1979:Saint Augustine on Memory, John A. Mourant, The Pennsylvania State University.

Villanova, PA: Villanova

University Press.

SAINT AUGUSTINE ON MEMORY

With the exception of a few scholarly articles and

some summary accounts and analyses, l Saint Augustine's treatment of memory has not in my opinion
been given the attention it clearly merits. It is true
that the subject has been treated unsystematically in
Saint Augustine's writings,2 but this points up nl0re
the difficulty Saint Augustine had in explaining the
meaning and place of memory in his thought rather
than any minimization of its importance for him. 3
Where a more extended analysis appears, as in the
Confessiones and the later books of the De Trinitate,
Saint Augustine's discussion is both profound and
original. His study not only throws considerable
1. See especially the brief bibliography furnished by A. Solignac
in Oeuvres de Saint Augustin, vol. 14, Les Confessions Livres VIIIXIII. p. 567. Bibliotheque Augustinienne (Desclee de Brouwer,
1962, Paris).
2. The principal sources are Book X of the Confessiones and
the later books of the De Trinitate. In addition scattered references
are to be found in the De Musica, the Soliloquia, the De Genesi
ad Litteram Libri XII, the De Ordine, Epistola 7, and the Retractationes.
3. See Appendix A for a brief summary of the Augustinian soul
with special reference to the nature of mind, soul, and spirit within
which context the meaning and function of memory will attain
greater precision.

light upon his analysis of the nature of the mind

but also plays a role of high importance in his epistemology, and in his endeavor to understand the
nature of tlle Trinity in its relation to the human
soul. His study of memory is also significant, we
believe, for the light it may throw upon the problem
of the unity of the Confessiones, a problem we sha11
consider to a linrited extent il1 the second appendix
to this article. My principal purpose, however, will
be to develop in some detail Saint Augustine's conception of the nature and function of memory with
special reference to his treatment of it in the Confessiones and the de Trinitate.
Before considering any analysis of Saint Augustine's
cOl1ception of memory, it is important to recognize
that very early in his intellectual development he had
temporarily accepted the Platonic theory of memory
as reminiscence. Commenting on the origin of knowledge he declares in the Soliloquia: "This is the manner
in which those who are erudite have been disciplined
by the study of the liberal arts. Such knowledge
which beyond doubt is buried in the depths of their
minds, they unearth and rediscover so to speak. "4
Btlt with particular reference to this statement from
the Soliloquia, Saint Augustine makes a specific retraction:
But I also reject that statement. When some men
who are ignorant of certain disciplines, can respond
4. 11. 20, 35. 4; See also De Quantitate Animae 20. 34.

10

eorreetly when they are ably questioned, is it not

beeause there has been presented to them, in so far
as they are able to grasp it, the light of Eternal
Reason in whieh they see the immtltable truths.
Atld not beeause they onee had this knowledge and
had forgotten it, as Plato and others believed. 5
In his study of the Augustinian tlleory of memory
Klaus Wil1kler shows how Saint Augustine dealt with
the problem of memory in the De Ordine. Winkler
notes espeeia1ly the doubts of Saint Augustine eoneerning the Plotinial1 theory and his refutation of
Lieentius in the De Ordine. On this point he observes:,
En revenant sur ces opinions anterieures, qlli s'exprimeilt dans les paroIes de Lieentius, saint Augustin
est arrive au point de depart du futur developpement de sa theorie de la memoire. La premiere
etape de sa pensee personnelle sur ce sujet est done
earaeterisee par le doute et des reserves a l'egard
de doetrines plotiniennes qu 'il avait adoptees auparavant. Ainsi, la diseussion du De Ordine prepare la voie plutt qu'elle n'annonee une direetion. 6

5. Retractationes, J. iv. 4.
6. Winkler, Klaus, "La Theorie Augustinienne de la memoire
a son point de depart," Augustinus Magister J (Paris: Etudes augustiniennes 1954) p. 519.

11

On tbis same issue Gilson aptly observes the importance of understanding such terms as "remembrance"
and "reminiscence" as they are used by Saint Augustine. Gilson notes: ... "if Saint Augustine continues to use the terms 'remembrance' and 'reminis~
cence' in the explanation of thought, we are to understand them in a sense quite different from that of
Plato. The Platonie recollection of the past gives
way to that Augustinian memory of the present
whose role becomes more and more important." 7
It iso also important in considering the development
of the different meanings that memory has for Saint
Augustine to take care not to confuse his analysis
with any contemporary psychological account of the
nature and function of memory. In particular,
memory is not to be considered as a "part' , or a
"faculty" of the mind, although sometimes it is
difficult to avoid the use of such ternlS in translating
Saint Augustine. That memory is not a faculty is
noted by Bourke: "For Saint Augustine, memoria
is not a faculty of the soul, but the whole soul, as
conscious of itself and its contents."8 It should also
be 0 bserved, as we sha11 see in more detail later,
that Saint Augustine frequently uses metaphors, particularly spatial ones, in describing the nature of
memory. Such metaphors are not to be taken in
7. Gilson, Etienne. The Christian Phi!osophy 0/ Saint Augustine.
Trans. by L. Lynch. (Random House, N. Y. 1960) p. 75.
8. Bourke, V. J. The Con/essions 0/ St. Augustine. (Fathers of
the Church, Inc. (New York, 1951), p. 286n.

12

any literal sense. Actually, as will become more

apparent, memory may be much more readily identified with duration rather than with space.
Sensible Memory. In point of development, but
not necessarily of importance, the first kind of memory
to which Saint Augustine gives his attention is that
of sensible memory.9 This form of memory is required for all sense perception. In fact, our sense experiences are so fleeting that they could not be known
without memory. Saint Augustine makes this observation in the following passage from the De Musica:
So even in hearing the briefest syllable, the assistance
of memory is required... For in the moment of
time when the beginning of the syllable sounds,
that motion which was made initially in the soul
with the sound remains until the end. Otherwise
we cannot say that we have heard anything. 10
Since the sensible memory as weIl as the imagination depend upon the senses, Saint Augustine follows
for the most part the traditional analysis of the senses.
Of paramount importance, however, is that his analysis
of serlsation, imagination, and the sensible memory
is based upon Ws rather peculiar doctrine of sensation
il1 which he maintains that only the soul can produce
sensation. He holds that sensation is neither the
function of the seds'e organ nor of the physical body
9. De Musica, VI. 5. 10.
10. Ibid., VI. 8. 21.

13

but rather is the result of the attention which the

soul gives to the action of a physical object upon the
body. "Briefly," Saint Augustine declares, "it appears to me that when the soul experiences sensations
in the body it is not in any manner affected by them,
but pays more attention to the passions of the body...
And all of this is what nlay be called sensation. "11
Or: "Listen then. Sensation I believe to be the
bodily experiences of which the soul is not unaware. "12
In speaking of the mind's knowledge of the objects
outside inself, Saint Augustine describes rather graphically how such objects may be said to be brought
within itself:.
But because they are bodies which it has found
pleasure in olltside of itself through the senses of
the body, and has through long familiarity become
intermingled with, it cannot bring them into its
inner nature, as though into an incorporeal or
spiritual domain. Therefore, it forms their images,
made out of itself, and gathers them into itself,
for in forming them it gives them something of
its own substance; it also retains that by which
it may freely judge of the nature of these images.
And this power is more properly the mind, that
is, the rational understanding which serves to pass
judgment. For those parts of the soul which in-

