hence, as a result, he was late for his next class.
The Honor Code is PMAs basis for the minimum standard of behavior required of their
cadets. Any violation thereof may be a ground to separate a cadet from PMA.
Cudia submitted an explanation to the HC. Thereafter, the HC, which is composed of nine
(9) cadets, conducted an investigation. After two hearings and after the parties involved
were heard and with their witnesses presented, the HC reconvened and the members
cast their vote. The initial vote was 8-1: 8 found Cudia guilty and 1 acquitted Cudia.
Under PMA rules (Honor System), a dissenting vote means the acquittal of Cudia.
However, they also have a practice of chambering where the members, particularly the
dissenter, are made to explain their vote. This is to avoid the tyranny of the minority.

After the chambering, the dissenter was convinced that his initial not guilty vote was
improper, hence he changed the same and the final vote became 9-0. Thus, Cudia was
immediately placed inside PMAs holding center.
Cudia appealed to the HC chairman but his appeal was denied. Eventually, the
Superintendent of the PMA ordered the dismissal of Cudia from the PMA.
Cudia and several members of his family then sent letters to various military officers
requesting for a re-investigation. It was their claim that there were irregularities in the
investigation done by the HC. As a result of such pleas, the case of Cudia was referred to
the Cadet Review and Appeals Board of PMA (CRAB).
Meanwhile, Cudias family brought the case to the Commission on Human Rights (CHR)
where it was alleged that PMAs sham investigation violated Cudias rights to due
process, education, and privacy of communication.
Eventually, the CRAB ruled against Cudia. This ruling was affirmed by the AFP Chief of
Staff. But on the other hand, the CHR found in favor of Cudia.
PMA averred that CHRs findings are at best recommendatory. Cudia filed a petition
for certiorari, prohibition, andmandamus before the Supreme Court. PMA opposed the
said petition as it argued that the same is not proper as a matter of policy and that the
court should avoid interfering with military matters.
ISSUES:
1. Whether or not Cudias petitions is proper.
2. Whether or not the PMA can validly dismiss Cudia based on its findings.
HELD:
I.
Mandamus is not proper
Mandamus will not prosper in this case. Cudias prayer that PMA should be compelled to
reinstate him as well as to give him his supposed academic awards is not proper. The
Courts, even the Supreme Court, cannot compel PMA to do so because the act of
restoring Cudias rights and entitlements as a cadet as well as his awards is a
discretionary act. Mandamus cannot be availed against an official or government agency,
in this case PMA, whose duty requires the exercise of discretion or judgment. Further,
such act which PMA was sought by Cudia to perform is within PMAs academic freedom as
an educational institution and such performance is beyond the jurisdiction of courts.
Certiorari is allowed
The petition for certiorari is allowed because the issue herein is whether or not PMA and
its responsible officers acted with grave abuse of discretion when it dismissed Cudia.
Under the Constitution, that is the duty of the courts to decide actual controversies and

to determine whether or not a government branch or instrumentality acted with grave

abuse of discretion. Thus, PMA cannot argue that judicial intervention into military affairs
is not proper as a matter of policy. Suffice it to say that judicial non-interference in
military affairs is not an absolute rule.
On the civil liberties of PMA cadets
One of the arguments raised by PMA is that cadets, when they enrolled in the PMA, have
surrendered parts of their civil and political liberties. Hence, when they are disciplined
and punished by the PMA, said cadets cannot question the same, much less, question it
in the courts. in short, they cannot raise due process.
On this, the SC held that such argument is wrong. It is true that a PMA cadet, by
enrolling at PMA, must be prepared to subordinate his private interests for the proper
functioning of the educational institution he attends to, one that is with a greater degree
than a student at a civilian public school. However, a cadet facing dismissal from PMA,
whose private interests are at stake (life, liberty, property) which includes his honor,
good name, and integrity, is entitled to due process. No one can be deprived of such
without due process of law and the PMA, even as a military academy, is not exempt from
such strictures. Thus, when Cudia questioned in court the manner upon which he was
dismissed from the PMA, such controversy may be inquired upon by the courts.
(Authors note: PMA, in essence, raised that due process, as contemplated by the
Constitution, is not needed in dismissing a cadet yet, as can be seen in the below
discussion, PMA presented evidence that due process was, in fact, complied with.)
II. Yes. It is within PMAs right to academic freedom to decide whether or not a cadet is
still worthy to be part of the institution. Thus, PMA did not act with grave abuse of
discretion when it dismissed Cudia. In fact, Cudia was accorded due process. In this case,
the investigation of Cudias Honor Code violation followed the prescribed procedure and
existing practices in the PMA. He was notified of the Honor Report submitted by his TO.
He was then given the opportunity to explain the report against him. He was informed
about his options and the entire process that the case would undergo. The preliminary
investigation immediately followed after he replied and submitted a written explanation.
Upon its completion, the investigating team submitted a written report together with its
recommendation to the HC Chairman. The HC thereafter reviewed the findings and
recommendations. When the honor case was submitted for formal investigation, a new
team was assigned to conduct the hearing. During the formal investigation/hearing, he
was informed of the charge against him and given the right to enter his plea. He had the
chance to explain his side, confront the witnesses against him, and present evidence in
his behalf. After a thorough discussion of the HC voting members, he was found to have
violated the Honor Code. Thereafter, the guilty verdict underwent the review process at
the Academy level from the OIC of the HC, to the SJA (Staff Judge Advocate), to the
Commandant of Cadets, and to the PMA Superintendent. A separate investigation was

also conducted by the HTG (Headquarters Tactics Group). Then, upon the directive of the
AFP-GHQ (AFP-General Headquarters) to reinvestigate the case, a review was conducted
by the CRAB. Further, a Fact-Finding Board/Investigation Body composed of the CRAB
members and the PMA senior officers was constituted to conduct a deliberate
investigation of the case. Finally, he had the opportunity to appeal to the President. Sadly
for him, all had issued unfavorable rulings. And there is no reason for the SC to disturb
the findings of facts by these bodies.
Academic freedom of the PMA
Cudia would argue that there is no law providing that a guilty finding by the HC may be
used by the PMA to dismiss or recommend the dismissal of a cadet from the PMA; that
Honor Code violation is not among those listed as justifications for the attrition of cadets
considering that the Honor Code and the Honor System (manner which PMA conducts
investigation of Honor Code violations) do not state that a guilty cadet is automatically
terminated or dismissed from service.
Such argument is not valid. Even without express provision of a law, the PMA has
regulatory authority to administratively dismiss erring cadets. Further, there is a law
(Commonwealth Act No. 1) authorizing the President to dismiss cadets. Such power by
the President may be delegated to the PMA Superintendent, who may exercise direct
supervision and control over the cadets.
Further, as stated earlier, such power by the PMA is well within its academic
freedom. Academic freedom or, to be precise, the institutional autonomy of universities
and institutions of higher learning has been enshrined in the Constitution.
The essential freedoms of academic freedom on the part of schools are as follows;
a. the right to determine who may teach;
b. the right to determine what may be taught;
c. the right to determine how it shall be taught;
d. the right to determine who may be admitted to study.
The Honor Code is just but one way for the PMA to exercise its academic freedom. If it
determines that a cadet violates it, then it has the right to dismiss said cadet. In this
case, based on its findings, Cudia lied which is a violation of the Honor Code.
But Cudias lie is not even that big; is dismissal from the PMA really warranted?
The PMA Honor Code does not distinguish between a big lie and a minor lie. It punishes
any form of lying. It does not have a gradation of penalties. In fact, it is the discretion of
the PMA as to what penalty may be imposed. When Cudia enrolled at PMA, he agreed to
abide by the Honor Code and the Honor System. Thus, while the punishment may be

severe, it is nevertheless reasonable and not arbitrary, and, therefore, not in violation of
due process -also considering that Cudia, as a cadet, must have known all of these.

