What Is THAAD, What Does It Do, and Why Is China

Mad About It?

Hint: Its not about the THAAD interceptor missiles themselves.

By Ankit Panda
February 25, 2016
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Over the past monthsand particularly in the days since North Koreas latest nuclear
and satellite teststhere has been a lot of ink spilled on South Koreas interest in
deploying what is known the Terminal High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) system.
A lot of mainstream coverage of the issue, which has China and South Korea at
loggerheads, correctly notes that China is worried about the system, but doesnt quite
get at what exactly THAAD is, what it does, and why its deployment on the Korean
peninsula is so threatening to China. Chinas anxiety over THAAD has gotten to the
point where its ambassador to South Korea would suggest that its implementation
would destroy their bilateral relationship in an instant.
THAAD is a relative recent addition to the United States anti-ballistic
missile/interceptor toolkit. It entered production in 2008 and is primarily tasked
with taking out threatening ballistic missiles in whats known as their terminal
phase (the T in the acronym). This is actually the first part where a clarification is
due. As Jeffrey Lewis recently highlighted in a Foreign Policy column, THAAD, and
systems like it, including the Patriot Advanced Capability (PAC-3) interceptor, are
designed to hit things as they zoom downward toward the earthnot as they go up.
This may seem like a trivial point, but Japan made a show of deploying its PAC-3
interceptors in Tokyo ahead of North Koreas latest satellite launch. Of course, the
Kwangmyongsong satellite had a one-way ticket out of the atmosphere and wouldnt
be coming back, making PAC-3, or hypothetically THAAD, useless. (North Korea
does have a bunch of short- and medium-range SCUDs that THAAD would be great
against, though.)
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THAAD is particularly well-suited to intercept and destroy short, medium, and
intermediate-range ballistic missiles in their terminal phase. Rod Lyon, in a recent
post at the National Interest, helpfully catalogues some of THAADs tried-and-tested
abilities, which attest to that fact. THAADs overall operation is similar to many other
missile interceptor and surface-to-air missile systems: an X-Band active
electronically scanned array (AESA) radar (AN/TPY-2) kicks off THAADs

interception, detecting the target projectile. THAADs fire control and support
equipment identifies, verifies, and initiates the launcher. The launchera roadmobile erector launcher, to be precisefinally releases the infrared seeker headequipped THAAD missile which, according to the systems manufacturer, then uses
kinetic energy to destroy [the] incoming missile. In plain English, missile meets
missile in mid-air; both missiles go Boom.
Theres a lot more to THAADs feature set. The high altitude part of the acronym
isnt there for show: THAAD is able to intercept incoming missiles at endo- and exoatmospheric altitudes, with a maximum engagement altitude of roughly 93 miles
above the earths surface. The missile itself can travel at speeds over Mach 8, placing
it in the hypersonic category. Indeed, THAAD manufacturer Lockheed Martin is
interested in developing an extended range THAAD variant to counter hypersonic
glide vehicles, including Chinas own WU-14.
Keeping this feature set in mind, why is China so upset about a potential THAAD
deployment? The answer, I think, has to do more with the monitoring capabilities
that are part of the THAAD package. Beijing isnt, for instance, worried that a
THAAD deployment in South Korea would threaten any ballistic missiles it would
plausibly fire at the United Statesagain, THAAD only works against ballistic
missiles in the terminal phase and not against inter-continental ones anyway. Lyon
evaluates Chinas concerns:
Chinas right to believe that THAAD surveillance data could be transferred to other
BMD assets protecting [the continental United States (CONUS)]. Indeed, one of
THAADs missions would be to strengthen U.S. defenses against the possibility of
North Korean ballistic missile attack on CONUS. So it has to be able to transfer
data to CONUS-based radars and interceptors. But the United States already has a
THAAD battery deployed on Guam, two AN/TPY-2 radars deployed in Japan (at
Shariki and Kyogamisaki), space-based assets, plus a range of ship-borne radars
and larger land-based radars in other parts of the Pacific theatre. Would a THAAD
deployment in South Korea change much? The short answer is that it could
improve early tracking of some Chinese missiles, depending on their launch point.
Still, that might not make actual interception of those missiles much easier. ICBM
warheads move fast. And sophisticated penetration-aids help to confuse missile
defenses.
So, from the Chinese perspective, a THAAD deployment could shift the strategic
stability needle ever so slightly away from its status quo equilibrium and advantage
the United States, giving Washington better early warning and tracking of Chinese
ICBMs. That, in itself, doesnt seem like a serious impingement on Chinas security or
its nuclear deterrent. Whats interesting is reading Chinas worries about a THAAD
and AN/TPY-2 deployment on the Korean peninsula together with murmurs that
Beijing is growing increasingly interested in a launch-on-warning nuclear posture.
Does a THAAD deployment affect the credibility of Chinas second-strike capabilities
by giving the United States a greater early warning edge? Perhaps, but, as Lyon notes
above, the difference would be marginal given the AN/TPY-2s already in Japan.

Assessing Chinas position on THAAD in light of the systems real capabilities, we

should concede that Beijing does have some legitimate reasons to be upset, but I
question if the negative implications for Chinas security really outweigh the
diplomatic cost to the bilateral relationship with South Korea, which had seen a
sharp uptick over the past year. Moreover, its clear that South Koreas security
would benefit in important ways from a THAAD deploymentPyongyangs Toksa,
SCUDs, and No Dong missiles would be a lot less threatening.
China and South Korea should be able to come to an understanding, but this wont be
possible as long as Beijing holds to its maximalist position on THAAD, refusing to
abide a deployment of the interceptor on the peninsula. Are there alternatives? If you
ask South Korea and the United States, then the answer is yes: China could change
its approach to North Korea, making this THAAD business less necessary in the
short-term. I wouldnt count on that happening anytime soon, despite news of the
United States and China making some progress on harsher sanctions.