11. Ibid., I. 5. 10.

12. De Qu. An. XIII. 41.

14

form the corporeal images, we perceive that we

have in common with the animals. 13
Clarifying further the distinction between sense and
image, Saint Augustine observes how the image that
is received through the bodily senses is retained in
the memory. He comments on his memory of the
city of Carthage and notes that the image of in the
mind is the word 'Carthage'. The same is true he
declares when he WOllld speak of Alexandria, a city
which he has never seen, for an image of it is within
hinl:
Having heard from many people al1d believing it
to be a great city, from the descriptions of it that
were given to me, I formed as I was able, an image
of it in my mil1d. This image is its 'word' within
me when I wish to speak of it, before I have pronounced the five syllables of the name that almost
everyone knoWS. 14
The sensible memory is a spiritual activity and one
of the functions or powers of the mind. Closely
related to the sensible memory, and also a function
of spirit or mind, is the imagination. It resembles
what might be termed the reproductive or creative
imagination. Although the sensible memory is limited

13. De Trin. X. 5. 7.
14. Ibid., VIII. 6. 9.

15

to that which can be perceived, the imagination has no

such limits. Saint Augtistine declares:.
...we can only remember corporeal species as we
have actually perceived them in number, and in
the intensity of our perception of them. On the
other hand, those things seen in thought, although
drawn from those things which are in the memory
are multiplied and diversified in a truly infinite
manner. 15
He observes that we have a memory of only one
sun, but that we can imagine or think of two or three
or many more suns. We may also imagine the sun
to be green or square even though we remember it as
white or round. And what is true of the sun, he
avers, is true also of other things that he can remember. 16
This power of the memory in relation to the imagination is developed in more detail in a letter to Nebridius written in 389. Addressing Nebridius, Saint
Augustine states:. "You say that without images or
imaginary visions memory cannot exist. I think
otherwise. "1 7 And he proceeds to point out that
all mental images can be divided into three classes:
1) Those based on actual sense impressions, e. g.
Carthage. 2) Images of fancy, e. g. the fictions and
15. Ibid., XI. 8. 13.
16. Loc. cit.
17. Epistola 7.

16

fantasies of fables and myths~ 3) Numbers and

dimensions.
Intellectual Memory. Essentially the distinction between sensible menl0ry and intellectual memory is
that the function of sensible memory is to conserve
the images of corporeal things, a function that is
also identified with spirit. Intellectual memory is
concerned with the remembrance of the incorporeal
and the il1tangible-with the rememberance of "numbers and dimensions," of ideas, of feelings (but not
the experience), of forgetfulness, and of memory
itself.
In the Confessiones Saint Augustine gives particular
attention to what he terms "numbers aIld dimensions. " These include, he declares: ... "all that I 11ave
ever learned of the liberal sciences. "18 More specifically he notes that: "By means of the senses I have
become aware of numbers by which we number
things. But the principle of number itself is not an
image of the things by which we count but rather is a
principle which exists in its own right. "19 In other
words the distil1ction is one between 'sensible number'
and 'intelligible number.'
The fairly unambiguous use of the ternl "images"
in Epistola 7 seems to break dOWl1 at this point.
There appears to be a suggestion here of "imageless" thought. In any event, the traditional meaning

18. X. 9.
19. Ibid., X. 12.

17

of "image" is clearly inapplicable to the memory

of mathematical principles and scientific knowledge,
to the memory of the emotions and feelings, to tlle
memory of the mind, and of ,God. Mathematical
principles and scientific knowledge are not conveyed
to us by the senses. The memory of feelings and
enl0tions, e. g. pain, joy, fear, etc. is not accompanied
by the corresponding experience of such feelillgs or
emotions. Fillally, no images are required for the
memory of the self, of true happiness, which is the
possession ofGod, and ofGod Himself. 20 With
particular respect to our remembrance of the four
kinds of emotions-desire, joy, fear, and sorrowSaint Augustine acknowledges a difficulty in the use
of the term "images" to describe the remembrance
of such emotions. He suggests that perhaps we
might speak here of tlle "inlages of images,' '21 as
best describing this fornl of knowledge that constitutes
in part our intelligible memory.
Memory, too, can be remembered, for as Saint
Augustille points out, when I remember memory,
memory is present to itself in itself. 22 Evel1 forgetfulness can be remembered, although there is no
inlage for it. Bllt the memory of forgetfulness seems
to create a special difficulty for Saint Augustine.
He becomes involved in a paradox of remembering

20. Ibid., X. 14-17.

21. Ibid., X. 15.
22. Ibid., X. 16.

18

forgetfulness which would obliterate memory itself.

"When 1 remember forgetflLlness," he declares
"there are two things present, memory which remembers forgetfulness, and forgetfulness which is
remembered. "23 But if forgetfulness is the absence
of memory, then 110W can it be remembered, he asks?24
Even the retention of an image of forgetfulness will
not do, for such an image is self-contradictory.25
It would appear that Sai.nt Augustine fails to distinguish between forgetfulness and the things that are
forgotten. Forgetfulness is just as characteristic of
the mind as is memory. Forgetting is the converse
of remembering and presents the same problem of
whether images are necessary for their eXplat1ation.
I can forget, that is, lose the images or the verbal
senses of thought just as readily as I can remember
them.
Hence even forgetfulness can be remembered, although there is 110 image for it. Wl1at 1 remember
is the act of forgetting or a particular item of knowledge but not complete forgetfulness which would be
oblivion and the very contradiction of memory itself.
For that which is wholly absent in the sense of privation, aml1esia or oblivion, is not present for the
mind to remember. Bourke makes a similar point
when he remarks: "Augustine's difficulty with oblivion

23. Loe. eit.

24. Loe. eil.
25. Loe. eil.

19

is, at least partly, in the use of memory and its privative term, oblivion. He does not clearly distinguish
the capacity to remember from the act of remenlbering, nor complete oblivion (total amnesia) from the
forgetfulness of one item of knowledge. "26 Thus the
chapters on "forgetting" in the Confessiones27 point
up the difficulties that memory has for Saint Augustine
and add to his endeavor to identify memory with
the mind and with ,God.
Functions of Memory. Since for Saint Augustine
the mind or soul is one and contains no distinct faculties, it is often difficult to determine the specific powers
of the mind. Will nlay overlap or be confused with
mind, and memory, as we shall see, takes on very
broad powers and is also identified with the milld
(memoria sui) and with God (memoria Dei). However, some of the specific powers of the memory are
made rather explicit. Imagination, as we have seen,
is clearly a function of memory. And such activities
as recall and recognition are also specific functions
of memory. This last point is brought out rather
vividly in the Confessiones following his account of
the woman who had lost a drachma and looked for
it by the light of a lamp and who would not have
found her coin unless she had remembered it. As
Saint Augustine relates it:

26. Op. Cit., p. 284

27. Conf. X. 16-20.

D.

52.

20

And so it always happens when we look for somehing lost and then find it. When something is
lost from sight but not from memory, namely, like
a visible body, its image is retained within us and
we look for it until it comes to light once more.
And when it is found it is recognized by the image
within us. Nor do we say that we have found
what was lost, unless we recognize it and we cannot recognize it unless we remember it. Thus it
was lost to sight but was retained in the memory.28
With respect to the intellectual memory and its
powers of reca11 and recognition, the problem takes
on new dimensions. For the knowledge contained
in our intellectual memory is not contingent upon the
senses, but of necessity is innate. Instead of a remembrance of the past we have a memory of that which
is present to the mind. To recall is simply to recognize something as present to the mind. Gilson sums
up the problem rather effectively in the following
commentary:
...when I look and find in my mind knowledge
that is wholly abstract, such as the idea of essence
or that of cause, how am 1 to say this knowledge
found entry to the mind? It is obvious that it did
not come through the senses, and yet it is in the
mind. Thus we see that in order to make room
for knowledge of this sort, and in general for all
28. Con/. X. 18.27.