(5) MARIA CAROLINA P. ARAULLO, et al. v. BENIGNO SIMEON

AQUINO III, et al.
G.R. Nos. 209287, 209135, 209136, 209155, 209164, 209260, 209442,
209517 & 209569, 3 February 2015, EN BANC, (Bersamin, J.)
The exercise of the power to augment shall be strictly construed by virtue of its being an
exception to the general rule that the funding of PAPs shall be limited to the amount
fixed by Congress for the purpose. Necessarily, savings, their utilization and their
management will also be strictly construed against expanding the scope of the power to
augment. Such a strict interpretation is essential in order to keep the Executive and
other budget implementors within the limits of their prerogatives during budget
execution, and to prevent them from unduly transgressing Congress power of the purse.
The ascertainment of good faith, or the lack of it, and the determination of whether or
not due diligence and prudence were exercised, are questions of fact. The want of good
faith is thus better determined by tribunals other than this Court, which is not a trier of
facts.
FACTS:
In this Motion for Reconsideration, Aquino III, et al. maintain that the
issues in these consolidated cases were mischaracterized and unnecessarily
constitutionalized because the Courts interpretation of savings can be overturned
by legislation considering that savings is defined in the General Appropriations Act
(GAA), hence making savings a statutory issue. They aver that the withdrawn
unobligated allotments and unreleased appropriations constitute savings and may be
used for augmentation and that the Court should apply legally recognized norms and
principles, most especially the presumption of good faith, in resolving their motion.
On their part, Araullo, et al. pray for the partial reconsideration of the
decision on the ground that the Court failed to declare as unconstitutional and illegal all
moneys under the Disbursement Acceleration Program (DAP) used for alleged
augmentation of appropriation items that did not have actual deficiencies. They submit
that augmentation of items beyond the maximum amounts recommended by the
President for the programs, activities and projects (PAPs) contained in the budget
submitted to Congress should be declared unconstitutional.
ISSUES:
1. Are the acts and practices under the DAP, particularly their non-conformity
with Section 25(5), Article VI of the Constitution and the principles of
separation of power and equal protection, constitutional?
2. Did the Courts Decision invalidated all DAP-funded projects?
3. Did the Courts Decision throw out the presumption of good faith of the

authors, proponents and implementors of the Disbursement Acceleration

Program (DAP)?
RULING:
1. No. Regardless of the perceived beneficial purposes of the DAP, and
regardless of whether the DAP is viewed as an effective tool of stimulating the
national economy, the acts and practices under the DAP and the relevant provisions of
NBC No. 541 cited in the Decision should remain illegal and unconstitutional as long as
the funds used to finance the projects mentioned therein are sourced from savings that
deviated from the relevant provisions of the GAA, as well as the limitation on the power
to augment under Section 25(5), Article VI of the Constitution. In a society governed by
laws, even the best intentions must come within the parameters defined and set by the
Constitution and the law. Laudable purposes must be carried out through legal methods.
Section 38, Chapter 5, Book VI of the Administrative Code refers to the
authority of the President to suspend or otherwise stop further expenditure of
funds allotted for any agency, or any other expenditure authorized in the GAA.
When the President suspends or stops expenditure of funds, savings are not
automatically generated until it has been established that such funds or
appropriations are free from any obligation or encumbrance, and that the work,
activity or purpose for which the appropriation is authorized has been completed,
discontinued or abandoned.
The reversion to the General Fund of unexpended balances of
appropriations savings included pursuant to Section 28 Chapter IV, Book VI of
the Administrative Code22 does not apply to the Constitutional Fiscal Autonomy
Group (CFAG), which include the Judiciary, Civil Service Commission,
Commission on Audit, Commission on Elections, Commission on Human Rights,
and the Office of the Ombudsman. The reason for this is that the fiscal autonomy
enjoyed by the CFAG.
Section 39 is evidently in conflict with the plain text of Section 25(5),
Article VI of the Constitution because it allows the President to approve the use of
any savings in the regular appropriations authorized in the GAA for programs and
projects of any department, office or agency to cover a deficit in any other item of
the regular appropriations. As such, Section 39 violates the mandate of Section
25(5) because the latter expressly limits the authority of the President to augment an
item in the GAA to only those in his own Department out of the savings in other items of
his own Departments appropriations. Accordingly, Section 39 cannot serve as a valid
authority to justify cross-border transfers under the DAP. Augmentations under the DAP
which are made by the Executive within its department shall, however, remain valid so
long as the requisites under Section 25(5) are complied with.
2. No. It is to be emphatically indicated that the Decision did not declare
the en masse invalidation of the 116 DAP-funded projects. To be sure, the Court
recognized the encouraging effects of the DAP on the countrys economy, and
acknowledged its laudable purposes, most especially those directed towards
infrastructure development and efficient delivery of basic social services. It bears

repeating that the DAP is a policy instrument that the Executive, by its own
prerogative, may utilize to spur economic growth and development.
This modified interpretation does not take away the caveat that only DAP
projects found in the appropriate GAAs may be the subject of augmentation by
legally accumulated savings. Whether or not the 116 DAP-funded projects had
appropriation cover and were validly augmented require factual determination that is
not within the scope of the present consolidated petitions under Rule 65.
Nonetheless, the Decision did find doubtful those projects that appeared to
have no appropriation cover under the relevant GAAs on the basis that: (1) the
DAP funded projects that originally did not contain any appropriation for some of
the expense categories (personnel, MOOE and capital outlay); and (2) the
appropriation code and the particulars appearing in the SARO did not correspond
with the program specified in the GAA.
Accordingly, the item referred to by Section 25(5) of the Constitution is the
last and indivisible purpose of a program in the appropriation law, which is distinct from
the expense category or allotment class. There is no specificity, indeed, either in the
Constitution or in the relevant GAAs that the object of augmentation should be the
expense category or allotment class. In the same vein, the President cannot exercise his
veto power over an expense category; he may only veto the item to which that expense
category belongs to.
3. No. The Court has neither thrown out the presumption of good faith
nor imputed bad faith to the authors, proponents and implementors of the DAP.
The contrary is true, because the Court has still presumed their good faith by
pointing out that the doctrine of operative fact cannot apply to the authors,
proponents and implementors of the DAP, unless there are concrete findings of
good faith in their favor by the proper tribunals determining their criminal, civil,
administrative and other liabilities.

(6) PEOPLE VS. COGAED

June 30, 2014, G.R. No. 200334
FACTS: Victor Cogaed was riding a jeepney with a bag from Barangay Lun-Oy and during
a checkpoint, the driver of the jeepney he rode made a signal to the police telling that
Cogaed was carrying marijuana inside Cogaeds bag; the police officer then approached
Cogaed and asked the accused about the contents of his bags. Cogaed replied that he did
not know what was inside and that he was just transporting the bag in favor of Marvin, a
barrio mate. Cogaed subsequently opened the bag revealing the bricks of marijuana
inside. He was then arrested by the police officers.
ISSUE: Whether there was a valid search and seizure; and, whether the marijuana
confiscated is admissible as evidence.
HELD: NO. There is no valid search and seizure; thus, the marijuana confiscated shall
not be admissible as evidence.
As a general rule, searches conducted with a warrant that meets all the requirements of
Article III, Section 2 of the Constitution are reasonable. This warrant requires the
existence of probable cause that can only be determined by a judge.
However, there are instances when searches are reasonable even when warrantless. The
known jurisprudential instances of reasonable warrantless searches and seizures are:
(1)
(2)
(3)
(4)
(5)
(6)
(7)

Warrantless search incidental to a lawful arrest

Seizure of evidence in plain view,
Search of a moving vehicle;
Consented warrantless search;
Customs search;
Stop and frisk; and
Exigent and emergency circumstances.