21

kl10wledge we have described as in some sense

innate, we must extend the concept of nlemory
to include anything the mind learns from the Interior
Master, sees in the illuminating light of the Word,
or can discover in itself by direct apprehension.
Consequently association with the past ceases to
be an essential characteristic of the memory. Since
the soul remembers everything present to it even
though unaware of it, we can say that there is a
memory of the present which is even far more vast
than the memory of the past. 29
Saint Augustil1e is qllite firm in his conviction that
nlemory is concerned not only with the past but also
with the present. He applies this conviction especially to the knowledge that we have of the self. Drawil1g upon Latin literature he points out that when
Virgil declares that Ulysses did not forget himself,
he clearly indicates that he (Ulysses) was present to
himself and remembered himself. Thus memory pertains to present things as weIl as to past things. Saint
Augustine observes:,
Therefore. that which makes it possible to recall
and recognize things past is called nlemory; so
with things present, as the mind is to itself, that
may be called memory, by which the mind is present to itself, so that it can be understood by its
29. Op. Cit., p. 102.

30. De Trin. XIV. 11.14.

22

own thought and both united by the love of itself. 30

By extending in this way the spiritual power of the
memory to cover not 011ly the past but also the present
we are faced with the intriguing question whether
nlemory can in some way be extended to the future
as weIl. Moreau nlaintains that for Saint Augustine memory is essentially duration and a spiritual
power that both transcends and spiritualizes space
and time. As he Pllts it:
La "memoire" est une puissance de l'ame admirable, parce qu 'elle transcende et spiritualise I'espace, en conferant aux corps qu'elle connait ou
qu 'elle imagine, llne existence il1corporelle; mais
elle est une puissance de l'ame encore plus admirable parce qu'elle transcende et spiritualise le temps
et fait participer les images a sa duree interieure... "31
Thus menl0ry creates a continuity. It is concerned
not merely with the past and tlle present but also with
the future. Saint Augustine observes that the proof
of this lies in our ability to repeat in their correct
sequence verses and hynlns which we have remembered.
But without the foresight of what is to come, we
could not utter these verses or hymns. "Yet," he
declares, "it is not foresight, but memory, that el1ables
31. Moreau, M. "Memoire et duree," Rev. des Etudes Augustiniennes, I. 1955, p. 239.

23

us to foresee them. For as long as we continue to

speak or to sing, we utter nothing except what we
have foreseen and expected. And yet when we do
so, we do not say that we sing or speak from foresight, but from memory;' '32 Essentially Saint Augustine's meaning is that although we obviously cannot llave a memory of the future as we do of the
past and the presel1t, memory is basic to any anticipation we make of the future. By means of the present
and past knowledge we can predict with varying
degrees of probability a future event. Yet we do
not have a true knowledge of that event until it merges
into the present and the paste
A further distinction of some importance between
the sensible memory and the intelligible memory
should be noted and that is the function of the will
relative to each. The importance of the will as a
"faculty" or power of the human soul is not to be
underestimated. It has always played a dominant
role in the Augustinian tradition. Clearly it is an
important factor in the practical decisions we make
and it governs all the movemel1ts of the soul. It
definitely plays the dominant role in our sensible
memory. Drawing largely from Saint Augustine's
analysis of memory in the De Musica, VI. 8.21.
Gilson declares:
If a person says something in our hearing while
we are thinking of something else, we claim that
32. De Trin. XV. 7. 13.

24

we have not heard a thing. This is not exactly

tlle case. We have heard, but we do not remember
anything because Ollr will was distracted, and did
not fix the sounds in memory as they struck our
ear. By showing, therefore, that sensation falls
under the control of the will, we have established
the will's dominion over the memory.33
However, it may be contended that on occasion
memory to some extent seems to have a priority over
will with respect to sense knowledge. For we do not
consciously determine our sensations and before sense
memories can be revived they must have already been
retained in the memory. With respect to the intellectual memory, I believe it is more difficult to establish
a clear priority for the will over the memory. In
the later books of the De Trinita te no such priority
is unequivocally established. Here Saint Augustine
is more concerned to identify memory with the self
and withGod. His interest lies more in the knowledge tl1at memory has of the present rather than
of the paste
That the will is not prior, at least I ogically, to the
memory seems clearly evident in the following passage
from the De Trinitate: "When knowledge arises, and
what we have known is retained in the memory and
later recalled, who does not see that the recollection
by the memory is prior in tinle to the sight of that

33. Opa Cit., p. 133.

25

knowledge, and the uniting of these two things by

the will as a third.' '34
Even more definitively he declares in another passage from the De Trinitate:
The first thing to be considered then is thet there
cannot be any will to remember, unless we retain
in the depths of our memory, either all or apart
of that which we wish to renlember. For the will
to remember cannot arise when we have altogether
and absolutely forgotten something. For we have
already remembered that it either is or was in our
memory.35
Although the problem of the priority of the will
or the memory may still be considered moot, the
issue can be more readily resolved if we distinguish
between a logical priority and the possibility of an
ontological priority. Logically, it would seem that
the memory or mind is first in point of time. From
an ontological perspective there really is no question
of priority because in the Augustinian psychology the
mind or soul is one and there are no distinctive faculties. This whole issue will emerge again when we
consider the memoria Dei and the analogue of the
human mind to the Divine Trinity which is consubstantial or ontologically one even though a certain
logical order may be assigned to the different members
of the Trinity.
34. De Trin. XIV. 10. 13.
35. Ibid., XI. 7. 12.

26

Memoria Sui. To some extent we have already

anticipated the next stage in the development of
Saint Augustine's concept of n1emory, namely, its
idel1tification with the mind itself. As previously
noted, he has observed that all his knowledge of the
arts and sciences and "especia1ly of the innumerable
pril1ciples and laws of numbers and dimensions"36
is not 0 btained by means of the bodily senses nor
through language. Such knowledge is seen only in
the mind and existed in the mind or memory before
learning. However, the remembrance of such knowledge must not be confused with the Platonic doctrine
of reminiscence. For Saint Augustine such knowledge is innate and has had no previous existence
outside the mind. The remembrance of such forms
of knowledge is an activity of the soul through memory by which it discovers incorporeal ideas, just as
in sense knowledge the soul by a spiritual power
creates corporeal images. But neither the images
nor the ideas come from without. Our knowledge of
ideas involves more than a mere recall of ideas.
Such knowledge n1ust be assembled or brought together by the mind, and this is &1 activity of the
n1emory of the present and not that of a remembrance
of the paste To explore further the whole process
of knowledge would lead us into Saint Augustine's
conceptiol1 of God as the Interior Master and his
theory of the Divine Illunlination. For our present

36. Con/. 12.

27

purpose it is sufficient to emphasize that it is the function of menlory here to discover ideas that are present
to and within us. Vltimately, of course, all knowledge is dependent upon God and his Divine Illumination. Both in memory and in learning, as weIl as
in knowledge and wisdom the soul must turn toGod
for illumination.
On the level of intellectual knowledge to recall is
merely to recognize something as present to the mind.
As Le Blond puts it:
La memoire, en effet, c'est la une idee chere a
Saint Augustin, n'est pas seulement la faculte de
conserver et de rappeller les souvenirs, elle est
la faculte de la duree, dans toute sa richesse. Aussi
ne la definit-il pas premierement comme la faculte
du passe, mais comme la faculte de present... 37
It is in this respect that memory merges into and
becomes the mind itself, with a knowledge of the
past and the present, with the ability to collect and
assemble its knowledge. For once the attention
lapses, ideas sink back, as Saint Augustine puts it:
...into the remote chambers of my memory. Hence,
if I am to know them I have to draw them out
from their old lairs... and I have to collect them
again, and this is the origin of the word cogitare

37. Le Blond, J. M. Les Conversions de S. Augustin. (Aubier,

Paris 1950), p. 16.