The search involved in this case was initially a stop and frisk search, but it did not
comply with all the requirements of reasonability required by the Constitution.
Stop and frisk searches (sometimes referred to as Terry searches) are necessary for
law enforcement. That is, law enforcers should be given the legal arsenal to prevent the
commission of offenses. However, this should be balanced with the need to protect the
privacy of citizens in accordance with Article III, Section 2 of the Constitution. The
balance lies in the concept of suspiciousness present in the situation where the police
officer finds himself or herself in. This may be undoubtedly based on the experience of
the police officer. It does not have to be probable cause, but it cannot be mere suspicion.
It has to be a genuine reason to serve the purposes of the stop and frisk exception.
The stop and frisk search was originally limited to outer clothing and for the purpose of
detecting dangerous weapons.

There was not a single suspicious circumstance in this case, and there was no
approximation for the probable cause requirement for warrantless arrest. The person
searched was not even the person mentioned by the informant. The informant gave the
name of Marvin Buya, and the person searched was Victor Cogaed. Even if it was true
that Cogaed responded by saying that he was transporting the bag to Marvin Buya, this
still remained only as one circumstance. This should not have been enough reason to
search Cogaed and his belongings without a valid search warrant.
Likewise, the facts of the case do not qualify as a search incidental to a lawful arrest. The
apprehension of Cogaed was not effected with a warrant of arrest. None of the instances
enumerated in Rule 113, Section 5 of the Rules of Court were present when the arrest
was made. At the time of his apprehension, Cogaed has not committed, was not
committing, or was about to commit a crime. There were no overt acts within plain view
of the police officers that suggested that Cogaed was in possession of drugs at that time.
Also, Cogaed was not an escapee prisoner that time; hence, he could not have qualified
for the last allowable warrantless arrest.
There can be no valid waiver of Cogaeds constitutional rights even if we assume that he
did not object when the police asked him to open his bags. Appellants silence should not
be lightly taken as consent to such search. The implied acquiescence to the search, if
there was any, could not have been more than mere passive conformity given under
intimidating or coercive circumstances and is thus considered no consent at all within the
purview of the constitutional guarantee.
The Constitution provides that any evidence obtained in violation of the right against
unreasonable searches and seizures shall be inadmissible for any purpose in any
proceeding. Otherwise known as the exclusionary rule or the fruit of the poisonous tree
doctrine, this rule prohibits the issuance of general warrants that encourage law
enforcers to go on fishing expeditions. Evidence obtained through unlawful seizures
should be excluded as evidence because it is the only practical means of enforcing the
constitutional injunction against unreasonable searches and seizures. It ensures that the
fundamental rights to ones person, houses, papers, and effects are not lightly infringed
upon and are upheld.
Considering that the prosecution and conviction of Cogaed were founded on the search of
his bags, a pronouncement of the illegality of that search means that there is no
evidence left to convict Cogaed.
(7) ALVIN COMERCIANTE VS. PEOPLE
July 22, 2015, G.R. No. 205926
FACTS: On July 31, 2003, an Information was filed before the RTC charging Comerciante
of violation of Section 11, Article II of RA 9165.
According to the prosecution, at around 10 o'clock in the evening of July 30, 2003, Agent
Eduardo Radan (Agent Radan) of the NARCOTICS group and PO3 Bienvy Calag II (PO3
Calag) were aboard a motorcycle, patrolling the area while on their way to visit a friend
at Private Road, Barangay Hulo, Mandaluyong City. Cruising at a speed of 30 kilometers
per hour along Private Road, they spotted, at a distance of about 10 meters, two (2) men

- later identified as Comerciante and a certain Erick Dasilla. Standing and showing
"improper and unpleasant movements," with one of them handing plastic sachets to the
other. Thinking that the sachets may contain shabu, they immediately stopped and
approached Comerciante and Dasilla. At a distance ofaround five (5) meters, PO3 Calag
introduced himself as a police officer, arrested Comerciante and Dasilla, and confiscated
two (2) plastic sachets containing white crystalline substance from them. A laboratory
examination later confirmed that said sachets contained methamphetamine hydrochloride
or shabu.
After the prosecution rested its case, Dasilla filed a demurrer to evidence, which was
granted by the RTC, thus his acquittal. However, due to Comerciante's failure to file his
own demurrer to evidence, the RTC considered his right to do so waived and ordered him
to present his evidence.
In his defense, Comerciante averred that P03 Calag was looking for a certain "Barok",
who was a notorious drug pusher in the area, when suddenly, he and Dasilla, who were
just standing in front of a jeepney along Private Road, were arrested and taken to a
police station. There, the police officers claimed to have confiscated illegal drugs from
them and were asked money in exchange for their release. When they failed to accede to
the demand, they were brought to another police station to undergo inquest proceedings,
and thereafter, were charged with illegal possession of dangerous drugs.
ISSUE: Whether or not the CA correctly affirmed Comerciante's conviction for violation of
Section 11, Article II of RA 9165.
HELD: NO. The petition is meritorious. The Court finds it highly implausible that PO3
Calag, even assuming that he has perfect vision, would be able to identify with
reasonable accuracy - especially from a distance of around 10 meters, and while aboard
a motorcycle cruising at a speed of 30 kilometers per hour - miniscule amounts of white
crystalline substance inside two (2) very small plastic sachets held by Comerciante. The
Court also notes that no other overt act could be properly attributed to Comerciante as to
rouse suspicion in the mind of PO3 Calag that the former had just committed, was
committing, or was about to commit a crime. Verily, the acts of standing around with a
companion and handing over something to the latter cannot in any way be considered
criminal acts. In fact, even if Comerciante and his companion were showing "improper
and unpleasant movements" as put by PO3 Calag, the same would not have been
sufficient in order to effect a lawful warrantless arrest under Section 5 (a), Rule 113 of
the Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure.
Section 2, Article III of the Constitution mandates that a search and seizure must be
carried out through or on the strength of a judicial warrant predicated upon the existence
of probable cause; in the absence of such warrant, such search and seizure becomes, as
a general rule, "unreasonable" within the meaning of said constitutional provision.
The exclusionary rule is not, however, an absolute and rigid proscription. One of the
recognized exceptions established by jurisprudence is a search incident to a lawful arrest.
In this instance, the law requires that there first be a lawful arrest before a search can be
made - the process cannot be reversed.
Section 5, Rule 113 of the Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure lays down the rules on
lawful warrantless arrests, as follows:

xxx (a) When, in his presence, the person to be arrested has committed, is
actually committing, or is attempting to commit an offense; xxx
For a warrantless arrest under Section 5 (a) to operate, two (2) elements must concur,
namely: (a) the person to be arrested must execute an overt act indicating that he has
just committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to commit a crime; and (b) such
overt act is done in the presence or within the view of the arresting officer. On the other
hand, Section 5 (b) requires for its application that at the time of the arrest, an offense
had in fact just been committed and the arresting officer had personal knowledge of facts
indicating that the accused had committed it.
In both instances, the officer's personal knowledge of the fact of the commission of an
offense is absolutely required. Under Section 5 (a), the officer himself witnesses the
crime; while in Section 5 (b), he knows for a fact that a crime has just been committed.
The factual backdrop of the instant case failed to show that PO3 Calag had personal
knowledge that a crime had been indisputably committed by Comerciante. Verily, it is not
enough that the arresting officer had reasonable ground to believe that the accused had
just committed a crime; a crime must, in fact, have been committed first, which does not
obtain in this case. Gonzales must be acquitted.
(8) JOEY M. PESTILOS VS. MORENO GENEROSO
November 10, 2014, 739 SCRA 337
FACTS: On February 2005, at around 3:15 in the morning, an altercation ensued
between the petitioners and Atty. Moreno Generoso. Atty. Generoso called the Central
Police and when they arrived, they saw him badly beaten. Atty. Generoso then pointed to
the petitioners as those who mauled him. This prompted the police officers to "invite" the
petitioners to go to Batasan Hills Police Station for investigation. The petitioners went
with the police officers to Batasan Hills Police Station.9 At the inquest proceeding, the
City Prosecutor of Quezon City found that the petitioners stabbed Atty. Generoso with a
bladed weapon. Atty. Generoso fortunately survived the attack. In an Information dated
February 22, 2005, the petitioners were indicted for attempted murder. Petitioners filed
an Urgent Motion for Regular Preliminary Investigation on the ground that they had not
been lawfully arrested. They alleged that no valid warrantless arrest took place since the
police officers had no personal knowledge that they were the perpetrators of the crime.
They also claimed that they were just "invited" to the police station. Thus, the inquest
proceeding was improper, and a regular procedure for preliminary investigation should
have been performed pursuant to Rule 112 of the Rules of Court. The RTC denied the
Urgent Motion and the CA also denied such.
ISSUES:
(1) Whether petitioners were validly arrested without a warrant (YES)
(2) Whether petitioners were lawfully arrested when they were merely invited to the
police precinct (YES)
(3) Whether the order denying the motion for preliminary investigation is void for failure
to state the facts and the law upon which it was based (YES)
HELD:

(1) YES. For purposes of this case, the Court shall focus on the history of Section 5(b).
The provision has undergone changes through the years not just in its phraseology but
also in its interpretation in our jurisprudence. Under the 1940 and the 1964 Rules of
Court, the Rules required that there should be actual commission of an offense, thus,
removing the element of the arresting officer's "reasonable suspicion of the commission
of an offense." The 1940 and 1964 Rules of Court restricted the arresting officer's
discretion in warrantless arrests under Section 6(b), Rule 113 of the 1964 Rules of Court.
Section 6, Rule 113 of the 1964 Rules of Court again underwent substantial changes and
was re-worded and re-numbered when it became Section 5, Rule 113 of the 1985 Rules
of Criminal Procedure. As amended, Section 5(b), Rule 113 of the 1985 Rules of Court
retained the restrictions introduced under the 1964 Rules of Court. More importantly,
however, it added a qualification that the commission of the offense should not only have
been "committed" but should have been "just committed." This limited the arresting
officer's time frame for conducting an investigation for purposes of gathering information
indicating that the person sought to be arrested has committed the crime
Section 5(b), Rule 113 of the 1985 Rules of Criminal Procedure was further amended
with the incorporation of the word "probable cause" as the basis of the arresting officer's
determination on whether the person to be arrested has committed the crime. From the
current phraseology of the rules on warrantless arrest, it appears that for purposes of
Section 5(b), the following are the notable changes: first, the contemplated offense was
qualified by the word "just," connoting immediacy; and second, the warrantless arrest of
a person sought to be arrested should be based on probable cause to be determined by
the arresting officer based on his personal knowledge of facts and circumstances that the
person to be arrested has committed it. It is clear that the present rules have objectified"
the previously subjective determination of the arresting officer as to the (1) commission
of the crime; and (2) whether the person sought to be arrested committed the crime. As
presently worded, the elements under Section 5(b), Rule 113 of the Revised Rules of
Criminal Procedure are: first, an offense has just been committed; and second, the
arresting officer has probable cause to believe based on personal knowledge of facts or
circumstances that the person to be arrested has committed it.
The purpose of a preliminary investigation is to determine whether a crime has been
committed and whether there is probable cause to believe that the accused is guilty of
the crime and should be held for trial. On the other hand, probable cause in judicial
proceedings for the issuance of a warrant of arrest is defined as the existence of such
facts and circumstances that would lead a reasonably discreet and prudent person to
believe that an offense has been committed by the person sought to be arrested.
Hence, before issuing a warrant of arrest, the judge must be satisfied that based on the
evidence submitted, there is sufficient proof that a crime has been committed and that
the person to be arrested is probably guilty thereof. At this stage of the criminal
proceeding, the judge is not yet tasked to review in detail the evidence submitted during
the preliminary investigation.
In contrast, the arresting officer's determination of probable cause under Section 5(b),
Rule 113 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure is based on his personal knowledge
of facts or circumstances that the person sought to be arrested has committed the crime.
These facts or circumstances pertain to actual facts or raw evidence, i.e., supported by

circumstances sufficiently strong in themselves to create the probable cause of guilt of

the person to be arrested. A reasonable suspicion therefore must be founded on probable
cause, coupled with good faith on the part of the peace officers making the arrest
The phrase covers facts or, in the alternative, circumstances. According to the Black's
Law Dictionary, "circumstances are attendant or accompanying facts, events or
conditions." Circumstances may pertain to events or actions within the actual perception,
personal evaluation or observation of the police officer at the scene of the crime. Thus,
even though the police officer has not seen someone actually fleeing, he could still make
a warrantless arrest if, based on his personal evaluation of the circumstances at the
scene of the crime, he could determine the existence of probable cause that the person
sought to be arrested has committed the crime. However, the determination of probable
cause and the gathering of facts or circumstances should be made immediately after the
commission of the crime in order to comply with the element of immediacy.
In other words, the clincher in the element of "personal knowledge of facts or
circumstances" is the required element of immediacy within which these facts or
circumstances should be gathered. This required time element acts as a safeguard to
ensure that the police officers have gathered the facts or perceived the circumstances
within a very limited time frame. This guarantees that the police officers would have no
time to base their probable cause finding on facts or circumstances obtained after an
exhaustive investigation.
Hence, for purposes of resolving the issue on the validity of the warrantless arrest of the
present petitioners, the question to be resolved is whether the requirements for a valid
warrantless arrest under Section 5(b), Rule 113 of the Revised Rules of Criminal
Procedure were complied with, namely: 1) has the crime just been committed when they
were arrested? 2) did the arresting officer have personal knowledge of facts and
circumstances that the petitioners committed the crime? and 3) based on these facts and
circumstances that the arresting officer possessed at the time of the petitioners' arrest,
would a reasonably discreet and prudent person believe that the attempted murder of
Atty. Generoso was committed by the petitioners?
(2) YES. The term "invited" in the Affidavit of Arrest is construed to mean as an
authoritative command. After the resolution of the validity of the warrantless arrest, the
discussion of the petitioners' second issue is largely academic. Arrest is defined as the
taking of a person into custody in order that he may be bound to answer for the
commission of an offense. An arrest is made by an actual restraint of the person to be
arrested, or by his submission to the custody of the person making the arrest.91 Thus,
application of actual force, manual touching of the body, physical restraint or a formal
declaration of arrest is not required. It is enough that there be an intention on the part of
one of the parties to arrest the other and the intent of the other to submit, under the
belief and impression that submission is necessary.
(3)
YES. The Order denying the motion for preliminary investigation is valid.
There is no impropriety or grave abuse of discretion in this Order. The RTC, in
resolving the motion, is not required to state all the facts found in the record of
the case. Detailed evidentiary matters, as the RTC decreed, is best reserved for
the full-blown trial of the case, not in the preliminary incidents leading up to the

trial. Additionally, no less than the Constitution itself provides that it is the decision
that should state clearly and distinctly the facts and the law on which it is based.
In resolving a motion, the court is only required to state clearly and distinctly the
reasons therefor. A contrary system would only prolong the proceedings, which
was precisely what happened to this case. Hence, we uphold the validity of the
RTC's order as it correctly stated the reason for its denial of the petitioners' Urgent
Motion for Regular Preliminary Investigation.