28

which means to think or to collect one's thoughts,

for the word cogo in Latin meaJ.1S I collect and is
related to cogito, which means I think, just as ago
is related to agito or facio to factito. But the mind
has taken to itself the word cogfto, so that it is
correctly used only of what is assembled in the
mind, and not of what is assembled elsewhere. 38
As related to the cogito, memory is the act of
knowing myself and this is possible only if I can
remember myself, not simply the things and events
of which I am aware bllt to remerrlber them as relating to myself. In other words, I collect things relating to myself and this requires memory. The cogito,
then, is the supreme act of memory, for if I am deceived in any of the things pertaining to my memory,
my memory can still transcend all such deceptions
and enables me to affirm the existence of the self.
Thus, the cogito transcends all other manifestations
or functions of memory, such as imagination, recall,
recognition, sensible and intellectual memory. In
this respect memory is never a faculty of the soul or
the mind, but it is the mind itself. And as aspiritual
being it possesses no parts except in a metaphorical
sense. Hence, we can properly speak only of the
powers or the functions of tlle nlind but not of its
faculties. That memory is not a faculty of the mind
is observed by Bourke in his statement:. "For Saint

38. Con/. 11.

29

Augustine, memoria is not a faculty of the soul,

hut the whole soul as conscious of itself and its contents; nlemory even includes the subconscious present
of anything to the soul, and thus God, is always in
nlemory. "39 And that the mind and the memory
are one is stated very definitively by Saint Augustine
in the following passage:
But the nlind and the memory are one and the
same. We even call the memory the nlind, for
when we tell another person to remember something, we say 'See that you keep this in mind',
and when we forget anything, we say 'It was not
in my mind' or 'it slipped out of my mind. '40
And in speaking of the mind knowing itself, Saint
Augustine says: "It is like a nlal1 knowledgeahle il1
many sciences: he possesses them as hidden in his
memory, but only those are present to his mind when
he trunks of them. All the rest are hidden in a secret
kind of knowledge which is called memory. "41 This
statenlent has an apparent reference to what today
we would call the "subconscious. "42 It would seem
to be even nlore explicit in the following remark by
Saint Augustine:

39.
40.
41.
42.

Op. Cit., p. 286. n. 55.

Conf. X. 14.
De Trin. XIV. 6. 8.
This seems to be inlplied in Conf. X. 8. 14.

30

For we say that we know that best which we have

discovered to be true in tbinking of it, and tbis
again we relinquish to menlory. But tllere is a
more profound depth to our memory, when we
discover first that which we think of for the first
time, and where the inner word is begotten which
belongs to no 1anguage, knowledge of knowledge,
visioll of vision, and an understanding which appears in thought aIld comes from the understanding
already present but still latent in memory. Yet
if thought did not also have sonle memory of its
own, it would not return to those things wluch it
had left in memory when it thought of other things. 43
Gilson relates the Augustinian position to modern
psychology in bis observation:
...the term 'memory' means much more than its
modern psychological connotation designates, i. e.,
a menlory of the paste In Saint Augustine it is
applied to everything which is present to the soul
(a presence whish is evidenced by efficacious acti 011) without being explicitly known or perceived.
The only modern psychological terms equivalent
to Augustiluan memoria are 'unconscious' or 'subconscious', provided they too are expallded to
include the metaphysical presence within the soul
of a reality distinct from it and transcendent, such

43. De Trin. X. 21. 40.

31

as God, in addition to the presence to the soul of

its own perceived states. 44
The Augustinian position is significant because it
identifies memory with the mind through those reflexive acts by wltich the mind knows tl1at it knows,
understands that it understands, sees that it sees
and, it might be added, remembers that it remembers.
All these self-conscious activities are ways by which
the memory through reflection brings il1to the present
the activities of the mind. There is also a parallel
here between the mind's knowledge of itself and
God's knowledge of Himself. For by the "word"
may be meal1t that knowledge the mind has of itself,
a knowledge of knowledge, i. e. an expression of our
knowledge of ourselves, just as the Word of God
is an expression ofGod's self knowledge, which
issues from His memory in the Second Person of the
Trinity. Furthermore, the knowledge the mind has
of itself begins with its very existence... "from the
moment it began to be it has certainly never ceased
to remember itself, never ceased to understand itself,
and never ceased to love itself. "45
Memoria Dei. 46 From the memoria sui, the memory
and the knowledge that the mind has of itself, from
44. Op. Cit., p. 299, n. 110.
45. De Trin. XIV. 10. 23.
46. By the memoria Dei we shall mean our memory of God.
By the Memoria Dei we shall mean God's memory of Himself.

32

the cogito as a revelation of what is implicitly known

to us in memory, we turn to the final stage in the
development of the concept of memory: the discovery
of ,God in our memory and the virtual identification
of memory with God Hirnself, the memoria Dei.
Saint Augustine's quest forGod in memory might
be said to take the fornl of answers to two queries:
Why is memory chosen for the "place" ofGod in
the soul and how is God discovered to "reside" in
the soul?
In the Confessiones the setting for this quest may
be said to begin with Saint Augustine's remarks on
the capacities and the powers of memory. To appreciate fully what might seem to be an undue emphasis on the importance of memory, of the transition
from the self to the divine presence within that self,
we must note in particular the very great impression
that memory made upon Saint Augustine. The very
capacity of memory continually astounds him and
he describes it with a great profusion of spatial metaphors. It -is likened to "a vast field and a spacious
palace," to a "storehouse which contains innumerable
images derived from the senses, " it is "an inner
hiding place," a "place of safe keeping. "47 All
things are preserved separately in the memory, each
according to its kind. All the images of colors are
there as weIl as the rich reserves of sound. "In the
vast court of my memory are the sky, the earth, and

47. Canf. X. 8. 12.

33

the sea," and in my menlory, "I can even encounter

myself and remember myself and all the things that
1 have done. "48
Continuing his account of the greatness of the
memory, Saint Augustine describes very lyrically the
power ofthe memory. "It is prodigious," he declares,
"it is a vast an unlimited satlctuary. Who can plumb
its depths?"49 So great is this power of memory
that it eludes his grasp, and leads him to declare:
"I am astonished and lost in wonder when I dweIl
upon this problem. Yet men admire the great
mountain peaks, tl1e vastness of the ocean, the broad
rushing rivers, and the stars in their courses and they
consider not themselves. "50
Equally impressive for Saint Agustine is our memory
of the various forms of intelligible knowledge, of our
feelings and passions, of our joys and sorrows, and
even of our forgetfulness. The various powers of
the memory also testify eloquently to the manner
in which the transition is effected to an identification
of memory not only with the mind but with God.
Thus:
Great is the power of memory, 0 nlY God! Its
depth and incalculable complexity is awesome.
Yet this is my mind, this is my seIfe What am I
then, 0 my God!
48. Ibid., X. 8. 14.
49. Ibid., X. 8. 15.
50. Loc. ci!.

34

Behold in the plains, and caves, and hollows of

my memory are innumerable kil1ds of things...
My mind can glide freely from one to the other.
I can delve deeply into them and there is no limit
to them. So great is the power of memory, so
great is the power of life in the mortallife of man.
What am I do do thel1, 0 God my true Life? I will
pass beyond this power of mind, which is ca1led
memory, so that I can attain you nlY Sweetness
and my Light... Hence, I shall pass beyond menlory too so that I may attain the God who has set
me apart from the beasts and made nle 'wiser thal1
the fowls of the air. '51 I must pass beyond memory
also to find Y ou, who are truly good and sweet.
But where shall I find you? If I find you beyond
memory, it means that I am without remembrance
of you. How, then, may I find you, if I am withOllt memory of you ?52
The lyrical quality of these and many other passages from the Confessiones reflects 110t only Saint
Augustine's awareness of his own remarkable memory,53 but reveals even more why he chose memory,
-not reason, nor understanding, nor will-as the
51. Job. 35. 11.
52. Con/. X. 17.
53. He is said to have known the Psalms by heart and was never
lacking for a Scriptural quotation. There are approximately 217
references to the Psalms and some 379 references to the rest of
Scriptures in the Confessiones.