(9)

Dela Cruz vs. People GR No. 200748 July 23, 2014

FACTS:
The petitioner here was Jaime De La Cruz, a police officer, who was charged of
violation of Sec 15, Art 2 of RA 9165 or Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002.
According to the prosecution, the NBI received a complaint from Corazon and Charito
that Ariel, who was the live-in partner of Corazon and the son of Charito was picked up
by unknown persons whom were believed to be police officers for allegedly selling
drugs. After that, an errand boy came and gave a phone number to the complainants.
During the call, complainants were instructed to go to Gorordo Police Office wherein they
met James who demanded them money worth P100,000 which was lowered to P40,000
in exchange of the release of Ariel. After the meeting, they went to the NBI to file a
complaint. Thus, the NBI conducted an entrapment operation. During the course of
entrapment, the officers were able to nab Jaime Dela Cruz by using a pre-marked 500 bill
dusted with fluorescent powder which was made part of the amount demanded by James
and handed by Corazon. After that, petitioner Jaime was required to submit his urine for
drug testing which produces a positive result for having presence of dangerous drug.
However, petitioner denied the charge against him. RTC and CA found the accused
guilty.
Issue:
WON the drug test conducted upon the petitioner is legal
Held:
No. Drug test can be made upon persons who were apprehended or arrested
under the situations listed in Art 2 of RA 9165. It must be noted that the accused was
here was arrested in the alleged act of extortion. Extortion is not listed in Art 2 of RA
9165. Thus, drug test in Sec 15 does not cover persons apprehended or arrested for any
crime, but only for unlawful acts listed under Art 2 of RA 9165.
It is incontrovertible that petitioner refused to have his urine extracted and tested
for drugs. He also asked for a lawyer prior to his urine test. He was adamant in
exercising his rights, but all of his efforts proved futile, because he was still compelled to
submit his urine for drug testing under those circumstances.
The pertinent provisions in Article III of the Constitution are clear.
Section 2. The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and
effects against unreasonable searches and seizures of whatever nature and for any

purpose shall be inviolable, and no search warrant or warrant of arrest shall issue except
upon probable cause to be determined personally by the judge after examination under
oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce, and
particularly describing the place to be searched and the persons or things to be seized.
Section 17. No person shall be compelled to be a witness against himself.
In the face of these constitutional guarantees, we cannot condone drug testing of all
arrested persons regardless of the crime or offense for which the arrest is being made.
While we express our commendation of law enforcement agents as they vigorously track
down offenders in their laudable effort to curb the pervasive and deleterious effects of
dangerous drugs on our society, they must, however, be constantly mindful of the
reasonable limits of their authority, because it is not unlikely that in their clear intent to
purge society of its lawless elements, they may be knowingly or unknowingly
transgressing the protected rights of its citizens including even members of its own police
force.
(10) GMA NETWORK, INC., et al v. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS
G.R.Nos. 205357, 205374, 205592, 205852, and 206360, 2 September 2014,
EN BANC, (Peralta, J.)
Political speech is one of the most important expressions protected by the Fundamental
Law. Freedom of speech, of expression, and of the press are at the core of civil liberties
and have to be protected at all costs for the sake of democracy. The aggregate-based
airtime limits is unreasonable and arbitrary as it unduly restricts and constrains the
ability of candidates and political parties to reach out and communicate with the people.
FACTS:
Resolution 9615 of the Commission on Elections (COMELEC) changed
the airtime limitations for political campaign from per station basis, as used during the
2007 and 2010 elections, to a total aggregate basis for the 2013. Various broadcast
networks such as ABS-CBN, ABC, GMA, MBC, NBN, RMN and KBP questioned the
interpretation of the COMELEC on the ground that the provisions are oppressive and
violative of the constitutional guarantees of freedom of expression and of the press.
Collectively, they question the constitutionality of Section 9 (a), which
provides for an aggregate total airtime instead of the previous per station
airtime for political campaigns or advertisements, and also required prior
COMELEC approval for candidates' television and radio guestings and
appearances. Petitioners claim that Section 9(a) limits the computation of aggregate
total airtime and imposes unreasonable burden on broadcast media of monitoring a
candidates or political partys aggregate airtime. On the other hand, COMELEC alleges
that the broadcast networks do not have locus standi, as the limitations are imposed on
candidates, not on media outlets.
Comelec maintains that the per candidate rule or total aggregate airtime
limit is in accordance with the Fair Election Act as this would truly give life to the
constitutional objective to equalize access to media during elections. It sees this as a
more effective way of "levelling the playing field" between candidates/political parties

with enormous resources and those without much.

ISSUES:
1. Does Section 9(a) of Comelec Resolution No. 9615 on airtime limit violate the
constitutional guaranty of freedom of expression, of speech and of the press?
2. Does resolution No. 9165 impose unreasonable burden on the broadcast
industry?
RULING:
1. Yes, Section 9(a) of COMELEC Resolution No. 9615, with its adoption of
the aggregate-based airtime limits unreasonably restricts the guaranteed
freedom of speech and of the press.
Political speech is one of the most important expressions protected by the
Fundamental Law. Freedom of speech, of expression, and of the press are at the
core of civil liberties and have to be protected at all costs for the sake of
democracy.
GMA came up with its analysis of the practical effects of such a regulation:
Given the reduction of a candidates airtime minutes in the New Rules, petitioner
GMA estimates that a national candidate will only have 120 minutes to utilize for his
political advertisements in television during the whole campaign period of 88 days, or will
only have 81.81 seconds per day TV exposure allotment. If he chooses toplace his
political advertisements in the 3 major TV networks in equal allocation, he will only have
27.27 seconds of airtime per network per day. This barely translates to 1 advertisement
spot on a 30-second spot basis in television.
The Court agrees. The assailed rule on aggregate-based airtime limits is
unreasonable and arbitrary as it unduly restricts and constrains the ability of
candidates and political parties to reach out and communicate with the people.
Here, the adverted reason for imposing the aggregate-based airtime limits
leveling the playing field does not constitute a compelling state interest which
would justify such a substantial restriction on the freedom of candidates and
political parties to communicate their ideas, philosophies, platforms and programs
of government.
2. No, Resolution No. 9615 does not impose an unreasonable burden on the
broadcast industry
The Court cannot agree with the contentions of GMA. The apprehensions
of COMELEC appear more to be the result of a misappreciation of the real import
of the regulation rather than a real and present threat to its broadcast activities. The
Court is more in agreement with COMELEC when it explained that the legal duty of
monitoring lies with the COMELEC. Broadcast stations are merely required to submit
certain documents to aid the COMELEC in ensuring that candidates are not sold airtime in
excess of the allowed limits. There is absolutely no duty on the