35

most suitable carrier for divinity and ultimately for

the analogical identification of memory with Deity
as the First Person of the Trinity. For Saint Augustine saw memory with all its great powers and
capacities as a necessary prerequisite for the activities
of the mind and for its ultimate identification not
only with the self, the cogito, but also its identification
in the Trinity with God Himself. Since the De Trinitate in part overlaps in conlposition with the Confessiones,54 it is not surprising to find that in Book
XIII. 8.11 of the Confessiones l1e explicitly mentions
the trinity of being, knowing, and willing which is
also found in the De Trinitate IX. 4. 3. And it may
be conjectured that Saint Augustine had already
anticipated the highest of the Trinities which he will
discover in the mind of man, that which is revealed
as Memory, Understanding, and Love in Book XIV
of the De Trinitate. 55
Thus it is fitting that God should "reside" in
memory. Yet God is not among the images of corporeal thil1gS, nor can he be identified with the atfections or with intellectual knowledge. He is not the
mind itself, although He is the Lord of the mind.
For all these things are finite and changeable, whereas
God is infinite and unchangeable. Atld yet ,God is
willing somehow to dweIl in our memory. For God

54. The Confessiones was begun in 396 and probably completed

in 401. The De Trinitate was begun in 400 and completed in 416.
55. De Trin. XIV. 8. 11.

36

was not always in our memory as Saint Augustine

testifies: "Where, then, did I find you, in oder to
know you, unless in yourself above me. "56 And he
concludes with one of tlle best known and most lyrical
passages of the Confessiones, the "sero te amavi":57
Late have I loved you, 0 Beauty so ancient and
so new. For you were within me, and I was in
the world outside. I sought you outside myself,
and deformed as I was I seized upon the beautiful
things of your creation. You were with nle, but
I was not with you. The beautiful things of YOllr
creation kept me from you, but if they had not
been in you, they would not have existed. You
sholle upon me and your brilliance shattered my
blindness. You called and cried out and burst in
upon my deafness. You sent forth your fragrance
and I drew it in and now I pant for you. I have
tasted you and now I hunger and thirst for you.
You have touched me, and I am inflamed with
the desire for your peace. 58
Thus there appear to be good reasons why God is
to be found in memory, for memory is unchangeable
as is God. Memory appears to approach the infinite
in its permanence and in its capacities and powers
so vividly described by Saint Augustine. In con56. Conf. X. 26. 37.
57. Cf. Bibliotheque Augustinienne, vol. 14, p. 569 n. 16.
58. Con/. X. 27. 38.

37

trast, the other powers of the soul appear more

limited. Will has its limitations; it requires tlle grace
of God to actualize its full potentialities. Reason
also has its limitations; it cannot function without
memory. Like the will it cannot attend to or seek
out the contents of memory unless memory is already
present.
The power of memory that made a particularly
great impression upon Saint Augustine was the role
it played in our knowledge of time. Memory he
discemed in Olle of its aspects as a kind of duration
in which all the phases of time may be discovered.
In bis analysis of time Saint Augustine observed that
tlle past does not exist except in the memory, alld the
present eludes us as it disappears into the past, into
the vast caverns of nlemory. The future has no
existence or reality until it emerges into the present
and then it is preserved by memory in its true reality,
in those same "innumerable cavems of the mind."
Its reality depends not only upon memory's power of
recognition and recal1 but even more upon the mind's
expectation of the future which is to be nlade present
and then paste Hence in a very real sense it is menlory
that somehow 'abstracts' fronl the temporal span and
makes knowledge and understanding possible. It is
memory that enables the mind to recognize that the
future resembles the past, thus making scientific
knowledge and prediction possible. Hence, where
else could God deign to 'reside' except in the seeming infinitude and greatness of man's memory, in a
power or function of the mind that best reflects the
38

infinitude and greatness of God who exists in an eternity of past, present, and future. It would seem
evident, therefore that the analysis of memory can
only be continued and exemplified in its highest form
in the eleventh book of the Confessiones. Even the
final and tentative answer of Sail1t Augustine to the
nature of time as a distension of the mind seems to
be anticipated in the rather crude metaphor with
which he likens memory sonlewhat facetiously to a
distension of the stomach. 59
It should be evident then why memory l1as been
singled out and honored with God's presence. For
not only is the power of the nlemory great and awe
inspiring in the depths of its complexity, but it is
also the mind itself. A mind that can discover all
things within the memory, for the memory contains
all things whether the mind is aware of them or not.
"My mind," Saint Augustine declares, "can glide
from one thing to another, and there is no limit
to the depths of my memory. So great is the power
of my memory. "60
Yet if he is to reach God he must go beyond memory. But if he goes beyond memory then paradoxically he has no memory of God. "How, then,"
declares Saint Augustine, "am 1 to find you, if 1 have
no memory of you?" 61 But God cannot be forgotten

59. Ibid., X. 14. 21.

60. Ibid., 17. 26.
61. Loe. eil.

39

is the conclusion that Saint Augustine draws from

bis analysis of the relationship between memory and
forgetfulness. "We do not completely forget that
which we remenlber to have forgotten, otherwise we
would not be able to look for something that was
lost. "62 That God cannot be forgotten would seem
to be the real significance of the passages on forgettil1g
in the Confessiones, for did not tl1e providence of
God make itself known to Saint Augustine, not only
in bis Manichean days, but in the whole of his past
life to the time of his conversion? And it is his conversion that not only signifies the presence of God
but also enables Saint Augustine to remerrlber God
as present in bis paste
This brings us to the problem of how Saint Augustine proceeds to search for God in the memory.
His position is similar to that of the woman who lost
a drachma but was able to find it because she remembered it. 63 For Saint Augustine, memory's search
for God centers upon the search for happiness. "In
what way do I look for you, 0 Lord? Truly, when
I look for you, it is the life of happiness tl1at I seek." 64
Nothing, Saint Augustine asserts, is more present to
man than happiness. Some men, he declares, are
happy because they have achieved it, others are
happy because they hope to achieve it, for otherwise

62. Ibid., X. 19. 28.

63. Ibid., X. 18. 27.
64. Ibid., X. 20. 29.

40

they would not long for it. Furthermore, all men

love happiness and tros would not be possible unless
we knew happiness and that it existed in our memory.
"So, " he declares, "it must be known to all men,
and there can be no doubt that if it were possible
to ask all men whether they desired to be happy,
they would all reply without hesitation that they did.
And this would be possible only if happiness itself
were retained in the memory."65 However, happiness
is not present in the mind as an image nor as a knowledge of numbers or of the arts. Nor do we experience it in others. Perhaps, it is suggested, happiness
exists in the memory as a feeling, e. g. of joy. But
Saint Augustine points out that although there are
some joys which are to be reproached, there is a joy
that is given to those who love God for his own sake.
And true happiness is that joy which comes with
the possession of ,God. 66
However, not all men desire God or know God
as their true happiness. All men desire to be happy
but not all men identify their true happiness with
God. Furthermore, all men desire and love the
truth; they do not like to be deceived and insofar as
they love the truth, they love happiness. But they
could not love the truth unless they had some knowledge of it in their memory.
"Why," then, Saint Augustine asks, "do tbey take
65. Loc. cit.
66. Ibid., X. 22. 32.

41

joy in it? Why are they 110t happy? Beeause

they are n10re eoneerned with other things wllieh
have more power to make them u.nhappy than that
truth whieh they so dimly remember and whieh
would make them happy. There is still a little
light in man. 67 Let him walk on, lest darkness
overtake l1im." 68
Saint Augustine eoneludes that those men who do
not love God as truth are deeeiving themselves.
They find joy in falsehood rather than in truth. To
attain the true happiness they must ignore all else
and seek that Truth by whiel1 everything is true.
This quest for happiness whieh Saint Augustine
outlines so briefly in the Confessiones is developed
nlore fully in many of his other works. The De
Beata Vita, in partieular, is devoted entirely to the
question of what eonstitutes the happy life. Here
true happiness is equated solely with God who alone
is unehangeable and eternal. To attain ,God it is
neeessary to lead the good life and this is identified
with ,God and not merely an aet of eo~templation
sueh as Aristotle held. For Saint Augustine the end
of all knowledge is a wisdom that leads to the enjoyment of God. As he puts it in the De Libero
Arbitrio: "FlIrthermore, sinee it is in tl1e truth that
we know and that we possess the supreme good, and

67. lohn 12. 35.

68. Conf. X. 23. 33.

42

since this truth is wisdom, let us contemplate, and

possess, and enjoy in it the supreme good. "69
To attain ,God as our beatitude, to enjoy God as
tlle highest end, our will must be directed to that end.
This becomes possible only with that grace whereby
God gives men the power 110t only to obey the law,
but to accomplish the good and attain beatitude.
A particularly fine expressi011 of this thought is to be
found in the Confessiones where the orientation of
the will toward God is like11ed by Saint Augustine to
the principle ofGreek physics that physical bodies
are drawn by their own weight to their proper or
natural resting places in the universe. He declares:
A body in virtue of its weight tends towards its
proper place. For weight does not always tend
toward the lowest place but to that which is most
fitting. Fire moves upwards, a stone downwards.
They are moved according to their weight, each to
its proper place... My weight is my love and it is
this that carries me to wherever I am carried.
By your gift we are inflamed and carried aloft... 70
Concluding this search for God in our memory,
Saint Augustine observes:
Consider, 0 Lord, how much I have explored the
vastness of my memory in search of you, and I

69. De Lib. Arb. II. 13. 36.

70. Conf. XIII. 9. 10.

43

have not found you outside it. And I have found

nothing about you save what I remembered when
I first leamed of you. From that time forth I
have never forgotten you. For where I have found
the Truth, there 1 have found my God, who is
Trtlth itself. And from the time 1 have known
the truth 1 have not forgotten it. Therefore, from
the time that 1 have known you, you have always
been present in my memory. It is there that 1 find
you when I remember you and delight in you.
Such are my divine delights, which in your mercy
you have given me, caring for my poverty.71
But more precisely, What does it mean to say
that God is present in my memory? Clearly, Saint
Augustine is speaking in metaphors for God does not
occupy any specific place in his memory. He is not
an image, l1either is he a feeling, nor an idea. He
is not to be identified with the rind itself... "you are
not the rind itself," says Saint Augustine, "for you
are the Lord ,God of the rind. "72 And he concludes:
"Why do I ask what place is set aside in my memory
as your dwelling, as if there were rea1ly places in it?
Certainly, you dweIl in it, for 1 remember you from
the time 1 first leamed about you, and 1 find you in
it when I reca11 you to rind. "73 Rather, God is

71. lbid., X. 24. 35.

72. lbid. X. 25. 36.
73. Loc. ci!.

44

above the mind and is to be found in Himself when

He makes himself present to the mind by his Divine
Illumination and tl1fough the Etemal Ideas. Even
as the Interior rvfaster God is present to the mind
but not "in" the mind or the memory.
Transcending all metaphors we may seek a final
solution to the problem of memory and of God's
presence to the miIld by considering the analogies
that Saint Augustine discovers between the mind of
man and the Divine Trinity. Again, however, it needs
to be emphasized that Saint Augustine does not accept
any actual divisions of the mind. There are no
faculties of the mind but only one mind with specific
functions or powers. Like the members of the Divine
Trinity the correspondiI1g images of that Trinity in
the human mind possess a unity and consubstantiality.
Thus, the acts of memory, understanding, and will
are the acts of one substance. As Saint Augustine
puts it:
Accordingly these three, memory, understanding,
and will are not three lives, but one life; not three
minds but one mind; hence they are not three
substances but one Substallce. When one speaks
of memory as life" mind" and substance, this is
said with respect to itself. And when one speaks
of it simply as menlory, this is said of it in relation to something else. The same may be said
of the tlnderstanding and the will, for they are
called understanding and will with relation to
something else, but in respect to itself each is life,
45

mind, and essence... This is why tllese three are

one in that they are one life, one mind, and one
essence. 74
This image or analogue of the Trinity in the mind
of man is but one of several that Saint Augustine
discovers. Prior to the discovery and elaboration of
such images in the mind of man, Saint Augustine
had sought for other manifestations of God that are
to be found in the created universe. For Saint
Augustine the world aIld all that exists contains vestiges or traces of the divine creation. Such vestiges
or traces of God are to be found in the physical and
sensible order and even in the realm of sense knowledge. 75 But only man represents a true image of
God, forGod had said: "Let us make man to our
image and likeness." 7 6
Although the culmination of Saint Augustine's
search for the highest set of images that may be said
to represent most adequately the Divine Trinity are
to be found principally in the later books of the De
Trinitate, there are anticipations and brief expositions of the images of tlle Trinity in other Augustinian
works. As early as the De Libero Arbitrio there
appears to be an anticipation of the image of the
Trinity in which Saint Augustine moves from being
74. De Trin. X. 11. 18.
75. cr Portalie, Eugene. A Guide to the Thought 01 St. Augustine,
trans. by R. Bastian. (Regnery, Chicago, 1960) pp. 134-35.
76. Gen. J. 26.

46

to life to Ul1derstanding il1 lus seareh for eertitudes

that will lead to the diseovery ofGod. 77 In the Confessiones he deelares: "There are three things that
are found in man... and they are far different from
the Trinity... they are existenee, knowledge, and
will. For, I am, I know, and I will."7s And in the
De Civitate Dei he deelares:
We reeogJ.lize in ourselves an image of the Trinity.
It is not an adequate image, for it is not of the
same substanee as God. Yet by nature it is an
image whieh is eloser to God than anything else
in ereation ... We resemble the blessed Trinity in
that we exist, and we know that we exist, and we
love this existenee and this knowledge. 79
Limiting our analysis to the two highest images of
the Trinity which are those that contain memory, we
find: 1) memoria sui, intelligentia, voluntas and 2) memoria Dei, intelligentia, amor. so Eaeh of these analogies or images has an ontologieal as weIl as an epistemologieal signifieanee. Eaeh of the members of the
two trinities are of the same substanee, i. e. tlley are
consubstantial. The first analogy refers spe~ifieally
to man, to his nlemory of himself, his understanding
of himself, and to the will by whieh he loves himself.

77.
78.
79.
80.

11. 3. 7.
XIII. 11.
XI. 26.
XIV. 7-10, and XIV. 12. 5.