broadcast stations to do monitoring, much less monitoring in real time. GMA

grossly exaggerates when it claims that the non-existent duty would require them to hire
and train an astounding additional 39,055 personnel working on eight-hour shifts all over
the country.
(11) DENNIS L. GO v. REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES
G.R. No. 202809, 2 JULY 2014 Third Division (Mendoza, J.)
While there is no showing that petitioners witnesses were of doubtful moral inclinations,
there was likewise no indication that they were persons whose qualifications were at par
with the requirements of the law on naturalization. Simply put, no evidence was ever
proffered to prove the witnesses good standing in the community, honesty, moral
uprightness, and most importantly, reliability. As a consequence, their statements about
the petitioner do not possess the measure of credibility demanded of in naturalization
cases. This lack of credibility on the part of the witnesses, unfortunately, weakens or
renders futile petitioners claim of worthiness.
FACTS:
Dennis L. Go filed a petition for naturalization presenting witnesses Dr.
Joseph Anlacan, and Dr. Edward C. Tordesillas to testify for the results of his
psychiatric tests, which have come out to be normal. The other witnesses presented are
Silvino J. Ong, a friend of Dennis family who had known Dennis since childhood in their
residence in Sto. Cristo Street. Teresita M. Go claimed to have personally known Dennis
since birth because Dennis was the son of her brother inlaw, describing Dennis as a
peace loving person. Juan C. Go, a businessman by profession, claimed to know Dennis
personally and executed an affidavit of supportin his favor.
The Republic through the Office of the Secretary General posed no objection initially as
to the relevancy of Dennis evidence. Later on the OSG moved for the reopening of the
trial for a second time due to the lack of credibility of the
witnesses presented by Dennis, with which fails to prove that he did have all the
qualifications and none of the disqualifications. Dennis countered that the court was
reopening a case on a piece-meal basis. The OSG contended that the credibility of
Dennis witnesses are of great importance for they are key to proving many of his
allegations. In addition to the credibility of the witnesses, Dennis non-inclusion of his
former residence stated by one of his witnesses is an unpardonable lapse, rendering the
trial courts decision erroneous and void.
ISSUE:
Should Dennis Go be denied of Filipino citizenship because of his failure
to present credible witnesses?
RULING:
Yes. According to the OSGs contention the witnesses are the ones who are to vouch for
Dennis in the eyes of the State, which the State will have to take at
face value concerning Dennis morality and alleged good character. But with
evidence that Dennis had not included his former residence in Santo Cristo Street, which

was unwittingly revealed by one of his witnesses, is a blow on his credibility and good
morals as a person, alongside with the empty declarations and general statements which
do not prove his worthiness to become a citizen proves the OSGs claim to be meritorious
and the petition be properly denied.
(12) JOEY M. PESTILOS, et. al.v. MORENO GENEROSO AND PEOPLE OF
THE PHILIPPINES
G.R. No. 182601, 10 November 2014, SECOND DIVISION (Brion, J.)
Personal knowledge of a crime just committed does not require actual presence at the
scene while a crime was being committed; it is enough that evidence of the recent
commission of the crime is patent and the police officer has probable cause to believe
based on personal knowledge of facts or circumstances, that the person to be arrested
has recently committed the crime.
FACTS:
On February 20, 2005, at around 3:15 in the morning, an altercation ensued
between petitioners Joey M. Pestilos, Dwight Macapanas, Miguel Gaces, Jerry
Fernandez, and Roland Muoz and Atty. Moreno Generoso. The police officers
arrived at the scene of the crime less than one hour after the alleged altercation and they
saw Atty. Generoso badly beaten.cAtty. Generoso then pointed to the
petitioners as those who mauled him, which prompted the police officers to "invite" the
petitioners for investigation. At the inquest proceeding, the City Prosecutor found that
the petitioners stabbed Atty. Generoso with a bladed weapon.
Consequently, the
petitioners were indicted for attempted murder.
The petitioners filed an Urgent Motion for Regular Preliminary
Investigation on the ground that they had not been lawfully arrested as there was no
valid warrantless arrest since the police officers had no personal knowledge that they
were the perpetrators of the crime. Thus, the inquest proceeding was improper, and a
regular procedure for preliminary investigation should have been performed. The
Regional Trial Court (RTC) denied the petitioners' Motion. On petition for certiorari before
the Court of Appeals (CA), the petition was dismissed for lack of merit. The petitioners
moved for reconsideration, but the CA denied the motion.
ISSUE:
Whether the petitioners were validly arrested without a warrant
RULING:
The petitioners were validly arrested. In light of the discussion on the
developments of Section 5(b), Rule 113 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure and
our jurisprudence on the matter, we hold that the following must be present for a valid
warrantless arrest: 1) the crime should have been just committed; and 2) the
arresting officer's exercise of discretion is limited by the standard of probable cause to be
determined from the facts and circumstances within his personal knowledge. The
requirement of the existence of probable cause objectifies the reasonableness of the
warrantless arrest for purposes of compliance with the Constitutional mandate against

unreasonable arrests.
To summarize, the arresting officers went to the scene of the crime upon
the complaint of Atty. Generoso of his alleged mauling; the police officers
responded to the scene of the crime less than one (1) hour after the alleged
mauling; the alleged crime transpired in a community where Atty. Generoso and the
petitioners reside; Atty. Generoso positively identified the petitioners as those
responsible for his mauling and, notably, the petitioners and Atty. Generoso lived
almost in the same neighborhood; more importantly, when the petitioners were
confronted by the arresting officers, they did not deny their participation in the
incident with Atty. Generoso, although they narrated a different version of what
transpired.chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
With these facts and circumstances that the police officers gathered and which they
have personally observed less than one hour from the time that they have arrived at
the scene of the crime until the time of the arrest of the petitioners, we deem it
reasonable to conclude that the police officers had personal knowledge
of facts or circumstances justifying the petitioners' warrantless arrests. These
circumstances were well within the police officers' observation, perception and
evaluation at the time of the arrest. These circumstances qualify as the police
officers' personal observation, which are within their personal knowledge,
prompting them to make the warrantless arrests.
In determining the reasonableness of the warrantless arrests, it is incumbent
upon the courts to consider if the police officers have complied with the
requirements set under Section 5(b), Rule 113 of the Revised Rules of Criminal
Procedure, specifically, the requirement of immediacy; the police officer's personal
knowledge of facts or circumstances; and lastly, the propriety of the determination of
probable cause that the person sought to be arrested committed the crime.
The records show that soon after the report of the incident occurred, SPOl
Monsalve immediately dispatched the arresting officer, SP02 Javier, to render
personal assistance to the victim. This fact alone negates the petitioners' argument that
the police officers did not have personal knowledge that a crime had been committed the police immediately responded and had personal knowledge that a crime hadbeen
committed.