47

Tlle second analogy refers to man's memory of ,God,

to his understanding of ,God and to his love of God.
It may be observed with respect to these two groups
of analogies that Saint Augustine has moved away
from some of his earlier conceptions of the Trinity
in man in which being or existence is singled out as
the first member of the Trinity in man to the designation of memory as the first member of the Trinity.
This would not only seem to reflect his increasing
concern for the epistemological factor rather than
the ontological, but also clearly seems to emphasize
the inlportance that memory has attained in his
thought.
In the Confessiones God is found in our memory,
that memory which is concerned primarily with the
remembrance of the self, the memoria sui, the mind's
knowledge of itself as expressed in the cogito. This
first image of the Trinity involving menlory, does not
extend beyond the establishment of the cogito, a
requisite for both knowledge and being. For knowledge or understanding involves duration and the
function of memory is to render possible the duration
of knowledge. The mind is always present to itself
but it is not always thinking of itself, hence the necessity
of memory to preserve a knowledge of the self. In
the second image of the Trinity involving memory
God is not only discovered in our memory but in a
sense becomes identified with that menlory, so that
we can speak of a memoria Dei, meaning a memory
whose primary concern and object is God Himself.
Such a memory depends upon faith and it eludes
48

the sinner even though God is present to the sinner

and sometimes "touches" him with His grace.
"For," Saint Augustine declares, "the mind is reminded that it should turn toward the Lord ...For
thus it is that evel1 the sinner thinks of eternity and
correctly blames or praises mal1Y things in the morals
of man.' '81 Bllt even the sinner, l1e adds, walks in
the image of God because he has a memory, understanding and love of hirnself. And by this image of
God within hirn he can cling to God, for only ,God
is above his nature. 82
To attain this highest of all images, to rise above
the memoria sui to the memoria Dei, requires faith
rather than knowledge. For Saint Augustine true
wisdom is always religious wisdom the credo ut intelligam always takes precedence over the cogito ergo
sumo The opening lines of Book XIV of the De
Trinitate, "now we shall treat of wisdom," is a continuation of a thenle begun in Book XII and voiced
as early as the Soliloquia in the often quoted statement "Noverim me, noverim tee "83 Hence, the last
and the highest of the images of the Trinity studied
by Saint Augustine is concerned not with the memory
of the self, the memoria sui, but rather with that
knowledge and love of God which will be evoked by
the memory of ,God, the memoria Dei, and attained
Oflly through faith. Just as in the trinity of the
81. Ibid., XIV. 14. 20.
82. Loc. cu.
83. 11. 2. 1.

49

memoria sui the knowledge and love of the self presupposed the memory of the self, so in the memoria Dei,
without the memory of God, the very presence of
God to our minds, there can be no understanding or
love of Him. In a word, God must first present
Himself to us and He does this through His existence
in our memory. It will be by remembering God
that we come to know Him and to love Hirn. Without the memory of God, wisdom and happil1ess are
impossible for us. TIns is a matter of faith, but how
can I believe and attain wisdom and happiness?
Only if God through His grace extends faith to me
and makes His presence known to me in my memory.
In this way the last exposition of the several images
of the Trinity ends the long search for the highest
image of God by discovering Him in our memory.
Thus the all important place of memory in the
thought of Saint Augustine can hardly be overlooked
or underestimated. For just as the memoria sui
engenders the cogito and our love and knowledge of
the self, so the memoria Dei as a repository for God
leads to an understanding (intelligentia) and a love
(amor) for God. It mayaiso be observed that in
this highest trinity to be discovered in the mind or
memory of man there exists an image of the Divine
Word, the "word" (verbum) that is born from the
knowledge that is retained in the storehouse (thesauro)
of the memory. From such knowledge, Saint Augustine declares, "a true word is born when we say that
which we know, a word that precedes every sound
or expression...a word that belongs to no language,
50

it is the true word about a true reality. "84 That

such a word is merely an image is brought out rather
definitively in the following statement: " ...in this
enigma tllere is a likeness, be it what it may, to that
Word of God who is also God, since it is also so born
from our knowledge as that Word was also born
from the knowledge of the Father. ' '85 Saint Augustine
then proceeds to develop a similar analogy for love
or will represel1ted in the Divine Trinity by the Holy
Spirit.
Finally, there is the Divine Exemplar that corresponds to this highest image of the Trinity in the mind
of man al1d which we have already anticipated to
some extent. This Divine Exemplar is the Trinity
of ,God the Father, ,God the Son, and ,God the Holy
Spirit. The corresponding images are the Memoria
Dei, Intelligentia, and Amor, which nlay be said to
represent God 's memory of Hirnself, His knowledge
of Himself,86 al1d His love of Hirnself. God's memory
of Hirnself is exemplified in the Frst Person of the
Trinity, the Father. His understanding of Hirnself
is exemplified in the Word or the Sone His love of
Hirnself is exemplified il1 the Holy Spirit which engenders through love the Word. There is no tritheisnl in the Augustinian doctrine. There are three
Persons in the Trinity but there is no succession of
84. De Trin. xv. 12. 22.
85. Ibid., xv. 14. 24.
86. I leave it to the reader to speculate about the possibility and
nature of a Divine Cogito.

51

time nor of nature. Saint Augustine conceived of

the Trinity as one in origin and being. It is marked
by an ontological unity in which the Son is one with
the Father and the Holy Spirit and the Holy Spirit
is one with God the Father and with Christ the Word
or Son. As usually expressed there is a consubstantiality of Persons. The distinction of Persons follows
a logical but not an 011tological order. God the
Father is distinguished as the First Person of the
Trinity, Christ the Son or the Word is distinguished
as the Second Person of the Trinity, and the Holy
Spirit is distinguished as the Third Person of the
Trinity. The order witltin this Divine Trinity is reflected in the corresponding images within the human
mind. Thus memory is logically prior to understanding and love, although ontologically it is one
with them, for there can be no real distinctions in
the powers of the soul or mind, any more thall there
can be real distinctions in the Divine Trinity.
To conclude: If our exposition and interpretation
of Saint Augustine's notion of memory is correct, it
is surely difficult to ntinimize its importance. From
sensible menlory and intelligible memory, memory as
the thesaurus of all knowledge, and memory as the
bearer of divinity, to memory as a function of time
and an intimation of eternity, its power is truly prodigious for Saint Augustine. Finally, there is the role
of memory in the cogito sui eventually leading by a
kind of mystical ascent from tl1e images of the Trinity
in us to the Divine Trinity itself-the Memoria Dei,
Intelligentia: and Amor.

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APPENDIX A

THE AUGUSTINIAN PSYCHOLOGY

In content the Augustinian psychology is closer to

what the later Scholastics termed "rational psychology." It is not a psychology in the modern sense
of the term. Rather it is more metaphysical il1 its
account of the structure of the soul and mystical in
its orientation toward God. In method it is both
analytical and introspective. It is not to be considered in terms of the faculties or parts of the mind or
soul except in a metaphorical sense.
The Augustinian psychology centers around the
nature of man, his origin, and his end which is God.
This conception of man is developed within the
context of the Christian faith and Saint Augustine's
persollai religious and moral experience. To the
religious context must be added a philosophical and
theoretical context borrowed largely from Plato and
Plotinus. Out of these divergent sources there emerges a cOl1ception of man as identified with the soul,
of man defined as a soul using the body, of the spiritual
nature of the soul and its manner of llnion with the
body, and finally the problem of its origin and its
end.

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It is important to distinguish the Plato1llc and the

Neo-Platonic elen1ents in the Augustinian psychology
from the demands of the Christian faith. Because
of the latter Saint Augustine always stops short of
a completely Platonie or Neo-Platonic conception of
man. The spirituality of the soul and its distinct
superiority to the body is always acknowledged.
The body is regarded as an instrument of the soul,
hut the consequent is never drawn (as it is in Platonism) that the body is somehow evil, that it has no
value in itself, and that it is something which the soul
might better be rid of. Saint Augustine's faith, his
Christian anthropology, so to speak, den1anded that
as a created being the body possesses the goodness
that characterizes all created being. Thus the body
is never described, as it is in Platonism, as the prison
house of the soul. Christian teaching would 110t
permit any such derogation of the body, for the dogma
of the resurrection of the body conferred at once a
dignity upon the body, glorifying it and n1aking it a
spiritualized body. And since the body will eventually be reunited with the soul, it has an importance
it could never ohtain in Platonism.
Again, for Saint Augustine the soul has no previous
existence; both Platonie and Origenistic tl1eories of
such forms of the previous existence of the soul are
explicitly rejected in his later writings. 011 the origin
of the soul, Saint Augustine accepted the teaching
of faith that the soul of man-that in which he is the
image of God-is the direct and unique creation
of God.