(13) ROMMEL C. ARNADO, Petitioner, vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS AND

FLORANTE CAPITAN, Respondents
G.R. No. 210164

August 18, 2015

FACTS:
Rommel Arnado was a natural-born Filipino. Later, however, he became an American
citizen.
On July 10, 2008, he re-acquired his Filipino citizenship by executing an oath of
allegiance to the Philippines.
On April 3, 2009, he executed an affidavit renouncing his American citizenship.
On November 30, 2009, he filed a certificate of candidacy (COC) for mayor of
Kauswagan, Lanao del Norte for the May 10, 2010 elections.
A rival candidate (Linog Balua) then filed a disqualification case against Arnado on the
ground that Arnado used his US passport after renouncing his US citizenship in April
2009. It was argued that such act of using a US passport constitutes dual allegiance and
that is a ground for disqualification under the Local Government Code. In short, it was
argued that Arnado remained a US citizen.
In his defense, Arnado argued that he is qualified to run for public office because he
complied with the requirements of Republic Act No. 9225 which provides that a former
Filipino citizen may run for elective public office if (1) they meet the qualifications for the
elective office they desire, and (2) make a personal and sworn renunciation of any and all
foreign citizenships which must be done before the filing of the COC.
Arnado explained that his use of his US passport after April 2009 was because of the fact
that he did not know yet that he had been issued already a Philippine passport; that
when he received said Philippine passport, he used it since then; that at any rate,
Arnado, on November 30, 2009, again executed an Affirmation of Renunciation with Oath
of Allegiance before a notary public.
Balua however presented proof that Arnado again used his US passport in January 2010
and in March 2010.
Eventually, the Commission on Elections disqualified Arnado, who won the 2010
elections, and declared another rival candidate as the rightful mayor. This was affirmed
by the Supreme Court (G.R. No. 195649).
Later, on October 1, 2012, Arnado filed his COC for mayor for the May 2013 elections.
Another rival candidate (Casan Maquiling) filed a petition to disqualify Arnado based on
the ruling in G.R. No. 195649. While the case was pending, Arnado won the 2013
elections as he even acquired 84% of the votes cast for mayor in Kauswagan.

Later however, the COMELEC disqualified Arnado from running in the May 2013 Elections
and his declaration as Mayor of Kauswagan was voided. Arnado sued the COMELEC as he
argued that the COMELEC acted with grave abuse of discretion. He averred that he was
able to comply with the requirements of RA 9225; and that his disqualification only
disenfranchised 84% of the Kauswagan voters.
ISSUE: Whether or not the arguments raised by Arnado are tenable.
HELD: No.
1. Firstly, the fact that he obtained a landslide victory does not override the requirements
set by law. The fact that he garnered 84% of the total votes cast in Kauswagan cannot
override the constitutional and statutory requirements for qualifications and
disqualifications. Election victory cannot be used as a magic formula to bypass election
eligibility requirements; otherwise, certain provisions of laws pertaining to elections will
become toothless.
2. The COMELEC did not act with grave abuse of discretion when it disqualified Arnado.
Arnado failed to comply with the requirements of RA 9225. Although he did swear
allegiance to the Philippines and renounced his US citizenship prior to filing his COC in
November 2009, such acts were deemed recanted or withdrawn when he again used his
US passport.
In fact, Arnado did not controvert the allegations that he used his US passport in
January 2010 and March 2010. As such, he remained a US citizen and is therefore
disqualified to run for public office.
What Arnado could have done, for the purposes of running in the 2013 elections, was to
renounce again (for the third time) his US citizenship. But he never did that hence he
was rightfully disqualified in the 2013 elections too.
Note also that assuming that Arnado never used his US passport in January 2010 and
March 2010, he is still disqualified.
Arnado averred that his use of his US passport prior to November 2009 was cured when
he again made a second renunciation of his US citizenship on November 30, 2009.
However, the Affidavit of Renunciation he offered in court during trial was a mere
photocopy of the original. Under the Best Evidence Rule (Section 3, Rule 130, Revised
Rules of Court), the original must be presented unless the same is lost. In this case, the
original was never alleged to have been lost. Further, the said Affidavit was being used
belatedly by Arnado. In fact, it was never formally offered. Under Section 34, Rule 132 of
the Revised Rules of Court, The court shall consider no evidence which has not been
formally offered.

(14) SAMEER OVERSEAS PLACEMENT AGENCY, INC., Petitioner, v. JOY C.

CABILES, Respondent.
G.R. No. 170139, August 05, 2014
FACTS:
Petitioner, Sameer Overseas Placement Agency, Inc., is a recruitment and placement
agency.5 Responding to an ad it published, respondent, Joy C. Cabiles, submitted her
application for a quality control job in Taiwan.
Joys application was accepted.7 Joy was later asked to sign a one-year employment
contract for a monthly salary of NT$15,360.00.8 She alleged that Sameer Overseas
Agency required her to pay a placement fee of P70,000.00 when she signed the
employment contract.
Joy was deployed to work for Taiwan Wacoal, Co. Ltd. (Wacoal) on June 26, 1997.10 She
alleged that in her employment contract, she agreed to work as quality control for one
year.11 In Taiwan, she was asked to work as a cutter.
Sameer Overseas Placement Agency claims that on July 14, 1997, a certain Mr. Huwang
from Wacoal informed Joy, without prior notice, that she was terminated and that she
should immediately report to their office to get her salary and passport.13 She was
asked to prepare for immediate repatriation.
Joy claims that she was told that from June 26 to July 14, 1997, she only earned a total
of NT$9,000.15 According to her, Wacoal deducted NT$3,000 to cover her plane ticket to
Manila.
On October 15, 1997, Joy filed a complaint17 with the National Labor Relations
Commission against petitioner and Wacoal. She claimed that she was illegally
dismissed.18 She asked for the return of her placement fee, the withheld amount for
repatriation costs, payment of her salary for 23 months as well as moral and exemplary
damages.19 She identified Wacoal as Sameer Overseas Placement Agencys foreign
principal.
Sameer Overseas Placement Agency alleged that respondent's termination was due to
her inefficiency, negligence in her duties, and her failure to comply with the work
requirements [of] her foreign [employer].21 The agency also claimed that it did not ask
for a placement fee of ?70,000.00.22 As evidence, it showed Official Receipt No. 14860
dated June 10, 1997, bearing the amount of ?20,360.00.23 Petitioner added that
Wacoal's accreditation with petitioner had already been transferred to the Pacific
Manpower & Management Services, Inc. (Pacific) as of August 6, 1997.24 Thus,
petitioner asserts that it was already substituted by Pacific Manpower.
Pacific Manpower moved for the dismissal of petitioners claims against it.26 It alleged
that there was no employer-employee relationship between them.27 Therefore, the
claims against it were outside the jurisdiction of the Labor Arbiter.28 Pacific Manpower
argued that the employment contract should first be presented so that the employers
contractual obligations might be identified.29 It further denied that it assumed liability
for petitioners illegal acts.
On July 29, 1998, the Labor Arbiter dismissed Joys complaint.31 Acting Executive Labor

Arbiter Pedro C. Ramos ruled that her complaint was based on mere allegations.32 The
Labor Arbiter found that there was no excess payment of placement fees, based on the
official receipt presented by petitioner.33 The Labor Arbiter found unnecessary a
discussion on petitioners transfer of obligations to Pacific34 and considered the matter
immaterial in view of the dismissal of respondents complaint.
ISSUE: Whether the Court of Appeals erred when it affirmed the ruling of the National
Labor Relations Commission finding respondent illegally dismissed and awarding her
three months worth of salary, the reimbursement of the cost of her repatriation, and
attorneys fees despite the alleged existence of just causes of termination .
RULING:
Sameer Overseas Placement Agency failed to show that there was just cause
for causing Joys dismissal. The employer, Wacoal, also failed to accord her due process
of
law.
Indeed, employers have the prerogative to impose productivity and quality standards at
work.58They may also impose reasonable rules to ensure that the employees comply with
these standards.59 Failure to comply may be a just cause for their dismissal. 60 Certainly,
employers cannot be compelled to retain the services of an employee who is guilty of
acts that are inimical to the interest of the employer.61 While the law acknowledges the
plight and vulnerability of workers, it does not authorize the oppression or selfdestruction of the employer.62 Management prerogative is recognized in law and in our
jurisprudence.
This prerogative, however, should not be abused. It is tempered with the employees
right to security of tenure.63 Workers are entitled to substantive and procedural due
process before termination. They may not be removed from employment without a valid
or just cause as determined by law and without going through the proper procedure.
Security

of

tenure

for

labor

is

guaranteed

by

our

Constitution. 64cralawred

Employees are not stripped of their security of tenure when they move to work in a
different jurisdiction. With respect to the rights of overseas Filipino workers, we follow
the
principle
of lex
loci
contractus.
Thus,
in Triple
Eight
Integrated
noted:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary

Services,

Inc.

v.

NLRC, 65 this

court

Petitioner likewise attempts to sidestep the medical certificate requirement by

contending that since Osdana was working in Saudi Arabia, her employment was subject
to the laws of the host country. Apparently, petitioner hopes to make it appear that the
labor laws of Saudi Arabia do not require any certification by a competent public health
authority
in
the
dismissal
of
employees
due
to
illness.
Again,

petitioners

argument

is

without

merit.

First, established is the rule that lex loci contractus (the law of the place where the
contract is made) governs in this jurisdiction. There is no question that the
contract of employment in this case was perfected here in the Philippines.

Therefore, the Labor Code, its implementing rules and regulations, and other
laws affecting labor apply in this case. Furthermore, settled is the rule that the
courts of the forum will not enforce any foreign claim obnoxious to the forums public
policy. Here in the Philippines, employment agreements are more than contractual in
nature. The Constitution itself, in Article XIII, Section 3, guarantees the special protection
of workers, to wit:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
The State shall afford full protection to labor, local and overseas, organized and
unorganized, and promote full employment and equality of employment opportunities for
all.
It shall guarantee the rights of all workers to self-organization, collective bargaining and
negotiations, and peaceful concerted activities, including the right to strike in accordance
with law. They shall be entitled to security of tenure, humane conditions of work, and a
living wage. They shall also participate in policy and decision-making processes affecting
their
rights
and
benefits
as
may
be
provided
by
law.
. . . .chanrobleslaw
This public policy should be borne in mind in this case because to allow foreign employers
to determine for and by themselves whether an overseas contract worker may be
dismissed on the ground of illness would encourage illegal or arbitrary pre-termination of
employment contracts.66 (Emphasis supplied, citation omitted)
Even with respect to fundamental procedural rights, this court emphasized in PCL
Shipping
Philippines,
Inc.
v.
NLRC,67 to
wit:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
Petitioners admit that they did not inform private respondent in writing of the charges
against him and that they failed to conduct a formal investigation to give him opportunity
to air his side. However, petitioners contend that the twin requirements of notice and
hearing applies strictly only when the employment is within the Philippines and that
these need not be strictly observed in cases of international maritime or overseas
employment.
The Court does not agree. The provisions of the Constitution as well as the Labor
Code which afford protection to labor apply to Filipino employees whether
working within the Philippines or abroad. Moreover, the principle of lex loci
contractus (the law of the place where the contract is made) governs in this
jurisdiction. In the present case, it is not disputed that the Contract of Employment
entered into by and between petitioners and private respondent was executed here in the
Philippines with the approval of the Philippine Overseas Employment Administration
(POEA). Hence, the Labor Code together with its implementing rules and regulations and
other laws affecting labor apply in this case.68(Emphasis supplied, citations omitted)
By our laws, overseas Filipino workers (OFWs) may only be terminated for a just or
authorized cause and after compliance with procedural due process requirements.

(15) JOSE TAPALES VILLAROSA, Petitioner, vs.ROMULO DE MESA FESTIN and

COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, Respondents.
G.R. No. 212953

August 5, 2014

FACTS:
Petitioner Jose Tapales Villarosa (Villarosa) and respondent Romulo de Mesa
Festin (Festin) were two of the four rival candidates for the mayoralty post in San Jose,
Occidental Mindoro during the May 13, 2013 National and Local Elections. On May 15,
2013, private respondent was proclaimed the victor, having garnered 20,761 votes,
edging out petitioner who obtained 19,557 votes.
With a difference of only 1,204 votes, petitioner filed a Petition for Protest Ad Cautelam
before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) alleging irregularities attending the conduct of the
elections. Specifically, petitioner brought to the attention of the court the complaints of
various voters who claimed that several ballots were pre-marked or that the ovals
appearing on the face of the ballots correspondingto the name of petitioner were
embossed or waxed to prevent them from being shaded. As a consequence of the alleged
massive electoral fraud and irregularities in the 92 clustered precincts of San Jose,
Occidental Mindoro, private respondent, so petitioner claimed, was illegally proclaimed.
In his answer, private respondent Festin likewise impugned the election results in the
precincts, particularly the number of votes credited to petitioner.
With both parties raising as principal issue the accuracy of the vote count, a physical
recount of the ballotswere conducted under the auspices of the RTC, Branch 46 in San
Jose, Occidental Mindoro.
ISSUE:Whether or not the petition is meritorious
RULING:

We dismiss the petition for lack of merit.

Propriety of certiorari in assailing COMELEC rulings

Petitioners recourse, aside from being unsound in substance, is procedurally infirm. The
governing provision is Section 7, Article IX of the 1987 Constitution, which provides:
Section 7. Each Commissionshall decide by a majority vote of all its Members any case or
matter brought before it within sixty days from the date of its submission for decision or
resolution. A case or matter is deemed submitted for decision or resolution upon the
filing of the last pleading, brief, or memorandum required by the rules of the Commission
or by the Commission itself. Unless otherwise provided by this Constitution or by law, any
decision, order, or rulingof each Commission may be brought to the Supreme Court on
certiorari by the aggrieved party within thirty daysfrom receipt of a copy thereof.
(emphasis added)
In the instructive case of Ambil v. Commission on Elections, 4 We have interpreted the
provision to limit the remedy of certiorari against final orders, rulings and decisionsof the
COMELEC en bancrendered in the exercise of its adjudicatory or quasi-judicial
powers.5 Certiorari will not generally lie against an order, ruling,or decision of a COMELEC
division for being premature, taking into account the availability of the plain, speedy and
adequate remedy of a motion for reconsideration. As elucidated in the case:

Rule 65, Section 1, 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, as amended, requires that there be no
appeal, orany plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law. A motion
for reconsideration is a plain and adequate remedy provided by law. Failure to abide by
this procedural requirement constitutes a ground for dismissal of the petition.
In like manner, a decision, order or resolution of a division of the Comelec must be
reviewed by the Comelec en banc via a motion for reconsideration before the final
enbanc decision may be brought to the Supreme Court on certiorari. The pre-requisite
filing of a motion for reconsideration is mandatory.6 (emphasis added)
The above doctrine further gained force when it was reiterated in Our recent ruling in
Cagas v. COMELEC,7 in which We held that a party aggrieved by an interlocutory order
issued by a Division of the COMELEC in an election protest may not directlyassail the said
order in this Court through a special civil action for certiorari. The remedy is to seek the
review of the interlocutory order during the appeal of the decision of the Division in due
course.8
Petitioner raises a fuss anent the temporary or permanent shuffling of members in the
Commission when, in fact, this is not a novel practice. In instances such as this,
exigencies justify the substitution of members and the designation of special divisions to
prevent paralysis in the administration of justice. This is also resorted to in order to
ensure that the speedy disposition of cases is not impeded and that docket systems are
unclogged. Obviously, these advantages far outweigh petitioner's baseless cry of violation
of due process.