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On the question of the union of the soul with the

body, the nature of such a union always remained
essentially a mystery for Saint Augustine. The problem of such a union arises because of the disparate
nature of the two entities. The body is obviously
material in nature. But that the soul is just as evidently of a spiritual nature is a matter of direct and
intuitive knowledge for Saint Augustine. Thought
reveals the essence of the soul as utterly distinct
from the essence of the body. It is only our inlagination, he contends, that leads us to conceive of the
soul as a body and as extended. Saint Augustine
always insists tllat we have a direct knowledge of
our soul. In fact, nothing except God is more selfevident to the soul than its own nature and existence.
Altllough the soul is wholly spiritual and completely
unlike the body, it does nevertheless exist in union
with the body. In contrast with Plato and Aristotle,
Saint Augustine held that the soul was created by
God in union with the body. He rejects any Platonie
notion that the soul is prior to the body or that the
soul alone is man. Nor does he accept the Aristotelian notion tllat the soul is the form of the body
and morta!. In one respect Saint Augustine is closer
to the teaching of PlotillUS that the soul exists in all
parts of the body. As Saint Augustine expressed
it: "The soul, however, is simultaneously and wholly
present not only in the entire mass of its body, but
also in each of its individual parts. "1
1. De Imm. An. 16. 25.

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Relevant to the Augustinian psychology is his

theory of knowledge. Such a theory of knowledge
is far from systematic and for the most part is developed within a context of religious ideas. Its principal
features are an activist theory of sensation, the functions of the imagination and the menl0ry, the nature
of learning, the celebrated theory of the Diville Illumination, and the distinction between science and wisdom.
For the proper understanding of the Augustiluan
psychology it is necessary so far as that is possible
to clarify some of his basic terminology. Thus:
Soul (animus) means esselltially that which confers
life upon the body. It is essentially "a rational
substance made to rILle the body. "2
Mind (mens) is the higllest part of the soul ... "we
correctly designate the mind as the principal part
of man, the head as it were of the human substallce... "3
That the mind is the highest part of the soul is further
attested to in the following statement: "The human
mind is not of the same nature as God, nevertheless
this image of His nature, which is superior to any
other nature, ought to be sought and found in us,
in that which is the best in our nature. "4
Spirit (spiritus) is sometimes identified with the
soul, 5 or in its Porphyrean context may be idelltified
2.
3.
4.
S.

De
De
De
De

Qu. An. 13. 22.

Trin. VI. 9.
Trin. XIV. 8. 11.
Fide et Symb. 16. 22.

56

with the sensible memory. 6 Frequently, Saint Augustine identifies spirit with the Scriptural meaning,
inspired partly by the in1pression made upon him
by the famous vision of Saint Paul. 7 The distinction between spirit and mind as weIl as some of the
meanings of spirit is clearly evident in the following
statement of Saint Augustine:
Concerning the words: "the spirit of your mind",
the Apostle Paul did 110t meal1 two different things,
as if the mind were one thing, and the spirit of
the mind another thing, because every mind is
spirit, while not every spirit is mind. God also
is spirit (John 4.24)....One even speaks of the
spirit of the beast...the wind is called spirit, and
it is evidently something material; so, we have
the words of the Psalm: "Fire, hail, snow, ice, the
spirit of the tempest." (Ps. CXLVIII, 8). Since
then, the word 'spirit' is used in so many different
ways, the Apostle in speakil1g of the spirit of the
mil1d wished to signify that spirit which is called
mind."8
Spirit is also related to the three forms of vision,
l1amely:. 1) Corporeal vision, because it is perceived
through the body and is represented in incorporeal
images 2) Spiritual vision insofar as it represents the
6.'" De Civ. Dei. X. 9.

7. 11 Corinthinians, 12. 1-4.

8. De Trin. XIV. 16. 22.

57

image of an absent body yet is not a body and 3) Intellectual vision but not mental (mentale) vision which
Saint Augustine COl1sidered to be absurd as though
it were something seen by the mind. 9
Understanding (intelligentia, intellectus) is above
reason (ratio) and represents the highest function of
the mind. It is regarded as higher than reason because it is possible to have reason without understanding, but not understanding without reason.
Ul1derstanding or intelligel1ce is that which is achieved by the mind in virtue of its activity as reason.
As Saint Augustine states it:
But understanding is one thing, reason another.
For we have reason even before we are able to
understand; but we cannot understand unless we
have reason. Hence, man is an animal endowed
with reason, or, to speak more precisely and briefly,
a rational animal whose very nature is to reason,
and who has reason before he understands. What
makes him eager to understand is the fact that he
is endowed with the gift of reason. 10
It is the intellect or intelligence which will be directly illuminated by the Divine Light. It-the intellect-is a kind of inner sight by means of which the
mind perceives the truth that is revealed to it by the
Divine Illumination. This highest form of vision
presupposes the possession of faith.
9. Sermo. 43. 2. 3.
10. Ennar. in Ps. 32.

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Reason (ratio) is that movement by which the mind

(mens) passes from one form of knowledge to another

in order to associate or dissociate them. 11 At this

point we might note that the terminology of Saint
Augustil1e is not always precise. For example, he
declares in the De Libero Arbitrio that reason is more
excellent than anything else in man and that if there
is anything more excellent, it is ,God. 12 It should
also be reiterated that understanding, reason, memory,
and will are not to be taken as "faculties" of the
mind. They may better be described as powers or
functions of the mind, but they are one with the
mind.
Will, (voluntas) may be identified with the soul of
man, for every movement of the soul is dependent
upon the will. Thus the will no more than the mind
or the spirit is to be considered as aseparate faculty
but as one with man hi mself. Saint Augustine likens
the movement of the will to the principle of Greek
physics that physical bodies are drawn by their own
weight to their proper or natural resting places in the
universe. 13
Not only is the will identified with the soul of
man, but it is identified as charity or love, a principle
which, for Saint Augustine, lies at the very center
of the moral life of the individual. It is also the
cel1ter and moving principle of the social order.
11. De Ord. 11. 11. 30.
12. De Lib. Arb. 11. 2.
13. Conf. XII. 9. 10.

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Virtually every mOvenlent or inclination of the soul

depends upon the will. Sensation is made possible
when the will fixes the attention of the mind and the
sense of sight upon the object seen. 14 The will is
the moving factor in the activity of the imagination
and the sensible memory. For intellectual knowledge it is that desire of the individual for knowledge.
Wisdom (sapientia) has a certain similarity to the
intellect. It involves an intuition or contemplation
of God and the eternal reasons. As Saint Augustine
puts it: "Tbis, tllen, is the true difference between
wisdom and science, to wisdom belongs the intellectual cognitioll of eternal things; to science the
rational kIlowledge of temporal things. "15
The distinction between knowledge and wisdom
mayaiso be said to be based upon the distinction
between the inferior reason and the superior reason.
Inferior reason is that function of the mind which
governs the practical life of the individual. It gives
him a knowledge of the corporeal and temporal
world of things. Superior reason is that function
of the mind which is concerned with the contemplative
life. It gives the individual a knowledge of incorporeal things, of the eternal rules or Ideas that exist in
the mind of God. Knowledge in this sense is wisdom
and its ultimate end is the attainment of God and the
beatific visioll.

14. De Trin. XI. 2.

15. De Trin. XII. 15. 25.

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